MY COMMANDO OPERATIONS

The Memoirs of Hitler's

Most Daring Commando
 OTTO
SKORZENY
MY
COMMANDO
OPERATIONS
The Memoirs of Hitler’s
Most Daring Commando
Translated from the German by David Johnston

SCHIFFER Miuitary History

Atglen, PA
 I DEDICATE THIS BOOK
TO THE TRUE HEROES
OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
THE COMMON
RUSSIAN AND GERMAN SOLDIER

Translated from the German by David Johnston.

Copyright © 1995 by Schiffer Publishing.

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 94-6803|

This book was originally published under the title,

Meine Kommando Unternehmen,
©1993 by Universitas Verlag in F.A. Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH, Munich.

This book was originally published

in 1975 by Edition Albin Michel.

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 CONTENTS
PART I

Chapter 1 10
ON THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES

Chapter 2 21
THE ANSCHLUSS

Chapter 3 33
Waffen-SS
Chapter 4 41
WHY WE DIDN’T LAND IN ENGLAND
& TAKE GIBRALTAR

Chapter5 52
FROM THE ENGLISH CHANNEL TO THE BALKANS

Chapter6 64
UNKNOWN FACTS ABOUT THE FLIGHT TO ENGLAND
BY RUDOLF HEss
(May 10, 1941)

Chapter7 75
BARBAROSSA

Chapter 8 85
CONTINUAL TREASON

Chapter9 102
WHy WE DIDN’T TAKE Moscow
 PART II
Chapter 10 126
THE “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER”
THE TRUTH ABOUT STALINGRAD

Chapter II 141
Don’T SHooT!

Chapter 12 158
Why HrrLer Dion’T BuiLD THE ATOMıcC BoMB
THE REVENGE WEAPONS

Chapter 13 171
FROM THE Best U-Boars To

Chapter 14 183
From SICILY TO REMAGEN

Chapter 15 201
PLANNED OPERATIONS

PART ITI

Chapter 16 228
HITLER’S ORDER: You Must Finp AND FREE THE Duce!
OPERATION ALARICH

Chapter 17 247
SEARCHING FOR THE DUCE

Chapter 18 265
THE FREEING OF THE DUCE
 Chapter 19 285
Jury 20, 1944

Chapter 20 303
OPERATION PANZERFAUST

Chapter 21 329
GRIFFIN

PART IV
Chapter 22 362
VLASOV AND BANDERA
NICOLAI, CANARIS & GEHLEN

Chapter 23 385
OPERATION FREISCHÜTZ

Chapter 24 396
ADRIAN VON FOLKERSAM MISSING
Wa tter Girc & His Last Mission

Chapter 25 412
ON THE ODER
Last REUNION WITH VIENNA

Chapter 26 432
NUREMBERG

Chapter 27 454
THe Most DANGEROUS MAN IN Europe

EPILOGUE 462
ParT I
 1
ON THE RIGHT
OF SELF-DETERMINATION
OF PEOPLES

An invented triumvirate: Borghese-de Marchi-Skorzeny — My youth

in Vienna — The tragedy of a German people in an East European
state — The student: the time of the duels — Ban on fraternities by
Baldur von Schirach — The engineer: work, sport and political com-
mitment in favor of union with Germany — Goebbels in Vienna -
Dolfuss declares Marxists and National Socialists illegal - Unex-
plained aspects of a failed putsch - Honeymoon trip to Italy — The
oppression.

or almost thirty years certain correspondents, journalists and

radio and television reporters have described me as “the most
dangerous man in Europe.” For example, at the end of No-
vember 1973 I was working in my office in Madrid, when I
learned while skimming through Italian and Spanish newspapers that
I was planning a coup d’état in Rome. I wasn’t surprised; for in the
fantasies of many journalists I had already organized countless coup
d’états, plots and kidnappings, not only in Europe — noblesse oblige
finally — but in Africa and both Americas. This time the Rome con-
spiracy had been directed by a triumvirate, consisting of Prince Valerio
Borghese, the attorney de Marchi, leader of the M.S.I., and me. On
completion of their preparations I was supposed to supply the Italian
rebels with four Fokker aircraft. Where was I supposed to get them?
I gave the following statement during an interview with Manuel
Alcala of the Madrid daily newspaper /nformaciones on November
23, 1973:

“It’s laughable: whenever the Italian government finds itself fac-

ing serious difficulties, it uncovers a plot which threatens it. It is no
10
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 1
less strange that this is the second time within a short period that they
have discovered a plot in which I was allegedly involved. More than
a year ago they found letters I had written to Prince Borghese, which
contained nothing astonishing. We became wartime friends in 1943.
The exchange of letters in question had nothing to do with a plot or a
conspiracy against the Italian government. For more than six months
I haven’t had the slightest contact with Valerio Borghese, and as far
as Mr. de Marchi is concerned, I have never laid eyes on him in my
life and didn’t even know that he existed. I would like to once again
state clearly that since the war I have never become involved in any
political or military affairs of any country, and that I would reject
any suggestion made to me in that direction.”

This time 1 could deny the charges against me, and this denial was
published. But I have thousands of articles from newspapers and
magazines — most were sent by friends — which attribute to me the
most fantastic, vile and perplexing actions and plans. Thousands of
other publications all around the entire world spread rumors and defa-
mations, sometimes in support of a political system.
Yet, I am not the only one affected. I think of the comrades at
whose side I fought, of the brave soldiers I commanded and who
died in the maelstrom of war: many fallen on the field of honor or
lost forever in the steppes, forests or prison camps of Soviet Russia.
I believe that people must know that these men never personally
fought unfairly, even though they were involved in a dirty war. Even
the enemy has acknowledged that.
In spite of all the ridicule, 1 firmly believe that there is military
honor and that it will continue to exist as long as there are soldiers or
until one half of our planet has destroyed the other half. But it is
always possible to learn from the past.
This book is not intended as an “official denial.” It is a book by a
witness to recent history, one who had the time to reflect on events
and people, on conditions and plans; a witness whose chief misfor-
tune was to be a patriotic German who was born in Vienna, the capi-
tal city of Austro-Hungary in 1908.
When I spoke above of the alleged Borghese-de Marchi-Skorzeny
triumvirate, I recalled, not without a certain nostalgia, two other tri-
umvirates that I had to study in my class in Roman history in second-
ary school in Vienna in 1919. The first consisted of Caesar, Crassus
12 OTTO SKORZENY
and Pompeius, the second Octavius, Antonius and Lepidus: Triumviri
rei publicae constituendae ...
I was ten years old at the time. The Hapsburg Empire had just
collapsed. Austria was now a country of six-million inhabitants (of
which nearly 2 million lived in Vienna), 83,000 square kilometers in
area. They had taken away the industries of Bohemia and the agri-
cultural land of Hungary and had left it no access to the sea. It was
therefore forced to live in misery or unite with Germany.
In March 1938 there was much talk of “rape by Hitler.” But like
Hitler, who was himself born in Austria, we were Germans! And we
had the same right as the Saxons, the Bavarians, the Swabians, the
Württembergers and all the other members of the German union,
from which Austria had been expelled after the Battle of Königgratz
in 1866.
For nine and a half centuries Austria, which in German means
eastern empire, was part of the German Empire. This explains why
an overwhelming number of Austrians voted for union. From 1918
to 1922, in the state of emergency of the defeated, we turned to the
“Reich” out of an instinct for self-preservation. All parties supported
reunification with Germany so strongly, that two laws were passed
by the Austrian National Assembly, on November 12, 1918 and on
March 12, 1919. They declared: “Austria is a fundamental part of the
German Reich.” This sentence was added to the nation’s constitu-
tion. Furthermore, the new state was officially called German-Aus-
tria.
In spite of the “right of self-determination of peoples,” the allies
refused to take into consideration the will of the Austrian people at
Versailles or St. Germain. We were not incorporated into the Reich.
Ultimately, in September and October 1919, the allies demanded that
the German and Austrian republics remove from their constitutions
those articles relating to the union of the two countries. The Austrian
government tried to “rouse democratic opinion” and organized re-
gional referendums in Tyrol and Salzburg; that was in April and May
1921. The results: 145,302 Tyroleans voted for union, 1,805 against.
However it was all in vain. These referendums were not “controlled
by the nazis.” There were none yet.
In 1931 former Foreign Minister Schober successfully concluded
a customs and trade agreement with the Weimar Republic. The League
of Nations and the International Court of Justice declared that this
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 13
type of economic agreement was “incompatible with Article 85 of
the Treaty of St. Germain.” However the agreement of 1931 got
Aristide Briand’s plan for a European confederation under way. All
these inconsistencies and willful decisions made no allowances for
the economic, social, racial and historical realities; they must result
in chaos and lead to a bloody revolution. The history of Austria from
1918 to 1938 is a tragedy which the people of my generation had to
suffer.
My father, an engineer-architect and a reserve artillery officer in
the Austro-Hungarian Ammy', was lucky to return from the war. Al-
though medicine attracted me, I decided to become an engineer, fol-
lowing the example of my older brother. In 1926 I enrolled in the
Vienna Technical College, where I found myself in the company of
war veterans, who were much older than I and who wished to com-
plete their studies, interrupted by the war and the subsequent terrible
crises. These men, who had seen battle and who possessed experi-
ence we did not, exerted a strong influence on us.
My father, a liberal man, believed that a democratic regime would
represent an advance over a double monarchy, which no longer cor-
responded to the times. In his opinion, politics should be run by se-
lected, highly-capable specialists of unimpeachable character, reliev-
ing the citizens of the need to participate in the business of govern-
ment. But neither the Social democrats, nor the Christian Socialists
who succeeded them, provided such an ideal government. I must
admit that politics were only of moderate interest to my generation.
What enthused me initially was the activity of the student frater-
nity to which I belonged, “the Markomannia Duelling Society.” These
fraternities, like the Saxo-Borussia, the Burgundia and the Teutonia,
were famous in Germany and Austria since the time of the revolu-
tionary movements of 1848, in which they played a mist active and
vital role. A tradition of these old student fraternities was student
duels on the “duelling floor” with long, double-edged swords.
In my opinion it was a place to teach courage, coolness and will.
I myself fought fourteen times, which is where I got my duelling
scars. They are tradition-rich, yes I would even dare to say, honor-
able wounds, on whose account the journalists dubbed me “the one
with the duelling scars” or “scar-face.” These traditional fraternities
were banned in Germany from 1935 at the instigation of Baldur von
Schirach, the later Gauleiter of Austria. He was leader of the Hitler
Youth at the time.
14 OTTO SKORZENY
The members of the student military societies and student corps
were neither snobs nor drunkards, they worked for the fatherland. I
was disappointed by Schirach’s national-socialist reforms, and after
1938 I took the opportunity to tell him so. Later I said the same thing
to the Reich Student Leader, Gustav Scheel. He agreed with me com-
pletely that the old student fraternities must be revived, for Baldur
von Schirach’s reforms had brought nothing positive in respect to
the education of our youth.
The matter was close to my heart. During a conversation with
Hitler at the end of 1943, I explained that student fraternities had
sprung up all over the Reich in 1848, at the moment therefore when
German youth manifested its will for change, and that this tradition
had been kept alive in a good sense in Austria. While on their holi-
days the students forged links with the workers and farmers, forming
a voluntary labor force which demonstrated a real socialist and na-
tional spirit. The vast majority had fought against the Red Front in
the streets, and they had never understood that they were treated like
snobs.
It seemed impossible to present to Hitler ideas which differed
from his own. However this time he listened to me attentively. When
I had finished he said, “Your arguments are fair and reasonable,
Skorzeny. Thank you for stating them so candidly. But at the mo-
ment the duel is not so important. First we must win the war. After-
ward we will talk about your questions again.”

In the Markomannia we wore white caps, black bands and our breasts
were trimmed with white and gold. Every year on the first Sunday in
September the student groups joined with the masses of people at
Heroes Square to officially demonstrate for union with Germany under
the black-white-red flag. This was the sole political demonstration in
which I regularly participated from 1920 to 1934.
On the other hand I played a great deal of sports: soccer, track
and field, skiing, kayaking on our beautiful Danube and sailing on
the lakes of our Alpine region.
In 1931 I passed my final exams for a diploma in engineering.
However the future was very dark for young Austrians, no matter
what class they belonged to. Like many other middle-class Austrian
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 15
families, we had come to know want, sometimes even distress, dur-
ing and immediately after the war and during the period of inflation,
when food, coal and raw materials were in short supply. For too long
unemployment had become a career for half a million Austrians.
After a visible improvement during the years 1926 to 1930 there
came a worldwide depression. An economic catastrophe befell Aus-
tria just as I was about to begin working. Before I took any concrete
steps in this direction I chanced to find work, although the pay was
low, and later I was a participant in a significant scaffolding building
operation.
As was usual in the building trade, some of my employees and
workers were socialist-marxists, some communist, which did not
prevent us from working closely together.
In the meantime the economic situation grew increasingly worse.
Living on loans, the nation was dependent on greedy, foreign credi-
tors who were ever more demanding and from whom the Christian-
Democratic government couldn't or wasn’t willing to free itself. It is
impossible to understand the tremendous tragedy of the Second World
War without considering my homeland. The division of Austria at
Versailles created a dangerous vacuum in central Europe. The com-
munist threat was not imagination. I was nineteen years old when the
Arbeiterzeitung, the organ of the socialist-marxists, published its or-
der for general mobilization in Vienna. That was in July 1927, and I
can still see the demonstrations deteriorating into a bloody mutiny
over two days. I still see how the communists charged police head-
quarters and set ablaze the Palace of Justice, which was soon one
huge pillar of fire. All the land registry entries, which were kept there,
were bummed. That was without a doubt one of the objectives of the
marxist mobilization. These violent street battles appeared to me to
be extremely stupid. One thing was for certain: the citizens had been
terrified.
The Marxists were the first to organize an armed militia, which
was Called the Republikanischen Schutzbund. Opposing them was
the Heimwehr, led by the fanatical Prince Starhemberg, and Major
Fey’s Heimatschutz. Both formations, which were supposed to have
been all-party, were in fact themselves political, revolutionary groups.
In reality Starhemberg and Fey were more than a little ambitious.
They only supported Dollfuss’ government in order to replace him at
some date. Thanks to Mussolini’s support, Starhemberg dreamed of
16 Orto SKORZENY
becoming regent of Austria, just as Admiral Horthy was regent of
Hungary. However his hopes were soon dashed. Finally he consoled
himself with actress Nora Gregor, with whom he was very much in
love. Chancellor Schuschnigg, who in the Duce’s view had the ap-
pearance of a “melancholy surveyor,” exploited him and in May 1936
eliminated him from the picture politically.

After the unrest of 1927 the Marxists tried to take over the univer-
sity. But we wanted to work in peace, and so the Academic Legion
was formed. I was the legion’s standard bearer at the usual demon-
Stration at Heroes Square in September 1927. But the legion was
soon infiltrated politically, was swallowed up by Starhemberg’s Heim-
wehr, and finally became the Heimatblock. Then I left the move-
ment.
The National-Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) made
clear progress in Austria toward the end of 1929. Agreat many young
supporters of reunification with Germany regarded this movement
with sympathy. It has been written that I was “a founding nazi.” That
is not true. Speaking frankly, I doubted that my countrymen desired
such a fundamental revolution as that advocated by the speakers.
The decisive event was in September 1932, when Dr. Goebbels
came to Vienna to deliver a speech. The party was not yet banned,
and the assembled crowd in the Engelmann Skating Palace was tre-
mendously responsive. While the Austrian police kept order outside,
it was the uniformed SA who maintained order inside. The swastika
flags, the singing and the ceremony gave the meeting an impressive
air.
Goebbels spoke for two hours, as he did when he was in his prime.
His analysis of the international situation, the lamentable state of
Europe since Versailles, the fruitless struggles of the parties, and
Austria’s position relative to Germany were all sound, completely
reasonable and based on facts and the will toward constructive work
in a finally-united people. The speaker was a tremendous success.
I admit that several weeks later, followed by many of my coun-
trymen, I declared that I was joining. The National Socialist Party
made a great leap forward in Austria. The next year, on June 19,
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 17
1933, Chancellor Dollfuss found only one means to prevent its growth:
he banned it. And that was his first mistake.
In fact our unfortunate chancellor set up a proper dictatorship
with his Vaterldndische Front, which had the support of Starhemberg’s
and Fey’s Heimwehr. He dissolved parliament, quarrelled with the
organizations of the left and mixed up the struggle against Marxism
with harassment of the workers. Blood flowed in Linz, Graz and
Vienna in those frightful February days in 1934.
The victims? More than 400 killed and 2,000 injured, of which
about 280 dead and 1,300 seriously injured were on the side of the
workers. In this way the Vaterländische Front made swom enemies
of the workers. Social Democrats and National Socialists, both
banned, came to each other’s aid. Adolf Hitler had been Reich Chan-
cellor in Germany since the beginning of the previous year, and sev-
eral of my comrades believed that “the time had now come”: the
national-socialist revolution in Austria was now only a question of
weeks. That was not my opinion. Strictly speaking, my activity within
the National Socialist Party from September 1932 to June 1933 was
not especially noticeable.
After the disbanding of the national-socialist movement in Aus-
tria, I limited myself to helping those comrades who had been jailed,
were being sought or were living in the underground. My help also
extended to numerous members of the Schutzbund, who were threat-
ened with imprisonment. It wasn’t a case of helping to defend a
Marxist ideology, but of helping people, who had been drawn into a
disastrous adventure, out of a predicament. One of my foremen, a
man named Oehler, a true-blue communist, who had fought at the
barricades, later did his duty so bravely in Russia that he was deco-
rated with the Iron Cross, First Class as a common soldier. From
1934 to 1938 there was a real union of the outcasts from the Marxist
and national-socialist camps under the sign of the underground move-
ment.
But very few of the supporters of reunification with Germany
could foresee the unbelievable events that were at hand at the begin-
ning of the month of June 1934: it was the national-socialist putsch,
in the course of which Federal Chancellor Dollfuss was to be killed.
Today we know that on April 9, 1934 Hitler sent a secret report to
the envoys of the Reich abroad (see: Documents on German Foreign
Policy, Vol. Il, Series C-459), in which stated:
18 OTTO SKORZENY
“At the moment the Austrian problem can obviously not be settled
by means of union. We must let the Austrian thing run its course; for
any attempt of this sort would make the European powers of the
Little Entente enemies of the plan. Under these circumstances it ap-
pears more advisable to us to wait.”

The leaders of the National Socialist Austrian Party in the under-

ground could not pretend to be ignorant of these directives. Never-
theless, a plot was hatched which was supposed to force Dolifuss to
resign. In his place a man they trusted, namely Anton Rintelen, Aus-
trian ambassador in Rome, was to be named chancellor. There were
indiscretions and Major Fey was informed. According to official
sources, Dollfuss was fatally wounded in a dark hallway of the
Bundeshaus by one of our comrades, Otto Planetta. The dictator was
there with Major Fey, Generalmajor Wrabel, the new State Secretary
for Security Karwinsky and the doorman Hedvicek. That was on July
25, 1934. Later I found that the role of Minister Fey and the autopsy
on the chancellor’s body, which was carried out with undue haste
and under strange circumstances, allowed this “confused affair” to
be seen from another point of view.
Those who wanted to “present the Reich with a fait accompli”
contrary to the directives from Berlin were surely acting in good
faith. What they didn’t know was that many senior functionaries were
playing a double game. The young conspirators, whose intention was
not to murder the chancellor, were unaware that all their movements
were watched by Fey’s agents since the morning of July 25. It would
therefore have been easy to stop them before they were able to storm
the chancellor's office and the Radio House. However they let them
have their way.
They had orders to use their weapons only in extreme emergency
and then to aim at the feet. It was 1 P.M. when Planetta fired at a
shadow in the passage that led to the palace archives. However he
could have been arrested at least three hours earlier.
Older than I, the putschists were already experienced activists
before the disbanding of the party. I didn’t know them personally.
What I was able to find out was that Planetta repeatedly claimed that
he had only fired once. But the chancellor was hit by two bullets, one
of which, having become lodged in his spine, was obviously fatal.
When Planetta tumed himself in to prevent his comrades from being
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 19
executed, he was under no illusions; he knew that his days were num-
bered. Even if one of his comrades at his side had fired, he would
definitely have said that he fired twice in order to save him. There
are several very mysterious aspects of this case which were never
explained. Certain historians have said that | participated neither in
the organization of the conspiracy nor in the putsch. In reality, in
May [ had just married a young girl named Gretl, whom I had known
for four years and who was then nineteen years old. We had set out
for Italy in a motorcycle and sidecar. In the course of this very sporty
honeymoon trip we visited Bologna, Venice, Ravenna, Pisa, Florence,
Rome and drove through the region of Abruzzi.
At the Piazza Venezia in Rome I heard Benito Mussolini for the
first time. He was speaking to a crowd from the balcony of the old
Austrian embassy. The Duce made a good impression on me, and I
suddenly found that, here among the Italians, my prejudices against
Italy disappeared. In general I made similar discoveries on my trips
through the various nations of Europe and I realized: we are one big
family and we could easily get along with everyone, as long as we
respect each other and each of us guards that which makes him spe-
cial. Europe is like a rainbow of nations, whose colors must remain
clear and separate. But scarcely had I returned from my trip to Italy,
when I found myself in the middle of a political uproar. It had seized
Styria, Kärnten and Tyrol after the radio said that the putsch was
successful and the Dr. von Rintelen had been asked to form a new
government. In truth Rintelen, who had walked into the trap, chose
to commit suicide.
As for the putschists, after being assured twice that they would
be taken safe and sound to the Bavarian border, they surrendered
their weapons and — were then immediately arrested! The official
published casualty figures were: 78 dead and 165 injured on the gov-
emment side and more than 400 dead and 800 injured among our
friends. Many of the politically-active National Socialists were able
to escape to Germany. Those less lucky, thousands of our other com-
rades and marxists, found themselves in the concentration camps that
had been set up by Dollfuss on September 23, 1233 and which they
hypocritically called “administrative internment camps.” Those of
Woellersdorf and Messendorf near Graz remain a sad memory. More
than two-hundred conspirators were brought before a court-martial
and sentenced immediately. Sixty of those sentenced to death had
20 OTTO SKORZENY
their sentences reduced to life at hard labor by the President of the
Republic, Miklas; but seven national-socialist leaders, among them
Franz Holzweber, who was assigned to take the chancellor’s office,
Otto Planetta, Hans Domes, Franz Leeb and Ludwig Maitzen, were
hanged, as were two young members of the Schutzbund, Rudolf
Ansböck and Joseph Gerl, in whose possession explosives were found.
The scale of the oppression by the “authoritarian and christian”
dictator was revealed by the amnesty decree issued in July 1936 by
Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, Dollfuss’ successor: it resulted in
the release of 15,583 political prisoners.
Two years earlier those condemned to be executed went bravely
to their deaths. As they walked to the gallows they called out, “Long
live Germany! Heil Hitler!”
On that 25th of July 1934 Hitler was taking in a performance of
Wagner’s Das Rheingold in Bayreuth. He received the news of the
tragic events with anger and dismay. At the same time he learned that
Mussolini had moved five divisions to the Brenner Pass and that
Yugoslavian troops were massing along the border with Styria and
Karten.
“Good God, protect us from our friends!” he said to Göring. “That
would be a new Sarajevo...”
At the same time, with the agreement of the president’s office of
Field Marshall von Hindenburg, he sent the pope’s secret treasurer,
Franz von Papen, to Vienna. It is significant that relations between
Berlin and Vienna were not broken off. They were in fact maintained,
and the Austrian tragedy was unfortunately not over.

Notes
‘ The Austro-Hungarian Army lost about 1,200,000 men killed in the First World War.
 2
THE ANSCHLUSS

Physical training in the German Gymnastics League - Schuschnigg

proposes a peculiar plebiscite or “secret without voting booths” —
The night of March 11, 1938 - Seyss-Inquart, chancellor — In the
presidential palace: a drama between the SA and the guard battal-
ion is avoided — We see Hitler from our scaffold - Recantations and
the triumph of the plebiscite - The men from the other side of the
Main.

n July 11, 1936 Kurt von Schuschnigg, Dollfuss’ succes-

sor, officially admitted that “Austria was fundamentally
a German state.” Nevertheless he was against union with
Germany and mobilized his police to ruthlessly suppress
everyone who expressed views which were friendly toward Germany.
Although the Hitler-Schuschnigg meeting of February 12, 1938,
which was held at Berchtesgaden, gave us hope for a normalization
of relations between Austria and Germany, we had no reason to be
optimistic that we would soon be incorporated into our German fa-
therland. The National Socialist Party was permitted again under
certain conditions. But since 1935 I had been a member of the Ger-
man Gymnastics League, a sports association which existed in Ger-
many as well as Austria. By chance I met again there many former
members and supporters of the disbanded party. It is probably un-
necessary to mention that the 60,000 members of the gymnastics
league all desired unification with Germany.
Within our gymnastics league we were organized in the form of
military platoons. I was leader of one such formation. We were very
aware that the communists and social democrats had become mas-

21
22 OTTO SKORZENY
ters at camouflaging their troops. Above all we knew that Moscow
had given the Austrian leaders specific instructions to prepare a
people’s front under communist direction and to take revenge for
what had happened in Berlin in Vienna. Certainly Schuschnigg had
shuffled his cabinet after his return from Berchtesgaden and named
Seyss-Inquart to the post of Minister of the Interior. Seyss-Inquart
was a brilliant lawyer and a catholic, who, like a majority of all Aus-
trians, was in favor of union with Germany, without, however, be-
longing to the National Socialist Party at any time. But at the same
time the chancellor made extraordinary efforts to reach an agree-
ment with the leaders of the extreme left against us. Moscow’s pres-
sure soon became stronger and Schuschnigg decided to plunge him-
self into an adventure which was to be decisive for the fate of Aus-
tria.
On Wednesday, the 9th of March 1938, a thunderclap! In
Innsbruck the chancellor announced a plebiscite (direct ballot) for
Sunday, March 13, for or against a “free, German, independent, so-
cial, Christian and united Austria.”
Berlin immediately accused him of “intentionally failing to com-
ply with the Berchtesgaden agreements,” “being in league with Mos-
cow” and “wanting to proclaim a Soviet republic in Vienna.” As
French historian Jacques Benoist-Méchin (Histoire de l’Armee alle-
mande, Vol. 4) stated, “they were in fact witnessing a strange spec-
tacle, which Hitler’s propaganda soon put to good use: apart from
the Vaterldndische Front, only the communists were openly in favor
of the plebiscite.”
Today we know that the chancellor was the victim of several
deceptions, as well as promises that could not be kept. He had dis-
posed of monarchist demands by rejecting a proposal for its restora-
tion, which was made to him by Archduke Otto von Hapsburg. The
latter signed his manifesto “Otto I.R.”, for Imperator Rex, exactly
like Carl the Fifth. Nine days later, on February 26, the French for-
eign minister, Yvon Delbos, announced his satisfaction to the Aus-
trian chancellor in front of the French parliament with the following
words:
“France cannot leave Austria to its fate: it confirms today that the
independence of Austria represents an indispensable element in the
European balance of power.”
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 23
In his memoirs, Franz von Papen wrote that, “the French envoy
in Vienna, Paux, a personal friend of Schuschnigg’s, was the father
of the idea of the plebiscite.”
The chancellor reckoned on foreign support, in order to prevent
or at least delay union by means of a successful plebiscite. This was
not forthcoming, however. In London, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden
had just resigned. Chamberlain, who replaced him with Lord Halifax,
thought the project was a “hazardous business.” Dr. Masty, the
Czechoslovakian envoy in Berlin, assured Goring that President Benes
had no intention of interfering in Austrian affairs.
Late on the morning of March 7, Colonel Liebitsky, the Austrian
military attache in Rome, handed Mussolini a copy of the speech
that Schuschnigg intended to give in Innsbruck. Genuinely startled,
the Duce immediately tried to talk the chancellor out of the idea,
which he said “could turn against him immediately.” But Schuschnigg
completely disregarded the advice. Was he perhaps expecting firm,
official commitments from the French? That is questionable. A few
weeks earlier the Chautemps government had won a vote of confi-
dence in parliament, 439 votes to 2. One day after the Innsbruck
speech, on the morning of March 10, Camille Chautemps spoke a
few words to the house. He stepped down from the rostrum and left
the room; his ministers followed him in silence. Chautemps and his
cabinet had resigned while still holding a majority.
Our physical training in the gymnastics league did not preveart us
from reading numerous foreign newspapers: the Times, the Daily
Telegraph, the Frankfurter Zeitung, the Temps and the Swiss press.
On the evening of March 10 we learned that Schuschnigg had lost
his nerve, that he had isolated himself.
One should know that the plebiscite was supposed to be held as
follows: as the last vote for the National Assembly had taken place in
1929, there were no voting lists on hand; they told us that none were
necessary. The Vaterldndische Front, which was the only organiza-
tion to organize the plebiscite, would take care of everything. At first
the officials were obligated to vote at their places of work; every
citizen over 25 years of age in Vienna and over 24 in the provinces
could vote, and needed only to show the family register, a rent, gas
or light receipt, a bank book, an identity card issued by the
Vaterländische Front or the Landbund and so on. Voters known to
the election overseers didn’t even need personal identification pa-
24 Orro SKORZENY
pers! It was said that the vote was public and that the polling stations
only had YES ballots.
There were no voting booths. Those citizens who wished to vote
in the negative had to bring with them a ballot marked NO and ask
the election overseer for an official envelope in which to place it!
Under these circumstances it was easy for a band of fifty wags to
give Schuschnigg several thousand votes if they began their route
through the various polling stations, which were not closely watched
by the election overseers, early in the morning. At the same time
Austrian radio and the government press continued to remind the
people that, “every citizen who votes NO is guilty of high treason.”
Therefore anyone so naive as to bring with him a NO ballot would
have identified himself as a traitor.
Such behavior was of course not very honorable; nevertheless
the organizers thought it was wonderful.
During the night of March 10 Schuschnigg issued a mobilization
order for the class of 1935. Ready for action were the militias of the
Vaterländische Front. But what caused more anxiety was the reap-
pearance of the old Schutzbund troops, who were ultra-marxists. Some
of them were in their camouflage — light grey uniforms — of the
Ostmärkische Sturmscharen, the combat units of the Vaterlandische
Front. Whatever one might have said about these things, Schuschnigg
had thrown all the logs in the fire, and on the trucks that drove around
Vienna on the morning of this March 11, one could see the propa-
gandists of the Vaterldndische Front, their fists raised in the commu-
nist salute. We knew that Schmitz, the mayor of Vienna, had called
together the factory militias, and we were convinced that weapons
had been distributed. Furthermore columns of trucks came from the
suburbs flying the red flag with the hammer and sickle. Workers raised
their fists, sang the Internationale and shouted:

“Vote YES for freedom!

Down with Hitler! Long live Moscow!”

Meanwhile aircraft bearing the red and white cocarde dropped tons
of leaflets with the instruction: “Vote YES.”
What could such a bizarre vote, organized in seventy-two hours,
mean to a government that lacked any popular basis? Since the
evening before, discussions in the chancellor’s office had taken on
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 25
an increasingly bitter character. It was a theater coup: the Wiener
Neuesten Nachrichten published a manifesto by Dr. Jury, adjutant to
Seyss-Inquart in the Ministry of the Interior, in which he declared
the vote “arbitrary and illegal” and called upon the population to
boycott it. It was impossible to obtain a copy of the paper.
What was happening? After much speculation, at about 1 P.M.
the chancellor, hoping to gain time, announced that the wording of
the question was to be changed. But Goring telephoned and demanded
that the government simply resign (4:30 P.M.). It was known that
German troops were massed along the border. Schuschnigg asked
Dr. Zehner, State Secretary of Defense, whether the army and the
police were ready to defend Austria’s borders. He soon realized that
nothing could prevent the German troops from advancing to Vienna,
“the population is enthusiastically in support of it.”

When the mobilization of the workers militias was announced, the

leaders of the German Gymnastics League called the defense pla-
toons together. Under no circumstances did we want to relive the
bloody days of 1927 and 1934.
Towards evening a huge crowd of people gathered in front of the
chancellor’s office. My comrades and I were also there, alternating
between depression and hope as various rumors circulated through
the crowd. Suddenly, at eight in the evening, Seyss-Inquart called
upon everyone to be calm and asked “the police and the National
Socialist security service to ensure that peace and order were main-
tained.” To my great amazement I saw that a large number of people,
including some of the police, had put on swastika arm bands. All had
become good national socialists once they learned that the President
of the Republic had accepted Schuschnigg’s resignation.
At first President Miklas refused to name Seyss-Inquart as
Schuschnigg’s successor, although he was the only minister who had
remained in his office, at the request of the president himself. The
latter was an honorable man, who had principles and fourteen chil-
dren. What he didn’t know was that two of them belonged to the
underground SA!
What they have called “the rape of Austria” began that night in
the form of a tremendous torchlight parade through the streets of
26 OTTO SKORZENY
Vienna and in front of the chancellor’s office. At Heroes Square people
cried, laughed and hugged each other. When the swastika flag ap-
peared on the balcony of the chancellory at about eleven o'clock,
there was no holding back, it was like in a delirium.
While his children were shouting “Heil Hitler!” in the square,
President Miklas stubbornly continued to search for a successor to
the resigned Schuschnigg. Seyss-Inquart didn’t suit him. Göring, who
was hosting two Austrian brothers-in-law, at first suggested, then
demanded that he accept Seyss-Inquart. Miklas retired to the chan-
cellery where he sounded out a dozen personalities, all of whom de-
clined to accept the position. They included the State Secretary, Dr.
Skubl; the former head of a Christian-Socialist government, Dr. Ender;
and finally the Inspector General of the Army, Schilkawsky. The main
concern of them all was to prevent a confrontation between brothers.
Near midnight Miklas gave in and at last appointed Seyss-Inquart
chancellor; the latter immediately gave him a list of new ministers.
My comrades and I were still in front of the chancellor’s office
when Seyss-Inquart appeared on the balcony: an enormous cry of
jubilation greeted him, and we saw that he had become chancellor.
He gave a brief speech to the crowd, but in the tumult we couldn’t
make out a single word. Suddenly everything grew quiet, and with
bared heads we all joined in singing the German national anthem. I
will never forget that moment, which made up for much suffering
and sacrifice and many humiliations.
I have read that “democratic principles were violated” on this
occasion. But not a shadow of democracy had existed in Austria.
Chancellor Dollfuss had dissolved parliament in March 1933. After
Dollfuss’ tragic death, Miklas named Schuschnigg chancellor with-
out consulting the Austrian people. Understanding our attitudes then
and how we felt requires good faith and a knowledge, even if only a
superficial one, of historical events.

I can still see myself on that memorable night, in the company of my

comrades of the German Gymnastics League. We had been ready for
action since ealy afternoon, al! wearing mountaineering coats, which
could be seen as uniforms; we also wore riding or ski pants. We had
no arm bands.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 27
We were so happy that we felt neither hunger nor cold. But there
was nothing left for us to do at Heroes Square, so my comrades and
I made our way to a side street behind the chancellor’s office, for I
had parked my car there. After the initial enthusiasm had faded, we
almost thought we were dreaming. Was Seyss-Inquart really a true
national socialist? We had formerly seen him as a middleman. How
would the extreme left react? Were the rumors that Hitler had given
the order for German troops to march into Austria true?
At that moment a black limousine pulled out of a driveway onto
the street. As we stepped aside to let it pass, I heard someone calling
to me. The man who had hailed me and several others had also come
out of the palace. He approached quickly and I recognized him as
Bruno Weiss, the president of our German Gymnastics League. He
appeared nervous and asked if I had a car.
“Very good,” he said. “It’s lucky that I ran into you here. We
need a man with a cool head and common sense. Did you see the big
limousine that just pulled out? Good, it’s carrying none other than
President Miklas. He is driving to his palace on Reisner Strasse, which
is occupied by a unit of the guard battalion. We have just learned that
an SA battalion from Fiorisdorf has received orders to go to Reisner
Strasse too, for the federal president is also supposed to receive the
protection of the new government. A confrontation between the two
formations must be avoided at all costs. Do you understand?”
“Completely, my dear Herr Weiss. But I have no authority...”
He interrupted me with a wave of his hand, “In the name of the
new chancellor, I instruct you personally to go to Reissner Strasse
and calmly, but energetically intervene to avoid any incident. As-
semble some of your comrades, but don’t waste time. I will-inform
the chancellor that I have given you this mission. I will try to reach
an agreement by telephone, but it would be better if you could be
there. Telephone the chancellery as soon as you arrive. Now get go-
ing, my dear fellow. The minutes are precious.”
And they were that! Luckily I was able to recruit a dozen com-
rades on the spot, who were loaded into two or three cars or jumped
onto their motorcycles. We roared into the night, straight through the
crowd, which cleared a path for us. We arrived in front of the palace
just as the president drove in. We stayed right behind him and I or-
dered that the large entrance gate be closed.
28 Orro SKORZENY
The president was just about to go up the stairs when we entered
the hall. A young guards lieutenant appeared at the second floor bal-
ustrade and drew his pistol. The confusion reached its climax: the
loud shouts of the guards soldiers and those of the president’s entou-
rage mingled, and finally Frau Miklas appeared, completely dis-
traught.
I shouted louder than the others:
“Quiet!”
“Weapons ready to fire!” ordered the lieutenant.
This officer, who later became my friend, and whom I met three
weeks later as a captain in the Wehrmacht, was just doing his duty.
Fortunately we had neither weapons nor arm bands, but our unusual
get-up scarcely spoke in our favor. The situation was as follows: about
twenty guards soldiers, who were standing along the second floor
gallery and down from the upper steps of the stairway, held us in
check. The president was still standing in the middle of the stairs,
looking at his wife without saying a word. From the street could be
heard a growing tumult. The SA people, who had jumped down from
their trucks, were demanding that they open the gate. I prayed that it
would hold.
“Quiet gentlemen!” I shouted again. “Herr President, I ask that
you listen to me.”
He turned and looked at me in surprise:
“Who are you sir, and what do you want?”
“Allow me to introduce myself: engineer Skorzeny. May | call
the chancellor on the telephone? He will confirm to you that I am
here on his orders.”
“Certainly, but tell me, what does all that noise outside mean?”
I knew what the noise meant, but I couldn’t say it. One would
have thought that the SA intended to take the presidential palace by
storm, and that would probably have resulted in a firefight.
“Please excuse me a moment, Mr. President, I will go and see at
once.”
With the help of my friend Gerhard and our comrades from the
gymnastics league, we were finally able to calm everyone. As Presi-
dent Miklas looked on, I called the chancellor’s office; Dr. Seyss-
Inquart came on the line straightaway: fortunately Bruno Weiss had
taken the necessary steps and the new chancellor spoke with the presi-
dent for a few minutes. Then Miklas handed me the receiver. Seyss-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 29
Inquart congratulated me on my determined conduct and asked me
to wait at the palace for further instructions and assume command of
the guards battalion detachment. I was to see to it that the latter unit
maintained order inside the palace, while the SA kept order outside.
For three days and nights I conscientiously carried out my mis-
sion, to the general satisfaction of those in charge and without inci-
dent. In the end Chancellor Seyss-Inquart thanked me with a heart-
felt handshake. I was still young then and somewhat naive: I be-
lieved that I had entered active politics, not by chance, but through
the big gate.

I witnessed Hitler’s triumphant entry into Vienna from a very lofty

vantage point, namely from one of the tall scaffoldings that had been
erected for the overhauling of a museum located on the ring road.
My workmen were even more enthusiastic than I was, and I under-
stood how they felt. They were welcoming one of their own, one of
our own. We looked down on this extraordinary man from our tall
scaffolding. Whatever they might say about him today, he had en-
dured hunger in Vienna. There, before our eyes, he took his place
among the greatest Austrian rulers: it was the place of a Rudolf,
Maximilian, Carl, Ferdinand or Josef, all of whom had been German
emperors. It was impossible, yet it was true. Hundreds of thousands
shouted out with us that it was true.
The spectacle on the ring itself was in keeping with the signifi-
cance of the event: it was magnificent, wonderful, with a sea of flags
and flowers, endless applause and martial music. The German troops
received a welcome the like of which no other army had ever seen in
Austria. Then, at a given moment, we sensed a general movement
and curiosity in the crowd. It was the arrival of the SS-Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler.
I have never been able to explain to myself where my country-
men got hold of the tens of thousands of swastika flags. I expect that
every family had prepared one or two such flags in anticipation of
the “rape of Austria.” Many other things surprised me too, things
that are forgotten nowadays. For example, on March 10, Cardinal
Innitzer, the Archbishop of Vienna, warmly endorsed Schuschnigg’s
plebiscite, declaring:
30 OTTO SKORZENY
“As Austrian citizens we are fighting for a free, independent
Austria!”
Eight days later, on March 18, Cardinal Innitzer, the Prince Bishop
of Salzburg Hefter, the Bishop of Klagenfurt Pawlikowski, the Bishop
of Graz Gföllner and the Bishop of Linz openly made a declaration
to the contrary, namely: “That they considered it their duty as Ger-
mans to speak out in favor of the German Reich.”
They said literally, “Out of the most inner conviction and with a
free will, we, the undersigned bishops of the church province of Aus-
tria, declare on the occasion of the great historical events in German-
Austria that: We joyfully acknowledge that the national-socialist
movement has done and is doing outstanding work in the areas of
national and economic development as well as social policy, for the
German Reich and people, and especially for the poorest strata of
society. We are convinced that the national-socialist movement will
have the effect of keeping at bay the threat of all-destroying, godless
bolshevism.
The best wishes of the bishops go with this work and they will
exhort the faithful in this vein.
For us priests, on the day of the plebiscite it is our obvious duty
as Germans to declare ourselves for the German Reich, and we ex-
pect that all Christian believers will realize what they owe their
people.”
What should one say about the attitude of the social-democratic
leader Dr. Karl Renner, first chancellor of Austria in 1918-1919 and
president of the National Council until 1933?
On April 3, 1938 he told the Illustrierten Kronenzeitung of Vienna:

“The twenty-year wandering of the Austrian people is now over,

and it is returning united to the starting point, to its solemn declara-
tion of will of November 12, 1918. The sad interlude of the half-
century from 1866 to 1918 hereby goes down in our common thou-
sand-year history.
“As a social democrat and therefore as the representative of the
right of self-determination of the nation and as past president of its
peace delegation to St. Germain, I will vote JA.”

On that same April 3 Herr Dr. Renner confirmed to the Neuen Wiener
Tageblatt:
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 31
“If I were not to welcome the great historical act of the reunifica-
tion of the German nation with a joyful heart, 1 would have to dis-
avow my entire past as a theoretical champion of the right of self-
determination of nations and a German- Austrian statesman. As a so-
cial democrat and thus as a representative of the right of self-deter-
mination of nations, as first chancellor of the republic of German-
Austria, and as past president of your peace delegation in St. Germain,
I will vote JA.”

Karl Seitz, a former leader of the social democrats and former mayor
of Vienna, agreed with this declaration: After the Anschluss Dr. Karl
Renner lived in Goggnitz at the foot of the Semmering and thanks to
the pension which was freely granted to him he survived the Second
World War peacefully and unharmed. The invading Red Army found
Dr. Renner and persuaded him to write a letter to Moscow. The fol-
lowing is an extract from that letter:

“Your excellency Marshall Stalin, Moscow

Honored comrade!
In the early days of the movement I made many personal friendships
with Russian champions... The Red Army found me when it entered
my home town, where I trustingly awaited the occupation with party
comrades.. For this I thank the Red Army and you, its glorious su-
preme commander, personally and in the name of the working class
of Austria, sincerely and humbly... The Austrian social democrats
will come to terms fraternally with the communist party and will
work on an equal footing with it in the refounding of the republic.
That the future of the land belongs to socialism, is unquestionable
and needs no emphasis.”

The results of the plebiscite held on April 10, 1938, which in reality
was a free and secret vote, were:

For the union of Austria with the Reich: 4,284,295 votes

Against: 9,852 votes
Spoiled ballots: 559
32 Orro SKORZENY
But why did we now have to be disappointed? Some of those
whom we welcomed with such enthusiasm treated us with a lack of
insight and a condescension which, under other circumstances, would
have been comical.
Surrounded by the halo of the triumph he had achieved in the
Saar Region three years earlier, Gauleiter Joseph Bickel, a
Rhinelander, brought with him to Austria neither a healthy common
sense nor political understanding. But not all of those who came from
the other side of the Main River were like him. First-class people
should have been sent to Austria, but unfortunately this was not al-
ways the case, and the functionary type we received often resembled
a Bavarian public school teacher from the year 1900 or a village
policeman. But we also had our mistakes. We tried to smile and to
understand those who did not understand us. The exaggerated strict-
ness and sometimes also the tactlessness of the Prussians and Saxons
were often hindrances to the truly fraternal union we longed for. These
difficulties have been exaggerated or forgotten by historians to some
extent, according to their personal attitude toward the subject.
 3
WAFFEN-SS

Danzig and the German-Russian Pact — “If we should ever lose this
war...” — Drafted into the Luftwaffe and admitted into the Waffen-SS
— Errors and mixups — Origins of the SS and the Waffen-SS -The
Death's Head Formations - General Paul Hausser — Esprit de corps
and ideologies — European warriors, who received no orders from
Himmler - Inquiry by the historical section of the Israeli Army: a
study for the classification of the soldiers of both world wars — Prince
Valerio Borghese.

On September 27, 1938 Sir Neville Chamberlain spoke the follow-

ing words to the English people in a broadcast on the BBC:

“It would be frightful, fantastic and unbelievable if we were forced

to dig slit trenches and put on gas masks on account of a dispute
which has broken out in a distant land among people of whom we
know nothing. And it seems even more incredible that this dispute,
which in principle is already settled, might lead to a war!”

Frankly speaking, in the course of the following summer I still be-

lieved there would be no war. The Munich Agreement seemed to us
to be the prelude to a general agreement by the European powers for
a revision of the treaties of 1919/1920, which, as the brilliant French
statesman Anatole de Monzie wrote: “Had created a half-dozen
Alsace-Lorraine in the heart of Europe.” It seemed impossible to me
that the Europeans, who together shared such a high level of culture
and civilization, should not reach an understanding: it was after all in
the interest of everyone. The Czech problem was solved, Poland had

33
34 OTTO SKORZENY
recovered the Teschen region — a point that is always forgotten — and
the 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans had again become citizens of the
Reich. My father, whose family came from Eger in Bohemia,' was
deeply moved by their return. We all thought that the Germans of
Danzig would not be kept much longer from becoming our fellow
citizens.
The whole world knew that Danzig, the home of Fahrenheit and
Schopenhauer, had been the capital of West Prussia in 1918 and that
it was taken from the Reich the following year. Its population was
German, something which Article 448 of the Versailles Treaty could
not change. It seemed to us that our scattered, torn-apart people, which
had suffered frightfully from 1918 to 1925, could not be held re-
sponsible forever for the mistakes made by its government in the
years from 1914 to 1918.
In August 1939 I was spending my vacation with the family of
Professor Porsche, designer of the Volkswagen, on the Wörthersee
in Austria, when we heard the news of the signing of the German-
Russian pact. We were all deeply dismayed. There are few examples
in history of such a sensational change of allegiances. I certainly
wouldn’t have believed it if someone had said a year earlier that Hitler
would one day conclude a pact with Stalin. Both governments de-
clared that their ideologies were not looked upon articles for export,
but we very soon realized what this pact meant.
On August 31 Mussolini proposed in vain that an international
conference be called for September 5 to review the clauses of the
Versailles Treaty, which, as he said, were the cause of the present
unrest. No one listened to him. At 5:45 A.M. on September 1 the
Wehrmacht entered Poland. Great Britain declared war on Germany
at 12:00 P.M. the next day, followed by France at 5:00 P.M., “in or-
der to defend the independence of Poland.”
No German was pleased and I believe that Géring expressed all
our thoughts when, during the night of August 31, he said to von
Ribbentrop: “God help us if we should ever lose this war!”

I had not yet done my military service. As | was about to take my

final tests as a pilot, I was called up by the Luftwaffe. They were of
the opinion, however, that at 31 I was too old to fly. But I had not the
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 35
least intention of spending the war in some lowly position in an of-
fice. | applied for a transfer to the Waffen-SS. I was one of only ten
out of a hundred applicants to be accepted, after a series of extremely
demanding physical tests and medical examinations.
Countless books have been published about the SS and appar-
ently will continue to be published. Many, however, fall far short of
the mark in providing a clear picture of this organization. In recent
years serious historians have admitted that the SS possessed an ex-
tremely complicated structure, and that its various branches were
animated by quite differing spirits and played vastly different roles.
Nevertheless the confusion continues and the Waffen-SS is still of-
ten equated with the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). In reality any confusion
was out of the question, for one could identify a member of the SD
simply by looking at his uniform: one could read large and clear on
the left sleeve: SD (Security Service) and the two SS symbols were
absent from the right collar insignia.
Further clarifications are necessary: writers always claim that
Heinrich Himmler was the founder and commander of the SS. This
is a double mistake. He was always only its first functionary.
Seen from the political and military standpoint, Hitler was obvi-
ously the commander of the Schutz-Staffel and we, the soldiers of the
Waffen-SS, swore loyalty to him.
It was at the end of 1924, when Hitler left Landsberg Prison, that
the problem of reorganizing the National-Socialist Party became
acute. The Sturm-Abteilungen (SA) were banned in most provinces
of the Reich. Hitler sent for his chauffeur Julius Schreck and tasked
him, together with Rudolf Hess, with the formation of a small motor-
ized formation made up of trustworthy people. It must be capable of
protecting the leader and speaker of the party under any circumstances
and of defending a hall where he was speaking. Such groups ap-
peared in the larger cities and first in the interiors of the assembly
halls, where they earned the name Schutz-Staffel (protection unit). In
cities where the wearing of a uniform was not forbidden, they wore a
white shirt with brassard, a tie, riding breeches, boots and a black
cap. On this was a death’s head, so that we were always aware of
death.
The death’s head has been characterized as a barbaric and fright-
ful symbol. In reality there have been death’s head hussars in the
36 Otto SKORZENY
German cavalry since 1741, these having served under the command
of Frederick the Great. At Waterloo General Delort’s much-feared
cuirassiers were attacked bravely by von Liitzow’s Black Uhlans,
who also wore the death’s head as their insignia. In Great Britain the
death’s head was the insignia of the 17th Lancers, earned in the Battle
of Balaklava in 1854. Many remember the silhouette of General von
Mackensen in his great uniform of the Death’s Head Hussars: the
famous marshall’s face was so alarming and gaunt that one thought
he was seeing a second death’s head beneath the one on his cap.
But the first SS men were not people from another world. They
bravely did their duty, which at times was difficult, and many of
them were killed in the fight against the Red Front. Toward the end
of 1928 they numbered about 300, and it wasn’t until the following
year that Hitler tasked Himmler with organizing the SS; this was to
be done under the completely new concept of military-political fight-
ers who were to stand out above the mass of the SA men.
The SS played a very special role following the assumption of
power and the very serious attempt to bring about a second revolu-
tion, which was undertaken by the SA’s Chief-of-Staff R6hm and the
SA leaders Heines (Silesia), Karl Ernst (Berlin-Brandenburg),
Heydebeck (Pomerania), Hayn (Saxony), Schneidhuber (Bavaria) and
others at the end of June 1934.
The first armed unit of the SS was the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler
under the command of a rough Bavarian, an old tank fighter of the
Great War, Sepp Dietrich. This parade regiment with its white leather
accoutrements, which we had seen march past flawlessly in Vienna,
was Hitler’s personal guard.
Soon afterward two further regiments were formed under the
designation SS-Verfiigungstruppen; these were active, military units
of the SS. At the end of 1937 there were three SS infantry regiments,
the Deutschland Regiment, the only one whose organization was
complete, the Germania Regiment and the Leibstandarte. Adminis-
tration and military training were entrusted to Paul Hausser, retired
Reichswehr Generalleutnant and commander of the Braunschweig
Junkersschule.
The military training of the Waffen-SS featured some interesting
innovations. After an extremely strict physical selection process, the
recruits, whether they were officers, NCOs or simple soldiers, had to
play sports intensively. Discipline was even stricter than normal in
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 37
the Wehrmacht. The officers took part in the lives of their men one
hundred percent. Comradeship, trust and mutual respect were the
rule. Relationships within the hierarchy of the Waffen-SS were sim-
pler, more human than in the Wehrmacht, and we had none of the
caricatured type of arrogant officer.
One will perhaps be surprised to hear that freedom of conscience
was absolute in the Waffen-SS. One could find agnostics, practicing
catholics and protestants there.? The chaplain of the French SS-Bri-
gade Charlemagne was Monsignore Mayol de Lipe, a personal friend
of Pope Pius XII, and I had in my unit a Romanian catholic priest
who served as a simple soldier.
While the majority of the SA men were members of the National-
Socialist Party, not only was party membership not obligatory in the
Waffen-SS, it wasn’t even recommended. People don’t want to un-
derstand this. We were without a doubt political soldiers, however
we defended an ideology which superseded politics and parties.
The motto engraved on our belt buckles read: “My honor is loy-
alty.” And so it remained.
We did not see ourselves as soldiers who were superior to the
others; we did however strive with all our hearts to serve our father-
land as well as it was within our power to do.
It cannot be denied that the Waffen-SS possessed an esprit de
corps, but that is nothing new, for every army in the world at that
time had an esprit de corps. I believe it even existed in the Red Guard
and in certain Siberian divisions, the elite troops of the Soviet Army.
One unique feature of the Waffen-SS was that it was a volunteer
army, in which from 1942 European soldiers from many lands and
peoples could be found: Albanians, Bosnians, Britons, Bulgarians,
Cossacks, Croats, Danes, Dutch, Estonians, Finns, Flemings, French,
Georgians, Greeks, Hungarians, Italians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Nor-
wegians, Romanians, Russians, Serbs, Slovakians, Swedes, Swiss,
Ukrainians, Walloons; as well Armenians, Byelorussians, Hindus,
Kirghizes, Tartars, Turkmen and Uzbeks served under their own flags
in the Waffen-SS. Almost all of these peoples were represented in
my unit. The only ones missing were Albanians, Bosnians, Britons,
Cossacks, Georgians, Greeks and Serbians.
It only remains to be said that as part of the army we neither had
to receive nor did receive operational orders from Himmler during
the war. Himmler was neither a serving soldier nor a military com-
38 Orro SKORZENY
mander, even though he tried to appear to be one at the beginning of
1945.°
The real creator of the Waffen-SS was thus General Paul Hausser,
whose nickname “Papa Hausser” was a symbol of the affection we
felt for him. Together with Felix Steiner, an old warrior from the
Baltic,‘ and Sepp Dietrich, he gave the Waffen-SS a style and an
offensive spirit which could perhaps be compared with that of the
Napoleonic Guard.
How can it escape a person’s notice that this army, consisting of
about a million young Europeans, all of whom displayed the same
cold-bloodedness toward death, thoroughly and absolutely failed to
confirm Reichsfiihrer der SS Himmler’s nebulous “Theory of the
Nordic Man?” Hitler himself was not an adherent of this doctrine.
I must also admit that the doctrine of Reichsleiter Alfred
Rosenberg always struck me as blurred. Rosenberg, whom I met later,
was sincere, but he was given responsibilities which were beyond
him. It was only with difficulty that I managed to read to the end his
book Myth of the Twentieth Century. I’ve met few people who have
read all 700 pages.
What sort of general opinion can one form conceming the con-
duct of the Waffen-SS in the course of the Second World War?
In 1957 the historical section of the general staff of the Israeli
Army sent a questionnaire to more than a thousand military chiefs or
experts around the world, as well as to historians and war correspon-
dents. It requested that they answer the following questions in regard
to both world wars: Which armies do you consider the best? Which
were the bravest soldiers? The best trained? The most skillful? The
most disciplined? Which had the most initiative and so on.
Among those who responded to the questionnaire were Generals
Marshall (USA), Heusinger (NATO), G.F. Fuller (Great Britain),
Koenig (France), as well as the famous military author Sir Basil
Liddell Hart, authors Leon Uris, Hermann Wouk and others. The
armies that participated in World War One were classified as fol-
lows:

1. German Army
2. French Army
3. English Army
4. Turkish Army
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 39
American Army
Russian Army

OIA
Austro-Hungarian Army
Italian Army

Where World War Two was concerned, the classification allowed for
a maximum of 100 and a minimum of 10 points.
The results were as follows:

1. The German Armed Forces 93 points

2. Japanese Army 86 points
3. Soviet Army 83 points
4. Finnish Army 79 points
5. Polish Army 71 points
6. British Army 62 points
7. American Army 55 points
8. French Army 39 points
9. Italian Army 24 points

Where the air forces were concemed, the RAF followed the Luftwaffe,
then came the American Air Force, the Japanese Air Force and that
of the USSR. The British Navy placed ahead of the Japanese and
American, while the German stood in first place.
Finally, among the elite units the Waffen-SS held first place, fol-
lowed by the Marines (USA), the British commandos and the French
Foreign Legion.
Naturally objections can be raised against any classification of
this type. Opinions were very divided on placing the Polish Army in
fifth place. In my opinion the Italian soldiers were not without merit,
they were just often poorly armed, very badly supplied and com-
manded by officers who were not always equal to the task. In Africa
the black shirt divisions were good. Italian submarine crews and fli-
ers achieved some extraordinary personal achievements and suc-
cesses. Italian units fought well on the Eastern Front and the Savoia
Cavalry Regiment fought heroically in Stalingrad in November 1942.
The manned torpedoes of the X-MAS Flotilla of Prince Junio-Valerio
Borghese and Teseo Tesei distinguished themselves through sensa-
tional successes in the Mediterranean. These should have been taken
into consideration.
40 Otto SKORZENY
I will come back to Prince Valerio Borghese, an aristocrat in the
truest sense of the word. I met him in 1943 under circumstances I
will describe later. He himself took part in two very dangerous, suc-
cessful operations, one in Gibraltar Harbour and the other in Alexan-
dria Harbour. In March 1945, when many of his countrymen were
changing their colors, he said to me, “My dear Skorzeny, we're fight-
ing for the same cause, for a free Europe. Rest assured that I will
fight to the end, come what may.” He kept his word.

Notes
1. Eger was an old fortress city of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Skorzeny family rove ers
from Posen, from the vicinity of Lake Skorzenczin, therefore Its name. Posen, in western Poland, had
been German until 1918. According to family documents written in German, the Skorzenys, at first
landowners and farmors, were the ancestors of a family tha! could be traced back to the end of the
Sixteenth Century.

2. SS leaders at least, were required to leave the church; however this regulation was ool gcnerally
enforced (editor).

3. In Erinnerungen eines Soldaten Generalobcrst Guderian said that Himmler’s greatest ambition was
to carn military laurels. in the view of the military experts this was a catastrophe. Guderian, then chief
of the army general staff, feared the wors and sent Gencral Wenck to assist. But Weock fell victim to an
auio accident en route (February 17, 1945). “Without Wenck,” wrote Guderian, “Himmler demon-
a tn Incompetenz... Tb day to day.” At Guderian’s request, Hitler
removed Himmler as commander-in-chief. . His place ut the bead of Anny Group Vitals wns ial
taken by General Henrici, wh Army (March
20, 1945).
4. A free carps formed after the collapse of the German front in the Baltic lands in 1918-19. It with-
stood the first bolshevik onslaught in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and even East Prussia.
 4
Why We Dipn’T LAnD
IN ENGLAND & TAKE GIBRALTAR

The “Moonlight Company” — Campaign in France with the SS-Divi-

sion Verfiigungstruppe — Tiger hunt in a Bordeaux suburb - Opera-
tion Felix, the planned assault on Gibraltar — Canaris, Chief of the
Abwehr, an “Admiral with seven souls” — His goal: “To prevent
Germany from winning the war by any and all means” - General
Franco's demands — Operation Otario — Misleading information from
the Chief of the Abwehr - Frankness on the part of Winston Churchill.

t was February 1940 when I was assigned to the 2nd Company

of the reserve battalion of the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler in
Berlin-Lichterfelde. Although I was an engineer-officer candi-
date, I had to endure six weeks of intensive training with young-
sters of sixteen to eighteen. The other recruits who were my age —
doctors, chemists, lawyers and engineers — had to clench their teeth
to avoid staying behind with this “moonlight company,” which had
thoroughly earned its name. The company commander had a decided
preference for conducting exercises at night, and we had had enough
of it.
My time in the “moonlight company” was followed by special
training with the reserve battalion of the Waffen-SS Regiment
Germania at Hamburg-Langenhorn. In May 1940 I passed all my
military-technical tests in Berlin and was named an officer candi-
date.
The Polish Campaign had lasted only eighteen days. Russia, which
occupied half of the country without fighting, also subsequently de-
stroyed the small but heroic Finnish Army, while the Wehrmacht stole
a march on the Anglo-French expeditionary Corps and occupied

41
42 Orto SKORZENY
Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940. Sweden subsequently per-
mitted free transit of German troops as well as the transport of ore
from Norway.
My comrades joked: “We’d better hurry if we want to get in on
the fighting, for the war will soon be over.”
But not everyone was so optimistic. I hoped that it might be a
short war, and that we would not have to directly attack either France
or Britain, for the greatest threat was not from the west, but from the
east.
Nevertheless, in May 1940 I, like everyone else, found myself in
a field-grey uniform with the eagle emblem on the left sleeve, on the
roads of Holland, Belgium and France. I was a member of the artil-
lery regiment of the SS-Division Verfilgungstruppe. This was the fu-
ture Das Reich Division. Our commanding officer, “Papa” Hausser,
already had three motorized infantry regiments — Deutschland,
Germania and Der Fiihrer — and the artillery regiment, which con-
sisted of three battalions of light artillery and one of heavy artillery,
to which I belonged, under his command.
Our division made a very rapid advance, in Brabant as well as in
Flanders and in the Artois. We crossed the Somme on June 6 and 7
after very heavy fighting and the “Weygand Line” collapsed. At the
height of the battle the month before, our division, which had suf-
fered heavy casualties, received more than 2,000 replacements. One
night my heavy artillery battalion was bombed by the enemy’s air
force and placed under very accurate fire by the French artillery. One
of our munitions trucks exploded and a Hauptsturmfihrer was blown
apart by a mine.
On June 12, my birthday, | was in Creusot, where the large
Schneider Works were located. After guarding the left flank of the
panzer division advancing on Dijon, we received orders to veer off
in a southwesterly direction.
During all these battles and our advance through the lovely country
of France, I was struck by the frightful consequences of war: ruins,
abandoned farmhouses, vacant villages with plundered shops, un-
buried bodies and countless suffering people, refugees, elderly, chil-
dren, women, some on the run all the way from Belgium. We over-
took them and sometimes, when we made a halt, gave them food.
This war between western countries was absurd, and the cease-fire
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 43
concluded with the French government on 22 June at first seemed to
me like the beginning of a lasting peace in Europe.
I cannot recall any expressions of absolute loathing or hate on
the part of the civilian population.
An unusual adventure awaited me in a suburb of Bordeaux. As I
was driving through the suburb at the wheel of my Kübelwagen I
noticed that something out of the ordinary was going on. I slowed
my vehicle. They called to me: “An animal...down there...a wild ani-
mal!” All the people then disappeared as if by magic, and I soon saw
what was going on. There, scarcely one hundred meters in front of
me, standing on the sidewalk at the top of a hill on a small road,
stood a full-grown Tiger. It was just about to eat a hind quarter of an
ox it had stolen from a nearby butcher’s shop. I stopped my car, and
in a quite natural! reflex placed my hand on my pistol holster. But I
immediately shrugged my shoulders, for what effect would a pistol
bullet have on such a magnificent and powerful animal? So I took
my chauffeur’s rifle and killed the tiger, something I wasn’t exactly
proud of, but which very much relieved the inhabitants of Bordeaux.
The butcher told me that the tiger had escaped from a circus and had
caused a panic in this suburb. The butcher was also friendly enough
to save me the pelt, which I picked up later.
We went into garrison in Dax, where I frequently used the French
military aircraft at the field to fly over the countryside and the Basque
region. We went swimming at Biarritz and often crossed the border
into Spain, always in uniform. Our comrades of the Spanish Army
always gave us a warm welcome.
Somewhat later I learned that our stationing on the border was no
coincidence. Our division and various other elite units of the
Wehrmacht were supposed to traverse Spain to take Gibraltar with
the agreement of the Spanish government. This was to be Operation
Felix. However the operation never took place, which calls for fur-
ther explanation.
It was said that this operation was thwarted by the Chief of the
Abwehr (the Wehrmacht’s intelligence and counter-espionage ser-
vice) Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. At this point we must take a closer
look at Canaris, whom I got to know personally in 1943/44 and who
played an extremely important role in the course of the Second World
War.
44 Otto SKORZENY
On visiting his Berlin villa in Grunewald, the first thing one saw
in the vestibule was a monumental portrait of a hero of the Greek
war of independence (1823), Constantin Kanaris, a scimitar in his
hand, cleaving Turkish heads.
The Abwehr chief claimed very seriously that this Constantin
was his ancestor, although his family had emigrated from Italy to the
Rhineland at the end of the eighteenth century. Canaris also told cer-
tain Spaniards that some of his distant Greek ancestors, who were
courageous seamen, had reached the Canary Islands, which suppos-
edly accounted for their name.
Born not far from Dortmund on January 1, 1887, Canaris be-
came a cadet in the Imperial Navy in 1905 and served with the rank
of Oberleutnant zur See on board the small cruiser Dresden, which
was sunk by its crew in Chilean waters in March 1915 to prevent it
from falling into the hands of the British cruiser Glasgow. Canaris
reached Spain toward the end of 1915 and served as an officer of the
German intelligence service in Madrid until 1916. He ended the war
as a Kapitänleutnant in the German submarine service. One can say
that he wasn’t very highly thought of by his comrades. In answer to
a question from attorney Otto Nelte, Grossadmira! Dénitz declared
in front of the Nuremberg court on May 9, 1946:

“In the navy Admiral Canaris was an officer who inspired little
trust. He was quite different from all the others. We said of him that
he had seven souls.”

Although Canaris called himself a monarchist, he served the Weimar

Republic with great zeal. In 1924 he was promoted to
Korvettenkapitän and in 1930 to Fregattenkapitän. Finally he was
named Chief-of-Staff of the North Sea Station. In 1935 he became
head of the Abwehr, succeeding Kapitän zur See Conrad Patzig.
At Nuremberg on June 3, 1946 Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Chief
of the Operations Staff of the OKW (Wehrmacht High Command)
characterized the Abwehr under the direction of Canaris as a “nest of
traitors.” One of Canaris’ most important department heads, Oberst
Erwin Lahousen, declared before the same tribune on November 30,
1945:
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 45
“We were unabie to prevent this war of aggression. The war meant
the end of Germany and of us, and thus a disaster and a catastrophe
of the greatest proportion. But a triumph by this system would have
been a disaster even greater than this catastrophe, and using all the
means at our disposal to prevent this had to be the ultimate essence
and purpose of our struggle.”

To return to Operation Felix, it didn’t appear that it would take any

great effort on the part of Admiral Canaris to convince General Franco
to allow German troops to march through Spain to get at Gibraltar.
The Chief of the Abwehr certainly knew the Cuadillo; it was even
said that they used the familiar “du” form of address. Canaris made
an inordinate number of trips to Spain, two alone in the summer of
1940, in July and August, and it was on the latter occasion that the
admiral discussed the matter of Gibraltar with Franco.
I cannot reveal the military sources that informed me that Canaris
convinced the Cuadillo to demand the following of Hitler in return,
demands which definitely had to be rejected: wheat, fuel, weapons
and ammunition in enormous quantities, and above all the annex-
ation into the Spanish colonial region of all of French Morocco and
the Departement of Oran in Algeria.
This was impossible. Why should Hitler give away something
that he didn’t possess and that he had never demanded from France?
He was still of the opinion that a policy of honest cooperation and
friendly relations with France was very desirable. This friendly policy
was outlined in October 1940 in Montoire during talks with Marshall
Pétain.
Following Canaris’ visit to Spain, the Reich’s ambassador in
Madrid, Eberhardt von Stohrer, related the following in a report to
the Wilhelmstrasse on August 8, 1940:

“(Even if the German government accedes to all of Franco's de-

mands) the date for the beginning of preparations and the action
(Gibraltar) itself must be adjusted to correspond to the expected de-
velopments in England (successful German landing in England), so
that we avoid a premature entry into the war by Spain, which would
mean an unbearable length of conflict for Spain and the possible
creation of a source of danger for us.”
46 OTTO SKORZENY
Nowadays most of Canaris’ subordinates and agents who actively
worked on the fall of the government are known. One of the most
determined was Oberst, later General, Hans Oster, head of the cen-
tral department in the Amt Ausland Abwehr. It was he who sent the
young Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin to London in August 1938 to
ask the British government for help and support against Hitler.
Kleist-Schmenzin established contact with Sir Robert Vansittart
and Winston Churchill in the name of a group of German generals
who were preparing a coup d’état — General Beck, his successor as
Army Chief of Staff Halder, Generals Witzleben (later promoted to
Generalfeldmarschall), Stülpnagel, Brockdorff-Ahlefeld, Hoepner
and others. On August 29, 1938, after returning to Berlin, he received
a very encouraging letter from Churchill which he passed on to
Canaris, who then informed Halder and Witzleben. Halder himself
subsequently sent two proxies to London, Oberstleutnant Hans
Boehm-Tettelbach and Theodor Kordt. Indeed they expected that
London would give them a free hand to bring down the government.
The Munich Agreement confounded these people, who called them-
selves “German patriots.”
On March 11, 1939 Oster informed the British and also the Czech
secret service that the German Army would march into Bohemia and
Moravia at 6 A.M. on March 16. This allowed the Czechs to fly their
best intelligence specialists and most important archives to safety in
England on March 14.
On March 16, 1948, Colonel J.G. Sas, who before the war had
been the Dutch military attache in Berlin, made a statement before
the Dutch Commission for Historical Documentation, in which he
declared that Oberst Oster had given him a great quantity of the most
vital, secret information over the course of several years. This in-
cluded the exact date of the German attack against Norway, as well
as much information concerning the offensive in the west (May 10,
1940).
At the same time as Oster was passing his information to the then
Major Sas, on May 30, 1940 the Abwehr notified its “colleague” in
Rome, Josef Müller, of the news. Müller had established contact with
Belgian, Dutch and British representatives with the Holy See. This
organization was called the “Black Orchestra,” as opposed to the
“Red Orchestra,” which I will come back to. What is more, Canaris
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 47
and Oster had an agent in Switzerland, Hans Bernd Gisevius, Vice
Consul in Zurich, who later maintained an outstanding relationship
with Allen Welsh Dulles, head of the American intelligence service
in Europe. Dulles later became head of the CIA.
The Abwehr established itself in Zossen, which from 1943 was
the seat of the Army General Staff. Oster kept extremely compro-
mising documents in a safe there, which were found in September
1944 after the attempt on Hitler’s life. Further documents were found
in another safe at the beginning of 1945 in the form of twelve vol-
umes of a private diary kept by Canaris. Convicted of conspiring
against the security of the state, Canaris defended himself by main-
taining that he had joined the conspirators in 1938 so as to be better
able to expose them.
While on his way to the shower, Canaris was able to whisper to
Theodor Striinck, one of Oster’s liaison agents in Zurich who was
likewise arrested and charged with treason, “Incriminate Oster and
Dohnanyi.” Dohnanyi was a direct subordinate of Oster’s. Canaris
played a double game to the end. He even denied for a moment that
he and Oster had worked together!
With the chances of Operation Felix becoming a reality appear-
ing more and more remote, our division was withdrawn from France
and stationed in Holland to prepare for Operation Sea Lion (Otario),
the landing in England. Toward the end of July, however, I received
two weeks leave, which I spent with my family on the banks of the
Wörthersee, where the beginning of World War Two had caught me
by surprise. Afterwards I returned to Amersfoort near Utrecht, where
my regiment was in garrison.
In January 1943 I had a conversation with Generaloberst Jodl
about the Sea Lion plan. Jod! explained to me:

“Operation Otario was planned relatively late, namely on July 2,

1940. In order to be able to understand why it wasn’t taken into con-
sideration earlier, one must consider what happened on May 24, 1940,
when the Führer ordered Reinhardt and Guderian’s XLI and XIX
Panzer Corps to halt their advance on Dunkirk and Calais. On the
following day it became clear that we no longer had to fear being
attacked or cut off on our left flank. Nevertheless the Fihrer kept his
order in place until about noon on May 26. I believe he was then
convinced that we could come to terms with Great Britain, and on
48 OTTO SKORZENY
these grounds wished to avoid embarrassing the nation by capturing
Lord Gort’s entire expeditionary corps.”

Hitler wanted to come to an understanding with the European pow-

ers, and especially with Great Britain. Documents from the German
archives, which were seized by the allies in 1945 and which are ac-
cessible today, prove that in 1936 the Duke of Coburg informed Hitler
that King Edward VIII was very well disposed toward an alliance.
Far from being aimed against France, this alliance was to include
France. King Edward suggested installing a direct telephone line from
Buckingham Palace to the Reich Chancellery.
I] am convinced today, that from June 16, 1940 (we were crossing
the Loire at that time) Hitler was hopeful of a successful outcome to
the negotiations for a peace with Great Britain which were being
conducted through Switzerland, Spain, Sweden and Italy with his
knowledge, and that he erred in this matter. He also believed
Reichsmarschall Göring, who declared that he could prevent the
embarkation of the expeditionary corps with his Luftwaffe alone. As
a result the English succeeded in evacuating 230,000 of their 250,000
men, albeit without weapons and equipment, back to England.
The evacuation by sea was carried out with civilian craft, some
small yachts, and it is still my view that the Dunkirk evacuation was
an unbelievably brave accomplishment by the British people.
Nevertheless, an enormous amount of materiel had been destroyed
or abandoned. In his famous speech broadcast by the BBC on June 4,
1940, Churchill said:

“...we will fight on the beaches, at the landing sites, we will fight
on the land and in the streets!”

The Deacon of Canterbury later stated that the speaker placed a hand
over the microphone at that moment and added: “And we will throw
beer glasses in their faces, for that is in fact all we have.” Later the
English Prime Minister officially admitted to the American Congress
(December 26, 1941):

“We were lucky to have time. If Germany had landed in the Brit-
ish Isles after the collapse of France in June 1940, and if Japan had
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 49
declared war on us then, disaster and suffering on an indescribable
scale would have come over our land.”

However Canaris was standing guard. On July 7, 1940 he gave Keitel

confidential information which stated that the Germans would meet
about twenty first-line divisions in an eventual landing in England,
with another nineteen in reserve. However, in his memoirs Mont-
gomery stated that at this time there was only one adequately armed
and equipped division available, namely the 3rd under the command
of Montgomery himself.
The false information from Canaris explains the demands made
by Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch, whom Hitler had entrusted
with the overall command of the landing forces: he wanted to land
on a wide front with 41 divisions, six of these panzer divisions and
three motorized! Grossadmiral Raeder naturally answered with a non
possumus; he didn’t have enough ships to cover the landing at sea
and furthermore demanded total air superiority on the part of the
Luftwaffe.
The preparations for Otario were nevertheless actively pursued.
One moming my commanding officer, Standartenfiihrer Hansen, and
Hauptsturmführer Emil Schäfer, who commanded the regiment, or-
dered me to build a loading ramp for the following day. The ramp
was to be able to bear mobile loads of 20 to 30 tons (tractors and
heavy guns). It was obvious that they thought that they had given me
an order which would take five or six days to carry out.
I immediately made a sketch of the design and was fortunate to
find the necessary materials in Utrecht, which I had prepared in the
workshops there. About 100 men worked through the night with light
provided by the headlights of twenty trucks. Finally we succeeded in
completing the loading ramp with the limited means available. At
dawn I became the first to try out the ramp, driving a gun tractor over
it with the regiment’s heaviest howitzer in tow. Afterward they woke
the Standartenführer and the Hauptsturmfihrer, neither of whom could
believe the news.
“I would like to tell you, my dear Skorzeny,” declared Hansen,
“that you will pay dearly if this is a joke.”
But it was no joke... We later carried out numerous loading tests
and landing maneuvers on the Helder, using Rhine barges with their
50 OTTO SKORZENY
bows cut off. They nearly went under in heavy weather. In spite of
our great enthusiasm we asked ourselves what would happen if the
landing took place at the end of August or in September when the
weather was generally very unfavorable in the English Channel.
Göring’s air offensive, the “Battle of Britain,” did not achieve
the desired success. On September 16 and 17, 1940 we were bombed
day and night by the RAF, and on 21 September a dozen transport
ships and numerous Rhine barges were sunk or damaged. We suf-
fered dead and wounded, which at the time led to rumors that we had
tried a landing, which had been repulsed.
In June or at the beginning of July we could have landed about
fifteen divisions in three or four attack waves. That would have been
very possible. Since the British Expeditionary Corps was surrounded
by our panzers in France, the Luftwaffe could have carried out a
useful “demonstration” against the RAF and the Home Fleet.
On September 19 Hitler gave the final order to disperse the land-
ing fleet and on October 12 Operation Otario was quietly put off
until the next spring. It was also at this time that the OKW again
considered Operation Felix against Gibraltar, however without tak-
ing any action.
It was clear that Hitler did not recognize the full strategic signifi-
cance of the Mediterranean. The Italians should have occupied the
“aircraft carrier,” the island of Malta, but we could also have ad-
vanced to Gibraltar and occupied the rock in June 1940. As soon as
we had taken possession of this and barred the entrance to the Medi-
terranean, the war would have taken an quite different course. The
English would have had to sail around Africa and the Cape and through
the Suez Canal in order to supply their forces in Egypt and North
Africa. Admiral Dönitz’s submarines would have wreaked havoc
along the west coast of Africa, and I believe it is not an exaggeration
to claim that Field Marshalls Alexander and Montgomery would only
have received about thirty percent of the troops and materiel which
in fact arrived directly via Gibraltar.
The Anglo-American landings in North Africa, Italy and France
would have been impossible.
Those who maintain nowadays that Operation Otario would have
ended in defeat in July-August 1940 should consider the following
“confession” by Churchill, which he made to officers of the Home
Guard on May 12, 1940:
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 51
“After the fall of France we were not only a people without an
army, but also a people without weapons. If the enemy had fallen
from the sky or landed in various parts of the country, he would have
found only a handful of poorly-armed men guarding searchlight po-
sitions.”

This, however, was not in tune with the assurances given by the Ger-
man intelligence service under Admiral Canaris.
 >
FROM THE ENGLISH CHANNEL
TO THE BALKANS

Operation Otario postponed “sine die” ~ Explanations by Ambassa-

dor Hewel - In France: Arrest of President Laval and Operation
Attila “A soldier of the SS may not fall under suspicion” - An en-
tente with France, foundation of a new Europe — Ambassador Abetz,
overtaken by events - In the Balkans -“Stoi!” — Thoughts on the
capture of the island of Crete —-Belgrade — Neither Gibraltar nor
Suez nor Malta — Return to Austria

n Holland we had no idea that Operation Otario had been post-

poned “sine die,” and we still believed that we would land in
England in early 1941. Training continued at a rapid pace and
discipline was strictly maintained.
Our aircraft had taken detailed photos of the English coast from
low altitude. We therefore knew exactly where our battalion of heavy
artillery was supposed to land and what natural obstacles we would
have to overcome. We were told that we had to fear that the English
would set their coast afire and cover the sea with a layer of burning
liquid. This reminded me of the mysterious Greek Fire, which had
first been used by the emperors of Constantinople, such as Justinian
in the sixth century and finally also by the Empress Theodora against
Russian ships.
This story of setting the coast afire seemed rather fantastic to me,
for it wouldn’t have been so simple to set, say twenty kilometers of
coast, the area necessary to land two divisions, on fire. But we would
get through in any case, with or without Greek Fire, we would get
through bullets, bombs, machine-gun fire, the entire Home Fleet and
any bad weather if it should be necessary, and we would advance to

52
 My ComMANDO OPERATIONS 53
London. We had not the least doubt that we would be successful. We
also knew that our submarines had sunk 63 British ships totalling
352,407 tons during the month of October 1940 alone.
After our attack on ships of the allied fleet at Anzio with manned
torpedoes in 1944, Grossadmiral Dénitz received me very cordially
in his headquarters near the Wolfsschanze. On this occasion he told
me that this success in 1940 had been achieved with only 8 U-boats
and that he had pressed for 100 submarines at the time!
In October 1940 Dénitz commanded just the submarine arm. If
his suggestions had been followed since 1938, England would have
been driven out of the Mediterranean, the Battle of the Atlantic would
have taken a different course and Operation Otario could have been
carried out in September 1940.
The misadventure later suffered by the Royal Navy at Dakar
showed even the allied storm troops that the English were far from
unbeatable at sea. For three days, from the 22nd to the 25th of Sep-
tember 1940, a strong expeditionary sent by the English and de Gaulle
tried to seize Dakar and a considerable quantity of gold which be-
longed to the national banks of France, Belgium and Poland. This
fact is little known. In spite of all the rumors it is a fact: there wasn’t
even the shadow of a single German soldier in Dakar.
But the English fleet was met by cannon fire. Two cruisers were
heavily damaged — the Resolution was hit by torpedoes and left list-
ing and the Barham was set afire by a salvo from the modern cruiser
Richelieu. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal, three other cruisers, the
destroyers, torpedo boats, tankers and transport ships were forced to
withdraw in order to prevent the entire affair from ending in catas-
trophe. Neville Chamberlain resigned on October 3 and Churchill,
under pressure from the opposition, was forced to shake up his war
cabinet. But there was no doubt that Hitler had already trained his
gaze toward the east at the end of September.
During my stay at Führer Headquarters in the autumn of 1944 I
gained a better insight into the grounds that had moved Hitler not to
give the order for the attack on England. Certainly the false informa-
tion from Canaris was decisive in the months of July and August, but
envoy Hewel, who was the liaison man between the OKW and the
Foreign Ministry, told me that at that time Hitler had not yet given up
the idea of reaching a peaceful arrangement with Great Britain.
54 OTTO SKORZENY
“The difficulties of a landing did not seem insurmountable to
him in the summer of 1940,” Hewel said to me. “What appeared to
be significantly more difficult, was the necessity of feeding a nation
of 47 million inhabitants which received about half its foodstuffs
from abroad and then would receive no more. The Royal Family,
Churchill and the government would go to Canada with the bulk of
the Home Fleet. Should we proclaim a republic in Great Britain?
‘Where,’ he asked, ‘are we to find a Cromwell?’ Churchill wanted to
see to it himself that the unity of the victorian empire was defended.
We would find ourselves having to control an island amid an in-
creasingly hostile population suffering from cold and hunger, while
the worst was to be expected from Stalin.” This was the reason why
Operation Felix seemed more advisable than Operation Otario. He
had already offered Great Britain what he could in his speeches to
the Reichstag on October 6, 1939 and again on October 8, 1940:
peace, guarantees for the British Empire and cooperation with all the
nations of Europe. All the other, more or less secret attempts, had
failed. But at the moment at which Otario was abandoned and Felix
was impossible to carry out, it became clear that the solution would
have to be sought in the east before it became too late. Stalin hoped
that we would plunge into Operation Otario in early 1941. That would
have been just right for him to attack Germany during the summer or
at the beginning of autumn!
In mid-December we were again brought to a state of readiness.
Christmas leave was cancelled and on December 18 we received the
order to leave Holland, destination unspecified.
We returned to France via Düsseldorf, Wiesbaden, Mainz,
Mannheim and Karlsruhe and drove through the Vosges to Vesoul.
The journey was extremely demanding: It snowed continuously, and
I had to retrieve more than 150 vehicles and trucks which had be-
come stuck in the snow-covered Vosges.
There was no rest in Port-sur-Saöne either. I was informed that
the SS-Verfügungstruppe Division was to be ready to leave for
Marseille with munitions, fuel and food by December 21. During the
night of December 20 I noticed that the largest of our fuel trucks had
two badly damaged tires. I sought out an army dump in the vicinity
of Langres, where, following lengthy negotiations with an insignifi-
cant Feldwebel, I had to resort to theoretical threats to get my two
tires. I finally got them in exchange for a regulation voucher.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 55
A few hours before our departure to cross the demarcation line
and march to Marseille by the shortest route the order was changed:
departure was planned for December 22, then for 4A.M. on the 23rd,
and finally the entire order was withdrawn.
Operation Attila, which was to see the occupation of the entire
free zone of France, including the French departements in North
Africa, was not carried out.
On December 13, 1940, Marshall Pétain in Vichy had separated
himself from the president of the privy council, Pierre Laval, and
even had him arrested. Poorly informed, ambassador Abetz, who saw
Laval as the only guarantee of political cooperation with Germany,
allowed himself to become confused and sent overly hasty reports to
Berlin. Laval certainly accepted the policy of a joint conduct of the
war at Germany’s side as perhaps possible, especially with the goal
of retaking the equatorial region of Africa, which had broken away.
At the same time Hitler had given back the ashes of Napoleon’s
son, the Duke of Reichstadt, which rested in the Capuchin Church in
Vienna, so that the young eagle could find his place next to his fa-
mous father in the Hétel of the Invalides. Marshall Pétain was repre-
sented by Admiral Darlan at the ceremony, because the French head
of state had been informed that we would detain him if he should
come to Paris! Hitler was furious when he learned of this. In reality
what was going on in Vichy was a palace revolution and shabby in-
trigues. “Purely a matter of internal politics,” Admiral Darlan ex-
plained to Hitler on December 25. At the time I had no way of know-
ing that I would later be given a delicate mission in Vichy, which
thank God I did not have to carry out, namely to seize the person of
the famous marshall.
After the departure order was ultimately withdrawn on Decem-
ber 23, 1940, I was again assigned leave. I was in Vienna with my
family when I was recalled by telegraph. I was to report to the com-
mander of my division immediately on my return: the people of the
military general staff administrative section were demanding that I
be severely punished. Generalleutnant Hausser informed me that I
was charged with threatening a Feldwebe! that I would level his tire
dump if he didn’t hand over the urgently needed tires.
“Gruppenfihrer,” I explained, “the fuel truck’s twelve tons of
gasoline had to reach their destination! Every minute was impor-
tant... The tires were lying there... Anyway I gave him a voucher.”
56 OTTO SKORZENY
“Skorzeny, you must understand that the stores administrators
are very formal and bureaucratic people, who believe that the mate-
rial they administer is their personal property. You were doubtless
very courteous to them, but this Feldwebel must have been shocked
by your persistence. These gentlemen of the administrative section
are demanding that you be punished as an example to others. There-
fore consider yourself punished in principle. Then we’ll see. Mean-
while you can go back on leave. Go on then.”
In Russia I had the opportunity to learn first-hand that certain
gentlemen of the administrative section were in fact extremely bu-
reaucratic.
We moved into our winter quarters on the Langres Plateau, and it
deserves to be mentioned that our relations with the French popula-
tion were outstanding. Any incorrectness on our part was punished
firmly. I can offer two examples as typical:
On May 18, 1940 our regiment passed through a small village
near Hirson (Aisne) whose name I cannot remember. Lying scattered
on the sidewalk were bales of cloth from a shop which had been
destroyed by a shell. The artillerists of our battery took one of the
bales, it was a yellow material, and made themselves neckerchiefs
from it. The next day the following division order, applicable to all
units, was read out at roll call:

“Soldiers of the division have been seen wearing neckerchiefs

which apparently have been made from French materials. The divi-
sion is hereby reminded that the appropriation of any item from the
street, be it cloth or other thing, is considered plundering. The
division’s officers are therefore advised to consider any soldier wear-
ing such a neckerchief as a plunderer. The same are to be arrested
immediately and brought before a court martial which will sentence
them on account of this offense.”

On the Langres Plateau and the Haute-Sa6ne some of us were put up

in private quarters and therefore shared the family life of the resident
hosts to a certain degree. This resulted in a number of situations.
In February 1941 numerous French prisoners of war were re-
leased to return home as a result of the cease-fire agreement. One of
the French soldiers arrived home unexpectedly late one night and
surprised one of our comrades with his wife. The woman claimed
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 57
that she had been raped by him, hoping to escape the wrath of her
husband. One can’t blame her for that. However our countryman
was arrested, brought before a court martial and sentenced to death.
Several of us officers and NCOs vainly asked our general for mercy,
for we were convinced that it was not a case of rape, rather that the
affair had been going on for several weeks. After he had listened to
us “Papa” Hausser said:

“Not a single member of the Waffen-SS, which is an elite force,

may fall under suspicion of having committed an act which would
shame a true soldier. The sentence will be carried out.”

And it was carried out.

During the hard winter of 1940/41 we asked ourselves various
questions on the Langres Plateau. What were we doing there? I saw
no hatred of Germans in France, just as the Germans did not hate
France. Both peoples had earned enough glory on the battlefield
against each other to now build a united Europe, which was a possi-
bility at that point in time, side by side.
Among those who believed it necessary to build a united Europe
and join its peoples, peoples whose cultures made them so close and
who also had common interests, as soon as possible, the meeting of
French Marshall Pétain with Hitler in Montoire awakened great hopes.
I confess that I was a convinced European all along and I haven’t
changed my opinion to the present day.
The meeting in Montoire, which could have turned out to be one
of the high points of modern history, was unsuccessful.
Certainly there were people in Germany and France who lusted
for revenge, but it seemed to me that this short-sighted and pitiful
nationalism could be overcome. A great, positive revolution was
waiting to be carried out on the old continent: we all had this feeling,
and it was primarily a revolution in social justice. As in the present
day, then too the lack of such social justice was the best weapon in
the hands of the action groups of the Communist Internationale. The
French, in particular, were in a position to carry out this revolution
without having to emulate the fascists or the national socialists.
The suffering of an unfortunate people has never brought with it
advantages for its neighbor. I later saw in Vichy how France, in order
to survive, had to adopt a double-faceted policy in the face of a vic-
58 Otro SKORZENY
tor who did not allow the nation to plan and carry out policy on a
large scale.
The French had a first-class agent in the person of Jacques Benoist-
Méchin, a historian for the German Army, who achieved noteworthy
advantages for his country. On June 25, 1940 several million French
soldiers were sent to Germany by the Wehrmacht as prisoners.' One
million of them were set free a month after the cease-fire; roughly
1,900,000 were brought to Germany, of which half were gradually
sent back to France by January 1, 1944.
How unfortunate that my country had not immediately adopted a
policy of cooperation without recrimination and concluded a peace
treaty with the French government, which was conscious of the great
threat facing Europe and the civilized world, instead of adopting a
short-sighted diplomacy which showed very little generosity!
In the end it was the German, but also the European, soldiers
who had to pay a high price for this haughty, clumsy and hesitant
diplomacy.
Today West Germany and France work actively and closely to-
gether although no peace treaty and not even a cease-fire was ever
signed by the two governments.
The lives of many millions of people, civilians and soldiers alike,
had to be sacrificed to achieve this coming together. It would have
been much more intelligent and humane to have achieved an under-
standing in 1939 or 1940! Everyone lost in this war, not only Ger-
many, but France, England, Italy, Belgium and Holland as well. And
unfortunately it produced no solution, neither in Europe nor in the
rest of the world.
However, after the false readiness order of December 1940 we
still clung to the illusion that not all the hopes for peace were lost. At
the beginning of 1941 we assumed that our diplomacy would make
the greatest efforts in this direction.
It soon turned out, however, that things were developing in a
rather unfavorable way for the Axis, first of all in East Africa, where
the Italians were defeated. Following a successful offensive by
Marshall Graziani in North Africa, which led to the capture of Sollum
and Sidi Barani in September 1940, in January and February 1941
the English launched a counteroffensive and occupied Tobruk and
Benghazi. On February 26 the Africa Corps under the command of
Rommel was forced to intervene.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 59
In Europe itself the theater underwent an expansion that for us
was completely unexpected. Without informing Hitler beforehand,
the Duce invaded Greece with his badly-trained, poorly-provisioned
and indifferently-led army. Our allies were soon thrown back and in
the end overrun in Albania. On top of that a coup d’état took place in
Yugoslavia: our ally, Prince Regent Paul, was overthrown on March
27, 1941.
Several days later the new head of government, General Simovich,
signed a friendship pact with Stalin guaranteeing mutual support!
In the last days of March 1941 our division suddenly received
orders to march to southern Romania. I was given leave to spend one
night at home in Vienna and rejoined my unit the next day at the
Hungarian border. We received a jubilant welcome when we marched
through Budapest, as if we were victorious Hungarian soldiers. We
reached the Romanian border near Gjola. The weather was poor and
our equipment began to suffer to an unsettling degree. The roads
were in the worst condition and they were no better through the en-
tire Balkans Campaign.
We attacked at 5:59 A.M. on Sunday, April 6, after a five-minute
artillery barrage. The Serbs defended themselves, setting one of our
armored cars on fire. They fought at close quarters from behind a
broad anti-tank ditch, but this couldn’t prevent us from quickly over-
running them. I experienced this, my baptism of fire, with Hauptmann
Neugebauer, a veteran of the First World War. After the first artillery
salvoes my stomach felt the way it did before a practice duel.
Neugebauer passed me a bottle of schnapps and said, “Have a drink,
it’s not very warm this morning!”
After the anti-tank ditch, where there were killed and wounded,
we moved ahead to Pancevo, where we learned that our division’s
advance battalion commanded by Hauptsturmfiihrer Klingenberg had
become the first to cross the Danube, in a surprise attack, and had
entered Belgrade.
I myself was sent ahead to scout east of our advance road as the
leader of two small motorized patrols. We were 24 men all told, and
I passed through Werschetz, which still had all the character of an
old city of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. We were advancing cau-
tiously toward Karlsdorf when the entire population came out to meet
us enthusiastically: it was an old German colony. We passed the vil-
lage. Serbian troops were reported and we soon made contact in a
60 Orto SKORZENY
difficult area of terrain covered with vegetation. When my right group
was attacked it responded energetically. Suddenly about thirty Serbian
soldiers appeared in front of me. I gave the order not to fire, while
the Serbians came ever nearer. I shouted with all my might, “Stoi!”
(Halt!)
Surprised, they listened, but then more Serbs came from all sides.
What should I do? Shoot or not shoot? For me that was now the
decisive question. Luckily at that moment my second group appeared
behind them, which caused the Serbians to thrown down their weap-
ons and raise their hands.
We retumed to Karisdorf with five officers and more than sixty
captured soldiers. But we were ourselves held prisoner in Karlsdorf
for three hours: the mayor gave a welcoming speech in front of the
town hall and I had to shake his hand when he solemnly declared that
the population had never forgotten its German fatherland. Afterward
there was a festive meal in the school, and I believe that neither
Brueghel or Teniers ever had the opportunity to paint such a festive
occasion.
I naturally gave instructions that our prisoners should receive their
share. As well as the five Serbian officers and the other prisoners, we
brought our regiment not only the best food, but also a number of
bottles of wine, which were welcomed enthusiastically. I gave my
report to Standartenfiihrer Hansen, who found the story extremely
interesting.
We were quartered with German farmers of the agriculturally
rich area of Banat. I found lodgings with a brave farmer’s wife whose
husband had been called up by the Romanian Army and who only
got leave when he bribed his superiors! That gave me cause for re-
flection.
Soon afterward I was summoned to the officers’ mess by Stan-
dartenfiihrer Hansen.
“That patrol operation the other day,” he said, “could get you the
Iron Cross. Instead I chose to recommend you for promotion to
Untersturmfthrer, and my recommendation has been accepted. My
sincere congratulations on your promotion and I hope that you agree
with my idea.”
I joyfully gave my blessings. Several hours later I was called for
again and learned that my promotion to Untersturmführer had also
arrived via official channels and was retroactive to January 30, 1941.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 6
Hansen said with a laugh, “Since you were already an Unter-
sturmführer, your promotion of this morning was obviously to
Obersturmführer!”
One can easily imagine my surprise and joy. All I had to do was
fill up the glasses again.
The Yugoslav Army surrendered on April 17 and hostilities ceased
the next day. Croatia had declared its independence on April 10. The
new state, whose president was Doctor Ante Pavelich, was immedi-
ately recognized by Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Romania and Spain, while the Swiss signed a mutually beneficial
trade agreement with Dr. Pavelich somewhat later (September 10,
1941).
On April 8, 1941 the German Twelfth Army (List), led by the
Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, broke through the Metaxas Line and oc-
cupied Saloniki, where a British army had landed. Most of the En-
glish troops were hastily evacuated across the sea to Crete, while on
April 17 the German troops marched into Athens and the Greek Army
surrendered.
The first large operation by parachute and airborne troops was
carried out against Crete from May 20 to 31. The action was under
the command of General Student. 22,000 men took part, our single
parachute division, our only glider regiment and the 5th Mountain
Infantry Division, which had not yet completed its training. The op-
eration was a complete success. The Royal Navy was only able to
save 16,500 of the 57,000 English, Australian, New Zealand and
Greek troops that had sought refuge on the island, and at the cost of
heavy losses.
Unfortunately our own losses, in large part due to the difficult
terrain, were not insignificant: 4,000 dead and somewhat more than
2,000 wounded. In the years 1942-1943 I had occasion to thoroughly
study the various episodes of the Battle of Crete, in order to find
means of reducing to the maximum degree possible the risks involved
in any future airborne operations that I might undertake. It seemed
Clear to me that such operations could not be carried out with inad-
equately-trained troops.
The losses suffered during the airborne assault of Crete made a
Strong impression on Hitler, who would not allow such operations to
be repeated in Cyprus, Suez or Malta.
62 Otto SKORZENY
Napoleon, who had correctly recognized the strategic importance
of the Mediterranean in general and of Egypt and Malta in particular,
found himself facing the Third Coalition in 1805 when he tried to
retake Malta, which he had conquered in 1793 and lost again two
years later. He had also tried to capture Gibraltar.
It was a fortunate fact that the Balkan Campaign ended quickly
and victoriously. In 1940 General Weygand, then the chief of the
French forces in the Levant, proposed a plan from Beirut to Paris,
which foresaw a landing in Saloniki, and even, “according on the
reaction of the USSR,” an eventual offensive in Asia Minor. The
French also considered bombing the oil sources of Batum and Baku
and made detailed plans. Undoubtedly General Weygand intended to
play the same decisive role that Marshall Franchet d’Esperey had
done toward the end of the First World War.
In pursuing a victorious war on the continent, the Mediterranean
Sea was of even greater strategic importance in 1941 than in 1805 or
1914, and we had conquered neither Gibraltar nor Suez. Without doubt
our Italian allies would have been able to take Malta in a surprise
attack in July-August 1940, but the Luftwaffe, then in the midst of
the Battle of Britain and Operation Otario, was in no position to help.
Later Malta and Gibraltar, both held by the allies, were the main
reason for our defeat in North Africa.
I soon had cause to visit Belgrade on official business, and it
interested me to get to know this city, which had been conquered by
the Turks repeatedly since 1521 and which they did not surrender for
good until 1866.
I knew that the city had been bombarded, and it was there that I
first got to know the worst side of the war. Our Stukas and level
bombers had reduced entire quarters of the city to rubble. We were
not yet used to such scenes of devastation and were therefore strongly
impressed. Instead of the friendly, smiling faces of the people who
had welcomed us so warmly in Werschetz, Karlsdorf and Pancevo,
all we saw here were hostile, hate-filled expressions. To whose ben-
efit was all this destruction and suffering? | felt for the unfortunates
and in the bottom of my heart I expected nothing good for Europe
from this war.
Soon afterward we received orders to pull back to Austria. I was
happy to be able to spend a brief leave with my family. My father
was more moved than he wished to admit at seeing me as an officer.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 63
“You have been promoted quickly,” he said to me, “I congratulate
you. But don’t start thinking you'll get the Knight’s Cross some day.
Keep a cool head.”
“Certainly father.”
“It’s a great honor to be an officer. You must now lead your people
with intelligence and courage, especially in difficult situations. My
son, your duties to your fatherland must be sacred to you.”
Today such words might sound banal or naive. But I have never
forgotten them.

Notes
1, tn Volume One of Life in France during the Occupation, Robert Moreau, the general commissar for
repatriated prisoners of war, gives the figure of 3,000,000 French prisoners of war in German hands.
 6
UNKNOWN Facts ABOUT
THE FLIGHT TO ENGLAND
BY RUDOLF HEss (May 10, 1941)

The war could have ended in March 1940 - The personality of Rudolf
Hess — Decisive supporter of an entente with Great Britain — Hitler's
deputy and successor — Careful preparations for the flight - The un-
successful efforts of Gauleiter Bohle. — Professor Haushofer — No
war on two fronts — Meeting between Hitler and Darlan, May 11,
1941 — Findings by the American Mercury since 1943 — Hess be-
lieved he had a contact in the Duke of Hamilton - Hess’ proposals in
Hitler’s name — Did Hitler see what was happening in the end, or did
Hess take off with his full approval? — Churchill refuses to exchange
Hess in 1943 The Nuremberg Tribunal

t was after our campaign in the Balkans, and shortly before the
beginning of our air landing on Crete, when our radio announced
the sensational news. In this way I learned on the evening of
May 11, 1941 that Rudolf Hess, the second most important per-
sonality in the state - Göring was at that time only third in signifi-
cance — had flown to England the previous evening.
The official statement said that Hess’ health had left something
to be desired for some time, that he had “hallucinations,” and that
“this incident would in no way had any effect on the war, which was
forced upon the German people by Great Britain.”
After the initial shock had passed, it occurred to none of us that
Hess might be a traitor. In early 1941 neither my comrades nor I felt
that the war might be so long and pitiless and that the civilian popu-
lation would have to suffer as much, or perhaps more, than we sol-
diers. I wasn’t the only one who thought that Hess had flown to En-
gland, not as the result of a crazy brain wave, as was officially an-

64
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 65
nounced, rather more likely for the purpose of trying to contribute to
an ending of a civil war among Europeans.
With the war already in progress, Sumner Welles, acting Ameri-
can Foreign Minister, was sent by Roosevelt on a special mission to
Europe, where he created certain illusions. Welles held lengthy dis-
cussions with Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini, Ribbentrop, Schacht,
Göring and with Hitler himself. Today we know that it would have
been possible to end the war in March 1940. But the opportunity to
convene a world peace conference, to be chaired by Roosevelt him-
self, was allowed to pass. Hitler gave his approval immediately. But
after the return of Sumner Welles the project for a conference was
torpedoed by Foreign Minister Cordell Hull.'
Of course in 1941 we knew nothing of these details. We did know
that Hitler had proposed peace negotiations following the campaign
in Poland. We also knew that his deputy was a man of unquestioned
integrity and loyalty. Hess had a reserved, sometimes mystical char-
acter, without however ever giving any indication of mental imbal-
ance. In the end we assumed that he had perhaps believed he was
tasked with a great mission which he couldn’t bring to a successful
conclusion. In spite of our uncertainty we weren’t far from the truth.”
Held prisoner for decades, condemned to life imprisonment as a
“war criminal” at Nuremberg, Rudolf Hess is today more than eighty
years old. Watched alternately by Soviet, American, English and
French soldiers, Hess is now the last and only prisoner in Spandau
Prison. Although the three western allies are in favor of his release,
motions to this effect have been passed in the British parliament and
countless petitions for mercy have been submitted by various per-
sonalities from all over the world, the Russians refuse to release this
last prisoner. (Hess died in 1987)

Many facts concerning the odyssey of Rudolf Hess have been known
for several years; however, others, extremely important, remain un-
known to the general public.
First of all, who is the prisoner in Spandau? He came from a well
to do family and his mother was of British descent. Born in Alexan-
dria, where he spent part of his youth and was brought up “in the
English style,” he fought bravely with the German Air Force in World
66 OTTO SKORZENY
War One. He later completed his studies at the University of Munich.
It was there that he came into contact with the National-Socialist
German Workers Party. After the putsch of November 9, 1934 he
was imprisoned with Hitler at Landsberg. He became Hitler’s truest
friend, and the future Fihrer dictated part of his book Mein Kampf to
Hess.
Reichsminister in 1933, in 1935 he was officially named deputy
to the Fiihrer, who in 1939 publicly named him his successor in the

Hess was a longtime advocate of an entente between Great Brit-

ain and Germany. This seems plausible to me, and a number of histo-
rians share my opinion that Hess flew to England as an extraordinary
emissary to bring about a peace with England on the eve of the war
against Stalin.
Many historians contend that Hitler was unaware of the planned
flight. But it had been prepared down to the last detail far in advance.
The minister carried out approximately twenty test flights, some even
with directional guidance by radio, in an Me 110 specially equipped
under the direction of Professor Messerschmitt. But all the world
knew that Hess had been strictly forbidden to fly an aircraft himself
since 1938, on orders of the Führer.
In contrast to statements by many alleged witnesses, Hitler did
not appear especially surprised when he was informed that Hess had
flown to the castle of the Duke of Hamilton in Scotland.

Hess had his adjutant deliver a letter to Hitler, in which he said:

“..Should my mission fail, I am ready to be disowned... It will be
easy for you to explain that I acted in a moment of mental confu-
sion.” I have not seen this letter, but extracts from same have been
quoted, especially by the English historian James Leasor in his book
about Hess. Moreover in 1945/46 I had the opportunity to speak with
Hess’ adjutant in the witness wing at Nuremberg, who told me the
same thing. The letter in no way corresponded to Rudolf Hess’ men-
tal state at the beginning of his mission, which was neither that of a
criminal, nor of a madman, but that of an emissary of peace.
It is known that numerous discussions concerning peace in the
west took place in 1940/41, The negotiations were conducted by of-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 67
ficial persons or German and English special representatives, such
as Richard Butler, adjutant to Lord Halifax in the Foreign Office,
neutral diplomats, for example the Swedish emissary in London
Bjoern Prytz, and others. Negotiations were also carried out in Swit-
zerland, in Madrid, Lisbon and Ankara.
One of the most active adherents of a peace with London was
Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, leader of the Volksbundes für das Deutschtum
in Ausland (DVA). Born in England and raised in South Africa, he
studied at Cambridge and was an energetic propagandist for his paci-
fist world view, which was also often expressed by Hitler, publicly
and privately, until 1941.? He declared: “Like the Roman church, the
British Empire is one of the pillars of western civilization.”

