1. Velasquez v. People, G.R. No.

195021, March 15 2017

G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017

NICOLAS VELASQUEZ AND VICTOR VELASQUEZ, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code1 admits to
the commission of acts, which would otherwise engender criminal liability. However, he asserts that he
is justified in committing the acts. In the process of proving a justifying circumstance, the accused risks
admitting the imputed acts, which may justify the existence of an offense were it not for the exculpating
facts. Conviction follows if the evidence for the accused fails to prove the existence of justifying
circumstances.

Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the accused
petitioners pray that the assailed March 17, 2010 Decision3 and December 10, 2010 Resolution4 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31333 be reversed and set aside, and that they be absolved of any
criminal liability.

The Court of Appeals' assailed rulings sustained the July 25, 2007 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41, Dagupan City, which found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder.

In an Information, petitioners Nicolas Velasquez (Nicolas) and Victor Velasquez (Victor), along with four
(4) others - Felix Caballeda (Felix), Jojo Del Mundo (Jojo), Sonny Boy Velasquez (Sonny), and Ampong
Ocumen (Ampong) - were charged with attempted murder under Article 248,6 in relation to Article 6,7 of
the Revised Penal Code, as follows:

That on May 24, 2003 in the evening at Brgy. Palua, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused while armed with stones and wooden poles,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and
abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, maul and hit
JESUS DEL MUNDO inflicting upon him injuries in the vital parts of his body, the said accused having thus
commenced a felony directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which could
have produced the crime of Murder but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some causes or
accident other than their own spontaneous desistance to his damage and prejudice.

Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code.8
All accused, except Ampong, who remained at large, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.9 Trial then
ensued.10

According to the prosecution, on May 24, 2003, at about 10:00 p.m., the spouses Jesus and Ana Del
Mundo (Del Mundo Spouses) left their home to sleep in their nipa hut, which was about 100 meters
away.11 Arriving at the nipa hut, the Del Mundo Spouses saw Ampong and Nora Castillo (Nora) in the
midst of having sex.12 Aghast at what he perceived to be a defilement of his property, Jesus Del Mundo
(Jesus) shouted invectives at Ampong and Nora, who both scampered away.13 Jesus decided to pursue
Ampong and Nora, while Ana Del Mundo (Ana) left to fetch their son, who was then elsewhere.14 Jesus
went to the house of Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora was there.15 He began making his
way back home when he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused.16

Without provocation, petitioner Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a stone. Petitioner Victor
also hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone.17 Accused Felix did the same, hitting Jesus above his left
ear.18 Accused Sonny struck Jesus with a bamboo, hitting him at the back, below his right
shoulder.19 Ampong punched Jesus on his left cheek. The accused then left Jesus on the ground,
bloodied. Jesus crawled and hid behind blades of grass, fearing that the accused might return. He then
got up and staggered his way back to their house.20

Jesus testified on his own ordeal. In support of his version of the events, the prosecution also presented
the testimony of Maria Teresita Viado (Maria Teresita). Maria Teresita was initially approached by Jesus'
wife, Ana, when Jesus failed to immediately return home.21 She and Ana embarked on a search for Jesus
but were separated.22 At the sound of a man being beaten, she hid behind some bamboos.23 From that
vantage point, she saw the accused mauling Jesus.24 The prosecution noted that about four (4) or five (5)
meters away was a lamp post, which illuminated the scene.25

At the Del Mundo Spouses' residence, Maria Teresita recounted to them what she had witnessed (Jesus
had managed to return home by then).26 Ana and Maria Teresita then brought Jesus to Barangay
Captain Pilita Villanueva, who assisted them in bringing Jesus to the hospital.27

After undergoing an x-ray examination, Jesus was found to have sustained a crack in his skull.28 Dr. Jose
D. De Guzman (Dr. De Guzman) issued a medico-legal certificate indicating the following findings:
x.x. Positive Alcoholic Breath
3 cms lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left
1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left
Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm
Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm
Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.

x.x.29
Dr. De Guzman noted that Jesus' injuries required medical attention for four (4) to six (6) weeks.30 Jesus
was also advised to undergo surgery.31 He was, however, unable to avail of the required medical
procedure due to shortage of funds.32

The defense offered a different version of events.

According to the accused, in the evening of May 24, 2003, petitioner Nicolas was roused in his sleep by
his wife, Mercedes Velasquez (Mercedes), as the nearby house of petitioner Victor was being stoned.33

Nicolas made his way to Victor's place, where he saw Jesus hacking Victor's door. Several neighbors - the
other accused - allegedly tried to pacify Jesus.34 Jesus, who was supposedly inebriated, vented his ire
upon Nicolas and the other accused, as well as on Mercedes.35 The accused thus responded and
countered Jesus' attacks, leading to his injuries.36
In its July 25, 2007 Decision,37 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City found petitioners and
Felix Caballeda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder.38 The court also found Sonny Boy
Velasquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of less serious physical injuries.39 He was found to have hit
Jesus on the back with a bamboo rod. Jojo Del Mundo was acquitted.40 The case was archived with
respect to Ampong, as he remained at large.41

The dispositive portion of its Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NICOLAS VELASQUEZ,
VICTOR VELASQUEZ and FELIX CABALLEDA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Articles 6, paragraph 3 and 51 of the
Revised Penal Code, and pursuant to the law, sentences each of them to suffer on (sic) indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day of Arrested (sic) Mayor in its maximum period as minimum to
eight (8) years of Prison (sic) Correctional (sic) in its maximum period to Prison (sic) Mayor in its medium
period as maximum and to pay proportionately to private complainant Jesus del Mundo the amount of
Php55,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the cost of suit.

The Court likewise finds the accused SONNY BOY VELASQUEZ [guilty] beyond reasonable doubt of the
[crime] of Less Serious Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Article 265 of the Revised Penal
Code and pursuant thereto, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Arresto Mayor on one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months.

Accused JOJO DEL MUNDO is hereby acquitted on the ground of absence of evidence.

With respect to accused AMPONG OCUMEN, the case against him is archived without prejudice to its
revival as soon as he is arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.42
Petitioners and Felix Caballeda filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Regional Trial Court
denied.43

On petitioners' and Caballeda's appeal, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners and Caballeda were
only liable for serious physical injuries because "first, intent to kill was not attendant inasmuch as the
accused-appellants, despite their superiority in numbers and strength, left the victim alive and, second,
none of [the] injuries or wounds inflicted upon the victim was fatal."44 The Court of Appeals thus
modified the sentence imposed on petitioners and Caballeda.

The dispositive portion of its assailed March 17, 2010 Decision45

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 25, 2007 Decision of Branch 41, Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City is hereby MODIFIED. Instead, accused-appellants are found guilty of Serious Physical
Injuries and each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.46 (Emphasis in the original)

Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the present Petition.47 They
insist on their version of events, particularly on how they and their co-accused allegedly merely acted in
response to Jesus Del Mundo's aggressive behavior.

For resolution is the issue of whether petitioners may be held criminally liable for the physical harm
inflicted on Jesus Del Mundo. More specifically, this Court is asked to determine whether there was
sufficient evidence: first, to prove that justifying circumstances existed, and second, to convict the
petitioners.

Petitioners' defense centers on their claim that they acted in defense of themselves, and also in defense
of Mercedes, Nicolas' wife and Victor's mother. Thus, they invoke the first and second justifying
circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree,
provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given
by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm upon another
person - a potential criminal act under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised Penal Code.
However, he or she makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have
inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon his or
her own person (or that of his or her relative) justified the infliction of protective harm to an erstwhile
aggressor.

The accused's admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden of proving that
the accused performed acts, which would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability. All that remains to
be established is whether the accused were justified in acting as he or she did. To this end, the accused's
case must rise on its own merits:
It is settled that when an accused admits [harming] the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing
evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he [harmed] the victim. Self-
defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of
evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution.48
To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: "(1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense."49 Defense of a relative
under Article 11 (2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the same first two (2) requisites as self-defense
and, in lieu of the third "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making
the defense had no part therein."50

The first requisite - unlawful aggression - is the condition sine qua non of self-defense and defense of a
relative:
At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression committed against
appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying
circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present. Unlawful
aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person
claiming self-defense.51
The second requisite - reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression -
requires a reasonable proportionality between the unlawful aggression and the defensive response:
"[t]he means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the defense."52 This is a matter that depends on the circumstances:
Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the
means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of
which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked
is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger
of such injury . . . As WE stated in the case of People vs. Lara, in emergencies of this kind, human nature
does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and
when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to
sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the consequences.53 (Citations omitted)
The third requisite - lack of sufficient provocation - requires the person mounting a defense to be
reasonably blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into launching an
assault. This also requires a consideration of proportionality. As explained in People v. Boholst-
Caballero,54 "[p]rovocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate
enough to impel one to attack the person claiming self-defense."55

II

We find petitioners' claims of self-defense and defense of their relative, Mercedes, to be sorely wanting.

Petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by barging into the
premises of petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's door, and threatening physical harm upon
petitioners and their companions. That is, that unlawful aggression originated from Jesus.

Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative requires, petitioners

offered nothing more than a self-serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared out of nowhere to
go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present independent and credible proof to back
up their assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted that it was highly dubious that Jesus would go all the
way to petitioners' residences to initiate an attack for no apparent reason.56

The remainder of petitioners' recollection of events strains credulity. They claim that Jesus launched an
assault despite the presence of at least seven (7) antagonists: petitioners, Mercedes, and the four (4)
other accused. They further assert that Jesus persisted on his assault despite being outnumbered, and
also despite their and their co-accused's bodily efforts to restrain Jesus. His persistence was supposedly
so likely to harm them that, to neutralize him, they had no other recourse but to hit him on the head
with stones for at least three (3) times, and to hit him on the back with a bamboo rod, aside from
dealing him with less severe blows.57

As the Regional Trial Court noted, however:

The Court takes judicial notice of (the) big difference in the physical built of the private complainant and
accused Victor Velasquez, Sonny Boy Velasquez, Felix Caballeda and Jojo del Mundo, private
complainant is shorter in height and of smaller built than all the accused. The said accused could have
had easily held the private complainant, who was heavily drunk as they claim, and disarmed him without
the need of hitting him.58
The injuries which Jesus were reported to have sustained speak volumes:
3 cms lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left
1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left
Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm
Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm
Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.59
Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to him by petitioners
and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to neutralize him. It was far
from a reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed aggression. Petitioners thereby fail in
satisfying the second requisite of self-defense and of defense of a relative.

III

In addition to their tale of self-defense, petitioners insist that the testimony of Maria Teresita is not
worthy of trust because she parted ways with Ana while searching for Jesus.60 They characterize Maria
Teresita as the prosecution's "lone eyewitness."61 They make it appear that its entire case hinges on her.
Thus, they theorize that with the shattering of her credibility comes the complete and utter ruin of the
prosecution's case.62 Petitioners claim that Maria Teresita is the prosecution's lone eyewitness at the
same time that they aclmowledge Jesus' testimony, which they dismissed as laden with
inconsistencies.63

These contentions no longer merit consideration.

Petitioners' averment of justifying circumstances was dispensed with the need for even passing upon
their assertions against Maria Teresita's and Jesus' testimonies. Upon their mere invocation of self-
defense and defense of a relative, they relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving the acts
constitutive of the offense. They took upon themselves the burden of establishing their innocence, and
cast their lot on their capacity to prove their own affirmative allegations. Unfortunately for them, they
failed.

Even if we were to extend them a measure of consideration, their contentions fail to impress.

Petitioners' primordial characterization of Maria Teresita as the "lone eyewitness," upon whose
testimony the prosecution's case was to rise or fall, is plainly erroneous. Apart from her, Jesus testified
about his own experience of being mauled by petitioners and their co-accused. Maria Teresita's
testimony was only in support of what Jesus recounted.
Moreover, we fail to see how the mere fact of Maria Teresita's having parted ways with Ana while
searching for Jesus diminishes her credibility. No extraordinary explanation is necessary for this. Their
having proceeded separately may be accounted for simply by the wisdom of how independent searches
enabled them to cover more ground in less time.

Regarding Jesus' recollection of events, petitioners' contention centers on Jesus' supposedly flawed
recollection of who among the six (6) accused dealt him, which specific blow, and using which specific
weapon.64 These contentions are too trivial to even warrant an independent, point by point audit by this
Court.

Jurisprudence is replete with clarifications that a witness' recollection of crime need not be foolproof:
"Witnesses cannot be expected to recollect with exactitude every minute detail of an event. This is
especially true when the witnesses testify as to facts which transpired in rapid succession, attended by
flurry and excitement."65 This is especially true of a victim's recollection of his or her own harrowing
ordeal. One who has undergone a horrifying and traumatic experience "cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account"66 of every minutiae.

