The Los Angeles County

Sheriff's Departl11ent

A Report by

Special Counsel James G. Kolts & Staff

July 1992

iW
 Staff to Special Counsel James G. Kolts

G.n.r.1 CouAS.1 Deputy General Counsel Editor

Merrick J. Bobb David R. Pettit Barbara Hallett
Hedges &Caldwell Consulting Psycbologist
Ex.cutiv. Board laura N. Fashing Fred laya. Ph.D.
Han. James G. Kolts. Chair Warrington S. Parker. III Certified Public AccountaDts
Merrick J. Bobb Hufstedler. Kaus & Ettinger Thomas M. Neches
Jeffrey H. Dasteel Stuart Linnick Ingrid Boelman
Barbara Hall ett Matthew Graczyk
Steven N. Schneider
Katharine l. Krause Cindy Ho Idorff
Jeffrey K. Winikow
Fred Loya Ph.D. Mitchell. Silberberg & Knupp Julie Schoenfeld
Wendy Munger Simpson &Company
Justin L. Bastian
Julio A. Thompson Hearing Offic.rs
Anthony l. Press
Dr. Claudia Mitchell-Kernan
Executive Assistaat Morrison &Foerster
Vice Chancellor. UCLA
Diane Bowen Randall R. lee Fred laya. Ph.D.
Munger. Tolles & Olson COASulting Sociologist.
Kerry R. Bensinger William D. Darrough. Ph.D.
Quinn. Kully & Morrow California State University
Jay T. Kinn Robert M. Emerson. Ph.D .. UCLA
Sheppard. Mullin. Richter Grapbic Artist & Desiga
& Hampton Corky Retson
Jeffrey H. Dasteel Secretaries & Word Processors
Mark D. Hurwitz Lloyd Adams
David C. Marcus Lorna Carry
Stephen J. McConnell Norma Dehnadi
Shakil Rahman Norine Mar
Skadden. Arps. Slate. Pauline Romero
Meagher &Flam StaH law CI.rk. & Paralegal.
Richard S. Berger Lisa Geller
Greg Bragger
Alf W. Brandt
Judy Cho
James R. Gilson
Ect.v..t A. Mendoza Elke Dargan
Gregory D. Schetina Clare Fitzsimons
8OMi. Sun Alison Goldberg
Shaun O'Sullivan
Julio A. Thompson
Tunla & Taylor Scott Renfroe
Brigitte Travaglini
Elizabeth A. Cheadle
Stanley M. Yukevjch
Katharine l. Krause
SUdden. Arps. Slate.
Hon. Richard A.lavine
Meagher &Flom
William lutz
Wendy Munger Kim Birrell
Annah Kim
Peter V. Lee
Malissia R. Lennox
leslie McDowell
tuttle & Taylor
 Contents

1. Introduction

2. General Background 7
3. Public Hearings 19
4. Civil Litigations 25
5. Canine Unit 75
6. Administrative Claims 89
7. Complaints and Discipline 99
8. Officer-Involved Shootings 137
9. Problem Officers 157
10. Tracking the Use of Force 169
11. Headstrikes Policy 187
12. Conflicts & Disincentives 193
13. Recruiting & Affirmative Action 197
14. Hiring 207
15. Promotion Practices 219
16. Academy Training 225
17. Custody 237
. 18. Patrol School 249
19. Field Training 257
20. Continuing Education 267
21. Stress Management 271
22. Community Oriented ~olicing 285
23. Internal Department Culture 297
24. Deputy Gangs 323
25. Accountability Within the 335
Department

26. Accountability to the Public 345

Executive Summary 351
Footnotes 357
 1. Introduction

In December 1991. the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County appointed

the undersigned as Special Counsel to conduct a review of "the policies. practices and

procedures of the Sheriff s Department. including recruitment. training. job performance

and evaluation. record keeping and management practices. as they relate to allegations of

excessive force. the community sensitivity of deputies and the Department's citizen

complaint procedure." Throughout this report. the Sheriffs Department is also referred to

as "The Department" and "the LASD."

An increase over the past years in the number of officer-involved shootings prompted

this inquiry. Four controversial shootings of minorities by LASD deputies in August 1991

added a measure of urgency. These shootings, like the Rodney King beating with regard to

the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD"). deepened an awareness that increasingly

serious problems of excessive and deadly force were plaguing the LASD. That Los Angeles

County (the "County") had paid $32 million in claims arising from the operations of the

LASD over the last four years also caused the Board of Supervisors to wonder if corrective

measures could improve the operations of the LASD.

My staff and I found deeply disturbing evidence of excessive force and lax disci-

pline. The LASD has not been able to solve its own problems of excessive force in the

past and has not reformed itself with adequate thoroughness and speed. Implicitly

acknowledging this. the top management of the Sheriffs Department wanted us to appreciate

that since mid-1990, it has been in the process of self-imposed change in its approacb to

force, discipline, training, and community orientation. Tbe Sberiffs Department is quick to

point out that it began a serious process of self-criticism regarding brutality by its deputies

before the Rodney King beating made il impossible for any police agency any longer to

sidestep the long-festering bUllong-ignored problem of excessive force.

Prompted perhaps by a lengthy and very critical front page expose of the increasing

costliness of excessive force lawsuits which appeared in the Los Angeles Times on Sunday,

May 27,1990. a Task Force was established by the Sberiffin June, 1990 to study exten-

1
 sively the question of the application of force by deputies. Principal

Deputy Coumy Counsel Gordon W. Trask, working with

Lo. Angele. Commander James Callas. conducted an examination of the issue by

Sheriff'. Department
Core Value. a committee of at least 25 persons drawn from all areas of the

W. sblll be service ori.ml"

Department.
Ind plrform our duties witb thl
In December, 1990, Gordon Trask and Commander Callas
highllt ponillil dlg"l of
pirsoallind proftssionll submitted the Task Force's twenty-three recommendations to the
int.grity. Servici Orilnted
Policing mlln.: Sheriff. and since then, the Department has been involved in imple·
• Protlctinglitl Ind prop.rty
menting or planning the implementation of virtually all of the
• Prlnating crimi
• AppreblDding crimialls recommendations.
• AlwlY'lctingllwfully
• Beiag flir aad implrtialud Although this report will demonstrate that the Task Force did
trlltiog plopl. witb dignity
• Assistiag till commuoity Ind itl not go far enougb, its work was very useful to the Department in
citiz.ns ia solving probllml
lad mliataiaiag till Pilei several ways: It represented a well-intentioned effon to address
W. shill trllt IVI" mlmlllr force issues and demonstrated thereby that the Sberiff s Department
of tbl Dlpartmlat. IIotllswofll
IDd civiliu... WI woald was willing to think about these issues and to consider reform.
expect to .1 treltld if
tb. positioos wlr. rlVlrsed. The Task Force evidenced the candor with wbicb me Department
W. sball aot knowiagly IIrllk looked at itself. It negated any inference that the LASD would
tI.. Ilw to .aforci tbl Ilw.
permit a policy or practice of encouraging excessive force.
W. sblll III fally Iccountlbl.
for our OWIICtiODS orflil., .. The Sheriff s Department bas been ably served by Gordon Trast
lad. wIIID Ipproprilt•• lor till
action or flilur .. of oar and James Callas.
.ubordialt...
Just as the Task Force had completed its work and its efforts
la coaaidering tb. all of
dlldly forcl. WI sblll •• gal ... were to be announced, the Rodney King incident occurred on Marcb
lIy reVlflDeI for bUlDlI lifl.
3, 1991. The Sherifrs Department beld up formal announcement of
Iadividulll promotld or sellcted
for splcial assigamlata sban the recommendations because it did not want the unwarranted infer-
bani biltory of prlcticiDg
tb... ,.1 ..11. ence to be drawn that the Task Force recommendations were being
I
implemented in response to the King case.
In July. 1991. the Independem Commission on the Los Angeles

2
Police Department. better known as the Christopher Commission. issued its report on the

Rodney King incident and the LAPD. Sheriff Block. quickly recognizing its importance,

charged his Executive Planning Council ("EPC") with the responsibility of reviewing the

findings and recommendations and determining their applicability [0 the Sheriff s

Department. The EPC did so, issuing a lDRgthy report on September 6, 1991. The EPC

found itself in agreement with most of the Christopher Commission recommendations as

they reformulated and reinterpreted them and, as such. recommended implementation. Task

forces and committees and working groups were set up to consider implementation, and that

effort goes on to this day.

Running in tandem with his efforts regarding the Christopher Commission,

Sheriff Block initiated his Core Values project. The project team was charged with

assessing the work of the EPC in responding to the Christopher Commission report,

assessing the work of the Task Force on Use of Force, assessing the work of the

Department's Service Oriented PoliCing Committee and developing a plan of action for

the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department which "will result in the internalization

of core beliefs and attitudes, ultimately resulting in improved practices which will make

the Department a more effective and responsive poliCing agency." The Sheriffs Core

Values Statement is reproduced in the adjacent sidebar.

Our task in part was to evaluate these internal effom to determine whether the

Department bas made adequate progress in addressing excessive force and its causes.

We want to make it clear from the outset that we believe the Deparanent has made some

progress and is improving still. It bas many bright. able, well-meaning people whom we

have come to respect. Much of the credit for the openness to change and flexibility

goes to Sheriff Block. His temperament and style has encouraged self-examination within

the Department.

Nonetheless, this report is a somber and sobering one in terms of the large

number of brutal incidents that have been and still are occurring. This Department,

3
like the LAPD, has too many officers who have resorted to unnecessary and exces-

sive force. The Department has not done an adequate job disciplining them. It has

not dealt adequately with those who supervise them. It has not listened enough to

what the communities and constituencies of the LASD want and expect in their

police.

Thus, the Department has a longer way to go than it has travelled thus far

before its procedures and practices in the area of force, complaint resolution,

internal investigation, and community policing are at levels consistent with Sheriff

Sherman Block's expressed core values and where this large and very important

law enforcement agency should be.

We make many specific recommendations to belp reduce excessive force and the

exposure of the County to clvil liability on these claims. As this repon will make clear,

we recommend substantial reform of the process for tbe receipt and resolution of citizen

complaints. We urge the elimination of any and all roadblocks or intimidation or

discouragement to expression of a resident's right to complain and be heard with

respect to asserted police misconduct. We recommend responsible review of

LASD determinations that citizens' complaints are not well-founded by detached

and neutral persons outside the Department. We recommend internal reform to

make everyone in the Department accountable for reducing excessive force and

listening to the voice of the community. We recommend that conference commit-

t ..s comprised of sheriffs personnel and community members be formed at each

station. We recommend regular outside audits of the LASD.

In sum, we recommend that the Department concentrate intense energy

and commitment to move the Department much faster and much farther toward

community policing, problem-solving policing, and toward a style of policing that

treats every county resident with dignity and respect and deals firmly with any

employee who does not.

4
 Our recommendations do not cut deeply across the grain of the direction in which

the Department is beading. We do not see the necessity of stopping a behemolb dead in its

tracks and getting it moving in an opposite direction. Rather, we see our task principally

as one of urging Sheriff Block and his senior staff to listen hard to what his Captains

and Lieutenants are saying about dealing with excessive force; to pay careful atten-

tion to what certain of his Chiefs and Commanders, especially the minorities and

women among them are urging; to hear and respond to the message of pain and

hurt that is coming from the Hispanic and African-American communities in partic-

ular; to take seriously and thoughtfully the well-intentioned comments of women

inside and outside the LASD and the well-meaning criticisms of lesbians, gays, racial

and ethnic minorities, and others who are having a very hard time being heard by

the top management of the LASD.

We cannot quarrel wilb Sberiff Block's Core Values Statement. We respect the

seriousness of its purpose and its articulation of values lbat. if fully implemented, would

make the LASD a truly superb police force. We endorse it entirely and wholeheartedly.

It mirrors our aspirations for the Deparunent. We hope that our report and recommenda-

tions that follow will serve to help make these core values a reality. Whether they will

become a reality depends most importantly on political will. Some of our recommendations

will involve the expenditure of substantial sums of money. Whatever money is spent

on reform will be exceeded by money saved over the long run in judgments and settlements

of excessive force cases against the Sheriffs Department.

It is my hOpe, and that of the staff, that this report will meet the mandate of the Board

of Supervisors and constitute a worthwhile contribution to law enforcement in this County.

With these hopes in mind, we now tum to our review of the operations of the Sheriff s

Department.

James G. Kolls

5
6
 2. General Background

The Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department is currently the third largest urban

police force in the United States, ranking behind New York City and Chicago. The

Sheriffs Department has approximately 8500 funded positions for sworn personnel and

approximately 4200 funded positions for civilians, bringing it to a total of approximately

12,700. Not all the funded positions are filled, however: As of the end of May 1992,
there were approximately 8000 sworn personnel and 3800 civilians on the job. By way of

comparison to the County's other major law enforcement agency, the Christopher

Commission reported that in 1991 the Los Angeles Police Department had approximately

8450 sworn personnel and approximately 2000 civilians. The LAPD has a somewhat larger

budget, although comparisons here are difficult because the LASD performs many tasks

which the LAPD does not - notably, the LASD runs all of the County Jail facilities, trans-

ports inmates from the jails to the courthouses, and provides security services for the

Superior Courts. Generally speaking, the LAPD budget for policing services is about $550

million and the LASD budget for the same services is about $500 million.

The Sheriffs Deparunent serves a population of approximately 2.5 million persons in a

3182 square mile area; the LAPD serves 3.5 million persons in a 465 square mile area.

The demographics of the City of Los Angeles and the overall demographics of the County

of Los Angeles are similar: The City is 37% Caucasian, the County 40%; the City is 13%

African-American, the County 12%; the City is 40% Hispanic, the County 37%; and the

City is 10% Asian, Pacific Islander and other, while the County is 11 %. Both the LAPD

and the LASD have very low ratios as compared to most major police departments: There

are approximately 2 sworn personnel per eacb 1000 persons served. By contrast, New York

City bad, as of 1986,3.7 sworn officers per each 1000 persons; Detroit had 4.7; and

Chicago had 4.1.

There are 87 incorporated cities and several unincorporated communities in Los

Angeles County, the total population of which is approximately 9 million. The LASD is

the law enforcement provide.r in the unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County, along the

7
Southern California Rapid Transit District's Blue Line, and in 41 municipalities within

the County which contract with the Sheriff s Department for police services and are

generally known as the "contract cities." Chart 1 is a synopsis of the contract cities

program. There are significant variations among the contract cities in terms of the level

of service. La Puente, for example, has a population of approximately 37,000 in

3.5 square miles. It spends about $3.4 million for about 32 personnel. West Hollywood,

in contrast, has a population of 36,000 in less than 2 square miles and spends almost

$9 million for about 98 personnel.

It is important to keep in mind that the contract cities decide the level of police

service they want from the Sheriffs Department. If there are significantly differing

levels of service in different areas, one must look in part to the responsible officials in

each of the contract cities to account for these variations.

The contract cities in the main are more heavily populated and are concentrated in a
smaller area. The contract cities total approximately 1.5 million people in about 500
square miles. The unincorporated areas of the County, in contrast, have approximately

I million people in 2700 square miles. Many large municipalities within the County are

served by the Sheriff, including the cities of Carson, Lancaster, parts of Long Beach,

Norwalk, Palmdale, Bellflower and Diamond Bar.

The popuiation densities of the areas served by the Sheriff vary widely. Antelope

Valley has about 186 people per square mile; East Los Angeles has about 10,400 people

per square mile. The Firestone service area has more than 17,000 people per square mile;

Santa Clarita Valley has 210 per square mile. Lennox has 14,000 people per square mile;

La Crescenta/Altadena has 303 persons per square mile.

The population served by the LASD is highly diverse. The racial and ethnic mix of

the populations served by the 19 stations of the Sheriffs Department varies from area to

area. The service area of the MalibuJLost Hills Station, for example, is 87% Caucasian,

1% African-American, and 6% Hispanic. The Firestone Station serves an area that is

8
9
 - ",

2% Caucasian, 17% African-American, and 80% Hispanic. Lynwood Station serves

communities that are 33% African-American. 61 % Hispanic. and 6% Caucasian or other.

East Los Angeles Station serves an area that is 94% Hispanic.

Cbart 2 sbows the racial and ethnic breakdown of the personnel in eacb of the

Sberiff s stations and the racial and ethnic breakdown of the communities served by the

various stations as of December, 1991. As is apparent, there is wide diversity. To the

extent that one may generalize, it appears that the Sberiff s Department serves areas in

wbich Hispanics are the largest single minority. As is also apparent from the chart, the

racial and ethnic make-up of the area policed does not often correspond to the racial and

ethnic make-up of the sworn personnel in the area.

It sbould also be noted that there is other diversity within the service population,

althougb precise numbers are not available. There are, for example, gays and lesbians

througbout the Sberiff s service area with a significant concentration in at least one service

area, West Hollywood, wbere it is estimated that one fUth of the population is gay and

lesbian. By way of further example of the great diversity of the population served, the

recent census pointed out that in Los Angeles County, only 54.6% of the population speaks

English at home. Recent census figures show that 31.5% of the County's population

speaks Spanisb at bome, 8.3% speak an Asian or Pacific language and 5.6% speak

a variety of other languages.

The rate of violent crime in the areas served by the LASD is similar to the crime rates

in the areas served by the LAPD, and the rates for the LAPD and LASD are eclipsed only

by the numbers for New York City. See Chart 3. Cbarts 4 and 5 detail further the crime

rates for the various areas served by the Sberiff. As sbown on Cbart 4, there is one murder

every 21 bours; one forcible rape every 9 bours, one robbery every 49 minutes, one aggra-

vated assault every 21 minutes and one burglary every 18 minutes. There are wide varia-

tions in serious crimes rates througbout the service area. Malibu's crime rate is 1.80 per
10,000 persons served; Hawaiian Gardens is 860.03 per 10,000; Rolling Hills is 85.52.

10
a LASD Station/Policing Ethnic Comparison
....

RegiOil Area Swam Region Z Area Sworn Regiol3 Area Swom eoulty·WIde Sworn
Ethaic Policed Personnel Ethnic Policed Personnel Ethnic Policed Personnel Un ill Ethic Personnel
Make-Up Make·Up Mako·Up Mak..U,
Aldolope Vallo, Carso. Av.lo. AOIG
StIIlioa (237 employees) Statioa (ISSI StatiOi (12) B,,.•• (291
Caucasian 71% m Caucasian 26% 620ft Caucasian 60".4 m CaUC35ian !Kl%
African-American 6% 1% African-Arrerican 25% 15% African-American OGJ. OGJ. African-American 3%
Hispanic 1~ 6% Hispanic 27% In. Hispanic 4OGJ. ~ Hispanic 7%
Asian 0% OGJ. Asian 22% 5% Asian OGJ. OGJ. Asian OGJ.
Other 5% 1% Other OGJ. OGJ. Other OGJ. OGJ. Other OGJ.
Cresc.ata V.'loy Firesto... Industry Special EAforc.MIt
Statio. (1351 Station (119) Slitioa (1911 B.,.•• (92)
Caucasian 61% 87% Caucasian 2% 70% Caucasian M 76% CaUC35ian m.
African-American 21% 3% African-Arrerican 17% ~ African-American n. 6% African-American 13%
Hispanic 11% SOk Hispanic 8O"It 20% Hispanic 53% 16% Hispanic 6%
Asian OGJ. OGJ. Asian 0% n. Asian 15% n. Asian 1%
Other 7% 2% Other 1% OGJ. Other 1% OGJ. Other OGJ.
fait 1.01 Ang.'es Lennolll: Lakewood
StIItiol (1!Kl1 StatiOD (1781 StIliDl (3011
Caucasian 4% 48% Caucasian 35% 73% Caucasian 49'4 m;
African-American 1% 5% African-American 7% 14% African-American 5% 5%
Hispanic 94% 43% Hispanic 48% 1OGJ. Hispanic 29'4 15%
Asian OGJ. 0% Asian 9% 3% Asian 16% 1%
Other OGJ. 4% Other 1% OGJ. Other 1% 1%
M.,ibu/LG1t Hilll Loraitl NOMalk
Statio. (1381 Stitio. (941 StIlio. (2121
Caucasian 87% m Caucasian 74% 69'4 Caucasian 43% 73%
African-American 1% 4% African-American n. ~ African-American n. 1.5%
Hispanic 6% 2% Hispanic ~ 15% Hispanic 46% 24%
Asian OGJ. 0% Asian 16% ~ Asian ~ 1.5%
Other 6% 2% Other OGJ. OGJ. Other 1% OGJ.

Sa .... Clarita Valloy

SIItiO.(1S6)
Lynwood
StItio. (166)
Pico Ri""
Stili,. (951
Caucasian 72% 94% Caucasian 5" 71" Caucasian 16"4 67"
African-American
Hispanic
2%
2O'fo
.5%
5%
African-American
Hispanic
33"
61"
,,"
16"4
African-American
Hispanic
.5"
81"
2"10
29"4
Asian OGJ. 0"4 Asian 1% n. Asian 2"10 2"10
Other 6% .5" Other OGJ. OGJ. Other .5% 0"4
T.rapl, MariDl d,' Hey W~.D"II
SlatiOi (193) Statio. (00) Slltio. (2261
Caucasian
African- American
25%
2%
74" Caucasian
African-American
38"4 63"
19%
Caucasian
African-American
49'4
5%
72%
~
6" 55"
Hispanic 55% 1~ Hispanic 55" 15% Hispanic 22% 1~
Asian OGJ. OGJ. Asian 3" 3" Asian 23" 1"
Other 1~ n. Other 0"4 OGJ. Other 1% 1%
Wolt Hollywood
Slatio. (1251
Caucasian SS% 67"
African-American
Hispanic
3%
9"4
21"
9%
Asian 3% 3%
Other OGJ. OGJ.

11
 - .~

The Sheriff s policing operations are conducted at 19 separate stations grouped in

three Field Operations Regions. Chart 2 details which stations are in which region.

The station is headed by a captain, who is also known in the Sheriff s Department as a

II·'···· ......................::............ "unit commander." The captains

report to area commanders for the

Rate of Viole lit Crime 1 SiDce 1960 per 10,000
region who in tum report to the
1960 1970 19811 1989
UDited State. 160.9 363.5 580.7 663.2 division chief for the Region.
los ADgele. 376.3 737.5 1339.6 1601.1
New York 183.5
The division chiefs report to the
980.7 1710.6 2021.2
Cbicago 396.1 633.6 585.0
assistant sheriffs who in turn report
Plailadelplaia 203.1 321.1 637.9 608.5
Houlloll 230.5 562.4 718.8 801.1 to the Undersheriff who reports to
Detroit 309.8 916.8 859.2
LASD 372.2 2 618.0 1149.0 1365.1 the Sheriff. Importantly, the

commander in charge of the Office

1 V"oo1en1 ailllH.' hoInicide. 'ape. robbery. ;pi iIggIMled assaub
2 Fiscal year 1960-61 !lala
• Data ~I Miiablt of Professional and Ethical

Standards (OPES), which oversees

', ............. :... : ....... -:.: .... -:.: ::>: .. ::.:. "';:':::;:::':::::::>:::::::::: ..................... ,....... .
the Internal Affairs Bureau (lAB)

and the Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau (lCIB), reports directly to the Sheriff.

The Sheriff is an elected public official who serves a four-year term. He has broad

powers to preserve the peace and to administer the jails and to serve process. The Sheriff

has the power to appoint deputies, and has authority over the discharge and evaluation of

deputies subject to Civil Service constraints.

Although the Sheriff has the power to appoint deputies, the Los Angeles County

Board of Supervisors has the power to decide the number of deputies and controls the

budget for the Sheriff s Department. As will be discussed in detail in those sections of

our report dealing with accountability, the Sheriffs Department differs from other large

urban police forces by virtue of its independence from direct civilian control through a

Police Commission or even a disciplinary process in which civilians are represented.

As also will be discussed, this absence of civilian oversight has serious implications with

12
respect to the accountability of the Sheriffs Department.

As of May 1992, there are 91 persons of the rank of captain and higher within the

LASD. There is one sheriff, Sherman Block, one undersheriff, Robert Edmonds, two assis-

tant sheriffs, eight division chiefs, 22 commanders and 57 captains. The upper management

of the LASD is overwhelmingly male and Caucasian. Of tbe 91 top officials, 84 are male

and 78 are Caucasian. All the division chiefs. the two assistant sheriffs, the undersheriff

and the Sheriff are all males. An

African-American male was promoted

130.9
1991 Part I Crialas ....•.. ;. ....... .
to the position of assistant sheriff a
--::
Every 24 Hoan "__-:::'JL
::::::::):::;:::
short while ago. Of the eight division ODe Marder every 21 hours
Oal Forcibll Rape every 9 hours
~j~:~j~:j)~]~~\
-_., ,-_-:, ",:,,:,:,:,:.,-
..
chiefs, all are male. Two are African- ODi AnOD every 7 hours ?\/\{
:}(/:t~
American and one is HispaniC. ODI Robblry every 49 minutes
.,-_-c:':.::'
Oae Aggavated Assault every 21 minutes
Twenty of the 22 commanders are

male. Two of the commanders are

African-American. None are Hispanic.

70
Fifty-two of the 57 captains are male

and three are African-American. 4 are 60

Hispanic, and 1 is Asian. See Chart 6.

50

Below the rank of captain, the

40
proportions of women and minorities
30
increase somewhat. Almost 93% .of

the 310 lieutenants are male and about 20

85% are Caucasian. Approximately 10

2.7 3.4
90% of the 935 sergeants are male and 1.1
".-;.:.:.:.:.:.:: .:.:.:.:.:.:::.:.:.
0
.
J:
...-...
=-Z' »
......=-o ..
CD
about 85% are Caucasian.
i.
=
-II iI iJ
o
:I
•
~
..
i1
~
Approximately 93% of the 118 senior

deputies are male and 77% are

13
 Caucasian; 87% of the more than 6500 deputies are male and 70% are Caucasian. 9.4%

are African-American. 17.9% are Hispanic. 2.2% are Asian. Of !.he sworn personnel in

total. 87.5% are male and 72.4% are Caucasian.

The average age of sworn personnel is mid-thirties. The average age of female

sworn personnel is 35; for males it is 36. The average number of years of service for

females is 10; for males it is 11. The average age of Caucasian and African-American

officers is 37; of Hispanics, 34; and of Asian and Pacific Islanders, 33. The average

number of years of service for Caucasians and African-Americans is 11 years; for

Syaopsis - Demographic and Geographic Dala

1991 Area Total Population Part 1 Crim. Station

Population Sq. Milts in D.nsity plr p.r 1000 Compl.m.nt
SIMion Incorp. Unincorp. Stati on Ar.a Sq. Mil. Population Sworn

101111 1.429.403 1.032.250 3.182.17 773.58 568.21 3.306 666

Field OperatioDs RegioD I 512.597 376.259 2.546.03 349.11 452.17 1.113 228
Antelope Valley 166.133 72.564 1.283.58 185.96 482.91 236 46
East los Angeles 34.952 126.545 15.54 10.392.34 598.40 210 39
Crescenta Valley/Altadena 19.378 63136 272.67 302.98 327.43 149 29
Malibu/lost Hills 56.387 19.380 186.26 406.78 409.94 145 2
Santa Clarita 110.642 42182 725.67 210.73 335.26 164 26
Temple 125.105 52.252 62.31 2.846.36 454.56 209 46

Field OperatioDI RegioD II 280.090 263.418 81.86 6.639.48 712.04 1.076 220
Carson 83.995 42.498 28.32 4.466.56 741.62 216 29
Firestone 71.869 4.17 17134.77 601.93 141 26
lennox 27.331 85.040 8.04 13.976.49 728.84 202 35
lomita 70.701 4.075 22.75 3186.86 297.82 99 24
lynwood 61.945 32.778 7.61 12.447.17 769.40 192 3
Marina Del Rey 26.028 7.80 3.336.92 839.48 96 7
West Hollywood 36.118 1.130 3.17 11.750.16 1.334.57 130 56

Field OperatioDI RegiaD III 636.716 392.573 554.28 1.856.98 573.53 1.117 218
Avalon 2.918 527 131.23 26.25 879.54 10 7
Industry 43.812 120.239 64.96 2.525.42 647.91 215 32
Lakewood 265.384 90.158 44.00 8.080.50 694.15 318 67
Norwalk 150.251 59.021 40.75 5.135.51 544.12 228 46
Pico Rivera 59.177 25.944 13.04 6.527.68 513.39 104 23
Walnut/San Dimas 115.174 96.684 260.30 813.90 361.75 242 43

14
II Los Angeles County SberiH', Department Breakdown of Personnel By Ruk, Sex, and Elbnicity

CII" Totll Male Femlle eluenil. AfriclII' Hi'pllie N.ti" A.ilA Filipil' Otlltr
Am. ric .. Amerie ..

Sheriff 1 100% 1 100%

Undersheriff 1 100% 1 100%
Assistant Sheriff Z 2 100% 2 100%
Chief
Commander U
• 8 100%
20 90.9% 2 9.1%
5
20
62.5%
90.9%
225.0%
2 9.1%
112.5%

Captain 57 52 91.2% 5 8.8% 49 86.0% 3 5.3% 4 7.0% 1 1.8%

lieutenant 311 288 92.9% 22 7.1% 263 84.8% 20 6.5% 24 7.7% 3 1.0%
Sergeant 935 846 90.5% 89 9.5% 793 84.8% 53 5.7% 77 8.2% 1 0.1% 11 1.2%
Deputy IV 11. 110 93.2% 8 6.8% 91 77.1% 1311.0% 1311.0% o 0.0% 1 0.8%
Deputy 6523 S656 86.7% 86713.3% 4555 69.8% 614 9.4% 116817.9% 5 0.1% 144 2.2% 370.6%
Deputy Trainee 21 1781.0% 419.0% 11 52.4% 314.3% 628.6% o 0.0% 1 4.8% 0

Totlls: 799. 70e1 17.5'4 99712.5'4 5791 7U'4 710 U'4 1J93 11.2'4 1 '.1'4 151 z.r.t. 371.5'4 11.0'4

Hispanics, 9 years; and for Asian and Pacific Islanders, 8 years.

The LASD has grown substantially over the past several years, There were approxi-

mately 5800 budgeted positions for sworn officers in 1980 and 6500 in 1985. Today, there

are approximately 8500. Captains and others within the upper echelons of management

seem in accord that the dramatic growth of the LASD has brought with it substantial prob-

lems.

Another noteworthy change over the last five years has been in the area of budgetary

support It is no secret that all governmental bodies have bad to do more with fewer

dollars. Although the Sheriff s Department has been an exception and has generally

enjoyed increasing budgets, it appears that this may no longer be the case.

Even if its budget is not cut, there is no question but that costs have risen, and what

was affordable before is not affordable today. One area in wbich this phenomenon has seri-

ously and, in the view of captains, detrimentally impacted the LASD bas been in the loss of
two-person patrol cars. It used to be the case that two deputies would be paired in a single

car. The advantages to eacb of the deputies of the two-person car are obvious: greater

15
ability to perform the job safely. greater support and better rapport with peers. The halving

of personnel assigned to each patrol car also has implications for training: with a two-

person car, pairings can be made so as to provide year-round teaching of the junior person.

The problem is that the contract cities are reluctant to pay for two-person cars; they would

rather see two cars with one deputy each on the street than one car with two deputies.

These an~ other changes, as well as general conditions in society, have contributed to

a state of somewhat eroded morale within the Department. In a survey conducted in 1991.

some worrisome trends were noted. Although pride in the Department was generally high

and job satisfaction moderately high. 68% of survey respondents felt that the Department

did a below average job, and 22% thought the Department did a poor job, in addressing the

poor performance of individual officers. Fifty-nine percent of supervisors thought that the

Department performed in the below-average range in terms of training them prior to their

first supervisory assignment. and 25% said the Department provided no such training at

all. Forty-seven percent of the survey respondents rated support from top management in
the below average to poor range. Thirty-six percent of sworn personnel felt inadequately

trained for their current positions. The promotion process was viewed as less than

adequate to poor by 68% of those surveyed; 48% rated the promotion process as unfair;

66% thought it hurt morale; and 64% felt that the most deserving seldom to rarely are

promoted.

Perhaps most disturbing from the viewpoint of community relations was the percep-

tion that individual officer's tolerance of other racial and ethnic groups bas been

decreasing. Significant numbers of line employees (31 %) and lieutenants (25%) indicated

that their tolerance bas decreased. Of great concern also was the rmding that the decreaSe

was noted to the greatest degree in deputies, detectives and sergeants, all of wbom have
,
the greatest contact with the public, and was further localized more often to whites (30%)

than to members of other racial or ethnic groups (14%).

16
17
 --

18
 3. Public Hearings

In order to bear from the greatest number of people across the widest geographical

sweep. we determined that we would conduct a hearing in each of the three field operations

regions of the Sheriffs Department. In mis way. there was an opportunity for individuals

from all parts of the County, each of the contract cities. and all the unincorporated areas to

attend a bearing in their own LASD region. We held the hearings in public facilities in

county parks, we promulgated press releases about the bearings in general and sent out

specific releases for each of the individual bearings. We contacted individuals and groups

to encourage them to appear and present testimony.

In aU, we beard testimony from more than 60 individuals and groups. Many of the

groups also gave us written testimony and documentation. Two of the bearings were well

attended; a third was not. Much of the testimony was critical of the LASD. Tbis is not

surprising: People wbo are generally satisfied with the police are not necessarily as moti-

vated to come forward and publicly avow this fact as those who believe they bave been

treated sbabbily or disdainfully.

One young African-American in his twenties spoke simply and eloquently about bis

personal experiences with the LASD:

"I've been living righl ocross Ihe SIreel from tltis pori for lite losll 5 yeors. I've sten tit is
pork when it wos dirl ond 0111 con soy is I love Ihe oreo oul here. ... My Mom fougltlltord

10 bring us oUlltere, bring us up in 0 nice environmenl. llooe it outlttre. . .. I choose to be

out Itere wltere it's nice ond so/e. The only people I reolly feor out Itere is tlte police ond it's

o domn shome /0 be bloci ond feor the police in 0 nice neigltborhood. . .. I'm bloci. I knofIJJ

I'm block. BUlos I got older in oge the police force oul ltere would pull me ooer, coli me
'nigger' .. , 'Whot ore you doing OUI here? Where ore you from, CampIon?' This ond tltot.
Sit me on tlte curb, dirty my dOlnes. Teor OUI everything in my cor. It gOllo fIJe poinllo
wltere I would Iry 10 come from my girlfriend's houst Ihe bock woy. I'd gel pulled ooer.
They'd be 0/ Dunkin' Donu/s. [At other times I would try /o} go the front woy. They!,d} be

19

----- ~------
 - ,$'

at 7-Ele'l)tn. I'd get pulled over. ... Now the scariest incident I've had was maybe two

months ago. To me, it's a crime to be black and to be on the streets of the Lakewood sheriffs
department after 11 0 'clock. . . . I was thrown to the ground. . .. I don't want to be

treated like that. I wont to be treated with some respect. . " Now, the guy takes me,

he squeezes my mouth like this. He tells me to open it rJ1)ide open, rJ1)iggle my tongue up and

down as he has his flashlight- as he's about to clobber me because I'm not wiggling my

tongue fast enough, rJ1)ide enough or lifting it enouglt. NOrJ1) rJ1)lto in tlte rJ1)orld can do tltat

with their mouth wide open.~ I'm not used to this type of thing. I asked the officer, 'Why
would you have me do something like this? I've never been tltrough anything like this in my
fife. Why art you doing this to me?' 'Don't worry about it nigger. What are you doing out

at tltis time of nightP' 'I'm walking to tlte store.' 'Well, just have a nice day.' I said,

'Excuse me, officer, rJ1)hat art your names?' 'Don't worry about it.' '" The scariest times

is when they're training a rookie officer. It's always like tfrey nave something to prove.

This is just one incident out of hundreds that has happened to me while living out here. I'm

trying to be a voice for some other people, black people in general, because I can only speak
from the experiences that rJ1)e go through . ..

An elderly Hispanic woman told us in broken English:

"The police Itave busted my door three times. I almosl got killed. .. If I fJ1)ould Itave

panicked and run back tltey fJ1)ould have shol me in tlte back. Tltey insulted me, relling me

thaI I look disgusting. And then the last time, they did it again. . .. They're calling me

'Slupid, dirty Mexican.' ... [A deputy) hod a gun on my back to rJ1)olk me 10 tlte CIlr, /fRJO

policemen. There fJ1)as my son, handcuffed. And one fJ1)illt a gun Itere and a gun over lure.

ThaI's a 101 of harassmenl. And lelling us t"OI fJ1)e fJ1)ere slupid Mexicans, no good for

nothing. So I still CIln 't gel over il. I'm still sad. . .. I fear for my life and my son's life.
'Cause thaI's rJ1)ltot they -they even told me, 'Well, ldoria, [we'll) be bock. We'll see you

nexltime.' And I rellthem, 'No, you're nol 'coust I'm leaving.'

20
And they - the deputy told me, 'Oil, well, r;;e'll find you wherf'oer you go, Moria.' So that's

a lot of harassment. So I fear for my life. .. "

There was also the testimony of a diminutive African-American gentleman who stated:

"JJy home is Birmingham, Alabama. And I come out with my wife and lids to WJorl a
constroction contract in August of /990. . .. And for some reason a Firestone sheriff come up

btlzind my cor and they osled me -they soy, 'Is this your cor?' I soy, 'Yeah.' They soy,

'Where you fromP' I said, 'A/obomo.' And we - he said something else to me. But onJfJOoy,

he snatched me out of the cor and threw me on the bocl of the cor, and for no reason at all just

split my head open with a flosh/igill. For no reason, nO reason whatsoever. And whot hurt

me so much is that not only did he jump on me, but IWlO more sheriffs pulled up. They jumped

out of the cor and stomped me and messed up my bocl. I got a problem with seeing out of my

eye now. And I was making $/300 a week when I got jumped on . ... Because let me /til you

something, they almost killed me. You know, I hod left on my lunch break and I ended up in
St. Francis Medical Center with my heod split open.

"But the port Ihot hurt me the most is the guy that was fixing to tow my cor . ...

They found oUllhot he hod traffic WOffonts against him. The detective rIDent 10 Ihis man's

house at /2 0 'dock at !light and told him Ihot if he would soy Ihot I hit the deputy in the

stomoc/z Ihey would dismiss 01/ his Iroffic lielets. And you know that bastard dismissed 01/

his traffIC tickets juS! to make me look like I hit him in the stomach first, you knorID.
". .. This committee ain't gonno do nothing until you gel those damn bigots out of the

Sheriffs Deportmmt. 'Couse it's good whitt people out here. I know good white people.

I work for 'em all my life. And 01/ white people ain't low down. But like I said, tile ones that

jumped on me I never forget it. "

In most cases, it was impossible to verify the factual accuracy of the testimony. But

there was an inescapable conclusion: The perception exists within various communities

21
that racism, discourtesy, excessive force and outright violence by the LASD not only

happens, but is commonplace. We do not necessarily agree. Our investigation leads us to

believe that nearly all deputies treat nearly all individuals, most of the time. wiLb at least

minimally acceptable levels of courtesy and dignity. The exceptions. when Lbey occur,

are outrageous enough and frequent enough to poison the well in some communities. The

perception be.comes the reality. The LASD must understand that one racial slur or inci-

dent of unreasonable force reverberates quickly throughout a community and can under-

mine years of work to build up trust between the LASD and its constituency.
The complaints of citizens fell into two general classifications. We note them here

as specific complaints and suggestions. We attempt to address them Lhroughout the

balance of this report.

Complaints arise from what persons see as a lack of respect for individuals on the

part of law enforcement. For example. on routine traffic stops, the disrespect may be

manifested by approaching with drawn guns when Lbere are adult ethnic males in the car,
or requiring male individuals to sit on the curb while warrant checks are made, or

requiring male individuals to place their hands on the bot boods of black and white patrol

cars or behind their heads during warrant checks. There were many reports of abusive

racist language directed at citizens, and, fmally, accounts of specific incidents in which

individuals were beaten or killed under circumstances which appear to lack justification. .

Many people found fault with the complaint system that is in place within the depart-

menL Complaints are made at sheriffs stations. In many instances an individual

(usually an undocumented alien) will refrain from making a complaint because of fear of

arrest and deportation. Where there are language problems, the Department seldom has·

an interpreter available. We also received accounts of the person accepting these reports

requiring the complainant to furnisb bis name and a social security number at the outset.

Before the complaint procedure proceeds, this name is checked for warrants and the

complainant may well find ~imself bebind bars, with the complaint still unreponed.

22
,

Tbe second aspect complained of is that there is no public disclosure as to the result of

the complaint. No one outside of the Department is aware of wbether any discipline is

imposed, and if it is imposed, what it consists of. Tbis final aspect is one of the factors

which drives citizens to seek redress in the civil courts, as they feel they have not been able

to find any other way to correct wrongs within the system.

Citizens also complained that deputies either failed or refused to identify themselves in

confrontational situations. They felt that deputies should be required to distribute cards

identifying themselves in all contacts with citizens.

Lastly, speakers felt that the problems between the department and citizens went much

farther than street contacts. The consensus was that the attitudes of the deputies on the

street was a reflection of attitudes held by their supervisors. In the words of one witness,

"to concentrate on deputies and not focus on management is a whitewash."

Building upon these criticisms, several citizens' groups presented suggestions which

they felt would produce a more evenhanded justice in this community. Some recommended

an independent grand jury to hear excessive force cases convened by the Presiding Judge of

the Superior Court. Some urged that an independent prosecutor be appointed pursuant to

California Penal Code section 936.5 to handle cases of excessive force. This procedure

would be the decision of the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court.

Others suggested taking photographs of injured arrestees at the earliest opportunity.

Assumedly, this would be even before transportation to a medical facility.

The hearings proved very useful. They put faces and voices to what we bad only seen

in documents. The hearings convinced us that the instances of abusive, disrespectful, and

even violent behavior by deputies, if not widespread, are nonetheless far too frequent, cause

deep sorrow, and produce needless suffering. Such actions must stop.

23
24
 4. Civil Litigation

The Staff s review of verdicts against the County and settlements by the County in

civil litigation alleging excessive force by members of the Los Angeles County Sheriff s

Department was a crucial part of the examination of excessive force by Department

personnel.

The verdicts in this litigation represent findings by an independent trier of fact that the
force used was excessive. Although settlements are not admissions of liability, substantial

settlements in excessive- force cases are based primarily on an assessment of the likelihood
of adverse verdicts. By examining these incidents, and by examining the Department's
subsequent investigations of the incidents and the extent of Departmental discipline

imposed on the deputies involved, we were able to learn much about the Department's

handling of excessive-force issues.

What we learned was the basis for concern. Most of the cases represent clear examples

of excessive force. Many involved similar situations and repeat patterns. The fact that

little or no discipline was imposed on tbe Department members responsible for the exces-
sive force in many of the cases suggests that the Department is tolerant of excessive force
and that the elimination of excessive force is not a high priority of the DepartmenL

The single most important conclusion we have come to as a result of our review of

these cases is that the Department should review all excessive-force settlements and

verdic!S, past and future, in the same way that we have done, so that the Department can

identify the reCurring situations creating a high risk of excessive force, train Departtnent

members to avoid the use of excessive force in those situations and more effectively disci-

pline those who engage in the use of excessive force.

We reviewed the files of 104 excessive-force cases settled for more tban $20,000 1
between January 1987 and the end of May 1992, and the ftles of 20 excessive-force cases in

which verdicts of more than $20,000 were entered against the Department between July

1988 and tbe end of May 1992. These settlements and verdicts totalled $18,037,789.

In addition, we compiled statistical data about 114 settlements and verdicts of S20,OOO

25
 p
.4

or less between January 1989 and May 1992. based on summary

memoranda.

In less than three and one-half years, from January 1989 to the
Aeeoeiatad Coete
of Exeeeeive-Forea end of May 1992, the settlements and verdicts in all excessive-force
Litigation
cases against the Department totalled $15,492,971.85. 1 Some of the
A1thougb we did DOl attempt ID
compile statistics wid! respect to the verdicts included in this total are being appealed by the County. If
total cost to the County of responding
these verdicts are upheld on appeal, the total stated for this time
to allegations of excessive foree in
civil litigation, it is clear that the period will have amounted to a cost to the County of $377,877 per
amounts paid I I settlements Ind
"rdicts constitute only a fraction of month for settlements and verdicts in excessive-force cases against
the actual costs incurred lIy tile
County in coanectioa with this litiga- the Department.
tion.
The amounts paid as settlements and verdicts constitute only a
In addition to the amount paid oul for
settlements, the County lIore the cost fraction of the actual cost incurred by the County in connection with
01 deleading the lawsuits prior to
settlement. iDCluding tile cost of the excessive-force litigation, because of the high cost of defending
delense attorneys representing the
County. these cases.
The County Counsel's office has Approximately 400 members of the Department were named as
lID 10 attorneys assigaed to work on
cases for the D.parlln.at.llacked lIy defendants in the 124 lawsuits which involved settlements and
support p.rsonnel. Our review
show.d that in additioa to paying for verdicts of more than $20,000. This number includes many members
those employees, tile Couaty also
paid for contract services of privll'
who were not active participants in the use of force, but were present
attorneys bired to bandle at least 73
when it occurred, or subsequently came into contact with the injured
oltha 124 Cllli.

Moreover, ia SOlD. CIIII i. wbic. party.

punitiv. damagel were lOugllt
against individual m.mHrs of tile Approximately 35 deputies were named as defendants in more
Departm.nt, th. Couaty bore .... cost
than one of these cases. And of these, six were named as defendants
of seplrate counsel to represent
those individualL Other def.au in three cases. The files show that these repeat defendants were
costs illCladed court costs, IXpert
wilaentaes and th. cOlI of privata active participants in the use of excessive force in many of the cases
iavestigators. ...
in which they were named. The exact number of repeat defendants

could not be determined because the deputies in some cases were not

identified by full name or badge number.

26
 Most of the Department personnel alleged in the civil litigation

lO bave used excessive force were deputies. Althougb higber officers

were named in many cases, our review showed that sergeants were
The County sometimes also bOR tbe
active participants in the use of force in seven cases, and lieutenants cost of waiving meclical,xpenses
incurred by tile plaintiffs at County
participated in the use of force in two cases. medical facilitin a part of settle-
m.nll, ill additiOll to tile lIIIount of
Eighteen of the Department's 21 stations were involved in the call paid out to tile plaintiffs. III
Il10,. thaa 10 pen:ent of tile CIMS
excessive-force cases reviewed. Tbe Lynwood, Norwalk, Industry,
0'
willl_alements verdicts of IIIOrI
Firestone and East Los Angeles stations eacb accounted for more of tIIaa $20.000. Ibe County also paid tile
cost of la arbitratiolliluring befolt I
the incidents underlying the 124 lawsuits than any of the other sealeIHat was reaclted.

WIlen vlrdidlresuhad. thl costs

stations. The Lynwood station was involved in 18 incidents, the
bo'DI by the County w.,. lVel
Norwalk station in 13, Firestone and East Los Angeles stations were lIight,. In addition to til. amount of I
verdict rendered agaiat tile County.
each involved in 8 incidents, and the Industry station was involved tile County was required to pay til.
pllintiffs court costs. And mOil
in 7 incidents. significlntly. in cases in wllicfl I
verdict iI.atered against Department
The excessive-force cases we reviewed included only those lD.mbelS 10, ,iolatioDi of tile U.s.
Civil Rigllts Act. and damages III
cases in which the use of force was alleged to have resulted in IWarded, 10 matter flow small. tile
County IDly be requind to pay the
personal injury to the plaintiffs. We did not review false-arrest
plaiatifr. attonaeys' .....
cases, or cases involving a failure to obtain medical treatment for h iltould b. aotad tllat CoUDty Counsel
statistics 01 cases takell to trialsllow
people with pre-existing medical conditions, if these cases did not lbat 20 caslllllegiDg Ion:e agaiut
tIM Depar1lDe.. wen WOI by tIM
involve allegations of the use of excessive force. The cases we
County i. flSCll ,ur 1918-19. 20 wen
WOII i.'9&90. 1SwaN WIll is 1998-
reviewed fell into two major categories: cases involving sbootings
91 aad 13 well WOD from July-
by Department members and cases alleging assaults and batteries by Decemller 1991. However, tile
def.asa costs associated witll !bell
Department members. case. win fliglltyell dloqll the
Couaty .ltilllet." pllYlil.d. ..
Shootings accounted for 29 (23%) of the 124 cases we

reviewed, 13 deaths and $8,100,982 of the total amount of settle-

ments and verdicts.

Only 8 of the 29 victims allegedly bad deadly weapons wben the

shootings occurred. and only 3 ever fired a shot. Those three were

27
 _.

people who frred in apparent self-defense when surprised by armed

deputies, and in at least 2 of the cases, the victims did not know that
the people firing at them were deputies.
haitive damlge IWlrds agaiast indi-
vidual deputies were included ia Bof Of the 13 people killed in shootings, 6 were Hispanic, 4 were
the ZO ClSel is wbicb verdicts of
Alore dlla SZO,OOO were entered African-American, 2 were Caucasian and 1 was Asian. Of those shot
Ipiast the Depar1mellt. AJtbougb aot
legally o~ligattd to do 50, die Couaty and injured, 8 were Hispanic, 5 were Mrican-American, 2 were
111II11y pays sucb Iwards. Of dltH I
Caucasian and, in one case, the race of the victim was not specified.
ClSel, 3 were settled Iftllr trial
pllfSlllat to lsettlemeat ia whicll tbe In 93 (75%) of the 124 cases reviewed. the force alleged was an
paitive duaqll were dropped.
Another 3 of tbe I ClIII Ire on assault and battery by Department personnel. Two of these, plus two
appeal. Two Idd'rtioaal ClseS were
sealed Ifter Ylnficts were entered other cases, involved attacks by the Department's Canine Unit. (The
agaiastlbe County oaliabili1y lad
~efore the punitive damage pban of cases involving canine attacks are discussed in Chapter 5.)
the trials.
These 93 assault and battery cases resulted in settlements and
The cost of civillitigatioa settlements
and verdicts ia calli iavolviag ane- verdicts totalling $9,861,807.
gatioDl of eidler excessive Ion:e or
. anlawflllarrests ~ tile Departmeat ia The cases alleging assaults by Department personnel involved a
1915 WII S13S.ooo.111991, the cost to
til. COIID1y ointtllllllats or v.rdicts
number of repeat patterns. Many of the cases involved assaults
ia excessive-Iorce casel aloae bad
during arrests, and most of those cases involved arrests for minor
risea to $4.223,750.

The aUIDHrs of excessiv.-fo~. crimes such as traffic violations. A number of cases arose out of
ClSe' oa usiglllDlat ia the County
Counsers offic. illCreased tra .. 148 i.
assaults on innocent people mistakenly identified as criminal
1981 to 171 is 1991. Hthe cuneat rale
suspects by Sheriff s deputies or assaults on bystanders at the scenes
coatiaUlI, it will •• lbollt 172 i11992.
Thi, iacmn IDlY be du. to I grealer of crimes committed by others. Several additional cases were based
freqUlacy alexc.ain fore. q
Deplmae ... persoaaeL Bill it also is on assaults on pany-goers by deputies responding to loud-party
lillaly ilia. die iacrelse is affecttd ~
the public', illCreased aw........ of complaints by neighbors. A number of other cases involved assaults
tbe litigltioa proce.., aad till lCets-
sibility of plaiatifls' lltonItys wbo on inmates in jail.
specialize ia baadling lorce Clses.
The profitability of excessive-force ...
In some of the assault and battery cases, the plaintiffs were

released by Department members after the use of force occurred.

without being charged with any crime. Most plaintiffs in the

majority of the cases were not charged with any crime other than

28
those relating to an altercation with Department members, such as

obstructing or resisting a peace officer, or battery on a peace officer.

Few of these charges ultimately resulted in gUilty verdicts against

easel iacraased ill light of the U.s.
the plaintiffs. Sapra.... Courfs na/illg ill 1989 in
Tn•• $,.,. T",cb.n AssDcimD" ,.
In most of the assault and battery cases, the Department GMlfIIJd I"depend.", School Dimfct.
489 U.s. 712 (1989). Ullder the Nintll
members involved claimed that their use of force was in response to Cirelli!'1 interpratalioD of tbil case,
victllriou plailltifll are .1I0wld til
the resistance, threatened assault or actual assault by the injured
racovlr llIonaeys' fell from defe.-
party. Many of these cases appeared to involve "contempt of cop." dllltl. eve. Whlll the compeasatory
d_lIIlllW.rded to tile plaiotiffs
The files showed that a verbal altercation arose between a deputy Ira lIIillimlL Ia ,.... federal Clles,

and the injured party, and that this dispute then escalated into a
1Itt plaialifrl .Iorae, III, reeover
lubstaatial fees ill caa inolviag
dlllllllll .. low .s S1.ll0. n.
shoving match or other type of physical confrontation. Each side County's pollatialliability ia the..
cases could Incau,. the County to
claimed that the other side had started the fight .. till I lawsuit lor .III1DOunt graater
till. circllDNltCIs otherwise would
The deputies in many of these cases admitted using some force,
justify.

but denied using as much force as alleged by the plaintiffs. There Ia c.... tIIat do lOt invoke the U.S.
Civil Riglltl Act. the pllintitrs
often were independent wimesses who supported the plaintiffs' ltlomey ge .....llly is paid I
percentage of the plaintitrs verdict
versions of the incidents. In several of the cases, the injuries
or setdemeDt. So it Illy lot lie
suffered were inconsistent with the stories told by the deputies. ,coDOlllicilly Idvisabl. for ltlomeys
til PUmil tbose 1I000.fedl,.1 CUll i.
A substantial majority of these cases involved the use by wbicll the D.partIII.1It Islik.1y to M
fou'" liabl., 11111 the iaiury to the
Department members of weapons, such as batons, flashlights or plaillliff was sligllt lad cIa.lgeS
libly to M . .n.
saps. Very few of the victims of the assaults were armed with any
•
weapon in these 93 cases. .

Of the 87 cases in which assault and battery victims were identi-

fied by race, in 42 cases the victims were Hispanic, in 31 they were

Caucasian and in 14 they were African-American. In 6 additional

cases, the race of the victims was not specified.

Four of the cases alleging assaults by Sheriffs deputies

involved the death of the injured party. Tbe rest of these cases

29
 .... -

involved injuries ranging from life-threatening or serious injuries, including injuries

resulting in pennanent disabilities, internal injuries requiring surgery, or fractured bones,

to less serious but nevertheless traumatic injuries such as head lacerations requiring

sutures or psychiatric problems stemming from the unjustified use of force.

Our review of the excessive-force litigation included a review of the results of all

investigations done by the Department with respect to the incidents which gave rise to the

124 cases, to the extent records of those investigations were available, and a review of

the personnel files of all deputies named in these cases.

Although it was difficult to determine the scope of all investigations because Internal

Affairs Bureau files of investigations which occurred before 1986 had been destroyed, we

did locate records of lAB investigations of 100 deputies involved in 57 of the incidents

that gave rise to the litigation. In these investigations, the allegations were determined to

be "founded" with respect to only 22 deputies involved in 18 incidents.

According to the records available to us, only 22 deputies were disciplined at all in

connection with the incidents underlying the 124 cases reviewed. The discipline of these

22 deputies included the termination of 6 deputies (3 over one case), the resignation of 1

deputy, both an oral reprimand and a written reprimand to another deputy involved in two

separate incidents, and suspensions of 14 deputies amounting to a total of only 123 days.

Many of the cases we reviewed stemmed from arguments between deputies and inno-

cent people wbo were not engaged in criminal activity. The Department sbould not be

permitted to deny that the deputies used unnecessary force in these incidents simply

because the deputies claimed to have been assaulted by the plaintiffs during the argu-

ments, and Department policy allows the use of force under those circumstances. Instead,

the Department should train its deputies to prevent arguments from leading to the use of

force and to avoid the use of force whenever possible. Juries are likely to award damages

in cases involving the use of force on unarmed people whose only misconduct was

arguing with a deputy, particularly if the people are oumumbered and out-sized by the

30
deputies involved.

The kinds of incideilts that are repugnant to juries also should be

repugnant to the Department.
Settlement. and
Because so many of the cases involved repeat patterns, the situ- Verdicta of $20.000
or Le ••
ations creating a high risk of excessive force are identifiable. The
Batwa.. JaDuary 1989 Ind May 1992.
factors present when deputies approach tbese high-risk situations, ICCDnliDg III IIIeIIIOfInde supplied by
tile COUDfy eou..rs office. the
such as responding to loud-pany calls or engaging in confrontations
Coullty sealad 1D1axcalliva forea
with bystanders at the scenes of arrests, are predictable. The case. tor ."to $20.000 aleb. tor I
IIItil of S9&6J7&.85.I.ldditioo, duriAg
Department should focus its energies on determining how to train its tile same period. plliD1iffl i. IIlelsa
.ix cue. Dbtlioad Ylrdic1lllllder
deputies to avoid the recurrence of the types of excessive force $20.000 ucla. lor I totll 0' $41J81.

presented in these cases, how better to investigate allegations of

excessive force and to diSCipline more effectively deputies who use

iDdiella Iny stetistical tn.
Wbile the verdicts wm too faw 10
tile
Dumber lad doll .... 001111 of till
settlamaall tor up III $20.000 laava
increaed over tima. For exampla. i.
excessive force.
III of 19!111the County settled 19 of
The approximately 400 Department members who were named thase casH for I total of S11i.61D. II
just tile first five 1I0Dta of 1992. the
as defendants in tbe 124 excessive-force cases reviewed, which COODfy sealad It lust 20 lUCia cases
for II leest $217.995.
arose out of incidents from 1979 to 1990, constitute only a small
Notwithstudiag tbe ralltively low
percentage of the total number of deputies employed during that ..alama"'l. verdict IIIIODllti i.
the.. casu. 111. iDjOria••aflered by
period. The fact that the deputies and officers named in the litiga- tile fore. victims ware sometinM.
qaita Hvere. Alleest 1Doftllase
tion represent a small percentage of those employed by the cae. i.,olved sllootillll ,ictims.
inciadillll4 who ware kill.d. Except
Department suggests that most members of the Department perform tor I coopla of elDioaiaeidell1l, die
plaiDtiffl iltlle l'8IDIilder of tile -
their jobs without using excessive force. ease.llieged sollllollll O'lIUuJt
lad NtIIIlJ. I. _uy other caHl,tIIe
However, the cases reviewed may be merely the tip of the
pbysical injuri.. ware relltivaly
miDOf. or ...rely iociclal1lllo
iceberg with respect to the use of excessive force by Department
amotioDlI distress or c,jril ri;btl
members. Most of the 124 cases we reviewed constitute clear exam- ,iOlatiou. Naftrtballa. illllaast
34 of tlleH case. 1M plliatifls ..
pIes of excessive force. The cases resulted in large settlements and

verdicts primarily because they involved a combination of sympa-

thetic plaintiffs, severe injuries and witnesses who supported the

31
 plaintiffs' versions of the facts. They represent the "best" cases in

terms of the ease with which the plaintiffs were able to prove their
cases. The number of complaints made against the Department
complliald of blows to dae bead or
facl. lad ia 11 olllers they suffered greatly exceeds the number of cases that end in substantial settle-
llrokea 1I0aes Ind/or adler injuries
requiring surgery. ments or verdicts. yet the allegations of force made by injured
The situltionS ia whicll lIIe. ioci- parties who register complaints against the Department are often
deats occumd wire similar to 1110.
ia the cases tblt resulted I. selll... very similar to the allegations made in these cases. The question
meats lad judgmeats of atore th..
S20_ The plaiatiffs iacluded arises as to how often excessive force is being used against people
Illeged traffic Yiolaton. drug usen
lad penoDi druak i. public•• Will
who are gUilty of a crime and are. therefore. less sympathetic plain-
as iAlIOC8at lIymaden aDd peopla
tiffs. or against people outside the presence of witnesses so that the
wbo were mistakeA for crilaiaal
suspacts or wbose 110m.. were credibility contest tips in favor of the deputies.
wroagfully Alrelled. $eyeral of tbe
iAcidaats occurred wllaa daputies
respoaded to figb! or distarbaac ... Types of Force
calls. aDd albers involvad lltercatioDi
at I Slierifl'l statio .. iA jlil. or at the
·jlil Wlrd of Iba COIla" medical The allegations of excessive force made in the litigation we
ceater. Almost an of dae yictims were
unarmed.
reviewed fall into two major categories: shootings and assaults and

la olber CI.I it Ippa. . dial tile batteries. Each of the categories of cases is discussed in more detail
Coaa" lIICCaafuDy lItotiated $Iala-
• a . for less dlaa it bel 10 pay i. below .
olber cael iavofYiag similar lac...
SollIe ,laiatiffs la tIIae ClHIIIIY
Shootings
baYa ..tiled for SIUIl1ID01IIdI
NcIUN tile, could .ot prove serioa
iajDrie.. or Ncaa.. their pllpical Afler almosl colliding tlPilll a SIIeri!!'s Departmenl vellic/e, a
injuriel ware IIOl lIIalr claiet
complaiAt about deplllias' Idoa. young man ltd snleral palrol cors and a IIelicopler on a long mase in
• Ille early-morning IIours of Marcil 8, J988. He drove IAroug" dari-
ened city SlmlS and Ille baciyard of a Aouse, tlPound up in a tJ1JareAotise
dislria and came 10 a SlOp beJorea Jena on a dllld-end road.
,
He did nOI raise Ais anns, and lie did not dimb oul of Ille car. He
did nOI raise a tJ1Jeapon. Inslllld, in a fjuici series of nlenlS, IAe man
jammed Ihe car inlO rnlerse, spinning IAe rJPAuls, and banged inlO a

32
patrol car that had pulled up behind. ,4 deputy, with gun drawn, rapped on the driver's

window and jumped back when he saw the youth move suddenly.

Two deputies opened Jire and a/hers Jollowed suit. Thru deputies and a sergeant fired 0/0/01

oJ17 rounds, killing the youth who turned out to be unarmed. In a selliement, his parents were

awarded $1 million.

A Lynwood station deputy decided to check into the activities oj Hispanic men outside a
bar. He and his portner approached three men in the parking lot, one oj whom he said raiud
a gun. Fearing that the man would tum and shoot, Ihe deputy fired six rounds and killed him.

One oj the victim's companions said he TIever sow the victim holding a gun, and there was no

indication that the weapon at Ihe scene was checked Jor fingerprints. The County stilled Jor

$60,000.

Three weeks later, with a ne1J1J partner, the same deputy dr(Jf)e pasl the bar and stopped a
Hispanic man who was crossing the street. He ordered him to rtm(Jf)e his hand Jrom his jacket
pocket, and in doing so, Ihe man rroealed Ihe butt oj a gun. The deputy said he reached OUI his

car window 10 lake it and the man grabbed his wrist with both hands. The man said he raised

his hands on top 0/ the cor and a witness standing across the street co"oboraud this. In fact,
the witness' version oj roents was substantially similar to the man's. In any event, the gun

discharged Jrom within the man's pocket and the man Jell to the ground.
The man alleged Ihalthe deputy mode racial and profane remaris and toid Itim he was
going to die, statml/nlS Ihe deputy denied moling. The man's medicol bills reached $7,000
and the County paid OUI 150,000 as a result of tltis incident. This flPas the second of tllree

shootings Ihe deputy would be involved in be/ore the County stilled this case in 1991. As of
June, tlte deputy was flPorking as a gong investigator in the Safe Streets program.

After spending several hours ;n a bar, an off-dilly sergeant cltased some men Ite safIP

tampering with a cor until he lost sight of them. Then, upon seeing what he thought rRJert I"!

33
some three men in a cor pulling out 0/ a gas station, he fired, because he said he thought one

0/ them had a gun. The person he shot at was an innocent A/rican-American man who hod
just purchased gas. He was not hit and his injuries were limited to psychological trauma.

The incident cost the County $50,000.

Generally, the victims in the 29 shooting cases we reviewed (13 of whom were

killed) were not engaged in violent criminal activity when they were shot. Some of the

victims in these shooting cases were completely innocent of any wrongdoing. Only 8

victims allegedly had deadly weapons at the time of the shootings, and only 3 of these

ever fIred a shot. Moreover, 2 of the latter 3 victims fired at deputies who suddenly

entered their homes during early-morning raids, and the third victim fIred in the dark

when a deputy suddenly yelled ·'freeze."

Few of the shootings appear to have been caused by the deputies' malice or personal

anger. Some of the shootings were accidental and others resulted from the deputies'

misperception that they were threatened. The deputies often seemed to have created

dangerous situations, whether by negligence, overreaction or simply bad decision

making.

Four victims in the cases we reviewed were shot unintentionally, including two inno-

cent bystanders, a robbery victim and a suspect shot when a deputy's gunaccidentally

went off as the deputy reached for the radio. A flfth was shot when he was misidentified

as a suspect. Two unarmed victims were shot in their cars when they bent down and

deputies reportedly feared they were reaching for weapons. Two others were shot when

they reached for "weapons;" one was shot holding a B-B gun and the other was shot when

he reached for a large toy gun. Other unarmed victims who made "threatening move-

ments" included a 16-year-old motorist who exited his truck, allegedly bent over in a

crouch and quickly spun around toward the deputy, and one who said he was shot when

he tripped and stumbled toward a deputy who already had shot at the man's partner

34
following the theft of a six-pack of beer.

The plaintiffs in the shooting cases obtained settlements and judgments totalling
$8.100,982.

Assaults and Batteries

The 93 excessive-force cases reviewed involving allegations of assaults and batteries

by Department personnel fell into the following categories of repeat patterns: (1) assaults

by deputies on innocent people mistakenly identified as criminal suspects, (2) similar

assaults on innocent bystanders and passengers in vehicles stopped by deputies, (3) assaults

on party-goers by deputies responding to "loud-party calls," (4) assaults on suspects during

arrests for minor crimes such as traffic violations. (5) assaults during arrests for more

serious cbarges sucb as drug sales, (6) assaults on inmates in jail and (7) canine attacks.

(Cases involving canine attacks are discussed in Cbapter 5.)

In some of tbe assault and battery cases, the plaintiffs were released after the use of

force, witbout being cbarged with any crime. Most plaintiffs in the majority of the cases

were charged only witb crimes relating to an altercation with Department members, such as

obstructing or resisting a peace officer (Penal Code Section 148), or assault or battery on a

peace officer (P.C. Sections 243(b) or 245 (c». Several plaintiffs were also charged with

minor crimes related to the incident, such as disturbing the peace or fighting in public (P.C.

Section 415), unlawful assembly (P.C. Section 408) or disorderly conduct ( P.C. Section

647). A minority of these charges ultimately resulted in guilty verdicts against the plain-

tiffs. In some cases, the plaintiffs were released after the use of force occurred and were not

cbarged with any crime.

In most of tbese cases, tbe Department members involved claimed tbat their use of

force was in response to the resistance, threatened assault or actual assault by the injured

party. In many of these cases, a verbal dispute arose between a deputy and the injured

party, and then escalated into a shoving match or other type of physical confrontation.

35
 Each side claimed that the other side had started the fight. The plain-

tiffs and the deputies often claimed that the other party had made

profane or obscene comments.