I met Bohle at Nuremberg. He had been charged in the so-called

“Wilhelmstrasse Trial” of having promoted the “criminal ideas” of
our foreign ministry. It is odd that he, who had previously been a
complete agnostic, should find refuge in the catholic religion. A great
piety had come over him: his cell was decorated with holy pictures, a
privilege permitted him through the efforts of Sixtus O’Connor, a
captain in the American Army and the resident catholic priest.
O’Connor was a devoted Christian who was sympathetic to almost
all the prisoners and to whom | shall return later.
But in the end the steps taken by Gauleiter Bohle failed to lead to
success. Hess had met the Duke of Hamilton at the Olympic Games
of 1936. At that time a large part of British public opinion was of the
view that the Versailles Treaty had to undergo a revision if Europe
was to be reorganized and the German people allowed a place on the
continent. Edward VIII shared this view during his brief reign. After
he became the Duke of Windsor he visited Chancellor Hitler with the
duchess. Likewise the leader of the Labour Party, David Lloyd
George, made his way to the Berghof, although he had had a hand in
creating the Versailles Treaty. The proponents of an entente with
Germany in London were more numerous than we are led to believe
today. The loud manifestations of Sir Oswald Mosley’s blackshirts
undoubtedly had an absolutely negative effect in regard to an entente
between the English and German peoples — which, by the way, Sir
Oswald admitted in his book My Life, published in 1968. Men like
68 Otto SKORZENY
Lord Rothermere, Redesdale, Beaverbrook, Nuffield, Kemsley, Ad-
miral Sir Barry Domvile and the Duke of Hamilton also believed
that war with Germany was contrary to the interests of the British
people.
After the war had broken out and our official diplomacy com-
pletely disappeared, it became increasingly difficult to end the bloody
struggle and the mass death of peoples in the west. The Daily Mail
stopped praising Hitler in the name of a “very honorable peer of the
realm,” Lord Rothermere. The British mentality changed. Hess prob-
ably knew this, but continued to believe that many people in London
were still of the opinion that this war was absurd.
Hess’ most important advisor in the politics of a peace with Lon-
don was one of his old friends, Professor Haushofer, the inventor of
geo-political science and the editor of the magazine Geopolitik, which
Hitler read. Since September 1940 Hitler’s personal deputy had been
in possession of a long memorandum by Professor Haushofer on the
possibilities of concluding a peace with England. Hitler probably
read this memorandum and discussed it with Hess. In his compila-
tion of the Hess-Haushofer conversations, which were written down
by the latter, James Leasor noted that the professor explained to Hess
that it was the view of influential Englishmen that Ribbentrop was
playing “the same role as Duff Cooper or Churchill in the eyes of the
Germans.”
In the professor’s opinion it might have been possible to estab-
lish a reasonable contact with the deputy minister O'Malley, who
was the envoy in Budapest, with Sir Samuel Hoare, who was in
Madrid, and with Lord Lothian, Great Britain’s ambassador in Wash-
ington. Haushofer had known the latter for a long time.
Hitler would gladly have achieved in the west what he had ac-
complished in the east in August 1939. In order to avoid having to
fight on two fronts, he wanted to replace the treaty he had signed
with Stalin with a treaty or at least a modus vivendi in the west, and
not just with Great Britain.
It is not without a certain significance that on May 11, 1941, the
same day that Hess was in principle supposed to be discussing peace
terms with Great Britain, Hitler received Admiral Darlan, head of
Marshall Pétain’s government, and the president’s general secretary,
Jacques Benoist-Méchin, at the Berghof. Certain concessions were
made to the Frenchmen,‘ and they were given assurances that their
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 69
country would play an important role in Western Europe. It was too
early — especially on account of Italy — to conclude a peace treaty
and thus give a guarantee for France's colonial empire. Hitler how-
ever expressed his good will and told the admiral that “his peace
would not be a revenge peace.”
From this one can infer that Hitler was not only fully informed
about Hess’ planned flight, but that he had also given his official
representative full powers to speak in his name. And this at the be-
ginning of the war. In reality the flight was preceded by lengthy ne-
gotiations, and Rudolf Hess was certain that he would be received by
very senior persons on the other side of the English Channel, even if
he hadn’t been officially invited.

I believe that a correct explanation of Rudolf Hess’ flight was given

in a very well-documented article in the American magazine The
American Mercury in May 1943. According to the author, who wrote
anonymously, it was Hitler himself who from January 1941 concerned
himself with the possibility of direct negotiations with Great Britain
for the purpose of concluding a lasting peace. The following is an
extract from The American Mercury:
“Hitler turned not to the English government, but to a group of
influential Englishmen belonging to the already disbanded English-
German Society — of which the Duke of Hamilton had been a mem-
ber. A diplomat with an international reputation served as courier.”
The American Mercury did not give the name of this diplomat,
but it was without a doubt a German diplomat. From the anonymous
account it is apparent that the British responded to the offer with an
evasive, lukewarm reply. Negotiations went on in this way for four
months, “with caution and restraint” on both sides, until the moment
when Hitler suggested continuing the negotiations in a neutral coun-
try, which the English refused to accept. They even rejected Bohle as
middleman, while the Turkish and South American press reported
that Bohle had “received an important and confidential mission
abroad.”
This was the moment when Hess intervened. As deputy Führer
he had full authority to make arrangements in Hitler’s name. On May
10, 1941 he flew to Dungavel, the Duke of Hamilton’s castle in Scot-
70 OTTO SKORZENY
land, near which there was a small private airfield. They were ex-
pecting him there, but Hess, who parachuted from his aircraft and
landed approximately 16 kilometers from the castle, injuring his ankle
in the process, was in no doubt as to the identity of the people wait-
ing for him.
In May 1943 The American Mercury reported, “The first con-
tacts in 1941 were intercepted by the British secret service, which
from that moment on took charge of the entire affair.”
When RAF Fighter Command located the unidentified
Messerschmitt aircraft, which failed to respond correctly to the radi-
oed queries, the duty officer called the fighter commander, who was
stationed in Scotland: “For God’s sake tell them that they’re not to
shoot him down!” In this way Hess received an “honor guard” of
two English fighters. He noticed the presence of one of the fighters.
Had he not taken to his parachute and had instead landed at the Duke
of Hamilton’s private airfield, the secret would never have been
known. But after Hess landed in a field belonging to a farmer named
David MacLean, he was taken by the man to his house. He said his
name was Alfred Horn and demanded that they notify the Duke of
Hamilton.
With some imagination one could imagine that the brave Scot-
tish farmer, who, pitchfork in hand, watched Hess fall from the sky,
belonged to the same clan as Donald MacLean, who passed impor-
tant atomic secrets to the Soviets and years later, in 1963, escaped to
Russia after falling under suspicion. That would be an interesting
theme for the lover of historical anecdotes. In this case, however,
something quite different was involved.
Hamilton, a wing commander in the RAF, was at his post. When
he was notified by telephone he declared that he did not know an
Alfred Horn. The next day when he saw Rudolf Hess, whose visit he
was not expecting, he was extremely surprised. The people waiting
for Hess at the small airfield were senior officials of the intelligence
service and secret service officers, who had set a trap for Hess.
They had to take Hess-Horn away from a half-dozen members of
the home guard, which had been notified by MacLean. The secret
service officers conducted the first interrogation of Hess in the bar-
racks at Maryhill, Glasgow. Then he was taken to a military hospital.
The American Mercury wrote:
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 71
“Hess believed that he had to go a long way until he reached the
top. But this happened much more quickly than he had imagined.
Churchill sent Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, master spy from the First World
War and British diplomatic advisor between the wars, to him. He
was supposed to listen to Rudolf Hess’ proposals and lay them di-
rectly before the British government.”

According to The American Mercury, Hitler offered the following: a

cessation of hostilities in the west, a withdrawal from all occupied
lands except Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg, withdrawal from
Yugoslavia, Greece and the Mediterranean basin in general. In re-
turn he demanded Great Britain’s benevolent neutrality with regard
to Germany’s policies in the east. No country, whether a combatant
or neutral, was to demand reparations. According to The American
Mercury, Hess insisted that it was necessary to eliminate the danger
posed to the whole world by communism once and for all. Germany
offered to carry out this mission alone, for which it needed the war
production of France and Great Britain.
Hess also spoke with Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of State, whom
he knew, with Lord John Simon “and other members of the war cabi-
net.” He did not see Churchill, who notified Roosevelt directly. The
answer to Rudolf Hess’ proposals was of course negative.
When Hess realized that he had walked wretchedly into a trap,
and from the very beginning, and that Great Britain was in reality
already an ally of the Soviets, Hess was in fact the victim of a ner-
vous breakdown, as The American Mercury tells us:
“The lie about his alleged derangement had almost become real-
ity
When he leamed that the battleship Bismarck, which had sunk
the British battleship Hood, had herself gone down (May 27, 1941),
he wept the whole day.
The fantastic and noble character of his flight kept numerous
commentators from realizing that their reports, seen from their point
of view, sounded improbable.
The English preparations, cleverly camouflaged as ultimate co-
operation toward peace, would not have found any good faith in
Germany had it not been for the Halifax-Butler precedent, as well as
the peace proposals which the Foreign Office made to the Swedish
ambassador Prytz (June 17, 1940).
72 OTTO SKORZENY
The honest character of Rudolf Hess has never been placed in
question, neither by his friends nor by his family. He would never
have spoken the name of Hamilton if he had not been convinced that
the duke was acting in the name of very high English governing
circles. Furthermore all the statements by witnesses agree that Hess
asked directly that they should notify the one he saw as his middle-
man, namely Lord Hamilton, who was supposed to place him in con-
tact with senior empowered members of the government.
It is an insult to the Duke of Hamilton to believe and to write that
he was an accomplice of the British secret service. His astonishment
when he saw Hess was real, for as The American Mercury tells us,
“his handwriting had been imitated on falsified letters,” so that it
could be compared with that which possibly existed on pre-war cor-
respondence in Berlin.
It would of course be interesting to see this correspondence. We
hope, although not too confidently, that it same might someday be
made public. I myself have little hope that it will.
If the Duke of Hamilton and other English personalities had se-
cretly been in contact with Germans for four months, especially with
Hess, how is it that they were not tried and convicted for dealing
with the enemy after Hess’ flight? Nothing of the sort happened.
I therefore believe the theory put forward by the American Mer-
cury, which in 1974 recalled that the facts published in 1943 came
from an “observer with a first-class reputation,” who based his infor-
mation on especially secure sources.’
Hess said to Ivone Kirkpatrick, “I come in the name of peace and
humanity. The thought of a prolongation of the war and the needless
sacrifice is terrible to me.”
Hitler's reaction is also understandable. It is very likely that he
became mistrustful after he read all the files pertaining to this peace
feeler to the west. It is possible that he noted certain suspicious things.
Hess, who was less intuitive and more trusting, must then have been
disavowed by Hitler.
The historian Alain Decaux put forward another theory in his
Dossiers secrets de |'Histoire (1966). He scrutinized the reactions of
Hitler and Göring before, during and immediately after Hess’ flight.
He quoted facts and witnesses, especially those concerning the me-
teorologists and radio service of the Germans. He reasoned that Hess
had flown to Scotland with Hitler’s approval, and that a letter he left
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 73
behind was supposed to allow Hitler to describe his attempt as mad-
ness if it should fail. Decaux wrote:

“In August 1943, when Hitler gave Skorzeny the job of freeing
Mussolini, who was being held prisoner on the island of Maddalena,
he referred to the Rudolf Hess case and said that he would have to
disavow Skorzeny in the event of failure.”

Here I must correct Decaux somewhat: although it is true that in

August 1943, while I was preparing to free Mussolini from the is-
land of Maddalena, Hitler made me aware that he would perhaps
have to declare me mad in the event of failure, at no time did he refer
to Rudolf Hess in my presence and never in any way mentioned his
name or the flight made by him.

Toward the end of 1943 the Polish General Rowecki, head of the
secret Polish army, was captured. This army was under the direct
command of the Polish exile government. Minister president of this
government in London was General Sikorski, who several days later
was the victim of a peculiar air accident near Gibraltar. General “Grot”
Rowecki’s successor, General Bor-Komorowski, was also taken pris-
oner in early October 1944. He was received by General von Lüttwitz,
commander of the German Ninth Army, who informed him that he
and his general staff were considered prisoners of war and not as
partisans. Toward the end of the war the German authorities handed
Bor-Komorowski over to Swiss delegates of the Red Cross.
In Bor-Komorowski’s Histoire d'une Armée secrete, published
in Paris in 1955, we read that General Rowecki was supposed to be
exchanged for a high-level German prisoner. “The Germans,” wrote
Bor-Komorowski, “were only willing to exchange Rowecki for
Rudolf Hess, but Great Britain refused to agree.”
At the beginning of my stay in Nuremberg the eighteen main
accused were still in the same wing of the prison as the witnesses. I
was therefore able to observe Hess almost every day walking in the
prison courtyard, when chanced to receive my fifteen minutes “exer-
cise” al the same time. The ban on talking was draconian in its strict-
ness, and it was impossible for me to talk to him in order to at least
74 OTTO SKORZENY
offer him a word of encouragement. He appeared to me not in the
least mentally ill. Quite the contrary.
While walking he was chained to an American soldier. When it
came time to change direction, he made use of his prerogative as
“mentally unstable” to make sudden, unexpected movements, which
were only intended to upset his guard and force him to walk about in
a comic fashion. It was then not so easy to tell which of the two was
the actual prisoner.
On the straight sections Hess walked calmly and with firm steps,
very worthy and head held high, without concerning himself with
the soldier, who followed him under compulsion and appeared to be
his servant.

Notes
1. The details of this intrigue and the fins! refusal by Cordell Hull were revealed in April 1966 by
Professor C. Tansill in an article published in the weekly magazine The Weekly Crusader. The weekly's
director is the Reverend BJ. Hargis of Tulsa, Oklahoma. Tansill's work was cited and commented on
by J. de Launay in his Hissoire de la diplomatie secréte (1966).

2. Compare to this complex the description by Ilse Hosa in Ein Schicksal in Briefen. Leoni, 1974.

3. After halting our panzers, which could h hed Dunkirk before the British Expeditionary Corps,
in May 1940, Hitler spoke to his generals about the significance of the British Empire to the wesiern
world. (Otto Skorzeny considered this order to be a great military-political
mistake.) Sir Basil Liddell
Hast related that Ficld Marshall Rundsted: confided the following to him after the war: “Hitler sur-
prisedus on May 24, 1940 by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity of its
existence and of the civilization England had brought to the world... His conclusion was that an honor-
able peace should be concluded with England.”

4. Thanks to the negotiating skill of J. Benoist-Méchin,France in fact achieved a restoration of French

authority in the north and at the Pas-de-Calais, concessions in the drawing of boundaries, the retum of
83,000 prisoners of wer, the rearming of 13 warships and a reduction in occupation costs. In return
France gave Germany permission for German and Italian aircraft to overfly French territory for a
limited period of time. In Syria and Iraq, Rashid Ali called for an uprising against his country's pro-
British government and asked Germany for help. Admiral Canaris was ancnihusiastic and the assis-
tance he provided was inadequate.

5. The article, which the magazine carried in May 1943, included a picture captioned “The Vision of
Rudolf Hess”: long rows of coffins and German and English bodics. Hess also spoke sbout this vision
in a two-and-a-half-hour talk with Lord Simon on June 10, 1941, which, if I'm not mistaken, was first
March 25, 1946. On that day Hess’ defense attorney, Dr. Seidl, entered
the text of the discussion with Lord Simon on June 10, 1941 into the case record. One can ask oneself,
whether the writer of this fantastic article recei ion at least from a person who had dealt
with Hess.Why did The American Merewry publish this piece when it did (in the middle of the was),
and how was it possible that no official or unofficial protests were raised on account of it?
 7
BARBAROSSA

Pitiful condition of the equipment after the Balkan Campaign — The

Persian Gulf or Egypt? - Lawrence and The Seven Columns — “Sol-
diers of the Eastern Front...” - What would Europe be today if Hitler
hadn't attacked? - Hitler erred and was deceived — Strength and
tactics of the enemy — The stubborn legend of Stalin's “surprise” —
He received intelligence about our attack in December 1940. At that
time Roosevelt was already sending him aircraft and placed training
officers for them at his disposal.

n December 1940 our SS-Verfügungstruppe Division was re-

named the SS-Division Das Reich. Our unit was retrained and
rejuvenated, and in spring 1941 it was necessary to check over-
all our rolling stock, which was in a really pitiable condition.
We had, in some cases more than once, crossed Germany, Holland,
Belgium, France, Austria, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. I have
read that our general staff was “satisfied” with the state of our rolling
stock after the Balkan Campaign. Besides it was the effects of nature
as well as the wear and tear on the materiel that contributed to the
slowing of our movements on the Eastern Front.
The tanks of Panzergruppe Kleist had to cross the roads of the
Peloponnese and climb the Carpathians at a snail’s pace before, 600
in number, finally attacking Budenny’s 2,400 tanks. Generalfeld-
marschall von Rundstedt, who commanded Army Group South when
we attacked Russia, told the English military author Sir Basi! Liddell
Hart after the war that his “preparations had been hindered by the
late arrival of Kleist’s panzers.” Kleist himself confirmed this: “A
large part of the tanks under my command came from the Pelo-
75
76 OTTO SKORZENY
ponnese, and the vehicles themselves as well as their crews needed a
longer period for rest or repairs.”
A motorized division had a total of about 2,200 vehicles, but
unfortunately up to 50 different types and models; 10 to 18 types
would have been more than enough. Our artillery regiment, for ex-
ample, had 200 trucks of about 15 various models. In the rain, in the
mud and during the Russian winter it was practically impossible for
even the best specialists to carry out all the necessary repairs. I even
ask myself whether our general staffs even understood this problem
in all its importance: motorization required an unbroken supply of
materiel and replacement parts.
Our Das Reich Division therefore spent several weeks working
exclusively to put our rolling stock in working order, and at the be-
ginning of June 1941 we received the order to entrain the division.
After we had driven around Bohemia-Moravia our train reached
Upper Silesia and finally Poland. Where were we going? We had no
idea and gave our imaginations free reign. Several stated confidently
that we would cross the Caucasus with the agreement of Russia in
order to occupy the Persian Gulf oil fields. Others said that we were
about to sign a friendship and assistance pact with Turkey (June 17,
1941). Accordingly, after crossing the Caucasus we could march
through Turkey so as to fall upon Suez and Egypt and attack the
English from behind, while the Italians and Rommel went on the
offensive. None of us came up with the idea that we might attack
Russia and so have to fight on two fronts.

Since August 1939 Stalin had gained enormous advantages without

fighting: half of Poland, the Baltic States, which he had simply an-
nexed contrary to the existing arrangements, and finally northern
Bukovina and Bessarabia, near the Romanian oil wells. Obtaining
his “neutrality” had been an expensive proposition. We knew that
the USSR had tried to enter the Balkans thanks to General Simovich’s
coup d’état in Belgrade. But we had settled that question.
What we did not know, however, was that the Russians had sent
only second-class troops and obsolete materiel to the front in Fin-
land. We had no idea that their hard-won victory over the courageous
Finnish Army was just a bluff intended to conceal the USSR’s might
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 7
offensive and defensive power. Canaris, the chief of the Wehrmacht’s
intelligence service, must have known about these strengths.
One believes what one hopes for, and the idea of a campaign in
Persia, Arabia and Egypt seemed especially tempting to me. I had in
my pack a copy of The Seven Pillars of Wisdom by Colonel Thomas
Edward Lawrence, the peculiar adventurer, archaeologist, secret agent
and champion of Arab independence from the Turks. Could we not
also achieve with the Arabs and Turks against England what he had
undertaken? Couldn't we seize this pipeline —- which General Weygand
wanted to cut — as we later tried to capture the railroad to Narvik?
During our rail journey we had time to think, and the account by
Lawrence of Arabia, in which adventure and economic interests were
so intimately mixed together, gave me material enough to let my
imagination wander. This Waliser had conducted an unconventional
campaign with great imagination, which resulted in astonishing prac-
tical results. The combined English and French fleets never succeeded
in forcing the Dardanelles during the First World War. On the other
hand Lawrence’s action to a certain degree allowed England to se-
cure the peace in this part of the world, which had such great strate-
gic importance from an economic, political and military standpoint,
to its own advantage.
The results of the blitzkrieg over London and the threat of our
landing had the same effect as the halting of the advance by our panzer
divisions across the plains of Picardie toward Dunkirk. I was of the
opinion that Churchill would only give in to force, but when? Had
we in fact succeeded in making adequate preparations for such a
large war in the period since 1935/36?
So I went on reading The Seven Pillars of Wisdom as our train
crossed the Polish flatland. I had just reached the point in my reading
where, in September 1918, Lawrence was preparing to blow up a
Turkish military train, when our train pulled into the station in Lvov
(Lemberg). From there we drove through the night into the area south
of Brest-Litovsk, less than 50 kilometers from the Bug, the river which
divided the Polish Generalgouvernement, which was administered
by Germany, and the former Polish territory occupied by the Soviets.
Now it was no longer possible to have any sort of illusions.
All the units of the division were assembled at 10 P.M. on June
21. The company commanders solemnly read out an order from the
Fihrer, part of which is reproduced here:
78 OTTO SKORZENY
“Soldiers of the Eastern Front!

Burdened by heavy concerns, sentenced to months of silence,

the hour has now come in which I can speak openly to you, my sol-
diers.
Today there are about 160 Russian divisions standing at our bor-
der. Violations of this border have been going on for weeks, not only
against us but in the far north and in Romania as well.
At this moment, soldiers of the Eastern Front, an assembly of
strength the like of which in size and scale the world has never seen
is now complete. In league with Finnish divisions, our comrades are
standing with the victor of Narvik on the shores of the Arctic in the
north. German soldiers under the command of the Conqueror of
Norway, and the Finnish heroes of freedom under their own marshall
are protecting Finland. On the Eastern Front stand you. In Romania,
on the banks of the Prut, and along the danube right down to the
beaches of the Black Sea are German and Romanian troops united
under Antonescu, the head of state.
When this, the biggest front line in history, now begins its ad-
vance it does so not just to provide the means of ending for all time
this great war, or to defend those countries currently concerned, but
the salvation of our entire European civilization and culture.
German soldiers! You are thus entering upon a harsh and demand-
ing fight — because the fate of Europe, the future of the German Reich,
the existence of our nation now rest on your hands alone.

May the Lord God help us all in this struggle!”

I would like to make several comments about this Führer Order which
preceded Operation Barbarossa.
I am firmly convinced that the European states and most of the
nations of Europe would today be bolshevized if Hitler had not then
given the order to attack.
Hitler was wrong and was tricked. The armies that he sent to the
attack in eastern Europe were not “the greatest in world history.” The
Soviet armies, superior in numbers, possessed armaments that were
in some areas superior to ours. In 1941 we had three million men at
the front, with 3,580 tanks and somewhat more than 1,800 aircraft.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 79
We immediately found ourselves confronted by 4,700,000 sol-
diers, which were deployed in depth and occupying unequivocally
offensive positions, as in the south, with approximately 15,000 tanks’
and, in White Russia alone, 6,000 aircraft, of which 1,500 were newer
models.
Of the Soviet tanks, the T-34, which appeared near Yelnya to-
ward the end of July 1941, was outstanding. Other giants, unknown
to our intelligence specialists, appeared in 1942 and 1943: the Klimenti
Voroshilov of 43 and 52 tons, and in 1944 the 63-ton Stalin tank.
From the beginning there were other surprises in store for us, like the
famous “Stalin Organ” and the equipment carried by the engineer
battalions of the enemy’s tank divisions. These had the materials to
construct a 60-meter-long bridge capable of supporting sixty-ton
vehicles.
At dawn on June 22, 1941, a Sunday, we went over to the attack
to the east, just as Napoleon’s Grand Army had done against the same
foe on June 22, 1812.
The Barbarossa plan (which as we will see Stalin had lying be-
fore him) was divided as follows:

Army Group North, under the command of Feldmarschall Ritter

von Leeb, consisted of two armies and a panzer group; its objective
was to advance through the Baltic States and take Leningrad.
Army Group South, commanded by Feldmarschall von Rundstedt,
with its three German armies and two Romanian armies under the
command of General Antonescu and its panzer group, was supposed
to advance south of the Pripyat Marshes, occupy the western Ukraine
and take Kiev.
Army group Center, under the command of Feldmarschall von
Bock, was the strongest. It was to advance between the Pripyat
Marshes and Suvalki in the direction of Smolensk. It consisted of
two armies and had two panzer groups: the first, under the command
of General Hoth, and the second, under the command of General
Guderian. The SS-Division Das Reich marched with Guderian’s Sec-
ond Panzer Group. Guderian was already referred to by us as “Fast
Heinz.”

On the preceding day, before 1 P.M., all the general staff officers
waited for one of two code words” Altona or Dortmund. The first
80 OTTO SKORZENY
meant that Barbarossa had been postponed. But Dortmund was the
code word that was issued.
The crossing of the Bug and the battles for Brest-Litovsk were
marked by three special points. At dawn I was at my post with the
light artillery of my new battalion, the second, which opened fire at
3:15 A.M. then moved its positions forward and opened fire on the
second line of Russian positions. At five in the morning I was in the
top of an oak on the bank of the Bug, observing the effect of our fire.
I was forced to agree with our forward observers, who had crossed
the deep river in inflatable boats and on their return advised us that
we were firing at nothing. The Russians had pulled back beyond the
range of our artillery and were now concealed in the swamps and
forests, from which they had to be driven out.
The first point: the enemy did not appear to have been taken by
surprise. He had carried out all his maneuvers according to plan.
Second point: He was however perplexed. Before his eyes the
eighty tanks of the 18th Panzer Regiment submerged beneath the
waters of the Bug, only to emerge on the Russian bank several mo-
ments later. They were in fact underwater tanks which had been pre-
pared for Operation Otario. They were completely watertight tanks
which were equipped with a snorkel like that used by our U-boats
years later.
Third point: This was uncomfortable for us: even though the city
of Brest-Litovsk itself fell quickly into our hands, the old fortress,
which was built on a rock and had once been conquered by the Teu-
tonic Knights, put up bitter resistance for three days, Even the heavy
artillery and the Luftwaffe had no visible effect. I approached the
fortress with a platoon of assault artillery. The Russians fought all
day from their casemates and bunkers, which were under our direct
fire. We had heavy casualties and many good comrades fell beside
me. The Russians fought heroically to the last round, including at the
station, whose basement we finally had to flood with water, until
resistance collapsed.
Our losses at Brest-Litovsk were more than 1,000 wounded and
482 killed, 80 of them officers. To be sure we took 7,000 prisoners,
including about 100 officers, but the German losses at Brest-Litovsk
made up five percent of the total figure on the Eastern Front during
the first eight days of the war. The determined resistance put up by
this fortress got me to thinking.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 8
I believe | am speaking from experience when I say that the Rus-
sians tried to employ a double tactic throughout the entire campaign.
Special units fought to the bitter end and the last man in prepared
positions. While we were forced to slow our advance to master this
resistance — and later partisan groups — the main body of the Soviet
armies tried to escape encirclement.
I might also mention here that Stalin, in his speech of July 3,
1941, recommended the retreat by the large masses of troops and
simultaneously instituted the policy of scorched earth and ordered
the immediate formation of partisan groups. The latter were not con-
sidered combatants as per the valid international rules of war. Russia
had not signed these agreements.
Since 1945 and to the present day they have not ceased to claim
that Stalin in 1941 was “completely peaceful and faithful,” that he
was only interested in building socialism in Russia and had fulfilled
to the letter every clause of the agreement signed with Ribbentrop in
August 1939. He was “treacherously attacked,” they tell us, “com-
pletely surprised,” and it was this surprise which made the German
success possible. After Stalin’s death Khrushchev, the Soviet Minis-
ter President and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party, even accused his predecessor of having “allowed
himself to be taken by surprise.”
As proof of Stalin's friendly attitude toward Germany we are
offered the telegram found in the archives of the German Foreign
Ministry, which originated from our ambassador at the time, Graf
von der Schulenburg.
On May 12, 1941 he telegraphed Ribbentrop:

“Policy statements by the Stalin government are ... aimed at ...

reducing tensions in the relationship between the Soviet Union and
Germany and creating a better atmosphere for the future. In particu-
lar we may assume that Stalin has always personally been in favor of
a friendly relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union.”

A diplomat can always have a limited intelligence. He can also play

a double game, and it is difficult to say when Schulenburg took the
latter path. However, thanks to the papers of our former ambassador
in Rome, Ulrich von Hassel, which were published in Zurich (Vom
anderen Deutschland, 1946) we know that in 1943 Schulenburg, who
82 Otto SKORZENY
was already retired, proposed to the anti-Hitler conspirators that they
send a Suitable, secret emissary to Moscow to propose peace nego-
tiations to Stalin in the name of a new “east-oriented” German gov-
ernment. All he asked was to be named foreign minister.

Operation Barbarossa in no way came as a surprise to the Soviet

dictator, who on May 6, 1941 had taken Molotov’s place as chair-
man of the Council of People’s Commissars.
As early as June 1939 the brothers Erich and Theo Kordt, senior
officials in the German Foreign Office informed (in agreement with
Canaris, Oster and General Beck) Sir Robert Vansittart that Germany
and the USSR were going to sign a treaty. It is therefore natural that
the allies were informed just as soon about Hitler’s hostile intentions
toward the USSR.
Canaris and Oster very soon realized that Hitler, like Napoleon
in his day, regarded the Russians as England’s soldiers on the conti-
nent. I have already said that he did not want to undertake Operation
Otario in the spring of 1941 as long as he ran the risk of eventually
being attacked by Stalin in the rear. On September 6, 1940
Feldmarschall Keitel had the following note sent to the chief of the
Abwehr:

“The forces on the Eastern Front will be strengthened in the course

of the next weeks... But these movements can in no way be allowed
to give the impression that we are planning an attack on Russia, rather
they should point only in the direction of the Balkans, where we
must defend our interests.”

This was sufficiently clear, and beginning in September 1940 the

German counter-espionage people could initiate measures to inform
in detail their “correspondents” in the foreign ministry and in the war
ministry, as well as abroad, in Italy and Switzerland. Details were
not available until December 5, 1940, when General Halder, Chief
of the Army General Staff, submitted to Hitler the plan it had worked
out for him and which on February 3, 1941 received the name Op-
eration Barbarossa. In that same month of February the under-secre-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 83
tary in the American foreign office, Sumner Welles, informed the
Soviet envoy in Washington, Konstantin Usmansky, that Germany
intended to attack Russia in the spring. Sumner Welles not only gave
Usmansky the Barbarossa plan, but all or part of the Oldenburg plan
as well, which foresaw the industrial and agricultural use of various
areas of Russia by the Wehrmacht. This plan had been worked out by
General Thomas, the chief of the Military-Economic and Armaments
Office in the OKW, associate of Halder and friend of Canaris.
The Soviet Army was placed on alert at the end of May 1940.
Marshall Timoshenko, who had been named Commissar of Defense,
immediately signed the alert plan 0-20: he accelerated the orders when
our panzers reached the Seine, or on June 9, Beginning in September
1940, the majority of the active divisions of the Red Army and Gen-
eral Bezougly’s Tenth Airborne Corps moved from the central USSR
toward the west. All of the officers of the Soviet Army with German-
sounding names were sent to the east.
I may reveal here for the first time, that one of my postwar friends,
Colonel Adam of the US Air Force, who after the war was military
attache in a West-European country, told me that as the result of an
appeal by Stalin, Roosevelt provided him with military assistance
from December 1940. Adam and about 100 American pilots were
sent to the USSR at that time to train the Russians on the latest Ameri-
can aircraft, deliveries of which had begun to Russia. Adam told me
that in his opinion this pilot training was in no way associated with
an eventual war between Russia and Japan. It was clear to all that it
was a war against Germany that was involved. As one sees, this does
not exactly agree with the history we are taught today.
Furthermore, in his last book Liddel Hart admitted that the Brit-
ish secret service had “to a great extent” been informed about Opera-
tion Barbarossa “long before,” and that it “informed the Russians
accordingly.”
In April 1941 Sir Stafford Cripps, socialist member of parlia-
ment and Great Britain’s ambassador in Moscow, informed the Rus-
sians of the exact date of the attack, June 22, 1941. Hitler was even
told that the Russians were informed. By whom? Not by Canaris, but
by the naval attache of the German embassy in Moscow, who on
April 25 sent the following telegram to the High Command of the
Navy in Berlin:
84 Otro SKORZENY
“The English envoy is giving the date of the outbreak of hostili-
ties between Germany and the USSR as June 22.”

One can only shrug one’s shoulders when an “historian” like the
German Gert Buchheit tells us in his book Hitler der Feldherr, 1961,
that Stalin and Molotov “fell into a deep depression.” The same view
was taken by Michel Garder, who wrote in his book Une guerre pas
comme leas autres:

“One does not know what to say about Stalin’s blindness in this
period from September 1940 to June 1941... The Red Army was not
prepared for the unexpected blow, which was planned without its
supreme commander knowing anything at all about it.”

This theory of the “absolute surprising” of the Russians is still de-

fended today, not only in the official or semi-official publications of
the communist nations, but by numerous western historians as well.

Notes
July 30, 1941, Stalin claimed to have 24,000 tanks, of which more than
half were on his western front. in Hiner ofthe Second World War, Liddell Han states that Hitler
with only 800 more tanks thar pP i Ir invasion of Western
Europe.
 8
CONTINUAL TREASON

The secret side of the war — Origin of the continual treason — Hitler
does away with the military caste-spirit - He accepts the new panzer
strategy of Guderian and Manstein against the opinions of Beck,
Stülpnagel and Halder — Canaris and Basil Zaharoff, the “Trader
with Death” — The Tukhachevsky affair: 3 million in numbered bills
- The real outcome of the affair — The entire plot against the new
state — Unrealistic goals of the plotters — Churchill's realistic objec-
tive — Guilt of the traitors in the outbreak of the war - The enemy
despises the conspirators ~ The career musicians of the Red Orches-
tra — A Schellenberg fable - Coro, Werther and the Three Reds -
Swiss neutrality.

ntil today the various aspects of the Second World War

have been considered mainly from an analytical or chro-
nological point of view. All armed conflicts have a politi-
cal, economic, strategic and tactical side. But the war of
which I speak also had a secret, scarcely-known side, which was
decisive. It involved events which were not played out on the battle-
field, but which caused the loss of a tremendous amount of materiel,
saw the death or maiming of hundreds of thousands of European
soldiers and had the most tragic consequences. Manstein and Guderian
bravely assessed this side of the war in their memoirs. The most con-
scientious historians, like Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Paul Carell have
sometimes made vague references to this matter. Where Jacques
Benoist-Méchin is concermed, he has not yet finished his noteworthy
and monumental history of the German Army. The Second World
War was however more than any other a secret war.
85
86 OTTo SKORZENY
At this point 1 must mention the resistance against the national-
socialist state, which became public knowledge with the failed as-
Sassination attempt of July 20, 1944, but whose effects extended be-
yond the collapse of the Third Reich. It is an extremely extensive
theme, which will probably never be completely cleared up, even
though there are numerous accounts of German, English and Ameri-
can origin, while the Russians have so far only admitted the role
played by their master spy Sorge.

In Germany it all began on June 30, 1934. That day, or more accu-
rately that night, Hitler quashed a rebellion by the SA, whose Chief-
of-Staff was Ernst Rohm. In reality it was a large-scale plot, whose
national and international connections have not yet been completely
cleared up. ROhm was only an instrument. Of whom? This horrible
affair was called the “Night of the Long Knives.”
The Reich President, Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg, pub-
licly congratulated Hitler on July 1: “You have preserved the Ger-
man people from a great danger,” he telegraphed him. “For this |
express to you my deep appreciation and sincere esteem.”
The effective strength of the SA was initially reduced from about
three million men to one million. Then the law of May 21, 1935
created the Wehrmacht in place of the Reichswehr. This law, which
reintroduced general compulsory military service, began with the
words: “Military service is an honorable service to the German
people.”
Like the Kaiser before 1918, Hitler was the Supreme Commander
of the armed forces. Every officer and soldier swore the following
oath to him and not to the constitution:

“I swear before God to obey Adolf Hitler, the Führer of the

Reich and of the German people, Commander-in-Chief of the
Wehrmacht, unreservedly and commit myself as a brave soldier to
always fulfill this oath, even at the cost of my life.”

It would have been possible for the officers of the Reichswehr whose
consciences did not allow them to agree with the principles of the
national-socialist state to refuse to take this oath.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 87
From then on everyone, from general to common soldier, ful-
filled a common duty to the nation and to the German people. There
were no more castes. The entire reach of such a revolution must be
understood.
The majority of the officers agreed with this, the younger ones
frequently with enthusiasm. But in Berlin, in the Army General Staff,
the holiest of holies of the old Prussian system, a small number of
generals persevered in a conflict between tradition and anachronism.
While the majority of these career soldiers understood the deep sense
of the national-socialist revolution, others gave up their privileges
with regret. This conflict also showed itself in the military field when
Hitler supported General Guderian, who spoke out in favor of the
daring, completely novel use of panzers against the opinion of Gen-
eral Beck, the then Chief of the General Staff.
When, in 1937, Guderian explained to the Chief of the General
Staff how it would be possible to pierce an enemy front and drive
deep into the enemy’s rear and lead the battle by radio from a fast
vehicle at the front of the army, Beck shrugged his shoulders and
said to Guderian, “Haven’t you read Schlieffen? How can you direct
a battle without table, maps and telephone?”
Guderian also encountered resistance from General Otto von
Stülpnagel. He was the inspector-general of motorized units and had
forbidden the employment of tanks beyond the scope of the regi-
ment. “He considered panzer divisions as utopian.”
Hitler named Guderian chief of the Wehrmacht’s panzer units.
But the mobilization order of 1939 made him commander of a re-
serve army infantry corps! Guderian protested and afterward received
command of the 19th Army Corps, which took Brest-Litovsk and its
citadel on September 19, 1939. However four days later Guderian
was forced to hand over the citadel to Russian General Krivoshine,
as the fortress was located in the agreed-upon Russian zone of influ-
ence.
General Halder, Beck’s successor at the head of the general staff,
opposed the Manstein-Guderian plan for crossing the Meuse and driv-
ing through the Ardennes, characterizing it as “absurd.” Hitler pushed
through the plan, whose success is well-known, in spite of Halder’s
opposition.
88 OTTo SKORZENY
That men like Beck and his successor Halder and Generals von
Fritsch, von Witzleben, von Hammerstein, Heinrich and Otto von
Stülpnagel, von Brockdorff and others should have to obey a man
whom certain people called “the Bohemian corporal,” was for them
extremely difficult, and that into the bargain that Hitler should force
upon them military plans which were successful, was for them unac-
ceptable.
What became known as the “Conspiracy of the Generals” had no
other causes. When the time of victories was past, other generals and
senior officers joined them, so that in 1943/44 the names of Generals
Hoepner, Lindemann, Thomas, Wagner (Quartermaster General of
the Wehrmacht), Stieff (Chief of the Organization Department), von
Tresckow, who was Chief-of-Staff of Army Group Center in Russia,
and his adjutant, Fabian von Schlabrendorff, and others appeared on
their list.
Until the fall of Admiral Canaris (spring 1944) Germany had two
intelligence services, which naturally were rivals. Within the
ptamt or RSHA (Reich Central Security Office),
which was led by Heydrich until his death on May 30, 1942, then by
Himmler himself and finally by Kaltenbrunner from January 30, 1943
to the end, four departments formed the Sicherheitsdienst or SD (Se-
curity Service). Department III, under the direction of Otto Ohlendorf,
was the intelligence service for domestic policy, while Department
VI under Schellenberg, with Offices A, B, C, D, E, S and Z acted as
the intelligence service for foreign policy. In the Abwehr, which was
under the command of the OKW, Department I was the military in-
telligence service.
These two important offices whose jurisdictions often overlapped
naturally gave rise to conflicts of authority. As far as I have been
informed, never has a country successfully eliminated the rivalries
between the intelligence services of the various branches of the ser-
vice as well as between the political and military lines. Germany was
therefore no exception. Each side watched the other and took pains
to prevent interference. Since many vital documents are lacking, some
lost, others not made public, it is impossible to say with certainty
how much the two sides knew, whether Heydrich, for example, had
in his hands proof of Canaris’ treason, or whether the admiral had
learned anything from his “friends” of the plan to murder Heydrich
in Prague.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 89
The two men knew each other since 1920. Canaris was then an
officer on the training vessel Berlin, on which Heydrich was an of-
ficer candidate. Canaris knew that Leutnant Heydrich had been ex-
pelled from the navy in 1929 because he refused to marry a girl he
had seduced. He likewise knew that there were doubts as to the racial
background of his mother, Sarah, who was said to have been a jewess.
At first Canaris tried to bring about Heydrich’s downfall. It turned
out, however, that Heydrich was much too powerful, much too intel-
ligent, and the little admiral, whom I called “the medusa,” soon left
him in peace. Otto Nelte, the lawyer for Generalfeldmarschall Keitel,
was able to say (on July 8, 1946) at Nuremberg that “Canaris cooper-
ated with Himmler and Heydrich in an astonishingly friendly way,
although he was hostile to the RSHA.” Was this adaptability or cau-
tion?
A sectet service is obviously the ideal cover for conspirators: so
it wasn't until 1962 that the English discovered that Kim Philby of
the intelligence department M.1.6 had been an agent of the Soviet
secret service since 1934. Conversely, the secret service is an indis-
pensable system in a nation which is in a state of war. From 1939 to
1945 the leaders of the Abwehr, Canaris and his colleagues Oster
and Dohnanyi, came into possession of highly-important intelligence
which was gathered by about 30,000 agents, of whom practically
none knew they were working for conspirators.
The officers and soldiers in this enormous operation did their
duty. Several members of the Abwehr recorded very great successes.
I am very well informed on this, as members of the Brandenburg
(Special Duties) Regiment (later Division) came as volunteers to the
units of the Waffen-SS and to the SS-Jagdverbinden (commando
units) which I commanded. Officers of the Abwehr worked obsti-
nately within the scope of the possibilities given them to uncover the
agents of the Red Orchestra.
Canaris was clever enough to occasionally allow intelligence to
reach the OKW which at least appeared to be sensational.
By the end of 1941 Hitler was tired of Canaris’ reports. In the
following year Hitler, and later Jodl as well, began to have doubts
about Canaris. Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, who in 1917 had been
the liaison officer between the Grand Headquarters and the Naval
Headquarters, defended Canaris in good faith:
90 Otto SKORZENY
“A German admiral cannot be a traitor,” he said to Jodl, “what
you suspect is impossible.”
I had conversations with Canaris three or four times. He was nei-
ther subtle, nor did he possess exceptional intelligence, as is still
sometimes written today. He was evasive, crafty, baffling, which was
something else altogether.
In response to the questions by Gisevius, Lahousen and other
witnesses for the prosecution, Otto Nelte said everything before the
Nuremberg court which could be said in front of such a court at that
time (July 8, 1946):

“Canaris’ activity was of extraordinary importance to the con-

duct of the war... His character is not only to be characterized as
ambiguous, but also as deceitful and not very trustworthy... He is a
typical salon conspirator whose character is difficult for others to see
through, and who, if he wants to, can submerge into the crowd com-
pletely unnoticed.”

It is noteworthy that neither the surveillance, or better said the hos-

tile attitude of Department VI of the RSHA toward the heads of the
Abwehr, nor the investigations begun as a consequence of the assas-
sination attempt of July 20, 1944 completely brought to light the
treachery of Admiral Canaris and General Oster, his second in com-
mand. I read, for example, in the book by Brian Murphy The Busi-
ness of Spying, which appeared not long ago in London, that Canaris
made contact with the British Intelligence Service before the war
through the notorious “Dealer in Death,” Sir Basil Zaharoff. That is
possible: the old Zaharoff perhaps believed that Canaris was Greek.
So far as I know, this is the first time that they spoke of this descent.
Our most sensational intelligence agent was Elyesa Bazna, known
under the cover name of Cicero. Bazna, who was the valet of Sir
Knatchbull-Hugessen, the British ambassador in Ankara, appeared
spontaneously before Dr. Moyzisch, police attache at our embassy
and official of the SD. From October 1943 until 1944 Cicero passed
us extraordinary information, especially about Operation Overlord,
the Anglo-American landing in Normandy. No one put any faith in
the information provided by Cicero, neither Rommel nor the Abwehr
specialists! No one appeared to give it any closer thought.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 91
The SD was not led by conspirators. However Department VI
suffered from the disadvantage of being under the leadership of a
man who neither had the determined character nor was as clever or
clear-seeing as he thought he was. I first met Walter Schellenberg,
then an Obersturmbannfihrer in the SD, in April 1943 when I took
command of the Friedenthal Special Duties Battalion. Schellenberg
was a talker. He loved to tell stories and especially to talk about him-
self to a newcomer to the magical world of the secret service. We
often ate together at noon and recalled his former chief, Reinhard
Heydrich, who had been murdered in Prague the year before.
Schellenberg used a prominent example to show me how an idea
could be transformed into a brilliant act. He told me the circumstances
under which he had taken part in the “Operation of the Century,”
namely destroying the General Staff of the Red Army in 1937.
The most important episodes of this strange affair are well-known
nowadays. Heydrich made use of several documents procured in Paris
by a certain General Sklobin, a double agent and adjutant to General
Miller, chief of the White Russian veterans. These faked documents,
which incriminated Marshall Tukhachevsky, who had reorganized
the Red Army, were cleverly passed to Eduard Benes. In this way
Stalin received the documents by way of the Czech president, an
ally.
The origin of the documents was not unknown to him, and he
paid three million rubles to Heydrich by way of an agent in his em-
bassy in Berlin. It was in large banknotes, whose serials the Russians
had obviously recorded. When Schellenberg’s secret agents tried to
use the same in Russia they were immediately arrested.
So it was thanks to the Sklobin-Heydrich documents that Stalin
began numerous trials and was able to squash any opposition in the
Red Army.
Stalin and Tukhachevsky had in fact hated each other for a long
time, and since the end of 1935 the relationship of the party to the
army had grown increasingly worse. Stalin was feared in Russia.
The Kulaks, the Trotskyites, the jews, the intellectuals, the industrial
saboteurs and so on had all been ruthlessly crushed, even factory
workers were convicted and executed. The pitiless GPU sent mil-
lions of Russians to forced labor camps. The canals from the White
Sea to the Baltic (225 km.), the Moscow- Volga canal and other ma-
92 OTTO SKORZENY
jor construction projects were built by hundreds of thousands of forced
laborers.
Coming from a minor royalty family in the province of Smolensk,
and a former officer of the famous Semeyonovski Regiment of the
Kaiser’s Guard, Tukhachevsky joined the Reds in 1918. He was defi-
nitely more popular than Stalin, who had made a fool of himself
when he tried to play the strategist before Warsaw in 1920. At the
time Tukhachevsky, with great difficulty, was just able to save sev-
erai units of the completely shattered Red Army. Stalin never for-
gave him for that. By 1936 he knew that the majority of officers,
especially the higher ranking ones, were decidedly hostile toward
the Communist Party. The faked documents he received from Prague
allowed him to destroy his enemies in the Red Army.’
Marshalls Tukhachevsky, Yegorov and Blücher, as well as 75 of
the 80 generals, the members of the Supreme Defense Council, were
shot; of 15 commanders of armies 13 were removed, as well as 367
other generals. More than 32,000 officers of the Soviet Army were
executed from May 1937 to February 1938.
This tremendous blood-letting in the military, which followed so
much political blood-letting, not only fooled Heydrich and
Schellenberg, therefore our political intelligence service, who were
convinced that they had achieved a decisive success, but also Hitler
himself. The Red Army was not weakened, as is still believed today,
on the contrary it was strengthened. From Komandarm (army com-
mander) to company commander with the rank of captain, all offic-
ers were placed under the command of two so-called political com-
missars. One of the two commissars was a member of the Special
Department OO (Ossobody Otdiel), while the other belonged to the
Politkoms Regiment.
The liquidated officers were replaced at the heads of armies, army
corps, divisions, regiments and battalions by younger, more political
officers who were reliable communists. At the same time Stalin used
Tukhachevsky’s plans: from autumn 1941 he made the Red Army
into a Russian national army. The officers again wore the golden
epaulets of the former imperial army; national decorations were cre-
ated: the Orders of Kutuzov and Suvorov. The Politkoms were re-
moved and their places taken by Zampolits, the same men with the
same goals but under a new name. From the total, brutal house-clean-
ing of 1937 there emerged an army that was Russian, political and
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 93
national in character and which was even capable of surviving the
initial destructive defeats of 1941.
By April 1943 my experience at the front had long since taught
me that the Red Army General Staff had in no way been destroyed.

Even before the war our foreign office was a “nest of traitors.” In
Berlin Ernst von Weizsicker and many other senior officials used
the greatest part of their working hours sending emissaries, intelli-
gence and proposals out of the country. These diplomats and the heads
of the Abwehr exchanged information. In the German embassies and
consulates abroad the conspirators could count on sympathetic and
active participants who met with hostile legation attaches and their
agents, be it in their own countries or in Switzerland, Italy, Sweden,
Spain, Portugal or Japan, in order to pass them political, economic or
military information as quickly as possible. The former German
ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von Hassel, the German ambassador in
Moscow, Graf von der Schulenburg, and his opposite number in Brus-
sels, Biilow-Schwante, were involved in the plot; others, like Eugen
Ott in Tokyo, covered up or overlooked the spying activities and the
treason of their subordinates (Dr. Sorge).
Oberst Ott had belonged to the staff of General von Schleicher,
who was Reich Chancellor from December 2, 1932 to January 29,
1933. Schleicher, who had tried to talk the left wing of the national-
socialist party (Strasser) into a joint move against Hitler with the
communist labor unions in order to break up the party, was murdered
on June 30, 1934 in the course of the countermeasures. It was also
Schleicher who sent Ott to Tokyo as a “military observer” in 1933.
He was named attache and later general and ambassador. His behav-
ior in Japan concerning Dr. Sorge is inexplicable.
Before the war legation advisor Theo Kordt was active in Lon-
don in cooperation with his brother, Erich Kordt, who in the begin-
ning had been a close associate of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop.
After the declaration of war Theo Kordt had himself transferred to
our legation in Bern. What Heydrich called “The Black Orchestra”
was nothing more than a branch of this group, which consisted of
agents of the Abwehr and diplomats posted in Rome.
94 Otro SKORZENY
What was the objective pursued by all these men? They wanted
to prevent the war and later to end it in order to save their country.
They saw only one avenue open to them: get rid of Hitler. Their
actions repeatedly contradicted their words. They claimed to be pa-
triots who watched in desperation as their country was enslaved by
national-socialism and a despicable tyranny. In this case they there
were two avenues open to them.
The first would have been the simpler and could have been car-
ried out by a single man: to murder Hitler at some point between
1933 and 1939.
The second solution would have been to replace Hitler and na-
tional-socialism with something better. That would have required a
real leader personality with a superior social, political and economic
program. There was no trace of this to be found among our conspira-
tors. None of them had the courage or the will to sacrifice his life in
order “to slay the tyrants.” Not even Stauffenberg. He set down the
bomb, started the timed fuse and disappeared. The bomb killed or
injured a dozen people without killing Hitler.
Not one of the plotters appeared to be seriously concerned with
the future of Germany. They declared that the death of Hitler was
enough to solve all problems and eliminate all difficulties. They did
not understand that even after the murder of Hitler peace could only
be achieved through unconditional surrender and that this fact would
have meant a terrible civil war. Furthermore the conspirators knew
from the allies that they would receive no better terms than Hitler.
Nowadays it is clear that Churchill waged war not against Hitler
and “his Huns” nor against national-socialism, although he then main-
tained the contrary. He himself later wrote in his memoirs that “En-
glish policy depends on the nation that has dominance in Europe.”
This nation must be destroyed. “It makes no difference,” Churchill
went on, “whether it is Spain, or the French monarchy, or the French
imperial empire or the German Reich.” “It is,” he said, “the most
powerful nation or the nation that is beginning to become the most
powerful.” Today one can calmly say that Churchill, as an English-
man, deceived himself when he allied himself with Stalin. He admit-
ted as much after the war, when he said, “We slaughtered the wrong
Pig.” This form of expression could be understood by every English-
man.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 95
Roosevelt, too, had enough of German competition in the areas
of industry and trade. He therefore decided in Casablanca in 1943
that Germany must accept unconditional surrender. Churchill and
Stalin immediately approved this decision, which was carried out to
the letter. One of Roosevelt’s chief advisors, Morgenthau, had even
worked out a plan whereby Germany should be transformed into a
“nation of vegetable farmers.” This plan was put into practice from
1945-1947, until they realized that it was a product of blind hate and
that the western world needed Germany.
It is known that allied statesmen and generals actually reckoned
with serious unrest and mutinies in the German Amy from October
1940. The Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in France, General
Maurice Gamelin, declared at an official banquet at Paris city hall,
“That it mattered little whether the German Army had more than 10,
20 or 100 divisions, for on the day that Germany declared war the
German Army would have to march on Berlin to quell the unrest
which would then break out.” This story was told by the French for-
eign minister, George Bonnet, in his book De Munich a la guerre.
General Gamelin knew General Beck very well and had received
him before the war in the company of the future General Speidel.
In 1932 the Soviet government began building a double espio-
nage and counter-espionage organization spanning the entire world.
The Comintern had its political, economic and active agents, just as
the red Army had its 4th Office. These intelligence apparatuses were
expanded considerably from 1928 on, to Africa, America and Eu-
rope. Diplomatic and trade missions, military attaches, trade union
organizations and so on were used by Moscow as cover for their
espionage nets from early on. Finally special schools for intelligence
specialists were founded in the USSR. These noteworthy efforts, ini-
tiated by Stalin himself, paid extraordinary dividends which were
visible from 1936/37. One of the most important agent apparatuses
was the Red Orchestra.
The fixed location agents, the intelligence gatherers, the radio
operators and so on of the Red Orchestra were all veteran profes-
sional spies. Many of them are known today. The identity of their
real chief inside Germany is still a mystery however. He worked in
Führer Headquarters under the name Werther, and it was he who
directly informed the Swiss net. Consequently a decision made by
96 Orro SKORZENY
Hitler or the OKW at noon was sometimes known to Moscow within
five or six hours.
The amount of intelligence sent by the so-called “Comintern Net”
in the Weimar Republic climbed considerably after the outbreak of
the war against Russia. In the period from June 10 to July 8, 1941 the
number of Red Orchestra radio stations rose from 20 to 78! In Au-
gust 1942 the many listening posts of the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine
and the Abwehr’s counter-intelligence service intercepted 425 trans-
missions from suspected radio stations! The Red Orchestra organized
the sabotage of German monitoring stations and direction-finding
equipment. It succeeded in smuggling communist agents into the
central office of Abwehr signals counter-intelligence as decoders,
and furthermore it delivered unusable direction-finding devices in-
stead of serviceable ones or delivered the instruments to units that
had no idea what to do with them. Whereas the deciphering units of
the navy, air force and OKW were in business at the beginning of
hostilities, the deciphering devices of the Abwehr signals counter-
intelligence service were not operationally ready until mid-April 1942!
In autumn 1941 the specialists of the Abwehr still had no vehicles
equipped with direction-finding equipment.
The Red transmitters in Berlin and Brussels were known as early
as June 24, 1940, but it took until December 1941 before all the agents
of the Brussels group of the Red Orchestra were arrested by the SD.‘
In Marseille and later in Paris the Russian Sokolov, alias Kent, and
Leopold Trepper, alias Gilbert, were arrested. The latter was known
to the Polish and French police, whose spy net was used for some
time by German signals counter-intelligence (July and November
1942).
In Moscow the intelligence sent by members of the Red Orches-
tra was received by specialists, who decoded the material immedi-
ately under the leadership of General Fyodor Kuznetsov, alias Direc-
tor. After the information was decoded and evaluated it was passed
on to Stalin, who at the end of 1941 had taken over the leadership of
the State Committee for Defense and under whose command the
General Staff of the Red Army (STAVKA) was.
In Berlin the Director’s operatives were at first paralyzed, but at
the same time protected, by their incompetence: they broadcast to no
one and could not receive Moscow, ceased to transmit and passed
their intelligence to Kent, who was in Brussels at that time. Moscow
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 97
instructed Sokolov to go to Berlin, put the radio stations in order and
gave him the addresses. But this message from Russia was deciphered
on July 14, 1942 and the chief of the Berlin Orchestra was exposed.
It was Luftwaffe Oberleutnant Harro Schulze-Boysen, alias Coro,
grand-nephew of Admiral von Tirpitz. He had been working for the
Soviets since 1933. He was not short on ambition: he wanted to be-
come minister of war in the future German government. Why not?
Numerous opponents of the regime from within his circle of ac-
quaintances and several communist spies were arrested with Coro,
men who were active in the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of
Labor, the Air Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and the Abwehr. In
total 81 persons (August-September 1942).
The radio transmissions by the Red Orchestra were to be heard
from all over Europe, from Antwerp, Amsterdam, Namur, Lüttich,
Lilles, Lyon, Nizza, Annecy, Marseille and Paris, but also from
Barcelona, Prague and Belgrade.
In the period 1943-1945 I learned that significant Red Orchestra
spy rings existed in areas occupied by the Wehrmacht, and not just in
the west, but in Copenhagen, Warsaw and Athens as well. There were
more in Russia, behind our front. A net of sixty stations was in Op-
eration in the Don region, a second, with twenty stations, in the Kuban,
and further stations were located near Stalino and Voroshilovgrad.
The net in the Don region alone sent an average of 3,000 words a day
to Moscow. Hence the STAVKA had only to make the right choice.
Keitel on the other hand was able to state to the Nuremberg court
on April 4, 1946:

“The intelligence service of the OKW under Admiral Canaris

provided the army and me with very little material about the strength
of the Red Army...”

The first Red Orchestra transmitter in Switzerland, in Lausanne, be-

gan broadcasting after the arrests in Berlin, Brussels, Marseille and
Paris. The man in charge was a Hungarian jew, Alexander Radolfi,
alias Rado or Dora, a career agent of the Russian MGB and an out-
standing geographer and director of the Géo-Presse Society in Geneva;
furthermore he seems to have been an officer of the Red Army. His
contact man to the German General Staff was a certain Rudolf Roes-
sler, alias Lucy. He was a Bavarian, a former officer of the Reichswehr,
98 Otto SKORZENY
who became a traitor out of “patriotic hate” for national-socialism.
Roessler appears to have been in the service of the Communist
Internationale for a long time. In his book Geheime Reichssache, the
American Victor Perry established that Roessler had been an agent
of Kurt Eisner, Minister President of the Bavarian Soviet Republic
in 1919. From 1940 he worked in the Swiss Special Service with a
Czech, Colonel Sedlacek, alias Uncle Tom, who belonged to the Brit-
ish intelligence service.
Lucy did not spy for fame alone. He received 7,000 Swiss francs
a month, in addition to bonuses and expenses. I have read that he
wanted to “root out nazism in Germany.”
However he continued his activities in Switzerland after the fall
of the Third Reich and in 1953 was arrested and sentenced to a year
in prison for spying on behalf of the Soviet Union. Herr Roessler
therefore worked not just against the Third Reich. He was just a ca-
reer spy who worked for whoever paid him best.
Roessler died in 1958, but it is known that he received the intel-
ligence he passed on to Rado from two groups of senior German
officers. The Werther group was active in the OKH and OKW and
the Olga group in the Luftwaffe general staff. We know that Coro
was in the air ministry in Berlin. If Werther was a group in the OKW,
then who was its leader? That we do not know. We do not know who
provided Lucy with the first means of radio communication and thus
enabled contact with Rado. The Rado group had three radio sets,
known as the Red Three (radio operators: Foote, Hamel and Margit
Bolli).
The Red Three utilized the protection of an allegedly neutral coun-
try to there work for the triumph of a political system which since
1917 had made its objective the destruction of all the western pow-
ers. On the other hand it is true that they all found them beneficial,
the Swiss, English, Americans and especially the Soviets, to whom
the accrued material was of vital importance.
From the summer of 1940 Director received hundreds of pieces
of intelligence from Werther via Lucy and Dora, and the Troika sent
him several hundred radio messages each month during the course
of the war in the east. Director queried the Red Three about every
point of possible interest to the war effort: new weapons, supply,
troop movements, creation of new divisions, personal acts by the
most important army chiefs and their attitude toward Hitler, the ef-
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 99
fect of the allied bombing, political events, intelligence received from
the Abwehr, production of war materiel, but especially the offensive
and defensive plans of the OKW, differences of opinion at Fihrer
Headquarters and so on.
Even though the decoding service of signals counter-intelligence
could decipher the messages sent by Kent in Brussels and Coro in
Berlin from the end of May 1941, the code used by Dora was much
more difficult to crack, and therefore these supremely important ra-
dio communications remained a mystery to us for a long time. It was
a Finnish colonel, whom I later met, who discovered the double en-
coding being used by the latter. I believe he’s still alive in South
Africa. He did not inform the German authorities in Finland of hid
discoveries, rather gave them to a diplomatic representative of a neu-
tral country, whom I also met after the war and with whom I became
good friends. He gave me all the details of the affair. In this way the
German Foreign Ministry learned of the discovery by way of the
senior diplomats of this neutral country, and the foreign ministry
passed the information on to the OKW.
When I took over command of the sabotage school in the Hague
at the end of March 1943, and under Schellenberg of Office 6 as-
sumed responsibility for this school and thus the command of De-
partment VI S, my new duties and problems were still a great secret.
I had to become familiar with the activities of Office VI and espe-
cially with the questions of the political intelligence service. It was
then that I learned of the existence of the Red Orchestra.
Naturally | could then not yet appreciate its full significance. |
would like to say that I immediately recognized the dangerousness
of the Red Orchestra but it was not until later that I leamed how
decisively important these radio reports by this group were to the
Eastern Front.
Many hundreds of radio messages of the various nets which made
up the Red Orchestra were eventually deciphered. If many historians
do not want to or cannot take this matter into account, their work
gives a completely false picture of the war. Let us take a simple ex-
ample. Reproduced here are four signals from the Red Orchestra,
which are mentioned by Hauptmann V.F. Flicke (who during the war
was a conscientious officer of the Abwehr) in his book Spionage-
gruppe Rote Kapelle (1949:
100 OTTO SKORZENY
“July 2, 1941 - To Director No. 34 - RDO.
Most urgent.
The valid operations plan is Plan No. I with the objective of the
Urals via Moscow and diversionary maneuvers on the wings. — Main
attack in the center. Rado.”

“July 3, 1941 — To Director No. 37 — RDO.

Present Stuka production is 9 to 10 daily. Average Luftwaffe losses
on the Eastern Front 40 units. Source: German Air Ministry. — Rado.”

“July 5, 1941 - To Director No. 44 - RDO.

The Luftwaffe currently has a total strength of 21,500 first-and
second-line aircraft and 6,350 Ju 52 transport aircraft.
— Rado.”

“July 27, 1941 — To Director No. 92 - RDO.

In the event that Plan I should run into difficulties, it will be

immediately replaced by Plan II. It foresees an attack on Arkhangelsk
and Murmansk. In the event of a change of plan I will receive details
within 48 hours. — Rado.”

On July 27, 1941, therefore, the STAVKA had received 92 messages

from Rado alone and knew about the German attack plan and its
variants.
The Swiss authorities allowed the Red Three to radio Moscow
until the end of September 1943. They didn’t arrest Roessler until
May 19, 1944, in order to protect him from an eventual German com-
mando action. But on September 8, 1944 the Helvetians set him free
again and likewise his most important agents and helpers in Switzer-
land. This was one of the consequences of the assassination attempt
of July 20.
Several chroniclers maintain that Roessler reestablished contact
with Werther on September 16, 1944. That is unlikely. By this time
Guderian had been named Chief of the Army General Staff (OKH).
Many traitors were exposed and the opportunity for them to do fur-
ther damage was removed. But very late. Too late.
Thanks to a single Swiss group, the Red Orchestra, for thirty
months the STAVKA learned about many plans of our general staff.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 101
Stalin was informed daily of the attack objectives of the German
Army, as well as our attack strength, the chain of command of our
large and medium-size units, our strategic plans, the state of our re-
serves of men and materiel, German defensive intentions, German
losses in men and materiel, and so on.
One must ask oneself how, in spite of this permanent treason, the
Wehrmacht was able to achieve its great victories, which according
to Feldmarschall von Manstein’s book were Lost Victories. Today
we know how and why this was. Three hundred years before Christ
the Chinese military theorist Ou-Tse said tellingly: “An enemy whose
intentions one knows, is already half beaten.”
The following seems clear to me: there were two basic reasons
why we were able to hold off the Red Army for so long in spite of
this tremendous betrayal. First the Russians were not immediately in
a position to halt the blitzkrieg, which was conducted according to
the principles of Guderian, Manstein and Hitler and which had yielded
such good results in Poland and in the west. Without the mud and the
absence of roads the war in Russia would have been won in spite of
the Red Orchestra. But the Russian commanding officers, from divi-
sion generals down, were good, younger and more determined than
ours. Besides the Russian soldier was outstanding. Finally Stalin very
soon received tremendous quantities of materiel from his capitalist
allies: in total 22,500 aircraft, 13,000 tanks, 700,000 trucks, 3,786,000
tires, 11,000 railroad cars, 2,000 locomotives, without adding in the
18 million pairs of boots, 2,500,000 tons of steel and hundreds of
thousands of tons of aluminum, copper, zinc and so on.
Although they were informed about all our plans, the command-
ers of the Soviet Army were initially forced to watch as their armies
were defeated, encircled and destroyed. In cases where Hitler and
our general staff made sudden changes of plan which Werther did
not learn of, the situation for the Russian armies became catastrophic.

Notes
1. and 2. Sec Guderian: Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, Heidelberg 1951.

3. The affair came from Skiobin, wbo was instigated by the NKVD. The falsified documents came
from Heydrich, however, not from Paris. Heydrich merely played the role ofa helper to the NKVD in
this matter, for the decision to liquidate the Tukhschevsky group had been made in January (minutes
Radek trial) while the documents did not show up in Moscow until April-May.

4. This was only a firs: action. The Brussels group worked again from March until July 1942.
 9
Why We Dipn’T
TaKE Moscow

With Panzergruppe Guderian - "Fast Heinz” and Feldmarschall

Rommel — We cross the Beresina and the Dniepr — The new, almost
invincible T-34 appears - The hell of Yelnya - The sad fate of the
Russian farmer - Stalin without information from the Red Orches-
tra: victory in the Ukraine, 1,328,000 prisoners - The Battle of
Borodino - The army group that disappeared — The capture of Istra
— Cold — The liquid-air rockets — We fire on the suburbs of Moscow —
The order to retreat — The reasons for our setback — Inexperience,
limited knowledge and sabotage — One cannot win with odds of 6 to
1 — Richard Sorge: he knew the future Frau Ott in Munich — Unusual
guarantors: Agnes Smetley and Dr. Zeller - The real identity of en-
voy Eugen Ott — He encouraged and covered up the activity of the
spy - The Lyuchkov file delivered t0 Moscow - Why Stalin was able
to almost completely denude his front against Japan (Korea) — Was
Sorge exchanged like Abel? - Were his activities and perhaps his
existence incompatible with the “miracle of Moscow” ? — Thoughts
on the retreat

rom June 22-29, 1941 our Panzergruppe Guderian advanced

from the Bug to the Beresina. An outstanding infantry unit,
the Grossdeutschland Regiment (later a division) supported
us; we found ourselves at the forefront of the Eastern Front.
We lacked artillery and ammunition for a crossing of the river and
radio contact could not be established with the rear: our sentries were
not strong enough. I was given the task of searching for our rein-
forcements, which were more than 120 kilometers to the west, and
return with them as quickly as possible. I left with five men and
102
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 103
oriented myself by compass alone. I had found that our maps were
inaccurate and wanted to avoid the roads we had already taken. I
knew that the enemy had taken possession of them again behind us.
I found my artillery battalion and the commander, Hauptmann
Rumohr — one of the best officers I ever knew — immediately gave
the order to depart, direction east.
On July 3 a battalion of the SS-Division Das Reich and a battery
of our artillery battalion, soon followed by a second infantry battal-
ion, established a bridgehead near Brodets, 70 km. south of the
Beresina. When “Papa” Hausser informed General Guderian of this,
he was congratulated by “Fast Heinz.”
Before 1 met Generaloberst Guderian personally in the OKH, |
saw him often, even at the height of a battle, standing in his armored
command vehicle, and I observed him when he discussed the situa-
tion with the commander of the Das Reich Division. He was a man
in his late fifties, of medium height, but slim and very lively. He
always listened most attentively to whoever he was talking to with.
He was very much liked by us, significantly more so than
Feldmarschall von Bock, the commander of Army Group Center.
Guderian had read and studied the prophetic theories of all the tank
specialists like Martel, Fuller, Estienne, Liddel Hart and the book
Der Kampfwagenkrieg (1934) by the Austrian General von Eimanns-
berger before he wrote his book Achtung! Panzer, which was greeted
skeptically by our general staff. However as soon as Hitler saw tanks,
armored cars with machine-guns or 20mm cannon and fully motor-
ized infantry in joint maneuvers, he immediately understood the views
represented by General Guderian but also by General von Manstein.
Neither Beck nor Halder or Keitel or even Jod] wanted to believe
that the Russians had, “more than 10,000 armored vehicles,” as
claimed by Guderian, who was much better informed than Canaris.
On August 4, 1941 in Novy-Borisov Hitler said to the commander of
Panzergruppe II:

“If I had believed that the number of Russian tanks you named in
your book corresponded to the facts, I probably wouldn’t have started
this war in June 1941.”
104 OTTO SKORZENY
It is rare that a military theorist is able to transform his ideas into
a victorious battle. Guderian was one of these. He was one of the
three or four commanders in the German Army who spoke their opin-
ions openly to Hitler to the very end.
It is not justified when certain people compare Guderian with
Rommel. The latter was undoubtedly an outstanding tactician, but he
never commanded more than four or five divisions of the Africa Corps
and the Italian divisions. Guderian, who maneuvered more than thirty
divisions in Russia, was a notable strategist as well as a first-class
tactician. Would he, had he been at Rommel’s side in July 1942, have
been able to turn the tide at El Alamein? No one can say. One thing is
for certain though; the fall of Alexandria would have opened the way
to the oil and would have resulted in Turkey joining the Axis powers.
With the Suez Canal closed and the help of the Arab oil-producing
countries the war would have taken a different course.
It must be said that the Africa Corps and the Italian divisions
were also victims of the permanent treason. An Italian admiral,
Maugeri, betrayed us often and very effectively from the start. He
did so well that he was decorated by the allies after the war. It is
thanks to him that 75% of the supplies destined for the Africa Corps
were sunk. Carell said in his book Afrikakorps that Maugeri was not
the only informant the English had. “From Berlin,” he wrote, “intel-
ligence of great importance was transmitted to the Anglo-American
spy centers via Rome.” The Red and Black Orchestras were busily at
work. Feldmarschall Kesselring, the Commander-in-Chief in Italy,
told me in 1943 that the allies were well-informed about the sailing
times and routes of German-Italian convoys to North Africa and even
knew exactly what the individual ships were carrying as cargo. Gen-
eral Bayerlein, one of Rommel’s closest associates, even wrote in
1959 that he was firmly convinced that, “Rommel’s plans had been
betrayed to the English.” (See Carell, Afrikakorps).
It sounds almost unbelievable and like a cheap excuse when one
traces the failure of a campaign back to treason. But in this case one
is justified in saying, and it is proved, that the betrayal played a great
role in Africa and in Russia from 1941, something which should no
longer be allowed to go unsaid in the present day.
It rained in streams during our advance from the Beresina to the
Dniepr and our first enemy was the mud, from which we repeatedly
had to free our vehicles. Making repairs on the many vehicles was
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 105
very difficult, almost impossible. But it was to become worse yet.
Our division crossed the Dniepr south of Skov in spite of the mud
after a brief but intense battle and a lively reaction by the Soviet Air
Force.
The pincers of the two armored groups — Hoth in the north and
Guderian in the south — closed on July 3, and far to the east the great
pocket was closed behind Minsk. According to a report by
Feldmarschall von Bock on July 8 the result was as follows: 287,704
prisoners, 2,585 vehicles destroyed or captured, including tanks of
the heaviest type.
In spite of everything the Russian campaign was not “won in 14
days,” as Generaloberst Halder had written so hopefully in his diary
(July 3). Another error repeatedly committed by historians is to main-
tain that “at the beginning of the campaign the Soviet troops had
received orders to resist to the death.” Quite to the contrary; they
received orders to withdraw as quickly as possible when threatened
with encirclement. Only certain units were sacrificed. More than half
a million Soviet soldiers escaped the Minsk pocket. Hitler was aware
of this. After we had fought off a heavy counterattack on July 13, the
following day we drove south of Gorki and together with General
Schaal’s 10th Panzer Division advanced toward the Smolensk —
Stodoliste road. On July 18 and 19 we took Yelnya in very heavy
fighting.
We fought on, fully convinced of final victory. The tactical supe-
riority enjoyed by the panzers marked with a “G” (Guderian) was
outstanding. However if the enemy had known then how to concen-
trate his T-34 tanks en masse in an orderly counterattack, it is likely
that our difficulties would have been more than our forces could have
coped with. Our anti-tank guns, which stopped the Russian T-26 and
BT tanks on the spot, were ineffective against the new T-34. They
drove through the unharvested wheatfields and there was little we
could do against them with our 50mm anti-tank guns or the guns of
the Panzer III and IV. Our soldiers, well concealed by the tall grain,
ran after the tanks to put them out of action with molotov cocktails.
These were simply bottles filled with gasoline with a fuse running
through the stopper. The cocktail had to be thrown onto the hot en-
gine cover plates. In this way the tanks were sometimes set afire.
Also effective was a hand grenade placed in the gun barrel, a suffi-
cient quantity of plastic explosive on the turret hatch or Teller mines
106 Otto SKORZENY
on the tank’s tracks. It wasn’t until much later that the Panzerfaust
was introduced, and several Russian tanks were stopped by direct
artillery fire at the start of the campaign.
Fighting on a 1,000-kilometer-long front, on July 24 we found
ourselves at the leading tip of the offensive. At that time several Ger-
man units were still more than 100 kilometers to the west.
Yelnya on the Desna, 75 km. southeast of Smolensk, was one of
the most important strategic points and a significant railway junc-
tion. Together with the 10th Division our division established a bridge-
head and a hedgehog-shaped defensive position. It had a radius of
about 8 kilometers and our battalion was on the southern flank.
Paul Carell was right when he characterized the battles which
were played out near Yelnya as frightful. Marshall Timoshenko, who
had been named Commander-in-Chief of the Russian central front,
tried for six weeks to crush our hedgehog, committing reserve divi-
sions under the command of the future Marshall Rokossovsky.
On July 30 alone thirteen Russian attacks against the hedgehog
position held by the Grossdeutschland Regiment and the Das Reich
Division were beaten back. On that day our Hauptsturmführer Rumohr
saw T-34 tanks appear in front of the 2nd Artillery Battalion’s 6th
Battery. He jumped onto a motorcycle and directed the defense, cold-
bloodedly driving around between our artillery and the enemy tanks.
The last was destroyed from a distance of 15 meters by a 105mm
howitzer. And it was high time by then! That was a really extraordi-
nary episode. Shortly thereafter Rumohr was promoted to Obersturm-
bannführer.
We were relieved by two infantry divisions at the beginning of
August. However we had no time to reach our rest positions and had
to occupy a position north of the hedgehog position, where enemy
infantry were undertaking massive counterattacks.
They suffered fearful losses. The enemy came at us in wave after
wave, only to allow themselves to be massacred, always at the same
spot where our artillery had the exact range. It was impossible to
fathom, heart-breaking and sickening to watch. Why were thousands
of brave soldiers stupidly sent to their deaths in this way? At about
the same time I was decorated with the Iron Cross, Second Class.
We could understand the Russian soldier defending the soil of
his fatherland, for we were the invaders. But in the name of what
social order were they sacrificed? What we had seen in the Russian
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 107
villages and towns we passed through had opened our eyes about the
“Soviet paradise.” People and animals lived together in a, for the
people, degrading fashion, and men and animals had little to eat.
North of Kobrin | visited a kholkhoz (collective farm): the Russian
farmer was little more than a wretched slave from the time of Gogol’s
Dead Souls. Alexander Solzhenitsyn is still correct today; but what
we saw and experienced in the USSR has been expressed for us by
Kravchenko and the courageous Solzhenitsyn.
We are criticized for having considered the Russians subhumans.
This does not correspond to the facts. From the first year on I em-
ployed Russian prisoners as auto mechanics. I found them to be in-
telligent and inventive; for example the Russians found out that a
certain spring from a T-34 could be installed in our Horch cars, whose
front and rear springs had all broken in a short time. Why should I
treat these Russians like subhumans? Even though I was and still am
anti-bolshevik, I was and am not anti-Russian.
If Hitler underestimated the Russian soldiers in the beginning, as
some maintain, he made a serious mistake. We had a superior strat-
egy and our generals were significantly better in dealing with the
problems of mobile warfare and were more innovative than the Rus-
sian. But from common soldier to company commander the Russian
soldiers were the equal of the German. Brave, tough, and with an
outstanding sense for camouflage, they put up astonishingly bitter
resistance and walked en masse and with unbelievable fatalism into
certain death.
In the hell of Yelnya we were convinced that we were fighting
not for Germany but for all of Europe. But the division was at the
end of its strength. Like many others, I had contacted a severe case
of dysentery. I refused to go to hospital and simply pitched my tent at
the edge of our camp. Fortunately the Das Reich Division was sent
to rest position in the Roslav! sector: the men and vehicles badly
needed a rest.
At this time Hitler made a decision about which opinion is still
divided today. The offensive toward Moscow was suddenly inter-
rupted and ordered south in the direction of Kiev. The reason behind
this move was not just the capture of the Ukraine and its wheat and
of the Donets Basin industrial region. Prisoners capture near Yelnya
had spoken of a great concentration of forces to defend the capital
city of the Ukraine. “The art of war,” wrote Napoleon, “consists of
108 Otto SKORZENY
having the greater strength at the point at which one is attacking or
being attacked.”
Those German generals and historians who since the war have
criticized Hitler’s decision, taken in the night of August 20-21, to
attack in the south while Feldmarschall von Rundstedt was supposed
to attack toward the north, have apparently forgotten the activities of
the Red Orchestra in Switzerland. Let us examine the situation in
detail.
On August 10 Werther transmitted details of the attack plans of
the greater part of Feldmarschall von Bock’s army group to Lucy:
primary objective Moscow. This was Directive Number 34 by the
OKW of the same date. Rado immediately sent the information to
Director. Stalin, Shaposhnikov, Chief-of-Staff of the Red Army, and
Timoshenko, commander of the Western Front, made their decisions
accordingly. Stalin summoned General Yeremenko, armor special-
ist, and on August 12 ordered him to fortify the sector in front of
Moscow and to expect Guderian there.
But on August 18 Halder, Chief-of-Staff of the OKH, suggested
to Hitler that they not carry out the attack on Moscow frontally, rather
via Briansk. Guderian wanted to give the impression of veering south,
before suddenly changing direction toward the north and advancing
from Briansk to Moscow. In Moscow Director learned immediately
of this change to Directive Number 34. For this reason Yeremenko
was able to write in his memoirs that, “Comrade Shaposhnikov in-
formed him on the morning of August 24 that the attack on Briansk
would take place in the coming days.” Yeremenko therefore concen-
trated the bulk of his forces there in order to parry a thrust from the
west, as the Russian general staff had ordered.
But on August 21 Hitler decided, without informing Halder, that
Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 would attack neither Briansk nor Mos-
cow, but instead would veer south with Kiev as its objective, a move
which would grant him great freedom of maneuver. Lucy was not
informed in time and consequently neither was Moscow.
Guderian offered Hitler his point of view on August 23: “I want
to head straight for Moscow.” “Hitler let me speak my mind without
interrupting me,” wrote the general. “But I couldn’t convince him.”
It was Kiev and the Ukraine. The generals obeyed.
I cannot see the behavior of an “incompetent, a dilettante” in
Hitler’s decision, as Gerd Buchheit, a former Reichswehr officer,
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 109
wrote in his book. It was this decision that fooled the enemy and
allowed approximately fifteen Soviet armies to be destroyed and most
important agricultural and industrial areas to be occupied. The rest
period granted the Das Reich Division was brief, and it took part in
the great battles of encirclement east of Kiev commanded by Gener-
als Guderian from the north and von Kleist from the south. The re-
sult: 665,000 prisoners, 884 tanks, 3,178 guns on September 15. The
same day Stalin demanded of Churchill “twenty to twenty-five divi-
sions, which should disembark in Arkhangelsk.”
We fought our way to Priluki and Romny, where the much-ad-
mired and courageous Carl the Twelfth of Sweden had established
his headquarters in the year 1703. Then came the first phase of Op-
eration Taifun, whose objective was the conquest of Moscow. The
division marched north again, through Gomel to Roslavi, where we
arrived at the end of September.
It is not an exaggeration to claim that up to that point the land
and the climate had been our bitterest enemies. During the summer
dust had worn out or engines and clogged the filters. Guderian, who
had ordered 600 replacement engines, received half, and the Das Reich
Division was no better supplied. It rained from September 3rd to the
20th, and instead of dust there was mud. When we reached the Desna
I was lucky to be able to say that I had been able to pull about 100 of
our trucks, almost all of which had bogged down, out of the mud.
After the great battles of encirclement in the Ukraine, our march north
was a new way of the cross.
At the beginning of October we veered northeast toward Gshatsk
and Yukinov. We found that Stalin’s directives had been followed:
we were fired on by groups of partisans while transiting the woods
through which we had to pass. They were still small units, made up
of soldiers who had escaped our encirclement and escaped prisoners.
Escape was so simple! We could barely spare a single soldier to
watch over 500 prisoners. Of every twenty villages we occupied two
or three, while the others offered refuge to the partisans, whose leader
forced the population into obedience in good or bad.
In Gshatsk we had to fight on two fronts: toward the west, in
order to prevent a breakout by the encircled enemy, and toward the
east, to face the divisions Timoshenko threw into battle against us on
this “track” from Smolensk to Moscow.
110 Otro SKORZENY
That year winter came very early. The first snow fell during the
night of October 6-7. I recalled that Napoleon, after crossing the
Beresina on July 22, had entered Moscow on September 14, 1812
and that on October 19 he was forced to abandon the burning capital
to begin his frightful retreat. When I saw this snow, which gave the
countryside a monotone but dangerous appearance, I felt a sense of
foreboding, but my own optimism soon swept it away. We had the
crossroads near Gshatsk firmly in our hands and Moscow was only
about 160 kilometers away on the “highway.”
The “highway!” This word brings to mind a broad road of con-
crete or asphalt. In reality here it was nothing more than a wide,
raised wall of earth. To the south, the double battle of Vvazma-Briansk
(September 30-October 14) had finally ended with the destruction of
nine Soviet armies. Generals Guderian, Hoth, von Arnim, von
Manteuffel and Model had taken 663,000 prisoners and destroyed or
captured 1,242 tanks and 5,142 guns. We attacked Moscow’s first
defensive line in front of Borodino. It was here on September 7, 1812
against Kutusov and the Princes Bagration, Duvarov, Barclay de Tolly
and Rayevsky that Napoleon had won the battle that opened the gates
to Moscow.
The Das Reich Division attacked with the Hauenschild Brigade
of the 10th Panzer Division, the 7th Panzer Regiment and a battalion
of the 90th Motorized Artillery Regiment and the 10th Reconnais-
sance Battalion. Between the “highway” and the old mail route, some-
what farther north, the enemy had erected a very strong defensive
position with minefields, barbed-wire obstacles, anti-tank ditches and
rifle pits as well as small, fixed strongpoints. The first strongpoints
were defended by a special unit which had at its disposal
flamethrowers, first-class artillery, Stalin Organs and excellent sup-
port from the air force. But there was also a very unpleasant surprise
waiting for us: at Borodino we had to fight Siberian troops for the
first time. They were very well-equipped, strong and determined lads,
with huge fur coats and caps, fur-lined boots and automatic rifles,
naturally with all manner of heavy weapons. It was the 32nd Light
Infantry Division from Vladivostock, which was accompanied by
two brigades of T-34 and KV tanks.
Of all the difficult battles which I had the honor of taking part in,
this was undoubtedly the most murderous. It lasted two days. I saw
many good comrades fall and “Papa” Hausser was badly wounded
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS mW
not far from me. He lost an eye. But our massed artillery under the
command of Oberst Weidling opened a breach through which our
assault grenadiers forced their way, and the barrier of the first of
Moscow’s defensive lines was cracked. On October 19 we occupied
Moshaisk: it was only 100 kilometers to Moscow!
After Moshaisk the resistance became weaker. We were convinced
that we would be in Moscow at the beginning of November. But then
came the catastrophe: beginning on October 19 torrential rain fell on
the area of Army Group Center, which in three days literally sank
into the morass. I was given the task of getting the trucks on the
“highway” mobile again. It was a frightful scene: for many kilome-
ters, thousands of vehicles in three rows, sunk in the mud, some up
to their hoods. There was no fuel. Supplies had to be delivered by
air: on average 200 tons per day for each division. The complete
stoppage of traffic extended several hundreds of kilometers to the
west. In this way three precious weeks and an enormous quantity of
materiel were lost. In his book Decisive Battles of the Occidental
World, the English General J.F. Fuller wrote in 1958:

“More than by Russian resistance, which certainly was energetic,

Moscow was saved by the collapse of the German supply system in
the morass on the entire front.”

In a tremendous effort, 15 kilometers of corduroy road had to be

built from trees felled by us while the fighting was going on. In spite
of counterattacks by Siberian troops and T-34s we crossed the Moskva
above Rousak: we wanted to be the first to arrive at Red Square. We
thought: long live the cold! It froze during the night of November 6
and 7. Slowly the supplies began to flow again. We received ammu-
nition, fuel, some food and cigarettes. Finally the wounded could be
evacuated, and preparations were made for the final offensive.
We were supposed to advance through Istra to Moscow. Rather
prematurely I received orders to keep an important waterworks in
Moscow from being destroyed and make sure that the facility kept
running. The Church of Istra was still undamaged. Through the fog
we could see the bells in its steeples shining. The small city was one
of the main support bases of the capital’s second defensive line.
In spite of the losses we had suffered our morale was good: we
would take Moscow. Preparations were made for the final assault.
112 Otro SKORZENY
But on November 19 the temperature suddenly fell to minus 20 de-
grees Celsius. We had no cold-proof motor or gun oil, and the en-
gines were almost impossible to start early in the moming. Never-
theless Oberstleutnant von der Chevallerie took Istra on November
26 and 27 with the twenty-four tanks he had been loaned by the 10th
Panzer Division and the Das Reich Division’s reconnaissance battal-
ion, which was under the command of Hauptsturmfihrer Klingenberg,
who had been the first to enter Belgrade. Istra was defended by an-
other elite division, the 78th Siberian Light Infantry Division. The
next day the Russian Air Force levelled Istra.
Ahead and to our left lay Khimki, Moscow’s port, 8 kilometers
from the city itself. On November 30 a motorcycle reconnaissance
company of the 62nd Pioneer Battalion, which belonged to the
Hoepner Panzer Corps, entered Khimki without firing a shot, caus-
ing an outbreak of panic. Unfortunately this incident was not ex-
ploited. Inexplicably our motorcycle infantry withdrew.
Here another very mysterious episode in our offensive against
Moscow took place. This episode has so far not been mentioned by
any historian. In order to give an appropriate response to the fright-
ful rockets of the Stalin organs, we received rockets of a new type,
whose payload consisted of liquid air. They looked like large aerial
bombs and had, as far as I can tell, a frightful effect which resulted in
a visible reduction in the will to resist on the part of the enemy.
Opposite our lines the enemy had powerful loudspeakers for his
propaganda, which at that time was quite mediocre. Several days
after the first use of our large, liquid-air-filled rockets, the Russians
let us know by loudspeaker that they would employ poison gas if we
continued to fire these rockets.
They were never used again in our sector, and I don’t believe that
they were used subsequently in other sectors of the front.
On December 2 we advanced farther and reached Nikolayev, 15
kilometers from Moscow. In the clear weather I could see the spires
of Moscow and the Kremlin through my field glasses. Our battery
fired on the suburbs and streetcars. But we had almost no tractors left
for our howitzers. Chevallerie now had ten panzers and the tempera-
ture fell to minus 30 degrees C. From October 9 to December 5,
1941 the Das Reich Division, the 10th Panzer Division and the other
units of XXXX Panzer Corps had lost 7,582 officers, NCOs and en-
listed men. That was 40 % of their nominal effective strength. Six
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 113
days later, when day and night we had to battle fresh Siberian divi-
sions that had broken through on our right wing, our division’s losses
reached more than 75 percent.
That day we learned that Germany and Italy had declared war on
the United States after Pearl Harbor. The result of this was that the
morale of some of our comrades fell. The most important thing was
to learn what attitude Japan, our ally, would take against the Soviet
Union. But the presence of the Siberian troops, most of whom came
from the northern border of Korea, and whose numbers had been
growing for a month, gave no cause for optimism.

Why were we unable to take Moscow? Many historians have asked

this question and have answered it in various ways. My division was
one of those which had to give up just short of the objective and the
reason for our failure is clear to me today. I will try to explain as
briefly as possible.
Since 1938 the German Army had been under the command of
Feldmarschall von Brauchitsch, who came from a Prussian officer
family. He was a good general of the old school. In 1941 he was
already over sixty. There should definitely have been a younger com-
mander in his post, someone who had a better understanding of the
principles of this “revolutionary” style of warfare directed by Hitler
and proposed by Manstein and Guderian. But in the end the field
marshall was a man of the old general staff and there is no doubt that
a better planned and organized logistics by one of his specialists would
have saved the Wehrmacht enormous losses.
We have seen that the Russian land with its swamps, its morass,
with rainfall and frost defended itself. Our vehicles, trucks, guns and
their tractors, as well as our tanks, sank deep into the sandy and muddy
roads. The catastrophic, cloudburst-like rainfalls of September-Oc-
tober were followed by temperatures between minus 25 and 40 de-
grees Celsius, against which our machines and men were almost de-
fenseless.
We of the Waffen-SS had absolutely no privileges. As we were
under the command of the Wehrmacht, we received exactly the same
food and equipment as the other soldiers. After the first snowfall our
division’s administrative people ordered our allotted winter equip-
114 OTTO SKORZENY
ment, and in mid-November we received warm clothing, as did our
comrades of the 10th Panzer Division. We had also seen the equip-
ment worn by the Siberians captured at Borodino. We questioned
them and learned, for example, that when we had no felt-lined boots
our leather shoes or boots should not be hob-nailed and most of all
should not be too tight. Every skier knows these details, but they
were unknown to our equipment specialists. Practically all of us wore
fur-lined boots taken from dead Russian soldiers.
Toward the end of October I saw to my astonishment a panzer
division approaching whose kibelwagens, trucks and tanks were
painted sand-yellow and whose men wore summer uniforms. It was
the Sth Panzer Division which was initially earmarked for the Africa
Corps. This division was hit hard in its very first action and our divi-
sion had to help restore the situation.
The officers of this 5th Panzer Division, and we too, found it
shocking that in November Goebbels had to tum to the German people
and ask for donations — skis, warm clothing and so on — for the East-
ern Front. The meaning of this late appeal by Goebbels was clear to
all of us: the general staff hadn’t done its job. Since Operation
Barbarossa had been planned for more than a year, they should have
known that proper winter equipment was an absolute necessity in
Russia. Even if we had taken Moscow at the end of October, we
would still have needed the best winter clothing as occupation troops.
During the first days of the retreat I intervened and had a supply
of warm clothing distributed to the troops. An officer of the adminis-
trative section had stored the clothing in a farmhouse and was reluc-
tant to issue it to the needy soldiers, who had only a light coat over
their normal uniform, without orders from a senior officer. This of-
ficer wanted to burn the clothing, which undoubtedly saved the lives
of many of my comrades, as per orders. The army’s administrative
organization and its head office, which knew that it snowed and rained
in winter in Russia, should have taken appropriate steps beginning in
April. But the Chief of the army’s Military-Economic and Equip-
ment Office was General Georg Thomas, one of the conspirators of
July 20, 1944. He was under the direct command of General-
feldmarschall Keitel in the OKW and his task was to foresee all the
army’s needs in foodstuffs, equipment, rolling stock, weapons, mu-
nitions and so on. This he did in accordance with Géring, who played
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 115
the role of a commissioner of the four-year plan, and with the Reich
Minister for Armaments and Munitions, Todt, later Speer. Here is an
example: in March Thomas informed the OKW that 3,000 guns with
ammunition would be available at the beginning of May. In accor-
dance with the OKW’s plans these guns and ammunition were then
supposed to be issued and sent on their way to the front. This task
fell to the offices of General Olbricht. These offices were under the
command of General Fromm, Commander of the Replacement Army,
Bendlerstrasse, Berlin, whose chief-of-staff was von Stauffenberg.
Every piece of inexact information the OKW received from Olbricht’s
or Thomas’ offices, every unreported delay in production or trans-
port naturally had the most serious consequences, both for the OKW
in planning the war and most especially for the front.
In spite of the morass, the ice, the lack of roads, in spite of the
constant betrayal by certain commanders, in spite of the confusion
of our logistics and in spite of the bravery of the Russian soldiers, we
would have taken Moscow at the beginning of December 1941 if the
Siberian troops had not intervened.
In the month of December our Army Group Center did not re-
ceive a single division as reinforcement or replacement. In the same
period Stalin committed 30 light infantry divisions, 33 brigades, 6
tank divisions and 3 cavalry divisions against us. From October 17
on the Das Reich Division faced the Siberian 32nd Light Infantry
Division near Borodino and later, at the beginning of December, the
78th Division. Both units were very well equipped and like the 32nd
Division at Borodino were supported by a new tank division. I have
not mentioned the other units of the Red Army, which fought with
equal determination to that of the troops from Siberia.
It must also be said that our air force, which was already short of
aircraft in November and December, failed to destroy the Trans-Si-
berian railroad net, thanks to which the Siberian troops were able to
save Moscow, which was already considered half lost by the Russian
leadership and from which the Soviet government had already fled.
To get within 20 kilometers of Moscow our division had had to
fight an enemy whose numerical superiority in October was 3 or 4 to
1 in soldiers, 5 to 1 in artillery, thanks to the Stalin Organs, and at the
end of December 5 or 6 to 1 in men and 8 to 10 to 1 in materiel,
munitions and fuel.
116 OTTO SKORZENY
eee

In October Stalin had a gigantic front which was threatened by Ja-

pan, which had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. From Vladivostock
and the Bering Strait to Amgu-Okhotsk it was more than 9,000 kilo-
meters and there was a land boundary of about 3,000 kilometers from
Lake Baikal to Vladivostock. The USSR had to worry about attack
from a vulnerable, 12,000 kilometer southern and eastern flank.
Let us recall that the first confrontation between the Soviet Army
and Japanese troops took place in August 1938 on the shores of Lake
Kazan. In May 1939 the Japanese Army entered the Mongolian
Peoples Republic. The Red Army intervened and the result was the
battle at the Khalkin. The Japanese Army occupied not only Korea,
but also a large part of northern China and was moving toward the
Gulf of Bengal. In Manchuria its infantry had occupied the right bank
of the Amure River. Cities like Kabarovsk, Vladivostock and Nakoda
were difficult for the Soviets to defend. On July 1, 1941 the German
Reich, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia recognized the pro-Japa-
nese government in Nanking.
Forty or more Japanese divisions threatened the USSR along this
long front and they could be reinforced quickly. What would the Japa-
nese strategy be? Would Japan attack in the north and seize the Trans-
Siberian railroad in spite of the Soviet-Japanese agreement signed in
Moscow on April 13? Would Japan attack in the south? At the begin-
ning of summer 1941 Stalin did not know yet.
At this point there appeared a man whose secret has still not been
fully cleared up: Soviet master spy Richard Sorge.
Of course I never met Sorge, alias Johnson, Ramsey, Smith and
so on, but my friend Dennis MacEvoy, one of the chief editors of the
Readers Digest and other American papers, a journalist in Tokyo
before the war, saw a great deal of Sorge, who as we will see was one
of his newspaper colleagues. MacEvoy had absolutely no idea of
Sorge’s real occupation.
The most complete work to be written on Richard Sorge so far is
Shanghai Conspiracy (1952) by General A. Willoughby. The author
served as head of General Douglas MacArthur’s intelligence service.
Further details may be found in The Case of Richard Sorge (1966)
by F. Deakin and Storry. The articles and books concerning the “he-
roic acts of Comrade Sorge” which were published in the USSR in
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 117
1964 are apologies. Serious study of the Sorge case brings surprises
to light.
Richard Sorge was born on October 4, 1895 near Baku. His fa-
ther was a German, an engineer with an oil company, and his mother,
Nina Kopelov, was sixteen years younger than her husband.
Sorge volunteered for service in the German Army in 1914 and
was twice wounded. He completed his studies in political science at
the University of Hamburg in 1920. By 1922 he had already become
a specialist in agitation propaganda with the German Communist
Party. two years later he went to Moscow. Sorge attended courses at
specialist schools until 1927. The Comintern agent became a spe-
cialist in the Red Army’s 4th Office (intelligence). 1929 found him
back in Germany. There is little doubt that he met the future wife of
Eugen Ott, later an envoy of the Third Reich, in Munich at this time.
She was then married to an architect and was said to hold radical
leftist views. General Willoughby wrote: “Many assume that she was
a member of the German Communist Party KPD).”
Sorge was sent to Shanghai in 1930. Three years later he was
recalled to Moscow by the 4th Office, which gave him his most im-
portant assignment, in Tokyo. Oddly enough Sorge first spent two
months in Germany, where Hitler was now Reich Chancellor. He
had to create another good cover. A Soviet female spy, Agnes Smedley,
a correspondent with the Frankfurter Zeitung, recommended him to
the newspaper, which sent him to Tokyo as a correspondent. But
Sorge needed a contact with Oberstleutnant Eugen Ott, who had come
to Tokyo as a military observer in 1942. But who was to give Sorge
the introduction?: Dr. Zeller, editor of the Taglichen Rundschau. Zeller
had such progressive views that his paper was banned at the end of
1933. He introduced Sorge to his friend Ott as “completely trustwor-
thy, personally as well as politically.”
This should make the historians suspicious, for we know that
Oberstleutnant Ott had previously belonged to the staff of General
von Schleicher. Following the failure of the political-military alli-
ance with the extreme left planned by Chancellor von Schleicher at
the end of 1933, Ott was sent to safety in Tokyo. I don’t believe that
it was chance that Sorge was recommended to Ott by Zeller as “com-
pletely trustworthy.” It has been claimed that Sorge made his entire
career as a Secret agent as the result of a sentimental relationship
with Frau Ott. It is completely possible that this relationship existed,
118 OTTO SKORZENY
but there is no explanation as to why Ott and Sorge became “very
intimate.” It was however Eugen Ott, quickly promoted to Oberst
and named First Military Attache and later, in April 1936, German
ambassador in Tokyo, who assisted Sorge during his entire career
and thus eased his work as a spy.
Ramsey was not only accepted as a member of the Tokyo branch
of the National-Socialist Party (October 1, 1934), but in 1939 the
envoy officially made him his press chief. In autumn 1934 Sorge
accompanied Ott on a trip through Manchuria.
In 1936, with Sorge not yet an official member of the embassy
staff, he encoded certain telegrams signed by Ott and addressed to
Berlin! When he had to travel to Hong Kong to deliver microfilm to
his Soviet agent leader, the new ambassador, the now General Ott,
entrusted him with the secret diplomatic mail, in which Ramsey was
able to smuggle through all his documents intended for the 4th Of-
fice.
In 1938 the embassy entrusted him with the files on an important
Soviet defector, General Lyushkov. At the time of the Tukhachevsky
clearing operation Lyushkov passed important data on the Soviet
military organization in Siberia and the Ukraine to the Japanese along
with secret codes, the names of Stalin’s main military foes in Siberia
and so on. The Japanese informed Ott and Canaris at once sent Oberst
Greiling to Tokyo to summarize Lyushkov’s information in a memo-
randum. Sorge learned of this and informed Moscow of the most
important details.
After Sorge’s arrest on October 18, 1941, Ambassador Ott sent
reports to Berlin in which he at first portrayed Ramsey as the inno-
cent victim of the Japanese secret service and declared that Sorge
had played only a subordinate role in the embassy. No one can seri-
ously believe that Ott did not know who Sorge really was, but no one
expressed this fact, which however did not escape the Japanese, clearly
and acted accordingly.
Sorge was of course careful not to expose Ott, who was not re-
placed as ambassador in Tokyo, by Dr. Heinrich Stahmer, until No-
vember 1943. Ott and his wife did not return to Germany, instead
they went to Peking where they waited for the end of the war.
From April 1939 until October 14, 1941 Sorge’s radio operator,
Max Clausen, sent 65,421 words to the 4th Office via secret trans-
mitter. Sorge also had at his disposal special couriers for his micro-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 119
film, and at the end his net had also established contact with the
Russian embassy in Tokyo.
He employed at least 30 Japanese. His most important agent was
Ozaki Hozumi, advisor and close friend of Prince Konoje, minister
president in the years 1937-1939 and 1940-1941. It was due to the
indiscretions of Eugen Ott that Ramsey was able to inform his 4th
Office on March 5, 1941 that the German attack on the USSR would
take place “mainly in the direction of Moscow” and in mid-June. In
another signal deciphered by the Japanese, on May 15 Sorge gave
the date of the attack as June 20, 1941. Immediately after the sitting
of the Imperial Council on July 2, 1941 Ozaki informed Sorge that
the Japanese government had decided to attack the USA. On August
14 Ozaki brought Sorge the important information that all Japanese
war plans against the USSR had practically been abandoned, and
Sorge also leamed the significant points from the meeting of the Japa-
nese high command held on August 20 or 23, 1941. Ozaki was also
informed about the entire military transport on the Manchurian rail-
roads. On September 27 he was able to assure Sorge that “Japan was
preparing a great offensive in the south,” aimed at Singapore, Hong
Kong and the Philippine Islands: it would take place at the end of
November or early December 1941. Any danger of a war against the
USSR had been eliminated.
Only now, after receiving this intelligence, could Stalin send the
bulk of the Siberian troops to Moscow. It was more than half a mil-
lion men. Thus was Moscow saved.
Sorge transmitted several more radio messages, the last after a
conversation with Clausen and Ozaki on October 4, 1941. After eight
years of extremely successful activity as a spy in Tokyo he consid-
ered his mission ended and feared being discovered. On October 13
Miyagi, a member of his group, failed to appear at the agreed-upon
meeting place: he had been arrested. Sorge had to become more cau-
tious. On October 15 radio operator Clausen came to see him; Ramsey
then dispatched a radio message to Moscow suggesting they dissolve
the net. Too late. Sorge was arrested at his home on the morning of
October 18 and was taken to Sugamo prison still in his pajamas and
slippers. On his desk the Japanese police officials found a draft of
the radio message which Clausen was to send to Director on the
evening of October 15. Clausen was found in possession of the same
half-encoded signal. That was the end.
120 OTTO SKORZENY
eo

Was Sorge a double agent? In the confession he made to the Japa-

nese investigators, he claimed that in 1940-1941 Moscow had autho-
rized him to pass certain, rather unimportant confidential informa-
tion to the Germans.
In his memoirs Schellenberg claimed that until 1940 Ramsey
passed secret intelligence to Director von Ritgen, head of the official
press agency DNP, and that he, Schellenberg, was also fully informed.
It seems appropriate here to point out that Walter Schellenberg, a
prisoner of the English in 1945, was sentenced to prison by the
Nuremberg tribunal. He died in Italy in 1952; The Schellenberg Mem-
oirs first appeared in 1956. It is clear that this document was care-
fully sanitized of any potentially dangerous revelations. Several para-
graphs do not appear to have been written by Schellenberg at all.
In Office VI of the SD they knew that Sorge had a relationship
with Stennes, one of the senior SA chiefs, in 1933. Stennes was very
much orientated toward the left and a friend of Gregor and Otto
Strasser and had fled to China. It is curious that no one mentioned
the close relationships between the various people, like Schleicher,
Ott and his wife, Stennes, Zeller (of whom Schellenberg said noth-
ing) and Sorge, although these connections were naturally very im-
portant and revealing.
In 1941 the German political intelligence service recalled its rep-
resentative, Franz Huber, from Japan. Huber, who apparently had
lost no sleep over Sorge, was replaced by Chief Inspector Meisinger,
who, as Schellenberg said, “had played a dark sinister on June 30,
1934.” Josef Meisinger, who was sentenced to death and executed in
Poland after the war, arrived in Tokyo in May 1941. He undoubtedly
knew that Sorge was not clean. The Japanese Tokko special police
arrested Sorge and Ozaki while Meisinger was in Shanghai to make
enquiries about one — just one! - Abwehr agent. This German Abwehr
man was Ivar Lissner, a correspondent of the Völkischer Beobachter
(the daily newspaper of the Nazi Party) and a Soviet agent. Lissner,
arrested by the Japanese military police on June 5, 1943, was, like
Max Clausen, Sorge’s radio operator, released in August 1945 on
orders of the American authorities.
Ozaki and Sorge were tried behind closed doors by a regular Japa-
nese court in September 1943 and hanged on November 7, 1944.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 121
That Ozaki is dead is a fact. There is some doubt about Sorge, how-
ever. His arrest, his sentencing and especially his execution were
aggravating moments for the Japanese in their negotiations with the
Soviets. In October 1931 the government of Nanking had merely
expelled a veteran of the asian intelligence service, Noulens, and his
accomplices, who had been sentenced to death for spying. Sorge was
then active in Shanghai, paralle) to the Noulens net.
In a report to Ribbentrop, the new German envoy Stahmer claimed
that Sorge had been exchanged for a group of Japanese agents of the
Kouan-Tong Army then being held by the Russians. According to
Hans Meissner (The Man with Three Faces, 1957), the exchange had
taken place on Portuguese soil in Macao, to where Sorge had been
taken by the Japanese General Doihara.
Richard Sorge was a first-class agent, in the category of a Rich-
ard Abel, who was another master spy who was accidentally uncov-
ered in the USA. He was exchanged for Francis Gary Powers, the
unlucky pilot of the U-2 spy plane, in Berlin on February 10, 1962.
Richard Sorge’s life in Tokyo was, as Dennis MacEvoy told me,
a very frivolous one. He drank very heavily, and his successes and
failures with women ran into the dozens although he had married in
Russia and the USA. He had a long-term relationship with a Japa-
nese woman, Hanako-Tshii, who allegedly found and identified his
body.
For twenty years no one in the USSR spoke of Richard Sorge.
Then on November 5, 1964 the Soviet government published an lau-
datory obituary of their master spy and made him a “Hero of the
Soviet Union.” A street in Moscow was named after him, as was an
oil tanker, and in 1963 a stamp was issued in his memory.
It is true that at this time about twenty works had appeared in
Japan, the USA and Europe concerning Ramsey, whose decisive role
slowly became known even behind the iron curtain. At the same time
two of Sorge’s former superiors, General Bersin and Colonel
Borovich, both of whom had been executed on Stalin’s order, were
rehabilitated. It was the era of “de-Stalinization.”
If Sorge really was exchanged, it may well be that Stalin let him
live, naturally at a place chosen by the Soviet dictator. The man was
dangerous, however. His activity and his network of spies had al-
lowed the Siberian divisions to intervene decisively in the Battle of
Moscow while we were bogged down in the mud and cold.
122 OTTO SKORZENY
If the truth were known in Russia this would destroy the myth of
the “Miracle of Moscow,” which was attributed to Stalin. Even to-
day the existence of the Red Orchestra is practically unknown in the
USSR.

