Electromagnetic pulse

The term electromagnetic pulse (sometimes abbreviated EMP) has the following

meanings:

1. A burst of electromagnetic radiation from an explosion (especially a nuclear

explosion) or a suddenly fluctuating magnetic field.  The
resulting electric and magnetic fields may couple with electrical/electronic
systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges.
2. A broadband, high-intensity, short-duration burst of electromagnetic energy.
In military terminology, an EMP bomb detonated hundreds of kilometers above the
earth's surface is known as a High-altitude ElectroMagnetic Pulse
(HEMP) device. Nuclear electromagnetic bombs have three distinct time
components that result from different physical phemonena. Effects of an EMP
device depend on the altitude of the detonation, energy yield, interactions with the
earth's magnetic field, and shielding of targets.
History
The fact that an electromagnetic pulse is produced by a nuclear explosion was
known since the earliest days of nuclear weapons testing, but the magnitude of
the EMP and the significance of its effects were realized very slowly.
During the first United States nuclear test, electronic equipment was reportedly
shielded due to Enrico Fermi's expectation of some sort of electromagnetic pulse
from the detonation. During British nuclear testing in 1952–1953 there were
instrumentation failures that were attributed to "radioflash," which was then the
British term for EMP.
The high altitude nuclear tests of 1962, as described below, increased awareness of
EMP beyond the original small population of nuclear weapons scientists and
engineers. The larger scientific community became aware of the significance of the
EMP problem after a series of three articles were published about nuclear
electromagnetic pulse in 1981 by William J. Broad in the weekly
publication Science.
Starfish Prime
In July 1962, a 1.44 megaton (6.0 PJ) United States nuclear test in space,
400 kilometres (250 mi) above the mid-Pacific Ocean, called theStarfish Prime test,
demonstrated to nuclear scientists that the magnitude and effects of a high altitude
nuclear explosion were much larger than had been previously calculated. Starfish
Prime also made those effects known to the public by causing electrical damage in
Hawaii, about 1,445 kilometres (898 mi) away from the detonation point, knocking
out about 300 streetlights, setting off numerous burglar alarms and damaging a
telephone company microwave link.
The EMP damage of the Starfish Prime test was quickly repaired because of the
ruggedness (compared to today) of the electrical and electronic infrastructure of
Hawaii in 1962. Realization of the potential impacts of EMP became more apparent
to some scientists and engineers during the 1970s as more sensitive solid-state
electronics began to come into widespread use.
The relatively small magnitude of the Starfish Prime EMP in Hawaii (about 5,600
volts/meter) and the relatively small amount of damage done (for example, only 1 to
3 percent of streetlights extinguished)[7] led some scientists to believe, in the early
days of EMP research, that the problem might not be as significant as was later
realized. Newer calculations showed that if the Starfish Prime warhead had been
detonated over the northern continental United States, the magnitude of the EMP
would have been much larger (22,000 to 30,000 volts/meter) because of the greater
strength of the Earth's magnetic field over the United States, as well as the different
orientation of the Earth's magnetic field at high latitudes. These new calculations,
combined with the accelerating reliance on EMP-sensitive microelectronics,
heightened awareness that the EMP threat could be a very significant problem.
Soviet Test 184
In 1962, the Soviet Union also performed a series of three EMP-producing nuclear
tests in space over Kazakhstan, which were the last in the series called "The K
Project  Although these weapons were much smaller (300 kilotons or 1.3 PJ) than
the Starfish Prime test, since those tests were done over a populated large land
mass (and also at a location where the Earth's magnetic field was greater), the
damage caused by the resulting EMP was reportedly much greater than in
the Starfish Prime nuclear test. The geomagnetic storm-like E3 pulse (from the test
designated as "Test 184") even induced an electrical current surge in a long
underground power line that caused a fire in the power plant in the city
of Karagandy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the level of this damage was
communicated informally to scientists in the United States.  Formal documentation
of some of the EMP damage in Kazakhstan exist but is still sparse in the open
scientific literature.
Non-nuclear history
The concept of the explosively pumped flux compression generator for generating a
non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse was conceived as early as 1951 by Andrei
Sakharov in the Soviet Union, but most nations have kept work on non-nuclear EMP