The deputies' report of aa incideat
that occurred the evaaiag of Mother's In several cases, the deputies attempted to arrest the plaintiffs
Day 1984 bore little resemblaace to
the plaiatiff's description of whal simply because they refused to follow the deputies' orders to move
happeaed that nigbt. lbe iacideDl
bep. Wllel deputies saw ateeuge away or to put their hands on the hood of the deputies' car. In these
boy driving a truck without Iaeadlights
cases, the excessive force was used when the plaintiffs resisted their
just before be ,.rlted ia froat of I
home oa alomibl street. The boy was arrests or when friends or family members tried to intervene.
coming from a picnic be bad attended
witla the owlers of thl bOllle, aDd tI. The deputies in many of the cases outnumbered and out-sized
owners wire parking their car ia their
drivew.., just as 1M deputies the injured parties. In many cases, the deputies admitted using some
approacbed the teeaager il froat of
the bOUH. force, but denied using as much force as alleged by the plaintiffs. In

The 42-year-old mea wbo owned lIIe several of the cases, the injuries suffered were inconsistent with the
home wlnted to voucb for Iais teeaage
friend, aad be walked up to a deputy stories told by the deputies. There were often independent witnesses
and asked bim whalwas happtniag.
The deputy described bis aaswer as: who supported the plaintiffs' versions of the incidents and called
-I asked [the IRanI to step up Data lhe
curb aad I would explaia my action into question the deputies' accounts of the incidents.
Iftar I cOlRpleted my busiDeIS willi
A substantial majority of the 93 cases involved the use of
the driver: HOWIVII', II. mu
claimed that lIIe deputy said, -Get"e weapons by Department members. Baton strikes were alleged in 24
bell i. your bouse:

The mea said thll be tllea -told [the of the cases, blows with flashlights were alleged in 18 of the cases,
deputy11 wisbed to observe what was
and the use of a sap was alleged in 4 cases. Seventeen additional
bappeailg.- Buttbl deputy stated
thai the lilia's respoose was ~k cases involved allegations that a combination of these weapons was
yoa.1 dol'l have to listea III YOIL-

Becluse lIIe mla refused to Ita, ap used.

oa lIIe curb, ead Ibe. refastcllll put
In 16 of the cases, the injuries were alleged to be the result of
bis baDds OD tile bDDd of tbt .Put¥'s
car, as ordered by tile deputy, lit was fi~t blows or kicks or a combination of both. The allegations of fist
amsted. ~ lbe deputy escorted bill
to U. car, be saw lIIall large crowd blows or kicks also were made in many of the cases involving the
bad galllered...
use of batons, flashlights or saps. In 5 cases, the plaintiffs' injuries

were alleged to be primarily the result of Department personnel

shoving them against a hard surface, such as the pavement or a wall.

36
Allegations of injuries caused primarily by restraining holds were

involved in 3 cases. A frequent complaint was !.he alleged use of

force after a suspect had been handcuffed or o!.herwise restrained.

BteallH of what tbe deputy
Very few of !.he victims of the assaults in any of these 93 cases described as the lIa11" bostile
actiolll and diose of the crowd,
wert armed with any weapons. Tbe only exceptions included a beer he requested back-up.

bottle that an I8-year-old was allegedly about to throw at a deputy Deputies arrested tile aIao's wife
wbel sU bied to ioterveol.
20 feet away at the time be was bit in the mouth with a baton by a As deputies ased a restraiDing bold
oa Mr, .... screamed iA pain.
sergeant. and a flashlight picked up by a man in a house invaded by appareDtly dDt to IIIgmatioA of a
cbroaic back iujury. The couple's
deputies attempting to disperse a loud party. 13-yur-01d daugbter lleard IIer aad
cried. -Mocaray. Mommy; II she ran
Four cases involved the deaths of the victims of the assaults,
toward die sceDl. Witnesses reported
and 50 of the 93 cases involved wbat could be defined as serious lIIat • deputy hit lIIe girl ia the face
witb a -rouDdbollH- puaclL TIle
injuries, including those resulting in pennanent disability, internal deputy dlllied hittiDg ber II all. IIIIt
ber face was badly ~rvised and ber
injuries requiring surgery, and fractures to skulls, vertebrae, arms, jaw was iDjured.

legs, sboulders, ribs, jaws and noses. Tbe remaining 39 cases TIle CoIIIIty seaJecllbis cae for
$39.9011. NODI of tile deputies iDYolvecl
involved injuries including !.he knocking out of front or side teeth by were discipliDld by die DepartmeDt.

blows to the head; lacerations requiring sutures, often to the head; •

bruised ribs; sprains; jaw displacement resulting in dysfunctions;

contusions;'sometimes over many different areas of the body; neck

and back injUries requiring ongoing therapy; and psychiatric prob-

lems stemming from the use of force.

The 93 assault and battery cases resulted in settlements and

verdicts totalling $9,861,807.

Each of the repeat patterns appearing in these cases is discussed

in more detail below.

37
Innocent People Mistakenly Identified as Suspects

A small (/ 20-pound), mentally retarded man suddenly come into contact with deputies

one evening in ,Yay /985 when he went out behind his apartment building to empty the

trash. He become confused when a patrol cor pulled up and one deputy beckoned to him.

According to him, the deputies called out, "Are you doing dope, son of a bitch?" He become

afraid when they ordered him to get into the cor and resisted their efforts to control Itim.

During the course of the struggle that ensued, the man suffered head lacerations

requiring stitches, bock and leg injuries and emotional distress.

Neighbors were angry because lhey said depulies left the young man down and cuffed

even after they hod been told the man was retarded and not a port of any drug activity in

tlu area.

The ordeal cost the County a 160,000 settlement.

A 29-year-old CIIrpenler was at work one September afternoon in 1985 in a residence in

Compton when he become the victim of a case of mis/olen identity. Unbeknownst to him, a

deputy was in pursuit of a reported stolen CIIr, whiclt was abandoned outside the residence.

Another deputy responding to the scene clzased one of three suspects inside where the CIIrpenltr

was working.

. Confronting botA tIu suspect Ilnd tAe CIIrpenter Ilt gunpoillt, the deptlly orderttitAem to

the groulld. TIle suspect fIIent prone. The CIIrpenter did not.

He protested Ais innocence but to no (Jf)ail. TAe deputy fIIas jointtl by another deputy in

applyillgfora to tAe carpenltr, wlto describttl it as being tArelltenttl, cuffed, cursed, thro.,n

to the grolmd, kicked, bultn, insulted and othtrtlPise trealtd in Iln inAumane, rude, violent

and insolent manner .,itAout aplanation or jl/stificlltion. TIle carpenltr suffered internlll

injuries and required surgery and brief hospitalisation and Aad S13,500 in medical bills.

The County settled lhe matter in /988 for 155,500. Several months afltr the settlement,

tAe deputy who Aad confro,!ltd tAe carpenttr sAot and killed a man in on incident thllt

38
resulted in a $560,300 verdict against the County. He is currently a

superoising line deputy at a county custodial facility.

A deputy mistook a middle-aged woman for a robbery suspect in a The curiosity of • YOUDg . . . i.
Lakewood llrougbt lIim intD coatlct
1989 incident. The small African-American woman was an employee witli Sheriff'. d.putie.. His fear of
u... got lIim iato troubl•.
in Universal City, who had Slayed late one night after work. She was
Wbile w.lkiag to • friead's lIouse.
completing a telephone call to her son for a ride home when her trou- tile ••• 1Iad se••• patrol car pursai.
'lOdler car .Dd tllea beard • crulL
bles began. H.look.d iudl tile craslaed car to III
if 1OIIlIO.. had bee.llurt, ancIMling
A car's headlights blinded Irer, and a 200-pound deputy jumped. no D• • left 10 go Quill billlusineil. It
was tha. tIIat d.puties c.ught up with
from the driver's seat. The woman said she was unaware he was a
bila ad w.nted lit tak.laila back to tile

deputy and panicked when she saw a "whitt face" running at her. She
The youog BI•• objected. explainiDg
said she thought she was going to be mugged so she took off, yelling for lllatbe IIad just bappeaeel..,. bill
d.putie. iasilted .l1li • struggle
thepolice.
reAla.d. Back-up dlputin arrived
.Dd i. tile COlrse of a. altercatio•• tile
The deputy was responding to a call about a car burglary in
......,. was laroke.. I. lail case. iii.
which a black bag was reported missing. He saw the woman standing re.istaac. Ita_eel tro. tear and
IIII:.rtalaty. lOt guilt.
with a blaci bag near the scene of the reported burglary. He said he WIle. quatioaad • to wily Iae bedD'!
cooperated. til. BIll seid, ••.1 1larti4
identified himself, osled her to come to the cor, ond she soid she would.
10 gat scared Hcallll-I just elida'!
But wlsen slse dropped her bog, Ite become more suspicious ond os site bow .UdIy wlaat !My w.re goiog to
do..llIad llaard I. biola scllool tUt
ron, he chosed Iter. He soid she tripped; slse soid she flfJOS pushed d(}flOn. IOIDItiIaas tIIay get • litlle roagla wid!
10M people. AId I didll't baw tor An
Either flfJOY, the 200-pound deputy landed on top of her os she wUl was goillllll UppaL·

screomed ond continued shouting for help. After tAe deputy eluded Aer HI aid. laid . . . 1ust nIIIOrS lid
i.......... lakewood . .riffs
bog ontl determined il tJlJOS hers, nOI stolen,lu rtleosed Aer. ... tbiap of ..... 1Iblre· ... ·tUt
tIaaywe,. overly IUllIliYI _tim..
TAe incident cosl tAe County 0 147,500 Stl/lemenl. ... . . . people il can.Dd laid •
. . . .... • ride lid laid.. tIaeaa helt III
tlleir car. till... of ..... lit.... I did lICIt
We reviewed 12 cases of "mistaken identity," in which innocent bow if dIia w. trill or lOt 1rH.·

people were detained and injured. The injuries suffered by those His case w.lltdad for SZS.DOD.
I
people included a seriously broken ann, broken shoulder. broken

jaw, broken foot, dislocated lrnee, neck and back sprain. and broken

39
teeth, bruises, cuts, bead lacerations requiring stitches, internal injuries, dog bites and

fractured ribs and fingers. At least six people suffered head injuries.

These cases were not simple occasions when a person was stopped, questioned and

released after any misunderstanding was cleared up. Instead, initial confrontations esca-

lated to the alleged use of excessive force by dozens of deputies and resulted in County
payouts totalling $1,073,000.

It may be assumed that innocent people would behave in such a way as to make it

obvious to deputies that they have the wrong person. But these cases suggest otherwise.
The innocent people here exhibited both fear of the deputies and outrage over their treat-

ment Many refused to cooperate, incensed, apparently, that they were being "treated as

criminals." Others resisted the deputies because they were afraid of being hurt.

Because these cases all involved incidents in which the injured parties were ulti-

mately shown to have been completely innocent, the cases serve as vivid reminders of the

importance of avoiding the use of force in all cases, unless it is clearly justified.

Bystanders and Passengers

Afllr 11 grlldulllion pllrry for 11 young mlln one tvening in J 986. one of IAe guesls

crllsAed Aer veAicie inlO 11 porled ur. A erosd glllAertd IlllAe scene, including IAe

mOlorisl's brolher lind IAe guesl of honor. lind mllny olAer pllrry gueslS.

Tilt mOlorisl'S brollur Sll", Ihol slit SIIS upst/Ilnd crying. lind he Ilpprolldled Aer 10 Iry

10 comfort Aer. TAe depulies Illlhe scene ordertd him 10 ItllVe. TAe brolher sllid IAIlI Ae ",IlS

fol/Of/Iing lilt depulies' orders 10 lellve Ihe scene slltn he SIIS grllbbed from beAind. drllgged
30 feel. sJommed silA Ais bllclagainsla Cllr, lurned around and slammed foce firslagainst
IAe car and Inocled unconscious. He flas lold by silnesses IAot Ae sas later Ait in IAe
slomacA silA 0 balon. TIle deputies said IAot he rtfused 10 ItllVe ond stf71cl first, and IAen

IAlY pushed Aim IlgainsllRe Cllr, 1001 him 10 lite ground and hllndcuffed him. In any tvenl,

Ite suffered injuries, including a brolen nose.

40
 Meanwhile, lire guesl of honor saw thai his fatlrer and siSler hod bun orresled, after they

allegedly interfered wilh the paramedics at the accident scene. He approached the deputies and

protested his family's arrests but to no avail. He and the deputies disagreed as to whether he

played "peacemaker" or "troublemaker. .,

He left the scene but later returned as the altercation with the motorist's brother occurred.

He said that he simply walked toward the ollercotion, but the deputies said tltot he ran at a

deputy. He claimed that Ire was then struck by a baton on his head, fell to the ground and was

struck several more times on the head as he covered it with his hands. His injuries included

lacerations to his head and hand, and a broken /inger.

The deputies claimed Ihat he injured his head as he tumbled fOTTmard after two depulies

grabbed him. However, the injuries were consislent with the injured party's description of tilt

incident, and Ihe wilnesSts, including some who were not party guests, supported Ihe occounlS

of bOlh Ihe brolher and Ihe guest of honor. The County paid $72,500 in a settlemenl of lite case

an'sing out of this incident.

The assault and battery plaintiffs in 13 cases were "bystanders," that is, they were not

the suspects that the deputies Originally sought to detain or arrest. but they were present at

the scene and eventually became involved in altercations with the deputies. Some of the

plaintiffs were family members or friends of a detainee who questioned, protested or other-

wise interfered with the detention. Others were passengers of drivers who were pulled over

for traffic violations.

None of these plaintiffs was armed nor were any suspected of criminal acts before their

altercations with the deputies. Their injuries included head lacerations, broken bones,

ruptured disks and nerve damage. The County paid a total of $1,396,900 in these cases.

The cases in which passengers in vehicles stopped by deputies became embroiled in

physical altercations with the deputies often, although not always, involved passengers who

were under the influence of alcohol. At the time of the stop, the passengers were not gUilty

41
of any crime, but their alcohol consumption probably contributed to the altercations.

Some of the incidents involving bystanders stemmed from the problems related to crowd

control. and the protective instincts of family members towards relatives. The deputies were

engaged in trying to question. detain or arrest individuals in the presence of their friends

and/or families. While the deputies probably wanted to deal with as few people as necessary,

concerned onlookers wanted explanations and tried to vouch for the innocence of the people

being arrested. The plaintiffs included a 13-year-old girl, who was met with a "roundhouse"

punch to the face when she saw deputies arresting her parents, and a 73-year-old woman

dying of brain cancer, who was injured when she allegedly interfered with the apprehension

of relatives suspected of participating in a fight in a bar.

In other cases the plaintiffs did not have a personal connection to a suspect but ended up

in altercations with deputies because they apparently were at the wrong place at the wrong

time and became involved in a verbal dispute with deputies.

One evening in 1983 a husband and rIlJife in Iheir fiflies left a bar and rIlJere detained by IrIIJO

depulies rIlJho rIlJere responding 10 a silent alarm at the bar.

According to a rIlJirness, the husband asked a mole deputy rIlJhy he rIlJas detaining them.
The rIlJilness staltd Ihat Ihe dtputy told Ihe husband to get Ais ''fucling Aands" on the patrol cor

and 10 Itll thaI "bitch" to do Ihe some. The husband alleged thaI ofler he protested Ihe use of

foul language, Ihe deputy hilhim 10 limes rIlJith his baton, including several bl()fJgS to Ihe head.
The dtputies clo;med thaI the husband rIlJas obstruclive and refused to cooperate.

TIle Ausbond reponed Ihal a female deputy then hit him about six times in the head rIlJith

her sop. Try;ng 10 proltClher husband, who Aad a heart condition, the wife thm jumped on her

husband's bacl to cover him, and she rIlJas struck several times on her bock wilh a bOlon.

The husband claimed Ihol after he rIlJas handcuffed Ihe female deputy puncAed h;,,! ;n IAe faa
three limes. As a result of Ihe incident, Ihe husband suffered multiple contus;ons and abrasions,

and Ihe wife's prior bacl problems rIlJere aggrovaltd. The County paid $70,000 for tAis incident.

42
Loud-Party Calls

.4ltempts by deputies to break up a "quinceanera" birthday celebration hosted by the

birthday girl's sister and brother-in-law in early / 985 resulted in the filing of a lawsuit by 20
party-goers, including 7 minors, who claimed injuries ranging from sprains, bruises, ligament

damage and chipped teeth to a miscarriage. The plaintiffs' medical bills came to nearly

$20,000.

The first deputies to arrive at the home wnere some 50 people were celebrating at /2:45

a.m. were responding to a third complaint by neighbors. The first two hod been resolved

without incident. The responding deputies, Deputy A and Deputy B, walked into the backyard
without seeking permission and, according to plaintiffs, announced that the party was over

and ordered guests to leave. The party-goers aJ/eged that wnen the host protested, he was
thrown to the ground and handcuffed.
The deputies reported that the party-goers began to shout and scream at them, so they
requested backup and 13 deputies responded. The plaintiffs claimed tnat when the party-goers

did not leove as quickly as he wished, Deputy A began pulling Ihem out of Ine nouse. The

ploinliffs also claimed Ihal he seized Ihe hosl's 27-year-old nepnerm, nilnim wiln a bOlon and

grabbed a 25-year-old rrooman. Whm tne rrooman's nusband tried 10 pullner back, Deputy A

nitnim on the head rroilh a bolon and in the eye rroillt a sop, according to the plaintiffs. A
neighbor rroho was tlDolChing from inside his house reported Ihot Ite sarro this man being loken
outside and beaten and kicked by several other deputies. Tne hosl's tlDife claimed she rroos held

by Ihe neck and pUI in on ormloek by deputies. Others claimed similar Itondling and injuries.

For nis port, Deputy A claimed then rroos a fight going on beltJDeen ltJDo guests and tho/

someone jumped him rrohm he lried to breok il up. Deputy A and Deputy B alleged Ihollhe

Siluolion looled lile a gong fignl and required quid oel;on.

The odull plaintiffs rroert all young pOrtnlS rroith small ehildrtn, all employed and hod no

prior arreSI records. A neighbor reported Inollne couple tlDno nosted Ihe party rroere qu;el ne;gh-

43
bars who rartly gave parties.

Six of the plaintIffs were arrested for disturbing the peace, failurt to disperse, resisting

or obstructing a peact officer, and battery on a peact officer. Charges against one of the

plaintiffs were never filed by the District Attorney, and all charges against the others were

dismissed at trial for lock of evidence.

Most of the plaintiffs' allegations of force were against Deputy A, who has sinct left the

force. The Deportment had rectived several prior citizens' complaints of similar actions by

Deputy A, all of which hod been found to be "unsubstantiated." Some involved al/egations

of exctssive force and racial remarks by Deputy A, who was Caucasian, against Hispanics.

Eight of the other deputies named as defendants also hod received prior citizens' complaints

for excessive force.

An lAB investigation into tlte incident was closed because tlte plaintiffs' criminal

defense attorney would not allow his clients to be inftroitfJPed. lAB recommended tltat no

further action be token against ony of tlte deputies involved.

The County paid $225,000 to settie tlte cose.

The County paid out $ 1.252,009 in verdicts and settlements arising from 12 cases

alleging the use of excessive force during incidents involving deputies responding to

"loud-party" calls. In addition the County paid another $925,000 to settle a case about an

incident that occurred after a party had ended and involved injuries inflicted by deputies

on a man they had come into contact with earlier during their response to a complaint

about a loud party be was attending.

The injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in these cases included a fractured elbow and

nose, chipped teeth, face, head and skin lacerations, neurological damage, aggravation of

a pre-existing beart condition, bruises and sprains in the back, shoulder, knee, face, cbest,

wrists and groin, miscarriages and one death caused by a blood clot resulting from a

broken hip.

44
,.

These cases involved very similar facts. The incidents almost always took place in

private residences, and the plaintiffs in many cases indicated their resentment about the

deputies' intrusion into their homes.

Many of the cases involved family celebrations that included two or three generations

of family members, so that young children and middle-age or older people were present.

The plaintiffs in several of these cases included women and children. The celebrations

dispersed by deputies included birthday panies, a wedding reception and a baptism. Other

parties were gatherings of teenagers or young adults simply out to have a good time.

The plaintiffs in these cases were not "criminals," and none was armed with any

weapon during the conflicts with deputies with the exception of one man who was holding a

flashlight. The charges filed against the plaintiffs in these cases were limited to charges

arising out of their interaction with deputies (resisting or obstructing a peace officer, or

assault or battery on a peace officer) or charges related to their conduct at the parties

(disturbing the peace, failure to disperse, or disorderly conduct). In most of these cases the

charges against the plaintiffs were dismissed or the plaintiffs were acquitted of all charges

after a trial.

These cases all took place at night, and all involved crowds of people, although the size

of the crowds varied. Many of the pany-goers were, to some extent, under the influence of

alcohol.

The cases involved crowd-control problems and problems related to the intervention by

protective family members similar to those involved in the bystander cases. In some cases,

there were between 10 to 20 deputies present, so there were "crowds" on both sides. The

party-goers tended to rush to the assistance of anyone involved in a dispute with the

deputies, and the deputies of course rushed to control anyone who appeared to be a physical

threat to a deputy.

The perspectives of the party-goers and the deputies were predictably different in these

cases. The party-goers could have reasonably felt that they were innocently enjoying a

4S
social or family gathering, drinking and celebrating. In contrast, the deputies could have

reasonably seen thel!1selves as facing a potentially hostile crowd of people under the

influence of alcohol. In most of the cases the complaints by neighbors were limited to

complaints about noise, but in some cases the neighbors also complained that party-goers

were blocking driveways with cars, throwing bottles or causing other disturbances.

There were witnesses to the use of force in each of these cases. Because of the like-

lihood of the presence of witnesses at incidents involving parties and the fact that a

person injured by deputies during a party at a private residence may be a particularly

sympathetic plaintiff, the risk of civil liability is high if excessive force is used.

The similar fact patterns present in these cases suggest that the incidents were

predictable, and could have been avoided.

Suspects Arrested for Minor Crimes

On the night of August 17, 1981, 0 mon and his girlfriend hod 0 long, loud orgument.
The mon fIlJOS intoxicated and repeotedly telephoned the locol Sheriff's station for assistance.
Finally, after deciding thotthe man rmas unlofllJful/y tying up emergency telephone lines,

stotion personnel sent tr;;o deputies to his home.

The deputieS entered through the open door of the second-floor opartment ond encoun-

tered the drod mono As the girlfriend rmotclzed, the deputies pushed the mon out into tile

hoJ/rmoy ond shoved him foce first into 0 rmo//. TIley Itondcuffed him ond he asld tltem rmhy

tltey rmere orresting him. The lorger deputy, rmho reportedly stood 6 feet, 3 inclzes to// ond

fIlJtighed 250 to 300 pounds, then punched the mon tr;;;ce in tlte clzeel, cousing him to bounce

off of the fIlJo// ond fo// to the floor.

Despite hoving olnady rtSlroined the mon, the lorge deputy sot on the hondcuffed mon

and repeatedly hit him on the bocl of the heod rmith 0 flashlight, occording /0 the girlfriend.

TIle mon mooned ond tempororily lost consciousness. He come to os the deputies brough/

him /0 his feet and dragged him dormn the ho// and dormn the stoirs. The mon doimed thot

46
 the deputies used his head to ram open the door at the bottom of the stairs. .Vter the deputies
took him to two hospitals, they released him.

A couple of days after the incident, the girlfriend took the man back to tilt hospital.

o He spent the next week in the intensive care unit and another month in a hospital room.

The doctors found that he suffered a fractured siull and brain hemorrhaging. Seven months

later, he hod the first of several seizures that recurred for the next few years.

The large deputy insisted that the man instigated the struggle. He did admit that Ite

punched the man twice in the face. However, his explanation for the three 3 1/2-inch lacera-
tions at the back of the man's head was that the man struck his head on the wall and floor
in the hallway as a resull of the punches. The deputy added that the man continued 10 resist
by punching and kicking.

The County paid $325,00010 Slltle the man's lawsuit. As of ,Yay 1992, the large deputy

was still with the Department.

On March 25, 1985, an intoxicated African-American man was walking on a South Los

Angeles street at night, Shouting obscenities. Deputies suspected Iltat Ite was under the influence

of PCP, but this suspicion was not substantiated. Thty allmptttl to apprehend the man and

an alterca/ion ensued. A crowd gathered and tllJa/dzed.

Witnesses alleged that the deputies called the onlookers "niggers, " and that four deputies

beat the handcuffed man witlt flashligllls ond batons and licled him os he lay defenseless on

the ground. The deputies' otllJn arrest report aclnotllJledged that three deputies administered 20

to 30 blotllJs, tllJhim tltty claimed tllJere necessary to OfJtrCome tlte man's resistonce. Tlte man

suffered bruised ,ribs and lacerations to Itis face and arms, and the County stilled Itis lawsuit

for $50,000.

We reviewed 30 cases based on injuries occurring in the course of arrest or detention

for "minor" crimes such as traffic violations, disturbing the peace or public drunkenness.

The plaintiffs in these cases obtained settlements and judgments totalling $3,127,898.

47
 Injuries included: fractured skulls, ribs, vertebrae, jaw, nose,

shoulder, elbow, wrist and leg: concussions, seizures and other

neurological damage; a punctured and infected arm; circulation

A combiaatioa of druakea revelry,
lbe obesity of I Sberiffs deputy and problems in the legs; knee and groin injuries requiring surgery;
•coatempt of cop· led to I benDO
wbicb resulted ia tile paymeat of a perforated eardrum; broken and lost teeth; damage to an artificial
nearly $1 milliol to compensate I
25-year-old maa for la ·exploded-
foot; aggravation of pre-existing beart and back problems; and
testicle, bi, friead for ruptured disc,
contusions, abrasions, swelling and strains allover the body.
ia bi$lIack and bis fatber for addi·
tional injuries. It also resulted ia tbe Tbere were also two fatalities.
discharge of ODe deputy iaYOlved ia
th. Sept. 30, 1919, incident bowever, About half of these cases arose from detentions of drivers or
a second deputy i.,olved in the liter·
calioa DOW works II I field traiaiDO pedestrians for traffic violations. In some cases the cause for the
officer.
detention appeared to be questionable, as in the case of a man
The 25-year·old lUll had attended I
party ia bis IplrtlDeat campl.x whicla stopped for walking in a residential street that bad no sidewalk, or
resulted ia two Daise complliats by
aeighbors duriag the .veaing. Two to be inadequate, as in a case of a driver wbo was detained without
deputies, called bere Deputy A aad
Deputy B, respoaded to ODe of tbose probable cause for driving under the influence.
call' Ind DO trouble 'DlUed, but the
deplltieslater said tlaat tb. 25-y....•
In a 1984 incident, a man flIJith an open container of alcohoJ in
old man bad been druak. obaoxious
and belligerent. AI 3:30 1.11 .. Deputy A his car, flIJho flIJas on probation after pkading dOfllJn from driving
aad Deputy B responded to I
aeigbkr', cOllplliat IIaaII dozeD under 'he influence to reckless driving, drOfJe e"aticaJJy and led four
juveniles were makiag noise lad
throwiot ~tlIeslDd garNg•. TIl. Malibu station deputies on a moderate-speed fretfllJoy chose from
party was onr aad tbl'( foud 110
jUYeailes, but they did fiDd the zs. Agoura, across the counly line, 10 Thousand Ools. The driver become
year-old man ia th. carport boldi..
two beer bottles. T1te .... latar said
involved in a flIJrestling mota flIJit!t Dtputy A, leading Dtputy B to
that be bad goD. to tb. carport to pick
slrile him at leoSf six times on ,"e kfl leg flIJilh his balon.
up trullieft liter 1IIe party aad to bel,
a friead clela off SOIDt 11111 throwa OD The four dtputies eventuoJJy handcuffed him, but contended t!tOI
ber car by party-goers.

The deputies ordered tbe IDID to

the man's flIJeighl and his resistance mode il difficult 10 reslroin !tim.
return to bi$ Ipartm.nt. ..
The man claimed that he did not resist and that Deputy B punched him
in the head and upper bad, bUI that !It then blocked out. He could not

explain how his left leg flIJOS injured.

48
 No one other than the deputies and some California Highway

Patrol personnel, who supported their stories, witnessed the alterca-

tion. But key evidence in the case was till man's shallertd left leg,
H. said be was 01 priVlte property.
broken in 10 places, that required bone graft surgery and remained Aller II Irgame .... the mill wllked
blCk 111 his Ipal1lll..... but betore
permanently 3/4 of on inch shaner than his right leg. Another factor slamming til. door,'" tulll8d IDd said
10 Deputy A. WilD was very large IIId
was the publicity that Deputies A and B hod allramd because of other oVlIWeiglit. "Why dOl" you get I real
fuckiag job, you fat assr
lawsuits against them. The man received 0$500,000 selllement.
Deputy B told Deputy AIII Irrest billl.
TIley adIIIiaed tlaat llaeir daeilion W8I
A federal grand jury recently indicted four deputies on charges made il response to llis -,..1 job-
tau., Ihbougb al arrest for public
stemming from their 1987 beating of a trucker who was sleeping in Iris drunk.lDlelS required I fiading that
tlte yOUDg IDIII W81 lIDabl.1D care for
truck in a parking lot and tlreir alleged perjury at tire trucker's subse-
bit OWl! safety.
quent criminal trio/. Tire trucker selfled witlr the County for $150,000 Deputy A testified be caugbt the 1111
before be entente! his apartmeal
for injuries, which included a severe nead laceration and circulation
However, reports froll several inde-
peldeaf witDessessuppor1ed tbe
problems in nis legs.
IRal'Stistilaooy u..t ... Wit iDSide
wbu Deputy A b..ged 01 bis door
One deputy's extreme actions resulud in a traffic violator's death witll iii, NtOI IDd llael relCbed il III
pull II. Old liter be opaDld tJae door.
in 1984. The deputy nod stopped the 54-year-old man but could not
A straggle eaUld. 1\e . .', frieod
access computer data 10 determine wnetlur any outstanding worronlS .Id .....r, wH IIad 11II11Iellded tile
,erty, we,. .....,. 11Ie . .1 celled
for tne driver existed. The deputy said that tlu man's altitude hod oailD lIis friend for !lei, lid Deputy A
cllillled tile fri.ad bit bill. T1te frieed
bun hostile and unpleasant. Subsequently, the deputy ltorned of a lIid be lIIe,.,., tried III pIli th....

traffic warrant and, several times, It/t his potrolorto and entered
WI" fnI. D.puty A. wbo llit tile
frind w~ bit fist IIMI bled tile IIIU
i. tJae graiL Deputr Acilled III
another jurisdiction to visit the driver's nome and try to "inform" him D.puty Bfor assistuce, aDd Deputy B
rHioecl for backup nita. D.,.., A
about the warrant.
coati laid to IInIggie with til. young
• •1 .1Id lIit II.. ildle grail! willi
Approximately two monlhs after the traffic stop, the deputy
•II' wbile tryi", ID pul/Ii. 0111 of
...,.1tIHIIt.
entered the driver's back door. In Ihe course of a struggle with the
s...,.1 deputies t .. belped Deputy A
5-/00t, 7-inclt, 153-pound man, the substantially larger deputy used a laaadcuff tbe III.....

sop 10 strike the man 7 to 10 times in the head, allegedly fearing that

the man would grab tire deputy's gun. The man's skull was fractured

49
 in several places and he died 13 hours later. The County paid

$150,00010 Ihe man's family members 10 selfle their lawsuit; Ihe

deputy retired Iwo years later on a slress-related disability claim.

Several witneSSll reported that
thre, or lour deputies bit !be lIIaR on
th. beck witb NtDDI 's be lay DO Another common situation that spawned several of these
th. ground. Tbua witnesses also
statad daat after most of tilt other lawsuits was the deputies' response to calls about disturbances,
d'puties had goAl illtD tile apar1meat.
they saw Deputy It repeatadly kkk
including domestic arguments and large street fights. In several of
bim ia the beck aDd legs after III was
the cases when the deputies responded to disturbance calls, deputies
handcuffed and lying oa the ground.
No deputy adraitted to hitting him oa arrived when no physical altercation was taking place, either
the beck witb a batoa, tad Deputy A
deaied IticltiDg lliaJ. because it had already ceased or because it was a noisy verbal argu-
The witnesses were undeaiably
ment that had never become violent
unbiased and indepeDdeat.
They iDCluded the daughter of I los
Aageln police officer, a friend of In a 1990 incident that resulud in litigation, ~o brothers appar-
senral sheriffs deputies who hoped
ID apply III IItcorae ODe bimseH, lad ently had stopped fighting by the time deputies arrived in response to (J

th. girlfriend of a deputy DOt involved

ia the incident. diSlurbana call about a fight. The deputies reported that the brothers
Deputy B lAd several other deputies made obscene and insulting comments to them that escalaud into an
broke down a lledroom door and
subdued tbe friend atter a wrestling alurcation in which both brothers sustained head wounds from
mate II oa a lied. Deputy B admitted
bitting the trieDd th,.. times on the numerous baton or flashlight blows. The trmo lead deputies received
sid. of bis chest. but denied makiag
aay otber balDa strik.L Of the other
commendations for their actions, but the resulting lormsu;t cost the
deputies wllo participated i.
County $90,000 to settle.
lubduing the biend aad th. olber
deputy aad two lIfIIelAts who
witlllssed tbe struggl., 1lOIII recalled Overall, the facts in these cases give the sense that even if the
aay Ntoa strikes to bis back.
deputies lawfully detained or arrested the suspects, and even if the
The mu's father IIad awalt, ..d aDd
wandered out of bis roOlllIll Itt WN! suspects were drunk, profane and belligerent, the suspects' actions
was bapp.ning.ln their PurAit 01 th.
friend. deputies caused hira ID faU did not warrant the deputies' violent reactions or the resulting
inlD tbe bathroom tad contiaaed to
pusb him Nck iato th. batbroom ... injuries. In at least two of these cases, the deputies involved were
fired or forced to resign due to their use of excessive force on

suspects who were verbally abusive but posed no physical threat.

50
Suspects Arrested for More Serious Crimes

In September, 1988, two brothers, ages 12 and 14, Slole a car and wbea II. tried ta lelV•• 1be deputi.1
claillad the fatller disreprded their
led deputitS on a high-speed chase after ronning a SlOP sign. Six orders aad attempted ta block thair
p.... ta the friead. 10 ... was al78Sled
deputies pursued them to a shopping center. The boys said they w"e for interfering with a pNce officer
aDder PC 141.
ordered out of the cor at gunpoint and that they complied with the
The blows to tile ...·1 grail r.sulted
deputies' orders to lie On the ground. They claimed that they were i. a fractured testicle tllat a doc1Dr
dllCribed • llaviall -exploded.- It
beaten after they were restrained. bad 10 be .rgically r.moved. la acldi-
tio., the liaR lIIffered allnlroll
The deputies claimed that the boys did not immediately comply but
COlltDSiODl aad welts. ilcludinll

instead fled on foot. In groups of three, the six deputies chased each boy IIVlrIIllianr uta.slaaped walts 01
lIis back. a severe laceratio.
and eventually caught both of them. The deputies stattd that the 14- requiriag saturelta lIis leg aad
emotional proble... requiring psyclli-
year-old kichd a deputy in the groin, and the 12-year-old also atric belp.

The force lied OR the trielld resulted

violently resisted. However, one of the deputies involved later said
ia ruptured discs ia llil back wlUcll
that the boys did not resist as described in tire arrest report and that required IlIrg.ry, and coatusioas so
IIftre tIaat a wilDess reported that
tire deputies used excessive force in restraining them. his .atirelllck alMl buttocks werl
black aad bl ...
The deputies hit the boys with flashlights and batons. The 14-
The lilA claimed that although lit aad
year-old hod 13 well-defined baton marks on his bock as well as lIis ffiead w.re badly iajlll'lcL Deputy
B drov. tIIHI a""Bld aiIDleaty for a
contusions and lacerations 01/ over his body. In addition, he claimed period of tim. before takiag u.. ta •
lIospitai. TIle uamiaalicNl of the lIal
that he suffered blurry vision, dizzy spells and sporadic memory loss. was excruciatillllly paiaful. ,et
D.puty B teUDted lIim duriag the
Tire deputies insisted that lit fell and hit his head on a roil ofI " procad..., Kcordiallo allegatio ..
made ., tbImaa. Deputy BdeDi.
sustaining flashlight and baton blOfJDs. Meanwhile, the 12-yeor-old
. .king .ay obaoxious COlllllllat. 11111
aa ."rg_acy roOIl lIune coDfiraed
hod suff"ed on indentation in his shin, contusions and loarotions to
that .... o_red Deputy Bout of ....
his head, face and limbs, and dislocation of his jaw. . . .iail, room I I a result of lIis
re . . rb 10 th. UL T1Ie cIoc:tor told
This incidtn/ cost IRe County a $45,000 smlemen/. Among IRe D.puty 8 10 te~ tIM ... 10 the or

deputies involved, one now is a sergeant and another is a training

officer WRO ROs received nearly a dozen commtndotions.

51
 In an incident in /986, several deputies pursued some young men

who reportedly vandalized the Sheriffs Academy trainingfieid and

Lo. Angeles County Medical Center,
bill instead III took bim to 1111 statioa caught up with two suspects in a truck. According to the deputies one
to be Iraaslenad latH. Deputy B
tastified III.. III did lIIi. becaUH tbe suspect, age /9, exited the truck and kicked one deputy in the groin,
doctor did IIOt talillilll to takl laim
-iJamecr..tely" pushed a second deputy and attempted to hit a third. Those three

TIll .... claimed tbat Dlputy B deputies, plus a fourth, used force to restrain the suspect, who kicied
continuld to tauat him It the station.
callinglliID I -crybaby.- Another and swung at them.
deputy reported bearing SODleonl call
tbe ilia I -crybaby- It 1111 station.
.411 four deputies administered at least one blow to the head or

Wb.. tile fathe, wl.laua to Ibl face with a flashlight or sap. The suspect's sku", jaw and nose were
statioa, III was vlrbally disruptive
Ind coatiaued to complaia lad qua- fractured. The suspect claimed that he was handcuffed when the
tioa wby III bad beea Imstael.
accordiag to deputils. A lientlnaat
beating occurred. The County paid $ 45,000 to settle the lawsuit
Iscol1ing till fatlaer dowa lllilaall
arising out of this incident. Ail four of these deputies were named as
pasbed iii. up agaillll III. win while
. boIdiag bis DICit. TIIIlielllHalll defendants in other excessive-force lawsuits. Two of the deputies
reponed tlaat III did Ibi. because tbe
father mad. I .ddt. mowllllllat willi involved no longer are with the Department.
bis buds. 11Ie father "stified It was
ia respoDII til lais Cllliag tile Ii. .
tauat u ·assbo .... In the 12 cases we reviewed in which the plaintiffs based their
TIle ....r Rfftrtd two bnl•• ribs claims on injuries allegedly suffered in the course of apprehension
.... a Ink.. toe as. result of tile
iacidut. and arrest for more serious criminal violations, the County paid out
TIll District AItDnIIy &Ied 110 CWgeI
.l1li...., of tile plaiatifts. 1be DA
revilwed tile iacideat ... _idId ao.
a total of $782,000. In two of the cases, the plaintiffs principally

challenged the lawfulness of their arrests and not the force used in
to filt crimiul clwvtl . . . MY
deputils; III. Depar1lDe.... lAB ines- executing the arrests. However, in the remaining 10 cases, the
tiptin resabd ill DepllJ A'I
dischargl about Hn.1DOIItbs ago. arrestees suffered significant injuries, including one man who
Iltboagllbe is Ipplililll tllil decisio.
to till Cml Servic. COIDIIIissio.... suffered a heart attack after a struggle to restrain him in a patrol car.

In five other cases the plaintiffs suffered broken bones ~d1or lost

teeth.
The worst damage in these cases apparently resulted from

52
 -

deputies who used far more force than necessary to restrain suspects.

Most of the plaintiffs appear to have resisted in some fashion,

whether by leading the deputies on a pursuit, physically struggling

Curve. -vaiost Deputy Bwar.
with them or simply not complying with the deputies' orders. deemed to" -U8Il1N\lIItiallcr
aflef III lAB inYistiptioll, lAd be
Nevertheless, with the exception of one plaintiff who had a boule receiv.d no disc ipliDIII I result of
tbis iaciclelll. No other d.puty
raised in his hand, all of the plaintiffs in these cases were unarmed. illvolvtd ill the iacidtat received lay
discipliDL Bat the CoIIIIty paid
The deputies often were larger than the plaintiffs and/or outnum-
thAI_gil tIaI H.: S!I25,D011 ill casll
bered them. p..,..ats. pllII coverage of m.dical
cOltl for the friend'. ~ack sarg.,.,.
Independent witnesses in some of these cases supported the Today Deputy B is workinga.1 field
traillillg officar, respoasibll for
plaintiffs' claims that they were intentionally beaten while
traiDing DeW deputies iD!be ,.mr-
restrained. One plaintiff was under the influence of pcp and may mince of their duties.

have been difficult for the deputies to control, but witnesses said he
•
was pulled out of the patrol car after being restrained and was beaten

a second time. Another man suffered fractured ribs and severe

neurological damage from a beating in his home that he said

occurred while he was handcuffed during the execution of a search

warrant.

In some cases that involved a pursuit of a suspect by deputies,

the subsequent beating appeared to be a "payback" on the part of an

angry deputy.

Inmates Assaulted in Jail

An inmote in custody in the Centrol Jail in 1990 claimed in his

lawsuit that he was strucl in the groin by deputies, slammed against

the rrPall and talen to an isolation cell when he rrPas beaten rrPith a

flashlight in the head and ribs, because he had had trouble spreading

his legs during a search due to vomit on the floor. The deputies denied

53
the chargu and said that his injuries occurred when a very large deputy shoved him against

tilt wall a/the cell, striking his legs against a metal bench. This incident resulud in

$28,000 in medical npenses and cost the County $325,000. Three a/the deputies involved

were discharged.

An inmate at the County Jail in /985 was pulled aUla/ line by a deputy a/ler rtturning

from a meal because one of his hands was hanging oUlside his jumpsuit in violation of an

order Ihal inmates were to keep both hands in their pockels. Tlte inmate said that Itis jump-

suit was missing a pocket. He alleged that after Ite slood against a wall for 5 to 10 minutes,

he was struck in the ribs by tlte deputy and then hit in the eye. The deputy said tlte blows were

a result o/Ihe inmate's atUmpt to hil him with his elbow. He and anotlter deputy Ihen
allegedly hilthe inmate repeatedly in the head and torso, causing him to /011 to IIze ground,

where again the deputies allegedly hit him 15 10 20 limes. The deputies' version o/IIze story

included only a couple of punches. Tire County paid $/00,00010 settle Ihe cast broughl by

Ihis inmate.

With one exception, the 13 jail-beating cases we reviewed involved single victims

wbo were unarmed and wbo were beaten or otherwise injured in a custodial setting.

Plaintiffs in these cases obtained settlements and verdicts totalling $1,305,000. The

inj'¢es were particularly severe in these cases. One man became permanently lame,

another suffered a dislocated sboulder, another required a splenectomy, another bad a

testicle removed, another lost bis peripberal vision, two required nose surgery, and four

suffered broken bones.

At least six plaintiffs in the jail-injury cases were beaten after they did not comply

with deputies' orders or otherwise created disturbances. A seventh said be was asleep

wben deputies attacked bim. In two of the cases, victims were injured by other inmates

and alleged that jailers knowingly placed them in cells in wbicb they were likely to be

attacked. One man lost an eye wben be was stabbed after being placed in a module with

54
r

Crips gang members in spite of the fact that he was wearing red (Bloods' gang colors) on

his tennis shoes.

Two of the cases involved female inmates at the Sybil Brand Institute. One was

injured when she was held in an "armlock," and the other was injured during what the

deputies called a "takedown."

Two of the jail-beating cases were specifically alleged to be racially motivated.

An ,4Jrican-American inmate who punched out a Caucasian inmate at the Wayside (now

Pitchess) Honor Rancho alleged that deputies belonging to a white supremacist gang of

deputies known as the "Wayside Wllities" subsequently pulled him from his barracks and bear

him to "teach him a 1m Ott " about beating white guys. This 1989 incident resulted in $4,800

in medical expenses and cost the County $60,000.

One morning in J986, as ;nmaus at the Hall of Justice Jail lined up for breaEfast, a

deputy ordered an AfricaTt-American inmate to hang up the telephone, allegedly calling him an

"asshole" and a "nigger. " An altercation ensued, involving several deputies and a few other

African-American and Hispanic inmates. One of these inmates was left permanently unable to

wall as a result of the incident. That evening, a different group of deputies, who said they

were executing a contraband uarclr, went from cell to cell, allegedly pulling out African-

American inmates and beating them. The County paid $175,000 to six inmates to settle the

resulting lafl)suit.

Investigation of Incidents and Discipline

Investigations

In almost all of the cases we reviewed, some use of force was reponed by Department
I
I
II 55
personnel immediately after the incident occurred. Tbe use of force was determined to be

justified by a supervisor at the station in most of the cases in wbich it was reported. The
first level of scrutiny available to the Department in determining whether the force used

was excessive is the examination of arrest reports, wbere a notation must be made of the

use of force after an oral report is made. The fact that the use of force was determined to

be justified in cases that later led to large recoveries by the injured parties calls into ques-

tion the effectiveness of this level of review.

Procedures recently adopted by the Department require the watcb commander to fill
out a form about any incident involving a "significant" use of force. a visible injury or a

complaint of pain, or any other indication of misconduct, and to interview the injured

person. He/sbe is required to determine whether the force used was "objectively reason-

able" and to recommend further action if necessary. The unit commander then reviews

the forms submitted by the watch commander. These procedures improve upon the

former policy. wbich required the watcb commander to determine wbether the force was
necessary and required no further action if be/sbe determined that it was necessary. The

new procedures sbould raise the level of awareness of all watch commanders about the

seriousness of any incident involving injury or pain to an arrested person and, if imple-

mented and enforced, should improve the initial investigation of excessive force inci-

dents.

Our review showed that the arrest repon almost always was at wide variance with the
allegations made by the plaintiff in a lawsuit. In fact, the two versions were often so

diverse that a deputy's report alone could not have alerted a supervisor to a problem. It is

for this reason that the reviewing officer must take into account all the information avail-

able to him/ber, including the apparent seriousness of the arrested party's injuries, the

need for medical treatment, the arrest cbarges, the statements of the suspect/victim, the

statements of wimesses, supplemental reports by other deputies, the oral repon of use of

force and the arresting deputy's report.

56
r

Although all of these factors are important in determining

whether the use of force in a particular case was "objectively reason-

able." three factors that have led to large plaintiff recoveries in

The County paid $150.000 il 198910
excessive force litigation should be given substantial weight. HUle the claims of I mil injured
whe. I deputy pushed bim 1IIrougili
The first such factor is the severity of a suspect's injuries. wire-reillfon:ed door window. but Ibe
I1atiol commander's report I few
Force that has resulted in life-threatening injuries or serious or clays .ft« lite iDcidellt il 1913 blamed
the iajured ml.1IId lYeI tbe window.
painful injuries such as broken bones. knocked-out teeth and lacera-
lad llIo_rated IIMi deputy.
tions requiring sutures. particularly on the head, should not be The inc ide. begl. OAI light wilen
I deputy Imsted I driver for drullk
readily approved. especially in cases in which the injured party was driving lad then Imsled tbe
plIIIDger for Ming drunk IDd disor-
not arrested for any crimes other than those associated with the alter-
derly. A back... p deputy reported that
cation with the deputy. the passeDger WIS belligerent lad
called 1IIe deplllies·pip; aad !be
The second factor is the arrest charges filed against the .nesting deputy stated i. tile Irrest
report Iblt the driver lad tile
injured party. A substantial majority of the cases we studied pllllDger spat o. 1IIe wiadows and
dasbbNnI of lIis patrol car IS be
involved no criminal activity by the plaintiff before contact with waited ollbide for the tow truck. 11Ie
driver claimed tbaI the Imsling
deputies. Where the only arrest charges against a suspect are deputy told die passeager tIIat ....
WI. goiDg to get it.. kt the deputy
resisting or obstructing a peace officer, or battery of or assault on a
deaiad beiDglagry or mlldDgI
peace officer, the use of force should automatically be subject to a 1IIrel"

Attlle strioa. .. the deputy lICorted

higher level of scrutiny. The cases we reviewed suggest that the use the badcaffed ,I. .ager iato IIMi
ltatioa, be ,ulbed 1h paIIIaDlf's
.of force should also be examined carefully in cases in which the
laud tIaroup the jail door wiadow.
llllUbiag two Huts of regular gila,
arrest charges filed against the injured party are limited to disturbing
I ...... 01 plexiglaa lad JAOre tbal
the peace, unlawful assembly or disorderly conduct. 10......... of wire. n. d.pldy Slid
daat the p_ager was resistiag Inr
The fact that the arresting deputy claims that the use of force forwlrd IIOYelDlat lad 1IIat lie
iatilctively Ibned tile passeager
was in response to an assault by the injured party should not auto- iato ... wiadow Wllel the plSHag.r
saddellly paW agai . . iii...ad
matically resolve the issue of the appropriateness of the use of force. stepped o.lIis toac. ..

If, as we recommend, deputies are trained how to avoid or defuse, to

the greatest extent possible, the kind of arguments that may lead to

assaults or threatened assaults by angry people on deputies, the use

57
 of force in connection with such an argument should not necessarily

be approved. The officer approving the use of force must take into

account the avoidability of the incident.

but the driver said that the deputy
pulled tile passenger'1 bead back The third factor in determining the reasonableness of force
approximately two te.t aAd rlllUl'led it
straight througb tbe wiAdow.
used is the existence of witnesses who support the claim that
Photograpbic evidenCi of the damage
the injuries resulted from excessive force. The testimony of such
to tbe window supported lilt driver'1
account of the incid.1It. At tbe time of witnesses can lead to substantial liability in a subsequent civil case,
the incident. the paAeagerwu41
Y'II'I old. 5 feet. 9 inchtl talland so it makes no sense for the watch commander to discount such testi-
w.ighed 170 pouacls, while th. deputy
wal21 years old, 6 feet. 3 incbes tall mony at this early stage.
and w.igbed 210 pouads.
We understand the tendency of the Department to believe its
In additioa to a b.adlaceratioa. the
passeager suffered major .erve, deputy's version in a dispute involving conflicting stories.
artery and 1II\llCit damage to bis rigbt
anD and .Ibow. H. also attributed a Department members have analogized the relationship of the watch
subsequent stroke to the damage ht
suffered in thil iDCident. commander and a patrol deputy reponing on the use of force against

In laia report four dap after the iDCi· a suspect to a parent-child relationship, where the parent naturally
dH1. th. ltation commander
coaclacled that tbe deputy ·coAdaeted tends to believe the word of its child over the word of another's
bills.H properl( aad described the
injaries al ·an .fortunlde COIlA· child. But a "parent" should not automatically believe his "child" if
qUlace of_Ith. '-DOer's) aggres-
sive actioaanel..ldIe deputy's) ruc-
the hard evidence, including the testimony of witnesses, supports the
tio.: The cOllllllader added that
other "child" or if his "child" is accused again and again of the same
-there is strong suspicion in lIlY lIind
that tbe glan may bave bad uncle- thing by different people.
tect8d flaws or weuDeSIII wbicb
allowed it to break lllroDOb .. it did.• In many of the cases we reviewed, the arrest reports did not
An lAB investigation i .... dIe
contain names of any witnesses to the use of force, or only the
deputy'l usa of forea coacludetl
lIIat the cbarges agaiaat •• names of witnesses who would support the deputies' version of the
were-aafoUDded: He recti. DO
discipline lor ilia incident. Today. incident The witnesses who were ready to testify in support of the
be is a patrol deputy at the TlIDplt
Citr statioa. plaintiffs' case during the litigation often were not listed at all in the
• Department's reports prepared at the time of the incident. In some

cases, private investigators were hired by the defense attorneys

representing the Department to locate witnesses who had not been

58
r

interviewed at the time of the incident. These investigations were hampered by the fact that

the incidents usually occurred several years previously, and, for this reason, the identity

and location of many witnesses could not be determined.

Some units in the Department now make a point to locate and preserve all evidence of

the use of force at the time of the incident; including the names of all witnesses, regardless

of whether the evidence preserved is favorable or unfavorable to the Department This prac-

tice is absolutely necessary, and a much-needed improvement over general routine, to the

extent it is implemented.

The new Departmental procedures relating .to the watch commander's initial investiga-

tion of the use of force will be useful only if the watch commander and hislber superiors are

held accountable in the event it is later determined, in the litigation process or otherwise,

mat they did not adequately investigate andlor repon on an incident involving the use of

excessive force.

We understand that in many cases a thorough investigation of an incident involving the

use of force cannot be completed by the time a watch commander is required to make a

determination of the reasonableness of the force used. Some evidence relating to the use of

force may not be available at the time the approval of such use of force is given. Suspects

in custody may be unwilling to be interviewed by Deparbnent personnel about the use of

force because of criminal charges pending against them, or because of fear or anger about

the injuries already received. Some injuries at rust will not be apparent. Soft-tissue injuries

may not be diagnosed immediately. Bruises may not appear until after a beating victim bas

been released from custody. Other injuries, such as back injuries, may not be revealed for

weeks. In addition, the identification and questioning of all possible witnesses to the use of

force often is not feasible prior to the time the determination must be made of the reason-

ableness of the force used.

According to procedures recently adopted, an lAB "roll-out" team is automatically sent

to investigate any use of force that results in the hospitalization of the injured party. Our

59
 r
. .-;::

review suggests that using hospitalization as the only determinative factor may not be

enough. Very few of the cases reviewed involved victims who were hospitalized immedi-

ately after the incident. Almost all of them received emergency medical attention, often

with continuing treatment, and some required subsequent surgery andlor hospitalization.

ThUs. using a policy linking an lAB "roU-out" investigation with hospitalization would

have resulted in lAB investigations in very few of the cases that ultimately resulted in

substantial settlements and verdicts.

Because lAB records of investigations prior to 1986 no longer exist, it is impossible

to determine whether all the cases we reviewed involving incidents during that time

resulted in lAB investigations. An lAB investigation of an incident may be hard to locate

because it may be flIed under the name of the person who filed the citizen's complaint

that led to the investigation, rather than under the name of the person injured who subse-

quently became the plaintiff in the litigation. lAB investigations may also have been

"uncarded" from the lAB card catalog if they were closed or deemed to be frivolous.

With these limitations on our search for lAB investigations of the incidents giving rise to

the 124 cases we reviewed, we found evidence of internal investigations of only 100

deputies involved in use-of-force incidents that resulted in 57 of the 124 cases. Some of

the deputies were involved in more than one case and some cases involved more than one

dep.uty.

It was not possible to determine with any cenainty from the files we reviewed

whether the lAB investigations were thorough. However, the adequacy of the procedures

governing the investigations is called into question by the fact that only a small number

of these investigations led to determinations that the allegations were "founded," and the

fact that discipline was imposed on so few of the deputies involved in the underlying

incidents. Allegations were determined to be "founded" against one or more of the

deputies involved in only 18 of the 57 incidents investigated. Allegations were deemed

to be "unsubstantiated" against the deputies involved in nine of the incidents, and

60
,.

allegations were determined to be "unfounded" against the deputies who participated in 24

of the 57 incidents. Allegations against deputies involved in an additional two incidents

were deemed to be "unfounded/unsubstantiated" or "unfounded" against some deputies and

"unsubstantiated" against others. Investigations of allegations in four incidents were closed

without resolution, but in one of those cases the deputy was fired shortly after the incident.

The allegations of excessive force that were investigated but determined to be "unfounded"

and/or "unsubstantiated" in 35 of these incidents subsequently gave rise to settlements and

verdicts that cost the County a total of more than $3.8 million. See Chapter on Tracking

the Use of Force for a more complete discussion of "founded," "unfounded" and "unsub·

stantiated" allegations.

Discipline

According to the lAB card files we could locate, discipline was imposed on only those

deputies against whom the allegations of excessive force were determined to be "founded":

22 deputies involved in 18 incidents. It is possible, however, that others were disciplined

but the dispositions were not listed in a common database or file.

The discipline imposed varied from case to case. Six deputies were fired (3 over one

case), and 1 more was allowed to resign after termination was recommended. One deputy

receiv~d an oral reprimand in one case and a written reprimand in another, and 14 deputies

were given suspensions, amounting to a total of 123 days.

Of the suspensions. 3 were for 3 days each, for cases costing the County SI00,OOO,

$75,000 and $45,000; 3 were for 5 days each, for caSes costing the County 527,000

(involving two deputies), and 525,000; 2 were for 6 days each, for a case costing the

County $25,000 and for one in which the plaintiffs were awarded a verdict of more than

$100,000 that is on appeal; 1 was for 7 days, for a case costing the County $30,000; 2 were

for 10 days each, for cases costing the County $60,000 and $25,000; 2 were for 15 days

each,1 for a case costing the County S150,OOO and the other for the same case resulting in

61
 ,....

the verdict mentioned above; and 1 was for 30 days, for a case
costing the County S50,000.
We found several cases in which the accuracy of deputies'
la lIIost caus, th. d.puties present
dW'iDIi an incid.nt of .xc.ssiv. fore. reports of the use of force was absolutely discredited because
told similar stories about what
happ.Ded. But iD OD' case. ill wllicll the injuries sustained were inconsistent with the force reported
sev.ral deputies were all'lIed to Ian.
and were consistent with the testimony of witnesses, and yet
used .xcessiv. force to break up a
lIatberiDg,lb. ·code of sil.nc.·
no discipline was imposed on the deputies involved. The
failed to op.rat••

One d.puty wbo bad beea at lb. files of some of these cases included statements by deputies wbo
scene said that thOIl who w.re
amlled were acting in • coop.rativ.
witnessed the use of force but did not participate in it These state·
III.Dner aad Ibat the forc. used by
ments appeared in supplemental repons filed by the deputies at the
sev.ral deputies was exc.ssive.

H. wenllO fu II to say that it WII time of the arrest of the injured parties and in trial and deposition
th. aggressiv. bebavior of some of
th. d.puties that caused the problem
testimony by these deputies. In most of these cases, the deputy-
.ad .scalated tbe confrontatioD
witnesses' reports tracked the versions given by the deputies wbo
betwHD the deputies.ad those
arrelled. used the force. In other cases, none of several deputies present
Hilmlemeat related d.tails of
specific actioDS of v.rious deputies,
during an incident involving the use of force "recalled" the use of
as oppolld to the more vigue recol-
force alleged, even thougb the injuries sustained and the statements
lectioas of moll of the deputies at th.
SC'H. by independent witnesses conclusively established that the force was
The deputy allO Aid,how.ver,
tltat IS I result of llis stalCe, be WIS
used.
ostracized It tit. statioL He Aid
We found no instance in which a deputy involved as a witness in
th.re w.re bard feelingl betwlln bill!
lad other d.puties IDd thai ... one of these cases was investigated or disciplined for having failed
believed bis staace bid burt hila ia
tennl of iii. POSitioL to repon the use of excessive force by another, or for baving
TIle County lIuled the CUI for mare
reponed inaccurately the extent of the force used. The Department
thla $50,1108.

• has established a procedure requiring all deputies wbo witness the

.use of force by another deputy to file a report about the use of force.

This procedure is a commendable improvement over the earlier

system that allowed the deputies to use their discretion in deler-

mining whether the force should be reponed and that may bave

62
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promoted !.he "code of silence." However, the requiremem that deputies file reports about

all force used or witnessed will not lead to accurate reporting if no discipline is imposed for
failures to make accurate reports.

Process of Tracking Civil Litigation as it Relates to

Personnel Issues

All civil litigation involving the Department is monitored by Departmem officials who

participate in approving all settlements in excessive·force cases and in deciding which

cases should be taken to trial. They are aware of tbe identities of the deputies named as

defendants. They are informed of tbe evidence against the deputies and the County,

including medical expert testimony on the type of force necessary to cause the particular

injuries suffered, the testimony of independent wimesses to the incident, the testimony of

experts on police procedures and tbe testimony of the plaintiffs and the deputies involved.

However, the evidence produced in connection witb the litigation we reviewed apparently

almost never triggered any new investigations of the deputies involved, and the results of

such litigation virtually never appeared in the personnel files of the deputies involved. The

performance ratings and promotions given to these deputies apparently were not affected in

any way by the litigation. We located only one instance in which a verdict was entered into

a deputy's personnel file, and that was a verdict for the County in a case in which he had

been involved.

The discrepancies are striking between the descriptions of the deputies' perfonnance

that are made based on evidence produced during the litigation and the evaluations of the

deputies in their personnel files. A Dumber of examples can be cited:

In one case, two deputies were commended at the time of a shooting incident that

resulted in a man's death. and yet the County later settled a lawsuit over the incident for

more than half a million dollars. The evaluations of the deputies' performances were

63
 laudatory. One of the deputies was commended for his "exemplary"

performance. The other deputy's evaluator was "proud of him" and

noted that due to his "maturity and training he did not come apart"
Two Norwalk deputies were involved
in separate illCidents in 1983 aDd 1984 when he found himself in a "precarious position."
that resulted in excessive·loree lili·
gatiOi ending iD costly settlemeats by In another case, a deputy named in two lawsuits, for which the
the County.
County paid out Sloo,ooO and $30,000 respectively, had no mention
la the first cese, It Ibout 4 l.m. one
day ie September of 1983, the two of either incident in his personnel file. In fact, he had no evaluation
deputies riding ID tandem vehicles
stopped Ibree boy., Iges13 to 14, who at all for the year in which the 5100,000 incident occurred. He had
Ibe deputiel .. ld they saw runeiag
dowa tbe street. The boys Slid they
been rated "competent" during the period of the 530,000 incident
were going fishing and were
and the only negative item in his file referred to a traffic accident
approacbed by the deputies .. they
stood in Iront 01 the bouse of Ibe He has left the Department on his own volition.
grandfalber of one 01 Ibe boys. The
deputies relnsed that boy to his In yet anolher case, a deputy involved in a shooting death and a
grandfather's custody, but they baad-
cuffed the other two aDd put Ibem iD severe beating case in one year resulting in two substantial settle-
their patrol cers. Tbere WIS no
evidence that the bOYI were involved ments received a "very good" rating that year and either "very good"
in lay crialinll ICtivity at Ibe time.
or "outstanding" ratings since. His file contained statements by
The deputies took tbe boys OD I
respoasa to I prowllr callind theD supervisors that his attitude was "pure gold" and that be never was
droYi tbem to Ibe plrkiag lot of the
aearby La Mirlda Country Clull. the subject of citizen complaints.
They separately interrogated the boys
tor 20-30 miautes before releasill9
In other information taken from personnel files, we learned that
thllll. The boys were not sariously
a deputy involved in a S70,000 beating incident was lauded in a
injured. but tbey did Illege that tbe
deputiel used foree OD tbeaa, review one month after the incident for demonstrating tact, courtesy
including I light baton blow 10 the
older bOY'1 bead. Ie addidoa. die and self-restraint in dealing with the public.
younger boy cllimed that" fint
deputy cballeDged bim to bit 11M Allegations that a deputy threatened, cursed, kicked, insulted
second deputy with I bltoa. ead the
second deputy then pointed his gu It and beat an innocent man mistaken for a car thief resulted in a settle-
Ibe boy ud threatened to -blow I
fucking bole- ia bini ...
ment of more than $50,000 by the County but was not mentioned in

the deputy's personnel file. He was rated as "competent" and subse-

quently received six commendations as well as four suspensions

unrelated to force issues.

64
r

A deputy involved in a case in which a drug suspect alleged he

was beaten and which resulted in a $75,000 settlement had an

"outstanding" evaluation for the period in question. He also had a
if be picked up the !NItolL T1Ie boy
dozen departmental commendations, three citizen commendations said ia bis CitiZI.'S complaiat thet be
was • really scared" and tbat lie
and one from another agency. His file also lists four suspensions wu told, tvblt if lie took yoar life
rigbt DOW? No ODe would miss I punk
during the five-year period before the incident. two involving
lib you: HI Aid he wu taunted Ind
cilled _slib ·wimp: The
drinking but none involving excessive force.
dlputies dellied breadisbiag tbei,
It is ironic that while discipline in excessive-force cases is 0'
welpo., mikillll Units lay olbe,
bllalwio, ca!cull1ed to "noml the
rare, and notice of excessive-force incidents seldom is included boys.

The deputy traiaH's deposition WIS

in the personnel records of deputies, more than 40 deputies had
described as beiag more favonble to

comments in their files regarding suspensions or reprimands tbe boys tba. to tile deputies. He
decli ..d til stly witb tile Dlplrtlllent
arising out of traffic incidents, or just notice of vehicle-related Botb deputies reclived fiwe-dly
nlpeasiolS for tbei, letio•• i. this
activity. One deputy received a six~day suspension simply for iacident. lad tile Couaty setlled the
resuitiDglawsuit for S27.ooo.
failing to register his car. In comparison, it should be noted that
la tJie IIIIIIme, 011984, tbese deputies
seven deputies who were found to have used excessive force in 19ail plrticiplted iIIlCtions tbal
resula-d i. II ucasive.fon:a
cases that cost the County a total of more than $350,000 each lawsuit aglilllt tbe Coanty. T1Ie case
involved I yoaDg mil wlto bid preti-
received suspensions of less than six days. oasly received I SZO.aoo ..ttI.lat il
II Ixcissi..·forcl lawsuit .iut
Even in cases in which deputies were disciplined as a result of tile Couaty!bat lrose from II iacideat
involviDgI dillere. Norwalk deputy.
excessive-force incidents, their personnel records rarely included
n. ... cllimed tblt III was tbe
any reference to the discipline. Moreover, even where the diSCipline IIflet of uflllDlell by 10l1li
Norwllk deputies i. '1lililtioD for
was disclosed, the personnel records did not always reflect any IIi1SUCCIII il dte l.til, IawsuiL
I. two iacidellli lew Wilks IPut.
adverse consequences as a result of the discipline. One deputy bl wa iavolvecl il fights willi
deputies. II tile Slcold iDcidell. I
received a "competent" rating for the period in which he was disci- dlpaly stnack bim ia tile lleld wi1lll
flaslaJigbt. ud bill..... r WIS Mellli
pUned for violating Department policy and procedures in connection Wllel lie IUemplltl1D iatlrvl •. ~

with an incident that resulted in a $35,000 settlement. His personnel

record said that his suspension may be attributed to "overzealous-

ness," rather than disregard for the rules. He subsequently received

65
 "very good" ratings and worked as a field training officer.

The situation represented by these examples seems to be a case

of the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing. Some
The first deputy WII a by figure ia
both of tba 1984 iacideats, but tile Department members are aware of all of the facts related to exces-
secoad deputy WII iAvolved only ia
die Acoad iacideat aAd WII DOt sive-force litigation indicating misconduct by deputies that has cost
a.ed al a defeadaat ia 1IIe lawsuit
TIle lAB iavestigatioa of tile 1984 iaci-
the County substantial amounts of money in settlements and
deals coDCIaded 1IIat tilt foree allega-
verdicts, yet the Department members responsible for making
tioDl agaiast both deputill aad all
other deputill iayolved were personnel decisions are apparently not informed of those facts.
uafouaded.