One can ask oneself why the retreat at the end of December 1941 and
early January 1942 did not assume catastrophic proportions and end
with the total destruction of the German armies. In the year 1812,
after the lightning retreat by Napoleon, who had heard of General
Malet’s plot and the desertion of Prince Murat, the Grand Army prac-
tically ceased to exist.
It is thanks to Adolf Hitler that this was not the case with the
Wehrmacht. Instead of ordering a general retreat, he decreed that
only those units facing the greatest danger of encirclement could
withdraw, while the others must hold their positions fanatically.
Cities were declared fortresses and defended as such: Novgorod,
Schlüsseiburg, Rzhev, Vyazma, Briansk, Orel, Kharkov, Taganrog,
on these the divisions of Konev and Zhukov were broken. The Rus-
sian generals were unable to successfully counter the troops move-
ments by Generals Hoth and Guderian behind Smolensk, although
even airborne troops were committed. Their losses were very heavy.
We had to wait until 1970 until Liddel Hast, nearly alone among
the historians of the Second World War, acknowledged that Hitler
was right not to listen to the advice of his generals, who proposed a
general withdrawal to a line from Pskov in the north and Mogilev-
Gomel in the center to the Dniepr. Nothing is more dangerous than a
panic during a retreat, and I have seen certain senior officers lose
their heads. An Oberst used energetic gestures in an effort to keep
me from pulling back with my trucks to Volokolamsk as per orders,
informing me that he knew that the Russians were already there.
However this news was false.
I reached Volokolamsk, which is about 60 kilometers northwest
of Istra, without difficulty; nobody there had seen even a single Rus-
sian soldier and the Das Reich Division established a solid defensive
line there.
Liddel Hart wrote:
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 123
“It is today certain, that Hitler's refusal to authorize a general
retreat restored the confidence of the German troops and thus cer-
tainly prevented their total destruction.”
PART II
 10
THE “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER’?
THE TRUTH ABOUT STALINGRAD

Evacuated - In officer school for tank training - Back to Berlin to

the reserve battalion of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Waffen-SS
Division — Roosevelt demands “Unconditional Surrender” ~ The true
reason behind this decision — Secret negotiations in Stockholm and
Ankara — Franz von Papen makes confidential reports in Madrid
after the war — Without informing Hitler or Ribbentrop he informs
the Americans in Ankara of the Russian proposals ~— Unfavorable
reactions in the Reich Foreign Ministry — The Russians feel deceived
— A good opportunity to achieve peace was missed ~— Surrender of
the Sixth Army at Stalingrad — Causes of the tragedy — The “Blue
Plan” on Stalin's desk since November — Timoshenko is defeated —
Stalin asks the Red Orchestra: “Where is Paulus?” — Eighteen days
without gasoline — “Rendezvous at Stalingrad”: eleven armies against
one — General Wenck’s forces save 500,000 men - General von
Seydlitz, Paulus’ adjutanı, calls for resistance - Gisevius believes
Paulus did not give ıhe signal at which Feldmarschall von Kluge
was to unleash the putsch in the east — Failure of Operation “Silver
Fax” — Thoughts on the war -I assume command of the “Friedenthal
Special Duties Battalion”

y the seventh month of the Russian campaign I had seen

so many brave comrades fall that I considered myself lucky
to have escaped relatively intact. In November 1941 near
Moshaisk I was caught by a salvo from a Stalin Organ,
however I was fortunate to escape with a heavy blow and a head
wound. On the other hand, however, I had not completely recovered
from the severe case of dysentery that had so weakened me at Roslav!.
126
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 127
During the retreat I was struck by biliary colic and only managed to
stay on my feet by relying on injections. At the beginning of 1942 1
was transferred to Smolensk on a hospital train and from there to
Vienna. I was in really poor shape, and I only managed to tempo-
rarily avoid an operation as the result of a stay in Karlsbad Hospital.
Later, in 1946, I had to have the operation while in a POW camp.
During my convalescent leave in 1942 I was able to see my fa-
ther again a week before his death. That was a comfort to both of us.
“I am convinced,” he said, “that the European armies will defeat
the Russians. Perhaps one day the western powers will understand
that it is in their interest to put an end to bolshevism. Then the world
will achieve a lasting peace and your generation will perhaps be hap-
pier than ours.”
Many thought as he did — and deceived themselves. But at least
my father died with this illusion.
The hospital release order classified me as “GvH” (fit for garri-
son duty at home), and so I was sent to the replacement unit of the
Waffen-SS Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler in Berlin as engi-
neering officer. The six months I spent there were terribly boring. I
felt like a shirker, but I soon found ways and means to overcome the
boredom: I volunteered for retraining with the panzer arm. After pass-
ing several tests I was transferred as an engineering officer to the
Waffen-SS Division Totenkopf which in fully motorized form was to
be reequipped as a panzer division.
Unfortunately I was not completely cured. In the winter of 1942-
1943 I had a relapse of dysentery. They determined that I was “GvH”
and sent me back to the Leibstandarte reserve unit in Berlin.
They undoubtedly needed engineering officers in the reserve units.
But I found that I could be more useful. The thought of being no
more than a conscientious working engineer did not please me. Then
came two events, almost simultaneously, which gave every German
to whom the future of his country lay near to his heart cause to think.
In January 1943 at Casablanca, Roosevelt, together with Win-
ston Churchill, decided that the allies would demand an “uncondi-
tional surrender” from the Axis powers, and especially from Ger-
many.
Roosevelt unintentionally supported Goebbels’ propaganda with
the words “unconditional surrender.” Hitler and national socialism
should not disappear, which actually would have been logical in a
128 OTTO SKORZENY
political-ideological war. Roosevelt wanted us to unconditionally lay
down our weapons. Stalin would obviously emerge as the sole, big
winner: that meant that not only Germany, but half of western Eu-
rope, would be delivered up to bolshevism.
Fundementally this decision of Roosevelt’s was caused only by
his real, panicky fear. Since November 1942 Peter Kleist, a member
of the German Foreign Office in Stockholm, had been in contact
with Edgar Klauss, a Swedish manufacturer and a confidante of the
Russian embassy in Sweden, which was then led by the extremely
active Madame Kollontai. At that time there existed a possibility of
signing a peace treaty with Moscow within eight days.
More than anything Roosevelt, who was fully informed of the
steps being taken by the Germans in Sweden, feared a renewal of the
agreement between Berlin and Moscow. Above all his “unconditional
surrender” was a bluff aimed at Stalin, who was supposed to be con-
vinced by it that the United States would continue to pursue the war
no matter what might happen.
Later, while at Nuremberg, I learned from Herr Sailer, German
ambassador in Ankara during the war, that the efforts in Stockholm
to reach a compromise in the east were taken up again at the end of
1943 by Franz von Papen, German ambassador to Turkey, and were
carried on in am ambiguous fashion. After his release in 1949 I learned
some highly interesting details from von Papen himself.
In 1952 the former Reich Chancellor was invited by the Spanish
foreign ministry to give a lecture in the Ateneo, a known Madrid
center of culture with a liberal tradition. The organizer of the lecture
was an outstanding diplomat and friend of mine, the Marquis de Prat
de Nantouillet. I had the opportunity to meet privately with von Papen
twice, and we had long conversations about the little-known “An-
kara affair.”
The USSR had extended the first peace feelers, by way of the
Turkish foreign ministry. Von Papen informed the Turkish minister
that a peace did not appear impossible to him, “if reasonable propos-
als were made.”
“What I anticipated and also desired then happened,” von Papen
told me. “The Turks lost no time in simultaneously informing the
Americans and the Russians of my reply. The American ambassador
immediately travelled to Washington. After his return he sought out
the Turkish foreign ministry, which immediately informed me of the
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 129
position taken by the US foreign ministry and the White House: Ger-
many was to know that the USA was ready to sign a separate peace
with Germany, twenty-four hours before the USSR.”
Pity that Herr von Papen carried out these conversations alone
without informing Hitler or Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop’s reaction was
extremely violent, and the Fihrer saw the discussions in Ankara,
which came on the heels of those in Stockholm, as proof that the
Russians had reached the end.
Had Papen immediately reported the Russian proposals to Hitler
instead of alerting the Americans, a cease-fire would possibly, even
probably been concluded. It was not in the interest of either Ger-
many or Russia to see both sides bled white. In April 1943 Stalin
feared that the allies would not land in Sicily (July 10, 1943) but in
the Balkans as Churchill wanted. A cessation of hostilities in the east
— I said this quite openly to von Papen during our “closed-doors “
discussions - would have made any landing in Sicily and later in
France impossible. “You are perhaps right,” observed the former Reich
Chancellor. “But believe me, Ribbentrop ruined everything.”
Franz von Papen was undoubtedly a far better diplomat than
Ribbentrop. However in this case it appears that everything was ru-
ined by him, because he tried to negotiate alone and play a double
game with the west. He probably did so out of conviction, and be-
cause Ribbentrop had signed the pact with Stalin in 1939. Papen
wanted to go him one better. Had he replaced Ribbentrop in the Reich
Foreign Ministry the Russian proposals would certainly have led to
something. But it is likely that the former Reich Chancellor had plans
extending beyond that.
Stalin and Molotov, who learned immediately of Papen’s double
game, did not believe for a moment that the Americans had been
informed without Hitler’s approval. They felt deceived and only now
gave the Americans every assurance. In a speech delivered on May
1, 1943 Stalin also spoke of “unconditional surrender”: “A separate
peace with the fascist bandits is impossible.”
General Franco and his foreign minister Jordana subsequently
made themselves available for a contact with the west. But on May
11, 1943 Anthony Eden, head of the Foreign Office, officially re-
jected any proposal for compromise: thus was the fate of many Euro-
pean states settled.
130 Orto SKORZENY
It is difficult to believe that anew Germany-Russian treaty would
have strengthened the European member parties of the Communist
International (Comintern), as many thought. On the contrary. Their
cadres and the comrades had made 100 much anti-German propa-
ganda to be able to agree to a new turnabout. As had been the case
earlier in the German Reich, in Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Spain and
in France and Belgium in the years 1936-1939, the communist work-
ers flocked to movements with a synthesis of socialism and national-
ism which showed European perspectives. In this way European anti-
marxist socialism could have taken form.
In Stockholm, and later in Ankara, everything was played out
without Ribbentrop being advised of the discussions that had been
held and contacts that had been made. Unlike the discussions held by
Herr Kleist in Stockholm,' those in Ankara are almost unknown.
Ribbentrop’s style of politics was basically negative since 1939.
It was unfortunate for Germany and Europe that we did not, apart
from Hitler, have any diplomats of rank who had a thorough knowl-
edge of the English mentality. I am firmly convinced — and I am not
alone in this — that England would have declared war on us in any
case, although this was contrary to its vital interests. Ribbentrop con-
vinced Hitler that the English would not declare war just on account
of the reincorporation of Danzig into the German Reich. One can say
with justification that a good opportunity of preserving the peace
was missed then.
Roosevelt’s advisors had assured him and Churchill that the threat
of unconditional surrender, together with the bombing terror, which
had only one — openly admitted — objective, to level every German
city with more than 100,000 inhabitants, would bring about a quick
end to the war. In any event the decisions made in Casablanca by
Roosevelt and Churchill prolonged the war by at least a year.

1943 saw the surrender of the rest of the Sixth Anny, which was
commanded in Stalingrad by General Paulus. He surrendered with
his staff on January 31, 1943. The last soldiers of General Strecker’s
Il Army Corps fought to the last round. Many officers took their
lives. Shortly before 9 A.M. the OKH received the following final
radio message:
 My ComMMAnNbDo OPERATIONS 131
“XI Army Corps and its 10 divisions have done their duty. Heil
Hitler. General Strecker.”
Not everyone in the Sixth Army had done their duty; they had
walked into a trap.
First of all one must realize that there exists a legend of Stalingrad
—just as in 1812 there was a legend of the Beresina, where the French
losses were exaggerated. At first it was conceded that about 400,000
German and allied officers and soldiers were taken prisoner at
Stalingrad. Then Yeremenko revised this figure downward, first to
330,000 and finally to 300,000. The truth was something else.
According to a “situation report” which the OKH received on
December 22, 1942, the exact number of soldiers in the pocket on
December 18 was: 230,000 German and allied troops, including
13,000 Romanian. However in the period from January 19 to 24,
42,000 wounded, sick and specialists were evacuated by aircraft.
16,800 soldiers were taken prisoner by the Russians from the 10th to
the 19th of January and another 91,000 after the surrender. The Rus-
sians therefore took a total of 107,000 prisoners. Of these only 6,000
soldiers returned home by 1964. The 101,800 missing died after the
surrender at Stalingrad. We captured 19,800 officers and soldiers of
the Red Army, who were released after the surrender. This was three
times as many as the German soldiers who returned after ten years of
imprisonment.
Hitler made serious mistakes during the war. For thirty years al-
most every historian has confirmed that he alone bore the responsi-
bility for the tragedy of Stalingrad, in that he refused to give General
Paulus the order to break out. One must realize that Hitler was as-
sured that Paulus could be supplied from the air — which then turned
out to be impossible and cost the lives of countless officers and sol-
diers, among them General Jeschonnek, the Luftwaffe’s Chief-of-
Staff, who committed suicide.
At the beginning of 1943, neither the German people nor the sol-
diers knew what the real causes of this defeat were. We all thought
that the luck of arms had abandoned General Paulus and this meant
for us a lost battle after many victories. In reality it was a great turn-
ing point.
Even today not everything is known about Stalingrad. But one
can say openly that this horrible tragedy would not have taken place
had the enemy not been informed daily of the intentions of our gen-
132 OTTO SKORZENY
eral staff and the weaknesses in our order of battle by the Red Or-
chestra. A certain hesitation of the part of Paulus also remains inex-
plicable. At the end of August 1942 he had not linked up with Gen-
eral Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army as ordered. Two of his most impor-
tant associates, Generals von Seydlitz and Daniels, were members of
the conspiracy against Hitler. Today we know that Paulus and Kluge
were supposed to give the signal for the beginning of a military putsch
against Hitler. Neither had the courage to do so, however, and mean-
while the Red Orchestra continued to play.
At the end of November 1941 the Red Orchestra informed
STAVKA of Hitler’s intention to attack toward the Caucasus in the
spring in order to seize the oil fields of Batum on the Black Sea and
Baku on the Caspian Sea. On a single day, November 21, 1941,
STAVKA received news from Gilbert (Trepper in Paris) that “the
Germans are assembling ships in Romanian ports and are planning
an operation in the Caucasus,”; they learned from Anton (Holland)
that “units of the Luftwaffe were moved from Greece to the Crimea”;
and from Coro (Schulze-Boysen in Berlin) came the following infor-
mation:

“Plan II, with Caucasus as its objective, originally planned for

November, will not be carried out until next spring... Planned direc-
tions of battle: Losovaya-Balakleya-Chuguyev-Belgorod-Ahktyrka-
Krasnograd-general staff in Kharkov. Details to follow.”

Our battle plans were regularly and in every detail transmitted to the
enemy. The entire Plan III, the later “Plan Blue,” and all the associ-
ated maps, were openly handed over to the enemy on June 19, 1942,
and by a member of the general staff, Major Reichel, who deserted
with a Fieseler Storch.
All our plans therefore lay on Timoshenko’s desk. There is no
doubt about this: Paul Carell, Erich Kern and W.F. Flicke, a former
officer of signals counterintelligence, prove it. Timoshenko thus dared
to mass troops near Kharkov on May 12, 1942 for a major offensive,
identical to the one which would later encircle General Paulus’ Sixth
Army. The attack was a failure. A joint counterattack by Generals
von Kleist and von Mackensen inflicted losses on Timoshenko of
60,000 soldiers dead and wounded, 239,000 captured, and 2,026 guns
and 1,250 tanks destroyed or captured. Timoshenko was subsequently
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 133
relieved of his post on the southwest front. When Generalfeld-
marschall von Bock, head of Army Group B, and Generalfeld-
marschall List, head of Army Group A, went over to the counterat-
tack, chaos broke out among the Russians.
Seen strategically, STAVKA was completely right to order the
rapid withdrawal of its troops. Stalin’s counter-plan was simple: draw
Army Group A (List) as far into the Caucasus as possible and allow
Army Group B (Bock) to advance to Stalingrad and tie it down there.
In the meantime they would assemble an overpowering force of men
and materiel on the banks of the Don and the Volga. Then when Army
Group List was stuck deep in the Caucasus, the bulk of the Russian
forces would drive toward Rostov, put the Sixth Army to flight and
cut off the line of retreat of List’s armies, which were inadequately
supplied and would have no time to fight their way back over this
tremendous distance.
Had the Soviet high command been more flexible, an even greater
catastrophe would have befallen the Germans.
But what happened? Kleist’s First Panzer Army took Rostov,
where the oil line from the Caucasus ended. Afterward it struck south,
took Krasnodar, Novorossisk, the oil fields of Maykop (annual pro-
duction 2,600,000 tons), Pyatigorsk, reached Ordshonikidze on the
road to Tbilisi and even a previously unknown railroad from Baku to
Astrakhan.
According to the “Blue Plan” the primary task of Sixth Army (of
Army Group B), commanded by General Paulus, was to screen the
left flank of Army Group List. General Halder, Chief-of-Staff of the
OKH, who in 1940 had had Paulus named Army Senior Quartermas-
ter, gave him the order to advance on Stalingrad, “neutralize” the
city and destroy the small enemy buildups which had been observed
north of the Don bend.
At first the retreat ordered by STAVKA was a chaos and we missed
our best opportunities. For example one might have released Gen-
eral Hoth and the Fourth Panzer Army from Army Group List and
had him march north of Stalingrad, which would have been a catas-
trophe for the Russians. But Hoth got out of Kotelnikovo too late.
In June 1942 Paulus therefore continued his “pursuit race” to
Stalingrad and advanced 300 kilometers with no serious fighting.
Meanwhile General Gordov became the provisional successor to
General Timoshenko. He had carried out STAVKA’s orders. Since
134 OTTo SKORZENY
the beginning of July he had stationed the 62nd Army, which was
then commanded by Kolpakchi, in the area of Lopatin. This army
was joined by the 63rd and 64th Armies under the command of
Kuznetsov and Choumilov, exactly at the place where Paulus would
have to cross the Don. According to the Russian plan other armies
were to help encircle Paulus: the Ist and 4th Tank Armies of
Moskalenko and Kruschenkin, Popov’s 5th, Chistyakov’s 21st,
Galardine’s 24th, Batov’s 65th, Shadov’s 66th, the 57th, 51st, 64th,
the 2nd Guards under Malinovsky, the Sth Tank Army, Guerasi-
menko’s 28th, the 4th Fully-Motorized Corps and so on hurried to
the “rendezvous at Stalingrad.”
But in July 1942 something suddenly happened that the STAVKA
had not planned: General Paulus’ Sixth Army did not appear where
the Russians were expecting it! In Moscow they first reacted with
alarm, then with panic. They feared that Hitler had once again over-
turned his plans without Werther learning of it. Where was Paulus
then? It was characteristic of the general staff of the Red Army that it
did not turn to its air force or patrols to find the answer to this ques-
tion: Director asked Rado. From Rado and Werther the Russians
learned that the Sixth Army was immobilized: due to a shortage of
gasoline! This fuel crisis lasted eighteen days. In the meantime the
defenses of Stalingrad were strengthened and the overall command
entrusted to General Yeremenko. Our supply specialists posed no
danger to the STAVKA!
The true story of the Battle of Stalingrad, which lasted from July
20, 1942 to February 2, 1943, must still be written. Let us hope that
this one day happens. Neither the memoirs of Field Marshalls Chuikov
and Yeremenko, nor B.C. Talpoukhov’s work The Great Victory of
the Soviet Army in Stalingrad (1953) are of much use: they give us
only a simplified, incomplete account. Naturally the Red Orchestra
is mentioned in none of these books.”
The heroic defense of Stalingrad in the months of September and
October in the large factories called “Barricades”, “Tractor Works”
and “Red October,” is definitely deserving of great admiration. Con-
trary to all the facts, however, General Yeremenko claims that the
German Sixth Army, which also had Romanians, Hungarians and
Italians at its side, was numerically and materially superior to the
Russians — although a dozen Russian armies, Rudenko's 16th Air
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 135
Fleet, special units trained in street fighting, a tremendous artillery
force, powerful anti-aircraft forces, elite troops and so on gave the
Russians a superiority of 4 or 5 to 1 in November 1942.
Why did Hitler and the OKH not give Paulus the order to with-
draw in October, although they saw that he could not move from the
spot? Primarily because the commander of our Sixth Army had in-
formed them that he would take the city. Carell wrote of this:

“Information supplied to the OKH, whose origin remains unclear

to this day, confirmed the Fiihrer’s optimistic assessment of the situ-
ation: since September 9 the Russians no noteworthy operational re-
serve.”

Six of the best-known Russian military commanders made their ca-

reers at Stalingrad: Voronov, Chuikov, Tolbukhin, Rokossovsky,
Malinovsky and A.E. Yeremenko. As thanks for his good and loyal
service Stalin sent the latter to the eastern Siberia and then to the
Caucasus. His book often sounds like a song of praise to his patron
Nikita Khrushchev and showing off of his own military talents.
The Russian soldiers fought remarkably in a city extending about
60 kilometers and which General Paulus had intended to take “by
November 10 at the latest.” At least that is what he telegraphed Hitler
on October 25. At the end of November Hitler could no longer give
Paulus the order to withdraw: his army was then holding eleven Rus-
sian armies in check, which otherwise would march to Rostov with
4,500 tanks in order to there cut off the avenue of retreat of our armies
in the Caucasus, about half a million soldiers.
On November 9, 1942 Director demanded from Dora the order
of battle of the Sixth Army. Ten days later the Russians attacked at
the most vulnerable spots. In the northwest corner of the “pocket,”
one of our weakest spots, they achieved a deep penetration. My friend
Wenck, who was then an Oberst, blocked the way with a brigade
thrown together on the spot, consisting of Luftwaffe ground person-
nel, railroad workers, members of the labor service, office person-
nel, Romanians of the Third Army, Cossacks, Ukrainians, volunteers
from the Caucasus and military police on leave. Together with
Oberstleutnant von Oppeln-Bronikowski he formed a small panzer
corps: 6 captured tanks, 12 armored cars, about 20 trucks and an
88mm flak. This then was the “Wenck Army,” which at the end of
136 Otto SKORZENY
November held a front of 170 kilometers — with captured ammuni-
tion and “stolen” gasoline. Thanks to the Wenck group, which fi-
nally received some help from elements of General Hollidt’s XVII
Corps, the penetration point between the Chir and the Don was sealed
off. Hurrying to the scene, Feldmarschall von Manstein was able to
recapture the hills of the southwest bank of the Chir, establish a line
of resistance and thereby prevent the encirclement of our divisions
falling back from the Caucasus by the Russians.
One must cite the example of Wenck and his volunteers and not
that of General von Seydlitz-Kurtzbach, the commanding general of
LI Army Corps. He disobeyed the orders of the OKH and withdrew
his corps on November 24. During this maneuver one of his units,
the 94th Infantry Division, was completely wiped out. But this did
not prevent the general, who had inherited a famous name, from call-
ing for a revolt. Here is part of his explanation from November 25:
“If the OKH does not immediately rescind the order to hold out
in the hedgehog position, then my own conscience in regard to the
army and the German people will produce the commanding obliga-
tion to seize the freedom of action denied by the previous order.”*
Later von Seydlitz and Paulus (whom Hitler, unaware of this
treachery, promoted to field marshall) again turned up at the micro-
phones of Radio Moscow, “acting according to their consciences.”
At the Nuremberg trial Paulus appeared as a “free witness” on behalf
of the Russian indictment.‘ He implicated Generalfeldmarschall Keitel
and Generaloberst Jodl and maintained that he knew nothing of Op-
eration “Barbarossa,” although he had himself worked on the plan,
specifically when he was still Quartermaster General in the OKW.
During the court proceedings in Nuremberg on April 25, 1946,
witness Gisevius stated:

“After trying in vain to convince the triumphant generals that

they should make a putsch, we made another attempt after these gen-
erals realized that we were on the road to a catastrophe... We made
our preparations for the moment, which we had predicted with al-
most mathematical certainty, at which the Paulus army would be
forced to surrender, in order to at least organize a military putsch.
They called me back to Switzerland at this moment to take part in all
these discussions and preparations. I can state that this time the prepa-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 137
rations were made very quickly. We had made contact with the
marshalls in the east and in the west with Witzleben. But this time
too the situation failed to develop as planned, for Feldmarschall Paulus
surrendered instead of giving us the agreed-upon signal as laid down
in our plan, according to which Marshall Kluge was to begin the
putsch in the east after receiving the signal.”

We know that the witness Gisevius worked in the service of the en-
emy in Switzerland.

At the time I knew nothing of all these proceedings. At the beginning

of 1943 I was convinced that Germany was not losing this war but
that the worst still lay ahead of us.
While I was lying in hospital and during my stay in Vienna and
Berlin I always listened attentively to the comments by officers and
soldiers back from the front. I thought a great deal about the cam-
paigns in western Europe, the Balkans and in Russia, which I had
experienced myself as an officer with the Waffen-SS Division Das
Reich. As well I maintained contact by mail with Standartenführer
Hansen, commander of my old artillery regiment. The Russians had
certainly been surprised by the “blitzkrieg,” in spite of the informa-
tion they possessed; they were also surprised by the large panzer
units which drove deep into their units. We had taken several million
prisoners. This created a problem which, given the lack of agricul-
ture (apart from the Ukraine), shortage of transport and poor supply
of foodstuffs, was unsolvable. By the beginning of 1943 tens of thou-
sands had already escaped. They rejoined Soviet units which had
escaped our encirclements. In this way partisan groups of consider-
able size were formed, as called for by Stalin in his speech of July 3,
1941.
In these endless, roadless expanses our panzers could not achieve
the same results they had in Poland, Holland or France. The combi-
nation of all our weapons - air force, artillery, tanks and infantry —
could not take effect as they had in the previously mentioned coun-
tries. Furthermore our objectives and equipment were known in de-
tail by the enemy. As in Napoleon's time our large formations were
138 Orto SKORZENY
harried on their flanks or from behind by special counteroffensives
and partisan units, which were impossible to find in the immensity
of the land.
We knew that the Russians were receiving tremendous amounts
of materiel from the Americans and that they possessed huge indus-
trial complexes out of reach beyond the Urals. We would have occu-
pied the “Soviet Ruhr” if Operation “Silver Fox,” conducted in the
far north by the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Infantry Divisions and the 9th
Infantry Regiment of the Waffen-SS Division Totenkopf, had suc-
ceeded. But the railroad line from Murmansk, the main supply line
of the Russian armies, could not be cut. After heavy fighting in the
tundra the Finnish Third Army encountered superior enemy forces
which compelled it to halt its offensive approximately 20 kilometers
from Sall Lukhi. Farther north the well-known mountain infantry
commander General Diet! succeeded in driving to within about 50
kilometers of Murmansk. On September 20, 1941 he, too, was forced
to give the order to withdraw. The first nineteen convoys to arrive in
Murmansk from the west delivered 520,000 trucks and other vehicles,
4,048 tanks and 3,052 aircraft.
This too we did not know. But I had the distinct feeling that we
were no longer employing a revolutionary style of warfare but were
fighting a conventional war of attrition.
We do not need to know the sad background of the Stalingrad
catastrophe, whose result was not kept from the German people, to
understand that the enemy had learned a great deal and adopted our
new tactics.
For my part, I was convinced that if we wanted to achieve a deci-
sion as in the years 1939/40, we must turn to daring methods and the
tactic of surprise as we had in those years. We had to consider the
entire nature of the war and discover and produce new weapons;
weapons which were especially useful for specific purposes.
Naturally I had too much imagination; I was only an unknown
Obersturmführer. If I had had an opportunity to present my unortho-
dox ideas to one of the staff officers wearing the red stripes of the
general staff he would most likely have smiled.
My personal files lay in the “Operational Headquarters” of the
Waffen-SS, our general staff, commanded by Obergruppenfihrer
Hans Jilttner. This former Reichswehr officer was a remarkable man.
In military terms he was far superior to Himmler. I now felt totally fit
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 139
and I expressed openly to him my wish to serve in a combat unit in
which I could show more initiative than in a Berlin barracks. Judg-
ing by his questions, he had gone to the trouble of studying my mili-
tary career. Not only did he know what happened when we were
planning Otario, but about Yelnya in the Ukraine, Borodino, Rusa
and the beginning of the retreat from Moscow. He was familiar with
my reports containing proposals for installing caterpillar tracks over
the rear axles of standard trucks. He also knew that I could fly an
aircraft and drive and repair all the new German tanks flawlessly, as
well as the American models and the T-34, in which one sometimes
had to use a hammer to shift gears.
The conversation was friendly. Gradually I brought forward my
unorthodox ideas for a more daring war, which in my opinion we
could conduct. The general agreed heartily and I suddenly got the
feeling that he had an “ulterior motive.” I wasn’t fooling myself.
Jittner had me summoned a few days later. He told me that he was
looking for an officer who had experience at the front and a good
technical knowledge to organize and command a “special duties unit.”
I listened closely as he explained in several clear sentences the
duties assigned to a certain battalion at Friedenthal near Berlin and a
“Seehof” school at The Hague.
In conclusion General Jüttner said, “this is probably a new form
of warfare for you and, I will not keep it a secret from you, a very
responsible post. During our last conversation I had the impression
that you are the man that we need. Naturally you must consider the
proposal. You are also free to turn it down.”
“T’ve already thought it over,” I said to him. “I accept.”
So I became an Hauptsturmfihrer and commander of the
Friedenthal Special Duties Battalion and the “Seehof” School.
I stood up to take my leave and thank the general.
He smiled, “You accepted immediately. Very good. In order. I
think that you should have a look at Seehof and Friedenthal first,
however. It may be that certain difficulties will crop up that you can’t
shake yourself of. When you return tell me what you think and only
then will your acceptance be considered final.”
Jiittner obviously knew about the “unforseen difficulties” that I
must overcome and wanted to give me the opportunity to back out of
the matter. He was as courteous a general as he was farsighted.
140 Orto SKORZENY
Notes
1. Soc Kleist, Peter: Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, Bonn 1950.
2. An extensive German account has since been published: Manfred Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analysis and
ofa Battle, from the series of publications by the Military-Historical Rescarch Office,
Volume 15, 1974.

3. Carell, Paul: Unternehmen Barbarossa, Page 524.

4. As to the proceedings surrounding Paulus, compare Peter Strasancr's Verräter, Munich 1960.
 11
Don’T SHOOT!

The Friedenthal Special Duties Battalion —- Why historians can make

mistakes too — Why I couldn't receive any orders from W. Schellenberg
~— My first officers: “Chinaman” Hunke and lawyer Radl — I turn
down an appointment to Oberst in the SD — Lord Mountbatten, his
successor General Laycock and the British Commandos - “Fair
play” by the BBC — My conversation with the “Phantom Major,”
David Stirling, the former chief of the Special Air Force — Acts of
heroism in Africa — London decides to eliminate General Rommel —
The night at Beda Littoria: comments by Sir Winston Churchill, leg-
ends and true occurrences — Lessons from the failure of the Scottish
Commando — The inaccessible Wolfsschanze - Why we don't shoot —
A conclusion by General von Clausewitz.

riedenthal, which is located about 20 kilometers north of

Berlin, was a former hunting lodge of the Hohenzollerns. In
early 1943 a barracks camp was erected around two pavil-
ions in a large park, where in their day the guests of the
Kaiser had gathered. The barracks housed one complete company as
well as half of another and elements of a transport company. The
whole thing called itself “Special Duties Unit Friedenthal” and was
commanded by a Dutch Waffen-SS officer and a staff which practi-
cally did not yet exist. There was little in the way of a records office,
documentation, organization, telephones, teletypes or radio stations.
Of the approximately 300 men I found in Friedenthal, about 85 per-
cent were German and 15 percent Dutch, Flemish or Hungarian “eth-
nic Germans.” All were volunteers who, like me, belonged to the
Waffen-SS.
141
142 OTTO SKORZENY
I have already explained that the members of the Waffen-SS were
not, as is so often claimed, “police in Himmler’s service,” but sol-
diers. 1 should expand on this theme at this point.
On June 16, 1929 Hitler named Himmler “Reich Leader of the
Protection Echelon” (Reichsfiihrer der Schutzstaffel, or SS). At this
point the echelon comprised 280 men. Then in 1933 the “Allgemeine
SS” (General SS) was founded. The black uniform looked good and
was a great success among young people: the SS appealed to stu-
dents, diplomats, doctors, lawyers, officials and national socialists
who wanted to distinguish themselves from the brown-clad SA.
On June 17, 1936 Hitler committed the momentous error of nam-
ing Himmler Chief of the German Police. He did not however re-
lieve him of his position as “Reichsfihrer SS.” This gave birth to a
whole series of mix-ups which make it difficult to understand cor-
rectly the history of the Third Reich.
It is understandable that even a well-intentioned historian might
confuse the six offices of the Reich Security Office (RSHA), some-
thing which still often happens. In the beginning they were all run by
Reinhard Heydrich, who was himself under Hitler’s command. In
reality Offices I through VI all had quite different duties. The first
two (I and II) were purely administrative services. Office I'V was the
“Gestapo” (Geheime Staatspolizei or Secret State Police), which,
under the direction of Heinrich Miiller, normally had to worry about
political crimes committed by German citizens and which worked
independently of Office V, the “Kripo” (Kriminalpolizei or Criminal
Police), which was responsible for crimes according to civil law. The
separation was so clear that if, for example, the “Kripo”, while in-
vestigating a civil crime, discovered that there were political mo-
tives involved the subsequent investigation was conducted by Office
IV or vice versa.
Office III (Ohlendorf) and Office VI (Walter Schellenberg) were
together a political intelligence service: however domestic (Office
IIT) and foreign (Office VI) worked independently of one another.
The idea of combining all these offices into a “super office” natu-
rally sprang from the desire to centralize the intelligence on which
national security depended. But no one would have been capable of
leading all six offices together. This task would have exceeded what
was humanly possible. In such a large organization, in which the six
offices worked side by side, personal initiative had free rein. Force-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 143
ful personalities such as Nebe or Müller, who could normally turn
directly to Himmler, thus achieved a great deal of independence.
Office VI had several departments, which were called “A”, “B”,
“C” and so on. In April 1943 Department “S” (Schule or school) was
added. I would have come under Schellenberg’s command had I not
been a member of the Waffen-SS, a military unit, to which Schel-
lenberg could not give orders: we will later see the consequences
associated with this fact.
Schellenberg’s Office VI, the foreign political intelligence ser-
vice, corresponded to — not to say concurred with — Admiral Canaris’
military intelligence service. Under Admiral Canaris the Abwehr
depended directly upon the OKW and Feldmarschall Keitel. How-
ever “Amt VI Ausland” is often confused with “Amt Ausland
Abwehr”, as in 1944 the political and military intelligence services
were combined and fell under Schellenberg’s command.
Prior to 1944 the “Ausland Abwehr” (called “Abwehr” for short)
had a central Department “Z” (Generalmajor Oster). Department I
(military espionage) was run by Oberst Piekenbrock, Oberst Lahousen
directed Department II (sabotage and subversion), Department III
(counter-intelligence) Oberst von Bentivegni. These two and lahousen
later eagerly helped the prosecution at Nuremberg. Lahousen was
summoned as a “free witness” (like Paulus), Piekenbrock and
Bentivegni did not appear before the court. But General Zorya, the
Soviet prosecutor, read incriminating statements by both colonels to
the court on February 11, 1946. These statements had been signed in
Moscow and bore the dates December 12 and 28, 1945. Both colo-
nels were released by the Russians in 1955.
It is astonishing that the three officers gave themselves up to the
Russians. Their Abwehr colleagues and all the heads of similar orga-
nizations, for example “Foreign Armies West” and “East”, moved
their offices and archives to the west and surrendered to the western
allies,

Early on the Abwehr possessed a special duties unit. At the end of

1939 it was the 800th Special Duties Battalion, attached to the “Sabo-
tage and Subversion” Department of Abwehr II. It can be confirmed
that at this point in time the command and part of the staff of the
144 Orto SKORZENY
800th Battalion were in fact involved in very special duties. In No-
vember 1939 its commanding officer, Major Helmuth Groscurth, had
the special task of working out the plans for the putsch against the
Fihrer and the German government. There were negotiations be-
tween Canaris, Oster, Goerdeler, Groscurth and the unavoidable
Gisevius. Halder, Chief-of-Staff of the Army, worked against this
and transferred Groscurth to another position.
The 800th Special Duties Regiment then became the Brandenburg
Regiment, later Division. I must emphasize that all the soldiers of
the Brandenburg Division did their duty bravely and conscientiously.
They ignored what Canaris, Oster, Lahousen, Groscurth and others
planned over their heads. I will come back to the Brandenburg Divi-
sion later.
The Sonderverband z.b.V. Friedenthal was formed as the result
of an order from General der Waffen-SS Hans Jittner, chief of the
Operational Headquarters of the Waffen-SS. Only he had the author-
ity to create and organize units of the Waffen-SS. They were com-
manded by Waffen-SS officers and in the beginning were allowed to
recruit from Waffen-SS volunteers only. But a few months later Gen-
eral Jiitmer authorized me to recruit from all four elements of the
German Armed Forces, provided that they volunteered.
Like all the units subsequently formed on General Jüttner’s or-
der, this one was ready for “special employment,” that meant that
any chief of an element of the armed forces could call on them for
special military operations. We were a unit within the armed forces
in which we fought, and we received our orders from the commander
of an army or army group. The operational plans were then worked
out by my staff or, with my approval, by the general staff of the
affected army.
I myself only worked for Schellenberg during Operation “Franz,”
as this operation was already under way when I took over. From July
1943 I always received my orders directly from the OKW or from
Hitler personally.

In April 1943 I became familiar with the training program, which in

my view was inadequate. Preparations were then being made for
Operation “Franz.” Although I was a beginner, it was immediately
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 145
clear to me that I needed an entire battalion and first-class material
for this and later operations.
I was supposed to “completely reorganize everything” as quickly
as possible. That was easier said than done. I spent the nights con-
templating my new mission from the most diverse points of view,
and by day I| sought suitable soldiers and materiel. 1 would like to
mention two of the first officers to come to me, for they were a valu-
able help to me until the end. Untersturmführer Werner Hunke came
to me as a “China specialist.” He had in fact been born in that coun-
try but had left it at the age of two. He didn’t speak any Chinese at all
and he knew no more about China than one could find on a map. Of
course we named him “Chinese.”
Like me, Untersturmführer Karl Radl was Austrian. He became
my adjutant. He was, or better is, a sturdy lad with broad shoulders ,
a daredevil, but one who is never lacking in sagacity: he conducted a
paper war with the administrative services (army rations office, weap-
ons office, etc.) with masterful dialectics, interpreted to our advan-
tage, knew how to circumvent prohibitions and make apparently harm-
less applications which later proved to be of great advantage. Natu-
rally they found our plans interesting, but unfortunately “in view of
the state of affairs” they were unable to grant many of our requests.
When I had equipped Friedenthal as best as I possibly could, I
made my way to the special school in The Hague. Located in a turn-
of-the-century style villa in a park, I found about 25 students under
the direction of Standartenfiihrer Knolle of the Security Service (SD),
Office VI. Theoretically I was his subordinate, but the SD ranks did
not correspond to those of the Waffen-SS. Members of the SD were
practically more officials than soldiers. My position could have be-
come difficult had not Knolle declared on his own that he would
gladly stay on at his post as my subordinate. He knew his job well:
listening in on enemy radio transmitters, transmitting with various
types of radio equipment, deciphering and encoding of secret mes-
Sages and so on. He remained director of the school. Of the twenty-
five students a dozen belonged to the Waffen-SS, one came from
Iran and was earmarked for Operation “Franz”, and the rest were
agents for Office VI.
The situation appeared less than ideal to me. The SD agents were
paid by Schellenberg’s office and received much more than the vol-
unteers of the Waffen-SS, who received only their soldier's pay.
146 OTTO SKORZENY
Schellenberg suggested to me that I join the SD at the same rank
as Knolle — Standartenfilhrer — “in order to overcome these minor
difficulties,” :¢ put it. I rejected the suggestion succinctly: I would
rather be a Reserve Hauptsturmfiihrer with the Waffen-SS than a
Standartenführer in the SD. He didn’t press the issue any farther. I
met with General Jiittner again and informed him of my final, posi-
tive decision.
Then I went to the school in The Hague, where I issued an order
that henceforth all training was to be done separated and as weil that
different ciphering methods were to be used for the Waffen-SS. Very
soon 90 percent of the students at th school were members of the
Waffen-SS and only 10 percent civilians of the SD. I didn’t concern
myself much with them. Personally I wanted only volunteer Euro-
pean soldiers, who if possible were to come from the Waffen-SS.
Like me, these volunteers wanted to fight bolshevism and prevent
Europe from being taken over by it. They wished to serve their own
nations in this way. It is often said today that we made a mistake.
That is possible. But if we hadn’t fought in 1941-1945 there would
be no free Europe today.
We wanted to defend the soil of Europe and Germany — not as
“nazis”, but as patriots and soldiers.

Adolf Hitler was interested in all sorts of special missions as early as

1941. At the time these were undertaken mainly by the British com-
mandos, which were very well-equipped and organized. In the years
1941-1943 Lord Mountbatten was chief of these “special operations.”
His successor, General Robert Laycock, was in charge from 1943 to
1947. It was he who wrote the foreword to the book by my friend
Charles Foley entitled Commando Extraordinary, which was released
in London in 1954 and in New York the following year. The Ameri-
can edition received a foreword by General Telford Taylor.
Foley’s book illustrated the sort of spirit that existed in my unit
in Friedenthal in 1943. He was one of the first authors, a citizen of
one of the western allied nations, a former enemy, who took the trouble
to seek me out in Madrid and study the documents that I made avail-
able to him.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 147
He is completely correct when he says that the success achieved
by the Special Air Service (SAS) in Africa under the brave Colonel
David Stirling at first alarmed us.
In a three-month period at the end of 1941, Stirling’s special com-
mandos destroyed “more German military materiel” in North Africa
than any squadron of the Royal Air Force. This yielded his nickname
of “the phantom major.” During the day he and his commando hid in
the desert. They came out at night, struck, sometimes several hun-
dred kilometers behind our lines, and then disappeared again in a
secretive v
In 1956 British television (BBC) filmed a series of ten, one-hour
features on “the ten military men who achieved the most sensational
feats of the Second World War.” The ten people were selected by
General Robert Laycock, and I was one of them.'
Then Colonel Stirling wrote to me expressing a desire that we
should meet, something I also wanted. We met at London airport and
talked for several hours. I told him candidly that the British special
commandos were in general better than ours. I also said that the Brit-
ish had formed these units significantly earlier and had more means
at their disposal.
“From 1941 to 1943 the Chief of Special Operations was Lord
Mountbatten, a member of the Royal Family,” I said to him, “that
was of great importance. Then General Laycock became his succes-
sor.”
1 added that the well-led, better-equipped and trained British com-
mandos had achieved outstanding success in Africa, Europe and Asia.
Stirling agreed completely, but observed that the objectives of the
operations carried out by my units had been of significantly greater
importance politically and militarily. The single major action by the
British was against General Rommel’s headquarters — and was a fail-
ure. (Stirling did not personally take part in this operation.) No one
could succeed at everything, I said, and then admitted that I had drawn
certain conclusions from the action against the commander of the
Africa Corps, which I had studied in detail. I will expand on this at
the end of this chapter.
I found that Colonel David Stirling was a man of exemplary sin-
cerity, extraordinarily sympathetic and very intelligent. When one
speaks with a former enemy, who experienced the same dangerous
148 OTTo SKORZENY
situations, one realizes that the Second World War was madness for
Europe.
The operations of the US Army Special Forces (OSS) obviously
began much later. The American parachute and underwater comman-
dos normally had considerable means at their disposal. In the Pacific
theater the raider battalions commanded by Merrit A. Edson of the
Marines distinguished themselves through their courage and their
daring operations.

In North Africa we had detachments of the Brandenburg units, which

blew up bridges and munitions and supply dumps and sabotaged rail-
road lines behind the British lines. Many of their acts are unknown.
The Brandenburgers’ reserve regiment commanded by Major
Friedrich- Wilhelm Heinz was likewise stationed not far from Berlin.
I eagerly studied its training program.
The Brandenburgers weren’t the only ones who distinguished
themselves in Africa by their bravery: Major Burckhardt’s parachute
battalion was their equal in every way. 1 would like to mention two
more outstanding examples: Italian Major Roberto Count Vimercati
San Severino and the German Hauptmann Theo Blaich. They suc-
ceeded, in two stages, in bombing Fort Lamy with an Heinkel 111.A
regular panic broke out in Chad...2,500 kilometers away from our
airfields!
One could write a book about the fantastic operations carried out
by the detachment led by Count Almaszy of Operation “Condor” in
early 1942. He was the descendant of an old Hungarian family, a
monarchist conspirator, race driver and explorer. The detachment
crossed 3,000 kilometers of desert in captured English vehicles. Its
objective was to reach Cairo and set up an intelligence center for
General Rommel there. The two Abwehr agents at the designated
location were soon exposed by the British. In Cairo they were helped
by two lieutenants of the Egyptian Army, then unknown but later
revolutionaries, Anwar el Sadat and Abd el Nasser.
What especially struck me were the training methods used by
our Russian and British adversaries and the way in which they tack-
led these missions. Obviously of prime interest to me was the at-
tempt to eliminate or capture Feldmarschall Erwin Rommel carried
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 149
out in November 1942. This attempt was not conducted as a single
commando operation, but was supposed to result in a major victory
within a three-part operation.
Following the failure of General Wavell’s attack (Operation
“Battleaxe”) on June 17, 1942, in which several hundred British tanks
were destroyed, Rommel intended to begin the offensive against
Tobruk in November 1941. The new English commander, Sir Claude
Auchinleck, therefore decided to attack before Rommel. He sent six
divisions (including two armored divisions and a motorized unit)
under the command of Sir Allan Cunningham in the direction of
Tobruk. This was the so-called Operation “Crusader” which was
scheduled for November 18, 1942.
In his memoirs Churchill confirmed that the English forces were
superior in all branches of the service. In his book History of the
Second World War, Liddell Hart shows that the British had more than
710 tanks (including some of the fast, new American Stuart tanks)
available, not counting the 500 reserve tanks which were likewise
committed. Opposing them were 174 German and 146 Italian “older
type” tanks. The English had 690 aircraft against 120 German and
200 Italian. Churchill was therefore able to declare in a speech broad-
cast by the BBC on November 18, 1941 that “the English desert army
is going to write a page in history that can only be compared to Wa-
terloo.”
But the reality was different: Rommel ordered a counterattack,
perhaps somewhat rashly. In the end he was forced to withdraw, but
on December 22, 1941 his forces destroyed 66 English tanks in front
of El Hassiat. When Rommel attacked again in 1942 he advanced
400 kilometers.
In London it was decided at the highest level that Rommel and
his general staff were to be eliminated the day before the attack (that
meant on November 17, 1941). This was intended to supplement the
plan for the “Crusader” offensive. It especially struck me that the
British included a special commando operation in a conventional at-
tack operation, which could have played a decisive role.
The combined operation against Rommel and his headquarters
was carefully worked out by the staff of Admiral Sir Roger Keyes;
his son Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Keyes and Colonel Robert
Laycock were to take part. About one hundred soldiers underwent
special training. Keyes selected 53 men, which were to operate in
150 OTTO SKORZENY
three groups under Laycock. He would personally guard the return
of the detachment, together with a sergeant and two men who made
up the first group. The second group, consisting of six men, was
supposed to operate outside the headquarters, destroy the mains sup-
ply and cut telephone and telegraph lines. The third group was to
enter the building. Keyes led this group: his adjutant, Captain
Campbell, spoke fluent German and Arabic. The English had sent
photos and plans of the main building as well as the surrounding
houses and store-rooms to London from Beda Littoria.
A whole series of fantastic reports were published in England,
France and the United States: the greater part of Rommel’s general
staff had been “liquidated... four colonels killed for certain... terrible
panic broken out among the Germans” and so on.
From the intelligence reports on file with Foreign Armies West
in the OKH, the Brandenburg files and our radio monitoring service,
in 1943 I was able to reconstruct most of what really happened. In
the meantime Peter Young (in his illustrated book Commando, New
York, 1969) and Paul Carell (in Afrika-Korps) have published details
of this action. Young sometimes follows the account from Hillary St.
George’s The Green Beret, which appeared earlier. Carell gives di-
rect eye-witness accounts, for example by Major Poeschel, medical
officer Junge and adjutant Lentzen. So it is possible to provide an
accurate description of this daring operation.
Young and Care]! say nothing about it, however I believe that the
detachment lost more than twenty men during the landing at Hamma
Beach on the coast of Cyrenaica from the submarines Torbay and
Talisman on the night of November 13-14, 1941. A considerable
amount of materiel and explosives must also have been lost. Pre-
sumably the part of the headquarters where Rommel was believed to
Staying was to have been blown up. The operation could not be post-
poned because Cunningham wanted to attack on November 18. So
the plans had to be changed. Only 29 of 53 soldiers reached the beach.
To their credit Laycock, Keyes and their comrades tried to carry out
the operation in spite of everything.
The group under Cook, which was responsible for the grounds
around the headquarters, and the group under Lieutenant-Colonel
Keyes and his adjutant Campbell hid in a cave and then later in a
cypress forest until 6 P.M. on November 18. They were supplied by
an arab robber band armed with Italian rifles, whose leader wore a
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 151
bright red turban. They were probably spies in the pay of Captain
J.E. Haselden, an officer of the British Desert Long Range Group,
which likewise landed at the beach at Hamma.
While the detachment cautiously approached its objective dur-
ing the night of November 17-18, an unusually strong storm broke
over Beda Littoria; it rained in torrents. The bad weather, which had
been such a disadvantage when they landed, was now favorable for
them.
Young related that Campbell succeeded in convincing an Italian
soldier and an arab that he and his people were a “German patrol,”
which is unlikely, for the detachment didn’t look the part. They were
now Standing in front of the headquarters. No one had noticed them
in the storm. Cook and his people interrupted the power supply and
cut the telephone cable without being spotted. Everything took place
in darkness.
From the first moment of the attack everything went wrong: the
orderly, whom Sergeant Terry tried to knife, defended himself so
energetically that he wasn’t even injured.
There was fighting. Keyes and Campbell, who were now also on
the scene, depended on Terry and didn’t switch on their flashlights
and couldn’t intervene. The two commandos kicked open the door to
the ante-room. The orderly called for help. Adjutant Lentzen appeared
in the doorway with his pistol in his hand, fired blindly and shot
Keyes in the hip. Keyes quickly threw two hand grenades over the
head of Lentzen into the room. Who was in there? Keyes didn’t know.
The grenades exploded. There was one victim: Feldwebel Kovasic,
who was killed on the spot.
At that moment Leutnant Kaufholz appeared above on the sec-
ond floor steps, spotted Keyes in the flash of the grenade explosions,
fired immediately and shot him through the heart. Campbell was
knocked down by a burst of machine-gun fire, but in spite of his
wounds he fired again and hit his opponent in the ankle.
Outside there was another burst of machine-gun fire. A member
of the detachment shot down Leutnant Jauger; the grenades had blown
a hole in one wall and shattered its window. Jauger, roused from his
sleep, jumped out the window in his pajamas because he assumed
that it was an air raid.
In the ante-room Keyes’ soldiers saw both their superiors out of
action and became convinced that they were under attack from out-
152 Otro SKORZENY
side. They began to retreat and in doing so killed soldier Boxhammer,
who came running to the scene in the darkness.
The action was doomed from the minute Lentzen began firing
and Keyes threw his grenades: this alerted all the Germans.
The result on the German side: four dead. Leutnants Kaufholz
and Jauger, feldwebel Kosavic and soldier Boxhammer.
On the British side one officer (Keyes) was killed and the other
seriously wounded (Campbell). His leg should have been amputated,
but a German military doctor, Junge, was able to save it for him.
Added to these losses were the twenty men missing after leaving the
submarine.
Colonel Laycock gave the members of the detachment the order
to hide themselves individually, for the storm prevented any orderly
embarkation and the pursuit had already begun. All were taken pris-
oner. Only Laycock and Terry reached the English lines after, as
Churchill wrote, “weeks of desperate adventure.”
Members of the detachment were not treated as guerrillas, but as
prisoners of war. Colonel Keyes? and the four German dead were
buried with military honors at the small cemetery in Beda Littoria.
What was General Rommel doing during the attack? Winston
Churchill only wrote: “One of the headquarters (General Rommel’s)
buildings was attacked and a number of Germans killed. But Rommel
wasn’t there.” That is correct. The commanding general of the Africa
Corps had left Cyrenaica at the end of August and set up his head-
quarters at Gambut, between Tobruk and Bardia. All that was in Beda
Littoria was the headquarters of the Quartermaster General of the
Africa Corps, which was run by Major Poeschel, Hauptmann Waitz
and a few officers. How could the English secret service make such
a mistake? After all it had a net of well-informed agents in North
Africa. The first conclusion I drew from the British failure was as
follows: the leader of such an operation must to the extent possible
check the information which forms the basis of such an undertaking
himself. I therefore made up my mind never to initiate an action of
this kind without having the maximum amount of information from
the most various sources. I needed “my own small intelligence ser-
vice.” We will soon see how | obtained this.
The second conclusion confirmed an idea that I always had: total
surprise is a precondition for the success of the operation. It must last
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 153
for at least several minutes. This time must be carefully taken into
account.
If the Scottish Commando could not eliminate Rommel, the only
task left to it was to render the quartermaster's headquarters unus-
able. But this had to be done absolutely quietly. The firing of weap-
ons and the grenade explosions doomed the action to failure from the
start. If this had in fact been an army headquarters, the Scottish Com-
mando wouldn't have been able to flee, for the sentries would have
intervened immediately.
Certainly it was not an act of sabotage. However this operation
was planned in such a way that it appears doubtful to me that they
really had any notion of taking General Rommel prisoner. He would
most likely have been killed. Only this explains the method of the
attack.
Properly led and with the necessary means, which the English
commandos had at their disposal, the operation could have achieved
its purpose against the real headquarters of General Rommel. The
commander of German forces in Africa would have lost his life or
been seriously injured. It would have been more difficult to take him
along as a prisoner.
Assuming that the general escaped harm, a few of his staff offic-
ers would have been incapacitated in any case. When the enemy of-
fensive began the functioning of the headquarters would have been
seriously disrupted and the issuing of orders at least partially inter-
rupted. Even a partial success by the Scottish Commando would have
had a negative effect on the morale of our troops; not only in Africa,
but on the other theaters and the Eastern Front. This action caused us
to think about the defense of German headquarters, which were some-
times so poorly guarded that we had to fear the worst. Our quarter-
master would have been well advised to be better prepared: the or-
derlies, who had to fight for their lives against an enemy trying to
knife them, weren’t even armed with revolvers.

I implemented strict security measures at Friedenthal. The park was

surrounded by a four-meter-high wall, and alarm installations were
soon installed. The area was patrolled at night, but the best protec-
tion was our trained dogs.
154 OTTO SKORZENY
The Wolfsschanze, Führer Headquarters, lay in the midst of a
wood near Rastenburg in East Prussia. Generaloberst Jodl described
the Wolfsschanze as “a blend of barracks, monastery and concentra-
tion camp.”
The geographic situation made security measures easier, and a
penetration by a special commando was practically impossible. The
Wolfsschanze lay within three security zones guarded by barbed wire
and fences. The outer ring was five meters high. In order to get in-
side one had to show his pass and his papers to the officer of the first
guard, who checked them closely. This first guard telephoned the
sentry at the second barricade, who had to confirm that one was in
fact expected and by whom. Then the visitor had to write his name,
rank and purpose of his visit in a book. The time of his arrival and
departure were noted precisely. In this way Oberst Stauffenberg im-
mediately came under suspicion after his hasty departure on July 20,
1944.
After crossing a railroad track and still in the forest, one came
upon the next checkpoint. Only then was one inside the third secu-
rity zone, a sort of extended park with scattered buildings on whose
roofs bushes had been planted. From above all that could be seen
was forest, for huge camouflage nets stretched over houses and roads.
This was Special Zone Number 1, to which even officers of the OKW
had no free access, “apart from General Warlimont,” as Generaloberst
Jod! declared before the Nuremberg court on June 3, 1946.
Sentries patrolled inside the first two security zones as well as
outside the third day and night. Hitler was not guarded by Himmler’s
police units, as is often written, but by a special army regiment, which
was commanded by Oberst Rommel at the beginning of the war.’
The Führer therefore knew him very well and had full confidence in
him.
I am of the view that even if Colonel Laycock’s entire Scottish
Commando had attacked the headquarters in November 1941, it would
have faced a very difficult task in spite of great courage and the best
materiel.
Before July 20, 1944 Hitler scarcely concerned himself with his
own security. “He endured the security measures,” Oberst von Be-
low, his Luftwaffe adjutant, told me, “out of a sense of duty to the
German people and his soldiers.” I also know that Hitler never wore
a bullet-proof vest or a steel helmet, as is sometimes claimed.*
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 155
But when Generals Schmundt and Korten were fatally injured at
his side on July 20, 1944, Hitler ordered strict security measures. For
example, after July 20 cach officer called to the headquarters had to
surrender his pistol to the sentry at the first security zone check-
int.’
m I was ordered to the Wolfsschanze nine times and also flew over
it; it was so very well camouflaged against air attack that one could
only see trees. The guarded access roads snaked through the forest in
such a way that I would have been unable to give the exact location
of the Führer Headquarters.
Hitler’s second residence, the Berghof in Bavaria, was visible
from the air. But like the Wolfsschanze, it was guarded by a heavy
concentration of anti-aircraft guns. The enemy air force attacked the
Berghof twice and in each case sustained losses of about 50 percent.
The assassination attempt of July 20, 1944 was difficult to pre-
vent. Hitler knew Oberst Stauffenberg personally. He had had sev-
eral discussions with him over the organization of the new “Volks-
grenadier” divisions. No one could suspect that there was a bomb in
the briefcase under the table around which the discussion was being
held.

We have seen why General Rommel was not killed or wounded and
not taken prisoner in Beda Littoria.
After studying this action I made up my mind to instruct the sol-
diers of my special unit to shoot only when it was an absolute neces-
Sity.
We were all excellent shots, and with every type of weapon; but
we also had the discipline to attack without shooting in order to
achieve total surprise.
I found an effective, proven means of preventing my soldiers
from firing: namely to go in first and not fire myself. This behavior
on my part steeled the nerves of the men behind me and instilled
confidence. This contributed greatly to our success in freeing Benito
Mussolini and especially in Operation “Panzerfaust.” In neither ac-
tion was there any general bloodletting. The objective of “Panzerfaust”
was to take military possession of the Burgberg in Budapest, seat of
the government of the Hungarian Reich administrator, Admiral von
Horthy.
156 OTTo SKORZENY
I led both operations and did not fire a single shot in either. The
soldiers who came right behind me were under orders not to shoot
until I opened fire. They followed orders and did not fire, to the great
astonishment of Colonel Stirling!
Psychologically it is of course easier to fire while attacking. The
training of a special unit therefore focused on the massed and con-
centrated attack on the enemy. I must emphasize that it would have
been a psychological mistake on my part to consider the Italians and
Hungarians as enemies. Such behavior would not have been in keep-
ing with the purpose of the mission entrusted to me. In reality they
were not our enemies, but only our opponents, who for their part had
orders to shoot. It is bewildering for the enemy when, surprised by
events, he sees an enemy who logically shouldn’t be there suddenly
appear and come towards him. He doesn’t believe his eyes. In this
way the moment of surprise is extended, which is necessary for suc-
cess.
Just one shot fired by the attackers is enough to awaken the self-
preservation instinct of those being attacked, and they will automati-
cally fire back. Nothing is more contagious than a shot.! I have seen
front-line units during the night suddenly open fire with everything
they have, simply because a sentry fired at a shadow.
Don’t shoot! The most difficult moment in this is when one comes
upon the enemy. For this tactic demands of the men under one’s com-
mand the strongest nerves and a mutual, unshakable confidence in
success.
There are few military theorists with such clear opinions as Gen-
eral Carl von Clausewitz. In his book Vom Kriege (Vol.1, Chapter 1)
he wrote that, “the disarming of the enemy is the actual objective of
a martial action.” Afterward he investigated under what conditions
such an objective can be achieved. But I believe that he, as well as
Colonel Stirling, would have a hard time imagining that one could
also disarm the enemy by making use of the moment of surprise and
without shooting!

Notes
1, Otto Skorzeny was the only German to appear in this scrics of programs, When journalist Laycock
was asked why he had sclocted a German officer for the serles, and in particular Otto Skorzeny, the
general simply sald, “Courage does not recognize borders.” (Editors’ note)

2. Licutenant-Colone) Geoffrey Keyes was awarded the Victoria Cross after his death. (Editors’ note)
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 157
3. The outer guard was the responsibility of the Wehrmacht, but within Security Zone UJ, ıhe Führer
Escort nehmen, a formation of specially-pickod SS men, was solely respomaible for security. (Edi-
tars’ note

4. Aclaim
to the contrary is contained in the memoirs of Rudolf Freiherr von Geredorff. (Editors’ note)

$. After the frecing of the Duce the formalities of pesaage through the first two security zones was
simplified for Skorzeny. The officer of the watch never asked him whether he was armed. (Editors’
note)
 12
Wury HITLER DiWn’T BuILD
THE ATOMIC BOMB
THE REVENGE WEAPONS

The Lindemann Plan (March 30, 1942): 52 German cities with over
100,000 inhabitants must be totally destroyed — Reichsmarschall
Göring is wrong — The German scientists’ lead in atomic physics —
Fantastic rumors about secret and ultimate weapons — Actions against
the heavy water plant in Norway — Hitler, ill and confined to bed,
sees me immediately: “The use of radioactive weapons would mean
the end of civilized man.” — Physicist Philipp Lenard’s theory - The
atomic bomb is designed “by mail” - “Tanum” and Speer - Opera-
tion Reichenberg: I want to build a manned V 1 - Plans and proto-
types by Heinkel — Field Marshall Mitch is skeptical — Failures -
Hanna Reitsch explains the reasons to me — She succeeds in flying
the V 1: “A very nice aircraft!” — The V 2 rocket — Hitler appoints
Wernher von Braun to professor — Hitler's prophecies — Rockets and
jet fighters derived from the V 2 - Operation Paperclip: the victors
plunder and take our resources — The views of Winston Churchill
and General Eisenhower

A soldier who is fighting for his country and who realizes that Eu-
rope is in deadly danger, obviously wants to win.
When, in early 1943, I studied the situation maps of all the the-
aters in Friedenthal, I saw that the eastern Front was holding. I knew
from experience how dangerous the Russian Army was, with its
masses of men, its courage and the fantastic quantities of materiel it
was receiving from the USA, England and Canada.
In North Africa General Rommel’s advance was stopped by the
enemy in July 1942, about 100 kilometers from Alexandria. On No-
vember 8, 1942 the Americans landed at Casablanca, Algiers and
158
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 159
Oran, and the troops of the axis powers, all of whom had to fight on
two fronts, succumbed to the law of superior numbers.
Germany’s cities were the special targets of the British and Ameri-
can bombers. Since May 1942 thousands of aircraft had brought ruin
and death to Cologne, Essen, Duisburg, Hamburg, Mannheim,
Dortmund and many other cities. It was not just our factories that
were attacked: each time the “carpets of bombs” killed tens of thou-
sands of women and children. In July 1943 Hamburg burned like a
torch. About 9,000 tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs were
dropped. What they hoped to achieve by this was, “an uprising by
the German people against its government,” forcing Germany to sur-
render through a type of internal revolution. In any case this was the
view which F, Lindemann, RAF Bomber Command’s psychological
advisor, put forward in a report to Winston Churchill on March 30,
1942: 52 German cities with over 100,000 inhabitants should be razed
to the ground.
Reichsmarschall Goring made the same psychological mistake
when he ordered the “Blitz” on London in 1940. The total number of
casualties inflicted by Luftwaffe bombing and by the V1 and V 2 is
known: 60,227 dead and 80,900 injured. It is impossible, however,
to give the number of victims of the Anglo-American attacks. The
bombing of Hamburg alone resulted in 53,000 killed and 160,000
injured. The number of people who lost their lives in the bombing of
Dresden is officially estimated at 250,000 to 300,000, from a popu-
lation of 630,000. Eighteen square kilometers of the city stood in
flames. When this tremendous funeral pyre, with flames eight to ten
meters high, was finally extinguir"ed, it was only possible to iden-
tify 40,000 bodies, from their wedding rings. At the end of February
1945 there were 420,000 refugees from the east in Dresden, mainly
women and children.
I believe that Reichsmarschall Göring bears a great deal of re-
sponsibility for the course which the air war took. He considered the
war won in 1940. On the basis of his illusions the jet aircraft were
delayed at least one to two years, for our specialists were already
working on turbojet engines in 1939. When our jet aircraft appeared
in the sky they came as an unpleasant surprise to the enemy.
I met the Reichsmarschall personally, as chief of the Luftwaffe
in his headquarters and as a brave soldier on the battlefield at Schwedt
on the Oder. In Nuremberg prison I was assigned a cell opposite his,
160 OTTO SKORZENY
before they placed the accused and the witnesses in different parts of
the building. I do not wish to speak badly of the dead. But one thing
must be said: the Reichsmarschall bears a great burden of guilt to-
ward the people of Germany and Europe.
Future historians will probably find it astonishing that Germany
did not build the atom bomb, although theoretically and practically it
possessed the means since 1938. At the end of that year Professor
Otto Hahn and Professor Strassman produced the chemical proof of
nuclear fission. Professor Hahn received the 1945 Nobel Prize for
chemistry. He worked at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin and
Dahlem with Professor Werner Heisenberg and a number of other
first-class researchers. But Professor Heisenberg’s assistant was Carl
Friedrich von Weizsäcker, son of diplomat Emst von Weizsäcker,
one of the conspirators against Hitler.
Professor Frisch, who had worked in Germany and who emi-
grated to England early on, was the first (in January 1939) to pro-
duce the physical proof of nuclear fission. His aunt, Madame Profes-
sor Lise Meitner, one of Otto Hahn’s associates, lived the entire war
as a refugee in Stockholm, but remained in touch with Berlin.
Another institute in Germany also conducted early research into
the atom. The institute, which I believe was located in Hamburg, was
under the direction of an outstanding young physicist, Manfred von
Ardenne, who worked in Russia and East Germany after the war.
Goebbels took a great interest in this work. After the war many Ger-
man physicists stated that they had done their best to prevent the
construction of a German atomic bomb. One could think highly of
their morals if this corresponded to the complete truth.
From 1939 Hitler was interested in the unbelievable potential of
nuclear fission. In autumn 1940 he had a long discussion on the sub-
ject with Dr. Todt, the armaments minister. His opinion never changed:
he thought that the use of atomic energy for military purposes would
mean the end of humanity.
We also know today that Hitler read not only the paper that Pro-
fessor Heisenberg wrote at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in 1942 (on
Nuclear Fission and the Construction of the Atomic Pile with Ura-
nium and the Electron Gun [Betatron]), but also other reports on
research conducted prior to 1941. Albert Speer wrote that Hitler, “was
not delighted by the prospect of seeing our planet transformed into a
flame-ravaged celestial body during his period in government.” He
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 161
wrote this, as he said, based on a few conversations he had with Hitler
“about the possibility of making an atomic bomb.” That meant that
for Adolf Hitler this question was no longer an issue. As well I might
describe a personal experience.
In October 1944, after the Budapest operation, I flew once again
to Fiihrer Headquarters in East Prussia. Preparations were just being
made for the Ardennes offensive and Hitler want to give me his in-
structions for Operation Greif.
At Führer Headquarters they told me that Hitler was sick in bed
but that he wished to speak with me at once. I am certainly one of the
few visitors, if not the only one, whom the Führer received in bed. I
found him very changed, emaciated, but as always mentally alert.
He asked me to forgive him for receiving me in this way, told me to
sit down and explained briefly the strategic and tactical objectives of
the Ardennes offensive and his thoughts on Operation Greif, which I
was to carry out. Before me was a man in bed who needed no pomp
and ceremony to underline his personality. While speaking in his
calm, rather hoarse, but moderate voice he exuded a persuasive power
which is rarely found. He assured me that the German Army would
triumph in the end in spite of treason and mistakes. This offensive
would be successful. Apart from that, “new, truly revolutionary weap-
ons would take the enemy completely by surprise.”
There was much talk about German “secret weapons” at this time,
and Dr. Goebbels’ propaganda did its best to nourish these rumors.
One heard the strangest things about the construction and existence
of these fantastic and deadly weapons.
One of these secret weapons was an anti-aircraft shell which ex-
ploded in the midst of an enemy formation and which was supposed
to create the absolute zero point within a considerable area, that meant
a temperature of -273 degrees Celsius, with the appropriate destruc-
tive consequences for the aircraft. However most talk was about an-
other, terrible weapon that was supposed to be based on artificially-
produced radioactivity.
Without being an atomic physicist, I knew that it was possible to
make an explosive device using the fission energy of uranium. The
English sabotage mission against the heavy water factory in Norway
at the beginning of 1943 drew my attention, as did the bombing raid
which followed the next autumn, which damaged the plant heavily.
162 Otto SKORZENY
Furthermore they sank our cargo ship which was transporting heavy
water.
I put it together myself: Norway, Dr. Goebbels’ speeches and
articles, and what the Fihrer had just said. Spontaneously I began
speaking of the rumors about artificial radioactivity and its eventual
use as a weapon. Hitler looked at me with gleaming, feverish eyes:

“Do you know, Skorzeny, if the energy and radioactivity released

through nuclear fission were used as a weapon, that would mean the
end of our planet?”
“The effects would be frightful...”
“Naturally! Even if the radioactivity were controlled and then
nuclear fission used as a weapon, the effects would still be horrible!
When Dr. Todt was with me, I read that such a device with controlled
radioactivity would release energy that would leave behind devasta-
tion which could only be compared with the meteors that fell in Ari-
zona and near Lake Baykal in Siberia. That means that every form of
life, not only human, but animal and plant life as well, would be
totally extinguished for hundreds of years within a sadius of forty
kilometers. That would be the apocalypse. And how could one keep
such a secret? Impossible! No! No country, no group of civilized
men can consciously accept such a responsibility. From strike to
counterstrike humanity would inevitably exterminate itself. Only
tribes in the Amazon district and in the jungles of Sumatra would
have a certain chance of surviving.”

These marginal notes by Hitler lasted scarcely more than a few min-
utes, but | remember those minutes precisely. At the beginning of my
time as a prisoner of war, in August 1945, I heard that two atomic
bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Unnecessary
bombs, by the way, for the Japanese emperor had already asked the
Americans for their peace terms.
While a prisoner American officers constantly asked me the same
question, “How did you bring Hitler out of Berlin at the end of April
1945 and where have you hidden him?”

I can still see the consternated expressions of the American of-

ficer before me, when, disgusted with the question, I answered: “Adolf
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 163
Hitler is dead, but he was right when he said that you and I would be
the survivors of the Amazon.”

In an interesting book Britain and Atomic Energy (1964), the official

chronicle of the “organization of atomic research” from 1939 to 1945
in England, Margret Gowing stated that among the pioneers of the
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were German
refugees: among them Peierls, Frisch, Roblat and so on, as well as
Klaus Fuchs, who was later convicted for betraying atomic secrets to
the USSR. Mrs. Gowing also writes that in 1941 atomic specialists
working in England “methodically studied what the best-known Ger-
man scientists were engaged in.” The intelligence service supported
them in these activities. This work, they say, was “exploited in an
advantageous way, as many of the scientists working in England had
previously fled Germany.”
And the great American specialists, Oppenheimer and Szilard:
they were trained at the University of Gottingen.
In July 1945 Winston Churchill himself had the task of telling
Stalin that an atomic bomb would be dropped on Hiroshima. Churchill
Stressed in his memoirs that the Soviet dictator greeted this news
with indifference, and added: “He naturally had no idea of what we
had just revealed to him.” But thanks to the efforts of Klaus Fuchs
Stalin knew just as much, if not more, than Churchill did about the
atomic bomb.
Hitler's stance on this question was, I believe, determined prima-
rily by a type of instinct, a revolt against the human nature that wants
to destroy itself.
Hitler, who had been gassed during the First World War, always
banned chemical warfare. Our chemists had discovered a new gas,
against which, as we know today, there was no defense: the nerve
gas “Tanum.”

The V-1 and V-2 revenge weapons appeared more credible to us. The
V-1, or “flying bomb,” whose official designation was Fi 103 for
164 OTTO SKORZENY
Fieseler 103, was a type of unmanned rocket aircraft. Speed: 640
kph; range: about 500 kilometers; weight: 2,500 kilograms, of which
1 ton was the explosive charge in the nose of the missile. On depar-
ture the machine’s flight path was controlled by automatic gyroscope
(direction and height). At the desired range the motor was switched
off and the bomb fell to earth. But a wind could force the bomb from
its direction of flight, and nothing could be done about it. However
in 1944 its advantages were that it was cheap to manufacture and
used little fuel. It also promised an incontestable psychological ef-
fect.
The V-1 was devised and designed by the Luftwaffe, in particu-
lar by the DFS (German Institute for Gliding Flight) and the Fieseler
company. Tests were carried out at Peenemünde, as this base on the
Baltic was suitably equipped for the job. The missile, which was
mass-produced by Volkswagen, was fired from a simple launching
ramp, usually three V-1s at once.
One day I had the opportunity to visit Peeneminde and witness
the launching of one such V-1. I flew with an engineer colonel of the
Luftwaffe, who was a specialist in these flying bombs, and on the
return flight I discussed with him the question: would it not be pos-
sible, to have the V-1 flown by a pilot?
The very evening of that summer day in 1944 we set to work
together with Focke-Wulf and Reich Air Ministry engineers. I had
invited them to a villa on the Wannsee. A dozen engineers began
drawing plans — on the billiards table and even lying on the floor: we
had to find sufficient room in the V-1 to accommodate a pilot with
ejection seat and parachute.
We worked the whole night and by morning we had the solution.
All we had to do was build a prototype. Feldmarschall Milch, State
Secretary in the RLM, gave me “clear road,” provided that an RLM
commission raised no objections. The chairman of the commission
was a venerable admiral with a white seaman’s goatee, who we were
told had been around since Noah's ark. After two or three sittings we
had cleared the first hurdle, but then the commission raised an objec-
tion: “Where do you intend to get the workers, foremen and engi-
neers to build this prototype? We don’t have enough labor forces as
it is, especially in the aviation industry.”
I replied that near Friedenthal there was an Heinkel factory that
was not operating at full capacity and that Professor Heinkel had
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 165
personally offered me three engineers and five mechanics and as well
had placed three empty work barracks at my disposal.
“Good,” said Noah, “but you can only carry out your work with
already built V-1s, and you must know that we have none.”
“That is not what Professor Porsche, a friend of mine, said to me.
To his own astonishment there are several hundred V-1s in his VW
factories waiting to be picked up. I can assure you that he would
gladly let me have a dozen!”
Just no complications thought “Noah,” and so in a short time I
had two small workshops at Heinkel’s. I had tables and beds moved
in. Everyone, engineers, foremen and workers, worked at full speed,
sometimes more than fourteen hours a day, in order to bring our so-
called Operation Reichenberg to fruition as quickly as possible.
When I saw Feldmarschall Milch again, he smiled.
“Well then, Skorzeny, satisfied hopefully?”
“Naturally,” I answered him, “in spite of the two to three week
delay.”
“Three weeks in such a project, that’s nothing. A manned V-1! If
you can roll out your prototype in four to five months I'll congratu-
late you again!”
“Herr Feldmarschall, I hope that I can show you the prototype in
four to five weeks!”
He looked at me seriously and thought that I was making a joke.
Then he shook his head.
“You're deluding yourself, my dear fellow. That’s all well and
good. But don’t make too much of it. We'll talk about this machine
again in four to five months. Until then, lots of luck!”
Our workshop at Heinkels was actually a craftsman operation,
but one that worked with success. When I could I spent several hours
each day in “my factory.” After fourteen days I again contacted
Feldmarschall Milch and informed him that we had both been wrong:
I had three V-1s ready to fly.
Feldmarschall Milch was amazed. He gave me authorization to
undertake three takeoff attempts at Gatow airfield. Two test pilots
were chosen. The manned V-1 was not launched from a ramp, in-
stead it was towed by a Heinkel 111 to a height of 2,000 meters and
then released. Both machines made crash-landings, however, both
pilots escaped with injuries.
166 Otto SKORZENY
A downright dour Feldmarschall Milch told me that a commis-
sion would be appointed to investigate the causes of the bad land-
ings.
For the time being I was forbidden to make any further attempts.
I was speechless. Had we worked too carelessly and too quickly?
Then Hanna Reitsch, our legendary female test pilot, called me.
Since her serious crash in 1941 in a prototype jet fighter, from which
she had recovered through strength of will alone, she had been living
in the Luftwaffe House in Berlin. She told me that she had had the
same idea as J several months earlier: the V-1 could be flown as a
manned aircraft! But she had received the official order to drop the
idea. There was no need to wait for the results of the investigation to
learn the causes of our two accidents: both pilots had previously flown
only propeller-driven aircraft. Our prototype, which was much lighter
than a standard V-1, reached a speed of 700 kph and a landing speed
of 180 kph, and this made both pilots more than uncertain when it
came time to land. Hanna and two of her associates who had like-
wise flown jet aircraft, declared themselves ready to repeat the at-
tempt.
I declined firmly and reminded them of the official, strict order
and that they wouldn’t make an He 111 available to us at Gatow
airfield. Hanna Reitsch shrugged her shoulders and said, “I took you
for a man who is willing to take a chance! One can always fly if only
one wants to! My friends and I have visited your workshop and ex-
amined your first V-1s. I am sure that we’re not fooling ourselves:
they're outstanding aircraft! We will talk more about it later. Until
tomorrow!”
I must admit that I couldn’t close my eyes that night. A third
accident would be unimaginable! Did I have the right to plunge this
wonderful aviatrix into such an adventure? The next day Hanna
Reitsch and her two companions were so convincing that I took it
upon myself to dupe the airfield commander. I acted completely natu-
ral and told him that I had just received approval to continue Opera-
tion Reichenberg. I asked him his opinion on several questions and
assigned two of my officers not to let him out of their sight, to ac-
company him into the mess and to take care that he didn’t telephone
Feldmarschall Milch’s staff. When I saw the V-1 flown by Hanna
Reitsch separate from the He 111 my heart pounded as never before.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 167
She had taken full responsibility onto herself without hesitation. She
knew that her airspeed on landing would be about 180 kph. I was
firmly convinced, however, that she would pull it off. And she did!
She landed smoothly and then repeated the flight. I congratulated
her with all my heart. “That is a wonderful aircraft!” she said to me.
“We'll be able to do something with it!”
The other two test pilots also flew the V-1 and landed without
any difficulty. The manned V-1 was not destined to be a success how-
ever.
When the flights by Hanna and her two companions became
known, we received permission to build five more prototypes with
which about 30 selected pilots could be trained. We accepted sixty
(from several hundred) volunteer pilots of the Luftwaffe in
Friedenthal; especially daring missions would now be possible! Un-
fortunately only part of the 500 cubic meters of aviation fuel I re-
quested at the beginning of summer 1944 was delivered, and we could
only train the first dozen pilots. The V-1 pilots remained in my unit
until the end. Most distinguished themselves through their coolness
and courage.

The V-2 was not an aircraft but a rocket, whose dimensions in its
ultimate form were 14.03 meters in length, a lower diameter of 3.564
meters and an upper diameter of 1.561 meters. Takeoff weight with
70% fuel (methyl! alcohol and liquid oxygen) was 12.5 metric tons.
Range was approximately 800 kilometers. Speed: 5,300 kph. Pay-
load: one ton of explosives.
The inventor of the V-2 was a thirty-year-old engineer and the
leader of a very dynamic group: Wernher von Braun. After the war
he was “exported” to the USA and later became an American citizen.
His name is known the world over.
Wernher von Braun worked in the army research center at
Peenemiinde, which was under the directorship of Walter Dorberger.
The latter was an outstanding officer and as they said, “a great fel-
low.” The first successful test of the V-2 took place on October 3,
1942 (without warhead of course), and the rocket reached its target
190 kilometers away, passing through the atmosphere at an altitude
168 Orro SKORZENY
of 80 kilometers. Hitler took a personal interest in the tests at
Peenemiinde. He promoted Domberger to general and had the younger
engineer named professor. In early 1943 he ordered both men to Fihrer
Headquarters. For better or worse, Speer had to admit what everyone
knows today; the Fihrer recognized the revolutionary significance
of the V-2 and after a conversation with Wernher von Braun declared,
“This young scholar has produced a rocket that upsets all known
ballistic laws. I am convinced that this young scientist is right when
he says that in his opinion more powerful rockets would be capable
of exploring the space surrounding the earth and perhaps even sev-
eral planets in our solar system. We will have von Braun to thank for
the uncovering of many great secrets.”
I met Professor von Braun personally during the war and later
exchanged letters with him. He was already a rocket specialist as a
quite young engineer and from 1933 to 1936 he worked at the test
center at Kummersdorf. He was already dreaming of space flight
and trips to the moon.
Peenemünde is located on the island of Usedom, at the mouth of
the Oder on the Baltic Sea, at the present border between East Ger-
many and Poland. Several weeks after Hitler received von Braun the
island was bombed by night and the installation almost totally de-
stroyed; there were 800 killed. The center’s research group was split
up; production was decentralized. A wind tunnel was built in Kochel
in Bavaria in which air reached speeds of more than 4,800 kph. This
speed was far superior to anything achieved by the enemy in similar
wind tunnels.
The V-1 and V-2 were manufactured according to the principle
of decentralized factories, with final assembly by German workers.
Wernher von Braun and his young co-workers had great plans
and were, so to speak, “far-seeing.” Very far even. At the beginning
of 1944 von Braun made statements which might have come from
the fantastic novels in the style of Jules Verne or what one today calls
science fiction — but it was no more than anticipation of what he later
realized. It is known that his idea of a multi-stage rocket — derived
from the V-2 — made it possible to launch satellites and reach and
explore the moon. The history of aerospace owes him a great deal.
Professor von Braun’s statements appeared in a German paper
and were accompanied by drawings which gave an idea of the rocket’s
design. The article was immediately picked up by the neutral press.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 169
Himmler had von Braun arrested and questioned. A week later Hitler
ended this paradoxical situation.
Included in the V-weapons program was the construction of a
rocket capable of bombarding New York or Moscow. This rocket
was practically finished at the end of March 1945 and could have
gone into series production beginning in July.
But the Russians came. General Dornberger, Wernher von Braun,
his brother Magnus, Oberst Axter and engineers Lindenberg,
Tassmann and Huzel, who were able to save some of their docu-
ments, fled to Bavaria and there surrendered to the American 44th
Division. Soon afterward they signed a contract to work for the U.S.
Army and in September they travelled to the USA.
On the far side of the Atlantic the Americans assembled 127 sig-
nificant German specialists. They were heavily guarded, for the
Americans feared that they might otherwise be abducted by the Rus-
sians. Professor Wernher von Braun became head of the Army Bal-
listic Missile Agency and deputy chief of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) and thus leader of the Apollo
Project, which on July 21, 1969 placed the first men on the moon
(Armstrong and Aldrin).

I could go on and list a whole series of other new weapons which

were designed and built by us during the war. There was the Natter
or Bachem 8-348-A-1, which was to be guided remotely from the
ground onto enemy fighter-bombers and which had a pilot on board.
It was armed with 24 air-to-air rockets which were to be fired in two
salvoes. The machine, which was armed with a full load of rockets,
crashed on its first test flight. The aircraft’s pilot, Oberleutnant Lothar
Sieber, lost his life in the crash. The device was a combination of
elements of the V-1 and V-2, and Sieber thus became the first pilot in
the world to be catapulted vertically into the air by a rocket, which is
the case today with the American and Russian astronauts.
The anti-aircraft rockets developed from the V-2 were numer-
ous: the Wasserfall or C-2, a remotely-guided surface-to-air missile
with a homing head was a small version of the V-2 with stub wings.
It was launched vertically. The missile automatically flew in the di-
rection of the hottest part of its target. Its speed of 2,900 kph was
170 Otro SKORZENY
exceeded by the Zaifun rocket, which reached 4,500 kph and was
intended to be used as an anti-aircraft barrage rocket. One can also
mention the Rheintochter, a two-stage rocket, the Feuerlilie or F-55,
the Enzian with two jet engines, short and squat, and so on.
Its is known, or perhaps it is not known, that the first German jet
aircraft, the He 178, flew at the end of August 1939. Professor Heinkel
had been working on the project for three years. The Messerschmitt
262, a jet fighter armed with four 30mm cannon, reached a speed of
950 kph. The Arado 234 bomber flew at 900 kph, reached a height of
11,000 meters and had a radius of action of 1,600 kilometers.
In April 1945 the designers of the Henschel 0-122 bomber blew
up the prototype, which was equipped with a turbo-reactor (1,000
kph, radius of action more than 2,000 kilometers). British experts
confiscated the plans and the wreckage of the device and were more
than astonished that such a German aircraft existed at all.
We will see that the new weapons, which were used or supposed
to be used above or below water, compared to the weapons employed
in the air, were superior to the technical inventions of the western
allies and were no less revolutionary in concept.
I would like to draw the reader’s attention to a fact that is perhaps
not very well known: the most successful combined operation against
Germany from east and west took place after our armies had already
surrendered unconditionally.
The purpose of this operation was to seize all German patents
and inventions. Characteristically this operation was called Paperctip.
An official plundering of the design bureaus and secret archives
of the German factories took place at the same time as all the facto-
ries not destroyed by bombs were being dismantled. The Americans
today freely admit that the benefits accrued from this operation more
than covered the costs of the war.
Eisenhower stated after the war:

“If the Germans had had the new V-1 and V-2 weapons six months
earlier, the invasion in Normandy in June 1944 wouldn’t have been
possible.”
 13
FROM THE Best U-BoATs
TO THE NEW °SYNTHETIC MATERIALS”

Grossadmiral Raeder, a traditional commander-in-chief - The revo-

lutionary ideas of Grossadmiral Dönitz, the “Manstein and Guderian
of the sea” — Hitler names him chief-of-staff - His government nei-
ther surrendered nor gave up its office: it was only a military surren-
der - The one-man torpedo and the remote-control explosive boat -
Successes and failures with conventional torpedoes — Prien's heroic
act - Memories of the bay of Scapa Flow - The French fleet is sunk
in Toulon — The role Canaris played - Three torpedoes against HMS
Nelson: they fail to explode and Churchill was on board! — Acoustic
and heat-seeking torpedoes — The “mini” U-boats — The snorkel and
the Walter Type XXI “wonder” submarine — New sea-to-air guided
weapons — “Fritz” sinks the battleship Roma — Churchill acknowl-
edges the merit of the German U-boats — The Battle of the Atlantic.

he following sentences (whose significance did not escape

Grossadmiral Dénitz) appeared in the manual of training
for U.S. Air Force pilots engaged in anti-submarine duties
at the end of 1943:

“If a U-boat sinks a 6,000-ton freighter and a 3,000-ton tanker,

we lose, for example: 42 tanks, eight 152mm howitzers, eighty-eight
87.6mm guns, forty 40mm anti-tank guns, 24 armored vehicles, 50
heavy Bren machine-guns on self-propelled carriages, 52,100 tons
of ammunition, 6,000 rifles, 428 tons of tank replacement parts, 2,000
tons of provisions and 1,000 barrels of gasoline.”

171
172 OTTO SKORZENY
In contrast to Grossadmiral Raeder, who in 1942 still believed in
the supremacy of the battle cruiser, Dönitz, who was still a
Fregettenkapitän in 1935, was convinced that the submarine was the
more effective weapon.
Dönitz had studied the latest ideas put forward by all the interna-
tional experts and had come up with attack plans employing packs of
U-boats — against enemy ships and convoys, which were to be lo-
cated and monitored by the air force. In vain he tried to convince
Raeder of the correctness of his revolutionary concept. When he was
named commander of U-boats in 1936 his desires had to become
more modest. The grand admiral then told him that relations between
England and the German Reich were very good and that Hitler con-
sidered a war between the two countries “out of the question.” The
result was that when England declared war on us in September 1939,
Dönitz had only 26 of 55 operational submarines available for ac-
tion. Nevertheless in September 1940 the U-29 (Leutnant von
Schubart) sank the aircraft carrier Courageous. In October 1939 the
U-47, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Prien, sailed right into Scapa
Flow and sank the battleship Royal Oak of 29,000 tons. I will return
to this extraordinary act of heroism.
Grossadmiral Raeder was a chief with too much tradition, who
had served in the Imperial Fleet in 1894: Dönitz was three years old
at that time. It was a serious disadvantage for Germany that Raeder
failed to comprehend in 1939 that the U-boat was the most effective
weapon against England. Manstein and Guderian could present their
plans for the employment of the panzer arm openly to Hitler, who
accepted them. Dönitz did not have the same opportunity in 1936-
1940 to draw Hitler’s attention to the submarine and the tactic of
packs of U-boats.
The prospect of having to wage war against England was con-
trary to Hitler’s wishes. However after Hess’ daring flight he had to
resign himself to the idea. The U-boat thus became a strategic weapon
of the greatest significance.
In 1942, during the first phase of the Battle of the Atlantic, Dönitz
should have had about 250 U-boats. He commanded 91, of which 23
were in the Mediterranean, 13 were involved in special missions, 33
were undergoing repairs and 10 were en route to their combat zones.
No more than 12 U-boats actually engaged enemy ships at any one
time: Dönitz’s tactics would have required about 50.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 173
When, at the end of 1942, an astonished Hitler criticized the fact
that our large warships were not committed against PQ-18, a large,
well-escorted Anglo-American supply convoy, he demanded expla-
nations. Liddell Hart wrote: “Informed by radio reports, Raeder held
back his largest ships out of excessive caution. These should have
attempted to destroy the convoy.” Afterward Hitler declared that if
the battleships were of no use it would be better to scrap them. Raeder
asked to be dismissed. It was accepted and Dönitz took his place.
But it was already too late: January 30, 1943.
Dönitz never had enough U-boats to implement his U-boat pack
tactics as he had wished. In his book Zehn Jahre und zwanzig Tage
he also complained bitterly about the lack of cooperation between
Göring’s Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine.
Grossadmiral Dönitz was as good a strategist as he was a tacti-
cian. One could say that he was the “Manstein and Guderian of the
sea.”
Millions of German soldiers and civilians escaped capture by the
Russians at the beginning of May 1945 thanks to his outstanding
leadership. He saved their lives, or at least of a large percentage of
them.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Dönitz represented the
honor of the German Armed Force before the international tribunal
at Nuremberg, and he succeeded in rescuing it, at least in the eyes of
the western accusers. The victors accused him of deliberately killing
enemy seamen, the crews of torpedoed ships. But Dr. Otto Kranz-
bihler, his defense attorney, was able to prove that the German Navy
had acted according to international law. The written testimony by
the Commander-in-Chief of the American fleet, Admiral Chester W.
Nimitz, in this regard was decisive. On April 30, 1945 Hitler named
D6nitz as his successor as head of the German state, which was in
the middle of collapse. However D6nitz did not shirk this most diffi-
cult task, neither for himself nor for his government. On May 8 he
was forced to offer the surrender of the Wehrmacht. The victors de-
manded that he “empower representatives of the three branches of
the service to sign the document of surrender.” He gave the author-
ity. An inter-state surrender never was signed, however, and the new
German government did not resign. A little later the members of the
government were arrested under degrading circumstances.
174 OTTO SKORZENY
Dönitz remained head of state after May 8 and was recognized as
such by the allies for two weeks. That means that the German state
continued to exist as before after May 8. Dönitz represented the legal
national unity of Germany and everything that affected this, and so
he signed no kind of declaration renouncing authority neither in his
name or in the name of his government. On May 2, 1945 he formed
a new government as president of the German Reich. He never re-
signed his office. There is a document, drawn up by Volkerrechtler,
that confirms these facts. When he was arrested on May 23, 1945, he
merely yielded to force. Dénitz was sentenced to 10 years in prison
by the Nuremberg court.

In reality, what Goebbels called “the fortress of Europe” faced deadly

threats in the west, south and east from the beginning of 1943. At sea
Grossadmiral Dinitz had to defend himself against two of the mighti-
est fleets in the world.
In an effort to partly make up for the superiority of the enemy
new weapons were invented and put to use, sometimes successfully,
with volunteers from the navy and soldiers of my special units. I thus
had the pleasure of meeting and working with Admiral Heye, chief
of the “Special Attack Units of the Kriegsmarine.” He was a seaman
in the best sense of the word and a first-class tactician.
At the beginning of 1943 Grossadmiral Dénitz was faced with
the fact that on the sea front we had practically nothing in the way of
“miracle weapons.” I saw manned torpedoes of three different types
developed: Neger, Molch and Marder.
Neger was a double torpedo. Beneath the manned torpedo was
an unmanned one loaded with 600-700 kilograms of explosives. The
pilot in the upper torpedo approached as near as possible to his target
and released the lower torpedo. He then turned and with “God’s help”
escaped. The Molch and the Marder were proper miniature U-boats
manned by one or two sailors and armed with two torpedoes. I must
emphasize that such “trip to heaven operations” were always carried
out by volunteers.
The “explosive boat” was a high-speed motorboat about 3.5
meters long with a top speed of nearly 60 kph — which at the time
was quite extraordinary. 500 kilograms of explosives were built into
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 175
the bow. They were used in “troika” form, which meant that three
boats took part in the attack and each had its own helmsman. Two
boats loaded with explosives were preceded by a third, in which sat
the attack commander. Scarcely visible on the surface of the water,
the trio moved into attack position. At the proper distance the com-
mander gave the signal to attack and the three motorboats raced to-
ward their target. Less than a kilometer from the target the pilots of
the two explosives boats were ejected from the boats with their seats.
The attack commander then guided the boats to their target by re-
mote control and, if possible, picked up the two pilots who had ejected.
The boats were supposed to strike their target amidships. They
did not explode immediately however; the explosives separated and
sank 6 or 7 meters beneath the water, below the water line. Only then
did they explode, where it was significantly more effective. All the
water was displaced from beneath the center of the ship and a vacuum
was created. This vacuum caused the ship to break in two in the
middle, as only the bow and stern were still supported by the water.
The first force to employ these “special attack units” with as-
tounding success was the Italian X-MAS Flotilla, commanded by
the well-known Lieutenant-Commander Prince Valerio Borghese. The
X-MAS Flotilla attacked enemy ships even in the ports of Alexan-
dria and Gibraltar and inflicted considerable losses on the British
fleet.
At the beginning of the war our torpedoes were detonated by the
magnetic field of the target. Detonation and the directional and depth
control of the torpedoes were imprecise. During the night of October
13-14, 1939 Prien was able to enter Scapa Flow under the northem
lights. It is not generally known that his U-47 first fired four torpe-
does, three of which missed the target on account of faulty construc-
tion. Displaying great coolness, Prien ordered the tubes reloaded and
fired another spread of three torpedoes, which exploded on reaching
the target. The Royal Oak broke apart, rolled over to port and sank in
several minutes.
In order to understand the symbolic meaning that Prien’s act had
in our eyes, we must recall June 21, 1919.
After the cease-fire of November 1918 the German High Seas
Fleet was restricted to this very bay of Scapa Flow. It did not con-
sider itself defeated. At the Battle of Skagerrak — or of Jutland — its
21 ships faced 38 British warships: the enemy’s losses were 115,000
176 Otto SKORZENY
tons and ours were 61,000 tons. On July 20, 1919, Admiral von Reuter,
who commanded the interned ships, received the news that the Ger-
man High Seas Fleet had to be handed over to the English fully intact
or else the war against Germany would be resumed.
With the agreement of the officers and men, von Reuter gave the
order that our 21 battleships and battle-cruisers and 10 torpedo-boat
flotillas should scuttle themselves. I was then 11 years old and the
self-destruction of these proud, beautiful ships made a very deep
impression on me. I knew that the S.M.S. Friedrich der Grosse, which
flew Admiral Scheer’s flag in the Battle of Skagerrak, was the first to
go down.
Later I understood how Admiral de Laborde must have felt when,
on November 26, 1942, he gave the order for the interned French
fleet to scuttle itself in Toulon harbor. The policy of European coop-
eration, loudly heralded by German diplomacy, literally fell into the
water — very deep in fact. How could one assume that a sailor — be it
Admiral von Reuter or Admiral de Laborde — would hand over his
vessels? The French Admiral Gensoul refused to hand over his battle-
ships to the English at Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940. And why should
de Laborde, who was not permitted to weigh anchor at Toulon, allow
the Germans and Italians to take over his ships? Perhaps one day we
will learn what role the Italian intelligence service, in cooperation
with Canaris and his Abwehr, played in this matter.

The German intelligence service failed completely in regard to Op-

eration “Torch”, the Anglo-American landing in North Africa. Dénitz
confirmed this in his book Zehn Jahre und 20 Tage. He added, “The
German intelligence and counter-intelligence apparatus under Ad-
miral Canaris failed completely in this case, just as it failed to pro-
vide the German U-boat command with a single useful piece of in-
telligence about the enemy during the entire war.”
During Operation “Torch” the French Atlantic and Mediterra-
nean Fleet, which was under the command of Marshall Pétain, had
the mission of attacking the invasion fleet. The French seamen felt
little sympathy for the English, since they had fired on their defense-
less ships at Mers-el-Kébir.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 177
The French lost the battleship Primauguet and the new Jean Bart
was badly damaged in these battles. The torpedo boats Thyphon,
Tornade, Tramontane, Frondeur, Fougueux, Epervier, Boullonais and
Bretois as well as 15 submarines and 9 other warships were also
sunk. The French Air Force’s losses were equally high. But in the
end all these sacrifices were in vain, for our diplomacy did not un-
derstand our friends in Europe and their attitude toward a new, uni-
fied and socialized Europe. This constructive, positive attitude would
have made this civil war unnecessary. I can state that it is not true
that a type of racial hatred toward Germany existed in France, Bel-
gium and even Holland in 1940. Our government neglected the psy-
chological weapon, a weapon which is likely the most effective of
all.
In the end Admiral Darlan, who was in Algeria in 1942, changed
sides and went over to the westem allies, before he was murdered.

Let us return to the first phase of the war at sea, to October 30, 1939.
That day Leutnant zur See Zahn, commander of the U-boat U-56,
had an unlikely piece of bad luck when he attacked the battle-cruiser
Nelson in the Orkney Islands. Displaying unbelievable courage, Zahn
worked his way through the screen of twelve destroyers. He was so
close to his target that the crew heard the three torpedoes strike the
flank of the warship. None exploded! On board the battle-cruiser
was Churchill, at the time First Lord of the Admiralty. One can imag-
ine the news at the beginning of November 1940: “The Nelson sunk
with all hands, Churchill on board!” Churchill was aware of the fate
of Lord Kitchener, who drowned on June 5, 1916 when the Hamp-
shire was sunk off the Orkney Islands while en route to Russia.
I am firmly convinced that Europe’s history would have taken a
different course if the three torpedoes fired by U-56 had exploded.
The acoustic torpedoes, which homed onto the engines of enemy
ships, worked significantly better. It was not a German invention,
our experts only improved it: they became faster and received a highly-
sensitive seeker head. We also used heat-seeking torpedoes, which
moved at high speed toward the hottest part of its target, namely the
engine room. These new weapons posed a great threat to the western
allies.
178 OTTO SKORZENY
Various “midget” submarines were also employed, from the Hai
(Shark), which was flat like a sardine, to the best, the Seehund (Seal),
which was crewed by two men. All were equipped with a snorkel,
like the amphibious tanks that simply drove through the Bug on June
22, 1941. The Seehund also had an air filtering system, as did the
Molch (Salamander) and the Marder (Marten). These “mini” U-boats,
which were equipped with high-quality periscopes, were capable of
reaching much more distant targets than the manned torpedoes. In
this case the two torpedoes were attached on both sides of the keel.
The snorkel provided the submerged U-boat with sufficient air
for crew and engine. The snorkel was a Dutch invention. The Ger-
man Professor Walter improved the system greatly and as well in-
vented a hydrogen-oxygen engine. The reaction produced only wa-
ter, which could be used for other purposes on board.
Dénitz had been pushing for production of the revolutionary
Walter U-boat since 1937. He found little understanding for the new
concept and it wasn’t until the year 1942 that Professor Walter and
engineers Schiirer, Braking and Oelfken introduced the snorkel sys-
tem. It was two more years until about 100 Type “Walter XXI and
XXIII” submarines were built and finally put into service. From May
1944 older type U-boats were also fitted with improved snorkels.
Our submarines, which had suffered heavy losses to air attack, no
longer needed to surface in critical moments.
The Type XXI Walter submarines, which reached a submerged
speed of 17.5 knots, possessed an extraordinary radius of action. For
example they could sail to Argentina without surfacing or refuelling
and could dive to a depth of 300 meters.’
In February 1945 at Yalta, the Americans and English insisted
that Stalin start a major offensive against East Prussia and Danzig,
where 30 of the Type XXI Walter boats were built, for, “the allied air
forces and ships were having difficulty dealing with the new U-boats,
and these represented a serious danger to our sea traffic in the North
Atlantic.” Winston Churchill himself wrote:

“If the new German U-boats had been committed earlier, they
could have, as Dönitz said, completely changed the result of the sub-
marine war on account of their great speed underwater.”
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 179
If sufficient numbers of Walter U-boats had been committed start-
ing in 1942, which was possible, the flow of supplies to England and
Russia, as well as the enemy landings in North Africa and on the
Italian and French coasts would have at least been seriously impeded.

The Bv-143 and Bv-246, flying bombs powered by solid fuel mo-
tors, were a product of V-2 research. They had to be launched from
aircraft and at three meters above the water they went into horizontal
flight and homed in on their targets, guided by an acoustic or heat-
seeking homing head.
Other air-to-sea flying bombs included the five or six versions of
the SD-1400. These weapons, which were fitted with stub wings,
were called “Fritz” and were capable of piercing the thickest armor
plate. In September 1943 the Italian battleship Roma, which was on
its way to North Africa to surrender to the allies, was sunk by “Fritz”
missiles launched by a Domier 217.
The remotely-controlled Hs-293 flying bomb sank numerous
enemy ships in 1943. The Hs-294 was 6.5 meters long compared to
the 4 meters of the Hs-293. It was placed in service the following
year. The flying bomb shed its stub wings on entering the water and
tured into a homing torpedo.
The Hs-295, Hs-296 and Hs-298 rockets, which were of light
alloy construction, were missiles which were guided to their targets
by the launching aircraft. Their range was eight kilometers. They
were 2.5 meters long and weighed about 125 kilograms. After vari-
ous improvements thought was given to employing them as pure air-
to-air rockets against enemy bomber formations. They would prob-
ably have been very effective, but the war ended before they could
go into quantity production.
One can now understand better how I came up with the idea of
using the V-1 as a manned aircraft. From the middle of a wave of V-
1s crossing the English Channel two manned bombs suddenly dive
on two large ships. Their pilots eject before the two missiles reach
their targets — in contrast to the Japanese “kamikaze” pilots. For I
was always of the view that each individual fighter must be left a
chance of survival. Perhaps the manned V-1 could have backed up
the Grossadmiral’s U-boats.
180 OTTO SKORZENY
They also tried to install the rocket motor of the V-1 in an anti-
shipping weapon. It was given the rather bombastic name of Tor-
nado. It was a sort of remotely-controlled giant torpedo — like our
Goliath mini-tank — with 600 kilograms of explosives in its nose.
This Tornado was supposed to fly just over the water; its speed never
exceeded 65 kph, however, and in wavy conditions its stability was
quite mediocre, although it was stabilized by two floats like a
floatplane.
One can see that there was no shortage of good ideas where spe-
cial weapons were concemed, only time. Here, too, our unlucky star
was: “Too late.”

Hitler’s most fateful mistake was his belief in a localized war of lim-
ited duration. Never was a statesman as poorly advised by his diplo-
mats as he. When he entered Poland to return Danzig to the Reich,
Hitler was not aware that he was starting World War Two.
In the first six months of 1942 our submarines sank more than
three-million tons out of the total of 4,147,406 tons of weapons and
supplies shipped by the enemy alliance; therefore far in excess of
fifty percent. 729,000 tons in November 1942 alone. The number of
ships sunk exceeded the number of newly-built vessels and those
under construction.
In spite of increasingly heavy air cover and the growing level of
protection from surface vessels, the convoys of the western allies
lost 627,000 tons of shipping to our U-boats in the Atlantic in the
first three weeks of March 1943. Liddell Hart wrote:

“The U-boat offensive was finally brought to a halt. It is certain,

however, that England came very close to defeat in March 1943.”
All of the above figures come from the archives of the British and
American admiralty headquarters.

As grave as Hitler’s responsibility and mistakes were, it is absurd to

write that “he had been thinking of and preparing for a world war
since 1930” and that he was its “planner and instigator.”
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 181
In my opinion the most important reason for the outbreak of the
Second World War was as follows: The First World War was never
ended by a just peace treaty acceptable to all sides. The war was only
interrupted and was adjourned until the outbreak of the next -
Versailles just created more European problems than existed before
the First World War.
Just as General Bonaparte found the French Republic’s treasury
empty in 1799, so had the Reichsbank’s gold and foreign currency
reserves fallen to zero in 1933. Hitler prescribed the only solution:
invent, work more, produce more, in order to live and above all ex-
port. New products came on the market, mainly in the years 1935-
1936, which became known in the international vernacular under the
name “ersatz” (substitute). Our chemists distinguished themselves
in all branches of the industry. They even produced synthetic food -
to the excitement of the foreign press.
Through “ersatz” we were able to produce many new industrial
goods, create modern homes for the workers, build the autobahns,
manufacture the volkswagen, produce new synthetic fibre fabrics and
so on. During the war “ersatz” was a part of our defense, which helped
the fatherland in its struggle and allowed it to hold out as long as it
did.
In Germany they not only produced fuel from hard coal, but food-
stuffs as well, such as butter, sugar and honey. Buna was an out-
standing rubber. The cellulose processing industry grew quite con-
siderably. Plexiglass was invented; synthetic materials took the place
of bronze and brass; artificial silk and other synthetic fabrics won the
race. I will not claim that the liverwurst made from the byproducts of
the cellulose industry could be compared to “Mainzer Schinken” or
with goose liver paté. But we were happy to be able to satisfy our
hunger with it.
The second and hopefully last world war was pure madness, as it
spared neither soldiers nor the civilian population. I would like to
repeat that I am firmly convinced that this war could have and should
have been avoided. Happily at least some of the inventions to come
out of the war have been used for peaceful purposes and for the good
of mankind. Inventions that an ancient European people, which once
again found itself facing defeat, created for its own self-defense.
Today Europe has disintegrated into three or four parts. The na-
tions of Europe not in the Soviet block found themselves in a very
182 Otro SKORZENY
serious energy crisis in December 1973 as a result of an oil shortage.
As a result of restrictive measures imposed by the Arab nations after
the war against Israel, gasoline, liquefied gas and heating oil became
scarce commodities. There was scarcely a branch of industry that did
not use oil as an energy source or as a basic material. The crisis had
corresponding direct effects on the operations of the processing in-
dustries such as: dyes, plastics, soaps, paints, synthetic fabrics, rub-
ber, fertilizers and so on. Unrest and a mood of near panic devel-
oped. Important branches of industry were thrown into total confu-
sion, in West Germany as well as in France, Holland, Sweden, Italy
and Belgium. In Great Britain many factories only worked three days
per week.
Unfortunately one must say that, in this case, the cooperation in
Europe of the “Common Market” was hardly glorious and that the
large western states did not show the necessary solidarity.
All of a sudden the cry is for finding new energy sources and the
invention of new technology. This appears to me to be an outstand-
ing idea — one which we Europeans have been practicing for centu-
ries.
The best energy source is not raw materials alone however, but
the will of honorable men, who place their ideas and their capacity
for work wholeheartedly into the service of the community.

