STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

MODULE 3
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408
Doctrine of constitutional supremacy. If a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is
null and void and without any force and effect. In case of doubt, the Constitution
should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938)
Constitutional Provisions must be presumed to have been framed and adopted
in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to
them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are
familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its
provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its
adoption.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone,
but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument.
Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990)
Ratio Legit Est Anima Legis (Intent of the Spirit of the law)
Tañada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco
(1) It is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of
contemporaneous or practical construction has any application; and
(2) The spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985)
The privilege of the right against self-incrimination and the right to due process
extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness against themselves.
Ordillo vs. COMELEC 192 SCRA 100 (1992)
The language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in
a sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional
provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947)
Where the law does not define the words used in a statute and the legislature
has not intended a technical or special legal meaning to these words, the Court
may adopt the ordinary meaning of the words as defined in the dictionaries.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997.
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would
give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
 body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute.
Pamatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
The provisions in the Declaration of Principles and Policies as stated in Article II
of the 1987 Constitution do not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Article II
of the 1987 Constitution are non-self-executing acts.
Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957)
There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a
statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are
mandatory. In the determination of this question, as of every other question of
statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent.
Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 28196, November 9, 1967
Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation
of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof."
Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 (1996)
A waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must
be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in
cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of 1987
Constitution.
Co v. Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)
“The spirit and intendment of the law must prevail over the letter thereof,
especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and
injustice.”
CASE TITLE Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government G.R NO. 122156
Service Insurance System, Manila
Hotel Corporation, Committee on
Privatization and Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel
PONENTE BELLOSILLO, J. DATE: February 3, 1997
DOCTRINE Doctrine of constitutional supremacy. If a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing.
FACTS Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government,
the GSIS sold through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). In
a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS
to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino
First Policy enshrined in Section 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “In the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”
ISSUE/S Whether or not Sec. 10, par. 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision and does not require implementing
legislation(s) to carry it into effect.
RULING/S In ruling the petition, the Court first defined the constitution and
explained why Sec. 10, par. 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to
carry it into effect, to wit:

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and

administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government,
assigns to the different departments their respective powers and
duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is
founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law
or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void
and without any force and effect.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found