TIlt Coua1y paid $400,00II10 settle the

Several reasons are given for the absence of any information
Cia.
relating to civiJlitigation settlements or verdicts in the personnel
Both deputiH curreatly are iaYlsti-
gator deputiel at tile Narwalk files of the deputies involved:
statiOD.
First, CiviJ Service rules require that performance evaluations
•
be timely. Althougb the deputies' union contract apparently would

not prohibit placing anything in a personnel file that refers to an

event several years earlier, questions of "double jeopardy" may be

raised if the Department takes personnel actions based on a plain-

tiffs jury verdict after a Departmental investigation resulted in a

determination that the plaintiffs allegations were "unfounded."

Second, the Peace Officers' Bill of Rigbts would allow a deputy

to request a bearing to dispute the inclusion of any paper in bis

personnel file that could be used as a basis for diSCipline. Inclusion

of information pertaining to a settlement could be cballenged since

there is no admission of liability. althougb it may be more difficult

to cballenge the inclusion of a verdict.

Third. it bas been argued that it would be "unfair" to put settle-

ments and verdicts into the deputies' personnel files because a case

may have been lost or settled due to factors unrelated to the actions

66
of the deputies. Examples of sucb factors cited by a representative of the Department

include incompetent defense attorneys wbo were not picked by the deputies, adverse

publicity, sympathetic victims, "biased" judges, "biased" juries and fear of baving to pay

high plaintiffs attorneys' fees.

It is possible that a careful evaluation of the incident that led to an excessive-force

verdict or settlement would lead the Department in some cases to conclude that a deputy

should not have his/her future employment or promotion affected by the verdict or settle-

ment, even if the deputy participated in the use of force. However, it is not possible that

careful evaluations of all such incidents would lead to a conclusion that they should all

be excluded from the deputies' personnel files because of one or more of these factors.

Fourth, there is a tension between the desire to minimize liability by not creating

discoverable files about an officer's past misconduct and the desire to create complete files

about past misconduct to be used for disciplinary purposes or in performance evaluations.

The simplified answer to this dilemma is that the best way to minimize liability is to stop

the actions giving rise to liability by rooting out deputies who cause the problems and

keeping better watch over those who have the potential to do so.

Fifth, the County may not want to create a potential conflict between its interests and

the interests of the deputies that would require separate counsel for the deputies. It might

vio~te the attorney-client privilege if the defense attorney representing both the County

and a deputy took any action counter to the interests of the deputy with respect to informa-

tion learned in the litigation process, such as commenting adversely on the deputy's credi-

bility as a wimess in summaries of litigation that might end up in the deputy's personnel

file. Moreover, if the deputy made an admission to his defense counsel that was covered by

the attorney-client privilege, the lawyer could not then relay that privileged information to

the deputy's employer to be used against the deputy for disciplinary purposes.

We believe, however, that this type of privileged disclosure is not necessary. Most of

the time, the deputy's version is set forth in the arrest repon, and in testimony under

67
 r
penalty of perjury at the criminal trial of the plaintiff and in the depositions in the later

civil litigation. The deputy's version in this form, without any assessment by the defense

lawyer, could be reviewed by his supervisors and be compared to the physical evidence of

the injuries to the plaintiff and to the testimony of independent witnesses.

All of these issues must be addressed in determining how information learned during

the civil litigation process and the results of such litigation can be used in connection

with personnel decisions by the Department. But somehow this information must not be

ignored, or the personnel records of deputies who use excessive force will continue to

have no mention of serious misconduct. even when that misconduct is known to the

DepartmenL

The Department must be able to use the information learned in the litigation process

to review the conduct of the Department members involved and to determine whether any

further investigation or discipline is required.

Recommendations:

1. The Department should continually review and track the civil litigation

involving excessive force to determine which repeat patterns have led to the use of

excessive force in the past, and to determine how the usa of excessive force in t-
0.

those casas could have been avoided. The Department should develop training

materials, basad on the facts of casas that resulted in settlements or verdicts

against the County, to teach deputies how to avoid repeat occurrences of exce.

sive force in circumstances that have been shown to lead to the usa of force in the .,
~

t;
.

past.

The Christopher Commission recommended that "conduct that results in large settle-

ments or judgments, including punitive damages awarded on the basis of egregious or

intentional misconduct, should be carefully studied to determine what went wroog and

68
r

wby." In the Department's Executive Planning Council response to Sberiff Block on the

Cbristopber Commission Report, it said that "the County Counsel bas developed and

presented lectures addressing civilliabiIity. Tbe Department bas developed and issued

training bulletins discussing civil liability and is also developing a series of videotapes

based on actual litigation involving the Department." It is also developing "a software

program that will allow civil cases to be tracked and causes and results analyzed to deter-

mine if the deputy's conduct was appropriate."

Tbe lectures, training bulletins and videotapes discussed are all geared toward post-

incident training to belp strengthen the defense of civil litigation. These training materials

include references to the need to take down all the names of witnesses, to write careful

reports, to bave good demeanor as witnesses and to prepare testimony carefully. A Script

for a litigation-training film has been completed, pointing out that the judge and jury's

mental picture of the event is affected by the deputy's attitude and demeanor. It advises

against dressing like a cowboy, clowning around with other deputies in the courthouse and

failing to take the matter seriously. All this may be belpful in cutting down the cost of Civil

litigation against the County, but it does nothing to prevent excessive force that gives rise

to the litigation.

Our focus instead is on the training that sbould occur before incidents bappen. This

training should address the issue of wben the use of force is required, alternatives to the use

of force and methods to defuse situations and avoid the escalation of the use of force.

Because so many of the cases jnvolve the use of force stemming from conflicts

between deputies and unarmed people wbo were innocent of any criminal activity before

they came into contact with the deputies, the Department sbould specifically address the

issue of bow the arguments leading to the use of force could have been avoided. It should

produce training materials directed to avoiding such arguments where possible and handling

such arguments without the use of force where the arguments cannot be avoided.

In addition, specific repeat patterns occurring in civil litigation should be used as the

69
basis for training deputies about how to avoid the use of excessive force under those

recurring circumstances. One example is a response by deputies to a "loud-party" call.

Incidents arising out of "loud-party" calls involve very predictable facts that could be

analyzed by the Department to determine bow best to avoid problems relating to the use

of force. Tbere will virtually always be witnesses to any force used by deputies in these

incidents, and the Department's risk of civil litigation should serve as a strong incentive

to take steps to avoid mistakes that are likely to lead to costly settlements or verdicts.

With respect to the software program discussed by the Department's Executive

Planning Council, the Department at last report bad this "under development" with a

completion date estimated to be 1993-94. Such a program, if carefully done, could be of

great benefit and should include the tracking of information discussed below.

2. The Department should establish early warning systems," by keeping

II

track of statistics that will help to determine which deputies are likely to use more

force than necessary, and which stations tolerate the use of excessive force.

Many of the statistics we tracked for the purpose of compiling this report could be

used by the Department to detect which deputies and which stations may be becoming

problems with respect to excessive force. The focus should be to track facts not subject

to credibility disputes, such as use-of-force reports, actual injuries to victims, head

strikes, arrests for criminal actions confined to interactions with the deputies, drunk and

disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace, and independent witnesses.

The tracking of use-of-force reports is particularly needed. Currently, in order to

determine how many and what type of such reports anyone deputy has generated, a band

search of arrest reports at each station where a deputy has worked must be undenaken,

and a review must be made of a supervisor's log book when possible. These reports

should be tracked, so that the quantity and quality of such reports could be readily avail-

able to those making evaluations of deputies and determining their assignments. See

chapter on Tracking the Use of Force.

70
r

3. The Department should improve the quality of the initial investigations of

use-of-force incidents.

The Department must come down hard if the use of force is not reported completeiy

and honestly at the time of the incident. In addition, a watch commander must be held

accountable if he/she determines that force used in an incident was "objectively reasonable"

or recommends that no further investigation is necessary, without careful consideration of

all of the relevant facts. These facts include the type of injuries sustained by the arrested

party, the arrest charges, the presence of any witnesses other than the deputies and the

injured party, and the avoidability of the force used. All supervisors and superiors involved

must be held similarly accountable. (See chapter on Tracking the Use of Force.)

4. The Department should review lAB investigation procedures to determine

why so many allegations resulting in substantial verdicts and settlements were not

investigated by lAB, and why so many of such allegations that were investigated by

lAB were deemed to be "unfounded" or "unsubstantiated."

5. The Department should use the lessons learned from a review of the civil

litigation to increase the frequency and effectiveness of discipline imposed on

deputies who use excessive force and on deputies who fail to report accurately

excessive force they witnessed being used by other deputies.

Because the civil litigation process often results in the most complete presentation of

the evidence of the use of excessive force, including statements by the plaintiffs wbo may

not bave agreed to be interviewed during Departmental investigations of the incidents and

opinions from medical and police- procedure experts. the Department should take advan-

tage of the information learned during the litigation process in determining wbether disci-

pline is appropriate for deputies who are alleged to bave participated in the use of excessive

force or for deputies who witnessed the use of excessive force by others but failed to repon

it accurately.

71
 r
Our review showed that when discipline was imposed for excessive force, it was often

minimal. The Department should review its priorities in determining the appropriateness

of discipline imposed to make sure that disciplinary measures taken for the use of exces-

sive force are not less than those taken for other less significant misconduct, such as traffic
violations or other misconduct relating to the handling of the deputies' vehicles.
6. Results of litigation, including a fuJI report of the underlying incident,

summaries of the testimony of all key witnesses and the amount of the settlement

or verdict, should be included in the personnel files of deputies who were alleged to

have used excessive force during the incidents.

7. "Unsubstantiated- allegations should be placed in a deputy's personnel file.

If there are conflicting reports about an incident, Internal Affairs calls an allegation

"unsubstantiated." One "unsubstantiated" allegation may not merit much action, but

several similar allegations, each deemed to be "unsubstantiated," may deserve more atten-

tion.
One deputy who was involved in the use of excessive force in connection with the

breakup of a large family party that resulted in a settlement of $225,000 to the people

injured by the deputy bad been the subject of several prior excessive-force complaints.

Allegations of unnecessary force resulting in investigations were made against him in

1983 and 1984, and two allegations were made in 1985, including the incident that led to

the litigation.
Two of these investigations resulted in fmdings that the allegations were unsubstanti-

ated. The investigations of the other two incidents were closed after the injured parties

refused to be interviewed by the investigators. Three of the incidents involved HispaniC

victims, and one of the incidents involved allegations of many anti-Hispanic statements by

the deputy.

By excluding any references to these investigations in the deputy's personnel file, the

deputy is presumably v~ewed for promotion purposes exactly the same as a deputy with no

72
excessive-force complaints. This does not seem to be a desirable result, if the Department

wishes to minimize excessive-force incidents in the future. See chapter on Tracking the
Use of Force.

S. The Department should make the prevention of excessive force a high

priority a~d hold all members of the Department, from deputies to their immediate

supervisors to those at the highest levels accountable for excessive-force incidents,

73
74
r
i

5. Canine Unit

The Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department's canine unit consists of 14 dogs,

mainly Belgian Malinois and German Shepherds. Before deployment, the dogs are trained

in basic obedience and tactical police work. Armed with a superior sense of smell and a

hunting or "prey" instinct, the Department's dogs can be used as an extraordinary law

enforcement tool: They can search for fleeing, sometimes armed and dangerous suspects in

buildings, warehouses and other spaces, frequently at night, far more safely and quickly

than humans. For this reason, the dogs are rightly credited with reducing injuries to and

saving lives of deputies in the line of duty.

But the LASD's dogs are not trained just to find suspects. They are also trained to

seize the suspects by biting and holding them until they are taken into custody, unless they

surrender to a deputy before being found by the dogs. Because these dogs have extremely

powerful jaws, their bites can result in significant injuries to the suspects, including punc-

ture wounds, lacerations, arterial vascular damage, functional impairment and psycbolog-

ical trauma.

The LASD Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB), whicb oversees the LASD canine

program, screens deputies wbo apply to be dog handlers. As part of the application

process, among other things, SEB checks the applicant's background. Founded allegations

of excessive force result in the disqualification of the applicant. Numerous unfounded alle-

gations of excessive force can tip the balance against the applicant. The applicant's then-

supervisors ~e interviewed, as are deputies with whom the applicant bas worked. The

applicant is then interviewed by two supervisors in the canine unit.

Numerous lawsuits bave been filed against the Department accusing it and individual

deputies in the canine unit of excessive force and racial discrimination in the use of the

dogs .. Plaintiffs complain of being attacked and mauled by the Department's dogs without

cause or justification as they attempt to surrender or after they are in custody, and because

of their race. And they complain of bites to all body parts: head, neck, face, chest, legs,

arms and genitals.

7S
 While all of the excessive force cases involving dogs that have been tried to date

have resulted in defense verdicts for the Department (except for one in which the jury
was unable to reach a verdict), the County has settled some of the cases before trial. But
more importantly, the allegations made in these cases are troubling and raise serious

questions about the canine unit. We have sought in this investigation to examine the

most significant'of these questions, and we set forth our conclusions below

Sheriff's Department Written Canine Deployment Policy

California Civil Code Section 3342 grants governmental agencies civil immunity in

California courts for police dog bites, if the bites occurred in the apprehension or holding
of a suspect where the dog's handler had a reasonable suspicion of the suspect's involve-

ment in criminal activity and if at the time of the bites the agency bad a written policy on

the necessary and appropriate use of the dog for sucb work.

Tbe LASD bas a written policy regarding canine deployment. As revised January 8,

1992, the policy permits deployment of dogs to search for armed suspects, felony

suspects and for armed misdemeanor suspects wanted for "serious" crimes wbere the

circumstances present a clear danger to deputies who would otherwise search without a

dog.

The policy probibits deployment of dogs to search for suspects wanted solely for

grand theft auto, absent extenuating circumstances, or to search for known juvenile

offenders, except where justified by the severity of the crime or "other critical factors,"

such as whether the juvenile is believed armed or bas a known propensity for violence.

In sucb cases involving juveniles, deployment must first be authorized by a supervisor.

The policy has a few other significant aspects, including the following: (1) A canine

supervisor from the SEB or a field supervisor must be present at a canine search to ensure
that the Deparunent's canine policy is followed; (2) before deploying a canine team,

76
 an announcement concerning the intended deployment must be made. The announcement,

which must be clear, audible and loud, and made in English and Spanish if necessary, is
intended to afford the suspect an opportunity to surrender to a deputy prior to deployment.

Before a searcb is commenced, deputies assisting in the search must confirm bearing the

announcement. The announcement is mandatory except in a searcb for an armed suspect

wbere making the announcement could endanger the deputies' safety. In sucb cases, the

announcement can be waived, but only with the prior approval of the on-scene supervisor;

(3) when a bite occurs, in addition to making a verbal report to the station watcb
commander, the handler must prepare a written bite report. and is responsible for taking
pictures of bite injuries.
The Department's canine policy, however, is also notable for what it fails to say.

For example, the policy does not specify either where on the ·scale of force- a police

dog's bite fits, or provide guidelines establishing when a dog should arid should not

be allowed to bite. These omissions are at the heart of at least some of the exces-

sive force litigation against the canine unit.

"Find and Bite" vs. "Find and Bark"

As noted above, the LASD trains its dogs to "find and bite." Under this approach, the

dogs are trained to find, seize and bold the suspects by biting them until they can be taken

into custody. In training exercises involving police tactics, the dogs primarily bite the

protected arms and legs of the trainers. In actual apprehensions, if the suspects' arms or

legs are not accessible to the dogs to bite, they will bite and bold any body parts that are

exposed to them.
"Find and bite" training is contraSted with another training method called "find and
bark." Under that approach, the dogs are trained to find the suspect and to alert the handler

to the find by barking. If the suspect moves after the dog has found bim but before the dog

77
 r.
. t

has been called back by his handler. or if the suspect attempts to assault the handler,

the dog is trained to bite the suspect. There are no national figures available from any

source showing how many law enforcement agencies use one method over another.

Based on its own informal national survey, however. the Sheriffs Department avers that

approximately 70% qf all such agencies use "find and bite" training.

The Department defends using "find and bite" over "find and bark" training on

several grounds. It argues that advocates of "find and bark" training ignore the big myth

on which it is premised: That such dogs bite only in exceptional cases. In fact, the

Department observes, because most suspects found by "find and bark" dogs are unaware

they will be bitten if they move, many "find and bark" dogs do bite. The dogs generally

track off leash and ahead of their handlers. and locate suspects before their handlers do.

Faced with an approaching dog perceived as about to attack, many suspects either anempt

to fight or flee. or otherwise gesture in ways that precipitates bites. Moreover, dogs

trained to "find and bark" often try to provoke movement by the suspect in order to

justify a bite by nudging the suspect's hand while Circling and growling.

It argues that dogs trained to "find and bite" suspects make searches safer for

deputies. Searches are generally conducted at night in dark rooms, warebouses, buildings

and other spaces for suspects who are, or wbo may be, armed and dangerous. Suspects ·in

these circumstances have a clear, tactical advantage. They can see but not be seen. While

a barking dog may alert the deputy that a suspect's hiding place has been found, that

deputy may still be unable to.see wbether the suspect is armed - until it is too late.

A dog trained to "fmd and bite" can nullify this advantage either by biting the suspect

until be surrenders or literally pulling the suspect from bis biding place. Of course, the

dog is at risk of harm - at least one dog has been sbot - but better the dog than the

deputy.

We view these arguments as persuasive, but only to a point. "Find and bark" dogs

do bite, and officer safety concerns rightly are and should be of paramount importance.

78
r

On lbe olber band, many suspects wbo are seized by "find and bite" dogs are unarmed and

may not pose any danger to pursuing deputies. These facts and olbers - including lbe
perception lbat litigation is more frequent against "find and bite" units - have led a

number of other police departments to adopt "find and bark" training, including Chicago's

and Philadelphia's .

. Bite Ratios

Whether the dogs are trained to "find and bite" or "find and bark," all observers.

including critics and proponents of one or the other training approach, agree that one key

measure of the quality of a police deparunen t' s canine unit is its "bite ratio," that is, the

number of bites to apprehensions. Experts, including those in dog bite cases against the
Department, generally agree that less than 30 percent of apprehensions should, on average,

result in a bite. See Kerrv. City a/West Palm Beacn, 875 F.2d 1546. 1551 (11th Cir. 1989).
Tbe Department appears to be under that ratio, but not by a very large margin. During

1991, Department dogs were deployed in 1,228 searches leading to the apprehension of 213

suspects. 58 of those suspects received dog bites - a bite ratio of 27%. During the period

from January through May 1992. dogs were deployed in 516 searches leading to the appre-

hension of 116 suspects. 23 of those suspects received dog bites - a bite ratio of 20% .

. "Objective Reasonableness" Standard

The Department's relatively low bite ratio. however. does not answer whether the

apprehensions resulting in dog bites involved excessive force. Whether an apprehension

resulting in a dog bite involves excessive and therefore unconstitutional force is analyzed

under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. Graltam v. Connor.

490 U.S. 386. 109 S.Ct. 1865, (1989); CntfIP v. Gotts. 744 F.Supp. 952 (C.D.Cal. 1990).

Objective reasonableness is evaluated in light of the particular circumstances from the

79
 T
,

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.

The factors to be taken into account when deciding how much force is appropriate to

apprehend a suspect include "the severity of the crime at issue, wbether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham, slIpra, l09 S.Ct. at

1872.

Data identifying the felonies for which canine searches were conducted reveal some-

thing about the severity of the crimes at issue. According to the Department's figures,

28% of all searches in 1991 were for suspects known or believed to be armed. Of the 58

apprehensions resulting in dog bites in 1991, 17, or 29%, were burglary suspects, 15. or

26%. were robbery suspects, 14, or 23%, were grand theft suspects, 7, or 12%, were

assault with a deadly weapon suspects, 3, or 5%, were murder or attempted murder

suspects, and 3, or 5%, were suspects in "other" crimes.

During the period from January through May 1992, 34% of all searches were for

suspects known or believed to be armed. Of the 23 apprehensions resulting in dog bites

during that period, 10 or 43% were robbery suspects, 5 or 22% were burglary suspects,

3 or 13% were murder or attempted murder suspects, 3 or 13% were assault with a deadly

weapon suspects and 2 or 9% were rape suspects.

To look behind these data and to evaluate the particular circumstances of apprehen-

sions resulting in dog bites, we reviewed dog bite reports from January 1991 througb

May 1992, provided us by the Department, force-related civil litigation against the

Department and Internal Affairs Bureau reports. For the most pan, these materials

suggest that the crimes for which the dogs were deployed were serious ones and that the

searches were conducted within Department policy. At the same time, however, some of

these materials raised a few serious concerns.

Not all crimes appeared severe enough to us to warrant a canine search. The

following example illustrates this point. On July 16, 1991, at approximately 2:45 a.m.,

80
two deputies responded to a felony auto burglary call at an apartment building in West

Hollywood .. When they arrived, two suspects fled. At the request of the deputies, a heli-
copter and a canine team responded to the scene. Before deployment, canine announce-

ments were made by ground units and the helicopter. When the dog was released, the dog

tracked one suspect to a carport in the rear of the apartment building. The dog found the

suspect under the front of a Suzuki Samurai, near the right ftont wheel and next to a raised

concrete walkway. The dog bit the back of the suspect's head and neck - evidently the

only body parts exposed to the dog - and attempted unsuccessfully to pull the suspect

through the small opening between the vehicle and the Walkway. The handler followed the

dog to the Suzuki, and called him off the bite. The suspect, a Caucasian male, aged 17.

who was under the influence of alcohol, suffered three, two-inch lacerations to the back of
his head and upper neck area, a one-inch laceration to his left ear, which was almost

severed. and a two-inch laceration to the left upper cheek and temple area

An Internal Affairs investigation of this incident was closed when it concluded that the

force used was within Department policy. That conclusion was based on the fact the search

was conducted at night, involved multiple suspects, was in an area with a heavy concentra-

tion of multi-unit and multi-story apartment buildings and underground garages, providing

the suspects with numerous areas in which to hide, and also on the likelihood that the

suspects might have been involved in similar activity in the past, and that canine announce-

ments were made by the helicopter and by mobile units at four adjacent intersections.

While the bite in the circumstances here can be argued to be a use of force within

policy for the reasons cited by the unit captain, the unanswered question is whether an auto-

mobile burglary, absent other factors, is a serious enough felony to warrant such a use of

force. We question whether it is. Indeed, we view as anomalous that the Department's

policy generally prohibits canine searches for grand theft auto suspects, but allows them for

automobile burglaries.

These materials reflect numerous instances in which it appears that the dogs are allowed

81
by their handlers to continue biting suspects far longer than appeared necessary. When

bitten,many suspects instinctively struggle with the dogs to escape their painful bites.

Under what appears to be a tacit Department policy, handlers are permitted to allow the

dogs to continue biting until the suspects follow the handlers' instructions to stop

resisting the dogs and to become completely passive. The handlers are also permitted to

use additional force to overcome the suspects' resistance to the dogs.

The following example illustrates this point. On the night of February 8, 1991, a

handler responded to a call for a canine search for a suspect wanted for attempted

robbery. After canine announcements were made, the dog was deployed. The dog found

the suspect under a parked car in a back yard, and pulled him out from beneath the car.

As the handler stated in his report about the incident:

"When I approached the suspect, he was sitting on the ground. The dog was biting his

left leg. The suspect hod his left arm around tlze dogs necl. He began striling the dog fll)ith

his clenched riglzt fist. I yelled at the suspect to stop fighting with the dog. The susped

ignored my directions and continued his struggle fll)ith tlze dog. He then began to try and pull

the dogs muzzle away from his leg. The suspect, by fighting with Ihe dog, was cousing more

injury to Izimself The suspect began 10 pull on tlze dogs Izeod and ears. Since I fll)OS nol

getting any compliance from Ihe Sl/speCI and he was btoting Ilze dog, I began 10 hilllze

suspects lefl shin area with my floslz/ighl in on attempt to end the fighl. Afler repeated bloflJs

on Ilze leg, the suspect still was gripping Ilze dogs muule . .. Sgl. [A] hil the suspects righl

arm flJilh his fJosAliglz1 in on ottempllO free the suspects grip. ThaI flJOS unsuccessfullOO.

He then lool hold of tlte suspects rl [sic} orm flJitlt both Izonds and he fll)OS able 10 pull Ais

hond off of the dog. He Ihen pinned it onto the ground ond placed Ais lnee on his arm.

The suspect still held onlo Ilze dog muule willz Itis left hand. llzil tlze suspects left ann in

on attempt to free his grasp. HOfllJever, it Izod no effect. I laid the dog to reJeose his bile,

whidlllt did. Tlte dog was off Ihe bite, but tlze suspect slill Iteld onto tlze dogs muule.

82
I then placed my loot onto the j"uspect's lace and neck. I pushed him away and pulled the dog

in the opposite direction. This worked and the suspect no longer hod hold 0/ the dog.
Once his grip was removed/rom the dog Sgt [Ai was able to bring both hands belrind his bock

and Dep. [B] then put hondcu//s on him."

The suspect, a Caucasian male, aged 24, suffered a large laceration on his left calf and

lacerations to his fingers as a result of the dog bites.

This point is aJso illustrated by the following example. On April 19, 1991, at approxi-

mately 1 a.m., two handlers and their dogs responded to a burglary caJl at a large retail

store. Before deployment. canine announcements were made by the deputies. During the

search. one of the dogs alerted to a display where large area rugs were hanging from a rack.

That dog then crawled between the rugs. and, according to the handler's account:

"I Iteord a male voice yelling/rom the rear portion of the TUg stand, but could not see

anyone. I ordered Ihe suspect to slep oul at fIl)hich time suspect [Y] jumped from behind the

stand and climbed onto a table adjacent to the rug stand. As suspect [number one] was being
watched by backup deputies [A], [B}, [e] and Sgt. [D}, my conine . .. continued to stay

belzind tlte rug stand. I again ordered any other suspects out from behind the rogs. Suspect
[Z] subsequently mode himself visible to me. I noticed [the dog] hod a grasp of the suspects

right leg. Suspect [Zl fIl)OS trying to licl [tlte dog] in the upper body areaalfempting to get

aWIlJ from him. I ordered suspect [Zl to show me his hands and to stand sti/l. Failing to do

so, suspect [ll dropped to his knees and began grabbing the muule of [the dog]. Again I

ordered Itim to jeep his hands up and in plain vitfll1and not to move. Tltis request was made
a third time atwlJiclt time suspect [Zj ceased fighting with [the dog] andlayed [sic] pronlon
the ground. I immediately removed [the dog's] grasp on the suspect. whiclt was now on his
lower right portion of his bock. The ntfll1 grasp was due to suspect [Z's} aggressive belzovior
towards tIJe dog and his attempt to disable him. Once my dog was removed, suspect [Z} was

token inlo custody without /u.rther incident. "

83
 y-
r.
l

The bitten suspect, an African-American male. aged 21. suffered puncture wounds to

his upper left arm. puncture wounds to his lower right back. and bite scratches to both legs.

In our view, this practice involves the application of force that appears neither

necessary nor justified. We believe that Department policy should be revised to

require handlers to call dogs off bites at the earliest possible moment. In the rust

example above, it was almost immediately obvious to the handler. who was standing by

the suspect. that the suspect was not holding a weapoD. Moreover, the handler was being

assisted by at least two other officers in his efforts to stop the suspect from holding the

dog's muzzle. In the second example above. it became obvious to the handler that the

suspect fighting with the dog was unarmed wben he grabbed the dog's muzzle with his

bands - if not earlier. With at least four back-up deputies looking on, the dog was

allowed to continue biting the suspect. In the above examples. there is no apparent justifi-

cation for allowing the dogs to continue biting these suspects.

Our review indicated that claims of post-arrest bites were supported in a few cases by

at least some conflicting evidence. For example, in a lawsuit filed in 1989 the plaintiff,

a Hispanic male, aged 23. claimed be was attacked by a Department dog following his

arrest as a robbery suspect while lying face down and handcuffed, and with four deputies

looking on. The deputies flatly denied this allegation. But the deputies' own bite reports

about the incident were inconsistent with each other, impeaching all of their accounts. One

deputy wrote that the handler ordered his dog to bite the suspect before he was handcuffed

to belp overcome his resistance to arrest. The handler, by contrast, wrote that the dog

"somehow managed to exit my police vehicle" and bite the suspect while he struggled with

deputies. Wbile there is DO direct evidence that the dog bit the suspect after be was band-

cuffed, the conflicting accounts of the deputies suggest that plaintiff s claim cannot be

rejected out of hand. This case was settled before trial for $90,000.

In another case filed in 1989, plaintiff, a Hispanic male, aged 41, claimed he was

beaten by deputies with flashlights, and was bitten by a Department dog after be was

84
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I

arrested and handcuffed as an armed robbery suspect. The deputies involved in the arrest

denied that any force was applied by them following the suspect's arrest. But an eyewitnes

asserted that she saw a deputy strike the plaintiff three to five times with his flashlight on

or abou t the head after he was handcuffed and being escorted away. While the eyewitness

evidently did not see the dog bite the suspect after his arrest, her statement contradicted the

deputies' denial that any post-arrest force was applied. In this light, as in the example

above, plaintiff s claim cannot be rejected out of hand. This case was also settled before

trial for $90,000.

Post-arrest bites, by definition, constitute excessive force. The Deparunent states that

it bas zero-tolerance for such incidents, and handlers, observing that the practice would

cost them their jobs and jeopardize the canine program, aver that they do not occur.

But claims of post-arrest bites appear to be almost routinely discounted by the Department.

While all such claims may ultimately prove to be spurious, we believe the Department

should view them with the gravity they deserve and investigate them with vigor.

Bias Against Minorities

In addition to the allegations described above, critics of the Deparunent's canine unit

argue that the victims of dog bites are primarily Hispanic and African-American suspects.

Data provided us by the Department, standing alone, do appear to support that claim.

As noted above, there were 58 apprehensions resulting in dog bites during 1991. 24 of the

58 suspects or 41 % were Hispanics; 23 or 39% were African-Americans; and 9 or 16%

were Caucasians. There were 23 apprehensions resulting in dog bites during the period

from January through May 1992. Fourteen of the 23 suspects or 61 % were Hispanics;

5 or 22% were African-Americans; and 4 or 17% were Caucasians.

The Department answers that most crimes are committed in minority neighborhoods

and that consequently most requests for canine search teams originate in those neigbbor-

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hoods. There is evidence to support that claim. But the data given above are significant

and cannot be ignored. We recommend the Department investigate and quickly

eliminate any institutional bias in favor of deploying the dogs primarily against

minorities.

The canine unit is in many ways an outstanding asset to the Department and to the

community~ Since it was centralized in SEB in 1990, the unit has placed increasing

emphasis on selecting the most qualified deputies and on rigorous training, both for the

dogs and their handlers, and on revising the deployment policy in the face of litigation to

reduce the number of apprehension-related bites. Law enforcement agencies from

throughout the United States have looked to the Sheriffs Department's canine unit as a

model to emulate. This report is not intended to detract from the unit's good work.

But, as noted above, there is room for improvement.

Recommendations:

1. The canine announcement should be mandatory in all cases. If making the

announcement would endanger deputies' safety, it is probably too dangerous for a

conventional search, and a SWAT team should be requested. In addition, announcements

are currently required in English and Spanish only "when necessary." The announcement

should always be made in both languages. Even if the language of the suspect is known,

bystanders may not share that language, and they too need to be warned of the imminent

deployment
2. LASD supervisors should automatically review the performance of the

canine unit whenever its bite ratio rises above 20 to 25%.

3. The LASD policy should provide that a handler determine at th~ earliest

possible instant when a bite is occurring if the suspect is armed. If the suspect is

not, the handler should immediately order the dog to release the suspect whether

86
or not the suspect is struggling with the animal.

4. The LASD should eliminate any institutional bias to deploy dogs against
minorities.

5. The LASD should regard dog bites as high on the force scale and specifically

prescribe the use of less harmful means of apprehending suspects wherever feasible.

87
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.
f'

88
 6. Administrative Claims

The filing of an administrative claim is a prerequisite to filing suit in Superior Court

against the County for personal injury or other damage caused by the Sheriffs Department.

It also is a vehicle for redress of grievances that can be filed as an alternative or in addition

to a citizen's complaint. The filing of a citizen's complaint leads to possible internal inves-

tigation and discipline of an LASD employee. It does not lead to payment of money to the

aggrieved citizen. The filing of an administrative claim, however, leads to the possibility

of a payment by the County for the claimed injury. Under current practice, it does not

usually trigger a disciplinary investigation.

The process for filing and reviewing an administrative claim is complex, and, in an

average of 67% of the cases, leads to a denial of the claim. We looked to see how many

administrative claims filed since 1988 alleging excessive force were denied. Of 944 such

claims, 78% were denied out of hand. In contrast, administrative claims respecting damage

to towed vehicles were denied only 35% of the time.

A comparison of two examples, the first hypothetical and the second actual, will

demonstrate that there is a worse and better way to handle these kind of claims.

Example 1

A citizen is strolling through a park when he is attacked and bitten by one of the

Sheriffs canines that broke away from his balding area and ran into the park. The citizen

is not badly hurt but is taken to the bospital by paramedics, where be is treated and

released. The citizen is angry and calls the County of Los Angeles with his complaint.

He is told that to make a claim, he can write or call the Executive Office of the Board of

Supervisors or telephone any branch of the Sheriff s Department.

The citizen calls, and later that week, be receives a claim form and an instructional

letter for processing bis claim. He is lold to give full details and to mail or deliver three

white copies of the claim to the Hall of Administration in downtown Los Angeles.

89
The County has 45 days to respond to the claim. The citizen files his claim. It is

reviewed and sent up to County Counsel's Office which sends a postcard informing the

citizen that his claim has been received.

The supervising investigator in the County Counsel's Office receives the claim and

prepares a Sheriffs investigative request. The request is then sent over to the Sheriffs

Department where it is received by an officer who reviews the claim, determines which

station or bureau was involved, and forwards it to the appropriate captain for review.

The request then arrives at the appropriate place to be reviewed by a captain who

asks his staff to find out what happened. The captain returns the request with a recom-

mendation letter to the forwarding officer who then makes a copy for the Sberiffs

Department and sends the request and the recommendation back to County Counsel's

Office.

The supervising investigator reviews the paperwork to determine if there are any

gross errors wbicb would merit a request for additional investigation. If be disagrees

with the recommendation of the Sheriffs Department. he can request that the Sheriffs

Department perform another investigation or, in rare circumstances, he may conduct or

authorize an independent investigation by the County Counsel's Office. If be agrees with

the Sheriffs recommendation, be fills out a recommendation disposition slip and

forwards it to an attorney in the County Counsel's Office for review.

If the attorney agrees with the recommendation and it is a denial, then a denial letter

is sent to the citizen. If it were determined that the claim should be paid, either a fmal

settlement letter paying the full amount demanded would be sent or a settlement offer

letter seeking to settle the claim for an amount lesser than the demand.

Forty-four days after his misbap, let us assume that the citizen learns that his claim

was denied. He then calls his lawyer who reviews the facts and determines that he has a

good case. At the end of the six month period allotted to bring a claim, the lawyer files a

lawsuit seeking damages according to proof.

90
I
\ The complaint is served. Another attorney in the County Counsel's Office is assigned
i
I
to handle the matter who contacts the Sheriffs Department to find out what it knows about
I
I

the case. If the attorney locates the claim file, it will prove to be useless because all it
I
generally contains is a letter recommending a denial of the claim.
I Three years later, as trial approaches, there are no longer any witnesses or documents

and no one can remember what happened. The attorney recommends settlement. The

recommendation is accepted by the relevant county decision maker, and the Sheriffs

Department concurs.

More than three years after the event, the citizen receives his check from the County of

Los Angeles for $75,000. It has probably cost the County and the Sheriffs Department at

least another S50,OOO to defend the lawsuit.

In 1988, 1074 claims were filed involving the Sheriffs Department. In 1989, 1092

claims were filed; in 1990, 1350 claims were filed; and in 1991, 1434 claims were filed. Of

these, the majority were routinely denied.

Example 2

Recently, one of the LASD canines somehow got out of his holding area, jumped over

a Wall, ran into a park, and bit a stroller in the park. Sheriffs paramedics rushed the citizen

to the hospital for medical treatment. Investigators from the Sheriff s Civil Litigation Unit

(CLU) were notified and lost no time. They went to the hospital immediately. checkbook at

the ready. The citizen was pleased that the Department was concerned and shared bis feel-

ings about the unfortunate incident. He agreed to settle for his medical bills, lost wages,

and S1000. He was issued a check an hour after his release from the bospital.

Example 2 actually happened the other day. Example 1, or variants thereon, bave been

happening for too long. This has resulted in a great waste of money.

The Civil Litigation Unit which quickly and competently dealt with the citizen is a

91
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relatively new and innovative office within the Sheriff s Deparunent headed up by

Lieutenant Dennis Bums, Sergeant Mike Jones, 10 deputies and clerical help. Among

other responsibilities, this unit oversees investigations of administrative claims that are

filed with the County. Previously, this was the only thing this unit did.

Now, in addition to investigation of claims, the unit is proactive: As in the second

example given, it will dispatch investigators to the scene and try to settle potential claims

on the spot. Generally, this has only been done in relatively minor damage and personal

injury cases, and we are not aware mat it has been attempted in any wrongful force cases.

Through May 1992, accelerated civil claim settlements have been made in only a few

cases. Nonetheless, it is a good start, and we recommend that this program be expanded,

and quickly. Another example will prove our point.

During me recent riots, Sheriffs Deparunent detectives learned that several thou-

sand dollars in looted merchandise was concealed at a certain bouse. They obtained a

search warrant. Mistakenly, me warrant was executed at the wrong house. Two doors
were broken down and personal property was damaged before the error was discovered.

While the detectives went off to the correct bouse one block away, making several arrests

and recovering the looted merchandise, representatives of the Civil Litigation Unit

arrived at the house that had been mistakenly damaged. The property owner forgave the

Department and was willing to seule the matter. A modest check was issued within days

for the total amount of the damages. What could have become a civil claim, or a

protracted and expensive lawsuit, or a citizen's complaint, was resolved quickly to the

satisfaction of the property owner. It could not be more obvious that it is cbeaper and

better to resolve simple claims quickly.

It is also clear that the administrative claims process is in dire need of substantial

reform. By denying nearly all claims out of hand, the County is being penny-wise and

pound-foolish. True, not all administrative claims will ripen into lawsuits, and there is

something to be said fo.! waiting and seeing who really sues. But on the other band,

92
 a sensible risk management program. as practiced by any responsible insurance company,

suggests that early intervention and speedy settlement will prove less costly in the long run.

The Sheriffs Deparunent does cost the County substantial sums in settlements of civilliti-

gation. At least some of that cost sbould not be charged against the Sheriffs Department

even if it was the conduct of the Department which gave rise to the claim: Rather. some of

the cost should be charged to the County itself wbich bas failed to come up with a rational

risk management system.

Recommendations:

1. We recommend that the County of Los Angeles hire insurance experts to

plan and implement an overhaul of the administrative claims process.

2. In the interim, we recommend other reforms which could resutt in savings.

First, the cumbersome procedures described in Example I need to be streamlined.

On a weekly basis, Lieutenant Burns or his representative should sit down with an attorney

in the County Counsel's Office with authority to settle and the two of them should come to

a quick resolution with respect to any claim that the Sheriffs Department believes should

be settled. The Sheriff should be recommending settlement in far more than 10% of the

cases. The supervising investigator should be eliminated from the process on claims the

Sheriff thinks should be settled, and the matters should be worked out directly between the

Civil Litigation Unit and the County Counsel's Office.

Second, the Sheriff should notify all unit commanders that they must immedi-

ately contact the Civil Litigation Unit if there is an incident which has the potential

for an administrative claim or a lawsuit. If a warrant is served and the front door of an

innocent third party is smashed, send the CLU immediately to the scene with cbeckbook in

band. If a deputy accidentally fires his weapon and bullets lodge in the side of some

bystander's car, call the CLU to come out and pay for the damage.

93
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Third, the Sheriff's Department should send the CLU to each station to give a

training program so that everyone in the Department is sensitive to the potential

for claims and lawsuits, and knows how to get hold of the ClU whenever there is

a potential claim. The resources it will take to expand the CLU and raise its visibility

and its role will not only pay for itself quickly, but it will pay for itself again and again.

Fourth, the Department needs to keep careful track of claims and systemati-

cally preserve evidence that may be necessary in connection with an administra-

tive claim or a potential lawsuit. Every administrative claim should be treated as a

potential lawsuit. When the captain receives a claim to investigate, he or she should

create a file for it at the station and a duplicate file should be created at the CLU. The

file should be tracked so that it is possible to access it by a number of relevant

approaches: the name of the deputy, the name of the claimant, the Executive Office file

number, the County Counsel file number, the station involved, and so forth. Any phys-

ical evidence relevant to the claim should be specially tagged so that it can be associated

with the correct claim and preserved until the claim has been settled or it is known

whether a lawsuit arising from the claim has been filed within the statutory period.

Obviously, if a lawsuit is filed, the evidence will need to be preserved longer. The names

and addresses of witnesses, statements of witnesses, the names of Sheriff s Department

personnel involved or present at the time, and any other information that is available at

the time should be preserved in the file.

Fifth, the Department needs to take a proactive and conciliatory approach to

claims. As explained in greater detail in our section on Citizen's Complaints, the rust

thing that should be done when a complaint is voiced is to offer conciliation: the officer

involved should be in the same room with the complainant and the station captain should

attempt a resolution of the matter right then and there.

If the first indication of trouble occurs in the field, the CLU should go to the scene.

If the first indication of trouble is an administrative claim, the captain should review it,

94
not simply with a bias toward denying it but rather with a bias toward resolving the claim

as quickly and cheaply as possible.

The station captain should also decide at the first possible opportunity whether to

initiate any disciplinary proceedings from the incident or claim. There should be a box. to

check on the paperwork sent to the captain to indicate whether he or she desires Internal

Affairs to open a file for an investigation either at the unit level or downtown. The station

tracking system should be checked to see if this is the first or the fifteenth time that the

deputy has been involved in a similar incident. And the current incident should be entered

into the system that tracks incidents involving the given deputy.

Sixth, if a lawsuit is filed, the complaint should immediately be reviewed to see

if it was the subject of an administrative claim. If the claims are cross-filed, this should

not be difficult. The lawsuit and the administrative claims file should then be consolidated

and tracked both at the station level and downtown. If there has not been an administrative

claim filed, then files should be created both at the station and downtown and an investiga-

tion commenced. The investigation should be twofold: to preserve evidence, statements

and names of witnesses, and to form a judgment regarding whether discipline is called for.

Each captain should be held responsible for knowledge of all lawsuits, claims and citizen

complaints arising from activity at his or her station. The records of each station as to the

foregoing should be made available to the area commander or division chief reviewing the

performance of that captain and should be specifically evaluated in the captain's review.

Moreover, goals with respect to reducing claims, lawsuits and citizen's complaints should

be part of each captain's annual plan negotiated with his or her area commander.

Seventh, if a citizen's complaint is filed, it too should be reviewed to see if it was

also the subject of an administrative claim. The citizen's complaint should also be flIed

and cross-filed in such a way as to be able later to link it to an administrative claim or a

lawsuit. If there has not been an administrative claim, then files should be created and an

investigation begun.

95
 r
Eighth, the systems for tracking individual officers at the station level and

downtown, the system for tracking citizen complaints, the system for tracking

administrative claims and the system for tracking lawsuits all should be integrated

and interactive so that a complete picture is available at any time.

Finally, the Department should conduct a thorough audit of the types of inci-

dents that give rise to claims or lawsuits or complaints and take steps to reduce

risk. For example, if most claims seem to arise out of the booking procedures at the

station, then the LASD might consider mounting video cameras in the booking cages. It

will act as a deterrent to overly aggressive conduct by staff at the station, and it will serve

as a record to check whether an allegation is true or false. If MDT transmissions are

useful in detennining the circumstances surrounding claims, then the LASD might want

to keep the transmissions for a longer period of time so they can be accessed if necessary.

If video cameras should be mounted on the hoods of radio cars, then it should be done:

Money will be saved in the long run. It may be a good idea for deputies to carry voice-

activated tape recorders: If so, they should be made available.

In sum, the Sheriffs Department needs to raise the level of conscious response by its

members to the threat of litigation and take steps to conciliate immediately; settle

quickly; act defensively; and keep good records.

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97
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98
 7 . Complaints & Discipline

Complaint Investigation

Many individuals and community groups believe that the Los Angeles Sheriffs

Department is unwilling to disCipline its officers. They complain that the public is discour-

aged from filing complaints, and that when complaints are filed, they are processed in such

a way as to ensure that no action is taken against the charged officers. This perception that

the Department "takes care of its own" is supported by statistics contained in the LASD's

own computer databases. As Table 1 shows, although citizens generated roughly 77% of

the excessive force allegations over the last two and a balf years, only 6% were sustained.

However, Department supervisors who alleged that their subordinates used excessive force

1$$~ ;;lf~j·~d'~"'~'." .
Disposition 01 Citizen
Complaints Compared to
Inlemally Generated Complaints ''''"•.
670 Allegations Between 1990
and April 9, 1992
. ··dtize~m.~i
Complaints by Origin- Use of fore.

Closed 61· WI.

Unsu OSlanUilleo ••.

unrl)Un(li~·.• , 2113-4&"4

CIt
o
a'" DispositiOIl of Citizell Complaiab-
!'!
> Us. of fore.!excludiJIlI peadiag casn)
'":;
o
;;
:;
!!.
~
..
~
<D
Founded 22-%1%

.
c:
CD
c
..
o
;;
o::r Disposition of Int'rDal Complainti-
..
:: Use of foreal.xellldiDg pendiDg elsesl

99
 had a 27% success rate. roughly 4 112 times that of citizens. Our review of nearly 1.000

LASD investigation files and our interviews with both Department personnel and civil-

ians also support the view that the LASD has not dealt adequately with citizen complaints

of excessive force.

The LASD, as the most visible arm of County government, may receive many

spurious complaints. Notwithstanding, our investigation uncovered explicit and implicit

biases against civilian complainants at every level of the complaint process.

• Civilians attempting to lodge complaints at the charged officer's station are ignored,

subjected to verbal abuse, and in some instances arrested;

• Investigations of citizen complaints of excessive force are not infrequently closed before

completion - at times under highly suspicious circumstances;

• Most complaints of excessive force are investigated by a supervisor who works on the

same shift as the accused officer. Such investigations are almost uniformly inferior and

occasionally contain biased comments by the investigator,

• Citizen complaints corroborated by physical evidence and independent witnesses are

frequently not sustained;

• The decision by the charged officer's captain that the complaint is not sustained goes

essentially unreviewed;

• Many officers receive minor discipline for using excessive force.

Recent changes in policy and procedure failed to cure these problems. Indeed. some

have exacerbated them. Substantial reform is necessary.

100
Overview of the Current System

Initiation of Complaints

A civilian may initiate a complaint regarding police misconduct by completing a

Citizen Complaint Form. l Complaint forms are available only from LASD personnel. Tbe

Department encourages its employees to resolve citizen complaints informally without the

filing of a formal complaint. Most complainants lodge completed complaint forms either

with the concerned LASD unit or the Internal Affairs Bureau (lAB). Complaints sent to

local elected officials are typically referred to lAB, which routes them to the accused

officer's station for action.

In September 1991 the LASD added a 24-hour toll-free number - 1-800-698-8255-

for citizens to lodge complaints (and to offer commendations) regarding officer conduct.

Since Marcb 1992 officers througbout the Department receiving civilian complaints or

taking botline calls bave been required to record the complaint on a Watch Commander's

Service Comment Form. These officers are also required to offer a complaint form to the

civilian or caller.

Initial Evaluation of Complaints

Wbether or not a citizen complaint results in a formal investigation depends in general

upon the initial evaluation by the accused officer's captain. Upon receiving a complaint,

the concerned captain orders a "supervisory inquiry" by the watcb commander (usually a

lieutenant) wbo was on duty wben the alleged misconduct occurred. This inquiry generally

includes reviewing the arrest repon and speaking informally with the parties involved.
The captain then determines whether the citizen's complaint can be mediated.
Mediation usually consists of explaining the officer's conduct to the citizen's satisfaction

or, in some cases, having the officer offer an apology. A number of stations in the

Department, such as Norwalk, Walnut and Lakewood have gone to great lengths to mediate

101
 ~
,~

disputes and are in the process of developing formal mediation procedures and training.

If mediation succeeds, the Department generally does not continue to investigate the

officer.

Where mediation is impracticable or fails, the captain must decide whether the

complaint has sufficient merit to warrant a formal investigation. If he decides not to

proceed, the process again stops. Tbe citizen bas no rigbt to appeal the decision that

a formal investigation is unwarranted.

If the captain thinks that the officer's conduct may have been criminal, he may

request. through his division chief, that a formal criminal investigation be conducted by

the Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau (ICIB). Further administrative action is

suspended pending the outcome of the criminal investigation. These investigations are

conducted in the same manner as ordinary criminal investigations, and result in neutral

investigative files wbich are presented to the Los Angeles County District Attorney's

Office (D.A.'s Office). Tbe D.A.'s Office then decides whether to proceed with criminal

prosecution. This process occurs independently from the rest of the LASD. Between
January 1986 and May 1992, ICIB investigated 57 cases of allegedly unlawful use of

force. The D.A.'s Office accepted seven for prosecution. Convictions or guilty pleas

were obtained in four of these cases.

In the vast majority of cases. however. captains inclined to take formal action will

request a formal administrative investigation (FAI) rather than a criminal one. The

captain also generally determines wbether the investigation will be conducted by his

station or by lAB. Since 1989. nearly 75% of all FAIs of excessive force bave been

conducted by supervisors at the charged officer's station.

Station investigations are usually conducted by the watcb commander or watch

sergeant on duty at the time of the alleged incident. Both must fit investigations into

their other day-ta-day responsibilities. Cases assigned to lAB are investigated by one or

two investigators, depe~ding on the complexity of the allegations.

102
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I
I
I
As is the case with ICIB investigations, unit and lAB investigations are expected to be

neutral packages of evidence. Investigators must impartially summarize the evidence in

"Findings."

The investigator presents the FAI file to the captain of the station from which the

complaint arose together with a list of the policy manual sections relevant to the

complainant's allegations. The captain then classifies the case into one of the following

three categories:

Founded: The allegations of misconduct are true; the officer is subject to diScipline.

Unfounded: The allegations of misconduct are untrue; no discipline shall issue .

. Unsubstantiated: The evidence is insufficient to determine the truth or falsity of the alle-

gations; no discipline shall issue.

Since November 1991 there is no longer any automatic review of the initial

determination that a complaint is Unfounded or Unsubstantiated. z

Discipline can only be imposed for a Founded Complaint. and may include the

following:

Written Reprimand: A letter from the Sheriff criticizing the officer for his conduct is

personally served upon the officer and placed in the officer's personnel file.

Suspension: The officer is relieved of duty wilbout pay for up to 30 days.

Salary Step Reduction: The officer's civil service compensation level is reduced without

reducing the officer's rank.

Bonus Removal: The officer is removed from a "bonus position," such as Field Training

Officer, which entitled him to additional compensation.

Reduction in Rank: The officer is reduced one rank. For example, a lieutenant may be

reduced to a sergeant, or a sergeant to a deputy.

Discharge: The officer is terminated from the LASD.

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 r ,

Captains have the power to reprimand their officers or to suspend them for up to 15

days. Suspensions of 16 to 30 days must be approved by the concerned region chief.

Reductions in payor rank and discharges must be approved by the two assistant sheriffs,

the Undersheriff and the Sberiff.

On October I, 1991, the LASD promulgated its first written guidelines for diSCipline.

The guidelines, which cover 18 single-spaced pages, contain a thorougb discussion of

various factors that go into a decision to discipline. The guidelines state that an officer's

past record of Unfounded, Unsubstantiated or Closed investigations may not be

considered.

The guidelines also attach a four-page grid of sample disciplinary outcomes for

various offenses. Nicknamed the "bail schedule," it serves as a nonbinding guide for

managers. It also serves to notify officers of the discipline they can anticipate in the

g::::::.::::::::.:. .:. .:.:.:. . :.:. . . .:.:. .:.:.:.::.:.:-:.:.::::::.:::::::::::::::::::::.: . . :.:. . .:.:.:.:.::.:.:.::.:.:.:.:.:.: . :.:.:.:.:.:.:.::::::::::.:.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::.::::::::::::.::;:;:::;:::::::: ...................:,-"::: .. . future. The recom-

LASD Guid.IiDII for DiscipliD' (Eft.ctiv. November 1, 1991) mended discipline for

force-related and
MilcODduct 1st Off.DIe 2d OfteDle 3d OOI.S. ·f
iii! harassment-related
Criminal charges Discharge
of brutality with nolo offenses is set fonh in
contendere pili

Using force deemed 5-30 days 15-30 days Dischargell·.

Table 2.
.,,
i
;.
I

to be unreasonable Suspension Suspension ,•

;-
or unnecessary Discharge Disch.rge
i
i
Inappropriate display or 6-30 days 15-30 days Discharge i
use of we.pon Suspension
Discharge
Suspension
Discharge i
Making derogatory, 5·30 days 30 d.ys Discharge
i
I·

racial, or ethnic remarks

to coworkers, subordinates,
Suspension
Reduction
Suspension
Reduction I
supervisors or the public I
.........;... :- ....:-:.:.;.:-:...:.:::.:.: .. :-: ........ .

104
Problems with the Current System

Intake of Complaints

For citizens wishing to file an excessive-force complaint. the logical place is the station

of the accused deputy. Our review of investigative files and interviews with community

leaders and individual citizens indicates that for many, the process of going to the involved

officer's station is a negative and occasionally traumatic experience. We heard reCurring

complaints of the following:

Civilians ignored or forced to wait for hours after requesting a complaint form;

• Spanish-speaking civilia~s erroneously informed that the station only accepts complaints

written in English;

• Hispanic civilians asked to provide proof of citizenship before receiving a complaint

form; and

• Civilians informed that as a condition for receiving a complaint form, they must provide
their driver's license so that the LASD may determine whether they have any outstanding

arrest warrants.

In an attempt to gauge the prevalence of sucb practices, we telepboned a sample

of over 150 complainants who bad alleged excessive force or harassment by the LASD.

These were individuals who persisted in filing a complaint. and whose allegations were

considered sufficiently serious to warrant the opening of a formal administrative

in vestigation.)

Sixty complainants agreed to be interviewed. Of that number, 29 complained of

mistreatment. Another 5 stated that LASD officers politely but persistently pressured them

to drop their complaints. Specific examples of respondents' experiences include:

105
 r

• Civilians repeatedly asking for a complaint form were informed that they may be

arrested for interfering with the duties of a peace officer if they did not leave the station
at once;

• Civilians were threatened that if they filled out a complaint form they would not be
permitted to leave the station;

• Complainants received unwelcome visits and telephone calls from LASD officers,
sometimes on an hourly basis;

• Several Complainants "struck deals" with watch sergeants and watch commanders in

which charges of resisting arrest were dropped in exchange for withdrawal of their

complaints; and

• The mother of a IS-year-old girl who was allegedly struck by a deputy during a traffic

stop withdrew her complaint after being told by a station officer that her daughter would
"undergo severe emotional stress" during the investigation which would include long,

"very stressful" taped interviews of her daughter.

In addition, our review of FAI files and arrest reports uncovered several cases in

which a person witnessing excessive use of force was arrested when he went to the

accused officer's station to lodge a complaint Without exception, the charges against

these individuals were eventually dropped. In many cases, the citizens subsequently

withdrew their complaints.

In one.recent incident, several deputies from the East Los Angeles station severely
beat and arrested two college students at a fundraising party for a street gang diversion

program. A student who drove to the station to lodge a complaint was ignored (or 30 .

minutes and then inexplicably arrested and booked for "lynching," an offense defined as

snatching a person from the custody of a peace officer. The college student spent the

106
 better part of the weekend in jail only to learn three weeks later that tbe charges against him

had been dropped.

Altbough tbe LASD insists tbat such practices are relics of tbe "old days," many of tbe

above examples were drawn from incidents occurring witbin tbe last 18 montbs. Moreover,

deputies told us that despite tbe recent introduction of tbe Watch Commander's Service

Comment Form and renewed emphasis on providing civilians with complaint forms, their

peers continue to discourage tbe filing of complaints.

In addition, the toll-free hotline, while a potentially valuable alternative to lodging

complaints at tbe accused officer's station, has not been adequately publicized. Many citi-

zens and civic leaders were surprised to learn tbat such a hotline existed. Moreover,

our staff discovered firstband tbat tbe number is not even posted in all LASD stations and

facilities.

Processing Complaints

Complaints to station "disappear-

Citizens we interviewed were generally not confident that their complaint form would

receive careful attention. One citizen related how a station sergeant tbrew several

complaint forms at her, pointed to a wastebasket. and promised that her complaint would

be filed there after she left the station.

Current and former LASD officers say citizen concerns are well-founded. Several

deputies and supervisors asserted that some captains may have no idea how many

complaints are actually lodged at tbeir station. A former LASD deputy stated: "'The

dumbest thing you can do is to file your complaint at the station. They'll bury it if they

can. I've deep-sixed a few myself." A former LASD watch commander observed that a

complaint filed at the station "is like a fish swimming upstream. It's got to clear tbe deputy

at the desk, [then] the sergeant and the watch commander. By the time the captain shows

107
 r
,,:

up [the next morning], there's nothing for him to see."

A former LASD officer related an episode in wbicb a senior citizen telephoned bis
station to report witnessing a field sergeant beating a suspect with a sap (a small leather-
covered club filled with 21 to 23 ounces of lead sbot) immediately outside the emergency

room of a bospital. Tbe deputy wbo took the call assured the citizen that he would notify

the watcb commander of the incident. Instead, be telepboned the hospital and told the

sergeant to "cool it" because someone bad seen bim. Tbe incident was never formally

investigated. Several deputies currently on the force confirmed that such cases are not

unusual, particularly when the incident occurs late in the nigbt.

Decisions Not to Investigate or to Terminate

Investigations Prior to Completion

Citizen complaints of excessive force may not be investigated for other reasons.

Tbe accused officer's captain has in practice discretion to determine that no formal inves-

tigation of the complaint will ever be conducted. Although higher officials have the theo-

retical authority to open investigations, they do not routinely review the captain's deci-

sion not to open one. Citizens hoping to bypass the accused officer's captain by writing

to lAB are disappointed to learn that the complaints are not acted upon by lAB but rather

are forwarded to the accused officer's captain for review.

Investigations of excessive-force complaints may be short-circuited by a practice

known as "busting." Officially, FAI files may only be "busted" (Le., destroyed) if they

are duplicates of existing FAI files. But non-duplicate files are nonetheless "busted"

with some frequency.

Our staff sougbt to review all 56 files listed as busted on lAB's 1990-92 computer

database. However, it found only 23 files wbich had not yet been destroyed. Of that

number, only 6 were busted because they were duplicates of existing files. The

remaining 17 files appeared to bave been busted because the captain thought that the

108
T
,

allegations were spurious or that the complainant was uninterested in pressing forward.

Because we could only find evidence of the contents of 23 of 56 busted files, we cannot

state categorically that the sample we reviewed was representative.

Nonetheless, we were troubled that several of the 17 non-duplicate busted files raised

serious allegations of misconduct. In one, the complainant alleged that a deputy mali-

ciously ordered a police dog to bite him. The accused deputy's captain busted the file after

one of his sergeants opined - without having conducted a thorough, formal investigation

- that the dog had come to the rescue after seeing the complainant attack the deputy.

The file contained no documented support of the sergeant's conclusion.

In addition to busting, an investigation of excessive force may be shon-circuited by

"Closure." The accused officer's captain or region chief may "close" an investigation of

the officer if: (1) the citizen withdraws his complaint, (2) the subject officer tenders his

resignation, or (3) "valid and sufficient reasons exist" for ending the investigation.

In some instances, the reason given was that the complainant only wanted to get the officer

in trouble. In others, the complainant withdrew the complaint after being charged with an

offense such as battery on a police officer. In others, the complainant appeared to withdraw

the complaint in connection with a negotiated plea bargain. Investigations were also termi-

nated because the complainant could not be found at a later time or refused to cooperate.

Some closed cases involved potentially meritorious complaints. One such case

involved an investigation triggered by an inmate's telephone call to lAB. In his interview

with lAB investigators, the complainant stated that be saw deputies wrestling with an

African-American inmate. He heard one deputy in the scuffle yell, "Nigger, get the fuck

down!" He then saw the deputies drag the inmate around a comer and beard them beat the

inmate. The deputies later emerged from the corridor congratulating eacb other.

Before lAB could interview the charged deputies, department executives ordered the

investigation to be closed. The asserted bases for closure were that (1) the jail Watch

Commander's Shift Summary showed that the incident had been reponed and (2) the

109
 alleged victim had never filed a formal complaint.

We find it disturbing that Deparunent officials would determine that complaints

lacked merit before all the facts were in. Such conduct unacceptably compromises what

should be an impartial investigative process.

Investigations

Criminal Investigations

Despite public perceptions that the LASD is incapable of adequately investigating

its own officers, we found that the criminal investigations conducted by ICIB were

uniformly thorough and fair. Instead, our concern in this area lies with the apparent

disinclination on the part of the D.A.'s Office to prosecute excessive force cases

involving the LASD. While the difficulty of winning sucb prosecutions was amply

demonstrated by the recent verdict in the Rodney King trial, this does not fully explain

the fact that in the past six and a balf years, the D.A.'s Office bas prosecuted only 7 of

the 57 cases investigated by ICIS.

This disinclination to prosecute was vividly displayed with the D.A.'s treatment of

the beating of Missouri truck driver Coy Willbanks by Norwalk deputies on Februaty 27,

1987. The confrontation began when Willbanks, groggy from a long drive, refused to

move his truck from a parking lot where be had been sleeping. It ended with four

deputies beating Willbanks with metal flasblights and batons. causing permanent injury.

The deputies cbarged Willbanks with "reSisting arrest" and "battery on a peace officer."

Although four witnesses reported that Willbanks was not struggling with the officers. the

D.A. 's office pressed forward with charges against Willbanks and presented the deputies'

story - that Willbanks kicked and fought with the deputies -to a jury. Within an hour,

the jury acquitted Willbanks of all cbarges. Two jurors publicly commented that the

deputies. and not Willbanks, deserved punishment. The D.A. did not initiate an investi-

110
T

gation or bring charges against the deputies, but on February 19 of this year, a federal grand

jury indicted all four deputies for violating Willbanks' civil rights. The reluctance of local

authorities like the D.A. to prosecute excessive force merits further study.

Administrative Investigations

The vast majority of formal investigations against officers are conducted at the

administrative rather than the criminal level. Our staff reviewed over 800 investigative

files, including every available FAI regarding excessive force which was opened between

January 1, 1990 and March, 1992. Because LASD officials freely admitted that pre-1990

investigations were deficient in many respects, we limited our review of pre-1990 cases to

approximately 350 force investigations conducted between 1986 and 1989. Altogether we

found many good and some superb investigations (especially those conducted by lAB),

many others were cursory and some appeared designed to exonerate the charged officer.

Listed below are some of the significant problems we encountered.

Identified Witnesses not Interviewed. In nearly 100 of the FAI files reviewed.

there was no apparent attempt to interview witnesses identified by LASD officers or the

complainant For example, one 1991 investigative file contained a memorandum listing

the names and telephone numbers of 16 witnesses to an alleged beating. The file contains

no indication that any of these wiUlesses were contacted. The complaint of excessive force

was not sustained.

No Attempt to Identify Witnesses. In roughly 50 of the files we reviewed, there was

no apparent attempt to identify and interview readily available witnesses such as party

goers or inmates. For example, during a 1991 investigation of an alleged jail beating, two

of the charged officers stated that 25 to 30 deputies responded to the scuffle. However, the

investigator's' activity log disclosed no attempt to identify or interview those officers.

Failure to Ask Key Questions. FAI files contain only summaries, not transcripts, of

witness interviews. Therefore, the reviewing officer, who does not have the time to listen

,"
to audiotapes of Lbe interviews, does not know which questions were and were not asked

by Lbe investigator. To evaluate the adequacy of the interviews and to test the accuracy

of Lbe wimess summaries contained in FAI files, we conducted a random audit of more

Lban 40 hours of interviews and compared them to the corresponding written summaries.

In a disturbing number of instances, the investigator sought to elicit only information

favorable to Lbe charged officer. In one case, Lbe complainant alleged Lbat his leg was

broken when it was stomped by several deputies. The involved deputies claimed that the

fracture was the result of a flashlight blow to the complainant's "thrashing legs." In a

taped telephone interview with the treating physician, the investigator asked only whether

the fracture was consistent with a flashlight blow; he did not ask whether it was consis-

tent with someone jumping on the complainant's leg. Although the LASD ultimately

embraced the deputies' version of the incident, the County settled a subsequent lawsuit

for a middle five-figure sum.

Failure to Photograph Injuries. We also found numerous cases in which investiga-

tors failed to photograph key evidence or simply took the wrong pictures. One FAI file

concerning an alleged beating resulting from the execution of a search warrant at the

wrong address, contains photographs of the exterior of the complainant's residence rather

than the interior, where the alleged beating and property damage occurred. (The sole

purpose of the exterior shots appeared to be to support the charged officers' claim that

they made an honest mistake in entering the wrong home.) Many other files contained

unhelpful photographs of a suspect's bandaged injuries.

Failure to Name Additional Officers as Subjects. Under current LASD policy,

an investigator cannot add an officer as a "subject" of an investigation without permis-

sion from the officer's captain or region chief. A number of lAB investigators have

complained that this policy permits captains and chiefs to limit what should be a neutral

and thorough investigation. One lAB investigator referred us to an investigation in which

the complainant alleged that several deputies knocked him to the ground with baton

'12
 slrokes and then kicked him in the face. The emergency room physician found smudges

of black shoe polish on the complainant's forehead. Although the investigation revealed

that six deputies were present at tile scene, only one was listed as a "subject" of the investi-

gation because the captain and the region chief had refused lAB's suggestion to expand the

investigation to include the other officers.

We found several other investigations in which officers listed as "witnesses" admitted

using force against the complainant but were not added as "subjects"of the investigation:

• One "witness" officer admitted that be, and not the subject officer, had punched the

complainant in the face. Tbe subject officer was exonerated of misconduct. and the

conduct of the "witness" officer was never reviewed.

• One "witness" officer admitted that be tackled the complainant and struck him in the back

with a flashlight while a second "witness" officer admitted that be struck the complainant

in the lower back with a sap. Neither officer was added as a subject of the investigation.

• One "Witness" officer confided that he was in an "almost dreamlike" state as he repeatedly

swung his flashlight at a citizen who was struggling with the two subject officers. He was

not added as a subject of the investigation.

