The International

Journal of the

Platonic Tradition

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112 www.brill.nl/jpt

From Plato’s Good to Platonic God

Lloyd P. Gerson
University of Toronto
[email protected]

Abstract
One of the major puzzling themes in the history of Platonism is how theology is
integrated with philosophy. In particular, one may well wonder how Plato’s super-
ordinate first principle of all, Idea of the Good, comes to be understood by his
disciples as a mind or in some way possessing personal attributes. In what sense is
the Good supposed to be God? In this paper I explore some Platonic accounts of
the first principle of all in order to understand where the integration of the per-
sonal into the metaphysical is organic and where it is not. I conclude that the
“ontological” and the “henological” construals of the first principle of all differ in
their openness to “intellectualizing” that principle.

Keywords
Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Numenius, Damascius, ontology, henology,
Demiurge, Unmoved Mover, Idea of the Good

Plato characterizes the Idea of the Good as that which is the cause of
the being and essence of the Forms and also as that which is the cause of
their knowability.1 This Idea itself is “beyond essence.”2 In contrast to the

1)
See Rep. 509B6-10: Καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς
προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ
δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. Cf. (1) 505A3: . . . the thing by which just things and the others
become useful and beneficial; (2) 508E1-4: “So, the provider of truth to the things known
and the giver of power to know to one who knows is the Idea of the Good. And though it
is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge.” (3) 533C8-D1: the
Idea of the Good is the first principle [ἀρχή] of all.
2)
I do not take Rep. 534B8 to contradict 509B8. The first passage says that dialectic aims
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94 L. P. Gerson / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112

Demiurge, which is or has a life, ungrudging and in possession of goodwill

and thinking, the Good does not appear to have any such “personal”
attributes.3 Plotinus, in his attack on Aristotle’s metaphysics, argues that
the first principle of all cannot be the Unmoved Mover precisely because
the Unmoved Mover is complex owing to its possession of some of these
personal attributes, in particular, thinking.4 So, it is initially puzzling to
hear from Plotinus that the Good or the One has some sort of life, in par-
ticular a cognitive life, including self-consciousness (συναίσθησις), that it
is God, that it has will in some sense, and perhaps most puzzling, that it
not only is love but has love for itself.5 I say this is puzzling because Ploti-
nus, as we know, aspires to be no more than a faithful expositor of what
Proclus later called “the Platonic revelation.” How may we suppose that
Plotinus thought he was accurately presenting the Platonic position when,
for example, he attributes ἔρως to the Good?6 No doubt part of solution to

to give a λόγος of the οὐσία of each thing; the second, that one aims to do as much for the
Good. But giving a λόγος of the Good does not, I would argue, entail that it has an οὐσία
distinct from the οὐσίαι of which it is the cause. I explain this more fully below. Contra
this interpretation see M. Baltes (1997) 8. And for a rebuttal of Baltes, see R. Ferber (2003)
127-49.
3)
See Tim. 29B-30C for the personal attributes of the Demiurge. Phil. 22C5-6 has been
taken to imply that the Idea of the Good is a “true and divine intellect.” But the following
qualification, namely, that this intellect “is in a different condition” (ἄλλως πῶς ἔχειν)
can be taken to be completed by “in relation to the Good” not “in relation to the question
of whether or not it is the Good.” Rep. 526E4-5 could be read as claiming that the Good
is the “happiest of that which is” (τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος). Here “happiest” has
roughly the same hyperbolic value as “divine” (θεῖον). See J. van Camp and P. Carnart
(1956). Cf. Iamblichus, De comm. math., 6.159, who refers to the text but does not take it
to be a reference to the first principle of all.
4)
See e.g., Enneads 5.3.10.
5)
For cognitive life see 6.8.16.12-29; 5.1.7.2; 5.4.2.12-26; 6.7.39.1-2; 6.8.18.26; for the
Good or One as God see 5.1.11.7; for will see 6.8.13.1-8, 53; 6.8.21.1-5; for love of itself
see 6.8.15.1. Cf. J. Rist (1964) 71-87, who discusses the “anthropomorphizing” of the Idea
of the Good by Plotinus. Rist, though, traces this to Plotinus’ misinterpretation of
Tim. 39E, taking this passage to indicate that the Forms are inside the mind of the
Demiruge. According to Rist, this led Plotinus to argue that since the Good is the cause of
the Forms, it is inevitable that “quasi-lifelike terms” be applied to it.
6)
Assuming the authenticity of Ep. II (312E), Plotinus does indeed take the “king of all”
to be equivalent to the Good. Cf. 5.1.8.1-5. The issue is surely not that this text provides
justification for “personalizing” the Good but rather why Plotinus takes this passage to war-
rant this personalization.

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the puzzle and part of Plotinus’ justification for using such language is to
be found in his frequent employment of the qualifier οἵον as a preface to
the attribution of properties to the Good or the One. But this could only
be part of the solution for two obvious reasons: (1) he does not always use
the qualifier; for instance, he does not use it when he speaks of ἔρως. For
another, it is not clear how Plato’s Good—which, we should recall, Aristo-
tle practically identifies with “the One”—can be thought to be οἵον any-
thing.7 We might suppose that a more straightforward solution to the
puzzle is to be found in Plotinus’ inference from the fact that Intellect is
ἐνέργεια, to the fact that the One must be ἐνέργεια, too.8 But this approach
is at least apparently blocked by the fact that Aristotle reasons that the first
principle of all must be unqualifiedly ἐνέργεια and that it is therefore a
subject of cognitive life, which is, however, precisely why Plotinus denies
that the Unmoved Mover can be the first principle.9 How could the One
be ἐνέργεια and not possess the complexity that Plotinus finds in Aristo-
tle’s Unmoved Mover? More to the point, how could Plotinus suppose that
he was thus accurately representing Plato’s unhypothetical first principle?
It is undoubtedly true that in calling the first principle of all “God,”
Platonists did not mean to cast this principle among the anthropomorphic
deities of Homer and Hesiod. On the other hand, it is I think unfair to
maintain, as Eric Dodds famously did, that the Platonic Gods resided “on
the dusty shelves of [a] museum of metaphysical abstractions.”10 When in
his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, Proclus refers to the deductions
in the First Hypothesis of the second part of Parmenides as “raising up to
the One a single theological hymn by means of all these negations,” we

