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SECOND UIVISION-

HAllBOUR CENTRE PORl' G.ll. No. 240984

'l1J:RMINAL, INC.,
Petitioner,

~ versus -

LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO
CORP. and PHILIPPINE
FOREMOSl' MILLING CORP.,
Respondents.
x------------------ ----------------·-·-- --------------x
MICHAEL L. ROMERO, G.R. No. 241120
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - - PERLAS-BERNABE, S.A.J.,

Chairperson,
1 ·-1-·EnNANf' l")
r: - ., J\J . ,- - ~-J '
LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO INTING,
CORP. and PHILIPPINE U . J:!- •u..., AN-
~--..ArI)T _ , an,l
"F0
..
1CfEi MO~T l'l./1!"1l"LLlN"(""'. c-·o·Ru
J!:\)_ . . , ,:, .l . ._LY.I..~. . ll . K ., .It DIJ\llAA1\1PAO, JJ.
Respondents.

SEP 2 7 2.021
x------• -.-- 1/ •---- TT.•. - -• ,_ - -- ~ p- <••---•-•-------, r .. - -•-<•-• - - - - - - .-- -- • ✓ ----•-X

HERNANUO, J.:

These petitions fix review on certiorari 1 assail the July 13, 2017
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA,-G,R. CR No. 38210 which

1
Rollo (G.R. No. 4.40984), pp. 18-44-A; rollo (Cl.R. No. 24! !20), pp. 13-51.
Rollo (G.R. No. 240984), pp. 46-60. Penned by Associalt:J Justice Zenaida T. Gal,:ipatc-Lng\1illes and
concurred in by Associate Justice~; Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and Marie Christine Azcarraga~Jacob.

t/
 Decision 2 G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120

reversed and set aside the February 2, 2015 Dec.-;ision3 of the R.egional Trh1.l
. Court (RTC) of Manila, Bn1nch 42 in Civil Case No. 09-121953, finding
Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. (HCPTI), Michael L. Romero (Romero),
Edwin L. Jeremillo (Jeremillo), and Henry Rophen V. Virola (Virola), guilty
of Indirect Contempt for violating the Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) 4
issued by Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila (RTC Branch 24) on September
25, 2008. The assailed July 24, 2018 Resolution 5 of the appellate court denied
herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Factua! Antecedents:

On November 19, 2004, HCPTI, th<~ operator of the Manila Harbour

Centre, on one hand, and La Filipina Uygongco Corp. (LFUC), an enterprise
engaged in the itnportation and trading of fertilizers, milk and dairy products,
soybean meal and sugar, together with its sister company Philippine Foremost
l'v[illing Corp. (PFMC), an entity primarily organized to import and mill
wheat, flour and animal foods, on th~ other hand, entered into a :r-v1emorandum
of Agreement (JVIOA) 6 which provided, arnong others, priority berthing rights
to the domestic and foreign vessels of respondents LFUC and PFMC.

In 2008~ the parties 1 relationship turned fetid. On August 29, 2008,

HCPTI sent a letter to respondc~nts LFUC and PFMC informing them of their
accountabilities amounting to ¥362,670,820.42 representing rental,
overhauling, and additional wharfage fees, short payments, and other
receivables. 7

By way of response, respondents LFUC and PFMC alleged that HCPTI

failed to provide priority berthing to their vessels and to conduct dredging to
maintain the depth of the navigational access channel and berthing area.
Consequently, respondents LFUC and PFMC filed a Complaint for
Compliance with Maritime Law, Regulation and Contract, Breach of Contract,
Specific Performance and Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 08-119957
against petitioner HCPTI before the :.RTC. 8

., . On even date, respondents' application for a 72-hour restraining order

was granted. 9 On September 11, 2008, the trial court granted respondents'
application for a 20-,day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). 10 EventuaUy, a
WPI 11 was issued by Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila on September 25, 2008,

3
ld. at 245-256. Penned by Judge Dinnah G. Aguilit-Topacio.
" ld. at 90-92.
5
Id. at 62-66.
6
Id. at 85-89.
7
See id. at 22-33 and 48.
8
See id. at 95.
9
See id.
10
See id. at 96.
11
Id. at 90-92.
Decision G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120

which enjoined HCPTI fi·om preventing respondents LFUC an.d PFMC access
to its rail lines and unloaders, and fi·om using the port facilities of HCPTI,
among others.