Notes
1. Compare this to Heinz Schacffer's account of sailing a conventional U-boat to Argentina in U-977,
Wiesbaden 1974. (Editors’ note)
 14
FROM SICILY TO REMAGEN

Old wives’ tales on an Andalusian beach — Canaris concludes that

the Anglo-American landing will take place in Sardinia and Greece
— “Husky” makes use of the mafia - Manned torpedoes at Anzio -
Why 1 didn't allow the invincibility of the Atlantic Wall to be ques-
tioned — A Series of astonishing coincidences help Operation “Over-
lord” succeed — The man who almost blew up the Rock of Gibraltar
destroys the Nimwegen Bridge - The failure of Operation “Market
Garden” - The Basler Bridge must be blown if... - Operation Forelle,
actions on the Danube - The blockade of Budapest is broken -
Leutnant Schreiber and his frogmen at the Remagen Bridge - Why
the war had to be continued in the west and the east — Field Marshall
Montgomery's battles and observations — Hitler says: “The day be-
fore yesterday I gave orders which must seem completely mad!” -
From Lord Byron to Winston Churchill.

ven if our volunteers were unable to distinguish themselves

with manned V-1s, there were other operations on the sea
and in rivers. The operations in which I took part were
played out under dramatic and unfavorable circumstances.
The most significant took place at Anzio, a port in central Italy about
50 kilometers south of Rome.
In order to properly understand what happened at Anzio, we must
think back to November 1942 - to the moment when the landing
troops of Operation “Torch” encountered unexpectedly strong oppo-
sition from French forces commanded by General Nogués and Ad-
miral Darlan. The Americans were fortunate to have a first-class agent
in Algiers, Consul-General Murphy, who succeeded in “turning”
183
184 OTTO SKORZENY
General (and later Field Marshall) Juin, whom we had released. The
admiral also allowed himself to be convinced by Murphy and was
later murdered by a young French fanatic, Bonnier de la Chapelle.
The latter had received absolution and a pistol from a priest (on De-
cember 24, 1942). He was found guilty by a military court and shot —
much to the relief of Churchill and de Gaulle.
According to the Abwehr’s information the Anglo-American fleet
must “land in Corsica or southern France” (See: Paul Carell, Afrika-
Korps). The troops of the axis powers had to fight on two fronts and
they resisted for six months. Rommel’s place had been taken by Gen-
eral von Arnim. On May 13, 1943 the last two units of the axis pow-
ers still fighting acknowledged defeat: the “Young Fascists” Divi-
sion and the Africa Corps’ 164th Light Infantry Division. Both units
were completely out of ammunition and food and surrendered to the
British 8th Army in southern Tunisia.
Tunisia and its great port, Bizerte, now gave the allies an ideal
springboard to the “soft spot” of the boot of Europe.
Hitler was aware of the danger the loss of Sicily would pose. He
offered Mussolini five divisions. According to a statement by Gen-
eral Westphal, then Field Marshall Kesselring’s chief-of-staff, which
was quoted by Liddell Hart, “the duce assured us that he only needed
three divisions.” Two of these were made up of young Italian draft-
ees and had to defend the Tunis bridgehead. The Italians looked for
excuses. At the end of June two German divisions, one of them the
Hermann Goring Panzer Division, were placed under the command
of the Italian General Guzzoni and transferred to Sicily. But when
the US 7th Army (Patton) and the British 8th Army (Montgomery)
landed on Sicily on July 20, 1943, the island was only moderately
defended by about ten Italian (of which six existed only in theory)
and three German divisions.
Once again the Abwehr had misinformed the OKW and had as-
sured Generalfeldmarschall Keitel that the landing in Europe would
not take place in Corsica or in France, but in Sardinia or Greece.
Canaris’ agents in Spain received their “proof” as part of a carefully-
planned operation by the British secret service.
Just off an Andalusian beach an English submarine dropped off a
dead body which came straight from a London morgue. False papers
were placed on the man identifying him as an English officer. Favor-
able currents carried the cadaver to the Spanish beach; “they” saw to
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 185
it that the German secret service was informed. A wallet was found
on the body containing a copy of a report sent by General Sir Archibald
Nye, one of the two deputy chiefs of the Empire General Staff, to
General Alexander and in which obvious references were made to an
imminent landing in Greece.
This red herring was perhaps not as significant as several film
directors or television programs of a few years ago tried to make it
out to be. In any case — the Abwehr believed it. Reinforcements were
in fact despatched to Greece and Sardinia, and what Montgomery
grandly called “the Sicilian campaign” only lasted from July 10 to
August 17, 1943. A few Italian units fought bravely; the others, poorly
armed and badly led, surrendered quickly.
The mafia chiefs brought to Sicily from overseas in American
trucks also did not play the role which many historians ascribe to
them. It is quite certain that “Lucky” Luciano, the head of the New
York underworld, who at the time was serving a thirty-year prison
sentence, was called upon to use his influence to have the Sicilian
mafia work for the “good allied objectives.” Luciano was released in
1946 “for the extraordinary services he had rendered.”
Seen strategically and tactically, Sicily offered the invaders ad-
vantages, but they were not in a position to exploit them. Three air-
borne operations, backed up by the heavy guns of the warships and
almost total air superiority, could not stop Feldmarschall Kesselring
from saving 60,000 Italians and 40,000 Germans from this trap.
Montgomery, who had enormous resources at his disposal, could have
closed “the net” earlier however, by shifting the focus of the attack
to Messina. It wasn’t until August 15 that he landed a commando
brigade at Scaletta, but by then it was already too late to seal off the
narrows.
Operation “Husky,” the occupation of Sicily, could have had cata-
strophic consequences for the Wehrmacht. Generaloberst Jodl later
confided in me that Hitler was of the opinion all along that the island
would be difficult for the Duce to defend. The island was neither
fascist nor anti-fascist: more than anything it was Sicilian. In the last
century it had fallen prey to revolutions and counter-revolutions. Pris-
ons and penitentiaries opened their doors, the criminals were released
and soon seen as heroes. The popular slogan sweeping the island in
July-August 1943 was “Sicilia ai Siciliani” (Sicily for the Sicilians).
186 OTTO SKORZENY
When Hitler met with Mussolini at Feltre on July 19, 1943, he
felt that the Duce was uncertain. During their conversation one of
Mussolini’s adjutants passed him a note, whereupon Mussolini said
desperately: “At this moment the workers’ quarter of Rome is being
bombed heavily by the enemy!”
The raid by the B-24 Liberators left behind 1,430 dead and more
than 6,000 injured. The Duce feared that there was little concern for
defending Sicily among his entourage. General Ambrosio presented
his ultimatum to Mussolini in private:
“Duce, you are a friend of the Fiihrer’s. You must make it clear to
him that we must concern ourselves with our own affairs. Italy must
make peace in two weeks!”
Mussolini did not have General Ambrosio arrested, and when he
bade farewell to Hitler at Treviso airport he assured him once again:
“Führer, we have the same goal, and together we will prevail!”
I am sure that he firmly believed this, as did several of his sup-
porters. But they were not very numerous.

On September 3rd and 8th general Montgomery’s 8th Army and the
American Sth Army under General Clark set foot in Italy itself — at
Reggio and Salerno. This was anything but a success. Montgomery
and Liddell Hart admit that both armies sustained “heavy” losses,
had to literally fight their way forward foot by foot and from No-
vember faced a supply catastrophe. Later they were unable to break
through the Hitler (or Gustav) Line which ran past Monte Cassino,
where the Americans unnecessarily destroyed the famous abbey.
The original monastery of the Benedictine monks, founded by
Saint Benedict in the year 529, it housed a wealth of artistic trea-
sures, a valuable library and an art gallery. Luckily these treasures
were moved to safety by German troops a few months before the
allied bombing. general von Senger und Etterlin wrote in his book
Krieg in Europa (Cologne, 1963), that Feldmarschall Kesselring gave
orders to spare the abbey’s great store of cultural treasures “even at
the cost of a tactical advantage.”
Not until January 22, 1944 did the Americans begin their Opera-
tion “Shingle.” General John P. Lukas and his 6th Corps landed at
Anzio. Since Anzio lay north of the “Gustav Line,” Operation
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 187
“Shingle” was supposed to allow the Anglo-Saxons to attack the
German armies in the rear and march on Rome. General Clark saw
himself in the eternal city by November 1943. But he deceived him-
self: Rome did not fall until June 4, 1944. He didn’t occupy Florence
until the end of August and it wasn't until March 1945 that he passed
Bologna.'

At Anzio our volunteers of the Kriegsmarine and from Friedenthal

used Neger manned torpedoes against the enemy ships. The action
took place a few weeks after the landing.
Early in the morning twenty manned torpedoes were brought to
the water north of the beachhead. Seated under their plexiglass cupo-
las the men raced toward their targets. At dawn they pulled the re-
lease lever for the lower torpedo, turned the upper torpedo and re-
turned north. Twenty explosions were heard.
The result was: one cruiser severely damaged, one torpedo boat
sunk and more than 30,000 tons of transport ship capacity sunk or
damaged. Seven torpedoes returned immediately to their base north
of Anzio. The next day six men reached our lines after slipping through
the beachhead; seven of the twenty men remained missing.
Later the element of surprise ceased to play a role as the enemy
was now aware of the threat. The glass cupolas of the Neger and the
Marder manned torpedoes, which were used in the Mediterranean
and the English Channel, were easily spotted. When the ocean cur-
rents were favorable we therefore set out numerous empty, floating
glass cupolas, so that thy could be spotted from one side of the se-
lected target. The enemy then opened up on the suspected torpedoes,
while the real ones approached from the other direction.
Grossadmiral Dénitz wanted to meet the thirteen survivors of the
Anzio operation, and they received well-deserved decorations from
him. He had asked that the four Friedenthal participants and I should
also be present. J thus obtained an opportunity to talk at length with
the man who was to be the last chief of the German Reich.
When soon afterward we studied aerial photographs of southeast
English ports, it became clear to us that the invasion was not far off.
We compared these photos with those that had been taken a few weeks
earlier and found something that interested me greatly: long rows of
188 OTTO SKORZENY
rectangles, that looked like docks. Soon we pieced together all the
parts of the puzzle and determined that what we were seeing were
prefabricated port installations. These artificial harbors made it pos-
sible to land many soldiers on a broad front. To me the coast of
Normandy appeared particularly suitable for such a landing opera-
tion. Admiral Heye told me of the conclusions reached by his naval
experts; it was a list which classified probable landing sites from one
to ten. The landing took place on the first three stretches of coast
listed.
My small staff and I set to work in Friedenthal: we prepared a
plan which was presented to the High Command West through mili-
tary channels. Commander-in-Chief West was Feldmarschall von
Rundstedt. They would form special units and incorporate volun-
teers from my commando units. These would wait in a permanent
State of alert on ten different stretches of coast on the English Chan-
nel and on the Atlantic coast for the landing of enemy troops. Their
mission would then be to locate the enemy’s headquarters and elimi-
nate them through commando operations against officers and com-
munications centers.

Our plan slowly worked its way back through the chain of command.
An accompanying letter stated that the High Command West was
aware of it and considered it correct and feasible. And, to quote just
the conclusion of the letter:

“It cannot be assumed that the necessary preparations for your

plan can be kept secret from the German occupation troops stationed
along the coast.
“But any such preparation could destroy the faith of these troops
in the absolute impenetrability of the Atlantic Wall. For this reason,
therefore, the entire plan must be rejected.”

signature illegible

Liddell Hart, General Emil Wanty in his book Die Kunst des Krieges
(Vol. III) and others admit that Hitler was thinking of a landing in the
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 189
Cotentin. He also ordered Field Marshalls von Rundstedt and Rommel
“to keep a close eye on Normandy.”
Generalfeldmarschall Rommel was unable to watch over
Normandy on June 6, 1944, the day of the allied landing. The day
before he had left Roche-Guyon to spend the day with his family,
and did not return to his headquarters until the afternoon of the fol-
lowing day.
However Helmut Mayer, chief of the Fifteenth Army's intelli-
gence service, which kept tabs on radio communications on the coast
from Rotterdam to east of Caen, intercepted and deciphered the
“Verlaine poem” on June 1. Transmitted twice, it was supposed to
alert certain French resistance groups that the invasion was immi-
nent:

Les sanglots longs

Des violons De l’automne
Bercent mon coeur
D’une langeur Monotone

Mayer at once notified the Commander-in-Chief of the Fifteenth

Army, who informed Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt. But the
only one not informed was the main participant: General Dollmann,
Commander-in-Chief of the Seventh Army and overseer of the coast
from Caen. As well on June 6 none of the corps commanders were at
their posts — all had been summoned to Caen for a “situation brief-
ing.”
Only General Max Pemsel, Dollmann’s Chief-of-Staff, remained
at his post. At 2:15 A.M. on June 6 he telephoned Rundstedt’s gen-
eral staff and informed them that the enemy had landed. The field
marshall called back half an hour later to let him know that he did
not consider the landing a “large-scale operation.” Rundstedt had in
fact predicted the actual landing to come between Le Havre and Calais.
So he went back to sleep.
Hitler himself wasn’t told about the landing “until late morning.”
General Jodl, head of the OKW, agreed with Rundstedt and felt that
the enemy was only carrying out a “screening maneuver.” Hitler and
Jod] ignored the fact that Rommel was not on watch at that moment
and that a few days before he had given orders for the fighter unit
assigned to defend the west coast to withdraw to the interior of the
190 OTTO SKORZENY
country. So on the morning of June 6 there were only two German
fighters to face the hundreds of allied aircraft; one was flown by
Oberst Josef Priller and the other by Feldwebel Wodarczyk.
The Seventh Army had only one panzer division available, and
that was the 21st, which was stationed near Caen. Without receiving
any orders whatsoever it counterattacked in the direction of
Courseulles-sur-Mer, straight through the British lines, where it caused
chaos. However as it received no reinforcements it was forced to
turn around.
The Ist SS-Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, which
was commanded by Sepp Dietrich, was informed to late or not at all,
as were the 12th SS-Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, which was in
Liseux, the 17th SS-Panzer-Grenadier Division which was stationed
in Saumur and Niort, and the Panzer-Lehr Division in Le Mans and
Orléans. Von Rundstedt’s general staff also made a serious error by
holding back two panzer divisions in the Paris area: General von
Liittwitz’s 2nd and General von Schwerin’s 116th. On June 6 they
were in Amiens and east of Rouen; in mid-July the 116th Panzer
Division was still at Dieppe! In his book Generaloberst Guderian
asked the question “whether the delays and the wide dispersement of
the reserve troops didn’t have political backgrounds.” As well he
quoted an article by General von Geyr published in the Irish maga-
zine An Cosantoir in 1950. Von Geyr assured that Generalfeld-
marschall Rommel “held back his divisions in anticipation of the
assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20.” But not only the
panzer divisions, which were supposed to throw the enemy back into
the sea, sat idle; two weeks after the landing, with a major battle
raging in Normandy, seven infantry divisions stood “at ease” north
of the Seine, waiting for the enemy.”
Many historians are of the opinion that Operation “Overlord”
could not have been defeated. That is not my view. The first V-1 fell
on England on June 21, 1944: that was too late. But referring to the
allied landing General Wanty spoke “of a most improbable conjunc-
tion of a series of lucky coincidences.” Liddell Hart found that Mont-
gomery played fast and loose with the facts in his memoirs. In any
case, wrote Sir Basil, “at the beginning of the landing success and
failure of the operation lay close together.”
It would have been enough if the German commanders had been
at their posts and had actually wanted to win. That was not the case.
I will explain why.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 191
eee

I must once again look ahead and summarize the most important
Operations undertaken by the members of Friedenthal on or in the
water. It was agreed with Admiral Heye that the Kriegsmarine would
undertake all operations at sea, while my specialists would be active
inland on rivers and lakes.
I was there when our frogmen were trained — in the Diana pool in
Vienna, which was closed to the public, in the Waffen-SS officer
school at Bad Tölz, in South Tirol and at Venice, where we were
housed in an empty monastery on an island in a lagoon. I was very
hard training. We tried out various techniques, concentrating on those
which had enabled Prince Valerio Borghese to blow up three tankers
at the Gibraltar roadstead on September 19, 1944. That was an act of
heroism by the Italian manned torpedoes. The frogmen, outfitted with
watertight diving suits, breathing gear and fins, did not just use the
previously-described equipment; they attached time bombs with spe-
cial suction discs to the stabilizing Leiste of the enemy ships.
Leading my frogmen from 1943 was Hauptmann Wimmel, who
moved over from the Brandenburg to Friedenthal. He was an officer
of quite special bravery and cool-headedness. In 1940-41 he com-
manded a special detachment which operated in the Gibraltar area.
He sank numerous British ships and with the help of Spanish work-
ers he succeeded in smuggling a powerful time bomb into the rock’s
tunnels, where there was a munitions dump. They hid the bomb in a
metal hull, which looked exactly like an English artillery shell. The
detonation of this bomb would have set off an explosion by thou-
sands of large shells and would have inflicted serious damage on the
rock. Wimmel never learned exactly why it did not go off. One thing
is certain: one of the men who helped transport the bomb was “talk-
ative.” Had they paid him off or forced him to talk? Probably. There
were great interests at work.
The attempt was made on December 5, 1940 and obviously could
not be repeated. It coincided with a trip which Janus and Canaris
made to Madrid on December 7 and 8, 1940. Canaris had a long talk
with General Franco on the 7th. He was unable to convince Franco
to take part in the war at Germany’s side. Granted — Hitler couldn’t
have chosen a worse ambassador.
192 OTTo SKORZENY
ee @

Field Marshall Montgomery planned the largest airborne-landing

operation of the war, called “Market Garden.” On September 17,
1944 three British army corps crossed the Maas-Schelde canal in the
direction of Kleve, Nimwegen and Arnheim. At the same time 9,000
aircraft and 600 gliders delivered 35,000 men, 2,000 vehicles, 568
guns and 2,500 tons of materiel to Son, Vegel, Kleve, Nimwegen and
Arnheim.
Surprise was achieved and the enemy’s numerical superiority was
enormous. Montgomery confessed, however, that the fighting strength
of Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich’s II SS-Panzer Corps, which
had withdrawn from Normandy, was underestimated. The corps of-
fered the enemy bitter resistance. Very soon Field Marshall
Montgomery’s airborne troops fighting north of Nimwegen needed
help from British units which were supposed to cross the Waal — one
of the tributaries of the Rhine — over the large bridge at Nimwegen.
German attempts to destroy the bridge by bombing were fruitless,
for its anti-aircraft defenses were too strong. But the bridge had to be
blown at all costs. On orders from Fiihrer Headquarters I gave
Hauptmann Wimmel the job of carrying out this difficult mission,
which won him the Knight’s Cross. This unique operation succeeded
in the following way. The enemy had established a bridgehead of
about seven kilometers on either side of the bridge. Wimmel first
slipped into the river and carried out a risky night reconnaissance.
Then he set out with his force of twelve frogmen and four explosive
torpedoes, which were kept afloat by flotation devices. They attached
their explosive torpedoes to the two bridge supports designated by
Wimmel, set the time fuses and opened the vents of the flotation
devices.
Wimmel and the detachment had 10 minutes and 10 seconds to
escape downstream. The bridge blew up just as a group of about 10
enemy tanks and trucks was crossing the bridge. Immediately after
both banks of the river were illuminated and searchlights swept the
river. Finally the enemy spotted our people and three were wounded
by machine-gun fire. Their comrades kept them above water. All
reached our lines — certainly with great difficulty and totally ex-
hausted.
 My COMMANDO OPERATIONS 193
Operation “Market Garden,” whose objective and purpose was
to conquer the Ruhr, was a total failure. After four days and nights of
heavy fighting we took about 10,000 prisoners.
In addition, I would like to note that it was the German first-aid
service of the SS panzer corps that evacuated the civilian population
of Arnheim, which was under heavy artillery fire. There was also a
brief cease-fire in order to evacuate wounded German and British
soldiers. The senior medical officer of the 9th SS-Division, Egon
Skalba and Medical Officer Warrack of the British 1st Airborne Di-
vision and their medics treated the numerous wounded soldiers on
the spot or moved them to safety. This humanitarian action was car-
ried out behind the German lines.
Without the crushing superiority of the artillery, infantry and es-
pecially the allied air force, “Market Garden” would have been an
even costlier failure to Montgomery. In his memoirs he speaks of the
“epic of Amheim” and draws the following conclusion: “In the fu-
ture it will be a great honor for any soldier to be able to say: I fought
at Arnheim.”
The Anglo-Saxons stood before Nimwegen until February 8, 1945
(almost five months long). In spite of all their resources their special
operations code-named “Veritable” and “Grenade” failed. The ob-
jective of “Grenade” was to seize the Rohr dam, but it came too late;
we had already blown the flood gate and the area had been under
water for two weeks.
I would also like to recall that for a time in September 1944 the
OKW feared that, on account of the solidifying of our front, the west-
em allies would be forced to violate Swiss neutrality and drive past
Basel into Germany. On the OKW’s orders I made certain prepara-
tions to blow that city’s Rhine bridge should Anglo-American troops
set foot on the soil of the Swiss Confederation. It was purely a defen-
sive measure which would in the meantime allow the OKW to pre-
pare a defense of this border, as there were no troops of any kind
stationed there. It was generally known that “Swiss Neutrality” also
included making it as easy as possible for all secret services hostile
to Germany. Allen W. Dulles, the head of the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) felt quite at home in Switzerland.
194 Otro SKORZENY
oo

In perusing the organizational scheme of all the units commanded

from Friedenthal, one will come across Jagdkommando Donau, which
was commanded by Hauptmann Wimmel and Leutnant Schreiber.
Since late summer of 1944 our comrades had been carrying out a
daring guerilla war on the Danube. With an overall length of 2,800
kilometers, the Danube was 400 meters wide in Vienna, 950 meters
in Budapest and 1,500 at the Iron Gate in Romania. It had numerous
tributaries in which our boats could hide during the day.
All of my danube operations were carried out under the code
name Forelle (Trout). I must admit that I was proud to defend this
ancient river on which I had spent so many happy days during my
childhood.
At this time the Red Army was in Romania, and we often at-
tacked their convoys. Our frogmen did their best with their explo-
sive boats and drifting mines. Our small “fleet” — camouflaged pri-
vate yachts fitted with makeshift armor, armed with 20mm cannon
and machine-guns and fitted with more powerful motors — also sank
valuable enemy tanker ships. In the course of the various Forelle
actions we inflicted losses on the Stalinists of 13,000 tons.
All large rivers have their own lives and the Danube was a world
unto itself. The old experienced Danube sailors who had volunteered
to serve with us knew the river like their vest pockets. By day they
hid their boats in a quiet tributary of the river or in the bay of a small
island and began their mission when darkness began to fall.

At the beginning of December 1944, as I was about to fly to the

Western Front on Hitler’s order, I learned that the defenders of
Budapest were fighting desperately to prevent the city from being
totally encircled by General Malinovski’s troops. This subsequently
took place when the city of Szekesfeherver was occupied. Supply by
air was impossible, and so I was tasked by the OKW to deliver phar-
maceuticals and ammunition over the Danube to Budapest. At the
same time I learned that Jochen Rumohr, my former battalion com-
mander who by now had been promoted to general, was leading the
defense of Budapest.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 195
I gave the order to use the fastest and most spacious of our Danube
ships, which would be followed by a tug. The bulkheads were re-
moved and the cargo space filled with 500 tons of food, medicine,
ammunition and drums of fuel. The operation was carried out on
New Year’s Eve 1944; I could only follow its progress by radio.
The two boats had to break through two Soviet fronts. They were
scarcely bothered as they passed the first enemy line, and by early
morning they were between the two front lines, about 17 kilometers
from Budapest. It was foggy and they used a tributary of the river.
Then, suddenly, the helmsman spotted the remains of a blown bridge
sticking up out of the water. His attempt to go around the obstacle
failed; both boats ran aground. Two members of the detachment were
able to reach Budapest in a small boat and inform the garrison. Most
of the ammunition, fuel and medicine was secreted into the city in
small boats during the next four nights.
On the first day the stranded boats attracted the attention of an
enemy patrol. We had calculated on such a risk. A Russian volunteer,
a proven anti-Stalinist, was a member of the crew. He told the leader
of the patrol that the boat “was on an extremely secret mission.” He
produced false Russian papers and passed around Russian alcohol
and cigarettes. The patrol moved on.
It proved impossible to refloat the ships, however. Sailing back
downstream by boat was out of the question, so the soldiers of the
Forelle operation joined their comrades in the beleaguered city and
shared their tragic fate.
My friend Rumohr was wounded and then shot himself to avoid
being captured by the Soviets. Of the ten thousand encircled German
soldiers still capable of fighting, only 270 reached our lines. Erich
Kem told of the last Forelle commando in his book. He probably met
a survivor who had returned from Russian captivity.

In mid-March 1945 I was summoned to Fiihrer Headquarters, where

Generaloberst Jodi ordered me to blow up the Ludendorff Bridge at
Remagen on the Rhine. Every Second World War historian mentions
the bridge at Remagen. It was fitted with explosive charges and was
supposed to be destroyed behind our withdrawing heavy artillery on
March 7. However a detonator failed to work and the bridge was
196 OTTO SKORZENY
only slightly damaged. They should have notified me at once. How-
ever Reichsmarschall Göring assured that his Luftwaffe would take
care of the matter. However our Stukas were as ineffective against
the enemy’s very heavy screen of anti-aircraft guns as they had been
at Nimwegen. By March 10, 20,000 Americans had already crossed
the Ludendorff bridge.
The destruction of the bridge was subsequently left to the Mam-
moth howitzer, which fired its 540mm shells at the bridge. After four
or five shots the howitzer jammed. We were then called out of pure
desperation. I explained to Generaloberst Jodl that there were very
great difficulties associated with this mission. The enemy bridge-
head was significantly larger than the one at Nimwegen: up to 16
kilometers south of the bridge. This had to be covered by swimming,
and in water temperatures of only about 7-8 degrees Celsius. The
action was carried out on March 17 by our “Danube” frogmen, who
had been flown in from Vienna. They were under the command of
Leutnant Schreiber, an officer who was as brave as he was daring.
On that cold night our comrades swam off, down the Rhine with
the torpedo mines that had been used at Nimwegen. It took them
about one and a half hours to reach Remagen. Schreiber realized that
we were right to fear the worst: the enemy had built two further pon-
toon bridgeheads upstream. The detachment carried out its mission
as well as possible. The Ludendorff Bridge was damaged and unus-
able. Schreiber wanted to destroy a pontoon bridge as well, but our
swimmers were discovered by the beams of the canal defense lights,
whose location could not be made out. Leutnant Schreiber lost three
men, two to hypothermia. The others were captured by the Ameri-
cans, completely exhausted and half frozen.
I am of the opinion that a soldier must be convinced to do his
duty. Today an action like that of the Schreiber detachment must
appear absurd. However when I explained the difficulties of this op-
eration to Generaloberst Jod] I did not hesitate to look for volunteers
only, who were willing to carry out the mission. Leutnant Schreiber
and his people did their best.
We often ask ourselves whether it wouldn’t have been better to
let the Anglo-American armies advance more quickly than those of
Stalin. But one always forgets that we could not call a halt to the
battle in the west alone: the allies were demanding unconditional
surrender — on all fronts — and all units had to cease fighting at the
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 197
same time and surrender on the spot — in the east as well as in the
west,
Millions of German soldiers and civilians would have died in
March 1945, for the enemy was in no position in the west, and even
less so in the east, to house or even feed millions of prisoners of war
and refugees. So we had to keep fighting in the east and west, in
order to defend the territory threatened by the Red Army in the east,
until as many people as possible had escaped to the west. Move-
ments by troops and civilians were possible only until midnight on
May 9. After that only a very few managed to escape from Soviet
captivity. A surrender two months before would have meant that
millions of civilians would have died of cold and hunger and that
they would have deported the armies of Weichs, Schörner and
Rendulic almost completely to the east.
Grossadmiral Dönitz noted that the German Kriegsmarine had
brought at least 2,404,477 people — mainly women and children —
out of Courland, East Prussia, Pomerania and Mecklenburg to the
western zone in the period from January 23 to May 8, 1945.
At Remagen a detonator failed to function and 20,000 then 35,000
American soldiers crossed the Rhine. What did they do then? They
waited. The tanks of General Hodges in the north and of General
Patton’s 3rd Army in the south were to link up in Koblenz, but not
until the beginning of the offensive by Field Marshall Montgomery,
to whom Eisenhower had entrusted overall command of the allied
forces. The allies thus failed to exploit the breakthrough at Remagen.
Montgomery did not cross the Rhine until March 24, much farther to
the north, with the 21st Army Group, which in reality consisted of
three army groups: the 1st Canadian Army, the 2nd British and the
9th American. This meant a total of 26 divisions, two of them air-
borne divisions. Facing these were only five German divisions, which
had already been decimated by the guns and the bombs of the Lib-
erators. When Montgomery had forced a crossing of the Rhine near
Wesel, on March 28 his offensive came to a stop. The impression
was created — and not only among us - if not the certainty, that Mont-
gomery in the north and Bradley and Patton in the south had orders
to wait until the armies of Zhukov, Konev and Malinovski had bro-
ken through in the east.
In his memoirs Montgomery complained bitterly that Eisenhower
had “put the brakes” on him. He shows in splendid fashion that the
198 OTTo SKORZENY
western allies could have taken Vienna, Prague and Berlin before the
Russians. | underline this view. He drew the correct conclusion, “that
the Americans did not understand that there was little value in win-
ning a war militarily if one simultaneously lost it politically.” For his
part, Patton, who had significantly less resources than Montgomery,
deplored the incredible slowness of the English field marshall. One
must in fact ask why he waited until the night of March 23-24 to start
the offensive on the Rhine and why he stopped again on the other
side on March 28. There was practically no longer any resistance.
Proof of this: the total losses of General William Simpson's 9th US
Army which, as Liddell Hart wrote, “provided half the infantry of
the 21st Army Group,” was just 40 men killed.
As a former combatant on the Eastern Front I would like to make
an observation: Hitler is often criticized for his stubbornness, refus-
ing to order any sort of “elastic withdrawal,” as his generals had
been proposing since December 1941. Hitler certainly made grave
errors in his appraisal of the war situation — but primarily because he
was badly informed.
Almost all generals commanding divisions and commanders of
corps at the front had the bad habit of understating their losses when
reporting them to “above.” Their reports were further “doctored” when
they reached the army and then the army group. I would like to cite
one example: In the summer of 1944 my friend Hans Ulrich Rudel,
our best Stuka pilot (with 2,700 combat missions), was received by
Hitler and subsequently by Gdring, who was under express orders
from Hitler to ban him from further flying. Oberst Rudel came straight
from the Eastern Front. Before Göring told him of Hitler’s decision
(which Rudel disregarded, by the way), he let him in on some “big
news”:

“We have prepared a major offensive in your sector which will

be supported by 300 tanks. Leading the attack will be the 14th Divi-
sion with 60 panzers...”

However Rudel had spoken with the commanding general ofthe 14th
Division the day before. The general confessed to him that he did not
have a single operational panzer. When Gdring heard this he couldn’t
believe it and telephoned the front. He found that what the Oberst
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 199
had told him was true, and that instead of the 300 tanks they had
allowed for, they could commit 40 at best.
This “major offensive” was called off.
I myself witnessed a similar scene at Fuhrer Headquarters in Sep-
tember 1944. For three days I had to be present for briefings, the so-
called “noon situation” and “evening situation” (10 P.M.), in order to
gain an exact picture of the situation on the Eastern Front.
As always the officers of the general staff had prepared a map
and drawn in the divisions available in the southeast. During the first
two days of my stay I was able to observe Hitler at his “war game”
and saw how he carefully considered all the information he was given.
If a sector of the front was involved that did not affect several of
the officers present, these withdrew to the ante-room and waited. On
the first day I was thus an involuntary witness to a discussion be-
tween two officers who wore the red stripes of the general staff on
their trousers.
“You know,” said one of the officers, “that of the three divisions
in the east of Hungary two are only as strong as battalions and the
third would have difficulty sending two battalions to the front. It
won't do!...”
“That surely won’t do,” observed the other, “and it’s not our fault!”
I walked away so as not to have to hear any more.
When, on the third day, Hitler asked exact and increasingly more
uncomfortable questions about these three phantom divisions, it be-
came clear to him that he had been deceived.
“That means then,” he shouted, “that the orders I gave the day
before yesterday were based on the existence of these divisions. And
now I hear that these divisions no longer exist! At the front they must
think that my orders are completely crazy. Why am I being lied to
here, gentlemen? Why? I want to be told the truth! The lives of brave
soldiers are at stake!”
Hitler did not chew the carpet and nor did he climb the drapes.
Only in his voice was there indignation and desperation.
In any case it is certain that if he had ordered all the retreats
recommended by his generals, there would be no Germany today
and the Soviet Army would have occupied all of Europe.
The German soldier felt betrayed since July 20, 1944. We have
seen, and will yet see, to what degree he was. In the west the Wehr-
macht had lost its offensive spirit by March 1945, and the terrible
200 OTTo SKORZENY
sight of our wrecked cities certainly did not encourage the retreating
troops. Our workers did not lose their courage to the end; in the Ruhr
and Silesia the enemy found the workers at their workplaces. No one
can deny that the German people fought bravely for five years against
the mightiest nations in the world.
At the beginning of 1945 Winston Churchill drove across the
Dutch border into Germany, accompanied by Field Marshalls Brooke
and Montgomery. He had the car stop, so that he could urinate on the
Siegfried Line, which ended there, and urged the two field marshalls
to do the same. Both immediately did as Churchill asked. The pho-
tographers were forbidden to film this act, which wasn’t exactly in
keeping with the fame of the Viscount of Alamein. John Toland de-
scribed this incident in The Last 100 Days and assures that it is au-
thentic.
This brought to mind a remark by Lord Byron, which he made
about Napoleon's jailkeeper in St. Helena: “If you pass by the grave
of Hudson Lowe, never forget to piss on it!”

Notes
1. in a book titled The D-Day, published in London in 1974 (by Sidgwick and Jeckson), witha fore-
word by Lord Mountbatten, the authors W. Tute, J. Castello and T. Hughes wrote: “Theinvasion was
almost a washout. The Anglo-Saxons, who were tied down until May, beld back the landing
craft in the
Mediterranean intended for D-Day, as a result of which the planned invasion of Southern France was
delayed until August.” (Editors’ note)

2. More than anyone it was Hitler, who for days went on believi di ion was going to
take place somewhere else, who was responsible for the belated‘commitment of the German reserves.
As well, allied air superiority made the movement of troops even more difficult. (Editors’ note)
 15
PLANNED OPERATIONS

The purpose of Operation Franz in Persia — I meet the real “Man

with the Golden Gun” - Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin in Teheran
— The action against the summit conference is hindered by the lack of
sufficient information — The story of the proposed Operation
Weitsprung — How the Russians made the most of it: they “watch
over” Roosevelt and isolate Churchill — Testimony by Averell
Harriman, Sir Kenneth Strong and Lord Moran - Operation Ulm:
target Magnitogorsk — Operation Zepppelin shows that organization
is not the same as execution — A dangerous chimera: the Werwolf -
Himmler dreams of a new operation after Magnitogorsk: New York!
— Mohammed Amin-al Husaini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a fig-
ure from A Thousand and One Nights - The Iran-Mediterranean oil
line - The wolf doesn't howl in Vichy - On the heels of Marshall Tito:
why Rösselsprung failed - We take Churchill prisoner and Major
Beck does business with the partisans — Bogus British pounds in cir-
culation, and what we did with them in Italy — The treasure of the SS
~ Mussolini in Sweden — A submachine-gun demonstration in our
park.

peration Franz, which was already under way when I took

over command of the Friedenthal Battalion, was no pipe
dream. It involved sending military advisors and instruc-
tors to Iraq to support the Kashgai fighters and other
mountain tribes that had rebelled in southern Persia since 1941 (after
the forced renunciation of the throne by Emperor Reza Shah Palavi,
who was well-disposed toward Germany, in favor of his son Moham-
med Reza).
201
202 OTTo SKORZENY
At this point in time Soviet troops had occupied the north of the
country. Four or five British divisions, which had moved in from the
south, had the south of the country in their hands. The only railroad
in this vast area of 1,648,000 square kilometers was used to deliver
supplies to Russia via Abadan, Teheran and Tabris, just like the rail
lines of the Caucasus from Tbilisi or Baku. The Persians soon had to
deal with another occupying power, namely the Americans, who did
not treat them as roughly as the other two. Neither the Soviet troops
nor the British occupiers were liked. There were uprisings in De-
cember 1942 and unrest in February 1943. Both were harshly sup-
pressed.
It was not our objective to prepare uprisings in large cities like
Teheran (750,000 inhabitants), Tabris (220,000) or Ispahan (200,000),
but to appeal to the Kashgai chiefs, who were in a very good position
to wage a guerilla war and thus tie down a certain number of enemy
divisions in Iran and interrupt supply lines over which vital raw ma-
terials such as crude oil, nickel and magnesium as well as Anglo-
American military supplies were delivered to Russia.'
A year earlier, in 1942, the advance by Feldmarschall List’s army
group failed at the last minute. The Austrians and Bavarians of the
4th Mountain Infantry Division were forced to halt on the north slope
of the Caucasus, 20 kilometers from Sukhumi, on account of inad-
equate supplies of ammunition and food. Nevertheless the war flag
of the Reich waved on the summit of Elbrus (5,633 meters), which
had been conquered by Hauptmann Groth, Hauptmann Gémmeler,
Oberfeldwebel Kümmler and the mountain infantry of the Ist and
4th Divisions. This symbolic victory by my countrymen on August
21, 1942 filled me with joy and I was very proud of them. The moun-
tain climbers among my readers will understand.
But now it was not Elbrus, rather the Elbrus Mountains between
the Caspian Sea and the highlands of Iran, on whose slope lay Tehe-
ran
The first to parachute into Iran was a group of two officers and
three NCOs of the Friedenthal Battalion, led by a Persian. We used a
large Junkers 290 of the Luftwaffe’s Kampfgeschwader 200, which
had difficulty getting airborne from the Crimean airfield. The run-
way was too short; the equipment, which together with the instruc-
tors was to be dropped by parachute, had to be drastically reduced.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 203
But we did not forget to take along hunting rifles and gold and silver
inlaid Walther pistols as gifts for the Persian tribal chiefs. The drop
took place on a dark night near a large salt lake southeast of Tehran.
After a forty-hour wait we received a radio report that our people
were safe.
My role was limited to training people for this mission, as the
operation was under the command of Dr. Grife, department chief of
Office VI (Foreign). I feared that the groups trained by me would
encounter a dangerous enemy there: the joint Russian-English mili-
tary intelligence services. I felt rather uncomfortable about training
my soldiers only to send them into uncertainty. I have always taken
responsibility for what I have done, and I must say that ifI had sus-
pected in advance all the intrigues, the narrow-mindedness and the
clumsiness of the bureaucracy, I would probably never have accepted
this commando post.
Unfortunately we were unable to supply Operation Franz, which
achieved mixed results, with sufficient material and soldiers as we
lacked Ju 290 transports with the required radius of action. A me-
chanical problem with one of our aircraft prevented a second group
of military advisors from jumping. This was lucky for us, for a short
time later we learned that our central operation in Tehran had been
exposed. Only one of Schellenberg’s agents managed to flee to Tur-
key. From there he informed us of what had happened. The new
planned actions were immediately cancelled and our people remained
with the rebel tribes until the end of the war. One of our officers then
took his life to avoid falling into the hands of the Russians. Others
were Captured when they tried to make their way to Turkey. They
returned to Germany in 1948.
Operation Franz nevertheless forced the enemy to keep several
divisions at alert readiness. The Russians and the British feared a
general rebellion by the various Persian tribes. The Persians who had
fought against the Russians were pursued relentlessly. Many of them
were killed. In 1956 I chanced to meet one of the Kashgai tribal
chiefs in the Breidenbacher Hof Hotel in Diisseldorf. He had man-
aged to flee to Rome at the time. He still had the goid-inlaid pistol
that I had sent him: “One of the few things, apart from my life, that I
was able to save,” he told me over supper in the Persian Hotel.
204 OTTO SKORZENY
e@@e@e

In the first days of November 1943 ] was ordered to Führer Head-

quarters, where I was told that a “summit conference” would possi-
bly be held in Tehran at the end of the month: Stalin, Roosevelt and
Churchill would be staying there for three or four days.
It could be that the report was received from the valet of Sir Hugh
Knatchbull-Hugessen, the English ambassador in Istanbul, the Yu-
goslavian Elyesa Bazna, alias Cicero. But I also believe that Walter
Schellenberg was enthusiastic about the idea of planning an action
against the “big three” enemies of Germany.
Naturally it was a seductive idea to send a special commando to
Tehran. But could such an operation succeed? And how? First of all
one would need the most precise information on the situation, the
city of Tehran itself and naturally on the allied troops stationed there.
Our contact man in Tehran, a captain of the Abwehr, passed me
the information by radio via Istanbul: the yield was rather meager.
For certain the capital of Iran was completely in the hands of the
three powers, whose political and military intelligence services were
on guard. The action in Tehran would have required 150 to 200 of
our best-trained soldiers, aircraft, special vehicles, precise know!}-
edge of the area and information about the enemy’s security mea-
sures, I was able to learn almost nothing about this. Under such con-
ditions of course there was not the least chance of success: the plan
was simply impracticable. I advised Hitler and Schellenberg of my
views on such an action — Hitler agreed with me.
At the end of 1956 the world press eagerly picked up parts of a
crime novel published by the Russian magazine Ogornick. In gen-
eral terms the rather mediocre novel’s plot was as follows:

“Evil nazis intend to kill or capture Stalin, Roosevelt and Stalin

in Tehran. The operation is ordered by me, Otto Skorzeny. The leader
of the detestable commando is a young Sturmbannfihrer named Paul
von Ortel — a fictional character. But Comrade Lavrenti Beria, the
supreme Soviet police commander, is on guard: all the nazis in Tehran
are exposed and liquidated at the end of November 1943. It was high
time!”
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 205
In December 1968 the Tribune de Genéve drew attention to an-
other work of fiction: a true democrat, the first-class Soviet spy Ilya
Svetlov, “operating under the name Walter Schulz, a member of the
National-Socialist Party - recommended by Rudolf Hess!” parachutes
into Tehran and after unbelievable adventures foils the planned as-
sassination attempt against the “big three” — code-named Operation
Weitsprung (Broad Jump).
Two years later (November 17, 1970) the International Herald
Tribune picked up this fictional account of Svetlov-Schulz again and
as well published a photo of me with the caption: “Ex-SS Colonel
Otto Skorzeny, who was supposed to carry out this plan conceived
by the German Führer Headquarters.” Neither the Tribune de Genéve
nor any other newspaper spoke to me about Weitsprung.
Finally, a book by Laszlo Havas entitled Assassinat du sommet
(Murder at the Summit Conference) came out at the beginning of
February 1968. The author at least took the trouble to make inquiries
of me. I must confirm that the parts of his account that concern me
are accurate: I had characterized this operation in Tehran as com-
pletely impossible, and he said so. However, Havas also wrote that a
German action aimed at Tehran was in fact begun and failed. I think
that if that were the case I should have at least learned about it later.
One cannot expect a historian or chronicler who has concerned
himself with this question for years to be a modem Xenophon. The
general in ancient Athens, who was also a writer of history and a
philosopher, fought in Persia and in his Anabasis described the fa-
mous retreat by the 10,000 Greek soldiers which he personally led.
But one asks oneself why the world press so eagerly published the
Soviet magazine Ogornick’s figment of the imagination.
The only account of Operation Weitsprung worthy of being taken
seriously was published in the Sunday Times on Jaunary 6, 1969.
The London weekly noted that Sir Alexander Cadogan, who was
State secretary in the Foreign Office in 1943, wrote in his memoirs
that at the time of the conference in Tehran “the Soviets claimed to
have uncovered a plot.” The author’s skepticism is obvious.
Averell Harriman, who was the American ambassador in Tehran,
was interviewed by the Sunday Times and said: “Molotov said to me
that there were many Germans in this area (flattering!!!) and a plot
was possible. I saw Molotov again after the conference and asked
206 OTTo SKORZENY
him whether there had in fact been a conspiracy. He assured me that
the strictest security measures had been taken on the basis of these
rumors. But he never told me that there really was a threat.”
Sir Kenneth Strong, who later led the British intelligence service
S.M., seemed to have the most accurate view of the suspected
Weitsprung action:

“T suspect,” he observed, “that the Russians used this alleged plot

as an excuse to move Roosevelt to a villa near the Soviet embassy in
Tehran; and you can be sure that this villa was bristling with micro-
phones.”

Lord Moran, Churchill’s physician, accompanied the prime minister

to Tehran. In his memoirs, under the heading “How Stalin Found an
Ally,” Moran wrote on November 28, 1943 that the American lega-
tion, where the president of the United States was supposed to stay,
was rather far from the British and Soviet embassy buildings in Tehran.
Since Molotov was talking about a possible assassination attempt
against Roosevelt, the American president moved to a villa belong-
ing to the Russian embassy. “He certainly was well guarded there,
for even all the domestic servants in the villa were members of the
NKVD, which Beria led.”
In conclusion Lord Moran said that, “Churchill protested furi-
ously if any of us expressed skepticism about an alleged German
plot. Winston Churchill was the only one who believed in a plot.
Stalin was not in the least worried about the safety of President
Roosevelt. He just wanted to keep an eye on him and prevent him
from being able to conspire against him with the English prime min-
ister.”
It is known that Stalin visited the villa immediately after his ar-
rival. On this occasion the American president expressed to the Rus-
sian dictator the hope that the Malaysian States, Burma and “the other
British colonies” would soon “learn the art of governing themselves.”
As well Roosevelt recommended to his “little brother” that he not
discuss India with Churchill yet... Lord Moran learned these details
from Harry Hopkins, an advisor and intimate of Roosevelt’s.
Certain journalists, who almost always defend the USSR and the
NKVD out of fear, would do well to read Lord Moran’s memoirs.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 207
In reality Operation Weitsprung existed only in the imaginations
of a few truth-loving scribes or for the “fellow comrades” of Bolshe-
vism. Stalin succeeded in isolating Churchill at Tehran, and the Brit-
ish prime minister was forced to accept the proposals of his two in-
terlocutors.
On July 3, 1958 Lord Halifax had tea with Lord Moran. On this
occasion he told him the following anecdote: as British ambassador
in Washington he was often invited by Republican senators. One of
them said to him: “All those present consider Mr. Roosevelt a worse
dictator than Hitler or Mussolini.”
In July 1945 Churchill said to his doctor:

“I begged the Americans on my knees not to leave the Russians

such a large part of Germany. But the president had already given in.
l am going to ask Stalin: Do you want the whole world?”

On the theme of Weitsprung, I would like to add in closing that in all

probability the Director in Moscow was advised of my visit to the
OKW by the Red Orchestra. Moscow undoubtedly also learned that
I declared the action in Tehran impossible. But for Stalin the oppor-
tunity was too good to pass up, to practically isolate Roosevelt in the
Russian embassy using the excuse of “having to protect him from
any danger” and in so doing completely isolating Churchill.
It is understandable that Operation Weitsprung became “news”
again when various scandals in the western intelligence services be-
came known in the years 1965-1968, followed by a wave of suicides.
Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoli, a former official of the French secret
service, made disclosures about the Soviet spy net “Sapphire.” The
“Sapphire” affair was so significant that President Kennedy even
encouraged de Gaulle to take drastic measures. It was an opportunity
for the east-oriented press to recall that their good friend Beria and
the Soviet secret service had prevented “the murder at the summit,”
and had saved the life of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The democratic
leader was elected President of the United States — for the third time!
— on November 5, 1940, after promising throughout his campaign,
“not to send a single American soldier across the Atlantic.”
208 Otto SKORZENY
..o

Operation Ulm, planned by Reichsführer SS Himmler, was by its

nature also not simple to carry out. Its aim was to destroy the blast
furnaces and steel works of Magnitogorsk, as well as one or two
power stations that provided the large metal and chemical plants with
the necessary energy.
I had never been to Magnitogorsk, which lay beyond the Urals.
The Luftwaffe had the best information about these remote Soviet
heavy industries. In the period 1940-41, when we still had total air
superiority, it had taken outstanding aerial photographs of the area.
Since 1942 Department VI-C of Office VI of the RSHA and the
corresponding offices of the Abwehr had been striving to obtain tech-
nical details. Together with the Luftwaffe and the Foreign Armies
East Department, whose chief was the later Generalmajor Gehlen,
comprehensive information was assembled under the name Zeppe-
lin.
From about 5 million Russian prisoners, 100,000 were selected
who knew something about the Urals region: engineers, architects,
teachers, intellectuals, shop foremen, and so on. They provided a
tremendous amount of information. As a result we were finally able
to create a faithful picture of this huge land, its industries and the
mentality of the various people who lived there.
Through Zeppelin? I possessed many exact site plans and knew
where the largest industrial collective combines were located and
how they were built: I also knew what sort of security measures there
were: for example dogs were largely used for the nighttime guards.
But that wasn’t a great help: it was totally impossible for me to
attack and destroy any sort of object in the Urals in the near future.
Walter Schellenberg, who had read Himmler’s imploring cable,
asked me for my opinion on this operation. I told him openly that I
considered the plan pure fantasy and wrote a report in the same vein.
“Let it be,” observed Schellenberg, “and let me give you some
advice based on my experience: the more fantastic and grotesque a
project coming to you from ‘above’ seems, then with all the more
enthusiasm must you take it up and find it brilliant. Then go on for
four or five months as if you’re working on it; in any case long enough
until a new, even crazier plan comes and the previous one is forgot-
ten. In this way you will eam the reputation of a man who shrinks
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 209
from nothing and on whom they can depend. That is easy, for if you
don’t undertake anything impossible then nothing can go wrong...”
It’s no wonder that Schellenberg had such a brilliant career in the
shadows of Himmler and Heydrich!
In November 1944, shortly before the Ardennes offensive, at a
time when I was working day and night on the plan for this action, I
was summoned by Himmler to his new headquarters at Hohenlychen.
We sat around a large, round table: Himmler, Dr. Kaltenbrunner,
Schellenberg, Obergruppenführer Prützmann and I. What was it
about? In the east the city of Riga had fallen into Russian hands on
October 13. The Soviet armies had taken Belgrade on October 21,
entered Romanian Transylvania and were bombarding the suburbs
of Budapest. The Reich itself was threatened.
“What is involved,” explained Himmler, “is to form and orga-
nize a resistance movement that Martin Bormann has, I believe, given
the unusual title of Werwolf.”
What had I to do with that? Everyone around me wore serious
expressions and Schellenberg, as always, agreed eagerly. They failed
to convince me of the effectiveness of this Werwolf, for the good
reason that a resistance movement must arise in the entire nation,
have realistic and constructive political objectives and most of all be
very strong materially and also be supported from the outside. The
countryside must be suitable as well. The strategy of the Werwolf
could certainly be used in the Balkans, or in Iran, in Russia or China.
There were certainly tactical advantages to be gained there. But not
in a country with a large population in a small area, with railroads,
highways and roads, which could expect no help whatsoever from
outside. It was completely illusory to expect Anglo-American help
against the Russians in 1945.
We could certainly have made use of such a resistance move-
ment within a limited time frame in the mountains and forests of the
“Alpine fortress,” had this been organized to continue the fight with
a political objective: namely to gain time and bring our soldiers and
civilian population from the east to the west. Elsewhere Werwolf
would have in any case provoked harsh countermeasures by the oc-
cupation forces, without our nation being able to gain the least ben-
efit from such resistance. A subversive war of this nature only makes
sense if it is developed with the necessary time in the necessary area.
The pure resistance action would have to be combined with an upris-
210 Orto SkKoRZENY
ing by all the European peoples already under the Soviet yoke or
directly threatened by bolshevism.
I had no faith in the success of Werwolf and immediately asked
Himmler whether the field of action of my troops still lay outside
Germany as before. He answered yes, and Obergruppenfihrer
Pritzmann was theoretically tasked with the organization of this
movement. As I predicted, the Werwolf action achieved no notewor-
thy success, something that every reasonable German can be glad
for. Fortunately Werwolf can also be placed in the category of an
operation that remained nothing more than wishful thinking.
In the course of the discussion with Himmler the subject of new
weapons also came up. Quite imprudently I mentioned that in the
opinion of Admiral Heye, it would be possible to equip U-boats with
launching ramps for V-1 weapons. When Himmler heard this he leapt
from his armchair and ran to the map which covered a large part of
the wall.
“Then we must bombard New York!” he cried out, “lay it in ru-
ins!”
Schellenberg became even more enthusiastic; he really was an
outstanding actor. Himmler’s eyes looked him over behind his fa-
mous steel pince-nez.
“The Americans must also get a taste of the war,” he went on
dreaming. “We must inform the Führer at once and telephone the
grand admiral! Believe me, the psychological effect would be enor-
mous! I’m convinced that the Americans could not bear to be at-
tacked in their own country! Their fighting morale would sink to
zero! What do you think?”
Schellenberg nodded in silent agreement. Dr. Kaltenbrunner’s face
remained impassive; Obergruppenführer Prütmann was busy count-
ing his werewolves. It was difficult to get a chance to speak before
the higher-ranking officers present there. Himmler was lost in a study
of the map of America. Certainly he was already looking for targets.
Prützmann gave me a sign behind his back and Kaltenbrunner cast a
knowing look my way. I broke the silence and interjected that the V-
1 was a very imprecise weapon and that by firing it from a U-boat at
sea it would lack any accuracy.
“The American government,” I added, “uses the lie that Germany
poses a direct threat to the United States to make propaganda. Bom-
barding New York with two or three V-1s would only confirm
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 211
Roosevelt’s propaganda. I believe that the psychological effects would
be negative for us in every respect, for I am convinced that the Ameri-
can people would not let themselves become panic stricken and would
react bravely, like the British people during the ‘Blitz’ of 1940. Speak-
ing frankly, I don’t see what advantage such an operation could bring
us. A single V-1 would have to be able to hit a certain target with one
hundred percent accuracy and we would have to announce the target
by radio beforehand: at such and such a time target so and so will be
destroyed.”
Kaltenbrunner came to my aid.
“It would in fact be wiser,” he observed, “to wait until our spe-
cialists can build more accurate rockets.”
Himmler looked at us irresolutely. Then he calmed himself, sat
down again and declared that he wished to be kept apprised of the
progress made in the area of the V-1.
Of course the USA was never bombarded with V-1s nor by Ger-
man bombers. Today, however, the USA has moved very close to
Asia: with today’s nuclear-tipped rockets one can destroy half the
globe in minutes.

One of the most amazing men I ever met is Mohammed Amin al-
Husani, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. He was born in Jerusalem in
the year 1895, is a learned doctor of the Koran and during the First
World War fought against the Turkish Army. From the moment in
1920 when Lord Balfour achieved the existence of the jewish state in
Palestine, he became a fanatical defender of arab claims, which re-
sulted in his being sentenced to ten years in prison by the English.
He fled to Trans-Jordan and was named Grand Mufti and chairman
of the Supreme Islamic Council. He entered Jerusalem in triumph.
The British High Commissioner in Palestine tried to reach an ac-
commodation with him — without success. In 1929 al-Husaini de-
clared “Jihad,” the holy war, against zionist colonization, for he was
political and religious leader in one man. Since the order to imprison
him was still in effect, he fled to Lebanon where the French placed
him in a heavily guarded residence as a precautionary measure. He
fled from there too and after unbelievable adventures reached
Baghdad. His friend Rashid Ali undertook a coup d’ état there in 1941.
212 OTTO SKORZENY
This received only weak support from Germany, for we had only
limited landing rights in Syria, which was under French mandate. In
spite of the praiseworthy efforts of the intelligence service, Rashid
Ali's operation failed, and the Grand Mufti was again forced to flee.
He shaved off his beard, put on a European suit and appeared in
Rhodos in 1942 and then in Tirana. Finally he flew to Germany, where
he was received by Hitler.
He was a striking man: snow-white beard, blue eyes and a white
turban. He looked like what he was: a figure from “A Thousand and
One Nights.” He supported us in a most generous way and the Africa
Corps undoubtedly benefited from the tremendous influence he had
in North Africa.
In 1946 he returned to the Middle East from Germany and settled
in Egypt, where he again became chairman of the Supreme Islamic
Council: he found many adherents at the Islamic Conferences in
Karachi (1951) and Bandung (1955) and many of his proposals were
adopted.
With his support we could have carried out many interesting op-
erations in the Near East. Three of these were under preparation: the
purpose of the first was to cut the Iraq-Mediterranean oil pipeline.
Arab commandos had already blown up this artery, which delivered
crude oil to the large refineries of Haifa and Tripoli, several times.
But each time the pipeline was quickly repaired. Each time new com-
mandos had to be trained and sent into action.
The ideal solution would have been to put the pumping station
out of action, for it would have taken two to three months to put it
back into operation. Our engineers had developed a small floating
mine that could be introduced into the pipeline; but this device would
only have destroyed the valves. Dropping phosphorous bombs into a
narrow valley where both lines ran parallel, to burn out the lines,
would have achieved the same result: they would only need to re-
place a few sections of pipe, with an interruption of perhaps a week.
The most effective solution was still a direct action against a
pumping station. All of these sites had a small airfield for use by the
aircraft that patrolled the pipeline, and a small blockhouse for de-
fense. It was therefore possible to send a small detachment against
one of these stations in gliders by night. Professor Georgi, a friend of
Hanna Reitsch and a great glider specialist, had designed a new glider
which could accommodate a dozen soldiers with their equipment and
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 213
could be towed at 400 kph. In Ainring near Passau we investigated
how this heavy glider could be recovered, meaning how our com-
mandos would get back. Progress on this question was slow, and as a
result I came upon the idea of using shot-down or captured American
aircraft, which our mechanics had repaired, for example the DC-4
and the DC-6.
After a long wait | was informed that a half-dozen of these ma-
chines were ready. They were to be stationed on the island of Crete
or in Greece and take off from there on their missions to the Near
East.
We had excellent photographs of the pumping stations and their
airfields. The landing strips looked rather short, but we were told
that they had been lengthened. The target was chosen, and | decided
that six four-engined aircraft should land there and that our people
would be covered by light cannon and machine-guns from the air-
craft. We had a special device with which we could destroy the an-
tenna of the blockhouse, preventing them from sounding the alarm.
But just before we were to pick up our DC-4s and DC-6s, they were
destroyed in an enemy air raid on Munich’s military airfield. The
operation against the Iraq-Mediterranean oil pipeline had to be called
off. There was not sufficient time to make other American aircraft
airworthy in time.
Another operation we had prepared, to block the Suez Canal,
which was constantly overflown by our jet aircraft, also had to be
called off. On a day when seven or eight ships would sail through the
canal our frogmen would sink the first and the last ships in the canal
— and as many as possible in between. The frogmen were supposed
to be deposited in the Sinai Desert by glider and subsequently picked
up again. By the time we worked out exactly how the gliders were to
take off again - the English used a similar system in their Operation
“Market Garden” by the way — there was no more fuel available for
the mission!
Our attack on certain important elements of the oil production
installations at Baku also had to be put off “until further notice.” The
reasons were always the same: lack of materials and, above all, lack
of means of transport.
The locks of several harbors in southern England were especially
weak points: all we needed to do was deliver our manned torpedoes
there, by glider — but that was exactly what we lacked!
214 Otto SKORZENY
eco

I am quite happy that of all these planned and prepared actions I did
not in the end have to carry out Operation Der Wolf bellt (The Wolf
Howls).
At the end of November 1943 I received orders from the OKW
to make my way to Vichy via Paris with the Friedenthal Battalion
and to wait there for further instructions. In paris I contacted the
military commander, who was staying in the Hétel Continental on
the Place de l’Opéra, Rue de Rivoli. It really was astonishing how
many officers from all branches of the service were staying there;
but one met even more of his superiors in the Hétel Majestic, the seat
of the military commander of France. In the end I learned what this
order from the OKW was about: on November 9 Brigadier-General
de Gaulle had kicked his superior, Army General Giraud, out of the
“Comité Francais de Libération Nationale” (National Committee
for the Liberation of France), which was meeting in Algiers, and had
named himself president of the committee. He then summoned two
communists, Midol and Fajol, who were active as ministers on the
committee. Reports which had to be taken relatively seriously indi-
cated that Operation Badoglio was being prepared in Vichy. Accord-
ing to other information Marshall Pétain, the French head of state, in
agreement with several personalities from the marshall’s circle, was
supposed to be abducted by an English-Gaullist parachute commando.
I therefore drove to Vichy and took stock. At my disposal were
six police companies, the battalion of my special detachment and a
battalion of the Hohenstaufen Waffen-SS Division. I posted these
troops around the city; in the north at the airfield, which we of course
occupied; near Vesse in the west, Cusset in the east and Hauterive in
the south. This were in total 2,000 soldiers who could seal off the
city in a very short time. I sent patrols to the Randan Forest. Not a
single enemy paratrooper was found in the course of the entire week.
There were no new reports: neither from the SD or the Abwehr.
My la Fölkersam and I obtained some completely contradictory in-
formation while in civilian clothes. It was clear to me that a serious
uneasiness existed in Vichy, but that the reason for this was not the
gaullist paratroopers. The meeting at Montoire in 1940 had not
achieved the desired results, neither for Germany nor for France,
with whom, as I have already said, a definitive peace should have
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 215
been concluded long ago. We had now occupied the country for three
years. The tide of war was turning against us on all fronts. Resistance
movements had sprung up, almost always led by the communists,
the same group whose leaders had recommended fraternization with
our soldiers from July to October 1940. Hitler had so little interest in
the future of Germany-France relations, which was so important for
a new Europe, that he was surprised to hear in November 1943 that
our ambassador Abetz had been working there since December of
the previous year.
I made all the necessary preparations around Vichy, and since no
further orders arrived I drove to Paris. There I telephoned the Wolfs-
schanze and learned that I was to return immediately to the Auvergne
and was to wait for the code-word “The Wolf Howls.” Then I was to
concer myself with the persons of French head of state Marshall
Pétain and his physician Dr. Ménétrel. I was responsible for their
safety and would receive further instructions when “the wolf howled.”
Marshall Pétain lived in Vichy on the fourth floor of the Hétel du
Parc; his bodyguard, which I observed in the course of its duties,
didn’t look too bad. A confrontation with it could possibly become
serious. But what worried me most was what time of day “the wolf”
would “howl.” I hoped that it wouldn’t begin to how! at night. If
two- or three-thousand enemy paratroops jumped around Vichy at
two in the morning, and if the marshall was well informed about the
action and was waiting dressed in his uniform or civilian clothes,
they would surely be able to take him.
I must admit that I had great respect for this old soldier, who
called to the politicians for help when nothing else worked. He was
then eighty-six years old and still stood erect in his sky-blue uni-
form. When I saw him I couldn’t help but think of Field Marshall
von Hindenburg, who after the First World War likewise had to bear
the burden of a lost war. Philippe Pétain was eighty-nine years old
when they sentenced him to death. He died at the age of ninety-five
as a prisoner in the fortress of the island of d’ Yeu.
I am glad that the wolf didn’t howl. We received departure or-
ders, left Vichy and were able to begin our Christmas leave straight-
away. At the invitation of the German submarine command we spent
it in a rest and recovery home for U-boat crews on the Arlberg. It was
my last leave of this war.
216 OTTo SKORZENY
On the other hand I must admit that I would have been very happy
to have captured a different marshall, namely Tito. The genealogy of
the present-day head of state of Yugoslavia is a controversial ques-
tion. My late friend Alexander Botzaris assured me that Tito’s
“Croatian grandmother” was pure invention. Josef F. Broz was offi-
cially born in Kamrovec in 1892. He was a soldier by profession and
fought in the First World War with the Austro-Hungarian Army. He
was promoted to sergeant in 1915 and was captured by the Russians
in the Carpathians. He was then said to have fought with the commu-
nists in the Omsk area and subsequently — so it says in the official
biography — worked for the communist party in Yugoslavia under the
name “Walter.” Was it the same Broz who turned up in Vienna in
1934 after five years in prison, was trained in the Moscow special
schools in 1935-36 and who led the pro-Soviet resistance in Yugo-
slavia in 1941-42? It may have been.
In early 1944 I received orders from the OKW to locate Tito’s
headquarters, to destroy it and capture him. Tito had already replaced
General Mihailovich as Churchill desired. The minister of war of the
young King Peter II of Yugoslavia, who was living in London,
Mihailovich was frightened of the growing influence of the commu-
nists. To his astonishment his chetniks sometimes even fought along-
side Hungarian troops, the croatians of Ante Pavelich and even our
soldiers against Tito’s troops.
But where was Tito hiding? I had no idea. Yugoslavia, with its
mountainous, wooded terrain, was ideal for partisan warfare. The
information we received from the appropriate sections of the Abwehr
and the SD was imprecise and contradictory. So I drove to Zagreb
and organized my own intelligence service. I entrusted this to three
capable officers. Each was in charge of his own intelligence net. The
agents of each net worked independently of each other. I myself re-
solved not to undertake anything until I had received three unani-
mous reports. We acted quickly and with the necessary secrecy, for
we couldn’t afford to attract the attention of the enemy; a cunning
enemy who was holding half a dozen of our divisions in check.
I had stationed a training battalion of my commando unit in the
Fruska Gora, a chain of mountains parallel to the Danube Valley and
south of it. The battalion’s training would, in reality, be carried out
“near the front”: the soldiers saw action every day against Tito’s forces.
A military convoy would have made the partisans suspicious. I there-
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 217
fore drove from Belgrade to Zagreb in a normal car and escorted by
two officers through the local area. After the Sawe Valley and over
poor roads, we reached Brcko, then Zagreb. The commander of the
German garrison was extremely surprised to see us in one piece after
our trip: the roads we had used were controlled by the partisans. We
had in fact encountered a group of bearded partisans, their rifles un-
der their arms. We also had our machine pistols on the floor of the
car — invisible from outside, with the safety catches on “fire.” It was
immediately obvious to me that we had committed an act of care-
lessness that could have had disastrous consequences: “Tito captures
Skorzeny!”, a lovely headline for the Daily Mirror in May 1944!
I then returned to Berlin and soon afterward learned from my
three independent intelligence services that Tito and his staff were at
the moment staying near Dvar in western Bosnia. I at once sent my
chief-of-staff, Hauptsturmführer Adrian von Fölkersam, to the com-
manding general of X Army Corps, which was stationed in this area,
in order to inform him that we would be carrying out Operation
Rösselsprung (Knight’s Move) against Tito. Just as I was about to
leave to lead the operation on the spot, suddenly von Félkersam
showed up back in Friedenthal.
“Something’s not right!” he said. “The general received me very
coolly, and I don’t believe that we can count on his support in this
action.”
A radio message from our small working staff in Zagreb soon
gave us an explanation for this very cool reception: “X Corps prepar-
ing an operation against Tito’s headquarters. Date set for June 2,
1944.”
That was decidedly stupid. Had the general revealed his cards, I
would gladly have placed myself under his command and left him
the glory of this operation and also accepted the responsibility my-
self had it eventually misfired. But even worse was the fact that if I
now knew that the plan was to be carried out on June 2, Tito had
surely been informed as well. I immediately advised X Corps and
sent another of my staff officers to corps headquarters in Banja Luka,
in order to try and change the date of the action. It did no good. The
operation took place on the scheduled day: the large force of German
troops encountered alerted partisan units. A battalion of Waffen-SS
parachute troops were encircled in the Dvar Valley and required re-
inforcements to be flown in by glider. A battalion of the Brandenburg
218 OTTO SKORZENY
Division had to cover the withdrawal by our soldiers, who were at-
tacked from all sides. This battalion was commanded by the brave
Oberstleutnant Walther, who was wounded and in January 1945 took
the place of my chief-of-staff von Fölkersham with my SS commando
units. The Waffen-SS parachute battalion and the battalion of the
Brandenburg Division also came under my command in September
1944. The courageous Brandenburgers were incorporated into my
units as “Commando Unit Southeast,” while the other companies,
which were commanded by Major Otto Beck, were attached to “Com-
mando Unit South,” which was fighting in Italy. I will come back to
Major Beck.
Broz had obviously fled. Allthey found in his headquarters were
two British officers, whom he probably wanted to get rid of, and a
brand-new marshall’s uniform. Tito had named himself marshall on
November 29, 1943 — and he dressed himself accordingly! Some-
what later I was informed that he had fled to the island of Viz. But as
a result of the assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20, 1944,
it wasn’t possible for me to organize a “Knight's Move” against the
Adriatic island. Major Otto Beck would have all to gladly attacked
Tito’s island headquarters. He was mad at me for a long time for
refusing to give him the order to do it.
Does anyone remember that the real oppression in Yugoslavia
began in April 1945? On November 11 of that same year Tito pro-
claimed the Federative People’s Republic, declared the dynasty of
the Karageorgians deposed and assumed the power of the throne.
General Mihailovich and his general staff were executed on July 17,
1946. Ten-thousand Croats and Serbs were punished with death and
3,670,000 followers of the previous regime were arrested. Many of
them died in prison or labor camps. Churchill contented himself with
writing to Peter Il in August 1945:
“I hear that many regrettable things are happening in Yugoslavia.
Unfortunately it is not in my power to intervene against them.”
That was the funeral speech for those who had fought against
communism in Yugoslavia.
I would like to cite a personal experience at this point: it’s a small
world: after the war I chanced to meet in Mallorca one of the two
officers who Broz had so nicely left behind when he fled. Like me,
he had been invited aboard the ship of a mutual English friend, and
we became friends right away. He belonged to Colonel David
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 219
Stirling's commando group and had taken part in the well-known
operation against Benghazi (Libya) by the “phantom major.” By the
way some of the participants in this action wore German uniforms.
Then my new friend joined a secret commando and was finally sent
by Churchill to Tito. My former enemy and new friend, later a Briga-
dier-General, told me that during his stay at the headquarters of the
“marshall” he became very aware that if Tito assumed power com-
munism would also triumph in Yugoslavia. He sent report after re-
port to this effect to London — but there was no reaction.
“The situation appeared so serious to me,” he told me, “and so
detrimental to British interests in the Balkans, that I made my way
with great difficulty to Gibraltar and from there personally spoke
with our prime minister by telephone. I gave him a very factual re-
port on what Tito had in mind for Yugoslavia. Churchill let me speak
and then asked:
“What do you plan to do personally, after the war?”
“Somewhat baffled, I replied that I intended to return to my es-
tate in Scotland.”
“That means then, if I understand correctly, that you don’t want
to stay and live in Yugoslavia?”
“No sir, of course not.”
“Then why should you care a damn what happens to Yugoslavia
after the war!”
The American secret service (CIA) credited me with the opera-
tion against Tito’s headquarters, because it was of the opinion that
the Waffen-SS parachute battalion had then already been placed un-
der my command.
My “Commando Unit Southeast” did however make life diffi-
cult for Tito’s brave troops. For some time in Fruska Gora we had the
same medical officer, a Serb, as the partisans, as the military doctor
assigned to our unit had not yet arrived. This fact simplified the ex-
change of wounded prisoners.
We started a small retaliatory action and captured a few British
liaison officers. Among these was Churchill’s son, Randolph. It was
amusing that our soldiers reaped the benefits of the supplies sent to
Tito by his father Winston Churchill. The credit is due to Major Beck.
He was an outstanding man, who in the First World War had been
awarded the Great Golden Medal! of Bravey (Austria) as a common
soldier. But Otto Beck, who was intimately familiar with the ways
220 OTTO SKORZENY
and customs of the Balkans, was also a man with big ideas. Almost
too late they made available large quantities of five and ten pound
Sterling notes, with which Major Beck’s middlemen bought from
the partisans whole truckloads of weapons, ammunition and assorted
war materials. These materials were dropped off regularly by British
submarines and small ships at certain hidden harbors on the Adriatic
coast. Our soldiers took delivery of the wares directly and paid with
phoney British Sterling pounds, which the partisans gladly exchanged
for thousands of dinars. This “exchange” went on for months to the
general satisfaction of everyone, until Marshall Tito’s general! staff
got wind of it. Fighting broke out in the course of an exchange of
goods and our useful and cheap deliveries were stopped.
The banknotes were made by professional counterfeiters, who
were in concentration camps during the war. On this occasion we put
them in special barracks, where they enjoyed more freedom. A cer-
tain Walter Hagen tries to describe the whole story in his book
Unternehmen Bernhardt. Hagen is the cover name for Wilhelm Hoettl,
one of Schellenberg’s associates in Office V1 (Foreign) of the RSHA.
Before the Nuremberg Tribunal he wriggled out by bravely playing
the role of witness for the prosecution. He had always been a master
of the double game. Today he admits that he had been in contact with
the Black Orchestra in the Vatican since 1943 and later established
ties with Allen Welsh Dulles, later head of the CIA, in Switzerland.
Unfortunately this takes us back into the magic circle of the secret
service.
After the war Doctor Hjalmar Schacht explained to me that the
Reichsbank had no idea that phoney Sterling pounds were being made.
A few banknotes were sent to the Swiss Banking Association to be
checked. In an accompanying phoney letter from the Reichsbank,
they explained that they thought the notes were counterfeit. After
close examination the Swiss replied that the banknotes were real and
that the Bank of England had certified that the serial numbers and
dates of issue corresponded to the bills in circulation.
The principal distributor of the phoney money was a clever busi-
nessman by the name of Friedrich Schwend, to whom they gave an
honorary rank in the Allgemeine SS and who naturally earned a com-
mission on each issue of money. After the war Schwend probably
hid or burned most of the available English pounds, and for years the
English secret service busied itself with the affair and made enqui-
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 221
ries. Schwend, who certainly lost no money in this affair, had pos-
sessed considerable wealth even before. But as Cicero said in his
famous speech against Vertes’: “in multis esse numnis” (having his
chests full of gold), always helped. And where the make-believe
Cicero was concerned, he was paid in phoney English pounds, al-
though his information was real gold. In 1954 Bazna wrote to Chan-
cellor Adenauer to complain about the “great injustice” that had been
done him and to demand the modest assistance of 2,100,000 DM
against the 12 million that he had lying in a frozen Swiss bank ac-
count. Unfortunately the German chancellor did not agree to Cicero's
request.
When we were preparing our commandos in the Near East, Walter
Schellenberg revealed to me, “that we might eventually manage the
affair,” and “that we weren't quite so poor.” In this way I learned of
the existence of the counterfeit English banknotes. Office VI's pay-
master gave 5,000 Pounds to my adjutant Karl Radi when we were
trying to find and free Mussolini. Radl kept the bills in a small, locked
case. I recommended that we only pass out these banknotes spar-
ingly, and subsequently demanded very precise record keeping of
Dr. Berger, who had to distribute this money to a dozen officers of
the intelligence service. I must say that, in my opinion, Dr. Berger
was too generous with it. I made it clear to him that this phoney
money was as good as real money and therefore had to be used spar-
ingly. Finally we were able to refund most of the sum entrusted to
him to the Office VI paymaster.
Must I mention that neither Karl Radi nor I used this money in
any way and that we defrayed our personal expenses from out of our
soldier’s pay? Many will probably say that we were stupid. But we
were just convinced that the phoney pound notes were a weapon that
allowed us to win a partial economic victory over the enemy. We
were soldiers and it would never have occurred to us to make money
on the side or buy on the black market. In Yugoslavia, on the other
hand, I had not the least scruples about using this phoney money: the
more weapons we bought, the fewer weapons the partisans had with
which to fight and even kill our comrades.
After the war there were many chroniclers and journalists who
claimed to have seen me in the vicinity of Toplitz Lake in Austria,
“the chief-of-staff of a special detachment charged with raising the
SS treasure sunk deep in the lake.” Of course about 30 chests, con-
222 OTTO SKORZENY
taining “millions of counterfeit pounds,” are lying in about 30 to 40
meters of water (others say 50 to 70 meters).
Anything is possible. During the war Toplitz was a navy testing
and training center, and it is quite possible that there are chests on the
bottom of the lake containing banknotes, documents and the like. I
don’t know; I have also never worried about it. In 1963 a so-called
Max Gruber, former member of the SS, testified that he had been
present at the sinking of the chests and had seen me on the shore of
the lake... Questioned by an investigating commission of the Aus-
trian government, Gruber was forced to admit that he was first of all
not a former member of the SS; second, that he had never been to
Toplitz until he went there with the commission; third, that he conse-
quently never saw any chests being sunk; and fourth, that he had
mentioned my name to lend himself credibility. He was charged with
making false statements.
It is true, however, that the Austrian investigating committee had
chests raised from the lake, however their contents have not been
revealed to this day. Unfortunately in 1963 a young Munich diver
aged nineteen drowned. Since then the Austrian government has for-
bidden further search operations.
The most unbelievable article ever published about this affair
appeared in the Swedish paper Vägen Framat (on November 30,
1963). A certain Palmquist “confessed” that under my direction he
had removed numerous chests of “treasure” from the lake, to where
he had come by aircraft from Stockholm every night. He had taken
several gold bars with him, which he kept in a safe. The same
Palmquist introduced the editor of another Swedish paper, the
Aftonbladet, to the Vagen Framat reporter as Benito Mussolini. The
Duce had a new face, supposedly the result of an operation by a
surgeon whom I had — of course — paid from the SS treasure. This
money had also enabled the Duce to be brought to Sweden and there
made the chief editor of the Aftonbladet!
I could recount many more crazy examples of this kind. But let
us leave that. In any case for about fifteen years certain persons have
made a profit from the alleged “treasure” of Toplitz, in that they have
ruthlessly exploited human gullibility and written and written...
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 223
ees

One can include the counterfeit money among the unconventional

weapons. But the father of this idea cannot claim the glory of having
invented this weapon. He was only imitating what the English did in
1794-1797, when they flooded France with phoney paper money on
the pretext of supporting the civil war in the Vendée.‘
In the years 1927 to 1932 ten million phoney banknotes of the
Federal Reserve Bank of the USA were made on Stalin’s order. These
bills were mainly issued in China, Havana, Montreal, San Francisco,
Belgrade and even Berlin. Numerous phoney 100-dollar bills, printed
in the Soviet Union, were discovered in Berlin. The Berliner Tageblan
of January 23, 1930 and then the New York Times of February 24,
1933 came to the same conclusion, namely that the phoney dollars
came from Russia and were put into circulation by known Soviet
agents, which was of course a mistake.
It is really a shame that we couldn't have bought the Russian
automatic rifle in 1941. This weapon, which then could fire ten shots
automatically, was easy to use and showed how carefully the Rus-
sians had prepared for war. In the early phases of the war this weapon
gave the Russian infantryman superior firepower.
The English also possessed perfect and simple weapons at that
time, especially the Sten submachine-gun, to which a silencer could
be fitted.
I took an interest in this type of weapon right at the beginning
when I took over the Friedenthal Battalion, in part because they were
delivered to us direct from London. In Holland we found several
resistance organizations, which though insignificant, enabled our
intelligence service to play an interesting radio game with the en-
emy. In this way I placed an order in London for a revolver with a
silencer. Fourteen days later I received the weapon via the Dutch
captain of a Swedish ship, a sort of double agent, as I suspected.’ I
opened the window of the office where we worked and fired at a
group of ducks swimming in the canal. There was scarcely a hiss to
be heard, and the passers-by never even raised their heads.
I was also one of the first German soldiers to receive a Sten
submachine-gun fitted with a similar type of silencer. Obviously it
was a great advantage to a special detachment or patrol when the
224 Otto SKORZENY
soldiers, if forced to fire, could do so almost without making a sound.
For the front-line soldiers such weapons would also be of great im-
portance in patrol work, and the best results could be achieved with
limited casualties.
Apart from the silencer the Sten offered several advantages: it
was far superior to the German submachine-guns and for several rea-
sons: much quicker to manufacture, it also cost significantly
less than ours, which were however more accurate. The Sten could
be dropped into the water, the snow, the dirt and it still worked. Not
ours. Why not produce the silent Sten in quantity?
I tried to convince two senior officers of the Military Economic
and Armaments Office, whose commander was General Georg Tho-
mas. I invited them to supper at Friedenthal: they were reluctant. It
was spring, pleasant weather, and so I suggested a walk in the park
after supper. They agreed. We walked part of the way. Suddenly |
stopped them.
“Gentlemen,” I said to them, “you are dead. And probably I too.”
They collided in the darkness.
“Dead? We're dead?”
Behind us one of my people flashed his pocket lamp. He had the
Sten with the silencer in his hand and pointed at the empty shell
casings on the ground. He had fired an entire magazine into the air.
Our technicians of the armaments ministry were visibly very
impressed by their theoretical and silent death. But the submachine-
gun lecture in the park achieved nothing. The answer I received from
General Thomas’ colleagues was:

“You are correct in principle. But, you admit yourself: the Sten
submachine-gun is no precision weapon. The Filhrer has repeatedly
said that every German soldier has a right to the best weapons in
every respect, and we could not accept responsibility for recommend-
ing the manufacture of a submachine-gun that, even if silent, is less
accurate than those already under production in Germany. Heil
Hitler!”

We could say the General Thomas, on the other hand, did not hesi-
tate to accept grave responsibilities.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 225
Notes
1. One should recall the mission given General Gardane, who was scnt to Shah Fel Ali in Tehran by
Napoleon in 1807. ee TT ee ene ee hres was tobe the
60,000 mediocre infamy and 140,000 outstanding cavalry. After Constantinople, Tehran was to be the
socood stop for the grast Orioctel Army. which wasn ts wey us laa: N Shah
the reincorporation of Georgia (which had belonged to Russia since 1801) into the Persian
Without the gold and the intrigues of Sir Hartford Jones, who also moved in from the Persian Gulf and
falled Operation Gardane in 1809, Sulin would perhaps have been born a Persian!

2. tt appears that the author of Schellenberg's biography confused Ulm with Zeppelin.
La it he speaks of
Operation Ahn int An Dımelın had neria] Prima.
rly in Magnitogorsk and Kubichev-Chelyabinsk. The strikes were to be made using V-1 weapons,
which were lo be carried part way to their targets by jong range bombers (of which we never had
caough, incidentally). This project could therefore nut have been planned before June 1944, because
the V-1 was not ready for series production until then. However, Operation Ube was supposed to be
caftied out a yoar carlier (in 1943).

3. ann Verren fensons Roanan Lyranl. Bppoied money ce In Say m 71 tr imposed«

ig Roman citizens. He fled without waiting to be tried. (Editors’
Hote)

4. This was an idea of British Prime Minister William Pitt. There was such s quantity of assignazs
(French bank notes), that paper moncy soon coased to have any value whatsoever. The “Louis d'or”,
which was worth 2,500 paper francs in November 1795, inne tito
the Direktorium was forced to withdrew all assignet from circulation. (Editors’ note

5. All Britiah special units were in posscasion of this 7.6Smm-celiber revolver in 1943. I was in Den
Haag when they gave me ane.
PART III
 16
HITLER’? ORDER:
You MusT FIND AND FREE THE Duce!
OPERATION ALARICH

Why Hitler chose me — His talent, convincing men — His proposals -

Discussions with General Student and Himmler — Illusions on the
part of the Reichsfiihrer — “You are not the right man for the job” -
Illusions on the part of Field Marshall Kesselring — The double game
played by the Italian king and Badoglio — Stalin, a “cousin” of Vic-
tor Emmanuel! - Betrayal, fear and flight by the royalist clique —
Canaris steps onto the stage — The story of the Pope’s arrest — Diffi-
culties in our investigations — Mussolini on the island of Ponza - He
is to be delivered to the English and is sought by the Americans, who
want to kidnap him - Churchill's secret speech to the English House
of Commons.

he six of us stood along the wall. We were six officers: an

Oberstleutnant and a Major of the army, two Oberstleutnants
of the Luftwaffe, an SS-Sturmbannführer and I. Since I
had the lowest rank, I was last in the line, all leaders of
special units.
The room had indirect lighting, so there were no shadows. Be-
fore us was a long table, with general staff situation maps and sev-
eral colored pencils, a fireplace, beside the large window a desk and
on the opposite wall a small painting, Dürer’s Veilchen, in a silver
frame.
A door opened to my left: Hitler stepped into the room, walked
past us slowly and saluted us briefly with a raised hand. Then he
looked at us for several moments without saying anything. This was
the third time I had seen him. The first time had been at the 1936
Olympic Winter Games in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. The second time
228
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 229
I had been standing with my workers high above on a scaffolding on
the Vienna Ring when he entered the city in triumph in March 1938.
At this moment he was only a few steps away from me. He wore
a white shirt with black tie under his field-grey jacket. On his breast
was the Iron Cross, First Class from the First World War and the
silver badge awarded for having been wounded three times. His ad-
jutant introduced the Oberstleutnant on the right end, then the others
followed. When Hitler stopped before me he shook my hand, and his
gaze did not leave me for an instant. I bowed briefly and gave a
quick summary of my military career. Then he stepped back a few
steps, sized us all up once again and asked:
“Who of you is familiar with Italy?”
For several seconds there was silence. I was the only one to speak
up.
“I have travelled as far as Naples in two private trips by motor-
cycle, mein Führer.”
Quiet. Then suddenly the second question.
“What do you think of Italy?”
The army Oberstleutnant answered that Italy was our military
and ideological ally, the Luftwaffe officers mentioned the Rome-
Berlin axis, and my immediate neighbor spoke of the anti-Comintemn
pact. When Hitler was standing in front of me, I merely said, “I am
Austrian, mein Führer!”
On hearing these words he looked at me long and searchingly.
Was he waiting for me to say something else? I remained silent. I had
said it all in three words: South Tirol, our struggle for union with the
fatherland. The silence continued and | sensed that something must
happen now.
“I have to speak further with Hauptsturmführer Skorzeny,” he
said in a calm voice. “The other officers may withdraw.”
They excused themselves and left the room. We were alone. It
was about 10:30 P.M., July 26, 1943, when Hitler informed me in the
Wolfsschanze what sort of mission he was about to entrust me with.
His approximate words were, “Mussolini was betrayed yesterday.
His king has had him arrested. But the Duce is not only my ally, he is
also my friend. To me he is the embodiment of the last great Roman,
and I can not abandon this statesman. He was too careless. The new
Italian government will surely desert us and deliver the Duce to the
230 Orro SKORZENY
Anglo-Saxons: he will be betrayed and sold. And I must prevent such
a breach of faith from taking place!”
Both of us were still standing. He walked up and down the large
room and appeared to be thinking. Then he stopped before me and
once again looked at me long.
“We must find out where the Duce is being held and free him.
That is the mission I have for you Skorzeny. And I have chosen you
because I am convinced that you will succeed with this operation.
And you must risk everything to carry out this action, which is now
most important to the conduct of the war. Naturally this mission is to
be kept absolutely secret, otherwise it will fail. Only five other people
may be informed about it. You are attached to the Luftwaffe and
placed under the command of General Student, who will subsequently
give you the details. I don’t want Italy to become a trap for our sol-
diers, and all false friends must be eliminated. I charge you person-
ally with finding out as quickly as possible where Mussolini is being
held prisoner and rescuing him from there. You will of course select
your own people for the mission. But you must act quickly, very
quickly! You will understand that the life of the Duce depends on it!”
“Jawohl, mein Führer!”
So it wasn’t Franz, or Ulm, as I had assumed when I drove to the
Wolfsschanze. I thought of my comrades in Berlin and Friedenthal,
who were definitely worried.
“The most important thing,” continued the Führer, “is that nei-
ther the German military headquarters in Italy nor our embassy in
Rome is to be allowed to learn your exact mission. Understand, these
gentlemen have a completely false picture of the situation and would
probably act incorrectly. That means: strictest secrecy! I have full
confidence in you Skorzeny. We will see one another again. In the
meantime I wish you all the best!”
He shook my hand. I promised to do my best.
Much has been written about Hitler’s gaze. It is said that this
gaze was fascinating, hypnotic, magnetic. The only thing I can say
for certain is that the Fihrer did radiate a real, unusual persuasive
power. His gaze alone was enough to convince. His word, his bear-
ing, the entire man radiated an extraordinary power. This conversa-
tion had lasted barely twenty minutes, and nevertheless I gained the
impression that Hitler’s account of events had lasted hours.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 231
Hitler knew me no better than the other five officers. Why had he
chosen me? ... “Because I am convinced that you will succeed,” he
had said, and he repeated it twice. From where did he have this con-
viction, and why was I too, when I stood before him, convinced of
the success of this operation? I cannot say.
I felt hungry and was about to get something in the tea house
when Hitler’s adjutant Otto Giinsche, then an Hauptsturmführer in
the Waffen-SS, informed me that General Student was waiting for
me in an adjoining room. He was a jovial-looking, somewhat rotund
man, who had been badly wounded outside Rotterdam in 1940. A
deep crevice on his forehead was a reminder. He greeted me warmly
and I told him of the mission I had just received from the Führer.
Then to my great surprise the Reichsführer of the SS also walked
into the room.
This was the first time I had seen him close up, and I must admit
that he didn’t look especially sympathetic to me. He had a weak hand-
shake, and his eyes shifted constantly behind his pince-nez. He got
on very well with General Student and turned out to be friendly in
spite of his extraordinary nervousness. He repeated to me what I had
already heard from Hitler.
“But there’s more than Mussolini involved!” he cried out. “You
must also know what’s behind it. And this is nothing less than trea-
son: the conspiracy that has been planned for four months is not lim-
ited to Italy. Its feelers reach out to Madrid, Ankara and Lisbon. The
leaders of this plot are King Victor Emmanuel and Prince Umberto.
The Fihrer doesn’t believe a word of Badoglio’s declaration that
Italy will stand by its treaties with us.” Himmler began to develop a
picture of the entire Italian conspiracy, and I had difficulty following
and committing to memory all the names.
The suspicion existed since January 18, 1942, the day on which
General Ambrosio, the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army, was
named chief of the general staff to succeed General Roatta. He had
been preparing to arrest the Duce since April of that year in agree-
ment with General Castellano. On orders from the king, a trap was
laid by Dino Grandi and Counts Ciano, de Vecchi and Bottai for a
sitting of the “Grand fascist Council.”
“And that’s not all!” continued the Reichsfihrer. “According to
the latest statistics the National Fascist Party has 700,000 members
232 OTTO SKORZENY
and the “Dopolavoro” movement five million. There is the fascist
militia as well! One can and must be able to hold a country with such
forces!”
Himmler had plenty of illusions. He ignored the fact that the fas-
cist militia had recently been incorporated into the army and that two
days hence the National Fascist Party was supposed to be abolished.
He added that Cercia, the carabinieri general, was not to be trusted
and that one couldn’t trust General Carboni, whose troops were sta-
tioned near Rome. Fortunately the capital was declared an open city
at the instigation of Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring.
This fact did not prevent the city from being bombarded by the
allies, however.
Himmler went on: General Galbiati, who intended to defend
Mussolini in front of the “Grand Council,” did not possess the neces-
sary ability, nor did Farinacci. Proof: the vote on Grandi’s order of
the day resulted in 19 votes against 7 and one abstention. Polverelli,
the minister for press and propaganda was a washout and so on. But
the craftiest was Umberto. He and the king had to be arrested. Also
Badoglio and others...
“Do you know at least who the future foreign minister will be?”
Himmler asked me.
Modestly I admitted that I did not. The Reichsfithrer shrugged
his shoulders.
“Guariglia, the former ambassador in Ankara! That’s also clear!”
For me that wasn’t so clear. Who was supposed to arrest the king
and the crown prince? The Fihrer had given me very explicit in-
structions where the Duce was concerned. Himmler showered us with
an avalanche of names — generals, admirals, ministers... He was in-
exhaustible, and although I had a good memory, | pulled out my
notebook to write down certain facts.
“Have you lost your mind?” the Reichsfihrer screamed at me.
“Everything I’m saying here is strictly secret!”
He shrugged his shoulders again and ensured that Student had
witnessed this unpardonable behavior. As it was almost eleven, I asked
for permission to telephone Berlin and let my unit know what was
happening. Outside in the hall I lit a cigarette as I waited for the
long-distance call. Just then Himmler came out of the room and lit
into me, “This is unbelievable! Don’t you have enough willpower to
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 233
stop smoking? Always these stinking cigarettes! I can see that you're
not the right man for this job!”
I said nothing, and he walked away, furious.
“You’re right not to take that too seriously,” observed Otto
Giinsche. “You just can’t talk to the Reichsfihrer when he’s ner-
vous.”
Günsche kindly offered me a room to work in. I asked for a sec-
retary, who came immediately. General Student called for me again:
I would act as his operations officer in Rome and fly with him to
Rome on July 27 at 8 A.M. Finally I got Untersturmfihrer Rad! on
the phone. I made it clear to him that there’d be little time for sleep
that night, and gave him my instructions: select thirty volunteer sol-
diers and the best officers; dress them in paratrooper uniforms and
provide them with the necessary papers. They were to leave from
Staaken airfield at six o’clock the next moming. The destination was
secret but would be given to the pilot during the flight. Ten officers
of the intelligence service, who were assigned to us, must leave with
us. Further instructions would come by teletype.
From midnight on, Karl Radi organized the operation in Berlin.
He was speechless when I told him that I had spoken to the Führer
personally. I didn’t see Rad] and his volunteers until they arrived at
the Practica di Mare airport. They had in fact followed all the in-
structions, except for one (which came from the Reichsführer per-
sonally), that all participants were to dye their hair black — the most
certain way to attract attention!
General Student and I landed at Rome at lunchtime on July 27
and subsequently drove the 20 kilometers southeast to Frascati, where
Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the commander-in-chief of
the southern front, had his headquarters. As General Student’s op-
erations officer, I had to accompany him to dinner with the
Generalfeldmarschall that same evening.
In the course of the evening I was able to ascertain that Hitler
was right: Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring was convinced that the
new monarchist government would continue the war at our side.
Marshall Badoglio had officially assured him of this and had even
given him his word of honor as a soldier.
Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring was one of the most sympathetic
commanders I ever met. After supper I sat with some young officers
who had spoken with senior Italian officers about the arrest of the
234 OTTO SKORZENY
Duce. The latter had assured them that they didn’t know where the
Duce was and that Marshall Badoglio probably didn’t know either. I
assessed these statements extremely skeptically and made that plain
to all, without noticing that Field Marshall Kesselring was standing
behind me.
“Herr Hauptmann,” he said positively, “I consider our Italian
comrades to be honorable, and you would do well do adopt a similar
attitude in future. We have no reason to doubt the word of honor of
an Italian general who is serving his king. The Italian armed forces
are and remain our loyal allies. They will fight at our side until the
end!”
I did not respond to the field marshall, but he wasn’t to hang on
to his illusions much longer: General Castellano would sign the dec-
laration of surrender with General Bedell-Smith in Syracuse on Sep-
tember 3, 1943.
On the evening of July 29 I waited for Radi and our soldiers. We
quartered our apparently genuine paratroopers at Practica di Mare
next to the airfield. I took Radl with me to Fracati. It is home to some
very famous: Borghese, Aldobrandini, Monti, Bracciano, Tusculum...
I had arranged our room in a villa next to Tusculum I], it was close to
General Student’s room. Only now did I explain to my adjutant what
was involved: to find where the Duce was being held prisoner in
order to free him as quickly as possible: that was the mission I had
received from Hitler personally. But during the night of July 26-27
we received an additional order from the OKW, according to which
we must eventually “take care of” the following personalities: the
king, the crown prince Umberto, the new foreign minister Guariglia,
the minister and advisor to the king Acquarone, as well as Signore
Bottai, former member of the Fascist Grand Council. The paratroops
of Student’s corps had the job of arresting admirals and generals, and
if 1 remember correctly general Student had the “gratifying” per-
sonal task of informing His Majesty Victor Emmanuel III that he
was to consider himself a German prisoner. This was how Operation
Alarich was to proceed in the event of betrayal on the part of the
Badoglio government, or if we wanted to head off such a certain
betrayal.
The Grand Council contained one of the most determined of the
conspirators against the leaders of the fascists: Count Galeazzo Ciano,
who was married to the Duce’s oldest daughter, Edda, with whom he
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 235
had three children. Mussolini had made Ciano his foreign minister,
but took over the post himself on February 5, 1943 and appointed his
son-in-law ambassador to the Vatican. Following the arrest of his
father-in-law Ciano remained at his post at the King’s wish. How-
ever Badoglio, who couldn’t stand him, gave orders to keep him un-
der observation — with the intention of later sending him to the penal
island of Ponza. Edda Ciano alerted an unusual man she had met:
Eugen Dollmann. He had lived for a long time with his mother in
Rome and was known as a great art connoisseur. He was welcomed
in certain circles in Rome, was courteous to the ladies present, al-
though it was said that their charms had no effect on him. He held a
high honorary rank in the “Allgemeine SS” and was Himmler’s “spy”
in Rome’s high society.
Hitler had decided, “to save Mussolini’s daughter and grandchil-
dren and also to see to Ciano.” Sturmbannfithrer Kappler, the police
attache at the German embassy, organized the escape together with
Hauptsturmführer Groebl, an Italian specialist in the SD, and
Hauptsturmfiihrer der Waffen-SS Priebke, who was later killed in
action against Tito’s partisans.
It has been claimed, wrongly, that I took part in this action on
August 27. I didn’t think that the operation would present serious
difficulties and flew to Fihrer Headquarters with General Student
while preparations were under way. Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring
put a Ju 52 at the disposal of the refugees, who arrived safe and
sound in Munich. I first met Count Ciano in September 1943, when
I was forced to witness an extremely embarrassing conversation be-
tween the Duce and his son-in-law.
Much later Baron von Steengracht, the German state secretary in
the Foreign Ministry, informed me that Ciano had gone through his
“diaries” and substantially revised them: the count had crossed out
or added passages according to the time and circumstances so as to
achieve a sufficiently anti-Hitler version, which could serve as his
alibi in dealing with the allies.
On the other hand, I was happy to have sent four of my men from
Friedenthal with a truck to Rocca delle Caminate on September 12,
1943. Staying there were Donna Rachele, the wife of the Duce, and
their two youngest children, Annamaria and Romano. They were
flown to Munich, where they were reunited with their husband and
father.
236 Orro SKORZENY
Operation Alarich was not to our taste. I had about 50 officers
and NCOs at my disposal; about 40 were members of my 502nd
Commando Battalion. The remaining 10 were military intelligence
officers of Schellenberg’s Office VI. Several of these outranked me,
but were of course under my command. They were supposed to put
us onto the trail of Mussolini. But how were we to proceed if they
changed the place where the Duce was being held at the same time as
we had to arrest a good dozen political personalities...“with appro-
priate respect in view of their positions?”
The object of Operation Alarich was to guard against a betrayal
that was going to take place anyway. How could one tell in the midst
of political confusion that a former ally, who still firmly maintained
his loyalty, would commit open treason? Surely the decision would
fall to the OKW. But how could they in the Wolfsschanze calculate
the exact moment when an ally becomes an enemy?
After General Eisenhower's declaration (on July 29, 1943), in
which he encouraged the Italian people to rise up against the German
Army and promised allied help to free Italy, we received another list
of suspicious persons, which brought the total to 70! This list was
given to me by General Student and Sturmbannfihrer Kappler, the
attache to ambassador von Mackensen. The latter was soon replaced
by Rudolf Rahn, whose credentials were accepted by King Victor
Emmanuel III, who was still “determined to wage the war to final
victory at Germany's side,” on September 8, 1943. At 7:30 P.M. on
that same September 8 Badoglio was forced to admit in a radio re-
port that the king’s government had surrendered in Syracuse on Sep-
tember 3.
On September 3, in the course of an official conversation, Bado-
glio said to our ambassador Rahn:
“I don’t understand why the German Reich is so suspicious of
me. They’re trying to insult me, which hurts me deeply. Don’t you
think that an old general like me knows what it means to give his
word of honor to the Führer? Never, and you can be sure of that,
never will we break our word!”
At that moment his own chief-of-staff Castellano was breaking
the officer’s word of honor he had given on his order.
The story contains another graphic example of double dealing.
One must say that the Italian people felt only disgust toward this
behavior. Later the Italian children in allied-occupied working class
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 237
suburbs painted Marshall Badoglio in yellow traitor’s colors and
shouted loudly:

“Badoglio,
Colore di olio...”

I don’t know who gave the name of the King of the Visigoths to this
operation of Himmler’s. Alarich, who threatened Constantinople fol-
lowing the death of Theodorich the Great and took Rome at the be-
ginning of the Fifth Century, was definitely a symbolic figure in the
eyes of the troubled Reichsfiihrer. Viewed from the Wolfsschanze,
such an operation could appear tempting. But seen up close, from
Frascati and Rome, it was obvious that it would be difficult to carry
out with the available means and rolled out political problems which
we had no authority to solve.
The king and his retinue lived in a huge palace, “Villa Savoia,”
which was surrounded by a park and guarded by a battalion of the
king’s guard. General Student planned a ground action by two or
three companies of paratroopers, which were to storm the palace under
his personal command at the moment the gliders carrying the larger
special commando landed in the park. At the beginning of August I
feared that such an operation must entail considerable bloodshed,
and that it would give our “allies” an official excuse to break our
alliance, which they still officially stood by. I myself was to take care
of Crown Prince Umberto, and I therefore resolved to proceed in all
silence. The crown prince occupied the Palazzo Quirinale in the cen-
ter of the city; a huge building with about 2,000 rooms. I knew that
Prince Umberto and Princess Marie-José of Belgium occupied sepa-
rate apartments, but I didn’t know exactly where they were. It was
impossible to obtain an up-to-date plan of the palace, and the aerial
photos taken “in error” proved to be poor, as there was a cloud right
over the palace. Furthermore in the second floor of the Quirinal there
was a passage to the Palazzo Colonna, which was as big as a gallery
and which was to be occupied first. Of course the Quirinal was also
guarded by a battalion of carabinieri. Consequently, a forced entry
must automatically lead to a bloody battle. I felt it more suitable to
organize a small detachment which, with the help of ladders, could
climb into the palace through a suitable salon window. One will un-
derstand that we weren’t happy with Alarich for all these reasons.
238 OTTo SKORZENY
Rad) and I had set up fourteen files with situation plans of the resi-
dences of prominent persons who were to be neutralized on X-Day
of the open betrayal. In the mornings RadI and I had breakfast in the
officers mess dressed in paratrooper uniforms. Then we drove through
Rome in civilian clothes in a car which had been placed at our dis-
posal. It was unbelievably hot. Since we had to pay for our lunch out
of our soldier’s pay, we only rarely looked for expensive restaurants.
We understood Italian fairly well and also spoke some of this lan-
guage. The mentality of the people we had to deal with was thus less
foreign to us.
The Italian people had had enough of a war which had begun
eight years earlier with the difficult conquest of Ethiopia. The East
African Expeditionary Corps comprised 500,000 soldiers and about
100,000 workers, engineers, sailors, road builders and masons, who
built the roads and cities that have now disappeared. From 1937 to
1940 King Victor Emmanuel’s far-flung empire had to be organized
and equipped.
When on June 10, 1940 the Duce made the mistake of declaring
war on Great Britain and France without being asked by Hitler, the
king announced: “I entrust the head of the government, the Duce of
fascism, the first marshall of the empire, with the command of the
troops on all fronts.” From 1940 the poorly-equipped, inadequately
fed and badly-led Italian troops went from one catastrophe to the
next, in Ethiopia, on the French border, in Greece, in Albania, in
Cyrenaica, in Libya, Somaliland, Eritrea, in the Sudan and on the
banks of the Don in Russia — three years filled with defeats and huge
losses, with many killed, wounded, captured and missing in these
far-away lands, and as well often unwarranted reproaches.
Benito Mussolini was not a good wartime leader. But whatever
mistakes he may have made: he was arrested in treacherous fashion
by his king, the man who after the victory in Ethiopia offered him the
title of prince for himself and his heirs. “I turned it down,” the Duce
later explained, “as I would also have refused the title of duke. I
answered the king: my ancestors were farmers, and that, majesty, is
honor enough to me.”
On January 9, 1944 this same king bestowed on Josef Stalin the
Necklace of the Order of Annunziata, by which the Soviet dictator
became a “cousin” of Victor Emmanuel III. Stalin must have laughed!
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 239
Operation Alarich, also called Operation Student by many histo-
rians, never took place. The monarchist government surrendered se-
cretly and unconditionally to the Anglo-Americans on September 3
and imagined that it had enough time to disappear by September 9.
But the secret conclusion of peace was announced by Radio Algiers
on September 8. The monarchist government withdrew to the Minis-
try of the Interior and from there to a carabinieri barracks. Badoglio,
half dead from fear, was the first to leave Rome, at 3 A.M. on Sep-
tember 9. The king and his retinue and almost all the generals did the
same an hour later. They subsequently met in Bari, “in order to fully
comply with their duty.”
So the betrayal had taken place, and the new government could
do what it wanted. I was now interested in where they were holding
the Duce prisoner. From now on the Italian government was seen as
the enemy and the situation had thus become clear.
Naievely, I must say today, I asked General Student whether our
military intelligence service, namely the Canaris office in Italy, which
must have numerous agents at its disposal, could not work hand in
hand with us, so to speak. I didn’t know then that Admiral Canaris
had refused to spy in the country of an ally and that he pretended,
“not to have any agents active in Italy.” Nevertheless the Abwehr
sent regular reports on the current situation in Italy to the OKW.
These reports were circulated to the commanding generals of corps.
I got to see one of these reports at the beginning of August. In
essence it said that, “the change of government in Italy was a guaran-
tee of an invigorated employment of all forces,” in order to continue
the struggle at Germany’s side. Rad! was just as skeptical as I, and I
also learned that Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring was no longer con-
vinced of Badoglio’s good will.
Messina fell on August 17. Almost simultaneously we heard that
the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, accompanied by Lahousen,
had met the chief of the Italian intelligence service, General Cesare
Amé. The discussion took place on July 30 in the Hotel Danieli and
the following day on the Lido. Rad! and I concluded from this that
the report was written by Canaris after checking with Amé.
I will explain in the next chapter how we discovered Mussolini’s
prison: on the northeast tip of Sardinia, on the island of Santa
Maddalena. We informed the OKW and were supposed to free the
Duce on August 28. But on the moming of the 27th Benito Mussolini
240 OTTO SKORZENY
was flown away to an unknown destination in a Red Cross seaplane.
Bad luck, I thought. Then, on August 31 in Rome, Sturmbannführer
Kappler informed me that during my absence (on August 29 I was
with General Student at Fiihrer Headquarters), the Italian foreign
minister Guariglia had delivered the following official message to
the German ambassador in Rome von Mackensen:
“The Italian government possesses solid proof that a German
commando is planning a coup d'état for August 28 in Rome and,
working with former fascists, intends to set up a new dictatorship in
Italy. Furthermore, the German troops intend to arrest numerous per-
sons, including His Holiness Pope Pius XII, the King, the Crown
Prince, serving ministers, senior military men and other public fig-
ures, in order to deliver them to Germany dead or alive.
His Majesty’s government, which since the arrest of Mussolini
has strived, and will continue to strive, to continue the struggle at
Germany's side, can only deeply regret such behavior. The Italian
government insists that the German government be informed that
any attempt of this type would be nipped in the bud.”
I can only confirm that there was never any talk of, “kidnapping
the King, the Crown Prince and so on, in order to deliver them to
Germany dead or alive.” Our orders in this regard were clear: the
personalities were to be arrested, but “with appropriate respect in
view of their position.” In no case were they to be injured and were
definitely not to be killed.
The arrest of Pope Pius XII was also never planned: I never heard
of it, neither at Führer Headquarters or in Rome.
The inventor of this news could have been a special friend of
Himmler’s, SS General Wolff, who served as a sort of escort officer
to the Reichsfiihrer, who in 1945 had Dollmann as his adjutant.
All that I know is that in the autumn of 1943 the Holy See pub-
lished an official communique in which the behavior of the German
soldiers in Rome came in for special praise. Dr. Laternser, a defense
lawyer before the Nuremberg court, brought this document to the
court’s attention on May 22, 1946.
Nevertheless, the following telegram from the Associated Press
news agency appeared in Stars and Stripes, the newspaper of the
American occupation forces in Germany, from Nuremberg dated Janu-
ary 29, 1946.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 241
“When the Fihrer learned of the collapse of the Italian Army, he
gave the order for the pope “to be murdered or eliminated,” King
Victor Emmanuel to be deposed and Mussolini freed at any price.
The Duce was, as planned, freed in the course of a glider landing
at a height of 2,200 meters. But Admiral Canaris, the genius of Ger-
man military intelligence, saw to it that the plan against the King
failed when, in the course of a dramatic breakfast in Venice, he suc-
ceeded in informing the anti-fascist members of Italian military in-
telligence (General Amé) of the imminent operation.”
The same account was printed by the world press. It is a fact that
the Italian monarchy was not up to such a double game. The Duce
told me: “I should have forced the King out of his position after the
conquest of Abyssinia and proclaimed the republic.”
Badoglio was forced to surrender his office on June 5, 1944. For
his part the king abdicated in favor of Umberto, whose reign lasted
little more than a year. Italy was proclaimed a republic on June 2,
1946 after a plebiscite. The result was 12,717,925 votes for the re-
public and 10,719,284 for Prince Umberto. But I am convinced that
the House of Savoy brought about its own downfall on July 25, 1943
when King Victor Emmanuel had Mussolini arrested, the same man
he had embraced in a brotherly fashion only a short time before.
In his protest note Foreign Minister Guariglia suggested that
former fascists were involved in our preparations. We saw very few
of them and none were involved in our operation. The few true fas-
cists had been decimated at the front during the war years. Those
who were left were serving in the blackshirt brigades at the front.
Many followed the example of the majority of the members of
the Fascist Grand Council, which had abandoned the Duce after the
last known sitting. They criticized Mussolini, especially those who
had previously been members of fascist organizations. There was no
more talk of whether fascism had saved Italy from chaos in 1922 and
had “shored up a tottering throne.” They also ceased to reflect on the
moral and social aspects of fascist doctrine, or on a corporative sys-
tem that enabled workers, technicians and employers to function co-
operatively. We must state that these questions no longer played a
role. For many only their own prosperity, their own interests and
their own person was of importance. The enemy had set foot on the
soil of their fatherland: this was the signal to switch from the side of
the loser to the side of the victor as quickly as possible.
242 OTTO SKORZENY
It was a mistake on the part of the Duce to enter the war. But in
1939, and even more so in 1936, there were few fascist leaders who
clearly let it be known that they were against a war. At this point I
must once again point out the fact that the memoirs of Count Ciano
were “revised.” Apart from that, the allies demanded an “uncondi-
tional surrender” of the Italian government. Field Marshall
Montgomery’s memoirs are very revealing in this respect.
Some of the remaining true followers and fascist leaders went
into hiding. Many were persecuted or liquidated by “defenders of
justice,” who hated these old fascists. On August 23 Ettore Muti, the
former general secretary of the Fascist Party, who was under house
arrest, was lured to Fregene and killed. Ciano now became scared.
He told Radl that Scorza of the Grand Council, who was still free,
had been very badly mistreated. But he knew nothing, or “wanted to
know nothing.” This man was finished. Farinaccis, whose order of
the day had received only one vote, namely his own, was in Ger-
many and met with Hitler, Géring, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, Himmler
and others.
Only among the Italian youth did one still find civil courage,
loyalty and bravery. We knew that certain groups of young officers
wanted to free Mussolini. But these groups were watched and spied
on, and it would have been a gross mistake if we had made direct
contact with them. I feared that they would in fact try and free the
Duce and in the process act in such a way that the entire operation
must end in a fiasco, and that the King, the Crown Prince and Badoglio
would then hand Mussolini over to the English or the Americans
immediately. We therefore had no time to lose; but as a result of
Alarich we lost a great deal of time.
Charles Foley was right on the mark, when he wrote in Com-
mando Extraordinary:

“Skorzeny...who kept the political developments in Italy away

from his real objective, the freeing of Mussolini, learned that the
latter had been arrested on July 25 at about 5 P.M. at the portal of the
Villa Savoia and taken to an unidentified village. Various rumors
surfaced and Skorzeny was quickly able to determine that the
Badoglio government was behind this whispering campaign, in or-
der to cover its tracks. The supposedly secret reports, which were
said to originate from generals, ambassadors and certain personali-
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 243
ties in the Vatican, were pure diversions: ‘Mussolini was said to be in
a sanatorium... He was being held prisoner in Rome... We know from
a reliable source that he was flown to Portugal’...”