Certainly, Jesus' supposed inconsistencies on the intricacies of who struck him which specific blow can
be forgiven. The merit of Jesus' testimony does not depend on whether he has an extraordinary memory
despite being hit on the head multiple times. Rather, it is in his credible narration of his entire ordeal,
and how petitioners and their co-accused were its authors. On this, his testimony was unequivocal.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31333
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

2. People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 174483, March 31 2009

G.R. No. 174483 March 31, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RAMON REGALARIO, MARCIANO REGALARIO, SOTERO REGALARIO, BIENVENIDO REGALARIO and
NOEL REGALARIO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For automatic review is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01556 which
affirmed with modification, an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Branch 13 in
Criminal Case No. 3613, finding accused-appellants Ramon, Marciano, Sotero, Bienvenido and Noel, all
surnamed Regalario guilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00, and another
sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
In the court of origin, accused-appellants Ramon, Marciano, Sotero, Bienvenido and Noel were originally
charged with Homicide. However, after reinvestigation of the case, the Panel of Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, Legaspi City, consisting of State Prosecutors Romulo SJ Tolentino, Mary May B.
De Leoz and Elmer M. Lanuzo filed an amended information3 charging the accused-appellants with
murder, committed as follows:

That on February 22, 1997 at about 11:00 in the evening, at Brgy. Natasan, Municipality of Libon,
province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with cruelty, treachery, abuse of superior strength, nighttime attack,
assault, strike and hit ROLANDO SEVILLA with wooden clubs (bahi) used as their night sticks, hitting the
latter at the different parts of his body and tying down his hands and feet with a rope, thereby inflicting
upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice
of his legal heirs.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

On October 9, 1998, accused-appellants, duly assisted by their counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to
the offense charged.4 Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the following as its witnesses: Zaldy Siglos, Nancy Sara, Ryan Sara, Armando
Cabais Poblete, Ronnie Siglos, Cynthia Sevilla, Norma Torres, Policeman Jose Gregorio, Cenen Talagtag,
Cesar Sazon and Dr. Mario Cerillo, while Antonio Relato and Nicanor Regonia testified on rebuttal.
Nancy Sara, Cynthia Sevilla and Ryan Sara were presented for a second time also as rebuttal witnesses.

On their part, accused-appellants took the witness stand. All raised the defense of denial except for
Ramon who admitted the act charged but claimed self-defense. To corroborate their defense, Jose
Poblete and Adonis Velasco were presented. The defense also presented Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2)
Jimmy Colisao, Harold Reolo, Ma. Julieta Razonable, and Dr. Leopoldo Barrosa II.

On August 24, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision5 giving full faith and credit to the prosecution’s
evidence. It ruled out accused-appellant Ramon Regalario’s claim of self defense, and held that there
was conspiracy among the accused-appellants in the commission of the crime as shown in the manner in
which all of them inflicted the wounds on the victim’s body. It further ruled that the killing was qualified
to murder by abuse of superior strength and by their scoffing at the body of the victim. It also
appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The pertinent
dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding Ramon, Sotero, Bienvenido, Marciano and Noel, all
surnamed Regalario, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Par. 1, of Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the aggravating circumstance of scoffing at the corpse of the
victim. However, accused are entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender which offset the aggravating circumstance of scoffing at his corpse, hence, are hereby
sentenced to suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided
for by law.
The accused are hereby ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Rolando Sevilla
the amount of ₱50,000.00 and another sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92 the ₱200,000.00 bail bond put up by
accused Marciano Regalario is hereby cancelled and is ordered recommitted to jail.

SO ORDERED.

The record of this case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review, in view of the penalty
imposed.

In our Resolution6 of August 13, 2001, We accepted the appeal and directed the Chief of the Judicial
Records Office, to send notices to the parties to file their respective briefs. The Court also required the
Jail Warden, Municipal Jail, Polangui, Albay to transfer accused-appellants to the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, and make a report of such transfer within ten (10) days from notice. Likewise, the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections was required to confirm the detention of accused-appellants.
Accused-appellants filed their Appellants’ Brief7 on December 4, 2001, while the People, thru the Office
of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee's Brief8 on July 30, 2002.

Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo9 which modified the provisions of the Rules of Court
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed
by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was referred for
appropriate action and disposition to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 01556.

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, as follows:

Accused-appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are barangay officials of Natasan, Libon, Albay and related
to one another by consanguinity. Marciano, barangay chairman, Sotero, barangay kagawad and Ramon,
barangay tanod, are brothers while Bienvenido Regalario, also barangay tanod, is their cousin and Noel
is the son of Marciano. (TSN, November 16, 1998, p. 9; RTC Order dated October 9, 1998, pp. 115-117)

On the night of February 22, 1997, a dance and singing contest was being held in the barangay pavilion
of Natasan, Libon, Albay. At around ten o’clock that evening, Rolando Sevilla and Armando Poblete were
enjoying the festivities when appellant Sotero Regalario approached them (TSN, December 7, 1998, p.4).
To avoid trouble, the two distanced themselves from Sotero. Nevertheless, a commotion ensued. (ibid.,
p. 5). Appellants Sotero and Bienvenido Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla several times with
their respective nightsticks, locally known as bahi. (TSN, November 16, 1998, pp. 13-17, 32, 34, 36-37).
The blows caused Sevilla to fall down in a sitting position but after a short while he was able to get up
(ibid., pp. 16-17). He ran away in the direction of the house of appellant Mariano Regalario, the
barangay captain (ibid., pp. 18-38). Bienvenido and Sotero Regalario chased Sevilla (ibid., p. 38, TSN,
December 7, 1998. p. 6). When Sevilla was already near Marciano’s house, he was waylaid by appellant
Ramon Regalario and at this point, Marciano Regalario and his son Noel Regalario came out of their
house (TSN, December 7, 1998, pp. 7-9 and 35). Noel was carrying a seven-inch knife. The five appellants
caught the victim in front of Marciano’s house. Armed with their nightsticks, they took turns in hitting
the victim until he slumped to the ground face down (ibid., pp. 8, 35 and 38). In that position, Sevilla was
boxed by Marciano in the jaw. After a while, when Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano first ordered
the others to kill the victim and to tie him up (ibid., pp. 36-37). Upon hearing the order, Bienvenido, with
the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope used by farmers for
tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching. (ibid., pp. 37-38).

In the early morning of February 23, 1997, Cynthia Sevilla, the victim’s widow, after she was informed of
her husband’s death, went to the poblacion of Libon to report the incident at the town’s police station
(TSN, December 8, 1998, pp. 7-8). However, her statements were not entered in the police blotter
because appellant Marciano Regalario had earlier reported to them, at two o’clock in the morning, a
different version of the incident, i.e., it was the victim Sevilla who shot Marciano’s brother Ramon and
that Sevilla, allegedly still alive, was placed under the custody of the barangay tanods. (ibid., p. 7; TSN,
November 20, 1998 [A.M. Session], pp. 9-10). At around eight o’clock of the same morning, SPO4 Jose
Gregorio, with some other police officers and Cynthia Sevilla, left the police station on board a truck and
proceeded to the crime scene in Natasan. SPO4 Gregorio conducted an investigation of the incident.
(TSN, November 20, 1998 [A.M. Session], pp. 10-12). Thereafter, the policemen took the victim’s
cadaver to the police station in the poblacion (ibid., p. 26) where pictures were taken showing the
victim’s hands and legs tied behind him [Exhibits ‘C’ and ‘D’] (ibid., pp. 14-15; TSN, December 8, 1998, p.
10; TSN, November 20, 1998 [P.M. Session], pp 5-7). On that same day, SPO4 Gregorio requested the
Libon’s Rural Health Unit to conduct an autopsy on the victim’s body but since the municipal health
officer was not around, it was only performed the next day, February 24 (TSN, November 20, 1998 [A.M.
Session], p. 26; TSN, December 8, 1998, pp. 10-11; TSN, November 20, 1998 [P.M. Session], p. 11). After
Dr. Mario Cerillo, Municipal Health Officer of Libon conducted the autopsy, he forthwith issued a
Medico-Legal Report dated February 24, 1997 (Exhibit ‘B’), the pertinent portions of which read:

Findings:

Head : Lacerated wound 4 cm

frontal area, Right.

: Lacerated wound 8 cm.

occipital area, Right.

: Lacerated wound 4 cm.

with fractured skull

(post auricular area),

Right.

: Abrasion 4 x 2 cm.

eyebrow, Right.

: Abrasion 2 cm. x 1 cm.

with lacerated wound

1 cm. eyebrow, Left.

: Periorbital Hematoma

Left and Right eye.

: Lacerated wound 1 cm.

lower lip, Left.

Neck : Stab wound 2 cm.

penetrating lateral base

of the neck just above

the clavicle, Right.

: Stab wound 2 cm., 6 cm.

depth lateral base of the

neck just above the

clavicle, Right.

Trunk : Hematoma 10 x 8 cm.

clavicular area, Right.

: Multiple abrasion chest

: Contusion 7 x 2 cm.,

7th Intercorsal space and

clavicular line, left.

Extremities : Multiple abrasion and

contusion on both Right

and Left arm and forearm.

: Abrasion (Ropemark)

around Right and Left wrist.

 : Abrasion (Ropemark) around

distal 3rd of both Right and

Left leg.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

Cause of Death:

Sever blood loss secondary to stab wound and multiple lacerated wound, probably secondary to
intracranial hemorrhage.

On the witness stand, Dr. Cerillo opined that the victim’s lacerated wounds could have been caused by a
blunt instrument like a hard stick, a stone or iron bar, his stab wounds by a sharp-edged instrument or
knife, his contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or through contact with a blunt instrument. Also
according to the physician, the sharp object which caused the victim’s stab wounds could have been a
knife 2 cm. wide and 6 cm. long because they were clean cut wounds. (TSN, November 20, 1998 [P.M.
Session], pp. 14-15).10

On the other hand, the accused-appellants’ Brief presents a different story:

At the time of the incident in question, accused Marciano Regalario was the incumbent barangay
captain of Natasan, Libon, Albay. Accused Sotero was a kagawad, while Ramon and Bienvenido were
barangay tanods of the same place. Noel Regalario had no public position. He is the son of one of the
other accused.

On the night of February 22, 1997, a public dance and singing contest was held in their barangay.
Naturally, being barangay officials, the accused, (except Noel who is not an official and whose wife has
just given birth) were at the place of the celebration, discharging their peace-keeping duties. They were
posted at different places in that vicinity.

At first, a fire broke out in the toilet of the Day Care Center. It was attended to by the persons assigned
in that area. A while later, there was another commotion in the area assigned to accused Ramon
Regalario. When he approached the group where the disturbance was taking place and tried to
investigate, Rolando Sevilla suddenly emerged from the group and without any ado, fired a shot at him.
He was hit at the left shoulder. Instinctively, and in order to disable Sevilla from firing more shots, which
might prove fatal, he struck his assailant with his nightstick and hit him at the back of his head. This is
the blow which Nancy Sara and Zaldy Siglos said were delivered by Sotero and Bienvenido. This blow
caused Sevilla to reel backward and lean on the bamboo fence. To prevent Sevilla from regaining his
balance, Ramon pressed his counter-attack by continuing to harass him with blows of his nightstick. As
Ramon pressed on forward, Sevilla retreated backward. Ramon kept him busy parrying the blows which
hit his arms and front part of the body, as they were face to face with each other. But even in the course
of such harassment, Sevilla was able to fire a second shot which missed Ramon.

When they reached the end of the road pavement, Sevilla lost his footing on edge of the pavement and
fell down. At that juncture, Sotero arrived and shouted to Ramon to stop beating Rolando. But Ramon
told him that Rolando still had the gun. So, Sotero plunged at Rolando and they wrestled on the ground
for the possession of the gun. As they struggled, the gun went off but no one was hurt. When Rolando
raised his arms to move the gun away from Sotero, Ramon knocked the gun off his hand and it fell near
the place where Jose Poblete was standing. Poblete just arrived at the scene along with Marciano
Regalario who was already told that his brother Ramon was shot by Sevilla. Poblete picked up the gun.
He was instructed by Marciano to keep it until it is turned over to the authorities.

The wounded Ramon Regalario was brought to town for treatment and later to the provincial hospital.
Marciano and Sotero proceeded to the police station to report the shooting of Ramon.

Bienvenido Regalario, the barangay tanod, arrived at the scene after the fact. He was instructed by
Marciano, the barangay captain to effect the arrest of Rolando Sevilla for the crime of shooting Ramon.
According to Bienvenido, they were taught in their training seminar to just use a rope in lieu of
handcuffs because they could not be supplied with it. So, he tied the hands and feet of Rolando Sevilla
for fear that he might be able to escape.

On the early morning of February 23, a team of policemen went to Natasan and found the dead body of
Rolando Sevilla. Jose Poblete also turned over to the police, Rolando Sevilla’s gun. Meanwhile, Noel
Regalario, after learning of the incident, scoured the place where the third shot was fired during the
struggle between Sotero and Rolando. He found a .38 caliber slug which was also turned over to the
police.11

On May 31, 2006, the CA promulgated the herein challenged decision affirming for the most part the
decision of the trial court with modification as to the penalty imposed. Unlike the trial court, the CA did
not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accused-appellants.
Thus, the penalty was changed from reclusion perpetua to death, and an additional award of ₱25,000.00
as exemplary damages was likewise imposed. Pertinently, the CA decision reads in part:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellants are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Rolando Sevilla
the amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for its review, pursuant to AM No.
00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases)
which took effect on October 15, 2004.

SO ORDERED.12

As can be gleaned from the above quote, the CA elevated the instant case to this Court in view of the
penalty imposed. In our Resolution13 dated November 14, 2006, we required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. On December 12, 2006, the people filed a
manifestation14 stating that it is waiving the filing of a supplemental brief. Accused-appellants filed their
supplemental brief15 on February 15, 2007.

In their Brief, accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL OF THE ACCUSED PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLING OF
ROLANDO SEVILLA AND BASING ITS DECISION, NOT ON DIRECT EVIDENCE BUT ON ITS OWN
SUPPOSITIONS, CONJECTURES AND INFERENCES;

2. THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE AND DISPLAYED BIAS WHEN IT
LEANED IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DESPITE THEIR VITAL CONTRADICTIONS AND
OBVIOUS FALSEHOODS;

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE ACCUSED AND
THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE WAS ATTENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND SCOFFING AT THE BODY OF THE VICTIM;

4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DECEASED WAS KILLED IN SELF-DEFENSE
AND/OR DEFENSE OF RELATIVE

5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED.16

We begin our evaluation with accused-appellant Ramon Regalario’s claim of self-defense. Both the CA
and the trial court gave no credence to this theory of self-defense.

