Defendant Exxon's Response To Motion For Sanctions
Defendant Exxon's Response To Motion For Sanctions
02-CV-2018-903102.00
Judge: JAY A YORK
To: HEDGE ROBERT JON
[email protected]
JOJO SCHWARZAUER
CIRCUIT COURT CLERK
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
CIRCUIT CIVIL DIVISION
205 GOVERNMENT STREET
MOBILE, AL, 36644
251-574-8420
[email protected]
DOCUMENT 261
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
ADAM P. HARRINGTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
CIVIL ACTION NO.
)
v. )
02-CV-2018-903102
)
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION et al., )
)
Defendants )
Harrington’s Motions for Sanctions. [Docs. 225, 250]. At bottom, this is a dispute about whether
documents that ExxonMobil voluntarily produced in response to a Rule 30(b)(5) and (6)
deposition notice should have been produced in response to a more generic request for
production that was filed at the beginning of the case. Regardless of whom the Court thinks has
the better side of that argument, one thing about which there should be no dispute is that the
disagreement does not warrant the imposition of any sanction, much less the death penalty the
• ExxonMobil has not violated any order of the Court, which makes any sanction,
especially default, inappropriate.
• Plaintiff has the materials he has requested and may still use them in discovery, including
in the open deposition for ExxonMobil’s 30(b)(6) witness.
• ExxonMobil made the reasonable search required by the Rules for documents responsive
to the initial RFP, and there was was no reason for ExxonMobil to withhold the later
discovered documents if it had located them earlier.
• Many of the materials are irrelevant or duplicative of documents that have already been
produced.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s motions.
DOCUMENT 261
Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, alleging ExxonMobil and P&E Crewboats, Inc.
(“P&E”) were negligent, which led to Plaintiff’s injuring his knee when transferring by swing
rope from ExxonMobil’s offshore platform (“B-Deck”) to P&E’s boat,the M/V Miss Kristin. See
generally [Doc. 15] (Amended Complaint). Plaintiff’s injury happened while Plaintiff was
working for Skelton’s Fire Equipment, Inc. (“Skelton’s”), a contractor for ExxonMobil. See id. at
¶¶ 1, 8. In the nine paragraph amended complaint, plaintiff alleged under Maritime Law that both
defendants, including ExxonMobil, jointly controlled the vessel onto which the plaintiff had
fallen and that plaintiff’s injuries were the result of the negligence of both defendants. There was
no claim in that complaint that plaintiff’s training had been deficient or that ExxonMobil was or
ExxonMobil and Skelton’s operated under an agreement for Skelton’s to provide fire
equipment and inspection services, and part of that agreement required Skelton’s to ensure its
employees were adequately trained for their work tasks. See, e.g., Hrinsin Depo. at 198:9–199:23
(Exhibit A). 1 ExxonMobil required its employees and contractors’ employees to perform annual
179:14–181:1 (Exhibit B); [Doc. 226 at 1]. Plaintiff’s employer, Skelton’s, provided a certificate
showing that Mr. Harrington had completed his swing rope demonstration. See Harrington Swing
On February 14, 2019, Plaintiff served ExxonMobil with interrogatories and requests for
production. See generally [Doc. 36] (Notice of Serving Discovery). ExxonMobil and its counsel
reviewed the discovery requests, collaborated, and sought to provide answers and responsive
1
ExxonMobil is attaching only the relevant excerpts of cited depositions as exhibits to this filing.
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documents to the requests, framed by the allegations of the lawsuit as it understood them. See
Aff. of R. Sewell at ¶¶ 6–8 (Exhibit D). ExxonMobil served its initial discovery responses on
March 18, 2019. See [Docs. 63–65]. In that initial production, ExxonMobil produced 119 pages
of documents and one video. See Aff. of R. Sewell at ¶ 9. Part of the production included a
printout of the portion of ExxonMobil’s Mobile Bay orientation for all who go offshore that
ExxonMobil and P&E deposed Plaintiff on October 22, 2019. See Harrington Depo. at 1
(Exhibit E). In his deposition, Plaintiff admitted to receiving and being trained on portions of
Skelton’s safety manual addressing how to safely transfer by swing rope and that he had seen it
before his accident. Harrington Depo. at 21:23–23:10, 26:8–27:8 (Exhibit E); Exh. 1 to
Harrington Depo. (Exhibit F). Following Plaintiff’s deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel asked for
supplemental production of training materials and guidelines for contractors. See Email from R.
Fuquay to R. Sewell (Oct. 31, 2019) (Exhibit G). Again, ExxonMobil’s counsel conferred with
seven pages of documents, including the Swing Rope Demonstration Requirements, [Doc. 226],
in November 2019. See Aff. of R. Sewell at ¶¶ 11–12. Plaintiff also deposed P&E’s boat
about two topics related to training. Hrinsin Depo. at 1; 30(b)(5) & (6) Notice of Depo. of Def.
ExxonMobil Corp. (Jan. 13, 2020) (“the First Rule 30(b) Notice”) (Exhibit I). Following the
deposition and per Plaintiff’s counsel’s request, ExxonMobil produced a swing-rope safety video
that was created and put in place after Plaintiff’s accident and a complete copy of Mobile Bay
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orientation slide show, including portions not dealing with swing ropes at all. See Aff. of R.
Sewell at ¶ 16.
Four months later, the parties deposed Avery Fick as the representative of Complete
Safety Work. Fick Depo. at 1 (Exhibit J). In her deposition, Ms. Fick testified about the swing
rope proficiency training they had provided to Harrington, and stated that Complete Safety
Works had received no written materials from ExxonMobil about that training. See Fick Depo.
at 37:9–17, 43:3–12.
A few weeks later, on June 15, 2020, the parties deposed Scott Skelton, the Vice
President of Skelton’s. Skelton Depo. at 1 (Exhibit K). In his deposition, Mr. Skelton testified
that Skelton’s employees are required to receive training before going offshore, and part of that
training would have included being provided portions of the training manual addressing
personnel transfers by swing rope. Skelton Depo. at 17:17–23, 20:18–23:1; Exhs. 3 & 4 to
In July and August 2020, during a COVID-19 related lull in discovery, ExxonMobil’s
counsel conferred with ExxonMobil employees concerning any documents that had not yet been
uncovered that might be relevant to the defense of the case. See Aff. of R. Sewell at ¶ 17. As a
result of those discussions, ExxonMobil’s counsel learned of the existence of and received from
ExxonMobil an “Offshore Personnel Transfer Risk Overview” from March 2016 (“the March
2016 Global Study”), an “Offshore Personnel Transfer Mobile Bay Analysis from June 2016
(“the June 2016 Mobile Bay Study”), a “Mobile Bay Offshore Personnel Transfer Study” from
May 2018 (“the May 2018 Mobile Bay Study”). 2 See id. These documents are helpful to
2
ExxonMobil discloses the fact that it provided outside counsel with these documents as a result of these
discussions. ExxonMobil contends that communications regarding these studies are subject to the attorney-client
privilege, and ExxonMobil does not waive otherwise that privilege.
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ExxonMobil’s defense, in that they show just how safe ExxonMobil viewed swing rope
transfers. ExxonMobil’s counsel also received photographs of B-Deck from ExxonMobil, and
ExxonMobil produced those photographs to the parties in August 2020. See id. at ¶ 18.
The parties did not depose another fact witness until May 27, 2021, which was P&E’s
owner, Chris Esfeller. Esfeller Depo. at 1 (Exhibit M). Mr. Esfeller testified the only training he
was aware that ExxonMobil provided was an orientation. See Esfeller Depo. at 120:14–121:15.
On June 8, 2021, Plaintiff noticed the depositions of Ms. Munksgaard, Mr. Bedgood, and
ExxonMobil’s Rule 30(b)(6) representative on a host of topics not previously covered. See
Munksgaard Depo. Notice (Exhibit N); Bedgood Depo. Notice (Exhibit O); 30(b)(5) & (6)
Notice of Video Depo. of Def. ExxonMobil Corp. (June 8, 2021) (“the Second Rule 30(b)
Plaintiff deposed Ms. Munksgaard by via video conferencing on June 17, 2021.
Munksgaard Depo. at 1 (Exhibit Q). Ms. Munksgaard led the investigation of Plaintiff’s
accident. See Munksgaard Depo. at 28:19–21 (Exhibit Q). Ms. Munksgaard was not involved
with creating the May 2018 Mobile Study, and she only had loose familiarity of the study based
On June 23, 2021, six days before the deposition of Mr. Bedgood, individually and as
Second Rule 30(b) Notice. See Aff. of. R. Sewell at ¶ 21. The production included fourteen
additional documents, including Plaintiff’s Exhibits 5–7 and 9, and encompassed 3,138 pages of
documents. See id. Of those pages, 3028 pages were weather data used as part of preparing the
May 2018 Mobile Bay Study, and the pertinent data is summarized within the attachment to the
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study. See id. On June 28, 2021, ExxonMobil’s counsel received additional materials from
ExxonMobil, and the materials included a portion of ExxonMobil’s Upstream Safety Manual
that addresses personnel transfers (“the Personnel Transfer Requirements document”). See id. at
¶ 22; [Doc. 233]. The Upstream Safety Manual, including the Personnel Transfer Requirements
document, were made available to Skelton’s as part of working for ExxonMobil. See Bedgood
Depo. at 74:15–21. ExxonMobil produced the Personnel Transfer Requirements document on the
On June 29, 2021, Plaintiff deposed Shaun Bedgood. Bedgood Depo. at 1. The
depositionlasted an entire day, but was not concluded and remains open. Plaintiff’s counsel
contended during the deposition that some of the recently produced items about which he was
questioning Mr. Bedgood should have been produced earlier. After the deposition, ExxonMobil
offered dates to complete the deposition, but Plaintiff has not confirmed any dates and instead
filed this motion. Bedgood Depo. at 345:23–346:9. Other discovery is proceeding, with the
parties having recently made efforts to schedule the deposition of another ExxonMobil former
employee. See Email from R. Hedge to J. Lieb & R. Sewell (Aug. 27, 2021) (Exhibit R).
requesting to set up a time for a telephone call to discuss plaintiff’s expressed unhappiness with
ExxonMobil’s document production. Email from C. King to R. Hedge (July 2, 2021) (excerpt)
at 3 (Exhibit S). Plaintiff responded with a demand that ExxonMobil permit Plaintiff to re-
depose all previous fact witnesses at ExxonMobil’s expense. Id. at 2–3. ExxonMobil replied by
asking Plaintiff to identify which portions of the recent production Plaintiff believed should have
been produced in response to prior requests. Id. at 1. Plaintiff did not respond to that request.