highly classified until the technology was old enough for similar ideas to be
conceived by physicists in other nations.
According to some reports, the U.S. Navy used experimental non-nuclear E-bombs
during the 1991 Gulf War. These bombs utilized warheads that converted the
energy of conventional explosives into a pulse of radio energy. CBS News also
reported that the U.S. dropped an E-bomb on Iraqi TV during the 2003 invasion of
Iraq, but this has not been confirmed.
Characteristics of nuclear EMP
The case of a nuclear electromagnetic pulse differs from other kinds of
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) in being a complex electromagnetic multi-pulse. The
complex multi-pulse is usually described in terms of three components, and these
three components have been defined as such by the international standards
commission called the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
The three components of nuclear EMP, as defined by the IEC, are
called E1, E2 and E3.
The E1 pulse is the very fast component of nuclear EMP. The E1 component has an
intense electric field that can quickly induce very high voltages in electrical
conductors. E1 is the component that can destroy computers and communications
equipment and is too fast for ordinary lightning protectors.
The E1 component is produced when gamma radiation from the nuclear detonation
knocks electrons out of the atoms in the upper atmosphere. The electrons travel in a
generally downward direction at relativistic speeds (more than 90 percent of the
speed of light). This essentially produces a large pulse of electrical current vertically
in the upper atmosphere over the entire affected area. This electrical current is
acted upon by the Earth's magnetic field to produce a very large, but very brief,
electromagnetic pulse over the affected area.
The E2 component of the pulse has many similarities to the electromagnetic pulses
produced by lightning. Because of the similarities to lightning-caused pulses and the
widespread use of lightning protection technology, the E2 pulse is generally
considered to be the easiest to protect against.
The E3 component of the pulse is a very slow pulse, lasting tens to hundreds of
seconds, that is caused by the nuclear detonation heaving theEarth's magnetic
field out of the way, followed by the restoration of the magnetic field to its natural
place. The E3 component has similarities to a geomagnetic storm caused by a very
severe solar flare.[18][19] Like a geomagnetic storm, E3 can produce geomagnetically
induced currentsin long electrical conductors, which can then damage components
such as power line transformers.
For a more thorough description of E3 damage mechanisms, see the main
article:  Geomagnetically induced current
Practical considerations for nuclear EMP
The strongest part of the pulse lasts for only a fraction of a second, but any
unprotected electrical equipment — and anything connected to electrical cables,
which act as giant lightning rods or antennas — will be affected by the pulse.
Older, vacuum tube (valve) based equipment is much less vulnerable to EMP than
newer solid state equipment; Soviet Cold War–era military aircraft often had
avionics based on vacuum tubes due both to limitations in Soviet solid-state
capabilities and a belief that the vacuum gear would survive better.On the other
hand, the solid state PRC-77 VHF manpack radio survived extensive EMP
testing. The earlier PRC-25, nearly identical except for a vacuum tube final
amplification stage, had been tested in EMP simulators but was not certified to
remain fully functional.
Many nuclear detonations have taken place using bombs dropped by aircraft.
The B-29 aircraft that delivered the atomic weapons at Hiroshimaand Nagasaki did
not lose power due to damage to their electrical or electronic systems. This is simply
because electrons (ejected from the air by gamma rays) are stopped quickly in
normal air for bursts below roughly 10 km (about 6 miles), so they do not get a
chance to be significantly deflected by the Earth's magnetic field (the deflection
causes the powerful EMP seen in high altitude bursts), but it does point out the
limited use of smaller burst altitudes for widespread EMP.
If the aircraft carrying the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs had been within the
intense nuclear radiation zone when the bombs exploded over those cities, then
they would have suffered effects from the charge separation (radial) EMP. But this
only occurs within the severe blast radius for detonations below about 10 km
altitude.
During nuclear tests in 1962, EMP disruptions were suffered aboard KC-
135 photographic aircraft flying 300 km (190 mi) from the 410 kt
(1,700 TJ) Bluegill and 410 kt (1,700 TJ) Kingfish detonations (48 and 95 km (30
and 59 mi) burst altitude, respectively) but the vital aircraft electronics were far less
sophisticated than today and the aircraft were able to land safely.
Generation of nuclear EMP
Several major factors control the effectiveness of a nuclear EMP weapon. These
are:

1. The altitude of the weapon when detonated;

2. The yield and construction details of the weapon;
3. The distance from the weapon when detonated;
4. Geographical depth or intervening geographical features;
5. The local strength of the Earth's magnetic field.
Beyond a certain altitude a nuclear weapon will not produce any EMP, as the
gamma rays will have had sufficient distance to disperse. In deep space or on
worlds with no magnetic field (the moon or Mars for example) there will be little or no
EMP. This has implications for certain kinds of nuclear rocket engines, such
as Project Orion.
Weapon altitude
According to an internet primer published by the Federation of American Scientists
A high-altitude nuclear detonation produces an immediate flux of gamma
rays from the nuclear reactions within the device. These photons in turn
produce high energy free electrons by Compton scattering at altitudes
between (roughly) 20 and 40 km. These electrons are then trapped in
theEarth's magnetic field, giving rise to an oscillating electric current. This
current is asymmetric in general and gives rise to a rapidly rising
radiatedelectromagnetic field called an electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
Because the electrons are trapped essentially simultaneously, a very large
electromagnetic source radiates coherently.
The pulse can easily span continent-sized areas, and this radiation can affect
systems on land, sea, and air. The first recorded EMP incident accompanied
a high-altitude nuclear test over the South Pacific and resulted in power
system failures as far away as Hawaii. A large device detonated at 400–500
km (250 to 312 miles) over Kansas would affect all of the continental U.S.
The signal from such an event extends to the visual horizon as seen from the
burst point.
Thus, for equipment to be affected, the weapon needs to be above
the visual horizon. Because of the nature of the pulse as a large, long, high
powered, noisyspike, it is doubtful that there would be much protection if the
explosion were seen in the sky just below the tops of hills or mountains.
The altitude indicated above is greater than that of the International Space
Station and many low Earth orbit satellites. Large weapons could have a
dramatic impact on satellite operations and communications; smaller
weapons have less such potential.