When self-defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide he necessarily owns up to
the killing but may escape criminal liability by proving that it was justified and that he incurred no
criminal liability therefor. Hence, the three (3) elements of self-defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. However, without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-
defense, either complete or incomplete.17

Accused-appellant Ramon contends that the victim Rolando Sevilla committed an act of unlawful
aggression with no provocation on his [Ramon’s] part. Ramon testified that he was trying to investigate
a commotion when, without warning, Rolando emerged from the group, thrust and fired his gun at him,
hitting him in the left shoulder. To disable Rolando from firing more shots, Ramon struck the victim’s
head at the back with his nightstick, causing the victim to reel backward and lean on the bamboo fence.
He continued hitting Rolando to prevent the latter from regaining his balance and, as he pressed on
farther, the victim retreated backward.

By Ramon’s own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latter’s head and he
continued hitting the victim who retreated backward. From that moment, the inceptive unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation of the offensive stance of
Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer any danger, but still Ramon
went beyond the call of self-preservation. In People v. Cajurao,18 we held:

…The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has
the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Upon
the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the necessity for the
person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases.1avvphi1 If he persists in attacking his
adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Self-defense does not
justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramon’s claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on the neck, four
(4) lacerated wounds on the head, as well as multiple abrasions and contusions on different parts of the
victim’s body, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Mario Cerillo who conducted the post-mortem
examination on the victim revealed that the victim’s lacerated wounds could have been caused by a
blunt instrument like a hard stick, a stone or an iron bar; his stab wounds by a sharp-edged instrument
or knife; his contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or through contact with a blunt instrument. He
also declared that the sharp object which caused the victim’s stab wounds could have been a knife 2
centimeters (cms.) wide and 6 cms. long because they were clean-cut wounds. Indeed, even if it were
true that the victim fired a gun at Ramon, the number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the
victim indicated that the force used against him by Ramon and his co-accused was not only to disarm
the victim or prevent him from doing harm to others.

The four (4) other accused-appellants, namely, Sotero, Marciano, Bienvenido and Noel, to exonerate
themselves, denied their involvement in inflicting wounds on Rolando.

Sotero claimed that he arrived at the scene of the crime at the time when Rolando lost his footing on
the edge of the pavement and fell down. He even shouted at Ramon to stop beating Rolando. However,
when Ramon told him that Rolando still had the gun, he jumped on Rolando and they wrestled on the
ground for the possession of the gun.

Marciano maintained that he, together with Jose Poblete, arrived at the crime scene when Ramon had
already knocked the gun out of Rolando’s hand and the gun fell near the place where Jose Poblete was
standing. When he went to that place, he already knew that his brother (Ramon) had been shot, so, he
told the latter to go to the hospital. Thereafter, he and Sotero proceeded to the police station to report
the shooting incident.1avvphi1

Bienvenido asserted that he arrived at the crime scene after the shooting incident. He was asked by
Marciano to arrest Rolando.

Lastly, Noel insisted that he was not present when the shooting incident took place. He was inside their
house sleeping, as his wife had just given birth.

We are not convinced.

Accused-appellants’ denials cannot overcome the positive identification by the prosecution’s witnesses.
Elementary is the rule that positive identification, where categorical and consistent, prevails over
unsubstantiated denials because the latter are negative and self-serving, and thus, cannot be given any
weight on the scales of justice.19 The participation of each of the accused-appellants can be fully
ascertained from the clear, categorical and spontaneous testimony given by prosecution witness, Ronnie
Siglos, who was at the scene of the crime, thus:

PROSECUTOR RESARI:

Q While you were walking on your way home, was there an unusual incident and can you recall?
A Yes, ma’am

Q What was that incident about?

A While I was on my way towards the house of my parents, I just suddenly saw a person being
beaten on the road.

Q When you first noticed that there was a man being beaten along the road, how far were you?

A I was about more or less 9 to 10 meters.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you saw a man being beaten what did you do?

A I continue walking, but upon reaching that place near the person being beaten, I stopped.

Q Why did you stop?

A To verify and know as to who that person being beaten.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And who was that person being beaten?

A Rolando Sevilla.

Q Who were the persons beating Rolando Sevilla?

A Marciano Regalario, Sotero Regalario, Ramon Regalario, Bienvenido Regalario, Noel Regalario,
Ernani Regalario, Reynante Regalario, Jose Poblete, Jose Quinno and Virgilio Rebanal.

Q Who else?

A Cecilio Lunas.

Q If some of the persons you saw beating Rolando Sevilla are present in this court room, will you
be able to point and identify them?

A Yes, ma’am.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR:

Q You stated that you saw the persons you have just named as beating Rolando Sevilla. Were
there weapons used in beating Rolando Sevilla?
A Yes.

Q What kind of weapons (was) used?

A Sotero was armed with bahi wood, and also Ramon. Bienvenido was also armed with bahi, as
well as Cecilio Lunas, Jose Quinno were also armed with ‘malo-palo.’

xxx xxx xxx

Q What kind of weapon was being held by Noel Regalario?

A A knife.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, when you saw Rolando Sevilla being beaten by the persons you mentioned before, what
did you notice on the condition of Rolando Sevilla?

A He was lying on his stomach.

Q Did you see the face of Rolando Sevilla?

A Yes.

Q How were you able to see the face of Rolando Sevilla?

A Because Sotero was holding him by his hair.

Q What was your observation on the condition of Rolando Sevilla?

xxx xxx xxx

WITNESS:

He was already motionless. He is not moving anymore.

PROSECUTOR:

Of the persons you named as holding weapons, you did not mention Marciano Regalario as
holding any weapon. What was Marciano Regalario doing then?

A He boxed Rolando Sevilla and Rolando was hit on his jaw.

Q What else did Marciano Regalario do if any?

A After he boxed Rolando Sevilla, he went inside his house but after about one (1) minute he
again return(ed) back.
Q After Marciano Regalario returned back, what did he do if any?

A He shouted to kill that.

Q After you heard Marciano Regalario (say) to kill "that," what did you do?

A I proceeded towards home.

Q While you were walking, was there any unusual incident which again happened?

A Yes.

Q And, what was that incident?

A While I was walking towards home, again I heard Marciano Regalario shouted to tie him, that
is why I again stopped.

Q When you heard Marciano Regalario to tie him how far were you from him?

A More or less 7 meters.

Q You said that upon hearing Marciano Regalario, you stopped. What else happened?

A Bienvenido Regalario passed by me and went to that sleigh (pababa) which is on the lower
portion and got a rope.

Q What did Bienvenido Regalario do with the rope?

A He tied Rolando Sevilla by placing he rope around his neck and tied his hands.

Q Was there somebody who assisted Bienvenido Regalario in tying Rolando Sevilla?

A Yes.

Q Who were the persons, if any?

A Sotero Regalario.

Q Aside from Sotero, was there anybody else who helped Bienvenido Regalario in tying Rolando
Sevilla?

A No more.

Q While Rolando Sevilla was being hog tied, where were the persons of Marciano Regalario,
Noel Regalario, Ramon Regalario and the rest of the persons whom you just mentioned awhile
ago?
A They were there standing beside Rolando Sevilla and they were watching.

Q Did you notice whether Rolando Sevilla was still moving when he was still being tied up by
Bienvenido and Sotero?

A He was not moving anymore.20

The aforequoted testimony of Ronnie Siglos is corroborated by the following testimony of

Armando Poblete:

Q While you were standing by the road, what did you notice?

A Then I saw Rolando Sevilla being chased by Bienvenido and Sotero both surnamed Regalario

Q To what direction was Rolando Sevilla being chased by Sotero and Bienvenido Regalario?

A Towards the place of Kapitan.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR RESARI:

Q Considering that was already nighttime, how were you able to know that the person being
chased was Rolando Sevilla and the persons chasing him were the two (2) Regalarios which you
have identified?

A Because, I was with Sevilla during that time and it was moonlit night.

Q When the two (2) were chasing Rolando Sevilla, what happened next?

A Ramon waylaid Rolando Sevilla.

xxx xxx xxx

Q After you saw Ramon Regalario waylaid Rolando Sevilla, what else did you see?

A After that I saw the group of Sotero, Regalario, Marciano, Noel, caught up with Rolando.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR RESARI:

Q Since Bienvenido Regalario and Sotero Regalario were the ones chasing Rolando Sevilla, from
what direction did Ramon Regalario come from when he waylaid Rolando Sevilla?

A That side, left side going towards the house of Kapitan.

 Q And where did Marciano and Noel xxx come from?

A From their house.

Q After the five (5) caught up with Rolando Sevilla, what happened to Rolando Sevilla?

A They took turns in beating him.

Q Did they use any weapon in beating Rolando Sevilla?

A Yes, their night sticks.

Q When Bienvenido and Sotero caught up with Rolando Sevilla; and the three (3) other accused
also joined the two (2), how far was your distance to them?

A More or less 14 to 15 meters.21

We agree with the findings of the two courts below as to the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do not write down their lawless plans
and plots. The agreement to commit a crime, however, may be deduced from the mode and manner of
the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of intent. It does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is
the act of all, and each incurs the same criminal liability.22 We quote with approval the findings and
observations of the CA, thus:

The eyewitnesses’ account surrounding Rolando Sevilla’s death shows that the accused-appellants
performed concerted acts in pursuit of a common objective. Sotero, Bienvenido, and Ramon, armed
with nightsticks, and Noel armed with a knife, seven inches in length, beat Rolando Sevilla. All five
accused-appellants caught up with the victim, blocked all means through which the victim could escape
and ensured the achievement of their plan to kill Rolando Sevilla even as the latter already fell to the
ground. Accused-appellant Marciano hit the victim on his jaw and later, ordered his co-accused to kill
and tie the victim. Upon hearing Marciano’s instruction, Bienvenido Regalario tied Rolando’s neck,
hands and feet with a rope. The collective act of the accused-appellants is sufficient to make them co-
principals to the killing.23

Considering the foregoing, as well as the manner in which the attack against Rolando was carried out,
and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses positively identifying the accused-appellants as the
assailants, we concur in the rulings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, in (a) disregarding
Ramon Regalario’s declaration that he attacked the victim in self-defense and (b) holding that all the
accused-appellants acted in concert and killed Rolando.

We likewise rule that both the CA and the trial court were correct in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength in killing Rolando Sevilla. To take advantage of superior
strength is to use force out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend
himself. In order to be appreciated, it must be clearly shown that there was deliberate intent on the part
of the malefactors to take advantage thereof.24 In this case, as testified to by the prosecution
eyewitnesses, accused-appellants Ramon, Sotero and Bienvenido, with the exception of Marciano, were
armed with nightsticks (bahi) while Noel was holding a knife. Clearly they took advantage of their
superiority in number and arms in killing the victim, as shown by numerous wounds the latter suffered
in different parts of his body.

Also affirmed is the ruling of both courts appreciating the presence of the generic aggravating
circumstance of scoffing at the body of the victim. Accused-appellants did not just kill the victim. They
tied him hog-style after rendering him immobilized. This action constituted outraging or scoffing at the
corpse of the victim. In this connection, we agree with the trial court’s observation:

…The concerted acts committed by all the accused mostly armed with wooden clubs and one with a 7-
inch long knife after the victim fell pummeling him with mortal blows on the forehead and back of his
head and stab wounds on his neck and one of them telling his co-accused to kill the victim clearly proved
that the Regalarios conspired and took advantage of their strength and number. Not satisfied with
delivering mortal blows even when their hapless victim was already immobile, Bienvenido and Sotero,
upon order of their co-accused Marciano, tied their victim hog style. The manner by which Rolando was
tied as vividly captured in the picture (Exhs. ‘C’ & ‘D’) clearly speaks for itself that it was nothing but to
scoff at their victim.25

The CA was likewise correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of accused-appellants. For said circumstance to be appreciated, it must be spontaneous, in such a
manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense of
finding and capturing him.26 In the case at bar, accused-appellants remained at large even after Judge
Jose S. Sañez issued the warrant for their arrest on February 6, 1998. Accused-appellants surrendered
only on September 9, 1998 after several alias warrants of arrest were issued against them. Hence,
voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in their favor as mitigating circumstance.

The accused-appellants’ acts plainly amount to murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength. As the
generic aggravating circumstance of scoffing at the body of the victim was alleged and proven, and as
there was no mitigating circumstance, the CA correctly sentenced accused-appellants to death in
accordance with Art. 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in relation to Art. 63(1) of the revised
Penal Code.

In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,27 the imposition of the death penalty has
been prohibited. Thus, the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a
heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous.28 Consequently, the civil indemnity for the
victim is still ₱75,000.00. In People v. Quiachon,29 we explained that even if the penalty of death is not to
be imposed on appellant because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor (292 SCRA 186), the
said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.
As to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the CA correctly held accused-appellants jointly and
severally liable to pay the heirs of Rolando Sevilla for the same. Moral damages are awarded despite the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature
and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victim’s family.30 If a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either
qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil
Code. This kind of damage is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as vindication of
undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct.31 However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the
imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the
award of moral damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.0032 while the award of
exemplary damages should be increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.33

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 01556 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following modifications: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants is
lowered to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; (2) the monetary awards to be paid jointly
and severally by accused-appellants are as follows: ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (3) interest on all the damages awarded at the
legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid is imposed.34

SO ORDERED.