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On July 28, 2021, ExxonMobil located and produced additional documents in response
to Plaintiff’s request for supplementation based on materials produced on June 23 and 28. See
[Doc. 250 at 1]. The production included a video of an “ExxonMobil Production Offshore
Personnel Transfer Overview” training module (“the Training Module”) (Pl.’s Exh. 11); job-
safety analyses that were part of the Training Module, including one discussing swing ropes
(“the Swing Rope JSA”) (Pl.’s Exh. 10 [Doc. 252]; and a complete image of a Go/No-Go
Decision Matrix referenced in the 2016 Studies (“the Go/No-Go Matrix”), which had been
produced with some language at the botton cut off due to formatting. (Pl.’s Exh. 23 [Doc. 253]).
ExxonMobil produced these materials to try to put discovery issues behind it, although none
would be relevant in any way to a case here involving a contractor in Mobile Bay, as it does not
appear ExxxonMobile ever used this module in the United States. See Aff. of S. Bedgood at ¶ 7
(Exhibit T).
Argument
Although ExxonMobil does not believe that its voluntary discovery responses have been
unreasonable, Alabama law would not support the requested sanction, regardless. Under Rule 37,
for the Court to order any sanction (especially default), the Court would first have to find
ExxonMobil either failed to obey a court order or failed to serve a written response to Plaintiff’s
Rule 37(b)(2) and (d) discuss the possibility of the Court entering default as a discovery
sanction. However, that language has certain conditions. “If a party . . . fails . . . (3) to serve a
written response to a request for production or inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders
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in regard to the failure as are just . . . .” Ala. R. Civ. P. 37(d) (emphasis added). “If a party . . .
fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the court in which the action is pending
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just . . . .” Ala. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (emphasis
added); see also Dutton v. Dutton, 446 So. 2d 615, 618–19 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (motion to
compel required before court can impose sanctions under Rule 37(b)). ExxonMobil has located
no reported decision where an Alabama court has upheld a default as a sanction absent one of
In this case, ExxonMobil served written responses Plaintiff’s requests for production. See
[Doc. 65]; see also [Doc. 225 at 7–8] (Plaintiff’s motion’s referencing ExxonMobil’s written
discovery responses). Also, the Court has not issued any orders compelling discovery in this
case. Considering ExxonMobil served written responses to Plaintiff’s discovery and has not
disobeyed any Court order regarding discovery, Rule 37 does not authorize default—or any
II. ExxonMobil Did Not Willfully Fail to Comply with Discovery Obligations.
ExxonMobil does not believe it has abused the discovery process or that any sanction is
appropriate under the circumstances. Specfically important, though, Alabama case law makes
clear that default is appropriate only in truly egregious situations, generally involving violation
3
Additionally, Plaintiff failed to meet his conference requirement before filing his motions. See Ala. R. Civ.
P. 37(a)(2). Plaintiff’s counsel did propose that ExxonMobil permit Plaintiff to re-depose fact witnesses at
ExxonMobil’s expense. However, ExxonMobil requested to have a phone call with Plaintiff to discuss the
discovery dispute and for Plaintiff to identify his specific complaints about ExxonMobil’s production. Plaintiff
never responded to ExxonMobil’s request prior to filing his motions.
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sanction is appropriate where the conduct is not willful or the party accused of not
complying with discovery was acting in good faith.
Ex parte Sears, Roebuck & Co., 882 So. 2d 326, 328 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Seaman
Timber Co., 850 So. 2d 246, 258 (Ala. 2002)). “A default judgment, like a dismissal, would be a
‘severe sanction.’” Ex parte Coale, 757 So. 2d 393, 395 (Ala. 1999). “[D]ismissal orders must be
carefully scrutinized, and the [party]’s conduct must mandate dismissal.” Weatherly v. Baptist
Med. Ctr., 392 So. 2d 832, 837 (Ala. 1981) (emphasis added). Mere negligence does not justify
dismissal or default. See id. “‘The court, however, should not go beyond the necessities of the
situation to foreclose the merits of controversies as punishment for general misbehavior.’” Id.
at 836 (quoting Dorsey v. Acad. Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1970)).
The cases Plaintiff cites in his motion do not suggest anything different than the standards
above. Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc. involved spoliation of a fuel pump that was the subject of the
litigation and that the defendant requested to inspect, and the Alabama Supreme Court upheld
dismissal because the plaintiff failed to preserve the subject fuel pump. See generally 553 So. 2d
82 (Ala. 1989) (affirming dismissal after trial court found the plaintiff’s explanation not
credible). Ex parte Seaman Timber Co. involved a party’s failure to comply the trial court’s
discovery orders regarding the production of a party witness for a deposition and compelling the
production of documents. See generally 850 So. 2d 246 (Ala. 2002) (the plaintiff obstructed the
defendant’s effort to depose plaintiff-witness until witness was not mentally competent and then
passed away). The present facts are distinguishable for two important reasons. First, no
spoliation has occurred. Plaintiff has the documents at issue and will have the opportunity to use
them in this litigation, to the extent they may be relevant or admissible. Second, ExxonMobil has
not failed to comply with any order from the Court because the Court has not entered any
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discovery orders. Thus, Plaintiff’s cases do not support the Court imposing sanctions,
In fact, ExxonMobil’s research has not located a single Alabama appellate decision
upholding a default or dismissal absent a party disobeying a discovery order or failing to attend
its own deposition. See, e.g., Manci v. Ball, Koons & Watson, 995 So. 2d 161, 164, 167–68 (Ala.
2008) (upholding default where defendant failed to comply with multiple court orders
compelling production of documents); Napier v. McDougal, 601 So. 2d 446, 448 (Ala. 1992)
(same); Blair v. Cooper, 437 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Ala. 1983) (dismissal for willful failure to
whether the documents over which he complains were responsive to earlier discovery requests.
Such a disagreement does not justify any sanction, let alone a default, because ExxonMobil did
not act willfully or do anything wrong. An example case is Phillips v. Winsett, 717 So. 2d 818
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998). In that case, the plaintiff served interrogatories inquiring about the limits
of the defendant’s insurance policy. Id. at 819. When the defendant did not timely respond to the
discovery requests, the plaintiff moved for, and the court granted, an order compelling the
defendant to respond. Id. The defendant did not believe the policy limits were discoverable and
objected to answering. Id. The plaintiff moved to compel the answer, and the defendant opposed
and objected to the motion. Id. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion and ordered the
defendant to produce legible copies of its policy and allowed the plaintiff to submit affidavits
regarding expenses associated with the discovery motion. See id. The defendant moved the court
to reconsider, and the court denied the motion. Id. After the defendant still failed to produce the
insurance policy, the plaintiff moved for default, and the defendant opposed the default. Id. The
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trial court denied the motion for default but granted the plaintiff attorney fees associated with the
discovery. Id. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals upheld the trial court’s order of attorney’s
The takeaway from Phillips is that even in the face of noncompliance with a court order
default is not mandated, and other sanctions may be appropriate. Default is not the “go-to”
sanction, even when a party violates a court order. It stands to reason, then, that the Court should
not impose any sanctions when the Court has not entered an order that a party could violate and
A discussion of three other cases—Ex parte Coale, Ex parte Sears, Roebuck & Co., and
Johnson v. Citizens Bank, Inc.—may be helpful to the Court. Each of these cases undercuts
Plaintiff’s arguments.
In Ex parte Coale, the plaintiff sought customer lists, including addresses, from
defendant-insurer Liberty National, and Liberty National produced the lists piece-meal and
pursuant to multiple court orders. See 757 So. 2d 393, 394 (Ala. 1999). The plaintiff complained
that addresses within the customer list were out of date and then moved for default, claiming
Liberty National had not complied with its discovery obligations as the court ordered. See id.
at 394–95. The trial court denied the motion for default, and the plaintiff sought mandamus
relief. See id. In its opinion denying the plaintiff’s petition for mandamus against the trial court,
In his brief to this Court, Coale states that Liberty National did not comply with his
discovery requests despite the trial court’s ordering it to do so. The only time he
gets more specific than this is when he says that Liberty National supplied outdated
information and, therefore, has not “adequately responded.” Liberty National
contends, and the trial court apparently agrees, that Coale has the information he
sought. Coale’s argument is accusatory and conclusory, but nonspecific, and, in
light of Liberty National’s contentions and the trial court’s rulings, we see no
evidence suggesting that Coale does not have the information he needs.
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Id. at 395.
In Ex parte Sears, Roebuck & Co., the plaintiff sued for a workplace injury. 882 So. 2d
at 326. The plaintiff served discovery requests, the defendant (Sears) responded and objected to
the production of certain documents, and the plaintiff moved to compel production. Id. at 327.
The trial court granted the motion to compel, the plaintiff moved to enforce the order, and the
defendant moved for a protective order. Id. The trial court denied the motion for protective order
and ordered the defendant, multiple times, to produce the documents. Id. Ultimately, the trial
court sanctioned the defendant by striking the defendant’s “‘pleadings at they relate to the fraud
claim . . . .’” Id. In the midst of this discovery dispute were other filings and proceedings relating
to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and appellate review. See id. The defendant
sought mandamus relief to vacate the striking of the defendant’s fraud pleadings. Id. at 327–28.
The defendant did not dispute that it had not complied with the trial court’s order, thus the
Alabama Supreme Court’s only decision was whether the trial court’s sanction was appropriate.
See id. at 328. The Alabama Supreme Court repeated Ex parte Seaman Timber Co.’s position
that lesser sanctions are appropriate when the offending conduct was not willful or the party was
acting in good faith. See id. (quoting Ex parte Seaman Timber Co., 850 So. 2d at 258).