7)
On the Good as the One see Meta. N 4, 1091b13-14; cf. A 9, 990b17-22 and EE
1218a24-8.
8)
6.8.20.13-15: Εἰ οὖν τελειότερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας, τελειότατον δὲ τὸ πρῶτον,
πρώτη ἂν ἐνέργεια εἴη. See 6.8.16.15-18, where the term ἐνέργημα is used. For my pur-
poses, I take this as synonymous with ἐνέργεια. But cp. 6.7.17.9-10 where the One also is
said to be ἐπέκεινα ἐνεργείας.
9)
Cf. Porphyry’s Sententiae 43, in which we find an argument for the priority of the One
to Intellect because of the latter’s complexity. This is also why Proclus, Platonic Theology,
2.4, p.31 Saffrey-Westerink rejects the Platonist Origen’s argument that a first principle
cannot be absolutely simple and, accordingly, must be identified with a first intellect.
10)
E.R. Dodds (1963) 260.

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96 L. P. Gerson / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112

may legitimately wonder how Platonic ascent to the unhypothetical first

principle of all was to be transformed into theology.11
That the above is not a pseudo-puzzle is I take it indicated by the fact
that it is perfectly possible for a philosopher to acknowledge the Good as
first principle of all without thereby investing in it any personal attributes.
It is true, for example, that Iris Murdoch understands “the sovereignty of
Good” in a way that is probably unlike the way Plato understands it, but
nevertheless she can insist that “Good, not will, is transcendent,” and “it
makes sense to speak of loving God, a person, but very little sense to speak
of loving Good, a concept,” and, “the highest love is in some sense imper-
sonal.”12 In this paper I am going to explore some of the historical and
philosophical elements in the divinization of Plato’s Good, the first princi-
ple of all. Some of the parts of this story will be familiar to most readers;
some of the more speculative parts may not be, at least insofar as they are
put to use here.

1.
It is well to begin with the scant but interesting evidence regarding Plato’s
successors in the Old Academy regarding their reading of the Idea of the
Good and its putative personality. The testimony on Speusippus is unam-
biguous; that on Xenocrates less so. Speusippus held that that which is best
is not in the first principle but in that which comes from it.13 So, for him
the Good is not the first principle. Xenocrates, by contrast, identified the
first principle as the “first God” and the One but he also called it “intel-
lect.”14 It is not clear whether Xenocrates does this under the influence of
Aristotle or not.15 At any rate, he is evidently unable to see how one could
maintain the separation of intellect and all that that entails from the pri-
macy of the Good.16 And it is also not clear whether Xenocrates is inten-

11)
See Proclus, In Parm. 7.1191.34f.
12)
See I, Murdoch (1970) 69, 72, 75.
13)
See Aristotle, Met. 12.7.1072b32ff. Cf. 14.4.1091a29ff. Also see Ps.-Alexander, In Met.
699, 28 Hayduck; Aetius, Plac. I.7.20 Diels = Fr 58 Tarán.
14)
See Fr. 213.4 Isnardi Parente.
15)
See J. Dillon (2003) 107.
16)
Cf. Theophrastus, Met. 6a1-2: τὸ γὰρ δὴ πρῶτον καὶ θειότατον πάντα τὰ ἄριστα
βουλόμενον.

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tionally conflating the intellect of the Demiurge with the Good or the One
as Plato describes it. To do the latter is, among other things, to prepare the
way for the Middle Platonic view that the Forms are thoughts in the mind
of God.
If I pass over much suggestive material in order to focus on Alcinous, it
is primarily because I take as thoroughly unoriginal his account of the first
principle as a conflation of the Good with Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover.
I do not doubt that in some respects Alcinous is in accord with the tradi-
tional view going back at least to Antiochus of Ascalon that Aristotle’s
philosophy is in harmony with Plato’s. Perhaps it is also unrealistic to
expect that, well before Plotinus raised the issue, Alcinous should have
appreciated that the essential complexity of thought precluded the pro-
posed conflation. In the famous chapter 10 of his Handbook, Alcinous
does seem to be aware that “attributes” (συμβεβηκότα) must be excluded
from the first principle.17 I take it that Alcinous here means both accidents
and properties, that is, καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα. It is perhaps because the
first principle is absolutely simple that it is supposed to be “more or less
beyond description” (μικροῦ δεῖν καὶ ἄρρητον).18 The identification with
the Unmoved Mover becomes explicit a bit later in the chapter when the
first principle is said to be “everlastingly engaged in thinking of itself and
its own thought, and this activity of it is Form.”19
Since the first principle is simple, the many things said about it—that
it is “everlasting” (ἀίδιός), “self-perfective” (αὑτοτελής), “always perfect”