Weapon yield
Typical nuclear weapon yields used during Cold War planning for EMP
attacks were in the range of 1 to 10 megatons (4.2 to 42 PJ) This is roughly
50 to 500 times the sizes of the weapons the United States used
in Japan at Hiroshimaand Nagasaki. Physicists have testified at United
States Congressional hearings, however, that weapons with yields of
10 kilotons (42 TJ) or less can produce a very large EMP.
The EMP at a fixed distance from a nuclear weapon does not depend
directly on the yield but at most only increases as the square root of the
yield (see the illustration to the right).  This means that although a
10 kiloton weapon has only 0.7% of the total energy release of the 1.44-
megaton Starfish Prime test, the EMP will be at least 8% as powerful. Since
the E1 component of nuclear EMP depends on the prompt gamma
ray output, which was only 0.1% of yield inStarfish Prime but can be 0.5% of
yield in pure fission weapons of low yield, a 10 kiloton bomb can easily be 5
x 8% = 40% as powerful as the 1.44 megatonStarfish Prime at producing
EMP.
The total prompt gamma ray energy in a fission explosion is 3.5% of the
yield, but in a 10 kiloton detonation the high explosive around the bomb core
absorbs about 85% of the prompt gamma rays, so the output is only about
0.5% of the yield in kilotons. In the thermonuclear Starfish Prime the fission
yield was less than 100% to begin with, and then the thicker outer casing
absorbed about 95% of the prompt gamma rays from the pusher around the
fusion stage.Thermonuclear weapons are also less efficient at producing
EMP because the first stage can pre-ionise the air which becomes
 conductive and hence rapidly shorts out the electron Compton
currents generated by the final, larger yield thermonuclear stage. Hence,
small pure fission weapons with thin cases are far more efficient at causing
EMP than most megaton bombs.
This analysis, however, only applies to the fast E1 and E2 components of
nuclear EMP. The geomagnetic storm-like E3 component of nuclear EMP is
more closely proportional to the total energy yield of the weapon.
Weapon distance
A unique and important aspect of nuclear EMP is that all of the components of the
electromagnetic pulse are generated outside of the weapon. The important E1
component is generated by interaction with the electrons in the upper atmosphere
that are hit by gamma radiation from the weapon — and the subsequent effects
upon those electrons by the Earth's magnetic field.
For high-altitude nuclear explosions, this means that much of the EMP is actually
generated at a large distance from the detonation (where the gamma radiation from
the explosion hits the upper atmosphere). This causes the electric field from the
EMP to be remarkably uniform over the large area affected.
According to the standard reference text on nuclear weapons effects published by
the U.S. Department of Defense, "The peak electric field (and its amplitude) at the
Earth's surface from a high-altitude burst will depend upon the explosion yield, the
height of the burst, the location of the observer, and the orientation with respect to
the geomagnetic field.  As a general rule, however, the field strength may be
expected to be tens of kilovolts per meter over most of the area receiving the EMP
radiation."
The same reference book also states that, "... over most of the area affected by the
EMP the electric field strength on the ground would exceed 0.5Emax.   For yields of
less than a few hundred kilotons, this would not necessarily be true because the
field strength at the Earth's tangent could be substantially less than 0.5Emax."
(Emax refers to the maximum electric field strength in the affected area.)
In other words, the electric field strength in the entire area that is affected by the
EMP will be fairly uniform for weapons with a large gamma ray output; but for much
smaller weapons, the electric field may fall off at a comparatively faster rate at large
distances from the detonation point.
It is the peak electric field of the EMP that determines the peak voltage induced in
equipment and other electrical conductors on the ground, and most of the damage
is determined by induced voltages.
For nuclear detonations within the atmosphere, the situation is more complex.
Within the range of gamma ray deposition, simple laws no longer hold as the air
is ionised and there are other EMP effects, such as a radial electric field due to the
separation of Compton electrons from air molecules, together with other complex
phenomena. For a surface burst, absorption of gamma rays by air would limit the
range of gamma ray deposition to approximately 10 miles, while for a burst in the
lower-density air at high altitudes, the range of deposition would be far greater.

Non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse

Non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NNEMP) is an electromagnetic pulse
generated without use of nuclear weapons. There are a number of devices that can
achieve this objective, ranging from a large low-inductance capacitor bank
discharged into a single-loop antenna or a microwave generator to an explosively
pumped flux compression generator. To achieve the frequency characteristics of the
pulse needed for optimal coupling into the target, wave-shaping circuits and/or
microwave generators are added between the pulse source and the antenna. A
vacuum tube particularly suitable for microwave conversion of high energy pulses is
the vircator.
NNEMP generators can be carried as a payload of bombs and cruise missiles,
allowing construction of electromagnetic bombs with diminished mechanical,
thermal and ionizing radiation effects and without the political consequences of
deploying nuclear weapons.
The range of NNEMP weapons (non-nuclear electromagnetic bombs) is severely
limited compared to nuclear EMP. This is because nearly all NNEMP devices used
as weapons require chemical explosives as their initial energy source, but nuclear
explosives have an energy yield on the order of one million times that of chemical
explosives of similar weight. In addition to the large difference in the energy density
of the initial energy source, the electromagnetic pulse from NNEMP weapons must
come from within the weapon itself, while nuclear weapons generate EMP as a
secondary effect, often at great distances from the detonation.  These facts severely
limit the range of NNEMP weapons as compared to their nuclear counterparts, but
allow for more surgical target discrimination. The effect of small e-bombs has
proven to be sufficient for certain terrorist or military operations. Examples of such
operations include the destruction of certain fragile electronic control systems of the
type critical to the operation of many ground vehicles and aircraft.
NNEMP generators also include large structures built to generate EMP for testing of
electronics to determine how well it survives EMP. In addition, the use of ultra-
wideband radars can generate EMP in areas immediately adjacent to the radar; this
phenomenon is only partly understood.
Information about the EMP simulators used by the United States during the latter
part of the Cold War, along with more general information about electromagnetic
pulse, are now in papers under the care of the SUMMA Foundation, which is now
hosted at the University of New Mexico.
The SUMMA Foundation web site includes documentation about the huge wooden
Trestle simulator in New Mexico, which was the world's largest EMP simulator. 
Nearly all of these large EMP simulators used a specialized version of a Marx
generator.  The SUMMA Foundation now has a 44-minute documentary movie on
its web site called "TRESTLE: Landmark of the Cold War"
Many large EMP simulators were also built in the Soviet Union, as well as in the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland and Italy.