Ultimately, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that striking all of the pleadings—the general
denial and the affirmative defenses—would essentially be a default or concession of all the
plaintiff’s fraud pleadings, leaving damages as the only issue, and this result was too harsh “in
light of the fact that [the plaintiff] has suffered no legally cognizable prejudice . . . .” See id. The
trial court’s order was unclear that trial court intended to impose such a harsh sanction, thus the
Alabama Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus but instructed the trial court to
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The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, in Johnson v. Citizens Bank, Inc., 778 So. 2d 828,
830–31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000), overturned a trial court’s dismissal of a suit as a discovery
sanction. In that case, the plaintiff sued the bank and its employee for negligence and fraudulent
misrepresentation. Id. at 828. During the suit, the defendants served plaintiff with discovery
requests, and the plaintiff’s attorney was injured in an automobile accident. Id. Two months later,
the defendants sent a follow-up letter to the plaintiff’s lawyer requesting responses, and about
two weeks later the defendants filed a motion to compel responses. See id. at 829. The trial court
granted the motion and gave the plaintiff ten days to comply. Id. When the plaintiff did not
comply, the defendants moved for sanctions, but the plaintiff’s lawyer did not receive notice of
the motion. Id. The trial court held a hearing on the motion for sanctions and dismissed the
plaintiff’s case with prejudice. Id. A week later, the plaintiff’s lawyer served the requested
discovery, including unsigned interrogatory answers because the plaintiff regularly worked out
of town. See id. The next day, the plaintiff’s lawyer received the order dismissing the plaintiff’s
case. Id. The plaintiff later produced signed interrogatories without any changes. Id. The plaintiff
moved the trial court to reconsider the dismissal, and the trial court denied the motion. Id. The
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed and noted several factors supporting the finding that
the plaintiff’s lawyer had not acted willfully. See id. at 830–31. First, this was not a case where
the plaintiff was refusing to respond or had destroyed evidence. See id. at 830 (discussing
Iverson and Napier). Second, the time that had passed between the time of the request and the
time of the response was four months, which paled in comparison to the five-year delay in Ex
parte Coale (especially with the lack of willfulness). See id. Additionally, the plaintiff’s lawyer
served unverified interrogatory responses prior to learning of the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions
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Following these cases as guideposts, this Court also should not impose the harsh sanction
of default. Other than conclusory claims to need to re-depose witnesses or having to otherwise
prepare to prosecute his case, Plaintiff has failed to articulate exactly what prejudice he has
suffered as a result of the timing of when he received the documents. Additionally, Plaintiff has
received the documents he claims fall into the ambit of his requests, thus he has the information
he needs. See Ex Parte Coale, 757 So. 2d at 395. Plaintiff has the information and may be able to
depending on which document referred to, either when it was realized they existed and were
responsive or in response to the Second Rule 30(b) Notice. Finally, many of the documents apply
only to ExxonMobil employees (not to contractors like Plaintiff), some are duplicative of other
information, and some have not been implemented within the United States. Accordingly, the
case law makes clear that default under these circumstances is disfavored—and can be reversible
error—and the Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion for default as a sanction.
as discussed below, ExxonMobil did not engage in any misconduct during the discovery process.
various discovery requests. ExxonMobil respectfully disagrees with Plaintiff’s contentions and
below discusses why any sanction is inappropriate. As the Court is aware, a party is entitled to
discovery of non-privileged matters that are relevant and proportional to the needs of the case.
See Ala. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevant evidence is that which is related to the subject matter of
the case and may reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Drewes v. Bank of
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Wadley, 350 So. 2d 402, 403–04 (Ala. 1977) (finding plaintiff not entiltled to bank records
because they would not have admissible and no indication they would have led to admissible
evidence). With these legal principles, the Court will see that Plaintiff’s motions are not well
founded.
1. March 2016 Offshore Personnel Transfer Risk Study (Exhibit 5) and June 2016
Offshore Personnel Transfer Mobile Bay Analysis (Exhibit 6)
On June 23, 2021, ExxonMobil produced the March 2016 Global Study and the June
2016 Mobile Bay Study (collectively, “the 2016 Studies”). See [Doc. 229] (Pl.’s Exhibit 5);
[Doc. 231] (Pl.’s Exhibit 6). The March 2016 Global Study was a review of risks for personnel
transfers based on a review of ExxonMobil’s operations globally, and the June 2016 Mobile Bay
Study used some of the same information specifically looking at ExxonMobil’s Mobile Bay
operations. See Bedgood Depo. at 42:13–22. As is apparent from the documents themselves, the
2016 Studies were internal to ExxonMobil. These documents are helpful to ExxonMobil’s
Plaintiff claims these studies are responsive to three of his initial requests for production:
No. 10: Each document relating to any passenger transfer from the platform
described in request number 3 above on February 15, 2018.
No. 11: Each pamphlet, book, booklet, memorandum or other document available
to this Defendant, which relates to the transfer of passengers from the platform
described in request number 3 above which were in effect on February 15, 2018.
4
Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 3 reads, “All log books, or other records of the fixed oil/gas platform from
which Plaintiff was being transferred at the time of his injury on February 15, 2018.” [Doc. 65 at 1].
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See [Doc. 225 at 13]. ExxonMobil did not (and does not now) interpret these requests to
Grammatically, these requests do not encompass the 2016 Studies. Request No. 7 uses
the correlative conjunction “and,” which indicates the request seeks materials that discuss
multiple factors. Here, the request seeks “safety or operating rules, regulations or
recommendations . . . relating to the transfer of passengers from [B-Deck]” and “the duties for
employees during such passenger transfers.” See Bryan A. Garner, The Redbook: A Manual on
Legal Style 214 (3d ed. 2013) (§ 10.50(a) discussing correlative conjunctions). The 2016 Studies
do not discuss duties of employees, rather they discuss potential mitigations for management to
consider implementing. Additionally, the studies are not the same as “rules, regulations or
2016 Studies were research findings and proposals for potential implementation. See Ex parte
City of Millbrook, 304 So. 3d 202, 205–06 (Ala. 2020) (discussing the associated-words canon).
As for Request No. 10, ExxonMobil objected to this request as vague because
“documents relating to any passenger transfer” is not clear. See [Doc. 65 at 3]. ExxonMobil
interpreted the request to ask for documents or materials regarding specific transfers, not
response to Request No. 3 and the logs of transfers. See id. Even if Plaintiff intended for Request
No. 10 to encompass documents like the 2016 Studies, ExxonMobil should be excused from not
Plaintiff’s attempt to stretch Request No. 11 suffers similar flaws. The request was vague
regarding what it was asking for that “relates to the transfer of passengers from” B-Deck. See id.
at 3–4. Additionally, the 2016 Studies are not of the same ilk as a “pamphlet, book, booklet, [or]
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memorandum” regarding transfers from B-Deck that ExxonMobil would expect those specific
examples to guide the general catchall of “other document.” See, e.g., Ex parte Mitchell,
989 So. 2d 1083, 1091–93 (Ala. 2008) (discussing the ejusdem generis doctrine); Lambert v.
Wilcox Cnty. Comm’n, 623 So. 2d 727, 731 (Ala. 1993) (same); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 199 (2012) (“Where general words
follow an enumeration of two or more things, they apply only to persons or things of the same
general kind or class specifically mentioned (ejusdem generis).”). Moreover, the requests
inclusion of “in effect on February 15, 2018,” implies some directive or guiding document that
would have governed the conduct of individuals making transfers offshore. See [Doc 65 at 3–4].
ExxonMobil did not perceive the 2016 Studies as being any kind of publication that would have
directed or mandated conduct relating to transfers; rather, as discussed above, the studies were
sanctions. This becomes more apparent because when Plaintiff served the Second Rule 30(b)
Notice, ExxonMobil reviewed the requests and determined that the 2016 Studies were responsive
No. 4: Testimony and documents regarding all Job Safety Analysis performed by
Exxon as to rope transfers, including any analysis of the dangers involved in swing
rope transfers.
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Believing the 2016 Studies were responsive to the document requests in the Second Rule
30(b) notice, 5 ExxonMobil produced the documents, along with others, six days in advance of
the deposition, despite the rule only requiring the materials be made available at the deposition.
See Ala. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(5). Accordingly, Plaintiff had the materials for use in advance of the
deposition of ExxonMobil’s representative, Shaun Bedgood, and was able to (and still can)
question Mr. Bedgood about the documents. What is more, because the 2016 Studies are internal
to ExxonMobil, they would not have been provided to any non-ExxonMobil employees (e.g.,
Scott Skelton, Complete Safety Works, Adam Harrington), and the First Rule 30(b) Notice only
asked about training, which the 2016 Studies would not qualify.
ExxonMobil also produced a document titled the May 2018 Mobile Bay Study. See also
[Doc. 232] (Pl.’s Exhibit 7). The May 2018 Mobile Bay Study was a review of risks for
personnel transfers based on a review of the June 2016 Mobile Bay Study and other data
collected following Mr. Harrington’s accident. See Bedgood Depo. at 43:3–20. Again, this
Plaintiff claims these studies are responsive to two of his initial requests for production:
No. 10: Each document relating to any passenger transfer from the platform
described in request number 3 above on February 15, 2018.
5
ExxonMobil does not believe either of the 2016 Studies qualify as a “Job Safety Analysis,” which is a specific
term within ExxonMobil. See, e.g., Munksgaard Depo. at 203:14–19. That said, the 2016 Studies otherwise
discuss dangers of swing rope transfers.
18
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As discussed above relating to the 2016 Studies, Request No. 10 is vague, and
ExxonMobil interpreted the request to seek logs or other documents specifically addressing
transfers on the date of Mr. Harrington’s accident. While the May 2018 Mobile Study mentions
Mr. Harrington’s February 15, 2018, accident during his transfer, the accident is only mentioned
in passing as being somewhat of a springboard for the overall study. See [Doc. 232 at 2]. The
May 2018 Mobile Bay Study does not specifically relate to any transfer on February 15, 2018,
and it does not provide any information beyond the incident reports and statements ExxonMobil
produced previously.
ExxonMobil also disagrees that the May 2018 Mobile Bay Study falls under Request
No. 13. The request specifically calls for “communications between or among the Defendants.”
ExxonMobil believed the May 2018 Mobile Bay Study was responsive to document
No. 4: Testimony and documents regarding all Job Safety Analysis performed by
Exxon as to rope transfers, including any analysis of the dangers in swing rope
transfers.
