Art-15,16 Reservation Consti Law
Art-15,16 Reservation Consti Law
Article 15: Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of
birth
1. The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
2. No citizen shall, on ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to -
a. access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment;
or
b. the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort
maintained whole or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of
general public.
3. Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for
women and children.
4. Nothing in this article or in clause (2) or article 29 shall prevent the State from
making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
5. Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the
State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially
and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the
Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to
educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or
unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in
clause (1) of article 30.
6. Nothing in this article or sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 or clause (2) of
Article 29 shall prevent State from making:
(a) any special provision for the advancement of any economically weaker sections of
citizens other than the classes mentioned in clauses (4) and (5); and
(b) any special provision for the advancement of any economically weaker sections of
citizens other than the clauses mentioned in clauses (4) and (5) insofar as such special
provisions relate to their admissions to educational institutions including private educational
institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational
institutions referred to in clause (1) of Article 30, which in the case of reservation would be in
addition to the existing reservations and subject to a maximum of ten per cent of the total
seats in each category.
For the purpose of this article and Article 16, “economically weaker sections” shall be such
as may be notified by the State from time to time on the basis of family income and other
indicators of economic disadvantages.
In the case DP Joshi v/s Sate of MP,1955(Art 15), there was a medical college which was
established in Indore and it was under the control of Madhya Pradesh Government. The govt,
had made a rule which stated that all the students residing in Madhya Bharat wouldn’t be
required to pay any “capitation fees”, but all the non resident students had to pay a nominal
fees of Rs. 1300-1500 as capitation fees. This rule was challenged by filing a writ in Supreme
Court under Article 32 claiming that it had violated the Fundamental rights guaranteed under
Art 14 and Art 15(1). The court had passed a judgement stating that, this rule doesn’t violate
article 15(1) since “Place of Birth” and Place of Residence” are two distinct terms.
State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon 1975(Art 15): The reservation of seats in Medical Colleges
in U. P. for candidates from rural areas is unconstitutional but the reservation for candidates
from hill and Uttrakhand areas is valid. The hill and Uttrakhand areas in Uttar Pradesh are
instances of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. The reservation on the
basis of place of birth offends Article 15. Therefore the reservation of seats for candidates
from rural areas is unconstitutional on this ground also because the incident of birth in rural
areas is made the basic qualification.
Evolution of article 15 in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan,1951, (Art 15)
Supreme Court held that Madras governments decision to provide caste-based reservation in
government jobs and college seats was in violation of Article 16 (2) of the Indian
Constitution. This judgment led to the 1st constitutional amendment in 1951, resulting in the
introduction of the Art. 15 (4). First landmark judgment that came out was M.R. Balaji and
Ors. v. State of Mysore [1963] (Art 15). This judgment came against the order of the state
of Mysore, providing as much as 68% reservation. SC in this judgment strike down the order
and enunciated the following principles:
(1) Article 15(4) is a proviso or an exception to Clause (1) of Article 15 and to Clause (2)
of Article 29
(2) For the purpose of Article 15(4), backwardness must be both social and
educational. Though caste may be a relevant factor to consider, in determining the social
backwardness of a class of citizens, it cannot be made the sole and dominant test.
(3) The reservation made under Article 15(4) should be reasonable. It should not be such as
to defeat or nullify the main Rule of equality contained in Clause (1). While it is not possible
to predicate the exact permissible percentage of reservations, it can be stated in a general and
broad way that they should be less than 50 per cent.
(4) A provision under Article 15(4) need not be in the form of legislation; it can be made by
an executive order.
(5) The further categorisation of backward classes into backward and more backward is not
warranted by Article 15(4)
T. Devadasan v. Union of India 1964(Art 15): (over ruled in Indra Sawhney case)
Reservation of vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes- Carry forward rule
permitting reservation of more than 50% vacancies held unconstitutional . Also held Clause
(4) of Art. 16 is by way of a proviso or an exception to cl. (1). A proviso or an exception
cannot be so interpreted as to nullify or destroy the main provision.
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas 1976(Art 16) (over ruled in Indra Sawheny on certain
points): Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules (1958)- temporary relaxation for SCs and
STs for Departmental Tests - held valid. The court held that Art. 16(4) is not an exception to
Art. 16(1). The court observed that Art. 16 (1) as a facet of right to equality under Art. 14
permits reasonable classification. For making such classification two criteria were fixed (1)
basis of classification must be ‘backwardness’ 2. should have nexus to the adequacy of
representation 3. overall administrative efficiency.