Biased and Incomplete Presentation of Evidence. Some FAI files span hundreds

of pages. Many captains and lieutenants admitted to us that they simply did not have the

time to read every page of every investigative file, let alone listen to audiotapes of witness

interviews. To many, the most valuable item in the files is the investigator's "findings," a

chronological summary of the evidence. Indeed. several lieutenants said that their captains

read only the findings unless the incident looked "wobbly" or gave them "beartburn."

We found a number of investigations - particularly those conducted at the charged

officer's station - containing findings which made biased statements or wbich failed to

point out evidence corroborating the complainant's story. We also found that the

113
findings contained "admissions" by the complainant that appeared unlikely or that

contradicted the complainant's initial written submission.

In some cases, there was subtle bias. Rather than presenting two sides of the story,

many findings relied upon the charged officer's interview or the arrest report for the

general narrative. Others contained subtle editorializing such as: "Deputy [AJ defended

himself by .... "or "Fearing that the complainant would attack bim, Deputy (B] .... "

In several instances, the mask of neutrality simply fell off. The following excerpt

from a unit investigation is illustrative:

"Investigator's Nou: I have been Subject [D's] Watch Commander for stveral

months and have ntver received al/ything but laudable comments from citizens concerning

his demeanor and actions. He is a youlhful looking deputy who appears to have a very

cheerful disposition. Based on the findings this investigator belitves the allegations to be

unfounded. "

Another unit investigator suggested in his findings that a gay inmate who needed

medical treatment after three [0 four deputies allegedly struck him with a metal cbain had

simply gotten what he deserved:

"[Complainant] was treated as any other homosexual would be lreated who bealS,

kicks, and yells during the course of his processing through Ihe courl syslem. "

Other findings seemed ~ bend over backward to discredit witnesses corroborating

the complainant's story. For example, one set of findings describes a bystander witness

to a courtroom brawl as someone who "appeared to have some axe to grind that we don't

knowabout.'·

While many findings were excellent in pointing out inconsistencies in statements of

witnesses supporting the complainant's allegations, they routinely failed to note inconsis-

tencies in statements of LASD officers. In one recent case, the findings reported that

114
T

according to a station sergeant, one wimess he interviewed laughed and regretted his

attempt to prevent deputies from beating a man lying near a sidewalk. However, the

findings failed to point out the inconsistency between the sergeant's description and the

following notes taken by the same sergeant during his interview with the "laughing"

witness:

a: Why'd you get involved?

A: When lwolked up Ihis man was in Ihe gutte,. being held down by two Depulies. I heo,.d

him yell "Please help me, God." ThaI did somelhing 10 me ond I wonted 10 help him. I

wonted him 10 know someone was there.

Q: What did you do then?

A: I walked up and yelled to him that I would be a witness for him. That's when the Deputy

told me to get bock.

a: Did you move bock?

A: I mOfJed bock abOUI five (5) feel, bUI Ihot's all.

a: Then who I happened?

A: The Deputy laId me to move away and not get involved, but I wonted to see what was

going to happen.

a: Then what happened?

A: That's when the Deputy swung at me so / ron . ....

"Lt. [A] then explained that a situation like this might have been better handled bere at

the station or by contacting a supervisor. [Tbe Witness] stated he understood and thanked

us for talking to him."

The complaint was adjudged to be "Unfounded."

Findings also routinely failed to mention physical evidence supporting the

complainant's allegations. In one case, two deputies claimed that they bad to defend them-

selves from two women who allegedly jumped on their backs and attempted to strangle

115
 r
them. Although the findings made a point of describing both women as heavyset, they

neglected to mention evidence that both also suffered from crippling bone diseases.

As with other troubling aspects of the investigative process, the LASD's official

response is that the problems belong to the "old days." Our research indicates otherwise.

Nearly all of the above examples were drawn from both unit and lAB investigations

conducted within the last two years. We were particularly disturbed by the poor quality

of a major lAB report issued in the middle of our investigation. The report concerned an

apparently brutal beating by a deputy known throughout the department as a supervision

problem. Review of the four-volume report suggests that the investigators apparently

failed to read their own exhibits. Their findings (which span 15 single-spaced pages)

relied almost exclusively upon the arrest report for their description of the incident and

ignored the attached transcript of the court hearing in which the deputy recanted key

aspects of the arrest report.

Adjudication of Investigations

"If 85% of the complaints are unsubstantiated, something's wrong with the system. "
- LASD Captain

"To tell you the truth, about 20% of our coses come outlile, 'Huh? HOfll} could they

possibly nOI noillhe guy?'"

Q: "Do Ihings lile lAo I Atroe on effect on morale around here? "

A: "II can gel to YOIl somelimes. " -lAB Officer in inteMeW with Judge KoItfs staff

As Table 1 points out, only 6% of citizen complaints of excessive force tracked by

the LASD for the last two and one balf years have been sustained. This extremely low

success rate warrants serious attention.

For a variety of reasons, the successful imposition of discipline against officers for

116
 use of excessive force represents the most difficult disciplinary issue confronting this or

almost any police agency. There are inherent problems because the use of force is often
unavoidable. and the question of its reasonableness can be a very difficult one. For·

example. the initial force used by the deputy may be mild, but may have increased in

response to combative or uncooperative conduct by a suspect. If there is no probative pbys-

ical evidence. it may tum upon a credibility determination between the deputy and the

suspect.

A further complication is that in a straight credibility contest. the suspect/complainant

may be far from an ideal witness. For example. he may bave such a long and unsavory

criminal record that it would take unusual prosecutorial zeal to depend upon the persuasive-

i ness of his testimony alone to upbold diScipline against the deputy.

A well known "Code of Silence" among officers can readily add one more level of

complexity. especially where the suspectJcomplainant is regarded as unsavory or a "slime."

In addition. there are difficult practical issues. For example, the incident may involve

a decision as to whether to proceed criminally or administratively. This may tum upon the

practical consideration of "should we require the deputy to talk about the incident" recog-

nizing that once he is "ordered to make statements, the ability to criminally prosecute is

severely, if not irreparably, damaged," in the words of a high-placed LASD official.

In evaluating the adjudication process, we first turned to the investigative materials

available to the reviewing officer and compared them with the result reached. We then

next reviewed a brief discussion of the facts as found by the reviewing officer. Finally.

we interviewed investigators, captains and region chiefs.

We note at the outset that we found widespread confusion within the Department about

the applicable standard for proving allegations of misconduct. The majority of captains ,we

interviewed erroneously believed that the burden of proof was "beyond a reasonable

dOUbt." rather than the far less exacting "preponderance of the evidence" standard actually

required by the Civil Service Commission.

117
 Tbis widespread misperception may account for a good number of the

"Unsubstantiated" dispositions. It does not, however, explain the recurring failure

on the part of reviewing supervisors even to address evidence which undercut the

officers' version of events.

Ignoring Physical Evidence. Many captains and region chiefs simply omitted

discussion of physical evidence contrary to their findings of fact. In one recent example,

a deputy fatally sbot a suspect be claimed bad faced bim with a weapon in bis band.

However, several eyewitnesses reponed that the suspect was sbot with bis back turned.

Tbe captain accepted the deputy's story, without accounting for (I) the fact that two

rounds struck the suspect from the rear, and (2) the fact that all bullet trajectories

described in the coroner's report fully corroborated witness accounts that the suspect was

in the process of turning away from the deputy when he was shot.

In addition, we found investigations in which the actions attributed to the victim by

the reviewing officer seemed physically impossible. In several cases, persons whose

spinal cords have been completely severed were described as performing a range of

"furtive" actions after the assault.

Tbe growing (and laudable) practice of photographing victims does not yet appear to

playa real role in adjudication of excessive-force complaints. In one 1991 case, the

complainant and several wiblesses claimed that a deputy had repeatedly beaten the

complainant across the back with a metal baton. The captain accepted the deputy's denial

of this allegation without attempting to account for a color photograph in the investiga-

tive file which clearly showed horizontal bruises on the complainant's back.

Discrediting witnesses. LASD officials agree that the classic example of an

"Unsubstantiated" complaint is the "one-an-one" confrontation at a deserted location in

which it is the officer's word against the civilian's. We found many cases where

reviewing officers refused to sustain allegations even if supported by numerous indepen-

dent witnesses. In one recent shooting, department officials accepted the word of the

118
involved deputy over that of nearly 20 wi messes, several of whom were tourists with no

stake in the outcome of the investigation.

In another incident, an emergency room nurse, a paramedic and a hospital clerk

reported seeing a deputy repeatedly punch and kick his prisoner without provocation and

then slam the prisoner's head onto his patrol car. The complaint of excessive force was

deemed "Unsubstantiated" because this testimony was "offset" by denials from both the

deputy and the prisoner, who incidentally was so intoxicated that later be could not recall

being at the hospital in the first place.

In other cases, minor inconsistencies in witness statements were deemed sufficient

to render a complaint "Unsubstantiated." One complaint that deputies Y and Z

beat a civilian wilh their flashlights was deemed "Unsubstantiated" because neither the

complainant nor a witness correctly identified bolh deputies Y and Z. However,

the complainant bad identified deputy y, the witness identified deputy Z, and both

Y and Z admitted being at the scene.

Discipline

The LASD rarely sustains civilian complaints of excessive force. Of those complaints

it does sustain, many result in discipline which appears to be far too lenient As Table 3

shows, most citizen complaints of excessive force sustained the last three years result in

suspensions of 5 days or less. Given that the standard punishment for denting a patrol car

bumper is a 2-day suspension, it is clear that the LASD does not adequately punish its offi-

cers who use excessive force.

Of particular concern is lax punishment even when the civilian posed no threat or was

unable to protect himself from the officer's blows.

One 1991 case involved an inmate who had recently had his left hip and buttocks

removed as the result of an automobile collision. While unwrapping a throat lozenge

(in violation of a jail rule that inmates walk with their hands in their pockets) the inmate

119
 r
. ...... ,' ...•. ::: ... . ................. -: .. -::-:-:.::>.:.:;:...::- ....

Suspensions of LASD Officers for excessive Forci

46 total suspensions logged by the LASD ·Clipper- database between 1990 and April 1992

25

·\23>
.. . . . . . . . . n<.
20
---t . .·. .·. · . :.: .: · .: .>•.:.•.•.- - :::20::::·
• :L> <.><

<>< •...• )
.~---------------
••••• ••••••••••••••••·.! •••••i·i.·• • •• • ___ •.
15
---:.• • .•.• • >.•. • .• •.•:• • • }
}:}>: • . • .: •:. •:.•. •.
• :. •. :• •.: •:. •: :•. •
:.:.i:..•.·.::
.•:. :.• .

---iiI!;i::i~~~~ lit' . . 1
lD

5
--- ;.j". .§.).ll ';. . --.-•.• -(-3-:.-{-•••-•••.-.- - - - - - - - -
Source:
LASo Internal
Affairs Bureau
o Databes,
6-5 day saspensions 6-15 day suspeasiolll 16-30 day suspensioDs

Discharges of LASD Personnel

423 total discharges tracked by the LASD ·Clipper· database between 1989 and April 1992

160
140
120
100

80

.. 60 o Non use of torce

related dischar\les

40
• Un of forci
relatld disch ar\les

20 Soiree:
LASo Intamal
7 Affairs Bureau
0 Database

1989 1990 1991 Jan I-April 9, 1992

120
was kneed several times in the buttocks by a 6-foot 3-inch 215-pound deputy. The blows

caused the inmate's surgical wounds to reopen. The deputy claimed that he kneed the

inmate because the inmate "tensed up" when ordered against the wall, causing the deputy to

fear for his safety. He was suspended for only four days.

The LASD has been particularly lax in its discipline of officers found to have lied to

investigators about force they used or witnessed. One officer repeatedly lied to criminal

investigators about his involvement in a 1990 beating of a handcuffed prisoner. In his first

interview, the officer stated that he neither saw nor used any force on the prisoner. One

month later, when ICIB investigators confronted him with evidence that he was present at

the beating. be admitted lying in his first interview. He further admitted that he kicked the

prisoner twice and that he saw his partner hit the prisoner. However, he added that such

force was necessary because the prisoner was attacking them. When lCIB investigators

returned the following week with further evidence, the officer admitted that he bad lied

during both of his previous interviews in order to protect his parmer. He then admitted that

the prisoner was not resisting when beaten. The officer received only a 5-day suspension.

In another case, a deputy kicked an inmate who was making noise on a bus and then

squeezed the inmate's testicles until the inmate began to cry. The deputy did not report the

incident. Although the captain stated that he was "incredulous" upon hearing the officer

claim that he did not know that squeezing testicles constituted "reponable force," the

officer received only a 5-day suspension for excessive force and failure to report it

The LASD responds by arguing that it has recently increased the amount of punishment

handed out for excessive force. It points out for example that between 1989 and April

1992, it discharged a total of 15 officers (or excessive force. This number is small,

however, when compared to the number of discharges for misconduct which is unrelated to

excessive force. (See Table 4). Moreover, as the foregoing examples of recent discipline

indicate, the LASD continues to punish officers lightly even for egregious beatings.

121
 We do commend the LASD for establishing written guidelines for disciplining offi-

cers and will be interested to see if the guidelines. effective November 1. 1991. have the
effect of increasing punishment of officers using excessive force.

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates. the LASD bas been unacceptably lenient

in punishing officers using excessive force. A further problem is that during the

grievance process, the LASD often reduces the punishment it originally intended to hand

out. Obstacles, real or perceived, to unilaterally imposing discipline include the opposi-

tion efforts by the unions; the occasional tendency of civil service hearing officers to

mitigate the discipline in accordance with their views of appropriate or just discipline;

inconsistency in levels of diSCipline imposed for the same conduct; the argument that a

past practice has emerged which, allegedly, created a historical level of discipline which

ought not be changed; and the inherent tension that is in every police agency when the

discipline and remedial actions the agency bas taken are used against the agency by plain-

tiff s attorneys in a subsequent civil trial. Thus, good faith efforts at correction may

become a weapon against the agency in a coun room setting, where high stakes damage

awards are involved.

Notwithstanding the above, the Department bas, in prior years, a good track record in

disciplinary matters before the Civil Service Commission. Departmental sources estimate

that in the 1970's the vast majority of cases were won at the Civil Service Commission

but that this bas been gradually declining in recent years. Recent statistics, however, are

inconclusive. For example, we reviewed 10 instances in 1991 where the LASD proposed

a discharge. All 10 were appealed, 8 to the Civil Service Commission. Not one has been

concluded. Two were appealed to arbitration, but involved probationary officers, and

arbitrability was denied. In addition, two deputies were discharged prior to their rein-

statement pursuant to a ruling of a Civil Service Commission hearing officer:

This is not to suggest that there are overwhelming barriers to upholding discipline:

Indeed, the Department's investigatory resources outstrip that of most employers.

122
Rather, it is to suggest that excessive-force cases raise more complexities than almost any

other disciplinary matter, and that such cases may require much more preparatory effort
and care.

The problem of excessive force can be attacked from many directions, for example,

recruitment, training and counseling. The disciplinary process is an obvious avenue of

deterrence. However, it will not be an effective deterrent if the Department lacks

confidence in its ability to make the discipline "stick," In that connection, there is

the general impression that management of the LASD is willing to significantly miti-

gate discipline during the grievance process, If this becomes perceived as standard

practice, there is little or no incentive for the deputy not to appeal any and all discipline.

There are many tactical considerations which are involved in such decisions, but where

the circumstances warrant it, the possibility of increasing the discipline at, for example, the

third step should not be overlooked. In short, it should not be a one-way street. As long as

the obstacles seem overwhelming and confidence is lacking, the inclination to compromise

and mitigate will increase, and the ultimate message is less deterrence than the Department

would want.

The first step is to create an appropriate atmospbere. Fully communicating its policy

and pbilosophy of increased intolerance toward excessive or gratuitous force, resolutely and

frequently, can have a very worthwhile practical effect. The standard by which arbitrators

or other triers of fact assess whether or not the use of force was excessive, may vary from

community to community. Ifa par,ticular community bas a clearly enunciated pbilosopby

of intolerance of excessive force, that may be a persuasive factor in upbolding discipline in

particular cases. (See award and opinion of arbitrator in City of Gorden Grove AAA Case

No. 7-72-390-0163-88, wherein the arbitrator noted that the particular police department's

philosopby bolstered the arbitrator's reluctance to substitute bis own judgment for that of

management officials in determining the severity of discipline.) In short, it can assist a

trier of fact in assessing the level of incompatibility of the grievant's alleged conduct with

123
the standards of the deparunent. In contrast. a community known to be tolerant of exces-

sive force may find it more difficult to make the discipline "stick."
Presently, the Department is perceived by some as vulnerable to arguments about
past practice (however subjective and sketchy). However, the Department is not

barred from a renewed emphasis upon its intolerance of excessive force. The

Department is not forced to abandon its goal simply because. in a department of thou-

sands of members, there have been some inconsistencies in the imposition of discipline.

For example.

the Memorandum of Understanding with the Union (MOU) specificaily provides:

"The waiver of any breach. term of condition of this Memorandum of Understanding

by either party shall not constitllte a precedent in the future enforcement of all its terms and

provisions . ..

While the vast majority of disciplinary appeals go to the Civil Service Commission

rather than to arbitration pursuant to the MOU, this provision does help dispel the notion

that because variations in the level of discipline, the lowest level of discipline becomes

the standard.

A vital aspect in communicating this philosophy is in the training sessions for

recruits. With cenain qualifications. our staff found two new Academy lectures on the

legal and moral implications of excessive force to be encouraging. The presentations of

the lieutenant and sergeant reflected an enthusiastic dedication to inculcate the appro-

priate philosophy. If this is typical of what can be expected. the recruits will certainly get

the message.

However. our staff found no evidence that the philosophy communicated to recruits

at the Academy is also being communicated up the chain of command. The danger is that

many superior officers are not bearing the message that is being communicated to the

recruits in an area where coordinating the message is essential.

124
 On the other hand. there is a legislative development which would obviate this entire

effort. AS 2067, passed by the California General Assembly, would actually codify the

unwritten "code of silence." It would severely limit the ability to question police offi-

cers about unlawful conduct that they observed on the part of other officers. This

legislative effort. dubbed the "Rogue Cop Protection Bill" by the Sacramento Bee

(February 3. 1992). was passed by the Assembly by the lopsided margin of 58-5. despite tbe

major effort by Sheriff Block to rally support against it.

Another "legislative" factor in disciplinary cases before the Civil Service Commission

is Rule 4.11 which provides:

"Testimony of Petitioner. In hearings on discharges, reductions or suspensions in

excess of five days. the petitioning employees shall not be required to testify, but may be

cross-examined as to any matter relevant to the bearingif the petitioner takes the stand

voluntarily. In any other type of bearing the petitioner may be called and examined as if

under cross-examination."

Tbat rule prevents the Department from calling the grievant employee as an adverse

witness. Thus. the witness bas a much better opportunity to shape and tailor his defense to

the testimony of the Department's witnesses. (If the employee were to be required to

respond to certain questions at the outset. it should. of course, be subject to his counsel's

right to defer cross examination until later in the case.) Moreover, certain facts may be

uniquely within the knowledge of the employee, so that calling the employee as an adverse

witness at the outset can save a great deal of bearing time by obviating the need for other

witnesses. In any event. the desirability of amending Rule 4.11 deserves consideration.

In the disciplinary hearings themselves the grievants are usually represented by counsel

(and by attorneys who speCialize in this area). In contrast. the Depanment bas not been

represented by attorneys in disciplinary matters. This is not to suggest that experienced

non-attorneys cannot handle certain disciplinary matters as competently as attorneys, or

125
more competently than inexperienced attorneys. Indeed, the LASD was ably represented

by a non-lawyer for many years. However, the issue is broader because the pre-hearing

preparation of a case may be affected by the familiarity with new developments, nOlonly

in the public sector labor law area, but in the private sector as well.

Where important cases are involved, it is difficult to dismiss the effect of utilizing sucb

resources as an experienced specialist in labor law, even if it is just for assistance in the

pre-hearing preparation and strategizing of the case. In some current cases, the LASD

is using an attorney, and this is a positive step.

Moreover, the Civil Service Commission bearings often involve extensive arguments

by attorneys for employees seeking to restrict the admissibility of certain evidence.

Despite the express liberality concerning rules of evidence, mandated by Rule 4.10, these

disputes persist. If nothing else, an attorney is likely to be more comfortable in eviden-

tiary disputes than a non-attorney, and potentially more effective on those types of issues.

It is our impression that the Deparunent has not afforded such resources to its advocates.
In particular cases, it could result in providing an edge to grievantswbo, in important

cases, invariably utilize those resources on the other side. The Board of Supervisors

should designate additional funds earmarked for a lawyer to represent the

Department in Civil Service proceedings. Any consideration of these issues that does

not account for a vigorous contest by the representatives of the disciplined officers is

myopic. All of the media attention, and the demands for greater discipline, are likely to
result in a redoubling of effort in defending the officers by their attorneys and their labor

organizations. It is as unrealistic to expect the unions to be unassenive to the rights of

their "clients" as it would be, for example, to bave sucb expectations of the ACLU or

Legal Aid. The LASD needs and deserves its own first-class legal counsel repre-

senting it in Civil Service hearings.

An inherent tension, readily acknowledged by this and any police agency, is the use

of its own investigative efforts by plaintiffs counsel in coun suits against the agency. In

126
 a real sense, the Department runs tbe risk of making tbe case against itself for plaintiffs

counsel in a damage action against tbe Department. Nonetheless, the Department's posi-

tion, in the words of a senior official, is to "take any and all remedial action necessary,

even in light of increasing liability ramifications." Sheriff Block has stated: "My first

obligation in this regard is the management of tbis Department."

It is difficult to believe tbat, despite this position, the posslble use and abuse by plain-

tiffs counsel of the Department's own work product does not have the potential for

inhibiting an investigation. The specter of plaintiff s counsel utilizing, for example, a thor-

ough investigative effort by tbe Departmem regarding an officer engaged in excess force,

against the Department, to extract a seven-figure jury verdict, is not an attractive picture for

many officers to conjure up. Equally unattractive is the possibility that plaintiffs will use

the efforts the Department is making to improve its prevention of excessive force, to argue

to juries that these efforts merely demonstrate the pervasiveness of such conduct. This

obviously bas the potential for misuse and abuse by plaintiffs. Legislative solutions to the

dilemma would be helpful.

Tbere is a positive note to be sounded for the future, and that is that the risk of punitive

damages should be reduced by the efforts now being taken by the LASD. A combination of

efforts to attack the problem of excessive force in the recruitment, training, promotion and

disciplinary process should greatly enhance the argument that punitive damages should not

be imposed on the LASD.

Recommendations Regarding Filing of Complaints:

We recommend a stop to any discouragement by any member of the LASD to

the filing of a citizen's complaint. To that end, we recommend that a complainant

should be able to receive and fill out a citizen's complaint form against the Sheriff's

Department at a variety of County facilities in addition to a Sheriff's station

127
including, but not limited to, district office,: of the members of the Board of

Supervisors and such other public facilities as the Board of Supervisors may deter-

mine. The complaint forms should be available in Spanish, English and any other

languages widely spoken within the County. Placards providing information in

Spanish, English and these other languages about filing citizen's complaints

should be prominently displayed at each Sheriffs station along with the hot line

telephone number and information about using the hot line. Each citizen's

complaint received in person by a member of the Sheriffs Department should be

legibly signed, dated and time-stamped by that member of the Department.

We further recommend that the complaint form should have a specific ques-

tion asking the complainant if the complainant was discouraged by any member

of the Sheriff's Department from filing a complaint or was harassed or threatened

in any way by any such person in connection with the filing of the citizen's

complaint and if so, by which member of the Sheriffs Department. If the answer

is yes, a separate unit level investigation should be automatically and immediately

commenced of the person accused, irrespective of any decision to investigate the

main allegations of the citizen's complaint. If the accusation respecting discour-

agement of filing a complaint contains allegations of force or verbal abuse, lAB

should automatically and immediately commence a separate investigation of those

allegations irrespective of any decision to investigate the main allegations of the

citizen's complaint.

We recommend a stop to the practice of some officers to refuse to identify

themselves to possible complainants. To that end, we recommend that each

member of the Sheriffs Department be required to carry business cards and to

hand them out immediately and without protest to any person who requests one.

Similarly, each member of the Department should immediately and without

protest provide his or her complete name and employee number to any civilian

128
who requests that information. Placards announcing these policies should be prom~

nently displayed in English, Spanish and other widely spoken languages at each

station. There should be a question on each complaint form asking whether the

. complainant was refused a business card or identification by any member of the

Department involved in any allegation. If the answer is yes, a unit level investigation

of that allegation will automatically and immediately be commenced.

We recommend a stop to the reported practice by some officers of contacting

complainants or witnesses to discourage the filing or prosecution of complaints.

To that end, we recommend that no member of the Department other than the

assigned investigator or investigators should be allowed to contact any complainant

or witness in person or by telephone or otherwise pending final resolution of the

investigation. Prior to the conclusion of any interview by any investigator with any

witness or complainant, the investigator should ask if the witness or complainant

was at any time contacted by any member of the Sheriff's Department after the filing

of the citizen's complaint or was contacted by any member of the Sheriff's

Department to discourage the filing of a complaint. If the answer to any of these

questions is affirmative, separate lAB and ICIB investigations should immediately

and automatically be commenced.

We r,ecommend a stop to the Complainant's inability to ascertain the status

of the investigation of a complaint. To that end, we recommend that the Board of

Supervisors name a civilian to whom a copy of each and every citizen's complaint

should be forwarded within two days of receipt by the Sheriffs Department.

That individual should keep a log of such complaints and should be empowered to

ascertain the general status of any investigation upon the request of any

complainant and shall report the same to the complainant.

We recommend a stop to the present situation where the complainant never

learns what discipline, if any, is imposed upon a founded complaint. To that end, we

129
 ,

recommend passage of whatever legislation or amendment to whatever

labor/management agreements may be necessary to achieve that result.

As described more fully in our section on accountability, we believe that

many of the deficiencies in the investigation and adjudication of excessive-force

complaints can be ameliorated by introducing some civilian oversight of complaint

resolution.

Recommendations Regarding Investigations:

The Internal Affairs Bureau (lAB) should have the sole authority to conduct

formal administrative investigations (FAls) regarding (1) citizen complaints of

unnecessary and/or.excessive force; (2) citizen complaints of harassment on the

basis of race, sex, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation; (3) officer-involved

shootings; and (4) deaths which occur during custody. These investigations should

be completed in a timely fashion. The Board of Supervisors should earmark addi-

tional funds for the expansion of lAB. As discussed above, our staff found that

although lAB investigations were not problem free, they were markedly superior to unit

investigations. lAB investigators have both the time and the experience to conduct full

and thorough inquiries. Moreover, their investigative reports are reviewed by a lieu-

tenant for thoroughness and fairness. The appearance of integrity of an investigation is

enhanced when it is performed by lAB rather than by a sergeant or lieutenant performing

an investigation of a fellow officer at the same station.

Perhaps more significantly, the shift of these investigations to lAB will enable watch

commanders and watch sergeants to devote more time to supervising their officers. As

one unit commander complained, "While you have one lieutenant in his office investi-

gating one complaint, two more are happening out on the street."

At the same time, it will be necessary to expand the resources and personnel in lAB.

130
A frequent, serious complaint by deputies is that lAB takes an extremely long time to

complete investigations. The uncertainty hanging over the head of a deputy and the

possible cloud on the deputy's reputation can produce unintended cruel results, to say

nothing of distracting a deputy from performance of duties and increasing anxiety and

worry. For these reasons, investigations must be quick as well as thorougb and fair. lAB is

already seriously overburdened. We are cognizant that our recommendations will only add

to that burden. Accordingly, we strongly urge the Board of Supervisors to earmark addi-

tional funds for expansion of lAB.

lAB's investigation of force- or harassment-related complaints should be shielded

from pressures from within and without the LASD. To that end, no one in the LASD

should have the authority to narrow the scope of an ICIB or lAB investigation.

However, a captain requesting an investigation and that captain's superiors may

request that ICIB or lAB expand the scope and direction of the inquiry.

The captain of lAB should, upon reviewing the investigative file and conferring

with the lAB investigators, make a recommended finding of whether the

complainant's allegations are Founded, Unfounded, or cannot be resolved. Our inves-

tigation revealed that station captains often lack the time to conduct a thorough review of

the investigatory materials. In a given day, they must oversee the management of a unit

with anywhere from 100 to 300 officers. In interviews with our staff, many confided in

time that they often called the lAB Sergeant who conducted the interview to get a "bottom

line" impression. Virtually all agreed that they did not spend as much time as they would

like reviewing investigative files. Some captains recommended that lAB supply a recom-

mendation. Others opposed it.

We believe that captains should play the central role in determining the appropriate

discipline for Founded complaints of excessive force. They are or should be familiar with

the officer's work history and performance. We do not believe it undercuts their authority

to consider an lAB recommendation as to whether a complaint is Founded.

131
A properly insulated lAB is particularly well-suited for that task because it has inter-

viewed the witnesses. can therefore best judge credibility and has the perspective and

overview to do a detached and professional appraisal. We believe that a station captain

should be free to disagree with lAB's recommended disposition, but if he or she does so,

should carefully articulate the reasons. All resolutions should continue to be subject to
review by the commander of Office of Professional and Ethical Standards, who should

retain the authority he presently has to express disagreement with a result if he so

chooses.

It is a common practice among a number of police departments. including Chicago,

Philadelphia and San Diego for the investigatory arm of the force to make an initial

recommendation as to the result of the investigation. We believe this system can work in

the LASD as well.

Citizen complaints should be fully investigated to the satisfaction of lAB, even

if the citizen withdraws his complaint. The LASD should satisfy itself that each

complaint is investigated to the point that an informed and fair decision can be

made on the merits of the complaint, and that any failures to comply with depart-

ment policy are addressed adequately, regardless of an apparent change of heart

on the part of the complainant. Accordingly the current practice of Mclosing Mor

MbustingM investigations when the citizen loses interest in pressing charges must

cease.

lAB findings should list the name of the station supervisors on whose shift the

alleged incident occurred. As it stands now, the LASD has no data to measure the

performance of its sergeants and lieutenants in curbing excessive force. This must

change if supervisors are to be held accountable for the actions of their subordinates.

Each officer's personnel folder should contain copies of (1) all citizen

complaints and the resulting lAB Findings and Final Dispositions, regardless of

disposition; and (2) reference to all lawsuits in which the officer was named as a

132
 1

defendant.

lAB should investigate all allegations of force or harassment made in civil claims

and lawsuits, even if the plaintiff never filed a citizen's complaint.

The practices of "closing" files prior to the conclusion of an investigation should

cease. The practice of ""busting" files prior to the conclusion of an investigation

should cease. A duplicative file should be retained with a notation that the

investigation was consolidated with another named file. All investigations should

be concluded with one of the following dispositions:

Founded: A preponderance of the evidence establishes that the allegations are true or that

a preponderance of the evidence establishes misconduct even if the specific misconduct is

not alleged by the complaint.

Unfounded: A preponderance of the evidence establishes that the allegations are not true.

Exonerated: A preponderance of the evidence establisbes that the facts occurred as the

complainant alleges, but that the Officer's actions were lawful and proper.

Unable to be Resolved: There is insufficient evidence to establish. by a preponderance

of the evidence. whether the allegations are true or false or wbether the officer otherwise

acted properly or improperly.

Recommendations Regarding Discipline:

The Department should emphasize by every means possible that it does not

tolerate excessive force. Every word and action of the Department must reinforce

that policy.

In order to maximize the enforcement and deterrence functions of the disci-

plinary process, the Department should vigorously prosecute disciplinary cases,

refrain from mitigating discipline during the process and consider increasing the

discipline at later stages.

133
 Amendment of Civil Service Rule 4.11 should be considered so that the

Department can call the grievant employee as an adverse witness at Civil Service

hearings.

The Department should be represented by first-class legal counsel in all

Civil Service proceedings.

The Department should seek legislative solutions in order to assure that the

Department's internal force investigations and efforts to reduce excessive force are

not inhibited by fear of misuse or abuse.

134
135
136
 m

8. Officer-Involved Shootings

Criminal Investigations

"Firearms sholl be regarded as defensive weapons and used only wizen the individual

Deputy is compelled 10 do so by exisling circumSlances. " - LASD Manual of Policy and Procedures

"When low enforcement officers fire their guns, the immediate consequences of Iheir deci-

sions are realiud otlhe rate of 1,500 feet per second and are bryond reversal by any level of

official review. " -lieutenant Ed McErlain. Huntington Police Department t

Officer One: He's got my fOOl! He's gOI my fOOl! Shoot him! Shoot him! Gel off him! Get

off, I'm going to Shoolhim! [unintelligible} Shoolhim! He's gol my fOOl!

Officer Two: No! No! No! No! Wail, wail, wail, wail. Wail. Wait.

[gunshots}

Officer Two: Damn it!

[more gunshots} -Audiotape of fatal shooting recorded by LASO deputy

No aspect of police work attracts more attention than an officer's decision to ftre his
gun. The consequences of deadly force demand that the LASD thoroughly appraise how
and why a shooting occurred each time an officer purposely flres a gun, whether or not
someone is hit.

We acknowledge that suspects are often violent and well-armed. Nonetheless, we

reviewed enough cases of offtcer-involved shootings of unarmed suspects - particularly of

persons shot in the back - to raise concerns that LASD offtcers may be involved in shOOl-
ings because of poor training, impatience and panic. Table 1 compares officer-involved
shootings to deputies shot in action.
Until last year, if the District Attorney declined to prosecute an LASD deputy who shot
a suspect, the LASD generally did not proceed administratively against the officer. The

137
 D.A. saw fit to prosecute only one shooting in the past decade.

Hence. in the vast majority of shootings, there never was an investi-

gation to see if administrative discipline was warranted. The LASD
Dlplrtmlal policy rlglrdiog Ihl
UI. of firllnal il sel fortb io § 3- has recently altered this practice and has proposed discipline for
D1fQ3D.3D of Ih. LASD MIDUII of
Policy lad Procldurl. wbicb il SlI officers in shootings that did not result in prosecution but are
forti! b.low ia r.l.uDI plrt
II Uliog firllnal. d.puty plnonnel
otherwise out of policy. Within the past year, the LASD flred four
lball b. IWlrl Ibll IlIlilultiOl1
officers and demoted a fifth in connection with out-oC-policy shoot-
clanol be aaticlpilid Ind. tbarl-
for •• g.D.rllizatioa il unavoid- ings. We commend the LASD for taking this step in the right
Ibll.

FirllrIDl or forci liklly to produci

direction. We also commend its recently inaugurated policy of
grelt hdily blna shill not III Ulad
conducting an administrative inquiry into all shootings resulting in
i a Ibl prOC1l1 of Irrllti DII aay
plnol 1011ly for I mildlmuDor. injury.- However, as the discussion below indicates, LASD's internal
Dlputy p.noan.llblll Dot fire al I
fl'liDg f.loDY IUIPICt unlill thl
investigative process contains serious deficiencies and biases and
officer .... probabll CIUII 10
should be substantially reformed. We will first discuss LASD
btlilve Iblt Ibl IUSp'Ct POSIII
ligDificlDt Ibrlll of dlltll or criminal investigations and our criticisms of them. Then we will
"rioal iljary to Ibl offic.r or
olbln; aor il Iblre IDY lustifica- tum to administrative investigations of shootings and our criticisms
tiol. aader BlOst clrcIBlstlllCll. to
fire It I f11.iDg .. bicil wblreia of them.
tbe IiYII of iaDoclat penODlmlY
bllldlDoerld.
Homicide Investigations
Dlpaty p.noDDI' arl DOt to be
restrictld ia lb. Ilwful plrfor-
mlac. of t ... ir datill. nlY Illy. The LASD has always required its Homicide Bureau to conduct
t ... positiY' duty to us. firelflll
w".an., th. I.cllsity .xists iD an automatic criminal investigation of officer-involved shootings in
t ... prolectioD of Ib.ir livll. or lb.
livil of olbln...
which someone is wounded by a bullet. In such cases, four

Homicide sergeants and one Homicide lieutenant will "roll out" to

the shooting at any time of day or night Two of the four Homicide
sergeants secure the area Cor evidence. They place cones to indicate
the location of sbells, weapons, blood spatters and other pertinent
,
evidence. They also direct Crime Lab personneito measure, sketch I
and photograph the scene. The other two Homicide sergeants are
I,
I

138
 responsible for locating and interviewing witnesses and the involved

officers. Homicide always bas the first opportunity to interview

witnesses and officers. Unlike many police agencies, the LASD has
WarniDg ,bot, ,bill Dot b.lir.d.
generally been able to obtain statements ftom involved officers.
Firearm. sb.1I II. reg.rded I I
Homicide's final report, commonly called the "Shoot Book," is defeasin weapOD. aad Dlld oDly
wllea tile iDdividul1 d.puty i.
submitted to the Special Investigations Division of the D.A.' s office compellad to do .0 lIy nistiDg
cirCUIDIIaDC".
for disposition. The Shoot Book, which can take months to
It IbllI be tbe full relpollibility of
assemble, is designed to provide a neutral summary of the evidence. tbe illdividu.1 deputy to UII
fireanD. oDI, wll.1 1111011111,
In March 1992, a member of our staff examined the rollout DlC ....ry lid fully justifi.d II, tb.
circumllaIC".
procedure firsthand by walking through the scene of an officer- •

involved shooting in the City of Rosemead. The on-site investiga-

tive procedures appeared impeccable.

In addition, our review of over 100 Homicide Shoot Books

indicated that, by and large, Homicide investigations of officer-

a::::::::::::::::":':':':':'::::.:"'::::::::::::'::':::: .... :.:: .. :.: ... :.:.:.: .. :.:.:.:... :...:....................................:.:.:.:.:.: ...:.:.:.:.:::.:.... :...:-:.:.:.::-...:-:-..:-:.:-..:.:.:-:.:.: ...........:....:.:-......:.:-:-: ...·..:···:-:::::x::::::::::::::::::·:·.····:·:··.. ·:·:· ... ·.............................:...:.: ... :

LASD Officer·IDvolv.d Shooting January 1. 1992 to July 2. 1992

60

:.:::

o Suspects Shot !::t:

• Officers Shot ::::

."
0.":'
So,me
LASD Fie! Sheet:
1886 R.view

1911 1911 1919 1951 1991 Ju'-A,ri." '"2

139
 ,
involved shootings were fair and thorough. We did, however, find evidence of practices

which compromised the integrity of some investigations.

Untaped interviews. We found a pattern of Homicide investigators conducting

unrecorded interviews of witnesses and involved officers. The most widespread practice

is "pre-interviewing" witnesses and officers at the station before tape-recording the

session. According to a high-ranking Homicide official, the purpose of a "pre-interview"
is to engage in "small talk" in order to calm the witness. However, we reviewed a

number of files in which the investigator used the unrecorded "pre-interview" to talk to

witnesses about the incident. One such file concerned a Homicide investigation of a

recent fatal shooting in which several officers fired over a total of 40 rounds. In the

taped interviews, the Homicide investigator "summarized" witnesses' off-tape statements

in his own words and then asked the witnesses if his characterization was fair. A number

of captains we interviewed condemned "pre-interviewing," claiming that it resulted in

"cleaned up" interviews of involved officers.

Less widespread, but far more disturbing, were instances in which the investigator

without explanation shut off the tape recorder in the middle of a witness interview.

Whatever the real reason for going off-tape, it inevitably causes the listener to suspect

manipulation. One example of this concerned a 1988 fatal shooting of an unarmed

motorist During an interview of the sole civilian witness, the Homicide investigator shut

off the tape recorder when the witness began to contradict the story of the involved offi-

cers. When the tape recording resumed, the Homicide investigator marcbed through the

sequence of events, allowing the witness only to reply, "Yes sir," and "Yeah." A subse-

quent wrongful death lawsuit was settled for nearly $1 million.

Leading Questions. To determine the lawfulness of an officer-involved shooting,

Homicide investigators must try to discover the officer's mental state at the time of the

shooting. In some cases, we found unnecessarily suggestive questioning. Here are three

examples:

140
 • "So, YOlJr intention at this point was to in fact combat {tire slJspect's}

violent attacH"

• U[Y} OIJ formulated lire plan to return fire was - tltis ... prompted nae LASD does lOt lutomltically
CDilducl. crimi ..1illYistigltiOi
for tire plJblic safety dlJe to this armed suspect and fear for lire safety 0' officer·illYo/Yed IliootiDgl i.
wllic" 110 i.dividull illiit.
of your safety [sic} as well as your fellow deputies tlrol were 10 How..." Deplm.Dt officilll
lilY' tile discretiOi to IIIYI til,
respond to Ihe location?"
IlIterllll CrilDi .. IIIlYestillltioDl
Surel. ,-ICIS-' or lAS CDlld.ct I
• "So ... you immediately retumed/ire/oralllhtsame/oclors, CrilDillll or adlllillistrltiYl ilquiry.
For ,xllDple, ill MarcIl199Z.
fear, public safety and lire lives of your fellow depUlies as well as SIItri" Siock perloDllly ordtr.d
0'
III ICIS iDveltigltioll I. off·duty
yoursel/p" party ill Maywood i. wllic" IlYtral
deputies IIIeg.dly fired over two
doz ... rOllDdl il tile air.
In a small number of instances, the investigator seemed to be
•
manipulating civilian witnesses to make statements exonerating the

involved officer. One such interview arose out of an investigation of

a shooting following a high speed car chase. Several gang members

were raCing toward a hospital after one passenger was shot by a rival

gan~ member. LASD officers io an unmarked sedan saw the

speeding car and pursued it. The gang members, seeiog the

unmarked sedan follow them at higb speed, frred at the vebicle,

apparently thinking that they were being chased by the gang member

wbo bad fired the earlier shots. At some point in the pursuit,

the officers saw the suspects toss their guns out of the car window.

When the suspects' car stopped, and the officers demanded

surrender, the driver raised both of bis bands and placed them

outside the window. He was instantly shot in the rigbt arm. The

officers continued to fire on the suspects, who were later discovered

to be unarmed. The following is an excerpt from an interview with

141
 T

the driver. a 1S-year old Hispanic male who spoke without an attorney present:

a: So you stopped your car?

A: Yes.

a: What happened next?

A: I Slopptd the cor and I took my hands alit 0/ the window.

a: You plaad your hands out the window?

A: Yes.
a: What happened next?

A: The cops started shooting at us.

a: Why?

A: I don't know. We already Slopped. BtCouse probably 'couse we [had been] shooling 01

Ihem.

a: So, when YOII pllt YOllr hands 0111 the window, maybe Ihey Ihollght that YOII TJlJere gonno
shoot again at them?
A: Maybe - yes, they probably Ihoughllhot.

a: Maybe? WOlild YOII have Ihoughllhol if you were Ihe cops and Ihey TJlJeT't the bod guys

and Ihey hod jusl gOI done shOaling 01 you and -

A: Yeah, I would have -

a: -thty Slopped -they stopped Me cor and slUck Iheir arms oUIIAe windoTJIJ, would YOII

Ihid Ihol maybe Ihey wert gonno shool again?

A: Yes.

Q: So do you think thollAe - maybe IAe po/ia o/fiars 1JIere juslified in sAooling boel 01
you again wAen you sluck your hands 0111 the window?

A: Yes, I Ihink Iho/they wert right.

142
D.A. Investigations Of Shootings: Operation Rollout

Since the summer of 1979. the LASD and the D.A.'s office have participated in a

program known as Operation Rollout in which a deputy district attorney and a district

attorney investigalOr also visit tbe scene to investigate police shootings at any hour of the

night or day. The purposes of tbe rollout program are (1) to provide assurance of the

integrity and trustwortbiness of tbe LASD's internal investigation by the participation of an

outside independent agency, and (2) to provide for quick, informed prosecutorial decisions

about whetber a crime occurred.

As soon as is practicable, the Homicide lieutenant is to provide the D.A. team with a

briefing of the information developed in the investigation and provide a location for the

D.A. team to observe the scene of the investigation. The D.A.' s personnel may not enter

the scene, however, until escorted by tbe Homicide lieutenant, altbough the LASD is obli-

gated to make every effort to place tbe D.A. team so tbat it can clearly view tbe physical
evidence within tbe scene and to observe tbe investigative work by all LASD personnel

within the area. Upon request and before any evidence is removed from the scene, the

LASD will make the physical evidence found at the scene available for inspection to the

D.A. team.

The Homicide lieutenant is further obliged to provide tbe D.A. team with a comprehen-

sive walk-tbrough of the scene and to identify all civilian and sworn witnesses and princi-

pals and their whereabouts. Homicide must also provide any otber information that might

assist the D.A. team.

Provisions are made in the protocol for interviews of civilian witnesses at the sheriffs
station. Tbe guidelines provide that when the LASD Homicide investigators have

completed their interviews of any civilian witnesses at the station and know that the D.A.

team may want to interview the witnesses, the Homicide lieutenant shall make the

witnesses available to them. If possible, the responsible lieutenant will also brief the D.A.

143
 ,
I:

team concerning the statements of civilian witnesses made to LASD investigators,

including whether the interviews were tape-recorded. Finally, the Homicide lieutenant is

obliged to make every reasonable effort to keep the D.A. team informed of the progress

of the entire ongoing investigation.

Operation Rollout is limited to officer-involved shootings in the field when there is a

hit. The D.A. does not automatically investigate deaths occurring in police custody and

does not roll out in instances of serious injury involving hospitalization but not involving

shootings.
In general, the Operation Rollout procedures appear to work well, although there

have been some complaints from the District Attorney's office that on occasion, the

LASD fails to inform the D.A. Command Post of shootings in a timely manner; that on

occasion, witnesses have left before the D.A.'s representatives can interview them or they

get to the D.A.'s people very late; and that some captains on occasion are hostile to the

D.A. team.

We also heard a number of more serious criticisms of the process from present

and former deputy district attorneys. The principal criticism concerned attempts by the

Sheriffs Department to manage or manipulate the outcome of investigations or to

discourage prosecutions altogether. The manipulation can take many forms.

Perhaps the most serious potential for such manipulation arises because of the

Sheriffs Department's practice not to permit contemporaneous interviews of the officers

involved in the shooting by the D.A. team. the internal Homicide investigation always

takes precedence. This compromises the appearance of integrity of the investigation even

if the internal investigation is completely above board. The potential exists for the

involved officers to be coached as to what to say to avoid prosecution or walked through

an interview in which leading questions suggest lines of defense to the officer: Again,

we are not saying that this occurs. But the appearance of integrity is not maintained

if the deputy district attorney is excluded from these interviews.

144
 The Department's rationale for not allowing the deputy district attorney to conduct

a contemporaneous interview is that the officer will not talk if the deputy district attorney

is present or would insist on the presence of a union representative or a lawyer. It would

impede and overly fonnalize the investigative process, in the view of the Department.

But in tbe view of deputy district attorneys we spoke with, this practice is a serious impedi-
ment to a full and fair investigation and a principal cause for the lack of prosecutions in

officer-involved shootings. We recommend that this practice be changed.

The deputy district attorneys stressed other ways in which investigations can be

manipulated. A deputy district attorney who bas the reputation of being bard on the police

may be given the run-around, kept in the dark about investigative details, or simply be kept

waiting interminably at the scene of the shooting or later wben he or she attempts to follow

up. Deputy district attorneys state that passive noncooperation, delays. mix-ups, unavail-

ability of personnel and otber similar tactics by the Sheriff s Department can severely prej-
udice an investigation or prosecution of a deputy for misconduct.
An example of the foregoing, tbough not involving a shooting, arose from a station-

house beating of an undocumented person. The man was hung upside down by the rafters

in an interrogation room at a station and beaten by two deputies with batons. The man

complained to a sergeant, who laughed the incident off until the alien's bloody shirt was

found in a wastebasket. The D.A. filed a case against the deputies. The man who was

beaten was sent to prison. In such circumstances, when an alien is in prison and is needed
for a subsequent case. the normal practice is for the police to secure a temporary visa for

the alien so that he is not immediately deported upon release from prison. Here. the prison

was not contacted. the alien was deported, and was thus unavailable for the contemplated

trial of the deputies. fatally prejudicing the prosecution. The absence of the alien also

apparently led to a Civil Service determination to reverse an order to discharge of the

deputies.
Pressure can be exerted at all levels by the Sheriffs Department to dissuade prosecu-

145
 To

tions. Although the Sheriff's Department may not directly tell the deputy district attorney

not to file a case or to reject a referral, the representative from the Sheriffs Department

may strongly disparage lhe case, saying lhal "lhe witnesses cannOl make up lheir minds"

or simply pointing out aUlhe weak spots in the case and not mentioning the strong ones.

Sometimes the D.A.'s investigator will find evidence the Department bad overlooked.
Deputy district attorneys said that lobbying not to file a case occurs with regularity in

cases wbere the Sheriff s Department is dead set against there being a filing. Pressure

may be brought to bear on the D.A.'s investigator, who is usually a former police officer.

Pressure can be put on lhe deputy D.A., his or her chief and up through the ranks of the

District Attorney's office.

On lhe other hand, lhe D.A.'s office must lake substantial blame for its failure to

prosecute more than one questionable shooting incident in the last decade out of 382
referrals of possible prosecutions to it Cognizant of the perils of second-guessing,

attorneys on our staff reviewed several strong cases which should bave been prosecuted,
but were rejected by the D.A.' s office. Particularly disturbing was the tone of several

D.A. rejectletlers, likened by one attorney on our staff to a "don't worry" letter sent to

a troubled client. We found incomprehensible a recent D.A. reject of a fatal shooting

where there was ample documented evidence that the deputy was combing the streets

outsi,de bis patrol area, against direct orders not to interfere, looking for a fight one New

Year's Eve. The D.A:s reject letter explained in soothing tones to the LASD that the case
was not prosecutable because of ~nconsistencies (which we found to be immaterial) in the

statements of two eyewitnesses. Contrary to the deputy's version of the facts, the

eyewitnesses and the Coroner's report indicated the victim was shot in the back and side.

There was slim, if any, evidence that the deputy was in danger or could have believed

himself to be. The D.A. should have filed a case.

Thus, the D.A:s office, along with the LASD, must be held accountable for a lack of

prosecutions when the shooting suspect is a Sheriffs deputy.

146
Administrative Investigation Of Officer-Involved Shootings
And Force-Related Hospitalizations

Officer-Involved Shootings

Within the last year, the LASD has stated its intention to discharge four officers in
connection with three fatal shootings deemed to violate Department policy. Since 1980.

there has only been one other discharge for a shooting. A 1990 internal task force on the

use of excessive force critiCized the dearth of discharges and the lack of any formal

mecbanism for examining the propriety and tactical soundness of officer-involved shoot-

ings. The lAB Officer-Involved Shooting Team (01S Team) was formed on June 1, 1991

to respond to these criticisms. Headed by a lieutenant, the OIS Team is a cadre of top lAB

investigators who ro11outto all officer-involved shootings in wbich a person is injured by

gunshots nred by LASD officers.

An lAB Unit Order explains:

The primary purpose oj tlze investigation is to develop Jacts ,hot r;Jill enable Deportment

executives to determine whether Ihere wos adherence 10 Departmmt po/icy, compliance with

specific Iraining, utilization of basic loclical princip Its , and whether tltere r;Jas turcise of

reasonable judgment under Ihe given circumstances.

One OIS Team official distinguished his team's investigation from Homicide's,
explaining, "Homicide looks at the shooting from the time the trigger is pulled to determine

whether the officer commiued a crime. We look at the incident from the trigger pull and

work backwards. The idea is learn what events lead up to the shooting and whether the

officer employed sound tactics."

Upon notification of an officer-involved shooting, two OIS Team sergeants,

accompanied by an lAB lieutenant, respond immediately to the scene and conduct a policy-

147
oriented investigation. Ten days later, the OIS Team issues its report for review by the

involved officer's captain, area commander, and region chief. Each reviewer must deter-
mine whether the report indicates (1) officer misconduct, requiring the opening of full-

blown administrative investigation, (2) poor tactics, requiring counseling and/or

retraining or (3) that current policy and/or training should be reevaluated. Each has the

discretion to refer the matter to a training bureau (e.g., Advanced Officer Training

Bureau, Field Operations Training Unit).

The LASD deserves credit for its recent decision to give close administrative

scrutiny to officer-involved shootings. We acknowledge that the OIS Team bas only beeD

in operation for a year, but we nonetheless identified several problems in its current prac-

tices.

Only -hits· receive priority. The first sbortcoming is that the OIS Team does

not automatically respond to shootings in which the officer misses the suspect. One OIS
Team official conceded that "because the only difference between a hit and a miss is

marksmansbip, there's no real reason not to rollout to incidents where no one is hit.

The tactical issues are the same." He added that current budgetary constraints have thus

far prevented rollouts to shooting "misses."

Non-hit shootings are investigated, if at all, by the station watcb commander on duty

at the time of the shooting. Watcb commanders we interviewed complained that they bad

neither the time nor the eltpenise to conduct a thorough and complete sbooting investiga-

tiOD. Several felt their efforts were futile because non-bit shootings received little

scrutiny by deparunent executives. One described a recent non-bit sbooting at his station

thus: "If [the] deputy bad hit someone, it would have been the stinkiest sbooting this side

of Creation." He then complained that because no one bad been injured, no action would

be taken.

A 1990 informal survey of deputies and sergeants on force-related issues revealed

similar discomfon with the low priority given to non-bit shootings. Deputies cited two

148
specific instances where fellow officers wrongfully fired at fleeing suspects. Despite what

they felt was a blatant misuse of deadly force, neither incident was investigated because
the suspects were not struck.

Shooters are not interviewed. In order not to compromise a possible criminal

prosecution. the OIS Team is not allowed to interview the involved officer while a criminal
investigation is pending. However. the OIS Team does not generally interview the officer

even after it is determined there will be no criminal prosecution. As a result, many of its

investigative reports contains no direct statements from the involved officer. Those OIS

Team reports which do contain officer statements simply attach a transcript from the

Homicide interview. which does not address policy or tactics. A number of captains

viewed this as a central failure. One asked, "How can you pretend to do a tactical evalua-

tion and not interview the shooter?" Several frustrated captains added that they took

matters into their own hands and (in violation of Department policy) directly questioned the

officer about policy and tactical issues.

Pertinent information is often missing. One OIS Team investigator conceded that

because his reports are due within 10 days of the shooting, be often does not bave time to

conduct a comprehensive investigation. We agree. Many of the reports we reviewed

lacked statements from witnesses present at the scene. Those included were typically

conduct~d by Homicide. whose investigation is limited to possible criminal conduct.

Several files reported the number of shots fired, but because the Coroner's Report bad not

yet been issued, could not state wh~re. or bow many times, the suspect was struck. Some

captains stated that the OIS Team report was too cursory to be of any use.

Tactical evaluations generally not thorough. Although the LASD bas established

rigorous procedures regarding the format and content of OIS Team reports, it bas provided

little or no room for tactical insight. None of the OIS Team investigators has received any

special weapons and non-weapons training in preparation for rollout evaluation. The OIS

Team does not keep a mini-library of training materials in its offices. Finally, the OIS

149
Team reports typically do not include copies of relevant training materials.

Focus too narrow. Although the purpose of OIS Team rollouts is to allow depart-

ment managers to evaluate shootings "from the trigger pull backward," we found that

many managers limited their focus to events occurring after the officer draws the gun
from the holster. This focus is too narrow. Our staff reviewed many cases in which
officers unnecessarily walked into or created situations which ultimately required

the use of deadly force. In one such incident, Sheriff s deputies found a motorist fast

asleep in his vehicle with his hand on a gun. Rather than closing off the area and offering

the suspect a chance to surrender, one deputy opened the driver's door and lunged across

the front seat. Predictably, the suspect was startled awake and in the ensuing confusion,

deputies fired a total of 70 rounds into the vehicle, killing the motorist instantly. In
another instance at Ramona Gardens, described in detail later in this report, a deputy

started a confrontation that inevitably led to a fatal shooting.

These incidents, and many others we reviewed, presented issues of training and judg-

ment as well as possible misconduct. Yet without fail, executives confined their focus to

whether the incident presented "a good shoot," (e.g., whether the officer toole cover, or

left other officers in the line of fire.) We found no evaluations in OIS Team reports

that directly addressed the question of whether the confrontation could have been

avoided in the first place. That is the key question which in each instance the OIS

Team report should address.

Investigations Of Force-Related Hospitalizations

In June 1991, the LASD also launched a program for rollout evaluation of all force

incidents (including those which do not involve a firearm) resulting in hospitalization

of a suspect beyond emergency room care. In all such instances, the lAB "Force Team"

(composed of the same investigators on the OIS Team) responds to the hospital to

conduct its investigation.

150
 The Force Team investigation is similar to the OIS Team investigation in many

respects. Firs[, it is usually completed within 10 days of the incident. Second. it utilizes

the same highly-detailed form which provides data about the setting of the incident as well

as victim and officer profiles. Third, the Force Team report is submitted to the captain and

his superiors for a determination of whether the force used fell within Department policy
and was tactically sound.

Neither Homicide nor the District Attorney conduct an automatic criminal investigation

of force-related hospitalizations. Thus, the Force Team is free in theory to interview the

involved officer unless it refers the case to ICIB for a criminal investigation.

Unfortunately, it rarely exploits this opportunity. In virtually every Force Team report, the"

officer's version of events is provided by the arrest or supplemental reports. This is

woefully inadequate. In the first place, officers prone to use excessive force cannot be

expected to admit to misconduct in their reports. Second, the Force Team does not avail

itself of the opportunity to question the officer on tactics and whether the severe use of
force could have been avoided.

Force Team reports share many of the shortcomings found in OIS Team reports:

• Wi mess interviews not fully presented. In one file, Force Team investigators failed to

interview over one dozen witnesses, relying instead on handwritten notes by a sergeant.

• Photographs sometimes unnecessarily poor. Several files contained photos of

bandaged arms and legs. Obviously, such photos are of no help in determining the severity

of the injury or whether the injury is consistent with the involved officer's explanation.

• The focus is too narrow. The stated mission of the Force Team is to provide an opportunity

to review officer tactics and to determine whether training needs LO be revised.

Unfortunately, the focus is confined to the tactics employed once the confrontation

has begun.

151
 Our staff also found that managers reached suspect conclusions by ignoring clear-cut

physical evidence contradicting the officer's version of events. In one case, a suspect

was hospitalized for a blunt trauma to the head which resulted in cranial bleeding. The

involved deputy claimed that after he tackled the suspect (who had just obeyed the

deputy's order to drop a gun he was carrying), the suspect hit his head on the sidewalk.

The suspect claimed that after he dropped the gun, the officer struck him twice above the

eye with a metal baton. The attending physician opined that the suspect's injuries were
not consistent with hitting a flat surface, but rather with at least two powerful blows from
either a fist or a sharp object. The deputy's captain and region chief accepted the

deputy's story without even referring to the physician's testimony. Moreover, the captain

praised the involved deputy for exercising "commendable restraint" during the incident.

We applaud the LASD for establishing the long-overdue DIS and Force Teams. The

above criticisms and the following recommendations are made in the spirit of ensuring

that these teams realize their potential.

Recommendations Regarding Criminal Investigations:

. The LASD Homicide Bureau should not permit untaped portions of interviews

or leading questions which compromise the integrity and neutrality of the investi-

gation.

The Sheriffs Department is to be commended for being an early pioneer in the use of

a rollout team which includes representatives of the District Attorney's office. In the

intervening years since 1979, however, there has been an expansion and refinement of
rollout programs throughout California, and we believe that it is time for the Sheriffs

Department and the District Attorney's office to review the rollout program and proce-

dures thereunder. We recommend in particular that the Sheriffs Department put

down in writing and formalize a number of practices which may already exist on an

152
informal basis but which are necessary to enhance the integrity of all shooting and

force investigations. We particularly recommend that the Sheriffs rollout program

contain the following features:

1. That each participating agency, including the District Attorney's office, have

access in the first critical hours to all of the investigation's information sources,

including the scene, the weapons, other physical evidence, the involved officers, the

witnesses and the victim's family. We believe this step is necessary to assure a high

level of investigative integrity. The public, the news media, and the victim's family will

have greater confidence in the fullness and fairness of the investigation. It will enhance the

investigative credibility of those agencies whose officers are involved and might become

the subject of litigation in connection with an officer-involved shooting.

2. That officers who were present at the scene at the time of an officer-involved

shooting, whether as actors or witnesses, be relieved of duties at the scene as soon

as possible; that an uninvolved officer from a station whose officers are not involved

in the incident be assigned immediately to come to the scene and be assigned to

accompany the involved officers and to remain with the involved officers, either in a

group or individually, until they can be interviewed. The sequestering of officers will,

among other things, ensure the integrity of each officer's later statements to investigators

and will eliminate the need for multiple and sometimes confusing interviews by several

different agencies. Although the LASD officially sanctions sequestration, we found

numerous instances in which officers were permitted to remain together. Failure to strictly

require sequestration inevitably gives rise to inferences of collusion which could be devas-

tating in civil litigation.

3. That the rollout be expanded to include (1) in-custody officer-involved

fatalities and (2) injuries from use of force which require hospitalization or a trip to

an emergency room.

4. That the D.A:s Special Investigations Division be informed and given an

153
 opportunity to rollout, if the D.A. so desires, in any instance in which there are

injuries resulting from a use of force in the field or at a station house that requires

a trip to the hospital's emergency room.

Recommendations Regarding Administrative Investigations:

1. All officers involved in shootings should be interviewed by OIS investiga-

tors regarding policy and tactics once it is determined that the officers will not be

prosecuted for criminal conduct. Furthermore, all officers involved in uses of force

requiring any medical treatment or examination by a physician should be inter-

viewed by the lAB Force Team regarding policy and tactics, unless the Force Team

decides to refer the use of force to ICIB for criminal investigation.

2. The Force Team should automatically rollout in all instances in which a

suspect requires medical treatment and/or examination before being released for

booking. Currently. Force Team investigations are limited to those incidents in which

the suspect/inmate is admitted to a hospital. However. our investigation has indicated

that many injuries not requiring full hospitalization were nonetheless quite serious-

the most common being bead trauma from batons or flashlights. Under current depart-

ment policy. suspects are routinely transported to the hospital, have their scalps sutured

and are returned for booking. We believe such incidents present the very same policy

and training issues presented by full hospitalization, and should receive department-wide

attention.
3. All OIS and Force Team personnel should receive specialized weapons and

nonweapons training on an annual or semi-annual basis. Furthermore, they should

include relevant training materials in their investigative reports to ensure that

reviewing managers and executives receive up-to-date information regarding

training and tactics.

154
 4. All OIS and Force Team reports should be routed to the appropriate officer

training bureaus for evaluation and possible inclusion in future classes or training

films. The commanders of training bureaus should be authorized to issue memo-

randa with their own impressions of the reported incidents to the involved officer's

captain, area commander, and region chief.

5. The OIS and Force Team, in conjunction with various training bureaus,

should issue an annual report discussing the incidents investigated by the OIS and

Force Teams during the past year.

6. Department executives reviewing OIS Team reports should make a specific

determination of whether the shooting incident could have been avoided by "tactical

retreat-.

7. The LASD should attempt to make OIS and Force Team assignments career

positions through various incentives. The OIS and Force Teams have the potential to be

one of the greatest assets to the LASD in terms of identifying disciplinary, training, and

policy problems. Accordingly, it should devote resources to attract and retain the best offi-

cers for the job.

155
156
 9. Problem Officers

Using a methodology akin to that employed by the Christopher Commission in its

examination of tbe LAPD, we structured a focused examination of particular deputies who

were disproportionately responsible for force investigations. Our purpose was to obtain

insight into the LASD's disciplinary practices and to determine if the repeated use of exces-

sive force detrimentally influenced a deputy's career.

Before we set forth our conclusions, we must make several caveats with respect to how

this portion of our Report should be interpreted or compared to the similar study in the

Christopher Commission Report. Much attention focused on the 44 officers studied with

particular care by the Christopher Commission. In some quarters, there was an erroneous

impression that the LAPD's force·related problems were limited to these 44 officers and

that if the LAPD dealt with them, its problems would be largely resolved. In contrast. we

believe that the Christopher Commission singled out the 44 simply because their cases were

the clearest examples of a system-wide failure on the part of the LAPD and that the prob-

lems their files displayed extended to a substantial number of other officers in the LAPD.

OUf study identifies 62 deputies who constitute an illustrative group according to the

methodology we employed. It illustrates clearly and dramatically how the LASD has failed

to give them the close scrutiny they deserve. We discuss these deputies only to sbow in an

emphatic way how serious the system-wide failures can be. We should not be interpreted to

say that these deputies constitute the only potentially problem deputies or define the scope

Of boundaries of excessive force problems within the LASD. Nor sbould any inferences be

drawn about the 62 LASD deputies versus 44 LAPD officers. W. specifically disavow

that these numbers mean that LASD has a bigger group of problem officers, or a

greater problem with excessive force or more -bad guys· than doesthaLAPD.

It would be a grave error to read into our Report any relative judgments about the LAPD
,
and the LASD in this area. We leave it to others to draw whatever comparisons they wish

between the LASD and the LAPD.

We also want to make clear that we believe the vast majority of the 8000 or more

157
 T

LASD sworn personnel do their job well. Nonetheless, the following discussion indicates

that the LASD has failed to deal with officers who have readily identifiable patterns of
excessive force. The Department responds by stating that it is becoming tougher on

discipline, and it has. For example, within the last year, the LASD took the unprece-

dented step of discharging 4 officers for shootings which were determined not to be crim-
inal.

These efforts, however, are inadequate responses to the problem. We were able to

identify an illustrative group of deputies who were repeatedly the subjects of formal

administrative investigations for shootings or excessive force. Despite a history of ques-

tionable conduct, nearly all of these officers continue to patrol the streets of Los Angeles

County. Worse, many act as Field Training Officers ("FrOs") imparting their "street

wisdom" to patrol deputies.

The methodology we employed was shaped largely by the contours of the LASD's
current recordkeeping system, which was seriously underinclusive. For example, the
LASD, unlike the LAPD and other large law enforcement agencies, does not require

deputies to submit a separate use of force repon for tracking purposes. Another example

is that the LASD did not require ~ptains to retain records of citizen complaints which

were not considered sufficiently serious to warrant a formal investigation.

The LASO's recordkeeping required us to use the number of internal investigations

of alleged excessive force as the best available indicator of whether an officer exbibited a

pattern of using excessive force. The LASD Policy Manual defmes many categories of

misconduct, only one of which is narrowly defined "Use of Force." We combined "Use

of Force" with other misconduct categories, which we call "Force/Harassment allega-

tions" to arrive at the best approximation of the total investigations of an officer's use of

force. Examples of excessive force categorized by the LASO in different areas include:

picking fights with citizens or subjecting them to cruel treatment, which is categorized as

"Conduct Toward Others," and deliberately or negligently injuring a suspect or inmate,

158
which is categorized as "Safeguarding Prisoners."

We thus reviewed various LASD databases and files to find deputies who, between
January 1986. and April 1992, have been investigated at least five times for shootings or

complaints of ForcelHarassment allegations .

. ............ .
.:.:.:.:: ...... ::.:-:.:::: ................................................... , ........ . .................................. ..::.. .; ...:-:-:.:-:.:- .......... .