17)
See Didaskalikon 10.4.2-3.
18)
Ibid., 10.1.1. Plato does not actually use the word ἄρρητον in reference to the Good or
to the Demiurge. The fact that the “father and maker of this universe” is hard to find
and even that “having found him it would be impossible to declare him to all mankind”
(Tim. 28C3-5) hardly amounts to a claim that he is “beyond description.” And in
Rep. 505A2 despite the transcendence of the Idea of the Good, the fact that the “study”
(μάθημα) of it supremely desirable also seems to preclude indescribability. Plato does say of
the One of the first hypostasis of the second part of Parmenides that οὐδ᾽ ὀνομάζεται ἄρα
οὐδὲ λὲγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται
(142A4-6). If Alcinous is thus presuming that this One is identical with the Idea of the
Good and the Demiurge, then he is representing an interesting “pre-Neoplatonic” tradi-
tion. See J. Dillon (1993) 108-9.
19)
Ibid., 10.3.2-4: ἑαυτὸν ἂν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ νοήματα ἀεὶ νοοίη, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια
αὐτοῦ ἰδέα ὑπάρχει. Cf. Met. 12.7.1074b33ff.

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(ἀειτελής), and “all perfect” (παντελής), “divine” (θειότἠ), “essentiality”

(οὐσιότης), “truth” (ἀλήθεια), “symmetry” (συμμετρία) and “good” (ἀγαθόν)—
cannot be supposed to compromise its simplicity.20 The three ways of
“thinking about” (νόησις) the first principle—abstraction, analogy, and
“preeminence” (ὑπεροχή)—are not clearly equally compatible with the
assumption of absolute simplicity.21 In the case of the first two, there is no
danger of compromising simplicity in deducing all the things that the
Good is not nor in comparing it with the Sun, as Alcinous does. But to
infer that the Good is eminently all that the intelligible world contains
seems to make it more like the “Living Creature” of Timaeus than like the
first principle of all. And this takes us back to our original problem: if the
Good is beyond the complexity of the intelligible paradigm, in what sense
is it personal?
Numenius of Apamea together with Philo of Alexandria have an espe-
cially crucial role to play in the development of our story, but I am going
to ignore the latter for the simple reason that it is quite a bit easier for a
proponent of Biblical religion and its representation of a personal deity to
assimilate or incorporate Platonic metaphysical insights into his world view
than for a Platonist like Numenius to do the opposite. And yet we find
Numenius in the first book of his On the Good saying that Brahmins, Jews,
Magi, and Egyptians have “teachings” (τὰ δόγματα) that are in agreement
with Plato.22 There can be little doubt that among these approved teachings
is one referring to the incorporeal first principle of all, which certainly in the
case of the Old Testament is robustly personal. Nor can there be any doubt
that this first principle is for Numenius absolutely simple because of its being
present only to itself.23 This simplicity is in explicit contrast to the second
and third divinity, the Demiurge and the World Soul.24 What makes these

20)
Ibid., 10.3.4-7.
21)
Ibid., 10.5-6.
22)
See On the Good, Fr. 1a Des Places. Platonists repeatedly return to the idea of the har-
mony of Plato with both Greek and non-Greek theological traditions. See H.D. Saffrey
(1992) 35-50.
23)
Ibid., Fr. 11.11-13 Des Places: ῾Ο θεὸς ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ὤν ἐστιν ἁπλοῦς, διὰ
τὸ ἑαυτῷ συγγιγνόμενος διόλου μή ποτε εἶναι διαιρετός·
24)
I shall ignore the evident problem of distinguishing the Demiurge and the World Soul
in the fragments of Numenius. Cf. Fr. 21 where Proclus (In Tim. I.303.27ff) describes
Numenius’ three Gods as: (a) father of creation; (b) creator; (c) creation (ποίημα).

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(or this divinity) other than simple is that in giving unity to matter, it itself
is divided by matter.25 In other words, the transcendence and simplicity of
the first principle are mutually implicating. As we shall see, this fact might
be thought to provide a reason for divesting from the first principle of all
personal attributes, rather than investing it with them.
So, we wonder what the βίος of the first God, the Good itself, is
supposed to be. We do not have to wait long for an answer: the first
God is “concerned with intelligibles” with an “inherent motion” (κίνησιν
σύμφυτον).26 So, we are obviously once again in the presence of a simu-
lacrum of the Unmoved Mover. But far from being transcendent, in its
inherent motion it is “that from which is derived the order of the kosmos
and its everlasting permanence, and preservation is poured forth on all
things.”27 This description coheres nicely with Aristotle’s account, but once
again it seems to compromise the simplicity of the first principle.28 For if
the order of the cosmos is somehow derived from the first God, this order
does not come from nothing; therefore, it is somehow already in the first
God. If this is the case, then it is puzzling why Numenius insists that the
first God is “completely unknown” (παντάπασιν ἀγνοούμενον).29 Since the
first God is an intellect thinking about that which is contained in it, and
since the second God is an “imitator” (μιμητής) of the first, and since the
universe is an imitation of the second, one would not have been surprised
to see Numenius claim that the first God is in some way knowable through
creation.30 But he does no such thing.
Numenius seems to be responding to these problems in calling the first
principle of all αὐτοόν, ὁ ὤν, and following Aristotle and apparently despite

25)
Ibid., Fr. 11.14-16 Des Places.
26)
Ibid., Fr. 15 Des Places. The “inherent motion” is obviously Plato’s κίνησις νοῦ. Cf.
Soph. 248E6-249A2.
27)
Ibid., Fr. 15.14-15 Des Places: ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἥ τε τάξις τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡ μονὴ ἡ ἀίδιος καὶ ἡ
σωτηρία ἀναχεῖται εἰς τὰ ὅλα.
28)
See Met. 12.7.1072b14-30; 10.1075a11-23.
29)
Ibid., Fr. 17 Des Places.
30)
See Fr. 16.8-16 for the νοῦς—μιμητής—μίμημα sequence. By contrast, in the anony-
mous commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, Fr. 1 Kroll/Hadot, the attribution of the name
“God” to the One is taken to imply the unknowability of the first principle of all. It must
be added, however, that in Fr. 2. the author adds that God must be distinguished from the
“concept of the One” (ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔννοια).