3. People v. Dulin, G.R. No. 171284, July 29, 2015

G.R. No. 171284 June 29, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO DULIN Y NARAG, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The accused is guilty only of homicide in a prosecution for murder where the record does not
substantiate the attendance of treachery. But he may not benefit from the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense if there was no unlawful aggression from the victim. The Case

Alfredo Dulin y Narag appeals the decision promulgated on August 26, 2005,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification his conviction for the murder of Francisco Batulan rendered on
December 29, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.2 In convicting
him, the RTC had appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, and
had then sentenced him to "suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of
imprisonment ranging from 17 years and 4 months and 1 day to 20 years." On appeal, the CA prescribed
reclusion perpetua.
 Antecedents

The information filed on January7, 1991 averred as follows:

That on or about August 22, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Alfredo Dulin y Narag alias Freddie, armed
with a sharp blade(d) instrument, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Francisco Batulan,
inflicting upon him several stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law.3

During the trial, the Prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: (a) Dr. Nelson Macaraniag, (b)
Alexander Tamayao, (c) Romulo Cabalza and (d) Estelita Batulan. Their version follows. Tamayao was on
Tamayao Street in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990
when a young man came running from the house of Vicente Danao towards the house of Batulan,
shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had been stabbed. Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house,
which was about 30 meters from his own house, and there he saw Dulinstabbing Batulan who was
already prostrate face down. Dulin was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot touching the
ground. Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and thrusting the knife at the latter
with his right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran towards Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the
victim’s wife who was his aunt, about the incident. He went home afterwards.

Tamayao mentioned of the long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of seeing them
fighting in April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two occasions: He will soon have his day and I will kill
him.4

Cabalza, a barangay tanod, was in his house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990
when he heard the commotion in Danao’s house which was facing his house. It was Carolina, Danao’s
daughter, screaming for help. He thus sought out a fellow barangay tanod. On his return to the scene,
he found Batulanat the door of Danao’s house, with Dulin wielding a sharp pointed instrument, about 6-
7 inches long. Fearing for his safety, he rushed to the Barangay Hall to seek the assistance of Edwin
Cabalza and Nanding Buenaflor to bring Batulan to the Provincial Hospital in Carig, Tuguegarao.5

Estelita recalled that Tamayao went to her house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990
to inform her that Dulin had stabbed her husband in Danao’s house. She rushed to Danao’s house but
fainted on the way. Upon regaining consciousness, she learned that her husband had been rushed to the
hospital. On her way to the hospital, she met Barangay Captain Loreto Meman, who told her: Finally,
Freddie Dulin killed your husband as he vowed to do. At the hospital, she was told that her husband had
sustained two wounds in the back and several stab wounds in the front, and was being attended to at
the hospital’s intensive care unit (ICU) before he expired.

Estelita said that Barangay Captain Meman went to her husband’s wake and repeated what he had said
to her about Dulin. But when she later on sought out Barangay Captain Meman to ask him to confirm
what he had told her about Dulin’s vowing to kill her husband, Barangay Captain Meman’s response
was: I’m sorry I cannot go and declare what I have stated because I am afraid of FREDDIE and he will kill
all those persons who will testify in their favor.6
Estelita mentioned of the heated discussion between her husband and his nephew, Seong Bancud, in
front of Danao’s house in April 1990. On that occasion, Dulin wielded a knife with which he tried to stab
her husband. Dulin was pacified only when she went to the aid of her husband, but she then heard Dulin
saying: You will soon have your day, I will kill you.7

Batulan was attended to at the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital on August 22, 1990 by Dr. Macaraniag,
who said that the victim was in a state of shock from his 12 stab wounds. Dr. Macaraniag was part of the
three teams that conducted the surgery on Batulan. He issued the Medico-Legal Certificate8 attesting
that Batulan died on August 24, 1990 at 12:15 a.m.; and that Batulan had sustained several injuries, as
follows:

Multiple stab wounds #12

(1) Lacerated wound, sternum, 1 cm.

(2) Lacerated wound, 4th ICS, 2 cm. MCL

(3) Lacerated wound, 1 cm. post axillary line

(4) Lacerated wound, 3 x 2 cm. 3 cm below scapula

(5) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect, left hand

(6) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, left hand

(7) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, about 3 cm. from elbow, left

(8) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. middle third, left forearm

(9) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. posterior aspect left forearm 4 cm. from left wrist

(10) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect of left foot

(11) Lacerated wound, 4 cm. lateral aspect, left thigh

(12) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. scapular area.

x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x.9

Dr. Macaraniag stated the cause of death to be "Hypovolemic shock secondary to Massive Hemothorax
secondary to Multiple stab wounds."10 He clarified in court that there were clerical errors in the
preparation of the Medico-Legal Certificate because his handwritten records indicated that Batulan had
sustained stab instead of lacerated wounds. He surmised that one of the clerks could have misread his
handwriting in the process of transcription.11

Estelita declared that her late husband had earned a living from buying pigs, deriving a monthly income
of ₱8,000.00; that their marriage bore only one child; that she spent more or less ₱6,500.00 for
Batulan’s hospitalization, including his medicines, and ₱36,000.00 for Batulan’s 10-day wake, his burial
attire and his coffin; that during the wake she butchered one cow worth ₱6,800.00 and six pigsworth
₱15,000.00; that his death caused her and her family so much pain; and that she and her family
expended a total of ₱70,000.00, plus the ₱20,000.00 for the counsel’s services in bringing the criminal
charge against Dulin.12

In his defense, Dulin testified thatin the evening of August 22, 1990, he was in his house in Atulayan
Norte, Tuguegarao, Cagayan with Doming Narag, Imelda Danao, Jun Danao, Carolina Dulin and Caridad
Narag; that Nicanor Annariao and Raymund Soriano arrived at his house to see the fighting cocks being
sold by Alberto Eugenio (Alberto); that Alberto was not yet around, arriving only at about 8:00 o’clock in
the evening to talk with Raymund and Nicanor about the price of the fighting cocks; that after their
transaction, Alberto served Nicanor and Raymund food, and he (Dulin) and Jun Danao thereafter
accompanied Raymund and Nicanor to the highway to get a tricycle ride, but on their way, they passed
Angel Bancud who called out to him: that he (Dulin) asked the others to go ahead, and he would just
catch up with them; that as he (Dulin) approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his (Dulin) mother,
stabbed him on the right side of his body and in the left hand; that he complained to Batulan: Uncle, you
hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill you; that he (Dulin) ran to the upper level
of Carolina Danao’s house, pursued by Batulan who stabbed him again several times; that they grappled
for the weapon until he (Dulin) was able to wrest it from Batulan; that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan with
the weapon, and they struggled until he (Dulin) felt weak, eventually falling to the ground; and that he
(Dulin) regained consciousness only the next day at the hospital.

Dulin insisted that there was no grudge between him and Batulan, but interjected that the barangay
captain would summon him to bring Batulan home each time the latter got drunk at night.

Erlinda Danao, Records Officer of the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital in Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
authenticated the hospital records showing that Dulin had also been injured.13 Judgment of the RTC

On December 29, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of murder,14 to wit: WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Alfredo Dulin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, and appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
and no aggravating circumstance, this Court hereby lowers the penalty of said crime by two degrees and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of
imprisonment ranging from 17 years and 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱36,000.00 and
moral damages for ₱40,000.00.

Without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and without pronouncement as to costs. SO

ORDERED.15

Decision of the CA

In his appeal, Dulin contended that his crime should be homicide instead of murder, considering the
RTC’s appreciation of incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance; and that even if
self-defense should be unavailing, he could be found guilty only of homicide because it was the victim
who had first attacked by stabbing him, and that the multiple wounds inflicted on the victim did not
mean that he had not been justified in killing the victim. He argued that the penalty imposed on him was
incorrect considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.

On August 26, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction subject to the modification of the civil liability,
decreeing:

The Court agrees with the OSG representing the State that the penalty requires modification. The Court
a quo committed error in the imposition of the proper penalty. The crime committed by appellant in the
case at bench is murder qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating and no mitigating
circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Where no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the medium period of the imposable penalty,
which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification of the penalty
and awards of damages. Appellant ALFREDO DULIN y NARAG is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The award of ₱36,000 actual damages is DELETED. Appellant is ordered to pay the
heirs of Francisco Batulan ₱20,000 as temperate damages and ₱50,000 by way of moral damages.

SO ORDERED.16

On January 12, 2006, the CA denied Dulin’s motion for reconsideration.17

Issues

In this appeal, Dulin submits the following issues for our review and consideration, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING
THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SELF-DEFENSE AS A

PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IN THE EVENT THAT THE APPRECIATION OF A COMPLETE
SELF-DEFENSE IS UNAVAILING.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF TREACHERY IN THE KILLING OF FRANCISCO.18

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is partly meritorious.

 I.

There was no self-defense

The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. The burden of proving self-
defense rests entirely on him, that he must then prove by clear and convincing evidence the
concurrence of the following elements of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)

reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.19 The most important of all the
elements is unlawful aggression,20 which is the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a
justifying circumstance. Unless the victim committed unlawful

aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, should not be
appreciated, for the two other essential elements of self-defense would have no factual and legal bases
without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.

Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense is aptly described in
People v. Nugas,21 as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The
test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is

whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must
establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical
or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the
attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent
unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with
a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury.
Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must
not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and
positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a
motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an
angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor
because all its elements had been present in the commission of the crime.

In rejecting Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had initiated the attack against
Dulin the unlawful aggression from Batulan effectively ceased once Dulin had wrested the weapon from
the latter. The CA thus found and held in its assailed decision:
Appellant testified that after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able to take possession of the
weapon and ran towards the second level of the house of Vicente Danao, away from FRANCISCO. At that
point, the unlawful aggression against him effectively ceased. When

FRANCISCO and appellant again grappled for possession of the weapon, appellant now became the
armed protagonist, and FRANCISCO’s act of trying to wrest the weapon cannot be considered as
unlawful aggression. At that moment, appellant no longer faced any imminent or immediate danger to
his life and limb from FRANCISCO.

xxxx

From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that FRANCISCO could no longer be considered as unlawful
aggressor. Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore, appellant’s theory that he was merely defending
himself when he killed FRANCISCO is unavailing. A fortiori, there would be no

basis for the second requisite of self-defense.22

We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin, ceased to
be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon. Even if Batulan still went after
Dulin despite the latter going inside the house of Danao, where they again grappled for control of the
weapon, the grappling for the weapon did not amount to aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin
who held control of the weapon at that point. Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan
with the weapon – constituted retaliation against Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was not the same as
self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused
attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the
aggressor.23 As such, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing
by Dulin.

Still, Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by Batulan did not cease because the
latter followed him into Danao’s house with the singular purpose of ending his life; and that there was
no gap in the aggression initiated by Batulan.24

The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan and then running
away from him. With the aggression by Batulan having thereby ceased, he did not anymore pose any
imminent threat against Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not committing any aggression when Dulin fatally
stabbed him.

It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to have sustained
twelve stab wounds25 confirmed the cessation of the attack by Batulan. The numerosity and nature of
the wounds inflicted by the accused reflected his determination to kill Batulan, and the fact that he was
not defending himself.26

II.

Incomplete self-defense was not proved

Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. For this purpose,
the accused must prove the existence of the majority of the elements for self-defense, but unlawful
aggression, being an indispensable element, must be present. Either or both of the other requisites may
be absent, namely: reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, or the lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.27

Dulin posits that the totality of circumstances indicated that his acts constituted incomplete self-
defense, and must be appreciatedas a privileged mitigating circumstance.28

Dulin’s position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove the elements of
incomplete self-defense by first credibly establishing that the victim had committed unlawful aggression
against him. With Batulan’s aggression having already ceased from the moment that Dulin divested
Batulan of the weapon, there would not be any incomplete self-defense. Moreover, as borne out by his
stabbing of Batulan several times, Dulin did not act in order to defend himself or to repel any attack, but
instead to inflict injury on Batulan.

III.

The RTC and CA erred in appreciating

the attendance of treachery

Murder is the unlawful killing of any person attended by any of the circumstances listed Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code.1âwphi1 Treachery, which was alleged in the information, is one such qualifying
circumstance.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.29 Two conditions
must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one, the assailant employed means,
methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the assailant.30 Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently
and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder.31

Based on the established facts, Dulinand Batulan grappled for control of the weapon Batulan had
initially wielded against Dulin, who divested Batulan of it and ran with it into the house of Danao, with
Batulan in immediate pursuit. They continued tograpple for the weapon inside the house of Danao, and
it was at that point when Dulin stabbed Batulan several times. Under the circumstances, treachery
should not be appreciated in the killing of Batulan because the stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan by
surprise due to his having been sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s impending assault,32 and being thus
afforded the opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to recover control of the weapon from
Dulin. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning, or is done in a swift,
deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance
to resist or to escape, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.33 The mode of attack
must not spring from the unexpected turn of events.
Consequently, Dulin should be liable only for homicide, the penalty for which is reclusion
temporal.34 There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its
medium period (i.e., 14 years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four months). The
indeterminate sentence of Dulin is, therefore, eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with full credit of his preventive
imprisonment, if any.

Anent the civil liability, the CA ordered the accused to pay to the heirs of Batulan ₱20,000.00 as
temperate damages and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. We modify the awards, and grant to the heirs of
Batulan ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages. Indeed, the current judicial policy sets the civil indemnity for death caused by a crime at
₱50,000.00. In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to moral damages of ₱50,000.00. The civil
indemnity and moral damages are allowed even without allegation and proof, it being a certainty that
the victim’s heirs were entitled thereto as a matter of law. Temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 should
further be granted to the heirs of the victim for they were presumed to have spent for his interment. It
would be unjust to deny them this amount for the reason that they were not able to establish the actual
expenditure for his interment with certainty.35

In line with recent jurisprudence,36 interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of the civil
liability fixed and imposed herein, computed from the date of the finality of this decision until the items
of the civil liability shall be fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the judgment promulgated on August 26, 2005 by finding ALFREDO
DULIN YNARAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM, TO 14
YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, with full credit of his preventive
imprisonment; ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of Francisco Batulan ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on
each item reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 4. People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012

G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful aggression
against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke self-defense as a
justifying circumstance.

The accused prays for the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006,1 whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for murder handed down by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.