One who actually did fly to Portugal was Grandi, who went there to
make contact with the allies and conclude a separate peace.
Thanks to a letter written by a love-sick carabinieri to his fian-
cee, we learned that the Duce was being held captive on the island of
Ponza, where the ardent Italian soldier was in garrison. The Duce
later told me that the population of the island, the mayor, the doctor
and the chemist in particular, had prepared a moving reception. He
remained locked up in a small house situated by the sea for a week.
“I was guarded heavily,” he later told me, “and watched day and
night. The carabinieri sent the population away and were themselves
rotated often, out of fear that they would become too friendly toward
me. The food was terrible, but they allowed the locals to secretly
bring me fruit. By night the police patrolled with trained dogs. I myself
thought of Italy, of those continuing the struggle, of my family and
everyone I loved — but also of the ingratitude of man. I was con-
vinced that you, the Germans, would not abandon me. But how were
you to pick up my trail? A stairway led from the small house down to
the Tyrrhenian Sea, whose waves lapped the bottom steps. The day
of July 29 seemed especially long to me: it was my sixtieth birthday.
I scanned the horizon, always expecting to see an enemy battleship
appear...”
To which western country was the Duce to be handed over? To
the English or the Americans? That remained questionable. At about
6 P.M. on September 8, 1943, Radio Algiers announced that
“Mussolini, the former Duce, would be handed over to the English.”
There were differences of opinion between Crown Prince Umberto
and Badoglio. They feared that Churchill and Mussolini might find
common ground. The pro-English sentiment was undoubtedly pre-
dominant in monarchist circles and especially in the Italian Navy.
This probably explains a previously unknown fact: the Americans,
too, were trying to find out where the Duce was being held!
After the war I met a very sympathetic American: Johnny Ringling
North, the owner of “the greatest show on earth.” He told me that his
brother Henry, a captain in a commando of the US Army, had on
September 9 or 10, 1943 been given the job of seizing the Duce, who
244 Orto SKORZENY
according to their information was to be found on the island of Ponza.
Soon afterward I met Henry Ringling personally. He was just as sym-
pathetic as his brother and described to me his adventure in detail:

“I landed on Ponza with my team on September 11. The Italians

had become good friends and I hoped that I could bring everything
to quick and successful conclusion. To my great surprise, however, I
learned from the astonished and suspicious carabinieri that the Duce
hadn’t been on Ponza since the moming of August 8. He had left the
island on the old French torpedo boat Phantére during the night of
August 7-8, direction unknown.
“His destination was Santa Maddalena, but he was no longer there
either. I had no idea! At first I didn’t believe it, but then I had to
resign myself to the facts. You can imagine what I thought of the
American secret service at that point! In short, I spent the night on
the island with my team and waited for further orders. The next day
the carabinieri staff was informed that your commando had just freed
Mussolini, who was being held on the Grand Sasso. We were at once
suspicious. The carabinieri had probably been told by their superiors
that I might be the commander of a German unit dressed as an Ameri-
can. As a result I myself was held prisoner on the island for a few
hours.”

This comical, unbelievable situation could have come from a com-

edy by Plautus or Goldoni. Henry Ringling is a witty man with a
great sense of humor, and his account of these events was very well-
told.
It proves that I would very probably have experienced a similar
adventure had I depended on the reports sent by Canaris to the OKW.
But by then Rad! and I already knew that the admiral wasn’t very
trustworthy. And as for the American secret service, it functioned
with even less precision and with considerable lateness, which is
always embarrassing for an intelligence service.
Mussolini’s fears were all too warranted. General Castellano de-
nied several times that the monarchist government ever had the in-
tention of handing Mussolini over to the enemy. Badoglio made simi-
lar statements. Today, however, we know that the Duce was simply
to be got rid of to the allies. On September 21, 1943 Winston Churchill
declared to a closed session of the House of Commons:
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 245
“An unconditional surrender naturally requires that the war crimi-
nals be handed over to the victors. Where Mr. Mussolini is concerned,
there is a special clause in the Italian document. But it wasn’t pos-
sible to announce this clause before the landing and before the cease-
fire. Otherwise the enemy would have become aware of the true in-
tentions of the Italian government. Anyway the enemy is interfering
with all state business and have their hand on the tiller... We had
every reason to assume that Mussolini was in a safe place and well
guarded. It was in the Badoglio government’s own interests to pre-
vent his flight. Mussolini himself declared that he was convinced
that he was going to be handed over to the allies. That was exactly
our intention and we could have done so without difficulty. The mea-
sures taken by the Badoglio government in regard to Mussolini were
precisely planned and carried out. But we had not counted on the
massed action by paratroopers as carried out by the Germans at the
Grand Sasso. Remarkably Hitler had the works of Nietzsche and other
publications delivered to Mussolini in order to give him something
to do in captivity. That meant that Hitler knew where he was being
held and the conditions there. The operation was extremely daring in
its planning and the Germans were magnificently equipped.
“This proves that modern warfare offers many possibilities for
this type of action. I don’t believe that the Badoglio government,
which had its last trump card in its hand, is guilty of any negligence
or treason.
“The carabinieri guards had orders to kill Mussolini immediately
in the event of any attempt by the Germans to free him. The large
number (70) of paratroopers landed on the Grand Sasso prevented
the order from being carried out, in that they made the carabinieri
responsible for the health and safety of the prisoner.”'

Even after September 8 Churchill did not make public the secret clause
of the cease-fire concerning Mussolini. Furthermore he erred in as-
suming that Hitler had knowledge of the Duce’s whereabouts: the
works of Nietzsche, which Hitler gave Mussolini on his sixtieth birth-
day, were delivered by the Badoglio government. We will also see
that no “massed” drop by paratroops on the Grand Sasso took place.
The truth is that the Duce’s captivity ended when eighteen German
soldiers and two pilots, who were not paratroopers, “came from the
sky” and occupied the Hotel Imperatore.
246 OTTO SKORZENY
Notes
1. This document was published by J. Launay in The Last Days of Fascizm (Paris 1968) and by André
Brissaud in The Tragedy of Verona (Paris 1971). Briesaud quoted past of a letter writen by Roosovelt 10
Churchill on 26 July 1943: “I bolleveIt necessary to force‘mas Brians) doo ed du nk
(Mussolini) and his moat important accomplices.” Launay and Brissaud also quoted the testimon:
piven by SD Hauputurnfler Hol of whom I spoke In th provous char (Par I, Chape 6
Höttl’s book Unternehmen Bernhardt, which , Contains
may inact Hon cans ws ci of Department Vi in Schleif. Howee ths
was led by SD Sturmbannführer BrunoWaneck Hagen-Houl mide only two brief visitsto
the Gran Sense votioa bay oma haar In la opel he fi toy of tio Dose cam 2 He knew about
‘Duce cost 50,000 counterfeit
Pounds Sterling! H: ty added h fmonoy ihat most of which
we handed back to Office VI. $0,000 Pounds wees huge vem 2 1943, Paying out large sums ofmoney
to buy information would have been the surest means of attracting the attention of the various ltallan
Police services. The best par of a is that HOw! accuses me of landing fi
errors thal almost caused une operation 1 ft tn the sume book, bubever he claims 19 ove resoen
mended me for the Knight’s Cross. Apan from the fact that Hot! was not entitled to make such a
recommendation, | received the decoration in Viennaon the day Mussolini was freod, precisely at
midnight. Ee ere of an order from Tiler who personally
telephoned me at the Hote! Imperial from Führer Headquarters to inform me of the sward. One won-
ders bow Hot! manage i Führer Headquarters In an hour! (The Duce and
Tlandes in Vieana grahouit PM. on September 12. 1943, and at 12 P.M. thet same dsy a Genera!
Staff Oberst handed me the Knight's Cross.)
 17
SEARCHING FOR THE DUCE

Predictions and defense — Teetotaler Warger plays the drunk - I crash

in a Heinkel: three ribs broken - Mussolini on Santa Maddalena -
The OKW orders us, “To look on a small island near the island of
Elba” — 1 succeed in convincing Hitler - “If your operation fails,
Skorzeny, I will be forced to disapprove of your actions” — Four days
lost: the Duce is no longer on Santa Maddalena — Secure informa-
tion: the Duce is now on the Gran Sasso — The mission tactics are
decided: General Student’s staff calculates 80 percent technical losses
— Confusion in the Italian armed forces - Roosevelt and Churchill
call for resistance: Generalfeldmarschall prevents the success of this
call- An angry interlude - On General Student's order I inform Major
Mors of the operation's plan and objective - Hauptmann Mandel
brings Donna Rachele, Annamaria and Romano Mussolini to Munich
- The plan - General Soleti’s silly dream - Student: “...] am certain
that you will all do your duty” — Bombardment and departure at X-
Hour.

T: govern, it is said, means to foresee. Or to be clairvoyant, for

the Reichsfiihrer consulted fortune tellers. I can confirm that
Hitler did not believe in such things.
I have read that President Poincaré secretly sought advice from
an especially clairvoyant fortune teller who gave good advice to the
famous Madame de Thébes Daladier, and that Winston Churchill
thought highly of the “magician” Louis de Wohl, an Hungarian refu-
gee. Possibly this benefactor saw the constellations in a mostly
Stalinist light.

247
248 Otto SKORZENY
In any case Himmler asked fortune tellers and astrologers to find
out where the Duce was being held prisoner.
On August 10 or 11 we learned that Mussolini had left the penal
island of Ponza on a warship — destination unknown. General Stu-
dent subsequently passed on to me a telegram from the OKW, which
said that Mussolini was a prisoner on the cruiser Jtalia in La Spezia
harbor. Himmler sent a telegram, ordering us to free Mussolini as
quickly as possible. An action against a cruiser, on which we had no
confederates, seemed completely illusory to me. But more accurate
information revealed the OKW’s information to be false.
Rad! wrote:

“On about August 15 several pieces of corresponding informa-

tion made us aware of an interesting voyage north of the island of
Sardinia. We heard that certain followers of fascism were prisoners
on the ‘isola di porco’ and that a concentration camp was being pre-
pared on the neighboring island of Caprera. Finally we learned from
a reliable source that the Italian garrison on the island of Santa
Maddalena, off the northeast tip of Sardinia, had suddenly been rein-
forced. Our informant was Commander Hunaus, the German liaison
officer to the Italian harbor master of Santa Maddalena. We talked it
over with General Student and it was agreed that Hauptsturmfihrer
Skorzeny, together with our only officer who spoke perfect Italian,
Untersturmfihrer Warger, should speak to the liaison officer person-
ally. Otto Skorzeny ordered Warger to make the rounds of the Santa
Maddalena bars and act as if he was mildly drunk. Unfortunately,
and it was nearly a serious blow, Untersturmfiihrer Warger was the
only non-drinker among the Friedenthal volunteers, and so I set to
work teaching him to drink. We fed him large amounts of Asti
Spumanti, Grappa and Chianti. We helped a little, to give him cour-
age. In the beginning he proved to be very averse to the effects of the
various types of alcohol. But duty is duty, and Warger had to play his
role as a drunken sailor perfectly!”

On August 18 Warger and I flew from Ciampino near Rome to Vieno

Fiorita airfield on Sardinia in a Heinkel 111. Hundus had sent his car
for us, and we soon covered the 80 kilometers of mountain road to
Palau in the north. In Palau the German commander of the two flak
battalions stationed there told me that Mussolini had been brought ill
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 249
to the monastery hospital of Santa Maria, a small village on the road
we had just travelled. Oddly enough, I hadn’t noticed a single
carabinieri in this area. Hundus himself had heard talk of a so-called
Villa Weber or Webber, which lay somewhat outside of Santa
Maddalena. A white red Cross seaplane had been anchored in a small
bay below the villa for several days. Hundus, whom I did not inform
fully as to the nature of my mission, took in Warger as a common
seaman and passed him off as his interpreter.
Back at Vieno Fiorita I asked the pilot to fly over Santa Maddalena.
I wanted to get an overall view of the island and the coast from 4,000
meters and take photos. I was lying in the nose by the aircraft’s can-
non and was about to end my observations, when I heard the dorsal
gunner’s voice through the microphone.
“Attention! Two English fighters behind us!”
With my finger on the trigger of the cannon, | waited for the
attack. At that moment the aircraft nosed down. The left engine had
stopped. We hit the water with great force. I lost consciousness for a
few seconds. Then the pilot, copilot and I clambered out through the
upper escape hatch. I dove back down to retrieve the camera and the
map. Meanwhile the pilot and his crew succeeded in releasing the
life raft. We managed to rescue the other two members of the crew
before the Heinkel went under. We swam to a small, rocky island
where an auxiliary cruiser of the Italian flak picked us up several
hours later. I had injured my right arm and broken three ribs. The
captain of the cruiser saw to it that we were well cared for. But it
wasn’t until 11 P.M. that I reached Bonifacio on Corsica, which was
then occupied by Italian units, and I lost a great deal more time be-
fore I finally reached Bastia in the north. My goal was to make con-
tact there with the commander of the Waffen-SS brigade stationed
on the island.
The Heinkel was not shot down by English fighters, however,
rather it couldn’t handle the Italian gasoline with which the pilot had
refuelled, against my advice, at Vieno Fiorita: a subsequent analysis
revealed that the gasoline contained thirty percent water!
Rad! waited for me in Frascati. When he heard no news, on the
evening of the 18th he went to General Student’s headquarters, where
an Oberst said to him, “Didn’t you know that Skorzeny has come
down in the water?”
250 OTTO SKORZENY
Rad] was amazed. Why hadn’t they notified him immediately?
The Oberst shrugged his shoulders, and Radl asked, “What do you
mean, he’s come down in the water? Are you trying to say that the
He 111 has crashed into the sea? But where? And when? Was the
crew able to escape?”
No one knew anything. It was unlikely that I had survived, for
according to statistics, of hundreds of He 111s that had crashed into
the sea only a few crews had been saved. Radl asked to see General
Student immediately, but he knew no more than the Oberst. And if
the OKW gave the order to start Operation Alarich? Then, declared
the general, “everything must go one hundred percent nevertheless!”
Not until August 20 did Rad! learn that we had escaped in one
piece. The next day I drove to Frascati, where Kappler informed me
that Edda Ciano was back from Germany and had written her father
in Santa Maddalena. So the operation was planned in principle, in
agreement with General Student and the Kriegsmarine, with Kapitin
zur See von Kamptz, wearer of the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves,
and Korvettenkapitän Max Schulz, commander of motor torpedo boats
in the Mediterranean. Two torpedo boats with Radl and me on board
were to sail to Santa Maddalena on August 27. Then came news from
Warger, who of course had stayed on the scene to keep an eye on the
Villa Weber: he had seen Mussolini with his own eyes!
On August 23 RadI and I flew in an He 111 from Practica di Mare
to Vieno Fiorita and from there reached Santa Maddalena. Warger
had made a wager with a fruit seller that Mussolini was dead. In
order to win the bet, the fruit seller showed him Mussolini, albeit
from a distance, on the terrace of the villa. On our responsibility we
told Hundus of the plan and returned to Frascati to prepare the action
— with the agreement of General Student and the cooperation of the
Kriegsmarine. Then a report reached us from the OKW:

“Führer Headquarters has received reports from the Abwehr, ac-

cording to which Mussolini is being held prisoner on a small island
near Elba. Hauptsturmfiihrer Skorzeny is to prepare a parachute op-
eration against this island immediately and report the earliest pos-
sible starting date. The OKW will select the date of the action.”

After this puzzling telegram I asked to be allowed to accompany

General Student to Fiihrer Headquarters on August 29, 1944 to, if
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 251
possible, explain to the Fiihrer myself that the Duce was on Santa
Maddalena and not somewhere else.
And so I once again found myself in the Wolfsschanze, in the
same room where two weeks earlier Hitler had instructed me to find
and free his friend. Seated around the table were all the leading men
of the Reich: to Hitler’s right were Generalfeldmarschall Keitel and
Generaloberst Jodl, to his left Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop,
Himmler, General Student, then Grossadmiral Dénitz and
Reichsmarschall Goring. I was assigned a place between Goring and
Jodl. General Student soon gave me the word to begin my presenta-
tion.
I must admit that I had to overcome my shyness in the beginning.
But since I knew the material well, I described in a simple and clear
way how we had arrived at our conclusion that Mussolini was being
held prisoner in Villa Weber on Santa Maddalena as of August 27. I
also described the terrible adventure of our teetotaller Warger. Göring
and Dönitz smiled. Himmler’s gaze remained ice-cold, and Hitler
wore a rather ironic look. He stood up and shook my hand.
“Good! I believe you Skorzeny. The operation on the small is-
land near Elba is cancelled. Now please outline your plan for the
action on Santa Maddalena.”
I cast a quick glance at the clock and realized that I had been
talking for half an hour. Then I outlined my plan of operation and
made a few sketches to illustrate. Hitler, Göring and Jodl all inter-
rupted me to ask questions: thus it was clear to me that I had won.
The plan conceived with the Kriegsmarine and Rad anticipated
the action beginning in the moming; the element of surprise would
decided the entire success. One day prior to the attack a motor tor-
pedo boat flotilla — each boat armed with two torpedoes and two
20mm cannon — would anchor in Santa Maddalena harbor on the
pretext of a hospitality visit. It would still be there the next morning,
and our minesweepers, which arrived during the night, would join it
without arousing suspicion. These vessels would have on board a
detachment from Friedenthal and a company of Waffen-SS soldiers
of the Brigade Korsika under my command. We would land in close
formation and our torpedo boats would cover us. We were to give the
impression of a peaceable group of Germans going on shore leave,
for it was vital that we reach the vicinity of the villa as quickly as
possible without hostilities breaking out. Afterward we would act as
252 Orro SKORZENY
the circumstances dictated, for the villa was watched day and night
by more than 150 carabinieri and police.
Our flak positions on Corsica and Sardinia would have to lend us
help. We had to fear a reaction, even a late one, by the Italian flak.
Telephone communication between the villa and a barracks in which
200 officer cadets of the Regia Marina were stationed would, of
course, be cut, and a detachment would put out of action the two
Italian fighters that escorted the Red Cross seaplane on all of its flights.
Hitler agreed to this plan. Grossadmiral Dönitz was to give the
units of the Kriegsmarine the necessary orders, and the entire opera-
tion would be under my command.
Hitler took me aside:

“Something else, Hauptsturmführer Skorzeny. It’s possible that

at the time that you carry out your operation, the new Italian govern-
ment will still, officially at least, be our ally. Therefore it the attack
fails, or if Mussolini is not on Santa Maddalena, I might be forced to
disapprove of your action publicly. In that case you will have acted
on your own and not informed your superiors. I hope that you under-
stand that I will have to punish you against my will in the event of
failure?”

I understood completely and told him so. Then I answered several

questions by Dénitz and assured Goring “that the He 111 could also
be used as a U-boat,” which amused him. I was about to take my
leave when Hitler came up to me. He shook my hand and gazed into
my eyes, “You will do it, Skorzeny,” he said. “I am convinced of it.”
But I was not to do it on Santa Maddalena at the end of August
and the action was never begun, as we learned just in time — the
evening before — that the Duce had been flown away in the Red Cross
seaplane early that morning.
I have already mentioned that, following our first return from
Santa Maddalena to Rome, we learned of the note of protest that
Guariglia had sent to the German ambassador von Mackensen and in
which he complained that the Germans were planning a coup d’ état
for August 28. That was the day of our mission to free the Duce and
not of Operation Alarich, whose date was never fixed.
Canaris’ report about the “monarchist government’s everlasting
loyalty to the Axis” seemed laughable to us. When we learned that
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 253
the Duce had left the island of Ponza, a telegram from the OKW
referred us to La Spezia and the battleship /talia, on which Mussolini
was supposed to be — and that was wrong! The trail led us to Santa
Maddalena. Then, based on reports by Canaris, the OKW declared
that the Duce was to be found on a rock near the island of Elba. That
too was wrong. We lost several precious days this way. I was able to
convince Hitler that Mussolini was really on Santa Maddalena, from
where they took him away exactly one day before the planned opera-
tion. The date had been set only a short time before, and only a few
persons had knowledge of it. From where did the information seep
through?
From Kappler we learned that General Amé, head of the Italian
intelligence service and an old friend of Admiral Canaris, had long
been known as an anti-fascist. We also heard that the chief of intelli-
gence of the Royal Italian Navy, Admiral Maugeri, who had escorted
the Duce from Gaeta to the island of Ponza on the corvette Persefone,
was a friend of Amé and Canaris. After the war Maugeri received an
American decoration for his good and faithful service.
All was not the best in General Student’s staff. Rad! and I were
astonished to learn that there were even defeatists in the general staff
of an elite corps. Right after our arrival in Frascati a major asked us
ironically whether we knew that the war was lost. And after the Santa
Maddalena fiasco we noticed more often that they made not the least
effort to really help us. They seemed to think we were crazy people
who had our eye on some insane goal. We reported this to General
Student. But to our great surprise he was fully aware of the unusual
concept of duty and moral attitude of his officers. But he couldn’t, so
he said, manage without them.
“The training of a paratrooper demands special technical train-
ing. One doesn’t simply become an officer in our service. The people
of whom you speak and who I know better than you, jumped at Narvik,
Eben Emael, at Rotterdam and Crete. I am sure that they will con-
tinue to do their duty.” Radl, who wasn’t one to hoid back, inter-
jected:

“Allow me to state, Herr General, that an officer cannot give his

best in a war that he already considers to be lost. That is a sentiment
that we don’t and will never understand.”
254 OTTO SKORZENY
I tried to shift the conversation onto another track. The next day
I was to accompany General Student to Vigna del Valle, on Lake
Bracciano, north of Rome. There we chanced to come across the trail
of the Red Cross seaplane that had flown out of Santa Maddalena
with the Duce on August 27.
Numerous false trails led us to hospitals, to Perugia on Lake
Trasimeni; but our investigations proved that the Duce had been on a
seaplane that landed at Vigna del Valle and he had then been taken
away in an ambulance.
Kappler’s office intercepted a radio message sent by a so-called
General Cueli, which gave us definite proof that the trail from Lake
Bracciano to the Gran Sasso was the right one. Cueli was the inspec-
tor general of the military police, and he reported to his superiors:
“Security preparations around the Gran Sasso complete.” Was not
the “La Albergo Campo Imperatore,” a mountain hotel at an eleva-
tion of 2,212 meters, the safest prison in the world? This hotel could
only be reached by cable car. We therefore needed aerial photos.
General Student instructed his intelligence officer, Hauptmann
Langguth, to make a reconnaissance flight with an automatic camera
installed in each wing. But the reconnaissance He 111 was in Nancy
and could not be in Rome until September 8.
All the pilot knew was that we wanted overfly Rimini, Ancona
and Pescara and were supposed to return via the same route, which
led over the Abruzzas and the Gran Sasso (2,900 meters). Langguth
was supposed to take the photos. Scarcely had we boarded the air-
craft, when he told us that the automatic cameras weren’t working
and that there was no time to repair them. Radl and I looked at each
other in amazement. Langguth casually showed us how to use a heavy
hand-held camera, on which the film also had to be advanced by
means of a hand crank. He had no intention of doing it himself.
So I had to take the photographs myself, for better or worse. The
aircraft flew at a height of 5,000 meters at 370 kph. The outside air
temperature was minus eight degrees Celsius. I was in shirtsleeves
and stuck my upper body half in the open through the dorsal turret’s
entry hatch. Rad] sat on my legs to prevent me from falling out. The
copilot had to give Radl a hand to pull me back into the aircraft. At
the end of our air journey I was completely frozen through. But these
photos gave us no idea of the slope of the mountain plains which
were available for us to land on.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 255
To complete our luck the automatic large-format camera, with
which one could normally could make stereo exposures, was also
out of order. General Student would otherwise have noted that the
slope on which we planned to land had about the same gradient as an
average-difficulty ski slope and was full of boulders. Student would
definitely not have authorized the operation under these conditions.
And so Hauptmann Langguth unintentionally came to our aid.
So on the evening of September 8 Rad] and I outlined our plan of
action. The ski hotel could only be reached by cable car from Assergi.
It had telephone communications with the hotel and was naturally
watched from above and below. If the funicular railway was attacked
we would lose the vital element of surprise.
Parachute troops, who had jumped out onto the plateau, could
have done this in front of the eyes of the Italians. That meant that we
could neither carry out the operation successfully on foot or with the
aid of the cable car. As well we feared that orders had been given to
kill the Duce if a rescue attempt should be made.
A parachute drop had the same disadvantages, and in the thin air
at this altitude and wind the rate of descent would have been too
great and the paratroops would have come down widely scattered.
Helicopters seemed the best solution, but the helicopter center in
Erfurt couldn’t let us have any. So all that was left was a landing by
glider. Rad] and I thought over this solution and then discussed it
with General Student’s staff - Oberst Trettner, Major Colani and
Hauptmann Langguth. They were all skeptical.
We intended to land on the meadow of the Campo Imperatore
with twelve DFS-230 gliders. Each glider seated nine men and a pi-
lot. Theoretically we would therefore have 108 soldiers at our dis-
posal. But Student and his staff objected that the thinner air above
2,000 meters would make landing the gliders much more difficult.
No one had ever tried such a risky landing. They forecast technical
losses in the order of eighty percent. That meant that we would have
to take on about 200 carabinieri, most likely armed with machine-
guns, automatic weapons, mortars and so on, with only about 20 com-
bat-capable soldiers. General Student rated our chances of success
very low, even if the pilots didn’t crash on landing: “Even a crash
landing would be suicide,” General Student said to me. “I expressly
forbid a landing in this way!”
256 OTTO SKORZENY
But Hitler had given me an order, and to me that meant that I had
to carry out this order no matter what. I also had no wish to wait until
the Italians made their famous prisoner disappear again. As well the
eighty percent losses seemed to be a very pessimistic estimate. No
glider had ever landed at this altitude before. So how could they quote
such figures? Following a lengthy discussion with the chief-of-staff
and Hauptmann Langguth, who had landed at Eben Emael, I declared,
“Very well then gentlemen. I am ready to carry out any other plan, as
long as it is better than ours.”
General Student finally gave his authorization to the operation
that I had proposed, under the express condition that the landings by
the gliders on the terrain in front of the hotel would be as smooth as
possible.
At the time when we were working out our plans there was great
turmoil in Rome. The joy over the announcement of the cease-fire
on September 8, 1943 was followed by hostile pronouncements
against us on one hand, and on the other the flight of certain persons
and confusion within the armed forces. Rome had been declared an
open city; the monarchist government had already fled. There were
alerts every day. The English and Americans bombed the city. Fortu-
nately neither the Italian divisions nor the civilian population lis-
tened to Badoglio, who before he fled on the moming of September
9 had instructed the army, “to energetically resist any attempts by the
Germans to attack.” On September 11 Roosevelt and Churchill went
on the radio, calling for the Italian people to rise up against us.
On my order, during the night of September 8-9 the volunteers
from Friedenthal — still in paratrooper uniforms — formed a small
unit led by Untersturmfiihrer Menzel and Untersturmfihrer Schwerdt.
This unit reinforced Major Mors’ parachute battalion in Africa.
On the moming of September 9 a detachment dropped from a Ju
52 just missed the Italian High Command, which had flown out just
minutes before. Student’s paratroopers were encircled by Italian
troops; but everything turned out well, for the German parachute
troops put up stubborn resistance. They emerged from the affair with
honor, kept their weapons and returned to their quarters. The Italians
had their hands full defending against the English and Americans.
Why should they now suddenly fight us? Most had had enough of
the war.
 5

1
a

During his student days in Vienna, Skorzeny belonged to the “Markomannia” fencing club. He
ts sven in this photo (right front) ater receiving a serious wound in 1928, which later earned
him the name “scar-face.”
A rary: members of the
weapTurkestan
ine Legion at Legionovo
near Warsaw. They took part in

Friedenthal 1943: the inner circle in front of the so-called “barn”: from left to right: Skorzeny,
Warger, Cieslewitz, Menzel, Schwerdı, Gföller and Radl.
 Ann Uniersturmführer in naval
uniform. The
Untersturmführer and interpreter
Robert Warger in Santa Maddalena in
1943. There he practiced until he was
able to “handle a drink,” so that he
could obtain information
in as to _

italian sailors in the local “rnin”

establishments.

September 1943 in Avezzano. The man

in paratrooper uniforms, from left to
right: Wa otzer,
er, Skorzeny, Hans Holzer,
Werner Holzer, Himmel, Menzel and
Glärner. Sitting in the foreground:
Wagner, Radi and Gföller.
After being freed on
om September 13 1 1943, , Mussolini climbed into a Fieseler Storch waiting on
the rocky plateau of the Gran Sessa Szen leaning
over the Duce is Otto Skorzeny (in Luftwaffe uniform), who insisted on accompanying
Mussolini on his flight into the valley.
 UO 22RTNY H4ods WAG
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 scetching over Macolinl while he
was a prisoner.

Franz Szalasi, leader

of the
the
Pfelikreutter, who took over the
running of government in
Budapest after Horthy's fall in
November 1944, Here ‘he is sean
 A rare photo: the head of the
Reichssicherheltshauptamı,
Walter Schellenberg, and Otto
Shorzen ry (in steel helmet), in

Generalfeldmarschall Model, the

studying a map (right General

Staff Major Behr).
German Panther tank disguised
as an American tank, as used by
the 150th Panzer Brigade during
the Ardennes offensive.

Members of Otto Shorzeny's

150th Panzer Brigade in action
during the Ardennes offensive in
December 1944.
Ardennes offensive 1944: exect tion of memb f one of Sk 's special detachments by
US military police Most of the English-speaking German soldiers, who spread confusion
behind the American lines while wearing American uniforms over their German ones, returned
to the German lines. Only about eight fell into American hands alive. They were shot
immediately as per military law, although their actions were covered by the rules of warfare.
The enemy carried out similar operations.

Aae ee an ns pchind ore) teca en Dowanber 1 100,

Skorzeny 5 unit were ı seers; they were sent behind enemy lines on December
16,
 i

SS-Obersturmbannführer Joehen Peiper, one of thee bavest and most highly-decorated armor
Second WWorld War, at the fatefulM which became the
talk of the whole world after ıthe war, Later, in thesoeatled (Malmedy Trial” at Dachau,
Pe d during theArdennes offensive, and 42
generals, officers and men of the.Wate SS were sentonced t to death for having sh shot 71
71
American “prisoners.” The sentences were later reduced 10 life imprisonment and
aftjerward the men were set free. The convictions had no foundation, as the “confessions”
Gane hough oreo Schwäbisch Hal proved ob false. It is certain that Jochen
Peiper could not be reproached for the orders he gave his conduct inn battle, Peiper, who
in France after the { by unknown P
Pr 14, 1976, the French national holiday, at Traves, mar lyon u
 Photographs of the “Matmedy Massacre, ° like those presented by the prosecution in the
ot Dachau, were supposed to prove the shooting of 71 American prisoners by
Baale Group Piper ofthe at S-Panzer Dion LAH at thr Malmodycroronds. low many
Of these were killed in an initial ex. of
Hrrendered, how man) were ahot and ied contre soba rales of won und hows mony were
killed by machine-gun fire while running away, will never be clarified. It was a wagedy not
uncommon in time of war.
Ono Skorzeny as a prisoner of war.
 Former SS-Obersturmbaennfahrer Ofto Shorzeny
CL, hbandad theo indi,
if dmet time a} f
Dachau on June 24, 1947. er fregdsibccher at nd Jess er
Our photo shows the council for the American Colonel Albert Rosen to
=—m The leners on the legs of Skorzeny's trousers are an abbreviation of “Prisoner
 wie hal es

Skorzeny while in pre-trial detention

at Nuremberg. Th j d
Shorser’ of having criiaptod to abduct and rundey Gerzrel Bisentower and other high
ranking officers.
 u
ry -

In Darmstadt POW camp:

with his adjutant Radl.

Skorzeny in private. Thisfrei taken

in 1950, shows him with his daughter
Waltraut.
A civilian again, Skorzeny acquired an estate in Curragh, Ireland, where he raised sheep half
the year. The other half he spent in Madrid, where he worked as an engineer and represented a
number of steel-making firms.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 257
Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring was clever enough to disarm
the confused Italian divisions. One after another they laid down their
weapons, and the few monarchist officers who wanted to fight found
they had no one to follow them. There were brief confrontations in
Rome and about twenty kilometers southeast in Albano and Aricia,
where our “paratroopers” from Friedenthal discovered two batteries
of the royal artillery, which they promptly disarmed. Since Unter-
sturmführer Menzel’s men had come on foot, they commandeered
the trucks and cars, which were found to be in excellent condition,
and returned to their quarters in Frascati. This event was the cause of
an unpleasant incident, which I will speak of shortly.
The next day, September 10, all Italian troops in and around Rome
surrendered to Generalfeldmarschall Kesseiring. The chiefs of the
carabinieri units and the police were made responsible for the main-
tenance of order. In this he avoided bloody street battles, frightful
confusion and probably destruction and plundering. I am not certain
that a revolt wouldn’t have broken out in Rome if another commander
had taken Kesselring’s place.
The field marshall was never angry with me for not revealing my
mission when general Student introduced me as an officer of the
paratrooper corps. He knew that in doing so I was following an order
from Hitler, and when I saw him again after freeing the Duce he
congratulated me in comradely fashion.
In my opinion Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring was one of the
best commanders we had. Inferior to the enemy in numbers and ma-
teriel, he defended central and northern Italy in spite of the growing
guerilla threat from July 1943 until May 7, 1945. He was sentenced
him to death in Venice according to the statutes of the Nuremberg
Tribunal. The sentence was commuted and he stayed in jail until 1952.
It was clear: he was on the losing side.
When his book Soldat bis zum letzten Tag came out in 1953, he
sent me a copy with a dedication, which helps console me over many
injustices and minor offenses. I would like to repeat his dedication:

You too, my dear Skorzeny, will find much in this book worthy
of remembering, associated with shared experiences — even in cap-
tivity. And one more saying that applies to you: “Deeds are the real
man’s true joy.”
258 OTTO SKORZENY
Albert Kesselring
Generalfeldmarschall (Ret.)
December 1953'

By September 3 I had brought my volunteers from Practica di Mare

and Frascati. They took up quarters in tents on the grounds of a monas-
tery, the Collegio Nobile Mandragone. The Student Division’s in-
struction battalion, which was commanded by Major Harald Mors,
occupied the same monastery quarters.
General Student made the final decision to carry out the Gran
Sasso operation at noontime on September 11, and he told me that
the valley would be taken by Major Mors’ battalion to cover our rear.
He therefore asked me to visit Major Mors and to brief him on the
mission orders, which had already been worked out.
I reported to Major Mors at about twelve o’clock. Together with
my Untersturmfihrer Peter Schwerdt, I looked him up in his tent. I
described to him the plan worked out by the division staff, Radl and
me, which had been accepted by General Student. Ninety men of his
battalion’s 2nd Company and four of my officers plus twelve of my
NCOs would land on the Campo Imperatore under my and Leutnant
Berlepsch’s command. Meanwhile Mors and the rest of his unit would
march into the valley at the foot of the Gran Sasso over side roads,
barricade the entrance and cut the telephone and telegraph lines. Then
he would advance to Assergi and occupy the cable car station in the
valley. The occupation of the station had to take place at exactly the
same time as the first of our gliders landed on the Campo Imperatore.
The two operations had to be perfectly synchronized in order to pre-
vent the mountain or the valley stations from sounding the alarm.
The occupation of Aquila airport was planned in principle for later.
Now Major Mors learned the objective of the operation: to free
Mussolini.

But there was more at stake than freeing the Duce: there was also his
wife Donna Rachele and their two youngest children, the sixteen-
year-old Romano and fourteen-year-old Annamaria.
Donna Rachele was heavily guarded in Rome from July 26 until
August 2. Their villa, which the Duke of Torinia had made available
 My COMMANDO OPERATIONS 259
to the Duce in 1930, was surrounded by 300 soldiers armed with
submachine-guns. From August 3 on, Donna rachele found herself
under house arrest with her children in their house in Rocca delle
Caminate.
I was worried about them even though the house was guarded by
carabinieri. But an attack by some sort of revolutionary group was
always possible, and the carabinieri probably wouldn’t have put up
any serious resistance. I knew that Donna Rachele was very brave
and much loved in this province. But later in Munich she told me
that she became fearful for her children when she heard of the mur-
der of Ettore Mutis, an old and faithful friend of her husband. I suc-
ceeded in sending her a message: she was to leave the house as little
as possible and to have faith in us; they were, so to speak, the scourge
of the Badoglio government.
On September 9 Vittorio Mussolini, Pavolini, Ricci, Farinacci
and Preziosi declared on Munich radio that “a national-fascist gov-
ernment had been founded,” which would “work in the name of the
Duce.” Donna Rachele and her children were thus in great danger.
Six of my volunteers, commanded by Hauptmann Mandel, were
given the task of getting Donna Rachele, Romano and Annamaria
out of Rocca delle Caminate and bringing them to Forli, from where
they would be flown to Munich. We were afraid for a few days, for
the freeing of the Mussolini family could not take place before the
Duce had been freed without alarming the Badoglio government.
These operations had to be carried out simultaneously.
Hauptmann Mandel left in the truck, reached Rocca delle
Caminate at noontime and was fortunately able to complete his mis-
sion.

The ultimate plan for Operation Gran Sasso was as follows:

In charge of the operation on the Campo Imperatore: Hauptsturm-

führer Otto Skorzeny.
In charge of the action in the valley: Major Harold Mors.

X-Day: Sunday, September 12, 1943.

260 OTTO SKORZENY
1. In the valley: Major Mors will occupy the crossroads from
Aquila to Bazzano and from Pescomaggiore to Paganica as far as
Assergi. He will make all the necessary preparations to repulse an
eventual attack on the valley by Italian troops from Aquila.

He will occupy the cable car valley station above Assergi.

X-Hour: 2 P.M.

2. On the Gran Sasso — Campo Imperatore:

X-Hour: (originally) 6 A.M. (The air currents are weakest at this

time.) X-Hour for the landing has to be moved back, as the gliders
coming from France have run into a delay. It is set for 2 P.M.

Means and unit strengths: 12 DFS 230 gliders, towed by 12

Henschel aircraft, and a reconnaissance aircraft with Hauptmann
Langguth on board. Each glider transports 9 armed soijdiers and the
pilot.

Sequence for departure and arrival of the gliders: a theoretical

interval of one minute between gliders.

Gliders No. 1 and 2: 18 soldiers of the 2nd Parachute Company

under the command of Leutnant von Berlepsch, who is in Glider No.
5. The four machine-guns must be moved into position immediately
after landing. The remaining soldiers are armed with 14 special para-
trooper rifles and are to cover the two assault groups from Gliders
No. 3 and 4.

Glider No. 3: On board are Hauptsturmführer Skorzeny together

with an Italian officer (Carabinieri General Soleti), Untersturmfiihrer
Schwerdt, Untersturmführer Wagner and 5 Unterscharführer of the
Waffen-SS from Friedenthal. They will storm the hotel, make their
way to the Duce, neutralize the guards and protect the Duce.

Glider No. 4: On board are Karl Radl, adjutant to Haupt-

sturmführer Skorzeny, Untersturmführer Menzel and seven soldiers
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 261
of the Waffen-SS from Friedenthal. They are to storm the hotel im-
mediately after landing and support Hauptsturmfiihrer Skorzeny and
his group.

Glider No. 5: Parachute troops of 2nd Company under Leutnant

von Berlepsch. Task: support the special group from Friedenthal in-
side the hotel.

Glider No. 6: Parachute troops of 2nd Company. Task: occupy

the cable car mountain station and the tunnel which connects the
station with the hotel.

Glider No. 7, 8,9, 10, 11 and 12: Parachute troops of 2nd Com-
pany. Have heavy weapons on board: 2 heavy machine- guns, 2 light
mortars, 2 light paratrooper cannon. These groups are to take up battle
positions immediately. Cover for other groups advancing on the ho-
tel.

First landing planned at 2 P.M.

Fundamental ban for all participants to fire their weapons before

Hauptsturmfiihrer Skorzeny. If Hpt.St.Fhr. Skorzeny is inside the
hotel, Leutnant von Berlepsch assumes responsibility outside.

On the afternoon of September 11 I assembled all my people and

said to them, “Dear comrades, for six weeks you have waited with-
out knowing why. But now I can tell you that tomorrow we will
undertake an operation that the Fiihrer has ordered personally. The
operation is not a simple one, and it may be that we will have heavy
losses. But this operation must succeed under any circumstances. I
will lead the action myself, and we will do our best. Anyone who
wishes to volunteer, take one step forward!”
Everyone stepped forward. I had to select seventeen men, which
wasn’t exactly easy. A further dozen would accompany the Mors
Battalion under the command of my Untersturmfiihrer Bramfeld, a
member of our pentathlon team at the 1936 Olympic Games. This
group set out during the night of Saturday, September 11-Sunday,
September 12.
262 Otto SKORZENY
The next morning at about five A.M. my complete commando
unit was at Practica di Mare airport, ready to go. But one piece of
bad news is often followed by more: the first was a lie by Radio
Tunis. This station reported that the Italian warships that had sailed
from La Spezia had arrived at Tunis. On one of these ships was
Mussolini, “who was now a prisoner of war on African soil.”
I knew, however, that the ships had not left La Spezia until the
day before — the large battle-cruiser Roma was sunk by a remotely-
controlled bomb called “Fritz,” and the Duce could not at that mo-
ment have been a prisoner in Tunis or Bizerte.
The second piece of bad news: our gliders would not arrive from
France for four or five hours. Last but not least, General Soleti, who
was supposed to meet Rad! and Warger in front of the Ministry of the
Interior at 7:30 A.M., had not yet arrived and it was 8.30! Luckily,
however, he showed up soon afterward.
Our twelve gliders finally landed, just as Untersturmfihrer Radl
was dining with the general. But let us allow Radl to tell what hap-
pened:

“From the window the general watched as our twelve DFS 230s
landed in front of us.
‘Very interesting, very ingenious, these aircraft without motors,
don’t you think?’
“Yes, Herr General. The DFS 230 is an outstanding machine.
Excellentissima macchina!’
“You are a paratrooper and surely you have flown this machine
often?’
I was neither a paratrooper nor were gliders my specialty. The
general wasn’t aware that he was going along, in fact in the third
glider with Hauptsturmfilbrer Skorzeny. I had to reassure the general
somehow or other:
“Yes, very often, Herr General. It makes an extremely comfort-
able impression, not only because there’s no engine noise, which
makes it difficult to talk, but also because one in fact feels like a
bird-man; uomouccello!’
‘Really, what are these machines for?’
I looked at my watch. The moment I had feared had now arrived.
Simple, Herr General. Later we will take off in these gliders and
land on the massif of Gran Sasso and free the Duce.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 263
At first General Soleti looked at me in incredulously and prob-
ably thought that I was making a bad joke.
‘I hope that you’re saying that in jest! The Duce is being held
prisoner at an elevation of 2,000 meters, in the high mountains! You
really intend to land there? That is impossible, my friend: that would
be a really idiotic operation, plain suicide! A proper massacre! And
you think that I, Soleti...'
When Warger finally managed to convince him that he was part
of this ‘mad operation,’ he first protested, then pure desperation seized
him. He actually became sick, and we had to put out an urgent call
for Doctor Brunner to come.”

Speaking honestly, I understand General Soleti’s behavior. He was

an outstanding cavalryman who had proved himself magnificently
while leading his cavalry regiment. But our operation appeared to
him senseless and impossible. After talking with Sturmbannfihrer
Kappler, who remained unshakable, and a brief conversation with
General Student, he was forced to agree to come with us for better or
worse, “in order to avoid a bloodbath.” He had no other choice: Radl
and Warger didn’t let him out of their sight on the morning of on
September 12.
Before General Student took his leave of us, he assembled all the
pilots, officers and group leaders taking part in the action in the air-
port administration office:

“Gentlemen,” he said, “very soon you will take off on a really

extraordinary mission. All present were selected from the best pilots
and officers, accustomed to looking danger in the eye. This opera-
tion will go down as unique in military history, not only because you
have enormous technical difficulties to overcome, but because this
operation is of quite considerable political significance. Before you
receive your final instructions from Hauptsturmführer Skorzeny, I
would like to wish you all the best for a complete success. I am sure
that every one of you will do his duty.”

Using a large-scale map of the Campo Imperatore which was pinned

on the wall, I explained to each pilot and each group leader his mis-
sion. I had made a close study of the attack on the fortress of Eben
Emael on May 10, 1940, and I knew that three minutes elapsed be-
264 Orro SKORZENY
tween the time when the first paratroopers and special engineers “fell”
out of the sky onto the cupola of the fortress and the moment at which
the Belgians opened fire.”
I estimated that I and the people in my glider (No. 3) would have
more than four minutes to reach the Duce before they would fire at
us. Then we would receive cover from the crews of Gliders Nos. 1
and 2, while Rad], Menzel and the soldiers of Glider No. 4 would be
only a minute behind us.
But, as the Italians say, there were “imponderables”: beginning
with the bombing of our small airfield by a few English aircraft about
fifteen minutes prior to our departure. When I emerged from cover I
saw that miraculously none of our gliders had been hit. Only the
runway had been partially destroyed by bombs. At X-Hour for take-
off, at 1 P.M., our operation began, and the glider with Langguth on
board took the lead and set course to the northeast toward the moun-
tain massif of the Gran Sasso.

Notes
A li Kesselring of ioned Hitler's order to free the Duce in his book. On
Page 225 be wm: “Genmalobers Stadont end Suurmbennführer Skoresny, his executive, were cho-
sen for this missfon.” (Editors’ note)

2. In Sixty Days that Shook the World (1956), J. Benoist-Méchin wrote that Hiver had personally
worked out the plan for the taking of Eben-Emael. (Editors' note)
 18
THe FREEING OF THE DUCE

The lead aircraft and Glider Number One return to Practica di Mare!
~1 order a steep approach and the capture of the hotel — “I knew that
my friend Adolf Hitler would not leave me in the lurch!” -— The
carabinieri surrender — Gerlach’s act of heroism — The Knight's Cross
~ With the Mussolini family in Munich — Neo-fascism - The conver-
sation between Mussolini and Ciano — In Fithrer Headquarters -
The midnight tea — Mussolini’s diary - The Duce a prisoner
again...this time of the Germans — Conversation with Admiral Canaris
— Consequences of this action: Adrian von Félkersam comes to us —
April 18, 1945: the Duce’s Waffen-SS guard unit is withdrawn —
“There’s nothing we can do...”

ne could see practically nothing of the landscape from

the inside of a DFS 230 glider. Its tubular steel frame was
covered only with canvas. Our formation climbed through
dense clouds to a height of 3,500 meters.
Brilliant sunshine came through the tiny plastic windows, and I
saw that several of my people, who had already eaten all their emer-
gency rations, were now very ill. I could also see that the face of
General Soleti, who was sitting in front of me between my knees,
was taking on the grey-green hue of his uniform.
The pilot of the Henschel glider tug kept the pilot of our glider,
Leutnant Meier-Wehner, the glider pilot leader, informed of our
progress. He in turn passed on to me the current position of our for-
mation. In this way I was able to follow our flight path precisely. I
held a detailed map in my hands, which Radl and I had drawn using
the photographs we took from Langguth’s machine on September 1.
265
266 Otro SKORZENY
I thought of General Student's words: “...1 am sure that each of you
will do his duty.” Then Leutnant Meier-Wehner told me that the pilot
of our tow plane had informed him that Langguth’s lead aircraft and
Glider Number 1 were no longer in sight. I later learned that these
aircraft had quite simply turned around and returned to Practica di
Mare!
That meant that my and Radl’s assault teams now had no one to
cover their rear, and I would have to land first if I wanted to carry out
the operation at all. I didn’t know that two of the gliders behind me
were also missing. I believed I had nine gliders behind me, when in
fact I had only seven! I called to Meier-Wehner: “We're taking over
the lead!” and cut two openings in the skin with my paratrooper’s
knife. In this way I could orientate myself to some degree and give
the two pilots instructions, first to Meier-Wehner, who then passed
the order on to the “locomotive” pulling us. Finally I sighted beneath
us the small city of Aquila in the Abruzzis and its small airfield, then
somewhat farther on the Mors column on the winding road to the
cable car valley station. It had just passed Assergi and was trailing a
dense cloud of dust. They were on time; down below everything was
going according to plan. It was almost X-Hour, 2 P.M., and I shouted,
“Fasten steel helmets!”
The hotel appeared beneath us. Leutnant Meier-Wehner gave the
order: “Release tow cable!”, and soon afterward he made a flawless
turn over the plateau. I realized that the gently-sloping meadow on
which we intended to land — as General Student had instructed — was
little more than a short, steep meadow which was also littered with
boulders.
I immediately shouted, “Steep approach! Land as close behind
the hotel as possible!” The other seven gliders flying behind me would
surely do the same. Radl, who reported our maneuver to the pilot of
machine number four, later admitted to me that he thought I had gone
mad.
In spite of the braking parachutes, our machine landed much too
fast. It bounced several times and there was a frightful din, but fi-
nally it came to a stop about 15 meters from the comer of the hotel.
The glider was almost completely destroyed. From then on every-
thing happened very quickly. Weapon in hand, I ran as quickly as I
could toward the hotel. My seven Waffen-SS comrades and Leutnant
Meier followed. An astonished sentry just stared at us. To my right
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 267
there was a door: I forced my way in. A radio operator was at work in
front of his set. I kicked the stool out from under him and the radio
operator fell to the floor. Ablow from my submachine-gun destroyed
the radio set. Later, I learned that at that very moment the man was
supposed to send a report from General Cueli that aircraft were ap-
proaching to land. The room had no other doors, and so we dashed
along the back side of the hotel looking for an entrance: but there
was none, just a terrace at the end of the wall. I climbed on to the
shoulders of Scharführer Himmel. I climbed up and found myself
standing at the front side of the hotel. I ran on and suddenly caught
sight of Mussolini’s striking profile in a window frame.
“Duce, get away from the window!” I shouted as loud as I could.
There were two machine-guns in front of the main entrance to
the hotel. We kicked them aside and forced the Italian gun crews to
back away. Behind me someone shouted: “Mani in alto!” I pushed
against the carabinieri who were bunched up in front of the entrance
and fought my way against the stream in a not too gentle fashion. |
had seen the Duce on the second floor to the right. A set of stairs led
upward. I raced up them, taking three steps at a stride. On the right
there was a hallway and a second door. The Duce was there, and with
him two Italian officers and one person in civilian clothes.
Untersturmführer Schwerdt bundled them into the hall. Unterschar-
führer Holzer and Benzer appeared at the window: they had climbed
the facade using the lightning conductor. There Duce was in our hands
and under our protection. The entire action had been played out in
barely four minutes — without a single shot being fired.
I had no time to say anything to the Duce. Through the open
window I saw Radi and his group approaching at the run: their glider
had landed in front of the hotel. Weapons in hand, they rushed to the
entrance where the carabinieri were just beginning to set up their
machine-guns again. I called to Rad]: “Everything in order here!
Secure below!”
A few shots were fired in the distance: the Italian sentries had
come to life. I stepped out into the hall and asked to speak to the
Italian commander immediately. The carabinieri now had to be dis-
armed as quickly as possible. Their leader, a colonel, wasn’t far away.
“Any resistance is pointless,” I said to him in French. “I demand
your immediate surrender!”
268 Orto SKORZENY
“I need some time to think it over!...Must speak with General
Soleti...”
“You have one minute! Go!”
Just then Rad] walked into the room; he had been able to push his
way through. I left two of our soldiers to guard the door and stepped
into Mussolini’s room. Schwerdt was still there.
“Duce, the Führer has given me orders to free you!”
He shook my hand and hugged me, with the words, “I knew that
my friend Adolf Hitler would not leave me in the lurch!” Benito
Mussolini was extremely moved and his black eyes glistened. I must
confess that this was one of the greatest moments in my life.

The minute had elapsed and the colonel had thought things over. He
came back into the room, surrendered, then passed me a glass of red
wine. He bowed and said, “To the victor!”
I drank to his health and passed the glass to the thirsty Radl, who
emptied it immediately.
Once out of the aircraft, General Soleti became his old self again.
He hadn’t, of course, been able to follow us in storming the terrace,
but he was spotted by the Radl group from glider number four and
picked up. Since he was anxious that no one shoot at him, like all my
people he repeated my order: “Mani in alto!” A bed sheet hung from
a window replaced the white flag. When Leutnant von Berlepsch
spied the sheet at the window, he followed my instructions to the
letter and surrounded the hotel with his paratroopers. Through the
open window I gave him instructions to immediately ordered him to
disarm the numerous troops guarding the Duce, and added, “Gently,
but as quick as you can!”
Leutnant von Berlepsch saluted and clamped his monocle firmly
in his eye. He had understood. At the request of General Soleti, who
knew Mussolini well, the officers were allowed to retain their
sidearms. The Duce told me that the carabinieri captain Faviola, who
had been badly wounded at Tobruk, and the other officers had treated
him well. Nevertheless, on September 11 Faviola had taken away
everything sharp that he owned, like knives, razor blades and so on:
Mussolini was determined not to fall into allied hands alive.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 269
I learned that we had also captured a general. Then a man in
civilian clothes, who was with Captain Faviola and the other officers
in the Duce’s room, introduced himself: he was General Cueli! Later
I heard that this man was supposed to have spirited Mussolini away
that afternoon and handed him over to the allies! I decided that Soleti
and Cueli should also be taken to Rome.
One of our gliders crashed on a scree about 800 meters away.
The ten men inside were immediately recovered by our medics and
Italian soldiers and treated by Dr. Brunner and the Italian medics.
None of those aboard the glider were seriously hurt. We had undoubt-
edly been extremely lucky; we sustained nowhere near the 80 per-
cent losses predicted by the regimental staff of the parachute regi-
ment.
There was a brief skirmish in the course of occupying the cable
Station in the valley, and the Italians suffered minor casualties. But
both stations had fallen into our hands intact. Major Mors telephoned
and asked if he might come up; I consented.
My mission was not yet over, however. How could we get the
Duce to Rome? Three possibilities had been planned. The first in-
volved seizing the airfield at Aquila di Abruzzi. Three Heinkel 111s
would land there. I would escort Mussolini to the airfield and ac-
company him in one of the aircraft. This machine would be escorted
by the others during the flight.
I had our radio truck, which had arrived in the valley, transmit
the agreed-upon signal “Operation successfully carried out.” I set
the attack on the airfield by the paratroopers for 4 P.M. But as I waited
for confirmation that the three Heinkel 111s would land, it proved
impossible to reestablish contact with the parachute corps’ radio sta-
tion. To this day I do not know why.
Second possible option: a Fieseler Storch aircraft was to land
near Assergi, site of the valley station. Unfortunately the pilot of the
aircraft, whose hard landing I had witnessed through my field glasses,
tadioed that his machine’s undercarriage had been damaged.
So all that was left to us was the third solution: Hauptmann
Gerlach, General Student’s personal pilot, would land another Storch
on the Campo Imperatore. Carabinieri and parachute troops worked
quickly to clear a narrow landing strip, for Gerlach was circling over-
head waiting for the signal that he might land, a green flare.
270 OTTO SKORZENY
He landed with consummate skill, to the amazement of all. But
he had to take off again, with the Duce and me aboard! I had re-
ceived an order from Hitler. The takeoff would be very difficult; if I
let Benito Mussolini fly away alone with Gerlach and he then per-
haps crashed with the Duce, there would have been nothing left for
me to do but put a bullet in my head. It would have meant that I was
unwilling to risk the dangerous takeoff with Mussolini and pilot
Gerlach.
Since I was forced to opt for Plan C, I informed the Duce that we
would take off in the Storch in half an hour. As he was a pilot him-
self, he knew what a takeoff at this elevation and without a proper
runway involved. I was grateful to him that he didn’t waste any words
over the takeoff. Mussolini at first wanted to go to Rocca delle
Caminate. But he changed his mind when he learned that his wife
and children were no longer there and that they had already arrived
in Munich with one of my commando units under the command of
Hauptsturmführer Mandel.
He gave his luggage to Radl and stepped out of the hotel into the
open. Just then Major Mors arrived with two of his lieutenants. Ma-
jor Mors asked “Fliegerhauptmann Skorzeny” to introduce him to
the Duce. This was a fortunate moment for war correspondent von
Kayser of the Student Division, who had come up to the Campo
Imperatore in the cable car with Mors.
At this point I would like to mention that, although I was aware
of the presence of an Italian division near Aquila, I did not know that
it had moved toward Assergi. The Duce’s presence in the valley and
the trip from the valley station to Assergi and from there to Aquila
airfield via Camarda and Bazzano would have been dangerous. I had
destroyed the radio set in the hotel, the one Cueli used to send his
reports. But it was possible that the commander of the Italian divi-
sion might wonder about the loss of communications and seize the
initiative, which would be uncomfortable for us. The Duce had to be
gotten to safety as quickly as possible, however there were serious
risks associated with Plan C. But let us allow Karl Radl to speak
once again:

“When we saw Gerlach, Mussolini and Skorzeny squeezed to-

gether inside the small aircraft we were all seized by fear. The air-
craft glided down the sloping ‘runway,’ where we had removed all
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 271
the large stones. But a water drainage ditch ran through the second
third of the strip. Gerlach tried to miss it. He tried to pull the aircraft
up and then lift off. The Storch in fact jumped over the obstacle, but
then it tipped to the left and almost seemed to flip over. Then it touched
down again...the last few meters, and then it disappeared into the
chasm.
My legs went weak; I had the feeling they had been cut off. Sud-
denly I sat on one of the Duce’s cases. Luckily no one saw me. It was
a reaction to the tremendous activity and tension of the last few days.
Now it’s all for nothing, I thought: the Duce will die; I will shoot
myself in the head. We all stared at the aircraft, which disappeared
into the valley. But we could still hear the motor. Suddenly the Storch
appeared on the other side of the chasm. It was still flying...flying in
the direction of Rome!”
Several years ago I was introduced to a carabinieri at Rome’s
international airport. He was one of those who was supposed to have
defended the entrance to the hotel with a machine-gun.
“Well,” he said, “up there you gave me a lovely knock with a
rifle butt, Herr Oberst!”
“I’m sorry about that...”
“But I preferred that to a bullet in the head!”
“You're not mad at me?”
“No, Herr Oberst. Afterward my comrades and I helped clear
away the boulders so that the Storch could land and take off again
with you and the Duce on board.”

We shook hands. The aircraft had sideslipped to the left and dived
into the valley. I closed my eyes and waited for the impact. But |
soon opened them again and saw Gerlach slowly pulling back on the
stick. The Storch pulled out of its dive: we flew over the rocks at a
good thirty meters to the mouth of the valley of Arezzano. I couldn’t
refrain from placing my hand of the shoulder of the Duce, who was
just as pale as Gerlach and I. He turned and smiled. He had been
fully aware of the danger but hadn’t wasted a word about it. Only
now did he begin to talk, and as we were flying quite low for safety
reasons, he described the area to me and stirred old memories. It
struck me that he spoke excellent German.
Soon the “eternal city” was off to our right. Gerlach landed art-
fully on the tailwheel and the right mainwheel, as the left had been
272 OTTO SKORZENY
damaged on takeoff. Hauptmann Melzer was waiting for us. He
greeted the Duce in the name of General Student, congratulated
Gerlach and I and escorted us to the three Heinkel 111s which were
supposed to have picked us up in Aquila. I introduced the Duce to
the crew of our aircraft and to Dr. Reuther, 2nd Parachute Division
medical officer, who accompanied us on the flight.
Soon we arrived near Vienna, in the middie of a storm. Our ad-
venture wasn’t over yet: in vain we tried to make radio contact with
Vienna. Visibility was practically zero. I was sitting beside the pilot,
and we rechecked our course. It was night and we were slowly get-
ting low on fuel. We had to be close to Vienna and we descended
cautiously. There was no question of trying a forced landing with the
Duce on board. Then suddenly I saw a large body of water shimmer-
ing through a gap in the cloud; I was sure it was Lake Neusiedler. We
dropped lower: my assumption was correct. I told the pilot to fly
north. We landed at Aspern airport in total darkness. There I learned
from the control tower that we hadn’t been able to make radio con-
tact “because it was Sunday” and the radio center wasn’t fully manned
that day. A few weeks later when Goebbels spoke of “total war,” I
quoted him a few examples, especially the one concerning Aspern.
The Duce was subsequently taken to the Hotel Imperial in Vienna,
where they had reserved a suite for him. He had no pajamas, but in
any case he considered them a waste of time, which led to a light-
hearted discussion. I was glad to see an entirely different man than
the one I had met on the Gran Sasso when I kicked open the door of
the room in the Hotel Imperatore. He had a few more kind words for
us. Then I took my leave and went to my own room next door.
Slowly I began to feel the fatigue that had accumulated in the last
five days. But I was not to have any claim to rest. The phone rang: it
was Himmler. He sounded very friendly, and after he had congratu-
lated me he said:

“You are Viennese, if I’m not mistaken? Your wife isn’t with
you? Send a car for her, that’s quite in order! Of course stay with the
Duce. You will accompany him to Munich tomorrow and from there
to Fiihrer Headquarters.”

I gladly accepted the Reichsfihrer’s suggestion. Just before midnight

General der Waffen-SS Querner, who had escorted us to the Hotel
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 273
Imperial from the airport, informed me that the chief-of-staff of the
Vienna Corps Headquarters wished to speak with me. Soon after-
ward the Oberst introduced himself and declared ceremoniously:

“Hauptsturmführer Skorzeny, I come on order of the Führer, the

Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and it is my duty to present
you with the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross!”

He took off his own decoration and placed the band around my badly-
shaved neck, over the jacket of my decidedly tattered paratrooper
uniform. I regretted that my father was no longer alive: he would
have been happier about this than I. Then there began a confusion of
congratulations, handshakes and more questions. The telephone rang,
and I wasn’t paying attention when General Querner said to me: “The
Führer himself wishes to speak to you!”
I took the receiver and heard Hitler’s voice:

“...Not only have you successfully concluded an act unique in

military history, Skorzeny, but you have also returned a friend to me.
I knew that if anyone could do it, it was you. I have promoted you to
Sturmbannfihrer of the Waffen-SS and awarded you the Knight’s
Cross. I know that you’re wearing it already, for I gave the order that
they were to present it to you immediately...”

He had a few more words of thanks, and I could sense how happy he
was that the Duce had been rescued. Keitel and Géring came on the
line after him and likewise congratulated me. I explained to them all
that the Duce could not have been freed without the courage and
imagination of everyone who had taken part in the action and its
planning. In particular, I mentioned Untersturmfiihrer Rad], Leutnant
Meier-Wehner, pilot of Glider No. 3, and Hauptmann Gerlach. Shortly
afterward I learned to my great joy that Hauptmann Handel’s opera-
tion had succeeded and that Donna Rachele, Annamaria and Romano
were safe and sound in Munich.

The next day I accompanied Mussolini from Vienna to Munich in a

comfortable Junkers aircraft. The overnight rejuvenated and again
274 OTTO SKORZENY
vital Duce explained his plans to me during the flight. These were
grandiose. His new movement, the republican-fascist party, was to
restore the Italian nation to its old heights. The House of Savoy had
not supported the fascist revolution in any way, instead it had sabo-
taged it. The king, who had no notion of government, and his court-
iers had fought a constant secret war and committed treason in the
end. Josef Mazzini had been right.
“When our ship passed by Gaeta at about midnight on July 27,”
he added, “I first thought they would bring me into the famous for-
tress and asked that, as a special honor, they should put me in the cell
in which the hero of the Risorgimento of 1870 had been jailed. But
they took me to Ponza.”
At Riem airport near Munich Mussolini tenderly took his wife
Donna Rachele and his two children into his arms. We stayed until
September 15 in the Reich government’s guest house in Munich.
The Duce insisted that I was also put up there and took my meals
with him and his family. We had a number of conversations. He was
under no illusions and knew that the republican-fascist state would
still have enormous difficulties to overcome. The neo-fascist doc-
trine, whose fundamentals Mussolini laid out for me, was much more
than a “nationalist-monarchist” fascism. It was more than anything a
call for European union. This union could not come about under the
domination of a single nation or a small group of nations, rather it
must embrace all the countries of Europe. The new doctrine pro-
posed to unify all free nations — outwardly against international plu-
tocracy, and inwardly against aggressive capitalism. The nations of
Europe were to join together to manage the tremendous riches of the
African continent, for the benefit of the African and European peoples.
Mussolini told me that he had given a great deal of thought to the
idea of Euro-Africa. It was only to be realized when the old conti-
nent left behind the egotistical and limited nationalism and was reor-
ganized. Otherwise the European peoples, in spite of their common
culture, would not be able to survive. The era of the fratricidal war
was over. It was time to unite or go under.
The Duce gave a speech in this vein at the first congress of the
republican-fascist party in November 1943. I can also confirm that
neo-fascism — which was totally different from “monarchist” fas-
cism — was no invention of Hitler’s, as many historians contend. Since
his capture (on July 25, 1943), at Ponza, as well as on Santa Maddalena
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 275
and the Campo Imperatore, the Duce had had time enough to con-
sider these problems. I remember something he said: “We don’t feel
like Italians, because we’re Europeans, rather we feel like Europe-
ans to the degree in which we really feel like Italians.”
During the afternoon of Monday, September 13, 1943, Edda Ciano
asked her father to see the man who had so effectively betrayed the
Duce in the Grand Fascist Council. Mrs. Ciano claimed that it was
all “a tragic misunderstanding,” and that Galeazzo was ready to offer
him an explanation for what had happened. But Donna Rachele stub-
bomly refused to see her son-in-law. She couldn’t stand the sight of
him and said that “bad luck had come to the family with him.” The
Duce gave in to his daughter’s pleas, however. He met Ciano, how-
ever he insisted that I should be present during their talk.
I feared that Donna Rachele might appear at any minute to give
her son-in-law a piece of her mind. The conversation was a brief one.
Ciano complemented the Duce, congratulated him and tried to vindi-
cate himself. His behavior was so miserable that I really felt sick.
Mussolini was very cool and the conversation was ended quickly. I
escorted Ciano out, still fearing to see Donna Rachele suddenly ap-
pear. He took his leave. Afterward the Duce told me that he felt obliged
to punish the one who had betrayed him in such a mean fashion —
namely the leader of the palace revolution to which he had fallen
victim.
I could help but ask, “Duce, you would therefore bring the man
who was just here before a court?”
“I must!” answered Mussolini seriously. “I have no illusions as
to the outcome of the trial. Even if | find it hard and if Edda’s con-
cern is great —I must act so. When I think that the worst reproach that
Scorza made to me on that fateful night, was that I wasn’t tyrannical
enough! He dared to say in the Grand Council: “You were the man
least listened to in this century!” He said that, Scorza!”

We arrived at Führer Headquarters during the afternoon of Septem-

ber 15. Hitler was waiting for the Duce at the airport and gave him a
warm welcome. In reality the new fascist republic had no other basis
than the friendship of these two men and several tens of thousands of
followers. Italy was now even more susceptible to communism than
276 OTTO SKORZENY
in 1921, for this time the communists came as the allies of the great
democracies.
Hitler asked me to give him a detailed account of the action. I
talked for two hours. I still didn’t know what had become of gliders
number one and two or of those that had failed to get off the ground
at Practica di Mare. I took the last two for lost and told Hitler frankly
that probably thirty percent of the soldiers that took part in the opera-
tion were missing. German radio then reported a “loss of thirty per-
cent,” and I was later reproached for having exaggerated our losses
“in order to represent the operation as more dangerous.” Two weeks
later Radl and I had the opportunity to speak for an hour on German
radio and clarify everything. Our total casualties were in fact ten.
The next day, September 16, 1943, Hermann Göring arrived in a
special train and asked me a multitude of questions. He awarded me
the Flying Badge in Gold, but remarked that I had assumed a great
responsibility when I went along with the Duce in Gerlach’s ma-
chine. He did add that he understood that I wanted to take the same
risk as Mussolini as I was carrying out a personal order of the Führer’s.
I took advantage of the opportunity and asked the Reichsmarschall
to allow Hauptmann Gerlach and Leutnant Meier-Wehner to be rec-
ommended for the Knight’s Cross. Hitler gave his approval to both
high awards, as well as for the decoration of my volunteers and Karl
Radl, who was also promoted to the rank of Hauptsturmführer.
Somewhat later I had to give another speech on the operation to
a good dozen generals of the Führer Headquarters. Göring and Jodl
sat in the front row. If any of them were expecting a talk in the gen-
eral staff style, they were surely disappointed. I described the actions
as they had happened, as we had experienced them, with our hopes
and mistakes, but also our will to carry out the mission successfully
in spite of everything.
The next day I spoke with Oberst Strewe, who was responsible
for military security in the Wolfsschanze. He expressed his concern
and wanted to know whether, in my opinion, the Fiihrer Headquar-
ters was adequately guarded against enemy attack. All I could say to
him was, “The Führer Headquarters is undoubtedly very well cam-
ouflaged. Its entrances are well guarded. But an enemy attack on the
site is always possible. Obviously any headquarters can be attacked,
just like any other military target.”
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 277
I took part in the “midnight tea.” Hitler sat between his two sec-
retaries, Johanna Wolff and Traudi Junge and drank tea. On this
evening he talked mainly with ambassador Hewel, who represented
Ribbentrop at Fiihrer Headquarters.
“You are of course invited to midnight tea whenever you come to
Fihrer Headquarters, Skorzeny,” said Hitler. “I would like to see you
here more often.”
I thanked Hitler, but in future I didn’t take advantage of this invi-
tation to come to midnight tea, which often lasted until three or four
in the morning. Many used the occasion to try and further their ca-
reers — through flattery and intrigues, provided that they succeeded
in attracting the attention of Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, who was
always present in Führer Headquarters.
Today I regret that I didn’t take part in this midnight tea as often
as possible. I could have made Hitler aware of realities of which I
knew. It is said today that it was impossible to present one’s own,
contrary opinion to him. That is not true. He gladly debated with
those he spoke to, provided these were well-informed about the topic
under discussion and made reasonable suggestions. From 1943 his
physical condition deteriorated more and more — under the influence
of the “treatment” he received from Doctor Morell, a dangerous quack
who was supported by Bormann.
I did not meet Martin Bormann, the Reichsleiter of the party,
until the day (September 16, 1943) that he invited me to supper. I
was a little late in arriving, which was not to the taste of Reichsfiihrer
Himmler, who was also present. Even before I could apologize he
made several malicious comments about me. Today I can’t recall
even one of the insignificant topics which Bormann chose to dis-
cuss. Himmler, for his part, was not talkative. In any case Bormann
tried to prescribe what I should tell the Führer and what I should not.
In short an icy atmosphere prevailed. Joachim von Ribbentrop, who
I had visited in the afternoon for coffee, was also far from entertain-
ing. He received me very much according to protocol, sat on a high
armchair like the others and offered me Turkish cigarettes which bore
his initials. I must say that our foreign minister was very poorly in-
formed about what had happened in Italy in the past months.
When I said goodbye to the Duce at Führer Headquarters, he
made me promise to visit him soon in Italy. But it wasn’t until mid-
June 1944 that I went to Gargnano, located on the west bank of Lake
278 OTTo SKORZENY
Garda, Mussolini's new seat of government — and it was von Ribben-
trop’s fault.
My soldiers waited for me at Frascati. 1 was given permission to
drive to Innsbruck via Tirol and Lake Garda, and I had just arrived in
Innsbruck when I received news from Berlin relating to Generals
Soleti and Cueli. Mussolini was suspicious of the former and told me
so. On the other hand he had a certain degree of trust in Cueli, be-
cause he had treated him well on the Gran Sasso. One will remember
that the Duce entrusted his luggage to Radl, who handed it over to
the two Italian generals. Following necessary repairs, these two flew
in the second Storch to Munich. There they gave the Duce back his
luggage. Both men expressed a desire to return to Italy; they were in
Innsbruck when their own luggage underwent a routine check. We
then learned that papers apparently belonging to Mussolini were found
in their bags and confiscated. I later saw with my own eyes that
Mussolini’s diaries were involved. I had played my own role in this
adventure and consequently reported to Ribbentrop’s office that these
papers had been sent to the Reich Foreign Minister and should be
given back to Mussolini, who was still Hitler’s guest. Naturally they
should explain to him that his diary had been found in the luggage of
the two generals when they tried to cross the border.
From Rome and Frascati, where my volunteers had prepared an
enthusiastic welcome for me, we moved up to Lake Garda, where I
Panzer Corps of the Waffen-SS was located. The corps was under
the command of my former chief, General Paul Hausser. The recep-
tion we received there compensated for all our labors. We forgot all
the anger, the minor obstacles that had been placed in our path, and
the intrigues. I also received a gift from the Duce there: a great Lancia
sports convertible. It wasn’t until mid-June that I was able to thank
him personally. For the diary discovered in Innsbruck was held at
Wilhelmstrasse for more than eight months, and I had to make sev-
eral emphatic requests that they might hand it over to me, as I couldn’t
visit Mussolini without the diary. This was possibly taken as a sharp
criticism of Ribbentrop’s diplomatic skill.
In June 1944 I went to Gargnano with Hauptmann Radl. Mussolini
welcomed us warmly in the Villa Feltrinelli. Prior to our visit ambas-
sador Rahn and his office gave us numerous recommendations as to
what were appropriate topics of conversation about and what were
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 279
not. We were dismayed to see only a few Italian soldiers on guard
outside the villa. Security was provided by a battalion of the Waffen-
SS — as if Mussolini couldn’t have found thousands of Italian sol-
diers to guard and defend him. Had we freed him from the Gran
Sasso only to see him as a prisoner again? It was quite obvious:
Mussolini was not a free man. I was overcome by a great sadness.
It was even worse when he greeted us in his small office: he
looked like an old lion without a mane. He again accused the House
of Savoy and regretted that Duke Aosta had died in captivity in Nairobi
in March 1942.
“I have deceived myself, because they deceived me,” he said to
us. “I am happy to see that honorable socialists who had earlier re-
fused to follow me are now supporters of the fascist republic. For
example the former communist chiefs Niccold Bombacci and Carlo
Silvestri.' The traitors think they can save themselves — but they are
wrong. They believe that our enemies will reward them for their be-
trayal. But they are already being treated like toadies. Badoglio was
forced to resign his office three times. The King has abdicated in
favor of his son. Certainly it was all the same to Umberto to pass
himself off as a good leninist, just as long as he became king. But he
will be thrown out by Ercoli, who came direct from Moscow.”?
“In the House of Savoy they’re convinced that they’ve saved the
crown. But I can foretell one thing Skorzeny, this crown is lost for-
ever.”
I gave him back his diary and asked him to forgive the delay in
returning it, for which I was not responsible. He replied that he was
quite certain of that. Then the topic of conversation turned to another
theme, namely the efforts of the republican Italians on behalf of the
axis and victory.
But the enthusiasm and conviction that he had shown nine months
earlier were gone. He seemed to convince only himself. I asked him
to dedicate photos of himself for all the participants of the Gran Sasso
operation, which he gladly did.
The Duce’s dedication read:

“To my friend Otto Skorzeny, who saved my life.

We will fight for the same cause: for a united and free Europe.”
280 OTTo SKORZENY
In October 1943 the Duce had gold wristwatches presented to all the
paratroopers and my sixteen Waffen-SS men who had landed by glider
on the Campo Imperatore. The watch faces were all engraved with
the famous “M.” Every officer received a gold stop watch. To me the
Duce sent the wristwatch and the stop watch, together with a gold
pocket watch whose “M” consisted of rubies and which bore the date
12. 9. 1943. It was stolen from me by the Americans in 1945.
Other souvenirs also disappeared in this confusion! The photos,
the dagger of honor of the fascist militia, as well as the “Order of the
Hundred Musketeers,” which was only awarded to one hundred Ital-
ian soldiers. In the meantime friends have sent me a copy of this
medal.
In the course of the day I had the opportunity to speak with Prince
Junio-Valerio Borghese, the commander of the famous X-MAS Flo-
tilla.
“What madness the allies are committing,” he said, “by aiding
Stalin! Europe will be mortally wounded if Germany ever loses.
Churchill, Roosevelt, the English and the Americans will one day
regret allying themselves with militant communism. We will fight
with you to the end, because we are Italian patriots and committed

Rad] and I ate our meals with the Duce and his family in the Villa
Feltrinelli. A member of the German foreign ministry was likewise
there and endeavored to steer the conversation toward peaceful
themes. But the Duce, who had a very thorough knowledge of Euro-
pean, and especially German, history, enjoyed himself. He observed
that Frederick the Great possessed extraordinary political and mili-
tary abilities at the same time, which explained why he was self-
critical. The ambassadorial advisor looked like he was sitting on hot
coals when Mussolini spoke of the astonishing diplomatic virtuosity
that Frederick the Great developed in the years 1740 to 1786.
One felt that the present scarcely interested the Duce any more.
He was no longer chief of state, but a philosopher, historian, a far-
seeing theoretician who sought the synthesis between tradition and
revolution, between socialism and nationalism to the benefit of a
reconciled Europe.
When we left Mussolini asked me to visit him often. He took my
hand in his; I had no way of knowing that I had seen him for the last
time.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 281
oe...

“This action in the Gran Sasso massif attracted world-wide atten-

tion,” wrote Charles Foley in Commando Extraordinary. | don’t know
whose silly idea it was to send a paratrooper propaganda company to
the Gran Sasso to make a film that was supposed to recreate our
operation and which was mediocre in every respect. The only con-
vincing role was played by the 2,914-meter-high Gran Sasso. I would
also have been happier if the German and Italian press hadn’t printed
so much material that was a figment of someone’s imagination and
hadn’t published my photo as well.
This action also had psychological effects on our soldiers. Eleven
officers of the Brandenburg Division requested that they be trans-
ferred to Friedenthal. This was the reason for my first discussion
with Admiral Canaris, in the course of which I got to know his char-
acter. This man had something of the jelly-fish about him, like a flee-
ing eel. Today I ask myself why he had a portrait of Hitler on his
desk: one of Roosevelt, Churchill or Stalin would have served the
purpose better. The conversation lasted for hours. Oberst Lahousen
appeared from time to time and declared that this or that officer was
indispensable to the Brandenburg Division. After three hours of ne-
gotiation Canaris said to me, “Good. Very well, I will order the trans-
fer... No, wait. I just thought of something else,” and so on.
He had to begin all over again and not until four hours later did
the admiral give in, albeit reluctantly.
Among the officers transferred from the Brandenburg Division
to Friedenthal was Oberleutnant Adrian von Fölkersam, the son of
an old Baltic family. His grandfather had been an admiral in the czar-
ist fleet and had commanded a flotilla during the Russo-Japanese
War. He spoke fluent Russian, French and English and had studied
economic science at the University of Berlin. As a Brandenburger he
had already undertaken daring missions, such as raids behind Soviet
lines, an attack on a Soviet Red Army division headquarters at the
beginning of 1942 and so on. He soon became my chief-of-staff.
Félkersam confided to me that unusual things happened in the
Brandenburg Division. French- or Arabic-speaking soldiers were sent
to Russia, and those who spoke English or Russian to the Balkans.
By a unique coincidence he learned that the enemy had been waiting
for certain commando units when they arrived in the Near East, the
282 Otto SKORZENY
USA and elsewhere (Operation Pastorius). Since certain units of the
Brandenburgers were new formations and the young officers showed
little initiative, Canaris decided to use the Brandenburg Division as a
simple division unit within the armed forces, although the
Brandenburgers could and should be used for special missions and
had been trained for such.
Fölkersam and the other Brandenburg officers who transferred
to Friedenthal were permitted to voluntarily join the Waffen-SS.
Generals Jiittner and Jodi subsequently gave me authorization to re-
cruit from among the soldiers of every branch of the armed forces
for my commando units. On August 5 the Sonderverband z.b.V.
Friedenthal became the 502nd SS Commando Battalion with a head-
quarters company and three motorized companies. Somewhat later
the battalion was expanded to become Commando Unit Center
(Jagdverband Mitte), to which four more battalions were added, the
instruction battalion and others. Finally, in September 1944, addi-
tional units of the Brandenburg Division were transferred to the SS
commando units and placed under my command on order of General
Guderian, Army Chief-of-Staff.
I thus achieved an early departure from Schellenberg’s sphere of
influence and now received orders from the OKW, from General Jodl
of, most commonly, direct from Hitler.
“Following the Gran Sasso operation,” wrote Charles Foley,
“Friedenthal became a gathering place for every dare-devil and spe-
cialist of the handiwork of war. Skorzeny had under his command
soldiers of the army, the air force and the navy. At one point in time
Friedenthal was literally swamped with these volunteers who wished
to fight in his units: wild dare-devils, standard-bearers, idealists and
the ‘tough ones’ who wanted to distinguish themselves in sensational
actions... Hundreds of photographs from Friedenthal show how
Skorzeny trained his people. One recognizes his officers by their tired
appearance: Skorzeny drilled and trained them unyieldingly, so that
they might be capable of overcoming expected and also unforeseen
difficulties.”

On April 28, 1945 I was on my command train in the vicinity of

Salzburg. I had set up my command post in two special cars which I
 My ComMMANDOo OPERATIONS 283
had got out of Berlin with much difficulty. My mission was to orga-
nize the famous “Alpine Fortress” together with Field Marshall
Schörner. I had an excellent communications system at my disposal
with telex, telephones and a good dozen radios, and was thus able to
communicate with every front.
In the afternoon a report was received from the radio monitoring
service. Italian radio had announced that Benito Mussolini had been
captured and shot by partisans. I considered that impossible. If the
Duce was no longer alive, it was because he had taken his own life: I
was firmly convinced of that. I knew that Mussolini was guarded in
Gargnano by a battalion of the Waffen-SS. It was totally inconceiv-
able that even a large group of resistance fighters could successfully
ambush a battalion of the Waffen-SS in its quarters.
To be sure, I knew nothing of the negotiations being carried out
in Bern between General Wolff and his adjutant Dollmann and Dulles:
the Duce was not informed of this! But Himmler knew about it. I
finally succeeded in establishing contact with Major Beck, the chief
of my Jagdverband Italien (Commando Unit Italy), who had vainly
tried to get in contact with me. He explained to me a fact of which he
learned all too late: the Duce left Gargnano on April 18 to go to
Milan. Someone had withdrawn the Waffen-SS battalion assigned to
guard the Duce and sent it to the front.
“But what idiot gave that order?” I asked Dr. Beck.
“No idea,” he replied. “All that we heard was that the battalion
was supposed to be replaced by a company of the Luftwaffe. And I
don’t know if that was the case. I later learned that the Duce left
Milan headed north during the night of April 25-26, and this was
after a conversation with Cardinal Schuster and one of the leaders of
the resistance fighters, General Cadorna.> The Duce didn’t want to
surrender himself...”
“To the north you say? To Switzerland or Austria?”
“T just learned that he stopped at the prefecture in Como, in order
to wait there for a strong militia column under the command of
Pavolini and then put up a fight in the Valtini Mountains. It is certain
that there were no soldiers of the Waffen-SS with him. It was too
late. There was nothing we could do...”
Nothing! And in the Valtini Mountains! We would have been quite
close, if Pavolini’s 5,000 had actually existed and we had received
the order to begin the final battle in the Alps.
284 OTTO SKORZENY
Our Waffen-SS was thus used to hold Mussolini prisoner and not
to defend him! Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring would never have
allowed such a rotten trick! But he was in Bad Nauheim, acting Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Western Front in von Rundstedt’s place.
The rest is common knowledge. Benito Mussolini was abandoned
by everyone. The hangman, the communist Audisio-Valerio, a former
member of the Workers International in the Spanish Civil War, said,
“Duce I have come to rescue you!”
He enquired cautiously, “You aren’t armed are you?”
Some have even written that the Duce did not die bravely. But
according to the words of Audisio’s chauffeur, the Duce’s last words
were, “Aim directly for the heart!”
Everyone is familiar with the horrible photographs from Loreto
Square in Milan.

Notes
1. Bombacci broke with Moscow in 1927. He joined the new fascist republic and was murdered by
partisans. Silvestri, a journalist, was arrested in 1924 for writing that Mussolini had given the order for

to do with the murder. The Duce met with him at Gargnano and the two men made peace. (Editors'
note)

2. On April 2, 1944, broadcasting overs Radio Bari, communist leader Ercoli called upon the Italian
people to “join the battle against fascism together with the great democracies.” He also praised the
heroic Soviet armies, which were going to “liberate Europe.”

3. This General Cadoma was the son of a former commander-in-chief of the Italian forces whose front
was broken by Austro-Hungarian troops at Carporetio in October-November 1917. The Italian Minis-
ter President Orlando had declared to Marshall Foch that Cadomo was determined “to fight to the end,
even if he had to fall back all the way to Sicily.” To this Foch replied: “That's out of the question. The
stand must be made on the Piave!” (Marshall Foch, Memoirs, Part 2). In 1922 the Duce attempted to
restore the honor of tho older Cadoma. (Editors’ note)
 19
Jury 20, 1944

“..a bombing attempt at Führer Headquarters...” — Schellenberg

behind his desk with a submachine-gun within reach - The supposed
putsch by SS Colonel Bolbrinker, Chief-of-Staff of the Inspector of
Armored Troops, is delayed -A confrontation averted - General Stu-
dent doesn't want to believe it - Géring’s orders — I drive to
Bendlerstrasse - “The Führer is dead”: Major Remer is skeptical -
I speak with Adolf Hitler by telephone from Goebbels’ house - The
helplessness and nervousness of the conspirators —- General Olbricht
and Oberst von Stauffenberg, the leaders of the conspiracy — The
counter-putsch by Oberst Pridun, Oberst von Heyde and others -
Generaloberst Beck takes his own life; General Fromm liquidates
witnesses — Speer's odd report - What Major Remer found out - My
actions at Bendlerstrasse: The Walküre order is rescinded immedi-
ately — Stauffenberg’s game of dice - Canaris is arrested — Hitler
fears that Stauffenberg might be injured! —- Field Marshalls Rommel
and von Kluge commit suicide - The Red Orchestra and the 20th of
July —- Guderian: “The assassination attempt had devastating effects
on the morale of the Fuhrer” — The struggle continues.

“ turmbannführer Skorzeny! Sturmbannführer Skorzeny!” An

officer ran alongside the fast train standing in a Berlin sta-
tion and called my name. Scarcely five minutes had passed
since Radl and I had installed ourselves in our reserved
sleeper car. We were about to travel to Vienna to form a new com-
mando unit of our best frogmen. It was to visit Tito, who had fled to
the island of Viz, at his new headquarters.

285
286 OTTO SKORZENY
I rolled down the window and called out to the officer, who had
already passed our compartment. He was a Leutnant from General
Jittner’s staff, a liaison officer to Schellenberg’s Office VI. He was
quite out of breath and was scarcely able to call to me that I was most
urgently expected in my office in Berlin. Rad! passed my bags through
the window. I told my adjutant to go on to Vienna alone and do his
best there. It was 6:10 P.M., July 20, 1944,
That afternoon we had learned that Hitler had barely escaped an
attempted assassination. But the seriousness of the situation was first
made clear to us by a radio broadcast at 6:45 P.M. I didn’t know that
Himmler and Gestapo chief Miller had sent experts to the Wolfs-
schanze at 1 P.M. and that the entire national police force had been
placed on alert at 2 P.M. Then, on the platform, I heard that there had
been dead and wounded and that the situation in Berlin was still not
clear.
I called Félkersam, who was in Friedenthal, from the military
office at the station. Félkersam was to place the 502nd Commando
Battalion on alert and report immediately as soon as the first com-
pany was ready to march. I then drove to the Berkaerstrasse in Ber-
lin-Schmargendorf, where my administrative section was located.
At a quarter to seven the network suddenly interrupted its broadcast
and issued a special bulletin:

“A bombing attempt was made on the Fiihrer’s life today.

Generalleutnant Schmundt, Oberst Brandt and colleague Berger were
nearby and sustained serious injuries. Generaloberst Jodl, Generals
Korten, Buhle, Bodenschatz, Heusinger and Scherff, Admirals Voss
and von Puttkammer, Kapitän zur Sce Assmann and Oberstleutnant
Borgmann escaped with minor injuries. Apart from minor burns and
bruises, the Führer himself suffered no injuries. He has already gone
back to work and, as planned, has received the Duce for lengthy
talks. Reichsmarschall Göring joined the Führer a short time after
the attempt.”

The mood of the communique worried me. Who had done this thing?
Had the enemy penetrated the Wolfsschanze, the Führer’s H.Q.? Ten
months earlier I had said to Oberst Strewe in Rastenburg Führer
Headquarters was not one hundred percent secure against a surprise
attack by a determined enemy with a really ingenious plan. The oddest
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 287
rumors were circulating among the offices of Berkaerstrasse. The
Officials stood there armed to the teeth and they were waving their
submachine-guns around so carelessly that I got goose-bumps and
drew Oberfiihrer Schellenberg’s attention to this impossible situa-
tion.
Since February 12, 1944 the military and political intelligence
services had been under a central command. Certain agents of Admi-
ral Canaris’ Abwehr were all to openly committing treason and were
exposed as double agents; he himself was put on ice. However this
did not stop Generalfeldmarschall Keitel from having him named
“Chief of the Special Staff for the Economic War,” which operated
from Eiche near Potsdam. Schellenberg “inherited” the entire Ausland
Abwehr organization — which was then christened “Amt Mil” — but
remained chief of Office VI of the Reich Security Office.
Schellenberg was green in the face. A pistol lay on his desk.
“Just let them come,” he said, “I know how to defend myself!
They wont get me that easily!”
“Is someone really out to get you?”
“Skorzeny, the situation is serious. I have had submachine-guns
issued to all the male employees. We will do our utmost to defend
ourselves.”
“You know,” I said to him, “what you have ordered appears to
me very imprudent. These people simply can’t walk around with fire-
arms and they will probably shoot themselves yet. I just had one of
your NCOs sent to the basement: he was holding his machine-pisto]
like an umbrella!”
Schellenberg informed me that the center of the conspiracy was
obviously located in Bendlerstrasse, and asked whether I might not
order one of my companies over for “our” protection.
“Yes. Of course. I really am absent-minded! My battalion is al-
ready on alert. I should have thought of that straight away. But may I
know who the enemy is?”
“TI tell you everything was cooked up in Bendlerstrasse. It is a
conspiracy. They won't shrink from anything!”
“And whom is it against? Who is plotting against whom?”
“A putsch is probably being prepared and tanks will roll in the
streets of Berlin. Imagine that, Skorzeny, tanks!”
“Calm yourself Oberfihrer! I will find out what’s going on while
we wait for my company to arrive.”
288 OTTo SKORZENY
It was probably about 7 P.M. I telephoned Féikersam and told
him to send 1st Company under the command of Hauptmann Fucker
to Berkaerstrasse immediately. Félkersam and Oberjunker Ostafel
were to join me as quickly as possible, which they did in record time.
Félkersam remained at Berkaerstrasse while Ostafel and I carried
out a “patrol” through the government quarter. All was quiet.
“So far it seems no more than a comic opera revolt to me,” I
observed to Ostafel, “but let’s drive over to the panzers.”
I had many friends at the panzer corps and I knew Oberst
Bolbrinker, the chief-of-staff of the panzer inspectorate, which was
based at Fehrbelliner Square. I immediately had the impression that
something wasn’t right there. Two tanks sat in readiness on each of
the broad streets leading into the square in a star-shaped pattem. Stand-
ing in my car, I saluted the officers; they let me pass and I found
Oberst Bolbrinker. He saw me immediately and was at something of
a loss. He obeyed an order from Bendlerstrasse and had all the panzers
from the Wiinsdorf panzer school ordered to Berlin, but he concen-
trated them around Fehrbelliner Square so as to keep them under his
control. He was supposed to send armed patrols to Lankwitz and the
Lichterfelde Barracks, the quarters of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler.
“What do you make of that?” said the Oberst. “Did you hear
about it earlier on the radio? A bombing attempt against the Fuhrer’...
Unbelievable! Isn’t it?... Oberst Glasemer, the commander of the
Krampnitz Panzer School, hasn’t returned from Bendlerstrasse. The
Waffen-SS planned a putsch and there have already been clashes.
What do you think of it?”
“Herr Oberst, I am a member of the Waffen-SS myself and I don’t
believe under any circumstances that my comrades have planned a
plot against the Führer and against the Reich. However, I suspect
that certain people are even now trying to set off a proper civil war
and play the army off against the Waffen-SS.”
The Oberst was surprised.
“A civil war. How?”
I explained to Bolbrinker that the Leibstandarte would react vig-
orously if the panzer units, which had already moved from Wiinsdorf
to Berlin on his orders, were to carry out an armed reconnaissance to
Lichterfelde. That had to be avoided at all costs. The order was sense-
less. The Oberst was of the same opinion and told me that his tanks
had not yet moved any farther: he had concentrated them around
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 289
Fehrbelliner Square. Then I suggested to the Oberst that we drive to
Lichterfelde with two of his officers.
He agreed. We left immediately, and as we passed by the panzer
officers we recommended that they do nothing unti! further orders
were received. Shortly thereafter Bolbrinker gave the order that the
panzer units were only to obey the orders of the Inspector of Ar-
mored Troops, General Guderian.
We raced by car to my old barracks in Lichterfelde. There I had a
talk with Oberführer Mohnke, who soon afterward was promoted to
Generalmajor of the Leibstandarte. He saw us as heaven-sent.
Goebbels had alerted him at about 7 P.M. and warned him that cer-
tain elements of the army would claim that the Führer was dead and
would attempt to seize power and issue orders. Furthermore the
putschists would spread the lie that the SS — and especially the Waffen-
SS - had carried out the act of violence at Führer H.Q. Oberführer
Mohnke had therefore brought his cannon and machine-guns into
position in the Leibstandarte barracks parade square; his people were
ready for battle. We discussed the situation openly.
“Dear comrades,” said Mohnke, “luckily you have come. For if
the panzers had showed up here there would have been shooting, and
the matter would undoubtedly have taken a bloody course.”
I asked him not to allow his troops to leave the barracks, for it
might be that one or another panzer would show up in front of the
barracks in spite of everything. The Waffen-SS was not to react to
any such provocation. He agreed. One of Bolbrinker’s liaison offic-
ers stayed with Mohnke; the other went to report to his commanding
officer. It was about 9 P.M.
I later found out that Oberst Glasemer was captured by the con-
spirators. However he escaped from Bendlerstrasse and notified
Oberst Bolbrinker, who then ignored any further orders from that
source.
1 called Fölkersam from the Leibstandarte barracks. The 1st
Motorized Company had meanwhile arrived from Friedenthal. I
briefed Fölkersam to stand ready for anything in front of the build-
ings on Berkaerstrasse. My adjutant reported to me that commander
of the Berlin military district had initiated an alarm plan shortly be-
fore 4 P.M. A practice alarm of this type had been carried out by the
general staff of Military District III on July 15. The exercise involved
security measures in the event of an allied airborne landing against
290 Orto SKORZENY
Berlin. But the orders that had been coming from Bendlerstrasse since
5 P.M. were no practice: it was a secret mobilization for a military
putsch! Who was behind it? It was clear to me that the confusion that
reigned here in Berlin was linked to the attempt on Hitler’s life. Dur-
ing the night it was confirmed to me that the conspirators had in fact
attempted to camouflage their actions by giving the Walkiire order:
Walkiire anticipated certain special measures which were to be set in
motion if enemy forces suddenly broke in or in the event of a general
revolt by foreign workers which might threaten state security. I also
heard that the “exercise” of July 15 was merely the result of an error
on the part of some of the conspirators themselves: they assumed
that the attempt on Hitler’s life would be made that day.
After my conversation with Félkersam I decided to drive to
Wannsee, where General Student’s headquarters was located. They
had not received any alert order, however. So I immediately drove to
General Student’s home in Lichterfelde, which I knew. The general
was at home and received me. It was already past 9 P.M. He was on
the garden terrace, wearing casual clothes and sitting beneath a half-
darkened lamp, in front of him a mountain of files. His wife sat nearby,
busy with her knitting. The general welcomed us warmly. When |
explained that we were there on military business his wife excused
herself and I gave the general a brief description of the day’s events
as I knew them. He shook his head in disbelief: “But no my dear
Skorzeny, that sounds very much like an adventure novel! An at-
tempted putsch? A military plot? That’s completely impossible! It
must be just a misunderstanding, that’s all.”
Then the telephone rang. It was Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring.
He informed General Student that the attempt to kill Hitler had been
carried out by a staff officer from the Bendlerstrasse, who was really
convinced that his bomb had killed Hitler. Afterwards orders had
come from the Bendlerstrasse, some of which had been carried out.
From now on only orders that originated from Führer Headquarters
orthe OKW were to be followed. Göring recommended staying calm
in order to avoid clashes. The Führer was unhurt and would speak to
the German people during the course of the night.
The general became pale. He turned to me and said: “You are
right.” He reported my actions to Göring and the fact that I was there
with him, hung up and said, “That is really unbelievable! Even viewed
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 291
superficially the situation looks serious. I will alert our troops at once
and forbid them to follow orders that do not come direct from me.”
“Herr General,” I said to him, “the panzers and the Waffen-SS
are already taking it easy. I suggest that you establish contact with
Oberst Bolbrinker and Oberfiihrer Mohnke.”
“Right! We will exchange liaison officers.”
I took my leave of General Student and returned to Berkaerstrasse
by the quickest route. It was already past 10:30 P.M. Félkersam re-
ported that the OKH had in fact been issuing orders to the military
districts and the fronts since 4:30 P.M. They thought Hitler was dead!
It was high treason!
Fölkersam, Fucker, Ostafel and I were disgusted. The Wehrmacht
was fighting on three fronts against the strongest armies in the world.
On the Eastern Front the Romania was threatened by the Red Army;
it had broken into the Baltic countries and had taken Pinsk, Bialystok
and Brest-Litovsk in the central sector. On the Western Front the
allies commanded the air and sea and were expanding their bridge-
head. The port of Cherbourg and the bomb-biasted city of St. Lé had
just fallen into their hands. In Italy, after the capture of Arezzo they
were already at the gates of Pisa.
I received a call from Fiihrer Headquarters — probably on the
initiative of Reichsmarschall Goring. I received the order to immedi-
ately proceed to the Bendlerstrasse “with my entire force,” in order
to support the watch battalion of the Grossdeutschland Division, which
was commanded by Major Remer, who was already on the scene. I
pointed out that I had only a single company at Berkaerstrasse at that
time. I would march to Bendlerstrasse with it.
It was shortly before midnight. We rushed through the streets in
great haste. The buildings had been destroyed by enemy terror at-
tacks and looked really eerie. Our own thoughts were far from opti-
mistic. My broad Kiibelwagen led the column of about twenty ve-
hicles. Félkersam sat beside me, and I believe it was he who said
what we were all thinking, “When I think of how many brave com-
rades have fallen on account of these fellows...!”
We reached the Tiergarten-Bendl intersection. There was
a car in front of us, and a second, which had just left the main en-
trance of the Bendler block, came toward us. Both cars stopped. I
waited a moment and then got out. In the first car was Dr. Ernst
Kaltenbrunner, who had taken Heydrich’s place in the RSHA. In the
292 Otto SKORZENY
other car sat a general. As I learned later, it was General Fromm,
commander of the Replacement Army. Standing off to one side, I
overheard the general say to Kaltenbrunner, “...I’m tired and am go-
ing home. I can be reached there any time.”
But as it turned out General Fromm did not drive home, but to
Doctor Goebbels.
Both men shook hands. The way was clear: go! I let the convoy
move out, waved my pocket lamp and shouted: “Major Remer.”