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Plato, οὐσία.31 Though we have little to go on by way of argument, I am

assuming that at least the οὐσία that is the first principle does not imply
the sort of complexity that Numenius means to exclude by calling it abso-
lutely simple. Hence, it does not have the complexity, as Plato argued in
Parmenides, of that which participates in οὐσία.32 So, the words ὁ ὦν can-
not be intended to indicate that which is because it participates in οὐσία.
A similar conclusion must be drawn for αὐτοόν. What is Numenius trying
to tell us?
I think we must suppose that at least part of what Numenius is getting
at is that participation in the first principle does not follow the rule—later
articulated by Iamblichus according to Proclus’ testimony—that when
there is participation that which is participated in must be complex.33 That
is, we must be able to distinguish within it the unparticipated “part” from
the participated “part.” This rule works fine for Forms; it hardly seems to
work for that which is absolutely simple.34 Thus, by participating in the
first principle the Demiurge has whatever the first principle is, but that
cannot be distinct from it. Because goodness, unity, and being are not
distinct in the first principle, whatever nature anything has must ultimately
find its explanation in the simple being that is the first principle. In short,
“beingness” itself must be an οὐσία.
How does this shed light on our original problem regarding the attribu-
tion of personal properties to the Idea of the Good? Most straightforwardly,
participation in the first principle of all follows alone from the fact of
being. If, though, for any being, to be is to be something, how are we to
look to the being apart from the something that it is in order to discover
the supposed personality of that which is being itself ? If, for example, part
of what it is to be a human being (as opposed to part of what it is just to
be) is to have will or βούλησις, what is the basis for inferring will in the

31)
See Fr. 17.4, 13.4, 16.15 Des Places. On the appellations of the first principle, see
M. Burnyeat (2005) 143-69, esp. 149-55.
32)
See Parm. 142B-C.
33)
Cf. Proclus, In Tim. II.105, 15ff; 240, 4ff; 313, 15ff.
34)
At Fr. 20 Des Places, Numenius infers that the Demiurge must participate in the Good
analogous to (ὥσπερ) the way sensibles participate in Forms. We need not thereby draw the
implication that the Good is complex, such that part of it is unparticipated and part of it is
participated.

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first principle of all? Or, to take Numenius’ explicit identification of the

first God as intellect, or as “primary intellect,” we would like to know
whether this is inferrable from an analysis of being alone or whether we
need to look elsewhere. In the latter case, we shall once again run the risk
of inferring the existence of a first God that possesses intellect or is other-
wise composite.
I should like now to suggest one possible strand in our developing story
that will probably not have occurred to readers as particularly relevant.
That is the role of Epictetus. As is well known, Epictetus was well regarded
in the Platonic tradition. Simplicius wrote a massive commentary on his
Handbook. Plotinus certainly knew his Discourses and evidently held him
in high respect. I am particularly interested in Epictetus’ account in his
Discourses of the relation of the divine and human intellects. In Book 1,
Epictetus has Zeus respond to a query about how it is possible for embod-
ied human beings not to be bothered by external circumstances.35 Zeus
replies that since he was not able to give us bodies that were impervious to
external depredations, he gave us “part of himself,” namely, the faculty by
which we choose, desire, and in general make use of external impressions.
This is what Epictetus called the faculty of προαίρεσις. In Simplicius’ clos-
ing hymn in his commentary on Epictetus’ Handbook, he says, “I implore
you, Lord, father and guide of the reason in us, remind us of our noble
origin, which we were thought worthy to receive from you. Act with us,
since we are self-movers, for our purification from the body and its irra-
tional states, so that we may be superior to them and to rule them, and that
we may use them as instruments in a fitting manner. Act with us, too, for
the precise correction of the reason in us and its unification with the truly
existent things through the light of truth. And the third request to the
Savior: I implore you, completely remove the mist from the eyes of our
souls, so that we may clearly know, as Homer says, both God and man.”36

35)
See Discourses, 1.1.10-12. Cf. Cleanthes’ remark: ᾽Εκ σοῦ γὰρ γενόμεσθα, θεοῦ μίμημα
λαχόντες μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ᾽ ἐπὶ γαῖαν· Also, Chrysippus’ claim that
“our natures are parts of the nature of the universe.” Right reason in us is identical with
Zeus (ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διι). See D.L. 7.87-8.
36)
See Simplicius, In. Epict. 138.22-33 ῾Ικετεύω σε, Δέσποτα, ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡγεμὼν τοῦ ἐν
ἡμῖν λόγου, ὑπομνησθῆναι μὲν ἡμᾶς τῆς ἑαυτῶν εὐ γενείας, ἧς ἡξιώθημεν παρά σου·
συμπράξαι δὲ ὡς αὐτοκινήτοις ἡμῖν, πρός τε κάθαρσιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν

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Simplicius’ remarkable hymn recalls one of the central texts in the entire
Platonic tradition: Socrates’ exhortation in Theaetetus to “assimilate oneself
to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ).37 It is not so difficult to imagine Simplicius’
implicit reasoning as follows. To assimilate oneself to the divine is at once
to become what we are really and at the same time to become something
other than what we are, where “what we are” refers in the first instance to
an intellect and in the second, to a soul-body composite, the ἄνθρωπος.
We can confidently say that here Simplicius will be following Aristotle and
Plotinus in characterizing the highest achievement of an intellect as iden-
tifying itself with an intelligible object. He will also have learned from
Plotinus that the soul seeks union with the One beyond Intellect.38 How,
a good Platonist might ask, could union with the One by an intellect be
achieved unless that One was in some sense intellectual, not just intelligi-
ble? But of course it could be neither in any way that implied complexity.
In trying to understand the Platonic position, Stoic influences must of
course be used with care.39 The immanence of Zeus in Stoicism has to be
clearly distinguished from the transcendence of the Good or the One in
Platonism. Nevertheless, to the extent that the logic of the Platonic posi-
tion moves toward the conclusion that the One is all things, just to that
extent we can, like the Stoics, infer the nature of the first principle from its
“parts.” That there should be real parts of the Stoic God is not only not
problematic but actually necessary for a corporeal deity. This, however, is
obviously not the case for Numenius’ Brahmins, Jews, Magi, Egyptians,
and Platonists all of whom acknowledge or argue for an incorporeal deity.

ἀλόγων παθῶν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ἄρχειν αὐτῶν, καὶ ὡς ὀργάνοις κεχρῆσθαι
κατὰ τὸν προσήκοντα τρόπον· συμπράττειν τε καὶ πρὸς διόρθωσιν ἀκριβῆ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν
λόγου, καὶ ἕνωσιν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, διὰ τοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας φωτός. Καὶ τὸ τρίτον
καὶ σωτήριον· ἱκετεύω, ἀφελεῖν τελέως τὴν ἀχλὺν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἡμῶν ὀμμάτων, ῎Οφρ᾽
εὖ γινωσκωμεν (κατὰ τὸν ῞Ομηρον) ἠμὲν Θεὸν ἡδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα. Cf. Simplicius’ quotation
from a presumed fragment of Aristotle’s On Prayer, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s De
Caelo 485.19-22, who says that Aristotle said ὁ θεός ἢ νοῦς ἔστιν ἢ ἐπέκεινα τι τοῦ νοῦ.
37)
Tht. 176B. See the valuable and comprehensive study of S. Lavecchia (2006).
38)
Cf. 6.9.3.10-13. This is precisely what Hierocles denies; for him union with Intellect is
the ultimate goal. See his Commentary on the Golden Verses 1.17 (pg.12.25-6 Koehler),
where ὁμοίωσις θεῷ is pretty clearly identification with an Intellect.
39)
Cf. the suggestive remarks of S. Gersh (1973) 4-5, on the “transposition of the Stoics
physics into the [Neoplatonic] metaphysical sphere.”

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 L. P. Gerson / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112 103

Our problem then becomes: how can the One be all things and at the same
time be absolutely simple? If the Platonist can explain how this is so, then
according to how we determine what “all things” means, we are in a posi-
tion to infer these as what the being or οὐσία of the One is.

2.
I return now to Plotinus and to his solution to our initial puzzle. In order
to appreciate the subtlety of his solution, we need to sketch first his argu-
ment for an absolutely simple first principle of all.
In Ennead 5.4.1, Plotinus argues for two conclusions: (1) every compos-
ite must be accounted for by that which is incomposite or absolutely sim-
ple and (2) there can be only one absolutely simple thing. We can better
understand the reasoning for (1) if we concentrate first on the reasoning
for (2). Assume that there is more than one absolutely simple thing. Then,
there would have to be something that each one had that made it at least
numerically different from the other, say, for example, a unique position.
But that which made it different would have to be really (not merely con-
ceptually) distinct from that which made it to be the one thing it is.40 That
which had the position would be really distinct from the position itself.
But then something which had a position and so was distinct from it would
not be absolutely simple. So, that which is absolutely simple must be abso-
lutely unique. Only the first principle of all is unqualifiedly self-identical;
the self-identity had by anything else is necessarily qualified. This argu-
ment suggests the meaning of “composite” that Plotinus has in mind when
he argues for (1). A composite is anything that is distinct from any prop-
erty it has. What we might call a “minimally composite individual” is one
with one and only one property from which it is itself distinct.41 Compos-
iteness is then equivalent to qualified self-identity.

40)
The possibility of real distinctiveness within one thing follows from a denial of nominal-
ism, which is the view that all self-identity is unqualified self-identity. To claim, for exam-
ple, that x is f, is for Platonists to acknowledge that f somehow identifies that which is
nevertheless distinct from the identifying property.
41)
Plotinus’ argument seems to be inspired by Plato’s Parmenides 142B5-C2 where it is
argued that that which is one must partake in the ousia of oneness and hence be distinct
from that.

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104 L. P. Gerson / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112

It is owing to the compositeness of everything other than the One that

potency is introduced into the intelligible world.42 To be Intellect is then
to be in potency, a potency that Intellect’s cause, the One, does not possess.
The One is not just the cause of the οὐσία in which Intellect partakes, but
the cause of Intellect’s being itself. Intellect is limited by the οὐσία in which
it partakes, even though it partakes of all possible οὐσία.
So, now the question is: why should any composite need the unique,
absolutely first principle of all to account for it? Plotinus’ concise answer is:
“All beings (ὄντα) are beings by the One (i.e., the first principle of all).”43
Here, the word “being” refers to that which partakes in whatever property
it has. Why is it that the One explains this? Plotinus answers that if any-
thing is deprived of the “oneness” that is said of it, then it is not that
“one.”44 Here, “one” or “oneness” appears to refer to a second-order prop-
erty of whatever property that the being has.45 Thus, a being is one being
having whatever properties it has owing to the first principle of all. The
“oneness” belongs not to the οὐσία alone nor to the being that has it, but
to the composite. That is, its oneness is irreducible composite oneness. As
such, it is not a “one among many,” but rather a unique entity.
The One is needed to explain any composite being because no compos-
ite being is self-explicable. The One explains as an efficient cause of the
being of any composite whatsoever.46 Composites are necessarily what we
may conveniently call “heteroexplicable.” Heteroexplicability follows from
the fact that the οὐσία in which something partakes could not uniquely
constitute the being’s identity. If it could, then that being would be
unqualifiedly identical with its οὐσία, a possibility which has already been
excluded by the argument for the uniqueness of that which is absolutely
self-identical. Something gets to be what it is by partaking in some οὐσία,
which means, minimally, that the οὐσία is what that thing is. The One is,
however, as Plato said, “above οὐσία.” It cannot be the οὐσία that explains