However, from March 9, 2009 to June 28, 2009, around twenty-four (24)
barges and tugboats classified as domestic vessels chartered by respondents
LFUC and PFMC were Gither not allowed access to their unloaders and rail
lines, or were delayed in using the berthing area, fronting their facilities, in
violation of the November 19~ 2004 MOA and the WPI issued by RTC Branch
')4
,i;., •

During the said periods, respondents' barges were not permitted to berth
in their assigned berthing area despite the fact that they were ready for
berthing and notwithstanding that the proper documentations were already
submitted by respondents to HCP'1] such as the PP A Application for
Berth/Anchorage, an HCPTI Commitment Sheet and Request for Berth
Application.

There were even instances when respondents' barges were ~llowed to

berth at the berthing area~ only to be orc;lered to vacate the same before the
cargoes were fully discharged or unloaded. As a consequence, respondents
were constrained to rent the said barges for an extended period of time thereby
causing them to incur additional expenses ..Respondents were also forced to
ui1foad some of their c:c1rgoes at the property owned by the Philippine National
Bank adjacent to the berthing area, which resultantly caused them to pay
unnecessary charges.

This prompted respondents LFUC and PFMC to file a Petition for

Indirect Contempt 12 on August 13, 2009 against I--:ICPTI and individual
respondents therein Virola, Romero, and Jeremillo, in their c~pacities as Vice
President for Operations, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Chief
Operating Officer for Administration, respectively, before the RTC of Manila.
Respondents ave1Ted that HCPTI and its officers willfully violated the WPI
issued by RTC Branch 24 as well as the provisions of the November 19, 2004
MOA when they denied respondents access to and use of its rail lines,
unloaders and port facilities.

In its Answer, 13 1-ICPTI denied the accusations of respondents. It claimed

that respondents either failed to apply for berthing for any or all of the vessels
allegedly denied priority berthing, or sorne of the said vessels were never
se11viced at all by HCP]] during the period from l\1arch 19, 2010 to June 28,
2010. HCPTI further argued that a dwrge frx Indirect Contempt is criminal in

12
Id. at 93-102.
13
Id. at 138-148.
Decision 4 G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120

nature and thus, the rules of evidence m conten.1pt proceedings should be

applied as far as practicable.

Ruling of the Regional T:rhd

Court:

The RTC Branch 42, in its February 2, 2015 Decision/ 4 dismissed the
P1/tition for Indirect Conternpt. It ratiocinat~d that pursuant to Sections 3 and
4 .of the 1V10A, priority berthing for respondents' domestic vessels can be
availed of only when the two requirements set forth ::ire met: first, the
Locntors, respondents herein~ serve a Final Advice of Arrival (FAA) upon
fICPTI; and second, the Berthing Area is vacant.

The RTC Branch 42 found that no written FAA. was submitted by

respondents to HCPTI in contravent.ion Qf the MOA. J\rforeover, the delay in
the berthing of the subject vessels was due to the failure of the respondents to
indicate their vessels Expected Time of Arrival (ETA) in some of their Berth
1

Applications.

Respondents moved for reconsideration which the RTC Branch 42

denied in an Order 15 dated October 8, 2015.