Major Hans-Otto Remer, commanding officer of the watch battalion

of the Grossdeutschland Division, had been wounded eight times
since the beginning of the war. A few weeks ago Hitler had deco-
rated him with the Knight’s Cross. At 4:30 P.M. he received instruc-
tions to initiate Operation Walkie. General von Kortzfleisch, com-
manding general of the Berlin Military District, was absent from the
headquarters in Berliner Square. He had been arrested by the con-
spirators in the Bendlerstrasse. General von Hase, commander of the
Berlin garrison, explained to Remer that Hitler was probably dead
and that the Waffen-SS was attempting to seize power. Therefore the
watch battalion must block off the government quarter and see to the
security of the general staff of the replacement army in the
Bendlerstrasse. Remer was surprised and said, “In this case, Herr
General, it is up to Reichsmarschall Göring, who will replace the
Führer and who must give the orders.”
Below in the communications room, Untersturmführer Roehrig
and Scharführer Tegeder had sensed the treachery at about 5 P.M.
and at 6 P.M. transmitted the putschist’s orders incoherently. At about
10 P.M. Roehrig even succeeded in taking control of the entire com-
munications system — telephones, teletype and radio — and warned
Hauptmann Schlee, one of Major Remer’s officers. Remer had set
up his command post in Dr. Goebbels’ offices on Hermann Göring
Strasse. Schlee, who was in command of the blocking force around
the Bendler block, informed him of the orders given by Olbricht,
Hoepner and Stauffenberg. It was now apparent that the Olbricht
office was the central point of the conspiracy.
But while I was alerting Oberst Bolbrinker, Oberfiihrer Mohnke
and General Student, those inside the huge building were acting on
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 293
their own and demanding explanations of the conspirators. Olbricht
and von Stauffenberg were thus forced to disarm and confine Gen-
eral Fromm. The latter knew of the plot and was prepared to support
them as soon as they were successful. But Fromm had spoken with
Keitel by telephone shortly before 5 P.M. and learned from him that
Hitler was not dead, but was in conversation with Mussolini and
Marshall Graziani. As a result Fromm wanted nothing more to do
with the conspirators. He was disarmed and locked up — together
with Generals Kunze, Strecker and Specht — and was immediately
replaced by General Hoepner, who had been demoted and relieved
in 1942! They couldn’t have made a worse choice!
It was Austrian, Oberstleutnant Pridun, who organized the counter-
putsch in the Bendlerstrasse, together with Colonels von der Heyde,
Kuban and Herber. But they lacked weapons. Hauptmann Fliessbach
drove to the arsenal at Winsdorf. Not until later did he succeed in
bringing weapons and ammunition, submachine-guns and mortars,
in a truck, and it was after 9 P.M. when these were passed out.
Oberst von der Heyde then entered Olbricht’s office with twenty
officers and NCOs and called on him to surrender. There was a brief
exchange of fire, in which Stauffenberg was wounded. General
Fromm was freed by another group and declared Generals Beck,
Olbricht and Hoepner and Oberst Stauffenberg under arrest. Field
Marshalls von Witzleben and Gisevius had already left. Generaloberst
Beck tried to commit suicide. He only succeeded in wounding him-
self twice, however, and had to be finished off by an NCO.
General Fromm returned to his office and announced, “I have
just convened a court martial which has sentenced General Olbricht,
Oberst Mertz von Quimheim, that Oberst there, whom I don’t want
to know any more (he pointed at Stauffenberg) and that Leutnant
(referring to Leutnant von Haeften, Stauffenberg’s adjutant) to death.”
The “sentence” was carried out immediately in the courtyard of
the building, which was illuminated by searchlights. The firing squad
was made up of NCOs of the replacement army. It was about 11:15.
General Fromm liquidated the inconvenient witnesses.
According to former armaments minister Speer’s book, “the up-
rising was put down by Oberst Bolbrinker’s panzer brigade.” He,
Speer, had arrived at Bendlerstrasse to try and stop the shootings,
which took place shortly after midnight.” He wrote, “Bolbrinker and
294 OTTO SKORZENY
Remer sat in my car. In completely blacked-out Berlin the Bendler-
Strasse was lit brightly by searchlights: an unreal and eerie scene.”
At the same time this scene was said to have had “a theatrical
effect, like a movie set.” Speer’s car was stopped by an SS officer at
the corner of Tiergartenstrasse. He saw “Skorzeny, the liberator of
Mussolini, talking to Kaltenbrunner, the head of the Gestapo.” Not
only was Kaltenbrunner not the head of the Secret State Police (that
was Miller), but it seemed that one always had to mention the Ge-
stapo when someone was eliminated. “Their conduct had the same
shadowy effect as these dark figures.”
Suddenly “a mighty shadow became visible against the brightly-
lit background of the Bendlerstrasse,” and General Fromm came,
“alone, in full uniform.” He turned to Speer and “in a trembling voice”
informed him of the death of Olbricht, Stauffenberg and so on.
There are so many improbable things in this book that I feel ob-
ligated to go into several: Oberst Bolbrinker’s tanks put down abso-
lutely nothing and saw no action. The reason for this is known. As
well the Bendlerstrasse was not lit by searchlights. I don’t remember
seeing Speer that evening, and when he says that I spoke to him, I
wasn’t even there at the time, for General Fromm was still in the
Bendler block. I also don’t believe that Oberst Bolbrinker and Major
Remer got into Speer’s Lancia. And finally I had other things to do
besides stand on the street and chat in the shadow of the trees.
It is true that the real Gestapo chief, Miller, sent a sort of inves-
tigating committee to the Bendlerstrasse at about 5:30 P.M. on
Himmler’s order. This commission was led by Dr. Piffrader and con-
sisted of four people: two Gestapo officials and two members of the
SS with the rank of Unterfiihrer. General Piffrader was supposed to
interrogate General Olbricht and his chief-of-staff von Stauffenberg
and find out why the latter had left Rastenburg in such a hurry.
Himmler, who was at Führer Headquarters at that moment, was aware
that the replacement army had already issued the order for the imple-
mentation of the Walküre plan. I therefore don’t understand why
Müller, who must also have known about it, only sent four men.
They also put Olbricht under lock and key and Dr. Kaltenbrunner,
head of the RSHA, came in person to fetch him — so lightly did they
take the putsch!
At that time Kaltenbrunner did not yet know that Count Helldorf,
Berlin’s chief of police, and Arthur Nebe, the Kripo chief, also be-
longed to the circle of conspirators.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 295
In his book Speer claims that he drove to the Bendlerstrasse to
protest against the executions. Apart from the fact that he did not
have the authority to do so, when his book came out in 1969 that was
supposed to mean that he “had offered resistance” in 1944. I asked
Hans Remer, today a retired Generalmajor, what he thought of Speer’s
account. His reply follows:

“Herr Speer only reached the Bendler block because I asked

him to drive me there from my command post in Goebbels’ official
residence. I had only just received word that shootings were taking
place in the Bendler block. My own car was not available at that
moment, but I wanted to get to the Bendler block as quickly as pos-
sible to prevent the shootings, so I asked Speer to drive me there. He
did so right away in his white Lancia sports car. If you like, Speer
was no more than my driver, albeit a prominent one! No one stopped
us. I met Fromm and a small party in the entrance to the Bendler
block, in my opinion that was immediately after the shooting of
Stauffenberg and the others.
“Fromm knew me. He said to me, ‘At last a proper officer from
Grossdeutschland! What do you know about the situation? ‘ I told
him that Hitler had given me full authority in Berlin and that I was
responsible for the security of the government and the restoration of
legitimate order. I suggested to Fromm that if he wanted to know
more about the political situation he should drive to see Goebbels, in
whose residence I had set up my command post.
“T recall that Fromm and Speer spoke after this conversation.
How Fromm and Speer got back to Goebbels’ house I do not know.
I was, however, very surprised to see SS men searching Fromm’s
coat, which was hanging in the hall, when I arrived there a half hour
later.
“As for your question, the Bendler block was blacked out as usual.
After a brief conversation with Fromm I went up to the second floor
and received a quite general picture of what was happening. I subse-
quently spoke with Hauptmann Schlee, commander of the company
on guard, in the doorman’s house and gave him explicit instructions.
We must therefore have met and come to our agreement at this time.
In any case I subsequently drove back alone to my command post in
Goebbels’ residence. Himmler arrived there a short time later and |
reported to him personally.”
296 OTTO SKORZENY
It was agreed with Major Remer that he would take over security
outside the building and I the security inside. That’s the way it was
done.
I had often gone to the Bendlerstrasse on official business. I went
up to the second floor, where Olbricht’s and Stauffenberg’s offices
were located, with Félkersam, Ostafel and two of my other officers.
The atmosphere was still very excited. There were armed officers in
every comer. I attempted to calm the mood and had Oberst Pridun
and Oberst Herber, who I knew personally, describe what had hap-
pened that afternoon. Then I went into Stauffenberg’s office. A
Luftwaffe officer I knew told me that the chief of the radio section
was waiting for orders for that night. 1 ordered him to cancel every-
thing associated with Walkiire and restore normal communications
with Fuhrer Headquarters, the military districts and the general staffs
of the various fronts, as well as set up a telephone monitoring ser-
vice, especially for long-distance calls. Nevertheless, I was unable to
get in touch with Führer Headquarters.
I determined that the putsch and counter-putsch had been going
on for a good ten hours and that all work had been forgotten in the
process. The most important thing now was to get the tremendous
administrative apparatus moving again, and so I had the department
chief report to me. I told him:
“The main thing now is to cancel all the orders associated with
the Walkie alert plan. Millions of our comrades are fighting hard.
Think about them. Deliveries of food, munitions and reinforcements
are needed on all fronts. Each of you must endeavor tonight to make
up for lost time!”
Then an Oberst informed me that various urgent decisions about
questions of supply had to be made and signed for by General Fromm
or General Olbricht or Oberst von Stauffenberg. “Very well! I am
assuming the responsibility for signing orders and issuing urgent in-
structions. You will do your part. To work gentlemen!”
I sat down at Stauffenberg’s desk. In a drawer lay the real Walkiire
plan and two dice and a board game printed in four colors. The game
showed the path that a corps of Army Group South had taken during
the Russian campaign. The declarations in the various boxes were so
cynical and mean that I was quite shaken.
Hitler finally spoke to the German people at about one in the
morning. He stated that he was unhurt, “although the bomb planted
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 297
by Oberst von Stauffenberg exploded two meters away from me.”
He then went on:

“What a fate would have befallen Germany if the attempt had

succeeded, perhaps it’s better not to think about it. I myself do not
thank providence and my creator that he has preserved me — my life
is only worry and is only work for my people — rather I thank him
that he has given me the opportunity to be allowed to continue to
bear these worries and to continue my work as well as I can answer
to my conscience...
1 would especially like to once again welcome you, my old com-
rades in arms, that I was again allowed to escape a fate that meant
nothing terrible to me, but which would have been a disaster for the
German people.
I see this as a hint from providence that I must continue, and
therefore will continue my work.”

Hitler intended to speak at 9 P.M. However this was not possible as

the radio recording vehicle was in Königsberg. It was strange: on
such a day as this Führer Headquarters was unable to turn to the
German people by radio.
Two hours later, at about three in the morning on July 21, I was
finally able to get through to Generaloberst Jodl’s staff by phone. He
had been wounded in the head and his friend Oberst von Below in
the neck. Generals Korten and Schmundt had been fatally injured;
Oberst Brandt was dead. I asked that they might relieve me with a
competent general. That would be done the next moming, I heard,
and until then I was to stay at my post. I stayed for more than thirty
hours — sometimes dozing in my arm-chair in spite of the coffee which
Stauffenberg’s secretary made me. There were reports and telegrams
to read. I dictated to Olbricht’s and Stauffenberg’s secretaries and
Signed outgoing orders “on behalf of.”
Generaloberst Jodi himself called me from Rastenburg at about
lunchtime and instructed me to carry on for a few more hours. I was
to inform the OKW if “an especially important decision” had to be
made. I replied that in many cases it wasn’t possible for me to decide
what was an important decision and what wasn’t.
“Skorzeny,” said Jodl, “I know that you’re terrified of staff work;
but that doesn’t matter. Carry on, everything will soon be straight-
298 Orto SKORZENY
ened out; you will be relieved this evening or tomorrow morning at
the latest.”
In the first hours of my stay at Bendlerstrasse, while there was
still great excitement, Félkersam called me from the third floor to
say that they were looking for a certain Luftwaffe general. The man
was sitting across the desk from me. He had just voluntarily placed
himself at my disposal and requested orders.
“Please give me your pistol,” I said.
He gave me his weapon. I laid it on the desk and left the room. I
was told that the man was to be arrested. I waited one or two min-
utes. An army Hauptmann asked me where the man was.
“Stay by this door,” I answered him.
I walked in. The pistol was still lying where I had left it. The
general said, “Thank you. But my religious beliefs forbid me to take
my own life.”
“Yes, I understand.”
I opened the door and the Hauptmann came in. The two men left
the room.

On the morning of July 22 Himmler and General Jiittner arrived at

Bendlerstrasse. Hitler had had the strange notion to name the
Reichsführer commander of the Replacement Army as a replacement
for Fromm. In truth Jiittner bore the entire responsibility, for Himmler
was incapable of understanding military problems.
Félkersam, Ostafel and I returned to Friedenthal. We were dog-
tired and slept for fifteen hours straight. It must have been July 23
when Schellenberg called me. He still made a nervous impression
and announced that he had just had two telephone conversations,
one with Reichsführer Himmler and the other with Heinrich Müller,
head of the Gestapo. Admiral Canaris was deeply involved in the
conspiracy, and Schellenberg was to see to his arrest.
“I find myself in an uncomfortable situation,” Schellenberg said.
“The Reichsführer, who is following an order from above, wishes
the admiral to be treated with a certain degree of respect. On the
other hand I would appreciate it if you would place a detachment
from your unit at my disposal. It would serve me as an escort detach-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 299
ment, for I have a task to carry out that J would rather dispense with.
We must also expect resistance.”
In 1946 in Nuremberg prison, Schellenberg told me that he would
be in my eternal debt if I could testify that he had been partly on the
side of the conspirators on July 20. I refused. Why should I make a
false statement? Surely it was far easier to resist in 1946 than in July
1944.
But what I learned about Admiral Canaris was far too important
not to pass on to my chief-of-staff Fölkersam. As we know he had
been a Brandenburger and had served well and loyally there. Since
coming to Friedenthal he had often expressed doubts about the per-
formance of the Abwehr. Many commando units fell into totally in-
explicable ambushes, and employing the Brandenburg Division as a
normal army unit was completely unbelievable and incomprehen-
sible. For my part, I knew what I thought of Canaris. His report about,
“the firm intention to continue the war at our side,” shown by the
Italian royalist government (July 30, 1943), was an extremely seri-
ous matter. Luckily Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring accorded it no
importance. The good admiral then wanted to send us to a small is-
land near Elba to look for the Duce, who was certainly on Santa
Maddalena. Even Generalfeldmarschall Keitel and Hitler believed
him for a long time.
“Is it at all possible,” said Félkersam, “to win a modern war if the
chief of the intelligence service makes common cause with the en-
emy?”
I asked myself that too, and posed myself another question: what
would have happened if another, well-camouflaged conspirator had
been sitting in my place at Bendlerstrasse?
The conspirators had demonstrated a total lack of competence in
Berlin. They should have set the Walkiire alert plan in motion begin-
ning at 2 P.M. and made sure that the right units followed them.
Olbricht ordered Oberst Fritz Jager to arrest Goebbels, but they
searched in vain for policemen willing to assist them. Major Remer
wanted nothing to do with it. Jäger finally turned to the regional de-
fense force, which dodged the issue, and then to the men of the fire-
fighting school, who refused.
Meanwhile the poor Hoepner planned that 350,000 nazis should
be arrested. But by whom? The firemen?
300 Otto SKORZENY
We of the Waffen-SS were to be “incorporated” into the army,
that meant placed under the command of Feldmarschall von Witz-
leben. Any officer or soldier who refused to obey an order from a
senior officer without authority to do so would be considered a trai-
tor and stood against the wall.
Karl Goerdeler had appointed himself Reich Chancellor, while
Stauffenberg promoted himself to Generalmajor and state secretary
in the war ministry. There were two foreign minister aspirants: if
they negotiated with the west it would have been Ulrich von Hassel,
Schülenberg was responsible for the east. They had obviously never
heard of unconditional surrender, which also applied to the conspira-
tors!
It was clear that Hitler’s death could only have resulted in chaos.
This was the view of Grossadmiral Dönitz, Field Marshalls von
Rundstedt and von Manstein, of General Guderian and all the front-
line generals. Admiral Heye said to me of the 20th of July, “You
know that I am a monarchist by tradition. However I have sworn
loyalty and obedience to the Fiihrer. Besides, if a navy ship runs onto
a reef there is nothing in marine law that says to throw the captain
overboard. He remains on board and in command until, with God’s
help, the crew reaches the safety of the shore. Only then does he
come before a normal marine board of inquiry. Besides, one doesn’t
need to send twenty-three persons to the other side with a bomb just
to get rid of one person.”
The men of the 20th of July, whose sole, if somewhat utopian,
goal it was to save Germany, certainly deserve respect, for they risked
their lives. But the results of their act was catastrophic.
On one hand one must admit that Himmler was very badly in-
formed in spite of his entire police apparatus. he didn’t see until very
late in the game that the assassination attempt was the starting signal
for a putsch. He thought that the culprits responsible for the bombing
were the workers who, during the night of July 19-20, had repaired a
bunker damaged by a stray bomb. The Führer did not share this opin-
ion. He had a search begun for Stauffenberg right after ihe explo-
sion, not to interrogate or arrest him, but because he feared that the
Oberst might be injured and lying unconscious somewhere. It was in
this way that Stauffenberg’s strange conduct was first noticed, and
from then on he was under suspicion. It was thought that he could
have fled behind Russian lines, which were only 100 east of Rasten-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 301
burg. Himmler, who doubted this possibility, instructed Gestapo chief
Müller to dispatch Dr. Piffrader to Rangsdorf airport to arrest the
Oberst when he landed. However the car carrying Stauf-fenberg and
Haeften passed Piffrader’s on the road to the airport.
Many conspirators were drawn into this sad affair without even
knowing the objectives of the leaders. The conspirators believed their
ideas were realities and maintained that it would be possible to nego-
tiate with the west after the disappearance of Hitler.
The worst thing was that Olbricht sent orders to the front, where
they only increased the confusion in the east and west.
An honor court of the OKW determined which of the officers
who had taken part in the conspiracy kept their rank and which did
not. The court consisted of Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt
and Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, who chaired the forum, and Gen-
erals Guderian, Schrodt, Kriebel and Kirchheim. Only those officers
who had been demoted and expelled from military service came be-
fore the people’s court.
The assassination attempt had wounded Hitler deeply, not physi-
cally, but morally. The mistrust he had long harbored against certain
generals became open hostility. It became clear to him that Canaris,
Oster and Lahousen had been committing treason since the begin-
ning of the war, and the fact that Feldmarschall Rommel had a part in
the conspiracy struck him deeply. The thought that even more trai-
tors might be in key positions in the Wehrmacht plagued him day
and night. Even the medications prescribed him by Doctor Morell
failed to calm him. On the contrary: more than ever he came under
the evil influence of Martin Bormann.
I myself was always received warmly by Hitler, which was not
the case with many officers. General Guderian, who took over Gen-
eral Zeitzler’s position as Army Chief-of-Staff, told me:

“The attempted on his life had the most adverse effects on the
morale of the Fihrer. He has become excessively suspicious. It is
becoming increasingly difficult to discuss matters with him. The con-
sequences of July 20 are terrible in every respect.”

One must concede that Hitler made extraordinary efforts to suppress

his desperation and overcome fate. But according to Roosevelt and
Morgenthau, following an unconditional surrender on all fronts Ger-
302 OTTO SKORZENY
many was to become a third-class agrarian nation with no industry
whatsoever — and according to the assurances of the Soviet writer
Ilya Ehrenburg “a scorched wasteland of ruin.”
Did we have any other choice than to carry on the fight until the
bitter end, to at least save as many German soldiers as possible from
captivity in Russia?
 20
OPERATION PANZERFAUST

A conspirator falls victim to Stauffenberg: General Heusinger - The

Soviet partisans at work: 12,000 acts of sabotage on July 19 and 20,
1944 — Walther Girg's commando unit in the Carpathians - Hungary
threatened — Inside Fiihrer Headquarters: I scarcely recognize Hitler
— It is certain that Reich Administrator Horthy is negotiating with
Stalin — My mission in Budapest — Mickey Mouse is rolled up in a
carpet — Bach-Zelewski and Thor - Panzerfaust: the general surren-
ders — Reich Administrator Horthy flees to SS General von Pfeffer-
Wildenbruch — Seven dead - All Hungarian officers stay with us, to
voluntarily carry on the battle — The Pfeilkreuzler in power — Grand
Duke Josef and his horses —- At Nuremberg with Admiral Horthy; he
tries to deny the facts — Proof of his negotiations with Stalin — The
German Cross in Gold - Hitler: “I will entrust you with the most
important mission of your military career.”

hen I was summoned to the Wolfsschanze on Sep-

tember 10, the German armies on both major fronts in
the east and west found themselves in a critical situa-
tion. The real causes of this situation were not just of
a material nature, as was widely held, rather the reasons were moral
and intellectual. One must examine the matter from a distance.
In May 1944 Keitel, Jodl, the Chief-of-Staff of the Wehrmacht
Operations Staff, and Zeitzler, the Chief of the General Staff, asked
themselves where and when the Soviet armies would attack next.
The head of the operations staff in the west, General Heusinger,
had his own opinion on the subject: Stalin would continue the offen-
sive in the south begun by Zhukov in the spring. The Soviet armies
303
304 OTTO SKORZENY
would advance between the Carpathians and the Pripyat Marshes in
the direction of warsaw and the Vistula. Jodl did not quite agree, but
Hitler was convinced by Heusinger’s arguments.
STAVKA had in fact decided to strike in the central sector.
In his book Verbrannte Erde (Berlin 1966) Paul Carell wrote:

“It should come as no surprise that the Soviet intentions remained

a mystery. The Germans did not possess a smoothly- functioning
espionage organization within the Soviet High Command or any-
where else in Russia. No Dr. Sorge and no Werther.”

On the other hand the Soviet High Command possessed detailed in-
formation about our troop concentrations in the central sector.
Military historians paint a rather superficial picture of General
Heusinger. On July 20 there were twenty-four persons, including
Hitler, around the large, rectangular table in the Wolfsschanze. Gen-
eral Heusinger stood to Hitler’s right. He knew Stauffenberg very
well. Nevertheless the Oberst had no scruples: he placed his brief-
case containing the live bomb beneath the table and disappeared.
Heusinger was lucky that nothing happened to him. But the fact that
Stauffenberg set off the bomb in spite of the presence of General
Heusinger proved that the assassination attempt was a completely
improvised affair.
A number of diplomatic documents were made public in Wash-
ington on December 15, 1966, among them a report by General
Magruder, the chief of the American intelligence service, on “all the
plans of the German resistance movement.” These proposals had been
shown to Dulles, who was in Switzerland, in May 1944. The topic: a
putsch against Hitler. General Magruder pointed out that “Zeitzler,
the Chief of the General Staff, had been won over to the conspiracy
by Generals Heusinger and Olbricht.” The latter recommended to
Dulles an airborne operation against Berlin with the support of the
German Replacement Army.
Dulles replied — I am quoting the American diplomatic docu-
ments — “that he didn’t think Great Britain and the USA could enter
into such an agreement without consulting the USSR.” General
Heusinger was slightly wounded by the bomb planted by his friend
and fellow conspirator and was arrested on July 24, General Guderian,
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 305
General Zeitzler’s successor at the head of the OKH, then replaced
him with General Wenck.
This is further proof of the futile efforts by our conspirators to
negotiate with the west. Personally, I had always feared a well-orga-
nized airbome operation against Berlin. Even though I knew nothing
of the plans of the resistance, I had been expressing my thoughts on
the matter to members of the General Staff - Admiral Heye, General
Jüttner and others - since the beginning of 1944.

At Nuremberg General Heusinger spoke out under oath against the

“German fighting methods” which were used against the partisans.
It is true that these police operations all too often got out of hand.
They were carried out by units which usurped the designation
“Waffen-SS.” It was known in official circles, however, that these
were in reality not members of our units. Still, it must be said that the
catastrophe that followed the assault by 200 Soviet divisions against
Feldmarschall Busch’s 34 divisions on June 22, 1944 was prepared
by the partisans and special commando units of the Red Army.
On June 19 and 20 alone more than 12,000 acts of sabotage were
carried out behind Busch’s lines: bridges, railway lines, power plants
were blown up, telephone and telegraph lines were cut. It was the
largest operation in the partisan war to that point, and as a result our
units’ lines of communications and supply had been almost com-
pletely cut off when the huge attack began. From a tactical and stra-
tegic point of view, it was the partisan and commando units which
achieved total victory. This fact is unfairly ignored by many military
historians.
The simultaneousness of the enemy offensives in the west, east
and the interior was noteworthy: on June 6, 1944 the Americans and
the English landed in Normandy and on June 22 took Valognes. On
the same day the Soviets attacked our central front in the east. Pinsk
fell on July 16; on July 20 Stauffenberg’s bomb exploded two meters
away from Hitler. On July 30 the Americans advanced to Avranches
in Normandy, while the Russians marched into Brest-Litovsk. On
the Eastern Front there were barely 10 out of the 38 German divi-
sions manning the central sector left. The Soviet armies advanced
306 OTTO SKORZENY
just as rapidly as we had done in 1941: 700 kilometers in five weeks!
In the north they reached the East Prussian border.
Things were no better in the south. On August 2 Turkey broke off
diplomatic relations with Germany. Romania was swamped by So-
viet troops, which entered Bucharest on August 31.
On instructions from Fiihrer Headquarters I sent two platoons of
my “Commando Unit East” Battalion — about 100 men — to Romania
by aircraft. The units were under the command of the extremely brave
Untersturmführer Walter Girg. Four months earlier he had come from
the officer school at Bad Tölz, blond, daring and hardened — just
twenty years old. In cooperation with V Mountain Infantry Corps of
the Waffen-SS, part of Army Corps Phleps (of the Romanian Waffen-
SS), Girg’s soldiers, who were divided into three commando units,
succeeded in advancing to the most important Carpathian passes of
Kronstadt, Hermannstadt and Karlstadt. First they held the passes
for a short time, then they rendered them impassable by blowing up
the roads. This action enabled German units and many ethnic Ger-
man Transylvanians to escape to the west. As well the observations
of the enemy by Girg enabled another corps of Army Group F to
escape encirclement in the Gyergyoti area. This was the so-called
Operation Landfried.
After completing his mission Girg and the men of his commando
unit, disguised as Romanian soldiers, entered Kronstadt with the
Russian troops. Shortly thereafter they tried to reach the forward
German lines. They were discovered, taken prisoner and beaten up.
Girg managed to escape before he was to be shot; although a bullet
struck his foot, he was able to reach a swamp and hide himself there.
He reached the German lines near Morosvasachely during the night.
His other two groups, which were operating farther to the south, had
better luck and returned with only minor losses.
During its mission into the midst of the Soviet lines, Girg’s com-
mando unit came upon a 2,000-man-strong German flak unit. Com-
pletely surrounded in a valley, it had resigned itself to being captured
by the Russians. After talking to Girg, 300 of the unit’s soldiers de-
cided to fight their way back to the German lines with his people,
which they in fact did. But what became of many other units which
found themselves in similar situations?
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 307
eee

At the beginning of September 1944 Soviet troops (Russian and Ro-

manian) marched into Transylvania. Hungary declared war on Ro-
mania. However Admiral Horthy undertook some reshuffling in his
ministry that suggested a change of course politically, and indeed in
a pro-Soviet sense. Although the majority of the Hungarian Army
(Honvéd) was not in favor of the move, it was nevertheless very
dangerous to our position in Hungary.
In Romania our allies of yesterday were now the enemy. I must
state, however, that there were entire Romanian regiments that fought
at our side until the end. In February 1945 at Schwedt on the Oder I
had a Romanian regiment under my command, while the Russians
had two Romanian regiments. A sometimes difficult situation!
Marshall Antonescu was arrested on August 23, 1944, and General
Zanatescu immediately asked the Russians, whose divisions were at
that moment flooding Poland and Hungary, for a cease-fire. On the
morning of September 10 General Jod! requested that I sit in on the
Fiihrer’s situation briefings for several days, at least those where prob-
lems relating to the southeast front were under discussion.
“It is possible,” he said, “that the Führer will entrust to you an
important mission on this fluid and uncertain front. You must be fully
informed about the strategic and tactical problems in Hungary. Please
come punctually to the noon briefing.” There were two situation brief-
ings held in Führer Headquarters each day: the “midday situation”
(at about 2 P.M.) and the “evening situation” (at about 10 P.M.). The
most important heads of the three branches of the armed forces gath-
ered at these briefings: army, navy and air force or their deputies and
those of the OKW. Generalfeldmarschall Keitel was supreme com-
mander of the OKW, while General Jodi was Chief of the Operations
Staff.
The OKH was the High Command of the Army and was respon-
sible only for operations on the Eastern Front: Chief of the General
Staff at that point in time was General Guderian.
The Balkans usually fell into General Jodl’s area of responsibil-
ity, although this area was being invaded mainly by Russian armies.
Over Keitel, Jodl, Guderian, Géring, the Commander-in-Chief
of the Luftwaffe, and Dénitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, stood
308 OTTO SKORZENY
Hitler as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and of the Army,
to which the Waffen-SS belonged.
The large conference room was located in a barracks, about 50
meters from the just-completed Führer bunker. Hitler was forced to
live beneath seven meters of iron-reinforced concrete. Acomplicated
ventilation system provided fresh air. Nevertheless the atmosphere
was unhealthy, as the concrete, which had not yet fully set, gave off
a damp warmth.
In the situation room barracks a situation map showing every
front lay on a huge table, which received light from the windows in a
twelve-meter-long wall. Current troop strengths and their positions
were entered in colored pencil. Two stenographers sat at the short
ends of the table. Since 1942 Hitler had required that all situation
briefings be recorded. By the end of the war more than 103,000 pages
of notes had accumulated. These were taken out of storage near
Berchtesgaden and, unfortunately, burned. The intelligence service
of the 101st US Airborne Division was only able to save a fraction of
the notes — scarcely one percent.'
When I entered the briefing room on September 10, 1944 I intro-
duced myself to the generals and general staff officers who were
already present, as I knew only a few of them. Many officers had
been replaced after July 20 for reasons that are easily understood.
We all stood. A stool was provided for Hitler: the colored pencils, a
magnifying glass and his glasses lay on the map table.
A curt command: Hitler entered. I was shocked when I saw him
up close. I scarcely recognized him. This was not the man I remem-
bered from the previous autumn: he walked bent and dragged one
leg behind him. His left hand trembled so badly that he sometimes
had to hold it with his right. His voice sounded veiled and brittle. He
greeted a few generals. When he spied me he had a few kind words.
Then he said, “Skorzeny stay for everything that concerns the
Balkans.”
Generalfeldmarschall Keitel stood to Hitler’s left; General Jodl
was to his right and began a presentation on the general situation,
which was easy to follow on the general staff map.
After General Jodl’s presentation Hitler spoke. His voice had
become somewhat stronger and his commentary was so clear and
convincing that one had to cast aside any thoughts that the man might
be suffering from Parkinson’s Disease, as the rumor said. His mental
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 309
activity and his still passionate reactions did not fit the symptoms of
this illness or any other degenerative disease.
Both of Hitler’s eardrums were burst on July 20; he also suffered
injuries to his arm and back. However the moral shock was greater
than the physical. As I leamed from Dr. Brandt, Dr. Morell was giv-
ing him large doses of glucose, multivitamins containing caffeine,
Pervitin — which the Luftwaffe gave to pilots to keep them awake —
and other “wonder drugs.” The pills which Hitler often took for stom-
ach cramps contained traces of arsenic. Today we know that Morell
wrote many prescriptions for rare or dangerous medications on so-
called state paper, which Bormann provided. This paper bore the let-
terhead “The Führer and Reich Chancellor.” Morell’s prescriptions
were thus, so to speak, transformed into “Fuhrer Orders.” The physi-
cian Professor Ernst Günther Schenk, who came home from Soviet
captivity in 1955, related that in 1943 he had made Dr. Conti, the
chief of the Reich Health Office, aware that in his opinion Morell
was doping Hitler in a dangerous way. The nervous stability of the
man on whom the lives of millions of others depended had been
seriously affected. In 1966 another physician, Dr. Hans-Dietrich
Röhrs, wrote in his book Hitler, die Zerstörung einer Persönlichkeit,
that it was only due to Hitler’s extraordinarily robust health that he
was able to withstand “the systematic and progressive poisoning by
Morell.”
During my three days at the Wolfsschanze I was astonished, not
only by Hitler’s extraordinary memory, but by the intuitive sense he
possessed for military and political situations, their possible devel-
opments and eventual solutions of the problems associated with them.
General Jod! knew how to present a military situation. But when
Hitler spoke afterwards, everything was much simpler and clearer.
I am convinced that the great catastrophes — especially that of
Stalingrad — could have been avoided if he had always been loyally
and accurately informed since 1939. I have already spoken of Hitler's
outburst of rage when he learned the actual strength of certain divi-
sions. I would like to add, that on this occasion they concealed the
truth from him concerning the uprising by Polish General Bor-
Komarowski’s secret army in Warsaw, the cruelty of the street fight-
ing and the ticklish situation in which several of our units in the south
of the city found themselves.
310 OTTO SKORZENY
The situation in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Hungary was
gradually becoming catastrophic. Hitler was fully aware of this. The
Romanian oil was lost for good; the Danube bridges had been occu-
pied by Romanian troops on Russian orders, and we had lost 15 divi-
sions in this trap. Bulgaria went over to the side of the enemy — with
the tanks and light guns we had just delivered to them. In Yugoslavia
Tito’s partisans were moving north and would soon make contact
with Soviet troops.
There was still Hungary. At the end of August Hitler had sent
General Guderian on a secret mission to Reich Administrator Horthy.
He delivered a personal letter from Hitler and was warmly welcomed.
But in spite of everything Guderian came away from Hungary witha
very bad impression.
On the third day, after the evening briefing, Jodl ordered me to
remain in the situation barracks. Hitler had also assembled Keitel,
Jodi, Ribbentrop and Himmler for this extraordinary briefing.
Hitler began to speak and declared that he was under no more
illusions: the admiral-Reich administrator was in the process, not
only of negotiating with the western allies, but very probably with
Stalin as well. Obviously without informing us. With great effort the
front had been stabilized at the Hungarian border. If the Honvéds,
the Hungarian Army, now went over to the enemy too, 30 of our
divisions — about 400,000 soldiers, would be trapped. And those fight-
ing in Italy would probably also be hard pressed if the Soviets could
mount an offensive from southern Hungary through Yugoslavia in
the direction of Trieste.
“That's out of the question,” said Hitler in a firm voice. “The
Reich Administrator considers himself a great politician and he doesn’t
realize that in this way he would be opening the door to another
Karolyi.”?
“They really seem to have a very short memory in Budapest.
They have forgotten that they extended the Anti-Comintern Pact for
five years on November 25, 1941! But can they forget that you,” — he
turned to Ribbentrop — “made a certain arbitral award in Vienna on
August 29, 1940? Through this decision Hungary got back the greater
part of Transylvania that had been taken from them by the Treaty of
Trianon in 1920: 45,000 square kilometers and 2,380,000 people,
who today are threatened by bolshevism.”
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 31
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop declared that the political situ-
ation in Budapest was becoming increasingly clouded. Two true
friends of the German Reich had been forced to step down: the act-
ing Minister President Raasch and the Economics Minister von
Imredy; a new cabinet under General Geza Lakatos had taken power.
“Power! Stalin will take power in Budapest if we are forced to
leave Hungary. Can the Reich Administrator forget the solemn words
he spoke on April 16 of this year: ‘We will fight at the side of the
German Army until we have victoriously weathered this storm.’ And
now they say craftily to General Guderian: ‘My dear comrade, in
politics one must have several irons in the fire.” The Reich Adminis-
trator said that, but no loyal ally talks that way, only a man who
intends to betray us and break his solemn promises. I won't tolerate
that, for our soldiers are still defending Hungarian soil too!”
“Skorzeny, I have asked you to take part in the briefings on the
situation of the southeast front. You know Hungary and especially
Budapest. Under no circumstances do I want a Badoglio in Hungary.
If the Reich Administrator breaks his word, you are to take the
Burgberg and seize all those you find in the Royal Palace and the
ministries. Then seal everything off and occupy the Burgberg
militarily. Begin your preparations immediately — in cooperation with
Generaloberst Jodl. In forming your units there may be difficulties
with other Wehrmacht offices: in order to avoid this you will receive
from me a written order with far-reaching authority. We've talked
about a parachute or airborne operation, but the decision is up to
you.”
I no longer have the order that Hitler signed for me, but I remem-
ber the words more or less exactly:

“SS-Sturmbannfihrer Otto Skorzeny is carrying out a personal,

highly-secret order of the utmost importance. I instruct all military
and state offices to support Skorzeny in every way and comply with
his wishes. Signed Adolf Hitler.”

For practical purposes this document was Hitler’s blank cheque to

me, and it will soon become obvious how useful this paper was to
me. Unfortunately it was taken from me, together with the Duce’s
watch, when I was taken prisoner by the Americans.
312 Otto SKORZENY
ee @

Under the cover-name Doctor Wolff I drove to Vienna with Radl. We

wore civilian clothes. One of our true allies, an Hungarian German,
placed his home, with servants and cook, at our disposal. I am almost
embarrassed to confess that in my entire existence I never lived as
well as during these three weeks in Budapest.
Radl was urgently recalled to Friedenthal just before the action,
but Adrian von Fölkersam was with me, as well as most of my men
from the Gran Sasso operation.
Our host, who welcomed us like a true Magyar, was well-informed
about everything being played out in the court and the entourage of
the regent.
Horthy, an admiral with no fleet and a regent with no king or
queen, had resisted the return of the Hapsburgs to Hungary in 1920:
he quite obviously had dynastic ambitions. On February 19, 1942 he
had his oldest son, Stefan Horthy, recognized by parliament as the
vice-regent with the right of succession. This son, who was quite
gifted by the way, fought bravely against the Soviets. He was a fighter
pilot and was killed on August 19, 1942 on the Eastern Front. The
character of Niklas Horthy, his younger brother, was quite different.
He was a regular customer of the Budapest night clubs and his
father’s worry until the day he became involved in subversive politi-
cal activities. Discretion was not his strength, and when we arrived
in Budapest the informers knew very well that Niklas was in com-
munication not only with the politicians in London, but also with
Stalin’s and Tito’s agents — and all this with his father’s blessings.
Our SS and police commander in Budapest, Winkelmann, knew of
the dangerous associations maintained by “Nicky” — that was his
nickname. Fölkersam didn’t understand correctly and heard “Mickey.”
From then on Niklas Horthy became to us Mickey Mouse from
Wait Disney’s world of wonders.
The German police knew that Nicky was supposed to meet one
of Tito’s agents for a conference, first on October 10, then on Sunday
the 15th of October, in an office building in the middle of Budapest
near the Danube. Winkelmann decided to catch Mickey Mouse “in
the act,” and set an appropriate trap. He asked me to provide military
protection against possible intervention by the Honvéd.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 313
Horthy Junior was suspicious. He came to the meeting place by
car at about ten in the morning on October 15. A few officers of the
Honvéd stayed hidden in a canvas-covered jeep parked behind
Mickey’s car in front of the entrance to the office building.
Then I arrived by car. I feigned engine trouble and parked my car
radiator to radiator with Mickey’s car, in order to prevent him from
driving away suddenly. Something moved in the jeep. Two Honvéd
officers were walking in the park opposite the building, but I had one
of my officers and two NCOs sitting on a park bench reading news-
papers. At that moment, it was 10:10 A.M., two of Winkelmann’s
police officials appeared. They were about to enter the building when
a burst of submachine-gun fire rattled from the jeep and killed one of
the men. The two Hungarian officers in the park also fired. I lay
behind my car, which had been turned into a sieve, until my soldiers
came from the park to help. We defended ourselves as well as we
could with our pistols. My driver was shot in the thigh. Then a squad
of about 30 men from Friedenthal, which had been concealed in a
side street, approached at a fast run with Félkersam in the lead.
But Mickey was well-guarded: positioned in a nearby house was
a strong Honvéd unit. An explosive charge was set off immediately.
It destroyed the door to this house and prevented young Horthy’s
guard detail from coming to his aid. Scarcely five minutes had passed.
The German police needed only to go down one flight of stairs to
reach the room where the conspirators were meeting. They were four
in number: Niklas Horthy, his friend Bornemisza and two of Tito’s
agents. For simplicity’s sake, and to avoid passers-by from recogniz-
ing him, “Mickey” was bound and rolled up in a rug. The two police
officers grabbed the ends. It has often been said that “Mickey” was
taken away in a Persian rug. I only saw the back side of it, and if I
remember correctly it was a quite ordinary rug. The rug, together
with the three other men, was put into a police truck which arrived
on the scene punctually. Fölkersam was in the process of withdraw-
ing our troops, in order to disappear as quickly as possible. An inner
voice advised me to follow the truck. Three Honvéd companies ar-
rived near the Elizabeth Bridge at quick time.
Fölkersam hadn’t been able to withdraw yet: I had to bluff in
order to gain a few minutes. I quickly climbed out of the car, went
over to an officer and called out, “Halt!...Where are you going?...Let
314 OTTO SKORZENY
me speak to your major...Not here?...Who’s in command then? Don’t
go there...to the square... There's a wild mixup there!"
The Major approached. He understood German and I shouted to
him, “We must avoid a fratricidal war between our peoples, which
would assume quite awful proportions...quite awful.”
I gained five or six minutes, and that was enough. Fölkersam had
time to load all our people and the wounded into the truck. I took off,
leaving the confused Hungarians behind. I arrived at the airport, where
“Mickey” and his friend Bornemisza were already in a military air-
craft, which soon delivered them to Vienna. And so Horthy Junior
was caught in the act. He wasn’t very popular and his kidnapping
aroused little sympathy in Hungary. But the reaction of the Reich
Administrator wasn’t long in coming. I subsequently drove at once
to the army corps’ headquarters, where I met General Wenck. He
had come from Berlin several days earlier to support and advise me
if necessary. At about noon a call came from our embassy’s military
attache, who was housed in a small palace on the Burgberg: the
Burgberg was under a state of siege and he had been turned back on
every exit road. Shortly thereafter the telephone lines were cut.
At 2 P.M. Hungarian radio broadcast a special announcement by
Horthy, in which he said that “Hungary had asked the Soviet Union
for a separate peace.” However, a communique by the Honvéd’s
Chief-of-Staff, Vitez Vécrées, added that so far only “cease-fire ne-
gotiations were under way.” That said it all. General Wenck and I
agreed that the die had been cast and that I must now set in motion
Operation Panzerfaust, for which we had made preparations.
Before I turn to the planning and execution of this operation,
which involved taking and occupying the Burgberg militarily, I must
mention that many briefings took place before October 15. The Po-
lice General von dem Bach-Zelewski appeared in the plan: he came
straight from Warsaw and brought the gigantic “Thor” with him.
This “Thor” was not the nordic god of thunder, the son of Odin,
but a 650mm howitzer whose shells each weighed 2,200 kilograms.
They were capable of piercing “any thickness of concrete known
today.” “Thor” had only been used on two occasions: against the
fortress of Sevastopol and shortly before in Warsaw at the personal
request of Herr von dem Bach-Zelewski.
He was a sort of bespectacled scarecrow and didn’t impress me
in any way, although many officers were impressed by him. He sug-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 315
gested “finishing off the Burgberg without a lot of fuss,” destroying
the royal palace with “Thor” and with it the entire garrison. I don’t
believe I’m injuring the memory of poor Bach-Zelewski, when I say
that he wanted to identify himself with his howitzer.
It was a waste of effort to try to explain to the man what this hill
meant to me as an Austrian and a European. It was there that the
Anjous, Hunyadi and the White Knights had defended the west so
bravely. I simply told him that I was leading this operation and that I
believed that the OKW’s order could be carried out with little loss of
blood — and not in so brutal a fashion as had just happened else-
where. I didn’t need to show him Hitler’s letter of authority. General
Wenck, who was acting as advisor from the OKW, supported my
view, and “Thor” and its 2,200-kilogram shells were not used.
Shortly before midnight on October 15 a colonel of the Hungar-
ian Ministry of Defense reported to the comps command. He showed
us the letter he had been given by the minister of war, authorizing
him to negotiate with the German authorities. They could give him
only one answer: there was no basis for negotiation until the Reich
Administrator’s cease-fire declaration was withdrawn. Furthermore,
our diplomats were virtual prisoners on the Burgberg. That was a
typical “unfriendly act.” On my suggestion the Hungarian govern-
ment was given an ultimatum: If the mines and roadblocks on the
Vienna Road, which led to the German embassy, were not removed
by 6 A.M on October 16, to our great regret, we would be forced to
draw the appropriate conclusions.
We had the definite impression that the Honvéd agent was not in
agreement with the Reich Administrator's sudden about face and was
certainly not alone in his opinion.
Hungarian soldiers had been battling a common enemy since June
1941, the same one which devastated Hungary in 1920-21. Tzalassy’s
“Pfeilkreuzler” activist party gained a great deal of support as a re-
sult of the communist threat and had many supporters among the
younger officers of the Honvéd. The mood in Hungary was not for a
surrender to the east. Quite the contrary.
For my part, I planned to launch a surprise attack and occupy the
Burgberg, at 6 A.M. on October 16. It was a difficult mission. The
hill on which sat the Burgberg, a fortification more than three kilo-
meters long and at least 600 meters wide, towered above the Danube.
I heard that the garrison had been reinforced. The Reich Administra-
316 OTTO SKORZENY
tor was guarded by 3,000 alerted men: behind the Vienna Gate lay a
regimental barracks; its mortars and heavy machine-guns were in
battle positions. At the other end of the hill, among the palace's ter-
raced gardens above the Danube, were five solid positions with bun-
kers and machine-gun nests; tanks had been positioned in front of
the citadel and in the citadel courtyard; there was a three-meter-high
stone barricade in front of the gate to the citadel; behind it in the
courtyard six anti-tank guns. The palace itself was occupied by a
regiment which had light and heavy weapons at its disposal. Before
reaching the palace one had to pass by the ministries of defense and
the interior, which were defended by two battalions equipped with
mortars and machine-guns. I must admit that we did not become com-
pletely aware of this distribution of forces until we had occupied the
Burgberg and it was all over.
Furthermore an underground passage led from the quay on the
right side of the Danube to the war ministry, which was reached by a
secret set of stairs. Halfway up the stairs was the famous “treasure
room,” where Hungary’s royal treasures were kept. This passageway
was of course sealed off by several armored doors, but no matter
what, we had to use this route to take the war ministry by surprise.
As I have mentioned, those in Fiihrer Headquarters had in mind a
parachute assault or an airborme operation: to attempt this would have
been pure madness. The only suitable place for a landing was the
“Blood Field” - it would have earned its name all over again. In the
event of Hungarian resistance, this practice field beneath the Burgberg
would immediately have been placed under concentrated fire by the
defenders and they would have shot us down like rabbits from the
walls of the fortress. Another solution had to be found.
I had the following forces at my disposal: First there was the
22nd Waffen-SS Cavalry Division Maria-Theresia (named after the
Holy Roman empress and Hungarian queen). This newly-trained di-
vision consisted of 8,000 ethnic Germans (Hungarians of German
descent). Beginning in the late afternoon of October 15, it formed a
blocking ring around the old, medieval Burgberg. The fortress was
completely encircled during the night. The Maria-Theresia Division
was supported by an Hungarian regiment commanded by the coura-
geous Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Karl Ney. This regiment later formed
the backbone of the 25th Waffen-SS Division Johann Hunyadi, one
of the two Hungarian Waffen-SS divisions.’
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 317
As well Hitler had placed a battalion from the Wiener-Neustadt
military academy under my command: about 1,000 magnificent-look-
ing officer aspirants; two companies of Panther tanks and a battalion
of Goliath tanks (remote-controlled miniature tanks which carried a
powerful explosive charge). Obviously my Commando Unit Center
was also present, along with a battalion of Waffen-SS parachute
troops, which remained under my command until the end. A signals
company and a small staff with Adrian von Fölkersam rounded out
my military forces.
Félkersam and I worked out a plan of attack, without worrying
about the numerous conferences taking place at the same time. I felt
it adequate that General Wenck approved of the plan.
At three in the morning I had all the officers fall in on the Blood
Field and gave them my final instructions. The Burgberg had to be
assaulted from four sides simultaneously. In the south the battalion
from the Wiener-Neustadt military academy had to blow up the iron
fence around the castle park, enter the gardens and pin down the
barricading Hungarian forces. In the west, specialists of the com-
mando units under the command of Hauptsturmführers Flucker and
Hunke were to break in over the western wall, attack the front of the
palace and distract the Honvéd troops. In the east the parachute bat-
talion was supposed to force entry into the ministry of defense through
the tunnel. In the meantime I would drive through the Vienna Gate
directly to the palace with the bulk of our motorized units, together
with the Panther tanks and two companies of Commando Unit Cen-
ter.
This last action was supposed to look like a peacetime buildup.
The soldiers in the trucks were all to carry weapons with safety catches
on, and keep them out of sight beneath the side walls of the trucks.
Not a single shot was to be fired from our side. As well there was a
strict ban on replying to single shots. I just hoped that the road lead-
ing up to the Vienna Gate and the two other parallel roads on the
Burgberg hadn’t been mined.
As per my last detailed orders I sent another liaison officer to
corps headquarters: there was nothing new. The officers went to their
posts. It was one minute to six; it began to get light.
I raised my arm: “Forward march!”
I took the lead of my long column and stood in my large com-
mand car. Behind me sat Fölkersam, Ostafel and five “chums” from
318 OTTO SKORZENY
the Gran Sasso. All were armed with Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifles
and had hand grenades hanging from their belts. Each was also armed
with a “Panzerfaust,” a recently-developed anti-tank weapon with a
hollow-charge projectile. This was my assault squad. We were fol-
lowed by four Panther tanks, the Goliath tank platoon and finally the
trucks in which my troops were, so to speak, mounted, as if on an
exercise.
We started from the Blood Field beneath the fortress and drove
in the direction of the Vienna Gate. The engines and caterpillar tracks
created a huge racket. I listened: no explosions. To my right the Vienna
Gate appeared in the morning twilight: they had already opened a
gateway. We drove past a few astonished Hungarian soldiers, who
were even more amazed when I saluted them cordially. Then we came
up to the barracks on the right. The machine-guns were in position. I
saluted again, and we continued on. We drove on toward the palace,
which was still one kilometer away. In driving by, the formation
showed the Hungarian troops its unprotected flanks — now they could
shoot us in the back. A mine could explode, a single shot fired by a
sentry or a burst of machine-gun fire could be the opening act of a
bloody battle.
“Drive faster!” I said to my driver. The convoy thundered up the
road at 35-40 kph. I turned right, to drive by the German embassy.
The other half of my group took the left, parallel side road. Another
600 meters. Nothing moved. On the left now the war ministry. Then
there were two loud explosions: it was our paratroopers forcing the
entrance to the secret stairs in the war ministry. Now the utmost cau-
tion was called for! In a few seconds we reached the fortress square
in front of the palace and faced three Hungarian tanks. The panzerfaust
anti-tank weapons were ready. But what a magnificent target we were
ourselves! No: the first tank raised its gun as a signal that it didn’t
intend to fire. A three-meter-high stone barricade had been erected in
front of the gate. Everything happened quite quickly now. I instructed
my driver to pull off to the right and signalled the following tank. It
headed straight for the barricade, rammed it and forced a large open-
ing. We jumped from the car and ran through the opening into the
fortress courtyard, behind me the commando unit with panzerfausts
in hand. The alarm was sounded: an officer appeared in front of us;
he aimed his pistol at us and shouted something. Félkersam knocked
his weapon from his hand. We spotted the six anti-tank guns in battle
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 319
positions in the courtyard. But two more Panther tanks had already
driven in. Another Honvéd officer made as if to stop me. I called out
to him, Take me at once to the fortress commandant! We have no
time to lose!”
“That way!”
He pointed to a marble stairway covered by a wonderful red car-
pet. We climbed up the stairs at a run, accompanied by the brave
Hungarian officer. A hallway, an anteroom. A table had been pushed
against the open window. On it lay a man, who opened fire on the
courtyard with a machine-gun. Feldwebel Holzer simply threw the
machine-gun out the window, and the gunner was so surprised that
he fell onto the floor. To my right was a double door. I knocked and
stepped in. A general sat at a huge desk. He stood up.
“Are you the fortress commandant?”
“Yes. But...”
“I request that you surrender the fortress immediately. There is
fighting, can you hear it? Do you want to be responsible for blood-
shed among allies? We have encircled all your positions. You can
believe me, all resistance is now hopeless and could be very costly
for you and your troops.”
From outside we heard shots and a brief burst of machine-gun
fire. This was the ideal moment for Obersturmfiihrer Hunke, our
“chinaman,” to step in. He saluted and reported, “Courtyard and main
entrances, radio station and war ministry are occupied. Request fur-
ther orders.”
He saluted the general, who turned to me, “I will send liaison
officers with you to have the firing stopped. Must I consider myself
a prisoner?”
“If you wish, Herr General. But mind you, all your officers may
keep their pistols.”
It was agreed that the order to cease fire should be delivered by
several officer patrols, each consisting of one Hungarian officer and
one of my officers.
I left the general with Ostafel and in the ante-room came upon a
group of excited, hostile-looking officers. I picked out two Honvéd
captains, who looked especially nervous to me, took them with me
as liaison officers, and with Félkersam and a few men from
Friedenthal set out to look for the Reich Administrator.
320 OTTo SKORZENY
The palace appeared to be still completely furnished. One salon
followed another, with rugs, Gobelins, paintings of battles and por-
traits. We had studied the floor plan of the castle carefully, and I had
placed a half-dozen NCOs with panzerfausts at this magnificent hall’s
main entrances.
I was absolutely against the use of a panzerfaust in an ornate hall,
unless it was absolutely necessary. Not only was this weapon effec-
tive against tanks; it could also be used for other spectacular pur-
poses. A single panzerfaust, fired at the junction of several halls,
would surely have given the defenders cause to think, and a
panzerfaust fired along the halls would have produced a terrible ef-
fect, which would surely have made a deep impression on potential
defenders and reduced their desire to fight on.
We had to face the fact that the Reich Administrator was not there.
I learned that he had sought protection that morning at about 5:45 in
the house of General der Waffen-SS Graf Karl von Pfeffer-Wilden-
bruch. The latter was a good friend of Kaiser Wilhelm II, to whom he
bore s striking resemblance. Horthy had left the commanding gen-
eral no orders of any kind for the defense of the Burgberg.
We were now masters of the Burgberg, the seat of government.
We fired several panzerfausts from the fortress without aiming. This
was enough to convince the Hungarian units still fighting in the for-
tress garden that it was advisable to cease resisting. It was 6:30 A.M.
We had lost sixteen men — four dead and twelve wounded. Losses
were equally light on the Hungarian side: three dead and fifteen in-
jured. I saw to it that the Hungarian troops of the Honvéd regiment,
the guard battalion and the royal guard laid down their weapons.
Then, at about 9:30, I assembled all the Hungarian officers, about
400, and gave them a short speech.
“At this historic site I would like you to remember above all that
the Germans have not fought the Hungarians in centuries and that I,
as a Viennese, can never forget our common liberation of 1718.‘ The
situation at the moment is so serious that European soldiers, what-
ever their faith or their political views might be, must stand together
— especially the Hungarians and the Germans! As of tomorrow any
of you who wants to, may once again command his regiment, his
battalion or his company. For no one has the right to force a man to
fight against his will and his convictions. We must fight voluntarily!
 My COMMANDO OPERATIONS 321
Therefore I would like to ask that those of you who wish to continue
the struggle at our side take one step forward!”
Every Hungarian officer stepped forward. I shook hands with
each of them.

I forgot to mention the occasion on which Hitler’s letter of authority

proved useful. At the beginning of October in Vienna the motoriza-
tion of our units, for example the SS-Parachute Battalion and the
Wiener-Neustadt military academy, presented us with very serious
problems. But I finally managed to solve it with the help of a rather
fussy Oberst of the military area headquarters.
It was late and I was hungry. We went into the officers mess,
where I ordered a few sausages. Then I noticed that I had forgotten
my food coupons.
“Nothing can be done,” observed the Oberst. “Orders are orders.
You would have to be the Führer himself to get something without
coupons.” The good official was slowly getting on my nerves. I was
hungry. Suddenly I had an inspiration: I produced the document and
held it out to the Oberst, who read in astonishment. He was a man
with a sensible mind: “You should have shown me this right away
my dear fellow!”
He immediately gave a few instructions and they brought us two
pair of sausages, which I devoured with unconcealed satisfaction,
but also with the appropriate respect.
I never again had to use this document, for all those I had to deal
with had been informed directly by the OKW. For better or for worse
I was the military commander of the Burgberg right after the occupa-
tion and for two days afterwards. This short-lived office enabled me
to finally spend two nights in a comfortable bed, in which Kaiser
Franz-Josef had once slept, to enjoy a bath in his 2.5-meter-long tub
and to make the acquaintance of an illustrious gentleman.
On October 16 Count Szalassy’s “Pfeilkreuzler” Party took power,
there was no opposition. A coalition government was formed with
the former minister Imredy and President Bereghfy. The latter came
to thank me for not damaging the fortress. He was pleased that losses
were so low and promised that the socialist and national coalition
322 Otro SKORZENY
would hold a joint service for the German and Hungarian dead. I
returned to Budapest on October 20 to take part in this moving fu-
neral ceremony.
Soon after my conversation with President Bereghfy, an older,
distinguished gentleman asked to sce me. He wore the uniform of an
Imperial-Royal Feldzeugmeister (Colonel-General).
“Servus, servus” he greeted me in the old style. “I heard that you
are a Viennese, and that didn’t surprise me. I said to myself: only
someone from Vienna could pull off a stunt like that. Magnificent!
Daring! I am happy to meet you. It’s wonderful!”
He seemed to have climbed down from one of the paintings that
covered the walls of the large rococo halls, where the day before our
lads had wielded panzerfausts. Félkersam walked behind me and
whispered:
“That is Archduke Josef of Hapsburg.”
] asked the archduke to sit down, and asked him how I might be
of help.
“Well, well. You could do me a great service. My horses are in
the royal stables in the fortress. Do you think that they might stay
there?”
“But of course, Your Highness. Everything is as it was before.
May I have a look at the horses?”
“Please! Come with me, I'll show them to you. You'll soon see
what magnificent horses they are.”
They were in fact very beautiful animals. The archduke wanted
to give me one as a souvenir. But I had to tell him that I had no idea
what I should do with such an animal: I commanded motorized units.
“You're right,” he observed sadly. “War today is not like it once
was. But yesterday you handled things like in the old times, like a
proper cavalier! And most of all, if you come to Buda don’t forget to
visit me. Servus!”
The fortress with its magnificent galleries and its horse stalls was
completely destroyed by the enemy’s air force and artillery in 1945.
Reconstructed after the war, it was once again damaged by Soviet
artillery in the course of the bloody suppression of the anti-commu-
nist uprising in 1956.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 323
eo

Reich Administrator Horthy had left Budapest and now lived in

Hirschberg Castle in Upper Bavaria. ] met him again in Nuremberg
Prison in 1945, He wanted to file a protest when I was transferred
from a single cell to the witness wing. This although I had had a
brief, but courteous conversation with him on the train in which I
had to take him and his family and their huge cache of luggage to
Bavaria. In Nuremberg, however, he didn’t want to have to see me
every day. Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring, our spokesman with the
Americans, made it clear to the former Reich Administrator that his
protest — which was unprecedented, by the way — had not been ac-
cepted by the allied authorities. But if he wished to, he could take my
place in the solitary cell, which I had just left and where he would be
alone. The ex-Reich Administrator declined; Kesselring then arranged
a conversation between us. I visited the admiral in his cell. He as-
sured me that he had known nothing about his son’s political activi-
ties, and that it was wrong to think that he had ever intended to make
a pact with the Soviets and betray the Germans. His claims certainly
didn’t correspond to the facts, but it would have been discourteous
on my part to call them untrue at this point in the conversation, for
both of us were, after all, prisoners of the allies.
Admiral Horthy was released soon afterward; he lived in exile in
Portugal. On November 3, 1954 he wrote to federal chancellor Konrad
Adenauer from Estoril and assured again that he had never betrayed
Germany or wanted to conclude a separate peace with Moscow.
In truth Horthy committed himself to a swindle. Today I would
like to add that if the SD did not arrest “Mickey” on October 10,
1944, when he had his first meeting with Tito’s agent, it was for the
following reason: “Mickey” came that day accompanied by his fa-
ther, I saw it with my own eyes — and the OKW's order said that only
Horthy’s son was to be arrested.
The Reich Administrator’s proclamation on Hungarian radio on
October 15 was also no German invention. It stated that “Hungary
had asked the Soviets for a cease-fire,” whereupon the commander
of Hungarian troops in the Carpathians, General Miklos, went over
to the enemy with several of his staff officers.
In his Geschichte der Geheimdiplomatie (The History of Secret
Diplomacy), J. de Launay reported that Admiral Horthy said to Hitler
324 Otto SKORZENY
on March 18, 1944 in Klessheim, “Hungary has never betrayed any-
one. If someday we are forced by circumstances to ask for a cease-
fire, you can be assured that I will inform you openly about this in-
tention.”
He did exactly the opposite. While Hitler, who many consider all
too distrustful, still believed that a betrayal was imminent, in reality
it had already been committed. On October 5, 1944 the Reich Ad-
ministrator sent a delegation to Moscow under the leadership of the
inspector-general of police, General Faragho. During the night of
October 11-12 he received radioed instructions from Horthy to ac-
cept the cease-fire terms and to sign, which he did on October 12. (in
his book J. de Launay gave the date as October 11.) Later General
Faragho became a member of the first coalition government under
Soviet occupation.
After the war I learned that there was a secret transmitter in the
cellar of the fortress, which was constantly in contact with Moscow.
The responsible radio officer committed suicide when we occupied
the fortress.
But Horthy sent a second group of negotiators to the Russians.
An Hungarian officer, Retired Colonel Gatkiewicz, wrote me a letter
dated January 15, 1945, in which he confirmed that on October 12,
1944 he accompanied his immediate superior, Oberst Roland von
Utassy, to a meeting with the Soviet High Command, and that this
happened on the direct order of the Reich Administrator. On the
morning of October 13, after a mutually agreed upon pause in the
firing (between the Russians and Hungarians), the two officers left
the Hungarian lines and made their way behind the Russian lines on
the other side of the Theiss in the area of Szegedin. I would also like
to quote several passages from Colonel Gatkiewicz’s letter:

“Finally, shortly before 10 P.M. on October 1944, we were in-

formed that Marshall Malinovsky had arrived, and a short time later
he entered our room accompanied by a small staff. He was a good-
looking man, mid-fifties, blond, with a herculean physique, hands
like medium-sized attache cases, a common, somewhat rough face
and blue, clever, piercing eyes. The impression he gave was more
that of a well-situated butcher than a senior military man. He ap-
proached us with his hand extended and welcomed us warmly.”
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 325
By way of an interpreter Malinovsky first asked both negotiators
about the exact course of the German-Hungarian front line. Colonel
von Utassy gave false information. Malinovsky was surprised and
placed a detailed, completely accurate situation map in front of the
astonished colonel.
“Then he specified the main conditions for an eventual special
peace: withdrawal of troops from the Debreczen area, cessation of
hostilities in all sectors of the front, attack on the rear of the German
troops and their forced surrender. Unfortunately I have forgotten the
details. At our question, what would Hungary’s fate be, he merely
waved his hand casually: ‘We want nothing from the Hungarians.
But the Germans - and a fanatical hatred disfigured his face — we
will destroy the Germans.”
The negotiators were given a period of forty-eight hours to ac-
cept these conditions. In parting Malinovsky said that he hoped that
they would soon be able to greet each other as friends and comrades
in arms. Gatkiewcz wrote that the discussion was arranged on the
Hungarian side by General Miklossy.
As this document shows, Rodion Malinovsky wanted the Hun-
garian Army to fight against us as the Romanians had done earlier,
which cost us fifteen divisions. In the meantime it was proved that
the USSR did not in fact want much from Hungary, just that it cease
to exist as a sovereign state.
By the time Gatkiewicz and his superior were ready to return to
the Hungarian front line, they found that it had moved. They were
forced to walk through ten kilometers of mud to reach the battalion
command post from which they had left. They arrived at the Burgberg
to make their report on the morning of the 14th. Early on the morn-
ing of the 16th I took Colonel von Utassy prisoner in his uniform and
slippers, for his feet had been so badly chafed by his long walk that
he couldn’t pull his boots on. Gatkiewciz himself escaped through
the fortress garden before our arrival. In his letter he also admitted
that he gave his report to the Hungarian general staff and later to a
member of the SD, who interrogated him.
In any case these activities and statements by witnesses leave no
doubt as to the true intentions of the Reich Administrator. On the
other hand, the behavior of Marshall Mannerheim, who was elected
president of the Republic of Finland on August 4, 1944, was quite
different. Ribbentrop and our high command were immediately no-
326 Otto SKORZENY
tified when it became obvious that Finland could no longer continue
the war at our side if it didn’t wish to be destroyed by the Soviets.
The retreat by our troops began at the beginning of September; by
the 14th of the month all had been evacuated from Finnish territory.
Finland did not sign the cease-fire until five days later.
I would like to make just one comment at this point: Finland
today is not treated worse than the Romanians — just the opposite.
On October 20 I was informed that Hitler wished me to report to
him in person on the course of Operation Panzerfaust. I took Adrian
von Folkersam with me, as I knew that there was no greater treat that
I could give him, and introduced him to Hitler. The latter said that he
was very well informed as to Fölkersam’s military career, and asked
him about the daring raid he had carried out in the USSR as a Leutnant
with the Brandenburgers. Hitler gave specific details, mainly about
the occupation of the oil center of Maykop in the Caucasus by
Félkersam’s commando unit in August 1942, for which he had been
awarded the Knight’s Cross. Félkersam was deeply impressed.
“Amazing,” he later said to me, “one could think he was there!”
“He surely was,” I answered him, “you just didn’t notice it.”
A day before we had driven to the Birkenwald Camp, Himmler’s
headquarters, which was located about 30 kilometers northeast of
Rastenburg. Girg had accompanied us; Himmler wanted to hear about
Romania from him. The Reichsfihrer had just moved; the Russians
were all too close. He invited us to dinner in his special car, but he
made no special impression on Fölkersam or Girg. Then we drove
back to Birkenwald with two orderlies. Himmler’s headquarters lay
completely abandoned. The empty barracks in the middle of the for-
est had something eerie about them: we all sensed the coming disas-
ter.

Hitler informed me through Generaloberst Jodl that he wished to

speak to me alone. His warm welcome calmed me.
“From now on,” he said, “you are an Obersturmbannfihrer of
the Waffen-SS and I am awarding you the German Cross in Gold.
No, don’t thank me for it! All the decorations that you propose for
your soldiers are approved in advance. Take them to Günsche, my
adjutant. And now, tell me how it was in Budapest.”
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 327
We sat in a small room in his bunker, where the air was so poor.
But he seemed calmer than the last time I saw him. As well his left
hand didn’t tremble so much. He listened without interrupting me.
He found the appearance of the archduke in imperial uniform very
amusing. I was about to take my leave, but he held me back. Then he
told me in every detail the plan for what is now known as the Ardennes
offensive.
“T will very likely entrust you with the most important mission in
your career as a soldier. In the course of this offensive, whose basic
concepts I have just explained — and which is obviously top secret, I
probably don’t have to tell you that — you and your special comman-
dos will occupy one or another of the Maas bridges between Liittich
and Namur. Your people will make their way behind enemy lines in
English or American uniforms and there finally fight in German uni-
forms. I know that the Americans used the same tactic at Aachen. As
well, some commandos will retain their camouflage behind the en-
emy lines to, where possible, misdirect enemy troops and spread con-
fusion in the general staffs. I know that you have only a little time to
organize such a large operation of this kind. But I also know that you
will do your best. Generaloberst Jodl will answer your detailed ques-
tions.
Something else: I do not want you to cross the front line person-
ally under any circumstances. You must be at the front in the course
of the offensive. It would be a catastrophe if you were wounded or
captured now. I have complete faith in you, my dear Skorzeny. We
will see each other again soon.”
And so I was tasked with Operation Greif: Griffin, the mythical
animal — half eagle and half lion.

Notes
1. Those pages that were saved from destruction reside today in the library of the University of Pean-
sylvania. In 1964 the Albin Michel Veriag published extracts from these under the title Hitler sprichs zu
seinen Generalen (Hitler Speaks to His Generals). (t was translated into French with a foreword by J.
-Méchin. These are highly-significant documents. (Editors’ note)

2 Count Michel Karolyi was a man with liberal ideals. Ho came from an old H aristocratic
family and believed in the democratic ideal. He became president of the Hungarian Republic in 1918-
1919. He took up residence in the Palace In Buda, something that is still talked about. But
soon afterward he was put to flight by Bela Kuhn’s bloody Bolshevik revolution. Hitler was a good
prophet: Count Karolyi in fact returned to “liberated” Hungary in 1946, but the Increasing Sovictiza-
tion of Hungary soon caused him to leave his homeland onco again. He lived in exile in Vence on the
Riveria, where he died in 1955. (Editors’ note)
328 OTTo SKORZENY
3. John Hunyadi (ca. 1385-1456), Hungarian gene ral and imperial admini ished himsclf
early on in the struggle against he Turks. The 2nd Hungarian Division, the 25th Waffen-SS Division
Gombds alalso fought a! ovr aide until the end. A third division was raised in March 1945, conalsting
of
Hungarian volunteers and Gorman-Hungarians.

4. Led by Prince Eugen von Savoyen-Carignan, the Austrians came to the aid of the Hungarians and
defeated the Turks at Zenta (1697), thus the Peace of Passarowits (1718). (Editors’ note)
 21
GRIFFIN

The Ardennes: political offensive - The objectives of Operation Greif

and the opinion of Sir Basil Liddell Hart - A mistake by the OKW
and a “prediction” — The offensive bogs down - I commit eight com-
mando units and attack Malmedy in vain with the 150th Panzer Bri-
gade — The fateful affair at the Baugnez crossroads — Colonel Willis
M. Everett: a ten-year struggle for the truth — The tragedy of Malmedy
— Telegram from Field Marshall Montgomery: “This time we can't
embark like at Dunkirk...” Churchill calls Stalin for help - The hunt
for “disguised nazis” — Bradley arrested and interrogated — Half the
U.S. Army looks for Skorzeny — General Eisenhower a prisoner in
his own headquarters — Raid on the Café de la Paix — Eisenhower's
double or the lost illusions — Griffin as an object of study in the ad-
vanced course for American officers — Hitler's commentary — Stalin's
game.

I: autumn 1943 General Eisenhower, the allied commander-in-

chief in the European Theater, bet General Montgomery five
Pounds that Germany would surrender before Christmas 1944.
On December 15 of the same year Montgomery, by now pro-
moted to field marshall, wrote Eisenhower to tell him that he would
be spending Christmas in England and asked him to pay the five
Pounds. On December 16, while playing golf, news reached him that
we had launched a surprise offensive that same morning along the
Luxembourg border from Monschau to Echternach.
The Ardennes offensive is still referred to as the Rundstedt of-
fensive. But in truth the field marshall, who was seventy years old
and who had again assumed command of the Western Front after the
329
330 OTTO SKORZENY
suicides of Field Marshalls von Kluge and Rommel, received the
plans from Hitler.
Rundstedt, quite incapable of grasping the political objectives of
the offensive, was in favor of a limited action in the Aachen area to
relieve the city. That was something quite different.
In spite of their apparently comradely relationship, Eisenhower
and Montgomery hated each other like poison. In his book My Three
Years with Eisenhower, navy Captain Butcher, the allied commander-
in-chief’s adjutant, revealed that on December 1, 1944 Montgomery
wrote the American general an extremely bitter letter in which he
harshly criticized his strategic and tactical concepts and suggested to
him “in a friendly way” that he resign as soon as possible.
Although Hitler wasn’t aware of these details, he was certainly
convinced that the western allies were far from united, and that
Churchill — and consequently Montgomery — had realized that
Roosevelt was insistent on playing Stalin’s game in Europe. Several
American generals — Patton, for example — were no longer able to
comprehend Ejisenhower’s behavior.
The offensive’s strategic objective was to take the port of Antwerp,
drive a wedge between the American General Bradley's army groups
and separate the British and Canadian armed forces from the Ameri-
can.
In the north Sepp Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army was to reach the
Maas in the direction of Lüttich, cross the river and advance on
Louvain, Malines and Antwerp. In the south the Fifth Panzer Army
under the command of General Hasso von Manteuffel was to ad-
vance on Dinant, reach Brabant and then, with a sudden change of
direction, throw itself at Brussels and Malines.
This ambitious plan was based primarily on surprise, which meant
speed. In order to fortify the element of surprise, Hitler came up with
Operation Greif (Griffin) and made me responsible for its execution.
A special unit formed for this purpose, which received the title the
150th Panzer Brigade, was placed at my disposal. I had two clearly
defined missions:

1. The 150th Panzer Brigade was to exploit the breakthrough by

Sepp Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army, assume the lead and take posses-
sion of the Maas bridges at Huy, Amay and Engis, between Namur
and Lüttich. These bridges had to be captured intact in order to en-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 331
able our panzers to advance on Antwerp. Officers and men were to
wear American uniforms as far as the Maas; after reaching the Maas
they were to fight in German uniforms.
2. Small units, also in American uniforms, were to infiltrate be-
hind the enemy lines and reconnoiter there, cut telephone lines, issue
false orders and cause general confusion among the enemy. These
units were instructed to use their weapons only in extreme emer-
gency and to do so exclusively in German uniform.

The times when this offensive was seen by military historians as “an
absurd, quite utopian operation,” or as the “delusion of a sick brain,”
are over. It could very well have succeeded, and Patton was the first
to realize this. On December 18, 1945 he said: “We could still lose
this war.” In his previously-mentioned book History of the Second
World War, Sir Basi] Liddell Hart expressed the same view:

“The idea, the decision and the strategic plan were Hitler’s intel-
lectual property alone. It was a brilliant concept and should have led
to a brilliant success if he had possessed sufficient forces and re-
serves to guarantee a tolerable chance of success.”

Liddell Hart made much mention of Hasso von Manteuffel’s ability

to maneuver his troops — Manteuffel had only just been appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Fifth Panzer Army — with particular
emphasis on Operation Greif, which, as he wrote, “was commanded
by another discovery of Hitler’s, Otto Skorzeny.” Sir Basil added
that they gave me neither the time nor the means to bring Greif to
fruition. I will show how very right he was.
With the full agreement of Generaloberst Jodl, to whom I had
shown all the plans worked out with Félkersam, the 150th Panzer
Brigade was to consist of:

— 2 tank companies, each equipped with 10 Sherman tanks;

— 3 armored reconnaissance companies, each equipped with 10
American armored cars;
— 2 anti-tank companies;
— 3 battalions of motorized infantry (with American trucks), with
reconnaissance units and a screening company;
332 Otto SKORZENY
— 1 company with a special mission;
— 1 company of light flak;
— 1 signals company;
— 1 regimental headquarters for brigade and command sections
for each battalion.

This gave a total strength of 3,300 men, all volunteers of course.

Theoretically they were all supposed to wear the American uniform
over their German uniforms. The use of American uniforms was sup-
posed to help them cross the battle lines; they had to be taken off
before the actual hostilities. The jurists of General Winter’s staff —
the OKW's operations section — gave me the following instructions:

“Stratagems between combatants are not forbidden in principle.

The commander-in-chief must arm himself against stratagems just
as he does against force. When the ruse consists of approaching the
enemy by using his uniform, regulations strictly specify that this is
only permissible before actual combat begins. At the moment of com-
ing to blows every combatant must show his colors honorably and
reveal his true nationality.” This can still be read today in the classic
handbooks on the rules of war. In any case the Hague Convention of
November 18, 1907 states in Article 23 (f):

“The misuse of flags of truce, the national flag or the military

insignia or uniform of the enemy (is forbidden)...”

However in an article entitled The War Crimes Trials (Missouri Law

Revue, January 1959), Max Koessler, prosecutor for the American
Department of the Army, drew the attention of his readers to the fact
that:

“Article 23 (f) was the most important charge in the case in which
Otto Skorzeny was cleared. Unfortunately it merely forbids misuse
of the uniform of the enemy, without specifying what constitutes
“misuse.”

I would also add that in many cases our enemies in the east and west
used German uniforms, long before December 1944,
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 333
This form of warfare has remained practically unknown to this
day. During the trial of my comrades and me at Dachau, our Ameri-
can defense lawyer, Colonel Durst, obviously did not have the Ameri-
can, Russian and British archives at his disposal. Nevertheless, he
declared that, “all warring powers had used questionable methods in
the course of the Second World War.” He was able to offer as ex-
amples the operation that took place at Tobruk in September 1942
and the attacks by the American Rangers at Aachen and the Saarlouis
Bridge.
Today we know the details of these three operations as well as of
numerous others on all fronts.

In September 1942, when the Africa Corps occupied Tobruk, a unit

of the Long Range Desert Group under the command of Lieutenant
Katz-Griinfeld, who was born in Palestine, was assigned to blow up
the defensive works and certain installations in the city; a further
unit, commanded by Colonel Stirling himself, was to attack the har-
bor, and from the sea. A third group of volunteers under the com-
mand of Major Crewe was to use the general confusion to attack our
headquarters and kidnap Generalfeldmarschall Rommel — all while
wearing German uniforms. This was the second such attempt against
the commander of the Africa Corps.
The operation was brilliantly prepared, but in the end it failed
because of a number of coincidences which even the most carefully
prepared plan could not foresee. On the eve of the three-pronged
operation a member of Katz-Griinfeld’s commando unit, a German
emigree by the name of Grossmann, was recognized by an Africa
Corps Leutnant, who was amazed to find Grossmann in Tobruk wear-
ing a German uniform. Grossmann was taken prisoner and he talked.
The surprise attack failed. Not a single member of the Stirling, Katz-
Griinfeld or Crewe units was shot. They were all treated as prisoners
of war.
In October 1944 Aachen was almost completely surrounded by
the US 1st Army. Only in the east was a corridor, about 6 kilometers
wide, still open. In order to overcome the fortified positions at the
entrance to the corridor, the Americans infiltrated several detach-
ments of Rangers into the city dressed as German soldiers, with fal-
334 Otro SKORZENY
sified papers and German weapons. On October 13 these phoney
Germans attacked the positions from behind and destroyed them.
The 1st Army was subsequently able to occupy the corridor. The city
itself resisted until October 21. None of the members of the various
commando units removed their German uniforms before the fighting
began.
Indeed it was this surprise attack that inspired Hitler to come up
with Operation Greif. The American Rangers were under the com-
mand of General Bill Donovan, just as the Brandenburg Division
was under Canaris’ command. Donovan asked to see me during my
time in Nuremberg Prison. The meeting was very cordial; there was
neither victor nor vanquished, just two soldiers, both rather
daredevilish and inventive, who had served their countries to the best
of their ability.
General Donovan was supposed to be an official prosecutor in
the trial; however he was recalled to America in October 1945 and
his place as chief prosecutor was taken by Judge Jackson.

In 1967 Werner Brockdorff, on the basis of British and American

documents, pointed out in his book Die Geheimkommandos des
Zweiten Weltkrieges that there was as little doubt as to the existence
of the Rangers on the American side and of the Commandos and the
SAS on the British side, as there was to the existence of the
Brandenburg Division and my own units on the German side.
The allied military tribunal in postwar Germany finally accepted
a modification of Article 23 of the Hague Convention of 1907. The
new text read:

It may not be the mission of commando units to conduct offen-

sive operations in the uniform of the enemy; they may only have the
task of seizing important objects behind the lines like bridges, passes,
oil refineries and so on, without fighting, defending these against
enemy attack and preventing their destruction.
The commandos may only wear the enemy uniform in non-com-
bat operations, and in order to approach their objectives behind en-
emy lines. As soon as they are forced to join combat they must iden-
tify themselves to the enemy before they open fire.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 335
As long as the commandos act according to these principles, they
are not breaking international law.
Every member of such a commando unit who is captured in an
enemy uniform, will be considered a spy if he tried to obtain infor-
mation in this uniform, or if he succeeded in doing so. If he engaged
in combat in the enemy uniform or even opened fire, he is guilty of a
war crime and may be sentenced accordingly.

This addition to Article 23 of the Hague Convention of 1907 was

valid only under certain conditions and was provisional. The law
itself was not yet modified.
I would like to recall that the convention contained an Article 31,
in which it states that every spy who has returned to his own forces
and is then later captured by the enemy, must be treated as a prisoner
of war and may no longer be held accountable for his early activities
as a spy. This paragraph is obviously applicable to all members of
commando units who venture behind enemy lines and subsequently
return with information about what they saw.
The high command promised me twenty Sherman tanks for this
new Trojan Horse called Greif. I received two, one of which was in
working order. As an interim measure we modified twelve of our
Panthers to look like Shermans, so that we might perhaps be able to
fool the young enemy soldiers from a distance and in conditions of
poor visibility. Similar difficulties were encountered with the 23
machine-guns, the 247 jeeps, the 32 armored tracked vehicles and
the 193 trucks I had requested. We had to improvise everything, us-
ing what was on hand, and furthermore hope that we could, in the
course of the offensive, use captured weapons and equipment.
But I must say that I was left completely in the lurch where the
3,300 English-speaking volunteers were concerned. In Friedenthal I
received an OKW order by teletype. It read:

OKW/WFSt/Op (H) West Ia no 0012759/44 — Secret —

Operation — 25. 10. 1944

All units of the Western Front are to report before the X... of October
the names of those officers, NCOs and enlisted men who are willing
to volunteer for a special action in the western theater. The volun-
teers must be in good health, have experience in hand-to-hand com-
336 OTTo SKORZENY
bat and speak fluent English. They are to be sent to Friedenthal, where
they will be placed under the command of Obersturmbannführer
Skorzeny.

One can be almost certain that this order was copied by the division
headquarters and sent to the regiments, battalions and companies. In
fact this order was in the hands of the American intelligence service
eight days after it was disseminated. For the moment the Americans
drew no concrete conclusions, but they should have been alerted later
by the OKW order, and we shall see what the results of their belated
attention were. As for me, I was almost choked with rage. At first
such stupidity seemed unbelievable and I suspected sabotage. Today
I think it was stupidity, which is sometimes worse than treason.
As I considered our enemies more intelligent than we, I believed
that Greif was unfeasible, and it seemed to me advisable that Hitler
should know why. It was here General der Waffen-SS Fegelein got
involved. He was Himmler’s liaison man to Hitler, a salon lion whose
vanity was laughable. He was soon to marry one of Eva Braun’s
sisters. He deserted during the night of April 26, 1945 and was ar-
rested in his Berlin home. He was about to flee dressed in civilian
clothes with a considerable sum of foreign currency in a suitcase.
Two days later he was executed by firing squad in the courtyard of
the Reich Chancellery.
Fegelein intercepted my report and declared that under no cir-
cumstances could this “annoying incident” be brought to the Fiihrer’s
attention. Generaloberst Jodl, who for his part was also shocked, told
me that it must be passed on. Himmler, who at this time wanted to
bombard New York with V-1s, shared Fegelein’s view! It was typical
of the Reichsführer or SS-Obergruppenführer von dem Bach-
Zelewski, neither of whom were soldiers in the actual sense. Who
sent Bach-Zelewski to Budapest with the monster Thor? At least
Fegelein didn’t bombard anything.
The experts sent 600 volunteers for testing: we found 10 who
spoke fluent English, 40 who spoke it fairly well. 150 were capable
of making themselves understood, 200 spoke broken English and
another 200 could answer yes or no. It was therefore impossible to
form an “English-speaking brigade.” The OKW acknowledged this,
and it was agreed that the brigade was only to advance in enemy
uniform if the enemy was in full retreat. This enabled me to retain
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 337
the soldiers with the best knowledge of English for the commando
company, which was to carry out action number two in small units. I
placed it under the command of Hauptmann Stielau.
I asked the OKW for additional units for this action, which to-
gether with the two battalions of my commando units and the rest of
the 600 volunteers made a force of 2,000 men altogether. The bri-
gade was sent to the maneuvers camp at Grafenwöhr for special train-
ing under the command of Obersturmbannführer Hardieck. In the
final days they were sent to Wahn near Cologne.
One hundred and twenty volunteers were subsequently desig-
nated as talkers. All others were emphatically instructed to keep si-
lent; if forced to join a conversation they were to murmur or speak in
single syllables. All went through an intensive course of “American-
ization.”
Neither the 600 volunteers who assembled in Friedenthal, nor
the officers and men of my own units and the additional units were
told the objectives of Operation Greif. Generaloberst Sepp Dietrich,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Sixth Panzer Army, was first told
about Operation Greif at the end of November, the commander of I
SS-Panzer Corps only a few days before the attack.
One can just imagine the imaginative and fantastic rumors that
surrounded the special unit’s mission. During an inspection at the
beginning of 1944 Hauptmann Stielau asked me to talk about it. “I
know,” he said to me, “what our mission really is: we are supposed
to kidnap General Eisenhower.”
At that moment I slipped over to the door as if on cat’s paws,
opened it and assured myself that there was no one behind it or in the
hall.
“My dear fellow,” I said to Hauptmann Stielau, “please speak
quietly. You have hit the mark. But not a word to anyone - this is
most important. Here we have forbidden any contact with the out-
side world. However Obersturmbannführer Hardieck tells me that
one of our men has succeeded in sending a letter to his fiancee. You
can see the danger we’re in.”
“] know that, Herr Obersturmbannführer. You can count on my
absolute silence. But allow me to say that I know Paris and its sur-
roundings like my vest pocket, and I can be really useful if the need
arises.”
338 Otto SKORZENY
“I have no doubt of that, but have you considered all the risks of
such an operation?”
“Of course, Herr Obersturmbannführer, I think of nothing else.
In my opinion it’s absolutely feasible.”
He outlined his plan to me in detail. In his view his chances were
about one in a thousand. I left him all his illusions. “My dear fellow,”
I said, “believe me, I will remember you when the time comes.”
Stielau had surely talked about Eisenhower and Paris long be-
fore he confided in me. I am sure that he was absolutely discrete
after our talk, and that he told anyone who questioned him: “You
will understand that I can’t say anything. But the Obersturmbannfiihrer
has promised to take me with him. We will be playing an important
role in the whole affair, and so on.” All this with a knowing look that
couldn’t fool anyone.
The rest of the 150th Brigade was divided into three battle groups
~ X, Y and Z. Commanding these battle groups were Hauptmann
Scherff and Oberstleutnant Wolf, both army officers, as well as
Waffen-SS Obersturmbannfilhrer Hardieck. Hardieck was killed in
the first hours of the battle and was replaced by Félkersam. Each of
the three groups was to take and hold one of the three bridges over
the Maas. Obviously these groups could only reach their objectives
if we succeeded in getting close enough to the river during the night
after the first day of the offensive. Overall command of the offensive
was given to Generalfeldmarschall Model, and during a conversa-
tion with his chief-of-staff, General Krebs, I got the impression that
both were firmly convinced that it would succeed. I drew their atten-
tion to the masterpiece created by the American engineer units: the
two oil lines which, leading from Le Havre and Boulogne, were the
life-line of the Anglo-American armies. The success of Greif could
put us in a position to render them useless for some time. We would
then have been able to fight under less unequal conditions than at the
present, where the lack of fuel was having an extremely negative
effect.
The offensive, which was supposed to begin on November 20,
then December 1, was postponed until December 16 for reasons of
materiel and weather. I attended several briefings in Hitler’s head-
quarters prior to X-Day. On October 22 he had assured me that we
would, “soon have more than 2,000 jet fighters in the air.” Goring
had promised him that. Then, at the beginning of December, I heard
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 339
to my astonishment that it would only be 250! I remember a lengthy
conversation I had in Fuhrer Headquarters in September prior to
Operation Panzerfaust with General der Luftwaffe Ritter von Greim,
to whom I was introduced by Hanna Reitsch. Greim already regret-
ted bitterly that the jet fighter, which had been developed in 1942,
was not in use on every front. Hitler intended to replace Goring with
Greim, but this didn’t happen until 1945 when Berlin was encircled
by the Russians.
During one of the last briefings before the offensive, Hitler asked
whether I had studied the aerial photos of the Huy, Amay and Engis
bridges. All I could say was that I hadn’t received them. Hitler then
turned to the Reichsmarschall and showered him with accusations,
which were undoubtedly justified. At that moment I would have liked
to have been deep underground. Hitler calmed himself very quickly,
and in response to his question I gave my last report on Greif. “I am
sure you will do your best,” he said to me when I had finished. “I
also know that it is your style to be at the head of your men. In this
case I expressly forbid you to cross our lines and personally take part
in the operation. I will make the commander of the Sixth Panzer
Army of the Waffen-SS responsible for the carrying-out of this or-
der. You will not leave your command post and will direct Operation
Greif from there by radio. I don’t want you to run the risk of being
captured. I still need you!”
These words acted like a cold shower. Adrian von Félkersam,
who was with me, sensed my disappointment. I informed the leaders
of the three battle groups of Hitler’s decision and added that if the
situation of one of the groups became critical I would go to it in an
instant. I had no intention of staying with the staff of the Sixth Army.
Hauptsturmführer Rad] accompanied me to the last briefing prior
to December 16. He had not yet met Hitler, who shook his hand and
offered a few encouraging words; but our Karli was so impressed
that he stood at attention as if cast in stone.
I established my command post in Schmidtheim during the night
of December 15-16. No one slept that night. Our artillery went into
action at five in the morning on Saturday, December 16. Groups X,
Y and Z were in position, together with I Panzer Corps of the Waffen-
SS, in the Losheim-Graben sector, where the effect of the artillery
was mediocre. My radio operator signalled that there was heavy fight-
ing; then a catastrophe: Obersturmbannfiihrer Hardieck, commander
340 Otto SKORZENY
of Group Z, had been killed. Fölkersam, who so far had been respon-
sible for communications between the three groups, took over the
command of Group Z. In the afternoon I drove to Losheim to get a
firsthand look at the situation, and I realized why our offensive was
bogged down: the narrow roads were clogged with every type of
vehicle, and I had to cover ten kilometers on foot to get to Losheim.
The next day was to be even worse. It was obvious that our groups
could not advance. I therefore decided to wait until the next day. Not
until our panzers had crossed the High Venn could we reach the Maas.
In the meantime I sent two or three squads from the special com-
pany to the southem sector of the front with orders to infiltrate be-
tween the lines. The first American prisoners arrived, and I struck up
a conversation with a lieutenant. They had been taken completely by
surprise; the Americans had thought they were in a quiet sector. The
bad weather and the fog had prevented their air force from interven-
ing
Towards midnight I learned that the Ist Panzer Regiment of the
Leibstandarte, commanded by the daring Jochen Peiper, had gone
over to the offensive. It was he who was to smash open a breach for
our battle groups. A few hours later the leading panzer units sig-
nalled: “Have taken Ronsfeld. Lively resistance by the enemy.” One
of our special squads returned with intelligence, which was immedi-
ately transmitted to | SS-Panzer Corps’ command post.
On the morning of the 17th I made my way to the front to inspect
the commando units. The roads were now completely clogged: it
was impossible to get to 1 SS-Panzer Corps at the front and it began
to suffer from a shortage of fuel on the morning of the 18th. There
was no more talk of reaching the Maas bridges! Therefore, after in-
forming the Wehrmacht operations staff (Jodl) and obtaining his con-
sent, I placed my brigade at the disposal of I Panzer Corps.
The better roads in this area all ran in an east-west direction,
which may explain the difficulties encountered by the Sixth Army,
for it had to advance from east to north. On our left was the Fifth
Panzer Army of General Hasso von Manteuffel, who later became a
deputy in the Bundestag. He, too, had been confident of strategic
success. I met him at Führer Headquarters before the offensive. Dur-
ing a long conference with Hitler he achieved a significant tactical
amendment of the plans, which had been placed before him.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 341
Assault battalions from his divisions were to cross the lines dur-
ing the night, before our artillery preparations had alerted the enemy.
The advance by these elite units would then permit a deeper and
faster advance by our divisions. Hitler accepted this excellent plan.
In fact it was the conventional use of a tactic that had been used with
explosive effect by the 150th Panzer Brigade: the moment of sur-
prise was used for the infiltration of troops into the enemy lines.
Farther south General von Liittwitz’s 47th Panzer Corps had the
task of taking the important crossroads at Bastogne. The unit given
the job was the Panzer-Lehr Division. But because this division be-
came snarled in a huge traffic jam on December 16 and 17, it wasn’t
able to cross the Our River until about 9 A.M. on the morning of the
18th, more than 24 hours after X-Hour. Meanwhile the 26th
Volksgrenadier Division, which was supposed to support Panzer-Lehr,
was delayed because it was forced to advance on foot duc to a lack of
trucks, which were either stuck or were not available! General Fritz
Bayerlein, commander of the Panzer-Lehr, was supposed to arrive at
Bastogne on the afternoon of December 16: he didn’t cross the road
from Clervaux to Bastogne until Tuesday the 19th at about 2 A.M.!
The Americans thus had time to send the 10th Armored Division
from Patton’s army to Bastogne. It arrived from the south and re-
lieved General McAuliffe, the brave commander of the 101st Air-
borne Division. It was only by chance that this division ended up
defending Bastogne. It had got as far as Verbomont, where it was
redirected to avoid clogged roads. Luck really was against us.
On Wednesday, December 20, I decided to attack Malmedy early
on the morning of the 21st with a dozen tanks. There was — must |
add this? — fighting, and no one wore American uniforms. Heavy
barrage fire by the enemy’s artillery and a tremendous counter-of-
fensive by American tanks caused our plan to fail. The skies cleared
on the 23rd and the U.S. Air Force carried out massive attacks on
Malmedy, which was held by American troops. I couldn’t compre-
hend it, even less when the American bombardment intensified on
the 23rd and 24th. I soon thought that Malmedy must have been taken,
but by which German units?
I knew that the town hadn’t been evacuated. In fact one of our
commando units under the former Baltic naval officer Baron von
Behr was in Malmedy on the 19th. Our sailor in his black leather
342 OTTO SKORZENY
coat found himself pressed by a group of civilians, who asked him:
“Is it true that the Germans are coming back?” He confirmed this, as
one would think, and requested the people to completely evacuate
the town in order to increase the general chaos. I hoped that many of
the inhabitants of Malmedy had followed his advice.
The coolness with which the commando unit carried out its role
was all the greater, as it was unaware that it was behind enemy lines.
“I had no idea where we were,” the baron admitted to me, “nothing
like that ever happened to me at sea.” I advised him to equip himself
with a compass and sextant.
Our attack on Malmedy resulted in heavy casualties. Leutnant
Schmidthuber was wounded seven times. Félkersam, also wounded,
was just able to withdraw. We were forced to remain on the defen-
sive. I was also hit a short time later; I received a minor wounded in
the leg and a rather more serious one above my right eye, which |
feared I might lose at first. After | had been seen to at the division
command post they wanted to send me to the rear; however there
could be no talk of that. There were many wounded, however most
were not serious. One exception was the brave Untersturmfihrer
Lochner, Félkersam’s adjutant, who was shot in the belly. Stretched
out on a litter, he had lost consciousness. I spoke to him softly. He
opened his eyes and recognized me. “Are you wounded too?” he
asked me. I tried to comfort him. He died before they could operate.
What we lacked was heavy weapons. On December 24 they fi-
nally sent us a battery of eight mortars. But we had only 20 mortars
in total. Most of our tanks had been destroyed, a new attack was
quite impossible.
On December 25 I sought out Félkersam, who had set up his
command post 300 meters from the main line of resistance. There I
met an American patrol that had just allowed itself to be captured by
our people. The NCO in charge had a walkie-talkie with him, and
one of our English-speakers began a conversation with the American
unit, which amused us greatly. Our man began by reporting strong
armored units to the northwest, which were obviously moving fast
toward Verviers. He then went on to pass on all sorts of crazy infor-
mation. When he finally declared that a formation of flying subma-
rines was attacking, the American officer shouted: “You’re drunk!
Get back here immediately! It’s an order!” We gave the American
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 343
NCO back his radio, and he declared, “Sorry, but I’ve got to go to
Germany now.”
On December 28 we were relieved by an infantry unit which was
covering the northern flank of I SS-Panzer Corps. It was obvious
that our attack, and with it Greif, had failed. We had not reached the
Maas bridges. If our special units had done good work behind the
enemy lines, we didn’t know what benefit it might have for us.
Only eight squads, each consisting of four phoney Americans,
had gone behind enemy lines, a total of 32 men. Twenty-four re-
turned. Eight were declared missing on December 29, 1944. On that
day the rest of the 150th Panzer Brigade was sent to Schlierbach,
east of St. Vith, to rest. The brigade was had to be disbanded a short
time later.
Later I will speak about the reports made to me by the men of the
commando unit who came back. But first I would like to mention
two reports spread by Radio Calais, the enemy propaganda station.
The announcer declared — it must have been shortly before Decem-
ber 20 — that “a strong sabotage group, commanded by Colonel
Skorzeny, the kidnapper (sic) of Mussolini, had been uncovered,”
and that “more than 100 soldiers of this unit had been exposed and
taken prisoner.” We will see what is to be thought of this report,
which opened up various aspects of the special commando unit for
me.

The second, somewhat later report by Radio Calais, concerned “the

shooting of American prisoners and Belgian civilians by German SS
troops.” The American soldiers were said “to have been shot at a
crossroads southeast of Malmedy on December 17.” The staff of the
Sixth Panzer Army instructed all commanders, “to prepare a detailed
report concerning an alleged shooting of prisoners of war and civil-
ians during the offensive.” The 150th Panzer Brigade delivered a
negative report.
After the war, in May 1946, Jochen Peiper and 72 members of
his unit faced an American court-martial. They were accused of hav-
ing shot 308 American soldiers and 111 Belgian civilians in cold
blood. The charge relating to the civilians was soon dropped. The
344 Otto SKORZENY
only charge that was kept was that 71 soldiers of the American 285th
Field Artillery Battalion had been murdered by the unit at Baugnez
crossroads southeast of Malmedy. One can summarize the accusa-
tion as follows:

At about 1 P.M. on December 17, 1944, there was a brief skir-

mish between the leading tanks of Peiper’s 1st Panzer Regiment and
the affected American company, which was commanded by Lieuten-
ant Virgil T. Lary. The Americans surrendered and were murdered at
about 2 P.M. The main accuser in May 1946 was Lieutenant Lary.
The majority of the defendants had made comprehensive and identi-
cal confessions. The American tribunal handed down 42 death sen-
tences, 23 sentences of life imprisonment, two of 20 years, one of 15
years and five of 10 years. Among those sentenced to death was
Obersturmbannführer Peiper, who had already passed Ligneuville at
2 P.M. on December 17, and who was not accused of having taken
part in the massacre or of having ordered it.

This judgement infuriated Colonel Willis M. Everett of Atlanta, Geor-

gia, who had handled the defense. Convinced that this was a miscar-
riage of justice, he spent ten years of his life revealing the truth.
In fact Everett became convinced that, following a skirmish last-
ing a few minutes, Peiper had himself given the order to cease firing
before he continued on his way. From an American colonel, whose
name is not known and who was in the car with him, Peiper learned
that there was a U.S. headquarters three kilometers south of
Ligneuville. Peiper hoped to be able to take it by surprise.
It was proved that the alleged confessions of the accused had
been extorted from them by means of beatings, torture and threats
against their families and themselves, after they had been hooded
and taken before a phoney court-martial with a phoney judge and
fake priests. I am skipping over the details. The Americans set up
two commissions of inquiry, one military and one senate committee.
Investigations were even carried out in Germany, although the pun-
ishments were reduced in March 1948. All the death sentences were
commuted in following years. In addition to other illuminating facts,
in the report on the new investigations by the American judge van
Hoden, one can read that the court-martial made use of the alleged
confession of an eighteen-year-old member of the Waffen-SS. The
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 345
confession was wrung out of him as the result of torture which he did
not survive. He hanged himself in his cell — at least his guard found
him hanged.
On December 22, 1956, almost twelve years to the day after the
battle, all of the men convicted in the Malmedy trial were freed. Not
one death sentence was carried out — due to a lack of evidence.
The strangest thing was that Peiper’s 1st Panzer Regiment, after
continuing toward the west, took prisoner 131 American officers and
soldiers of the 30th Infantry Division in Stoumont on December 21,
among them Major Hal McCown. In his book The Story of the Bulge
(New York 1959) my friend John Toland related that McCown and
Peiper had a long conversation and that the American officer, who
was aware of the alleged massacre on December 17, was surprised to
find that his captor was a cultivated, reasonable and quiet man. When
he expressed concem about the fate of the 130 prisoners in La Gleize,
Peiper reassured him and gave him his word of honor as a soldier
that his unit respected the rules of warfare. With his supplies of fuel
running low, Peiper decided to pull back. The two officers reached
an agreement: the 130 American prisoners were released and the bat-
tered Waffen-SS unit could withdraw. And so it happened. McCown
remained Peiper’s prisoner until he managed to slip away on De-
cember 24.
Colonel! Willis M. Everett had great difficulty in obtaining per-
mission to use McCown as a witness in the trial concerning the
Malmedy massacre, even though Peiper’s unit was also accused of
having murdered the 130 prisoners at La Gleize, some of the civil-
ians and 250 refugee children, as well as wounded Americans and
Germans in the basement of a sanatorium. Colonel Everett got his
way and McCown was able to testify that none of this was true.
“His testimony,” wrote Toland, “proved that the atrocities alleg-
edly committed by the Germans in a village (La Gleize) were inven-
tions and thus placed a large part of the indictment in doubt, which
failed to prevent 42 of the accused Waffen-SS men from being sen-
tenced to death by hanging and 23 to life imprisonment.”
In any case the alleged massacre at Malmedy had further, direct
consequences, which were no less tragic. When the American High
Command learned what had happened there was anger and calls for
revenge. This found its expression in several orders, such as that
issued by the headquarters of the 328th Infantry Division on the 21st
346 Otto SKORZENY
of December, which called upon its members not to take members of
the Waffen-SS or German paratroopers prisoner, but to shoot them
on the spot. In Chegnogne 21 German soldiers, several of whom
were wounded, gave themselves up under a Red Cross flag. They
were shot down on the doorstep of a house as they walked out with
their hands raised.
I believe that the American High Command overreacted in this
regard. Having become a victim of its own propaganda, it was con-
vinced of the guilt of the SS units without an investigation because
that is what it wanted to believe.
This is in no way an attempt to apologize for the Waffen-SS. A
European force of 840,000 men, of which 360,000 were killed and
42,000 declared missing — to say nothing of the wounded — needs no
apology: the numbers say it all. The wrongs committed by several
Waffen-SS units, and others that helped themselves to the name, can-
not be laid at the feet of the entire Waffen-SS with the notion of
“collective guilt.”
Generaloberst Guderian, who undeniably fought a chivalrous war,
felt obliged to write the following in the forward to General Hausser’s
book Waffen-SS:
“Our honor is loyalty: this was the motto according to which the
Waffen-SS was trained and the motto under which it fought. Who-
ever witnessed these units on the battlefield cannot help but confirm
this fact. After the surrender this fighting force was the target of slan-
der and outrageously serious and unjustified charges.”
Generaloberst Guderian characterized the founder of the Waffen-
SS, Paul Hausser, who succeeded in giving it its “esprit de corps” as
“one of the most significant commanders that I know.”
In a speech in Hannover in autumn 1953 Bundeskanzler Adenauer
declared emphatically that “the soldiers of the Waffen-SS were sol-
diers like all the others.” General Hasso von Manteuffel also con-
demned especially mean and stupid slander against the former sol-
diers.
Following the war the majority of the Waffen-SS were held as
prisoners for many years. We were bound hand and foot and gagged
as well. In spite of his serious bias, American historian George H.
Stein was forced to admit in his book The Waffen-SS (New York
1966) that 99 percent of these men who were being held had fought
a clean war: the denazification courts reached the same conclusion
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 347
after lengthy investigations that were carried out in correspondence
with the victors and occupying powers.
The fact remains that 71 American soldiers were killed at the
Baugnez crossroads. The question is how. Most of the published re-
ports on this theme are confused and contradictory. However it seems
possible to me to give the following explanation based on the de-
tailed reports I was able to examine:
The American artillerymen were taken prisoner during the battle
with Peiper’s advance guard: 3 light tracked vehicles and 3 tanks.
Since the unit wanted to continue on its way quickly, the 125 prison-
ers were forced into a field. According to Toland and others, the first
shot at one of the prisoners, from a pistol from one of the light tracked
vehicles of the main body, was fired much later. The thought sug-
gests itself that the GIs, who were left on their own, had picked up
their weapons again or that at least several of them had. When the
main force arrived at the crossroads it saw a group of American sol-
diers, some of whom were armed - and opened fire.
In 1974 the English magazine After the Battle, No. 4, which dealt
with the battle in the Ardennes, published a photo taken by the Ameni-
can Army before the bodies were buried. On Page 18 one can see
among the bodies stretched out on the snow-covered field one which
still has a weapon in its hand, a rifle or probably a machine-gun. But
a prisoner of war is not armed. This man was undoubtedly killed in
battle. There was, probably as a result of a terrible misunderstand-
ing, a second battle.
A misunderstanding by a chief-of-staff of General Hodges, who
commanded the American Ist Army, had even worse consequences.
In 1969 a book by the young Belgian historian Michel Georis, with
the title Nuts, was released in Paris. This was the answer which Gen-
eral McAuliffe gave the German parlementaire from the 26th
Volksgrenadier Division, which offered the Americans in Bastogne
“an honorable surrender.” One of the book’s chapters is titled The
Tragedy at Malmedy. What sort of tragedy was it?
Georis noted that I had expended “much effort for nothing” in
my attempt to take Malmedy on December 21, for, he added, two
days later, on December 23, the American air force bombed Malmedy
and “killed more than 300 American soldiers and a good one hun-
dred Belgian civilians.” The bombing had been carried out by the
U.S. 9th Air Force, and Toland related that the GI’s referred to this
unit as the “American Luftwaffe.”
348 OTTo SKORZENY
A communique by the American Ist Army said that Malmedy
had been bombed because “the Germans had entered the town.” “The
reality was different,” wrote Georis. “Apart from the brief penetra-
tion by the Félkersam battalion, which, as we know, was immedi-
ately driven back, Malmedy was exclusively occupied by Americans
for three days. This did not stop the American air force from flying
more missions the next day and the day after that — Christmas — and
again killing hundreds of civilians and American soldiers.”
In a footnote the Belgian historian confirmed that although the
exact number of soldiers killed by American bombs was not known,
it was “probably 700.” But what was the “probable” number of civil-
ians killed in this senseless massacre? Georis doesn’t say!! Stubbornly
bombing one’s own soldiers and defenseless civilians in no way cor-
responds to an “obvious strategic necessity.” In my view, that is the
real “Tragedy of Malmedy.” No one has taken note of this for a long
time.

Let us now investigate what is true about the first report broadcast by
Radio Calais about the 100 captured members of the 150th Panzer
Brigade.
In Volume 4 of the English magazine After the Battle the claim is
repeated that the number of special units captured behind enemy lines
was fourteen. This number corresponds to the truth as little as that
given by Radio Calais, for the simple reason that no more than eight
units were able to advance far enough behind enemy lines to carry
out their special missions.
I am not counting the units, about 20 in number, which until about
January 15, 1945 carried out reconnaissance missions 2 to 3 kilome-
ters behind the American lines on order of the army group or corps.
These missions had nothing to do with Greif, and although they were
carried out in American uniforms, they did not involve sabotage.
Several of the units crossed the enemy lines a number of times, all
returned.
Of the eight units involved in Operation Greif only two were
reported missing, the other 6 came back. A previously-captured jeep
was fired on while leaving the American sector by the enemy, who
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 349
suspected a desertion. This was reported to us later by the opposing
German division.
I received reports on the activities of six units. Two gave me
reports that I thought lacked credibility, but the activities of the other
four were described very precisely. The units that got the farthest
reached the Maas abeam Huy, where the 150th Panzer Brigade was
supposed to hold the bridge. The Hauptmann of this unit, which took
up position at a crossroads, directed an American tank column into
the blue. Our radio monitoring service confirmed that the headquar-
ters of the American Ist Army searched in vain for this unit for two
days. They thought that it had been destroyed or captured in the course
of some mysterious battle. This unit cut telephone lines and changed
roads signs intended for the American supply units.
Another command vehicle crossed the Maas near Amay with no
difficulty whatsoever. Its occupants placed red banners to indicate
that the roads to the front had been mined — which caused approach-
ing enemy reinforcements to tum around and make lengthy detours.
This unit also destroyed telephone lines.
Another team caused an enemy infantry unit to withdraw between
Poteaux and Grand Halleux by assuring the Americans that the Ger-
mans were already farther west, in the vicinity of Lierneux.
The American officers expressed their gratitude before depart-
ing.
Unfortunately none of the units reached the large fuel depot that
lay between Stavelot and Francorchamps. Peiper’s column missed
the same depot when it advanced on La Gleize. But one of our units
captured a munitions dump and blew it up during the night.
Our eighth unit fell victim to an accident; the circumstances were
as follows: as he was almost out of gas, the driver of a jeep stopped at
an American supply outpost and casually said, “Petrol please.”
The eyes of the GI manning the gas pump became as big as sau-
cers, and he eyed our four comrades suspiciously; an American would
ask for “gas” not “petrol,” and he wouldn't say please, at least not if
he was in a hurry.
“Tell me,” asked the American, “do you know where you are?”
The driver thought they had been recognized. He drove away,
lost control of the jeep on the icy road and rammed the first truck of
a convoy coming the other way. The vehicle overturned, and when
350 Orto SKORZENY
the Americans hurried to the aid of the occupants they noticed that
they were wearing German uniforms under their American clothing.
Under intense questioning, one of our comrades admitted what
he thought was true: a special unit under my command was supposed
to kidnap General Eisenhower and cause the commanders of the Brit-
ish and American armies to disappear, as well as their staffs.
The chief of intelligence of the American army group was seen
as a panic monger. They hadn’t believed him when, on about De-
cember 10, General Hodge’s chief of intelligence reported that new
German divisions had been sighted east of St. Vith. He took out his
file on OKW Order 0012759, concluded from it that 1,000 phoney
Americans had mingled with the real ones and issued a general alert
for the whole front against disguised Germans.
After December 18 this caused real chaos among the enemy. All
the details have been described by General Omar Bradley, commander
of the US 12th Army Group, and by Montgomery and Sir Basil Liddell
Hart, to mention only the two most significant writers of memoirs
and one of the most famous World War Two historians.