See Second Rule 30(b) Notice at 2. The May 2018 Mobile Bay Study analyzes dangers of swing
rope transfers. An attachment to the study also included a listing of other swing rope incidents,
noting just how incredibly rare they have been, a fact that is helpful to ExxonMobil. Finally, the
May 2018 Mobile Study discussed methods of transfer and various considerations. As mentioned
19
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before, ExxonMobil believed the study to be responsive the Second Rule 30(b) Notice, and
On June 28, 2021, after ExxonMobil’s counsel learned of its existence, ExxonMobil
produced the Personnel Transfer Requirements document. See [Doc. 233] (Pl.’s Exh. 8); Aff. of
R. Sewell at ¶ 22. Plaintiff claims this document is responsive to Request No. 7. See [Doc. 225
at 14–15].
Request No. 7, and it would be responsive to requests in the First Rule 30(b) Notice. However,
the late production was oversight, not malice. In his deposition, Mr. Bedgood admitted that he
did not think to look for this portion of the Upstream Safety Manual—two pages out of more
requests. Bedgood Depo. at 77:12–78:16. ExxonMobil produced the document when counsel
Additionally, Plaintiff has not suffered prejudice because the Personnel Transfer
Requirements document is largely duplicative of documents already a part of the case or other
witnesses would not have knowledge of this document. The Personnel Transfer Requirements
document is a safety procedure used by ExxonMobil for its employees and made available upon
request for contractors, like Skelton’s, and it does discuss when a person should make his swing.
See [Doc. 233 at 1]; see also Bedgood Depo. at 74:15–21 (Upstream Safety Manual available to
Skelton’s). However, Skelton’s had training policies in place that already discussed when a
person should make his swing. See Exh. 1 to Harrington Depo. at 5, 7. Plaintiff admitted that
prior to the accident he had seen the part of Skelton’s safety policy that discussed the swing rope
20
DOCUMENT 261
Transfer Requirements document repeats information Mr. Harrington admits he already received
before his accident, thus there is no new information that would prejudice Plaintiff.
Other witnesses likely would not have any additional knowledge of the Personnel
Transfer Requirements document that would be relevant to this case. Plaintiff specifically cites
(P&E Crewboats employee), Stacy Perillo (P&E Crewboats employee), Avery Fick (Complete
Safety Works), and Scott Skelton (Skelton’s employee). [Doc. 225 at 2 & n.1]. To be sure,
training, thus the Personnel Transfer Requirements document may be relevant to his testimony.
However, before Plaintiff filed his motion, ExxonMobil agreed to make Mr. Hrinsin available for
another deposition in his individual capacity to discuss topics not previously discussed in his first
deposition. See Email from R. Sewell to R. Hedge (June 22, 2021) (excerpt) (Exhibit U). Also, to
the extent Plaintiff wishes to elicit a response from ExxonMobil’s representative, Mr. Bedgood’s
deposition is open, and Plaintiff can depose Mr. Bedgood further on this document. Ms.
Munksgaard’s involvement in this case was that she led the investigation following Mr.
Harrington’s accident, and she was not local to Mobile Bay Operations to be able to speak to the
implication of the Personnel Transfer Requirements document for Mobile Bay—at least not be
able to speak to it better than Mr. Hrinsin or Mr. Bedgood. See Munksgaard Depo. at 28:19–21,
Mr. Esfeller and Ms. Perillo are P&E Crewboats employees, and their training is not at
issue. Mr. Esfeller had never had swing rope training to be able to discuss the topic. See Esfeller
Depo. at 116:4–6. Ms. Perillo testified as to her understanding of timing a swing by swing rope,
21
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which was consistent with the guidance in the Personnel Transfer Requirements document. See
Perillo Depo. at 88:19–89:6. Mr. Skelton similarly testified that a person should swing when the
boat is coming up, and there is no evidence to indicate he requested or saw the Personnel
Transfer Requirement document. See Skelton Depo. at 96:16–21. Thus, deposing Mr. Skelton
regarding the Personnel Transfer Requirements document would not add to the case. Finally, Ms.
Fick from Complete Safety Works made clear in her deposition that she received no documents
from ExxonMobil, so she would have never seen it. Not only is default (or any other sanction)
inappropriate, but widescale re-deposing of multiple witnesses also is not necessary because
On June 23, 2021, ExxonMobil produced a 2012 email from employees of Chevron to
employees at ExxonMobil regarding Chevron’s swing rope safety protocols. See [Doc. 234]
(Pl.’s Exhibit 9). This email discusses Chevron’s requirements for swing rope transfers as a
sharing of information. Facially, the email does appear to be any governing document. Plaintiff
claims the email is responsive to Request No. 11. See [Doc. 225 at 13]. ExxonMobil disagrees.
As with the other documents, Request No. 11 does not appear to cover this email. The
request was vague. This email does not mention B-Deck or any ExxonMobil platforms.
Additionally, the email is not similar to a “pamphlet, book, booklet, [or] memorandum”
regarding transfers from B-Deck that ExxonMobil would expect those specific examples to guide
the general catchall of “other document.” See, e.g., Ex parte Mitchell, 989 So. 2d at 1091–93.
Moreover, the request’s inclusion of “in effect on February 15, 2018,” implies some directive or
guiding document that would have governed the conduct of individuals making transfers
offshore. ExxonMobil did not perceive the email as being any kind of publication that would
22
DOCUMENT 261
have directed or mandated conduct relating to transfers; rather, the email was just a sharing of
As with other documents, Exxon Mobil produced the email as responsive to Request
No. 6 in the Second Rule 30(b) Notice. Again, ExxonMobil produced this email before Mr.
On July 28, 2021, ExxonMobil produced the Training Module after Plaintiff requested it
as supplementation to ExxonMobil’s June 23 and 28 productions. See Pl.’s Exh. 11. Plaintiff
claims this document is responsive to Request No. 9: “All employee training video tapes, films,
photographs or other depictions used by or available to this Defendant which contain any
reference to the conduct of the employees of this Defendant during passenger transfer operations
aboard vessels similar in type and size as the M/V MISS KRISTIN.” See [Doc. 250 at 7].
relevant materials. See [Doc. 65 at 2–3 (Responses to Request Nos. 7 and 9). ExxonMobil does
The Training Module was not used in the United States, so it would not apply to Mobile
Bay’s operations. See Aff. of S. Bedgood at ¶ 7. Additionally, the Training Module was intended
for ExxonMobil employees. There is no indication that contractors’ employees like Plaintiff
would have ever had access to the Training Module. Because the Training Module would not be
provided to workers in Mobile Bay or to contractors’ employees, the Training Module has no
bearing on material facts, and its irrelevance makes it not subject to discovery. See Ala. R. Civ.
Additionally, Plaintiff has not suffered prejudice because information presented in the
Training Module is largely duplicative of information already a part of the case or other
23
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witnesses would not have knowledge of this document. As mentioned above, Skelton’s had
training policies in place that already discussed when a person should make his swing, and
Plaintiff admitted to having received that policy before the accident. See Exh. 1 to Harrington
information Mr. Harrington admits he already received before his accident, thus there is no new
Other witnesses likely would not have any additional knowledge of the Training Module
that would be relevant to this case. In fact, Mr. Bedgood, ExxonMobil’s representative, testified
that he did not recall the Training Module. Bedgood Depo. at 93:8–12. However, the platform
“GOTS eLearning,” was for ExxonMobil employees. See id. at 92:7–16. Mr. Hrinsin,
ExxonMobil’s earlier representative, was only noticed regarding personnel transfer training for
ExxonMobil employees and non-employees in the Gulf of Mexico. 6 See First Rule 30(b) Notice
at 2. Because the first notice’s topics were limited to the Gulf of Mexico and to information
provided to people not employed by ExxonMobil, the Training Module would not have been
relevant or subject to the deposition notice. Also, to the extent Plaintiff wishes to elicit testimony
from ExxonMobil’s representative, Mr. Bedgood’s deposition is open, and Plaintiff can depose
Mr. Bedgood further on this material. Ms. Munksgaard’s involvement in this case makes it
unlikely that she can speak to the Training Module at all. Because this particular training module
was for ExxonMobil employees outside the United States, non-ExxonMobil witnesses would not
be able to testify about the Training Module either. Because of the limited effect the Training
6
As mentioned above, ExxonMobil has also already agreed to make Mr. Hrinsin available for another deposition in
his individual capacity to testify to topics not initially part of Mr. Hrinsin’s depositon.
24
DOCUMENT 261
Module will have on witnesses and its inapplicability to Mobile Bay, Plaintiff has not suffered
prejudice.
With the Training Module, ExxonMobil also produced three job-safety analyses,
including the Swing-Rope JSA, that are within the Training Module. See [Doc. 252] (Pl.’s
Exh. 10). Plaintiff claims this document is responsive to Request No. 8: “All employee training
booklets, manuals or bulletins which relate in any way, or contain instructions to employees of
this Defendant, as to their responsibilities with respect to passenger transfer aboard vessels
similar in type and size as the M/V MISS KRISTIN.” See [Doc. 250 at 5]. ExxonMobil, subject
to objections regarding overbreadth and relevance, agreed to produce relevant materials. See
[Doc. 65 at 2–3 (Responses to Request Nos. 7 and 8). Plaintiff also claims that the Swing Rope
JSA is responsive to Plaintiff’s requests for the first deposition of ExxonMobil’s representative.
See [Doc. 250 at 2]. Those requests sought testimony and documents addressing:
No. 2: Any and all training and/or instructions provided to Exxon employees
regarding transferring from one of your rigs onto crewboats, and from crewboats
onto one of your rigs, in the Gulf of Mexico.
Because the Training Module was not used in the United States, the related job-safety
analyses (including the Swing Rope JSA) would not have been used in the United States either,
and the Swing Rope JSA would not apply to Mobile Bay’s operations. See Aff. of S. Bedgood at
¶¶ 7, 9. Additionally, the Swing Rope JSA was intended for ExxonMobil employees; there is no
indication that contractors’ employees like Plaintiff would have ever had access to the Training
Module. See Aff. of S. Bedgood at ¶ 7; see also [Doc. 252] (document includes acronym
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“EMPC” for ExxonMobil Production Company); Bedgood Depo. at 92:7–16 (GOTS eLearning
limited to ExxonMobil employees). The Swing Rope JSA also describes the task as “Swing
Rope from Kizomba A & B to field service vessels Debbie Tide & Midway Tide.” [Doc. 252].