in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there
is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act
is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. That is why
the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that—
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
to pass the needed implementing statute.
CASE TITLE Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, G.R NO. 45859
66 Phil. 259 (1938)
PONENTE Abad Santos, J. DATE: September 28,
1938
DOCTRINE Constitutional Provisions must be presumed to have been framed and
adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and
with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people
adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws
upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they
express their judgment and opinion in its adoption.
FACTS Gold Creek Mining Corporation alleged that it owns Nob Fraction
mineral claim, situated in the Barrio of Gomok, municipality of Itogon,
sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province and located on public
lands owned by C. L. O’Dowd in accordance with the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by the Acto of Congress
of February 6, 1905, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission,
relative to the ocation of mining claims. Prior to August 9, 1933,
petitioner filed in the office of the Director of Land an application for an
order of patent survey of a claim (land), which survey was duly
authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and
performed by a land surveyor in the former divisions of mines, Bureau
of Science, from August 9, 1933 to April 30, 1934. The expense was
paid by the petitioner. Prior to November 15, 1935, the petitioner filed
with the mining recorder an application for patent together with a
certification that more than P1,600.00 worth of labor and improvements
had been expended in the claim and the notice of petitioner’s
application for patent was forwarded by the mining recorder to the
division of mines, so that the latter could order the publication of said
notice. The petitioner had requested the respondents, Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce and as director of the Bureau of Mines,
respectively, to approve its application for patent and to prepare the
necessary papers relative to the issuance thereof and to submit such
papers for signatures of the President of the Philippines but the
respondents have failed and refused to do so. Respondents admit
some allegation of the petition and deny others, and, by way of special
defense, allege that “petitioner was not and is not entitled as a matter
of right to a patent to the “Nob Fraction” claim because the Constitution
provides that ‘natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture
land, shall not be alienated and that respondents are not only under no
obligation to approve petitioner’s application for a patent to said claim
and to prepare the necessary papers in relation thereto but also, in duty
bound to disapprove the issuance of said patent and the preparation
of the aforesaid papers because they have sworn to support and
defend the constitution”.
ISSUE/S Whether or not Gold Creek Mining Corporation is unaffected by the
prohibition against the alienation of natural resources covered in
Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution?
RULING/S YES. In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that
constitutional provisions must be presumed to have been framed and
adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and
with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people
adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws
upon subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they
express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. The Supreme Court
concluded that the mining claim under consideration no longer formed
part of the public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the
Constitution became effective on November 15, 1935. It does not come
within the prohibition against alienation of natural resources and the
petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the
terms and conditions prescribed by law.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court was not justified, upon the state
of the pleadings, to grant the relief sought by the petitioner.
Considering, however, that the refusal of the respondents to act on the
application for a patent on its merits as due to their misinterpretation of
certain constitutional and statutory provisions, following the precedent
established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wilbur vs
United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, a writ of mandamus should be
issued directing the respondents to dispose of the application for
patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against alienation of
natural resources contained in Section 1 of Article XII of the constitution
and in Commonwealth Act No. 137. So ordered.
CASE TITLE Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive G.R NO. G.R. No. 83896
Secretary
PONENTE Fernan, C.J. DATE: February 22, 1991
DOCTRINE It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to
be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
FACTS President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions. The petitioners filed a petition assailing the
validity of EO 284 because it is subject to the limitation imposed by
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office
or employment. Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez, construing
Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B,
rendered Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, declaring that Cabinet
members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries
may hold other public office, including membership in the boards of
government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the
Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8,
paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the
primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of
this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987, or two
(2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987, promulgated
Executive Order No. 284. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase
“unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” used in Section 13 of
Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the
Constitution, as in the case of the Vice President being allowed to
become a Member of the Cabinet under the second paragraph of
Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Article VIII,
Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the
phrase “unless otherwise provided in the Constitution” in Section 13,
Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar
as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the Executive Order 284 contravenes with the
provision of the Constitution particularly to Section 13, Article
VII, hence unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution” found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to
Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B would render meaningless.
RULING/S 1. YES. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
 and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. In the case at bar, the intent of
the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as
holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned. The blatant betrayal of public trust
evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the
Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in
consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after
the people successfully unseated former President Marcos,
should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions under
consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the
evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices
and employment. Such intent is underscored by a comparison
of Section 13, Article VII when other provisions of the
Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or
employees from holding other offices or employment.

Therefore, Executive Order 284 contravenes with the provision

of the Constitution particularly to Section 13, Article VII, hence
unconstitutional.

2. NO. It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction

that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from
all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and
to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple
offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to
posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
officials’ office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise
“any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties
and functions on said officials. To reiterate, the prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio
capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned official’s office. The term ex-officio
means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority
derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position.” Ex-officio likewise denotes an “act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.” An
ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue
of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or
appointment.

Therefore, the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution” found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to
Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B would not render meaningless.
CASE TITLE LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, v. THE G.R NO. 86889
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM
PONENTE J. PARAS DATE: December 4,1990
DOCTRINE Ratio Legit Est Anima Legis (Intent of the Spirit of the law)
FACTS Luz Farms, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business and together with others in the same business allegedly
stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b),
Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A.
No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
and its implementing regulations as they are law made to apply to
them:

Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in

the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural
Activity.

Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural

lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."

Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing

plan.

Section 16(d) and 17 which vests on the Department of Agrarian

Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to
be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in

Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the
production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the
end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other
farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they
currently receive xxx
ISSUE/S Questions the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A.
No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988),
insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in relation to RA6657
RULING/S Said provisions are unconstitutional.

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission

of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it
was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657

which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial
farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of
the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry
lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
CASE TITLE Tañada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco G.R NO. No. L-10520
PONENTE CONCEPCIÓN, J.: DATE: 28 February 1957
DOCTRINE (1) It is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the
doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any
application; and (2) The spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the
letter thereof.
FACTS Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tañada and Diosdado Macapagal sought to
oust respondent Senators from the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioners alleged that the Committee on Rules for the Senate
in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado and the Senate in
choosing these respondents as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and
in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in
assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the
corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted
absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully,
and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into
and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal."