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (Art 16)In 1979 Morarji Desai govt formed Mandal
commission to look into the job opportunities for backward classes. On this basis, 27%
reservation was allocated to OBC communities. This decision of the government was
challenged in SC in the case Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, also known as Mandal
Commission Case. in this case, the Nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court enumerated the
following essential points:
The SC held the government decided to allocate 27% reservation to backward classes
valid.
SC also fixed a ceiling on the maximum reservation at 50%.
Reservation to socially and educational Backward people will subject creamy layer
criteria.
SC also held that reservations for poor among forwarding castes on the basis of
economic conditions is invalid.
It also observed that reservation under Article 16(4) — which allows the state to make
provisions for “reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class
of citizens”, did not apply to promotions.
In the process of identification of backward class of citizens and under Article 16(4)
among Hindus, caste is a primary criterion or a dominant factor though it is not the
sole criterion.
Any provision under Article 16(4) is not necessarily to be made by the Parliament or
Legislature. Such a provision could also be made by an Executive order.
The power conferred on the State under Article 16(4) is one coupled with a duty and,
therefore, the State has to exercise that power for the benefit of all those, namely,
backward class for whom it is intended.
In order to nullify the effects of Indra Sawney judgment, Parliament enacted Constitution
(77th Amendment) Act, 1995.
Amendment inserted clause (4A) after clause 4 of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
Clause (4A) provides for giving the benefit of promotion in service to the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes.
Constitutional 81st amendment act inserted Article 16(4B) in the constitution.
Article 16(4B) provides that reserved promotion posts for SCs and STs that remain unfilled
can be carried forward to the subsequent year. It ensured that the ceiling on the reservation
quota – capped at 50% by Indra Sawhney – for these carried forward unfilled posts, does not
apply to subsequent years.
Constitution 82nd amendment act article 335 was amended and Proviso was added
"Provided that nothing in this article shall prevent in making of any provision in favour of the
members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes for relaxation in qualifying
marks in any examination or lowering the standards of evaluation, for reservation in matters
of promotion to any class or classes of services or posts in connection with the affairs of the
Union or of a State".
The constitutional 85th amendment changed the words ”in matters of promotion to
any class” to the words ”in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any
class”.
Bir Singh Vs. Delhi Jal Board & Ors (2014): (Art 16) Bench by a majority held
that the Scheduled Castes or Tribes can avail benefit of reservation in government
jobs only in their home states and they cannot access quotas in other states where they
might have migrated. It was also held by a five-Judge Bench that a person from the
SC or ST category should not claim benefits in another state or Union Territory.
Upholding the "son of the soil" principle, the Bench said if a person's status migrates
with him it will amount to depriving the rights of SCs or STs of the host state. The
court noted that a particular community is notified as SC or ST in relation to a state
and that concept would become "nugatory" (of no value) if migrants from other states
are in its ambit. It also held that the beneficiary lists cannot be changed by states and
alterations of the presidential orders can only be done by Parliament. "Unhesitatingly,
therefore, it can be said that a person belonging to a scheduled caste in one state
cannot be deemed to be a scheduled caste person in relation to any other state to
which he migrates for the purpose of employment or education" the court said. The
Bench said the expression 'in relation to that state or Union Territory' and 'for the
purpose of this Constitution' used in Articles 341 and 342 means benefits of
reservation would be within the geographical territories of a state or UT in respect of
which lists of SCs and STs have been notified by presidential orders, Court ruled that
scheduled caste and tribe citizens moving from one State to another cannot claim
reservation benefits, whether or not their caste is notified in the state where they
migrate to, since the exercise of notifying scheduled castes or tribes is region (state)
specific, i.e " in relation" to the state of their origin.
T.M.A.Pai Foundation v State Of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355(Art 15,16): and P.A.
Inamdaar v State of Maharashtra In this case the court held that the single most
powerful tool for the upliftment and progress of such diverse communities is
education. The state, with its limited resources and slow-moving machinery, is unable
to fully develop the genius of the Indian people. The Supreme Court held that the
State cannot insist on private educational institutions which receive no aid from the
State to implement State’s policy on reservation for granting admission on lesser
percentage of marks, i.e. on any criterion except merit.
The Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005 & Clause 5 to Article 15:As a
consequence of T. M. A. Pai Foundation’s case, special provision relating to
admission to educational institutions has been made by 93rd Amendment. This
amendment has added clause 5 to Article 15. This clause enables the State to make
special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, in so far as,
such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions, including
private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the
minority educational institutions.
Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union Of India,(2008) 6 SCC 1: (Art 15,16)The
fundamental question that arises in this case is whether Article 15(5), inserted by the
93rd Amendment, is consistent with the other provisions of the Constitution or
whether its impact runs contrary to the Constitutional aim of achieving a casteless and
classless society.
The Supreme Court upholds the validity of the Central Educational Institutions
(Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 providing 27 per cent quota to OBCs in the
educational institutions but excludes the "Creamy Layer". It was held that the
Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 does not violate the "basic
structure" of the Constitution so far as it relates to the state maintained institutions and
aided educational institutions.
This Court further held that clause (4) of Article 15 is neither an exception nor a
proviso to clause (1) of Article 15. Clause (4) has been considered to be an instance of
classification inherent in clause (1) and an emphatic restatement of the principle
implicit in clause (1) of Article 15.
M.Nagaraj & Others vs Union Of India, 2006(Art 16): In this case, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutional validity of the 77th, 81st, 82nd, and 85th Amendments, however,
certain riders were also laid down.
Some key observations that were made by Five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in
context of “extent of reservation” are as under:
That the ceiling-limit of 50%, the concept of creamy layer and the compelling
reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall
administrative efficiency are all constitutional requirements without which the
structure of equality of opportunity in Article 16would collapse.
That with respect to the “extent of reservation” the concerned State will have to show
in each case the existence of the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness,
inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency before making
provision for reservation. As stated above, the impugned provision is an enabling
provision. The State is not bound to make reservation for SC/ST in matter of
promotions. However if they wish to exercise their discretion and make such
provision, the State has to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class
and inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment in addition to
compliance of Article 335.
That even if the State has compelling reasons, as stated above, the State will have to
see that its reservation provision does not lead to excessiveness so as to breach the
ceiling-limit of 50% or obliterate the creamy layer or extend the reservation
indefinitely.
Subject to above, the Bench upheld the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Seventy-
Seventh Amendment) Act, 1995, the Constitution (Eighty-First Amendment) Act, 2000, the
Constitution (Eighty-Second Amendment) Act, 2000 and the Constitution (Eighty-Fifth
Amendment) Act, 2001.)))
IR Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu, 2007(Art 16): All amendments to the Constitution made
on or after 24th April, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule is amended by inclusion of various
laws therein shall have to be tested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the
Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19 and the principles
underlying them. To put it differently even though an Act is put in the Ninth Schedule by a
constitutional amendment, its provisions would be open to attack on the ground that they
destroy or damage the basic structure if the fundamental right or rights taken away or
abrogated pertains or pertain to the basic structure.
Reservation, particularly in promotions, has always been controversial. Article 16, which
provides for “Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment” originally did not
contain any explicit provision regarding promotion. However, Indra Sawhney, which came in
the wake of the Mandal Commission in 1992, held reservation in promotion as
unconstitutional. To counter this judgment and others like Virpal Singh and Ajit Singh,
parliament passed the 77th, 81st and 85th constitutional amendments in 1995, 2000 and 2001
respectively. These Amendments added the current Article 16(4A) and Article 16(4B) that
explicitly allowed reservations in promotions for SCs and STs. The constitutional validity of
these provisions was challenged in Nagaraj.
The court in Jarnail Singh read the concept of creamy layer as part of the equality principle
encapsulated in Article 14, 15 and 16. Borrowing from Indra Sawhney, a case that did not
concern itself with SC/ST reservation, the court made the following broad observations. First,
that for a class to be truly backward and for them to constitute a class, the ‘misfits’ among
them i.e. the advanced individuals among them should be excluded. Second, excluding the
creamy layer is necessary to make sure that the backward within the class have access to
reservations and the better off within the group do not corner all the benefits of affirmative
action. Third, not excluding the creamy layer violates the equality principle in as much as it
amounts to treating equals i.e. forward castes and creamy layer of backward classes
unequally, and unequals i.e. creamy layer of backward classes and the rest of the backward
class as equals. It is worth noting that in applying this principle to SC/STs, neither Jarnail
Singh nor Nagaraj engage in any discussion regarding the difference between OBCs and
SC/STs or the appropriateness and risks of importing the concept and measurement of
creamy layer to SC/STs. These are aspects that a constitutional court ought not to have
ignored. The judgment consequently construes equality in ways that delivers inequitable
results.
Creamy layer is an economic criterion. The assumption is that economic progress reflects
social advancement and therefore, the person is liberated from his/her backwardness at
attaining a certain economic standard i.e. when he/she becomes a part of the ‘creamy layer’.
While the correctness of applying this standard even to OBCs may be debated, its application
to SC/STs is fraught with grave risks….