Let us first of all examine the offensive from a tactical point of view.
One must say that on the morning of December 17 the 12th Army
Group was divided into three attack columns, and that panic reigned
at SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) for
four or five days.
Bradley, whose headquarters were in Luxembourg, did not at all
understand what was happening and sent contradictory orders into
thin air. With some difficulty Eisenhower alerted Generals Hodges,
Simpson and Collins, who on December 20 had seen neither Bradley
nor any member of his staff. The telephones were either out or unre-
liable. For several days it was impossible to reach General Hodges,
commander of the US 1st Army, who on December 16 had his head-
quarters at Spa. It was hastily transferred to Chaudfontaine without
Eisenhower or Bradley being informed. Finally it was moved to
Tongres.
When von Manteuffel was forced to halt six kilometers from
Dinant by lack of fuel on December 23, he had only the British 29th
Armored Brigade in front of him. Eisenhower, who in reality feared
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 351
that Montgomery would disengage from the enemy, urged him for-
wards and placed all American forces on the northern flank under his
command. That meant Simpson’s 9th Army and Hodges’ Ist, which
was “fighting desperately.” On the other hand the British 30th Corps
remained on the west bank of the Maas until January 3, 1945, while
in the south Bradley had to manage with the rest of the 3rd and the
8th US Corps.
In his memoirs Montgomery wrote that he had left the British
30th Corps on the other side of the river on December 20 just in case.
His single reserve armored division had just landed and the question
of whether it should be embarked again raised itself. The British ex-
peditionary corps was “ready for anything.” On that same December
20 Montgomery sent Churchill a telegram in which he characterized
the situation as “extremely disturbing.” Proof that he was consider-
ing a general retreat by the expeditionary corps, just like in 1940, is
found in his memoirs. There he quoted a sentence from his telegram,
which has never before been published:
“This time,” he telegraphed, “we can’t embark in Dunkirk again,
for there are Germans everywhere there.”
In fact Hitler had instructed that our troops were to hold certain
key coastal cities at all costs: Dunkirk, Lorient, Saint-Nazaire, La
Rochelle and Royan. The last named city was quite senselessly de-
stroyed by the American air force in April 1945.
On January 6, 1945 Winston Churchill, still highly worried, called
Stalin for help.
“The battles in the west are very hard,” he telegraphed. I ask that
you let me know whether we can count on a Russian offensive on the
Vistula front or elsewhere in January.”
While the tactical and strategic events of this offensive were of
significance at the beginning, the political effect was no less remark-
able. Churchill’s call to Stalin for help betrayed real fear and worry
that the result might be an unforseen agreement in the east, like that
concluded in 1939.
The English had a large part of American public opinion against
them. For two months the foreign press had been taking potshots at
Montgomery, whose behavior and claims seemed unbearable, espe-
cially after the bloody defeat at Arnheim. But the British press cer-
tainly did not spare Eisenhower, who was criticized for lack of fore-
sight and even incompetence.
352 OTTo SKORZENY
It was on Churchill’s order that Montgomery gave his famous
press conference in mid-January and directed “a passionate appeal
for Anglo-American solidarity.” After admitting that the enemy had
struck a serious blow, “which rocked the allied armies,” he turned to
the journalists and said, “You all know that the leader of our forces is
Eisenhower. I am very attached to Ike, we are good friends. It is not
without some concem that I read few flattering articles about him in
the British press. I would like to ask you to do your best to change
this state of affairs.”
1 imagine that the attending journalists were a little surprised when
they heard the field marshall declare, “I have had myself issued an
American pass, and so I am one of the soldiers of the US Army. My
fingerprints are registered in the Pentagon, and that is better than if
they were in Scotland Yard.”
Such statements could only have a regrettable effect, and Mont-
gomery admitted in his memoirs that it would have been better if he
had said nothing. “I gave the impression of a loser, not to the Ger-
mans, but to the Americans.” When all was said and done, the British
field marshall called the battle “interesting.” How could Eisenhower,
Bradley, Hodges, Gerow and Simpson, who had lost 80,000 men,
have agreed with Montgomery’s assessment?
From 1945 to 1960 many authors characterized the Ardennes
offensive as a “foolish plan of Hitler’s, that was doomed to fail.” Ten
years later Liddell Hart, among others, recognized that the plan for
the offensive was “brilliantly conceived.” Furthermore he wrote that
“the allies came to the brink of catastrophe at the beginning of the
battle.”
Operation Greif certainly impressed him. Where the 150th
Brigade’s action was concerned, he took into consideration the count-
less difficulties faced by the unit in the areas of camouflage and equip-
ment.
“This flimsy camouflage made greater caution necessary,” he
wrote. “In the northern sector, where the brigade was assembled,
there was no clear breakthrough; so its operation was postponed and
then called off altogether. However the first stage of the plan had
astonishing success, even more than expected.”
Tens of thousands of military police went on the hunt, in order to
ferret out the “disguised Nazis” as quickly as possible. They made a
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 353
good catch. Liddell Hart offered a long and interesting list of vic-
tims; one of the first was Omar Bradley. In his book A Soldier 's Story,
Bradley drew the picture of half a million GIs playing cat and mouse
whenever they met. It was quite impossible to prevent them from
running into each other, and Bradley described what followed:

“Neither rank, nor identity papers, nor protests prevented the al-
lied forces from being interrogated again at every turn.”

Bradley himself had to prove three times that he was really an Ameri-
can, naming the capital of Illinois and the players of a famous Ameri-
can football team. The third time he failed, because he didn’t know
the name of Betty Grable’s latest husband. The GI let him through
nevertheless.
At least Bradley was wamed. An American intelligence officer
had advised him to wait until the weather improved and then take an
aircraft. But in no case “should he venture onto the roads, on account
of the disguised Germans.” Charles Foley looked into this widespread
fear in his book Commando Extraordinary.
“They saw enemies and spies everywhere,” he wrote. “Half of
the American Amny was looking for Skorzeny in its ranks.”
General Emile Wanty reported in his book Art de la Guerre that
Montgomery was himself stopped several times while these dark
rumors were circulating. General Eisenhower was literally held pris-
oner by his own guard unit. He had succeeded Feldmarschall von
Rundstedt as a guest at the Chateau Saint-Germain-en-Laye. The
military police picked him up there and took him to Versailles in an
armored vehicle.
American military intelligence had a portrait of me drawn up in
the fashion of the Chicago police. General Wanty, a Belgian, wrote
that I was a condottiere; this was a word that the American blood-
hounds, who had never seen Venice and the Colleoni of the Verrocchio,
naturally assumed meant gangster.
Furthermore I was the “kidnapper of Mussolini,” while at the
same time Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio were his “liberators.” A
wanted poster in the best western style portrayed me as an Obersturm-
bannfiihrer of the Waffen-SS:
354 Otto SKORZENY
Wanted
SKORZENY
Spy
Saboteur Murderer

Beneath the photo was the following personal description:

This man is highly intelligent (flatterer!) and dangerous. Hitler

moustache or clean-shaven. He can appear in American or British
uniform and so on.

All this description lacked was the false beard. Several French jour-
nalists saw in me the reincarnation of Fanthomas, although I wore no
magic cap to let me come and go unseen. Charles Foley also quoted
the diary of Kay Summersby, Eisenhower’s secretary and loyal com-
panion, who held the rank of Lieutenant. Her disclosures appear un-
believable today, but they correspond to the pure truth.
Once the report on my alleged “imminent arrival in Paris” be-
came known among Eisenhower’s staff, the security service trans-
formed the area around the headquarters into a fortress with barbed
wire and tanks. The guard was quadrupled and “the password be-
came a matter of life and death.”
“A simple backfire,” she wrote, “caused all work in the offices to
come to a halt and provoked a wave of telephone calls: ‘Is the boss
still there?’”
In her diary she noted on December 22 that SHAEF’s intelli-
gence service had sent a report which confirmed that the saboteurs
had arrived in Paris. Fortunately their meeting place was known: the
Cafe de la Paix.
There were of course lovely raids on the Place de l’Op£ra as a
result, and a number of British and American officers who had had
the unfortunate idea of meeting at the Café de la Paix were arrested
in spite of their protests. Peaceful Parisians, whose conduct seemed
suspicious, likewise became victims of this police madness.
Eisenhower was forced to move. They found a double for him,
Lieutenant-Colonel Baldwin B. Smith, who played the role of the
supreme commander and served as a “decoy for Skorzeny.” He risked
his life each day, drove around and saluted “a la Ike.” He had prac-
ticed this salute for a long time; Smith played his role so convinc-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 355
ingly that in the end he believed that he was the big boss. After the
war American friends told me that the colonel gave up his illusions
with great bitterness.
They saw me everywhere in France, which was no surprise as
my photo had been distributed in thousands. In Troyes a druggist had
sold me aspirin, I had purchased jam jars in a grocery store in Saint-
Etienne; they had sighted me in Paris, not in the Café de la Paix but
in a bar on the Champs-Elysées in the uniform of an American air
force commander. All this happened at the beginning of February
1945, while we were fighting the Russians at Schwedt on the Oder.

Operation Greif was investigated by many military judges and ini-

tially by those who cleared us at Dachau in October 1947. I have
already cited Max Kössler, the lawyer for the American Department
of the Army, in the war crimes trial of 1946 to 1949. His study was
based on existing law, meaning the Fourth Hague Convention of
October 18, 1907. It concludes:
“The Skorzeny affair demonstrates in striking fashion that the
international law concerning the use of enemy uniforms for reasons
of stratagem must be defined and explained. The word ‘misuse’ in
Article 23(f) must be explained, in order to specify which types of
use are forbidden. We hope that this submission will stimulate the
United Nations to come to an agreement on new definitions.”
No such agreement has been reached by the end of 1974. Captain
Steven J. Abdala analyzed Operation Greif in a report for the ad-
vanced infantry officers course at the US Army Infantry School at
Fort Benning, Georgia. His report, titled The Role of Colonel Skorzeny
and Operation Griffin during the Second World War, bears the date
March 3, 1972. Captain Abdalla, who made personal inquiries of
me, made some interesting observations about Greif. As to the ques-
tion of law, he wrote concerning the German side:

“There is discussion as to whether the commando units broke the

Hague Convention of 1907. But Skorzeny received assurances that
as long as the German uniform was worn under the American and
the soldiers did not engage in combat, there was no breach of the
law. The terms of land warfare law are far from clear where this
356 OTTo SKORZENY
point is concerned, and this type of stratagem will probably create
the same problems in any future war.”

In the chapter on success, conditions and recommendations, the cap-

tain noted:

“Special actions like Griffin deserve to be studied closely. Future

military conflicts will be just as complex as the use of computers and
advanced technology permit. As always, however, it will demand the
military insight to appreciate that the thing will eventually be fin-
ished off by the infantry, which means that any new tactic of surprise
will enjoy a certain success.”

Overall the author confirmed our view of the psychological effect:

“The psychological effect of Operation Griffin was enormous, if

one considers the limited means that were put into play. One can
imagine a battlefield on which one of the armies no longer knows
who is friend and who is foe. The psychological advantage of such
an operation exceeds by far that which can be achieved by tactics
and intelligence services. One only need examine the American news-
papers of the time to assess the degree in which the allies were im-
pressed by Skorzeny and Griffin.”

In the foreword to his paper Captain Abdalla published the letter I

wrote to him on February 28, 1972, the most important parts of which
are reproduced here:

“Only sixteen of my men really operated behind the enemy lines

and returned. This means that only four were captured. As they wore
enemy uniforms they were shot. However in January 1945 I learned
from Radio Calais that more than 100 members of the 150th Brigade
had been taken prisoner. On the other hand the casualty lists reveal
that only eight members of the commando company failed to return:
the four who were captured near Brussels and executed, and the four
who were in the overtumed jeep. If Radio Calais spoke the truth, one
must conclude that the allies arrested a large number of real English
and American soldiers.”
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 357
While interned in Darmstadt and Dachau prisoner of war camps
I was in fact visited by several American officers who had been ar-
rested under suspicion of being nazis.
One last note: it is patently obvious that we never had any inten-
tion of kidnapping or killing General Eisenhower. On the other hand
the objective of the British commando unit in Beda Littoria in No-
vember 1941 under the command of Colonel Laycock and Major
Keyes was admittedly to kidnap or kill General Rommel. The many
members of this unit who were captured were not tried, sentenced
and executed, but were considered prisoners of war and treated ac-
cordingly. Any further comment seems to me unnecessary.

Hitler summoned me on December 31, 1944. His headquarters was

still located on the Western Front at Ziegenberg. When he saw me
with a bandaged head he insisted that his doctors, one of whom was
Dr. Stumpfegger, examine me before I told him anything about our
operation. Wy wound had become infected and I now received proper
treatment. Hitler expressed his pleasure that I hadn’t lost my eye and
he talked with me for half an hour. He regretted that the offensive
hadn’t reached its objective. Our panzers, which had been bogged
down on the first two days while the enemy air forces were grounded
by bad weather, could not advance quickly enough over the impos-
sible roads. Infantry divisions on foot had advanced as fast as our
panzer divisions! Nevertheless the enemy had been forced to take
heavy losses, and in any case our offensive had struck a heavy blow
against his morale.
“The most important thing is,” he said, “that the American or
British soldier believed that it was all going to be a military cakewalk.
His commanders had led him to believe that. But then the mortally
wounded got up and attacked! On the 17th we took 8,000 to 10,000
prisoners in the Schnee-Eifel alone. We couldn’t wait for them to
wring our neck, Skorzeny! The only solution for Germany is victori-
ous battle. There is no other.”
Unfortunately, I was of the opinion that neither of the two objec-
tives of Greif had been achieved. I said this openly to Hitler and he
amazed me even more:
358 OTTO SKORZENY
“I have no complaints with you, Skorzeny. You had to improvise
everything, with limited means, and your panzer brigade couldn’t
play its role in cooperation with Sixth Army. You would have been
successful if I had placed you at the head of the Fifth. You would
have easily been able to put Dinant behind you. You might perhaps
have reached Brabant, and who knows what might have developed
from that? Where your commando unit is concerned, I have the im-
pression that its psychological effect was much greater than you might
think. We shall see later.”

He appeared satisfied with the advance toward Malmedy by our three

battle groups after December 20 and awarded the Honor Roll Clasp
of the Army to myself and the commanders of Groups X, Y and Z -
namely Obersturmbannfilhrer Wolff, Hauptsturmfihrer Scherff,
Hauptsturmführer von Fölkersam and posthumously to the man he
replaced, Obersturmbannfilhrer Hardieck. From this moment on this
army decoration was awarded generally.
When I left Hitler he said to me, “A smaller-scale offensive is
beginning farther south on the Upper Rhine, along the border of the
Pfalz region.” Thanks to the minutes of his talk on December 28,
1944, in which he told the commanding generals of this operation,
we know that he said of the Ardennes offensive.
“At last! This is the first time since autumn 1939, meaning since
we have been at war, that we have been able to keep an operation
secret.” He was wrong. Stalin knew about it.
We must examine the game Stalin played. The western allies did
not land in Normandy until June 6, 1944; he began his own offensive
on the Eastern Front on June 24 in the north, on the 26th in the center
and in Romania after July 20. He feared that the western allies would
reach the German border very quickly. But he was very soon able to
assure himself that this was not the case, and he held back his attacks
in the northern and central sectors from mid-August until mid-De-
cember: this enabled Hitler to prepare his offensive in the Ardennes
and Stalin his own. Eisenhower and Churchill protested in vain.
When we — Americans, British, Germans and other Europeans —
had lost more than 200,000 men in the Ardennes, only then, on Janu-
ary 11, 1945, did Stalin throw his armies at Berlin. He was also care-
ful not to tell his “allies” what we were preparing in the west. At the
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 359
beginning of November 1945 at Yalta Stalin presented his plan for
the occupation and destruction of Germany, which was curiously simi-
lar to the Morgenthau Plan, which Roosevelt and Churchill had readily
accepted in September 1944. In fact both plans were written by Stalin.
The actual author of the first plan, from the Quebec Conference, was
the communist Harry Dexter White, a member of the powerful So-
viet espionage net directed by the Silvermaster family. Cordell Hull,
shocked by this “blind revenge plan,” asked Roosevelt: “Why did
you sign this document, which reduces Germany to an agrarian state?”
“I was tired,” answered Roosevelt, “and I signed without worry-
ing too much about what Morgenthau had written.”
Not Morgenthau. Stalin.

Notes
1. According to the official statistics, which Céré and Rousscau published in their Chronologie du
confit mondial (Paris 1946), In the period from April 5, 1943 to July 22, 1944 approximately 7,700
Belgian civilians fell victim to Anglo-American bombing— 2,007 in Antwerp, 674 In Malines and 425
in Brussels. The number of injured is not known. The statistics end alter July 22, 1944, (Editors’ note)
PART IV
 22
VLASOV AND BANDERA
NICOLAI, CANARIS & GEHLEN

“Eye to eye” with General Vlasov again — His program and his Eu-
ropean ideas — The danger of using Russian volunteers as divisions
or corps — They turn against us in Prague in May 1945 - The En-
glish hand the cossacks of the Ataman of Pannwitz over to Stalin -
Rosenberg and Koch - Operation Brauner Bär in the Ukraine - These
people have been at war with bolshevism since 1918 - The UPA's
stubborn struggle from 1945 to 1952 - The KGB murders Bandera
in Munich — The affair of the prussic acid pistol —A bullet with a red
ring — I take it from my pocket while the court is in session —A visit
from Oberst Walter Nicolai, the former chief of the German intelli-
gence service - Schellenberg doesn't want to acknowledge his ac-
tions - Character-wise, Nicolai is the exact opposite of Canaris -
Conversations with General Reinhard Gehlen — The bombardment
of the OKH “Zeppelin” - Gehlen, Bormann and the mysterious
Werther.

on’t shoot!” The man who had just called out these words
in German stepped out of the barn with his hands raised.
He was a big fellow with glasses; he wore a Russian
officer’s jacket, was thin and unkempt. His boots and his
pants were covered with dirt. Hauptmann von Schwerdtner, XXXVIII
Army Corps’ intelligence officer, recognized the man immediately;
he had been searching for him in the Volkhov swamps near Lake
Iimen for months. He nodded to the interpreter and the man said
slowly in Russian, “General Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov, give your-
self up. Hauptmann von Schwerdtner asks you to hand over your
weapons and military identity card.”
362
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 363
The giant gestured with his head toward the barn door and said
quickly in Russian, “The weapons are in there. I have no more am-
munition.”
And so General Vlasov, commander of the 2nd Guards Army,
which consisted of nine rifle divisions, a tank brigade and two artil-
lery regiments, was captured. Bitter battles had been fought against
this army in this marshy Volkhov region from March to the end of
May. Vlasov finally gave himself up on June 11, 1942.
I first met him two years later, shortly before Operation Panzer-
faust. Adrian von Félkersam, who spoke perfect Russian, had in-
vited him to Friedenthal with several of his staff officers.
Much has been written about Vlasov and his movement, but the
opinions expressed rarely correspond to the facts of the case. One
must remember that General Vlasov was a career soldier. I talked to
him at length, in German, which he spoke rather badly, or with the
help of Fölkersam.
He was from a rural background, was born in 1900 and served in
the infantry before graduating from the Frunse Academy, the Soviet
general staff school, in 1930. Vlasov would most likely have been
liquidated in 1937 when they arrested and did away with Marshalls
Tukhachevsky and Blicher, along with 30,000 other officers who
were seen as traitors, had he not been serving in the Far East at the
time, more specifically under his friend Marshall Bliicher in 1937-
38. Blücher probably warned him in time. He also knew Konstantin
Rokossovsky, the former officer candidate in the imperial army, whose
background was known to Vlasov: he came from an old aristocratic
family and not “from Warsaw, from a poor railroad family.”
We faced each other in front of Moscow in November-December
1941: Vlasov commanded the 20th Army, which prevented us from
taking the city, although we had captured Istra and Vysokovo. He
related to me interesting details of Stalin’s hasty flight, of the panic
that then reigned in the Kremlin, and of the workers revolt that was
suppressed by Beria’s police units. Viasov was then called “the sav-
jour of Moscow!”
Fölkersam brought me the manifesto of the Vlasov movement,
which the general had written in 1943: “The Russian committee calls
for the following principles for the reorganization of Russia:
364 OTTO SKORZENY
— Eradication of bolshevism, Stalin and his clique;
— an honorable peace with Germany;
- creation of a new Russia, without bolshevism, but also with-
out capitalism, with the help of Germany and other peoples of the
new Europe.”

The committee proposed the following program for the reformation

of Russia:

1. Elimination of forced labor, free right to work and labor-union

organization.
2. Elimination of collective farms and return of the land to the
farmers.
3. Restoration of commerce, of craftsman trade and of small in-
dustry.
4. Right of intellectuals to work freely in the interests of the people.
5. Social justice and the protection of all workers from exploita-
tion.
6. Right to training and social insurance of all workers.
7. Elimination of terror and reintroduction of human rights.
8. Guarantee of freedom for all the peoples of Russia.
9. Amnesty and return home for all political prisoners.
10. Reconstruction of the villages and cities according to a gov-
ernment plan.
11. Reconstruction of the factories according to a government
plan.
12. Cancellation of all debts incurred by Russia in secret agree-
ments between Stalin and the Anglo-Saxons.
13. Guarantee of a minimum standard of living for all war-dis-
abled and their families.

This “Manifest of Smolensk” was slightly amended in Prague on

November 14, 1944.
I had the impression that Vlasov was one of those Russians who
did not view Russia as an asiatic land and who wanted to sce their
nation take part in the building of a larger, more powerful Europe.
He knew the Far East and it was clear to him what enormous power,
but also what danger the still-sleeping China posed to his country
and to all Europeans.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 365
This theory scarcely fitted into certain racial theories held by
Reichsführer Himmler, and which I always held to be utopian and
dangerous. Vlasov told me that the officers and men of the czarist
guards regiments were at least 1.8 meters tall, had blue eyes and stub
noses, although they were not imported from Prussia. According to
Vlasov the Russians themselves had to defeat bolshevism. Then the
curse uttered by Dostoyevsky at the end of the last century would
cease to have any validity.
When Fölkersam and I met him he had already ceased showing
the greater Russian mentality, and he understood — even if somewhat
hesitantly — that a land like the Ukraine, for example, which had its
own established culture, had the right to govern itself, and that the
Baltic States had never been Russian. “Socialism” was a different
concept for the cossacks than for the other peoples of Russia, and the
redistribution of land was a difficult problem to solve.
We had war. The Wehrmacht employed more than 500,000 Rus-
sian prisoners as auxiliary volunteers (Hiwis), who rendered great
service in the rear areas. In the beginning Vlasov wanted all the Rus-
Sian prisoners of war, including the Hiwis, placed under his com-
mand. He would have been able to form about 30 divisions in this
way, which would have represented a great threat — not just to Ger-
many, but to all of Europe. It was wiser to aim for smaller objectives.
I believe that Vlasov was very impressed by Stalin’s speeches
and by the entire Russian and British press. His general staff rein-
forced him in his opinion that he was an extraordinarily good politi-
cian and a great tactician and strategist.
They made very strong propaganda in favor of his ROA (Ruskaya
Osvoboditelnaya Armia - Russian Army of Liberation) and numer-
ous Russian deserters came to our troops or directly to the Vlasov
battalions. Among these refugees there were of course stalinist agents,
who proved to be the harshest critics of the bolshevik regime. A new
committee was founded in Prague, the KONR (Komitet Osvo-
bodydenya Naradov Russi — Liberation Committee of the Russian
Peoples).
Seen from a European point of view, Vlasov’s ideas and goals
were extremely interesting. Besides, he held the view that, from the
social point of view, the Marxist-Leninist system had been completely
overtaken. The main thing for General Vlasov was to get rid of Stalin
and his regime, which held the Russian people in worse slavery than
366 Otto SKORZENY
in the time of the czars. His army was to be a “socialist army of
liberation.”
Vlasov made his best impression on me when he explained his
arguments logically and precisely. He was neither mercenary nor fa-
natic, he was a realist. “We need you,” he said to me, “because you
have the weapons and are fighting Stalin — but you also need us!”
He was very critical of Stalin. He knew that the STAVKA had
first-class information at its disposal, supplied by outstanding spy
organizations.
“We were not in a position,” he said to us, “to make full use of all
this outstanding information. Stalin, Voroshilov, Budenny and his
circle are mediocre strategists. Stalin has named Boris Shaposhnikov
to the general staff because he had Tukhachevsky sentenced to death.
But he came to the general staff in 1910 and is an officer of the old
czarist school. To Stalin a regiment, a division and even an army is
just cannon fodder to weaken the enemy. All that matters is the
‘politruk,’ the front, which the herd forces forward. It is always a
mass slaughter. Our people is bleeding to death. Our captured coun-
trymen aren’t protected by the arrangements of the International Red
Cross, as Russia never signed these agreements, and are seen by the
party as traitors.”
The problem of the Russian prisoners — we had about 5 million —
was really unsolvable in many cases. It was tremendously difficult
for the German supply organization to provide for these men at the
front, as even our own troops weren't being supplied regularly. As
well we knew that our prisoners in the USSR were being treated
brutally and with systematic cruelty, which Vlasov regretted deeply.
He complained that we still weren't according him our full trust
even though he had spontaneously offered to fight against Stalin. I
heard from Vlasov from time to time after this long conversation.
But since my activities had little in common with his, I never saw
him again personally, though my staff officers later held various dis-
cussions with Vlasov’s staff.
In my opinion they should have used the Russian anti-stalinist
prisoners — there really were many — as soldiers and formed compa-
nies and battalions. However beyond battalion strength the use of
the Russian volunteers at the front could have become very danger-
ous.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 367
Toward the end of the war Vlasov commanded two divisions in
the north of Czechoslovakia. The Ist Division was under the com-
mand of General Bunitshenko and the other under General Truchin.
A Russian fighter squadron was commanded by Colonel Maltsev.
One recalls the sudden about-face that these two divisions made
against us near Prague on May 1, 1945. The Russians played the
same role as the Romanians a year before, and the situation would
have become very serious had Schémer, who had just been promoted
to field marshall, not ordered energetic countermeasures.
I don’t believe that the very realistic Viasov thought in all seri-
ousness that an about-face “in extremis” could save him. He knew
Stalin all too well for that. He merely wanted to use the ensuing
confusion to gain several days time and make it possible for his units
to escape to the west.
I was kept informed about the Prague affair, for at the request of
Generalfeldmarschall Schérner, whom I met in his headquarters near
Olmütz, I and what was left of my Commando Unit East II, about
100 men, were entrusted with the task of blowing up a bridge on the
autobahn near Breslau, which was already in enemy hands. After
carrying out its mission, our commando unit had to make its way
through the Russian lines. Our “commandos” fought on grimly from
April 15 to May 15, 1945 and were among the last fighters in this
great war. They withdrew slowly, engaging enemy tanks until four to
five days after the Wehrmacht’s surrender, in order to cover the re-
treat of a column of refugees. The column was being pursued by the
Soviet soldateska, who spared nothing and no one — neither there nor
elsewhere.
During the retreat to Eger and the Czechoslovak-German border
our volunteers saw how Vlasov’s people were fighting their way to
the west in small groups and in German uniforms. A certain number
got through and were not handed back to the Soviets.
On the other hand, Vlasov and his staff were handed over to the
Russians. It was a personal order from General Eisenhower, who
consulted Washington after General Patton had issued Vlasov a let-
ter of safe conduct. Stalin had Vlasov and his staff officers hung on
August 12, 1946. Many of Vlasov’s soldiers were sent to labor camps
in Siberia. Several of these were fellow sufferers of Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, who in his book The Gulag Archipelago described the
suffering of these men who had wanted to put an end to Stalinism.
368 OTTO SKORZENY
Solzhenitsyn admits that mass deportations and killings were begun
by Lenin in 1920 and were continued by Stalin, and that concentra-
tion camps always existed in the Soviet Union. But who worries about
that today?
The cossacks, whether from the Kuban, the Terek, the Don or the
Urals, were always disposed to be anti-communist. In May 1918 the
Don Cossacks asked for the protection of the Central Powers, who
had recognized the independence of the Ukraine. Generaloberst von
Eichhorn set up a military protectorate there and the cossacks took
the field against bolshevik troops. At this time Oberst von Kress held
the Batum — Tiblisi — Baku railway line, the transportation link to the
oil region of the Caucasus.
The cossack people lived in communities in the form of clans.
The entire family always followed the soldiers. During the Second
World War about 30,000 cossacks fought under the command of
General Helmuth von Pannwitz, whom they themselves chose to be
“Ataman.”
These people were completely cheated by the English after the
surrender. They allowed themselves to be disarmed in the belief that
they were being sent to Italy. In this way 50,000 members of the
cossack “clans” were handed over to the Soviets at the end of May
1945. The English kept their horses for themselves.
General von Pannwitz and the cossack leaders were tried — soon
after Vlasov and his staff. On January 16, 1947 Moscow announced
that Generals T.I. Domanov and S.N. Krasnov, Lieutenant-General
A.B. Skuro, the “Ataman” P.N. Krasnov, who was chief of the White
Guard units during the civil war of 1918-1921, General Sultan Girej
Klytsch, the commander of the “Daredevil Division,” and of course
General von Pannwitz, had been executed.
In this way the English finished what the cheka troops had begun
in 1920-21, when they decimated, massacred and carried off cos-
sacks from the Don to the Urals.
About 130,000 members of various Russian ethnic groups fought
in the ranks of the Waffen-SS: Ukrainians, Russians, Turkmenes,
Tartars, Kirghezians, Crimean Tartars, Georgians, Uzbeks and so on.
But Vlasov was never seen by the soldiers of these various ethnic
groups as their military commander, only the Russians did so.
Those who accuse Hitler of erring in not giving the Ukraine its
freedom are undoubtedly correct. However this would first have re-
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 369
quired a credible Ukrainian government. When I was in Kiev in 1941
a dozen tiny groups were struggling for dominance: each group
wanted to govern alone and in opposition to the others. One wanted
a monarchy and a Romanov, the other a “solid republic,” the third a
democracy, and so on. Among the immigrants from the west there
were certainly some good political brains, but they were unknown in
the Ukraine, where a man like Gauleiter Koch, supported by Bormann,
was able to do his foul work. Alfred Rosenberg supported the idea of
a free Ukrainian state and wanted to reintroduce the Ukrainian lan-
guage, which had been banned from books, newspapers and schools
since Alexander II’s “Ukas” of 1876. Himmler, Bormann and Koch
were against it. After giving the matter a great deal of consideration,
the Reichsfiihrer proposed that Sevastopol should henceforth be called
“Theoderichshafen” - after the Gothic king! That was what he was
concemed about!
At the end of 1943 Fölkersam asked me to speak to Minister
Rosenberg. Rosenberg was also of baltic origin and was Reich min-
ister for the administration of the eastern territories. He was later
burdened with all the errors and mistakes that Koch and others had
committed there. At Nuremberg he was sentenced to death by hang-
ing; his ashes were thrown into the Isar River. Folkersam and I pointed
out to Rosenberg that the real reason behind the Russian partisan
movement was none other than Koch himself: through his “Com-
missariat of the Central Ukraine” (Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk) he had
drafted 200,000 industrial and 300,000 agricultural forced laborers
for Germany! The German administration also showed little under-
standing of the mentality of the people in the Baltic States. Rosenberg
was a man of good will. He asked us to report to him all the mistakes
and errors we knew of, which we did. But unfortunately he was not a
good organizer, and his book Myth of the Twentieth Century proved
that he lacked any sense of reality.
It was a great mistake to send Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia,
into the Ukraine. Strangely he was tried in Poland and was said to
have been executed in 1959. On the other hand one still hears that he
is alive in a Polish prison!'
The Ukraine, a mainly agrarian land of 601,000 square kilome-
ters and 49 million inhabitants, had suffered greatly under the Soviet
system through the “collectivization” of its territory. Millions of
“Kulaks,” small landowners, were liquidated, first by Dzherzhinsky’s
370 OTTO SKORZENY
Cheka under Lenin, then by the Yagoda’s and Yezhov’s GPU.
Solzhenitsyn places the number of farmers who were driven from
their lands through “collectivization” at 15 million. About four mil-
lion farmers starved to death during the great crop failures of 1932-
33.
The Ukrainians have scarcely stopped fighting against commu-
nism and for their own independence since 1917. As in 1918, in 1934
they also sought the support of Germany, which then supported the
“National Ukrainian Organization” (OUN) under Colonel Konovalets.
This passionate man turned to the wrong man when he trusted Admi-
ral Canaris. He was killed: on May 23, 1938 a “German secret agent,”
in reality a Soviet agent, gave him a package which contained a bomb.
In November 1939 we freed all the young Ukrainian nationalists
languishing in Polish prisons. Among them was Stefan Bandera, who
had been sentenced by the Polish government, first to death, then to
life imprisonment. Bandera was about thirty years old and soon af-
terward became the leader of the “Ukrainska Povstanka Armia”
(Ukrainian Insurgent Army). Logically Koch’s “working style” was
not to his taste. He and several comrades were arrested by the Ger-
man police in July 1941, taken to Berlin and subsequently to
Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Bandera was unjustly accused
of being a minion of Canaris and Lahousen. He wasn’t freed until
1944, by which time Canaris and Lahousen had been exposed.
Bandera took control of the UPA and began a pitiless struggle against
the Soviet armies.

During the summer of 1944, when the Eastern Front collapsed under
the Russian offensive, it was reported to us in Friedenthal that small
and medium sized units had no chance of retreating in the chaos that
ensued. Without ammunition or supplies, most of them were destroyed
or captured. Only small, determined battle groups succeeded in reach-
ing our lines: about 1,000 in all, consisting of 12-15,000 soldiers.
The group which risked the most extraordinary retreat was that
of Feldwebel Johannes Diercks of the 36th Infantry Regiment, a unit
which supported the remnants of the 20th Panzer Division. Diercks
left the Beresina on June 27, 1944. His people divided themselves
into various battle groups, which included the crew of a shot-down
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 371
He 111 and a battalion of the 52nd Howitzer Regiment. They hid
themselves in swamps and forests and fought like mad against the
Soviet troops. When Diercks reached the area of the 107th Infantry
Division in East Prussia he had just four survivors with him. All five
were injured, but had hung onto their weapons. The date was August
14, 1944.
At about the same time Generaloberst Jodi informed me that an-
other relatively large German unit was still fighting in the forest north-
west of Minsk, even though the city had fallen into enemy hands on
July 3. I will return to this unit in the next chapter. The German army
group in Northern Ukraine was commanded by Generalfeldmarschall
Walter Model. At the beginning of July 1944 Hitler also placed him
in command of Army Group Center. I met Model during the Ardennes
offensive. He chose to take his own life on April 21, 1945 rather than
surrender to American forces, after ensuring that his officers and men,
who were surrounded on the Ruhr, were able to end the battle in an
honorable fashion at the end of March.
Model was an outstanding defensive commander; he was capable
of improvising even in the most difficult situations. But he couldn’t
stop the red tide flooding over the Ukraine.
At the beginning of autumn 1944 we in Friedenthal were informed
that groups of German soldiers whose retreat had been cut off had
joined Bandera’s partisans. Among the survivors were volunteers of
the 14th Waffen-SS Division Galizien, which had been formed from
Ukrainian and Ruthenian volunteers in 1943. Their insignia was the
Galician lion with three crowns — the trident of the Holy Vladimir. In
August 1944 the Galizien Division fought courageously in the Tarnov
pocket, alongside the Waffen-SS Division Horst Wessel and a French
battle group of the Waffen-SS Division Charlemagne, all of whom
did their duty bravely.”
I decided to form a commando unit, whose mission it would be
to find Bandera and negotiate with him. Our idea was to organize the
German soldiers into small groups, which would do their best to reach
the German front lines. In any case the UPA would receive medical
supplies, weapons and ammunition from us, and the seriously
wounded could be flown out from improvised airfields.
I selected Hauptmann Kern to lead the commando unit; he came
from the army and had served in the Brandenburg Division. Kern
spoke Russian and Polish. His team consisted of a dozen NCOs and
372 OTTO SKORZENY
German soldiers and about twenty proven anti-Stalinist Russians from
my Commando Unit East, altogether about thirty well-trained, deter-
mined volunteers. They were provided with Russian uniforms, boots,
tobacco and false papers. With their shaved heads and two-week
beards they looked like real Russian soldiers. We dubbed this opera-
tion Brauner Bär (Brown Bear).
Kern’s commando unit crossed our front lines in December 1944
in eastern Czechoslovakia. Two weeks later we received the first coded
radio message from Kern. He had found Bandera. He had firm con-
trol over a rather large area of forest and mountains about 50 kilome-
ters by 20. He had organized his base of operations very quickly —
thanks to the cadres he employed (among them were numerous of-
ficers of the Galizien Division) and the sympathy of the population,
which was disposed to be decidedly anti-Russian and even more so
anti-communist. I had a friend from Vienna among these officers, a
battalion commander of the Galizien Division. Unfortunately Kem
was unable to contact him and so I have no idea of his subsequent
fate.
Bandera refused to release our soldiers and let them break through
to our lines in the west: he needed them. The “Supreme Council of
the Ukrainian Independence Movement” (Ukrainska Holovna
Vyzvolna Rada), consisting of 25 members representing the various
Ukrainian factions, had already decided that the training camps and
officer schools should be run by German officers. For their part, al-
most all of our NCOs were placed in command of a “sotnia” or com-
pany.
On the other hand Bandera declared himself willing to allow our
wounded to be evacuated. His people cleared a landing strip in the
forest. However by the time it was ready, the Luftwaffe unit at my
disposal, Kampfgeschwader 200, had no fuel left! All that we could
do was drop medics with medical supplies, medicines, arms and
ammunition. I instructed Kern and his commando unit to return. The
“Brown Bear” came back in mid-March under extremely difficult
conditions, for the unit had to pass through a combat zone held by
Petrov’s army. Nevertheless, Kern lost only five men. Not a single
Russian deserted. Obviously at the end of the war we supplied all our
foreign volunteers with the necessary papers to let them pass them-
selves off as forced laborers, thus preventing them from being handed
over to the Russians by the allies.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 373
Who will one day write the story of the UPA and Stefan Bandera?
In my opinion the UPA faced a much more difficult task then Tito in
Yugoslavia, who received every possible form of material aid from
the Anglo-Saxons. In the heyday of his organization, from 1946 to
1948, Bandera had more than 80,000 soldiers under his command,
of which 10-12,000 were German. But he was completely isolated:
he was no longer receiving weapons, ammunition and medical sup-
plies from us. The UPA procured new supplies by attacking Soviet
convoys. This true army fought on until 1952, with no hope of help
from the west.
The Ukrainian farmer worked the very fertile soil of what was
known as the “black earth region,” whose 1.5-meter-thick layer of
humus, the Chernosem, extended from the Carpathians to the Urals.
This “black earth” was formed by flooding at the edge of the retreat-
ing glaciers after the last ice age. The Ukrainian farmers became
“kholkoze functionaries” after their frequent uprisings in the period
1922-1937 were bloodily suppressed; but they obtained a certain free-
dom under the German occupation — even in the central Ukraine un-
der Koch’s administration! True agrarian reform was impossible dur-
ing the war years; the problems were not just of an agricultural na-
ture. However, in those areas where Koch could not exert his author-
ity and which were beyond Himmler’s fantasies — he had not the
faintest idea of what the Ukraine was like — reasonable, local solu-
tions to the problems were found: in Northern Bukovina and in South-
ern Ukraine (Odessa), which were under Romanian administration,
in Western Ukraine (Lvov), which was incorporated into the Polish
Generalgouvernement under Frank, and especially in the Eastern
Ukraine (Kharkov).
The complete failure of the collective farm system was obvious:
for example, 7 million farmers in the United States produced more
than the 40 million “farmer-workers” of the Soviet Union. The fact
is that the former sometimes had to feed the USSR. It is also a fact
that the Soviet “farmer-workers” now had a right to a piece of ground
“for their home use.” Nowadays large cities like Kiev, Kharkov and
Moscow are supplied with fresh vegetables from these small “pri-
vate plots.”
The Ukrainians only wanted to become masters of “their” land,
which they had farmed for generations and which had, in some cases,
belonged to them since the times of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy
374 OTTO SKORZENY
and the empires of the Romanovs. That was their crime! They wanted
to speak their own language, practice their own religion and follow
their own customs. The Ukrainian people could only survive as an
independent nation. That is what they fought for, fully aware that
they would be ruthlessly opposed by the Russian and the Polish gov-
ernments. And that is what happened. The struggle by Bandera and
his partisans, which was one of the saddest and most terrible chap-
ters in this unknown side of the war, is impossible to understand if
one tries to ignore these truths. In 1946-47 Bandera had more than
200,000 partisans under his command. If they did not all fight, it was
only because they lacked weapons and ammunition. But many men
— and women as well — preferred to fight and possibly die than lan-
guish in a prison or concentration camp.
The press of the victorious western powers dedicated a scant few
lines to the people of the Ukraine when, from May 1945 to August
1951, they fell victim to the mass destruction carried out by the Rus-
sian and Polish military police. The allies ignored the wrecked vil-
lages, the burnt-out farmhouses and other despicable acts — all car-
ried out by Soviet troops. These cruel measures also explain the des-
perate resistance by the UPA. Anyone who hasn’t fought in Russia
will find this hard to understand.
Not until 1954 was part of the truth revealed, when a committee
in New York published its first report: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army
in its Fight for Freedom.
The persecution of the Ruthenian Catholic Church reached its
climax in May-June 1946. A forcibly-held synod decided that the
church should merge with the Orthodox Church after a vote by 216
priests — out of a total of 2,714. The other 2,489 priests had been
arrested or killed or had chosen armed resistance with Bandera.
On January 29, 1944 a strong UPA force attacked a Soviet ar-
mored train near Kiev. The commander of the military district, Gen-
eral Vatutin, was killed. He was replaced by General Zhukov. Swier-
czewskij, another Soviet general and Marshal Rokossovsky’s adju-
tant in the Polish war ministry, who was infamous for his ruthless
suppression of Polish nationalism, was likewise killed on March 28.
During the Spanish Civil War Swierczewskij had commanded the
International Brigade under the name “General Walter.” His adjutant
was a Frenchman by the name of Marty, alias “the butcher of
Albacete.” The cruelty of these two men was directed not just at
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 375
Franco’s troops and Spanish Nationalist civilians, but also against
the militia soldiers of the International Brigade and against Republi-
cans who “deviated from Moscow's course.”
The UPA did not just fight Soviet troops, but also the military
and the police of the Polish communist government, which put the
7th, 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions, a division of the KBW (Polish
Internal Security Corps) police, tanks and aircraft into the field against
Bandera. Stalin had previously intervened at the end of 1945 with
nine infantry divisions, a tank brigade and a motorized division of
the NKVD. From May to September the UPA fought more than 80
battles and lost 5,000 men (killed and wounded); the Soviet losses,
however, were 7,400 killed and more than 9,000 wounded. During
the night of October 31, 1945 the UPA captured Stanislavov, the
former capital of Wolhynien.
From Ukrainian Christmas Day, January 7, until October 1946
the UPA was forced to fight more than 1,000 battles: bolshevik losses
were more than 15,000 killed. In 1947 Stalin sent two new police
divisions against Bandera. The situation became so serious that the
three Soviet governments — Russian, Polish and Czechoslovakian —
were forced to sign a treaty against the Bandera movement. They
decided to draw up a common war plan to strike down once and for
all this courageous Ukrainian who refused to accept communism.
The red terror became even worse, but the west scarcely took notice.
The UPA’s last battles took place in July 1952 in the area of the
Podolish Marshes: Stalin had despatched two police divisions and a
flamethrower brigade.

On October 15, 1959, at about 3 P.M., the tenant of Kreittmayr Strasse

Number 7 in Munich walked up the stairs leading to his second-floor
apartment. He was Herr Stefan Popel, a very quiet man. Just as he
was about to open his door he noticed that the key would not go into
the keyhole. An individual came running up the stairs behind him,
reached the landing and said, “You’d better get a locksmith!”
Popel turned around to find the man holding a pistol under his
nose. There was a slight hiss and Popel fell down the stairs. He never
had a chance to raise a hand in defense.
376 OTTO SKORZENY
He was found dead an hour later. His body showed no signs of
injury and the public-health officer concluded death by embolism.
But the police knew that Herr Popel was none other than the political
refugee Stefan Bandera. There was speculation that he had been poi-
soned or had taken his own life until 1961. That year “an agent of the
KGB chose the path to freedom.” He called himself Stakinsky and
admitted to having killed at least two Ukrainian nationalist leaders:
Lew Rebet and Bandera, who met his end the same way as Konovalets.
Stakinsky used a prussic acid pistol.
Stakinsky came before a criminal court, where in defense of the
acts he had committed he declared that, “he had acted on orders.” He
was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Many accused Germans
at Nuremberg and other military courts of the western allies, who
had likewise acted on orders, were convicted and executed. But they
weren't members of the KGB!
After a seven-year struggle against the UPA with military and
police units, the Soviets finally overcame the Ukrainian patriots. They
had Konovalets and Bandera killed, but they weren't able to elimi-
nate the Ukrainian people. The world press stayed silent, even though
from 1952 thousands of Ukrainians were arrested and deported year
after year. There were bloody uprisings in Southern Ukraine in 1972.
In June of that year several thousand workers went on strike in
Dnieprodzherzhinsk. They attacked and set on fire several party build-
ings: the headquarters of the Comsomol (communist youth) and those
of the KGB and the MVD (security police). The masses of people
sang the anthem of the UPA. In September and October of the same
year there were further, extremely violent demonstrations in
Dniepropetrovsk, one of the most important industrial centers of the
central Ukraine. The rebels took over some parts of the city; the po-
lice opened fire and more than 50 people were killed. The “Drujniks,”
auxiliary police recruited from within the ranks of the Comsomol,
had to be mobilized.
There were fresh manifestations of Ukrainian discontent in 1973
— this time by the collective farmers of the Southern Ukraine. The
world press remained silent.
However in 1963 I was accused by the communist press of “hav-
ing had during the war a silent pistol that fired poison needles.” I
need not say that no such pistol ever existed in Germany. As the
story went I intended to shoot Stalin with it. Furthermore, dozens of
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 377
newspapers in the eastern block maintained that I had tested this
“needle pistol” on inmates at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.
In what moral category do people belong who could imagine that my
comrades and I were capable of shooting at defenseless people? In
the war we waged, I always tried to avoid bloodshed on both sides,
an undertaking in which I was successful to some degree by exploit-
ing the elements of surprise. At the front I faced the enemy, like my
comrades. I would like to repeat at this point that our opponents were
very brave: this applied to Tito’s partisans as well as to the Russian
and American soldiers.
Is it possible then, that the people who were trying to hang evil
acts on me did not notice that they were exposing their own mean-
ness? Did these people ever fight? Did they ever face death on the
battlefield? I scarcely think so.
In truth the sensation-seeking journalists raised and falsified
charges against me that were the same as those which the good Mr.
Rosenfeld, the American prosecutor, had brought against me sixteen
years earlier at Nuremberg. He did his utmost to convict me then —
but without success!
This prosecutor Rosenfeld grilled a very young soldier, who had
served in my units, over and over until he finally “admitted”: “they
also gave us poisoned ammunition.”
I asked my defense attorney, the American Colonel Durst, to have
the witness state exactly how he claims to have recognized the poi-
soned ammunition.
“That is very easy,” answered the young soldier, “there was a red
ring between the casing and the bullet.”
Lieutenant-Colonel Durst spoke with me briefly and then told
the court that he reserved the right to question the witness the next
day. I was very familiar with this round with the red ring and couldn’t
be angry with the boy on account of his statement; he was surely
unaware of its gravity and potential consequences for me and my
comrades.
It was up to me, the accused, to show proof that Mr. Rosenfeld’s
accusations were false. We had to act very quickly. At Dachau many
prisoners left the camp under guard for daily labor service; some of
my friends passed on my instructions. In court the next day Lieuten-
ant-Colonel Durst had the young soldier called to the stand again.
Then I took a red-ringed bullet, which had been smuggled in to me in
378 Otro SKORZENY
a piece of bread, from my pocket. There was a moment of surprise
and Mr. Rosenfeld began asking scandalous questions. Lieutenant-
Colonel Durst interrupted him, “It is completely irrelevant to know
how this bullet came into our possession. All that matters is that the
court is informed about its characteristics. I ask the high court to
allow the witness to examine this bullet closely and to tell us whether
it is in fact one of the bullets which were issued to the officers and
men on Colonel Skorzeny’s order from time to time.”
The witness confirmed this immediately.
“Yes. This is one of the poisoned bullets that we received in
Friedenthal.”
“Witness,” began Durst again, “your statement is very impor-
tant. Please look at the bullet again and then tell us whether you are
quite certain that you haven’t made a mistake. Is it really one of the
special bullets that you say contained poison and which was issued
to you?”
“I am absolutely certain.”
“Very good! I thank you. I ask the high court to allow the ac-
cused to give several explanations.”
I explained that this type of bullet was in no way poisoned and
was only a so-called “waterproof” bullet. Because the bullets were
completely watertight, we issued them to members of commando
units who were likely to get wet in the course of their missions. The
analysis requested by my attorney and the court confirmed this. The
red circle prevented this ammunition from being confused with other,
normal bullets. I would also like to add at this point that no unit of
the Wehrmacht ever used prussic acid pistols or other weapons of
this type.
In 1941-42 we found prussic acid bullets on Russian partisans.
They were revolver bullets, whose tips were slit into four parts and
which contained prussic acid. The previously-mentioned Arthur Nebe,
the chief of Office V of the RSHA, had several hundred of these
bullets manufactured in the criminal police laboratory, and I received
about two-hundred of them. My officers received one of these bul-
lets when they had missions to carry out in which they might be
captured or tortured. These bullets were very easy to recognize, not
by a red ring, but by a cross marked on the tip of the bullet. I myself
had one, the last round in the magazine. When | voluntarily surren-
dered to the U.S. Army on May 22, 1945 and laid my pistol on the
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 379
desk of the American officer, I warned him, “Careful! It’s loaded and
the last bullet is dangerous!”
I explained to him why.
Progress is unstoppable. After the war the Soviets built and per-
fected a battery-operated pistol which fired cyanide gas under pres-
sure from a pulverized charge. This poison was absorbed by the
mucous membranes and the skin and was spread throughout the body
by the blood in minutes; the blood vessels contracted and caused
death. This is how Bandera was killed.
Before the murder Stakinski took atropine pills, an effective anti-
toxin, as a precaution. Unfortunately this is not something from an
lan Fleming novel.

The Soviet intelligence service has long employed a method that is

now all too well known: first they have it printed that the victim
committed suicide; but an even more cunning ruse is to declare that
the victim was murdered by enemies of the Soviets. Since 1942 it
was known that the Polish officers killed in a mass execution in the
Katyn Forest had been executed by the Soviets. However the Soviet
prosecutors in Nuremberg did not hesitate to lay this mass murder at
the feet of the Germans, and international! historians merely “har-
bored doubts” until just a few years ago. Apparently they didn’t want
to read and cite the official reports on this mass murder (especially
the Polish, American, English’ and Swiss documents).
After the murder of Bandera, and before Stakinski came before
the criminal court, General Reinhard Gehlen’s intelligence service
was accused of the crime. However the BND (Federal German Intel-
ligence Service) was a powerful organization and few put much faith
in this accusation. Before I evoke several memories, I would like to
tell of an astonishing visit I received in Friedenthal in January 1944:
the visitor was General (Special Duties) Walter Nicolai.
When they told me of the arrival of “General Nicolai,” it wasn’t
immediately clear to me that it was the former Oberst Nicolai, the
head of German military intelligence in the First World War. I had
thought he was dead.
But he wasn’t dead. He was no phantom, but a ghost. To this day
I can still see him before me, with his blue eyes and his white hair in
380 OTTO SKORZENY
a brush cut and his extremely lively look. When he sat down oppo-
site me I noticed one detail: like my father, he wore leggings over his
shoes, of the type that had become popular twenty years before. We
talked about the freeing of Mussolini.
“I believe,” he said, “that before you freed the Duce one of the
main difficulties was locating him. I had said to myself for a long
time that the Italians were trying to lead you down the wrong path.”
I admitted that I should in fact have convinced Hitler, as they had
also given him false information.
“Falsely informed,” he observed with a smile, “that happens some-
times. But it shouldn’t be allowed to happen too often.”
I was of the same opinion, but didn’t understand: Canaris hadn’t
yet been exposed. I explained to him what our objective was in
Friedenthal: imaginative commando operations exploiting the ele-
ment of surprise within the normal rules of warfare. Nicolai, who
was then over seventy years old, listened with enthusiastic attention
and interjected to point out that our activities needed completely ac-
curate information as a foundation. To my amazement he also said
that he would be pleased if he could be useful to me in any way and
would gladly work with me. When I told Schellenberg of this he
stuck his nose in the air and declared, “One can see that you're still a
beginner. Nicolai is much too big a catch! Admiral Canaris can’t
stand him nor can the Reichsführer by the way. He knows too much
about the west and even more about the east.”
“One more reason,” I said, “not to reject his services. Why should
we not make use of his experience?”
“His former contacts in the east, made at the time of the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk, make him somewhat suspect.” At my request General
Nicolai gave two or three lectures to the officers at Friedenthal. He
recalled past events, spoke in a witty way about his experiences and
his views and about the importance of strategic information, be it of
a military, political, scientific or psychological nature, and of the
necessity of tactical intelligence, which relates to every single opera-
tion and eventually affects general strategy. This data must be a com-
pilation of many and varied types of information, therefore a synthe-
sis must be made as quickly and as accurately as possible. He con-
sidered information on the enemy the most important element in a
modem war. For him the main value of a piece of information lay in
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 381
its reliability and clarity. As well, however, such information could
only be used at a certain time and within a certain area. It was more
dangerous to use false information than to receive none at all.
Nicolai noted that a surprise advance, which was planned after
careful consideration and with imagination — not contrived in the
midst of a major battle — also made a great impression on the enemy.
This was a new way of conducting warfare, one which general staffs
unfortunately gave little thought to.
When I read today that General Nicolai had a high opinion of
Admiral Canaris I can only shrug my shoulders: he was much too
refined to accuse Canaris personally. But in the course of a conversa-
tion he said to me:
“You know, Skorzeny, an officer doesn’t serve a regime. He serves
his fatherland, whatever its political form may be. To attack the ex-
isting regime in time of war is clearly treason.”
This was so obvious to me that in January 1944 I asked Nicolai
why he had spoken of it. I can assure the reader that I never would
have thought that Nicolai might sympathize with bolshevism; quite
the contrary. He was a first-class officer of “the old school.” I found
him to be an upright man, whose character was an odd contrast to the
ambiguous nature of a Canaris and the prevarications of a
Schellenberg. In the (spurious) memoirs of Schellenberg, who placed
himself completely at the service of the English, one can read that
“Nicolai’s small office on the Potsdamer Platz was one the most im-
portant centers working for the Soviet intelligence service” — and
that was in 1943! Is so, why didn’t they ever arrest General Nicolai?
In the course of the three or four conversations I had with him, I
was able to ascertain that he was highly intelligent. And as far as his
current reputation in international intelligence services, I can only
say that it is worldwide and much greater than that of Canaris. Apart
from that I had other things to do during the war besides worry about
spies and counter-intelligence. I must state one thing, however: it is
completely absurd for anyone to claim, as Schellenberg did, that
Nicolai organized a pro-Soviet spy net on the Potsdamer Platz dur-
ing the war. And when Schellenberg adds that “Gestapo chief Müller
had Nicolai and his pro-Soviet net watched,” it is simply laughable.
If that’s the case I think they should have had Milller watched too!
382 Orro SKORZENY
eco

Not only was “Zeppelin” the name for the mass interrogations car-
ried out by Department C of the RSHA’s Office VI among the five
million Russian POWs in German hands, as I described previously
(Part II, Chapter 6), but it was also the code-name for OKH head-
quarters in Zossen, about 20 kilometers south of Berlin, at the end of
1944.
This was a small, hidden city with identical, squat, concrete build-
ings hidden among lawns, gardens and trees. Every building was
built to the same design: the rows of rooms had a door every 10-12
meters leading to a central hallway, which had steep stairs leading to
the air raid shelter.
About three-thousand officers worked in “Zeppelin” under the
command of General Krebs, deputy to Generaloberst Guderian, whom
Hitler had named Army Chief-of-Staff after the assassination attempt
of July 20.
General Krebs’ office occupied part of one building and the of-
fice of General Gehlen (Foreign Armies East) the other. Several hun-
dred officers worked in the information department for the Eastern
Front. Reinhard Gehlen was never a convinced national-socialist,
although, like Heusinger, he worked under Halder as a department
head in the general staff. He never really took the talk of a possible
putsch seriously. General Guderian rightfully placed great stock in
his information conceming the Eastern Front. He nevertheless at-
tracted the suspicion of Hitler —- who had become extremely distrust-
ful after the 20th of July — not only because he owed his career to
Generaloberst Franz Halder, but because he had married Herta von
Seydlitz, a relative of General von Seydlitz, in 1931. General
Seydlitz’s behavior at Stalingrad is well-known. Together with Paulus,
he was one of the leaders of the “National Committee for a Free
Germany,” based in Moscow, while a prisoner of war.
I consulted the future chief of the BND during preparations for
all the operations we planned in the east as a commando unit, and I
got on well with him. I would like to contribute one anecdote.
On March 13, 1945 I drove to “Zeppelin” with Oberstleutnant
Walther, Félkersam’s successor. I can’t recall precisely which com-
mando unit missing behind Russian lines we were worrying about,
whether it was Braune Bar or a unit involved in Operation Freischiitz.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 383
We found ourselves alone with General Gehlen in this large room
with huge windows. All three of us stood bent over the staff map of
the Eastern Front spread out on the table and probably overheard the
air raid sirens howling. It was about twelve noon.
The first bomb fell about 100 meters from the building we were
in, and the three of us quickly crawled under the table. Several sec-
onds later the blast wave from the next bomb shattered all the win-
dows; broken glass flew in all directions.
“That was quite close,” observed Walther.
Just then General Gehlen got up without saying a word, ran to
the door and disappeared. We got to our feet, stepped out into the hall
and were soon standing in front of the locked armored door of the
bunker. We knocked forcefully and the door was finally opened by a
soldier. Inside sat the general; quite calmly he said, “Where were
you then gentlemen?”
“Herr General,” said Walther. “We were worried about you and
looked for you everywhere. We're happy to see you here safe and
sound.”
It struck me that many staff officers were quite allergic to bom-
bardments. I must admit that I wasn’t especially fond of them either.
Not that a general staff officer was more frightened than a mere mor-
tal or a soldier — and General Gehlen was certainly a brave man. |
merely mean to say that a general staff officer feels insulted in a
certain way if he becomes a target like a common soldier. We laughed
about this incident, but there were victims in the other wing of “Zep-
pelin.” Among them was General Krebs, who was injured rather badly.
In 1971 Reinhard Gehlen published a book of recollections un-
der the title Der Dienst. There one reads that the mysterious infor-
mant working for the Red Orchestra spy net was none other
than...Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, the head of the party chancel-
lery. This thesis is practically insupportable. Bormann didn't have
the means to learn of Hitler’s military decisions fast enough and pass
them on to Réssler so quickly. The STAVKA surely tumed to a highly-
qualified military man, whose treachery cost the lives of thousands
of soldiers — to say nothing of the civilians who were killed or car-
ried away.
When Gehlen wrote his book ~ which was a disappointment by
the way — it was certain that Bormann was dead, although in 1973
334 OTTo SEORZENY
they were still looking for him in all of South America, even among
the natives ofthe Amazon. The BND has now admitted that Bormann
is no longer among the living. I was aware of this fact and repeated it
every time I was interrogated by the allies. I always considered him
to be one of the most sinister people in Hitler’s entourage. peace to
his ashes.
I just ask myself why Reinhard Gehlen claimed that Bormann
was the “conductor” in the OKW?

Notes
1, The correctness of this speculation was confirmed to us. (Editors’ note)

2. The battle group of the Chariemagne Division, which came from the Newekiau training camp in
Bohemia, suffered the following losses from August 15 to 25: of 19 officers, 7 were killed and 9
wounded; of 1,112 soldiers, 132 were killed, 601 wounded and 59 listed as missing. 41 were taken
prisoner. The last units of the French Volunteer Legion (the LVF), which had distinguished Itself in
front of Moscow in 1941, fought on in Junc 1944; a Oe Ee Mogilov and Kol Dach 10
Borisov on the Beresina, where Napoleon’s soldiers had foughia tragic battle during their famous
retreat132 ycars cariier. It was Il Battalion of the LVF that took part in the defense of the Borisov
Bridge, across which streamed refugees and wounded and flosing soldiers. The Soviet alr force and
artillery obviously concentrated thelr efforts on Borisov. II Battalion
as well as two munitions dumps. Il was able to join the rest of the LVF and made its way through the
streets of Minsk, which had been entered by the first Soviet troops. Finally, after bitter day and night
fighting, it finally succeeded in reaching Greifenberg in East Prussia. (Editors’ note)

3. The secret report that the former English ambessador in the Soviet Union, Sir Owen O'Malley, sent
to Churchill from Moscow on May 24, 1943 was released 10 the public in July 1972. The report states
that the massacre of Polish officers at Katyn was clearly commited by the Russians. In the margins is
the notation “KCD” in Anthony Eden's hand. This meant thal the report by Sir Owen was to be shown
to the King, the war cabinet and the dominions. The latter never learned of the report, and the others
acted as if they had never read it. (Editors’ note)
 23
OPERATION FREISCHUTZ

The Soviet summer offensive 1944 — Why Rokossovsky was able to

cover 270 km in nine days - 21 German generals captured -
Oberstleutnant Scherhorn refuses to surrender and assembles 2,000
men — “In a forest, northwest of Minsk...” — The four paratrooper
groups of Operation Freischütz - Scherhorn found! - Fähnrich R.
eats in the Soviet officers mess - Kampfgeschwader 200's mission -
Untersturmführer Linder is decorated with the Knight's Cross - The
“long march” of the lost legion — Final report from Linder: “I just
want to hear your voices..." — My fears - Dr. Zoltan von Toth, a
survivor of a Soviet concentration camp, gives more precise figures
— The crime of being called Skorzeny: 10 years in prison camp - The
sad fate of Dr. Heller.

efore Operation Brauner Bar we were kept busy by an-

other unit behind the Soviet lines. At the end of August
1944 I received a teletype message urgently summoning
me to Fiihrer Headquarters. There Generaloberst Jodl in-
troduced me to two staff officers who tumed out to be Eastern Front
specialists. These gave me a brief account of the drama that had been
played out between Minsk and the Beresina, in the sector of the front
defended by Army Group Center.
Jodl could not explain how it was possible that armored and
motorized troops of the Ist and 2nd White Russian Armies under
Sakhorov and Rokossovsky, which had attacked north of the Pripyat
Marshes, had been able to reach Stolpce, 65 kilometers west of Minsk,
which fell the next day, through the seam between the Fourth and

385
386 Otto SKORZENY
Ninth German Armies. Rokossovsky’s motorized troops advanced
270 kilometers in nine days and breached our fronts.
In his History of the Second World War, Sir Basil Liddell Hart
notes that contradictory information and orders were given by the
conspirators to the various headquarters, and that “the events of July
20 had considerable negative effects on the Eastern Front as well as
in the west.”
Rado and Réssler’s Red Orchestra kept the STAVKA well in-
formed, and by June 1944 it had in its hands a detailed plan of our
central sector. It was also not to be overlooked that the movement of
enemy armor, which the Soviet generals ended with a pincer move-
ment and which uncannily struck the weakest point of our positions,
bore an astonishing similarity to the attacks ordered by Hitler in 1941
based on the plans of Manstein and Guderian. It was the same plan —
but in reverse. The Russian army command had been quick to learn
from us.
Hitler ordered General Model to the Eastern Front in February
1943 to save the 22 divisions of the Fourth and Ninth Armies, which
were threatened with encirclement in the Rzhev bridgehead. From
the 1st to the 22nd of February the general withdrew the divisions,
fighting in such a way that losses were reduced to a minimum in
Spite of ceaseless attacks by ten Soviet armies. This was the so-called
Operation Biiffel (Bussard).
Once again Model's mission was to save whatever there was to
be saved of these two armies and bring the front to a standstill. But
this time the situation was significantly different. The field marshall
found complete chaos; after the 20th of July a large part of the reason
was morale.
Nevertheless, and I would like to stress this once again, there
was no other solution for us but to fight on.
Even the disappearance of Hitler and the national-socialist re-
gime could not change anything about our enemies’ decision. The
comments of several historians, who always label Hitler’s orders to
“offer maximum resistance” as “absurd,” are not really correct. Any
German head of state who was conscious of his responsibility to his-
tory would have issued the same orders in the face of the enemy’s
demand for an “unconditional surrender.”
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 387
eco

At Fiihrer Headquarters they told me that part of the Fourth Army

encircled in Minsk might break out. A radio report was picked up
from one of our agents who had remained behind enemy lines: “In a
forest northwest of Minsk there are German units which haven't sur-
rendered.” This information was confirmed by several survivors from
the Minsk pocket. Finally we received more detailed information
from a small group of men who had escaped via Vilna. “A battle
group of about 2,000 men, which is probably commanded by
Oberstleutnant Scherhom, has withdrawn into a forest and is deter-
mined not to surrender and to fight its way through to our lines.”
“Skorzeny,” Generaloberst Jodl said to me, “unfortunately we
don’t know exactly where Oberstleutnant Scherhorn and his group
are. Do you think that we would be able to find out and make contact
with the group and rescue them?”
“Herr Generaloberst,” I answered, “I assure you that we will do
everything humanly possible — with the means that are at our dis-

One first becomes conscious of the true scale of the catastrophe

when one realizes that seven of the forty-seven generals of the Fourth
and Ninth Armies and the Third Panzer Army were killed in action,
among them general Pfeiffer, the commanding general of VII Army
Corps. Two generals committed suicide, one was posted missing and
21 were captured. But Scherhom did not surrender. People of his
type, who were capable of assembling 2,000 men, all prepared to sell
their lives at the highest cost, in the midst of chaos deserve to have
their courage praised, and not only with words.
I had the opportunity to talk to a general who managed to reach
our lines in East Prussia with the remnants of his division, a mere
seventy men, after a 700-kilometer march.
He told me that his division had been surrounded southwest of
Smolensk with two other divisions. The highest ranking general de-
clared offhand that in his opinion, “they ought to surrender and im-
mediately give themselves up to the Soviets.” The other two gener-
als tried all day to talk him out of it. As a result the breakout was
attempted too late, without the necessary conviction of its success.
As a result only minor elements escaped from the pocket. There was
388 OTTO SKORZENY
no doubt that Scherhorn and his men fell victim to the irresolution
and hesitation of his superiors.
What were our chances of finding these brave soldiers, who had
already been fighting “in a forest northwest of Minsk” for two months?
Perhaps fifteen or twenty percent. But this limited chance had to be
taken advantage of. I went to work immediately, and we named the
operation Freischiitz. Everyone at Friedenthal exhibited the same
energy and enthusiasm as one felt when listening to the overture of
the famous opera of the same name composed by Carl Maria von
Weber.
The recently-formed “Commando Unit East I” Battalion was
given the job of carrying out this mission.' Four groups, each of five
men, two German volunteers and three proven anti-stalinist Russian
soldiers, were formed. The eight German soldiers spoke Russian and
smoked the Russian machorka cigarettes. Their heads were shaven.
Each group was equipped with a radio.
The first group was under the command of SS-Oberscharführer
P. At the end of August 1944 the group was dropped by parachute
into the Minsk area near Borisov and Gevenj, after a 500-kilometer
flight in an He 111 of Kampfgeschwader 200, which had been placed
at my disposal. Its mission was to march in a westerly direction and
search for Scherhorn.
That same night we were able to establish contact with P., who
radioed: “Difficult landing. We are trying to assemble. Under ma-
chine-gun fire.” Then nothing more. Not until six to eight weeks
later did I learn during Operation Panzerfaust in Budapest that P.
found the Scherhorn group, but that his radio had broken down the
first day.
The second group was sent into the same area, but farther south,
at the beginning of September. The group, which was commanded
by SS-Oberjunker (officer candidate) Linder, had the same instruc-
tions as the first group, to head west. We received a radio message on
the fourth night. After the exchange of recognition code words Linder
reported: “Good landing. Scherhorn group found.” One can imagine
our joy — especially the next day when Scherhorn sent his personal
appreciation. The third and fourth groups jumped in the days follow-
ing the delivery of group two, before we received the news of Linder’s
success, into the Dzherzhinsk and Viteyka area. Their mission was to
march east.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 389
We heard nothing from group three, although we waited by our
radios for weeks. They had disappeared into the endless expanses of
Russia.
The fate of the fourth group, which was under the command of
young Fahnrich R., was as surprising as it was sensational. First good
news: excellent landing. R. reported that all five men were together.
Then he reported that they had encountered Russian deserters, who
took them for the same. They got along very well with their new
comrades. R. learned that special units of the Russian military police
were combing the Minsk area. On the second day he informed us
that he was being forced to take another route. We gave our approval.
Contact again on the third day: they were receiving aid from farm-
ers. The war-weary White Russian population in this area supported
their plan: on the fourth day — nothing more.
As a Baltic German, this action was very near to Adrian von
Fölkersam’s heart. He feared the worst — as did I. Two weeks later
we received a telephone call from a unit on the Lithuanian border:
“Group R. reports itself back with no losses.” The radio had broken
down and the fourth group had successfully travelled many hundreds
of kilometers to reach our lines.
They hadn’t found Scherhorn, but the information they brought
us was of great importance. The soldiers had covered more than 300
kilometers in an occupied area where the enemy was preparing a
new offensive. R.’s report proved that we could still learn a lot from
the Russians: they were really serious about total war. And not only
did they have American war materials, the entire Russian population
was mobilized. One could see women and children rolling drums of
gasoline to the front and passing shells from hand to hand in their
artillery positions.
Dressed in the uniform of a Red Army lieutenant, R. accepted an
invitation into an officers mess. The Red Army, which was no longer
an army of the proletariat but an army of the Russian nation, had just
reintroduced the officer’s mess. The Soviet military hymn was also
no longer the Internationale.
Back in Friedenthal, R. became one of the keenest helpers in the
rescue of the Scherhorn group. The most urgent priority was to drop
medical supplies for his numerous sick and wounded. The first drop
went badly: our volunteer doctor broke both legs on landing. His
death was reported to us several days later. Asecond doctor was able
to reach the group with more medical supplies.
390 Orto SKORZENY
From now on an aircraft of Kampfgeschwader 200 took off for
the east every two or three days to drop food, medicine and small
arms ammunition. These supply flights always took place at night,
and preferably when there was cloud cover. The pilots had to watch
for a weak light signal, which posed a risk to those on the ground. It
was not surprising that many supply containers failed to arrive.
During this time we worked on a rescue plan with the experts of
Kampfgeschwader 200. The only possibility was to lay down a run-
way near the forest where our comrades were hiding. The He 111
was to land and gradually take out the sick and the wounded and then
the soldiers. A volunteer Luftwaffe engineer parachuted in to direct
the construction work. After several days of enthusiasm and general
hope came the disappointing news that the strip had been discovered
and that men had been killed and wounded in the constant attacks
subsequently mounted by the enemy.
Then we agreed with Scherhorn that he should try to march to
the lake-covered plateau on the former Russian-Lithuanian border
near Diinaberg, about 250 kilometers to the north. If he arrived there
at the beginning of December the frozen lakes could be used as run-
ways. We had to make further drops of supplies: warm clothing, food
and more ammunition for 2,000 men. Nine Russian volunteers ex-
pressed their willingness to join Scherhorn, each with a radio set.
At the end of November 1944 I was able to advise Linder that he
had been promoted to Untersturmführer and had been awarded the
Knight’s Cross, which I was allowed to accept on his behalf.?
It was patently obvious that a march to the north through enemy
territory by a group of 2,000 men must attract attention. Scherhorn
was therefore instructed to split his group into two groups. The sick
and wounded had to be transported in farm carts; they would move
more slowly and were easier to attack. They therefore formed the
rearguard under Fahnrich P., who after weeks of stumbling about
had found the Oberstleutnant and our comrades and had made con-
tact with us. The Oberstleutnant and Untersturmführer Linder would
take over command of the group still capable of fighting and march
as fast as possible.
It had become winter. We had more apprehensions than hopes as
we followed the “long march” by our brave comrades. They had been
under way since November and were occasionally spotted and at-
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 39]
tacked by Soviet special units. Both groups were forced to fight, then
disappeared, changed the direction of their march, hid by day and
moved by night. At night, at agreed-upon hours, they were supplied
by Kampfgeschwader 200. We tried in principle to establish a grid
square within which the supply containers were supposed to be
dropped. But the groups advanced as fast they could, often deviating
from the planned route, and it was difficult to find them again. Many
supply drops, which we always had great difficulty organizing, were
lost.
The groups marched constantly, taking every security measure,
through swamps and forest, but scarcely made more than four to five
kilometers per day. We followed this daily progress with concern,
but we soon had the terrible feeling that our poor comrades would
never return to Germany. We struggled to suppress these thoughts:
such men deserved to stay alive.
For months we did our best to ease their misery and scrape up the
fuel necessary for the supply flights. Soon there was only one flight
a week. Then catastrophe struck us all. Kampfgeschwader 200’s fuel
supplies dried up. Although we tried everything, the supply drops
had to be stopped.
In February 1945 we received a message from Untersturmführer
Linder: “Lake plateau reached. Will starve if we don’t soon receive
supplies. Can you pick us up?” We could not. We had no more Heinkel
and no fuel either. At that time I was commanding a division, which
consisted of scraped-togeth Idiers, at Schwedt on the Oder. When
I thought of how much fuel and food fell into enemy hands or was
destroyed each day in the east and west, to the benefit of no one, I
became furious. Back in Friedenthal our comrades sat by the radio
night after night. All they could do now was receive messages; they
could offer nothing to raise the hopes of the lost soldiers.
Then we had to leave Friedenthal and transfer our headquarters
to southern Germany. The radio operators continued to listen wher-
ever they were: the signals from the lost legion became ever weaker.
The last message from Linder was heart-rending: he asked for noth-
ing but some gasoline to power the motors used to charge the batter-
ies of the radios: “I just want to stay in touch with you...hear your
voices.” It was April 1945. After that there was only silence.
392 OTTO SKORZENY
e@ee

In April and May 1945, and later as a prisoner of war, I often thought
of Scherhorn and his brave soldiers and of our volunteers who had
sacrificed themselves in an attempt to save 2,000 comrades. What
became of them? Doubts grew in me. Of course all of the radio com-
munications between Scherhorn and our radio operators were pre-
ceded by code-words, which were changed regularly as per our agree-
ments. All the radio messages we received, even near the end, corre-
sponded to these agreements. However in prison I learned a great
deal about the interrogation methods of the victors, and I asked my-
self whether the Russian intelligence service hadn’t been playing a
so-called “radio game” with us the whole time. When the communist
press later devoted a great deal of space to Scherhorn under the title
“Soviets bluffed Skorzeny,” that was for me, one familiar with So-
viet methods, proof that my doubts had been completely unfounded.
At the beginning of 1973 I received a letter from a Hungarian
military physician, Dr. Zoltan von Toth, from which the following
extracts are taken.
Doctor Zoltan von Toth was captured by the Russians in Budapest
on February 14, 1945. Sentenced by a Soviet court to twenty-five
years forced labor, he was sent to several camps. In February 1946
he arrived at the camp in Pechora, about 200 kilometers south of
Vorkuta in Siberia. Altogether about 30,000 prisoners lived in the
camp — Germans, Hungarians, Bulgarians and so on. He “treated”
about 600 seriously ill men in a barracks. Most of them were doomed
to die because he had no medicines.
“Among them,” wrote the doctor, “was, and I can remember him
well, an officer of the Waffen-SS, Will Linder from Magdeburg. He
was about twenty-six years old and was suffering from tuberculosis.
Under the prevailing conditions he was lost. He was an extremely
intelligent young man.”
Before he died in Pechora at the end of March 1946, Linder gave
the doctor an account, which Dr. Toth repeated in his letter and which
essentially said, “You were in fact in contact with Oberstleutnant
Scherhorn until the end of April 1945 and provided the group with
supplies. Linder was with Oberstleutnant Scherhorn in the first col-
umn, which made it to the lake plateau near Dünaburg. The second
column, which was led by an officer from one of your commando
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 393
units and whose name I can’t recall,” wrote the doctor, “arrived some-
what later. But it was February 1945, and only 800 men were left of
Scherhorn’s entire column; they waited in vain for rescue, then for
supplies and finally for just a few words...
At the end of April 1945 the 800 officers and soldiers were sur-
rounded and attacked by Russian police units. The fighting lasted
several days, with heavy losses on both sides. Those who surren-
dered in the end were initially treated well and then were all sen-
tenced to the usual twenty-five years of forced labor. Subsequently
they were scattered among various camps: Scherhorn himself sur-
vived the wounds he had received in the final battle.”
One can see that this account corresponds to what we learned
from the radio messages.
Dr. Zoltan von Toth went on, “It will probably interest you to
know that I met Generalmajor Lombart, who was also a prisoner. At
the beginning of the war he served as an Oberstleutnant on the staff
of Führer Headquarters. It was he who reported Rudolf Hess’ flight
to England to Hitler. Generalmajor Lombart met Oberstleutnant
Scherhorn in one of the many prisoner of war camps he passed
through. General Lombart retumed to Germany in 1953 and it may
be assumed that Oberstleutnant Scherhorn has retumed too, provided
he survived captivity. But possibly he is living in East Germany. I
give you permission, Colonel Skorzeny, to make use of this letter for
that purpose.”
I spoke personally to Dr. Toth: he was finally released from Rus-
sian captivity in 1953. He told me again of Will Linder, of the lost
legion and of the terrible years of imprisonment he had shared with
other brave soldiers. Many of them died before his eyes, from bad
treatment, from hunger and from cold.
What happened in the Soviet prisoner of war camps in Siberia
over ten years was indescribable, he said. One to two years after
Stalin’s death the zeal to finish off those of us who had survived
those terrible years lessened somewhat. In the end there were only
20 percent of us still alive.
Many European soldiers who had fought against bolshevism had
been prisoners since 1941. My brother was arrested on a Vienna street
in 1946 just because his name was Skorzeny and was held prisoner
in the Soviet Union for ten years. On his release in 1954, when other
prisoners were also released from the death camps of the Gulag Ar-
394 Orto SKORZENY
chipelago, he could barely stand and had lost about 30 kilograms. He
couldn’t be allowed to tum up in Vienna like that, and for propa-
ganda reasons the Soviets sent him to Yugoslavia, where he was
treated well and fed in semi-freedom. He suffered severe heart and
lung damage as a result of his ordeal and died ten years later as a
result.
Doctor Toth and I also talked about the Hungarian uprising in
October and November 1956. The Soviets had to employ Siberian
troops, who were of the opinion that they were fighting in the Near
East and thought the Danube was the Suez Canal! During the popu-
lar uprising in Budapest in 1956 there were 25,000 dead, 8,000 of
which were Red Army soldiers. Ten-thousand Hungarians were sub-
sequently arrested and deported in the name of “progressive democ-
racy.” And Stalin had been dead three years! But many of those who
presume to speak in the name of the “human conscience” forget to
talk about the martyrdom of Hungary under the bolshevik yoke.
Like many hundreds of thousands of Hungarians, Doctor Toth
was forced to leave his country. He wrote a book titled Prisoner in
the USSR (1945 to 1955). This is a really terrible piece of evidence
by a physician whose sole offense was to love his country and his
fellow men. He claims that there were more than ten million political
prisoners living in the Soviet concentration camps in the years 1948-
49. Toth also met Solzhenitsyn in one of the camps.
In his book Dr. Toth tells the story of Dr. Heller, one of colleagues
and a jew. Dr. Heller was arrested in Budapest in 1943 and deported
to Mauthausen. To the great surprise of Dr. Toth, who thought his
friend was well off in Budapest, he met Heller in a Siberian prison
camp. He was “accidentally” arrested in Vienna in 1945, where he
was accused of being a Gestapo agent and sentenced to twenty years
in prison. Finally released, Dr. Heller bravely tended to the wounded
in the streets of Budapest in the uprising of 1956 and turned his own
house into a hospital. When the Red Army had crushed the national
revolution the communist government had Dr. Heller arrested. He
was accused of “active cooperation in the counterrevolution,” sen-
tenced to death and hanged in January 1957.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 395

1. The follow! differs j in sapects from an account written by the formers Ic

of Army Grown Center, OberstWorpitsky (oer BND), which may be considered absolutely reliable.
(Editors’ note

2 Skorzeny seems to have confused names here. Based on scveral radio messages whoue (cxts were
reprinted by Worgitzky, the man referred to by Skarzeny as Linder has been positively identified as
Schiffer. (Editors’ note)
 24
ADRIAN VON FOLKERSAM MIssING
WALTER GirG & His Last MIssiIon

How Félkersam received the Knight's Cross — His commando unit's

mission in Maykop — His speech - The faked execution of the cos-
sacks — “...Well, you’re here at last!" — With the general of the NKVD
~ The army intelligence center is blown up —A suspicious general -
The great risk in the switchboard to the northern Caucasus — The
13th Panzer Division enters Maykop — Surrounded in Hohensalza —
“Break out tonight!” — Walter Girg and his Russians — 3,500 kilome-
ters behind enemy lines with the Knight's Cross under his necker-
chief ~ “...You are a Russian spy!” — One of the grimmest episodes of
the war — Russian roulette with five bullets in the chamber.

would like to speak here about Adrian von Félkersam. When

the 150th Panzer Brigade, whose Battle Group Z he commanded,
was disbanded, he pleaded with me for command of Commando
Unit East. I objected, pointing out that this would leave me
without a chief-of-staff, at a time when we had difficult missions to
organize. He conceded that. But this argument ceased to be valid
when 1,800 officers and men of the Brandenburg Division voluntar-
ily transferred to our SS commando units. Among them was Oberst-
leutnant Walther, an outstanding chief-of-staff.
So for better or worse, and against my inner voice, on January
22, 1945 I handed command of Commando Unit East I to Félkersam.
The unit couldn’t have got a better commanding officer. I had a bad
feeling about the move, however, and it was with great reluctance
that I signed the papers promoting him to battalion commander.
At the beginning of 1945 we were under no illusions as to the
outcome of the war — we needed a miracle. The Ardennes offensive,
396
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 397
which was followed by an attack at the Saar and in Alsace (from
January 1 to 26), failed to achieve the desired success. At least the
western front was holding: 68 German divisions faced 69 allied divi-
sions, and both sides were badly weakened. As is known, the Ameri-
can forces did not cross the Remagen Bridge until March 8. By this
point the enemy’s superiority, especially in the air, had become crush-
ing, and 79 enemy divisions were opposed by only 30 German divi-
sions, which in terms of materiel and morale were in no position to
fight with any hope of success.
But since January 8, 1945 it was clear to us all that the bitterest
and most decisive battles would be fought in the east. In spite of the
demand for unconditional! surrender and the imperatives of the
Morgenthau Plan (made worse by the “Fuhrer Orders” written and
signed by Martin Bormann, which intended the almost total destruc-
tion of German industry) we hoped that Germany would hold out in
the west. However we knew for certain that this could not be the case
in the east.
The Russians had stopped at the Vistula in July 1944. From that
point on they formed countless new divisions and received huge quan-
tities of was materiel from the westem allies. It was agreed between
Roosevelt and Stalin that a double offensive would begin in the east
and west on January 20, 1945. As it turned out, Churchill was forced
to ask Stalin to postpone his attack as the German Ardennes offen-
sive had upset all the Anglo-American plans.
Stalin attacked on the 12th and 14th of January, with 225 infan-
try divisions and 22 tank corps. General Guderian estimated the So-
viet superiority as follows:

infantry 11:1
tanks 7:1
artillery 20:1
air forces 20:1

Nevertheless our goal was to fight on and hold; it was a matter of life
and death. In his book Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, Generaloberst
Heinz Guderian, at that time Army Chief-of-Staff and responsible
for operations in the east, noted that the Soviet occupation of several
villages in East Prussia had shown what the fate of the German people
398 Orto SKORZENY
would look like if the flood could not be stopped. Seven-hundred
years of work and civilization were at stake.
He concluded, “...demanding an unconditional surrender from
the German people is a crime against humanity and a disgrace.”
Sturmbannfihrer Baron von Vélkersam arrived in Hohensalza!
northeast of Posen on January 18. This was in the precise path of the
Russian assault in the middle of a 75-kilometer-wide sector between
the Vistula and Warthe Rivers. Thirty-one enemy infantry divisions
and five tank corps broke into this small sector of the front, sup-
ported by almost unlimited air and artillery forces.
Listening to the radio reports in Friedenthal, I followed the course
of the fighting with concern. As I had no troops, I sent Félkersam
two dozen trucks with ammunition and food, which he had asked for
on January 18. On the 20th I heard that the city was surrounded. I
tried to find out more about the battle for Hohensaiza. | trusted
Fölkersam and his tactical skill. He had now assumed command of
all the German units surrounded there. But the information coming
in from other sectors proved that the Russian superiority really was
overwhelming. There was only a handfu! of German soldiers - Com-
mando Unit East and the remnants of other units — against a huge
mass. And so I ordered Commando Unit East to make preparations
for a break-out, to be carried out on my order; I was conscious of the
fact that in doing so I was guilty of disobeying orders, but it was a
responsibility I was willing to accept.
Adrian von Félkersam was certainly the most elegant and purest
war adventurer: in 1945 he was twenty-seven years old. He was tall
and slim and had grey eyes. In order to paint a true picture of him it
is best if he describes the operation which won him the Knight’s
Cross, which he described to me one night in Friedenthal, in his own
words:

“It was July 1942 and we were north of the Caucasus. I was a
Leutnant of the Brandenburg Division, but in this action I was Major
Truchin of the NKVD, who came direct from Stalingrad with special
instructions — which I only talked about very secretively — and a
troop of 62 men. Most of these were Baltic Germans, who spoke
fluent Russian, and a number of Sudeten Germans personally se-
lected by me. We were not exactly proud to be in NKVD uniforms,
but necessity becomes the law, especially when the enemy doesn’t
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 399
follow the rules of war himself. We were at the forefront of General
Ruoff’s Seventeenth Army, or more precisely of General Heer’s 13th
panzer Division, which had just reached the Rostov—Kala—Baku oil
pipeline at Armavir. They sent us across the front lines at Bieloret-
shanskaya, about 50 kilometers north of the oil center of Maykop
during the night. We had two missions: first, to make the occupation
of maykop by our panzers as easy as possible, and second, to prevent
to the extent possible the destruction of the production facilities. I
was the leader of the commando unit and we were all dressed and
armed @ la NKVD.
A patrol brought me the news that survivors of the retreating
Soviet units were camped in a nearby village. They were cut off from
their units, and there was a great diversity of people in the various
groups. There were cossacks from the Kuban, through which we had
just marched, Ukrainians, Khirghezian troops, Cherkessians and
Turkmenes - all muslims — Georgians and finally Russian and Sibe-
rian units. All in all there were some seven to eight hundred men.
Only the Russians and Siberians wanted to get back to their units,
but they were in the minority; their officers became anxious. It was
very interesting that they had tricks and fuel, as well as camels and
horses. I soon devised a plan.
We surrounded the village at dawn and attacked, firing our weap-
ons into the air. We woke everyone, disarmed them and herded them
to the main square. There I climbed onto the hood of a truck. My
faithful NK VD comrades surrounded the rostrum and | improvised a
speech.
After I realized that we had caught everyone asleep in a place
where the Soviet fatherland required the watchfulness of every single
defender, I shouted:
“What is going on! Do you plan to desert? What you are doing is
treason! Don’t you understand that our great Comrade Stalin, the
brilliant father of our peoples, has foreseen everything? Why do you
think the fascists have come to the Caucasus? | will tell you! Be-
cause they will all die here to the last man! These mountains will
become their grave...’
At this point several cossacks made sarcastic remarks and one of
them couldn’t help laughing. On my signal two of my NKVD men
seized the man.
‘Should we shoot him right here, comrade commander?’
400 Otro SKORZENY
‘Later comrade. He can wait quietly. Take him away!"
I continued my stern lecture, and at the end I declared:
‘Most of you deserve death! However I would like to assume
that many of you were talked into this by a few slimy snakes: I know
who they are, for we are well informed. You are in our debt for hav-
ing prevented you from committing filthy treason against our Soviet
homeland! All the cossacks — fall out to the right! The Turkmenes,
Georgians and others to the left! The Ukrainians over there! All the
others stay here until I return. Cossacks, step forward!’
My obedient NKVD troops immediately began sorting out the
groups. I left about 30 men behind, climbed aboard the trucks with
my remaining men, appropriated two cars and drove the cossacks
before me. After a forced march of three-quarters of an hour we came
to a ravine. I got out of the car and called to the Ataman.
“You want to desert to the Germans,’ I said to him. ‘I know that.
Do you know that many cossack units are already serving with them?
Tell me the truth!’
“Why do ask me that, comrade major?’
‘Do you think your people will follow you?’
No answer.
‘Listen. Stay out of sight here for one to two hours. There will
only be Ukrainians in the village then. Then march in the direction of
Anapa. Mingle with the Red Army refugees and you will find the
Germans.’
‘What kind of game are you playing?’
‘In a short time you will hear a wild outburst of firing nearby.
You’re not to move. The others will think: they’re being executing
by the NKVD. Now do you get it?’
I went back to the village, where they had heard the shooting,
and explained to the Russian and Siberian officers that they had bet-
ter leave the Caucasians and the Ukrainians behind: another NKVD
unit would ‘take care of them.’ The Russians and Siberians climbed
into the trucks, and I followed in my now fully motorized column.
On the morning of August 2 my column came to the main road
and joined the line of vehicles heading south. Terrific confusion
reigned. At the spot where the road crossed the Armavir — Tuapse
railroad real NK VD units were trying vainly to master the panic. I
introduced myself to their decidedly ill-humored commander, a lieu-
tenant-colonel.
 My COMMANDO OPERATIONS 401
‘Who are you?’ he asked.
‘Major Tuchin of the Zhdanov Brigade, comrade colonel.’
‘Where do you come from? What is your mission here?’
‘We come from Stalingrad with special orders, comrade. 124th
Brigade.’
The lieutenant-colonel’s face brightened. He knew nothing of a
124th Brigade or of special orders; but experience had taught him to
be cautious.
‘Well, you're finally here! We have been waiting for you since
yesterday! As you see, we’re sending the cavalry and the tanks to
Tuapse and the vehicles to Maykop. The infantry will be regrouped
there as well. Drive with your column to Maykop, but please, look
closely at the infantry! There may be German spies among them. I
am depending on you!’
“You can count on me comrade!’
In Maykop I had my group stop in front of NKVD headquarters.
On the steps I met a Russian officer who had departed the previ-
ously-mentioned village before me. ‘I have already made a report on
the matter,’ he said to me in passing. ‘They're waiting for you.’
Consequently the NKVD general received me very warmly. Such
was my reputation that he didn’t ask to see my papers or the special
orders. 1 showed them to him nevertheless. With a wave of his hand
he gave me to understand that this was not necessary. ‘You were
right,’ he said. ‘These cossacks are all traitors. You have given them
an instructive lesson. You are my guest this evening and I've arranged
suitable quarters for you.’
When I heard this I thought I had been spotted. But no! The gen-
eral requisitioned a large, comfortable villa for us with a garage. This
was lucky, for there wasn’t a single vacant room in Maykop, it was
packed with refugees. And so we were able to make our plans right
in the enemy’s midst. Six to seven days lay ahead of us before our
panzers would arrive. This time had to be put to the best possible
use.
Careful examination of the villa convinced us that there were no
microphones; nevertheless we only talked about our plans when the
radio was making sufficient noise. My two deputies, Fahnrich Franz
Koudele, alias Lieutenant Protoff, and Feldwebel Landowsky, alias
Lieutenant Oktshakov, played their roles perfectly. Maykop was a
scene of disorder. Everyone was frightened of us and didn’t look too
402 OTTo SKORZENY
closely at us; nevertheless the slightest lack of caution by our people
could cause the whole thing to fall apart. I had to take several of my
soldiers to task on the first two days for not being careful enough:
‘Have you forgotten what you learned at the special school in
Allenstein? Comrade Vuishkin, don’t always look so benevolent. That
can be the end of you and us! You are a member of the Narodny
Kommissaria Vnutrenny Diel, I said, never forget that! And you,
Comrade Lebedev, stop following around the girls ofthe Univermag
department store: that’s not your mission! Comrade Balamontov, I
have told you over and over that you are only allowed to say the
word ‘fascist’ together with ‘stinking rat’ or something similar. With
several exceptions, you always say ‘fascist’ as if you were saying
‘shoemaker’ or ‘garage.’ When you say the word ‘fascist’ you must
first grin most malevolently. Then you must look deep into the eyes
of whoever you're speaking to and look at him suspiciously. This
will make him tremble all the more, because he doesn’t know what a
fascist actually is. He will feel guilty and knuckle under.’
After two invitations to spend the evening with General Persholl
and a large number of emptied vodka glasses I was on a fine footing
with him. The two of us inspected the combat positions. The sole
dangerous point was this crossing of the road and railroad. All the
artillery was positioned there, arranged in three lines. As well anti-
tank ditches were being dug. The general asked for my honest opin-
ion of the preparations.
‘Comrade the defensive position is excellent, provided that the
fascists approach on this road and in single file. But what if they
appear fanned out behind those sunflower fields, or there, or over
there behind this hill?’
The general thought for a moment and then declared:
‘I said exactly the same thing to the leader of the anti-tank forces!’
‘The fascists were able to pass Taganrog and Rostov just because
we waited for them only on the main road, comrade general! But
what happened? The fascists advanced with several spearheads over
a wide front. They could just as well do the same here. A spearhead
here, one there, and another there, and they meet behind our rear.
One must be ready for anything, comrade! An echeloned attack is
always dangerous!’
“You are right! Now that I know your opinion it will be easier to
defend my own point of view. The appropriate measures will have to
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 403
be taken tonight.’
He was obviously happy not to have to take any responsibility on
his own. We also took the necessary steps. By the morning of August
7 we had gathered all the important information and made our plans
accordingly. By the end of the day all was ready.
I] drove to NKVD headquarters. Persholl was away — I never saw
him again. The archive had been evacuated. Plunderers were already
at work in the city, there was complete chaos everywhere. We di-
vided ourselves into three groups. The first and largest group was led
by Feldwebel Landowsky. His mission was to prevent the destruc-
tion of the production facilities as best he could. Nothing had been
dismantled. There were no trucks and the Armavir — Tuapse railroad
was the front line.
I gave command of the second group to Koudele-Protoff; he was
to stay in the city and destroy the telephone exchange and the tele-
graph lines to the northern Caucasus.
I wanted to take command of the first group myself, but during
the night of August 8-9 I learned that two brigades of the Red Guard
had arrived from Tbilisi and Baku and had taken up position at the
road-rail crossing. That was stupid. Early on the morning of August
9 I received a radio message stating that patrols of the 13th Panzer
Division were now 20 kilometers away and would attack the cross-
ing in a very short time. So I despatched four cars; with armed sol-
diers on the running boards, I succeeded in clearing a path through
the passing refugees against the flow. Finally I was out of the city. I
had the men park the cars near a free-standing building that was
guarded by the military: the army communications center. Shells from
our 150mm howitzers were already falling in many places. The streets
had become emptier. One could hear the sound of Russian guns fir-
ing. Six of our people slipped into the center with packets of explo-
sives under their arms. When they returned we set off at top speed
through the exploding shells in the direction of the front. A few min-
utes later we heard a loud explosion: the communications center had
gone up.
On reaching the Russian artillery I summoned its commander, a
lieutenant-colonel, who had been introduced to me by Persholl in the
course of our inspection. I asked him at what and whom he thought
he was firing with his guns.
‘At the germanskis naturally!’
404 OTTo SKORZENY
“The fascists have taken another direction and the front line now
lies beyond Maykop. Call and see!’
He tried to telephone - in vain of course. Then he gave the order
to cease fire and to initiate the retreat as quickly as possible.
‘Are you coming with us,’ he wanted to know.
‘Duty is duty, comrade. I will inform our heroic infantry so that
the trap doesn’t close behind them.’
“Comrade major, do you know what you’re risking by doing that?’
‘I have been aware of it for some time!’
We reached the positions held by an infantry division of the Red
Army. I introduced myself to the general and informed him that he
was almost cut off. The fascists had already passed Maykop. he was
a pedantic and suspicious general; obviously he had little sympathy
for the NK VD. | immediately launched into my telephone ploy again
and remarked that the artillery was already retreating. He tried in
vain to telephone and then began asking me some uncomfortable
questions. It became quiet. We looked into each others eyes. I didn’t
want to draw my pistol. At that moment a liaison officer arrived,
completely out of breath, and reported that the artillery was with-
drawing. I turned around. Only then did the Russian general order
the retreat. The neighboring units noticed the movements and sent
officers to ask whether new orders had arrived, which spared me an
embarrassing conversation which could have had downright uncom-
fortable consequences for me.
In the remaining time before X-Hour, Koudele-Protoff and his
people entered the North Caucasus Communications Center. They
acted as if they had been ordered there. They spoke loudly and came
upon a commander who declared at them from above: ‘Just because
the NKVD is running away doesn’t mean that I have to do the same!’
‘What!’ shouted Koudele-Protoff. ‘I am a lieutenant of the NKVD
and I ask that you please take back what you have just said!’
The comrade major became somewhat quiet and declared that he
had not yet received orders to withdraw.
‘Then you aren’t going to receive any! The new front line is al-
ready forming near Apshetousk. Find out for yourself!’
He called the communications center. No answer — naturally.
‘I have orders to blow up this building,’ said Koudele.
‘And I have orders, in case...
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 405
‘Good. Stay here with your men if you can’t come up with a
better idea, and go up with it! In fifteen minutes the north Caucasian
communications center will not exist! The fascists could show up
here at any minute!’
The commander and his subordinates cleared out with astonish-
ing speed. Then came the big number: Koudele and his people sat at
the radio operator positions and answered all queries: ‘...impossible
to connect you with X, Y or Z. The city is being evacuated and the
troops are marching toward Tuapse. We have orders to blow up the
center in a few minutes.’
All of the offices in Maykop still capable of action fled south as
fast as they could go. Koudele and his small detachment held the
North Caucasus Central for as long as they could on that August 9,
1942. But coded messages came that they couldn’t answer. They were
asked who they were. The best thing was to blow up everything at
once. But this decision was to significantly hinder Landowsky’s third
group very significantly in carrying out its mission.
The Russians had calculated on the arrival of German troops in
Maykop and they had taken steps — even for the possibility of an
attack by parachute troops. Landowsky had the numerically stron-
gest unit, which he divided into small groups of phoney NKVD troops.
Using a field telephone which he connected to a proper telephone
cable, he called the army communications center. When he received
no answers to his inquiries he sent his group in all directions to the
oil production facilities. They moved in as planned: they arrived at
the run and had themselves taken to the factory police sentries. There
they claimed to have orders ‘from above’ to take over the duties of
the factory police immediately and destroy all the oil field installa-
tions at the approach of nazi troops.
This trick did not succeed in every case: at Makdse they arrived
to late. The duty security chief had already called the army central,
then the North Caucasus central. When he received no answer from
both places he immediately blew up all the machines and well sites.
The clouds of smoke from the explosions immediately alerted other
security units, who then followed this example.
The advance guard of the 13th Panzer Division, which attacked
Maykop in the north, encountered only weak resistance from small
infantry units which formed the rearguard. At noon on that same
406 Otto SKORZENY
August 9, 1942 the first of General Heers’ panzers rolled into the
suburbs of Maykop.”

This performance, which earned him the Knight’s Cross, typified

Adrian von Fölkersam the man and the soldier. He was at my side
when we stormed the citadel in Budapest. I saw him go into action in
the Ardennes. Why should a man like him die in Hohensalza?
An officer with the task of leading a unit in combat has only one
desire: to reach the assigned objective. He also needs a little luck.
When from a tactical point of view all the advantages are on the side
of the enemy, even the best of intentions are of no use. In the course
of the final months of the war the intelligence and creativity of the
soldier in the east and west only played a role when he could act
before he was caught by the avalanche.
Like many others, SS-Sturmbannführer von Fölkersam, at the
head of his battalion and the remnants of other units, was caught and
overrun by the storm flood. The news coming from the front was
enough to convince me that in spite of his great skill and courage, it
would be impossible for him to halt the enemy attack. The Soviet
artillery had already massed more than forty guns per kilometer around
Hohensalza and was showering our surrounded troops with an inten-
sive bombardment. I knew that Félkersam would do his utmost, but
I feared that he wouldn’t tell me how hopeless even the great bravery
of his battle group was.
Félkersam was my best comrade and my most loyal! friend. To
sacrifice him such a hopeless situation would have been too hard for
me. To simply and unnecessarily let him and Commando Unit East
be destroyed was to much for me. At noon on January 21, 1945 I
received the following brief radio message from him: “Situation un-
tenable. Should I try to break out? F.” I took it upon myself to send
the order to withdraw: “Break out tonight!” It was already too late.
In the afternoon Major Heinz radioed the bad news:
“Félkersam badly wounded while leading a scouting advance.
Shot in the head.Have assumed command of the battle group. Break-
out attempt tonight.”
Several weeks later the survivors of Commando Unit East, just 2
officers (Balts) and 13 men out of 800, returned to Friedenthal.
The nocturnal breakthrough, made in two groups, enjoyed initial
success. Sturmbannführer von Félkersam, still unconscious, was laid
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 407
on an artillery tractor after his wounds were dressed. This half-tracked
vehicle was to follow the group whose breakthrough point was esti-
mated to be the most favorable. After a successful break-out a radio
message advised that the small group escorting Félkersam and the
gun tractor had made it through. From that point on there was no
further news of the group. During the night of January 22-23 the
main body of the battalion was surprised and wiped out in bitter fight-
ing. The fifteen survivors wandered around between the lines for
three weeks, and after their return they were unable to give us any
precise information as to the fate of our other comrades.
Félkersam’s wife and his newborn daughter were in Posen, about
140 kilometers west of Hohensalza. When, on January 20, I saw that
the situation on the Eastern Front was worsening hourly, I ordered
the division medical officer, Dr. Slama, to Posen. He was just able to
bring mother and daughter to the west. Félkersam had a younger
brother who was likewise with the Brandenburg Division. As a pris-
oner in the Soviet Union in 1947, he was said to have learned that
Adrian had recovered from his injuries and was being held as a pris-
oner. I was told that he believes this to this day.
For all those who knew Adrian von Fölkersam he is not dead: he
scorned death too much, ever to die and be forgotten.

Of the officers from Friedenthal whose conduct was marked by a

total disregard for danger, Untersturmführer Walter Girg stands out.
It was he, who at the end of August 1944 blocked the three most
important Carpathian passes while leading an assault team in Roma-
nian uniforms.
At the end of 1944 and in early 1945, acting on orders from the
OKH and with the help of General Gehlen’s “Foreign Armies East,”
we at Friedenthal organized numerous actions behind the Soviet lines
by Commando Unit East, but also by Front Reconnaissance Unit II,
which was now under my command. These long-range reconnais-
sance operations in Russian-occupied areas allowed the OKH to get
a better picture of where the enemy’s strong and weak points were.
The Soviets were now committed exclusively to a policy of “offen-
sive at any price.” This posed a great risk as their supply lines be-
came ever longer. No doubt: if the Ardennes offensive had begun in
408 Otro SKORZENY
November as Hitler originally intended it to and not in december,
and if it had been successful, the Western Front would have stabi-
lized until at least April. Has Stalin attacked as casually as he now
did, his offensive might have come to a bad end.
Our missions provided proof that the enemy scarcely controlled
the areas occupied by him. We were often able to make contact with
cities, villages, factories or offices by way of still-intact telephone
lines. On one occasion, for example, I spoke by telephone with the
director of an important German factory in Litzmannstadt, present
day Lodz, who asked whether they should go back to work. The en-
emy passed by the city without occupying it or showing any concern
for it at all.
One will understand that our missions provided the OKW with
interesting details, which were evaluated by the OKH.
Early in January 1945 the task fell to Obersturmführer Girg to go
into the area of the former Polish Generalgouvernement. His group
consisted of twelve German soldiers and twelve Russian volunteers.
They were taken by ship to East Prussia, which was still in our hands
but cut off from the rest of Germany. The commando unit was outfit-
ted with several captured Russian tanks and advanced in the direc-
tion of southern Poland. There was radio contact for several days,
then it was lost. Weeks passed with no news and I assumed that the
unit was lost.
Fortunately this was not the case: Girg’s unit disguised itself as a
Red Army inspection battalion whose official task it was to check
whether the positions responsible for supply were functioning cor-
rectly. In contrast to Félkersam, however, Girg spoke not a word of
Russian. Consequently all the acting officers and NCOs were Rus-
sians. They inspected everything in detail and returned at night to
destroy telephone lines and railroad signal installations and, where
possible, to blow up bridges, power plants and food and munitions
dumps.
Of course they also collected interesting intelligence. Whenever
they encountered a strong unit headed in the opposite direction, they
stopped it, feigning a breakdown. As soon as the Russians were gone
the radio operator, a German Feldwebel, transmitted the latest infor-
mation to Friedenthal. This continued until the truck carrying the
radio operator and all his equipment was lost; it broke through the
ice while crossing the frozen Vistula and sank. Girg and the rest of
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 409
the commando unit continued on their way, frequently sleeping and
resting with the inhabitants of the villages. The more suspicious the
unit appeared, the better it was treated by the villagers.
The unit’s luck was extremely changeable during its six weeks
behind enemy lines. On a number of occasions our Russian “offic-
ers” were invited into the mess, where they found many critical, war-
weary Soviet officers who rejected the mass sacrifice of standard
Stalinist tactics. Our entire commando unit owed its survival to anti-
bolshevik partisans, into whose midst it had to flee on several occa-
sions.
After an advance of 1,500 kilometers into the enemy rear, Girg
managed to return to the fortress of Kolberg on the Baltic coast. The
city was already surrounded by the Russians, and the German gen-
eral in command there wouldn’t believe a word spoken by our com-
rades. The only identifying symbol! Girg had with him was his Knight's
Cross, which he wore beneath his neckerchief.
The general said to him bitterly, “Not only are you a Soviet spy,
but you also take me for an idiot!”
Unfortunately I can’t remember the name of this general, although
he knew me well: when I introduced Girg to him, he had come from
the Oder where he had been my superior several days earlier when |
was commander of the Schwedt bridgehead, which I will discuss in
the next chapter.
“So you claim that you belong to Commando Unit Center from
Friedenthal,” the general said to Girg. “Alright then, who is your
commander?”
“Sturmbannfithrer Otto Skorzeny, Herr General.”
“Good. Where is he at the moment?”
“Probably in Friedenthal, Herr General.”
“It is quite clear that you are a spy for the National Committee
for a Free Germany, for three weeks ago I spoke with your chief on
the Eastern Front. Bad luck!”
Girg replied that I had been in Friedenthal when I gave him the
orders for this mission.
“Possible. Then surely you must know the wavelengths and the
special radio codes with which to contact Friedenthal.”
“Unfortunately no. My radio operator drowned in the Vistula at
the beginning of our mission and all his equipment was lost.”
410 OTTO SKORZENY
“Really? In the Vistula! You could have come up with something
more original!”
Girg and his men had to endure the indignity of being sentenced
to death by their own countrymen. It was a brain wave on Girg’s part
that finally brought them to their senses.
“Whether I die or not is all the same to me. But what annoys me
is that I am to be shot by friends, although so many enemies have
failed to get me!”
Girg made one last proposal: they should radio General Juttner
in the Bendlerstrasse in Berlin and obtain the wavelengths and code-
words for Friedenthal. The commander of Fortress Kolberg could
then radio Friedenthal himself and confirm Girg’s identity.
And so Karl Radl learned that the German soldiers in Fortress
Kolberg intended to shoot Girg and other comrades! One can imag-
ine how quickly RadI cleared up the situation. The general was then
happy that he could make use of Girg and his commando unit: he had
them carry out patrols and designated them the rearguard when the
fortress was evacuated with the help of the navy. The general was
himself the last to leave the fortress with teh rearguard.
In his book Commando Extraordinary, Charles Foley wrote of
Walter Girg’s fantastic adventure:

“The siege of Fortress Kolberg by the Russians was one of the

worst episodes of this war. The French, volunteers of the Waffen-SS
Division Charlemagne, fought for several weeks to hold open a nar-
row corridor through which the German refugees could flee to the
west, while at the same time the “red” Germans of the Seydlitz Divi-
sion, who had been recruited from the prisoner of war camps, did all
they could to block and cut off their own countrymen’s escape route.
Three French battalions under the command of Oberführer Puaux
defended the city of Küstrin, and a battle group of the Charlemagne
Division held out in Kolberg until March 6, 1945. Later another bat-
talion of the French Waffen-SS took part in the final battles in Berlin
near the Reich Chancellery which lasted until May 1, 1945.
What surprised Walter Girg the most during his last mission was
the loyalty and willingness to sacrifice of the German population in
the areas already occupied by the reds. ‘It was the women in particu-
lar,” he said, ‘who were ready to accept any risk to help us.”
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 41
In the entire mission Girg lost only three men in addition to the
radio operator. The Russians were convinced that the radio operator
was one of theirs, and they buried him with full military honors in
the nearest cemetery to the Vistula. Not a single Russian member of
the commando unit committed treason. Girg was promoted to
Hauptsturmführer on my recommendation and he became the 814th
German soldier to receive the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves. He
was an extraordinarily clever officer who defied fate.
“The black sheep of Friedenthal” was still alive, having mean-
while forgotten how many times he had gone through the Soviet lines.
Karl RadI observed that he had a very personal style of playing “Rus-
sian roulette” — he played with five bullets in the cylinder instead of
only one, or put simply, “he was plain lucky.”
In any case luck must have been on his side for him to carry out
missions of the kind that Walter Girg did and still be alive.

