U.S. Army General Dwight D.

Eisenhower gives the order of the day to paratroopers in England, just before they board their airplanes to par-
ticipate in the first assault in the invasion of the continent of Europe, June 5, 1944. (Photo courtesy of U.S. National Archives)

Mission Command: A Senior

Enlisted Leader’s Perspective
Master Sgt. Fred N. Tolman
U.S. Army Sergeant Major Academy

A
t the 2010 Joint Warfighting Conference, philosophy of command and control is known as mission
then-commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, command. This article analyzes the concepts of mission
retired Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, caught command and uses contextual examples from the per-
the attention of senior-level leaders by saying, “I don’t spective of a senior leader.
care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if
you cannot create harmony on the battlefield based on Mission Command Defined
trust across joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and The Department of the Army (2019b) defines mission
multinational lines, you need to go home, because your command as “the Army’s approach to command and
leadership is obsolete” (Luck, 2013, p. 10). Mattis was control that empowers subordinate decision-making and
clear that military leaders should not base leadership decentralized execution appropriate to the situation” (p.
proficiency solely on tactics and personal experience, 1-3). Successful leaders understand the trust necessary
but also on the ability to relay tactics and orders ac- for mission command to take place. They balance com-
curately to subordinates to be executed properly. This mand and control by synchronizing processes and devel-
builds trust that the commander’s intent will be executed oping plans with subordinates, allowing them to foster
properly down the chain of command. The Army-wide disciplined initiative (Department of the Army, 2019a).

NCO Journal 1 May 2020

NCO Journal provides a forum and publishing opportunity for NCOs, by NCOs, for the open exchange of ideas and information in support of training, education and development.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/
 Mutual Trust
According to ADP 6-0, “Mutual trust is shared
confidence between commanders, subordinates, and
partners that they can be relied upon and are competent
in performing their assigned tasks” (Department of the
Army, 2019b, p.1-7). Trust allows leaders to focus on the
big picture instead of individual units or Soldiers.
The 75th Ranger Regiment is a prime example of
mutual trust. New Rangers arrive at the organization
with a foundation of tactical and technical competence
and team leaders trust the assessment and selection
process (Department of the Army, n.d.). This builds a
shared trust as new Rangers arrive and develop within
the unit.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Andy M. Kin taken June 4, 2019)
A U.S. Army Ranger assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment, conducts
Shared Understanding
a mission brief prior to climbing the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc, Cricque-
The foundation for creating shared understanding is
ville en Bessin, France, June 4, 2019.
built into Army doctrine, institutional training, Army
culture, and a professional lexicon (Department of the
For this to take place, senior leaders must communicate Army, 2019b). This foundation promotes shared under-
clear intent down to the lowest level to allow a decentral- standing by keeping Soldiers informed throughout the
ized execution of operations. operations process and collaborating whenever possible.
Whether in garrison, or preparing for combat, the Army
Principles of Mission Command presents opportunities for leaders to practice effective
Commanders rely on the innovation and decisive communication and increase overall participation. This
action of subordinates to meet their intent in a complex solidifies shared understanding of unit vision, values,
operating environment. Commanders must be com- commander’s intent, and mission orders.
fortable accepting the inherent risks of operating in this In 2014, the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) learned first-
manner (Department of the Army, 2019b). According to hand the challenges in creating shared understanding
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Com- without a foundation. Working with Iraqi and coalition
mand: Command and Control of Army Forces, command- partners introduced challenges in language, communica-
ers and subordinates must build a relationship centered tion systems, and collaboration. The 1ID overcame these
upon the seven principles of mission command: Compe- obstacles by establishing a Combined Operations Center
tence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander’s to alleviate the strain of incompatible communications
intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk systems. This resulted in increased collaboration between
acceptance (Department of the Army, 2019b, p. 1-7). forces and 1ID conducting hundreds of successful
coalition and joint strikes in support of Iraqi operations
Competence (Lemay, 2016).
Soldiers should continually develop competence
through institutional education, realistic training, and Commander’s Intent
self-development. Organizations must also develop The commander is responsible for clearly commu-
competence through realistic and complex collective nicating his or her intent down to the lowest level. The
unit training. Mutual trust and shared understanding intent must articulate the purpose of the mission and
between leaders and subordinates will grow once compe- desired end state (Department of the Army, 2019b). A
tence is established (Department of the Army, 2019b). common saying in the military is that no plan survives
In November 1950 of the Korean War, the Eighth first contact with the enemy (Oxford University Press,
Army Rangers embodied this principle by trusting in n.d.). A clearly articulated commander’s intent allows
one another and their training as they defended six leaders at all levels to continually adjust plans after first
consecutive attacks from Chinese forces on Hill 205. The contact because every Soldier understands why they are
Rangers, led by1st Lt. Ralph Puckett, trusted in the spe- doing the mission and what the commander expects.
cific and realistic training they received (Piasecki, 2010). From personal experience, as a reconnaissance team
When asked about that night, now retired Col. Puckett sergeant, every contingency plan has to align with the
said, “we had the confidence that came from believing commander’s intent. Reconnaissance teams experience a
that we were the best that the United States of America wide array of challenges and obstacles during every oper-
could produce” (Piasecki, 2010, para. 14). ation. With few teammates, and hundreds of kilometers