Antecedents

At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut
Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood
called bellang.2 Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of
stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan,
the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their
father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.3

On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for murder
against Fontanilla in the RTC, viz:

That on or about the 29th day of October 1996, along the Provincial Road at Barangay Butubut Oeste,
Municipality of Balaoan, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike with a long coconut night
stick and thereafter hit with a stone the head of Jose Olais, thereby inflicting on the latter head wounds
which caused the death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The accused pleaded not guilty.

The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that they were only several
meters away from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that they shouted at Fontanilla, who fled because
of them; and that they were able to see and to identify Fontanilla as the attacker of their father-in-law
because the area was then well-lighted.5
Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais, attested that her
post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of the
skull, causing his death. She opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the victim
more than once, considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on the skull
had been radiating.6

SPO1 Abraham Valdez, who investigated the slaying and apprehended Fontanilla, declared that he had
gone looking for Fontanilla in his house along with other policemen; that Fontanilla’s father had denied
that he was around; that their search of the house had led to the arrest of Fontanilla inside; and that
they had then brought him to the police station.7 Valdez further declared that Fontanilla asserted that
he would only speak in court.8

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been
standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had
boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued
hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him
with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he
had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he
had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving.9

Fontanilla’s daughter Marilou corroborated her father’s version.10

On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged, and disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring he accused
ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO @ ‘Carlos’ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as
defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec.
6, and thereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH and to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos ( ₱50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.11

The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to employ a big
stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death"12 due to the victim attacking him
only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim
had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to
any injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released from the hospital;13 that
Fontanilla’s failure to give any statement at the time he surrendered to the police was inconsistent with
his plea of self-defense;14 and that the manner of attack against Olais established the attendance of
treachery.15

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable element
of unlawful aggression; that his failure to report the incident to the police at the earliest opportunity, or
even after he was taken into custody, negated the plea of self-defense; and that the nature of the
victim’s injury was a significant physical proof to show a determined effort on the part of Fontanilla to
kill him, and not just to defend himself.16
The CA ruled that treachery was attendant, because Olais had no inkling that a fatal blow was looming
upon him, and because Fontanilla was inconspicuously hidden from view when he struck Olais from
behind, rendering Olais unable to retaliate.17

Nonetheless, the CA rectified the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death to only reclusion perpetua
upon noting the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and disposed as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union,
Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 2561 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant Fontanilla
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. No cost.

SO ORDERED.18

The accused is now appealing, insisting that the CA erred because:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S CLAIM OF SELF-
DEFENSE.

II.

EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WHEN THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III.

FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE SPECIAL
PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

Ruling

We affirm the conviction.

Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.19 Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-
defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing,
for there is nothing to repel.20 The character of the element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as
follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The
test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from
the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not
be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b)
the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be
unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent
unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with
a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury.
Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must
not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and
positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a
motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an
angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.21

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death
of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction
of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.22 Having thus
admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court,23 and he would be held criminally liable unless he
established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof.24 He should discharge the burden by relying
on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing.25 Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit
unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head with a
stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to
the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.

Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from the
aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of
Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital did
not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him.26 In contrast, the
physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than
once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or
repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the
determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.27

The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant. We concur. Fontanilla had appeared out of
nowhere to strike Olais on the head, first with the wooden stick, and then with a big stone, causing Olais
to fall to the ground facedown. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack effectively denied to
Olais the ability to defend himself or to retaliate against Fontanilla.
The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA was warranted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code,28 which prescribes reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for murder. Under the rules on the

application of indivisible penalties in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,29 the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua is imposed if there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. Yet, the
Court points out that the RTC erroneously imposed "RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH" as the penalty.
Such imposition was bereft of legal justification, for reclusion perpetua and death, being indivisible,
should not be imposed as a compound, alternative or successive penalty for a single felony. In short, the
imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other.

The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity
of ₱50,000.00. When death occurs due to a crime, the damages to be awarded may include: (a) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral
damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.30

Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should also have granted moral damages in addition to the death
indemnity, which were of different kinds.31 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to
crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and
emotional sufferings of the surviving family of Olais.32 Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings
of the surviving family were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless
strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the deceased to their moral status quo ante.
Given the circumstances, ₱50,000.00 should be reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence,33 we are bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the
heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and
experience having shown that:

xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one
becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from
the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but
often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.34 1âwphi1

Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of the victim
to temperate damages. The victim’s wife testified about her family’s incurring funeral expenses of
₱36,000.00, but only ₱18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled that when actual damages
substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than ₱25,000.00, temperate damages of at least ₱25,000.00
become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount actually proved by receipts. It would
obviously be unfair to the heirs of the victim to deny them compensation by way of actual damages
despite their honest attempt to prove their actual expenses by receipts (but succeeding only in showing
expenses lower than ₱25,000.00 in amount).35 Indeed, the heirs should not be left in a worse situation
than the heirs of another victim who might be nonetheless allowed temperate damages of ₱25,000.00
despite not having presented any receipts at all. With the victim’s wife having proved ₱18,000.00 worth
of expenses, granting his heirs temperate damages of ₱25,000.00, not only ₱18,000.00, is just and
proper. Not to do so would foster a travesty of basic fairness.

The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil
liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."36 The Civil Code
permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."37 In light of such legal provisions, the CA
and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages on
account of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant
circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. As well explained in People
v. Catubig:38

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is
to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect,
one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment
for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a
shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be
due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when
it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction
that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In
fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

For the purpose, ₱30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages,39 for a lesser amount
would not serve result in genuine exemplarity.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court of Appeals, subject to
the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to the
heirs of Jose Olais ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition
to the ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity and the ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest of 6% per
annum on such amounts from the finality of the judgment.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 5. Josue v. People, G.R. No. 199579, December 10, 2012

G.R. No. 199579 December 10, 2012

RAMON JOSUE y GONZALES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Ramon Josue y Gonzales (Josue)
to assail the Decision 1 dated June 30, 2011 and Resolution2 dated December 1, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33180.

The petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, via an information that reads:

That on or about May 1, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of ARMANDO MACARIO y PINEDA a.k.a. BOYET ORA, by then and there shooting the said
Armando Macario y Pineda a.k.a. Boyet Ora several times with a cal. 45 pistol hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of Homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said
ARMANDO MACARIO y PINEDA a.k.a. BOYET ORA which prevented his death thereafter.

Contrary to law.3

The case was docketed as Crim. Case No. 05-236299 and raffled to Branch 40 of the RTC. Upon
arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.

The witnesses for the prosecution were: (1) victim Armando Macario y Pineda (Macario); (2) Dr.
Casimiro Tiongson, Jr. (Dr. Tiongson), Chief Surgical Resident of Chinese General Hospital; (3) Dr. Edith
Calalang (Dr. Calalang), a radiologist; (4) Ariel Villanueva, an eyewitness to the crime; and (5) Josielyn
Macario, wife of the victim. The prosecution presented the following account:

On May 1, 2004, at around 11:15 in the evening, Macario, a barangay tanod, was buying medicine from
a store near the petitioner’s residence in Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila when he saw the petitioner
going towards him, while shouting to ask him why he had painted the petitioner’s vehicle. Macario
denied the petitioner’s accusation, but petitioner still pointed and shot his gun at Macario. The gunshots
fired by the petitioner hit Macario’s elbow and fingers. As the unarmed Macario tried to flee from his
assailant, the petitioner still fired his gun at him, causing him to sustain a gunshot wound at his back.
Macario was then rushed to the Chinese General Hospital for medical treatment.
Dr. Tiongson confirmed that Macario sustained three (3) gunshot wounds: (1) one on his right hand, (2)
one on his left elbow, and (3) one indicating a bullet’s entry point at the posterior of the chest, exiting at
the anterior line. Dr. Calalang took note of the tiny metallic foreign bodies found in Macario’s x-ray
results, which confirmed that the wounds were caused by gunshots. Further, she said that the victim’s
injuries were fatal, if not medically attended to. Macario incurred medical expenses for his treatments.

For his defense, the petitioner declared to have merely acted in self-defense. He claimed that on the
evening of May 1, 2004, he, together with his son Rafael, was watching a television program when they
heard a sound indicating that the hood of his jeepney was being opened. He then went to the place
where his jeepney was parked, armed with a .45 caliber pistol tucked to his waist. There he saw
Macario, together with Eduardo Matias and Richard Akong, in the act of removing the locks of his
vehicle’s battery. When the petitioner sought the attention of Macario’s group, Macario pointed his .38
caliber gun at the petitioner and pulled its trigger, but the gun jammed and failed to fire. The petitioner
then got his gun and used it to fire at Macario, who was hit in the upper arm. Macario again tried to use
his gun, but it still jammed then fell on the ground. As Macario reached down for the gun, the petitioner
fired at him once more, hitting him at the back. When Macario still tried to fire his gun, the petitioner
fired at him for the third time, hitting his hand and causing Macario to drop his gun. The petitioner got
Macario’s gun and kept it in his residence.

The petitioner’s son, Rafael Josue, testified in court to corroborate his father’s testimony.

SPO4 Axelito Palmero (SPO4 Palmero) also testified for the defense, declaring that on May 26, 2004, he
received from Josue a .38 caliber revolver that allegedly belonged to Macario.

On October 22, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision4 finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. It gave full credit to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, further noting that the defense had failed to prove that the .38 caliber revolver that was
turned over to SPO4 Palmero actually belonged to Macario. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, accused RAMON JOSUE y GONZALES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Frustrated Homicide without any aggravating or mitigating circumstances to vary the penalty imposable.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum.

Accused Ramon Josue y Gonzales is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim, Armando Macario y Pineda,
the sum of [P]32,214.25 for hospitalization and medicine expenses as actual damages.

The accused’s bail is deemed cancelled. Bondsman is ordered to surrender the accused to this Court for
execution of the final judgment.

SO ORDERED.5

Unsatisfied, the petitioner appealed from the RTC’s decision to the CA, which affirmed the rulings of the
RTC and thus, dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assails the CA’s dismissal of the appeal, arguing that the
prosecution had failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.

We deny the petition.

At the outset, we emphasize that since the petitioner seeks this Court’s review of his case through a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law shall be addressed by the
Court, barring any question that pertains to factual issues on the crime’s commission. The general rule is
that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain
exceptions as when the trial court’s judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence or is premised on a
misapprehension of facts.6

Upon review, the Court has determined that the present case does not fall under any of the exceptions.
In resolving the present petition, we then defer to the factual findings made by the trial court, as
affirmed by the CA when the case was brought before it on appeal. The Court has, after all, consistently
ruled that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and weighing their credibility is
best left to the trial court which forms first-hand impressions as witnesses testify before it. Factual
findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility are entitled to great
weight and respect by this Court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, and will not be disturbed absent
any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially
affect the outcome of the case.7

As against the foregoing parameters, the Court finds, and so holds, that both the trial and appellate
courts have correctly ruled on the petitioner’s culpability for the crime of frustrated homicide, which has
the following for its elements:

(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault;

(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and

(3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
is present.

These elements were duly established during the trial.

The trial court’s factual findings, when taken collectively, clearly prove the existence of the crime’s first
and second elements, pertaining to the petitioner’s intent to kill and his infliction of fatal wound upon
the victim. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of
the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by
the victim.8 Significantly, among the witnesses presented by the prosecution was Villanueva, who, while
being a friend of the petitioner, had testified against the petitioner as an eyewitness and specifically
identified the petitioner as the assailant that caused the wounds sustained by the victim Macario. Even
the petitioner cites in the petition he filed with this Court the prosecution’s claim that at the time he
fired the first gunshot, he was shouting, "Papatayin kita! (I will kill you!)"9 The doctors who attended to
the victim’s injuries also affirmed before the trial court that Macario had sustained gunshot wounds, and
that the injuries caused thereby were fatal if not given medical attention. The trial court then held:

Weighing the evidence thus proffered, this Court believes the prosecution’s version.

xxxx

The Court gives credence to the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution as it did not
find any fact or circumstance in the shooting incident to show that said witnesses had falsely testified or
that they were actuated by ill-motive.

xxxx

x x x (A)s a result of being shot three (3) times with a .45 caliber gun, complainant sustained mortal
wounds which without medical assistance, complainant could have died therefrom. Dr. Casimiro
Tiongson, Jr., the chief surgical resident who attended the complainant and prescribed his medicines,
testified that the victim, Armando Macario, sustained three (3) gunshot wounds located in the left
elbow, right hand and another bullet entering his posterior chest exiting in front of complainant’s chest.

These findings were also contained in the x-ray consultation reports testified to by Dr. Edith Calalang as
corroborating witness.10 (Citations omitted)

What is also noteworthy is that the petitioner invoked self-defense, after he had admitted that he
caused the victim’s wounds when he shot the latter several times using a deadly weapon, i.e., the .45
caliber pistol that he carried with him to the situs of the crime. In People v. Mondigo,11 we explained:

By invoking self-defense, appellant admitted committing the felonies for which he was charged albeit
under circumstances which, if proven, would justify his commission of the crimes. Thus, the burden of
proof is shifted to appellant who must show, beyond reasonable doubt, that the killing of Damaso and
wounding of Anthony were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.12 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)

In order to be exonerated from the charge, the petitioner then assumed the burden of proving, beyond
reasonable doubt, that he merely acted in self-defense. Upon review, we agree with the RTC and the CA
that the petitioner failed in this regard.