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA. They averred that
their failure to furnish HCPTI with the written advice of their vessels' arrival
was not a, valid reason to deny them of berthing rights. They argued that for
the last three years prior to 2008 before the present dispute arose and even
after the petition for indirect contempt was filed, they have been allowed
pri;ority berthing rights even without their submission of the FAA and other
documents. They also claimed that they need not inform HCPTI of the ETA
of their barges since HCPTI was aware of their vessels' arrival because they
wen1 m.erely 200 meters away from the berthing area.
1

In their brief, 16 petitioners insisted that the appeal filed by respondents

should be dismissed even without necessarily delving into the merits because
the February 2, 2015 Decision of the R'TC dismissing the petition for Indirect
Contempt bars a second prosecution. They maintained that the disn:tissal is
akin to an acquittal of an accused in a criminal case, hence, could not be the
subject of an appeal.17

14
Id. at 245-256.
15
Id. at 264-27 L
16
See id. at 53--54.
17
Id. at 54.
Decision 5 G.R, Nos. 240984 & 241120

Ruling of Hw Court of Appeals:

In its July 13, 2017 Decision; 18 the appellate court did not sustain the
finding of the trial court and instead found petitioners liable for Indirect
Contempt for willfully violating the \~/PI issued by the RTC Branch 24 and
failing to comply with the November 19, 2004 MOA. It further held that
contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the petition for indirect contempt
filed by respondents is not criminal but civil in nature since the primordial
objective of the petition was to compel obedience to the iqjunctive writ for the
benefit of respondents.

The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners HCPTI and Romero

w©re denied by the appellate court in a Resolution 19 dated July 24, 2018.

Undaunted, petitioner HCPTI appealed the July 13, 2017 Decision and
July 24, 2018 Resolution via the instant petition for review, docketed as G.R.
No. 240984. Petitioner Romero's ;_tppe~1l was docketed as CLR. }fo. 241120.

In a Resolution dated April 8, 2019, 20 the two cases were ordered

consolidated as they involve the same parties and issues and assail the same
CA Decision.

1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioners liable for

indirect contempt; and

2) Whether or not the CA erred in finding the present petition for

indirect contempt civil in nature.

Petitioners insist that they could not be he.kl guilty of indirect contempt
since respondents thernselves violated the terms of the November 19, 2004
MOA when they failed to serve HCPTI with a written FAA of their barges as
vvrill as their ETA. This failure on the part of respondents prevented HCPTI
from determining the ex::1ct time of arrival of respondents' vessels such that
they had to allocate the vacant berthing area to another available vessel that is
ready for berthing. Further, petitioners reiterate that the petition for indirect
contempt is criminal in nature ..Ergo, thG RTC Decision dismissing the petition
amounted to an acquittal, hence, an appeal does not lie.

18
Id. at 46-60.
19
Id. at 62-66.
20
Id. at 409.
Decision 6 G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120

Our Ruling

Petitioners' contentions are partly meritorious.

In Oca v. Custodio, 21 the Court distinguished crin1inal contempt from

civil contempt, as follows:

The punishment for conten1pt is clasi;ified into two (2): civil contempt
and criminal contempt.

Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order

of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other party." A criminal contempt is
c(,.1mmitted when a party acts against the court's authority and dignity or
commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.

This ste1ns from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i) to
punish the party for disrespectinw; the court or its orders; and (ii) to compel the
party to do an act or duty \Vhich it refuses to perform.

In Ha/ili v. Court of Industrial Relations:

Due to this twofold aspe(;t of the exercise of the power to

punish them, contempts are claSt:;ified as civil or criminal. A civil
contempt is the fclilure to do something ordered to b$ done by a
court or a judge jbr the benc~/tt of the opposing party therein; and a
criminal conternpt, is conduct directed against the authority and
dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or
discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in
doing a duly forbidden act. Vv'here the punishment imposed,
whether against a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily
to protect or vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by
fine payable to the government or by imprisonment, or both, it is
deemed a judgment in tl crin::iinal case. V✓herc the punishment is by
fine directed to be paid to a party in the nature of damages for the
wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a coercive measure to
enforce the performance of some act for the benefit of the party or
in aid of the final jt:1dgrnent or decree rendered in his behalf, the
contempt judgment will, if made before final decree, be treated as in
the nature of an interlocutory order, or, if made after final decree, as
remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on appeal from the
final de1,~ree, or in such other mode as is appropriate to the review of
judgments in civil cases. x x x The question of whether the
contempt cornm.itted is civil or orirninal, does not affect the
jurisdiction or the pm,ver of a Court to punish the same.