This is more evidence that the Swing Rope JSA was not implemented in the United States
because Kizomba A and B refer to offshore platforms off the coast of Angola. See B.D. Boles &
G.E. Mayhall, Paper presented at the Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas:
visited August 19, 2021). Because the Training Module and the associated Swing Rope JSA
would not be provided to workers in Mobile Bay or to contractors’ employees, the Swing Rope
JSA has no bearing on material facts, and its irrelevance makes it not subject to discovery. See
Plaintiff’s argument that Mr. Hrinsin was less than honest in his deposition is also
without merit. The party noticing a representative deposition must state “with reasonable
particularity the matters on which examination is requested.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). Referring
back to the topics of the deposition, Mr. Hrinsin was asked to testify regarding training or safety
topics related to the Gulf of Mexico. See First Rule 30(b) Notice at 2. Based on these topics,
ExxonMobil made its reasonable efforts to prepare Mr. Hrinsin to testify on the noticed topics.
With the topics limited to the Gulf of Mexico, ExxonMobil was not on notice to prepare Mr.
For the same reasons Plaintiff has not suffered prejudice regarding the Training Module,
Plaintiff has not suffered prejudice regarding the Swing Rope JSA.
The 2016 Studies ExxonMobil produced June 23, 2021, included portions of images of
the Go/No-Go Matrix that were part of the discussions of safety steps for ExxonMobil to
26
DOCUMENT 261
consider. See [Doc. 229 at 12; Doc. 231 at 11]. The Go/No-Go image produced had some text at
the bottom cut off. After ExxonMobil produced the 2016 Studies, Plaintiff’s counsel requested
ExxonMobil produce the complete image. See Email from R. Hedge to R. Sewell (June 28,
2021) (Exhibit V). ExxonMobil began searching for the complete images, but they were not
ExxonMobil located a better copy of the Go/No-Go Matrix and produced it on July 28, 2021. See
[Doc. 250 at 1–2]. ExxonMobil’s counsel did not have the complete Go/No-Go Matrix before
Plaintiff claims the Go/No-Go Matrix is responsive to Request Nos. 7, 8, 10, and 11 of
would be responsive to requests in the First Rule 30(b) Notice. However, the late production was
not willful. As explained above, ExxonMobil did not consider looking for the 2016 Studies as
responsive to the initial requests, thus ExxonMobil did not think to look for the Go/No-Go
Matrix. Additionally, a review of the May 2018 Mobile Bay Study indicates the Go/No-Go
Matrix was not implemented at the time of the accident. The May 2018 Mobile Bay Study makes
the proposal of implementing or posting the Go/No-Go Checklist, which indicates that measure
was not already in place. See [Doc. 232 at 6]. If the Go/No-Go Matrix was not implemented at
the time of Plaintiff’s injury, then it would not have been a rule, procedure, or recommendation
provided to ExxonMobil employees to consider when conducting swing rope transfers, which is
Specifically for Request No. 10, ExxonMobil objected to this request as vague because
“documents relating to any passenger transfer” is not clear. See [Doc. 65 at 3]. Again,
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ExxonMobil interpreted the request to ask for documents or materials regarding specific
transfers. Even if Plaintiff intended for Request No. 10 to encompass documents like the Go/No-
Go Matrix, ExxonMobil should be excused from not reaching that conclusion based on the
Moreover, during Mr. Bedgood’s deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Mr. Bedgood
about the portions of the Go/No-Matrix that were available, and Mr. Bedgood testified to his
knowledge of the recommendations in the checklist. With Mr. Bedgood’s deposition still open,
Plaintiff’s counsel will have to opportunity to ask further questions about the remaing portions of
Plaintiff argues that ExxonMobil suppressed these documents because they would be
harmful to ExxonMobil’s defense. See [Doc. 225 at 2]. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The 2016 Studies and the May 2018 Mobile Bay Study show that ExxonMobil took steps to
evaluate methods of transferring people to and from offshore platforms and accounted for the
various risks and variables associated with those transfers. Not only that, ExxonMobil reached
out to other offshore companies for input on swing rope transfers. Finally, ExxonMobil put
together its Personnel Transfer Requirements document, which include timing considerations
and were available for Mr. Harrington’s employer to review and heed.
To be sure, the studies recognize there are dangers associated with all personnel
transfers—whether by swing rope or another method. But, most important, they show that swing
rope transfers had long been used and were extremely safe. In fact, the Plaintiff’s injury here is
the only injury from swing roping that had ever occurred in Mobile Bay. That is the best fact for
ExxonMobile in the entire case. Why would ExxonMobil try to hide the documents that show
28
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that fact. The materials are consistent with the testimony from ExxonMobil employees
throughout this case—ExxonMobil takes personnel transfers seriously and takes steps to reduce
the likelihood of injuries. And swing roping has been a very safe method to effect those transfers
in Mobile Bay.
In his motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter default and to allow Plaintiff to continue
with depositions to seek punitive damages. See [Doc. 225 at 19]. However, Plaintiff is not
entitled to punitive damages. As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s operative complaint has not
requested punitive damages nor raised a claim (e.g., wantonness) that permits punitive
costs, and interest). Plaintiff’s limnitation of his claim to negligence was entirely appropriate, as
the Eleventh Circuit has consistently maintained that punitive damages are not available in
personal injury claims under general maritime law. See, e.g., Eslinger v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,
772 F. App’x 872, 872–73 (11th Cir. 2019) (mem. op.) (citing In re Amtrak Sunset Ltd. Train
Crash in Bayou Canot, Ala. on Sept. 22, 1993, 121 F.3d 1421, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997); Lollie v.
Brown Marine Serv., Inc., 995 F.2d 1565, 1565 (11th Cir. 1993)). 7. Accordingly, the Court
7
United States Supreme Court has held punitive damages are recognized under general maritime law in certain
cases. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009). However, the Eleventh Circuit has since ruled, at
least twice, that the holding of Atlantic Sounding is limited and permits punitive damages only under instances of
willful or wanton disregard for maintenance and cure. See Eslinger, 772 F. App’x at 873; Petersen v. NCL
(Bahamas) Ltd., 748 F. App’x 246, 251–52 (11th Cir. 2018). There are no such allegations in this case.
29
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Conclusion
The Court should deny Plaintiff’s motions for sanctions. ExxonMobil has not violated
any orders of this Court. This dispute does not involve willful discovery abuses, rather it is a
Discovery remains open, and the disputed documents were all produced voluntarily. For these
OF COUNSEL:
M. Christian King (KIN017)
[email protected]
Robert J. “Jay” Sewell (SEW007)
[email protected]
LIGHTFOOT, FRANKLIN & WHITE, LLC
The Clark Building
400 20th Street North
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
(205) 581-0700
(205) 581-0799
30
DOCUMENT 261
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on August 31, 2021, I filed the foregoing electronically using the
EXHIBIT A
DOCUMENT 262
5
A D A M P . H A R R I N G T O N,
6
7 P l a i n t i f f,
8
Vs.
9
11
D e f e n d a n t s.
12
13
14
The 30(b)(5)&(6) Deposition of
15
E X X O N M O B I L C O R P O R A T I O N, t a k e n
16
through its representative
17
GREG A. HRINSIN, at the law offices
18
of Hedge Copeland, PC, 1206 Dauphin
19
Street, Mobile, Alabama, on January
20
20, 2020, commencing at approximately
21
9:25 a.m.
22
23
DOCUMENT 262
119
3 T h e n a s e c o n d a g o y o u s a i d M r . H a r r i n g t o n.
8 Q. W h a t r e q u i r e m e n t s?
10 Q. Where?
11 A. On Document 2. R e q u i r e m e n t s.
12 P e r s o n n e l. ExxonMobil --
13 Q. Hold on.
15 time, please.
17 bottom?
22 C o n t r a c t o r s) - -
23 A. -- p e r m a n e n tl y a s s i g n e d t o
DOCUMENT 262
120
4 a r e r e q u i r e d t o s u c c e s s f u ll y d e m o n s t r a t e t h e
5 a b o v e s w i n g r o p e d e m o n s t r a t i o ns a t a m i n i m u m
7 Q. Okay.
9 c o n t r a c t o r s.
10 Q. W e m a y b e g e t t i n g s o m e w h e r e, o k a y?
12 A. Yes, sir.
15 EM?
16 A. E x x o n M o b i l.
18 c o n t r a c t o r s, s u c h a s M r . H a r r i n g t o n,
19 p e r m a n e n tl y a s s i g n e d t o o f f s h o r e
20 i n s t a l l a t i o ns .
22 w e d o h a v e c o n t r a c t o r s t h a t a r e p e r m a n e n tl y
23 assigned there.
DOCUMENT 262
121
2 p e r m a n e n tl y a s s i g n e d.
6 B e c a u s e i t d o e s l i m i t i t t o p e r m a n e n tl y
7 a s s i g n e d e m p l o y e e s.
8 A. Yes, sir.
11 g o i n g t o a p p l y t o M r . H a r r i n g t o n. Same
14 w o r k a r e a s a r e r e q u i r e d t o s u c c e s s f u ll y
15 c o m p l e t e t h e a b o v e s w i n g r o p e d e m o n s t r a t i o ns
17 A. That is correct.
19 H a r r i n g t o n.
20 A. Yes, it would.
23 A. That is correct.
DOCUMENT 262
198
4 A. Yes.
7 Exhibit G.
8 A. Okay.
9 Q. I t's S e c t i o n 1, t h i r d p a r a g r a p h.
12 p r o c e d u r e s. D i d I r e a d t h a t c o r r e c t l y?
13 A. Yes.
17 E x x o n' s e x p e c t a t i o n, a s s h o w n i n t h i s
21 c o n t r a c t o r, t h e c o m p a n y, l i k e S k e l t o n' s ,
22 their job?
23 A. T o t r a i n t h e i r e m p l o y e e s, y e s.
DOCUMENT 262
199
2 c o n t r a c t o r e m p l o y e e s.
3 A. No, sir.
6 000104.
7 A. Okay.
11 S k e l t o n's, a s s u r e s t h a t s u p p l i e r s' a n d
12 s u b-s u p p l i e r s' e m p l o y e e s h a v e b e e n t r a i n e d
19 A. You did.
23 A. Yes, sir.
DOCUMENT 263
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT B
DOCUMENT 263
Shaun Bedgood 1
6 ADAM P. HARRINGTON,
7 Plaintiff(s),
8 vs.