While the three elements quoted above must concur, self-defense relies, first and foremost, on proof of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, then no self-defense
may be successfully pleaded.13 "Unlawful aggression" here presupposes an actual, sudden, and
unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim.14

In the present case, particularly significant to this element of "unlawful aggression" is the trial court’s
finding that Macario was unarmed at the time of the shooting, while the petitioner then carried with
him a .45 caliber pistol. According to prosecution witness Villanueva, it was even the petitioner who
confronted the victim, who was then only buying medicine from a sari-sari store. Granting that the
victim tried to steal the petitioner’s car battery, such did not equate to a danger in his life or personal
safety. At one point during the fight, Macario even tried to run away from his assailant, yet the
petitioner continued to chase the victim and, using his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the
mortal wound on his chest. Contrary to the petitioner’s defense, there then appeared to be no "real
danger to his life or personal safety,"15 for no unlawful aggression, which would have otherwise justified
him in inflicting the gunshot wounds for his defense, emanated from Macario’s end.*

The weapon used and the number of gunshots fired by the petitioner, in relation to the nature and
location of the victim’s wounds, further negate the claim of self-defense. For a claim of self-defense to
prosper, the means employed by the person claiming the defense must be commensurate to the nature
and extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression.16 Considering the petitioner’s use of a deadly weapon when his victim was
unarmed, and his clear intention to cause a fatal wound by still firing his gun at the victim who had
attempted to flee after already sustaining two gunshot wounds, it is evident that the petitioner did not
act merely in self-defense, but was an aggressor who actually intended to kill his victim.

Given the foregoing, and in the absence of any circumstance that would have qualified the crime to
murder, we hold that the trial court committed no error in declaring the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. Applying the rules provided by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the trial court correctly imposed for such offense an indeterminate penalty of six ( 6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. The award of actual damages is also sustained. However, we hold that in line with
prevailing jurisprudence, 17 the victim is entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount
of P10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2011 and Resolution dated December
1, 2011 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33180 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
petitioner Ramon Josue y Gonzales is also ordered to pay the offended party the amount of P10,000.00
as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.
 6. Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004

G.R. No. 158057 September 24, 2004

NOE TOLEDO y TAMBOONG, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23742
affirming on appeal, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82, in
Criminal Case No. OD-861, convicting the petitioner of homicide.

In an Information filed in the RTC of Romblon, the petitioner was charged with homicide allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of September 1995, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, in
Barangay Libertad, municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a bolo, one RICKY F. GUARTE,
which causes (sic) his untimely death.

Contrary to law.3

In due course, the prosecution adduced evidence against the petitioner which was synthesized by the
appellate court as follows:

On September 16, 1995, appellant went to a black-smith who made the design of his bolo.
When he went home to Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon late in the afternoon (TSN, September 4,
1998, p. 2), appellant saw the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky
Guarte drinking gin at the house of the Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky’s parents.
Appellant’s house is about five (5) meters away from the house of Spouses Guarte. Appellant
requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise. Thereupon, appellant proceeded
inside his house and went to sleep (ibid., p. 3). Around 9:00 p.m., Gerardo Faminia, Eliza
Guarte’s brother arrived at the Guarte house and asked for any left-over food (TSN, August 5,
1998, p. 3). Eliza prepared dinner for him and after Gerardo finished eating, he went home
accompanied by Ricky (TSN, April 26, 1996, p. 5). Gerardo’s home is about twelve (12) meters
away from the Guarte home (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 11). Minutes later, Ricky came back and
together with Lani, Rex and Michael, went to sleep at the Guarte house. They had not laid down
for long when they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house. The stoning was made
three (3) times (TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 2-3). Ricky rose from bed and peeped through a
window. He saw appellant stoning their house. Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to
appellant’s house. Ricky asked appellant, his uncle, why he was stoning their house. Appellant
did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his (appellant’s) house (TSN, April 26, 1996, p.
 6; August 5, 1998, pp. 4-5) and, without any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo
(TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 8). Eliza had followed his son Ricky and upon seeing that Ricky was
stabbed, shouted for help (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 13). Lani heard Eliza’s cry for help and
immediately rushed outside the house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and supporting his
body with his hands. Lani helped Ricky stand up and brought him to the main road. Lani asked
Ricky who stabbed him and Ricky replied that it was appellant who stabbed him. Then Docloy
Cortez arrived at the scene on board his tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on the tricycle and
taken to the Romblon Provincial Hospital (TSN, January 19, 1998, pp. 4-6).

At the Romblon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Noralie Fetalvero operated on Ricky that very night. Ricky had
sustained one (1) stab wound but due to massive blood loss, he died while being operated on (TSN,
November 24, 1997, pp. 2, 6-7). Dr. Fetalvero issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing the injuries
sustained by Ricky, thus:

Stab wound, left chest with gastric & transverse colon evisceration measuring 6 cms. long,
irregular-edged at 8th ICS, left penetrating (operative findings):

(1) abdominal cavity perforating the stomach (thru & thru) and the left lobe of the liver

(2) thoracic cavity thru the left dome of the diaphragm perforating the lower lobe of the
left lung.

(Exhibit C)

The Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Fetalvero stated the cause of Ricky’s death as:

CAUSES OF DEATH:

Immediate cause : a. Cardiorespiratory Arrest

Antecedent cause : b. Hypovolemic shock

Underlying cause : c. Multiple thoraco-abdominal

injury 2º to stab wound

(Exhibit B)4

The Evidence of the Petitioner

The petitioner adduced evidence that at around 5:00 p.m. on September 16, 1995, he was on his way
home at Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon. He saw his nephew, Ricky Guarte, and the latter’s friends,
Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez, and Lani Famero, about five meters away from his house, having a drinking
spree. He ordered them not to make loud noises, and they obliged. He then went to his house, locked
the door with a nail, and went to sleep. However, he was awakened at around 9:30 p.m. by loud noises
coming from Ricky and his three companions. He peeped through the window grills of his house and
admonished them not to make any loud noises. Ricky, who was then already inebriated, was incensed;
he pulled out a balisong, pushed the door, and threatened to stab the petitioner. The petitioner pushed
their sala set against the door to block the entry of Ricky, but the latter continued to push the door open
with his hands and body. The petitioner ran to the upper portion of their house and got his bolo.5 He
returned to the door and pushed it with all his might using his left hand. He then pointed his bolo, which
was in his right hand, towards Ricky. The bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the stomach, and the latter lost
his balance and fell to the floor. The petitioner, thereafter, surrendered to the barangay captain at 11:00
a.m. on September 17, 1995.

After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty as charged. The fallo of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, NOE TOLEDO is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and is meted the
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.

Accused is condemned to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil liability to the heirs of the
victim.6

The trial court did not give credence and probative weight to the testimony of the petitioner that his
bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.

On appeal in the CA, the petitioner raised the following issue in his brief as appellant:

WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE CRIMINALLY HELD LIABLE FOR THE

ACCIDENTAL DEATH OF RICKY GUARTE7

Invoking Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner claimed that he stabbed the
victim by accident; hence, he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim.

The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision with modifications. The CA also denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner failed to
prove that he acted in self-defense.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the CA erred in not
finding that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim by accident and prays that he be
acquitted of the crime charged.

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide
based on the evidence on record.

The petitioner contends that the CA committed a reversible error when it affirmed the decision of the
RTC convicting him of homicide, on its finding that he failed to prove that he acted in complete self-
defense when the victim was hit by his bolo. The petitioner insists that he acted in complete self-
defense when his bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense
with clear and convincing evidence. Hence, the decision of the CA affirming, on appeal, the decision of
the RTC is correct.

The contention of the petitioner has no merit.

The petitioner testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally. He asserted in the RTC and in the CA that
he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.

In his brief in the CA, the petitioner argued that:

In the case at bar, with all due respect, contrary to the findings of the lower court, it is
our humble submission that the death of Ricky Guarte was merely a sad and unwanted
result of an accident without fault or intention of causing it on the part of accused-
appellant. We submit, there were clear and indubitable factual indicators overlooked by
the lower court, bolstering the theory of the defense on accidental death.8

However, the petitioner changed gear, so to speak, and now alleges that he acted in self-defense when
he stabbed the victim. As such, he contends, he is not criminally liable under Article 11, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code which reads:

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it:

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending

himself.

The petitioner avers that he was able to prove the essential elements of complete self-defense,
thus:

A close scrutiny of the records of the case would show that the petitioner acted in self-
defense.

The essential requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable scrutiny of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself (People vs. Silvano, 350 SCRA 650)9
However, the petitioner also claims that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim.

It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided upon
that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal. The case will be
reviewed and decided on that theory and not approached and resolved from a different point of view.
To permit a party to change his theory on appeal will be unfair to the adverse party.10

The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he adopted in the
trial court and foisted in the CA – by claiming that he stabbed and killed the victim in complete self-
defense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the trial and
appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories – (1) that he killed the victim to
defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal
liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said
defenses are intrinsically antithetical.11 There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm
of criminal law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate
and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use
of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his
deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men
of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense.
The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends.12 Although the accused, in fact, injures or
kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to
have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities.13 On the other hand, the
basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.14 The
basis of the exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and
intent. The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a
crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which
constitute free will or voluntariness of the act.15 An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or
happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.16

Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial and appellate courts
for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident without fault or without
intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such affirmative defenses. He
should rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. If
the accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be acquitted.

The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident, without fault or intention on his
part to cause it. The petitioner was burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the essential
requisites for the exempting circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4, viz:
 1. A person is performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;

3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;

4. Without fault or intention of causing it.

To prove his affirmative defense, the petitioner relied solely on his testimony, thus:

Q What happened next when Ricky Guarte was able to push through the door and you ran
away?

A When Ricky Guarte was able to push the door, that is the time I go (sic) downstairs and got my
bolo and at that time the body of Ricky Guarte was at the entrance of the door and accidentally
the bolo reached him.

Q Where did you get the bolo?

A I got the bolo in the post or wall of our house.

Q Was Ricky Guarte hit the first time you boloed him?

A Not hacking but accidentally.

Q What do you mean by accidentally?

A Because when Ricky Guarte pushed the door and unbalance himself (sic) the bolo which I was
carrying hit him accidentally.

Q Where was he hit by the bolo you were carrying?

A In the stomach.17

Q And since you were at the left side of the door, your right hand was at the center part of the
door, correct?

A No, Sir.

Q Where was your right hand?

A Holding a bolo.

Q Where, in what part of the door?

A Right side.

Q When Ricky Guarte was pushing the door, the door was not opened?

A It was opened.

Q It was opened because you opened the door, correct?

A No, Sir.

Q Now, why was it opened?

A Because he was pushing it.

Q With his left hand?

A With his both hands and body.

Q Now, when he fell down because, according to you, he losses (sic) his balance, the left side of
the body was the first to fell (sic) down, correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You are sure of your answer now Mr. Toledo?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Now, and while holding that bolo, you are doing that in [an] upward position, correct?

A No, Sir, pointing the door.

Q Yes, you are pointing the tip of your bolo to the door upward, correct?

A No, Sir, steady pointing to the door.

Q Now, when the door was opened, your bolo did not hit any part of that door, correct?

A "Ginaiwas ko ang sunrang," meaning I was able to get away from hitting any part of the door.

Q The question Mr. Toledo is simple, while the door was opened and while you were pointing
directly your bolo at the door, not any part of the door hit the bolo (sic), correct?

ATTY. FORMILLEZA:

It was a valid answer, it did not hit any part of the door.

COURT:
 Answer.

A No, Sir.

PROS. FRADEJAS continuing:

Q You were only about five inches away from your door while pushing it, correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Now, when the door was pushed already by Ricky Guarte, not any part of your body hit the
door, correct?

A No, Sir.18

The petitioner also testified that the victim was armed with a balisong and threatened to kill him as the
said victim pushed, with his body and hands, the fragile door of his house:

Q Where were you when you saw Ricky went out?

A I was at the door.

Q Did Ricky proceed to the door where you were?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What did he do, if any?

A He drew his fan knife or balisong and asked me what do you like, I will stab you?

Q What did you do?

A I told him I have not done you anything wrong, I am only scolding you or telling you not to
make noise.

Q What, if any, did Ricky Guarte do to you?

A He pushed the door.

Q Whose door did he push?

A My own door.

Q Where were you when he pushed the door?

A Inside our house.19

We find the testimony of the petitioner incredible and barren of probative weight.

First. If the testimony of the petitioner is to be believed, the force of the struggle between him and the
victim would have caused the door to fall on the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to adduce
real evidence that the door of his house was destroyed and that he sustained any physical
injuries,20 considering that he was only five inches away from the door.

Second. If the door fell to the sala of the house of the petitioner, the victim must have fallen on top of
the door. It is incredible that the bolo of the petitioner could have hit the stomach of the victim. The
claim of the petitioner that he managed to step aside and avoid being crushed by the door belies his
claim that the bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.

Third. When he surrendered to the barangay captain and to the policemen, he failed to relate to them
that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim:

Q Now, that very night when you said Ricky Guarte was accidentally hit by your bolo, you did not
surrender to the police, correct?

A I surrendered to the barangay captain at one o’clock in Panique, in the afternoon.

Q Now, you only surrendered to the police when a certain person advised you to surrender,
correct?

A On my own volition, I surrendered to the barangay captain.

Q You did not narrate the incident to the barangay captain whom you have surrendered,
correct?

A No, Sir.

Q When you were brought to the municipal jail, you did not also narrate to the police what
happened, correct?

A No, Sir.

Q You just remained silent thinking of an excuse that happened that evening of September 16,
1995, correct?