21
814 Phil. 64 I (2017).
' . ~
. ,,

, Decision 7 G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120

The difforence between civil contempt and criminal contempt ,vas further
elaborated in People v. Godoy:

It has been said that the real character of the prO(;eedings is to

be determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or reinediaL

Criminal conle:1npt proceedings are generally held to be in the

nature of criminal or gut1si-criminal actions. They are punitive in
nature, and the Govenuncnt, the courts, and the people are
interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the
power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to
punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however,
they are not criminQJ proceedings or prosecutions, even though the
contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been
characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of
both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither.
In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in
accordance with the principles and rules applicable to t::,riminal
cases, in so far as such procedme is consistent with the summary
nature of contempt proceedings. So it bas been held that the strict
rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for
criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the
protections provided in regular crirninal cnses, and that proceedings
under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However,
criminal proceecUngs nre not required to take PllY particular f<mn so
long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved.

Civil contempt proce(~dings are generally held to be

remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for
the enforcement of some dutJ~ and essentially a remedy }<H' coercing
a person to do the thing required. As otlwrwi5e expressed, a
proceeding for civil conternpt is one instilr.tted to preserve and
enforce the rights of a private pqrty to an action and to compel
obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party
litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its
form, ff the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to
a sz,dt, of a special order made in beha(l of the other party and the
disobeyed order mt;ly still be obeyed, and the purpose cf the
p1Anishment is to aid in an cr~forcernent <?l obedience. The rules of
procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal
prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt
proceedings.

In gm1crall, dvH contempt pn»ceedings shouldl be

instituted by ~~.n aggrie'ved party, or bis suc<:~ssoi-, or someone
who has a pecuniary interest hli the right fo be protected. In
criminal coQtel!upt proc;eedings, it is gencraHy held that the
State is the real prosecu'toir.
Decision 8 G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120

Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings fr)r criminal

contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on
the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In
proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although
the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proc~f need
not be beyond reasonable doubt; it 1nust amount to more than a
mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of
proof in a civil conternpt proceeding lies somewhere hetween the
criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil '!fair
preponderance" burden.

Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey a court

order, jl1dgment, or decree which he or she refuses to do for the benefit of
another party. It is fcrr the ~nforcernent (md the preservation of a right of a
private party, who is the real party in interest in the proceedings. The purpose of
the contemnor 1s punishment is to compel obedience to the order. Thus, civil
contempt is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not necessary to prove it. 22 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original;
citations omitted)

In the case at bar, respondents prayed for the following reliefs in their
petition for indirect contempt, as follows:

a) DECLARE [petitioners] guilty of indirect contempt under Section (b)

of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;

b) ORDER HCPTI and each of the individual [petitioners] to pay the fine
of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) each;

c) ORDER that each of the individual [petitioners] be imprisoned for six

(6) months; and

d) ORDER each of the [petitioner] jointly and severally liable to pay

[respondents] in the amount of SIXTEEN MILLION SEVEN f-HJ1\JDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDP-.ED EIGHTY-NINE and 27/100
(Pl 6,712,789.27), and other demurrnge and unloading costs that may be
incurred should [petitioners] continue to violate the writ of preliminary
injunction after the filing of the in~tant petition. 23

While the reliefs prayed for by respondents is a combination of both

criminal and civil punishment, the nature of the contempt proceeding in this
case is more civil than criminal. To recall, respondents alleged that during the
period, March 9, 2009 to June 28, 2009 thirty-nine (39) of its vessels and
1,

barges were denied access to EfCP1Ts rail lint)S and unloaders and the use of
its port facilities in violation of the \7i/PI and the November 19, 20041\!IOA.