42)
See Enneads 5.9.6.9-10 where Intellect is said to be like a genus in relation to particular
intellects like a genus to species or a whole to parts.
43)
See 6.9.1.1.
44)
6.9.1.4.
45)
6.9.1.27.
46)
See 5.3.15.12-13; 5.3.15.28; 5.3.17.10-14; 6.4.10; 6.7.23.22-4.

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 L. P. Gerson / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112 105

the being of anything with οὐσία. Instead, the One is “virtually all things”
(δύναμις τῶν παντῶν),47 roughly in the way that “white” light is virtually
all the colors of the spectrum or in the way that a function is virtually
its domain and range. As such, it is absolutely self-explicable or “self-
caused.”48
Much more needs to be said about this line of argument and the various
versions of it that have subsequently turned up in the history of philoso-
phy as proofs for the existence of God. For present purposes, it is enough
to indicate first that this is the general line of argument taken by Plotinus’
successors in the Platonic tradition. And yet there is an obvious problem
with it as it stands. For it cannot be the case that when something partakes
of oneness, it partakes of that which makes the One composite—it and its
oneness. Either something partakes in the One itself, in which case the
One would have to be distinct from that which is partake in, or else it does
not partake in the One itself, in which case how can we continue to hold
that the One is the ultimate cause of the being of anything? Plotinus’ solu-
tion seems to rest on two claims. First, is the claim that things partake in
the One by “intermediaries,” meaning the “hypostases” of Intellect and
Soul.49 Second, Plotinus insists that the One is not really related to any-
thing else.50 This means that no relational “distance” can be assumed to
exist between the One and anything else. Hence, it is neither separate nor
identical with anything else. Yet the claim about intermediaries hardly
seems to work for Intellect itself, the first “offspring” of the One. Indeed,
Plotinus says explicitly that Intellect participates in the One.51 In addition,
if Intellect did not partake in the One, why not make it the first principle

47)
See 5.4.1.23-6; cf. 5.4.2.38, 6.7.32.31, 6.9.5.36, etc. I would resist the dominant schol-
arly opinion that the δύναμις of the One is a “power” or “active potency.” Active potencies
are still potencies of some sort and they therefore require compositeness, i.e., the entity plus
its potency, even if this potency is actualized in another. In addition, an active potency
actualized in another necessarily implies a real relation between that entity and the entity in
which the potency is actualized.
48)
6.8.14.41. Cf. 6.8.20.9ff where the One is also said to be “activity” (ἐνέργεια), but
activity “without οὐσία”. Compare this with the way that Numenius puts it.
49)
6.7.42.22; cf. 6.9.1.23.
50)
6.8.8.12-15.
51)
5.3.17.8-10.

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106 L. P. Gerson / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112

of all, as Aristotle argued? And if it does partake in the One without

being identical with it, must it not follow that it is really related to the
One and that the One must be sufficiently complex in order to allow this
eventuality?52
The controversy that swirled around the doctrines of Hierocles of Alex-
andria almost a century ago and have since then been immeasurably clarified
by Ilsetraut Hadot and most recently by Hermann Schibli reveals indi-
rectly part of the problem faced by Plotinus.53 On the one hand, there is
impressive evidence to support the view that Hierocles identified the first
principle of all with a divine Intellect.54 And yet, As Hadot has argued,
Hierocles’ identification of Intellect with the Pythagorean Tetractys or Tet-
rad as a source of the mathematical intelligibility of the sensible world
strongly suggests that Intellect is a derived principle.55 It is of course derived
from the Monad. But is this not exactly the problem Plotinus and before
him Numenius were trying to solve? If the first principle of all is the
Monad, it seems impossible to endow it with even an attenuated set of
personal attributes. If, in contest with Plotinus, ideal and ultimate union
is with Intellect, in what sense relevant to a religious or ethical ascent is the
Monad first? If the role that the Monad fulfills is attributable to Intellect,
how is its absolute simplicity to be preserved?

52)
Porphyry, Plotinus’ disciple, only seems to exacerbate the problem in claiming (Senten-
tiae 30) that all things participate in the One each according to its own capacity. If the
Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s’ Parmenides is, as Hadot and Dillon suppose, by Por-
phyry, then the evident attribution of cognitive characteristics to the One (cf. Fr. 2) is a
further complication. The author of the commentary does argue in this fragment that the
knowledge that the One possesses (or is?) does not entail complexity. But it is far from clear
to me at any rate what the reasoning here is.
53)
See especially H. Schibli (2002) 44-58, on Praechter’s postulation of what he called
Alexandrian Neoplatonism based largely on the claim that Hierocles conflated the One
with the Demiurge. Ilsetraut Hadot has provided powerful arguments in favor of the inter-
pretation that Hierocles did not deviate from the Neoplatonic tradition in positing a One
above Intellect.
54)
See e.g., Commentary on the Golden Verses 1.2 (pg.8.15-16 Koehler); 1.13 (pg.11.20-1
Koehler).
55)
Cf. Commentary on the Golden Verses 20.12-19 (pg. 87.19-89.14 Koehler).