9 BARRY GRAHAM OFFSHORE SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
10 Defendant(s).
11
12
13
14 DEPOSITION OF
15 SHAUN D. BEDGOOD
16
17
18
19
20
1 Munksgaard's and --
2 A. Greg Hrinsin.
3 Q. Hrinsin. Okay. And then you said
4 you reviewed the studies that we did. That
5 Exxon did, I assume?
6 A. Yes, Exxon, work. Yes, sir.
7 Q. The studies talking about the --
8 A. For swing rope and personnel
9 transfer methods.
10 Q. The 2016 studies?
11 A. Yeah. I mean, I looked through
12 that and the 2018 as well.
13 Q. Okay. And those studies, they were
14 basically to examine -- well, the first one
15 in the 2016 study, there's two of them here.
16 One is a study and one is an analysis.
17 Those were just Exxon's attempt to identify
18 potential hazards and figure out the best
19 way to minimize those hazards; right?
20 A. It was a study to see what -- you
21 know, what options were viable for personnel
22 transfer globally and in Mobile Bay. That
23 was the two that was before, and then what
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 263
Shaun Bedgood 43
1 All of that.
2 Q. You kind of go through the entire
3 list of risks involved in making sure that
4 you identify them if there are any and then
5 try to avoid them and how to do it safely
6 ultimately?
7 MR. SEWELL: Object to the form.
8 Q. Right?
9 A. Yes, safely.
10 Q. And where is that training -- where
11 does that training take place for Exxon
12 employees?
13 A. Where?
14 Q. Yes. Where?
15 A. At our facility.
16 Q. Our facility where?
17 A. OTF where our demonstrator is --
18 where our swing rope demonstrator is.
19 Q. What is OTF? Another acronym.
20 Sorry.
21 A. Onshore treating facility is the
22 plant where the office is in Mobile Bay or
23 was.
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 263
Shaun Bedgood 345
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 264
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT C
Complete Safety Works Inc.
90 N. Sage Ave. Mobile, Alabama 36607 251 479-6788
Adam Harrington
has on this date, successfully demonstrated
February 6, 2018
Ste en F. Fick
Instructor
Skelton00017
DOCUMENT 265
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT D
DOCUMENT 265
DOCUMENT 265
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DOCUMENT 266
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT E
DOCUMENT 266
Adam P. Harrington
3 ADAM P. HARRINGTON,
4 Plaintiff,
5 vs. CASE NO. CV-2018-903102
6 BARRY GRAHAM OIL SERVICE, LLC,
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, et al.,
7
Defendants.
8
9 * * * * * * * * * *
10 DEPOSITION OF ADAM PARKER HARRINGTON
11 * * * * * * * * * *
12 In accordance with Rule 5(d) of the
13 Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, as Amended,
14 I, Audrey Kirkland, am hereby delivering to
15 Mr. Jonathan M. Lieb the original transcript of
16 the oral testimony taken on Tuesday,
17 October 22, 2019, along with exhibits.
18 Please be advised that this is the same
19 and not retained by the Court Reporter, nor
20 filed with the Court.
21 * * * * * * * * * *
22
23
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 266
Adam P. Harrington 21
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 266
Adam P. Harrington 22
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 266
Adam P. Harrington 23
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 266
Adam P. Harrington 26
1 annual basis?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. Okay. And Number 2 under that says:
4 All personnel authorized and trained in swing
5 rope transfer will be given a copy of the,
6 quote, swing rope transfer procedure to review
7 before each job task requiring this task.
8 If you'll flip over to six -- the next
9 page, 638, there's a document titled Swing Rope
10 Transfer Procedure. Have you seen that
11 document before?
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. And were you given this document to
14 review by Skelton's or one of the third-party
15 training folks?
16 A. I do not recall if I had it.
17 Q. You do recall hav- -- having seen
18 this document?
19 A. Yes, sir. I do not recall receiving
20 it before that time going offshore.
21 Q. Okay. When do you recall receiving
22 it?
23 A. The swing rope training that I had
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 266
Adam P. Harrington 27
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 267
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT F
DOCUMENT 267
Loss Prevention
Skelton's Fire & Equipment, Inc. Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures Number
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and 2018-04
Page 1 of 6
Revision:
Working Near or Over Water A
Approval: Date:
January 1, 2018
I. PURPOSE
This procedure has been prepared for the guidance of all personnel involved in offshore
transport, personnel transfer and working near water.
IL SCOPE
This policy/procedure covers provisions to prevent injury, loss of life or property and applies
to all Skelton's Fire & Equipment personnel involved in Offshore work including personnel
transfer.
All personnel/employees have the best opportunity to avoid accidents or property damage by
Incident Investigation and Reporting to address proper recognition and assessment of hazards
likely to be encountered. Such circumstances may occur where:
3.1 All personnel/employee(s) do not know or do not follow the policies and guidelines set
forth within this procedure. These employees include, but are not limited to, the
following personnel:
A. Management
B. Supervisor/Superintendent
C. Authorized Personnel/Employee
D. Affected Personnel/Employee
Prepared by:
Bonner's Safety Service, Inc.
Skelton 000632
DOCUMENT 267
Loss Prevention
Skelton's Fire & Equipment, Inc. Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Revision A Page 2 of 6
Working Near or Over Water
VI. RESPONSIBILITIES
ft is the responsibility of Management and all employees to read and understand the safety
procedure for the Incident Investigation and Reporting Program.
A. Establishing procedures for the Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Working
Near or Over Water Program.
C. Assuring that a financial plan and time is allowed for certified training of all
personnel/employees affected by working Offshore.
D. Adhering to the Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Working Near or Over
Water Program at all times.
6.2 The HSE Director, Supervisors/Superintendents, Group Leaders, Line Leaders are
responsible for:
A. Supervisors are responsible for verifying that all assigned employees have the
required training and to coordinate any additional required training with the
contractor which requires the employees of Skelton's Fire & Equipment to work
offshore, or requires them to transfer from any vessel to a work platform or work
near or over water.
B. Adhering to the Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Working Near or Over
Water Program at all times.
Skelton 000633
DOCUMENT 267
Loss Prevention
Skelton's Fire & Equipment, Inc. Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Revision A
Page 3 of 6
Working Near or Over Water
VII. PROCEDURE
A. All Skelton's Fire & Equipment personnel that provide offshore services or work near or
over water and personnel traveling offshore will abide by this section of the safety manual.
B. All employees assigned to an offshore work will attend any required orientation and will
annually complete all "Water Safety" type training required including Personnel Transfer
provided by Skelton's Fire & Equipment, Inc. through their third party consultant.
C. Training records will be maintained and kept by Skelton's Fire & Equipment, Inc.
Prepared by:
Bonner's Safety Service, Inc.
Skelton 000634
DOCUMENT 267
Loss Prevention
Skelton's Fire & Equipment, Inc. Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
The vessel captain has absolute authority during all stages of the voyage.
Personnel must follow the captain's instructions at all times!
Prepared by:
Bonner's Safety Service. Inc.
Skelton 000635
DOCUMENT 267
Loss Prevention
Skelton's Fire & Equipment, Inc. Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Revision A
Page 5 of 6
Working Near or Over Water
F. Swing Ropes
Transfers by swing rope are not recommended, but if necessary, personnel being
transferred to or from vessels by swing rope must adhere to the following:
1. Life vest or personal flotation devices must be worn while using a swing
rope.
2. Personnel must have both hands and arms free.
3. Personnel must position themselves on the deck as directed by the captain.
4. Catch the knotted end of the rope. Do not let the rope get between your
legs.
5. Wait until the boat is at the top of a swell then push off with your feet and
swing to the structure.
6. After landing on deck, release the rope and turn to assist the next person.
G. Personnel Baskets
Personnel being transferred to or from vessels by personnel baskets must adhere to
the following:
1. Life vest or work vest must be worn while using a personnel basket.
2. Know the maximum number of persons allowed on the personnel basket
(typically 4). Never exceed this number. Reduce the number by half in
rough weather.
3. Personnel must position themselves on the deck as directed by the captain.
4. Personnel must never stand under the personnel basket.
5. Personnel must never ride in the middle of the personnel basket.
6. Personnel must stand on the outside rim of the basket and grasp the upright
basket ropes. Be prepared for sudden movement.
Skelton 000636
DOCUMENT 267
Loss Prevention
Skelton's Fire & Equipment, Inc. Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Revision A
Page 6 of 6
Working Near or Over Water
A. Training:
C. Retraining:
7.4 RECORDS
Prepared by:
Bonner's Safety Service, Inc.
Skelton 000637
DOCUMENT 267
Follow these guidelines when transferring workers using the swing rope:
If at any time you are unsure of yourself or your limitations to complete this
task DO NOT ATTEMPT the swing. Always remember that your safety is the first
priority to yourself and Skelton's Fire & Equipment, Inc.
Skelton 000638
DOCUMENT 268
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT G
DOCUMENT 268
Subject: Harrington
Date: Thursday, October 31, 2019 at 3:19:27 PM Central Daylight Time
From: Richard Fuquay
To: Robert J. Sewell
CC: Robert Hedge
Jay:
We have a couple issues we need to address concerning your client's document producMon. The first issue involves
documents related to training they give concerning swing rope transfers. RFPs 7, 8, 9, and 11 seek documents related
to any such training. The response to RFP no. 7 and the others by reference is "Subject to and without waiving its
objecMons, Exxon Mobil will produce relevant policies, procedures, and training materials upon entry of an
appropriate protecMve order." Have you produced any documents responsive to these requests? If so, please
idenMfy which documents by their Bates numbers. If not, please produce any such documents. In this same vein,
your response to interrogatory number 17 menMons guidelines your client provides to contractors concerning swing
rope training for the contractor's employees and an orientaMon and informaMon your client provides itself to the
contractor's employees concerning the safe use of swing ropes. Please produce all documents related to the
orientaMon and informaMon referenced in your answer.
The second issue concerns RFP number 20 which seeks documents related to the services provided by P&E to your
client on the date of Adam's injury. You agreed to produced a copy of the contract between Exxon Mobil and P&E
but the Charter itself references a Vessel Order and 4 related documents which are exhibits to the sample Vessel
Order at the back of the Charter. It seems that there should be completed documents for the Miss Kristen. Please
produce any such Vessel Orders or related documents.