Clearly, the purpose of thr,; contexnpt petition was for the enforcement of
the September 25, 2008 vVPl. It is a remedy resorted to preserv~~ and enforce
the rights of respondents and to cornpel obedience to the injunctive writ which

22 Id. at 678-680.
23
Rollo (G.R. No. 240984), p. IOI.
..
Decision 9 G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120

was issued for their benefit. Hence, the petition for contempt is civil in nature.
Accordingly, an appeal :frorn the decision dismissing the same is not barred by
double jeopardy. The 1:wpellattJ court W?S there:fore correct in holding that the
petition for indirect contempt instituted by the respondents herein is civil in
nature.

Be that as it may, We find that petitioners are not guilty of indirect

contempt.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in

opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the court's order, but such conduct which tends to
bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or,
in some manner, to impede the due adrninistration of justice. It is a defiance of
the aL1thority, justi<~e, c)r dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation. 24

The power to punish for conternpt is inherent in all courts and is essential
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
j1Jdgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice. 25 "Howeve1.\ such power shollld be exercised on the
preservative, not on the vindictive, principle. Only occasionally should the
court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect[,] without which
the' ad1ninistration of justice will falter or fail." 26 Only in cases of clear ~md
contun:iacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised. Such power,
being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest ofjustice. 27

In this case, HCPTI's failure to provide priority berthing rights to

respondents' vessels during the period material to the case was not intended to
undermine the authority of the court or an act of disobedience to the
September 25, 2008 vVPI of the RTC Branch 24.

'Io recall, the WPI enjoined HCPTI and any of its agents from
''preventing plaintiff,5 access to its rail lines and unloaders and. from using the
port facilities of HCPTI." It likewise directed the Philippine Po1is Authority
(PPA) to "ensure that IiCPTl is enjoined from the acts complained of,
particularly any act that would prevent plaintiffs from utilizing the port
facilities of defondant HCPTI in accordance with the MOA dated
Ntlvember 19, 2004.''

24
Bbnk of the Philippine Islands· v. Calanza, 64? Phil, 507,514 (201 O). (Citation omitted).
25
hlonog v. lbay, 6 lI Phil. 560, 508 (2009).
26
Lu Ym v. Mahinay, 524 Phil. 564, 573 (2006).
27
Oca v. Custodio, supra note 15 at 683.

/,1.
Decision 10 G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120

The injunction order, therefore, recognized the applicability of the MOA

in the enforcement of the \VPI.

Under the MOA, respondents were given priority berthing rights over
the berth fronting their facility, subject to the conditions set forth in Sections 3
and 4 of the said MOA, viz.:

Section 3. Domestic (Coastwise) Vessels' Port and Handling Cha1~e;es. -·

,HCPTI shall allow the berthing of the Locator's domestic (coastwise) vessels at
the Berthing Area, providf;d that the Locr:1t1Jrs ;'ierve a written final advice of
arrival upon HCPTL It is understood that should the Locators' domestic
(coastwise) .vessel be unable to berth at the Berthing Area due to congestion
caused by the volume of other vessds being accomrnodated by I-:ICPTI, or for
any other reasonable c:auses, HCPTl shal1 allow the Locators' domestic
(coastwise) vessels to dischnrgy in the nearest vac:mt berth other than the
Berthing Area. However, should the berthing area be vacated, the Locators'
domestic (coastwise) vessels shall be allmved to immediately transfer to the
Berthing Area at the expense of the Locators. x x x

Section 4. ~ Priority Berthing. The Locators shall continue to have the

right to priority berthing at the Harbour Centre Port Terminal as defined in
Section l(a) of this Agreement and shall be strictly implemented, as follows:

a. Foreign bulk carrier vessels chartered by Locators.