Notes
1. Hermann von Salza was Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights, which converted the resident hea-
thens to Christianity in the Thirteenth Century. (Editors’ note)
 25
SCHWEDT ON THE ODER
LasT REUNION WITH VIENNA

A regrettable decision by Hitler: Himmler becomes Commander-in-

Chief of Army Group Vistula — Organization of the Schwedt bridge-
head - "The Reds will never get in here!” — Our floating batteries
and self-propelled guns — Tactical change — Limited in time and space
— Krasnov's cossacks “lend voices” — A European division — The
battles - Himmler’s fits of rage - Reichsleiter Bormann beside him-
selfwith anger - Grabow is lost and is recaptured - Wilscher's sharp-
shooters — Speer: “The decision will soon be made concerning our
new weapons” — In the Reich Chancellery —- Eva Braun — Pilot Oberst
Rudel - In Vienna, a dead city - Two old policemen to encircle the
Russians — Baldur von Schirach’s subterranean salon — Neu-
Starhemberg 1683 — A farewell to the city of my birth.

ur reconnaissance missions behind the Soviet lines en-

abled the Army Chief-of-Staff, Generaloberst Guderian,
to create an accurate picture of what was coming at us
from the east. Hitler refused to believe it, however, until
January 12, 1945. He was badly informed by Himmler, who claimed
that “the Soviet preparations for a major offensive were just a gigan-
tic bluff.”
On January 23 Hitler received news that Fortress Lötzen, the most
powerful strongpoint in East Prussia, had surrendered without a fight.
“Terrible news,” wrote Guderian. “The Führer called it treason.”
Generaloberst Reinhardt, the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group
Center, was replaced with Generaloberst Rendulic. Rendulic was a
fellow Austrian, an army general and a very capable man, whom I
later met after he was placed in command of Army Group South. At
412
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 413
the end of the war there was a High Command South, which was led
by Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring, whose Chief-of-Staff was
Generaloberst Winter.
The choice of Rendulic was a good one. But as a result of the
surrender of Létzen Hitler became even more suspicious of several
generals. He now made a regrettable decision: he named Himmler to
command Army Group Vistula.
As we know, after July 20 the Reichsführer took the place of
Generaloberst Fromm as head of the Replacement Army. In truth it
was General Jüttner, his chief-of-staff, who did all the work and did
it well. Himmler was also chief of the Reich Security Office and
Minister of the Interior. The exercising of any one of these posts
would have been more than enough to keep busy any man with great
work initiative. Furthermore Himmler was neither a tactician nor a
strategist. He named SS-Generalmajor Lammerding to be his chief-
of-staff. Lammerding was an honest officer who was equal to the
task. Guderian was able to convince Hitler of the necessity of tempo-
rarily placing General Wenck at Himmler’s side. Unfortunately Wenck
fell victim to a serious car crash and so General Krebs was assigned
to Himmler. In the end Himmler had to be replaced as head of Army
Group Vistula by the outstanding General Heinrici, the CO of the
First Panzer Army, which had most recently been fighting in the
Carpathians (March 20). But it was already too late.'
It was therefore Himmler, the Commander-in-Chief of Army
Group Vistula, who on January 30, 1945 ordered me to set out for
Schwedt on the Oder immediately with all my available units. My
mission was to establish a bridgehead on the east bank of the river
“from which a counteroffensive would follow later.” The city and
bridgehead were to be held at all costs. The order further said that we
were supposed to “liberate the town of Freienwalde, which was oc-
cupied by the enemy, during the advance.”
Himmler seemed to ignore where the enemy actually was, and
he found it an obvious matter to capture a city “in passing.” A phone
call to Führer Headquarters proved to me that they didn’t in fact know
much about the situation on the Eastern Front.
The situation in the east took an ominous turn during the night of
January 28-29. The Soviet Marshall Zhukov, who commanded the
1st White Russian Army Group, sent the 1st and 2nd Tank Armies of
the Red Guards, the 8th Guards Army, the 5th Elite Army and the
414 Orto SKORZENY
61st Army in the direction of the Oder. The spearheads of the 2nd
Tank and the Sth Elite Armies had reached the suburbs of Landsberg
(Gorzow) and there was heavy fighting in front of Liiben. It was
feared that the enemy would cross the frozen Oder between Stettin in
the north and Kistrin in the south — at Schwedt, only about 60 air
miles from Berlin.
The old city of Schwedt, the so-called “Pearl of the Uckermark,”
was famous for its castle and its cavalry regiment, in which the Po-
meranian aristocracy served. About 50,000 people lived in the city,
whose population was now swelled by numerous refugees from the
east.
At about 5 P.M. on January 30, 1945 I received the order to cre-
ate a bridgehead there. I immediately informed Friedenthal and
Neustrelitz, where my parachute battalion was quartered, and at 3
A.M. I despatched two patrols to Schwedt, as I didn’t know how far
the Russians had hot. While on the move my liaison officer informed
me that the road to Schwedt was open.
It must have been about 7 A.M. on January 31 when I arrived in
Schwedt. My reconnaissance troops were waiting near the big Oder
bridge at the canal parallel to the river. I immediately sent them to
Königsberg, Neumark, a town located on the Stettin — Kiistrin rail--
road about 17 kilometers east of Kiistrin on the Oder, to find out
where the enemy was.
We had spent the whole night in Friedenthal organizing the units
and making them fully motorized: there was Commando Unit Cen-
ter, the battalion commanded by Hauptsturmfihrer Fucker; the sniper
company led by Oberleutnant Wilscher; Commando Unit Northwest,
which had been reduced to two companies under the command of
Hauptmann Appel; and finally, in reserve, an assault company with
light tanks commanded by Obersturmfiihrer Schwerdt, a comrade
from the Gran Sasso. My parachute battalion in Neustrelitz was led
by SS-Hauptsturmführer Milius. In addition to these units there was
the headquarters and the headquarters company under Oberstleutnant
Walther, Fölkersam’s successor, with Hauptsturmführer Hunke, our
“chinaman,” and the monitoring service, a supply company and two
signals platoons, which stayed in touch with Friedenthal. Only the
most important posts were manned there; a guard company of the
Waffen-SS, consisting of Romanian ethnic Germans under the com-
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 415
mand of the faithful Radl, also stayed behind. Normally we were
supplied by Friedenthal, but we came upon additional sources.
In Schwedt all I found was three reserve infantry battalions and a
reserve pioneer battalion — all four were very incomplete, and the
soldiers included sick and convalescents. But the commander of the
pioneer battalion proved to be very innovative and energetic and he
soon proved to be a great help to me.
On the very first day I set up my command post on the right bank
of the Oder in Niederkrönig and drove to Königsberg, Neumark,
which was filled with refugees from the east and soldiers separated
from their units. I immediately issued the necessary orders for allthe
retreating stragglers to assemble in a barracks in Schwedt, where
they were fed, issued equipment and assigned to one of the four bat-
talions. Soon they didn’t look all that bad. The flood of civilian refu-
gees, coming from Königsberg in the south and from Stettin in the
north, were channelled. These poor people were in very bad shape,
and I saw to it that the women, children and old people were gradu-
ally evacuated by train. The city commandant of Schwedt, a colonel
who had been badly wounded in the war, helped me in this, as did the
mayor, an intelligent reserve officer.

Nothing is as contagious as the fear that always follows the greatest

chaos. As far as I could tell, there was complete chaos within a radius
of fifty kilometers. If two or three Soviet tanks had driven up to
Schwedt before our arrival, the Russians could have crossed the river
unopposed.
I had proposed a plan for the bridgehead and on February 1 I
assembled the political, civilian and military authorities and said the
following words to them, “I have heard several of you say or mur-
mur: ‘What’s the good of all this? Everything is more or less lost.
The Russians will be here tomorrow.’ But I will tell you one thing: as
long as I am here in Schwedt, the Russians won’t be here tomorrow
or any other time, rather they will never be here! You, the
Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP, will now order the male inhabit-
ants to dig holes and rifle pits with shovels and hoes. You yourselves
will take up shovels and hoes and provide them with an example.
And you will give them a further example when you pick up a rifle
416 OTTo SKORZENY
after the digging is done. Then you will see how your example is
followed and Schwedt will remain German.”
I spent the first four days fortifying the bridgehead, assembling
the stragglers, raising and establishing new units, obtaining reinforce-
ments, locating materiel, weapons and ammunition and constantly
harassing the enemy with heavily-armed patrols. I requested good
staff officers to lead my newly-formed battalions; the army group
sent me a few outstanding, experienced captains and majors.
The pioneer major helped me lay out the bridgehead on the right
bank of the Oder, with an outer semicircle with a radius of about 8
kilometers running from the Oder to a small tributary, the Rörike.
Rifle pits and strongpoints were dug on this front line by a labor
service regiment from Stettin and the male population of Schwedt. A
second line of fortifications was laid down within this semicircle,
with strongpoints, machine-gun nests, communications trenches and
small hedgehog positions. The third ring was laid down around the
east end of the Oder bridge in a radius of about one kilometer, and
was intended to protect the city and Niederkrénig. Troops were placed
in a few of the villages outside the belt of positions to avoid sur-
prises. A stream of confusing and contradictory orders came from
the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Vistula; I merely answered
each one with a request for reinforcements and more weapons.
We lacked heavy machine-guns. The Ib, the supply officer in my
staff, located a arms dump containing new MG 42 machine-guns and
ammunition near Frankfurt on the Oder.
No artillery? The commander of the supply company found out
that there was factory for 75mm anti-tank guns about 50 kilometers
to the southwest. There were about 40 working guns there, plus am-
munition. Goring sent me two flak battalions with 88mm and 105mm
guns. I had six of these guns mounted on trucks — for we had also
found trucks and fuel — and had these hard to locate “flying batter-
ies” drive up and down a 20 kilometer front and fire at the enemy
positions. This gave the enemy the impression that he was facing a
strong enemy unit with dangerous artillery.
The Oder and the canal were frozen over. The commander of the
pioneer unit blew up the layer of ice, transforming the river back into
a natural obstacle. Oder barges were also refloated. I had a flak bat-
tery mounted on three of these ships, enabling my “floating artil-
lery” to also operate from the Oder cana! with constant changes of
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 417
position. This brought outstanding results, and in a report to the OKW
I suggested the use of the same method in Berlin, where there were
numerous waterways and where they were short on artillery but not
on anti-aircraft guns. No attention was paid to this proposal, how-
ever.
In the beginning I sent several detachments as far as possible to
the east each day. These strong patrols drove as much as 50 to 60
kilometers behind the enemy lines and caused unrest among the en-
emy units. The Soviet division headquarters were surprised. Our
105mm shells exploded as much as 15 kilometers behind their lines.
Farther east there were serious small battles. The Russians were dis-
concerted. So the fascist troops weren't on the retreat after all? Was
this not the precursor of a German counteroffensive?
Armed patrols brought back prisoners and information, which
allowed me to plan further actions against weakly defended posi-
tions.
I would like to mention that from February 3, 1945 the outer ring
in the north was defended by the first of our newly-formed battal-
ions, while I assigned the second battalion to defend in the south.
The center was held by Commando Unit East and my parachute bat-
talion. The parachute battalion, which had gone into position in the
east of the position, had to act as a shock absorber so to speak, to
intercept and brake the expected attack. Commando Unit Center took
over the defense of the second inner ring in the bridgehead.
Through these tactical measures I was able to strengthen all of
my positions in the briefest time and by the shortest route. This prob-
ably wouldn’t have been possible if I hadn’t been able to fool the
enemy as to our actual strength through the commando operations
deep into the enemy rear and the fire of our 88mm and 105mm guns.
The Schwedt bridgehead on the Oder River was certainly just
one tiny episode in the closing story of the Second World War. It
must be borne in mind, however, that we had to improvise every-
thing in the shortest time, and that we were able to deceive the en-
emy, who enjoyed a fivefold superiority over us, as to our real strength
for several weeks through our bold commando operations far behind
the front and our mobile artillery. These tactics won us time. Seen
close up, it looked as follows: east of Kénigsberg the parachute bat-
talion was soon supported by two battalions of the Volkssturm, first
by a battalion commanded by the district commander personally and
418 Orto SKORZENY
composed mainly of farmers from Kénigsberg; then by a fully-
equipped and armed Volkssturm battalion from Hamburg. The latter
unit consisted almost exclusively of dockyard workers. Most of them
had once been socialists or communists, but I never met a more de-
termined and committed group of soldiers.
In the first weeks I received additional reinforcements in the shape
of a battalion of the Hermann Goring Division; it consisted of pilots
without aircraft and students from Luftwaffe schools. They were as-
signed to the units and received their baptism of fire two weeks later.
It is true, by the way, that I also spread the cadre personnel of the
officer school among the new units.
A radio unit sent by Führer Headquarters installed a direct tele-
phone line to the Reich Chancellery. A squadron of cavalry from the
8th Regiment, a cossack unit under Captain Krasnov, the son of the
famous general, and a regiment of Romanian-Germans increased our
fighting strength. I must admit that Krasnov’s people were true mas-
ters at “lending voices” to their patrols — captured Russian officers
and NCOs who were especially talkative. The information obtained
in this way was of great use to us.
My Commando Unit Northwest included men from Norway,
Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France. Together with the soldiers
separated from their units, on February 7 I was in command of a
15,000-man-strong division, which I — not entirely without pride —
would like to call my “European division.” Whten I arrived on Janu-
ary 30 there was scarcely a soldier capable of fighting to be found in
Schwedt. My battle group became the Schwedt Division; they formed
a corps from a Kriegsmarine division fighting on our right to the
south. A commanding general and staff were appointed; I will return
to this later.

The first battles took place on February 1; our reconnaissance pa-

trols ran into enemy forces in Bad Schénfliess, 8 kilometers east of
königsberg, or 25 kilometers away from Schwedt. During the first
week there was an increasing amount of hostile contact with enemy
units, which were steadily reinforced. Information from Russian pris-
oners and other secure intelligence confirmed that the Russians were
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 419
planning a major offensive against the bridgehead and wanted to feel
out our fighting strength.
From February 5 our reconnaissance probes deep into the rear
were no longer possible; they encountered a ring of Soviets which
was growing ever thicker. Bad Schinfliess was attacked. I went along
ona patrol by my Commando Unit Center, all former comrades from
Gran Sasso. On the road lay two dead civilians. There was a deathly
silence. We met a man who could scarcely believe that we were Ger-
mans. Then he gave us some information: the Russians had set up
their headquarters near the station and there was also a gathering of
tanks there. The railroad had been put back in service and a steady
stream of trains was arriving with supplies and fresh troops.
My three-man patrols confirmed this information and reported
that they had in fact seen about thirty tanks on the grounds of the
station. The Russian troops were south and east of the city. We saw
still more bodies of civilians on the streets, among them an almost
naked woman. Gradually several inhabitants ventured out of their
homes. They were completely shattered. We had only two cars, and I
was thus able to evacuate just two women and their two children. I
immediately had my parachute battalion, an army battalion and two
Voikssturm battalions occupy Königsberg. The enemy attack took
place in the afternoon. There was heavy fighting in the streets. Our
troops destroyed eleven tanks with panzerfausts. Not until after mid-
night was the enemy, now also attacking from the north and south,
able to enter the city. 1 ordered our troops in the outer ring of fortifi-
cations to fall back, and amazingly our losses were light.
This first nocturnal, large-scale battle proved that the newly-
formed units would hold together. The first assault was repulsed by a
company of paratroopers; losses were heavy. The commander of the
Voikssturm unit from Königsberg, the district commander, had run
away. | will look into this in more detail.
The Russians attacked the bridgehead daily. I received further
reinforcement from Friedenthal in the shape of a company of ar-
mored reconnaissance troops commanded by Obersturmfiihrer
Schwerdts. In the weeks that followed this unit formed my best, last
reserve.
From February 7 on, the enemy superiority was such that we had
to evacuate all the villages outside the bridgehead. Each day there
were several attacks at three different places - always the same — by
420 Orto SKORZENY
Russian assault battalions, which were supported by improved T-34
tanks as well as American-supplied tanks. The Russians fought
bravely, but they made the mistake of trying to break through with
force. All of their attempts were stopped at heavy cost to them and
beaten back. In each case we counterattacked immediately.
The Soviets nevertheless managed to breach the first defensive
ring, at Grabow, which was defended by us. At 4 P.M. that day I was
ordered to the headquarters of Army Group Vistula. There was no
question of me leaving my soldiers alone in the midst of a battle to
drive to see Himmler. I did not arrive at Hohenlychen until about
8:30 P.M., after the enemy had been thrown back out of our bridge-
head; dirty and wearing the clothes I had worn in combat, I now
stood in the headquarters. Himmler’s toadies received me like men
who had been condemned to death. The one showed pity, the other
satisfaction. Himmler was in a foul mood: I heard: “...Letting me
wait four hours! ... Unbelievable! ... You failed to obey an order! ...
Demotion ... Court martial!”
But his greatest reproach was that I had refused to have a young
Luftwaffe officer, the leader of the defense of Nipperwiese, tried
because he had withdrawn into the actual bridgehead.
“Reichsfihrer,” I said, “this unit withdrew on my orders. The
officer only did his duty.”
In the end Himmler agreed with me. I also pointed out that I had
received a mass of senseless orders from the staff of the corps to
which I was subordinate, but that they had forgotten to allocate us a
minimum of supplies. We had to improvise everything. Then the
reichsfilhrer invited me to dinner — to the great astonishment of those
who had just received me so haughtily. The attitude of the “court-
iers” changed immediately. The whole thing was so sickening that I
hurried to get back to Schwedt.
I was fully conscious that this pitiful story had been cooked up
by a man who had borne a grudge against me since Budapest: the
police general von dem Bach-Zelewski, who had been prominent at
that time and who wanted to destroy the citadel with the “Thor” gi-
ant howitzer. Unfortunately he was now my commanding general, as
his predecessor, who had been named only a few days before, had
taken command of Fortress Kolberg; three weeks later he had a few
good reasons to take Walter Girg for a Soviet spy.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 421
Himmler calmed himself and even promised me a battalion of
assault guns, a reinforcement that he took away from me again ten
days later. Of the planned offensive that was to take place from the
Schwedt bridgehead not a word was spoken. I drove back to Schwedt
the same night.
For the sake of completeness I must add that I also had an enemy
in the Reich Chancellery who was as tenacious as he was powerful:
Martin Bormann. Before we reconnoitered to Bad Schénfield, I re-
ceived an order to look in this direction for some “important state
papers” that two party comrades had left in two trucks in a forest.
After several inquiries I learned that they were not “state papers” but
Bormann’s own papers from the Reich Chancellery. I also asked the
chancellery to send me in Schwedt the two officials who, in their
haste to get to the west, had abandoned the two trucks. They would
be helpful in the search, as they could tell us the exact location of the
vehicles. But the two gentlemen didn’t consider it necessary to ap-
pear and the Russians were already in Schönfliess. So I sent word
back to the effect that I wouldn’t risk the life of a single one of my
soldiers in order to recover these files. We had more important things
to do.
Then came the story of Königsberg. After the withdrawal of my
troops into the bridgehead I retumed to my command post and found
the district party leader there: he had simply abandoned his city and
his Volkssturm battalion. The excuses he made for his actions were
pitiful and, unfortunately for him, also common knowledge. After
his flight from Königsberg a certain panic seized the farmers - that I
knew only all too well. The two groups that fled in disorder suffered
some killed and wounded, for to flee in panic before an enemy al-
most always means heavy losses. Luckily my paratroopers and the
Hamburg dock workers brought the situation under control again.
But I was left with no choice but to bring the man who was supposed
to have provided his people with an example in courage and cool-
ness before a division court martial for desertion and cowardice in
the face of the enemy. The court handed down the death sentence
and two days later he was publicly executed.
Martin Bormann fumed and foamed: all party leaders from the
rank of a district leader up were unimpeachable. In his view they
could only be sentenced by a party court. I answered Gauleiter Stiirtz,
who visited me on Bormann’s behalf, that the circuit leader had not
422 OTTO SKORZENY
been sentenced as a party leader, but as the responsible commander
of a military unit that was under my command, and added, “I ask you
to answer this question honestly: are party leaders not punished for
desertion and cowardice in the face of the enemy?”
I never received an answer from the Reich Chancellery to this
question. At least I could undertake a surprise counterattack in the
south to Hauseberg with teh assault gun battalion and Commando
Unit Center. An enemy flamethrower battalion was wiped out and its
commander captured. There was a terrific haul of enemy equipment:
howitzers, anti-tank guns, heavy machine-guns with ammunition, all
more than welcome in Schwedt.
The enemy's superiority in soldiers, tanks, artillery and air forces
was in the order of about 15 to 15 to 1. After several days of bitter
fighting Grabow was stormed for the second time, and the Russians
stood in front of Hohenkrénig, about 2 kilometers from the Oder.
The situation was critical if not to say desperate. God knows what
would happen if we were overrun and the enemy crossed the river. I
was certain that my soldiers would make a superhuman effort.
Obersturmbannführer Schwerdt, who soon afterward was to be pro-
moted to Hauptsturmführer, recaptured Grabow after a surprise coun-
terattack from the flank. Four old hands from Gran Sasso were killed
in the attack. Schwerdt had them carried in front of the church and
they were buried with full military honors.
I was surprised to find Reichsmarschall Göring at my command
post in Schwedt. His staff had phoned regularly to see “how things
were going.” He came, he said, “as a neighbor”: Karinhall, his fa-
mous estate, lay somewhat further to the west.
The marshall came without the usual glittering uniform and he
wore no decorations on his grey jacket. He wanted to go to the front;
in my opinion there was nothing standing in his way. But a general
from his entourage whispered, “This is your responsibility!”
When darkness fell I instructed the cars stop on the road to
Niederkrönig and we continued on our way on foot, side by side.
Sometimes we had to throw ourselves down on the frozen ground
when an enemy artillery round fell not far away. The Reichsmarschall
was mainly interested in the enemy tanks, a number of which were
still burning nearby. He especially wanted to visit a Flak 88 which
had been employed in the anti-tank role in the very front line and to
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 423
congratulate the crew. As well as handshakes he passed out liquor,
cigarettes and cigars, with which he was very well supplied. He passed
out the same at the command post of our parachute troops. It was
totally dark when I escorted Hermann Goring to the big Oder bridge.
“They won't cross the Oder here tomorrow!”, he said.
“Never, as long as we can fight, Herr Reichsmarschall!”
He had a few encouraging words for the “division from out of
thin air.” The next time we saw each other was in prison in Nuremberg.
Although Luftwaffe pilots and gunners fought bravely in Schwedt,
as a branch of the service the Luftwaffe itself played a rather nega-
tive role. During my first reconnaissance the strange appearance of a
small, abandoned airfield caught my eye: a few slightly damaged
aircraft sat at the edge of the runway. | climbed out of the armored
car and discovered in the hangars and the radio room a mass of weap-
ons and materiel — all in excellent condition. Everything suggested
that here as elsewhere everyone had fled in panic. We took every-
thing usable with us and destroyed the rest. When we returned to
schwedt the airfield’s commander, a Luftwaffe Oberstleutnant, was
waiting for me. His conscience had plagued him, he had returned
and now explained to me that he couldn’t contact his superiors and
was therefore without orders. The general who was his superior had
disappeared.
“My dear fellow,” I said to him, “it is of course a stupid thing that
you acted so irresponsibly in this situation. You know the book of
military law as well as I do, and I fear that a court martial will sen-
tence you for deserting your post. Unfortunately I feel myself obliged
to report this to Generaloberst von Greim, commander-in-chief of
the Luftwaffe. In the meantime you may not Icave Schwedt.”
When the Oberstleutnant left Königsberg airfield I was not yet in
command of the bridgehead. The affair was therefore a Luftwaffe
matter. But I was surprised the next morning to see a Fieseler Storch
land on the barracks grounds and Generaloberst von Greim climb
out. He brought the Oberstleutnant before a Luftwaffe court martial.
The proceedings determined that the main guilty party was the gen-
eral who had disappeared. The Oberstleutnant was sentenced to a jail
term but was allowed an opportunity to prove himself at the front.
He immediately became a member of Battle Group Schwedt; he
fought well and bravely and survived everything.
424 Otto SKORZENY
eee

The Schwedt bridgehead was still holding on February 28, 1945. Of

my 25 months as commander of Special Unit Friedenthal, I spent 14
months at the front or in action, and I can say that we really had to
face a great diversity of combat situations.
In the beginning the bridgehead was established for a strategic
purpose, but one that existed only in Himmler’s imagination, namely
to occupy a certain area for a specified period in order to allow a
counteroffensive by an army corps. Battle Group Schwedt, and later
the division of the same name certainly played a tactical, defensive
role, but this was not in Army Group Vistula’s plan. The Soviet armies
did not succeed in crossing the river; as a matter of fact Zhukov’s
leading tank divisions gained the impression that preparations were
being made for a German counteroffensive — about 60 kilometers
from Berlin, in Schwedt.
As for the tactical operations carried out within and outside the
bridgehead, they were of course those of a conventional war. How-
ever with the limited means at our disposal, we would never have
been able to deceive the enemy for so long without the training and
without the fighting strength of my own unit, which provided the
backbone of the defense, without the mobile anti-aircraft guns
mounted on trucks and boats, and without another unit that weak-
ened the enemy considerably: I am referring to the company of snip-
ers from Friedenthal, which was under the command of Odo Wilscher.
There wasn’t supposed to be any shooting at Gran Sasso and in
the storming of the citadel in Budapest. But there had to be shooting
at Schwedt — and accurate shooting at that. | often pestered respon-
sible generals. “Why,” I asked, “didn’t they systematically commit
the snipers that each division possessed?” Since the first days of the
Russian campaign in June 1941 we had seen the Russian snipers at
work. They were dangerous and were feared, for their targets were
officers and NCOs.
At Schwedt, Wilscher hid his snipers by night in groups of two in
no-man’s-land. I have already mentioned that we blasted away the
layer of ice covering the Oder. Apart from that there was something
of a thaw at the beginning of February; huge blocks of ice, some
covered with wood and branches, washed ashore. The floating is-
lands offered Wilscher’s riflemen natural and mobile cover. I esti-
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 425
mate that our 25% of our defensive success was attributable to the
snipers.

I saw Himmler again during the month of February, together with

Oberst Baumbach, the commander of Kampfgeschwader 200, which
was assigned to me, and Armaments Minister Speer.
The latter, who always showed a great deal of sympathy for my
requests, was very optimistic — in contrast to what he claimed in his
memoirs: “That night (beginning of February 1945) I made the deci-
sion to do away with Hitler.” Quite suddenly the thought came to his
consciousness: “...I had, strictly speaking, thoughtlessly lived among
murderers for twelve years...” How could one live among murderers
without becoming the least bit suspicious, especially when one had
been present at the apex of power as Hitler’s favorite since 1933 and
had occupied one of the most responsible positions of the war? (Speer,
Page 437). In the first days of May 1945 certain leaders of the na-
tional-socialist state were seized by the so-called “resistance com-
plex.” There weren’t many, but there were some.
The only thing I can confirm is that in mid-February 1945 Albert
Speer, far from acting like “a member of the resistance,” behaved
like a zealous Reich minister. No doubt, they will say, he wanted to
play his cards close to the vest. But then he had his cards very well
concealed! To him Heinrich Himmler was a person worthy of re-
spect. I myself was called to Fihrer Headquarters to be briefed on an
intensification of the air war in the east. In my presence Minister
Speer promised the Reichsfiihrer new aircraft and new bombs for the
beginning of April. Today Speer assures us that he then considered
any hope as illusory. However on one February day I was able to
speak with him alone for a moment. I wanted to learn more about the
famous “secret weapons,” which we had been hearing volumes about
since October 1944. He could have advised me to give up any hope
in this direction. However he contented himself with stating to me,
“The decision will be made soon!”
This was a sentence that all soldiers heard often. I am not sur-
prised that Speer forgot to include it in his memoirs. What does as-
tonish me, on the other hand, is that the highly intelligent Albert
Speer was seriously thinking of killing Hitler at the same moment, in
426 OTTO SKORZENY
February 1945. At least that’s what he claims now. Assuming that he
actually intended to gas every living person in the Reich Chancel-
lery, he must have known that the single result would have been chaos.
Grossadmiral Dinitz has solemnly stated this, as have others.
Even without Adolf Hitler the German people would have had to
surrender unconditionally. This demand of Roosevelt’s, Stalin’s and
Churchill’s prolonged the war by two years. Who benefited from
this?

On the evening of February 28, 1945 1 was summoned to Fihrer

Headquarters in Berlin. Another Waffen-SS officer took command
in the bridgehead. This time the Western Front was the topic. But the
organization of combined operations was proving to be increasingly
difficult. Friedenthal was bombed heavily and the BBC had reported
three times that “the headquarters of Mussolini kidnapper Skorzeny
had been completely destroyed.” However my most important of-
fices had already been transferred to Hof in Bavaria. This didn’t ex-
actly make my work easier when I had to improvise an action against
the Remagen bridge.
The monitoring service informed me of a further BBC report,
according to which Hitler had promoted me to Generalmajor, given
me an important post in the defense of Berlin and that I had already
begun a purge. In fact Hitler had decorated me with the Knight’s
Cross with Oak Leaves for the defense of Schwedt and congratu-
lated me personally. I had just come down the long stairs of the Reich
Chancellery when he left teh situation room. His appearance was
shocking: bent, with grey hair — a picture of misery. The date was
March 29 or 30, 1945.
“Skorzeny,” he said, “I would once again like to thank you for
your accomplishments on the Oder.”
The bridgehead had been abandoned on March 3!
“We’ll see each other again soon,” he said. But I was never to see
Hitler again.
I later learned that Generaloberst Jodl had in fact mentioned my
name: he wanted to use me in the defense of Berlin. But how could
the news reach the BBC if I didn’t even know about it?
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 427
I often drove to the Reich Chancellery on official business in that
terrible month of March 1945. My eye injury hurt and Doctor
Stumpfegger wanted to look at it.
The examination took place in the room of Hitler’s secretary. On
this day I was introduced to Eva Braun, who shortly before she died
was to become Hitler’s wife. She was a young, very simple and ex-
tremely likeable woman, of whose existence I had previously been
unaware. I had a long talk with her. She was pleased to meet me and
invited me to have dinner another day. I didn’t take her up on this
invitation, however, for Doctor Stumpfegger told me that Fegelein,
who was married to Eva Braun’s sister, was always present at such
receptions. I already spoke of Fegelein in a previous chapter. His
boasting and arrogance were well known within the Waffen-SS. I
had had something to do with him during the preparation of Opera-
tion Greif and didn’t want to know him any better.
The weeks I spent in devastated Berlin, a shadow of the city I
had known, and which Hitler wanted to completely rebuild in 1940,
were a nightmare for me.
One evening an air raid warning had been issued, and when the
2,000-kilogram bombs began falling I fled to the large bunker near
the Zoological Gardens. The Luftwaffe had installed a field hospital
in this unusual structure, which the allies had great difficulty de-
stroying after the war. | used the opportunity to visit two of my men
being treated there, our “chinaman” Werner Hunke and Leutnant
Holle, who had been wounded at Schwedt. I also found Flugkapitän
Hanna Reitsch there — in a poor frame of mind - and Luftwaffe Oberst
Hans-Ulrich Rudel, the famous Stuka pilot, who had just had a leg
amputated.
My comrade and friend Rudel had flown more than 2,530 com-
bat missions, destroyed 519 tanks and sunk the 23,000-ton battleship
Marat in Kronstadt harbor. Hitler created a special decoration for
this German soldier: the Knight’s Cross in Gold with Oak Leaves,
Swords and Diamonds. In spite of his injuries and a strict ban from
the Führer, Rudel continued flying until May 8, 1945.
On that day Rudel and what was left of his Geschwader voluntar-
ily surrendered to the U.S. Air Force at Kitzingen airfield in Bavaria.
The pilots destroyed their aircraft after landing. They were led into
the officers mess; Rude! was taken to the hospital where they casu-
ally bandaged his bleeding stump. Then Hans-Ulrich Rudel also ap-
428 OTTO SKORZENY
peared in the mess. As he walked in his men stood up and greeted
him with the Hitler salute, which had been the official Wehrmacht
salute since July 20, 1944. An interpreter told Rudel that the Ameri-
can commander wanted no further demonstrations of this kind and
that he didn’t care for this salute. I now quote John Toland, who
wrote in The Last 100 Days: “We have been ordered to salute this
way. And as we are soldiers we will obey this order whether you like
it or not!”
He also declared that the German soldier had not been defeated
by a “superior human enemy,” but by overwhelming masses of ma-
terie] and said, “We have landed here on German territory, because
we didn’t want to stay in the Soviet zone. We are prisoners and don’t
wish any further discussion. We would like to wash — if that’s pos-
sible.”
The American commander subsequently had a very cordial con-
versation with the Oberst. But just as they took from me the watch
the Duce had given me, so too was Rudel robbed of his Knight’s
Cross in Gold while he slept. Rudel was the only recipient of the
decoration.
Like in Balzac’s novel Peau de chagrin, the area on which we
fought shrank day by day in the east and west. On March 30, 1945 I
received the order from the OKW to transfer my headquarters to the
Alpine Fortress, where principally the Führer Headquarters was also
to be set up. Obviously the last battles of the war were supposed to
take place in this redoubt. The OKW had confirmed to me that the
“fortress” was fully ready to mount a defense.
We — Radi and I — found the mountains, the glaciers, the forests,
the wild streams all in “their place,” but not a trace of military prepa-
ration or of fortification. I realized that everything would once again
have to be improvised. However my units were scattered, more like
destroyed or decimated. It proved difficult to collect several of my
soldiers who possessed mountain experience. I was able to have the
commander of Commando Unit Center and 250 soldiers assigned to
us
Afterwards I sought out Feldmarschall Schörner north of Olmütz
and placed about 100 soldiers of Commando Unit East Il at his dis-
posal. This formation’s Unit I had been destroyed at Hohensalza. |
have described the acts of this commando unit’s soldiers elsewhere
in this book.
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 429
On the morning of April 10, I learned from Schémer’s staff that
Vienna was already threatened, or more accurately that the remnants
of Commando Unit Southeast and Battle Group Danube had been
forced to leave the city to defend the so-called Alpine Fortress. How-
ever Vienna was my birthplace. My mother, my wife and my daugh-
ter must still be there, and perhaps I could help get them out of the
battle zone.
I set off in that direction and reached Vienna in the afternoon,
accompanied by my adjutant, Untersturmfiihrer Gallent, my driver
Anton Gfoeler — who had been present on the Gran Sasso — and a
radio operator who had been sent by the OKW. I had been ordered by
no less a personage than Generaloberst Jod! to make regular reports
on the southern front, which we were abandoning.
Before we drove across the Florisdorfer Bridge we witnessed a
spectacle that proved to me that the end really had come. We had just
passed a tank obstacle. To the right and left wounded sat in the ditches.
On the road a convoy of wagons drawn by teams of six horses. A fat
Feldwebel in the company of a young girl sat on the first wagon. One
look was enough: this man was a furniture mover. The six wagons
were loaded to overflowing with furniture and linen. I tried not to
lose my composure and asked the Feldwebel to take along some of
the wounded.
“Can’t do it,” he said. “All full.”
Everything happened quickly from that point. We disarmed the
Feldwebel and the other drivers. I passed out the weapons to those
with minor injuries. The wagons were unloaded and the wounded
were lifted onto them. The others took the places of the furniture
movers. I said to a Feldwebel who was wounded in the arm, “Drive
in a westerly direction to the nearest hospital and take as many
wounded with you as you can.”
And to the Feldwebel who wanted to rescue the furniture, “You
are a proper filthy pig. You and your people get out of here, and if
you don’t intend to fight, at least try to be less greedy in the future
and be more comradely.”
We arrived in Vienna as darkness was falling. Cannon were fir-
ing. Where was the front? The city seemed dead. Houses burned here
and there. We drove on to the Stubenring and past the former war
ministry: it was empty. A sentry told us that the command post had
430 OTTO SKORZENY
been moved to the Hofburg, the palace in the center of the city in
which the old Kaiser had lived.
Where were our troops? Who was defending now and who would
defend Vienna? I had to turn around at the Schwedenplatz: the rubble
of the house in which my brother, who had been called up, lived,
blocked the way to the Danube quay. Finally I reached the headquar-
ters of Commando Unit Southeast. The remnants of the unit had with-
drawn into the area north of Krems in the afternoon; Commando
Unit Danube had likewise evacuated its training quarters in the Diana
Baths. I found these soldiers in the following days on my way to the
Alpine Fortress and ordered them to Salzburg.
The courtyard of the former Kaiser’s palace was jam packed with
vehicles. In the cellar an officer reported to me that the Russians had
apparently already infiltrated the city and were “being held up and
engaged everywhere.” By whom? That was a mystery. I wanted to
know precisely and decided to continue on my way. I reached the
Matzleindorf zone. It was already after midnight. From the left came
the sound of battle. Ahead of me a barricade. I got out of the car. Two
elderly Vienna policemen appeared, “We are manning the barricade
here,” they declared to me. “If the Russians show up here, we will
surround them and they’!l have to give themselves up.”
They had always had a sense of humor in Vienna — even if it was
only gallows humor!
I drove through the dead streets back to the Hofburg and spoke
briefly with Oberstleutnant H. Kurz, the adjutant of the Gauleiter
and former Reich Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach. My report left
Kurz very skeptical.
“The reports we have,” he said, “prove the contrary, that the front
has been stabilized. Anyhow you can speak to the Gauleiter your-
self.”
In his book /ch glaubte an Hitler (I Believed in Hitler) Schirach
claimed that he had installed his headquarters “in the cellars of the
Hofburg” from April 6. That is correct, but he had made one room in
the cellar into a candle-lit salon for himself. On the floor lay mag-
nificent carpets, paintings of battles and portraits of generals from
the Eighteenth Century hung on the walls. The ante-room was used
for eating, drinking and kicking up a row. I had to explain to the
Gauleiter that I hadn’t seen a single German soldier in the city and
that the barricades were unmanned. | invited him to undertake an
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS. 431
inspection with me. However he declined this invitation and explained
to me, bent over his map, how they would save Vienna: two elite
divisions were ready to attack. One would attack from the north and
the other from the west: the enemy must capitulate.
“Prince Starhemberg used a similar maneuver,” he observed, “to
lift the siege of Vienna by the Turks in 1683.”
Any further discussion was pointless. I took my leave. Schirach
looked at me, “Skorzeny, my duty is expressed in three words: pre-
vail or die!”
He undoubtedly meant to say “prevail or retreat,” for five hours
later the defense commissar of Vienna district left Vienna as fast as
he could.
I found my mother’s house half in ruins. However a neighbor
who crawled from his cellar assured me that my mother had left
Vienna with my wife and daughter the day before. I drove to my
home in Döbling. The house was untouched. I quickly collected sev-
eral hunting rifles and took a last look at the home that I was about to
leave ready for occupancy by the enemy or looters.
I left the city by the Florisdorfer Bridge and turned around once
more: “Auf Wiedersehen, Vienna.” Then we took the Waldviertler
Road to Upper Austria. In carrying out the mission given me by
Generaloberst Jodl, I sent the following radio message: “All indica-
tions are that Vienna will fall today, the 11th of April 1945.”

Notes
1. Himmler maneuvered and intrigued in order to become and remain the head of Army Group Vistula.
Guderian stated that Himmier also hoped to receive the Knight's Cross, which many officers of the
Waffen-SS had been decorated. He even wanted the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, but his hopes
were in vain. (Editors' note)
 26
NUREMBERG

Grossadmiral Dönitz: "Our Führer is dead...” - Churchill's belated

revelations - General Rendulic proposes terms to General Walker -
The defense of the South Tyrolean passes was impossible - We be-
come prisoners of war voluntarily — “Have a drink; tonight you will
be hanged” — Handcuffs — “Where did you take Hitler?” — Colonel
Andrus — Suicide and unusual incidents - The Nuremberg Tribunal -
The prison under a state of siege: they fear a surprise attack by
Skorzeny and his troops! — “Watched like cobra!” ~ In Dachau -
“Wild Jacob” — Soviet offers — Our trial - Generous testimony by
Wing Commander Yeo-Thomas - Acquitted! - I leave the Darmstadt
camp

learned of Hitler’s death in Berlin on the afternoon of April 30.

The city was surrounded by the Russians and was one great
field of rubble. Prominent among the last troops defending what
was left of the Reich Chancellery was a battalion of the French
Waffen-SS Division Charlemagne.
Hitler dead! After the initial shock we considered this news as
unlikely. Adolf Hitler was supposed to go to the Alpine Fortress.
There were still troops ready to fight. No! That was impossible! They
were lying to us. Perhaps he would yet come.
However the report was soon officially confirmed. The next day
when we heard Anton Bruckner's 7th Symphony on German radio
we knew what had happened. Before his death he had named Karl
Dönitz the German head of state. On May 1 the Grossadmiral ad-
dressed the German people:

432
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 433
“Our leader, Adolf Hitler, has fallen... His life was service to
Germany. His actions in the struggle against bolshevism were also
for the benefit of Europe and the entire cultured world... The Fiihrer
chose me as his successor... My first task is to save German people
from destruction by the advancing bolshevik enemy. As far as and as
long as the achieving of this objective is hindered by the British and
Americans, we will also have to defend ourselves against them and
fight on... Maintain order and discipline in the cities and in the coun-
try, each do his duty in his place...”

I had all my officers and men fall in alongside my command train.

There was no need to make a speech. I merely said to them: “The
Fuhrer is dead. Long live Germany!” Then my German soldiers joined
in the national anthem Deutschland über alles, and together with the
European volunteers we sang “Ich hatt! einen Kameraden.

We all felt that the new Reich President was right and that the struggle
must be continued in order to at least keep the way open to the west
for as many women, children and soldiers as possible. In spite of a
lack of preparation the Alpine Fortress had to and could offer sanctu-
ary to many people. That was my plan since Radl had joined me in
Radstadt with 250 men. The economics minister and the president of
the Reichsbank had also sent me two of their adjutants and asked me
to look after the Reichsbank’s treasure. I informed them with the
necessary courtesy that I was not a safe watcher but a soldier and that
they had the wrong number with me.
Theoretically the Alpine Fortress should have been made into a
fortified area 350 kilometers long and 75 wide, which extended from
Bregenz in the west to Bad Aussee in the east, through Füssen and
Traunstein to Salzburg in the north and in the south to Glurns, Bozen,
Cortina d’Ampezzo and Lienz. The last-mentioned line was pulled
back to the Brenner Pass following the surrender of the German armed
forces in Italy. But after a few days I came to the realization that this
fortress never existed and never would exist. Was a dissolution of the
allied alliance possible now that Hitler was dead and the national-
socialist state had collapsed? I doubted it. However Winston Churchill
434 Otto SKORZENY
made the following declaration to the voters in Woodford, and it was
an astonishing admission:

“Before the end of the war, when the Germans were surrendering
by the hundreds of thousands, I telegraphed Lord Montgomery that
he should carefully collect and store the German weapons, so that
they could be easily handed out to the German soldiers again if we
were forced to cooperate with Germany in the event of a further Rus-
sian advance into Europe. My mistrust with regard to Stalin was con-
siderable, for he was doing everything to secure world dominance
for Russia and communism.”

We thought we must be dreaming! “...in the event of a further Rus-

sian advance.” But who had made possible this advance into Eu-
rope? Nowadays one can smile when he reads that “the German sol-
dier prevented all of Europe from becoming bolshevik.” But if we
hadn’t fought as we did in the east, many of those who have criti-
cized us since 1945 and branded the Waffen-SS as a criminal organi-
zation wouldn’t have the opportunity to enjoy freedom today; they
would also very probably no longer be alive, and if they were they
could suffer in silence or break rock in Verkoyansk.
It was clear that the rapid advance by the Soviet armies into the
heart of Europe posed an immense danger, not only for the peoples
of the old continent but for Great Britain and the United States as
well. The belated realizations of the British Prime Minister are proof
enough of that. General Guderian assured me that the Wehrmacht
could still have inflicted a bloody defeat on the Soviet armies, whose
supply lines were already overextended, at the beginning of Febru-
ary 1945 — provided that the western powers gave the Wehrmacht
freedom of action in the east. Unfortunately that was not the case.
I also met General Rendulic at this time. He was commanding
our Army Group South and at the end held a front reaching from
central Austria to the Czechoslovakian border against the Red Army.
Generaloberst Rendulic, who was also an historian, didn’t want
to just write history, he wanted to make it as well. After the death of
Hitler he dreamed that the four armies under his command could not
only stop Malinovsky and Tolbukhin in their march to the west, but
drive them back far beyond the Danube line. He also sent a negotia-
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 435
tor, who gave Major-General Walton H. Walker, the chief of the
American 2nd Corps, the following explanation:

1. Even if those in the United States were of the opinion in 1941

that Germany was a threat to the USA, they must now admit that this
threat no longer exists.

2. Hitler is dead; the German armies are fighting with the last of
their strength, and the westem allies cannot deny that the real threat
comes from bolshevism - in Europe as everywhere.

3. In the face of such danger the directly or indirectly threat-

ened powers must show their solidarity. Consequently Rendulic asks
General Walker to allow the German reserve troops still on hand to
pass, so that he can reinforce his four armies and counterattack in the
east.

General Walker’s reply was sarcastic and negative. Rendulic was

four years ahead of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which
was founded in 1949.

Acting on the instructions of the High Command South, which was

based by the K6nigsee, I had concentrated all the surviving and strag-
gling soldiers of my units into a new formation, which was dubbed
the Alpine Guard Corps. However it had little in common witb an
army corps apart from the name.
I received the last order from High Command South on May 1,
1945: I was to organize the defense of the South Tyrolean passes so
that the troops of General Vietinghoff, Generalfeldmarschall
Kesselring’s successor in Italy, could withdraw. At the same time I
was to prevent the Anglo-American troops from entering Austria.
But it was too late. Our army in Italy had already surrendered with-
out even informing Feldmarschall Kesselring. The officers of the
Alpine Guard Corps, which I had immediately sent to the Italian bor-
der, were smart enough to retum to me as soon as they saw what was
happening.
436 Otro SKORZENY
On May 6 Grossadmiral Dönitz issued the order that we were to
lay down our weapons on all fronts at midnight on May 8. I with-
drew into the mountains with my closest associates to wait and see
what would happen. My troops were grouped in small units in the
nearby valleys, waiting for my last orders.
Germany had lost the Second World War in spite of the courage
of its soldiers. We had really done our utmost to prevent this.
I could have committed suicide; many of our comrades sought
death in the final battles or freely took their own lives. I could also
have quite easily flown to a neutral country in a Ju 88. But I refused
to abandon my country, my family and my comrades in an hour of
need. I had nothing to hide, hadn’t attempted anything and had done
or ordered nothing that would shame a true soldier. I decided to sur-
render voluntarily and sent two messages to the American division
headquarters in Salzburg. In these messages I proposed that the sol-
diers of the Alpine Guard Corps should go into captivity together. I
received no answer. I later learned that the U.S. headquarters had
decided that this was a new trick on my part; I could never find out
how this, my last “stratagem,” was supposed to work.
What I didn’t know was that I was being eagerly sought and that
the allied press and radio were calling me “the most devilishly intel-
ligent man in Germany.” I really had no idea of the legend that al-
ready surrounded my name.

On the 20th of May 1945 Radl, Hunke, the officer candidate and
interpreter Peter and 1, armed and in field uniform, climbed down
into the valley. We had asked them to send a jeep for us at a certain
bridge near Annaberg. The jeep was in fact there to drive us to
Salzburg.
Our driver, a man from Texas, showed a great deal of interest in
us. Along the road he stopped in front of an inn. I got out with him.
He ordered a bottle of good wine, which I paid for. After we resumed
our journey the Texan turned to me and said, “All kidding aside, are
you really Skorzeny?”
“Naturally.”
“Well then have a drink with your boys, for tonight you'll surely
be hanged!”
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 437
I therefore drank “to our health.” Toward midday we arrived in
Salzburg; our driver couldn’t or didn’t want to find the division head-
quarters. He dropped us off in front of a hotel that had been taken
over by the Americans, saluted cordially and disappeared. In front of
the hotel several German liaison officers looked at us in amazement:
we were still carrying weapons!
An American major finally took the trouble to listen to us. He
sent us back to Saint Johann in Pongau in another jeep. There we
were to pick up trucks and other vehicles with which to transport the
Alpine Guard Corps from the German office in the prisoner of war
camp and from the American units. A German general then sent us to
a US battalion stationed at Werfen. I instructed Hunke to stay in St.
Johann; if we weren’t back in three hours, it would mean that we
were prisoners. In this case Hunke was to inform our people and
from then on the motto “everyone take care of himself and God ev-
eryone” would be the order of the day.
The American battalion had established its headquarters in a com-
fortable villa on the side of a hill. I had a discussion with a captain.
Radi and Peter had to remain at the entrance. Instead of signing the
passes I needed to transport my Alpine Guard Corps to Salzburg and
prisoner of war camp, the captain led me to the dining room, where
four American officers and an interpreter were waiting. Even as |
was pointing out on a map where my people were waiting, the three
doors and windows were flung open. A dozen submachine-guns were
pointing at me and the interpreter asked me to hand over my pistol,
which I did. I said to him:
“Be careful, it’s loaded, and the last bullet is dangerous.”
Then I was frisked and stripped naked. My Mussolini watch was
stolen; I had it returned to me but then it disappeared again, this time
for good. Finally Radl, Peter and I were put into three jeeps, which
drove away between two armored cars. We arrived in Salzburg dur-
ing the night. They had us get out in the garden of a villa. I had just lit
a cigarette when a pair of MPs grabbed us from behind and hand-
cuffed us behind the back. Then I was shoved into a room where a
dozen people sat behind two or three desks. There were several re-
porters and photographers among them. An officer began interrogat-
ing me. I stated that I would not speak a word until they removed the
handcuffs, which they did. Afterward I walked to the window — the
machine-guns still trained on me — and called into the garden, “Radl,
Peter, are you still bound?”
438 OTTO SKORZENY
“Yes,” came the answer from Rad. “It stinks!”
I turned to the major.
“I will not answer as long as my companions are in handcuffs.”
I remained standing in front of the window. After some time I
heard Rad!’s voice, “It’s alright. Thank you!”
Then I sat down in front of the American major and declared
myself ready to answer his questions. His first was, “You had a plan
to murder General Eisenhower, didn’t you?”
I said that I had not. Further questions followed, questions I was
to hear over and over again from American, British and even French
intelligence officers in my three years as a prisoner: “If you didn’t
plan to kill Eisenhower, did you intend to kidnap him? We know for
a fact that you intended to kill or kidnap General Bradley! Why didn’t
the Italian and Hungarian forces on the Gran Sasso and in Budapest
fire at you? What were you doing in Berlin at the end of April 1945?
Where did you take Hitler? We know from a reliable source that you
flew away with Hitler in an aircraft early on the morning of April 30,
1945. Where is he hiding? You know how to fly, don’t you? You flew
the aircraft; Hitler sat beside you in the cockpit; you can see how
well informed we are! ... You needn’t deny it: you intended to blow
up Montgomery’s headquarters, we have proof of it! How do you
know that Hitler killed himself in Berlin if you weren’t in Berlin at
the end of April? Did Hitler give you the order to murder Eisenhower?
Who then?” And so on and so on.
After several days | managed to convince Colonel Henry Gor-
don Sheen, one of the American intelligence chiefs: “If I had taken
Adolf Hitler to a safe place,” I said to him, “I would have stayed
there and not surrendered with my comrades.”
“That’s a trick,” declared the journalists. “Skorzeny is trying to
cover up the tracks.” The reporters from the New York Times and the
Christian Science Monitor outdid all the others in their skepticism.
In his book Commando Extraordinary, Charles Foley stated that,
“Skorzeny became a character of modern mythology capable of any-
thing.”
General Walter Bedell Smith, the high command chief-of-staff,
called all the allied press correspondents together in the Hotel Scribe
in Paris. Foley wrote:
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 439
“The general stated that there had never been a plot against the
life and the freedom of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Military in-
telligence had been mislead by conflicting orders.”

Not satisfied with that, the journalists then asked the general embar-
rassing questions about the “state of siege” that had existed at
Eisenhower’s headquarters at the end of 1944 and early 1945, Gen-
eral Eisenhower’s double, and the fact that the latter was virtually
held prisoner at Versailles by his own troops. General Bedell Smith
admitted that it was a case of “mistakes,” which had happened on
account of faulty intelligence. The journalists remained skeptical,
and after lengthy investigations and counter-investigations the allied
intelligence services reached the conclusion that something was fishy:
my alibis were all too convincing.
I was taken from one prison to another. In the sixth I shared a cell
with Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring. On May 29, 1945 I was in-
stalled in a wooden hut with Dr. Kaltenbrunner. The shack was copi-
ously equipped with microphones. We talked about our student days;
the listening service must have been very disappointed. Dr.
Kaltenbrunner had the bad luck to have taken over the post of RSHA
chief Reinhard Heydrich, who was murdered in Prague in 1942. He
was taken to London and for the first few weeks was interrogated
quite thoroughly. Then they locked him up in the Tower of London
for seven weeks.
Day and night he had to endure beatings in total darkness, just
like those reserved for former Russian prisoners in the Fortress of
Peter and Paul: the water slowly rose to a depth of more than a meter
in his cell and then flowed out again. This was followed by a cold
shower and blows.
Kaltenbrunner was often unable to appear during the trial in
Nuremberg on account of three outbreaks of meningitis. I saw him
for the last time in July 1946: he was calm and collected, even though
he knew that they had sentenced him to death and were going to
execute him.
Another fellow prisoner was Dr. Ley, who they had arrested in
sky blue pajamas and slippers. As they led him away he reached for
a woolen overcoat; as well they placed a tyrolean hat on his head. He
did not hold up well to his treatment in prison and soon after he was
transferred to Nuremberg prison he committed suicide.
440 OTTO SKORZENY
In the Oberursel camp I met Radl, who received permission to
share a cell with me. But on September 10, 1945 they once again put
handcuffs on me, before taking me to an aircraft which flew us to
Nuremberg. Also in the aircraft were Grossadmiral Dönitz,
Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl, Generaloberst
Guderian, Dr. Ley — still in pajamas — and even Baldur von Schirach.
On our arrival in Nuremberg Prison the commander of this penal
institution, the American Colonel Andrus — he wore a pince-nez and
bore a striking resemblance to Heinrich Himmler — almost had a
stroke. He found to his horror that Grossadmiral Dénitz and I were
still wearing full uniform and badges of rank. Colonel Andrus de-
clared that our uniforms were not permissible and that this was a
legitimate provocation. Alerted by his cries, several black military
policemen came running. But I had already given the Grossadmiral a
military salute. He understood my salute and nodded in approval.
We removed each other’s badges of rank without saying a word.
Then we saluted and the last head of state of the Third Reich shook
my hand.
The prison at Nuremberg was a large building shaped like a five-
pointed star. We were guarded by large numbers of black soldiers;
our jailer, Colonel Andrus, thought to degrade us in this way. But I
always got along well with the blacks, who proved to be much more
humane than the whites. One huge young man, a black sergeant, who
was extremely friendly, became my friend and more than once slipped
me a few cigarettes and chocolate.
We were quite well fed during the first weeks. Older German
prisoners, soldiers, who were assigned to kitchen duty, did their best
for us — to the annoyance of Colonel Andrus. He was Lithuanian by
birth, having become an American citizen only recently, and hated
everything German. One day he said to us, “I know that they call you
‘krauts’ because you like it (sauerkraut) so much. You will therefore
get some to eat every day.” He saw to it that the food was bland and
also of very poor quality.
A young Austrian engineer from the armaments ministry man-
aged to get himself assigned to the kitchen. His name was
Raffelsberger, I believe, and he saw to it that I received dumplings.
He was the only prisoner to escape from Nuremberg Prison; he did
so when he drove into town with several Gls to pick up provisions.
He reached South America. At the beginning I was in the wing where
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 441
the accused were held. My cell was opposite that of the Reichs-
marschall. We communicated by way of sign language, for talking
was strictly forbidden. Then, just before Christmas 1945, I was trans-
ferred to the witnesses wing. Our cells were locked at night and open
all day. Andrus issued a draconian decree: whenever he appeared,
every prisoner had to stand at attention in the doorway of his cell and
had to salute fifteen steps before he passed and twelve after. I found
this measure laughable, and each time his illustrious person came
into view I ducked into the nearest cell. He noted this and called out
to me, “So you refuse to salute me?”
“T will salute you when we are treated like soldiers who are pris-
oners of war. I refuse to salute you in a subservient way. I am an
officer with the same rank as you and not a lackey!”
“I can have you punished for disobeying orders with a month in
solitary confinement!”
“You can do whatever you like!”
I believe that the American officers under Andrus hated him more
than he did us. I met one of these officers on a flight a few years ago.
He recognized me and told me that my behavior toward Colonel
Andrus had been pure satisfaction to him and his comrades.
Outwardly the Americans’ conduct was “correct.” Colonel Andrus
therefore let us know that we had the right to complain. In reality not
a single complaint was resolved positively. Generaloberst Halder,
who was liked by the Americans, had a unique experience. When he
remarked to our jailer that he had been treated better in the German
concentration camp than in Nuremberg, he received two weeks “in
the klink.”
Some couldn’t take it. Besides Dr. Ley, the good and brave Dr.
Conti, the Reich Health Leader who was unjustly accused, hanged
himself in the next cell. Generaloberst Blaskowitz jumped to his death
from the fourth floor catwalk. And Generalfeldmarschall von
Blomberg died in the aid station, where they took him at the last
minute. Once, during my weekly walk to the showers, I was allowed
to “take along” three bed sheets, one of which I gave to von Blomberg,
who was always sick. I gave the second to the Austrian General von
Glaise-Horstenau, who had once been the adjutant of Kaiser Franz-
Josef. The third I kept for myself. We used them to make clean sleep-
ing bags.
442 OTTO SKORZENY
Colonel Andrus was able to introduce even stricter measures as a
result of these suicides. There were surprise inspections of the cells
day and night. We had to sleep with the lights on, were not allowed
to cover our heads and had to face the light bulbs. If we covered our
eyes with the blanket while asleep, we were brutally wakened by the
guard.
Later, when Reichsmarschall Géring poisoned himself with cya-
nide, there was a large-scale inspection of all the cells. In
Generaloberst Jod]’s cell they found thirty centimeters of wire and
two sharpened rivets, in Generalfeldmarschall Keitel’s a razor blade
and in Ribbentrop’s a broken bottle.
The worst however, at least for me, was the prison’s oppressive
atmosphere. The constant spying, the deals they tried to make with
the weakest, the use of informants, the denunciations, the false accu-
sations, the servile behavior of certain of the accused and witnesses
who hoped to come out of the entire affair with enhanced reputations
— they made promises, which they kept, if they proved cooperative —
all this had affected my morale badly. I came close to reacting in a
way that would have given Colonel Andrus an excuse to punish me
hard. There was nothing that he couldn’t and wouldn’t use against
us. We were “tested” by the so-called psychologists. M. Coldensen
and “Professor” G.M. Gilbert took me to task several times. We had
to take an I.Q. test. The big winners were Doctor Seyss-Inquart, Doctor
Schacht and Göring. The Americans were extremely surprised when
they found that, by their own criteria, our intelligence quotas proved
to be “very above average.”
But the main job of these “psychologists” was to report to the
prosecutors and create disunity among the prisoners. For example, |
was told that so and so had spoken very badly of me — in the hope
that I would in turn speak badly of him and reveal something that
could be exploited by the prosecution or at least by the press. This
trick didn’t work on me, but the weak and naive fell for it.
The journalists were hungry for sensational news, and it is not
surprising that the international press published such “sensational
bulletins” at that time, for the more fantastic a story, the higher the
price paid for it. Publishing agreements were concluded by way of
middlemen. They asked me for “ready to print” text. I refused. Many
prisoners, however, spent the whole day typing, either for the press
or for the prosecution — which came to the same thing.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 443
General Warlimont and the “iridescent” Höttl, alias Walter Hagen,
worked — no doubt on their defense — from morning until night.
The commentator of Radio Nuremberg also had a news net in-
side the prison. He called himself Gaston Oulman and allegedly came
from a South American republic. In truth his name was Ullmann and
before the war he had been on bad terms with the German courts.
The autograph trade was in full swing. Without embarrassing
myself, I demanded a package of cigarettes for each autograph. But
the more “dangerous” one was, the higher the fee. I knew more than
one prisoner who made himself out to be a very dangerous criminal
in order to make his stay more comfortable. I don’t know whether
their false familiarity with the guards was later included in the list of
charges or not. At least the friendliness of the catholic prison chap-
lain Father Sixtus O’Connor, who likewise could have been danger-
ous in a certain way, was honest. Though the Augustinian order to
which he belonged to came from a cloistered community, the father
was nothing like a penitent monk — quite the contrary. He had long
talks with the prisoners, proved to be conciliatory, friendly and stood
up for the prisoners to the extent that Colonel Andrus’ decrees al-
lowed. He was Irish, his mother was of German descent, and many
of the prison inmates were very flattering to him. Among the keenest
were Gauleiter Frank, von dem Bach-Zelewski, General Warlimont,
Gauleiter Bohle, Schellenberg and the talented Hattl.
Father Sixtus’ sermons were filled with references that everyone
could understand, for he did not hold back in his criticism of the
Nuremberg Tribunal. On Remembrance Day in November 1945 he
preached about the sacrifice of millions of German soldiers who had
fallen honorably in battle with the enemy.
Victors who set themselves up as judge and jury and who have
the defeated at their mercy for better or worse, have at their disposal
the means of exerting tremendous pressure. Thus it wasn’t until Feb-
ruary 1946 that we were allowed to correspond with our families.
However for many of us the joy was short-lived: the bombing raids,
the final battles, the occupation by three, then four armies, had claimed
many victims.
The “confessions” made at Nuremberg and quite generally the
statements made by prisoners under interrogation by the enemy's
military-political police must be read by the historian with a great
deal of skepticism. Many prisoner gave false testimony in order to
444 OTTO SKORZENY
be acquitted; I therefore denounce them. One in particular behaved
wretchedly: “I have a wife and children,” he said to me. “I can’t act
any other way.” As if we all didn’t have families to think about!
I was imprisoned in Nuremberg Prison three times: from Octo-
ber 1945 until May 1946, in July and August 1946 and in February
and March 1948. The third time I decided to accept a job. In each cell
they had replaced the panes of glass with sheets of plastic, which
were attached to the window frame with small strips of wood, which
frequently came loose. I volunteered to fix the windows.
Apart from the fact that they paid me for this work with a pack of
cigarettes each week, I was given the opportunity to go into the cells
and talk to my comrades, establish interesting relationships and en-
courage those whose morale had sunk to zero. At the same time I
encouraged myself. When the guards intervened I claimed that I had
asked about the prisoner’s family or something of the like. I must
repeat that a real solidarity existed between us and the black guards,
the pariahs. The psychologists made a big mistake when they had us
guarded by blacks, who refused to treat us like animals and in doing
so gave Colonel Andrus a lesson in humanitarian behavior.

It was the time of the “war crimes trials.” In the British occupation
zone lengthy investigations were made of 700,000 German officers
and soldiers. At the end they found 937 prisoners who were sus-
pected of having committed war crimes. The British military courts
sentenced them as follows:

Death penalty: 230

Life imprisonment: 24
Prison (suspended): 423

677
Acquitted: 260

Six-hundred-and-seventy-seven men had thus fought the war in a

way that the enemy saw as incorrect, that meant fewer than one in
ten-thousand soldiers.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 445
eo

In the American zone of occupation, following Brigadier-General

Telford Taylor’s final report only 570 German military personnel were
affected by the famous Law No. 10.' Only 177 were brought before
the American special court, with the following result:

Death sentence: 24
Life imprisonment: 118

142
Acquitted: 35

Several thousand persons were arrested in the French occupation zone.

The following sentences were issued on the spot:

Death sentences: 104 (carried out)

Life imprisonment: 44
Imprisonment (suspended): 1475

1623
Acquitted: 404

This meant that 2,442 men were convicted from more than 10 mil-
lion soldiers, or .024%? In the Soviet occupation zone the number of
summary executions exceeded 185,000. Of the four million German
prisoners of war in the Soviet Union barely thirty percent returned
from 1955.

At the beginning of March we noticed that something unusual was

going on in Nuremberg. Colonel] Andrus put the Palace of Justice on
a state of alert. The guard was tripled. Anti-tank barricades were set
up at the main entrances; machine-gun nests protected by sand bags
and heavy sheet metal were installed on almost every corner. Small
rifle stands with armor protection were set up in the prison corridors,
behind which our guards could take cover and fight off an enemy.
But what enemy was approaching?
446 OTTO SKORZENY
We vainly sought an explanation for these warlike preparations;
then Father Sixtus, who had just come from the officers mess, ex-
plained it to me. An American general, whose name the father would
not betray to me — for he could be very secretive when he had to be -
had told him the following: motorized German guerilla units had
been sighted near Nuremberg. Their objective was to march into the
city, storm the prison and free all the prisoners. These people were
all the more dangerous, because they were commanded by Colonel
Otto Skorzeny, the one who had kidnapped Mussolini and had nearly
kidnapped General Eisenhower.
“But,” argued Father Sixtus, “Colonel Skorzeny is here in prison,
since September of last year. I spoke to him only yesterday.”
“In that case,” observed the general, “you can rest assured that
you were talking to a phoney Skorzeny, for my information comes
from the best of sources. We will clear up this story.”
The result for me was intense interrogation, which sometimes
degenerated into pure farce. Finally I was able to convince that that I
— was myself.
When I was transferred to a camp at Regensburg in Bavaria, I ran
into my former radio officer, who explained the whole story. He had
discharged himself when the Alpine Guard Corps was dissolved. He
reached his family, which lived in Nuremberg. When he learned from
the papers that I was imprisoned there, he decided to free me and, if
possible, help me flee. A plan was worked out — it was totally im-
practicable — , but one of the plotters talked and the whole group was
arrested. The police informer probably though he recognized me as I
walked freely around Germany; therefore the great alarm in the prison,
which was maintained for months after the interrogation.
Stars and Stripes, the American armed forces newspaper, took a
great interest in me. Under the headline “Guarded like a Cobra,” one
issue featured an illustrated article on me. I learned that I had suc-
cessfully escaped four or five times, but that each time I had been
picked up. I read this article in bed in the medical station in Dachau,
where they had carried out a gall bladder operation on me and where
I was in fact “guarded like a cobra,” for a guard shared my hospital
room with me day and night.
In May 1946 I was transferred to the old Dachau concentration
camp. Soon afterward I found myself in a camp in Darmstadt, then
back in Nuremberg, then in Dachau again, where I went on a hunger
 My COMMANDO OPERATIONS 447
strike to protest against my solitary confinement and against the treat-
ment of the German prisone°s in general.
When one speaks of the old Dachau concentration camp one must
be clear about one thing: the camp’s facilities were relatively com-
fortable for prisoners in solitary; those sentenced to solitary confine-
ment had a rather large room (about 3.5 x 2.5 x 3 meters), with large,
barred windows, wash basin and their own toilet. The Americans
built a new bunker inside the camp, with cells for two prisoners each.
Each cell was 2.5 meters long, 1.4 meters wide and 2.2 meters high
and had a tiny, barred window. We were forced to wash in the toilet.
They even showed me the extraordinary kindness of assigning me a
habitual criminal for a cell mate. I quickly made it clear to him who
was in charge. I don’t know what camp they found him in, but I had
to teach him how to wash himself.
At least my habitual criminal didn’t have the same reputation as
Jakob Gröschner, “Wild Jacob,” who resided in, as he called it, “good
old Dachau” and who played the part of a crazy man. He was as
strong as Hercules, smashed everything that he could lay his hands
on, set his bed on fire, bent the bars in the window, climbed onto the
roof and so on. I don’t know why, but I felt sympathetic toward him.
Whenever he saw me, even from a distance, he called out, “Always
keep a stiff upper lip, Herr Oberst! ... Don’t give in an inch ... You are
right! ... Forwards!” and the like.
I have already mentioned our trial in Dachau, in which all the
defendants were acquitted. One of my supply officers behaved very
badly during the trial. Then “Wild Jacob” declared that, “these people
are all traitors” and must be “punished severely.” No one paid much
attention to these remarks until one day Gréschner began beating the
poor official with a stick and left him in rather bad shape. I had a
great deal of difficulty convincing the American authorities that “Wild
Jacob” had acted of his own accord.
Finally the Americans sent him to a clinic. He was released from
there as mentally disturbed. In Hannover a Czech intelligence agent
approached him with the idea of kidnapping me. Gréschner was able
to inform me — even though I had changed prisons — that the Soviets
intended to achieve by force in a special operation what they had
been unable to do through persuasion.
In fact in November 1945 in Nuremberg I was questioned two or
three times by the Soviet prosecutor who, by the way, was extremely
448 Orro SKORZENY
correct. We had the following interesting dialogue in the course of
the last interrogation:

“It is really astonishing,” he said, “that you didn’t receive your

promotion to Generalmajor. You should have been at least a gen-
eral!”
“I am an engineer and not a career military man, you know. And
intrigues are not my strength.”
“I know. Do you like it here? This prison is no friendly surround-
ing.”
“A prison is never a pleasant place to be.”
“I see that we understand each other. It would be an easy thing
for me to have you called to Berlin by our command posts in two or
three days. There you could select a job with us that suits your great
abilities.”
“Your offer is very well meant. But although Germany has lost
this war, it is not yet over for me. I didn’t fight alone. I was given
orders and I had my comrades carry them out and now I must defend
them. I can’t leave them in the lurch after our defeat.”
“I think you have seen and heard enough to understand. Many
personalities who were above you didn’t come here at all, perhaps to
leave you sitting here now.”
“That is the affair of those superiors and not mine!”

He didn’t pursue the matter any further, nor did the Americans, who
interviewed me next. I must say, however, that after my flight from
the Darmstadt camp in 1948 I was warmed that a second attempt by
the Soviets to bring me to the other side was being prepared. On this
occasion an officer of the US Army proved to be a really splendid
fellow. I have never forgotten it.
I held the firm hope that I would be released in the summer of
1947. But I had no illusions: at the end of July a certain Colonel
Rosenfeld, a prosecutor, informed me of an unbelievable indictment:
I was charged with “having mistreated, beaten and killed about one
hundred American prisoners of war!”
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 449
ee @

The struggle between desperation and death began again. Under the
influence of excessive propaganda, the victors were convinced that
we were all detestable criminals, regular monsters. Everywhere we
encountered lies, hatred and a feeling of vindictiveness, as well as
stupidity — which was difficult to combat.
We were ten officers of the 150th Panzer Brigade. Five came
from the army, three from the navy and two from the Waffen-SS. I
had scarcely ever seen six of them.
The German and international press took care of this sensation,
which was very well staged. A half-dozen German lawyers immedi-
ately declared themselves willing to defend us. One of them, a coun-
tryman of mine, the well-known lawyer Dr. Peyer-Angermann from
Salzburg, even had himself arrested in order to get to Dachau with a
convoy of German prisoners, for the German-Austrian border was
closed once again. None of these lawyers had the slightest hope of
receiving even the most modest fee: we had nothing at all. I thanked
him with my entire heart. Dr. Peyer-Angermann brought with him a
complete portfolio on my activities in Austria from 1930-1939, and
one could feel that he was prepared to risk his reputation and his
career to represent a cause he felt was just.
Apart from that, the tribunal had assigned three officers from the
American army as defense attorneys. They were Lieutenant-Colonel
Robert Durst from Springfield, Missouri, Lieutenant-Colonel Donald
McLure from Oakland, California and Major Lewis I. Horowitz from
New York. The latter, I wish to emphasize, was of the jewish faith.
The three officers first carried out detailed investigations and inter-
rogations as to my origin, my life in Vienna and my career during the
war and proved to be perfect defense attorneys. After all our German
lawyers didn’t know the “other rules of the game” in an American

The proceedings, which lasted more than a month, began on Au-

gust 5, 1947. Before that, during the first three, endlessly long days,
I was questioned and interrogated by Lieutenant-Colonel Durst, who
was armed with files provided by prosecutor Rosenfeld.
“1 would like to point out to you,” he said, “that I will only take
over your defense if I know every detail about your life before and
during the war.”
450 OTTO SKORZENY
I had nothing to hide, and at the end of the third day he offered
me his hand for the first time and said, “I am now convinced that you
are completely innocent, and I will defend you like my own brother.
However I cannot guarantee you a favorable outcome to the trial, if
the leadership of the defense is not given to a ‘team leader’ but to a
single defender, namely me. Furthermore it seems to me important
that you alone speak for the defense, in your own name and in the
names of your comrades.”
The so often criticized “leadership principle,” which ultimately
brought Germany so much misfortune, was used again — but this
time with complete success.
Chief presiding judge was Colonel Gardner, called “the hanging
gardner,” for to that point in time he had only handed down death
sentences by hanging. However Colonel Durst was able to have five
of the nine members of the military court, who were all colonels,
replaced by five other officers — all proven front-line soldiers, Durst
told me.
Finally, about halfway through the trial, prosecutor Rosenfeld
had to withdraw his charge of murder against us. He was left with
only one charge: wearing the uniform of the enemy outside actual
combat. Lieutenant-Colonel Durst presented no evidence that the
English and Americans had used German uniforms, as I have already
shown in this book. But it was already common knowledge that the
commander of the Polish uprising had worn a German uniform. They
knew that The Americans had penetrated to and fought in Aachen
while wearing German uniforms. General Bradley therefore wrote
the court a letter in which he assured that he “never had knowledge
of these events,” but the facts could not be denied.
Apparently General Bradley wasn’t aware of what was going on
within the army he was commanding. Perhaps too it was the memory
of his arrest by the MP, who suspected him of being a disguised Ger-
man, that caused the gap in his memory that was so uncomfortable
for us.
Then came the sensation. RAF Wing Commander Forest Yeo-
Thomas, one of the most brilliant personalities British intelligence
could boast of, took the witness stand. The decorations he wore on
his tunic spoke for themselves; he did not need to be introduced to
the court. The French resistance fighters knew him as “the white
rabbit.”
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 451
Colonel Rosenfeld was completely perplexed by the statements
made by the RAF colonel, who Eugen Kogon claimed had been killed
by the Germans in Buchenwald in his book Der SS-Staat. He de-
clared that the members of his own commando unit had used Ger-
man uniforms and German vehicles and that under certain condi-
tions his commandos “could take no prisoners.”
Lieutenant-Colonel Durst asked him whether he was sometimes
forced, “to take and use the papers of German prisoners of war.”
“Of course! A prisoner is not supposed to have any papers on
him. And if has such nevertheless — all the worse for him.”
He added, “As the leader of English commando units I studied
thoroughly the actions of Colonel Skorzeny and his units. Therefore
I can assure you that the colonel, his officers and soldiers acted like
real gentlemen on all occasions.”
For a moment I thought Rosenfeld was having a heart attack.
Unfortunately I wasn’t allowed to shake the hand of this honorable
and generous RAF officer. He stood up. 1 whispered a few words to
my comrades: we came to attention in salute to him. Lieutenant-Colo-
nel Durst informed the tribunal that three American officers had placed
themselves at the disposal of the defense. After the statement by Yeo-
Thomas theirs were seen as superfluous. The judge gave me the word,
and using a map I explained as simply as possible the course of Op-
eration Greif. Colonel Rosenfeld asked me a few more questions in
his role as prosecutor, but in a more courteous tone. However this
did not stop him from requesting the death penalty for us in his clos-
ing Statements, even though he was unable to prove our guilt; the
representatives of the press and radio could only watch in amaze-
ment.
Lieutenant-Colonel Durst gave a well-documented and in every
respect remarkable defense speech and expressed surprise that the
prosecution was still asking for any punishment after its failure to
present any convincing proof of our guilt. In conclusion Lieutenant-
Colonel McLure turned to the court and said:
“Gentlemen, I would be proud if I had the honor to command
such men. We demand a simple acquittal.”
During the taking of evidence the presiding judge quite obvi-
ously supported the prosecution. An acquittal was to be expected,
but it was not announced until September 9, 1947 - in front of a
room full to capacity and after much deliberation. A milling crowd
452 OTTo SKORZENY
of journalists, photographers and radio reporters swarmed around
the accused.
As I was about to thank my defenders Colonel Rosenfeld came
toward me with outstretched hand. I am not resentful and would gladly
have shaken the hand of my accuser, but I didn’t believe in the good
will of Colonel Rosenfeld. He knew very well that we had neither
beaten nor murdered American or other soldiers and that we had no
plans to attack Eisenhower’s headquarters and liquidate him or any
other general. Nevertheless he had tried to associate the 150th Panzer
Brigade’s action with the allegedly “proven massacre” at Malmedy.
He had also produced false statements — concerning the use of cya-
nide bullets by my units during the Ardennes offensive. The pros-
ecution had even called upon the faithful Radl and Hunke as wit-
nesses for the prosecution! Lieutenant-Colonel Durst filed a protest,
but in vain: “They wish to demonstrate that the principal defendant's
adjutants disagreed with him.”
In truth Rad! and Hunke appeared on the witness stand against
their will. Radl was uncooperative and gave monosyllabic answers
to the prosecution’s questions. And as far as our “chinaman” Hunke
was concerned, he persistently remained silent. He in fact appeared
to be in Peking or Tsientin while Colonel Rosenfeld showered him
with questions.
But without the iron efforts of our defense attorneys, without the
honorable and generous statements by Yeo-Thomas, we would have
been sentenced to death. But the sentences would probably never
have been carried out, as in the case of the notorious “Malmedy Trial.”
None of the forty-seven sentenced to death was executed.
“The defeated German generals were sentenced and done away
with. Should another war break out,” declared Field Marshall Mont-
gomery in Paris on July 8, 1948, “it would be conducted with even
more cruelty, for no one wants to be defeated if it means being
hanged!”
We were acquitted, but we were not yet free — we of the Waffen-
SS. We fell under the enemy decree known as “automatic arrest.” I
believe it was on September 11, 1947 when the world press pub-
lished Colonel Rosenfeld’s statement, “Skorzeny is the most danger-
ous man in Europe!”
The next day, September 12, I learned that Denmark and Czecho-
slovakia were demanding my extradition. After two weeks they noted
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 453
that this “was a mistake.” Further phoney witnesses were exposed.
However I was sent back to Nuremberg, then to the camp at Darmstadt
for “denazification.”
“They never permitted me a few words with Colonel Yeo-Tho-
mas in order to thank him, so I did so in a letter. Finally I received a
note from him: “You did a jolly good job during the war! If you are
looking for a place to stay I have a home in Paris... Escape!”
That was my intention too. Three years and two months seemed
to me to be enough. I warmed the American colonel who was com-
mander of the Darmstadt camp that I had decided to get away. He
didn’t believe me. But two hours later, on July 27, 1948, I installed
myself — with some difficulty — in the trunk of his car. The German
driver, who was going shopping for the camp commander, unwit-
tingly drove me through all the checkpoints. I too had chosen free-
dom.

Notes
1. This law allowed Al ied to set up tribunals to Judge those responsible for “was
crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity,” as defined by the Nuremberg Chanter.
(Editors’ note)

2. Professor J A. Martinez: The War Crimes Trials of ıhe Postwar Period, Paris 1958. (Editors’ note)
 27
THe Most DANGEROUS
MAAN IN EUROPE

My aim is to earn a living — Denazified “in absentia” — Talks with

General Peron, Colonel Nasser, King Hussein of Jordan and Presi-
dents Verwoerd and Vorster — The Daily Sketch is convicted of slan-
der —An absurd invention: “The Spider” — Imaginary kidnappings -
My secret army in the Sahara — The attack on Spandau Prison — The
train to Glasgow — I am General Dayan! — Sir Basil Liddell Hart:
the unnecessary war — The true heroes of the Second World War -
The United Nations faces an impossible task — Military conflicts go
on — Uprisings in the Eastern Block states — Atomic war = suicide -
The German decoding machine in British hands — Special commando
units combined with conventional warfare.

J= hurried to attribute the most fabulous adventures to

the “most dangerous man in Europe,” which was sometimes less
than welcome for my reputation.
First I was apparently the head of an international plot. In truth I
was wondering where I should live; like the vast majority of my
countrymen, who had lost everything in the war, I had to start over
again from zero.
But before I could earn a living I had to be “denazified.” As ev-
eryone knows, 3,300,000 Germans were called to appear before the
“denazification court” and were affected by this “purge.” A good
dozen of these civilian courts, which were run by real or alleged
“members of the resistance,” were in operation in the Darmstadt camp
(20,000 prisoners). One of these “judges,” before whose tribunal I
was supposed to appear, distinguished himself by being especially
hard. That was not surprising, for in his time he had denounced many
454
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 455
of his fellow citizens to Miiller’s Gestapo. These measures were forced
upon us by the occupying powers. They arranged the Germans into
five categories of culprits: to the first group belonged those who had
been members of the National Socialist German Workers Party or its
related organizations: the Labor Front, professional associations, male
or female youth organizations, and so on. Citizens who bore any sort
of responsibility within these organizations were placed in two fur-
ther groups (2 and 3 — less incriminated). Every former officer auto-
matically belonged to the fourth group. Group five formed the “prin-
cipal culprits,” like Minister Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, who was acquit-
ted at Nuremberg.
One could escape the process with a cunning lawyer and three
good witnesses to confirm that the accused had “put up sufficient
resistance.”
I myself was finally “denazified in absentia” in 1952 and was
classified as “less incriminated.”
After two years in Germany and two in France I found in Spain,
a chivalrous land, the opportunity to pursue anew my career as an
engineer. As I had none of the “SS treasure” — in contrast to what
many writers claimed — this was not easy. With the help of several
true friends, one of whom was a friend from my student days who
was likewise an engineer and who, luckily for him, had never be-
longed to the National Socialist Party, I got enough money together
to open a small technical office in Madrid.
Luck smiled on me in 1953. I obtained a contract for a large
quantity of railroad materials and machine tools. I was able to pay
back the money I had borrowed. | know of only one way to live
decently: that is to work. That is what I did and continue to do. Natu-
rally they discovered that I represented German firms, among oth-
ers, and sold their products. It would have been astonishing if I had
represented Soviet firms. It is true that I travelled on business to Ar-
gentina, where I was received by the late General Peron, and to Cairo,
where President Gamal Abd el Nasser told me that he would like to
develop Egypt industrially and economically with the help of the
west, especially the United States.
There was a German military mission in Cairo in 1951, whose
chief was General Wilhelm Fahrmbacher, who had stayed on after
the overthrow, and a civilian mission, which included capable rocket
scientists, under the leadership of Dr. Voss, a former director of the
456 Otro SKORZENY
Skoda factories. Fahrmbacher and Voss were extremely careful and
wanted no former members of the Waffen-SS in their groups at any
price. On my second trip to Cairo Nasser gave me a thick volume to
read, with about 100 typewritten pages. I had barely skimmed over a
few pages when I said to Nasser, who was now head of state, “But
these are very secret Egyptian government papers!”
“Read everything please.”
It was the text of very favorable Russian proposals for the Aswan
Dam and for considerable military aid.
When I had finished reading Nasser said to me: “We Arabs are in
no hurry. We can wait. I absolutely do not believe that our arab peoples
are susceptible to Marxist-Leninism; it contradicts our religion. I
personally am disposed toward the west. But since the west refuses
us its help, I see myself forced to accept that of the east. However I
will not accept the proposals you have read, not in a month, nor in
half a year.”
I then asked Nasser whether he authorized me to speak in general
terms about this conversation, should the occasion arise. He said that
he did.
I knew all to well that I had the American and British secret ser-
vices on my heels in Cairo. So I was scarcely surprised when, on my
return to the Hotel Semiramis, a charming person of Greek national-
ity but American spirit gave me an invitation to a reception being
held that night by the American military attache.
I drove there, and after an hour of general conversation the colo-
nel asked me if we could talk alone. We went into his office.
“Please excuse me for allowing myself the liberty,” he said, “but
we are soldiers and it is better to speak openly. I know that you were
with President Nasser this morning and that your audience lasted for
more than two hours. Of course I don’t wish to be indiscrete, but
may I ask what you talked about?”
“Your curiosity is understandable, and I have authorization to
satisfy it. I said little, read and listened.”
It turned out that the colonel had reported to the Pentagon some
weeks earlier that a decision was needed soon on aid for Egypt. He
planned to send a priority telegram that night and asked permission
to mention my name. I had no objections.
But there was little change in the policy toward Nasser. Many
took him for a communist, and so the Arab world was forced to turn
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 457
to the Soviet block. Fourteen months after our conversation Nasser
signed the well-known aid agreement with the Soviet Union.
In 1969 I met Ibn Talal Hussein, the King of Jordan, a ruler who
lived dangerously. How many coup attempts against him have al-
ready failed?
In 1965 in South Africa I spoke with Dr. Hendrik, who was mur-
dered by Dimitri Tsafendas, a steward, during a session of parlia-
ment in 1966. On that trip I also met the current President, BJ. Vorster,
who was then the Minister of Justice. During the war he was interned
in Koffeifontein concentration camp with the number 2229342, and
was then kept under house arrest, because he was one of the activists
fighting for his country’s freedom. The independence movement
called itself Brandwacht and eighty percent of the Boers between the
ages of twenty and fifty stayed in detention camp or prison or were
kept under house arrest until the end of hostilities. South Africa
achieved its independence after the referendum of October 5, 1960
and left the Commonwealth. The Boers, whose territory had simply
been annexed by the British Crown in 1977, had waited for this day
for more than eighty years.
I also made business trips to Portugal, the Congo — however I
only met the poor President Moise Tshombe later in Madrid, where
he lived in exile - Angola, Kenya, Greece, Paraguay and Ireland,
where I intended to raise sheep. But no one believed my peaceful
intentions.

For thirty years there had existed a sort of “Skorzeny legend.” It is

impossible to quote even a fraction of this figment of the imagina-
tion which has been printed about my alleged activities. I must admit
that I devoted a certain amount of attention to this sort of journalism
in the Sixties. I even kept several-thousand newspaper and magazine
clippings devoted my fictitious adventures. Not that the imaginative
scribes had had enough, but their fairy tales had now become boring.
Let us examine my supposed activities since 1950.
First, and even two years before I visited Argentina, I was the
Commander-in-Chief of the army of this republic, while General
Galland, the former General of Fighters, and Oberst Rudel com-
manded the air forces there!
458 OTTO SKORZENY
After my two-week stay in Cairo, in 1954 the Daily Sketch ac-
cused me of having for years instructed Egyptian special comman-
dos “‘in the art of killing British officers and soldiers.” There really
still were judges and strict laws governing the press in London. I
filed suit against the Daily Sketch. | was awarded ten-thousand Pounds
Sterling in damages as well as costs. I turned 5,000 Pounds over to
the Red Cross for the seriously war disabled of Britain and donated
5,000 Pounds to the fund for the German war-disabled.
After Father Sixtus’ disclosures at Nuremberg I thought that there
must be at least two Skorzenys. The weekly Wochenend related the
same thing in June 1950. Since 1944 I had a double who was almost
as tall as I and whose real or fictitious name was Vohwinkel. A doc-
tor had made the scars on his cheek — impossible to tell us apart. The
author of this article wanted to locate a photo of “Vohwinkel” and |
together. It seems he was unable to find one. The stupid thing was
that they no longer knew which of the two of us was travelling about
the world.
But in the time of the cold and hot wars the world press was not
unaware that | prepared a few revolutions here and there, and also
organized the “Nazi International” (Der Spinne or: “the Spider”), a
mysterious mafia with multifaceted, always criminal and subversive
activities.
Atthe end of 1950 Reynolds News and the Münchener Illustrierte
wrote that the heads of the “Spider” were none other than Serrano
Suner in Spain, Prince Junio-Valerio Borghese in Italy, the Grand
Mufti of Jerusalem in North Africa, Strasser in Canada, Sir Oswald
Mosley in Great Britain, Rudel in Argentina, General de Gaulle in
France, and so on, together with myself and Martin Bormann, who
in reality had died in Berlin in 1945. Only after protracted investiga-
tions did the German Ministry of the Interior conclude that the “Spi-
der” had never existed, as proved by a document dated August 30,
1972, which is reproduced here.
Not only had I sunk the “SS treasure” and fished it out again
several times from Lake Wahl, Tirpitz or Hinter or even from Lake
Neusiedler — they saw it! — which not only mobilized the press but
television as well — I also found the secret correspondence between
Mussolini and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, as the Duce
“confided in me.” Regrettably, I don’t know in which matter.
In August 1953 the French government deposed the government
of the Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed Ben Jussuf and deported the
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 459
ruler, who was descended from the Aluit Dynasty which governed in
the Eighteenth Century, and his family to Corsica. Soon the French
authorities learned that he wasn’t safe there. Numerous French and
Swiss newspapers confidently claimed that I had been hired by the
Arab League to kidnap the sultan and his family. Their reliable sources
even informed them that I was paid one million dollars for this op-
eration. So they took the monarch first to Fort Lamy, then to Mada-
gascar. The Laniel government was placed on highest alert.
There was no cause, for I never had any intention of freeing the
famous, noble prisoner and his family. | would scarcely have had the
time anyway, for Mohammed V returned to Rabat in triumph in 1955
and two years later was proclaimed King of Morocco.
In the same way I must deny that I ever intended to kidnap the
Algerian leader Ben Bella and Fidel Castro of Cuba. However, be-
fore the head of the revolutionary movement, the so-called “27th of
July,” seized power in February, certain American reporters told the
public that I was his advisor in the guerilla war against Batista.
It soon turned out that I would have to devote almost all my time
if I wanted to deny all the “information” published about me by the
world press and pursue all the slanderers. That was not possible.
Furthermore I was able to determine that the only country whose
laws enabled one to defend oneself effectively against lies, slander
and systematic defamation was Great Britain. The newspaper editors
in that country also knew the laws governing the press better than
anywhere else.
During the 1950s the Sunday Graphic did not make the same
mistakes as the Daily Sketch. It had me followed by two officers, or
alleged officers, of the intelligence service: Major Stanley Moss and
Captain Michael Luke. Their mission was to find me — which was
not easy, for “I moved like lightning” — and subsequently interview
me about my adventures.
Moss and Luke of course had an aircraft at their disposal. They
were lucky to come across my tracks in Sweden, Bavaria, France,
Italy, Egypt, in Baghdad and so on. But each time I learned through
dumb luck that they were coming, several hours before their arrival
at the place in question. This was probably attributed to my being
warned in time by the famous “Spider.”
I followed my supposed adventures from my desk in Madrid with
great interest, and I am sure that Ilan Fleming read them too. I lived in
460 Otto SKORZENY
the most extraordinary palaces in the world, surrounded by racy
blondes or mysterious dark-haired women, who employed their
charms in the service of my dangerous activities.
I also heard that I was commander-in-chief of a secret army, whose
garrison was located “near Mursuk” in the Libyan desert, “four-thou-
sand kilometers from any civilization” on a rocky plateau “where
many peaks exceeded 3,000 meters.” On October 13, 1956 the weekly
magazine Samstag published an account of the adventures of an old
Jesuit missionary, Monseigneur Jean Baptiste de la Gravaires. As he
knew the Sahara “like his own vest pocket, in the course of his ex-
plorations the father was a guest in a mysterious “city” in the desert.
This city was the capital of a sort of military empire, whose leader |
was.
“Monsieur de la Gravaires” admitted that I had treated him well.
I had placed left over units of the Africa Corps under my command,
about ten-thousand man, and organized and equipped them. I had at
my disposal tanks and aircraft, which “dove out of the steel-blue sky
like birds of prey and could land on the smallest surface in this rug-
ged area.”
My capital city was protected by “the most modern alarm sys-
tem,” which included infrared beam devices which watched over the
area at night; any suspicious approach was detected. Samstag noted
that organizing an expedition to go there would be very expensive,
and there would probably be fighting. The French intelligence ser-
vice (Le Deuxiéme Bureau Parisien) therefore had to abandon the
idea of an expedition... By the way, “if this phantom city remains
unknown to this day, it is because women are forbidden to enter.”
Pity!
From this mixture of Jules Verne and Pierre Benoit’s novel
L’Atlantide, we come in 1959 to the theft of the treasure of Begum: |
was said to have been the instigator. At the same time several news-
papers noted that in July 1940 I was supposed to have kidnapped the
Duke and Duchess of Windsor, who were in Lisbon at the time. When
the papers went looking for more information, they found that in
1940 we in the Das Reich Division were quite simply thinking about
how we might occupy the British Isles! But unfortunately this inva-
sion did not take place either.
Apparently I was in constant communication with Martin
Bormann. I met him in a forest on the Czechoslovak-Bavarian bor-
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 461
der, once in the Amazon, or...in Israel, which is even more original.
Of course I lived in grand style, owning various castles, a villa on the
Riviera, a yacht and fast cars...
But unfortunately they were only castles on the moon! When the
telephone rang in my Madrid office, my customers, as always, asked
for spiral-welded pipes, sheet metal, cement, a cost estimate for a
machine tool and the like.
However in 1962 it was obvious to the American Weekly that I
intended to storm Spandau Prison and free Rudolf Hess. In the fol-
lowing year, on August 8, 1963, the “hold-up of the century” took
place. The Glasgow-London train was stopped at a bridge by a false
red light. The mail car was robbed. The thieves got away with more
than two-and-a-half-million Pounds Sterling! The affair was prepared
down to the smallest detail by a “brilliant mind” and was executed
perfectly.
“Who else could this mind be?” asked the French weekly Noir et
Blanc, if not Otto Skorzeny? It was perfectly clear! I must admit that
this magazine did print all the letters of protest sent by me.
From 1957 to 1960 I simultaneously organized an army in India
and another in the Congo, supplied and advised both the Algerian
FLN and the French OAS, and thanks to my Irish sheep I was also
able to take an interest in the activities of the IRA.
Admittedly in the past six to eight years the press has proved to
be more objective where I’m concerned. The BBC and French tele-
vision really exhibited “fair play” and I would like to express my
appreciation for their fair judgement of my person.
The most exaggerated information? It was published by the Pol-
ish paper Glos Robotniczy and the story was immediately picked up
by a German paper: Israeli General Moshe Dayan and Otto Skorzeny
were, in reality, one and the same person.
This just proves that human stupidity knows no bounds.
 EPILOGUE

n concluding his gigantic work on the Second World War, Sir

Basil Liddell Hart concluded that the demand for unconditional
surrender, the death sentence for the German people, was stu-
pid and dangerous. He stated that “this unnecessary war was
thus prolonged unnecessarily,” and that the resulting peace “exclu-
sively served the interests of Stalin and gave up central Europe to
communist rule.” Unfortunately this “unnecessary war” took place. I
have tried to point out its true causes and the most important blows
which Germany was forced to take. Most of all I would like to give
pride of place to the soldiers who saw these battles through with the
greatest courage: the simple Russian and German soldier.
In 1941 the former met the onslaught of the German armies with
steadfastness and exemplary bravery. Poorly fed and under poor com-
mand at the division level, he resisted and often went over to the
counterattack in critical situations; his stubbornness and his energy
were downright admirable. Together with his opponent, the German
soldier, he is the unknown hero of this great war.
Only someone who has fought in Russia, in searing heat or at
forty degrees below zero Celsius, in the plains, the forests, the swamps,
in the muck, in the snow, in the ice, can make a proper assessment of
the Russian and German soldier. The latter fought for five years and
eight months; from July 1944 to April 1945 he fought on even though
he knew that he had been betrayed.
One should also not forget that for three long years millions of
German women, together with their children and older relatives, en-
dured constant bombing raids. Stoically, and with a calmness not
seen before, these women endured the terror night after night with-

462
 My ComMMANDO OPERATIONS 463
out complaint. The story of the quiet heroism of the German civilian
population and its horrible losses must still be written.
Hitler’s Third Reich was born in Versailles on June 28, 1919.
What monster was born on September 30, 1946? No one knows yet.
In the course of the largest and strangest trial in history, the victors
appointed themselves judge in order to punish the defeated.
How could I know in 1939 that I was committing a crime by
voluntarily joining the Waffen-SS. A former minister of the British
Crown, Lord Hankey, a member of the war cabinet, wrote in his book
Politics, Trials and Errors (1949), that it was very dangerous for the
future of mankind that the “victors subsequently invented crimes”
and “enacted laws retroactively, “which meant the denial of justice
itself.” Lord Hankey was also one of the first who declared that a
judge could not be the deadly enemy of those he judged.
“The defeated,” he wrote, “cannot be convinced that crimes like
the deportation of civilian populations, looting, the murdering of pris-
oners and destruction without military necessity were punished jus-
tifiably, when he knows that similar charges were never brought
against one or more of the allied victors.”
Other personalities also opposed the existence of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and its judgements with equal energy: Sir Reginald Paget,
the defender of Feldmarschall von Manstein, US Senator Taft, Prof.
Gilbert Murray, the Duke of Bedford, to name only the most famous
who protested in 1945-1949.
Theoretically the Nuremberg Charter is supposed to prevent
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity from
being committed in the future. The United Nations, like the League
of Nations before it, is supposed to outlaw war and apply the charter.
Although many German soldiers were the victims of false accusa-
tions, we, the other prisoners, thought at first that the United Nations
had taken on an honorable mission.
However Hitler and Mussolini, who were designated the chief
culprits in the war, were dead. Meanwhile more than fifty large and
small wars have been fought since 1946.
France, which had annexed Madagascar in 1896, was forced to
quell a serious uprising there in 1946-47. Suppressing it proved dif-
ficult, and the island was finally declared independent in 1960. The
war in Indochina (1946-1954) cost France 57,687 dead and it was
464 OTTO SKORZENY
forced to abandon its colony. In 1961 the USA resumed the war; it
devoured materiel and men endlessiy and brought untold suffering
to the population. Holland likewise fought to keep its colonies in
Indonesia (from 1946 to 1963), with the same lack of success as
France and Belgium, which was forced to quit the Congo.
The hostilities in the Congo were marked by great brutality, just
as they later were in North Angola, in Zanzibar, in the Sudan, in
Uganda, Biafra, Burundi and so on. The actions by the “Blue Hel-
mets” of the United Nations were bitter, but were criticized, prob-
ably justifiably. Racial feuds, anti-semitism and expulsions of ele-
ments of populations still plague the African continent, where for a
good dozen years coup d’état has followed coup d’état, with no out-
look for a “normalization” of the resulting political and social sys-
tems.
The Korean War cost the United States 54,246 killed and 104,000
wounded. France lost 30,000 men in the Algerian war and the num-
ber of wounded exceeded 55,000. For its part the Algerian Libera-
tion Front estimates “that total losses amounted to one million.” The
exact number of victims claimed by the Quemoy Islands affair (1958),
the wars between Israel and the Arab nations, the guerilla wars in
Syria, in Iraq, in Mozambique and so on, and the bloody religious
and racial conflicts which had taken place in India since 1947 is un-
known.
In most cases these hostilities were carried on in spite of the pro-
tests and directions by the United Nations. Never was a war criminal
tried according to the Nuremberg Charter, neither for conspiring
against peace, nor for war crimes or genocide. Certain officers of the
US Anny, who were charged with ordering massacres in Viet Nam,
were tried by normal military courts — but not in accordance with the
Nuremberg Charter.
In Africa and Asia however one sees the methodical elimination
of groups of people by others who are better armed and supported by
powerful nations. Uprisings in Poland, East Germany, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia against the Soviet yoke were bloodily suppressed.
How did the western powers react? Not at all. The victors of the
Second World War committed the same mistake as at Versailles in
1919, with the difference that they multiplied the causes of conflict
all over the world; now any one of them can deteriorate into nuclear
war.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 465
eco

They say that in a future war the “human” factor will be seen as
secondary. This is not my view.
No human community accepts its own destruction without de-
fending itself. It was this very feeling that motivated the German
people in 1944 and 1945, when the enemy was trying to force them
to accept an “unconditional surrender.” The world powers that today
possess atomic weapons — the USA, Great Britain and even China,
France and India — are all aware that a war fought with all the mod-
ern means of destruction would be outright suicide.
General Telford Taylor demonstrated in 1955 that a specially
trained commando unit could kidnap the President of the United States
from a golf course. The operation, in which a vertical takeoff aircraft
was used, was carried out so swiftly that it was impossible to deter-
mine whether the kidnappers were Russian, Chinese, Czech or Ger-
man. In my opinion it could also be Americans, although General
Taylor did not put forward such a hypothesis.
On the other hand Charles Whiting suspects that one fine day all
the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, together with the supreme chiefs of the Warsaw
Pact, will disappear. . .
There is nothing that proves that an atomic war would render the
use of special commando units superfluous, as many maintain. The
commandos could play a decisive role, while a conventional mass
attack would be doomed to failure.
Those general staffs that rely solely on the accuracy and destruc-
tive power of their guided weapons would regret it.
Another example of a British commando raid, carried out during
the Polish campaign, has only recently come to light. Group Captain
Frederick Winterbotham was chief or air reconnaissance in the Brit-
ish secret service until 1945.
A German cipher machine, “Ultra,” was captured in the first days
of the Polish campaign and immediately taken to England. The ci-
pher machine enabled the English to learn many German operational
plans, which made it easier to initiate countermeasures. The above-
named English secret service officer concluded the following in his
memoirs: allied propaganda, which claims to this day that the Sec-
ond World War was “a sort of great triumphant, heroic epic” and was
466 OTTO SKORZENY
won in that way, is false. It would be better if they would think about
what would have happened if the “Ultra” device hadn’t fallen into
British hands.
Perfectly equipped and trained, determined battle groups, which
are intelligently led, should always be capable of creating an unex-
pected situation and producing a decision, perhaps even — as I have
said — before a conflict breaks out. During hostilities, commando
units of technicians and propagandists could create confusion and
perhaps chaos.
Obviously the use of special units can only be planned when their
perfectly-coordinated missions are incorporated into the overall pro-
cess of the war.

As we know, the Laycock-Heyes operation in Beda Littoria in No-

vember 1941 failed for several reasons, the main one being that Gen-
eral Rommel wasn’t there. But this operation formed only one part
of the following whole:

1. Sir Claude Auchinleck, the commander-in-chief of the British

forces, who relieved General Wavell, possessed the plan for the of-
fensive which Rommel was to start on November 23.

2. On the night of November 17 the Laycock-Heyes commando

unit had the mission of spiriting Rommel away.

3. Auchinleck attacked on November 18, in the belief that Rommel

had already been liquidated.

Here is another example of a combination between special action

and conventional warfare:

1. Allied troops landed in Italy on July 10, 1943 and on the 23rd
occupied Salerno.

2. Sunday, the 24th of July: the Duce is outvoted at a meeting of

the Fascist Grand Council. The next day the King of Italy becomes
chief of the special command; he sets a trap for his government leader.
 My CoMMANDO OPERATIONS 467
The Duce is kidnapped at the exit from the Royal Palace and is spir-
ited away in an ambulance.

3. Hitler gives General Student and me the task of finding and

freeing Mussolini. It is a fact that the arrest of the Duce was arranged
with the western allies.

What happened in mid-1944?

1. The English and Americans land in Normandy on June 6.

2. During the night of June 19-20 hundreds of Russian special

commando units sabotage rail lines, blow up bridges, destroy tele-
phone lines, and so on, in the area of our Army Group Center. The
Russian offensive begins on June 22.

3. The western allies enter Cherbourg on June 27, Saint-Lö on

July 18; the Russian armies take Pinsk on July 15, Vilna in the north
on the 16th, Grodno in the center on July 17.

4. On July 29 Stauffenberg plants his bomb. His co-conspirators

inform the chiefs of the German army groups — in the west as well as
in the east: “The Führer is dead!”

Can one speak of simple coincidences?

Had the western allies known for certain that the assassination
attempt against Hitler was carried out on July 20, 1944, they might
have acted — or perhaps they would have done nothing, in spite of the
repeated requests by Dulles. In any case the assassination was post-
poned so often that they didn’t believe in it any more. The English
and Americans failed to react and left the conspirators in the lurch.
As for me, I wouldn’t have been surprised during the night of the
20th of July at the Bendlerstrasse to have received news that two or
three battalions of Anglo-Saxon paratroops had landed in or near
Berlin. Several units wearing German uniforms would have caused
confusion for two or three days at the most. In the critical situation in
which our armies in the west found themselves, the English and
Americans could have crossed the Rhine at the end of August, begin-
ning of September at the latest.
468 Orto SKORZENY
The enemy’s stubbornness to stick to their decision that Germany
must d it ly, prevented them from using outstand-
ing special troops within the framework of a strategic whole— which
would have helped achieve victory seven or eight months earlier.
On March 8, 1974 I learned from a German newspaper that I had
a rival in Israel. Not General Dayan (this time), but General Ariel
Sharon, the commander of Unit 101. Erich Kem, the author of the
article, first noted that, “Skorzeny’s methods were studied by the
Israeli general staff.” Consequently, “Sharon and his commando unit
crossed the Suez Canal at night. The participants in this operation
wore Egyptian uniforms and had about twenty Egyptian tanks. In
this way Sharon was able to smash a fairly wide breach on the Egyp-
tian side of the canal.”
General Sharon and his Special Unit 101 had more luck than we
did with the 150th Panzer Brigade. He crossed the canal — we could
not cross the Maas. But this example showed, clearly I believe, that
the prospect exists in any war of successfully carrying out a special
action and creating a decisive politica/ advantage.
We know that Hitler gave a great deal of thought — as did Lenin,
by the way - to Clausewitz’s answer to the famous question: “What
is war?”
His answer is well known:

“War is only a continuation of politics with other means.”

If these means have been fundamentally changed by the atom bomb,

only the special action remains as the clearest expression of “con-
tinuation of politics.” In most cases such an action is more of a mat-
ter of politics or economics than actual military science.
Like it or not, a new type of soldier has arisen: an organized
adventurer. He must have some of the qualities of a guerilla, a man
of science and an inventor, of a scholar and psychologist.
He can emerge from the water or fall from the sky, can walk
peaceably along the streets of the enemy’s capital or issue him false
orders. In reality war is for him an anachronism. In vain the “tradi-
tional” generals view him with understandable suspicion. He exists
and can no longer disappear from the battlefield; he is the authentic
secret weapon of his fatherland.
 The Memoirs of Hitler's
Most Daring Commando
...limmediately shouted, “Steep approach! Land as close
behind the hotel as possible!” The other seven gliders flying
behind me would surely do the same. Radl, who reported
our maneuver to the pilot of machine number four, later
admitted to me that he thought | had gone mad. In spite
of the braking parachutes, our machine landed much too
fast. It bounced several times and there was a frightful din,
but finally it came to a stop about 15 meters from the cor-
ner of the hotel. The glider was almost completely de-
stroyed. From then on everything happened very quickly.
Weapon in hand, Iran as quickly as | could toward the
hotel. My seven Waffen-SS comrades and Leutnant Meier
followed. An astonished sentry just stared at us. To my right -
there was a door: | forced my way in. Aradio operator was —
at work in front of his set. | kicked the stool out from under | —
him and the radio operator fell to the floor. A blow from my
submachine-gun destroyed the radio set. Later, | learned
that at that very moment the man was supposed to send
a report to General Cueli that aircraft were approaching
to land. The room had no other doors, and so we dashed
along the back side of the hotel looking for an entrance:
but there was none, just a terrace at the end of the wall. |
climbed on to the shoulders of Scharfuhrer Himmel. | moved
up and found myself standing at the front of the hotel. | ran
on and suddenly caught sight of Mussolini’s striking profile
ina window frame...