A No, Sir.21

Fourth. There is no evidence that the petitioner surrendered either the bolo that accidentally hit the
victim or the balisong held by the deceased to the barangay captain or the police authorities. Such
failure of the petitioner negates his claim that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim and
that he acted in self-defense.22

Fifth. To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof,
namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the petitioner; (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete.23 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack,
or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.24 We agree with the
ruling of the CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense, whether complete or incomplete:

The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. While
it was established that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of appellant’s house which would give
a semblance of verity to appellant’s version of the incident, such view, however, is belied by the
fact that Ricky arrived at appellant’s house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is,
to ask appellant why he threw stones at his (Ricky’s) house. With no weapon to attack appellant,
or defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from Ricky’s arrival at appellant’s
doorstep. Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest any aggressive
act that may have imperiled appellant’s well-being. Ricky’s want of any weapon when he arrived
at appellant’s doorstep is supported by the fact that only one weapon was presented in court,
and that weapon was the bolo belonging to appellant which he used in stabbing Ricky. Thus,
appellant’s version of the events does not support a finding of unlawful aggression. In People vs.
Pletado, the Supreme Court held:

"xxx (F) or aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, [un]expected

attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude (People vs. Pasco, Jr., supra, People vs. Rey, 172 SCRA 149 [1989]) and the
accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression (Pacificar vs. Court
of Appeals, 125 SCRA 716 [1983]). Unlawful aggression must be such as to put in real
peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself or of a relative sought to
be defended and not an imagined threat."

Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant’s life
necessitating his assault on Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual,
sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude. In the absence of such element, appellant’s claim of self-defense must fail.

Further, appellant’s plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of self-
defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.25

Sixth. With the failure of the petitioner to prove self-defense, the inescapable conclusion is that he is
guilty of homicide as found by the trial court and the CA. He cannot even invoke Article 12, paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code.26

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 7. Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 189405, November 19, 2014

G.R. No. 189405 November 19, 2014

SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in behalf of his deceased brother,
JEFFREY WERNHER L. GONZALES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set
aside the May 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner
Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its August 19, 2009
Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information3 dated March 2, 2005, which
alleged:

That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
JEFFREY WERNHER GONZALES Y LIM on the head, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and moral
gunshot wound which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner went to
the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. When petitioner was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the deceased
victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness Antonette
Managbanag’s sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards the aisle. As
petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at the back of
Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the gun, and
a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and
remained in possession of the said gun. Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the
trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead,
eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.

The defense recounted a different version of the facts.

Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less, petitioner,
together with his children, went to Sykes Asia, the workplace of his wife, Darlene Dela Cruz (Darlene),
located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati City, to fetch the latter so that their
family could spend time and celebrate together the New Year’s Day. Before entering the Robinson’s
Summit Building, petitioner underwent the regular security check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the
guards-on-duty manning the main entrance of said building and no firearm was found in his possession.
He registered his name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.

Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning the entrance once again
frisked petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his possession; hence, he was allowed to enter the
premises of Sykes Asia. The security guard also pointed to him the direction towards his wife’s table.

However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain man and asked the
latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene. The person whom petitioner had talked towas the
deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After casually introducing himself as the husband of Darlene, Jeffrey curtly told
him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The response
given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo sinusundo mo pa!"

Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he was. But
Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his chair which
happened to be a gun and pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed by a clicking sound. The gun,
however, did not fire.

Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of the gun.While
grappling, the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. Again, the gun did not fire.

Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any further
confrontation with the latter.However, Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner’s path and shouted,
"Guard! Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher, aimed and was about to
smash the same on petitioner’s head.

Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the act of parrying,
the gun accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that his parrying hand had made with
the fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey, which caused the latter
to fall on the floor and die.

Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards the elevator.
On his way to the elevator, he heard Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong nangyari?", but he was not able to
answer.

After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2) young children.
Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he received a copy of
the blog of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.

During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter, pretrial conference was conducted on even date and trial on the
merits ensued thereafter.

During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of Marie Antonette
Managbanag (Managbanag), Maria Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez) and Carlos Alberto Lim Gonzales (Gonzales),
respectively. The prosecution likewise formally offered several pieces of documentary evidence to
support its claim.

For its part, the defense presented aswitnesses, petitioner himself; his brother, Simeon Sander Dela Cruz
III (Cruz), Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena) and Managbanag, who was recalled to the witness
stand as witness for the defense.

On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati City, Branch 147, rendered a
Decision5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the fallo thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor medium as Minimum to Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium as Maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Jeffrey Wernher Gonzales y Lim in the amount
of ₱50,000.00 plus moral damages in the amount of ₱1 Million, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.6

On March 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, while private respondent, through the private
prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2007 insofar as the sentence rendered against
petitioner is concerned and the civil damages awarded.

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA). However, the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification on the
civil liability of petitioner. The decretal portion of the Decision7 reads: WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147 dated 26 February 2007 finding accused-
appellant Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofHomicide with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(2) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;

(4) the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity.

(5) to pay the costs of the litigation.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Raised are the following issues for resolution:

 1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE, AS
PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.

2. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS DISCHARGED
THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE TIME THAT THE
PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE ACT OF DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM THE
CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF THE DECEASED VICTIM.

3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.

4. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IS APPLICABLE IN

THIS CASE.

5. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE
VICTIM ARISING FROM THE ACCIDENT THAT TRANSPIRED.9

There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. What is leftfor
determination by this Court is whether the elements of self-defenseexist to exculpate petitioner from
the criminal liability for Homicide.

The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lackof sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.10 In other words, there
must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was
then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the
attack.11

Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled
thatwhen he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself.12 The burden of proving that the killing was
justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him.13 As such, he must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for, even if the prosecution
evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the killing.14

Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his petition
must be denied.

First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was
employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected or imminent danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action.15 There is
aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life.16 The peril sought to
be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative.17 In the case at bar, other than
petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly
responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that
Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may have
caused petitioner to fear for his life.

Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and
therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the
moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had every opportunity to
run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus:

In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun.1avvphi1 Accused admitted that
he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard",
then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused had
the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially
came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused
from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right
to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed (Peo Vs.
Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the
unlawful aggression has ceased (PeoVs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).

Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accused’s) headbut he
parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful as nothing in the records is or would be
corroborative of it.In contrast, the two (2) Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not impeached,
both gave the impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shieldhimself from the accused who
was then already in possession of the gun.18

Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense
has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.19 To be sure, when the present victim no longer
persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there
was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the
offender.20 Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to
inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had
already ceased.

More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if there was unlawful
aggression in the instant case, the same rather emanated from petitioner, thus: DIRECT EXAMINATION

Atty. Mariano:

Q: Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incident happen?

A: We were still at work, we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the moment and I was
standing at my work station and then Sherwin approached Jeff and he pointed a gun at the back of the
head of Jeff.

Q: And then what happened?

A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession of the gun.

Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?

A: Probably 10 to 12 feet.

Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after Jeffrey warded off the gun, they
started to struggle, what happened after that, if any?

A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried to get hold of the fire
extinguisher and the fourth shot went off and then Jeffrey fell down.

Q: And who was holding the gun?

A: Sherwin was holding the gun. (TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 12-14) CROSS-EXAMINATION: Atty. Agoot:

Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from the other side? Atty.
Mariano:

Objection, your Honor, witness already answered that.

Atty. Agoot:

I am on cross examination, your Honor.

COURT

You didn’t not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw him point the gun at the back of
Jeff and he did not come from my side so that means…

COURT

No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey?

A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey.

Atty. Agoot

He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him?

A: Yes, Sir.

(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 26-27)21

Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled a gun from his chair
and tried to shoot him, is not corroborated by separate competent evidence. Pitted against the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, Managbanag and Pelaez, it pales incomparison and loses probative
value. We have, on more thanone occasion, ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably
entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but also extremely
doubtful in itself.22

In addition, other than petitioner’s testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that the alleged
unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued when he blocked the path of petitioner while the
latter tried to run away to avoid further confrontation with Jeffrey. We also agree with the findings of
the RTC that there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire
extinguisher on petitioner’s head. Alternatively, the prosecution witnesses maintained an impression
that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a
deadly weapon. An excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit:

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced the person who was
holding the gun already?

Witness:

A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this.

COURT

For the record.

Atty. Mariano:

Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire extinguisher upright with
his right hand above the fire extinguisher and his left hand below the fire extinguisher.

Witness:

The left hand would support the weight basically.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the slapping of that person who was
in possession of the gun?

Witness

A: Yes, sir.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then after that there was again a grappling?

Witness

A: No more grappling for possession. Because Jeffrey was still holding the fire extinguisher at thattime.
And then he fell holding on to the fire extinguisher.

Atty. Agoot

Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi pumutok" Do you
affirmand confirm this statement?

Witness

A: Yes, sir. They were pushing each other. The other person was trying to point the gun at Jeffrey and
Jeffrey was trying to cover himself with the fire extinguisher so nagkakatulakan sila at the same time.

Atty. Agoot

Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click without firing?

Witness

A: Three (3) times, sir.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not fire?

Witness

A: They were still pushing each other at that time.

Atty. Agoot

Q: Using the fire extinguisher, heused that to push against the person…

Witness

A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who was pointing the gun at him.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire extinguisher?

Witness

A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. So I clearly saw what was going on at
that time.
(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense, TSN dated 04 September 2006,
pp. 12-17, emphasis supplied)23

Petitioner’s contention that Jeffrey’s unlawful aggression was continuous and imminent is, therefore,
devoid of merit.

Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe
wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be considered a
justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.

Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey, the
means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the
alleged attack, which he sought to avert. As held by the Court in People v. Obordo:24

Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-
appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was reasonable.
The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between
the means of attack and the defense. Accused appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was
trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting
knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part ofthe victim's body
was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the victim
used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25

Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as
correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:

The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the
discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the use of
fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates
a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).

It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the victim who
was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a deadly weapon. Under the
circumstances, accused’s alleged fear was unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an
imagined impending attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute unlawful
aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It is a settled rule that to
constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his lifeand limb; and
the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja v. Peo., 440 SCRA
695).26

If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run, despite
any obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could have also
immediately sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard stationed at the floor
where the shooting incident happened. In fact, he could have reported the incident to the authorities as
soon as he had opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet,
petitioner never did any of that.
We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling with Jeffrey,
and inthe end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four times, the last shot finally
killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:

Moreover, the Prosecution’s eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that while there was prior
struggle for the possession of the gun, it was nevertheless accused who was holding the gun at the time
of the actual firing thereof (TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005; TSN, p. 14, October 17, 2005). Witness
Managbanag even alleged that while the victim (Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire extinguisher,
and the accused were pushing each other, accused pointed the gun at the victim. She heard three (3)
clicks and on the 4th , the gun fired (TSN, p. 12, October 10, 2005). Under the circumstances, it cannot
be safely said that the gun was or could have been fired accidentally. The discharge of the gun which led
to the victim’s death was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or struggle for the possession
of the gun.27

The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot accidentally to the
detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. While petitioner may
nothave intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset, at the time he clicked the trigger thrice consecutively, his
intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be disregarded. We have held in the pastthat the
nature and number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which
disprove a plea of self-defense.28 Thus, petitioner’s contention that an accident simultaneously occurred
while hewas in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. There could nothave
been an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his head, a vital part of the
body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.

Besides, petitioner’s failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey and to
surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim militates against his claim of self-defense.29

In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of self-defense since it is
recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua nonfor upholding the justifying circumstance
of self-defense.30 If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will
have no basis.31 Hence, there is no basis to entertain petitioner’s argument that a privileged mitigating
circumstance of selfdefense is applicable in this case, because unless the victim has committed unlawful
aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the
latter.32

Anent petitioner’s argument thatthe RTC erred when it failed to consider as suppression of evidence the
prosecution’s alleged deliberate omission to present the testimonies of the security guards-on-duty at
the time of the shooting incident, the same fails to persuade. We concur with the decision of the CA on
this point, to wit:

Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that he acted in self-defense, shifted to
accused-appellant Dela Cruz. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of the prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his
open admission of responsibility for the killing.

The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the disposal of both the
prosecution and the defense. The defense did not proffer proof that the prosecution prevented the
security guards from testifying. There is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution is
guilty of suppression of evidence.

The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the opinion that their [the security
guards] testimonies were vital and material to the case of the defense. It could have compelled the
security guards on duty to appear before the court. xxx.33

It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is essentially a question
of fact.34 It is the peculiar province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and related
questions of fact because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses
while testifying.35 This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA and the RTC failed to
appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and substance that would have merited petitioner's
acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the CA that petitioner did not act
in self-defense.36

In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioner’s contention that since the incident transpired in
Jeffrey’s office, and the witnesses presented by the prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey, the
witnesses are expected to testify in favor of Jeffrey and against petitioner. Ascorrectly pointed out by
respondent, there appears no motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against
petitioner.37 The fact that they are officemates of Jeffrey does not justify a conclusion that Managbanag
and Pelaez would concoct or fabricate stories in favorof Jeffrey for the mere purpose of implicating
petitioner with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying under oath.

All told, we find no basis to doubt ordispute, much less overturn, the findings of the RTC and the CA that
the elements of homicide are present in the instant case as amply shown by the testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, and they constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of petitioner beyond cavil or
doubt.

Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed
firearm, we deviate from the findings of the CA. A perusal of the Information will show that the use of
unlicensed firearm was expressly alleged in the killing of Jeffrey. This allegation was further proved
during trial by the presentation of the Certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division, dated
November 11, 2005, certifying that petitioner is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and
calibre, per verification from the records of the said Division. Accordingly, under Paragraph 3 of Section
1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, such use of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance, to wit:

xxxx

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

x x x x.

Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being an aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, the penalty imposable on petitioner should be in its
maximum period.38 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the
minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
maximum, as the maximum penalty.

As to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and damages for loss of earning capacity in favor
ofprivate respondent, we sustain the findings of the CA in so far as they are in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, we find the grant of exemplary damages in the present case in
order, since the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has been
established.39 Based on current jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages for homicide is
₱30,000.00.40

Finally, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,41 an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on the aggregate amount awarded for civil indemnity and damages for loss of earning capacity
shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19, 2009 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

(1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty;

(2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following:

a. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

c. the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;

d. the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

e. the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity;

f. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity, an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full
payment thereof; and

g. the costs of the litigation.