Respondents assail the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the petition,

upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) senators as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by
the Constitution upon the Senate despite the fact that the
draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective
political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the
Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the
Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is
not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public
opinion."
ISSUE/S Whether or not the case at bar raises merely a political question.
RULING/S As distinguished from the judiciary, the legislative and executive
departments are spoken of as the political departments of government
because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated
by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of
public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to
violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority
not granted him by the Constitution or by statute, but within these
limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together,
to recognize that certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists,
and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow
therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts (Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326).

To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum: “It
is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with
such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provisions.” It is not easy, however, to define
the phrase ‘political question’, nor to determine what matters fall within
its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside
the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. Thus, it has been repeatedly
held that the question whether certain amendments to the
Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure therein
prescribed is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. The
term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the
language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government."

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present
case. The Court is called upon to decide whether the election of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias, a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate, on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes
the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ... of the party having the
second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and
void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full
discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature.
It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass
upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
CASE TITLE Galman v Pamaran G.R NO. G.R. Nos. 71208-
09, 71212-13
PONENTE Cuevas, J. DATE: August 30, 1985
DOCTRINE The privilege of the right against self-incrimination and the right to due
process extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases
in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness against
themselves.
FACTS On August 21, 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was
gunned down to death when he returned to the country after a long-
sojourn abroad. The suspected gunman, Rolando Galman, was also
found dead on the airport not far from the body of Sen. Aquino. As a
result, PD 1886 was promulgated to create an ad hoc Fact Finding
Board known as ‘Agrava Board’. Among the witnesses who appeared,
testified and produced evidence before the Board were the private
respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero
Olivas,Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo
Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt.Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto
Acupido. The Tanodbayan, after conducting preliminary investigation,
filed with the Sandiganbayan two Informations for Murder for the killing
of Sen. Benigno Aquino and for the killing of Rolando Galman. In both
criminal cases, private respondents were charged as accessories,
along with several principals, and one accomplice. Upon arraignment,
all the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the
prosecution offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies
of private respondents before the Agrava Board. The respondents, in a
Motion to Exclude Evidence, objected to the admission of said exhibits
contending that its admission will be in derogation of their constitutional
right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by P.D.
No. 1886. The Tanodbayan opposed the motion for exclusion, contending
that the immunity relied upon was not available to them because of
their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad
hoc Fact Finding Board.The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution admitting all
the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other
evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity
granted by P.D. 1886. Motion for the reconsideration of the said
Resolution having been denied, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65
was filed. The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of
the testimonies given by the eight private respondents who did not invoke
their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the respondents were denied of their constitutional right
to remain silent and right against self-incrimination
RULING/S The private respondents were denied of their constitutional right to
remain silent and right against self-incrimination. They were
summoned and provided their testimonies before the Agrava Board.
Presidential Decree No. 1886 deprived them the right to remain silent.
They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves.
Section 5 of P.D. 1886 left them no choice but to take the witness
stand, testify or produce evidence. Under pain of contempt if they failed
or refused to do so fearing that they will be placed behind prison bars
even before conviction. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be
a witness against themselves, both of which are enshrined and
protected by the fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to
remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself
were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. Yet when they testified
and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from
prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. The
investigation is geared to the ascertainment and/or determination of
the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their
conviction. And as safeguard, the P.D. guarantees "any person called
to testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the
proceedings." It cannot be denied that in the course of getting
evidence, persons called to testify will comprise not just plain
witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in
the tragic killing. When accused are summoned and called to testify
and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person
testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the
commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the
facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more
importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation.
CASE TITLE Ordillo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R NO. 93054 (192 SCRA
192 SCRA 100 (1992) 100)
PONENTE Gutierrez, Jr., J. DATE: December 4,
1990
DOCTRINE The language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be
understood in a sense it has in common use and that the words used
in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.
FACTS On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the city of
Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to RA No. 6766
entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.”

The official results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the
Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 voters only in Ifugao
Province and rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and
cities above-mentioned.

On February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating

that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified
by the majority of votes cast only in the province of Ifugao On the same
date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President
providing “…and considering the proviso in Sec. 13 A that only the
provinces and city voting favourably shall be included in CAR, the
province of Ifugao being the only city which voted favourably – then
alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.”

Petitioners filed a petition for the non-ratification of the Organic Act for
the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid CAR in
only one province as the Constitution and RA No. 6766 require that
said Region be composed of more than one unit.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which
voted favourably for the creation of Cordillera Autonomous Region, can
alone, legally and validly constitute such Region
RULING/S The petition is granted.