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 L. P. Gerson / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112 107

3.
If my account thus far of the Platonic efforts to join the Idea of the Good
and God as first principle of all is cogent, the succeeding trajectory is
not difficult to anticipate. As Proclus says in his Commentary on Plato’s
Parmenides, all the commentators agree that the First Hypothesis of the
Parmenides concerns “the first God.”56 But, as John Dillon has shown,
the commentators whom Proclus goes on to mention who also found in
the First Hypothesis the henads includes first of all Iamblichus.57 The Iam-
blichean distinction referred to earlier of the triad participant-participated-
unparticipated seems tailor-made for personalizing the first principle of all.
It is a straightforward matter to infer the personal attributes of the henads
from the existence of these anywhere, since these henads are the unifying
causal agents of these “series” or “orders.” So, for example, a henad for
intellection will be an intellect. Whether we preserve the absolute simplic-
ity of the first principle of all in the manner of Iamblichus or in the man-
ner of Proclus hardly seems to be of primary concern.58
What is crucial, however, is Proclus’ identification—we might say a pri-
ori identification—of the One as first principle of all with the primal God.
As Proclus surveys the various interpretations of the Parmenides, he intro-
duces the view of his master, Syrianus.59 According to that view, “if God
and the One are identical because there is nothing greater than God and
nothing greater than the One, then to be unified and to be deified are
identical.”60 This view represents a profound divergence from that which
we found first in Numenius, according to whom God is identical with

56)
See In Parm. 6.1053.39-1054.1: ἡ πρώτη περὶ θεοῦ τοῦ πρωτίστου (πάντες γὰρ τοῦτο
κοινὸν ἔχουσιν).
57)
See In Parm. 6.1054.37-1055.2: Οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους κατ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσάγοντες τὰ
ὄντα, τὴν μὲν πρώτην λέγοντες εἶναι περὶ θεοῦ καὶ θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς,
ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πασῶν τῶν θείων ἑνάδων αὐτὴν ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον. See J. Dillon (1972)
102-06.
58)
Cf. In Parm. 6.1066.16-1071.8 for Proclus’ argument against “de-simplifying” the One
of the First Hypothesis by introducing henads into its realm.
59)
In Parm. 1.640.17ff.
60)
In Parm. 1.641.10-12: Εἰ γὰρ θεὸς καὶ ἓν ταὐτὸν, διότι μήτε θεοῦ τι κρεῖττόν ἐστι
μήτε ἑνὸς, τὸ ἡνῶσθαι τῷ τεθεῶσθαι ταὐτόν.

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108 L. P. Gerson / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112

being, not with oneness.61 According to Numenius (we may suppose) and
according to Plotinus, the attributes of the first principle are to be inferred
from the properties of being with the proviso that no attribute should be
posited or posited in a way that compromises divine simplicity. According
to the view of Syrianus and his disciple Proclus, the attributes of the first
principle (or lack thereof ) are to be inferred from the property of unity.62
What this means is that even conceptual distinctions—conceptual quoad
nos—are eliminated or, rather, translated into really distinct attributes of
the henads. Whereas Plotinus would claim, for example, that the love that
the One has for itself and its “hyper-cognition” are only different ways of
understanding it as virtually all things, Proclus claims that the existence of
love and cognition are reason for positing explanatory divine henads. A
commitment to protecting the total transcendence of the first principle
follows from taking “One” as its proper name.63
I do not wish to suggest that the version of Platonism embraced by
Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, and later Damascius is not without resources
in responding to the version found in Numenius and Plotinus. For one
thing, it is difficult to see how Plotinus can maintain that the first principle
is the cause of the being of everything given that Plotinus identifies matter
with “privation” (στέρησις).64 By contrast Proclus, following Aristotle and,
in his view, Plato, identifies matter with “power” (δύναμις).65 Thus, matter

61)
Cf. Proclus’ Platonic Theology, 3.35.6; 36.6; 51.23 and In Tim. 1.232.6; 232.7 for the
distinction of αὐτοόν from τὸ ἕν.
62)
Cf. In Parm. 6.110824-5: πάντων γὰρ ὂν αἴτιον οὐδέν ἐστι τῶν πάντων. Proclus is
careful to add that not only can we have no cognition of the One, we cannot even have
cognition of the fact that it has cognition of itself. Cf. Elements of Theology, Prop. 5.20
which designates the One as αὐτοέν, not αὐτοόν.
63)
Cf. In Parm. 6.1108.38-1109.20 where Proclus refers to Parm. 142A in saying that
there is no “name” (ὄνομα) for the One. Nevertheless, in this passage Proclus goes on to
allow that the One is the cause of all things just in the way that primary Intellect is the cause
of all intellects and primary Soul is the cause of all souls. For Proclus, this would seem to
imply that the One is the cause of all being just insofar as being is understood as unity.
64)
See Tim. 52D which strongly implies that the receptacle of becoming or matter/space
has an existence independent of the Demiurge and, it would seem, of the One or Good.
This is a problem for all Platonists to confront. Cf. Enneads 2.4.16.3-8. Also, 1.8.5.6-13;
1.8.11.1-7.
65)
See Platonic Theology 3.39.4-40.6: Ταῦτά μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ περὶ Πλωτῖνον πολλάκις
ἐνδεικνύμενοι τὸ ὂν ἔκ τε εἴδους καὶ ὕλης νοητῆς ποιεῖν, τὸ <μὲν> εἶδος τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τῇ