Please produce the documents discussed above within the next 10 days so we can avoid filing a moMon.
Richard W. Fuquay
FUQUAY LAW FIRM
1206 Dauphin Street
Mobile, Alabama 36604
(251) 473-4443
Page 1 of 1
DOCUMENT 269
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT H
DOCUMENT 269
5
A D A M P . H A R R I N G T O N,
6
7 P l a i n t i f f,
8
Vs.
9
11
D e f e n d a n t s.
12
13
14
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF:
15 STACY JEAN PERILLO
16
17
18
19
DATE: November 6, 2019
20
TIME: 8:58 a.m.
21
23
DOCUMENT 269
88
1 a r e t i m e s w h e n I ' m , s a y, i n t h e w h e e l h o u s e.
9 d u r i n g a b o a r d i n g o p e r a t i o n. In other
12 Q. Always, right?
13 A. Yes.
18 three feet.
89
5 boat?
6 A. Correct.
10 rope class.
12 A. Yes.
18 s w i n g r o p e t r a n s f e r p r o t o c o l o r p r o c e d u r e?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. T e l l m e w h a t a l l i s e n c o m p a s se d b y
21 that.
EXHIBIT I
DOCUMENT 270
ADAM P. HARRINGTON, *
Plaintiff, *
v. * CV-2018-903102
Please take notice that at the time, date and location indicated above, pursuant
to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 30(b)(5) and (6), Plaintiff will take the
authorized to administer oaths. The oral examination will continue from day to day until
completed, and you are invited to attend and examine the deponent.
Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5) and (6) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, the
individuals, not employed by Exxon, who board or plan on boarding one of your rigs in
regarding transferring from one of your rigs onto crewboats, and from crewboats onto
Further, note that pursuant to Rule 30 (b)(6), said corporation “shall designate
one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons who consent to
testify on its behalf,” and “the persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or
Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5), Plaintiff requests that, at the time and place of the
taking of said deposition, said corporation produce for inspection and copying THE
OF COUNSEL:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 13th of January, 2020, a copy of the above and
foregoing document was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the E-File
system, which will send notification of such filing to the following:
John Lieb
McDowell Knight Roedder & Sledge
[email protected]
RSA Battle House Tower
11 North Water St. Suite 13290
P.O. Box 350
Mobile, AL 36601
EXHIBIT J
DOCUMENT 271
5
A D A M P . H A R R I N G T O N,
6
7 P l a i n t i f f,
8
Vs.
9
12 D e f e n d a n t s.
13
14
15
23
DOCUMENT 271
37
1 A. Yes, sir.
7 t h i s c e r t i f i c a t e, r i g h t?
8 A. T h a t w a s m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g, y e s .
15 on Exxon rigs.
17 guidelines, no.
21 A. Yes, sir.
43
2 A. Not at all.
7 methods, is he?
8 A. That's true.
12 trainers.
EXHIBIT K
DOCUMENT 272
3
4 ADAM P. HARRINGTON, )
5 Plaintiff, )
10
11 S T I P U L A T I O N S
21
22
23
17
3 A. (Witness complies.)
4 Q. Thank you very much.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And can you -- let me ask you this first.
22 study?
23 A. Yes.
20
8 is 638.
21
1 A. Yes.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And under A, training on 2, it says
13 A. Yes.
14 (Defendant's Exhibit 4 was
22
2 document.
6 A. I don't know.
7 Q. Okay.
9 document.
18 thing --
19 A. Yeah.
20 Q. -- that's referenced in Exhibit 3, is it
23
1 A. Yes.
3 Skelton's when?
4 A. I think it was in 2015, thereabouts.
8 A. Yes.
96
5 said, Look, I swung over, the boat came up and hit the
8 A. Uh-huh.
12 A. Uh-huh.
EXHIBIT L
Loss Prevention
Skelton’s Fire & Equipment, Inc.
Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures Number
I
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and 2018-04
I Page 1 of6
Revision: I
Working Near or Over Water A I
Approval: Date:
January 1, 2018
PURPOSE
This procedure has been prepared for the guidance of all personnel involved in offshore
transport, personnel transfer and working near water.
II. SCOPE
This policy/procedure covers provisions to prevent injury, loss of life or property and applies
to all Skelton’s Fire & Equipment personnel involved in Offshore work including personnel
transfer.
All personnel/employees have the best opportunity to avoid accidents or property damage by
Incident Investigation and Reporting to address proper recognition and assessment of hazards
likely to be encountered. Such circumstances may occur where:
3.1 All personnel/employee(s) do not know or do not follow the policies and guidelines set
forth within this procedure. These employees include, but are not limited to, the
following personnel:
A. Management
B. Supervisor/Superintendent
C. Authorized Personnel/Employee
D. Affected Personnel/Employee
‘ DEFENDANT’S —
EXHIBIT
Prepared by:
Bonner’s Safety Service, Inc.
Skelton 000632
Ske]ton s Fire & Equipment, Inc. Loss Prevention
Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and A
Page 2 of 6
Working Near or Over Water
VI. RESPONSIBILITIES
It is the responsibility of Management and all employees to read and understand the safety
procedure for the Incident Investigation and Reporting Program.
A. Establishing procedures for the Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Working
Near or Over Water Program.
C. Assuring that a financial plan and time is allowed for certified training of all
personnel/employees affected by working Offshore.
D. Adhering to the Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Working Near or Over
Water Program at all times.
6.2 The HSE Director, Supervisors/Superintendents, Group Leaders, Line Leaders are
responsible for:
A. Supervisors are responsible for verifying that all assigned employees have the
required training and to coordinate any additional required training with the
contractor which requires the employees of Skelton’s fire & Equipment to work
offshore, or requires them to transfer from any vessel to a work platform or work
near or over water.
B. Adhering to the Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Working Near or Over
Water Program at all times.
Prepared by:
Bonner’s Safeh’ Service, The.
Sketton 000633
Sketton s Fire & Equipment, Inc. Loss Prevention
Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Revision A
Page 3 of 6
Working Near or Over Water
VII. PROCEDURE
A. All Skelton’s F ire & Equipment personnel that provide offshore services or work near or
over water and personnel traveling offshore will abide by this section of the safety manual.
B. All employees assigned to an offshore work will attend any required orientation and will
annually complete all “Water Safety” type training required including Personnel Transfer
provided by Skelton’s Fire & Equipment, Inc. through their third party consultant.
C. Training records will be maintained and kept by Skelton’s Fire & Equipment, Inc.
Prepared by:
Bonner’s Safety Senice, Inc.
Skelton 000634
Skelton s Fire & Equipment, Inc. Loss Prevention
Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Revision A
Page 4 of 6
Working Near or Over Water
The vessel captain has absolute authority during all stages of the voyage.
Personnel must follow the captain’s instructions at all times!
Prepared by:
Bonner’s Safety Service, Inc.
Skelton 000635
Loss Prevention
Skelton s Fire & Equipment, Inc.
Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Revision A
PageS of 6
Working Near or Over Water
F. Swing Ropes
Transfers by swing rope are not recommended, but if necessary, personnel being
transferred to or from vessels by swing rope must adhere to the following:
1. Life vest or personal flotation devices must be worn while using a swing
rope.
2. Personnel must have both hands and arms free.
3. Personnel must position themselves on the deck as directed by the captain.
4. Catch the knotted end of the rope. Do not let the rope get between your
legs.
5. Wait until the boat is at the top of a swell then push off with your feet and
swing to the structure.
6. After landing on deck, release the rope and turn to assist the next person.
G. Personnel Baskets
Personnel being transferred to or from vessels by personnel baskets must adhere to
the following:
1. Life vest or work vest must be worn while using a personnel basket.
2. Know the maximum number of persons allowed on the personnel basket
(typically 4). Never exceed this number. Reduce the number by half in
rough weather.
3. Personnel must position themselves on the deck as directed by the captain.
4. Personnel must never stand under the personnel basket.
5. Personnel must never ride in the middle of the personnel basket.
6. Personnel must stand on the outside rim of the basket and grasp the upright
basket ropes. Be prepared for sudden movement.
Prepared by:
Bonner’s Safety Service, Inc.
Skelton 000636
Skelton’s Fire & Equipment, Inc. Loss Prevention
Environmental & Regulatory Compliance
Policies & Procedures
Offshore Safety, Personnel Transfer and Revision A
A. Training:
C. Retraining:
7.4 RECORDS
Prepared by:
Bonner’s Safety Service, Inc.
Skelton 000637
DEFENDANT’S
I
EXHBIT
I
Swing Rope Transfer Procedure
Swing ropes are used to transfer workers from boats to the landing area of the platform. During
moderate to heavy seas, using a swing rope can be quite demanding. Safety should always come first!
Follow these guidelines when transferring workers using the swing rope:
If at any time you are unsure of yourself or your limitations to complete this
task DO NOT ATTEMPT the swing. Always remember that your safety is the first
priority to yourself and Skelton’s Fire & Equipment, Inc.
Skelton 000638
DOCUMENT 274
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT M
DOCUMENT 274
Chris Esfeller 1
6 ADAM P. HARRINGTON,
7 Plaintiff(s),
8 vs.
9 BARRY GRAHAM OFFSHORE SERVICES,
10 LLC, et al.,
11 Defendant(s).
12
13
14
15 DEPOSITION OF
16 CHRIS ESFELLER
17
18
19
20
EXHIBIT N
DOCUMENT 275
ADAM P. HARRINGTON, *
Plaintiff, *
v. * CV-2018-903102
Please take notice that Hedge Copeland, P.C., attorney for Plaintiff, will take the
video deposition of the deponent named above at the time, date and location indicated
above, VIA ZOOM, upon oral examination pursuant to the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure before an officer duly authorized to administer oaths and swear witnesses. The
DOCUMENT 275
oral examination will continue from day to day until completed, and you are invited to
OF COUNSEL:
2
DOCUMENT 275
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 8th of June, 2021, a copy of the above and foregoing
document was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the E-File system, which
will send notification of such filing to the following:
John Lieb
McDowell Knight Roedder & Sledge
RSA Battle House Tower
11 North Water St. Suite 13290
P.O. Box 350
Mobile, AL 36601
3
DOCUMENT 276
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT O
DOCUMENT 276
ADAM P. HARRINGTON, *
Plaintiff, *
v. * CV-2018-903102
Please take notice that Hedge Copeland, P.C., attorney for Plaintiff, will take the
video deposition of the deponent named above at the time, date and location indicated
above, upon oral examination pursuant to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure before an
officer duly authorized to administer oaths and swear witnesses. The oral examination will
continue from day to day until completed, and you are invited to attend and examine the
deponent.