NCO Journal 2 May 2020

NCO Journal provides a forum and publishing opportunity for NCOs, by NCOs, for the open exchange of ideas and information in support of training, education and development.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/
between the team and friendly forces, the commander’s naissance mission in support of Operation Red Wings
intent keeps the team grounded in achieving the mission in eastern Afghanistan. The team experienced a soft
end state, regardless of the situation. compromise from local goat herders after insertion but
did not move from their surveillance positions. This
Mission Orders decision, which risked desynchronizing the operation
The unit staff should construct mission orders before the assault force conducted the infiltration, failed
describing the situation, commander’s intent, desired re- to further the commander’s intent. However, any other
sults, and required subordinate tasks. The commander’s decision may have also failed to further the commander’s
intent and mission orders serve as the guide for subor- intent. The following is the impossible decision laid out
dinates to execute disciplined initiative. The staff must before the SEAL team when deciding what to do with the
take care not to specify exactly how subordinates are to unarmed civilians:
accomplish the tasks. This maximizes their freedom of
action and creativity (Department of the Army, 2019b). Shoot them, get heard, have the villagers
Former Gen. of the Army Dwight Eisenhower’s come to search for them, and face the wrath
plan for Operation Overlord (the successful invasion of of the media and potential murder charges/
Normandy during World War II) is a prime example of jail; tie them up and leave them to die; or
a well-crafted commander’s intent and mission order. let them go and risk ‘military suicide’ as the
Authors Stephen Seitz et al., (2002) stated, “Despite goatherders alerted Ahmad Shah of their
the magnitude of Overlord and the numerous tacti- presence. They attempted to radio for advice,
cal operations required, the commander’s intent was but comms were down. They decided to turn
clear, simple, and succinct. Understanding conveyed to them loose. (Kessler, 2014, para. 17)
subordinates enabled confidence, encouraged freedom
of maneuver, and was the key to both operational and All military operations have a certain amount of risk
tactical success” (p. 4). associated with them and leaders will inevitably face
ethical dilemmas throughout their career. While killing
the unarmed civilians during Operation Red Wings
would have been the easy choice for mission success, it
was also an illegal choice under the rules of engagement.
There was no choice that didn’t end in someone’s death.
The result of their decision was the death of 19 Ameri-
cans, the destruction of a Chinook, and a failed mission
to capture the intended target (Sof, 2017). But the result
of illegally killing unarmed civilians could also have been
a court martial, jail time, and the loss of trust between
joint forces, possibly resulting in more deaths.