Post-Cold War attack scenarios

Typical modern scenarios seen in large numbers of news accounts and opinion
article speculate about the use of nuclear weapons by rogue states or terrorists in
an EMP attack. Details of such scenarios are always controversial. It is impossible
to know what kind of capabilities such terrorists might acquire, especially if they are
aided by state sponsors with access to advanced technology.
Some rogue states have developed an ability to deliver a light missile payload to the
necessary altitude for an EMP attack. Nuclear weapons in general have a much
heavier missile payload, however advanced weapons design enables larger weapon
yields with lighter weight. It is difficult to know if any particular rogue state has the
necessary combination of advanced missile technology and nuclear weapons
technology to perform an effective nuclear EMP attack over an industrialized
country.
A common scenario is the detonation of a device over the middle of the U.S. using
long-range missiles that have historically been available only to major military
powers. An offshore detonation at high altitude, by contrast, would present less
technical difficulty and would disrupt both an entire coast and regions hundreds of
miles inland (e.g. 120 mile altitude, 1,000 mile EMP radius).
In 2009, Yael Shahar, a director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism,
reported that home-built handheld non-nuclear e-bombs may become a significant
threat to airliners.
United States EMP vulnerability studies
The United States EMP Commission was authorized by the United States
Congress in Fiscal Year 2001, and re-authorized in Fiscal Year 2006. The
commission is formally known as the Commission to Assess the Threat to the
United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack.
The United States EMP Commission has brought together a group of notable
scientists and technologists to compile several reports. In 2008, the EMP
Commission released the Critical National Infrastructures Report. This report
describes, in as much detail as practical, the likely consequences of a nuclear EMP
on civilian infrastructures. Although this report was directed specifically toward the
United States, most of the information can obviously be generalized to the civilian
infrastructure of other industrialized countries.
The 2008 report was a followup to a more generalized report issued by the
commission in 2004.
Conclusion:
The EMP Commission sponsored a worldwide survey of foreign scientific and
military literature to evaluate the knowledge, and possibly the intentions, of foreign
states with respect to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. The survey found that
the physics of EMP phenomenon and the military potential of EMP attack are widely
understood in the international community, as reflected in official and unofficial
writings and statements. The survey of open sources over the past decade finds
that knowledge about EMP and EMP attack is evidenced in at least Britain, France,
Germany, Israel, Egypt, Taiwan, Sweden, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Iraq under
Saddam Hussein, Iran, North Korea, China and Russia.
...
Many foreign analysts–particularly in Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia–view the
United States as a potential aggressor that would be willing to use its entire panoply
of weapons, including nuclear weapons, in a first strike. They perceive the United
States as having contingency plans to make a nuclear EMP attack, and as being
willing to execute those plans under a broad range of circumstances.
Russian and Chinese military scientists in open source writings describe the basic
principles of nuclear weapons designed specifically to generate an enhanced-EMP
effect, that they term "Super-EMP" weapons. "Super-EMP" weapons, according to
these foreign open source writings, can destroy even the best protected U.S.
military and civilian electronic systems.
Prior to the creation of the United States EMP Commission, a widely-read article by
engineer and defense analyst Carlo Kopp, first published in 1996, stated that
suitable materials and tools to create electromagnetic weapons are commonly
available. In that article, Kopp said, "The threat of electromagnetic bomb
proliferation is very real." Kopp's article was mostly about non-nuclear EMP
weapons.
Submitted By:

Sneha Subudhi

Electronics & Tele-Comm. Engineering

7th Semester, PKACE