It is explicit in Art X Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution that

“Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim

Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.”

The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical

areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means
two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen
(13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative
purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province
by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of
their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The
Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.

The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of

the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in a sense
it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional
provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed, must then, be applied to this case.
CASE TITLE Alexander A. Krivenko vs The G.R NO. G.R. No. L-630
Register of Deeds, City of Manila
PONENTE Moran, C.J. DATE: November 15,
1947
DOCTRINE Where the law does not define the words used in a statute and the
legislature has not intended a technical or special legal meaning to
these words, the Court may adopt the ordinary meaning of the words
as defined in the dictionaries.
FACTS In December 1941, Alexander A Krivenko, a Russian resident, bought
a residential lot from Magadalena Estate, Inc. However, he was not
able to register the residential land due to the ongoing war. In May
1945, he was denied of the registration by the Register of Deeds, City
of Manila on the ground that he is an alien and is not capable of
acquiring a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko was also denied of the
register of deeds even in the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, as to why he appealed to ths Court.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the court adopted the technical meaning of the term
“public agricultural land” as to determine whether the land is alienable
or disposable
RULING/S The court adopted the technical meaning of the “public agricultural
land”.

With reference to the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, the term
“agricultural public lands” is defined as “those public lands acquired
from Spain which are neither minerfal nor timber lands.” This phrase
can be found in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and several
sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926).

In Section I of Article XIII of the Constitution, “public agricultural land”

included in its definition the residential lands. Moreover, with the
revision of the Public Land Law and the passing of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, it can be found in Sections 58 – 60, that residential lands are
considered as agricultural lands as well. With that, there is a need to
properly define the term “lands” so as to determine whether Krivenko
can or camnot be granted the register of deeds.

Under Commonwealth Act No 141, lands are made alienable or

disposable and the broad meaning of “public agricultural lands” was
put into specifics. It defined agricultural land strictly for agricultural
purposes only, then residential, commercial, and lands of other
purposes. Eventhough as for the term, “public agricultural land” is
alienable or disposable, under Section 23 of the Commonwealth Act
No. 141, there is no right for alien citizens to acquire residential or
industrial lands. Hence, Krivenko was not granted the register of
deeds.
CASE TITLE Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS G.R NO. 122156
PONENTE Bellosillo, J. DATE: February 3, 1997
DOCTRINE In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
FACTS Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose
to award during bidding in September 1995 the 51% outstanding
shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per share
against herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered
Php 41.58 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as
the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the
former's bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a
manager's check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS
refused to accept both the bid match and the manager's check.

One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued
a TRO enjoining the respondents from perfecting and consummating
the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court
En Banc accepted the instant case.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph,
Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution
RULING/S The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease
and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian
firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10,

second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory
provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En
Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over
foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the
51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock.
The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the
nation's cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in
question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time,
not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from
granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence
of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped
from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former
knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.
CASE TITLE Pamatong v. COMELEC G.R NO. 161872
PONENTE J. Tinga DATE: April 13, 2004
DOCTRINE The provisions in the Declaration of Principles and Policies as stated
in Article II of the 1987 Constitution do not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. Article II of the 1987 Constitution are
non-self-executing acts.
FACTS  Petitioner Rey Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for President on December 17, 2003.
 In return, respondent COMELEC filed a Resolution No. 6558
declaring Petitioner a nuisance candidate with thirty-five others
declared the same as well.
 Petitioner, together with the others who were declared as
nuisance candidates as well, filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration. Motion was denied through Omnibus
Resolution No. 6604.
 Petitioner filed for Writ for Certiorari on the Supreme Court,
arguing that it violated his right to “equal access to opportunities
for public service” under Article II Sec 26 of the 1987
Constitution.
 Petitioner also attacked the validity of the form of the Certificate
of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that
the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for
determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not
ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his program of government.

ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not COMELEC violated the petitioner’s right to

“equal access to opportunities for public service” under Article II
Sec 26 of the 1987 Constitution by declaring him a nuisance
candidate.
2. Whether or not the validity of the form of Certificate of
Candidacy is in accordance with the law.
RULING/S  The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC acted within its
official functions of shortlisting candidates and declaring
nuisance candidates for national positions.
 The SC also held that what is recognized is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the
privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
 The provisions under the Declaration of Principles and Policies
in the 1987 Constitution is generally not self-executing.
 On the issue of the COC, the SC held that it is suffice to say that
the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a
certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required
 information tending to show that the candidate possesses the
minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as
established by the Constitution and other election laws.
 SC remanded the COMELEC for the reception of further
evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly
Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated
in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
CASE TITLE Lorenzo M. Tañada and Diosdado G.R NO. L-10520
Macapagal vs. Mariano Jesus Cuenco,
Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio,
Placido Reyes, and Fernando Hipolito
in his capacity as cashier and
disbursing officer
PONENTE Concepcion, J. DATE: February 28,
1957
DOCTRINE There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions
in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which
are mandatory. In the determination of this question, as of every other
question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the
legislative intent.
FACTS The Senate, in its session on February 22, 1956, upon nomination of
Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose
Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of
petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said
petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal.
Upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on
Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Tañada and
Sumulong, the Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J.
Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral
Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed Alfredo
Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private
secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said
respondent; and Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical
assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as
supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his
recommendation.

Relative to this, Senator Tañada and Congressman Macapagal

instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and
the appointees that such nomination and appointment as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal was a violation of Section 11, Article VI
of the Constitution, therefore, it is null and void.

Respondents alleged, however, that the constitutional mandate to the

effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9)
members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that
when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party,
and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf of the
 minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;"
that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, said Senator Primicias and
the Senate merely complied with the provision of the Constitution on
the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that,
accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of
said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, is valid and
lawful.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the constitutional provision on the number of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is mandatory?
RULING/S "There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory
provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from
those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this
question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime
object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must
be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the
determination does not depend on the form of the statute.
Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object,
and the consequences which would result from construing it one way
or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other
related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a
mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and,
when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective
to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation,
without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should
be given. On the other hand, the language of a statute, however
mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative
purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the
legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; but the
construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly
adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of
that passed by the legislature. Whether a statute is mandatory or
directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the
essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is
a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial
construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute
relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the
statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the
directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper,
orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as
directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a
statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on
it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative
can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with
substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating
to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance,
is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs
acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the
legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential
to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and
pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or
must be performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the
statute must be regarded as mandatory.

The adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution reveals

clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from
controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is
founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority
parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are
members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power.
The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of
members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called
upon to play. It constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence,
compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in
violation thereof are null and void.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to
seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but it is conceded that the
present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of
our Constitution. Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its
letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the
Constitution, for partisan considerations cannot be decisive in a
tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3)
members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2)
members nominated by the party having the second largest number of
votes in the House concerned.
CASE TITLE Gonzales v. COMELEC G.R NO. 28196
PONENTE DATE: Nov. 9, 1967
DOCTRINE Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof."
FACTS On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives
passed R. B. H. No.s 1, 2, and 3 that seeks to amend Section 5, Article
VI, of the Constitution to increase the seats of the Lower House from
120 to 180; to convoke a Constitutional Convention of 1971; and to
amend Section 16, Article VI, of the same constitution to authorize
Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become
delegates to the constitutional convention, without forfeiting their
respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the

President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing
that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by
the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November
14, 1967.

Two cases were filed against this act of Congress:

1. Case L-28196, An action for prohibition, with preliminary

injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in, a Filipino citizen, a
taxpayer, and a voter. This case is a class unit, for and in behalf
of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated where
Solicitor General expressed himself in favor of a judicial
determination of the merits of the issued raised in this case.
2. Case L-28224, by Philippine Constitution Association, a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan
organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in
the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions
or onslaughts from whatever source where the Solicitor General
maintains that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter for it is “merely political”.

ISSUE/S Whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent

assembly — violates the Constitution.
RULING/S In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have
been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately. This,
notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and void
according to the following:
1. Section 5, Article VI, that Members of Congress, which
approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution
calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de
facto Congressmen. As a consequence, the title of a de facto
officer cannot be assailed collaterally.

Court argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases
at bar because the acts therein involved have not been
completed and petitioners herein are not third parties. As
Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions
herein contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete

2. Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, that Congress may

propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention
for that purpose. Congress may adopt either one of two
alternatives propose but may not avail of both.