Risk Acceptance
A commander must assess the risk to mission, and
(U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Connor Mendez taken Sept. 12, 2016) A
risk to force, while mitigating risks with control mea-
U.S. Soldier with Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, sets
sures. Much like with Operation Red Wings, it should
fire to an illegal crop, found outside of a compound housing a drug
lab, during an operation in the Ghorak District, Helmand Province,
be assumed unit communications with higher echelons
Afghanistan, Sept. 12, 2016. will go down. Commanders must trust their intent has
been relayed and every decision made by subordinates is
based upon that intent.
Disciplined Initiative
According to the Department of the Army (2019b), Senior Enlisted Leader Influence
there are two considerations subordinate leaders must
evaluate before deciding to execute disciplined initiative: Shaping Organizational Culture
“whether the benefits of the action outweigh the risk of One of the most significant contributions a senior
desynchronizing the overall operation and whether the enlisted leader can have within an organization is their
action will further the commander’s intent” (p. 1-12). Ex- influence over the culture within that organization. Senior
perienced leaders understand the importance of exercising enlisted leaders have the power to redirect the focus away
disciplined initiative because failing to do so can be fatal. from the inefficient structures of overcontrol and its abun-
In 2005, a team of Navy SEALs realized the seri- dance of policies, rules, and regulations that detract from
ousness of their decisions while conducting a recon- the strategy, concepts, and intent of mission command.

NCO Journal 3 May 2020

NCO Journal provides a forum and publishing opportunity for NCOs, by NCOs, for the open exchange of ideas and information in support of training, education and development.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/
 In 2019, authors Doug Orsi and Bobby
Mundell analyzed over 50 strategy research
projects related to mission command from the
U.S. Army War College and found that leaders
often view mission command as only being ap-
plicable in combat and not in garrison, in part
because of “overly bureaucratic garrison pro-
cesses” (para. 1). However, an organization will
never build the necessary competence, mutual
trust, shared understanding, and acceptance of
risk without implementing mission command
both on and off the battlefield.
Army Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, former
commanding general of U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command, stated:
From left, U.S. Navy SEALs Petty Officer 2nd Class Matthew G. Axelson, Senior
Developing leaders, Soldiers, and units Chief Daniel R. Healy, Petty Officer 2nd Class James Suh, Petty Officer 2nd Class
capable of operating this way in combat Marcus Luttrell, Petty Officer 2nd Class Eric S. Patton and Lt. Michael P. Murphy,
requires living and training for mission operating in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, 2005.
command every day. The object of train- Except for Luttrell, all were killed in action by enemy forces while supporting
ing for mission command is to instill and Operation Red Wings, June 28, 2005. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy)
empower disciplined initiative in every
member of the team. (Townsend et al., improve lateral communication flow and facilitate rapid
2019, para. 2) decision-making at all levels. Their efforts enhanced
vertical communication and increased mission buy-
in at all levels. SOTF 511 used this mission command
A Flat Organization model to defeat the Islamic State (IS) during the battle of
Senior enlisted leaders can also positively influence Marawi, capturing 30 IS leaders and killing over 1,000 IS
the communication flow and hierarchical structure fighters. This example highlights the importance of trust
within a unit by flattening the organization. A flat orga- and effective communication between units, resulting in
nization emphasizes both vertical and lateral communi- increased efficiency and the use of mission command be-
cation and information sharing. A flattened organization tween two different countries to achieve a common goal.
structure benefits from improved situational awareness,
collaboration, and increased production of disciplined Conclusion
initiative (Clark et al., n.d.). Mission command does not happen by accident. Like
According to Emmanuel Sioson (2019), in 2017, any other skill, it has to be practiced consistently and of-
Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) 511 implemented ten. Focusing on the seven principles of mission command
the flattened organizational structure during operations builds trust between leaders and teams. Through trust,
in the Philippines. SOTF 511 placed liaison officers initiative, and rapid-decision making at all echelons, the
within every interagency and multinational element to U.S. Army will be better prepared for the future fight.