SO ORDERED.
 8. Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014

G.R. No. 170462 February 5, 2014

RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 24, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28899. The CA affirmed, with modification on the amount of damages,
the joint decision3 dated April 16, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cauayan City,
Isabela, finding Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra (petitioners) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.

Factual Antecedents

Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide under two
Informations which read:

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide:

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with
a sharp pointed bolo one Erwin Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab
wounds on the different parts of his body, which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the said
Erwin Ordonez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Erwin Ordonez, which
prevented his death.4

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide:

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with
a sharp pointed bolo one David Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab
wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.5
Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8, 2000, the true date of
their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the CA through the records.6 The parties failed
to raise any objection to the discrepancy.7

On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges.8 The cases were jointly tried with
the conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre-trial, the petitioners interposed self-
defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a reverse trial of the case.9

During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the events that transpired on November 8,
2000.

Version of the Defense

To prove the petitioners' claim of self-defense, the defense presented the testimonies of Rodolfo, Joey,
and the petitioners' neighbor, Balbino Agustin.

Testimony of Rodolfo

Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11 :00 p.m., on November 8,
2000, brothers Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez, together with their companion, Philip Vingua, forced
their way into his compound and threw stones at his house and tricycle. Through the back door of his
house, Rodolfo went down to the basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to stop. David saw
him, threatened to kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas," hitting him on the palm of his left hand.
Rodolfo responded by reaching for the bolo tucked in the "so/era" of his house, and hacked and stabbed
Erwin and David until the two brothers fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin and David lying on the
ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to the hospital. He stayed in his house until the
policemen arrived.

Testimony of Joey

Joey, who was then thirty-one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000,
he was awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela.
Through the window, he saw Erwin, David and Philip breaking into their gate, which was made of wood
and interlink wire and located five ( 5) to six ( 6) meters away from their house. He then heard his father
Rodolfo say to the three men, "kung ano man ang problema bukas na natin pag-usapan,"10 and David
retorted in their dialect, "Okininam nga lakay adda ka gayam dita, patayin taka."11

Testimony of Balbino

Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at around 10:00 p.m., on
November 8, 2000, he heard a person from the outside saying "Sige banatan ninyo na."12 He opened his
door and saw David, Erwin and Philip throwing stones at the house of his neighbor Crisanto Briones.
Briones got mad and scolded the three men, "Why are you hitting my house? Why don't you hit the
house of your enemy, mga tarantado kayo!"13 David, Erwin and Philip then aimed their stones at the
petitioners' house. Balbino heard David calling out to Joey, "Joey, kung tunay kang lalaki lumabas ka
diyan sa kalsada at dito tayo magpatayan,"14 but no one came out of Rodolfo's house. The stoning lasted
for about thirty (30) minutes.
Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo's gate and pull the gate towards the
road. He heard David say to his companions, "koberan ninyo ako at papasok kami."15 David, Erwin and
Philip entered the petitioners' compound and damaged Rodolfo's tricycle with stones and their
''panabas." Also, he heard Rodolfo say to David in Filipino that they could just talk about their problems
with him the following day. But David approached Rodolfo and hacked him with a ''panabas." Rodolfo
parried the blow with the back of his hand, and David and Rodolfo struggled for the possession of the
''panabas."

Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on his right foot, causing
Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the "silung" of their house from where Rodolfo got "something shiny,"
and with it stabbed David and Erwin. He saw the two brothers fall to the ground.

Version of the Prosecution

As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the hacking.

Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother David and
Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners' compound. He was walking twenty
(20) meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David was being
stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was three (3) meters
away from where his brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his
arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners' compound and kept
on hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately fell to
the ground.

Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged Rodolfo's
tricycle.1âwphi1 They did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which was only damaged when his
brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound. While
they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained on them and people
outside the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come out."16

After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David died in the
hospital while being treated for his wounds.

The RTC's Ruling

In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's version of the incident
and found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and
homicide. It disbelieved the defense's version of the events due to material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the defense witnesses. It denied the petitioners' claim of self-defense for lack of clear,
convincing and satisfactory supporting evidence.

The RTC explained in its decision that "[w]hen an accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-
defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of innocence and assumes the burden of proving, with
clear and convincing evidence, the justification for his act";17 that self-defense is an affirmative
allegation which must be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that
excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.18 The RTC held that the
petitioners miserably failed to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, Erwin
and David.

Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes for which they are charged, and absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance/s that
attended the commission of the crimes, the Court hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer -In
Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from Three (3)
years and one day of prision correccional as minimum to Nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum
and to indemnify the victim Erwin Ordonez moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand
(₱20,000.00) Pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against the
accused.

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years
and one day of prision mayor as minimum to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased David Ordonez Sixty Thousand (₱60,000.00) Pesos plus Thirty
Thousand (₱30,000.00) Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against the accused.

The bail bonds of the accused are CANCELLED.19

The CA's Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of the crimes charged. As
the RTC did, the CA found that Erwin and David committed no unlawful aggression sufficient to provoke
the actions of the petitioners; that "aggression, to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent, such that
there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom that
person is seeking to defend."20 Even assuming the truth of the petitioners' claims that David challenged
Joey to a fight and threatened to kill Rodolfo on the night of November 8, 2000, the CA held that these
acts do not constitute unlawful aggression to justify the petitioners' actions as no real or actual danger
existed as the petitioners were then inside the safety of their own home.

The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense was belied by the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds on his arm and back, and David,
who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds on his back and stomach causing his death. These wounds
logically indicated that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined homicidal
aggression on the part of the petitioners.21

The CA, however, found error in the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the RTC.
Thus, the CA modified the RTC's decision in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1561,
appellants RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA are each ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
David Ordonez the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P.50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.22
 The Petition

In the present petition, the petitioners raise the following issues:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE
PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER JOEY
GUEVARRA WHO HAS NO PARTICIPATION IN THE SAID INCIDENT.23

Our Ruling

We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of October 24, 2005.

At the outset, we emphasize that the Court's review of the present case is via a petition for review under
Rule 45, which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well-settled rule is
that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain
exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court's judgment or the
appellate court's misapprehension of the adduced facts.24

The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this case. Factual findings
of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and are
deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record.25 We find that both the RTC
and the CA fully considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they have
adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the petitioners are guilty of
the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.

In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts and
circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome of the present case, we uphold the rulings of
the RTC and the CA which found the elements of these crimes fully established during the trial.

The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an "accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s
but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present."26
On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused
killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and ( 4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by
that of parricide or infanticide.27

The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by
their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things,
of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by
the victim.28 The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which
eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the
prosecution's theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and Erwin.29

In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordonez
would have caused his death were it not for immediate medical attendance."30

By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which
they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With this
admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of
David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense.31

Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon a person.32 The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for self-
defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.33

As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by the petitioners'
compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin
was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the petitioners' compound,
as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate
post was broken coincided with Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto
the gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with the nature
and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in self-
defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.

As to the penalties and damages

awarded

We affirm the penalties imposed upon the petitioners, as they are well within the ranges provided by
law, but modify the damages awarded by the CA.

In addition to the ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the CA, we
award ₱25,000.00 to each of the victims as temperate damages, in lieu of the actual damages they
sustained by reason of the crimes. Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that temperate or moderate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty.

Also, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%)
per annum from date of finality of the decision until fully paid.34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated October 24, 2005 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the petitioners are also ordered to pay Erwin Ordonez
and the heirs of David Ordonez the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The petitioners shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil indemnity, moral
and temperate damages from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

9. People v. Sevillano, G.R. No. 200800, February 09, 2015

G.R. No. 200800, February 09, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OSCAR SEVILLANO Y RETANAL Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

For this Court’s resolution is the appeal filed by Oscar Sevillano y Retanal (appellant) assailing the 17
August 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 04257 which affirmed the Regional
Trial Court’s (RTC) 4 December 2009 Judgment2 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged before the RTC, Branch 17, Manila with murder in an information that

That on or about March 11, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill
and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of PABLO MADDAUIN y TAMANG by then and
there suddenly and unexpectedly stabbing him several times with a deadly bladed weapon hitting upon
the said Pablo T. Maddauin fatal stab wounds which are the direct cause of his death immediately
thereafter.3

During arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial
thereafter ensued.
 Statement of Facts

The version of the prosecution was summarized by the CA thus wise:

Prosecution witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, 67 and 46 years old, respectively, testified
that at around 3:00 p.m. of 11 March 2007, they, together with Victim Pablo Maddauin, were seated on
a long bench having their usual chit-chat at the vacant lot situated at 4th Street Guadal Canal, St., Sta.
Mesa, Manila. Witness Jose was the watchman of this property. While conversing, they saw appellant
coming towards their direction. Appellant could not walk straight and appeared to be drunk. Without
warning, appellant pulled out a knife from his waist and stabbed the victim on the chest. Jose and
Carmelita tried to restrain the appellant from attacking the victim, but Jose experienced leg cramps and
lost his hold on appellant. Appellant turned again on the victim and continued to stab him several times
more. The victim was heard asking appellant, “Bakit?”. Carmelita shouted for help. The victim’s wife
came to the scene and embraced appellant as she wrestled for the knife. Thereafter, [the] victim was
brought to the University of the East Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical center; but unfortunately, he
died that same day.4

Appellant, for his part, denied the accusations against him. He interposed self-defense to absolve
himself from criminal liability. He averred that on that fateful afternoon, he went to the vacant lot
where the victim and his friends usually hang-out to feed his chicken. While thereat, the victim, whom
he described to have bloodshot eyes, walk towards him and stepped on his injured foot. While he was
on his knees because of the pain, he saw the victim draw a knife. The latter thereafter stabbed at him
while uttering: “Ikaw pa, putang ina mo,” but missed his target. As he and the victim grappled for the
knife, the latter was accidentally stabbed. When he saw blood oozing out of the victim, he became
apprehensive of the victim’s relative to such extent that he fled the scene and hid to as far as Bulacan
where he was eventually apprehended.

Ruling of the RTC

In a Judgment5 dated 4 December 2009, the trial court found appellant guilty of murder for the death of
Pablo Maddauin (Pablo) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
of parole and to pay the heirs of the deceased P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that appellant, who
appeared to be intoxicated, unexpectedly arrived and stabbed Pablo seven times with a knife. The trial
court disregarded appellant’s denial as his testimony was outweighed by the positive statements of the
prosecution witnesses. It likewise ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crime, as
demonstrated by the fact that the victim was seated and engaged in a conversation when suddenly
attacked by the appellant. The trial court ruled that such situation foreclosed any opportunity on the
part of the victim to ward off the impending harm.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his appeal before the CA, appellant contended that:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S GUILT FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE.6

The CA found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld its ruling but with modification on
the amount of damages awarded. The CA ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of Pablo in the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The appellate court held that the eyewitness accounts of prosecution witnesses Jose
Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, and their positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator, aptly
complemented by the findings of the post-mortem examination, are more plausible than the appellant’s
claim of self-defense.7 The CA likewise sustained the trial court’s findings that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was present in the case. It held that although the attack on the victim was
frontal, it was deliberate, sudden and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no opportunity to resist or to defend himself.8

Issues

Undaunted, appellant is now before this Court continuing to insist that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and that the lower courts erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and convicting
him of murder instead of homicide.

Our Ruling

We find the appeal bereft of merit.

Well entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the
witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the witness first hand and note his demeanor,
conduct and attitude under gruelling examination.9 Absent any showing that the trial court’s calibration
of credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment.

In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the
accused killed that person; (3) that the killing was attended by treachery; and (4) that the killing is not
infanticide or parricide.10

After a careful evaluation of the records, we find that these elements were clearly met. The prosecution
witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who stabbed Pablo several times on the chest
which eventually caused the latter’s death. They testified that they even tried to stop appellant’s attack
but unfortunately, were unsuccessful. We find no reason to disbelieve the testimonies of these
witnesses considering that their narration of facts were straightforward and replete with details that
coincide with the medical examination conducted on the body of the victim. We are not persuaded by
the appellant’s defense of denial as this cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of
him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.11

Anent the presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution was able
to establish that the attack on the unsuspecting victim, who was merely seated on a bench and talking
with his friends, was very sudden. In fact, the victim was able to utter only “Bakit?”. We note that the
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the unsuspecting victim by the
perpetrator of the crime, depriving the former of any chance to defend himself or to repel the
aggression, thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on
the part of the victim.

By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds which killed the
victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove that the killing was done in self-
defense. In Razon v. People,12 this Court held that where an accused admits the killing, he assumes the
burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would
follow from his admission that he killed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when
corroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.

Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be present in order that a plea of
self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal liability:

First. Unlawful Aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Appellant’s version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to stab him was
found by the lower court to be untenable. We agree with the lower court’s
conclusion. Assuming arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the
imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant was able to wrestle the knife from
him. Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would justify the need for him
to kill the victim or the former aggressor. This Court has ruled that if an accused still persists in attacking
his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense.13 The fact that the
victim suffered many stab wounds in the body that caused his demise, and the nature and location of
the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved
to end the life of the victim.14

As to the penalties and damages

We affirm the penalty imposed upon appellant. Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, the crime of
murder qualified by treachery is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death. The lower courts were
correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, upon consideration of the
absence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense.
We likewise affirm the CA’s award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim’s heirs, as these amounts are consistent with current
jurisprudence.15 In addition, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of the resolution until fully paid.16

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 August 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 04257 finding Oscar Sevillano y Retanal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole, and ordering him
to indemnify the heirs of Pablo Maddauin in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as
moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
he shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil indemnity, moral and
exemplary damages awarded from finality of this resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.