Distributioa af 495lavestigatioDs Geaerated by Group of 6Z Deputies

1"
12 _ _:»_::i>
'.:.;-
< 13
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

11_!U~
10 _.>:.- .>.> ....- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

_ • • •:._.·• ·.i._.·• •!_···• • •· ______________________

:::::::: ",:",

;? )y~. :....
s :=:':->:::.>-<>:_>:>:.>:>;...>- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

• j ...... .t~till_~4--------------------
:\ ?t: : : /:-:

2
? : .:.•·•_:.:.:_::.:.•·.:·.•:_2.•·.:.: .- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
~)~::-:.;.:.:. : : : ;:
SoIll'CeC
.>.:.:<: >::::). »>:.>: >. .:::»::>:
::<).::. 1 1 1 1 LASe Intem.1 Affairs
1 1 1
::::::::: ....... :}\: ..... :,:::::.:" .... : ..... ..
, ' ::::\~: ::: :::::::::: .... :.:... ...... :.:. ....
. :.:: Bureau Database
.::<::: ,::-;':-: .... ;.-.:-:.: )?} ~'.:/:~: :::::::::: ::::: .:.:.:.:,'
o :-:,":': & Cards
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 11 18 19 20 2\ 22 23 24 25 26 21
Number of Force/Harassment Investigations

Fropt these criteria we identified 62 deputies. The distribution of investigations by

deputy is set forth in chart 1. Because the LASD after five years routinely destroys inves-
tigative files (except those pertaining to officer-involved shootings), our ability to learn the

facts about these earlier investigations was limited. We reviewed all extant investigative

files and all personnel files on these deputies that could be found at the LASD's headquar-

lers.

All 62 of these deputies are men. Roughly 75% are over 30 years old, a fact that seems

to run against the popular notion in law enforcement that excessive force is associated with

chronological immaturity.

159
 r

Altogether, the group of 62 was responsible for nearly 500 separate

Force/Harassment investigations. One deputy alone accounted for 27 investigations;

another was responsible for 25. Seventeen of the deputies were responsible for 22
lawsuits resulting in nearly $3.2 million in jury awards or settlements paid out by the

County.

Review of Personnel Evaluations of the Illustrative Group

Upon completing their probationary period, deputies are evaluated annually for their

performance by a supervisor (usually a sergeant or lieutenant) who gathers information

about the deputy's conduct in the field. The supervisor can review all existing Homicide,

Unit or lAB investigative files on the deputies, as well as entries in the "Black Book" -

a log of positive or negative remarks made by citizens andlor station supervisors within

the last 12 months.

Supervisors use a standardized form to evaluate their deputies. The forms contain no

explicit category for use of excessive force, but implicitly test for it under categories such

as "Personal Relations," "Meeting and Handling the Public," "Work Habits" and

"Observation of Safety Rules." A deputy's performance is rated as "Outstanding,"

"Very Good," "Competent," "Improvement Needed" and "Unsatisfactory." Supervisors

must discuss the deputy's strengths and weaknesses during the 12-month period.
Overall, the evaluations in personnel files of the illustrative group were extremely

laudatory. Many files were filled with documentation of formal and informal compli-

ments and commendations, no matter how trivial. In sharp contrast, there was near

silence about investigations for excessive force. As a rule, the evaluations did not refer

to investigations that were determined to be "Unfounded" or "UnSUbstantiated." NOlie

referred to lawsuits in which a jury had decided that the deputy used excessive force or to

substantial settlements paid by the County in such cases. Nearly all of these evaluations

160
omitted mention of pending investigations of citizen complaints or fatal shootings.

Although discipline for Founded allegations of misconduct was noted in almost all

personnel files (one file neglected to mention a 30-day suspension), few evaluations

discussed the underlying incidents or otherwise appeared to take them into account.

In addition, a history of Foree/Harassment investigations did not stand in the way of

promotion to Field Training Officer or highly-coveted assignments such as the Gang

Enforcement Team (GET), where there is little or no supervision of the deputy.

The following profiles illustrate our general observations:

Deputy A

Deputy A joined the LASD after being tlirned down for employment by the LAPD

and another local police department He has been the subject of 27 ForcelHarassment

investigations. Although the LASD has been warned that deputy A may have deep psycho-

logical problems, it has kept him on the force.

In 1990, deputy A became involved in a verbal altercation with a civilian employee

of the LASD. The civilian alleged that deputy A, then assigned to a canine unit. threatened

to unleash bis dog on the civilian. Deputy A received a written reprimand for his conduct.

Earlier in 1990, deputy A had received a written reprimand for arguing tactics with his

supervisor during a field operation. On that occasion, deputy A was ordered to leave

the scene.

One 1988 lAB investigation of alleged derogatory language by deputy A refers to

28 prior complaints relating to deputy A's bebavior. It also contains a note to the

Undersheriff stating that deputy A's history has been discussed with County Counsel,

who concluded that deputy A's "anger and hostility" made bim a "potential liability."

County Counsel recommended that deputy A undergo a psychological examination

"to determine if he may be safely retained in an active law enforcement capacity."

This red flag does not appear in deputy A's personnel file or evaluations, wbich rate

161
him as "very good" in his ability to get along with others. Moreover, his evaluations did

not account for deputy A's willingness to fight with other law enforcement officers. For

example, they do not refer to (1) a written reprimand deputy A received in connection

with a dispute with his supervisor over tactics, (2) a written reprimand deputy A received

for a verbal altercation with a State Police officer or (3) a 2-day suspension deputy A

received for a fistfight with another deputy.

In short, we found no indication that the LASD has reacted responsibly to numerous

warning signs - or to the 1988 plea by County Counsel to restrict deputy A's access to

the public.

Deputy B

Since joining the LASD, deputy B has been the subject of 17 Force/Harassment

investigations, 3 of which related to shootings. In 1984, the Department proposed to fire

deputy B for writing a false police report that resulted in a failed prosecution. Althougb

not explained in deputy B's personnel file, deputy B was permitted to resign in lieu of

being fired. Deputy B's personnel file also does not explain why deputy B was reinstated

just over eight months later.

One 1990 investigation of deputy B concerned a citizen's allegation that deputy B

struck the citizen in the mouth with a metal flashligbt, knocking out four front teeth.

The allegation was deemed "Unsubstantiated," althougb the investigation confrrmed that

a blow from deputy B caused two caps on the complainant's teeth to come loose, and a
! .
document in the lAB investigative file expressed concern with deputy B's "extensive

record of prior investigations of similar allegations."

In a 1989 complaint, a motorcycle rider alleged that, after a sbort cbase, deputy B

beat him with a flashlighL A number of independent witnesses corroborated the

complainant's story. The matter was referred to the D.A:s office for prosecution, but

was ultimately rejected. After subsequent lAB investigation, the complaint was deemed

162
 1
"Unsubstantiated."

A 1987 investigation concerned allegations that deputy B put a suspect in a patrol car,

ostensibly to question him, and then punched and struck lbe suspect with his flashlight.

The Department referred the maHer to the D.A:s office for criminal prosecution. A prose-

cution of deputy B was initiated, but was later dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct. The

Department then wilbdrew its initially proposed lO-day suspension and entered a finding of

"Unsubstantiated."

Although deputy. B has a history of use of excessive force - he was twice referred to

the D.A.' s office for possible criminal prosecution - and was once fired for writing a false

police report, he is viewed by his superiors as a "hardcharger" and a good deputy. Deputy

B's evaluations over the above time period are consistently "very good." In his 1991 evalu-

ation, the only criticism was that deputy B was too willing to make arrests without calling

for backup. His 1989 evaluation states that deputy B "seldom generated citizen

complaints." Throughout the above time period, deputy B's "meeting and handling the
public" skills were also consistently rated "very good."

Deputv C

Since 1986, deputy C has been the subject of 7 ForcelHarassment investigations, 2 of

which pert,ain to 1990 shootings.

One 1990 investigation focused on deputy C's involvement in the beating and fatal

shooting of a robberylkidnapping suspect. The suspect allegedly drove his car directly at

deputy C, who fired six shots. The suspect eventually stopped his car after a high-speed

freeway chase, and, according to the deputies involved, became "combative." Deputy C

then pulled the suspect out of the car and struck him several times on the head with bis

flashlight. The Coroner's Report revealed that the suspect's skull had been smasbed after

the suspect sustained a fatal gunshot wound. The Coroner's Report also noted numerous

horizontal welts on the suspect's ,back. The difficulty in reconciling evidence of a severe

163
beating occurring after a fatal gunshot wound, as well as significant under-reporting of

the force used (deputy C's Watch Commander claimed that deputy C did not report any

force to him that evening), the LASD opened an lAB investigation which is still pending.

The D.A. thought that there may have been excessive force used on the suspect. but

declined to prosecute. The incident is the subject of a multi-million dollar lawsuit now
pending in state court.

The same year, deputy C shot and wounded an unarmed suspect after a car chase.
Deputy C claimed that the driver was armed. However, no gun was found and two

passengers in the car stated that no one was armed. The D.A. 's office declined to prose-

cute and the LASD did not open an administrative investigation.

Deputy C was relieved of duty in January 1992 - apparently not because of any

of the aforementioned force incidents, but because of becoming argumentative when he

was pulled over by LASD deputies for suspected drunk driving while off duty.

Except for referring to this off-duty incident and a reprimand for sending a sexist
Mobile Digital Transmission (MD1), deputy C's personnel file is extremely positive. In

1991, he was selected as an FrO. His evaluation for that year notes that deputy C

"handles the public well and has not received any citizen's complaints ... [he] always

handles emergency situations in a cool, collected professional manner." This assessment

echoes his 1989 and 1990 evaluations, which single deputy C out for his ability to get

along with the public.

Deputy D

Deputy D has been the subject of 6 ForcelHarassment investigations, 2 of which

relate to controversial shootings.

,
In March, 1987, deputy D shot and killed a suspect in an incident that resulted in a

settlement by the County that exceeded half a million dollars. Deputy D was involved in

a struggle with a suspected spouse-beater who allegedly grabbed deputy D's baton; the

164
baton was found under the suspect's body, but bad no fingerprints. Deputy D then shot the

suspect len limes, which required him to reload his revolver. Some entrance wounds were
in the suspect's back, and none was consistent with deputy D's story that the suspect had

assumed a "batting stance" with the baton. Indeed, some bullet trajectories were as much

as 90 degrees downward, suggesting that the victim had been shot while kneeling or

crouching. The suspect also had abrasions on his body. An independent eyewitness stated

that there was no struggle over the baton before the shooting began and that deputy D had

his gun drawn from the beginning of the confrontation. An LASD consultant hired in

connection with the defense of the lawsuit concluded that deputy D was in a "panicked

state" at the time of the shooting. The D.A.'s office declined to prosecute and the LASD
declined to conduct an administrative investigation of the incident.
Three years later, in May 1990, deputy D fired 23 rounds (again requiring him to

reload) at a fleeing suspect, striking him 6 times. The D.A.'s office declined to prosecute

and the LASD declined to open an administrative investigation, even though a bystander

claimed that the suspect was unarmed and was struck from behind. The shooting is part of

a multi-million dollar class action now pending against the County.

Deputy D's personnel file, like many of those we reviewed, was missing an evaluation

covering critical time periods. Deputy Dhad no evaluation covering the time period of the

1987 fatal shooting incident described above. The next evaluation, covering November

1987 through November 1988, stated that deputy D "performs well in emergent and

stressful situations." Two years later, deputy 0 was selected as an FrO, despite his

involvement in a controversial shooting that year. His 1990 evaluation does not refer to

that shooting incident. Giving deputy D an overall rating of "very good." the evaluation

stated: "[Deputy D] handles emergencies very well. He is able to maintain clear thougbt

and reason while in stressful situations." His 1991 evaluation characterizes him as a

"mature and professional" Field Training Officer.

165
 r
I.,

Deputy E

Since joining the Department in 1982, deputy E has been the subject of 5

ForcelHarassment investigations, 2 of which were Founded and resulted in discipline.

In 1991, deputy E broke a juvenile's arm while effecting an arrest and received a 5-day

suspension. In 1990, deputy E received a I-day suspension for disobeying an order to

terminate a high-speed car chase.

Deputy E also had generated several unsustained investigations for allegedly bran-

dishing his firearm before unanned citizens. In one incident, an African-American male

complained that as he was pulling into his own driveway, deputy E drew his firearm and
ordered the driver to exit the car and place his hands on the hood. When the driver's

companion protested that they were on their own property, deputy E allegedly responded

by yelling, "I don't care if you are in your goddamn yard, put your hands on the hood

now!" Deputy E was counseled for using derogatory language.

Deputy E's supervisors allude to deputy E's confrontational demeanor, but cast a

positive light on it in their evaluations. In one veiled reference to deputy E's penchant
for drawing his gun without provocation, a supervisor stated that "[Deputy E's] alertness

to issues of officer safety is deeply ingrained into his methods of personal conduct."

The supervisor dropped his guard somewhat to add that "[Deputy E's] increasing maturity

and tenure in his position will allow him to overcome his occasional over-zealousness."

However, the supervisor concluded overall that deputy E's "communication skilJs,

combined with a great deal of Perceptiveness and personable style, enable him to effec-

tively manage his personal relations with ease."

These profiles illustrate that the LASD has failed to identify and deal with officers

who appear to use excessive force and get away with it time and again - even when their
actions end up costing the County hundreds of thousands of dollars. We now turn to

discuss some solutions in the next three chapters wherein we recommend a tracking

166
system. a beadsu-ikes policy and a study of conflicts and disincentives to investigation of

problem officers and conflicts of interest inherent in such investigations.

167
168
 10. Tracking the Use of Force

"[S1JpefT)isorsj juS/let it go and thaI's why il goes 10 Ihe extent that it does - and then we

end up Itrminaling the g1Jy. We don'l need to terminate the guy most of Ihe lime. We could
have slopped him before we were forced 10 fin him. " -lAB investigator

The LASD keeps careful and abundant statistics about itself. Each year, for example, it

produces an inches-thick compilation of data entitled "Year In Review." In it, one can find

out almost anything: the percentage of female, Hispanic civilians in the LASD, the number

of blood/urine alcohol tests performed, the number of juveniles arrested by the Temple

Station forgambJing and the number of females, age 22, arrested for disorderly conduct.

In sharp contrast, however, the LASD keeps surprisingly little information in useable

form pertaining to the use of force. Although the Department is making advances in terms

of its computerization of force-related data, and may in a few years have a reliable system,

it does not have one today. To a large extent, this is a result of a previous policy of self-

imposed ignorance. Driven by fears that data on use of force and citizen complaints would

be used against it in civil litigation, the LASD followed legal advice from County Counsel

to avoid creating "paper trails" when it could. When it could not, the information was scat-

tered throughout the LASD and kept haphazardly.

To this day, then, the LASD bas very little information about trends and patterns

concemi~g its officers' use of force. This lack of concrete and specific information crip-

ples management in several ways. First, it disables the LASD, its training bureaus and its

task forces from adequately reviewing and evaluating weaknesses in current training and

policy. Changes thus cannot be made in a timely fashion. Instead, the Deparanent is

placed in the uncomfortable position of being reactive, waiting until a "beadline incident"

occurs before poor training receives Department-wide attention.

Second, the lack of useful information prevents the Deparanent from identifying

individual problem officers, or cliques of problem officers, until after the damage has been

done, possibly subjecting the County to millions of dollars in civil exposure.

169
 Third, failure to track force consistently and in a useful format

disables managers from identifying officers with a propensity to use

unnecessary force. A deputy who wields his flashlight as a weapon

For It lust five Yllrs, tbe LASD
bll issuld moatbly or qUlrterly several times a month may, in some circumstances. require
lummi rill of IdmiaistrltiYI disci-
plial rlcommladld lIy Dlplrtmlat retraining. counseling. rotation to a less stressful shift or location or
IX.cutiYII. How'Vlr, tb...
summarill coallia littl. iaforml-
simply a vacation.
tioa lilout lb. iacidlat OiYiaO rist
Fourth. the absence of a uniform. Department-wide force
to discipliDI lad DO laformltio.
Iliout tbl oHiclr'1 id.atity or tracking system gives rise to an inference that the LASD puts a low
IIsioamlal Thus, deplrtmeat
executiYII Ir. unlili. to trick priority on identifying and rooting out those who reson to excessive
plttenll of excessiYI force ubill-
it.d lIy plrticular oHicen or force. Some may infer that the LASD is uninterested in identifying
stltioll. la IdditioD, tbl
lum.aries proYidl aD iaformltion deputies improperly using force or who needlessly place themselves
indicllinll wby som. oHlaslI
in situations requiring force. An inability or unwillingness to detect
resulted ia mort IIVlr. discipliD'
tb .. otben. TIl. followiall
abusive behavior in its infancy and take corrective action burts both
excerpts from lbl rlport COYeriall
tbe tbird qDlrter of 1991 Irl iIIus- the LASD and the deputy himself. As one lieutenant put it.
tratiYI:

·0 .. deputy rlceived I r'primlDel

"Deputies try to read the bosses to figure out what they can and
for fliliDO to rlport tbl DSI of force
cannot do." If deputies know that management is interested in
lad for fliliaoto ..surl lbl' I
sup.ct bid IdeqDltl clothino readily identifying the frequency of force. and can readily identify
befori lI.ino IrIDsported.·
how a given deputy functions in the field as compared to others
·0 .. deputy wlIOiVlI I fODr-dlY
IUSPIDSiol for usiall Daalcllury
similarly situated, deputies will restrain their conduct accordingly.
forcl.-

·One depDty wlIoiYe. 815-0, Fifth. failure to document and track all uses of force disables the
SDlplDsloa for stilliDO I mock
saicide.·
LASD from countering and putting to rest allegations by citizens'

·On. deputy WII dlsclllrllid lor groups that either outright misconduct or questionable force is
firilO bis weapOD iato I rllideDcl
followiag la oH-duty tr.ffic widespread within the LASD. An lAB officer's observation that
disput • .-
"[slure, we've got some bad guys out there doing all kinds of stupid
·OD. dlputy WI. distblroed tor
coatiau.lly 'DIIIging in 011D1I of stuff," is no substitute for hard data. Our analysis of available
Cblll witll iam.tes'-
LASD data shows that the Department has a relatively small (but
•
nonetheless significant) number of individuals who use force exces-

170
 sively and appear to get away with it time and again. It also shows that the vast majority of

deputies appear to conduct themselves professionally. We can make these statements with

assurance because we have the data to back them up. The LASD, however, could not make

the same statements with equal credibility because the Department has not, until recently,

seen fit to look.

Sheriff Block and his executive staff have made it clear that the LASD is now fully-

committed to a state-of-we-art force tracking system. The idea of a Department-wide

tracking system has been around at least since mid-1990, when the Sheriff s Task Force on
Use of Force was established. The LASD plans to design and maintain a computerized

tracking system to regularly "flag" officers with an increasing number of citizen complaints

or a trend toward increasing force incidents. In addition, the LASD intends to make back-

ground information on each officer - from training, to assignments, to discipline, to

commendation - available at the press of a button, ~ith varying levels of access and confi-

dentiality, to those who need to know some or all of the information.

In 1991, the LASD purchased several million dollars worth of new computers for this
Department-wide tracking and early warning system. When we last looked, the only

programs they could run were various computer games and the like. We repeatedly

. requested the documentation describing the contemplated early warning system.

Apparently, it does not yet exist. The LASD has designed "less an early warning system

than an early warning concept." according to a knowledgeable LASD observer. The LASD

offiCially envisions a fully-operational system within a year. More realistic projections

from personnel in lAB place Department-wide implementation at least a year and a half to

two years down the road.

In the meantime, many Department managers remain in the dark and do not have all

of the information needed for considered personnel decisions. Worse, even as the LASD

continues work on its early warning system, it continues thoughtlessly obfuscating vital

information about patterns of force or misconduct. We tum now to the basic building block

171
 T
of any force-reporting system -- the initial report by the deputy that force was applied.

A deputy must orally report any force he used, or witnessed being used by another

deputy, to his immediate supervisor (usually the watch sergeant for that shift), even if the

force did not result in an arrest. If the force resulted in an arrest, the deputy must also

detail the force he used or witnessed in his arrest report. Nonarresting deputies also
using force must describe their involvement in a "Supplemental Memorandum" to be
appended to the arrest report. For reporting purposes, force is defined as "any physical
effort used to control, restrain, or overcome the resistance of another."
After receiving the deputy's oral report, the watch sergeant must orally report to the

watch commander. As a general matter, the watch commander will then make a brief

notation of the incident and an initial assessment (e.g. "force used was reasonable and

within policy") in the watch commander's log, known in most stations as "the Red

Book." The Red Book is reviewed by the watch commander of the next shift and by the

captain. However, LASD policy does not require station personnel to combine or
compile the separate Red Book entries and make them available to those up the chain of

command. Thus, unless a particular watch commander incidentally notes over time that a

deputy is having an increasing number of force incidents, the data in theory available

from the Red Book will go unnoticed and unacted upon.

Since November 1991, the LASD has required "significant" force to be more

carefully investigated and documented. According to the LASD Manual of Policy and

Procedure, significant force incidents are those in which:

1. the suspect is visibly injured;

2. the suspect complains of pain;

3. the watch sergeant determines from the circumstances that there is some indication

of officer misconduct; or

4. the use of force is "significant" (e.g. the use of a taser or an Arwin (a rifle which

172
fires rubber bullets».

Upon learning of a significant force incident, the watch commander must immediately

examine and interview the suspect. If he or she has any reason to believe that the involved

officer used unnecessary or excessive force, or that further investigation is necessary,

the watch commander must file a "Supervisor's Use of Force Report" with the captain.

The use of this form only began in November 1991. Prior thereto, for roughly a decade,

there was no separate written use of force form.

The captain must review all Supervisor's Use afForce Reports to determine whether

further investigation is warranted. The captain may request a criminal investigation by

ICIB or a fonnal administrative investigation either by lAB or by the watch commander

on duty when the incident occurred.

Whether or not a captain detennines that an investigation is warranted, he or she must

send the Supervisor's Use of Force Report to the Office of Professional and Ethical
Standards (OPES) for eventual input into the contemplated early warning and force-

tracking system. The data provided to OPES on these reports since last November will not

become available for review or analysis for at least another 12 months.

It was only in March 1992 that the LASD began to systematically track citizen

complaints of excessive force. Until then, oral or written complaints were handled only

at the station level. If there was no formal investigation, stations were not required to keep

the written complaints, and thus a substantial number of such complaints were discarded.

Until very recently, LASD executives had no way to ascertain with any precision the

number, character or location of citizens' complaints of excessive force or harassment.

On March 25, 1992, the LASD addressed this problem by issuing numbered "Watch

Commander Service Comment Forms," These forms are to be completed by the watch

Commander any time a citizen voices a complaint or makes a commendation. Copies are

sent to the captain, the region chief, and the OPES commander. Compilations and analysis

173
 r
i

of this information is not currently available to managers, and is likely not to be available

for the next year or two.

We commend the LASD for requiring that all force, however slight, be reported.

It deserves credit for its commitmenllo a Department-wide force tracking and early

warning system. Such a system is a sine qua non of a modem, responsible police force.

But, the system will be inadequate if all it reports is the information gleaned from the

Supervisor's Use of Force Reports and the Watch Commander Service Comment Forms.

These reports do not disclose all uses of force by LASD officers. Although the

Policy Manual requires that deputies must scrupulously report all uses of force, no matter

how sligbt. the uses of force that are reported must pass through the filter of sergeants

and lieutenants. Thus, if a watch commander determines that a use of force is not

"significant" according to the Policy Manual, he will never fill out a Supervisor's Use of

Force Report and the force will never be picked up by the OPES force-tracking system.

One captain described this as "a potential tail-wagging-the-dog situation." The basic

building blocks of the tracking system are (1) deputies, who mayor may not report a use

of force in the field and (2) the watch sergeants and watch commanders, who mayor may

not determine that a given use of force is "significant." Although we may assume that

most watcb sergeants and watch commanders will be scrupulous in their reporting,

we may also assume that some number will not. We may also assume that some will

make honest errors in judgment. Whatever the reason, underreporting by supervisors

will seriously distort the picture presented to Department managers and executives.

Any rational system designed to identify and track deputies with a propensity to use

force excessively should try to identify them at the earliest possible point. The current

system only kicks in after "significant" force is reponed: that is, only after deputies have

burt suspects or generated complaints of misconduct. This kind of tracking cannot fairly

be called an "early warning system." The earliest warnings - such as oral reports to

sergeants or Red Book entries by lieutenants - will not be detected by the contemplated

174
force· tracking system and thus will likely continue, as in the past, to go unheeded.

Accordingly, the LASD should track all uses of force no matter how minor. It is

essential that this be done for the system to have any real early warning component.

The LASD should also establish a "force scale" to differentiate between different

levels of force. Deputies in particular worry that the tracking systems will cause them to

be labelled as "heavies," with consequential anticipated negative implications on advance-

ment and promotion. We agree. A system that does not differentiate between types of force

may wind up equating someone who needs a lesson in manners with someone else who

needs psycbological reevaluation. Force may range from a gentle nudge to a blast of

a shotgun. An effective early warning system must be able to so distinguish and to perceive

movement along the continuum of force.

A force scale, combined with a reporting of all force, should help to correct for the

current subjectivity in force reporting. Arrest reports with descriptions of force employed
have been likened by those in the Department to creative writing assignments. Sergeants
have admitted that not infrequently, they come across vague or implausible descriptions of

force in arrest reports and have to send them back to deputies for "correction." It is also

the case that arrest reports often contained canned descriptions of justified force -descrip-

tions which stretch credibility after they are seen for the umpteenth time. Our staff

reviewe~ countless arrest reports in which deputies rationalized throwing the first punch by

stating that the suspect or inmate "assumed a combative stance," "tensed up" or made a
"furtive gesture."
Putting together our views that a force scale be employed and that all force

should be reported, we believe that the LASD should use a separate, computer-ready

Use of Force Report (- UFR"). The UFR should require the deputy to check off the

force used from a list of departmentally approved control techniques. It should also

provide the name of the watch sergeant and watch commander on duty when the

incident occurred. All UFRs should be logged into OPES's force-tracking and

175
 r
;

early warning system. The use of a UFR will also have the side benefit of reinforcing

the notion that force should be used only when verbal compliance techniques have failed

or are futile. It will also provide training bureaus with a pool of consistent data which

they can use to determine which control techniques work in real-life situations, and which

do not.
We noted earlier that a captain has discretion wbether or not to formally investigate a
force incident reported on a Supervisor's Use of Force Report or in a citizen's complaint

of excessive force. Occasionally under current practice, and often, we hope, under future

practice, citizen's complaints will be resolved by the captain through mediation and

conciliation. Nonetheless, we are uncomfortable with the notion that a captain has unbri-

died discretion not to initiate an investigation. The captain's decision not to request a

formal investigation should automatically be reviewed at least one step up the

chain of command.

As we bave noted, the LASD's most optimistic estimates are that it will take at least
a year to implement the modest system it bas planned. Adoption of our recommendations

may add to the time estimates. In the interim, the LASD cannot afford to be without a

force-tracking system. The Department can and should take concrete steps to require

each captain to document and track force at his or her station. Since August 1989, .

various stations, including Norwalk, Lakewood, Industry and Temple, have devised and

implemented their own force-tracking systems. Varying in scope and dimension, the

systems share a common aim: to fully document and track each actual or alleged use of

force as it occurs.

Station Force-Tracking Systems

The station force-tracking systems we examined are ingenious blends of determina-

tion and improvisation. For example, Lieutenant Louis Diot, a principal architect of the

176
early warning system used at the Lakewood and Industry stations. showed great ingenuity

by jerry-rigging a force-tracking system with software that came free with a personal

computer used by his family at home. Lieutenant John Radeleff. who designed the Norwalk

tracking system under the direction of Captain Norm Smith. modestly concedes that he has

not been able to master all the intricacies of DBase. but nonetheless came up with the most

sophisticated tracking system used in the Department today. We believe that similar force-

tracking programs can and should be implemented immediately at every unit in the LASD.

The sidebar accompanying this text describes the Norwalk model. We think it works well.

but we are not necessarily saying that it is the only such system that could be used. We

leave that decision to management.

Our staff compiled some of the data from the Norwalk tracking system to demonstrate

how it can provide managers with a bird's eye view of the activity at the station. Table 1

sets forth several analyses of data collected by Norwalk between August 11. 1989 and April

30. 1992. One useful piece of data is the distribution of force incidents by officer. Table 1

indicates that most deputies reported only 1 or 2 force incidents within a 31-montb period.

It also singles out one deputy who reported 19 separate force inCidents.

Instituting a force scale also permits managers to differentiate between the types of

force used. Table 2 sorts the Norwalk data by different levels of force. It reveals that the

great majority of reported force incidents involved minimal, nonstriking force. It also

suggests that Norwalk deputies are much more likely to strike suspects with their flash·

lights than with their batons. Such ~nformation is useful for purposes of evaluating

weapons training.

Finally. the Norwalk system permits managers to track incidents according to an

"injury scale." Table 3 indicates for example, that 80% of the reported force incidents

caused no actual or complained-of injury.

Perhaps the most encouraging piece of data to be gleaned from the Norwalk tracking

system is the absence of even a single instance in which a citizen alleged a use of force

177
 Distribution of Reported Force Incidents by Officer Norwalk Station 8/11/89 to 4/30/92

49
so
45 _ ..' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

40 ..................- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

35 -.CO....•-
32
---------------------------
:!
~ 3O L.>,....·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
~...
~
25 _ . U::·•. .--------------------------
.&J
e::0 -:-.: :-:.-:
20 19

'.: -.:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
20
z
15 ......

10 ~: ~::~iL~}:~ 10

5 -<. ','-':-',' . . ~
•..:_. ~S~~S~·....;4~_--:-_=--_ _ _ __:___:_---__:_-
.. . . . . . } 1 2 2 1 1
........ 0 0 0 0 0
0
3 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Number of Force Incidents

Reported Force Incidents by level 01 Force Used Norwalk Station 8/11/89 to 4130192

:23-'::\
200 -------------------------
..

. ............... .

5 .:::.::::::::::~<-.:. ::,::::::::::,::::,,_._ ...

·::::5:::::
:::.:.: .... "
..........
>:...:......... .
o '::-:-,:::,:,:::::;::',:

Restraillt Fist/F••t 8lto. RlSbligbt Sip TlSer Ie·' Fir....

178
 Reported Force Incidents by Injury to Suspect Norwalk Station 8111/89 to 4/30192

200 -_-:::-·.ijji
:.:.:-:::;:.;:.>.; .... :-:....
;::2?:::::':<::':'::':-:'" .....
~)):?~~:::\~.:~ :~·\\~t·\~

40

30

20

1
.................... -:.;.;.:.:.:-: ...:.:.:.:-:.

Mioor loiary Hospitalized

which was not reported by the deputy. Although no tracking system can guarantee that

100% of the force used on the streets or in the jails is reported, the Norwalk system

apparently substantially reduces underreporting of force.

By and large, those lieutenants and captains who have implemented their own

tracking systems report widespread acceptance by deputies. Several watch commanders

and captains told us that on several occasions, deputies generating multiple entries on the

tracking system "turned themselves in" and asked for help - admitting to problems at

home, and in some cases, volunteering for desk duty. Such cases illustrate how these

rather modest tracking systems signal to deputies that management wants to identify and

address the problem of force and wants to deal constructively, helpfully, and non-puni-

lively with people at risk for using excessive force before a disaster occurs.
We want to single out captains like Norm Smith at Norwalk and John Anderson at
Lakewood for their tracking systems and Bob Mirabella, the recently-appointed captain

179
 ,
of the Temple Station, for his. Within weeks of his arrival, Captain

Mirabella instructed his sergeants and lieutenants to compile

existing data on citizen's complaints, negative evaluations, lAB

Norwalk
Force Tracking investigations and civil claims which lay scattered about the station.
Policy
When our staff met with Captain Mirabella during his seventh week
If ID officlr iD till filld USII forcl,
bl lint. 111000 II il prlcticlbll,
at Temple Station, he was able, even at that early date in his tenure,
coatlct 1111 imlDldiltl laplrvisor
to show us a log he was keeping that measured deputy performance
(usuilly I filld serguDt). n.
suplrvisor thla respoads to tbl in a number of categories. He pointed out how the log was useful in
ICUI to idlatify lad iatervilw III
potntill witaesses. The luper- determining good or bad candidates for Field Training Officer posi-
yilor Iiso iDterviews persoo. It
tbl sceo. wbo cleilll tblY did aot tions. Mirabella also showed us that a thinking captain need not be a
III laytbiag liD CIII It some later
dltl tlley cllim tblt thlY did slave to the numbers: Before he would make any important deci-
witalss tbl inc idiot).
sions, he thought it was incumbent of him to make a thorough
fbi IUIPlct must be trlDsported to
I bospitll for IXilDialtioa lacl/or inquiry and talk to the deputy in order to understand the situation.
trlllDleat ia CIIII wber.:
In other words, Mirabella was using the information as an early
(1) lb. sasplct wilitruck apoa,
or laffered 18 iajary to, bis beld- warning - not as a conclusive verdict of wrongdoing. The actions
reglrdl.ss bow lIiaor tb. iDjury
IDly Ippllr; he planned to take - be they warnings or offers of assistance and
(~I the IUlpect WII choked - support - were calculated to prevent future problems rather than to
wbelber or DOt b. lost CODlcioal-
alii; merely punish. We think that his well thought-out approach should
(3) lb. sasp.ct wllippreb.ad.d
be emulated throughout the LASD.
by IIH of I tiler gaD or AMio rin.
(wbicb firll rubber bulI.ts);

(4) bal ,ilibl. iojan..-

reglrdl.ss kow miaor,
Tracking Other Data For Early Warning Purposes
(5) lb. sasp.ct reqa.ltIlII.dlcll
'rlllDleD" - reglrdl." of Data regarding civil lawsuits, criminal investigations, adminis-
wbllblr or oat IDY iojury i.
Ipplrut: .. trative claims and the various kinds of internal administrative

investigations should be tracked and integrated into the early

warning system that is currently being planned. Officers repeatedly

investigated for excessive force tend to overlap with those who

180
 expose the Department to civilliligation and who generate citizen's

complaints. LASD executives do not currently have this

integrated data available to them, and their decisions suffer

(61 tile IUlpect IlIlgellullstaatill
from it. Worse yet, they continue, on an almost weekly basis, force WII used Igliolt bi. -
wbelller or DOt lie lias lOY
to routinely erase records of certain investigations. Captains Ipplreat iailry or requests
IIIldical tnatlllnt or
cannot possibly prevent litigation or get early warning of potential
{71 lIIl prisoHr IIIege.ny iaiury,
problems unless they have specific, concrete data indicating who wllltbar or DOt be bal lOY
Ipparlat iailry or requists
uses force, who generates lawsuits and how often. IIIldical tnatmnt

State law requires that Unit and lAB investigations be kept a All doubt. raglrdiog tbe o.. d
for IIIldical Irlltmeot are relOlYtd
minimum of five years. The LASD abides by that statutory ~y takiog tbe IUIPlCt to tile
bOlpital. If lIIl "Ipect deelia..
minimum and routinely destroys investigative files more than five IIIldical Ir......1. be lDalt persoo-
ally i afoRII bOlpital p.rlou•• of
years old unless there is pending litigation over the incident in ques- bil decilioo.

tion. Once a file is destroyed. the Department's access to informa- la all ell.. whr. tbe IU.p.Ct i.
tlkea to tb. bospital for IXlllliDl-
tion about the incident is severely limited. If the citizen's complaint tiOi or tr..... a1. tbe .up.nisor
IIIUIt go tb.n lid iat.niew
is determined to be "founded," a Department letter imposing the lII.dical p.floaoll to d.tanDi.1
wb.lII.r til. susp.ct. iojllri.. an
discipline and describing the circumstances of the incident is placed
cooliltalt witll tla. d.gne of fore.
r.ported lIy t~ d.pllty.
within the officer's personnel folder. But if the citizen's complaint
R.gardl ... of tile allloillt of forc.
is either "unfounded:' "unsubstantiated" or "closed" (which occurs iliad or tile ioillri .. (if aoy •
• altaioed, tbl weteb cOllllllaoder
roughly 94% of the time), the only permanent record of the
(lIIl1ally • Ileate .. llt) for tllat sbift
...... wltll extra.e priority. ioltr-
incident is a 3" x 5" "lAB Subject Card" which describes the
view til, 'I.,ect i. ,11 c ....
alleged misconduct only by referring to the section of the Policy wb.n foree WII "lid. All IIcll
lateniew••1I1t lit eitll.r vldeo-
Manual implicated by the allegations (e.g., Use of Force, General tlpld or IlIdiotaPld. If lie is
laable to vldeot.,. tile ilteni.w.
Bebavior, Conduct Toward Others). tbe watell cOlllllllod.r IIIUIt take
Itlll pbotognpll. of tile .a.p.ct,
lAB Subject Cards provide managers with almost no useful plyi.g particlliar aa.oUol to tlte
!taOWI or all.g.d In .. ol·iaillry.
information regarding unsustained complaints. Our review of Unit-
•
and lAB investigative files revealed that the terse captions on lAB

Cards - such as "General Bebavior," or "Conduct Toward Others"

181
 l
- masked serious allegations of misconduct. For example, one lAB

Subject Card described as "False Statements" a 1991 incident in

wbich deputies at the Men's Central Jail placed a tattered training
For.II lSI of forci lavtstig.tions.
Ibl rllponibll w.lcb comllllldir dummy with exaggerated Negro features and the word "Coon"
lIIast .lIlmbll • ·forci iavlstig.-
lioa p.ck.gl- for review by Ibl scrawled across its chest in full view of African American inmates.
c.ptaia. Tbl p.ck.gl coataiDl .n
saplrvisory rlports. mldical Another lAB Subject Card described as "Safeguarding Prisoners" a
reportl. pllotogr.pbl•• udiotap.d
1990 incident in wbich a recalcitrant suspect was subject to tonure-
.ad/or vidlotapld iatirvilwi•• Ad
.ay other plrtiaeal ••teri.ll. like abuse. In that case, the deputy had transponed a suspect to the
Thl w.lcll comm.ader IIlISt .110
inelldl • detailed me.or.adum hospital to be treated for cuts sustained from several assenedly acci-
dltailia, lb. liadiag. of tbl iavII-
li,.liol. Forel iIVestig.tlol p.ck. dental flashlight blows the deputy had applied to the suspect's head.
Ig •• Ire starld ladaliailily .t lb.
stltioa for reflrlac. ia Ibl IYlat of When the suspect refused to sign a hospital release form, the deputy
M,re liligltiOI or inllrall iavllli·
gltioa• bog tied him, removed the back seat of the patrol car and placed the
• suspect on the rear floorboard. The deputy then left the suspect
All r.portlfl all. of fore •• rl there with the car engine idling for 45 to 60 minutes. Within
log,ld 01 a ...tiol co.pullr
d.tab .... f.d .alry 1/111 III. minutes. the engine heated the floorboard to temperatures exceeding
iIVolvlfl offlclri.), til. reportll'
lamller for tile .n.... dete lad 140 degrees. severely burning the suspect's chest and abdomen.
.lIift 01 wbicll till lacld.lt
occarred. til. tyPI of laJIIl (if lay) If either of these incidents had occurred before 1986, our staff would
1 .... iDld. aad tbe 1"11 of f.rc.
alld. laiurl•• fall iato foar catl- have been completely unaware of them because the investigative
gori.r. (11 I. 'aiary; (2••1.,
files would have been routinely sent to the shredder after five years.
ial.ry, ••dlc.1 tr'''''.It, .,It.bl.
lor stltlol Holdlg, (3) Ilil" The Department is thus remiss to the degree it relies solely on the
r'qairll, ~ooldall .t tbe 1I..,ital;
.ad (4) dec...." meager details provided on lAB Subject Cards for background
Fore. I. IIrok'l dowl II" all.
checks on candidates for promotion and transfer.
c.lI,ori.r. (11.n.,ltl.1 ~
lalplct tII.t forel wa. llId; (21 The LASD also continues the practice of "uncarding" officen
rlstrliat. foreia, to ,roaad. ao
blow. strack. (3) filt Of felt; .. - i.e., destroying the lAB Subject Cards which indicated that the

officer was ever investigated for alleged excessive force. Current

policy permits captains or region chiefs to "uncard" officers if they

determine one of the following conditions exist:

182
 1. The subject was not present when the alleged act occurred;

2. The subject was not involved, directly or indirectly, in the

aJleged incident;
(4) batoa; (5) nashliallt (6) SIp;
3. The alleged incident did not occur, (7) tallr/Arwia; (I) caaia.; lad
(9) fir.lnD.
4. The complaint concerned matters of procedure and there was no
At die .ad of ucla lIIondl. tile
wrongdoing by Departmental employees. caplaia rec.iv •• I priatoat liniag
III fore. incident •• ne priatoat
.lIbl.. tb. clptlia to id.atity
Although these four conditions may provide a basis for a deter- d.pllti .. wllo 1111 force frequlDdy
or wllo ulllligll-IIY.I fore •. lb.
mination that a complaint is "unfounded," they do not provide a elplaia is tIIu. put oa aolice tIIlt
lI.e dep uty lDay III ia 101D. so rt of
basis for eraSing all traces that the investigation ever took place.
troubl •• lad mlY call tb. deputy
iato Ilia oHie. for I word or two.
The most widely-cited reason by Department officials for uncarding
•
is that officers should not bave their reputations soiled by frivolous

allegations of misconduct. When asked why a determination of

"unfounded" did not suffice to cure that problem, several officials

replied that in many instances, when two equally-qualified officers

compete for a position, the officer with the fewest number of investi·

gations is likely to win regardless of the investigations' outcome.

If that is the case, then the practice of uncarding may work real
"'
injustice against deputies. Assume that deputies Y and Z are equally

qualified for a promotion. Over the last 10 years, deputy Y bas

been investigated 8 times for citizen complaints all determined to be

unfounded. Over the same period, deputy Z bas been investigated

four times for citizen complaints, all determined to be unfounded.

Six of the investigations against deputy Y have been uncarded.

None of the investigations against deputy Z have been uncarded'

A captain then asks for a routine lAB background check on both

officers. lAB reports that deputy Y bas only 2 cards of unfounded

183
 ,,
!

investigations, while deputy Z has 4. The executive, erroneously believing that Y has

fewer citizen complaints than Z, gives him the promotion.

Our review of Unit and lAB investigative files also revealed that the practice of

uncarding can be subject to abuse. We found several instances in which cases ultimately

determined to be "unsubstantiated" (Le. the evidence was not sufficient either to prove or

disprove misconduct) nonetheless resulted in the uncarding of officers. In other cases,

we could find no explanation for uncarding the officer. One such case arose out of a

1991 jail fight. An inmate had either accidentally or intentionally dropped his lunch tray
and spilled some food on a deputy in the mess hall. A scuffle ensued, and several

deputies responded, raining the inmate with punches. The deputies then dragged the

inmate outside to a hallway, beat him some more and eventually handcuffed and hogtied

him. During a Unit-level investigation, one deputy present in the mess hall admitted

punching the inmate once in the face. The captain uncarded that deputy, claiming that

the deputy was not involved in the incident. When a member of our staff asked two lAB

officers whether the captain had made a clerical error and misidentified the deputy to be
uncarded, both replied that uncarding was proper because the "complained-of incident"

was the beating in the hallway outside the mess hall in which the deputy bad not partici-

pated. Such bair-splitting not only provides Departmental executives with a distorted

view of deputies' use of force, but also reinforces the public's view that the LASD will

go to great lengths to "take care of its own."

Recommendations:

Any effective force-tracking system must be able to identify the fact patterns

giving rise to formal investigations. Accordingly, we make the following recom-

mendations:

The LASD should track all force on a written Use of Force Form with .. Force

184
r

Scale.

Computer data from all investigative bureaus - ICIB, Homicide, lAB and the Civil

Litigation Unit should be integrated and reports presented should be distributed to

executives and managers on a monthly basis. Such reports should indicate which

officers and stations have an unusually high level of force, complaint or lawsuit

activity.

All investigative files should be retained indefinitely. They can be microfilmed

to save space. In addition, lAB should replace the card file with a more extensive

system in which hard copies of the' lAB Findings and the ultimate disposition are

available for review. Supervisors requesting an lAB background check on an officer

should thus receive a "force package- which includes, for each lAB investigation,

a copy of (1) the citizen's complaint, (2) the findings issued by the investigator and

(3) the disposition sheet stating whether the allegations were sustained.

The force package will thus enable supervisors to determine whether successive investiga-

tions reveal a pattern of conduct (e.g., repeated allegations that the officer struck hand-

cuffed suspects).
The practice of "uncarding- should stop. A determination of ·unfounded"

should be sufficient to indicate that a citizen's complaint is devoid of merit,

especi~lIy if the rationale for the complaint being unfounded is provided in the

disposition sheet.

185
 .'

186
 1 1. H e a ds t r ike s Po lie y

During our review of LASD internal investigation files and litigation files, we were

concerned by the large number of cases in which officers hit suspects or inmates in the head

with impact weapons such as flashlights and batons. Vinually all of the files we reviewed

indicated that the suspects posed no immediate danger to the deputy's life. In many cases,

the suspect was either trying to flee or was no longer aggressively attacking the deputies

when struck on the head. Nonetheless, almost without exception, the deputies were neither

disciplined nor referred for retraining.

The seriousness of headstrikes with impact weapons is perhaps most chillingly illus-

trated in the 1990 beating of an inmate by a group of deputies at the Hall of Justice Jail.

The inmate, a paranoid schizophrenic, became involved in an argument with a deputy while

standing in line for lunch. According to witnesses. a deputy removed the inmate from the

line for refusing to follow directions. The inmate then allegedly responded by grabbing the

deputy's shirt. In the ensuing scuffle. at least four deputies bit the 150 pound inmate with

punches, kicks and flashlight blows to the head. A jail nurse arrived at the scene to find the

inmate lying in a pool of blood and convulsing from a seizure. The inmate then slipped

into a coma, only to awaken with brain damage.

The involved deputies stated in their initial reports that the inmate's mental illness

made him difficult to restrain. However, the physician who treated the inmate noted that he

"was small in stature and it is highly unlikely that he demonstrated any superhuman

strength that was reported at the time of the initial alleged altercation." In June 1992, the

County settled a lawsuit arising out of the beating for a near-record $1.75 million. The

Department also announced that it was discharging four deputies for using excessive force.

As this beating indicates, headstrikes with flashligbts or other impact weapons amount

to deadly or at least potentially deadly force. A summary of some of the heads trikes which

were deemed to be "in policy" after internal administrative investigations indicates that the

Department has no clear guidelines for identifying those situations in which headstrikes are

clearly inappropriate.

187
Case 1

Citizen A was sitting in a car outside a tavern when a deputy shone his flashlight

through the window and peered inside. Although the deputy had received no call

concerning a suspicious vehicle. the deputy ordered A to exit his car. As A exited. the

deputy struck him on the bead with a flashlight. Citizen A fell to his knees and again was

struck on the head with a flashlight. Two independent witnesses corroborated A's story

that the beating was unprovoked. During the course of a criminal investigation of the

incident. the deputy admitted the two blows. He claimed, however. that he swung his

flashlight only after A. who was unarmed. assumed a "combative stance." He further

claimed that he aimed both blows at A's shoulder, but A moved his head in the path of

the flashlight. A second deputy on the scene remarked to criminal investigators that he

turned his head away because the headstrikes made him sick to his stomach. The D.A.'s

office declined to prosecute the deputy for assault under color of authority. Thereafter. an

LASD administrative investigation determined that the allegation of excessive force was

unsubstantiated.

Case 2

Citizen B led deputies on a low-speed chase after refusing to pull over for an alleged

traffic violation. The deputies forced B's car to a stop and blocked it from moving.

The deputies found citizen B staring straight ahead while gripping the steering wheel

with both hands. When B failed to respond to commands to exit the car, a deputy broke

the driver's window and repeatedly struck B on the head with bis flashligbt. During the

course of an administrative investigation of the incident, the deputy explained that be

struck B in th~ head in order to loosen his grip on the steering wbeel. B's complaint of

excessive force was found to be unsubstantiated.

188
 Several former and current LASD officers who spoke with our staff agreed that the

LASD provides little guidance on the appropriateness of heads trikes. A former LASD

officer recounted an instance in which a deputy intentionally struck a suspect on the head

with a flashlight to prevent the suspect from throwing down a vial which the deputy

believed contained PCP. In other words, the deputy used deadly or near-deadly force to
prevent the commission of a misdemeanor offense - destruction of evidence. The lieu-

tenant pointed out that not only was the headstrike "grossly excessive" under those circum-

stances, but it also caused the vial to drop and shatter, thereby causing the very event the

deputy hoped to avoid. The lieutenant's request for a formal investigation of the incident

or at least retraining of the deputy was denied.

In response to our questions about me lack of a department-wide policy regarding

beads trikes, LASD officials said mat although the Department bad no formal policy against

beads trikes in its Manual of Policy and Procedure, its training materials constituted a de

facto policy against the use of heads trikes. If that is indeed the case, then the "de facto

policy" is apparently not working.

The Department's reluctance to include an unambiguous headstrikes policy in its policy

.manual is difficult to understand. The policy manual does explicitly discuss sbootings.

Headstrikes with impact weapons can inflict serious pbysical damage, and expose the

Dep~ent to substantial civil liability, just like officer-involved sbootings. Accordingly.

they deserve specific attention.

Recommendations:

We recommend that the LASD clearly articulate its policy regarding headstrikes

in its Manual of Policy and Procedures. We believe that at a minimum, the policy

should state that -intentional head strikes with any impact weapon are strictly

prohibited unless deadly force is justified under the same circumstances."

189
 T
We further recommend that tracking systems should identify those officers who

have either intentionally or unintentionally struck suspects in the head with impact

weapons.

While intentional heads trikes are a serious problem. accidental heads trikes deserve

equal attention. One recently-retired LASD officer with more than two decades of patrol

experience estimates that unintentional heads trikes occur far more frequently - perhaps
as much as three or four times more frequently - than intentional headstrikes. He

further complained that as a supervisor. he had no guidelines to deal with cases where a

deputy unintentionally strikes a suspect three to five times in the head. That lack of guid-

ance continues to exist. We therefore recommend that the LASD make avoidance

of unintentional headstrikes a training priority. Furthermore, the LASD should

investigate an officer who accidentally strikes a suspect more than once in the

head with an impact weapon to see if he or she should automatically receive

refresher training in avoiding the use of head strikes.

190
191
 l
I

192
 12. Conflicts & Disincentives

Sheriff Block has made clear to his Deparunent that if it ever comes to a choice

between imposing discipline on an erring officer or declining to do so out of fear of the

consequences on litigation the LASD is to choose to impose discipline. The Sheriff has

clearly made the right choice, but it should not be overlooked that the cboice he made is a

difficult and risky one.

In the past, the LASD may not have gone so far as to decline to discipline clear

misconduct, but it bas been very reluctant to create a paper record that could provide

ammunition for plaintiffs' lawyers. There are few top LASD managers whose wish list of
recommendations does not include legislation which would keep the results of investiga-

tions and subsequent disciplinary, remedial and corrective measures out of the hands of the
plaintiffs' bar and out of court.

As a result, out of concern about a paper record. the LASD would often delay adminis-

trative investigations of misconduct until litigation arising from that misconduct was over.

By that time, the deputy in question may either have gotten into more trouble or the event

may have receded so far into the past that discipline was no longer feasible or meaningful.

This practice also had the unintended consequence of making it much more difficult to

defend litigation. Because there was no timely investigation, valuable testimony, names of

witnesses and evidence was at times forgotten or misplaced by the time the matter came to

trial, perhaps forcing cases to settle that otherwise bad meritorious defenses.

If diSCipline is accomplished out in the open with speed, fairness and integrity. the

public perception that the police cannot police themselves will fade. If. on the other band,

a department suppresses bad facts about its officers. fails to investigate and declines to

impose discipline for fear of giving ammunition to plaintiffs, the reluctance to police them-
selves creates a strong incentive for civilian oversight.

We perceived certain internal conflicts at the LASD. The people who investigate

possible misconduct can be the same people charged with developing evidence to defend

the LASD in litigation arising from that misconduct. The tensions that naturally arise in

193
these two roles may produce skewed results. Accordingly, we believe that the internal

investigations and defensive investigations be separated and separately staffed.

Along the same lines, if the public agencies that pay the bills for liability put undue

pressure on the LASD to avoid large payouts, the consequence may be to encourage

suppression of investigation and discipline on the theory that if the plaintiff cannot prove

his case through LASD investigatory and disciplinary records, he may not be able to

prove his case at all.

We see the same potential for conflict being present at least in theory in the legal
advice the LASD may receive from County Counsel. County Counsel also represents the

County and the Board of Supervisors. We wonder at times if County Counsel, repre-

senting the LASD, can strongly advocate terminating an officer for misconduct knowing

at the same time that the fact of termination may increase the exposure of the County in

litigation arising from that misconduct.

Another potential conflict exists when County Counsel represents both the LASD and

a deputy and learns information from the deputy indicating that the deputy is guilty of
conduct punishable by the LASD. Should County Counsel keep that information from the

LASD?

There is also the situation where the County has made the decision that a deputy and

the LASD require separate representation because of an actual or potential conflict. The

interests of the deputy and the Department then may differ: The deputy will want the

County to settle with the plaintiff. We ask ourselves what happens if the deputy wants to

use information helpful to the County's defense as a bargaining chip to get the County to

forego heavy discipline for the underlying misconduct. We do not know if County
Counsel can recommend the bargain to the County knowing that it prejudices the interests

of the LASD.
We raise these issues because they pose practical, every day problems. W. recom-

mend that consideration be given to whether it is appropriate for County Counsel

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 to continue representing both the County and the Sheriff's Department as it does

currently.

The Board of Supervisors and the public should recognize that one of the consequences

of Sheriff Block's choice may lead, in the short run, to larger judgments or settlements.

If the Department is doing its job of increasing the integrity of its investigations and

imposing discipline more widely and uniformly, there may be a rise in litigation over past

misconduct and related judgments and settlements. It will take patience and statesmanship

to recognize that the rise is a temporary phenomenon, a momentary unwelcome side effect

of movement in the right direction. We believe the County should not take the LASD to

task for the costs associated with cleaning up the past.

Finally, we should take account in general of the rise in litigation against the police.

It is a reflection of the litigiousness of our society in general and of Californians in partic-

ular. It is a reflection of an American penchant to legislate both broad rights for the courts

to redress, and broad monetary and other sanctions for the courts to impose.

The threat of litigation can be a powerful vehicle for correcting misconduct. But it can

also be a powerful disincentive for the LASD to investigate and police itself. The LASD

understandably does not like the idea of doing a thorough investigation, documenting the

results and taking steps to correct a problem, only to have it all used against the Departmem

in litigation. This problem is somewhat beyond our charge, but we believe it merits further

study.

Recommendations:

Internal investigations and defensive investigations should be separately staffed.

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 ,

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 13. Recruitment & Affirmative Action

Composition of Department

As of May 8, 1992, the Department has 8,010 total sworn personnel. Of this total, 999

(12.47%) are female and 7,011 (87.53%) are male. The Department's sworn personnel are

predominantly Caucasian (72.37%) and are also predominantly Caucasian male (64.87%).

To change the approximately 35% non-Caucasian male composition of the Department

will require significant, committed and sustained effon. We were anecdotally advised that

to date, despite the Department's affirmative action program effons, approximately 70% of

the applicants continue to be Caucasian male. Affirmative action efforts appear to have had

reasonable success to date in recruiting African-American sworn personnel. African-

Americans, who represent 10.87% of the County's civilian labor force, currently represent

8.89% of total sworn personnel. l Reasonably successful recruitment of African-Americans

for sworn positions appears to have been a long-standing achievement of the Department,

as they represent 9.39% of sworn personnel with 10 or more years of Department service.

Female, Hispanic, Asian, and what the Department refers to as "Other" recruitment has

fared less well compared to their representation in the County's civilian labor force. The

Department's recruiting staff is aware of this and has made some effons to increase recruit-

ment from the minority communities. However, we are not aware of any special programs

to increase the number and percentage of female applicants.

Hispanics as of May 8, 1992 represen t 16.18 % of total sworn personnel, and 13.52% of

sworn personnel with 10 or more years of Department service. By contrast, Hispanics

represent 24.55% of the civilian labor pool. Asians, who constitute 6.12% of the civilian
labor pool. represent 2.0% of total sworn personnel. and 1.72% of sworn personnel with 10

or more years of Department service. The undesignated "Other" category represents only

0.54% of total sworn personnel, and 0.22% of sworn personnel with 10 or more years of

Department service.

If the recruiting staffs observations are correct that about 70% of applicants continue

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 t
.\ .

to be Caucasian male, and since about 65% of tbe Department's sworn personnel as of

May 8, 1992 are Caucasian male, recruitment of women and minorities, especially

Hispanics and Asians, is unlikely to be improved significantly without a major,

consistent drive to do so. That drive appears to have begun, should continue, and must

be substantially expanded.

Caucasian males in 1980 represented 32.88% of the County's total civilian labor

force. That percentage presumably is less today, given the likely increase in the County's

minority labor force since those 1980 Census figures. For reasons of perceived as well as

actual fairness of minority and female representation in the Department, decreasing the

May 8, 1992 Caucasian male representation of the Department's sworn personnel of

64.87%, which is at a level of almost twice the Caucasian male representation of the

County's total civilian labor force 12 years ago, warrants this investigation's and the

Department's serious attention.

This is especially so since the Department may soon experience a level of increased

competition with other local law enforcement agencies for qualified women and minority

applicants for sworn personnel positions. Given the disadvantages the Deparunent may

already have in such competition, such as mandatory initial service of newly bired sworn

personnel in the County jail system, discussed in Chapter 17, we believe that the

Department must strengthen its efforts to increase the number and percentage of women

and minority recruits.

Bilingual Personnel

Tbe Department serves many communities wbich are predominantly non-Englisb

speaking. The Los Angeles Times reported that 54.6% of all residents of Los Angeles

County do not speak English at bome. Wbile accurate figures are not available for rates

of non-Englisb speaking broken down by station, it is known that these rates are bigh at

198
the Firestone and Lynwood stations and. to a lesser extent, at the Norwalk, Temple City,

Industry and Pico Rivera stations.

In order to provide effective and sensitive policing to these residents, the Department

is in great need of bilingual personnel. Unfortunately, its current bilingual resources are

seriously outstripped by the need for bilingual services. Out of 8,010 sworn personnel, the

Department currently has only 566 with bilingual capabilities of whom 556 speak Spanish.

Other languages spoken are Chinese (3), Cantonese (1), Korean (1). Vietnamese (I),

Armenian (1), German (1) and sign language (2). As a result, the Department bas a serious

inability to communicate effectively with large portions of the communities it serves.

The Firestone station, which has the highest concentration of monolingual Spanish-

speaking residents, has only 19 Spanish-speaking deputies out of a total of 116. The

Lynwood Station, which has the next highest concentration, has only 13 bilingual deputies

out of 150. Of the custody facilities, Sybil Brand appears to have the greatest shortage of

Spanish-speaking personnel, with only 5 bilingual deputies out of 230.

The importance of bilingual ability is graphically illustrated by a recent Incident. In

April 1991, deputies in the Firestone area stopped a man for speeding. According to

witnesses, wben the deputies asked him to exit the car, he answered - in Spanish - "I'm

bandicapped." He must wear leg braces in order to walk, or even to drive. The deputies,

neither of wbom spoke Spanish, yelled at him to exit his car. The man then reached down

to pull his left leg out of the car. One of the deputies, apparently believing that be was

reaching for a weapon. struck him on the head with the butt of his gun. Tbe man fell out of

the car and was struck once more in the bead. His complaint of excessive force was deter-

mineo to be "Unsubstantiated." He has filed a civil claim against the County.

On several ride-alongs, we observed genuine exasperation in citizens' faces when they

made a 911 call in Spanish, were referred to a bilingual dispatcher, but found that the

deputy responding to their 911 call did not speak Spanish. A number of officers we rode

with did. bowever, know the Spanish for, "How many beers have you had?" "Empty your

199
 pockets." "Put your hands on the hood," and "Place your hands behind your back. Now!"

The Department's current efforts to increase its bilingual capacity are limited to a

small bilingual salary bonus and a brief Spanish course at the Academy. These efforts

pale beside the ongoing need for bilingual capability. Substantially more bilingual

deputies are needed not only in predominately monolingual Spanish areas but also in
those Department service areas heavily populated by other non-English speaking resi-

dents.

Increasing the Department's bilingual capacity will require a comprehensive

program of training, larger salary bonuses and greater use of unsworn personnel.

Recent Hiring

Hires for 1991 numbered 875, of whom 14.86% were women, 6.40% were
African-American, 23.09% were Hispanic, and 2.97% were Asian. In addition, Two
Native Americans were hired, as were two people in the Department's "Other" category.

Of the 1991 hires, 67.09% were Caucasian, and 58.06% were Caucasian males.

While women overall constituted 14.86% of total 1991 hiring, Caucasian women

represented 13.46% of total Caucasian hiring. By contrast, African-American women

represented 25% of African-American biring, and Hispanic women represented 17.33%

of Hispanic biring. Asian women were only 7.69% of the total Asian new hires.
Hires for 1990, by comparison, numbered 747, of whom 19.28% were women, 6.83%

were African-American, 23.69% were Hispanic, and 3.21 % were Asian. In addition,

four people in the Department's "Other" category were hired. Of the 1990 bires, 65.73%

were Caucasian, and 54.62% were Caucasian males.

While women overall constituted 19.28% of all 1990 biring, Caucasian women

represented 16.90% of total Caucasian hiring. By contrast, African-American women

represented 39.22% of African-American hiring, and Hispanic women represented

200
 22.60% of Hispanic hiring. Only 1 Asian woman was hired among the 33 total Asian new

hires (3.03%). Both the 1990 and the 1991 data suggest that efforts aimed at recruiting

more women should not neglect the Caucasian or Asian

% 01 Applicaats bired 1998 1991
communities.
Caucasian males 5.02% 4.35%
We also reviewed the proportion of applicants in Caucasian females 6.05% 4.18%
African-American males .91% . .86%
each group who were actually hired by the Department, as
African-American females 1.60% .81%
Hispanic males 3.16% 2.61%
set out in the adjacent chart:
Hispanic females 4.80% 2.99%
The 1991 data do not reveal significant disparities in Asian males 4.09% 2.50%
Asian females 1.23% 1.54%
the hire to applicant ratios of men and women within the

same race or ethnic group. There are, however, significant disparities in the hire to appli-

cant ratio of minority groups compared to Caucasians, especially for African-Americans.

The 1990 data reveal significant disparities in the hire to applicant ratios of men and

women within the same race or ethnic group for Caucasians, African-Americans, Hispanics,

and Asians. Moreover, similar significant disparities in the hire to applicant ratio of

minority groups compared to Caucasians seen in the 1991 data appear again in the 1990

data. especially for African-Americans, Hispanics and Asians. The selection criteria.

discussed below in Chapter 14, may be having an adverse impact on these groups.

Written Examination

One explanation for the hire to applicant disparity for minorities is that there is a

substantial disparity between applicants who initially apply for positions, those who actu-

ally appear to take the Department's written applicant examination and those test takers

who pass that examination.

As can be seen from the data on the following chart, the written examination is a high hurdle.

eliminating 60 to 87% of initial applicants. While some number of initial applications probably

are not serious. it is noteworthy that the written examination procedure by itself seems to eliminate

201
 60 to 70% of Caucasian initial applicants, but seems to eliminate approximately 85% of

African-American initial applicants, 80 to 85 % of Hispanic initial applicants, and 70 to 87%

:::.;:.':.::::: {::.:;':.:'::.":'>< <:.:':;.;:":;:.,<:::::::;. ::>::';'; ::.::::::.:>. :> ..::- ...... . ... ·················-::::·::-::;·:::::::·:::::::::::·:-::x·:-:- .. -. ...... :.:::.:.:.;::::.:- ..:...:: .........

1990 1991

Applicants Exam Initial Applicants Exam

who appeared takers who applicants who who appeared takers who
to take exam passed exam passed exam to take exam passed exam

Caucasian Males 58.17% 62.09% 36.12% 61.59% 64.76% 39.89%

Caucasian Females 58.85% 67.20% 39.55% 49.02% 70.67% 34.53%
African-American Males 37.10% 36.09% 13.69% 39.21% 40.57% 15.91%
.African-American Females 34.88% 40.83% 14.24% 29.46% 45.78% 13.48%
Hispanic Males 48.99% 44.19% 21.60% 48.19% 45.75% 22.05%
Hispanic Females 46.10% 49.22% 22.69% 32.05% 48.00% 15.38%
Asian Males 53.38% 54.33% 29.00% 50.05% 51.67% 25.86%
Asian Females 29.63% 41.67% 12.35% 39.23% 52.94% 20.77%

of Asian initial applicants. These data warrant a prompt and professional job content validation

of this written examination in order to determine whether the evamination is unfairly screening

out minority applicants by testing for attributes which are not job-related_

Effectiveness of Recruitment Efforts

Very little hiring of sworn personnel seems to have taken place in 1992, presumably

due to current County budgetary limitations_ We believe the Department's recruiting

staff should use this temporary period of markedly reduced hiring to obtain expert assis-

tance in planning and implementing substantially more imaginative and effective methods

to increase female and minority recruitment This is especially warranted in the Hispanic

and Asian communities, and for female recruits generally, with a particular focus on the

Caucasian and Asian female communities.

Increasing the representation of female, Hispanic. and Asian sworn personnel

without neglecting the Department's long-standing and reasonably successful recruitment

202
and retention of African-American sworn personnel should continue to be the major focus

of recruiting staff activity. However, the efforts devoted to those ends must surpass

the traditional affirmative action program activities.

The major focus of recruiting efforts to date for minority and female applicants seems

to have been traditional efforts such a broadening the number of job fairs which the

recruiting staff attends, as opposed to serious study about how to market the Department's

recruiting efforts to the appropriate audience for this purpose. The ineffectiveness of these

traditional efforts in recruiting for law enforcement was dramatically documented in a Los

Angeles Police Department study which found that only 1.9% of recruits learned of job

openings through newspaper advertisements, while over 64% learned of openings througb

police officers, friends or relatives.

The LAPD also found that more than 50% of job applicants decided to become an

officer at least five years before actually joining the force. This means that major marketing

efforts are warranted in county high scbools and junior high schools.

The Department must become substantially more proactive in marketing

Department careers to its appropriate recruiting audience, especially among women

generally and in the Hispanic and Asian communities. Those efforts are necessary in

order to overcome not only current but also projected recruitment barriers. including a

substantially reduced labor pool in the appropriate age group by the year 2000 and dramatic

increases in the proportion of minorities in the labor pool. If there are attitudinal barriers

to careers in law enforcement that some women or some minority group members

may have, they can be lowered only through well advised and implemented plans

aimed directly at changing those attitudes.