References

Clark, A., Singma, D., Albers, J., Evans, K., Yozamp, Z., Martin, mand: Command and control of Army forces. https://
C., Brown, J. (n.d.). Flat leadership. New York Times in armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/
Education. https://nytimesineducation.com/spotlight/ ARN19189_ADP_6-0_FINAL_WEB_v2.pdf
flat-leadership/ Horvath, G. (2019). Getting back to the basics of leadership.
Department of the Army. (n.d.). 75th Ranger Regiment. https://www.ausa.org/articles/getting-back-basics-lead-
https://www.goarmy.com/ranger.html ership/
Department of the Army. (2019a). ADP 6-22: Army leadership Kessler, M. (2014). Lone survivor : What really happened
and the profession. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/ during Operation Red Wings. Esquire. https://www.es-
DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN20039_ADP%206-22%20 quire.com​/uk/culture/news/a5665/lone-survivor/
C1%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf Lemay, J. C. (2016). Mission Command in Operations
Department of the Army. (2019b). ADP 6-0: Mission com- against DA’ISH: the Experience of the Combined Joint

NCO Journal 4 May 2020

NCO Journal provides a forum and publishing opportunity for NCOs, by NCOs, for the open exchange of ideas and information in support of training, education and development.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/
 Forces Land Component Command - Iraq (1st Infan- Piasecki, E. G. (2010). Eighth Army Rangers. https://arsof-his-
try Division) in 2014-15. In Finney, N. & Klug, J. (Eds.), tory.org/articles/v6n1_8th_rangers_page_1.html
Mission command in the 21st century (pp. 29-33). https:// Seitz, S.S., Oakeley, K.M., & Garcia-Huidobro, F. (2002). Op-
www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Primer-on-Ur- eration Overlord and the principles of war. https://www.
ban-Operation/Documents/mission-command-in-the- hsdl.org/?abstract&did=451480
21st-century.pdf Sioson, E. (2019). Experimenting with the art of mission
Luck, G. (2013). Mission command and cross-domain synergy. command. https://www.ausa.org/articles/experiment-
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/fp/ ing-art-mission-command/
mission_comm_fp.pdf?ver=2018-03-29-142405-290/ Sof, E. (2017). Operation Red Wings: The darkest day in history
Orsi, D., & Mundell, B. (2019). Will new doctrine fix mission of U.S. Navy SEALs. https://special-ops.org/34595/opera-
command? https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/arti- tion-red-wings-darkest-day-history-us-navy-seals/
cles/new-doctrine-mission-command/ Townsend, S. J., Crissman, D. C., Slider, J. C., Nightingale, K.
Oxford University Press. (n.d.). Helmuth von Moltke 1800-91. (2019). Reinvigorating the Army’s approach to command
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9 and control. Military Review. https://www.armyupress​
780191866692.001.0001/q-oro-ed6-00007547?rskey=b- .army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclu-
PQmdp&result=2642 sive/2019​-OLE/July/Townsend-Reinvigorating/

Master Sgt. Fred N. Tolman is an infantryman attending the Sergeant Major Academy, Class 70. His previous
assignments include senior military science instructor for the Charles River Battalion at Boston Universi-
ty, reconnaissance team sergeant in the Regimental Reconnaissance Company, Special Troops Battalion,
75th Ranger Regiment, and reconnaissance training course instructor for assessment and selection into
the Regimental Reconnaissance Company. He is currently working on a Bachelor of Arts in leadership and
workforce development from the Command and General Staff College.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/
https://www.facebook.com/NCOJournal
https://twitter.com/NCOJournal
https://www.instagram.com/ncojournalofficial/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
opinions of the NCO Journal, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

NCO Journal 5 May 2020

NCO Journal provides a forum and publishing opportunity for NCOs, by NCOs, for the open exchange of ideas and information in support of training, education and development.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/