Court ruled that the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean
"and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law
warrants it.

3. Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, that in this provision

nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a
"special," not a general, election

Court opine that constitutional amendments are, in general, if

not always, of such important, if not transcendental and vital
nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused
exclusively on the subject-matter thereof. The said term
("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election,"
general or special, of public officers.

Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of

declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases
must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein
prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
CASE TITLE FILOTEO, JR. V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R NO. 79543
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
PONENTE PANGANIBAN, J. DATE: OCTOBER 16,
1996
DOCTRINE A waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial
investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be
applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was
made prior to the effectivity of 1987 Constitution.
FACTS Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western
Police District in Metro Manila. He, upon the capture of his co-accused,
was being suspected to be the mastermind of hijacking a postal
delivery van on May 3, 1982 in Bulacan. They, two of whom were
armed with guns, robbed and carried away them the following: a)
Postal Delivery Truck, b) Social Security System Medicare Checks and
Vouchers, c) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers,
d) Treasury Warrants and e) Several Mail Matters from abroad.

On May 30, 1982, Filoteo admitted his participation by giving a sworn

statement in Tagalog and surrendering the voluminous assorted US
checks and voucher to M/Gst. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P.
Espero with the presence of a counsel.

The Sandiganbayan found them guilty for Filoteo beyond reasonable

doubt of the violation of Section 2(e), in relation to Section 3(b) of PD
No. 532 or the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.

Among the 11 accused, only Filoteo filed a petition claiming that his
arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was extracted
through torture, that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to
convict him and that the law should be in his favor.
ISSUE/S (1) Whether or not Article III Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
shall be given retroactive effect to the petitioner.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner’s extra-judicial confession is
admissible even without the presence of a counsel.
RULING/S (1) No, Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution cannot be
sustained.

The court ruled that there is a difference between the 1973 and
the 1987 Constitutions on the right to counsel, to wit:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense

shall have the right... to counsel. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
(Article IV, Section 20, 1973 Constitution)
 Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right... to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice .... These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." (Article
I, Section 12,1987 Constitution)

Therefore, the 1973 Constitution must prevail and the provision

of the 1987 Constitution may not be applied retroactively in
cases where extra-judicial confession was made prior to the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. And, although Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that a person guilty of felony
who is not a habitual criminal, what is being construed here is a
constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights
which is not a penal statute.

(2) Yes, the extra-judicial confessions are admissible under the

1973 Constitution. It was also emphasized that since he was top
notched fourth year student, he must be knowledgeable on the
matter and having been in the police force since 1978, with
stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, he
knew the tactics used by investigators to incriminate criminal
suspects.
CASE TITLE Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House G.R NO. 92191-92
of Representatives
PONENTE GUTIERREZ, JR., J DATE: July 30, 1991
DOCTRINE “The spirit and intendment of the law must prevail over the letter
thereof, especially where adherence to the latter would result in
absurdity and injustice.”
FACTS On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the
position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed
the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
 Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
 Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), in its
decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November
12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET, in its resolution
dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse in declaring the
respondent Jose Ong Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
2. Whether or not Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives have jurisdiction on all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.
RULING/S The petitions for certiorari are dismissed.
1. NO. Under Article IV Section 1 (3) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that, “The following are citizens of the Philippines: (3)
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority”.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying
not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February
2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in
Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women. The foregoing
significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the
provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow
interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also
be retroactive. It should be noted that in construing the law, the
Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of
its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail
 over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would
result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35
SCRA 279 [1970]) In application of the said provision, the
respondent was born in the year of 1948. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized
when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
As for the issue of his residence, under Art. 50 of the
Civil Code of the Philippine provides that, “For the exercise of
civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is the place of their habitual residence” the term
“domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong
Huan Tin v. Republic,19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a
person from said permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person.
In other words, domicile is characterized by animus
revertendi.(Ujanov. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]). The
domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. It has also
been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the
place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]). As stated
from the case, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the
purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his
profession. There was no intention to abandon the residence in
Laoang, Samar.

Therefore, Electoral Tribunal of the House of

Representatives did not act with grave abuse in declaring the
respondent Jose Ong Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
2. YES. Under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution
states that, “The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members.” The authority conferred upon the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use
of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial
review by the Supreme Court.
Therefore, Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives have jurisdiction on all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.