Echoing the finding of the LAPD study. minority officers within the Department stress

the importance of "word of mouth" recruitment efforts, and point, for example. to some

recent successes in increasing recruitment of Asians througb a concerted outreach by Asian

officers to possible applicants. But whatever the plan, vigorous and sustained activites

203
 are required to accomplish the goal of increasing female and minority group

recruitment, driven by a sense of what may be called rational urgency. Both inter-

nally and community-wide, the Department is viewed as lacking a sense of urgency

about this goal.

Recommendations:

1. The Department should conduct professional job content validation of

written pre-employment examination to determine if it is inappropriately screening

out minority applicants.

2. The Department should conduct substantially more proactive, imaginative

and effective recruitment efforts for females and minorities, and particularly for

Hispanics and Asians and for Caucasian and Asian females.

3. The bilingual salary bonus should be increased to 5 1/20/0 for bilingual

deputies working in areas with a great need for bilingual services.

4. For those deputies who desire to qualify for the bilingual bonus, the

Department should pay the tuition for outside language courses.

5. The Department should hire bilingual community services workers from the

communities with great need for bilingual services.

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205
206
 14. Hiring

Weight

Besides the written examination hurdle, one additional potential barrier which people

inquiring about positions with the Department have faced has been the weight scale. The

Department has a balance beam weight scale in the recruiting office, with a height/weight

chart attached to it. We were advised that potential applicants who weighed in excess of

15% above or below that chart's weight range for their sex and height were not permitted to

apply formally. They were told to return when their weight fell within that range. We were

advised anecdotally that this height/weight chart adversely affected more men than women,

with no discernible adverse affect on any specific minority group or minorities generally.

On and after July 26, 1992, the effective date of the employment provisions of the

U. S. Americans With Disabilities Act, such an initial barrier as a height/weight chart

presumably becomes unlawful. We were told that the Department has stopped using this

scale or the height/weight chart for that reason, although neither the scale nor the chart has

been removed.

Physical Fitness

Of more concern to the Department than the appropriate weight of applicants has been

the perceived need to compensate for their less than desired state of physical fitness.

Concerned that successful applicants entering the Department's b'aining academy were not

meeting the academy's rigorous physical training requirements, the Department wisely

established physical fitness programs for interested applicants and potential applicants.

The purpose of these programs, whicb meet three times per week in several locations, is to

increase upper body strength, overall pbysical stamina and endurance for both men and

women.

Tbe recruiting staff s goal is to help the applicants and potential applicants "get in

shape" for the physical training rigors of the Academy, as opposed to any desire we

207
 perceived to recruit and hire only the athletically inclined. Our inquiries as to whether

physical fimess standards adversely impacted recruitment of women generated responses

that these physical training programs were established because too many male applicants

were failing to complete the Academy's physical training. We were told that a higher

percentage of female applicants are in good physical condition when they apply than of
male applicants. In any event, these physical fitness programs help applicants of both

sexes become prepared physically for the rigorous academy training.

We recommend that these physical training programs be part of a concerted

marketing program that seeks to increase the number and percentage of female and

minority, especially Hispanic and Asian applicants. Women in particular, along with

many men, may be relieved to learn that they can consider careers with the Department

despite the fact that they may be neither physically imposing nor aggressively athletic.

Disqualifying Criteria

The recruiting staff strives to hire "stable" applicants. This quest for perceived

"stability" seeks to exclude drug users, as well as applicants who have poor driving

records, substantial credit problems or tendencies toward violence.

Many applicants apply for Department positions, but few are selected. In 1991 the

875 total hires were selected from among 30,058 applicants. This means that in 1991

only 2.91 % of the applicants were hired. In addition to the high initial applicant elimina-

tion rate caused by the written examination, the applicants' drug use, driving record, and

credit record also eliminate a large percentage of applicants who do pass the written

examination.

The Department's 1991 calendar year statistics indicate that only 49.17% of initial

applicants appeared for the written examination, and that only 56.15% who appeared to

take the examination passed it. That means that only 27.61 % of the initial applicants

208
ultimately passed the written examination.

After the written examination hurdle eliminated more than 72% of the initial appli-
cants, 5.92% of the successful test takers failed the prescreening process, and another

19.50% failed the oral examination. As a result 20.59% of the initial 30,058 applicants

survived the written examination, prescreening, and oral examination process and were sent

to what the Department calls the "background process."

In the background process, 66.35% of the surviving applicants were disqualified. Only

14.14% of these surviving applicants were hired, and another 10.26% were carried over into
calendar year 1992.
Disqualification in the background process occurred for a variety of reasons, princi-
pally for being overweight, drug use (primarily marijuana and cocaine), driving record,

criminal record, falsification of application, credit problems, or lack of higb scbool diploma

orG.E.D.

While U.S. citizenship and lack of felony convictions are legal requirements for sworn

personnel status, the screening criteria concerning drug usage, driving record, and credit

record do not seem to be legal requirements, althougb they make practical sense. Scrutiny

of these screening critera did not reveal any insensitive or unreasonable standards or
application of standards.

Tbe credit record review seems to focus on the reasons for a poor credit record.

if it exists. Wbat the recruiting staff seems to look for is how the applicant has handled

responsibility entrusted to bim or her in the past. The applicant's credit history is a proxy

for that searcb for responsibility. In this regard, major unresolved credit abuse for items

deemed frivolous, such as expensive restaurant meals or expensive clothing, often will
disqualify an applicant if he or she does not commit to a program of paying off those debts.
Conversely, we were told that major credit abuse for more understandable reasons such as

grocery store food or medical bills is not disqualifying. While we did not see any data

concerning the comparative impact of disqualifications for poor credit record by sex, racial

209
 or ethnic group, we were told that there is no sex, race or ethnic group pattern of such

disqualifications.

We are concerned, nonetheless, that the recruiting staff should conduct credit

screening with the utmost care, recognizing that this information is at most one indicator

of how the individual applicant handles responsibility entrusted to him or her, and that

disqualification for credit problems may disproportionately impact low-income and

minority applicants.

Minority officers believe that many qualified minority applicants "are allowed to
die" in the background investigation process througb excessive delays.

Screening for Bias

Although background investigators ask detailed questions on matters ranging from

drug use to job stability to credit history, they currently ask no questions whatsoever

regarding racial or sexual orientation bias of applicants. The Department does not.

for example. ask friends. neigbbors or employers whether an applicant is racially bigoted
or intolerant of gays and lesbians. Rather, it appears to expect that extremely open-ended

questions will elicit such data. In the memory of a knowledgeable manager, however,

only one applicant in recent history has been eliminated on the basis of racial bias identi-

fied in the background investigation process. When asked why more pointed questions

on bias are not included in the background investigation. the official replied, "I don't

have an answer to that." We were recently advised that the new background investigation

questionnaire will have one question regarding bias.

The Department also relies on the psychological evaluation to screen out biased

applicants. Despite these efforts, according to a high-level officer, "We have racists

coming into the Department."

210
Preemployment Psychological. Examination

The Department relies heavily on preemployment psychological examinations to

screen out applicants with potential to utilize excessive force. As discussed in later chap-

ters, very few recruits or deputies fail training at any level for the excessive use of force.

Department officials, when questioned on these low failure rates, invariably point to

preemployment psychological screening as the stage at which individuals with problems in

these areas are eliminated.

A review of this screening, however, reveals that in fact the preemployment psycho-

logical examinations do a poor job of identifying and screening out individuals with

a tendency to utilize force improperly. In a review of applicants found qualified by the

Department we found that a full 49% should have been disqualified due to excessive force

proclivities. We found, further, that failure of the screening to identify these individ-

uals was a direct result of Departmental pressure on the psychologists to lower

the rejection rate. Finally, we found that the Department has failed to adopt

excellent screening methods recommended by the Police Officers Standards &

Training Commission (POST) and other valid screening techniques, which would

substantially increase its identification of applicants who should be rejected.

The preemployment psychological examination is one of the final components of the

preemployment screening process. After disqualifactions through the interview and the

background process, an additional 617 failed the Psychological Evaluation. These statistics

reveal a psychological disqualification rate for 1991 of 42%.

The Psychological Evaluation consists of psychological tests, a review of the back-

ground investigation and a clinical interview. The psychological tests are the Minnesota

Multipbasic Personality Inventory (MMPI),an objective test designed to identify

psychopathology; the 16PF, an objective test designed to measure personality characteris-

tics associated with normal behavior which may suggest problems in personality

211
functioning; and a projective Sentence Completion Test designed to capture personality

and attitude feelings of applicants. Applicants also complete a Social History

Questionnaire whicb provides factual demograpbic, familial, scbool, drug usage and other
social relationsbip information.

Background investigation material includes a summary of demograpbic information

and any concerns flagged by the investigation sucb as suspicion of drug usage, question-

able intelligence or unstable family bistory. In addition, applicants submit an autobio-

grapbical statement and an essay on wby they want to become a deputy sheriff. Past job

references are also examined.

The clinical interview is conducted according to a Structured Clinical Interview and

rating summary form. In an effort to identify tendencies toward excessive force, the
psycbologist evaluates a number of dimensions of impulse control and stress manage-

ment. Tbe psycbologist evaluates any bistory of patterns of aggressive bebavior and

coping and adapting behavior with an empbasis on detecting bow the applicant responds

to provocation. Stress tolerance is also evaluated.

Our staff psychologist reviewed 10% of the test results of all applicants determined

to be qualified by the Departmental screening process in 1991. Of 53 applicants

reviewed, he concluded that 26 or 49% should not have been found qualified due to

tendencies to utilize excessive force.

These findings indicated a serious need to increasa the rate of psychological

disqualifications to assure that all individuals with excessive force tendencies are disqual-

ified. We were, therefore, very troubled to learn from a knowledgeable individual that

the Department places pressure on psychologists conducting the screening to lower the

rejection rate. In recent years the personnel needs of the LASD have dictated ambitious

hiring goals, and identifying candidates as qualified has been deemed a higher priority

than identifying all applicants with excessive force tendencies.

The rejection rate of applicants is lowered not only by Departmental pressure to find

212
applicants qualified but also by methodological flaws in the screening process.

Most of the flaws we identified result from the Department's failure to follow all of the

excellent psychological screening procedure recommended by POST, the state agency which

establishes standards for law enforcement training. In 1984, following a large scale study,

POST issued its Psycllological Screening Manual. This manual is replete with informative and

highly useful recommendations for law enforcement agencies which wish to utilize state-of-

the-art psychological evaluations. While the Departtnent did adopt selected recommendations

of the manual, it has not adopted major portions and is not following all of the portions which

it did adopt.

The primary weakness we identified in the Department's screening process is its failure

to utilize the POST-recommended Psychological Attribute factors to evaluate candidates.

POST recommends the use of these factors because they were found to be predictive of better

performance by police officers. The attributes are achievement, flexibility, sensitivity, matu-

rity, intelligence, somatic concerns, mood, social adjustment. anxiety, emotional control,

dominance, moral-ethical behavior, impression formation and attitudes.

We evaluated each applicant in the sample for each of these 14 POST -recommended

attributes. Among the candidates who passed the psychological screening process that we

would have rejected, we found more than twice as many force-related psychological attributes

as among those we would have accepted. We must conclude that among the applicants passed

by the County psychologists, half of these should have been rejected because of propensity

toward forcc.

The POST Psychological Attributes were a far more powerful tool to identify individuals

with excessive force tendencies than were the screening tools utilized by the Department.

Psychological tests do not distinguish between qualified and unqualified applicants, nor does

the state of the art permit them to do so.

Nor is the clinical interview, as conducted by the Department. able to identify many

applicants as unqualified. Defects in the conduct of the clinical interviews substantially

213
 reduce the usefulness of this tool.

First, the Department clinical interview process does not follow up on psycholog-

ical test results that are of questionable validity or indicate psychopathology, as

recommended in the POST manual. While the Department indicates that it adopted this

POST recommendation, our review found no instance in which such follow-up had

taken place.

We also believe that the clinical interview is not long enough. The interview

typically lasts for only 45 minutes. This is not enough time to make the applicant

comfortable and disarm the defensive behavioral posture which characterizes most

applicants. The clinical interview does not develop a sufficient historical base of infor-

mation to permit the detailed assessment of personality traits and characteristics neces-

sary to predict how an applicant may behave in the future.

The Psychological Evaluation can be a powerful tool to predict deputy sheriff

job performance if the Department bas the will to utilize it to its full potential.

The changes recommended would add significant validity to the Psychological

Evaluation process.

Recommendations Regarding Hiring:

I
1. The Department's physical training programs should be part of a

concerted marketing program that seeks to increase the number and percentage

of femal. and minority, and "especially Hispanic and Asian, applicants.

2. ered"rt screening must be conducted with utmost sensitivity in order to

assure that it does not unfairly eliminate minority and low-income applicants.

3. Th. Department must conduct much more proactive pr.employment

screening as to potential bias on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender and sexual

orientation and must disqualify applicants who are determined to be so biased.

1
!
i
214
 4. The Department should conduct regular audits of background investigations to

prevent needless delays. Applicants who inquire should be advised of the status of

their application ..

Recommendations Regarding Preemployment Psychological Exam:

1. Candidates must present themselves in a psychologically open manner and be

responsive to interview questions at a level of openness judged to be adequate by the

evaluating psychologist. If candidates are defensive, they should be disqualified.

2. If psychological test results indicate questionable validity or are interpreted as

defensive, the test should be repeated and should be the subject of evaluation in the

clinical interview. If candidates remain defensive, they should be disqualified.

3. Psychological test results in the clinical range indicating psychopathology

should be strictly evaluated in the clinical interview. Unless documentable justifica-

tion can be found, candidates should be disqualified.

4. All candidates must have a clinical interview before hire as a component of the

Psychological Evaluation.

S. The length of the clinical interview should be increased to 1.S to 2 hours t~

allow for detailed development of all Psychological Evaluation data including known

predictors of force, psychological factors, historical data and behavioral attributes

associated with the prediction of force.

6. A new structured clinical interview should be developed to specifically assess

psychological factors, historical data, and behavioral attributes associated with the

prediction of force.

7. The clinical interview should develop adequate psychological and behavioral

information to support a higher disqualification rate based on the presence of infor-

mation suggesting tendencies toward the use of excessive force.

215
 8. Stricter criteria for disqualification based on the presence of psychological

factors, historical data and behavioral attributes predictive of force should be

adopted independent of manpower goals of the organization. The Psychological

Evaluation criteria adopted for the prediction of tendencies toward force should be

based on the state of the art of psychological prediction of force rather than on

LASD personnel needs.

9. The structured clinical interview should be modified to incorporate assess-

ment of the POST recommended 14 psychological attributes.

10. The background investigation should develop the investigation tools to

gather information on the psychological factors, historical data and behavioral

attributes associated with excessive force. For example, verifications and ratings

of prior employment should be modified specifically to ask for this kind of informa-

tion.

11. The Department should conduct psychometric validation studies of the

predictive dimension of job performance, especially as related to excessive force.

216
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r
15.- Promotion Practices

Departmental promotion is largely a function of the County Civil Service system.

With its somewhat rigid rules and eligibility requirements, this system both constrains the

Department's ability to implement affirmative action goals and also strives to safeguard

the deCision-making process from biased selection procedures. The operation of the Civil

Service system, bowever, affects different positions differently. Subjective factors are more

beavily relied upon for positions of greater authority within the Department

Non Civil-Service Positions

Tbe top 11 positions in the Department are exempt from Civil Service requirements

altogether. Unburdened by the constraints imposed under a Civil Service regime, the racial

and ethnic mix of personnel occupying these bigb-ranking positions nearly mirrors that

of the Department at large. Of the 8 division cbiefs, 6 are Caucasian, : is African-American

and 1 Hispanic. Of the 2 assistant sberiffs, 1 is African-American and 1 Caucasian.

Tbe Undersberiff is Caucasian. Tbe sample size, bowever, is simply too small to draw

any meaningful conclusions regarding race or ethnicity. Possible gender bias, on the other

band, is bigbligbted by the fact that all of these bigb-ranking non-Civil Service positions are

beld by males, notwithstanding that women make up nearly 12% of the Department's

personnel with 10 or more years of service.

Civil Service Positions

The civil service examination process differs for each position. Candidates for sergeant

and lieutenant positions are evaluated based partly on their written examination scores,

and partly on an interview and appraisal rating. The examinations are developed by trained

industrial psychologists, and their content appears to be a valid measure of job-related

attributes. Neither written examinations nor oral interviews are used for determining

promotional opponunities for captain or commander positions. Indeed, captains advocated

219
the elimination of the interview "in recognition that the Sheriff needs to select whom

he wants to run the Department." Appointments to these positions are determined exclu-
sively by a promotability appraisal. a rating which is widely perceived to be highly

subjective.

Appointments to sergeant positions are based strictly on rank order of candidates

under the Civil Service Rules. Therefore, the Department may not even consider afflfOla-

tive action goals in allocating these promotions. (In any case, the Department may not

give a preference to any candidate based on racial, ethnic or gender considerations

without a showing of a "manifest imbalance" of the particular protected group in the

work force).

In comparison. the Department has more flexibility regarding appointments to

lieutenant, captain and commander positions. Rather than utilizing an ordinal ranking

system, candidates for these positions are banded in groups based upon a range of scores.

Therefore, rather than being required to select anyone particular individual for a given

position. under the Civil Service Rules. the Department has a range of qualified individ-

uals from which to choose. This gives the Department the ability to place a particular

qualified individual in a position for which his background is uniquely suited. With flex-
ibility, however, comes responsibility. The Deparbnent appears to have been using this

responsibility to further rather than to impede its affirmative action goals.

The Department's heavy reliance on subjective selection mechanisms such as

interviews and appraisals needs greater scrutiny. While the Department is sensitive

to the potential for abuse and reviews the promotional selection procedure to screen out

such bias, this sort of screening presupposes that no other forms of bias enter into the

promotion process before the applicant's promotability is assessed. For example,

content-validity studies and raters' appraisal and sensitivity training will not improve
conditions under which women and minority candidates feel predestined to fail and thus

remove themselves from promotion consideration. Moreover, given that one's promota-

220
bility appraisal is partly based on a candidate's prior job assignments, even an unbiased

rating system will not prevent bias in the assignment process.

There is reason to believe that such problems exist in the Department. To many

women and minorities the idea of a Civil Service meritocracy does not reflect a

departmental reality that promotions actually are dependent on political favoritism

or "cronyism." There does not appear to be bias in the testing procedure itself, but as one

ascends the Department hierarchy, the concentration of white males in these positions

increases. The figures are striking. While Caucasian males make up 86% of the deputies,

they are 91 % of the sergeants and 94% of the lieutenants. Caucasians (both male and

female), by contrast, form only 75% of the Department's senior personnel with 10 or more

years of service. Thus, there is reason to suspect that forces external to the Civil Service

system are operating to frustrate promotional opportunities or at least perceived promo-

tional opportunities for women and minorities.

The figures are somewhat more balanced for captain and commander positions, but

women appear to be underrepresented in these categories as well. Although nearly 12% of

the senior workforce, women occupy only 9% of captain positions and 8% of commander

positions. Further, the racial and ethnic balance of these positions appears to be skewed as

well. While the senior workforce is approximately 75% Caucasian, 9% African-American,

and 1~% Hispanic, Caucasians hold 85% of the sergeant and lieutenant positions, 86% of

the captain positions and 88% of the commander positions. This is compared to respective

percentages of 6% sergeant, 6% lieutenant, 5% captain and 8% commander for African-

Americans, and 9% sergeant, 8% lieutenant, 7% captain and 4% commander for Hispanics.

The single most problematic promotional area from an equal employment

opportunity standpoint appears to be the transition from deputy to sergeant. Oile

would expect members of protected groups to be promoted in proportion to their respective

representation in the pool of deputies. However, while only 70% of deputies are Caucasian,

85% of sergeants are Caucasian. African-Americans drop from being 10% of deputies to

221
 only 6% of sergeants; Hispanics drop from being 18% of deputies to only 9% of

sergeants. This trend adversely affects women as well. While 14% of the deputies are

women, women are only 9% of sergeant personnel. This disparity suggests that some

force, either internal or external to the selection process, is working to frustrate

promotional opportunities for women and minorities.

The Department cannot simply rely on its current selection procedures to ensure that

all equal employment opportunity objectives are being fulfilled. Even if the procedures

themselves are "fair," which is unclear, the underrepresentation of women and minorities

in lead positions is troubling. Given these figures. the Department needs to reevaluate its

system for allocating promotions.

Recommendations:

1. The Department must engage an outside expert to assure that its appraisal

rating process is based on objective performance criteria and the applicant's skills

and job performance history.

2. In order to eliminate obstacles that may discourage minorities and women

from applying for promotions, the Department must engage an outside expert to

identify such obstacles and to design employee career development services

necessary to assure that women and minorities apply for appropriate promotions.

222
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224
 16. Academy Training

Recruit training is conducted al the Sheriffs Academy in Whittier and at another site

in northern Los Angeles County. Training is also conducted at Laser Village at Biscailuz

Center. Classes are 21 weeks, 3 weeks more than state-mandated requirements.

We observed a wide range of classes, including Legal and Moral Aspects of Deadly

Force, Ethics and Professionalism, Cultural Awareness, Officer Survival: Reducing

Prejudice and Eliminaling Discrimination, Defensive Tactics, Tactical Communications,

Officer Intervention, Courtroom Demeanor, Proposition 115, Arson and Explosives, Crisis

Intervention, Search and Seizure, Instructors' Update, Laws of Evidence and Firearm

Training. In general, the quality of instructors and instruction is excellent. In certain

courses, however, the materials are not completely up to date, and in others video presenta-

tions could be used to enliven the presentation.

More fundamentally, Academy training on force issues still places far too much

emphasis on "worst case scenarios· which threaten officer safety despite recent

innovations in both the content and instructional methods.

Furthermore, Academy training is not utilized to screen out recruits who have a

tendency to use excessive force. As a high-level Academy officer stated, ·Our role is

not that of deselector. We want them to finish'"

Nor does the Academy, despite encouraging beginnings, provide sophisticated,

effective training in Cultural Awareness. More promiSing are the Department's first

training efforts in Reducing Bias and Eliminating Prejudice.

Recruit Force Training

Defensive Tactics

The initial systematic treatment of use of force issues is presented to recruits in

"Introduction to Defensive Tactics," a class in which they are required to learn techniques

to be used in "arrest, control, search, handcuffing and transportation of prisoners."

225
 In this course, instructors emphasize that reasonable force is "Only that force neces-

sary to effect the arrest, prevent escape, or to overcome the resistance of a person,"

(Penal Code Sec. 835). Recruits are instructed that "reasonable force increases by

degrees as necessary. But as soon as the suspect submits, the force is reduced.

Increasing and decreasing force as necessary is called escalation and de-escalation of

force."

In order to organize recruits' understanding of reasonable force, a "Force

Barometer" is utilized. The image of a barometer is used to display the contingent,

reactive andlor defensive character of reasonable force. Selection of force options at any

level is shown as contingent on, or "dictated by," actions on the part of "suspects."

The goal is to train recruits to make competent, professional and defensible force

decisions. They are admonished that they will be sanctioned for use of unreasonable or

unnecessary force. Recruits are also trained to apply the various force options compe-

tently and professionally. They are instructed that mastery of the Defensive Tactics (DT)
will enable them both to significantly reduce the frequency they will have to reson to

force and to use levels of force which are minimally necessary (and therefore legally

defensible). Recruits are admonished to "remember your training," and to "do things the

way we train you," so that they will not get into trouble. Frequent reference is made to

the "Rodney King incident" as an almost textbook example of use of excessive force

which would be severely punisbed by the Sberiff s Departmenl

Recruits receive training in basic defensive tactics wbich range, for example, from

issuing verbal commands, through the application of various control bolds, to the compe-

tent use of impact weapons, especially the baton. Many DT classes are beld in the gym

and consist of demonstrations of compliance bolds, searcb techniques, takedowns, hand-

cuffing techniques, etc. Basic instruction in martial arts and boxing is also provided.

The written material for this course is outdated and militaristic. It is inconsistent

with the current force policies being presented.

226
 Although Defensive Tactics instructors frequently admonish recruits to use restraint in their

use of force, a handout currently used (H-56) begins with the following statement:

.. These are precarious times for low enforcement. The deputy has btcome the target of

many; the criminal element, youthful gong members, organized revolutionaries, and tlze

mentally disturbed. A deputy's duty on tlze streets of any metropolitan area is apt to turn into

a (simple) moiler of survival." Such dire and potentially inflammatory rhetoric is out of

keeping with both the spirit and the letter of the training we wi messed, as well as the Core

Values espoused by the Department.

Ethics and Professionalism

Prior to the beginning of weapons training, a four-hour course on "Professionalism

and Ethics" is presented. In this course, during an extended discussion of police ethics, the

instructor gives the class a hypothetical case which closely resembles the Rodney King

incident. In the ensuing discussion of ethics, public trust and accountability, the instructor

argues that it would be the clear obligation of all deputies on the scene to restrain others

from using excessive force. This course of action was, he argues, in the interest of all

deputies involved, even the deputies involved in the assault. Through such intervention by

. ". professional and ethical law enforcement personnel, such deputies might ameliorate severe

discipline by the Department. a civil action by the person being assaulted, andlor criminal

prosecution.

Tactical Communications

Also preceding weapons training is a six-hour class devoted to "Tactical

Communications." This innovative course is intended to provide the recruits with an

appreciation for the crucial role that communication, broadly defined, plays in their

professional and personal lives and to identify specific skills "which can be developed to

enhance your effectiveness as police officers during interactions with citizens, colleagues

227
and supervisors. and even. for example. when involved in personal relationships with

friends and family members." The explicit goal is to make them more effective commu-
nicators as well as to sensitize them to factors which inhibit effective communication and

may underlie conflict.

In one of several discussions of use of force issues, a presenter suggests that poor

communication skills on the part of police officers may lead to "unnecessary violence."

He borrows from law enforcement expert James Fyfe, who has argued that such violence

occurs "... when well-meaning officers lack the skills to resolve problems without
resorting to violence. In the worst cases, they put themselves in trouble and then must

shoot their way out of it." One of the explicit goals of the course is to increase the skills

of recruits so that, as deputies, they will be better positioned to avoid such violence.

Instructors emphasize that development of good "Tac Com" skills will increase an

officer's ability to control situations via verbal techniques without resorting to more

forceful options. Even if verbal techniques fail to prevent violence, their use may prove

effective in documenting the fact that the force used was, in fact, reasonable.

Legal and Moral Aspects of Deadly Force

After weapons are issued to recruits but before weapons training commences,

a four-hour session on this topic is presented. Despite the title, the course addresses a

wide variety of issues surrounding the general use of force by police.

The instructor stales that effective police work unavoidably relies upon public trust

and support which, in lum, hinges upon how police and their actions "look" to members -I

of the public. He argues that the use of excessive force by any officer undermines public

trust in all officers and admonisbes recruits to contribute to the solution rather than to

exacerbate the problem.

The Force Barometer is again discussed, during an explication of the Department's

"Policy Regarding the Use of Force and Fireanns." Recruits are implored to become well

228
acquainted with the force policy and to prepare carefully for the possibility that they will

be required to use force. They are reminded that, while they are prohibited by policy and

law from using excessive force, they assume a "positive duty to use force when necessary"

when they become sworn law enforcement officers. The class seeks to prepare them for

this eventuality by reviewing the policy and procedures and providing a description of the
decision making which underlies reasonable use of deadly force as contrasted with pOlice
brutality.

The instructor underscores the importance of Tactical Communication skills in

reducing both the frequency of force use by police and the level of force to which they

resort. In his closing remarks, the instructor notes, "We're either crooks or cops,

we can't be both."

After the completion of weapons training, a final two-bour class is presented to refresh

the recruits' understanding of the legal and ethical context of force and weapons use.

Officer Intervention

In this innovative two-hour course, the legal and ethical context of police misconduct

is reviewed to develop the proposition that police officers bave a legal and ethical obliga-

tion to intervene when they witness misconduct on the part of other officers. The instructor

discusses the factors which most frequently block officer intervention. Among those

discussed are the perceived consequences of "snitching," peer group pressure and the police

"code of silence."

The Officer Intervention presentation works to. remove these obstacles to intervention
by attacking the moral and legal stature of any "peer group" which sanctions excessive
force and requires its members to engage, even passively, in a criminal conspiracy. As in

the lecture on Deadly Force, recruits are requested to join the "positive peer group of

honest and ethical" members of the Department rather than the few "dinosaurs who haven't

gotten the message yet," who will be disciplined, discharged andior prosecuted for brutal or

229
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II

corrupt misconduct

Once more, the Rodney King case is invoked, this time along with cases of deputies

who have been recently disciplined and discharged. If the bystander officers had inter-

vened, there would have been no damning and embarrassing videotape, no public contro-

versy and condemnation, no criminal trials of police officers and no civil liability. If

someone "had done them the favor of stepping in, of getting in their way," they would

not now face possible loss of career, loss of house and family, criminal prosecution, civil

litigation, embarrassment and public humiliation. By extension, he argues that police

officers across the nation were harmed by that failure to intervene.

Firearms Training

Twelve full days are devoted to firearms training, nine at the Sheriff s Range

followed by three at a "Laser Village" facility at BiscaiJuz Center. The most innovative

instruction in use of deadly force and deadly force decision making occurs at the Laser
Village, where recruits receive three types of training.

The first part consists of several b?urs of lectures and slide presentations principalJy

on the subject of how to avoid suspect inflicted harm to police officers.

The second phase of training involves fuing of laser-equipped Beretta pistols in' a

room with a large video screen. The video is interactive so that wben confronted with a

potentially dangerous situation the student must make the decision whether or not to

"shOOL" If the correct decision is to shoot and the student either fails to shoot or the

assailant files first, the student is pronounced to be "dead." If the correct decision is to

withhold flre and the student flres, the result is an unwarranted, perhaps fatal, shooting

of a citizen. The goal of the training is to teach recruits to shoot only when it is

proper to do so and, if proper, to fire first and effectively.

The third pbase of training is carried out in "Laser Village" proper, a setting

consisting of huts and outdoor sites where potential danger may be lurking. Pairs of om-

230
r

cers or individual officers must enter the situation and react to actions by other deputies

who take the part of citizens, dangerous or harmless. After the student goes through the

exercise there is a critique by the instructor deputy.

We noted that there was linle criticism of the trainees as to the decisions made.

To our knowledge, recruits do not fail the Academy because of their performance

at Laser Village. We were advised that the absence of criticism was due to a belief on the

part of training staff there is more than one correct approach and that trainees' confidence

needed to be bolstered.

However, subsequent monitoring of a group of patrol deputies being put through a

refresher class revealed the same failure to critique decisions made, even if they were

clearly incorrect. Deputies who made "mistakes" were not even required to repeat that

particular phase.

Role-Playing Examinations

Role playing is emphasized at the end of the curriculum. Recruits act out apprehen-

sion of burglary suspects, response to robberies and domestic violence, detaining suspects,

making peaceful arrests, making arrests using force and conducting searches of persons.

Failure to pass any of these role playing situations results in re-examination by the chief

instru~tor. A second failure results in dismissal.

One high-ranking officer observed that there is an automatic escalation of force

bias built into many of the role-playing scenarios. "The message communicated to

recruits is: 'You will use force. '" This officer suggested that such scenarios should be

balanced by ones which test the recruits' skills in managing potentially difficult situations

in professional and competent ways in order to minimize or avoid use of force.

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Dismissals and Discipline of Recruits

In order to determine the effectiveness of Academy training in screening out recruits

with potential force and bias problems. we examined records of resignations and dismissals

from recruit training for 1990. 1991 and early 1992. Pbysical disabilities. inability to main-

tain the physical pace demanded and personal disinclination to continue are the principal

reasons for resignations. Dismissals also result from serious infraction of rules: use or

possession of alcobol. sexual harassment. ethnic remarks. insubordination. and untruthful-

ness. Another cause is the inability to pass role-playing examinations.

Very few recruits leave for rule infraction or failure to pass role-playing. For
Classes #266 througb #277, graduated December 1990 through January 1992, only 17 out I
of 1006 recruits resigned or were discbarged on these grounds. Seven failed role-playing,

and 10 violated rules, ranging from lying to criminal activity. Only one, a fight with
j
another recruit, was force-related.

In 1990, the LASD added four new role-playing tests not mandated by the Police

Officers' Standards and Training Commission (POST) in the areas of use of force. cultural
awarenessllanguage, tactical communications and officer survival. Failure in any results in

automatic failure of the entire exam. For Classes #266 through #277, however, there were ..
. . f
no failures for improper force, and only one for cultural insensitivity. In Class #278.

one recruit failed the force test for failure to use suffICient force.

These figures reveal that the LASD does not use the Academy to identify and screen

out recruits who may have an inclination to excessive use of force. Management believes

that this problem does not surface in Academy training. They rely instead on prescreening

to eliminate applicants with such proclivities. We discuss deficiencies in prescreening proce-

dures for force in Chapter 14. The virtual absence of separations from the Academy for
force problems indicates insufficient attention to the issue. Indeed, the LASD is reluctant

to flunk anyone out; rather. their approach is to do everything to "help the recruit pass."

232
Cultural Aw)areness

Commencing with Class #279, graduated May 1, 1992, the Department required 22
hours of Cultural Awareness training. Cultural Awareness teaches the backgrounds and

customs of various ethnic groups and their differing ways of reacting to similar events.

Currently, the six courses teach about Hispanics, African/Americans, Viemamese, Pacific

Islanders, Native Americans, East Indians, Pakistani and Filipinos.

We thought the instructors of these courses, who are primarily sworn Department

personnel, were sincere, open and generally effective in drawing out the recruits' preju-

dices and opinions. Course content was not "censored" by the Department, and statements
made by certain instructors were quite frank.

The quality and effectiveness of the courses, however, were uneven. The reported

input by the Department's Cultural Awareness Committee was not apparent. Minorities

report having been embarrassed and offended by aspects of the course, both at the Academy

and elsewhere. In one instance, a minority instructor told an ethnic joke. In response to

one class, at which a "rap" videotape was presented, a sergeant stated, "A rap tape does not

a culture make." An objection was also raised to the showing of an Eddie Murpby

"Buckwheat" film. In Academy classes we observed, there were factual inaccuracies on

sensitive topics, such as the historical background of racial groups, and whether the

Department accords minority applicants hiring or promotional preferences. In addition, one

instructor advised recruits to keep racially biased remarks "within the patrol car" rather

than out of the work place.

In order to improve the quality and effectiveness of this course, the Department must

make substantially greater use of both internal and community resources. Minority law

enforcement officers' associations and other minority groups should review the curriculum
in advance, monitor the courses and propose improvements. Several of the instructors

need to develop their fund of background facts, methods of presentation and instructional

233
 ,
materials. Furthermore, substantially more practical advice regarding how to handle

specific situations in particular communities would make the course far more valuable.

Reducing Prejudice

Also commencing with Class #279 is a new ten-hour course on reducing prejudice

and eliminating discrimination. The course is based on materials furnished by the Anti-

Defamation League, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, the Boston Police
Department, the Gay and Lesbian Alliance against Defamation and the Recruit Training

Bureau staff instructors. It involves some role-reversal and open discussion of biases.

In the main, it was a successful effort. As noted elsewhere, there were serious prob-

lems with the gay and lesbian segment. We commend LASD for using outside groups

to develop the course.

"Code of Silence"

We were very interested in what the Academy had to say about the "code of

silence." We heard several instructors inform the recruits that they should report any

improper conduct by fellow officers, including excessive force. One tactical officer

gave his class the following example: Suppose a recruit saw him striking an arrestee

already under control. What should the recruit do? The correct and only answer,

stated the tactical officer, is t9 report the incident to higher authority.

The Department must vigorously enforce this obligation to report excessive use

of force.

234
Recommendations:

1. The Department should utilize Academy training to identify and screen out

recruits with potential excessive force and bias problems by substantially height-

ening the scrutiny with which it reviews role-playing examinations.

2. Similarly, the Department should utilize Laser Village training to identify and

screen out recruits with potential excessive force problems.

3. Officer survival "worst case scenarios· must be deemphasized in Academy

training.

4. In order to increase sophistication, effectiveness and practical usefulness of

the Cultural Awareness course, the Department should utilize minority law enforce-

ment associations and ather internal and community resources to design, implement

and monitor the course.

5. All course materials must be updated to be consistent with current

Departmental force policy.

235
236
 17. Custody

The Sheriffs duties include management of the County jail system. Therefore, his
resources are divided between patrol functions and jail functions. About 3000 personnel

work in the custody facilities. After completing the Academy, newly sworn deputies

invariably receive an initial assignment in one of the County's 11 jail facilities or in court

services. The custody assignment is preceded by 80 hours of Jail Operations School.

Deputies assigned to work in a jail remain in that assignment for anywhere from 18

months to as long as five years before they receive their first assignment to a stationhouse
for patrol duty. The length of the assignment to a custody facility varies depending on a

number of factors, including (1) the sex of the deputy (women get out sooner than men for

purposes of gender balance at the stationhouses)~ (2) the deputy's choice of patrol station

(some stations have longer waiting lists than others, especially suburban stations as

contrasted to inner city stations); (3) the availability of Field Training Officers at the

stations; (4) budgetary concerns; (5) the size of the jail popUlation; (6) the ratio of sworn

to civilian employees in custody facilities; and (7) the desire of a deputy

to delay going to a patrol assignment

Appropriateness as First Assignment

Of all the topics we focused upon in our investigation, none provoked quite as much

discussion and disagreement as the thesis that the custody assignment is an inappropriate

placement for a young deputy so early in his or her career. There are those inside and

outside the LASD who readily assent to the proposition: For them, it is self-evident that

spending two to five years in the exclusive company of hardened criminals in a grim

correctional facility will tum any young, inexperienced man or woman into a cynical

authoritarian ready to harass, intimidate, bully, and physically punish any person, wbo does

not immediately follow orders and conform. Those who view the custody assignment as

detrimental also point to instances where it is used to inculcate the "code of silence" and

237
 f
i

force young deputies to conform to it.

To those who abhor the idea that young deputies are sent to be turnkeys in jail right

out of the Academy, it also seems patently clear that after several years in a custody

facility, the deputies will adopt negative, stereotyped views towards African-Americans

and Hispanics because of their overrepresentation in the jail population and that these

views will carry over and influence the deputies throughout their law enforcement

careers. The African-American they pull over later in their career for a traffic violation

who does not immediately comply with an order will be dealt with in the same summary

way and with the same contempt as a surly prisoner. Any young Hispanic in a T shirt and

oversized slacks out on a Saturday night in Pico Rivera will be assumed to be as violent

as a hardened "gangbanger" behind bars and will be "curbed" or "proned-out" as a matter

of ceurse.

To others and to the majority of persons we spoke to from within the LASD,

including young deputies, the advantages of the custody assignment were equally self-
evident: The average age of newly sworn deputies gets increasingly lower. Many of

these newly sworn deputies are barely 21 and have little by way of life experience. Many

still live at home with their parents. They have not been in the military; they have never

had a substantial full-time job. They have never met a criminal and they have never been

con~ed by a prisoner. In the view of many within the LASD, if one were to put them out

on the mean streets of Black or Latino LA, it would be a disaster; they would frighten

easily, shoot first and ask questions later.

Those who favor the immediate assignment to custody also argue that the young

deputies need the controlled custody environment in order to learn to deal with criminals,

to assert their authority, to restrain an individual without using a gun, to learn about the

underside of life, to find out about drugs, gangs and can games, and to learn street

language. By the time they come out of the custody assignment, they are ready for the

streets and have the confi~ence that they can deal with anyone that they come across.

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 Top management within the LASD firmly opposes a recommendation to abolish the

custody assignment or to send a young deputy first to patrol. The logistical nightmare

conjured up by either proposal caused LASD managers to shudder. The idea that career

correctional officers be employed as jailers instead of young deputies was dismissed on the

grounds that (1) they are not as professional and qualified as deputies; (2) they are nOl any

cheaper in the long run than using deputies; (3) because there would be a lessening in
quality, the Department could not maintain the present advantageous ratio of one deputy to
seven or more prisoners; and (4) it would not be possible to send untrained correctional
officers out to the streets in the event of a major catastrophe.

The idea that deputies be required to serve only a short, fixed term in the custody

assignment was deemed impractical because of current budget constraints and the size of

the population in Los Angeles County jails. The suggestion of an experimental program

where some deputies out of the Academy go to custody and others to patrol raised logistical

difficulties and problems of manpower imbalances. The suggestion that deputies spend
their probationary period in patrol before being assigned to custody similarly raised logis-
tical and manpower problems.

Middle management at the level of captain generally favored retaining the custody

assignment but were more open to experimentation and were freer to criticize the assign-

ment. .One captain said that no decent training took place in custody and that there was no

incentive whatsoever to weed out problem deputies in custody because supervisors in

custody know that they will eventJlally rotate out into patrol and become someone else's

headache.
Another captain suggested that it is senseless to have the young deputies on probation
during the custody assignment and not on probation during the initial period of the patrol

assignment because it is far easier to fire a deputy while be or she is on probation. The

probationary period should therefore overlap with a patrol assignment because it is more

relevant to what the deputy will be doing for the balance of his or her professional life in

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the LASD.

Some captains believe that the custody assignment, especially when it lasts for

several years, is a disincentive for recruits to join the LASD instead of the LAPD or other

police departments. Others thought that it might contribute to a lower quality of recruit

Most of the deputies we talked to saw advantages to the custody assignment. Many

believed, however, that it should be limited in time. Importantly, no one in the LASD,

from top to bottom, made any argument that there is any educational or other advantage
to a young deputy staying in the custody assignment for more than a couple of years at
most; not a few argued that anything more than two years was positively harmful. We

did not come across anyone who was willing to support a longer custody assignment than

two years on any grounds other than the budgetary infeasibility of a shorter fixed period.

The asserted advantages and disadvantages of the custody assignment are not easy to

balance. There is truth on both sides. It is clear, however, that inertia in the LASD

weighs in heavily on the side of keeping things as they are. We are convinced that the
logistical, budgetary and practical difficulties of serious change in this area give the

management a distorted picture of the problem: the antiCipated pain of change is so

intense that management can clearly perceive only the possible advantages of the custody

assignment and cannot focus sharply upon the possible disadvantages.

We proceed cautiously in this area ourselve.s. We do not believe that there is

adequate empirical evidence to support a flat recommendation that the custody assign-

ment be abolished or switched around to follow a patrol assignment. We are not so

impractical or impolitic to dismiss out of hand the substantial logistical and budgetary

arguments that are raised.

One aspect of the practice of sending new deputies to custody before patrol is that

their probationary periods end prior to patrol. We believe this anomaly should be

cbanged to permit an actual probationary period on patrol. The recent case of Burden v.

SnofJ/}den. 92 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5954, made it plain that the Public Safety Officers

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 Procedural Bill of Rights is not applicable to recruits. Accordingly. we believe that the

probationary period should be extended through the first six months of patrol. It will allow

greater opponunity for eliminating serious problem officers early on and provide an

enhanced opportunity for follow-up on background cbecks, if necessary.

Qua lity of Training and Oversight

We now tum to the quality of training in the custody assignment and to whether the

custody assignment is used in a meaningful way to weed out deputies who show a propen-

sity to use force excessively. We find that there are serious deficiencies in the training

and that discharges for improper force are all too rare. We also find that training does

not adequately address force issues in the custody context. Nor does it deal adequately with

deputies' feelings of fear and unfamiliarity in the custody setting.

After graduation from the Academy. deputies currently receive 80 hours of

instruction in corrections. covering such topics as defensive tactics. force survival and

tactical communications. Eight bours of cultural awareness instruction were added for the

most recent class to attend Jail Operations Scbool in May 1992.

Jail operations training is generally seen as relevant to custody assignment but

ultimately of somewhat limited utility, since learning to work custody is "a bands-on

situation" with significant variations between custody units.

On first coming to a custody unit, recruits receive an orientation to that particular

unit, including its physical layout and standard procedures. Often these orientations are

brief and hurried with an emphasis on learning the basic physical plant and on getting

one's shift assignment.

In practice. recruits are almost immediately given job assignments in the

facility, typically being assigned to a particular module under the supervision of a

"training officer." Initial training bere typically involves being shown what to do, then

being ordered to do that yourself. As one recruit described bis rust day at the Inmate

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 1

Reception Center: "You see it once or twice, then it's your tum to do it." Recruits are

typically rotated through a number of different modules with their training officer.

The training officer is usually a deputy who has just completed training, i.e .•

someone who has been out of the Academy a year or so, but who is familiar with the

procedures for that particular jail facility. The training officer receives no special

training for the position and receives no bonus pay. Neither do the sergeants and

lieutenants who oversee the training process.

In general, training officers in custody provide instruction in how to carry out

day-to-day jail functions, such as how to work the gates to get inmates into and out

of their individual cells. Many recruits told us they felt unprepared for these job

asSignments, particularly those that were more complex and demanding.

The absence of adequate training for custody assignments may contribute to young

deputies' becoming barsh, uncivil and demeaning in treatment of inmates. One female

deputy related how sbe eventually realized that she could treat inmates civilly:

"I leonud tltot you didn't need to go in [the dormitory} and yell, 'Okay, you fucking

ossltom, get on your bunks! It's count time, gentlemen!' You InofllJ, screaming at the top of

your lungs ond hove a coronory over nothing. You InofllJ, so I leornttl ItOrJIJ to - you InorJIJ,
you con be calm and get tlte some txIlcl resulls. You con tvln be nice - you InofIIJ if Iltey osl

you fllJhot time il is, I fllJould /til them fllJltol time it was. BUI you knofllJ, bUI tvtry deputy is

ISllJing], 'NigAltime fuckAeod, go 10 sleep.' You knofllJ, and you go lile, 'WAo cores if tluy

InDfJI fllJhollime;t is'?"

Minimal or bad supervision in some custody situations may allow recruits to learn

or condone the gratuitous use of force against inmates. For example, a deputy who

formerly worked at Wayside South Facility commented:

"[North County CorrtCtionol Facility} is considered 'tlzt love sltocl' ond tlte IPitcltess .

Honor Roncltol is considtrtd 'Iht love shock' because lhey don'l get 10 bUll inmoles ond iI'S
not - you know, tvtrylhing is c/osttl and very controlltd ond Ihere's lot of seniors {senior

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deputies} CIlJalking around and lieutenants and sergeants [are} constantly around, watching tht

deputies . ... [Wayside} South is just notorious for beating inmates."

That the jails can become breeding grounds for violence by deputies cannot seriously

be disputed. A couple of examples will suffice. In November 1989, a Hispanic male who

was to be transferred to the INS for deportation was isolated in a room near the Release

Area by a deputy who began to shout obscenities and racial epithets at the inmate and to

strike the inmate in the face. Another deputy then joined the first deputy in beating and

kicking the inmate. Soon, four or five additional deputies joined in beating, kicking and

punching the inmate, slamming his face into the concrete floor. The first deputy stripped

off the inmate's shirt and used it to wipe the blood from the inmate's profusely bleeding

face. He then rolled the bloody shirt and roped it around the inmate's face, tightening it

over his broken nose. When the beating was over, the inmate was taken back to the Release

Area. The inmate noted that the deputies had obscured their name tags so they could not be

read. A few hours later, the deputies presented the inmate to the INS agents and asked INS

to take the inmate despite INS policy not to take custody of an injured inmate. Fearing for

the inmate's safety if he were to remain in the custody of the LASD, one of the INS agents

decided to violate the policy and take custody of the inmate. A doctor who later treated the

inmate diagnosed a severe beating on the face, back, torso and legs, as well as a fractured

nose. The deputies responsible for this outrage were discharged.

In another instance, a 27-year-old mentally ill man was in a coma for several weeks

and suffered permanent brain damage after being struck with metal flasbligbts and kicked

repeatedly as reported in the Los Angeles Times of June 9, 1992. The County settled with

the inmate for a payment of $1.7 million. The LASD bas decided to discharge four

deputies for using excessive force.

In a 1987 incident, two deputies tied two pieces of a broom bandle in the shape of a

cross, mounted it on a plastic milk crate, moved it directly across from a module containing

African-American inmates, and set the cross afire. A sergeant who learned of the incident

243
"cbewed out" the deputies but did not report the incident to his watcb commander. Later

in the year. sberiff's deputies burned a second cross in front of African-American inmates
at the Central Jail and yelled racial epithets over the public address system. A sergeant

learned of this incident also but did not inform bis superiors, claiming that be accepted

the deputies' stories that the cross-burning was just "good fun."

Neith~r incident came to light until an African-American officer alluded to

them in the course of an unrelated proceeding. Tbe two deputies involved in the first

cross burning ultimately received IS-day suspensions eacb. Tbe sergeant involved

was originally to be demoted, but the LASD later reduced the diSCipline to a 30-day
suspension. The two deputies involved in the latter incident were discharged, although at

least one was ultimately reinstated following Civil Service proceedings. The sergeant

originally was to be discharged but later settled with the LASD for a 90-day suspension.

The longest suspension in normal circumstances is 30 days.

It also is apparent that at times, deputies in custody are taught to adhere to a code of
silence. We found evidence that deputies wbo refuse to submit to peer pressure not to

report misconduct of their peers are on occasion "hard-celled." that is, handcuffed,

doused with water and placed in isolation cells for bours at a time.

We also found two documented instances of "staged beatings," and we beard second-

hand accounts of several more instances. In one of the incidents, a young deputy, in bis

second week of training in June 1990, was working an observation tower at the rear of

barracks wbere inmates were beld in the South Compound of Pitcbess Honor Rancbo.

During the early part of his shift., he saw several deputies bring an inmate to the rear door

of a barrack. The next time he looked, the inmate was on the ground and it appeared as if

the deputies were beating him. Shortly after the incident was over, the deputy received

an anonymous telephone call in which he was told that if he were asked, be was to report

that be did not see anything. Five minutes later, the young deputy received a call from

someone who identified himself as a supervisor and asked if the deputy had seen anything

244
 occur. The deputy said no. The deputy was later congratulated by his training officer who

told him the whole thing had been staged to see if the deputy would "roll on" (tell the truth

about) his peers.

Discharge of recruits from Custody is infrequent, and discharges for improper use of

force are, at least in the past, also rare. In recent years, however, the trend has begun to go

the other way: In 1990 and 1991, out of approximately 3200 deputies in the Custody

assignment, 165 resigned (largely for personal reasons) and 23 were discharged. Of the 23

who were discharged, 11 were involved in the improper use or reponing of force. During

the two-year period, there were five discharges for sexual harassment but no discharges for

racial epithets or bias.

Recommendations Regarding Custody as First Assignment:

1. The Department should undertake a thorough assessment of the

feasibility of placing deputies in patrol during their probationary period prior to

assigning them to Custody. It should do so if at all feasible, and the Board of

Supervisors should allot sufficient additional budgetary amounts to accomplish the

result. In any event, Custody as an initial assignment should be limited in all case~ to

a fixed period of no longer than eighteen months to two years. The Board of

Supervisors should make whatever budgetary additions that are necessary to accom-

plish this result which should be phased in as soon as practicable.

2. Deputies should be rotated between custody facilities during the course of

the custody rotation. Each deputy should work in maximum, medium and minimum

security facilities. If feasible, deputies should be rotated out to patrol from time to

time during the custody assignment to vary their experiences.

3. The LASD should give serious consideration to a pilot test program where

half the deputies randomly chosen from a given Academy class are sent first to

245
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patrol and their progress and attitudes are measured against the other half which

goes to Custody.

4. Each deputy should be rotated out of Custody once every six months for a

minimum of 24 paid hours of community service work in a social service agency,

be it a homeless shelter, a drug rehabilitation facility, an AIDS hospice or any other

program that will round out the missing elements in the young deputy's education.

If a young deputy needs to spend time in a jail to learn about life on the streets and bow

to deal with all types of bad people, then he or sbe equally needs to spend time learning

about the struggles in the lives of good people and bow to extend compassionate care to

people of differing walks of life, differing races, differing nationalities, differing sexual

orientations and differing economic circumstances. If eacb station within the LASD

adopts a community policing model, these placements will not be difficult to accomplisb.

The County should supplement the LASD budget as necessary to accomplish this

recommendation.

S. The LASD should"study how to shift the ratio of sworn deputies to civilian

employees working in the jails in favor of fewer deputies and more civilians.

6. The probationary period should be extended to cover the first six months

of patrol.

Recommendations Regarding Training and Oversight:

1. Training officers in custody should be provided with specific training in

how to orient and train new recruits.

2. Recruits should not be allowed to work modules without close supervision

by an experienced training officer.

3. The improper use of force, sexual harassment, racial epithets and bias, and

teaching or enforcing of a code of silence should be monitored and punished.

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 1 8 • Pat r 0 I S c h 0 0 I

Prior to 1983. deputy personnel could. if they chose. remain indefinitely in Custody

service. Commencing in that year. with the graduation of Academy Class #214 deputies
have been required to "complete assignment" in both Custody and Field Operations

Division. Any deputy working Custody who receives a field assignment is required to

successfully complete Field Operations Deputy School ["Patrol School"] before reporting

to his or her field assignment.

Patrol School was initially designed in 1974 to serve as a "refresher" course for

deputies who may have been working in Custody for an extended period after their

Academy training. as well as to train them in revisions in the relevant Department Policies

and Procedures since their Academy training. The course is also required for lateral entry
personnel as well as for any person assigned to the field who has not been in a field
assignment for more than five years.

Patrol School is intended to play two critical roles in the Department's training system:

(1) to prepare students to partiCipate in the Department's Field Training Program. and (2) to

introduce them to the intricacies of radio car patrol work.

Content of Training

The goal of Patrol School is to provide students with the "requisite knowledge and

skills" required to carry out their mission.

Patrol School consists of 136 total class hours taken over a three and one-balf week

period devoted to a wide variety of topics. Of the total, approximately 70 hours are devoted

to training students for the occasions on wbich they will use various levels of force in their

work. Since this training was of special interest to the investigation, it will be discussed in

detail after a general sketcb of the rest of the Patrol Scbool curriculum is provided.

A wide variety of other topics are covered, including the moral, ethical, and legal

contexts of patrol work; the complex policies and procedures which govern such work;

249
 elements of specific crimes patrol deputies handle and some of the typical conflicts and

citizen disputes they may encounter; and the diverse, complex and often highly tecbnical

forms of law enforcement communications, which range from report writing to the

competent use of such critical tools of police work as the radio and Mobile Digital

Terminal.

Although reference was made in various contexts during PatrOl School to service

oriented policing, Core Values, and cultural and racial sensitivity, these issues were not

adequately addressed.

A full four-bour classroom session is devoted to refresbing the students' "Tactical

Communications" skills. It is a class intended to increase the students' understanding of

the communication process in general and to provide them with improved "tactical"

communicative skills. This will enable them to communicate more effectively as police

officers during interactions with citizens and suspects as well as with colleagues,

supervisors and subordinates in the Department and with family members and friends.

The content and the goals of this class are explicitly linked to other classes on Career

Survival and Ethics and to a wide variety of courses devoted to the use of force.

Character and Quality of Force Training

The inquiry was particularly concerned with the training provided to new field

deputies regarding the use of force. Staff monitored several Patrol School classes,

reviewed materials distributed to students and discussed use of force training with

members of the Advanced Training Bureau teaching staff, trainees presently in Field

Training, and current Patrol School students. Force training involved classroom lectures

and discussions, but also included "practical applications," or simulations of street

policing situations staged in the gymnasium or the Academy parking lot, or during a full

ten hours spent at the generously donated Warner Brothers Studios in Burbank. At those

250
simulations, class members were confronted with situations requiring them to make

decisions and take action under the close scrutiny of monitors. Inexplicably, although

feedback is given, these exercises cannot result in student failure because they are

not considered a test. Such testing would likely be substantially more effective than

written testing in identifying deputies with excessive force tendencies.

Throughout Patrol School training, as in all other use of force training observed within

the Sheriffs Department, the "Force Barometer" was regularly referred to as a vehicle for

organizing the student's understanding of the proper sanctioned use of force. The visual

representation of the barometer organizes the relationsbip between "suspect action" and

"deputy action" in a way whicb prescribes the specific levels of force wbich are mandated

in the face of escalating resistance and then aggression on the part of the suspect. Training

staff regularly discussed the ethical and legal context of a peace officer's use of force and

cautioned against both excessive and unnecessary force. In a typical example, a captain

wbo was monitoring a class on "Searching, Handcuffing, and Weapon Retention"

interrupted a lecture to underscore the fact that policies governing use of force were far

more restrictive than they bad been previously, and that they would be rued and prosecuted

criminally, if they did not carefully control their mandated authority to use force in the

field.

Mucb of the material in a course on "Situational Planning" was explicitly devoted to

means by whicb "unnecessary force" could be avoided througb effective containment and

control tactics. According to research cited by lecturers in various classes, a full 96 to 98

percent of deputies' time is spent devoted to activities at the two lowest levels of "force"

on the metaphorical barometer, i.e., exhibiting command presence and issuing verbal

commands. The students are repeatedly reminded that the level of force that they are enti-

tled to use is contingent upon the level of resistance sbading into aggression with which

they are confronted.

Althougb virtually every discussion of use of force was framed by some reference to

251
 the fact that the level of force was "dictated by the suspecl" and that higher levels of

force were only to be used when lower levels proved ineffective, the systematic presenta-
tion of lower levels of force ("Tactical Communications," discussed above) was made

only after all other levels of force had been presented and practiced. The only class

sessions which occurred after the Tactical Communications course were the written tests
(none of which involved tactical communication) and Mobile Digital Training. Thus, the

Patrol School students entered their scenario training at the Academy and at Warner

Brothers Studios before the importance of the "Tac Com" skills had been impressed upon

the recruits. The inquiry also noted that the Patrol School course on "Policy and

Procedure of Force and Firearms" was given on the 15th day, well after the classes and

practical applications devoted to force issues. Firearms training, on the other hand. was

initiated on the 2nd day of class.

Overall, Patrol School does not provide sufficient emphasis on force issues to detect

and correct any increase in racial bias or tendency to use force which the deputy may
have developed in the custody assignment Such training is necessary for some deputies,

as recognized by a high-level officer who stated. "Sometimes something happens to

people in custody. Not everyone you're dealing with is a criminal."

Patrol Testing and Assessment

It is almost unheard of for a student to fail Patrol School. Tbe investigation

found only one student who was rejected by his field assignment and sent back to

Custody (in 1986) because of inadequate performance in Patrol School. Although some

of the curriculum is challenging and, at times. innovative. the testing of students focuses

primarily upon technical aspects of the role of a patrol deputy.

Formal testing in Patrol School does not include role-playing examinations in

any area, including force. Rather, it is limited to five written examinations in the areas

252
of spelling. report writing. radio code sections. a closed book examination on general infor-

mation such as probable cause and first aid. and an open book examination on matters
which may require research such as Penal Code sections.

The closed book test for Patrol School is the only test on which issues of force appear.
This test does not adequately evaluate knowledge of force principles. Reduced in

1991 from 150 to 50 multiple choice questions. only six questions on the test concern use

of force. Of these. four address policy limitations on the use of force and two deal with the

mechanics of applying force. Similarly. there are only four questions concerning tactical

communications and the role that communication skills play in reducing the probability that

a deputy may be required to resort to force.

Not only are there too few questions on force-related issues, but the questions them-
selves are often too easy to be effective. One true· false question is "A good police officer
will be able to avoid arguments many times by employing good tactical communication

techniques. "

A student who fails one or more of these five tests is provided remedial training and

given a second opportunity to pass the test. If the student fails following remediation,

he or she is sent to a Patrol Station and given two months' remediation. If that is failed,

he or she must return to Custody and must within one year meet Patrol standards or be

discharged. Of the 64S Patrol School trainees who graduated in 1990 and 1991, 25 failed

to become patrol certified and were returned to custody. As of June 1992, only one of these

deputies has been discharged, an~ this was the result of unrelated criminal charges rather

than failed remediation. In nine classes of Patrol School held in 1991, five students failed

spelling, one failed report writing, and one failed the closed book section. None has yet

been discharged.

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Recommendations:

1. The initial framing of Patrol School should be revised to clearly underscore

and discuss the service oriented policing model which has been adopted by the

Department, the Core Values which are to shape their behavior in the field,

and the problems of cultural and racial sensitivity which lie at the heart of the

contemporary crisis in policing.

2. Force training in Patrol School should be systematically organized so that

it is initially framed by the Department Policy and·Procedure lecture and follows

the Tactical Communications class which will bolster its importance within the

overall force framework.

3. The written tests must be revised to include a greater number of more

sophisticated questions regarding force.

4. Patrol School testing must be changed to include role-playing

examinations which test deputies' ability to apply the force policy and techniques
J"'
in difficult situations.

j
i
..
1
j

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256
 19. Field Training

The person who teaches a young deputy what it is really like to be an officer in the

Sheriffs Department is the deputy's Field Training Officer (FrO). We were told time and

again that the first six months of patrol duty is the most crucial time of all; it is the critical

period when a recruit is actually functioning for the first time in the field as a police

officer. It is where the young deputy is imprinted: The attitudes and habits formed during

the tour of duty with the FrO will stay with that deputy for the rest of his or her career.

Indeed, many FrOs reported explicitly modeling their own training philosophy and prac-

tices on those they had learned from their training officer.

Quality of Patrol Training

Upon the conclusion of the custody assignment, a trainee is assigned to a station and to

a specific FrO. The deputy then begins supervised patrol training that under normal

circumstances lasts for six months. The FrO evaluates the trainee's performance in

monthly written reports. With satisfactory progress, the trainee will spend the last month of

training in his or her own car, with the FrO continuing to supervise and evaluate. Training

may be extended for one or two months for remedial work in problem areas. Trainees who

are deemed not ready even after this remedial period are returned to Custody for an

additional year before getting a second chance to pass patrol training. Those that fail this

second chance are terminated from the Department.

In practice, ultimate failure to pass patrol training is rare. In 1990, only two

deputies were discharged from patrol, and neither of those involved force. In 1991, only

four deputies were discharged from patrol. Of those, two involved criminal misconduct.

Another involved sexual harassment. Twenty-two resigned during patrol training in 1990.

and 36 resigned in 1991. We were unable to determine with any precision what the grounds

were for the resignations, although we are aware of at least one resignation prompted

by the abusive conduct of an FrO.

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!

This low rate of failure of patrol training repeats the pattern of low failure

rates for each previous level of training. It also contrasts sharply with admonitions

given to FrOs in FrO School that the low failure rate in prior training requires them to
assume a major gate-keeping function: "The Academy pushes all but 3% of the

classes through. It's hard to fail. We also lose a few in Custody. Just a few.

That means you bear the brunt of trying to weed out the chaff.·

We believe that these Departmental expectations are currently unrealistic.

Even if the patrol assignment presents the Department with its most fruitful opportunity

to "weed out the chaff," FrOs often lack the experience, clout. training and back-up by

superiors necessary to do so.

Patrol training is extremely stressful and anxiety-producing for many deputies.

Their careers within the Deparunent depend upon successfully passing patrol training, an

outcome that is to a large extent dependent upon their FrOs' evaluation. In addition,

trainees move within a matter of days from Custody to street patrol, where a wbole new

set of demands is suddenly thrust upon them - making stops and arrests, learning to use

the penal code, "writing paper," operating a computer, talking to people encountered on

patrol and carrying nrearms.

As one deputy put it: "In custody they're already there; you're a big-time baby-sitter.
In patrol you're deciding wbether they're going tojail. You have to know the laws."

Another deputy put it this way: "In working patrol you're in an uncontrolled envi-

ronment In custody it's easier to pacify people if you have to ... , Dealing with the

stress [in patrol], that's been hard."

The LASD has focused recently on the pressures to whicb deputies are subject during

patrol training, and it has urged FrOs to reduce the stress. In FrO Scbool, for example,

FTOs are urged to call their trainees by their nrst name and to refer to the trainee as

"deputy," not "trainee," "particularly in the presence of citizens."

However well intentioned, these policies appear only partially effective. For despite

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r

calls for greater sensitivity, some FTOs still adopt authoritarian, "high stress" training

styles modeled on military practice. These FTOs still insist on being addressed as "sir,"

instruct by giving orders without explanation and require trainees to carry out the dirty

work of preparing to go out on patrol (carrying the FTO's gear to the car, getting the car

ready, etc.). Some FTOs apparently do not allow their trainees to eat while on duty, or else
they pile the work up so that the trainee has no time to eat Not only does this highly
authoritarian style often fade into hazing, but it also appears to maximize trainee anxiety

and, in at least some cases, to inhibit effective learning. One trainee noted, for example,

that he often "messed up" in perfonning tasks under the gaze of his own FrO which he

carried off without problem when riding with other FTOs.

Some trainees report accumulating so many reports to write that they have to work

significant overtime without commensurate compensation to complete them.

The practice of putting trainees under acute stress was studied by the LASD in 1990 in

a research project on hazing. Some of the stress can be characterized as part of rites of

passage or fraternity-like pranks. Other fonns of hazing identified by the study clearly had

a very different character, cutting to the very core of police patrol training. Some deputies

reported (and still report) being repeatedly degraded and humiliated by their training offi-

cers.

Even more threatening to the core of police work are various "tests" to which some

FrOs subject their trainees. In one reported instance, an FrO told his trainee that they

were going to arrest a group of men reputed to be drug dealers. The group was stopped,

and they arrested two or three. Their search turned up some rock cocaine nearby, but not in
the possession of any of those stopped. The FrO then asked the trainee: "Okay, I see this

as a possession for sale. How do you see it? Run it by me."

The trainee would ·flunk" the test if he did not lie and indicate that he would

write that the rock cocaine was found on the person of one of the men. The trainee

commented: "They tell you what to write, and you write it.. As a trainee, you are not

259
 afforded the luxury of saying that is not right. They want a good arrest If you say I don't

see that arrest, I think you got the facts wrong, you won't get off training ... They'll hit

you with every rotten call. They'll bury you!"

We are unable to assess with exact precision the extent of "hazing" in the Department.

While the Department's Hazing Research Project Committee in October 1990 judged that

the frequency of hazing is probably "fairly low," our assessment is that some hazing

persists and may even occur frequently on less closely supervised shifts in the so-called

"ghetto" stations.

Field Training Officers

Selection

The LASD appears to concede that its field training programs have suffered because

of hazing and because FTOs seemed to be selected more 00 the basis of their aggressive-

ness and arrest records than on their skills as mentors and role models. The Department is

thus currently considering a series of changes in the selection criteria for FfOs.

According to current proposals, candidates for FrO positions would be evaluated on the

following criteria:

"Assists thecolntnunity alld its citiuns in solving problems and maintaining tlze peace.

Treats botlz stJllorn and civilian department members equitably. Does not inotJllingly bred
tlze lafllto enforce tile latJII. Is fully accountable for "is/lztr OtJlln actions or failurtS. Is guided
by tile rtfJerence for hUlllan life tJIIhen considering the use of deadly fora. "

Additionally, candidates would be chosen on their reputation for

"personal and professional illtegrity, protecting life and property, preventing crime,

apprellending criminals, always actillg latJllfully, being fair and impartial and treats people

260
with dignity . ..

These revisions would mandate an interview and a background investigation

which includes use of force, past allegations of misconduct, disciplinary records and

driving history. Any founded investigations occurring within the past 12 months involving

honesty, integrity, unnecessary or excessive use of force, or two or more preventable traffic

collisions, would automatically disqualify an applicant.