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 L. P. Gerson / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112 109

is insinuated into the primary product of the One.66 And, accordingly,

Proclus will argue against Plotinus that evil is a privation of good, not a
privation of form, that is, matter. Undoubtedly, Plotinus’ doctrine of mat-
ter flows from his determination to reject metaphysical dualism of any
sort. But if that leads him to collapse privation and potentiality or power,
one might argue that the cost is too high. Proclus, in making the first
principle of all αὐτοέν, can accept that matter is a power inherent in all
multiplicities.67 The result of doing this, however, is that the being of what-
ever possesses being has no God as first principle. The One is only the
“source of all divinity.”68 Alternatively, Proclus can say that it is “divinity
itself,”69 thereby ensuring that the first principle is completely stripped of
personal attributes.
As we have seen, Plotinus holds that the One is δύναμις παντῶν; Proclus
seems to hold and certainly seems to be committed to saying that the One
is πρὸ δυνάμεως.70 And Damascius, taking the apophatic approach to its
logical conclusion, argues that the Ineffable One is beyond any causal role
or any non-causal role; indeed, it is not a first principle at all.71 This posi-
tion is not so much an explication of the Platonic Idea of the Good as it is
a sort of reductio ad absurdum of the hypothesis of the derivation of all
things from a first principle.72

ὑπάρξει, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἀνάλογον [ὑπο]-τάττοντες τῇ ὕλῃ. Καὶ εἰ τοῦτο λέγοιεν, ὀρθῶς
λέγουσιν· εἰ δὲ ἄμορφόν τινα καὶ ἀνείδεον φύσιν καὶ ἀόριστον ἐπι τὴν νοητὴν οὐσίαν
ἀναπέμπουσι, τῆς Πλατωνικῆς ἁμαρτάνειν μοι δοκοῦσι διανοίας. Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὕλη τοῦ
πέρατος τὸ ἄπειρον, ἀλλὰ δύναμις· οὐδὲ εἶδος τοῦ ἀπείρου τὸ πέρας, ἀλλὰ ὕπαρξις·
66)
See In Tim. 1.384.27-385.16. Note especially 385.14-15: διὸ καὶ [ἡ ὕλη] ἀγαθόν πῄ
ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον.
67)
On the univocity of “matter” see In Tim. 2.65.21-4.
68)
In Parm. 6.1109.7.
69)
Ibid., 6.1109.16.
70)
See In Parm. 7.1174.12. Proclus is here discussing the views of unnamed Platonists.
J. Dillon (1987) 524, n.37, thinks he is probably talking about Iamblichus. But he can
hardly disagree with Iamblichus (or whomever he is referring to here) in holding that the
One is prior to δύναμις in view both of his locating of δύναμις in the product of the One
and of his strictures on the description of the One itself.
71)
See On Principles 1.22.15-20, 2.115 Combès-Westerink. See S. Rappe (2000), 197-207.
72)
Cf. R.T. Wallis (1972, 2nd edition, 1995) 158, who says of Damascius’ account of the
Ineffable that “while he was doing no more than bring[ing] out some of the traditional
teaching’s implications . . . the consequences were little less than annihilation of the Neopla-
tonic hierarchy.”

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4.
Where does all this leave us? Historically, it is clear that there are two forms
of Platonic response to the suprapersonal Idea of the Good. One is what
has been called the ontological approach and the other the henological
approach. The first is represented by Numenius and Plotinus; and the
second especially by Iamblichus, Proclus, and Damascius. I do not mean
to suggest that these are, as it were, pure types of response. There are heno-
logical elements in the first group and ontological elements in the second.
Further dialogue or development within the Platonic tradition was to alter
considerably with the triumph of Christian philosophy. In the 20th cen-
tury, this speculation flourished most richly in France. Let me, however,
conclude with a different, philosophical consideration.
What Platonic ontologists and henologists share is a commitment to a
“top-down” approach to metaphysical, by which I mean ultimate, explana-
tions of the universe. This approach is in sharp contrast with the “bottom-
up” approach that virtually defines science. According to the first, the
lower or inferior is only explained by the superior or higher; according to
the second, the superior or higher, insofar as these terms have any
significance at all, are explained by the lower or inferior or, to add a mar-
ginally relevant variable, the earlier. It is not true that Platonists were not
in a position to engage their “bottom-up” protagonists, like Empedocles
and Democritus.73 It is certainly true, however, that such engagement
today must occur at an exceedingly more sophisticated level.
To put the question as plainly as possible, in explaining human intellect
and all the properties that flow from it, are the tools of physics, chemistry,
and biology adequate? The view shared by virtually all of the philosophers
discussed here is that intellection or thinking could not be a bodily state or
succession of states because any state of a body has a particularity or
specificity that belies the universality of thinking. One might object that a
particular bodily state—say, a functional state—can indeed instantiate a
universal rule. In reply, Platonists all insist that thinking is essentially self-
reflexive and that bodies, all of which have parts outside of parts, cannot

73)
Cf. Aristotle, Met. 12.7.1072b30-1073a4, for a “top-down” argument against Pythago-
reans and Speusippus.

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 L. P. Gerson / The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2008) 93-112 111

be self-reflexive. Accordingly, if the immateriality of thinking cannot be

explained by a “top-down” approach, it cannot be explained at all. It should
be noted that the latter possibility is equivalent to an admission of a failure
to find an explanation, not a proof that there cannot be one. A proof of
inexplicability could only pertain to an absolutely simple first principle.
We could just say that thinking is what it is, but the being or existence
of thinking could only be explained by that which is absolutely simple
and virtually thinking in the way described above. Here it seems that
Platonists need to reflect on the Aristotelian lesson that thinking is pri-
mary being, but not on the basis of a conception of primary being that
implies complexity.

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