1. Foreign bulk carri~r vessels chartered by the Locators shall

have priority berthing in the Berthing Area over any other vessels
being served by HCPTI upon submission of the Locators' final
advice of an-ival. xxx

b. Domestic (Coastwise) Vessels of Locators.

Dornestic (coastwise) vessels owned or chartered by the

locators shall likewise enjoy priority berthing when the berthing
Area is vacant. But should the Berthing Anin be occupied by a
Third party vessel whose operation is already in progress upon
arrival of the Locators' vessel, the Third Party vessel shall be
allowed to compkte its operation at the Berthing Area or shall be
shifted to another available berth to give 'Nay to the Locators'
vessel, at the option ofHCPTI. 28

In short, respondents' priority berthing rights is not absolute. The same is

conditioned on: 1) the submission of the required documents such as a written
FAA'()f its vessels to HCP'l'I; and 2) the availability of the designated berthing
area. In this case, the RTC Branch 24 found that respondt:mts did not submit a
written FAA to HCPTl in violation of the November 19, 2004 MOA. This was
admitted no less by respondents' own \vitness, Love Lee 1 Logistics l\!Ianager
of PFMC. 29 Moreover) the MOA provides that if the berthing an;a is occupied
28
Rollo (G.R. No. 240984), pp. 86-87.
29 Id. at 25 l.
...
Decision 11 G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120

by another vessel, respondents' vessels will have to wait until it is vacated by

the third party vessel either after the completion of its discharge or upon its
transfer to another berthing area. 30

Petitioners' witness, Bryan D. Gayagoy, Senior l\1anager for Planning of

HCPTI, testified that some of respondents' berth applications did not contain
the ETA of their vessels to allow FICPTI to schedule their berthing. Without
foreknowledge of when these barges would arrive, HCPTI would, thus, be
justified to allocate the vacant berthing area to the other vessels which are at
that time ready for berthing, to maximize its utilization. He explained that
without the ETA, there is no way. for them to know when respondents'
. vessel
would arrive.

Arguing against it, respondents contend that HCPTI could not deny
awareness of the arrival of .r0spondents' barges because they were located
merely 200 meters away from the bt~rthing area.

This contention is specious.

To reiterate, respondents' priority berthing right is sqbject to the

condition that the berthing area is vacant. Thus, even if respondents' vessels
are already near the vicinity of petitioners' terminals, if the berthing area is
occupied by a third party vessel, respondents' barges could not be
immediately accommodated. It must wait until after the unloading of the third
party vessel has been completed or it has transferred to another berthing area.
It is only when no other vessel is available for berthing at the time the be1ih
application is filed that the vessel with no E1'A would be provisionally
scheduled for berthing. 31

In fine, considering that petitioners' failure to provide priority berthing

ri:ghts to respondents' vessels during the tirne material to th(~ instant case was
due to respondents' own failure to comply with the requirements mandated in
the November 19, 2004 J\1OA, vVe find that petitioners did not con1mit any act
amounting to indirect contempt.

WHEREFORI~, the instant pet1t10ns are hereby GRANT:E.D. The

assailed July 13, 2017 Decision and July 24, 2018 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-0.R. CR. No, 38210 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the February 2, 2015 Decision and October 8, 2015 Order of the
Regional Trial Court ofManila, Branch 42 are hereby REINSTATED.

30
Id. at l 77; Judicial Affidavit of Bryan D. G<1yagoy.
31
Id. at 178.
Decision 12 G.R. Nos. 240984 &
241120

SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ESTELA M. ~~BERNABE
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

~-

H E N ~ B . INTING
C=s•~
~
SAMUELH.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARlUl[MAAMP~---
Associate Justice
Decision 13 G.R. Nos. 240984 &
241120

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

ESTELA M1~S-BERNABE
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.