Most FrOs are relatively inexperienc;ed officers; candidates are required to have

completed only one year of patrol duty beyond patrol training. Deputies aspire to become_
FrOs for a variety of reasons. Some want the pay bonus. Others are genuinely interested in

the training role. Others are desirous of upward mobility, and service as an FrO is a
requirement for many promotions within the Department, leading at times to the selection
of FrOs who lack strong commitment to teaching and training.

Department regulations currently allow each station to develop its own procedures for

selecting FrOs within the broad guidelines of the LASD selection criteria. Procedures vary

from station to station. Usually sergeants provide some evaluation or ranking of FrO candi-

dates based on their direct contact and knowledge. Lieutenants rank candidates on the basis

of interviews. The two rankings are then combined and a shon list is sent to the captain for

final decision.

At present, the collection of information about a potential FTO's past performance

varies from station to station. Some captains obtain a repon from Internal Affairs on a
candidate's disciplinary history. Others rely upon their own records, and still others do not

routinely do a background investigation.

Training

Deputies appointed as FTOs are required to attend Field Training Officer School.

Earlier policy required completion of FTO School within one year of appointment. The
Department modified this policy in January 1991 to require all FrO candidates to attend

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FrO scbool prior to the assignment of a trainee. The LASD admits, bowever, that it is

not always in compliance with this policy because of the large number of trainees
assigned to stations and the infrequency of FrO scbools.

Thus, a significant number of FrOs attend FrO Scbool after they have been assigned

and have begun to work with a trainee. Wbile most begin FrO Scbool within a month of

beginning to supervise a trainee, some attend FrO Scbool only after baving completed

the training of at least one trainee.

FrO School involves 40 hours of classroom instruction. At present. the

curriculum includes no training in tactical communications or cultural awareness, and

little content that is relevant to community-oriented policing. Tbe LASD is considering

adding courses on communication skills, cultural sensitivity, and non-discrimination to

the FrO School curriculum. We also note that only a limited amount of time is devoted

explicitly to teacbing skills. Instructional techniques are imparted primarily througb

lectures and written guidelines, providing FrOs with little or no practical training or

experience in using these techniques. We believe more instruction and supervised prac-

tice in bow to teacb is in order. We also think that the initial period of classroom training

should be followed up with regularly scheduled sessions providing continuing education.

These sessions would focus on specific topics and issues that characterize middle and

later pbases of patrol training and would be conducted by experienced FTOs as well as by

Academy staff.

Deselection

FrOs who do not meet performance expectations are "deselected," that is. removed

for cause from the list of deputies qualified to serve as FrOs. From June 1990 to June

1992,40 FrOs were deselected out of a total of 275 FTOs. We were unable to determine

precisely how many of these deselections were for cause as opposed to other reasons. It

appears that at least a majority resulted from misconduct. performance problems or

262
 failure to meet training staff and unit commanders' expectations. The stations deselecting

the highest number were East Los Angeles, which deselected 12. and Temple and Firestone.
which each deselected 4.

The high number deselected during the past two years appears to have at least

two major causes. First, in one station, a new captain began to enforce performance

standards for FTOs after a long period without enforcement. Second, the Department

acknowledged, a number of deputies with "marginal" qualifications were selected in order

to have sufficient FTOs for the unusually large numbers of trainees assigned to patrol

during this period. A number of those FTOs proved to be not qualified.

While recent deselections appear to have been appropriate, the Department itself

must assume responsibility for creating the problems which required deselection. The

LASD cannot tolerate lack of enforcement of FrO performance standards. Nor can it select

FrOs whom it knows to be marginally qualified. Even if poorly performing FrOs are later

deselected, their poor performance can do irreparable damage to a trainee's development.

Recommendations Regarding Field Training:

1. The Department should develop, implement and enforce patrol training

policies based on models and practices involving professional apprenticeship rather

than military subordination. Trainees should be regarded and treated as patrol

partners in need of special, individualized training, not as "boots" to be

embarrassed, humiliated or tested.

2. The Department should develop effective procedures allowing trainees to

receive regular evaluations of their performance, independent of those provided by

their FTOs. One such procedure Would involve requiring the training sergeant to

take the trainee out on an eight-hour shift once a month and to evaluate his/her

performance directly.

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 3. Effective limits should be placed on the amount of time that trainees can

actually work on any shift (10 hours), in order to prevent punitive practices such as

"burying the trainee with paper."

4. Field Training should promulgate and teach skills for interacting with

people as a core component of the craft of police work, at least equal in value to

"officer safety· and knowledge of penal codes.

Recommendations Regarding FTOS:

1. Selection criteria should be standardized and uniformly applied

at the station level.

2. Selection criteria should emphasize demonstrated skills and commitment

to working with the public in ways compatible with an orientation toward

community policing. This emphasis is well reflected in proposals currently under

review in the Department.

3. The Department should require FTO selection boards and station captains

to document FTO candidates' prior performance in working with the public and in

community policing. This information would include evidence of any special

training in key areas of community policing, records of citizen commendations and

citizen complaints, and a review of all entries in the station field performance book

for the prior two-year period involving the applicant.

4. All formal administrative investigations for allegations of excessive force

and harassment should comprise a mandatory part of the record of all FTO

applicants. This would include all investigations conducted by the lAB and the

local unit, whether founded or unfounded. Any founded investigations involving

honesty, integrity, unnecessary or excessive use of force, or hazing within a

relevant time frame should automatically disqualify any candidate.

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 5. The Department should not make FTO duty a necessary step for

promotion in that it encourages persons to become FTOs who may not have the

training skills or interest.

6.. All FTOs should attend FTO School prior to working with his/her first

trainee.

7. FTO School should be organized to provide continuing supervision, training

and discussion for the entire six-month period of an FTO's initial field training experi-

ence.

8. Skills and practices for community policing. culture awareness and tactical

communications should be given more prominent places in the FTO School

curriculum.

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20. Continuing Education

General Requirements

Once a deputy has completed Patrol Training, the only continuing education required

by the Department is 24 bours of training every two years. This is the minimum required

by Police Officers' Standards and Training Commission.

In order to meet this POST requirement. a deputy bas two choices. First, he or she can

select courses from Deparunental offerings and other institutions. The Department will pay
for one course per semester. Second, a deputy can take a 24-bour training course proposed
by bis or ber unit which has received POST approval.

By either method, the courses which comprise continuing education are largely tech-
nical in nature, such as computer training or training in a new weapon. Tbe training

courses proposed by each unit vary widely from unit to unit. but none includes training on

force or cultural awareness. The Department has not imposed any particular course require-

ments upon deputies' selection of courses or upon units' training proposals.

Cultural Awareness, Prejudice & Discrimination

A serious message has been sent througbout the Department by the lack of any .

commitment or deadline to require Cultural Awareness or Reducing Prejudice training as

part of continuing education, despite the recommendation to do so by the Cultural

Awareness Commiuee. We were advised in candor that the lack of commitment is due to

apprebensions of serious resistance to sucb training on the part of more senior officers.

The reaction of a number of officers to mandatory training at the station level, for example,

was predicted to be "I work in this community. How dare you lecture to me?" If, however,
such training is not made mandatory for all sworn staff, the Department is in effect
resigning itself to waiting an entire generation before all officers will receive needed

training in these vital areas.

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 T
i

Force

Just as the Department does not require regular continuing education in

Cultural Awareness, it does not require that all deputies receive continuing educe-

tion in force issues.

The Department does require some deputies and other officers to take Advanced

Tactical Communications. Officers required to take this course include a cross-section of

"problem" deputies who are ordered to attend by their superiors, average deputies,

primarily from patrOl, and superior officers who are included to serve as role models in

the class. To date. this course has been given approximately 20 times, with about 8
problem deputies attending each time out of a total of 24 in each class. No examination

is given, and it is not"possible to fail this course. At times, a problem deputy is

required to repeat the course once or more. The Department has indicated that it would

like to send all officers to this course, but notes that it is very expensive to conduct.

Advanced training in the use of firearms is available at Laser Village, a training

facility located at Biscailuz Center. Deputies in patrol also receive "recurrent briefings"

about twice a year in the proper use of force and firearms.

With these exceptions, the Department does not conduct a comprehensive continuing

education effort to assure that all deputies, or even all problem deputies, receive regular,

ongoing training in the proper use of force.

Recommendations:

1. Require regular continuing education in Cultural Awareness for all

Departmental personnel.

2. Require regular continuing education in Reducing Prejudice and Eliminating

Discrimination for all Departmental personnel.

3. Require regular continuing education in Tactical Communication and the

268
appropriate use of force for all Departmental personnel.

4. Require all deputies identified as "problem deputies" to attend Advanced

Tactical Communications and refresher courses in the appropriate use of force. In

each such course, the performance of each "problem deputy" must be assessed and

appropriate action must be taken in the event of unsatisfactory performance.

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t

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I

21. Stress Management

Stress illanagement & WeI/ness Programs

Stress management and wellness programs are extremely important components ioan

overall effort to stop excessive force. We found that the LASD has ignored or given
only token support to these critical programs.

A comprehensive stress management program would strive to identify all sources of

psychological, interpersonal and organizational stress in the total environment and to

systematically assist all personnel to find and use personal and organizational resources in

order to cope effectively with stress.

An effective wellness program should complement the stress management program by

providing necessary information and resources to promote the health of individuals and

their families. Promotion of health enhancement through physical conditioning, nutrition

and other healthy behavior would improve the overall health status of the organization. It
would also reduce many risks associated with illness, worker's compensation claims and

disability retirements.

We found that the LASD has virtually no formal stress management or wellness

programs in place on an organization-wide basis. Instruction at the Academy for deputy

sheriff trainees is limited to a brief course on stress management which consists primarily

of lectures on physiCal conditioning. No courses at the advanced training level are offered

to address the psychological stress reduction and wellness needs of Department personnel.

Formalized stress management programs in place at patrol stations and custody facilities

are limited to a well equipped gym, a set of weights and intradepartment sports competi-

tions.

Well ness program efforts fare only slightly better. A single LASD wellness deputy has

been designated for the entire department and has been in place for one year. Her mandate

is to develop well ness pilot programs for department-wide use and seek external grant

funding to support their implementation. This would be a Herculean task for a grants office

271
 of three to four experienced and successful grant writers. In actuality, this one wellness

deputy bas been delegated other responsibilities as well. In the last year, sbe equally
divided her time among wellness programs, safety office back-up functions, and special

projects.

On a regional basis, Field Region III has given each unit responsibility for promotion
of wellness programs and has designated one deputy in the region to coordinate activities.

Some moderate amount of activity has occurred.

If management does not provide effective stress reduction support, deputies will

look to their peers as the only source of support. Unfortunately, deputy peer group support

often reinforces rather than ameliorates stress-related behavior. Management must recog-

nize the importance of developing effective programs in order to preclude negative peer

group reinforcement of stress-related behavior.

Psychological Services

The LASD office of Psychological Services provides psychological services for

Department personnel and their families as well as training and consultation for Department

management. In order to encourage the utilization of these services by deputies, as part

of a Department-wide wellness program to encourage self-identification of problems which

may lead to excessive force, we believe that the counseling services now provided by

this inhouse unit should be handled off-site by an external provider.

Individual counseling services are provided to deputies on a voluntary basis, often

upon referral by a supervisor. They include crisis intervention and critical incident

debriefing regarding matters such as witnessing a suicide or the shooting of a child.

As many as 10 to 20% of the deputies utilizing these services are referred to the unit for

force-related concerns. The remaining referrals are for marriage, family and individual

problems.

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 Psychological Services also provide consultation and training for management on a

range of issues, as well as assistance to supervisors on a case-by-case basis regarding how

to deal with the deputies' problem behavior.

Because of the services it provides for management, Psychological Services may be

perceived to be part of LASD management rather than a professional clinic where

Department personnel can discuss intimate matters in a safe and confidential manner. This
perception may be exacerbated by the somewhat defensive personalities of some law
enforcement personnel, who may nOl believe the Department's resolve fully to implement

stress management and wellness programs that encourage psychological counseling as

needed.

Employees will nOl utilize services to the extent necessary if there is a perception that

their supervisor or employer will know about their personal and work problems. In order to

encourage utilization of counseling services to benefit both employees and the company.

private employers routinely utilize Employee Assistance Plans whicb are external to their

organizations.
We believe that LASD must do the same.

Mental Health Early Warning System

A comprehensive Early Warning System is essential to assure early identification

of excessive force tendencies and appropriate Department response. As discussed earlier.

the Department currently has n"o such comprebensive system. Nor, as will be discussed

bere, does the Department currently have a mental health component wbich is critical to an
effective Early Warning System.

A mental health Early Warning System would be triggered in three situations. FlfSt,

mental health evaluation would be required when an officer is involved in a critical force-

related incident or accumulates a certain number of lower level, founded or unsubstantiated

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 force-related incidents. In these situations, the deputy should be required to participate in

a psychological evaluation which is designed to capture behavioral and emotional factors

predictive of propensities to excessive force. The evaluation would be conducted by the

external Employee Assistance Program, which would design and mandate a psychological

treatment plan in conjunction with the deputy. Deputies would be required to attend and

cooperate, but the matters discussed in counseling would remain absolutely confidential.

Feedback to supervisors would be limited to whether the deputy attended and cooperated.

Second, when an officer displays emotional or force-related behavior which impacts

job performance, a mandatory referral for evaluation would be made. The evaluation and

treatment would proceed as with the first component, except that a different series of

clinical interventions might be necessary in order to obtain the cooperation of the deputy.

If possible, this component should remain outside of the progressive discipline system.

The third type of Early Warning System referral would occur when a mental health

evaluation is voluntarily initiated by a deputy at the suggestion of a peer or supervisor.

Such a referral should be triggered by psychological problems associated with a

propensity to force such as marital problems, pbysical abuse or threats, frustrated

attempts at communication or erratic behavior. The evaluation and treatment would

proceed as with the first two components except that cooperation is likely to be less of an

issue in a voluntary self-referral.

Fitness for Duty Evaluations

The LASD refers too few persons for psychological testing for fitness for duty, and the

county psychologists who do the testing find far too many of those referred as fit for

duty. The County finds people unfit only in the most extreme cases. It seems only to

find people fit or unfit It does not utilize other alternatives sucb as "fit for limited duty

but do not let him have a gun." Out of a force of approximately 8000 sworn personnel,

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II

only 16 deputies were given fitness for duty exams on purely psychological grounds during

1990 and 1991, the years we reviewed. One of the 16 exams was terminated before

completion.

We disagreed most strongly with the county psychologists in their judgments about

deputies referred for excessive force. Of the 6 deputies who were referred on this basis, the

county psychologists found 5 to be fit for duty. By contrast, our staff psychologist found 5

of the 6 unfit for duty and also concluded that they were not amenable to treatment or

other rehabilitation in a limited duty setting. A review of the files revealed that these

deputies, in general, showed a clear, ominous, frightening and escalating pattern of

aggression and force.

Of 9 deputies who were referred because of possible psychological impairment, the

county psychologists found that 8 were fit for duty and 1 should be given limited duty. By

contrast, our staff psychologist found only 1 to be fit for duty and only 1 unfit for duty.

With respect to the other 7, he would have recommended limited duty without a gun for all

but 1, whom he would have placed on limited duty, allowing him to keep his weapon.

He found the deputies who were referred for possible psychological impairment - as

distinguished from force-related referrals - to be far more amenable to treattnent in

limited duty settings.

Psychologically impaired deputies with serious marital and family problems were

ultimately willing to accept help because they knew they were losing control. In contrast,

deputies with force-related referrals were suspicious, distrustful, paranoid-like and believed

that management was wrong and but to get them. These deputies felt they were just doing

their job and that the force they had used was appropriate. They did not believe they had a

problem and thus were less amenable to treattnent.

The LASD does not require routine psychological testing of its personnel to determine if

the stresses of life and the job are causing deterioration in self-control or bum-out that

could create a potential for excessive force. On a case by case basis, however, the LASD

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refers personnel for psychological evaluation and testing to outside psychologists in the

County Office of Health Services.

These psychological evaluations are typically initiated by a captain when it

appears that a deputy is experiencing a personal, family, or marital crisis that causes him

to question whether the deputy can perform the job safely. There may be concern that a
deputy's judgment is too impaired to continue carrying a flfearm, and a captain may .
relieve the deputy of the weapon in connection with the psychological examination.

The memoranda from the captains to the county psychologists indicate that the fimess

for duty referral is a last resort after the failure of the deputy to respond to counseling by

supervisors following previous force incidents. In other words, the referral comes only

after the captain "bas had it" with the deputy. The referral is essentially a request for

professional assistance after other efforts have failed. We believe that captains are

waiting too long before referring these very troubled individuals for fimess evaluation
and may be subjecting the county and the public to unnecessary risk.

The examinations consist of psychological tests, an evaluation of current job

performance, a telephone interview with the referring supervisor, a review of pertinent

available medical or historical psycbological information, and a clinical interview.

The tests typically include the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI),

wbich is an objective test normed against abnormal behavior, and an Incomplete

Sentences Blank test (lSB), which is a subjective test that provides personal viewpoints

and opinions and can reveal biases. The clinical interview evaluates

perception, judgment, sensation and intellect. The interview uses the results of the MMPI

and the ISB to clarify and conf1flIl patterns or trends and leads to a diagnosis of any

mental illness and a judgment regarding fimess. It is an effort to predict future behavior

based upon an evaluation of repeated past behavior and current job performance.

Case-by-case reviews of all evaluations conducted in 1990 and 1991 were made by

our staff clinical psycbOlogist. The review did not include a clinical interview with the

276
deputy nor a telephone interview with the supervisor. These are disadvantages to be sure,

but the audit we conducted of the fitness for duty evaluations comported with the acknowl-

edged standards for such secondary audits. In any case, our staff psychologist reviewed the

County psychologists' notes from these interviews in the file.

We found that deputies undergoing force-related referrals were younger than the deputies

referred for psychological impairment, with average ages of 27.8 years and 36.2 years

"respectively. Those referred for force had an average of 5.3 years in the LASD wbereas the

impairment referrals bad 8.0 years of prior service. Four of the deputies referred for force

came from patrol assignments, two from custody assignments. All were male.

We were dismayed to find that the deputies referred for force problems had an

average of 12 prior force-related incidents. The mean number of force-related incidents

was 6.4. The big her average resulted from one deputy's self-reported total of 40 prior

force-related incidents. By contrast, those referred for psycbological impairment bad an

average of 1.5 prior force incidents. We conclude that the LASD is much too tolerant

of prior force incidents; it appears that only after an overwhelming number of force

incidents does it occur to the LASD to have someone evaluated for fitness for duty.

We were even more surprised to find that of the average of 12 prior force-related

incidents reported to county psychologists, an average of only 1.2 of these incidents

had been the subject of any recorded internal investigations by the LASD on me in

the card index of the Internal Affairs and internal Criminal Investigation Bureaus. Of the

7 prior force incidents for the 6 deputies that were investigated. only 4 were beld to be

founded. We conclude that there must be a great deal more force occurring

than results in a recorded internal investigation. The prior incidents of questionable

or clearly excessive force that are reported to the psychologists by the deputy or

his referring supervisor are far greater in number than the force incidents

recommended by the supervisor for internal investigation. It is clear that captains

are underreporting questionable force and are not conducting investigations leading

277
 to possible discipline in all force-related incidents. These findings clearly underscore

our recommendations elsewhere that tracking and early warning systems must be

implemented immediately throughout the Department. Moreover, the LASD niust

make it clear that all questionable force is to be investigated for possible discipline.

It is unacceptable that a captain can report an average of 12 prior questionable

force incidents to the psychologist where the official files show an average of only

1.2 force investigations.

We also asked ourselves and others why we would find so many more deputies

unfit for duty than does the County. The answer appears to be a fear of reversal of such

determinations by the Civil Service apparatus. The County seems to be extraordinarily

cautious and conservative about finding anyone unfit for duty and does so only in the rare

instance when the objective psychological test is abnormal. We can appreciate a

reluctance to draw harsh conclusions. But on the other hand, the County is failing its

responsibilities to the public at large if it is letting deputies carry guns and batons who in

truth have no business doing so. It is also too restrictive to have only two categories:

fit and unfit. There are a variety of gradations in between; and if a deputy is otherwise

able to perform useful service, he or she should be classified as fit with qualifications

sucb as "without weapons."

The county psychologists wbo perform these evaluations sbould be given a

more thorough understanding of the many jobs that it is possible to perform in law

enforcement, and they should tailor their recommendations to those jobs. It may be

that a given individual should not carry a gun, but might perform well in

other policing functions.

Recommendations Regarding Stress Management

& WeI/ness Programs:

1. The Department should develop a deputy-sergeant stress reduction

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mentorship program. Deputies would meet with their designated sergeant one

to two times a month at the deputy's convenience to discuss stress-related

feelings and concerns. The sergeants would have responsibility for ensuring that a

stress reduction agenda is followed by creating a safe and caring environment and

initiating interaction directed at deputies.

2. Sergeants must be given specific training in counseling skills and methods to

encourage deputies to be less defensive and more open with their sergeants.

Sergeants should be held accountable to evaluate the performance of their deputies

in utilizing effective coping strategies in response to their discussions.

3. Sergeants should meet with a psychologist consultant to assist them

in identifying stress reported by their deputies, in assisting deputies to cope with

identified sources of stress, in monitoring these deputies' mental status and in

making recommendations for referral to professional mental health counseling if

needed. Confidentiality issues should be vigorously explored and program

adjustments made to maintain confidentiality.

4. It is critical that the concepts of stress reduction and wellness programming

be embraced, supported and promulgated by top and middle management

throughout the organization as part of the implementation of core values. Therefore,

the same model of stress reduction mentorship pairs created between deputies and

sergeants should also be implemented up the chain of command in a similar manner

with participation by lieutenants through assistant sheriffs. Without an acceptance

of the premise that stress exists throughout the organization and that it may be

ameliorated bybuilding upon existing core values that assert the value of each

member of the organization, a double standard is created which sends a strong

message that stress reduction programs are for rank and file deputies only.

5. The Department should appoint a working committee drawn from all levels of

the command structure to determine the best organizational structure to support

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and promote effective stress management and wellness programs. These initia-

tives and programs must be institutionalized in a manner that best promotes

department-wide acceptance on the one hand and centralized monitoring of

accountability on the other.

6. Department managers should build upon the organizational structure

identified in Recommendation 5 and determine the best method for consulting

psychologists to use in reporting to captains, chiefs and the Sheriff about the

"State of the Organization" in its stress reduction efforts, especially as it relates to

use of force department-wide. Captains, chiefs and the Sheriff would then have

critical feedback on how effectively the organization is promoting stress

management and wellness programs. Again here, confidentially must be

protected.

Recommendations Regarding Psychological Services:

1. Psychological Services should be externalized from the LASD.

Psychological treatment that is provided on an ongoing basis or does not require

emergency response should be available at an external Employee Assistance

I
t
Program. I
2. The Department should maintain an inhouse Psychological Services Unit to
t
provide ongoing department-wide consultation, training, emergency clinical

psychological services, and emergency crisis intervention services.

Recommendations Regarding Mental Health

Early Warning System:
I
J
.
i-
!

1. Psychologists and managers should design a mental health Early Warning

System which requires deputies to present themselves for an especially designed

280
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psychological evaluation that is triggered by either a numerical accumulation of

lower level force-related incidents or one critical force-related incident.

2. Psychologists and managers should design a mandatory psychological

evaluation leading to a viable treatment plan for deputies referred by supervisors

who have a concern about problem behavior that may become force-related.

3. Psychologists and managers should design a voluntary component of a

mental health Early Warning System that is triggered by conduct or emotional

behavior indicative of a wide range of psychological problems. An emphasis should

b. placed on the evaluation of force-related factors and an appropriate treatment

plan designed.

Recommendations Regarding Fitness for Duty Evaluations:

1. The Psychological Reevaluations should be conducted by psychologists who

have specific job-related knowledge of the dimensions of law enforcement work in

the LASD.

2. The Psychological Reevaluation should utilize an evaluation strategy

consistent with the prevailing standard of practice and the state of art in prediction

of excessive force. Reliance on psychological test findings to the exclusion of

force-related history and assessment of personality within a clinical interview

represents an abdication of professional responsibility. In making judgments,

psychologists must be guided by current professional standards rather than fear of

reversal by the Civil Service Commission.

3. A wider range of findings than fit and unfit for duty should be

utilized. including limited duty with no weapon. Psychologists should mak~

recommendations for more in-depth clinical evaluations and treatment alternatives

where appropriate. Follow.up evaluations should be required where a limited duty

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or other evaluation or treatment recommendation is made.

4. LASD must make Psychological Reevaluation more responsive to the needs

of the department. AIiLASD supervisors should be oriented in the use of the

Psychological Reevaluation.

5 .. All LASD supervisory personnel should receive education on the

seriousness of force-related behavior problems. Supervisors should receive

training in recognizing warnings or high-risk indicators of force and how to counsel

identified deputies in alternatives to the use of force.

6. Where a pattern of repeated use of unnecessary force is found and a deputy

does not benefit from supervisor or professional mental health counseling, the

deputy should be discharged.

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 22. Community Oriented Policing

Sheriff Block empbasizes "service-oriented policing," and as we understand the term,

it shares elements in common with a pbilosophy of law enforcement known as "community

based policing" or "community pOlicing," As will be developed below, we view the
immediate, Department-wide implementation of community policing as our single

most important recommendation for reduction of excessive force cases.

Although the Sheriffs Department has taken initial steps in the direction of community

policing, we believe that fiscal and human resources must be made available for the rapid

implementation of community policing at each Station and throughout the Department.

What we urge therefore is that the budget of the Department be increased to fund the

immediate implementation community policing.

Community policing is not yet practiced in the Sheriffs Department to an adequate

degree. We do, however. want to recognize and commend Sheriff Block's efforts to foster

and encourage positive interaction between the Sheriffs Department and residents, and

we believe that many of his current programs are valuable and point in the direction of

community policing. Some of these programs are discussed in the accompanying sidebar.

Community policing proceeds from a recognition that the police alone cannot deal with

crime or with all the social ills which give rise to crime. As stated in the June 1991 issue of

Law and Order, "[c]rime is a complex social problem that requires total community

involvement for successful resolution, Proactive prevention of crime is a much more

sensible approach given the dismal record of reactive, incident-driven policing."·

Community policing is not an effon simply to improve relations with citizens by projecting

a positive image of the police. It is far more than public relations efforts. It is more than

what exists within the Sheriffs Department today, which are some well-intentioned and

well-run community-oriented programs in an otherwise traditionally structured and

managed police department.

Rather, community policing is a philosophy of law enforcement that builds up from a

base of partnerships created and nurtured at the station level by the deputies, sergeants and

285
 lieutenants with community organizations and individuals. As

described by Robert C. Trojanowicz in the FBI Law Enforcement

Bulletin for October 1990, community policing is a planned and
oII of tile most successful
progrlms is SANE. tbe Sberiff's fully articulated "process of reducing and contrOlling the con tempo-
SlblllDce Abuse Nlrcotics
EduCltiol progrl... It is rary problems of crime, drugs, fear of crime and neighborhood
completiag its fiftll year of
telclaiDg fourtll. fiftll. IDd sixtb decay, and [an effort] to improve the overall quality of life in the
grlden tIIrougbout Los Aagelll
community."l The essence of community policing is that every
COlDly Ihut tile rislts IDd dllgen
of drugl IDd glDgl. lbe SANE
person dealing with the police is to be treated with dignity and
progrlm b.. beea upgraded from I
lait to I hreau. is comlDlDded by respect, even in difficult circumstance,s when the person is abusive,
I captail. IDd lias 63 sworD
penonnll t..ching in 415 schools aggressive, resistant and provocative. It connotes a breakdown of
in 54 scbool districts. SlYerll
scllools bave expladed thl SANE the "us vs. them" attitude and the substitution of a thoroughly
program to includl tbe sevlntb Ind
ligbtb grades. A relltld progra... professional approach.
entitlld Drugs. Pregulcy. and
Community-based policing breaks down the isolation of a lone
You. is beilg given in more thaa 40
big II scbools in Los Angelll
police officer in a patrol car responding to radio calls; hence, the
CoaDly.

lbe Youth Athletic L..gue is lisa a emphasis on bicycle and foot patrols, smaller beats, greater conti-
VI" successful effort Iblt sbould
nuity of police personnel in a given community, and firsthand and
be expllded.

AlDolg otber innovative first-name knowledge of the community and its residents. It facili-
programs Ibe Sberiff bal ilitilted
are I prOgrlm It tbe ClrSOI stltiol tates ongoing dialogue between a community and its police
wbere deputies are iavited to
concerning priorities in law enforcement. preventative crime
dilDer witb Iaolt flmilies il
tbl,servici Irel; I bilinguII
measures, responses to emergencies and forward planning. It
cDmlDulity IlwllIUlr It till
Flrlstole StatiOI; a program It measures its success not so much by the numbers - number of
tbl LYlwood Stltiol wllirl
bOUHbolld seaion aad arrests, response time - but rather in terms of citizen involvement.
blDdiclpped penoDs UI clUed to
see if thl, Ire oltay and wbere a improvement in the quality of life, proactive crime prevention, coor-
fail.rl to laswer clUlmlY relult
il a visit from I rldio Clr; ..
dination with social agencies and the consequential reduction of

lawsuits and complaints of brutality, excessive force, and rude or

demeaning behavior or language;

286
,

An excellent example of community policing in action

is the partnership that has developed between the Sheriffs West

Hollywood Station and citizens and city administrators from West

I -til. policiog - progrlm at Ihl
Hollywood. In October, 1991, street protests broke out in Los Norwllk Statioo lid otlltrl i.
Filld R.,io.m wll.r. til. Iinice
Angeles County in response to Governor Wilson's veto of Ir.a ililrokao dow. ioto l1li111.,
1,.lllIcllllnicld lIy tbl .Im.
anti-discrimination legislation favored by human rigbts and civil t.I ..1 of pltrol offic. rs; a.
amllltiOiI leri.1 of progrlms s.t
libenies groups. As reported by the Los Angeles Times, LAPD
.p joilltly lIy Ibl City of Slota F.
officers on horseback waded into a crowd of an estimated 200 to 500 Spriags lod tbl Norwalk Statioa;
I joiet p.trollffort lIy citizi.
persons gathered at the Century Plaza Hotel on October 23 to protest voluat•• ,. lad D.puties i. tN East
N.wblll I,.. Hn.d lIy lb. Slata
the veto: "mounted officers began moving into the crowd ... and Clarita Statloe; • pro,r. . It tb.
T... ple City Statio. to disco.,a,.
pandemonium broke out, with protesters screaming and yelling as auto Ib.ft wiler. c.rs ,.gllllr led
,.c.iv. I d.cal II.rtieg d.puti ••
they slowly moved back. At least two demonstrators were knocked tblt til. car .bOlld .0111. olt o.
tN str.. t lIIaw ... 1 1.11. a.d
to the ground by officers and struck several times with batons as
5 ....; .ad • stoflfro.t commoDity
they lay there before being taken into custody.") A woman wbo was Hnic. c.lter staffed lIy a d.puty
.ad • cltiz•• vollota., out of til.
present with ber 10-year-old daugbter described ber child's borror in WllauC/Sa. Di.a. Statio •.
Additioo.lly. It 0 •• tim. tb.r. wa.
seeing demonstrators she cbaracterized as peaceful "being sboved, allo I v.ry .fflctiv. foot patrol
.ffort i. H.wliia. Glrd.al.
pushed, clubbed and trampled by uniformed officers. 'My daugbter
1\. SlIIriffl D.p.rtDI••t b.. 1110
was frightened and crying and scared the police were going to kill h •• I 1.ld., il til. iotroductiol of
lIik. patroll. II A.g," 1991. I
her. 'H. A man wbose arm was broken as be was sbeltering a woman IIlcycll patrol of two d.pltlll p.r
.bift ••cll d.y W.I fOI'lD.d It lb.
wbo was about to be clubbed in the face by a police baton was called W... Hollywood Statio.. 1\.,.
Ira also lIib patrols op.ratiag olt
a faggot and told that be was sick and should be put in a mental of lb. S••ta Claritl vln., StatiOI,
till L.nox Stltlo., lid tile
hospital. Another man reponed that be asked one officer "wby be
L.kewood St.tiOI.
was hitting me and he continued to bit me .... I asked for his badge TIl... pro,rl.. l. lid w. hv. lot
Itt•• pt.d to .... til•••11. Ira In
number and he continued to hit me."s i...gil.tiv.. ..

By contrast, a few blocks away in West Hollywood, the

Sheriff's Department presided over a series of entirely peaceful and

well-policed demonstrations in which no one was burt, mucb less

287
 clubbed with batons or called demeaning names.

For several nights, tbe West Hollywood Station had been

conducting briefings with tbe Sheriffs Conference Committee, a

W. particularly take Dot. of a
Dumber of iDDOwativ. programs group composed of five representatives from the West Hollywood
withiD Fi.ld R.gio. III. Bit it
r.mai.1 tile fact thaI thes. Station and five representatives of West Hollywood's gay and
programl .xill ally 01 a r.latively
lesbian communities. Members of that committee were present at
mod.1I scal. aad laave aol y.1
acbiev.d tbe fuadam.atal
every demonstration. The Committee and the Sheriffs Department
r.-orilDtatioa toward community
policiag Ibal w. b,li.v. il were in constant communication throughout the demonstrations to
nantial. Th. D.partmeat must gl
mlcb fartb.r aad macb fast.r iD help insure public safety, keep people calm and avoid violence by
ord.r to cr.dibly claim that il is
evolving to trot community either the demonstrators or the police. "I recall when 1 first saw the
policiag.
deputies prior to the demonstration, they had already put on their
•
riot gear," stated one of the citizen Conference Committee members.

"1 thought that the riot gear was unnecessarily provocative, and I

sbared my concerns with a lieutenant at the West Hollywood Station.

He thought it over and decided that taking the deputies out of riot

gear and putting them in their normal uniforms would reduce

the likelihood of confrontation. The ability of the community to

form a partnership with the Sheriff s Department is the key to

distinguishing what happened in West Hollywood from what

bappened at the Century Plaza."

This partnership between the community and the Sheriff s

Department to hold a peaceful demonstration is community poUcing

and tbe Sheriffs Department at its best. The City of West

Hollywood has a $9 million annual contract with the Sheriffs

Department to provide police services, representing roughly 10

percent of the Sheriffs Department's contract revenue. West

Hollywood is a densely populated city of approximately 36,000

288
permanent residents. Thousands more persons drawn by night clubs on the Sunset Strip

and bars and clubs on Santa Monica Boulevard visit the city during the evenings and on
weekends. West Hollywood has unusual demographics. At least one fifth of the population

is gay and lesbian and another fifm of the population is composed of senior citizens.

Nearly a tenth of me population are Russian immigrants. There are about 150 homeless

persons living on the streets of West Hollywood.

When West Hollywood incorporated, its gay and lesbian residents were

determined to establish a partnership wim me police and reduce perceived abrasive and
demeaning behavior by the Sheriff s Department directed toward gay males in particular.

The West Hollywood Sheriffs Station under me command of then-captain (now

commander) Rachel Burgess was open to the idea, and the Gay and Lesbian Sheriffs

Conference Committee was formed in May 1989. The Committee has 10 members: five

from the community and five from sworn personnel at the Station, one of whom is

automatically the station's commanding officer. The Committee is staffed by Nancy

Greenstein. the Public Safety Officer of West Hollywood's City Manager's Office.

According to its February 1992 progress report, the Committee "meets in private, although

not in secret, to provide a formal link of effective communication, i.e. a frank dialogue

between the Department and the Community in a non-adversarial environment. The goal is

to enhance relations between the Community and law enforcement in West HOllywood."

The Committee convenes annual public forums to solicit community input into the agenda

of the Committee for the coming year, as well as to air grievances and keep Committee

members in tune with community concerns.

The Committee and the Public Safety Office of the City have virtually daily

contact with the Sheriffs station about abatement of criminal activity, priorities for patrol

and enforcement, advance planning for parades and demonstrations and other potentially

disruptive events. They also attempt to resolve complaints received about Sheriffs

personnel for rudeness, insensitivity and demeaning language. The current and former

289
 ,
commanding officers at West Hollywood have made it clear that insensitive conduct

will not be tolerated: for example, any deputy caught calling someone a faggot is
automatically given a three-day suspension.

In the spring of 1991, the Sheriffs Conference Committee, the City of West

Hollywood and the West Hollywood Sheriff's Station implemented a pilot training

program for new deputies and transferees coming into the station. Recently, an expanded

version of the pilot program has been proposed. Its major features are as follows:

1. Trainers will consist of experienced sheriffs deputies, the West Hollywood

Station training staff, representatives of city government, members of various city-

commissions, business people and citizens involved in Neighborhood Watch programs.

2. Training sessions will take place at the Station and will cover at least the
following topics: The function of city government, including introductions of the city

manager, mayor, city council and as many department heads as are available; the history

of the city; a presentation by the city departments covering their responsibilities and

teaching how interaction between the Sheriffs Station and the departments can improve

service to the community; and presentations by representatives of various groups with

special interests and needs in the community.

3. Additionally, the trainees will be given structured tours of the city, including

City Hall and its various departments, the principal parks, a homeless shelter, a Russian

community center, a gay bar, and a Neighborhood Watch area. Trainees will attend at

least one meeting of a Neighborhood Watch group in both ends of the city, a city council

meeting, a chamber of commerce or other business group meeting, among others.

4. Each trainee will be assigned to an experienced deputy who bas himself or

herself been through the training program. The two will work footbeat exclusively for

two weeks to learn about the community on a personal level, meeting citizens, merchants

and social service providers.

It is anticipated that the program will keep the lines of communication open between

290
 c

the police and the community. It will reduce the number of citizen complaints.

It is hoped that it will involve the city, its citizens, its business people and its police in a

parmership, and provide a forum for deputies to hear firsthand what is important to the

people in West Hollywood. It should reduce the tension inherent when new deputies are

placed in environments which may be foreign to their upbringing. As one of the Sheriffs

Committee citizen members put it, "we do not expect deputies from traditional backgrounds

to adopt our values or necessarily share our feelings. But we believe that both the deputies

and the people of West Hollywood can treat each other with dignity and respect and work

together to further West Hollywood's law enforcement goals."

We believe that the Sheriffs Conference Committee and the ongoing work of the

West Hollywood Public Safety Office with the West Hollywood Station should serve as a

template for similar programs to be established at each Station. We also want to point out

that the LASD's policy of transferring personnel at regular intervals has been very frus-

trating to West Hollywood which has invested so much time and effort in getting to know

and work with people at the station. It is a tribute to both the quality of the personnel at the

West Hollywood station and the community it serves that the citizens deeply regret the loss

of people at the station whom they have come to trust and like. The West Hollywood expe-

rience demonstrates the value of community policing.

We do not make light of the difficulty of fully implementing a community-based

policing strategy. It requires a courageous and sweeping shift in management philosophy

and habits. It requires a sea change in how police officers from the deputy on patrol to the

upper management perceive their jobs. It connotes a wholly different way of measuring

success and failure. The model police officer may not be the deputy who makes the

greatest number of arrests with his aggressive or intimidating approach. Rather, the model

officer may be the one who is skillful at managing Neighborhood Watch programs and

knows whom to call to get a street lamp repaired near an ATM where there has been a

rash of muggings. The best officer may be the one who can best work with community

291
organizers to plan for a peaceful protest march or who knows the principal of the local

high school to call for help keeping an eye on a teenager who has been threatened by
gang members. The best officer is one who will be evaluated not only on how many

arrests she has made but also on the quality of the arrests, and her accountability to the

community.

It requires top management to delegate broadly and to eliminate excessive

bureaucratic layers. It means devolving real power to the unit commander to organize a

community-specific partnership as he or she sees fit. It means fashioning ways to hold

the unit commander accountable for failures and to reward him or her for successes.

It means looking beyond the local mayor or city manager to find out what the law

enforcement priorities are. Thus, it means sharing authority to set policing priorities and
policies with the individual resident and groups representing that person.
Community-based policing turns a lot of things topsy-turvy. It builds from the

bottom up instead of imposing from the lOp down. It is the antithesis of the usual model

of a paramilitary, hierarchical police force. Each police station is responsible to its

resident constituency for achievement of the priorities set by that constituency in

partnership with the station.

Community policing requires management to act in the interest of the citizen to

prevent sheltering of an errant officer. It means that the disciplining of officers cannot

be done in secret. The complaining citizen cannot be kept in the dark as to whether

discipline was imposed and in what form; and if this means that legislation must be

amended to attain this result or union contracts renegotiated. so be it It means that

management must take a firm stance and eliminate roadblocks to meaningful discipline.

demotion or termination of employees who cannot or will not treat everyone with dignity

and respect

Community policing also implies the courage to take responsibility for results.

It is common to hear complaints by managers in the Sheriff s Department about the

292
overweaning power of the police unions, the venality and cynicism oCthe plaintiffs

personal injury bar, the overstatements of minority and ethnic organizations, the

undermining by an assertedly lily-livered Civil Service Commission of efforts by

management to fire officers guilty of serious misconduct. and the impediments posed by the

Police Officers' Bill of Rights.

We do not dispute that these complaints by Sheriffs management in given instances

may be well-taken. Nonetheless. we believe it possible. despite these impediments, to

initiate a true community policing system; and if the system were fully implemented by a

determined management, we believe it would lead to less abrasion between the police and

those segments of the community from which complaints are most often voiced.

The diminution in abrasion will then lead to fewer citizen complaints. fewer lawsuits,

fewer injuries. fewer claims and fewer dollars spent by the County to settle litigation or pay

judgments. When the Sheriffs Department itself has fully implemented a community-based

strategy and has taken responsibility for reducing the abrasion, its protestations and

complaints about the forces arrayed against it will carry even greater force.

It is true that it can be cumbersome and difficult under current procedures to

administer swift and sure discipline to a bad deputy. There is California legislation which

shields the results of the disciplinary process from public scrutiny, and it should be

repealed. We understand the frustration felt by the Department in that regard. It is true

that there are a few cynical, venal lawyers who are prepared to seU their clients down the

river by asking only a pittance for their clients so as to provide a legal basis for an award of

tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees. Clearly, these abuses exist They are intolerable,

and they must be corrected.

But it is also true that most lawsuits would not have been brought if sworn personnel

had acted in a professional manner. It is similarly true that the Department should do far

more to teach and reinforce the message that all people are to be treated at all times with

dignity and respect under a community-oriented policing strategy. The need to impose

293
 discipline will diminisb as persons are trained and encouraged to deal in a respectful

way with all persons. So then will the jury verdicts and judgments against the LASD.

Recommendations:

We urge that adequate additional funds be made available to the Sheriffs

Department for the rapid implem~ntation of community policing at each station

and throughout the Department.

294
295
 r

296
 ----- - -------

23. Internal Departmental Culture

Recent Core Values and service-oriented pOlicing efforts signal a serious management

intention to shift the direction of the Department's work with respect not only to the com-

munity but also to the internal operation of the Department itself. A great deal remains to

be done, however, if the Department is to remove important obstacles to reaching its stated

goals. Making these changes will require a sincere and profound commitment to cbanging
the culture of the Department from its traditional paramilitary law enforcement environ-

ment with many features of an "old boys' network" to an open institution that values the

diversity of its employees and that fully utilizes the resources that they represent If the

Department cannot do so, its efforts to attract and retain the most talented personnel and to

provide more community-sensitive policing are doomed to fail.

While the Department has become a multi-cultural environment, it is, in the words of

one high-level officer, still a "difficult place to be if you're different." Many important

issues need to be addressed to make it a more comfortable place for minorities, women,

gays and lesbians. At the same time, the minority officers we spoke with were high in their
praise of many fellow officers across groups, including both peers and mentors, who have
provided them strong personal support. and in whom they bave complete confidence.

Racial and Ethnic Issues

The Department is not effectively addressing important internal racial issues and ten-

sions. One lOP supervisor stated, "The Department is not comfortable with its institutional

racism problem."
The Department's own Service Oriented Policing Committee (SOP) Survey of 3,764
sworn and civilian employees revealed very troubling statistics with regard to ethnic toler-

ance. A full 26% of respondents reported that their ethnic tolerance bad decreased since

joining the Department. Disturbingly, the proportion of Caucasians reporting ·such a

decrease was a fuI130%, while that of other ethnic groups was 14%.

297
 T
Our investigation confirmed the presence of not only racially

intolerant attitudes but also racially intolerant conduct. Racially

derogatory remarks are not uncommon. One lieutenant referred to

an arrestee as a "wetback." Another lieutenant asked a minority

01 Sept.llb.r 12. 1991,
tb. LOI Aag.lel TIII.I published deputy who was wearing a beeper, "Are you a dope dealer?"
.11 Irticl. Ibout coatroVinil1
trlallDlllioal by LASD d.putiel
A sergeant told an African-American deputy, "People in Ladera
01 tb. mobil. digital t.naialll Dr
Heights don't deserve their homes because they all got them with
MDTI tblt Ir. illtalled iD pltrol
een. lb. MDT trlasllillioal tbat drug money." A cartoon that was altered to be racially offensive
w.r. quot.d coatlia.d eXIDlpl1S
0' -glag lilgo, rleill mimicry, was placed on a departmental bulletin board.
I I w.1I II r.mlrks lbout womaa,
raeill miloritiel and yiolaae ... We also heard many reports that racial tensions were very high
boag tile OfflaliYI traasllillioo.
wlr. -I'll gOlal hat 'or I bit ... during the recent civil unrest and have remained high since then.
eltelt. hr. Good buatiog ...
lad tlkl'm witb tbl fi,st slIot ..
Remarks made at that time included, "Is this the watermelon
-WilD CII do tbl IIOlt dllllgi
crowd?" and, in the presence of a small group of African-American
oaci tblY clteb tb. IUSplctr

~ the wlkl of tbl Cbristopber deputies, "It's too dark in this area." We also heard a very troubling
COllllissioa reYllltiolS Ibout MDT
trlllllillioll il tb. LAPD, thl
report that Caucasian deputies riding on a bus through a riot-tom
Sberiffs Dlplrtmlat beglD to reg·
area cheered and applauded each time they passed a burning build-
DII,ly Ilidit MDTtrlaSlDillioas 01
I IPOt basil. Aceordiag to tbl ing. Minority officers report feeling highly disturbed by remarks
Departm.at, tb. IDlDber lid trl'
qUlaey 0' OffealiYI traasllinioas made during the disruption and believe that the unrest appears to
1111 dlcliald. 0., iliff samplld
MDT trlllmillioDS ""ore lid have given some people greater license to make such remarks.
Ifter I sellct.d Ilrill of
ItOps w. tboagbt migbt cOltaill We were deeply disappointed to find that management far too
pOllibly offealiYI trlasmillioll.
frequently lets such matters go unconfronted. While some managers
Olr slIllIlIlIpl. of t'lIlIIllIloal
did aot talll up bigbly offlalR.
take swift and decisive action when such conduct occurs, a far
commlals.

• greater number appear to do nothing. A high-level officer stated that

there is no consistent management policy to confront and deal with

racial issues.

We understand that the Sheriff has recently issued a strong

policy statement that racially biased conduct will not be tolerated.

298
Such a statement is important and is overdue. At Lhe same time, Lhe policy will not imp le-

ment itself. Unless every manager is held accountable to confront such conduct decisively,

the conduct will continue.

The failure of management in Lhis important area results not only from a lack

of accountability but also from a total lack of training in techniques for confronting both

individuals and groups on these sensitive issues. Management needs to develop skills in

bringing these issues out into the open, in facilitating discussions in which all participants

feel that their views are considered and in clearly articulating and enforcing the bounds of

acceptable conduct.

Minority officers report the existence of a double standard. For example, professional

development activities which would be considered "networking" for a Caucasian deputy are

often called "improper connections" for a minority. Minority deputies are advised not to do

anything, such as asserting their own needs or interests, which would give them a "higb

profile," yet they are in such small numbers in many units that they are unavoidably visible.

Racial attitudes are communicated to deputies by the Department's insensitivities and

througb them to members of the public. An important example is the inconsiderate, rude

and racially biased treatment of African-American, Hispanic, Asian-American and other

. minority drivers stopped by deputies. The Department's continued tolerance of such COD-

duct sends a clear message to botb Caucasians and minorities within the Department that

such conduct is acceptable. Several minority officers reponed having been stopped them-

selves wben out of uniform. One African-American officer reponed four instances of being

stopped and treated in a racially discriminatory fasbion in violation of Departmental

policy.

Similarly. Departmental tolerance of cultural insensitivity sends a powerful message to

,
minorities within the Department. One Hispanic Field Training Officer was highly critical

of deputies' lack of knowledge of Hispanic culture. He stated that be bas bad to stop a

number of fights that occurred after deputies had treated a Hispanic disrespectfully in the

299
 presence of his girlfriend or his "homeboys." This same FrO applied to become an

instructor in !.he new cultural awareness training but was turned down.

Departmental treatment of public housing tenants also reveals insensitivities.

At Nueva Maravilla, deputy sheriffs intrude inappropriately upon tenant privacy by indis-

criminately photographing asserted gang members and by turning over to the Housing

Authority arrest records of tenants' friends and relatives who are not on the lease. Wben

tenant leaders requested a meeting to discuss these and other concerns, the officer who

came treated them in an insulting fashion. saying, "Don't file complaints against the
Sheriffs Department" and "Lawyers only want your money."

Gender Issues

Seemingly indicative of attitudes within the Department, !.he SOP Survey did not

even address opinions regarding women in the Department. Interviews with a number of
Departmental personnel as well as the frequency of sexual harassment complaints indi-

cate that major problems exist in this area as well.

In the last two years, the Department appears to have taken strong disciplinary mea-

sures, including discharge, in response to reported incidents of sexual harassment. The

Department now trains both managers and recruits in this subject. Serious problems do

exist with regard to the willingness of women to report instances of sexual harassment. It

was widely reponed that many male supervisors do not take the issue of sexual harass-

ment seriously. One manager identified first-level supervisors as especially lacking in

follow-through on this issue, stating, "Men aren't used to dealing with women as people."
Like minorities, women deputies appear to suffer from a double standard. If a

woman deputy is ambitious, she is labeled as having "an attitude." There is a widespread

feeling that "women have to be twice as good" to prove themselves and that any mistake

made by a woman receives much more attention than if the mistake were made by a man.

300
 <

In the recent civil unrest, for example, a supervisor made negative comments about several

women who expressed difficulty in responding to rapid deploymem orders because of fami-
ly responsibilities. Men who expressed similar difficulties escaped criticism.
The practice of bazing still occurs in the Department, and it impacts particularly nega-

tively upon women. The Hazing Research Project Committee reported in October 1990

that women:

"... face more hazing Ihan mole counterparts and muSI per/orm at a mum higher level

than peers to be accepted. Many believe thaI hazing never ceases where females are involved.

They are continually subjected to ridicule that is apparently designed to test their ability to
handle Ihe pressures of a particular assignment or job lasl. Some have relattd, confidential-
ly, Ihat differenl Iraining officers would describe sexual experiences or gruesome crime scenes,

and then make assessments of them based upon their reactions. T!tese types of incidents wert

often handled wilh little or no sensitivity. '~

Another issue of importance to female and, to an increasing extent, male deputies who

are single parents or undertake major responsibility for child-rearing is the extent to which

the Department is understanding and flexible regarding these responsibilities. In order to

be able to attract and retain these deputies, the Department should review its personnel
policies to assure that they are as family-sensitive as possible. While there are inherent ten-

sions between family responsibilities and the Department's need to staff positions around

the clock, the Department should cQnsider instituting flexible scheduling, family leaves and

part-time positions in order to retain valuable, fully trained employees who would other-

wise resign and be lost to the Department. The Department currently limits childbirth leave

to three months and has no part-time sworn positions.

301
 T
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation

Like many institutions in our society. the LASD has been confronted with issues of

prejudice and exclusion for a long time. As other sections of our report have made clear,

it has not been easy for African-Americans. Hispanics and women to become fully

accepted in the LASD and to rise within the organization to positions of authority. As we

have traced and described conditions for each of these groups, it has become clear that

progress for all has been slow. We now tum our attention to gays and lesbians and con-

clude that movement here has been glacial.

Working Environment and Recruitment

Despite the LASD's recent efforts to improve its relationship with gays and lesbians,

the LASD is a very difficult environment for gays and lesbians to work in or find

employment. The Department has only two openly gay deputies among a force of about

8000 sworn officers. We understand there are closeted lesbians in the LASD also.

We were struck by the general fear of reprisal by closeted gays and lesbians.

Through organizations of gay and lesbian police officers and other community organiza-

tions, we attempted to contact gay and lesbian deputies, only to learn that nearly all such

officers were reluctant to talk to us because they believed that their identities would be

sought by the LASD and their careers would be prejudiced. By contrast, about 50

closeted LAPD deputies were willing to speak: to representatives of the Christopher

Commission.

Whether these apprehensions of gay and lesbian officers in the LASD are in fact cor-

rect is impossible to state with certainty. But these fears do have at least a rational basis:

Top management does not condemn intolerance and discrimination based upon sexual

orientation with the same vigor and seriousness of purpose with wbich it attacks other

injurious forms of racial, ethnic and gender discrimination. This reluctance firmly to

302
stamp out prejudice is evidenced by lhe absence of a strong statement from top management

lhat discrimination based upon sexual orientation is unacceptable and will not be tolerated.

Top management has not shown by word or by deed that discrimination based on sexu-

al orientation is as unacceptable as racism. Offensive comments and slurs continue to be

made on the job. It was reported to us that within the last couple of years, one LASD offi-

cial was overheard telling another official, after some gay men had sought information

about joining the LASD, "The dumb fags haven't figured out they'll never make it past the

background check." We ourselves heard a deputy say, "We must have some gay deputies;

we fire a couple every year." Use of offensive terms for gays and lesbians such as "fags"

and "dykes" by deputies on ridealongs was not uncommon. That these remarks were made

even in our presence makes it understandable why gay deputies are unwilling to be open

about their sexual orientation for fear that other members of the Department may treat them

as objects of derision. The nonchalance of deputies to speak in these offensive ways leads

to the inference that the LASD has not made it clear that it condemns out of hand discrimi-

nation by sexual orientation.

The perception that the LASD is unwelcoming was reinforced by media publicity of a

1988 statement by Sheriff Block that he was concerned that an openly gay employee might
fac~ open and overt harassment Sheriff Block responded to our questions regarding this

statement by saying it was not, and it is not his intent to tolerate discrimination against gays

and lesbians. He said that he intends to publish a new message regarding discrimination

that will make it clear that discrimination based on sexual orientation will not be permiued.

We were pleased with his response. The Department must go further, however, to make the

message clear that this form of prejudice and discrimination is as offensive as racism and

sexism.

We spoke at length with a West Hollywood councilperson and an employee of the

city's Public Safety Committee about the relationship between West Hollywood and the

Sheriffs Department. Because the city of West Hollywood has a large gay and lesbian

303
 T
population, the city bas a strong interest in issues of discrimination on the basis of sexual

orientation. Indeed, city officials face some pressure from the gay and lesbian communi-

ty not to renew the city's contract with the Sheriffs Department because of its perceived

inadequate response to sexual orientation issues. Although West Hollywood officials

argue that the Department in general is making progress and that the West Hollywood

station in particular bas worked with the city to resolve issues, they felt and still feel con-

tinuing resistance by the LASD at a departmental level. See the cbapter on community

policing for these reported successes. West Hollywood officials repon that it took a long

time and a bard struggle before a non-discrimination clause regarding sexual orientation

was included in its basic contract with the LASD.

West Hollywood officials also expressed frustration at the Department's reluctance

to affirmatively recruit gays and lesbians as potential deputies. Asserting that it is as

anomalous for there to be a lack of gay deputies in general and in West Hollywood in

particular as it would be to bave a lack of Spanisb-speaking deputies in East Los Angeles,

West Hollywood officials continue to make efforts of their own to recruit gays and les-

bians for the Department. West Hollywood officials report that the Department does not

officially recruit at gay and lesbian pride festivals.

Personnel in the recruiting department of the Sberiffs Department conflfUl that the

Department makes no special efforts to recruit members of the gay and lesbian communi-

ty as it does to recruit members of various racial or ethnic communities.

We asked people at all levels of the Depanment why the LASD attitude seems differ-

ent when it comes to issues of sexual orientation discrimination than with respect to

racial, ethnic or gender discrimination. The first argument generally raised by those with

legal training or exposure is that discrimination based upon sexual orientation in the

workplace is not subject to the heigbtened legal scrutiny by courts reserved for racial dis-

crimination. We are willing to assume for purposes of argument that there may be some

legal issues regarding sexual orientation discrimination that have yet to be definitively

304
resolved. But that, in our view is beside the point: Why should the LASD want to fall back

on legalistic arguments to justify discrimination in the first place?

It cannot be that gays and lesbians perform any better or worse than others as police.

Indeed, a study conducted of the San Francisco County Sheriffs Department affirmed this

perception. The San FranciscoCounty Sheriffs Department conducts targeted recruiting

efforts for gays and lesbians in recognition that San Francisco has a large gay and lesbian

population. Thus. it was not difficult to find statistically adequate samples of gay, lesbian

and heterosexual deputies for the study.

The results of that study were presented at the 99th Convention of the American

Psychological Association in August 1991. The study showed that 83% of the gay and les-

bian group were rated as "suitable for hire" by psychologists for the department and that

79% of non-gay and lesbian applications were rated "suitable for hire." This difference

was not statistically significant.

Subsequent review of personnel records disclosed no statistically significant difference

in job performance for the heterosexual, gay and lesbian groups. Of the heterosexual

group, 11 % were rated "outstanding," 76% were rated as "satisfactory" and 13% were iden-

tified as having job problems. The comparable statistics for the gay and lesbian group were

15% "outstanding," 72% "satisfactory" and 13% as problematic.

We asked LASD officials why they did not actively recruit gays and lesbians by

advertising in gay and lesbian publications. The response was that the Department would

have to advertise either in sexually explicit publications or in publications that encourage or

promote gay and lesbian acti vity. We frankly were puzzled. The Department does not have

to advertise in Hustler or Penthouu to reach heterosexuals. It should not have to advertise

in equally explicit publications to reach gays and lesbians. There are many publications

and media outlets of general circulation, or those aimed at a gay or lesbian audience, which

are not sexually explicit that could be easily used. The excuse was weak:.

Fear of AIDS and fear that a gay male might be perceived by a partner as a "sissy"

305
 r
I
I

or as unable to provide aggressive support in case of trouble also came up as reasons.

When asked about the first, some deputies responded that they feared coming in contact
with a gay deputy's blood or of having to perform mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.

Inasmuch as the LASD already requires deputies to use rubber gloves whenever there is a

risk of coming in contact with anyone's blood, be it a fellow deputy, accident victim or

wounded suspect, it seemed to us that the first fear, although real and not to be dismissed,

had already been addressed by the Department in a responsible way. Even if the likeli-

hood of contracting AIDS is small, the mortality statistics are not, and it makes sense to

squarely and honestly address the fears the deputies have. It is important to note in this

regard that incidence of AIDS among heterosexuals is growing at a faster rate than among

gay men. With respect to resuscitation. the Department uses mouth guards as a general

practice no matter on whom the resuscitation is performed. Fear of AIDS does not in any

way justify either exclusion of gays from the Department nor shunning of them if they

join. As to the second fear. top management in the LASD conceded that it was a vestige

of earlier prejudice and unfair stereotyping that would disappear over time. We agree:

but it will not disappear unless deputies have their prejudices challenged with the experi-

ence of working on a daily basis beside gay and lesbian deputies just as they do African-

American, female or Hispanic deputies.

We would be ignoring political and social reality if we assumed society in general

was as intolerant of sexual orientation discrimination as it is of racism. Police depart-

ments are not usually the leading edge in promoting tolerance. For example. we per-

ceived within the LASD some fear of criticism or disapproval from parts of the LASO's

constituencies, if the Department was seen as promoting a gay or lesbian lifestyle by

actively recruiting gays. But, the response is obvious: people want good policing; they

do not really care if the person responding to them when they are helpless or in danger is

African-American, Caucasian, Hispanic, Asian, female, gay or lesbian as long as the

police officer is well trained and competent. There is no sound reason to overlook the gay

306
and lesbian community when trying to recruit good deputies. The Department does itself

and the public a disservice, if it does so.

Background Investigations

We received reports from members of the gay and lesbian community that the

Department's hiring process, including background investigations and psychological exami-

nations, as recently as 1989, was designed to weed out gay men who applied for positions

with the Department. Today, the Department's background investigation process appears

not to focus specifically on a potential hiree's sexual orientation.

In this regard, however, we do have some concern about what may be unintended bias-

es. Recently, due to budget constraints, a small, select group of individuals was chosen for

admission to the Sheriffs Academy. By way of demonstrating their pride in these recruits,

LASD officials pointed out that they were able to select the most stable applicants, who

were "married if possible." The equating of maturity with marriage may lead to biased

results against gays and lesbians as well as men and women who, for whatever reason,

have remained single.

With respect to unmarried persons, we were also advised that at least as late as

February 1992, information was being sought from applicants about boyfriends or girl-

friends for purposes of checking references. The application form admonishes that failure

to provide complete information can result in disqualification. The potential is high for

misuse of answers to such questions against gays, lesbians and people who do not have sig-

nificant other people in their lives at the moment, and the questions should best not

be asked.

Background investigators currently do not seek information regarding applicants' pos-

sible bias based on sexual orientation. We would urge the Department to screen

applicants for such bias.

307
Training

In 1992, the Sheriffs Training Academy instituted a new cultural sensitivity

curriculum which included a class entitled "Strategies for Reducing Prejudice and

Eliminating Discrimination." This class was designed to address general problems of

prejudice and discrimination and then to focus on issues of race, ethnicity, gender and

sexual orientation. While the Department's attempt to institute such a curriculum is

admirable, this particular class was ineffective in dealing with gay and lesbian issues.

The class began with a stereotyping exercise, the purpose of which was to show the

Academy students that perceived stereotypes are often incorrect and that particular

groups of people cannot be judged simply on their appearance. In spite of all good inten-

tions, this particular stereotyping exercise succeeded in projecting a negative image of

gay men by including the category of gay men with such other generally negative

categories as "drug users," "people to be afraid of," and "dangerous people." The sexual

orientation component of this class was also compromised because it was placed as the

last item on the curriculum, meaning that when time ran out, sexual orientation issues

were given short shrift and were not fully discussed.

On the day before their spring 1992 graduation. however, one Academy class also

received a presentation put on by the West Hollywood Gay and Lesbian/Sheriffs

Conference Committee in which three hours were devoted to gay and lesbian issues.

We audited the class and reviewed the class members' written responses. We thought the

class was worthwhile. and the class members did too. It was presented by people

knowledgeable on gay and lesbian issues who could speak from direct experience and

who were not afraid of dealing with tough questions from the class. The Department

should expand this class to reach veteran deputies and officers who have never been

exposed to the class.

We want to note that where the LASD bas used the resources of the gay and lesbian

308
 community to develop programs and policies, it has done an excellent job. An example

of this kind of teamwork is a program at the Hall of Justice Jail. For the past nine years,

the Sheriff s Department has had a program in which self-identified gay prisoners are seg-

regated from the general jail population for their own protection. The success of this par-

ticular program has resulted from the participation of a representative of the gay community

in a screening process designed to prevent non-gay inmates from gaining access to and
harassing the gay population in the jail. The representative from the gay community not

only prevents possible abuse of the screening process but also acts as an ombudsman for the
gay inmates.

We note also that Sheriff Block recently met with members of the West Hollywood

Gay and Lesbian/Sheriff s Conference to discuss new programs and policies. We applaud

this approach to issues of sexual orientation and encourage the continuation of such dia-

logue. The Sheriffs Department should work closely with gay and lesbian representatives

to develop other effective programs and pOlicies.

Complaints

Women and minorities report that it is still very difficult to bring complaints about

racial or gender discrimination, or sexual harassment. To do so under the current system,

one must file a formal complaint which is invariably made public. Filing such a complaint

is widely perceived as certain to "ruin your career," to give you "a jacket as a troublemak-

er." The filing of such a complaint, moreover, is not always taken seriously. An African-

American (1eputy filed a grievance against a fellow deputy who called him "Boy" while
refusing to follow his appropriate order. Although a majority of witnesses present believed

the remark to be racial in nature, the grievance was found to be not racial. In r~cognition

of the reluctance of officers to file complaints, the SOP Committee recommended the ere-

.alion of an ombudsman position and unit liaisons to whom such complaints can be brought

309
 in confidence. Even if such an office is established. complaints will still be difficult to

bring forward until management is fully trained in the proper handling of such complaints

and is held fully accountable to respond promptly and decisively.

Racial and Gender Balance

The Department currently appears to have no enforced policy to achieve greater

racial and gender balance among different units. Some management efforts to address
this issue appear to be only token in nature. When an executive issued a memo indicating

that a particular division was attempting to recruit more minorities. the division's only

African-American was never asked for suggestions. and no one he talked to had been

informed of the memo. Such lack of follow-through by management sends a powerful

message.

The failure to enforce efforts to achieve greater balance is particularly striking given
the substantial disparities in the staffing of different units. Women deputies, who com-
prise 12.5% of the Department's sworn personnel, constitute less than 7% of the sworn
personnel at the Antelope Valley, Carson, East Los Angeles, Industry, Lennox and

Lynwood stations. Even more strikingly. there are no women among the 91 sworn per-

sonnel in the Special Enforcement Bureau.

Distribution of minorities among units is also very uneven. For example, while the

ethnic make-up of the area served by the East Los Angeles Station is 94% Hispanic, only

43% of its sworn officers are Hispanic. An even greater disparity exists in the area
served by the Firestone Station. where 80% of the residents are Hispanic, but only 20% of
the officers are Hispanic. Similar disparities exist for African-Americans. For the

Marina del Rey Station, 55% of the residents are African-American in contrast to only

19% of the officers. Many stations are disproportionately staffed by Caucasian officers.

For example. while only 5% of the residents of the Lynwood Station area are Caucasian,

310
71 % of its officers are Caucasian.

Disparities are most obvious in the highly visible and desirable positions within the

Department. Among the four top aides to the Sheriff, the Undersheriff and Assistant-

Sheriffs, there has never been a Hispanic, and the only African-American was recently

appointed. The Special Enforcement Bureau is 81.3% Caucasian, 6.6% African-American

and 12.1 % Hispanic. The Advanced Training Bureau is 86.0% Caucasian, only 2.3%

African-American, 9.3% Hispanic and 2.3% Asian. The Arson and Explosives Detail is

85.7% Caucasian, 4.6% African-American, 4.6% Hispanic and 4.6% Pacific Islander.

These disparities may be due to a number of factors including deputy interest in the

position, the need for a particular schedule and the residential patterns of deputies seeking

affordable housing. However, if the Department is sincere in its efforts to implement Core

Values and community-based policing, it must seriously consider whether its job selection

and transfer poliCies should be revised to assure appropriate racial and gender diversity

at each unit.

Among the policies that must be examined are job transfer policies that pose signifi-

cant barriers to women and minorities. The movement of officers within the Department

appears to be far too dependent upon personal connections, making such movement more

difficult for women and minorities. One officer stated, "If you don't come with recommen-

dations, you're dead in the water."

In addition, many job openings are not included on regularly circulated job openings

lists. For example, many serg~ant and lateral transfer positions are teletyped and posted

only if the captain or other manager desires them to be. This makes word-of-mouth the pri-

mary way to find out about these openings. Captains have virtual independence in selecting

deputies to transfer to their stations, and some captains limit hiring to people they already

know. There is no procedure by which an unsuccessful transfer applicant is advised why

he or she was not selected for an opening. A deputy who complains about not having been

selected may hurt his or her career by virtue of this fact alone, depending upon the reaction

311
 of the hiring officer.

These features of an "old-boy system" prevent desired movement by deputies with-

out personal connections, who tend disproportionately to be women and minorities. One

long-time middle manager described the attitude of many managers as "You take care of

people you like, and you mess over people you don't."

Promotions

Widespread internal dissatisfaction with the promotion process was indicated in the

SOP Survey, in which 64% of respondents stated that the most deserving "seldom" to

"rarely" are promoted. Only 14% stated that promotions are based more on merit than on
inappropriate criteria. Favoritism and having the right connections were identified by

officers as common means to obtain promotions.

A high-level officer stated that the evaluation of an applicant's merit is "all based on

opinion," rather than objective facts, and that management believes it has the "territorial

right to pick people it is comfortable with." Not surprisingly, given this reliance on crite-

ria other than merit, minorities do not believe that they are "given the same promotional

respect" as are Caucasians.

The Department needs to recognize that major messages about institutional values

are communicated by promotion decisions. When the Department declines to promote an

officer because his or her native language is not English, and, therefore, he or she bas a

distinctive style of communication, it sends a message that undermines its own efforts to

enhance tolerance of diversity. One high-level manager stated that "There is a lack of

consistency in promotion messages." Acceptance of the concepts of Core Values and ser-

vice-oriented policing is not always rewarded in promotion decisions, nor does resistance

to these new policies consistently prevent promotion. If the Department is serious about

implementing Core Values internally. it must assure that every promotion decision is

312
 consistent with those values.

Failure to Utilize j}lulti-Cultural Resources

In our judgment, the Department is not fully utilizing its rich multi-cultural human

resources. For example, the Department has not utilized its minority law enforcement offi-

cer associations and has not communicated the message that such groups serve an important

function. Peer acceptance of these groups is not always the case. A sergeant

told one such group that it could not meet again in a Departmental room open to community

meetings. Officers active in these associations are asked far too frequently by other

officers why there is a need for such an organization. One typical question is, "Isn't that

the same as if we formed a Ku Klux Klan?"

To the contrary, these groups serve a vital peer support function and are deeply

involved in volunteer service activities in communities that the Departtnent serves.

They embody the ideals of Core Values and community-oriented policing and should be

encouraged.

Many minority officers reported an eagerness to assist in the Department's cultural

awareness work, and several reported with disappointment that they had volunteered to

design and present training programs, but were not selected. These officers have important

knowledge, experience and insights regarding effective and sensitive community-based

policing. Many of them grew up in the neighborhoods served by the Department

Their cultural knowledge and communication skills could be invaluable in defusing

tensions on a street comer or in a jail cell. Their knowledge of neighborhoods can enhance

officer safety, as in the instance of a minority sergeant ordering a deputy to call off a chase

that was taking him, unknowingly, into a gang ambush area.

Many minority officers have a broad historical and societal perspective that is most

useful in the Department's efforts to increase the sophistication and effectiveness of its

313
 community-policing efforts. As one deputy put it. "I am very interested in how this job

fits into the total society." For example. a number of officers expressed interest in mak-
ing certain that the Departmental response to the recent civil unrest takes into considera-

tion the full historical and political context of those events. They expressed grave con-

cern regarding growing societal rifts and are eager to offer their unique skills and per-

spectives as minority law enforcement officers to address serious community problems.

Many of them have first-hand experience. either professionally or personally,

in difficult issues with which the Department is grappling. The Department appears to

have made little use of these resources. If it is serious about community-based policing,

it must find ways to utilize these talents in all aspects of Departmental work and particu-

larly in Core Values. Service-Oriented Policing and Cultural Awareness activities.

Outside Resources

While the Department is currently pursuing a number of new initiatives. there

appears to be substantial institutional reluctance to use outside experts. Notable excep-

tions occurred in the development of the Reducing Prejudice and Eliminating

Discrimination class and the class on Gay and Lesbian Issues, in which highly skilled

outside community experts were deeply involved.

In other areas, bow ever. there has been little utilization of this talent pool. For

example, in developing the Cultural Awareness class, althougb there was some advice

from the Cultural Awareness Committee, there did not appear to be any serious utiliza-

tion of experts. The Department appears to have made very little use of outside experts

in its Core Values work, its service-oriented policing activities.

While budget problems have been cited as the reason for failure to tum to experts, it

would seem that a lack of interest in or knowledge of community resources, rooted in

institutional insularity, is the more fundamental cause.

314
 The Department takes pride in being a leader on certain law enforcement issues, such

as the development of training standards adopted by POST. It is frequently contacted by

other departments that seek to model their policies after those of the LASD. Unfortunately,

this Departmental pride is too often accompanied by a virtual lack of interest in what other

law enforcement agencies, outside experts or community groups have to offer the

Department.

For an institution of its size, the Department makes virtually no use of academic or law

enforcement experts. Nor does it have any policy to encourage its personnel, even at the

higher levels, to spend time at other institutions. Those rare instances we heard about were

initiated by an interested individual rather than by any Departmental policy. For example,

we heard of only one officer who has spent time at other government agencies, where she

developed knowledge and perspective that are invaluable to the Department.

At his own request, an Asian officer participated in a high-level monthly Asian round-

table, which served valuable recruitment and service-oriented policing purposes. When he

cbanged job assignments, he was not replaced. This must call into question the

Department's interest in that community. Althougb other officers participate on outside

committee work, that work appears to be limited to local interagency committees and state

POST committees.

In order to obtain state-of-the-art thinking on all pbases of law enforcement work, the

Department must make substantially greater utilization of outside resources including acad-

emicand law enforcement experts. leading law enforcement agencies nationwide and local

community resources.

"Contempt of Cop"

Tbe lawlessness at the Lynwood Station as discussed in the next chapter illustrates

wbat can bappen when deputies are inadequately supervised. Althougb we were not

315
 convinced that various Lynwood deputies had formed white

supremacist cells, we did believe accounts by residents of the area of

vigilante behavior by Lynwood deputies.
Excerpt.
From Interview Given their contempt of any supervisors who tried to restrain them,
rIIIitA alf Emtrge"" PlrysicialJ
01 Couty USC GeT/tral Hospital
the depredations of the Lynwood clique were extremely difficult
Febrwaf"J 5, 199Z
to contain.
-II was ID Ipproximltely 40 yur We understand that as many as 16 of these deputies have been
old HisplDic mall wbo was wait-
iag to bl truted, lad be was wait- transferred out of Lynwood. We agree that it was absolutely neces-
ing I loag timl lad he was some·
wblt verbll Ibout the wlit sary 10 break up the group. We only hope that any station comman-
.•• After Ibout 10 hour or so be
beglD to flka I seizurl, wllich is der who inherits these deputies makes certain that they are not per-
I CODIIDOD occurreDU witll us
tblrl. I Wit Ibl. to tell that it
mined to spread their former attitudes and conduct throughout the
WlsD't I rill "seizarl bicausl I
Department. Firsthand accounts of friction between deputies and
bid SliD tbis happeD many times,
but from wblt I SIW the patient Lynwood transferees at the new stations have already come to our
slid from bis "It, fan 00 tbe floor,
oato bis stomlcb lad begla flail- attention. In one recent instance, a fistfight broke out after a deputy
ing bis IilDbs. HI dida't Ipptar to
pose lay tbrelt to Iny of tbe other from a "slow" station criticized a former Lynwood training officer's
pltitots 00 thl iail wlrd nor did be
It lay tim. appelr to pose harsh treatment of a trainee at the new station.
I thr.lt to lay of the staH . , ..
Five sheriHs desceaded upoa him
In our later discussion of the GET team, we allude to conduct
lad oat of tbem 00 elcb limb. !
that at best can be characterized as borderline: rousting of alleged
The pltieDt wltlyiag 00 bis stom-
Icb .•. ia tb. proae positioD. He gang members without substantial cause, possibly illegal searches,
was clllrly cOlDpletaly restrained I
by th. four sberiHs 00 lIis limbs and unnecessary confrontations. Some within the Department
IUd the fiftb sb.riH.1 guess be was
I depI". clme Iloag lad IIrabbed believe that the GET team can use highly suspect tactics with I
tbe back of bis beld, grlbbed bim I
by the hair lad b. begla reputed- impunity because of the unsympathetic nature of the "gangbangers"
ly slammiag bis face lad forebud
against whom the tactics are directed. Among the most disturbing
oato tbe tile Door with wbat I coa-
sidered sucb excessive force thlt I
behavior we came across in our investigation involved GET, and
WIS coDceraed Ibout tbe slfety ..
perhaps the most troubling of all is what occurred in Ramona

Gardens in August of 1991.

A GET car pursued a Monte Carlo car suspected of containing

316
gang members out of County territory into a housing project in the

City of Los Angeles late on a summer night. It lost the car. Instead

of leaving the area which was outside LASD territory, the GET car
of lb. pali.IIL H. did Ibi. for aboat
continued to prowl Ramona Gardens. As the car moved slowly 301060 •• colld •• I WIlli oVlr to
bim lAd I.aid IOmllbiall to Ibe
througb the streets of the project, the deputies came across a group deputy to til. Iff.ct tbat woald be
pl .... stop it, I w•• cODclnld
of 8 to 12 Hispanic youths congregated near a small wall. Tbe dri-
tb.t II. WlllloiDII to bart tbi.
p.tint•• ad I WII told, 'Doclor, lI.t
ver stopped the car and shined the side spotlight attacbed to the car
out of lI.r., tIIi. is DOlI of your
on the group for about 15 seconds. Noting no particular reaction by basiaus:- (D •• cribiDII" nllll
iD 1981 or 19191,
the group, the deputies continued slowly driving down the street. Ibi. pati.al w••• 11 iD-patilat.
H. was iD • bId ia ODI of tile back
About 20 to 30 feet past the group, the car was hit near the trunk
row •. HI was i. four POiDt leatblr
with a bottle. The deputy driving the car backed up and debated restr.iAts. III olblr word., .U bi.
extremitiel. H. b.d •• iatr.-
with bis partner whether they should get out of the car. Tbe more Vlaous iii' ia pl.c •..•.
lb. AU .... WII rlportedly .djllStillll
experienced of the two deputies counseled leaving the scene. The bis I.V .• ad iAadVlrtllldy c.ased
bim 10m. p.iD .ad tbe p.tieDt
younger deputy, recently transferred from Lynwood, decided other- can.d II.,. bitcll quitl loudly,
loud .00111111 to III lleard dow. til.
wise, got out of the car and approached the group near the wall. banw.y. 0 •• of til. d.pati .. b•• r-
iall Ibis .ad lIIillll prot.ctiv. of lbl
Tbe deputy confronted a youth, known as "Crow," who was flashing
m.dic.lst.H rll dow. tb. lllall-
w.y lid r.port.dly puacbld lb.
a gang sign. By his own account, he asked, "wbat's your problem?"
p.ti.at Vlry bird to tbe fac •• n.
Crow replied, "I ain't got no problem, this is Big Hazard [the name p.li.at illst.iDed .Iaci.llr.ctun
from tbis iajlry, ..• 1C.II't IIIHr-
of a gang]. I ain't got no problem." The deputy then repeated, staad bow I p.tilill tII.t bas .n
foar .xtnlDiti .. nstr.ill.d could
"What's your problem?" pr... llt Illoallil 01 • tllr•• t to aDJ-
oa. that II. sboald •• '"Iulted ia
The testimony is in conflict about wbo shoved whom first, but thi.lDlaa.,: (Delcribi'II" iaci-
dIal ia 1981 or 19191,
the gist of it is that the confrontation turned physical, others joined
-wIn I bow b. w•• ia castody
the group to see what was happening, the group began to move, the blc.u.. II. WI. 01 til. 13tb lIoor.
I do.'t bow il II. WI. frOID til. jlil
deputy drew his gun to restrain them, someone hit the deputy's part- Wlrd or rUlady Irr.st.d ...

ner and he fell to the ground, and the deputy fired three sbots, kiJIing.

a 19-year-old Hispanic named Arturo "Smokey" Jimenez.

The shooting was found by tlle LASD to be within policy and

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a grand jury declined to indict the deputy who killed Mr. Jimenez.

Although the Internal Affairs investigation of the incident was near-

ly flawless and supported a case for substantial discipline,

Sb. (r.f.rring to Inotber pbysi-
ciaal claims tbat on. of tbe the Deparunent decided to impose no discipline at all.
deputies ia aa anempt to restrain
tb. patient along witb tbe others, What set of attitudes and assumptions led the deputies into
plac.d som. pajamas over tbe
Ramona Gardens and caused them to prowl around looking for the
,atitaa's 'aCl, onr bis mOliltlaad
lOse for a proloag.d period of
car they had lost? What impelled one of them to get out of the car
tim., lad actually aspbyxiated tbe
pati.at. In otb.r words, be to confront the group against the wall? Who taught them, or failed
stopp.d br.atbing. Sb. claims that
bis bllrt stopp.d beating, tbat b. to teach them, about tactics, strategy, good sense and keeping things
lost a pulse, lost bis pulse. and
cardiopulmonary rasuscitation in proportion? In hindsight, the conduct was reckless and senseless.
WII begua. Fortunately, shl
clailDs that rllllscitation measures Why did the deputies have to pursue the car outside of their
w.r. takea iD .DOllgb tilD' to save
own territory? Both deputies conceded that they had no reason to
tb. patint's life, blcause bl
appareatly did surviv.:
believe the Monte Carlo was stolen or otherwise connected to crimi-
-But tbil is kind of my .xp.rience,
al w.II, tbat oa a fr.qulnt basil nal conduct. Why didn't they call the LAPD to pick up the pursuit?
SOlD. of tb. sberiffs s.. med to be a
What did they think was afoot that justified continuing the hunt?
linl. bit sadistic aod tbat wheD we
bav. to p.rfOnD painful procedurll
Why after they lost the car did they stay in Ramona Gardens?
tJaat tillY would fiDd it aID using
wbea the patieat screamed out ia Why did one deputy get out of the car? Was he powerless to stop
paia, I melD, I'm c.rtainly DOt try-
i ng to say that all of tbem did that. himself from taking the fatal step of confronting the group, which
it wala Vlry Imall minority, but
tb.r. w.re a few that would do was not connected to the lost car, or even clearly connected to the
tbil:(Describing anoth.r
incid.ntl bottle that was thrown? What was the deputy trying to prove?

• The answer, we speculate, is that this incident is the result of

the deputy's compulsion to prove that he could not be "fronted off'

or caused to lose face, or to permit any test of his ability to impose

control. When he left the car to approach the group. there was insuf-

ficient reason to risk a confrontation. At worst, two deputies bad lost

a car they wanted to stop and a bottle had been thrown at their patrol

car. We speculate that the frustration oflosing the car, combined

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 with the taunt from the bOUle (which was probably witnessed or even possibly thrown by

the group against the wall). was so intolerable that the deputy

felt compelled to humiliate someone to dispel the personal affront that the deputy read into

the events.

Tbis is not a story of a bungled arrest. It is a story of deficient training and flawed

judgment, and a deputy who was not suited for a GET assignment. This is not an attitude

limited to Lynwood or GET. It is the same attitude that caused another deputy to fly into

a rage and crush the testicle of a man who had the temerity to call the deputy "fat" and sug-

gest that he "get a real job," an incident that we discuss in the Litigation chapter of the

Report. It is the same auitude lhat caused a sergeant to order deputies to spray Mace on an

inmate who had the audacity not to face the sergeant when spoken to. As a highly-placed

LASD officer said, "Anger, not fear, is the number one cause of excessive force.

It is rage at defiance of authority.·

This is the worst aspect of police culture, where the worst crime of all is "contempt

of cop:" the deputy cannot let pass the slightest challenge or failure to immediately comply.

It is here that excessive force starts and needs to be stopped.

Our chapter on community policing suggests ways in which this culture can be

changed. Wbat Ramona Gardens represents is a lethal version of "I'm going to show you

wbo:s Boss around here." Certainly in police work there are occasions when it is entirely

proper to establish control. But when that becomes the all-encompassing end and not the

narrow means to a particular law enforcement result. it is unacceptable.

Recommendations:

1. The Department must vigorously enforce its anti-hazing policy, at;'ti-discrimt-

nation policy and sexual harassment policy, and hold all managers accountable for

such enforcement.

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2. In order to make Departmental expectations clear, the Department must

hold training for a" sworn personnel in its anti-hazing, anti-discrimination and sex-

ual harassment policies.

3. The Department must train a" managers to confront a" forms of discrimina-

tion and to articulate and enforce the bounds of acceptable conduct.

4. The Department should conduct pre-employment screening of applicants

for racial gender and sexual orientation bias.

5. The Sheriff's Department should create an atmosphere within the

Department where sexual orientation is as irrelevant to the workplace as race, eth-

nicity or gender.

6. The Department should condemn and impose discipline for discrimination

based on sexual orientation in the same way and to the same degree it purports to

condemn racism, sexism or bias based on ethnicity. It should not tolerate homo-

phobic slurs and remarks.

7. The Sheriff's Department should quickly release publicly the contemplated

anti-discrimination statement that includes "sexual orientation." This statement

must be applicable to a" areas in which the Department functions, including

recruitment, hiring and internal promotion decisions.

8. The Sheriff's Department should do targeted recruiting of gays and les-

bians as does the San Francisco County Sheriffs Department.

9. The Sheriff's Departm~nt needs to continue its efforts to incorporate gay

and lesbian issues into its cultural awareness sensitivity program for the Sheriffs

Academy. We recommend that the Sheriff's Department use the resources avail-

able to them from the gay and lesbian community in order to develop an effective

curriculum.

10. The Department also needs to institute similar classes for veteran mem-

bers of the Department, including supervisors and other officers.

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The West Hollywood Gay and Lesbian/Sheriff's Conference Committee has devel-

oped such a program. The Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Police Advisory Task Force

already provides such programs on a station-by-station basis within the Los Angeles

Police Department and other organizations. The Sheriff's Department should insti-

tute the same program, or a similar program, in the Los Angeles Sheriff's

Department.

11. The Department should develop Departmental policy and goals to increase

racial and gender diversity in all Department units, and hold all managers account-

able for thier implementation.

12. The Department must assure that minority, female, gay and lesbian person-

nel are fully involved in all Departmental activities, and particularly in Core Values,

service-oriented policing and cultural awareness work.

13. All job openings must be published and widely disseminated on a regular

basis.

14. A system should be instituted to advise unsuccessful transfer applicants why

they were not selected.

15. The Department should consider instituting flexible schedule, family leave

and part-time work policies.

16. The Department must budget a substantial sum to enable it greatly to

increase its utilization of outside resources including experts, leading law enforc.

ment agencies and communit.y groups and individuals. These resources should be

utilized to improve recruitment and to design and implement all initiatives related to

community-based policing, cultural awareness and reduction of excessive force.

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24. Deputy Gangs

We have examined the controversial allegation that racist deputy gangs exist within

the LASD. allegedly including. among others. the "Vikings" at the Lynwood Station.

These allegations merited investigation because they are of a profoundly serious nature,

touching the fundamental fitness of the LASD to perform its mission.

After reviewing the records of certain civil suits against the Department, including

findings by a federal district judge giving credence to allegations concerning the existence

of such gangs, and after a series of interviews with persons who hold a wide range of views

on the issue, we conclude that, although there is some evidence suggestive of the existence

of deputy gangs, such evidence is, at most, inconclusive. Nevertheless, it appears that some

deputies at the Department's Lynwood Station associate with the "Viking" symbol, and

appear at least in times past to have engaged in behavior that is brutal and intolerable and is

typically associated with street gangs. Such conduct WOUld, at a minimum, erode the com-

munity's trust in the LASD, which is essential for the Department to perform its mission.

To investigate these allegations, we first examined the record in the case of Thomas v.

County of Los Angeles, which is before U.S. District Court Judge Terry J. Hatter.

Additionally, we reviewed other case files concerning deputy misconduct and interviewed

members of the Department, members of the community, lawyers serving as plaintiffs'

counsel in suits against the Department, former deputies and others.

Record in Thomas and ALADS Lawsuits

The Thomas plaintiffs allege that deputies at the Lynwood Station engaged in numer-

ous acts of excessive force, including shootings, beatings and the destruction of property.

Although the Thomas suit does not focus specifically upon deputy gangs, the plaintiffs

point to the unchecked and abusive activities of deputies - including alleged Vikings - to

demonstrate the failure of Department supervisors to maintain control over their deputies.

In a preliminary injunction hearing before Judge Hatter, the plaintiffs woo an order

instructing the LASD to follow its own operational guidelines. Regarding the Vikings,

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Judge Hatter found that "[m]any of the incidents which brought about this motion

involved a group of Lynwood area deputies who are members of a neo-nazi, white

supremacist gang - the Vikings - which exists with the knowledge of departmental

policy makers." Thomos. No. CV 90-5217 TJH (Ex), para. 7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 1991)

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).

Other civil suits have also involved allegations of gang-like behavior by deputies.

A typical piece of evidence is the fact Lhat certain deputies wear tattoos, sometimes

accompanied by language that could conceivably be interpreted as being eLhnically

derogatory (e.g., "Chango Fighter").

Several plaintiffs' lawyers in Thomas stated that deputy declarations in Association

for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (A LADS) constituted the

strongest evidence demonstrating the Vikings' activities at Lynwood Station. ALADS

arose from a transfer of four deputies from Lynwood Station. These deputies charged

Lhat they were not advised of the reasons for their transfers, and that the circumstances

under which they were transferred had irreparably damaged their careers.

In suppon of their case, the ALADS plaintiffs offered declarations by themselves and

other deputies that describe long-standing rumors and suspicions that the Vikings are a

racist, white supremacist group. The declarations state that in April or June 1990, the

then-~aptain of the Lynwood Station called a meeting attended by many deputies. At this

meeting, he allegedly called the Vikings a malignant and disruptive element within the

station whose members had engaged in off-duty criminal activity.

The declarations further claim that in November 1990, there were rumors within the

Lynwood Station that the Long Beach Press-Telegram newspaper was investigating

reports of a cult-like deputy gang at the Lynwood Station that held white supremacist

beliefs. At a meeting arranged by certain deputies to discuss these rumors, the captain

again allegedly stated that the Vikings were a disruptive force that engaged in criminal

activity and interfered with the operations of the Department.

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 Finally. tile ALADS declarations state tilat shortly after tile publication of newspaper

articles concerning tile existence of tile Vikings, four deputies were notified of tileir immi-

nent transfers from tile Lynwood Station. The declarants claimed that the circumstances

of the transfers would severely damage their careers, tainting them witil a reputation of

being racist and insensitive to the needs of minority members of the community. At the

same time, the deputy declarants, who alleged that they were accused of being racists, did

not admit to harboring racist beliefs, nor did they accuse others of being white suprema-

cists. To the contrary, tile declarants state that the four plaintiff deputies were exemplary

performers and tilat charges maligning tilem in any manner were groundless.

The ALADS declarations refer to several newspaper articles published by the Press-

Telegram and other newspapers in December 1990, which we have reviewed. These arti-

cles were offered as exhibits in tile ALADS suit. The articles alleged that a deputy gang at

the Lynwood Station known as the Vikings had taken on the characteristics of a street gang.

The articles described how Viking deputies exchanged gang-style hand signs, used gang-

like slang speech when addressing street gang members and alleged that these deputies

sprayed Viking graffiti ("LVS25," for example, which allegedly denotes Lynwood Viking

Station 25) in the Lynwood community. The articles quoted the station's then-captain as

describing the Vikings as a disruptive disciplinary problem, whose members harassed and

intimidated supervisors and openly engaged in jargon and hand signals associated with

street gangs ...

Interview with the Captain

The former captain of Lynwood served as the commander from June 1989 until May

1992. He told us that he regarded the Viking symbol as a "childish" distraction from the

professional responsibilities of the Lynwood deputies, and eventually eliminated the Viking

emblem as Lynwood's symbol when most African-American deputies and some Hispanic

325
deputies objected to the symbol's Aryan connotation. He agreed with them that the

Viking was an inappropriate symbol for a Sheriff s station in a mulliethnic community

such as Lynwood.

The captain acknowledged that a group of deputies at the Lynwood Station had affil-

iated especially closely with the Viking symbol. He further stated that this "inner group"

of Vikings had in the past engaged in misbehavior, such as painting Viking graffiti over

street gang graffiti, harassing supervisors and damaging their personal propeny. He also

acknowledged that some deputies flashed Viking hand signals in the presence of street

gang members, although such signals might have been designed to establish a rapport

with gang members.

The captain said that he held meetings with deputies to discuss the demise of the

Viking symbol. Some deputies resented this change, but the captain explained that the

historical significance of Vikings - as Aryan warriors who raped and pillaged - was

inappropriate for law enforcement officials. Moreover, he beiieved that the Vikings COD-

stituted an internal disciplinary problem for the Lynwood Station, not a white suprema-

cist threat to the Lynwood community. He found that the Vikings were not a racially

motivated group, declaring that he had never seen anything racial about the Vikings in his

three years at the station.

We were impressed by the captain's candor and demeanor. Although he may have

understated the problems at Lynwood, we found him to be credible and to have done a

good job in difficult circumstances. We were panicularly impressed by his willingness to

break up deputy cliques and transfer the asserted troublemakers elsewhere, even over the

objections of the deputy's union. This willingness to do what is right and in the interests

of the entire department - even at the risk of incurring the wrath of the union - is com-

mendable.

We also talked to this captain's successor whom we also found very impressive and

who is highly regarded in the LASD. Her analysis of the problems at Lynwood were con-

326
 ,

sistent with ber predecessor's, and we are bopeful that sbe will continue to eradicate the

problems at the station.

Anietra Haley Tapes

While interviewing an attorney for the plaintiffs In the Thomas case, we discussed alle-

gations of Viking complicity in the drive-by shooting death of Lloyd Polk on December 7,

1990. Obviously, such allegations are shocking and controversial. They are also, at this

point, unsubstantiated.

Polk was a plaintiff in a case against the Department. Anietra Haley, an employee at

the Lynwood Station at the time of Polk's shooting, claimed to have overheard a conversa-

tion in which Lynwood deputies plotted to kill Polk.

Haley later recanted her allegation against the deputies and pleaded gUilty in federal

court to knowingly and willfully making false statements to the FBI. The United States

Attorney's office is investigating allegations that Haley's falsehoods were suborned by an

investigator for plaintiffs in the Thomas case.

In addition to discussing the Thomas case, the attorney gave us examples of inflamma-

tory racist literature that had been found at the Lynwood Station. Some of these materials

were presented as exhibits in the Thomos and other cases. This literature included a viru-

lently racist joke targeted at African-Americans and a map of the Lynwood area configured

in the shape of the African continent We believe that this literature is at least several years

old, however.

Interview with Former Lynwood Station Deputy

We also interviewed a former Lynwood Station deputy who insisted on remaining

anonymous. Without offering details, this individual claimed that the Vikings were a racist

group that terrorized the Lynwood minority population, and that supervisors at Lynwood

327
 Station purposely ignored the Vikings' activities. This witness promised to talk with us

again. but never did so.

We also spoke with an individual who had retired from the Department in 1990.

He had a number of negative things to say about the Department. though none of them

confirmed the allegation of racist gangs. According to him, groups such as the Red

Devils from East Los Angeles developed in the LASD because of group pressure.

In other words, a group of individuals developed an attitude of "us against the world."

He believes such groups began with good intentions, but that deputies in such groups

became carried away and their conduct deteriorated. He has seen members of such
groups drink and become violent. He himself was a Red Devil in East Los Angeles in

the early 1970·s. He believes that such groups are not racist, nor are they made up only

of whites. Rather, such groups consist of more :::-cgressive deputies, who take on an

identity as "hard chargers."

Sheriff's Bulletin No.396

We reviewed Sheriffs Bulletin No. 396, dated December 11, 1990, which is entitled

"Professionalism." In the Bulletin, Sheriff Block notes the media focus on the adoption.

of gang-like mannerisms by deputies. Although he does not admit that any of the reports

are true, Block condemns gang-style behavior by deputies as damaging to the

Department's image and, consequently, its ability to perform its job. "I consider any

behavior which imitates the conduct of social predators in our community unprofessional

and counterproductive to our mission. I believe that our appearances and conduct are

indicative of our overall performance as law enforcement officers."

Based upon the foregoing, we have reached certain conclusions. We have found

little evidence concerning the activities of deputy gangs other than the Vikings, and thus

focus our discussion on the Vikings group at the Lynwood Station.

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 '-

The evidence does not conclusively demonstrate the existence of racist deputy

gangs. The newspaper articles, the ,1LADS deciarations. the captain' s comments,

and mucb of the other evidence that we examined indicates that an inner group of deputies

with peculiar and unique bard attitudes likely did exist at the Lynwood Station. Those

attitudes manifested themselves in the form of excessive force and disciplinary problems

between deputies and !.heir supervisors. The spirit of this group was symbolized by !.he

Viking emblem; and was most clearly expressed by the sporting of tattoos and their use at

one time of gang-style hand signs. jargon and graffiti.

Sources within the LASD said that such cliques tend to be formed around "hard charg-

ers" who are assigned to the early morning and late night shifts. It is said that those who

prefer to work from about midnight to 8 a.m. are a different breed who promote and perpet-

uate an "Us vs. Them" and a "kick ass and take names" super-macho culture at various

stations.

These cliques are found particularly at stations in areas heavily populated by minorities

-!.he so-called "ghetto" stations - and deputies at those stations recruit persons similar

in attitude to themselves from among the deputies nearing the end of their custody rotation.

Several sources said that deputies at those stations test and size-up recruits during their

field training and take steps to assure that only those deputies who replicate their bard atti-

tudes are eventually assigned on a long-time basis to those stations. It is rumored that the

field training officers abet and perpetuate these abuses and in that connection, we refer to

the cbapter on Patrol Assignment and Training.

Members of the Department are candid in discussing the problems of early morning

cliques: As one sergeant put it. "I agree with rotating problem deputies on occasion.

But you're always going to have a problem with early morning cliques. They're a perennial .

problem because the only people they come across at 3 a.m. are bad guys. And let's face it.

the bad guys expect to be treated poorly by the police. Also, it can get real slow out there

and the deputies will start horsing around."

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Bad habits that develop during tours of duty on early morning shins are not easily

cured by putting the deputies to work during the daytime. As one sergeant put it,

"moving the guy doesn't make him change. If you've got a guy on 'earJies' who's frying

hands [keeping the detainee's hands on the hot part of the car hood) or having people sit

on the curb, changing him to days isn't going to break him of the habit." It can make
things worse, in the view of some, because the offensive practices are perpetuated during

the daytime on people indiscriminately: As one officer related, "we've got a deputy ...

who uses sit-downs and prone-outs indiscriminately because maybe he had to do it on

Earlies. The other day he made a 47-year old black housewife whom he stopped for a

traffic violation sit down on the curb across the street from MLK Hospital, where I

believe she worked. Now that's a disaster. That's how you get people crying racism."

We were told by at least one reliable firsthand observer that the members of a former
early morning clique at the Lynwood station had been trained by field training officers

who were nothing more than "thugs." The problems at Lynwood had festered for a long

time before the current captain's predecessor was placed at the station. As one seasoned

observer from within the LASD put it, "The rough station used to be Firestone. When

they opened Lynwood, Firestone transferred all its 'heavies' to Lynwood. Everyone else

caught on. Lynwood started out like a penal colony -like Australia."

The last unruly Lynwood early morning clique, now apparently no longer in existence,

is reported to have challenged all authority, and harassed and intimidated any sergeants
or lieutenants wbo stood in their way; going so far, we have been told, as to command

field sergeants to leave the scene of arrests, to slash the tires of supervisors they did not
like, to disregard orders not to roam freely outside their patrol areas into the city of

Los Angeles and to smear excrement and other noxious substances over the engines of

supervisors' cars. We cannot vouch for the accuracy of all the variants on these stories,

and some do have an apocryphal ring to them, but the fact that these stories are abroad

and frequently repeated erodes respect for the LASD and its supervisors. We should also

330
note that stories about various stations become compressed: In discussing the Thomas case,

one officer noted that "everyone has taken everything that has happened at Lynwood for the

past 10 years and bunched it all together as if it happened only a couple of months ago.

It's not fair to us who weren't around in '81 or '83."

Nevertheless, whether or not the spirit exhibited by the Vikings is racist in nature is

less clear. The racist maps and other literature found at the Lynwood Station are dated and
do not prove anything regarding the more recent state of affairs.

Further. the other evidence describing the Vikings as racist is largely second and third-

hand. anecdotal, and uncorroborated. As an example, the declarations in the ALADS case,

deemed by the Thomos plaintiffs' attorneys to be the most convincing proof of the Vikings'

racist nature. merely allude to rumors that the Vikings are inspired by race hatred. These

rumors certainly do not constitute convincing evidence of racist gangs within the

Department.
Haley's allegations that Viking deputies conspired to kill Polk because he had the
temerity to bring a lawsuit against the Deparnnent are dramatic, but her recantation and

gUilty plea obviously call her credibility into question.

In sum, while there may be some suppon for the allegations that a racist deputy gang

existed at Lynwood, there is no persuasive evidence to date.

There is no doubt, however, that cenain deputies' reson to gang mannerisms feeds a

public perception that racist deputy cliques may exist within the Depanmenl

As Sheriff Block bimself declares, the use by deputies of gang band signs, tattoos and

graffiti are higbly inappropriate and unprofessional and cannot be tolerated. Rather than

establisbing rapport with the community, the adoption of gang-like traits can lead commu-
nity residents to regard the deputies as simply another menacing street gang. The result

may be more lawless bebavior.

In similar fasbion, the use of gang terminology by deputies damages the professional

image of the Deparunent. Hence. deputies sbould take care to exercise their First

331
 Amendment rights within the context of Department professionalism. As the former

captain stated. deputies should not need symbols. names. and language to bind them-

selves together - they already have the uniform and the badge. We note in conclusion

that 16 deputies have been transferred out of Lynwood.

Recommendations:

The issue of deputy gangs is inflammatory and should not be allowed to fester.

Therefore, we recommend that the LASD take aggressive steps to eradicate

offensive station mascots and conduct an immediate, thorough Internal Affairs

investigation to identify, root out, and punish severely any lingering gang-like

behavior by its deputies. Unit commanders should aggressively break up deputy

groups which manifest any of the conduct which signifies gang-related activity.

332
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 25. Accountability Within The

Department

Our investigation examined in detail whether the top management of the LASD

appropriately delegates power and authority to middle managers, adequately tracks their

performance, and reacts with a swift supervisory response to substandard performance,

particularly by captains at the station level. Recent efforts by the Department gave com-

manders in the various stations the authority to handle disciplinary problems that formerly

were reserved for more senior managers. There is also some healthy experimentation

taking place, particularly at Temple City Station under Captain Bob Mirabella and within

Field Region III under former Commander (now ChieO Lee Baca, Chiefs Ray Morris and

Larry Anderson, where the captains have been asked to set up force tracking systems

and to fashion community policing projects.

On the other hand, we found that the delegation of authority to captains and others

is being made without clear standards of concomitant accountability and without detailed

definition of their duties as managers in the LASD.

These are not easy things to do, and we are cognizant of the difficulties facing captains.

One fundamental supervisory problem is that the police officer on the street cannot be over-

seen in the performance of his or her duties. The authors of ajoint Harvard University-

Department of Justice study suggest: "[g]iven the conditions of police activity ... officers

work alone, events occur in locations and at times that make them unavailable for direct

oversight, the problems citizens present to police require novel solutions. .. different

forms of supervision are required. These forms of supervision are more akin to coaching

than directing. They include teaching, reviewing, considering alternatives, training,

and other similar techniques.'"

A related problem is the difficulty faced by supervisory personnel in assimilating and

evaluating all of the activity that takes place at a police station. The station is open 24

hours a day. There are several shifts during the day and night with different deputies,

sergeants and lieutenants on duty. The captain is typically at the station during normal

daytime working hours. He or she necessarily has to depend on others to find out what

335
goes on at 3 a.m. Thus. it is exceedingly difficult for anyone manager to really know

what is going on in and around a particular station 24 hours a day.

Another factor aggravating supervisory problems is the high turnover of the corps

of deputies at any station at a given time. Turnover is high for many reasons: a deputy

may want to move from station to station to be nearer his or her home; a deputy may

move in order to advance to a better or more interesting position. Some stations have

more than 25% turnover every year. Sergeants and lieutenants are transferred with some

regularity. Captains change assignments every few years.

Moreover. when a deputy transfers from one station to another. there is no formal

mechanism for the transfer of that deputy's history beyond the bland notations in the

employee's personnel file. As demonstrated elsewhere in this report, personnel evalua-

tions are hardly models of candor and precision. The only way for management at a sta-

tion to find out whether it has been sent a "stand up deputy" or a problem deputy is to

call the watch commanders at the prior station. grill them and do a follow-up check with

Internal Affairs.

In the Sheriffs Department today, there is no clearly defined way to measure and eval-

uate what the captains are doing and how well or poorly they are doing it. There are few

goals and timetables. We would like to see each captain sit down with his or her area

commander and prepare a written annual negotiated plan for the station setting forth spe-

cific goals, timetables for attaining them and ways to measure progress. It should include

a specific plan for reducing force, reducing citizen complaints. handling claims, mediat-

ing resolvable disputes between residents and department personnel, interacting with the

community, implementing community~based policing and imposing discipline. Annual

performance review of captains should include specific review of whether the plan was

mel There should be incentives for captains to reach these goals and disincentives if

they do nOl

Similarly, commanders should sit down annually with their chiefs and prepare a plan

336
to assure that the captains under their charge meet the targets for reducing force and insti-

tuting community-based policing. The performance review of commanders should contain

a substantial component for evaluating whether their captains have met their goals.

Cbiefs should sit down with the very top management and engage in a similar e~ercise.

In this regard, we also recommend that the Sheriff. the Undersheriff, and the two assis-

tant sheriffs bold substantive working meetings at least once every quarter with all captains.

We do not believe that there is adequate direct communication between the top officials of

the Department and the captains who, as noted earlier, have been empowered to run their

own stations as they see fit in many key respects.

The captains in general seemed open to experimentation, willing to implement communi-

ty poliCing. anxious to institute force tracking and critical of the stodginess of top manage-

ment. As one captain told us. "You' ve got to shake up the old boys at the top." Another

captain put it this way, "The top department executives need to look at tomorrow.

They're preoccupied with yesterday." Top management should meet on a regular basis

with the captains.

Tbe Department should augment the setting of targets and timetables with regular and

consistent programs for proactive internal auditing. especially of community satisfaction:

"One form of vigilance is aUditing. An analogy is found in a fmancial audit of a busi-

ness. It is conceded that a financial audit cannot be universal; indeed. attempts to audit

everything may result in auditing nothing. Audits, instead, sample a representative number

of transactions (events) from the relevant universe. There is nothing to prevent police from

adopting similar schemes."z

Auditing programs can run the gamut from sting operations to test for possible corrup-

tion and compliance with policies to an in-depth review "of a given sample of arrests by

interviewing witriesses, defendants, and other interested parties .... Another example is

found in departments that routinely send postcards to a sample of 'customers' to determine

how satisfied they were with police service. Other deparanents routinely monitor samples

337
 of citizens complaints to determine whether they are being properly

handled.")

We believe that the imbalance between delegation of authority to

We rode eloag witb tbe Sheriff's
Gaag hforc.meat Team or GET captains and their concomitant accountability is exacerbated by the
aad ollserv.d conduct aad bave
beard reports of olber coaduct tbat lack of clear performance standards, let alone standards which incor-
was at bast borderline: roustiag of
porate qualitative evaluation of force reduction, complaint reduction
esserted gaag members witb thin
cause; questioaable pat dowas of
and community policing skills. Performance evaluations for all
asserted glng lIembers aad
saarclles of tbeir v.bicles; petty managers are conducted using the same form, rather than on forms
aad not so petty llarallment of
esserted gang members. The GET tailored to the particular and differing responsibilities of various
tllm is widely tbougbt of within
tbe LASD as I collectioa of loose jobs. Expectations in the areas of force reduction and community
caaaoas. lad supervision of it It
Ilist i. times past Ipplreatly is policing have not been clearly articulated and translated into perfor-
viewed as I aear uner failure.
mance evaluation forms.
GET operates IS I bigbly indepen·
deat group. The deputies Ire There is a widespread perception in the Department that officers
Issigned to particular stations. but
they Ire aot under tbe direct at the level of captain and above are almost never disciplined. Until
lupervilio. of tbe captaiD of Ibe
a few years ago, it appears that it simply did not happen. People
stltioa to wbicb tbey are Issigaed.
Rather. tbey report to tbe captaia
within the Sheriffs Department joke about "Get in trouble, get pro-
of Ibe Safe Streets Buteall. TIley
Ire freed frOIl tbe Isserted tyraaay mated." Others point out that one who has performed poorly in an
of respoadiag to radio calli lad
Ife permined to roam tbe streets assignment as a captain will simply be transferred to another assign-
virtuilly It will to deal witb glag
members. Ualike IIIlny otber menl As one sergeant put it: "X really goofed up as captain of ---
patrol deputies. tbe GET depaties
ride two to I c.r. so they put him in the penalty box by transferring him lO---."

Being I"igled to GET is biglll, The perception that discipline is reserved nearly exclusively for
coveted. It IIIIDS tbat assigalleat
to GET was lIore like I frlteraily deputies and the occasional sergeant or lieutenant is borne out by
rUlll tbaa I cODsidered decisioD:
noting that no one can cite an instance of a captain being demoted,

and that the only diSCipline anyone can recall is a recent instance

where a captain received a IS-day suspension,

The discussion earlier in our report about asserted deputy gangs

and cliques of overly aggressive deputies at some stations raises

338
serious questions about supervision and accountability of managers.

The accompanying sidebar describes similar supervisory problems

in the Gang Enforcement Team (GET).

On. knowl.dgeabl. m.mber of tb.
The deputies' union, ALADS, argues with great force and with LASD said, -tII.y would cbooH
who would g.t 01 til. tum by ask·
substantial justification that deputies should not be made the scape- iag GET deplllill whether deputy
'So-aad·So' W81 a 'good guy: So
goats for all force-related abuses. One must look alSo at failures of
tlaey w.,. claoosing tla.i, ~uddies.
What yo •• DeI ap witla is a lIuacll of
training and supervision. Although we believe that it is inappropri-
disciplia. problems, and - ...
ate to shift one whit of blame away from the individual deputy who idioll out there witll tla.ir hddi ..
supervisiag the.,-
commits an inexcusable act, we also believe equally strongly that •

any investigation of that wrongdoing by the Department must

include examination of concomitant failures of supervision and

training.

If a group of deputies on early mornings at a particular station are

using inappropriate force, the inquiry should not stop with identify-

ing and disciplining them. Who was the watch commander and who

were the field sergeants? Who were the lieutenants? What did they

do or fail to do to learn of the problem and to take action to stop it?

If they did. not have the basic information, why not? If they had the

information,_ why did they not do something or take it to the captain?

If the captain knew or should have known, why isn't he the subject

of an administrative investig~tion?

We are not suggesting that every force investigation must tum

into an Inquisition followed by a Reign of Terror. Nor do we mean

to imply that the supervisory personnel at a station can reasonably

be expected to know every bit of wrongdoing that may take place.

On the other hand, there should have been strong discipline about

what was allowed to take root and grow at places like Lynwood and

339
.others. It is not enough that a captain is transferred out of the station to a "penalty box"

assignment at some forlorn custody outpost. Supervisors up and down the chain of com-

mand should have been disciplined. The unions and others rightly point out the double

standard when those with power and prestige survive with a slap on the wrist and a

deputy finds his or her career ruined.

We part company with ALADS, however, when it focuses excessively on the severity

of the punishment meted out to the deputy. From what we have Jearned. discipline of

deputies. if anything. is too light. There are people who never should have been allowed

to remain on the force, who are still there with a badge and a gun. See our discussion of

Problem Officers.

We recommend that the top management demonstrate the un acceptability of excessive

force by becoming personally involved in the disciplinary process. We recommend that

with respect to any letter of intent to discharge. any founded complaint for excessive

. force. or any founded complaint for use of racist. anti-ethnic. sexist, or homophobic slurs
or comments. the deputy or other officer involved meet personally with the Sheriff and

Undersheriff. We further recommend that with respect to the same circumstances. the

Sheriff and Undersheriff meet personally with the Assistant Sheriff in charge and the

Division Chief from the region from which the conduct arose to discuss why the incident

occurred and how it can be prevented in the future. We do not believe that accountability

from the top to the bottom can be enforced unless the Sheriff and Undersberiff demon-

strate by their personal presence and commitment that excessive force and impermissible

conduct toward others will simply not be tolerated.

. .
We thus agree with the union that the disciplinary system is seriously inadequate when

it comes to supervisors and managers.

The case demonstrated by widespread negative perceptions regarding management per-

formance that surfaced in a survey conducted in 1991. Eleven thousand questionnaires

were distributed to sworn and civilian staff. of which 3764 questionnaires were returned.

340
Tbe return rate for deputies was 30%; for sergeants. 60%; for lieutenants, 76%; for cap-

tains, 80%; and for officers above me rank of captain, 68% An astounding 90% of survey

respondents thought me Department did a below average or poor job in addressing unsatis-

factory job perfonnance.

More than 85% of supervisors thought the department did a below average or non-exis-

tent job of training them prior to their first supervisory assignment. Almost half the survey

respondents rated support from top management in the below average to poor range.

The promotion process was rated as below adequate to poor by 68% of those surveyed.

Almost balf thougbt that me promotion process was unfair and 64% felt that the most

deserving seldom to rarely are promoted. Tbese survey results are clear warnings that the

Department needs to look quickly, seriously, and bard at performance evaluations,

standards for promotion. job descriptions, and accountability at all levels.

Closely related to accountability is training for responsibility. As noted earlier, the

members of the Department give it miserable marks in training for supervisory jobs.

The Department has no regular mandated training for new supervisors other than the

lieutenants, wbo attend two weeks of Police Officers' Standards and Training Commission

middle management school.

The only regular supervisory training held in-house is the Sergeant Supervisory School,

which was recently expanded to a three-week course. Other than these mandatory training

courses, there are only occasional one-time classes on issues such as evaluations or problem

employees, and one-time training is currently being held on Core Values. The lack of regu-

lar training, coupled with substantial delegation of authority without accountability, renders

fundamental institutional change difficult.

341
Recommendations:

1. The Department should look promptly at performance evaluations and

accountability at all levels. It needs to conduct regular evaluations of all managers

with respect to newly developed performance standards, including demotion, for

unacceptable performance. The Sheriff and the Undersheriff should become per-

sonally involved in the disciplinary process as described above.

2. We recommend that a formal mechanism should be established to make sure

that each supervisor maintains and passes on to his or her successor or other

supervisors a full and complete picture of the strengths and weaknesses of each

employee.

3. We recommend the implementation of monitoring programs to make sure

that captains are using force tracking systems and other sources of information to

reduce excessive force, impose discipline, reward good behavior, take care of prob-

lem deputies, and in general manage their stations in a manner consistent with

community-based policing standards and in a way to reduce dissatisfaction in the

community. The Sheriff and Undersheriff should meet on a quarterly basis with all

captains.

4. The Department should require supervisory training for all supervisors before

they are promoted into a new position.

5. The Department should develop intensive training programs for captains and

area commanders. The Board of Supervisors should specifically earmark additional

funds for this training.

342
343
344
 26. Accountability to the Public

In the preceeding chapter. we made recommendations for producing increased account-

ability within the lASD. We tum now to an even more important aspect of accountability:

the accountability of the Deparunent as a whole to the public. Police Departments often

exist in isolation behind wbat has been termed "the blue curtain." As demonstrated in our

discussion of the difficulty of filing citizen complaints. the lASD can also be impenetrable

and closed off. Meaningful citizen participation in certain facets of the lASD's activities

is necessary to reduce the Department's isolation and lack of adequate accountability.

The Sheriff s Department itself disputes that it is insufficiently accountable in general.

The Sheriff is a publicly elected official, and Sheriff Block argues that one can bardly be

more accoun£able than that. He also points out both his high approval rating in polls and

the low percentage of voters who think negatively of him. He also notes that he receives

various complaints and calls for redress from the city councils, city managers of contract

cities, the Board of Supervisors and their staffs, and other pOliticians and constituencies.

We acknowledge that. unlike most chiefs of police, he does have to face the voters every

four years. We also can appreciate that the Sheriffs Department has a lot of people to

please. But our point is somewhat different.

We are talking about wbat bappens between elections - the lack of meaningful citizen

partiCipation and oversight in the law enforcement process. The Sheriff has no real boss.

He is not appointed by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, and he is not super-

vised by them. Whatever theoretical authority the State Attorney General has is nominal at

best. The truth is that the Sheriff runs his own Department as he alone sees fit under pow-

ers derived from the California Government Code and California Constitution.

In this sense, the los Angeles County Sheriffs Department differs from other police

forces. Most large metropolitan police departments are under direct civilian oversight.

Oversight of the LAPD, for example, resides in the Los Angeles Police Commission, as the

Christopher Commission pointed out: "In concept, the Police Commission is intended to

function much like a corporate board of directors. setting policies for the Department and

345
overseeing its operations in conjunction with the Chief of Police, who acts as a chief

executive officer responsive to the direction and control of the Police Commission."1

Indeed. we know of no major metropolitan police department in the United States which

is not subject to some civilian oversight - except for the Los Angeles County Sheriffs

Department.

Nor do we believe that the status of the Sheriff as an elected official is tantamount

to civilian oversight. A police commission, as noted earlier, is like a board of directors

which meets on an ongoing and regular basis to receive information and monitor develop-

ments, set broad policy, change direction if necessary, oversee the operations and hold

executives accountable for fulfillment of policy and goals. The opportunity to vote once

every four years for Sheriff is not even arguably the same.

This lack of oversight makes the Sheriff s Department an anomaly among the major

police departments in this country. This fact. standing alone, may nOI be enough to sup-

pon a cbange of policy. But as this report bas set forth, the LASD bas not been able to

oversee its own problems of excessive force in the past and bas not reformed itself with

adequate thoroughness and speed. Hence, there probably should be such oversight by a

police commission or its analog. In its current absence, bowever, and in order to begin

immediately to deal with excessive force issues, it becomes even more critical that there

be citizen,participation and involvement at three levels in the Sberiffs Department's

affairs: (1) in the process for review of citizen complaints; (2) at the level of the

station house; and (3) by way of general monitoring and auditing.

For these purposes, we are speaking of all complaints of police misconduct by any

person not an inmate in a county jail facility. It would include, however, complaints by

persons being booked or held in a lock-up at a station house. For purposes of legitimacy,

integrity, accountability and trust it is absolutely necessary that there be an oppor-

tunity for any person who is aggrieved with the disposition of a police misconduct

complaint to have the Department's decision reviewed by a detached outsider.

346
 This participation legitimatizes the process. It can counter whatever tendency may exist

by police officers to second-guess fellow officers. It adds the potential for greater objectiv-

ity and detachment. It also offers an opportunity for input about police practices. the value

of which cannot be overemphasized. as authors on the topic of police accountability point

out:

"As individual complaints are examined. the acceptable limits of police practices in

enforcing laws and maintaining order can be better delineated. Such an approach ... would

offer the opportunity for conCiliating differences between police and citizens and for clarl-

fyingthe community's moral consensus as to what is the appropriate police response to

crime and disorder. The results would minimize the ambiguities faced by police officers as

they are called upon to serve in our culturally diverse communities .... " :

We are not calling for a Civilian Review Board as such. We do recommend,

however, that the lASD agree to procedures for civilian participation in the adjudica-

tion of citizen complaints which charge, in words or in substance, wrongful force,

harassment, disrespectful conduct and analogous misconduct by the Sheriff's

personnel.

If such a complaint is finally adjudged by the Department to be unfounded

or unable to be resolved, we believe a citizen should be entitled to a review of that

decision by someone outside the Department. That person should be empowered

to affirm the initial adjudication or remand it to the relevant captain for further

investigation or readjudication.

The model we have in mind would operate as does a court of appeal reviewing a

verdict. If the decision of the Department that a complaint is unfounded is supported

by the investigatory record, the Department is affirmed. If not, the case is remanded

for further investigation and redecision by the relevant captain.

We are attempting to create parity between the rigbts afforded to an officer possibly

subject to diSCipline for excessive force and the rights afforded to the citizen who is

347
possibly the victim of such force. As described in greater detail in our chapter on

Complaints and Discipline, if a citizen's complaint is held to be founded and discipline

is proposed, tbe County of Los Angeles provides an extensive review and appeal process

for the officer: If the Department decides to impose discipline in the form of a suspen-

sion without pay for five days or less, the officer may appeal the proposed discipline to

the Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM), a three-member panel appointed by the

Board of Supervisors; if the Department intends to suspend the officer for more than five

days or proposes to discharge or demote the officer, the officer is entitled to a hearing

with respect to the proposed discipline before the Civil Service Commission, a five-mem-

ber panel different from ERCOM but also appointed by the Board of Supervisors. Both

ERCOM and the Civil Service Commission have the power to subpoena wimesses and

order the production of documents. The ERCOM and Civil Service system is described in

greater detail in other sections of this repon.

In contrast, there is no process whatsoever for review of a citizen's complaint that has

been held to be unfounded or unable to be resolved: the station captain whose officer has

been accused by the citizen bas tbe last word. No matter how scrupulously fair and

detached the captain may be, the system does not have the appearance of integrity and

legitimacy and, as we have pointed out in our discussion of investigations of citizen's

complai.nts, the system bas substantial flaws and an inberent bias in favor of the LASD

officer. The opportunity for a review outside the Department will provide the missing

sense of legitimacy and integrity.

Wbo, then, sbould perform the function of civilian review? It seems obvious that there

are professionals whose training and experience uniquely suit them for detached, objec-

tive, fair decisions and the weigbing of facts and evidence: judges. There are substantial

numbers of highly qualified men and women of diverse backgrounds and experience from

all parts of the County who have retired from active service on the bench who are avail-

able to be engaged to perform judicial services.

348
 \Ve suggest that a panel of such individuals could easily be assembled. Individual judges

could !.ben be assigned on a random basis to perfonn a review if an aggrieved citizen wisbes to

appeal !.be Deparunent's finding !.bat his or her complaint is unfounded or cannot be resolved.

Recommendations:

1. We recommend that the Board of Supervisors select an individual of the

highest integrity and trust to meet with a representative of the Sheriff's Department

to prepare a list of mutually acceptable retired judges who, upon acceptance of the

responsibility, would be placed on a panel to be randomly drawn to perform the

review function upon such reasonable terms and conditions as might be arranged

between the County of Los Angeles and the individual judge.

2. The second level of citizen participation should be at the station house.

We refer here to our discussion of community policing, where we recommended that

the Sheriff's Conference Committee in West Hollywood and the ongoing work of the

West Hollywood Public Safety Office with the West Hollywood Station should serve

as a template for similar programs to be established at each station.

3. The final area of citizen participation should be in the process of monitoring

and aUditing the LASD. We believe that a commission should be appointed by the

Board of Supervisors and empowered on an ongoing basis to audit and monitor the

LASD on the topics covered by this report, and any others the Board of Supervisors

may deem appropriate. Such audits should be conducted of the LASD at least every

18 months.

349
350
 Executive Summary

Executit:e Summary and Key Recommendations

In December 1991. the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County appointed retired

Superior Court Judge James G. Kolts as Special Counsel to review the policies. practices

and procedures of the Los Angeles County Sheriff s Department (LASD). including review

of "recruitment. training. job performance and evaluation, record keeping and management

practices. as they relate to allegations of excessive force, the community sensitivity of

deputies and the [LASD's] citizen complaint procedure."

Judge Kolts engaged Merrick J. Bobb of the law firm of Tuttle & Taylor to act as

General Counsel of the investigation. He in tum assembled a staff of more than 60 lawyers,

cenified public accountants, a psychologist, a newspaper editor, and other academics and

professionals to conduct the inquiry which took six months and involved the review of hun-

dreds of thousands of records. Three public hearings were held. The staff met with repre-

sentatives of major interest groups and conducted interviews of hundreds of individual wit-

nesses and groups, including in excess of 100 present and former members of the LASD

and a substantial part of all officers of the rank of captain and above.

Based upon the foregoing, the principal conclusion of Judge Kolts and his staff is

that within the LASD there is deeply disturbing evidence of excessive force and lax

discipline. The LASD has not been able to solve its problems of excessive force in

the past and has not reformed itself with adequate thoroughness and speed.

Implicitly acknowledging this, since mid-1990 the LASD has been undertaking self-exami-

nation in its approach to force, discipline, training and community orientation. The

LASD' s openness to change and flexibility should be credited to Sheriff Sherman Block,

whose temperament and style have encouraged self-examination in the LASD. Sheriff

Block and the LASD do not have a policy or practice of encouragement of excessive force.

Nonetheless, the LASD, like the LAPD, has too many officers who have resorted

to unnecessary and exces~ive force. The LASD has not done an adequate job of di~

351
 ciplining them. It has not dealt adequately with those who supervise them. It has

not listened enough to what the communities and constituencies of the LASD want

and expect in their police. This report is a somber and sobering one in terms of the

large number of brutal incidents that have been and still are occuring. The LASD

has a longer way to go than it has travelled thus far before its performance in the

area of force, complaint resolution, internal investigation and community policing

is where a law enforcement agency of its importance should be.

Judge Kolts and his staff. therefore. made a series of recommendations addressing

each issue studied by the staff. The key recommendations are that the LASD should

emphasize at each level of the department by every means possible that it will not

tolerate excessive force. Every word and action of the LASD should reinforce that

policy. There should be civilian oversight in the process for review of citizen com-

plaints and there should be citizen participation and involvement at the station

level. There should be regular civilian auditing and monitoring of the LASD.

Additionally, fiscal and human resources should be made available for the rapid

implementation of community-based policing at each station and throughout

the LASD.

Other prin,cipal recommendations are:

1. The LASD should put an end to any discouragement by any member of the

LASD to the filing of a citizen's complaint. A complainant should be able to receive

and fill out a citizen's complaint form at a variety of Los Angeles County faciliti ...

Such forms should be available in English, Spanish and any other languages widely

spoken within Los Angeles County.

2. The LASD should put an end to the practice of some officers to refuse to

identify themselves to possible complainants. To that end, each member of the

352
LASD should be required to carry business cards and to hand them out to anyone

who requests one. Each member of the LASD should provide his or her complete

name and employee or badge number to any civilian who requests the information.

No member of the LASD should be allowed to contact complainants or witnesses to

discourage the filing or prosecution of complaints.

3. The LASD and other relevant legislative and executive bodies should remove

obstacles to the complainant's right to learn the status of the investigation of a com-

plaint and what discipline, if any, has been imposed.

4. An independent, adequately staffed Internal Affairs Bureau headed by a com-

mander reporting directly to the Sheriff should have the sole authority to conduct

formal administrative investigations of (a) citizen complaints of unnecessary or

excessive force or harassment on the basis of race, sex, religion, ethnicity or sexual

orientation, (b) officer-involved shootings and (c) deaths which occur in custody.

These investigations should be completed in a timely fashion and the Board of

Supervisors should earmark additional funds for the expansion of the Internal

Affairs Bureau.

5. In order to maximize the enforcement and deterrence functions of the discipli-

nary process, the LASD should vigorously prosecute disciplinary cases and refrain

from mitigating the discipline during the process.

6. The LASD should implement a department-wide force tracking and early

warning system to monitor which deputies use more force than is necessary or are

likely to do so and which stations appear to generate cases involving the us. of

excessive force. The system should integrate data to track which deputies and st.

tions are involved in citizens' complaints, lawsuits and administrative claims.

7. The LASD should adopt as a formal policy that intentional headstrikas with

any impact weapon are strictly prohibited unless deadly force is justified under the

same circumstances.

353
 8. The LASD should create an atmosphere within the LASD where race, gen-

der, ethnicity and sexual orientation are irrelevant to the workplace and should

condemn and impose discipline for any discrimination on any of these denominat-

ed bases. The LASD should conduct proactive, imaginative and effective recruit·

ment efforts particularly for females, minorities and lesbians and gays. The LASD

should increase the salary bonus for bilingual deputies in areas with a large need

for bilingual services and provide other incentives for deputies to become bilingual.

The LASD should take aggressive steps to eradicate offensive station mascots and

conduct an immediate, thorough Internal Affairs investigation to identify, root out

and punish severely any gang-like, racist, sexist, anti-ethnic or homophobic

conduct.

9. The Department should undertake a thorough assessment of the feasibility

of placing deputies in patrol during their probationary period prior to assigning

them to custody. Each deputy should be rotated out of custody onc. every six

months for a minimum of 24 paid hours of community service work in a social sere

vice agency.

10. The Department should adopt substantial reforms of its canine program.

354
355
356
 Footnotes

Chapter.
I. The County Counsel's Office has the authority to settle a civil case against the Department for less

than S20.000 with concurrence of the Depanment. Seulements of more than $20.000 but less than $ 100.000

may be made with the concurrence of the Depanment and Ihe County Claims Board. Settlements of more than

SI00.000 need the approval of the Board of Supervisors.

2. The higher figure of S32 millioD in Sheriffs Depanment selllemenu and verdicts during the past three
years sometimes cited in newspaper accounts includes some non-force cases such as traffic accidenu and false-

arrest cases that do' not involve excessive-force allegatioDJ.

Chapter 7
1. Inmates wishing to lodge a complaint may fill out an "Inmate Complaint Form" which is virtually iden-

tical 10 Ihe complaint form available 10 citizens.

2. Prior to November 1991. dispositions were made by the concerned region chief and then routinely
reviewed by one assistant sheriff and the Undersheriff. The current process was adopted u a part of the con-

cened efron to empower station captains.

3. Naturally, we were unable to contact individuals who were dissuaded from filing a complaint in the

first place.

Chapter 8
1. McErlain. Dilldl] Fora: A" Agl-Old Proo/tIII. A F.I.rl Sollllio •• CALIFORNIA PEACE OFFICER 24.

24 (March 1992).

Chapter 13
1. Civilialliabor force statistics cited in this section are based upoa the 1980 U.S. Census reflected in

the CalifOrnia Employment Development Departmellt'S Marcb 1986 UNr Mllrht I_/tlnllltio_/or A/ftrwIlJiw

Actio. PrOfT'II~.

Chapter 22
1. Jen1d R. Vauglua. "Commullity Oriented Pelicillg - You Cn Make It Happe.... Un.1I"tI Or""
Milltaiu, JUlle 1991, p. 35.
2_ Robert C. Trojuowic:z, "Community Policing ls Not Police-ColDl1lUa.ity Re1atiollS," FBI Un.

E,,/oru.nl B./I,li., October 1990. p. 8.

3. Los A"VI,s Ti.,s. October 24.1991. Metto; Pan B; Page I; CoIumD 2.
4. Los A.glus Ti.,s. October 30; 1991. Metto; Pan B; Page 1; CoIult1Il4.
S. Id.

357
Chapter 25
I. George L. Kelling, Robert Wasserman and Huben Williams, Polict .'.ccoulliability lI11d Co",,,,.,,;ty

Policing, "Perspectives OD Policing," (~ovember 1988, So. 7), a publication of the ~ational Institute of Justice,

V.S. Department of Justice and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and ~aDagement, John F. Kennedy School

of Government, Harvard University, p. 4.

2. Id, at p. 6.

3. Id.

Chapter 26
I. Repon of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, Chapter 10, p. 183

(1991).

2. Werner E. Pellerson. "Police Accountability and Civilian Oversight of Policing: Au American

Perspective, ~ Co",plllinis Agai"sl 'lit Polici/TIII Trend 10 £XI""111 RJt;inP, Chapter 8, p. 273, aarendon Press,

Ouord (1991).

358
 Acknowledgment.

TArrr art a umlNr of indifJitillals

10 a1JAom "" GtJI"1I1 Couul a"ti I VPisJ
10 nprtss gralillltit. Wt mllslllcitloaIJlttigt
a titOIlO tAt piolltn'illg t:l4mplt UIIIy
Tlu 11ItkpntitJII Co",missioll 011 rAe
us AlIgtles Polict DtpllrtllltJIl utUr tAt
tiirtaioll of Wllrrell CArislopAn-.

Wt rraiouI itlf)lIll1ahlt constl tnti

IItivia fro", _", gootifrinuis. incllltiillg
JoA1I DIlIIIII. GilDm Rtr,. R41pA SA4pira.
Mllri SIIi"""z a1lti Robtrt Vlllltin-t11l1
O'Mtl0tfIJ (I M,n-s; RII111101lti FisAn- III
Ht"". Urtrl1l1l. WAiit (I MeAlllifft;
JoA" Spiegtl III Mugn-. TallIS ~ Olso,,;
Midall JtJll:iru III RJdllrtis. WIIlSOll (I
Gtf"SAoll; Uz.rtJla Gotlitll III Finl
11I1tf"SIIIU; CAllrlts Pili"," III Pn-l:itlS Coit;
UCLA Via CAllllalior JostpA Mllnlkl;
M11'1 Niaols of tAt NRDC; allti /lllIrjorir
SlIillhrg lit Till/it ~ TII1/or. Wt also giOt
sptt:i41 dllds 10 DorolA, KaliS IInti A fJiOIl
BoIJIJ for IAtir aJlltlStlllllti i1lpIII.

W, rtaifJlIJ f"UlllSsisl1l1la fro", 11111"1

pm01ls .om1lg for 1M Co"/J of Los
AIIgIIIS. W,llpprtr:iau lAi hlp of DtWitt
Cli1lUJ., Ua," P,"lIIn, Frrti BtJI.ttI,
RoIJtrt A.6ros,lIu Gortioll TrllSi, 111111
1M s.ppon slll/l i1l1Jt en1l/J COUSIrs
Offia; also JII'" Halll",01l11 111111 Natiill
Wiuiu of 1M CAO's Offia 111111 SUilll
Orugll of 1M eo"/J DtptSrttllnl
of Pllris IIU R.tcr1llli01l.

W, rraiwti na//nI1 COOP"lIti01l

tArollgAolI1 /r0tll1Jt SJerifJ's DtPIlrt7tltJIl.
111 pllrne.14r, lilt . .11110 Ulld
eo",1IIIl1lll" JIIt11n Ca1141, LiftttJIlltll
Willill", MeS.""", Li,IlUtlIl.1 Cllrtis
Spttm. Linrnnl KftutA Brtnilt,
Lintnll1l1 JM1I GtIr'Ur, Li1l"11 H,.illplI1
1111" Ut sUff of 1M lAB for tUir patltJIct
1111" eHptrlltlOtl .

359