DOCUMENT 276
OF COUNSEL:
2
DOCUMENT 276
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 8th of June, 2021, a copy of the above and foregoing
document was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the E-File system, which
will send notification of such filing to the following:
John Lieb
McDowell Knight Roedder & Sledge
RSA Battle House Tower
11 North Water St. Suite 13290
P.O. Box 350
Mobile, AL 36601
3
DOCUMENT 277
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT P
DOCUMENT 277
ADAM P. HARRINGTON, *
Plaintiff, *
v. * CV-2018-903102
Please take notice that at the time, date and location indicated above, pursuant
to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 30(b)(5) and (6), Plaintiff will take the
video deposition of Exxon Mobil Corporation upon oral examination before an officer
authorized to administer oaths. The oral examination will continue from day to day until
completed, and you are invited to attend and examine the deponent.
DOCUMENT 277
Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5) and (6) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, the
as it relates to the Mobile Bay assets at the time of the incident made the basis of this
suit.
Exxon and Otto Candies and/or P&E as it relates to transporting third party contractors
3. Testimony and documents regarding any and all investigations into the
Exxon as to rope transfers, including any analysis of the dangers involved in swing rope
transfers.
transferring personnel from boats to your platforms in light of the weather conditions
rope training.
determine whether Mr. Harrington was sufficiently trained in swing rope transfers.
Safety Works regarding Complete Safety Works becoming an Exxon approved vendor
12. Testimony and documents regarding any efforts taken on your part to
ensure that Complete Safety Works was properly training individuals such as Mr.
like Mr. Harrington before being allowed to board one of your platforms. This is both
prior to and after the incident made the basis of this suit.
and Complete Safety Works concerning Complete Safety Works conducting Swing
said assessments.
16. Testimony and documents regarding the use of wristbands for those
such protocols;
e. Your policies regarding advising the boat captain of the identity of those
17. Testimony and documents regarding the reasons for the termination of
the business relationship between Exxon and P&E as described in P&E’s 30(b)(6)
deposition.
18. Testimony and documents that address any coordination between Exxon
and P&E regarding protocols to be followed to ensure that third party contractors such
as Mr. Harrington are safely transported to and from a crewboat and an Exxon platform.
Further, note that pursuant to Rule 30 (b)(6), said corporation “shall desig nate
DOCUMENT 277
one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons who consent to
testify on its behalf,” and “the persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or
Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5), Plaintiff requests that, at the time and place of the
taking of said deposition, said corporation produce for inspection and copying THE
OF COUNSEL:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 8 th of June, 2021, a copy of the above and
foregoing document was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the E-File
system, which will send notification of such filing to the following:
John Lieb
McDowell Knight Roedder & Sledge
RSA Battle House Tower
11 North Water St. Suite 13290
P.O. Box 350
Mobile, AL 36601
EXHIBIT Q
DOCUMENT 278
Kim Munksgaard 1
7 ADAM P. HARRINGTON,
8 Plaintiff,
9 v.
10 BARRY GRAHAM OFFSHORE SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
11 Defendants.
12
13
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 278
Kim Munksgaard 28
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 278
Kim Munksgaard 36
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 278
Kim Munksgaard 37
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 278
Kim Munksgaard 201
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 278
Kim Munksgaard 202
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 278
Kim Munksgaard 203
1 of that?
2 MR. SEWELL: We do. I don't think
3 it's been asked for in discovery yet. But we
4 can probably discuss about how to get that to
5 you after this.
6 MR. HEDGE: A job safety analysis
7 would cover that.
8 A. No. That's not a --
9 MR. SEWELL: We would --
10 A. -- job safety analysis. This is a
11 risk assessment. It's different.
12 Q. (By Mr. Hedge:) There ain't no
13 difference between the two, I can assure you.
14 A. At ExxonMobil, a job safety analysis
15 is a very specific form and tool. It's not a
16 risk assessment. A risk assessment is much
17 more detailed and it involves a lot more
18 probability analysis. Those are not
19 interchangeable terms.
20 Q. Okay. Well, it sounds to me like
21 Exxon is playing games with me, which is fine.
22 Okay. We will address that down the road
23 because we may have to take about six
www.prolegalreporting.com 251.433.2678
DOCUMENT 279
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT R
DOCUMENT 279
This date no longer works. I have a trial set starMng September 20 jury term, with docket set Monday. Will let
you know if that case is going and if so, will need to work around it.
Best Regards,
Robert Hedge
Hedge Copeland, P.C.
1206 Dauphin Street
Mobile, Alabama 36604
251-432-8844 (Office)
(Cell)
Good morning,
I have found space for Ms. Criswell’s deposiMon at Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., at 350 W. Cedar Street,
Suite 100, Pensacola, FL, 32502. I will have to drive down the morning of Sept. 9, so if we can start in the
adernoon I would appreciate it.
Thanks,
Jay
Robert J. Sewell
Attorney
Page 1 of 4
DOCUMENT 279
205-581-0700 main
The Clark Building
205-581-0731 direct
400 20th Street North
205‑581‑0799 fax
Birmingham, AL 35203
[email protected]
Confidentiality Notice
lightfootlaw.com
v2.01012020
Robert J. Sewell
Attorney
205-581-0700 main
The Clark Building
205-581-0731 direct
400 20th Street North
205‑581‑0799 fax
Birmingham, AL 35203
[email protected]
Confidentiality Notice
lightfootlaw.com
v2.01012020
Page 2 of 4
DOCUMENT 279
I am available September 9.
Best Regards,
Robert Hedge
Hedge Copeland, P.C.
1206 Dauphin Street
Mobile, Alabama 36604
251-432-8844 (Office)
(Cell)
Good morning,
Robert has asked to depose Tammie Criswell. She has availability September 7–9. She currently lives in the
Pensacola area, and she needs to stay in that area because she is the primary caregiver for her father. Once
we have a date in place, we’ll be happy to find a locaMon for the Pensacola area for the deposiMon. Please let
us know what works for you.
Regards,
Jay
Robert J. Sewell
Attorney
Page 3 of 4
DOCUMENT 279
205-581-0700 main
The Clark Building
205-581-0731 direct
400 20th Street North
205‑581‑0799 fax
Birmingham, AL 35203
[email protected]
Confidentiality Notice
lightfootlaw.com
v2.01012020
Page 4 of 4
DOCUMENT 280
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT S
DOCUMENT 280
Robert, I will want a call, but in the meanOme, can you tell me which porOons of our recent producOon you
contend was called for by which prior RFP or prior depo noOce? I see the argument on a couple of the docs,
but I’m having trouble matching up much of what we recently produced with a previous discovery request
and response. Thanks.
M. Christian King
Attorney
205-581-0700 ma n
The C ark Bu d ng
205-581-0715 d rect
400 20th Street North
205‑581‑0799 fax
B rm ngham, AL 35203
ck ng@ ghtfoot aw.com
lightfootlaw.com
Not a problem – always willing to work with other lawyers on discovery issues.
I simply need Exxon to agree to tender every Exxon witness we have already deposed, here in Mobile; agreed
to allow us to re-depose any non-Exxon individuals that we have already taken, e.g., Complete Safety Works,
Scoc Skelton, P&E witnesses (which will require you to work that issue out with P&E, Skelton, and Complete
Safety’s counsel); reimburse my firm for all the Ome necessary to re-take all these deposiOons; and produce
all the documents that we have requested be produced.
Page 1 of 3
DOCUMENT 280
Exxon will also need to tender a witness who actually can tesOfy to my 30(b)(6) categories. In other words,
we will have to start over with discovery, but this Ome with all documents that PlainOff requested in our
RFP/30(b)(5) in hand.
If you want to discuss ajer talking with your client, feel free to call.
Best Regards,
Robert Hedge
Hedge Copeland, P.C.
1206 Dauphin Street
Mobile, Alabama 36604
251-432-8844 (Office)
Robert, I’d like to try to work out any discovery differences if we can. Are you available for a call at 10:30 or
ajer tomorrow? If not, what do you look like on Tuesday? I’m copying Richard in case he wants to be on the
call.
M. Christian King
Attorney
205-581-0700 ma n
The C ark Bu d ng
205-581-0715 d rect
400 20th Street North
205‑581‑0799 fax
B rm ngham, AL 35203
ck ng@ ghtfoot aw.com
lightfootlaw.com
Page 2 of 3
DOCUMENT 281
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT T
DOCUMENT 282
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT U
DOCUMENT 282
Robert Sewell
Robert,
We understand your posiKon regarding Greg Hrinsin’s deposiKon, and we will agree to make him available for
a deposiKon in his individual capacity to answer relevant quesKons as to topics within his personal knowledge
and to which he did not address in his prior deposiKon. This should allow you to ask remaining quesKons
without expending addiKonal Kme or requiring us to start at “square one.” A]er reviewing the transcript, I
think you were able to ask, and I allowed Mr. Hrinsin to answer, a good deal regarding his personal knowledge
of the invesKgaKon of Mr. Harrington’s injury and even of prior incidents. I will be in touch with the client
about potenKal dates. I believe Mr. Hrinsin is currently located in Houston, so we ask that you consider a
Zoom deposiKon.
As for the referenced risk assessment, we believe it is responsive to requests included in your pending Rule
30(b)(5) & (6) deposiKon noKce. While we disagree with your posiKon that such materials would be
responsive to Request for ProducKon No. 13, or any other requests for producKon outside of the deposiKon
noKces, we intend to produce the document with the risk assessment, and others, this week in preparaKon
for next week’s deposiKon. Now, and throughout this case, absent an appropriately lodged
objecKon, ExxonMobil has produced and will conKnue to produce responsive, non-privileged documents that
is has located in its possession, custody, or control a]er expending reasonably diligent efforts to locate the
materials.
If you have any further quesKons or concerns, please feel free to call me or Chris to discuss.
Jay
Robert J. Sewell
Attorney
205-581-0700 ma n
The C ark Bu d ng
205-581-0731 d rect
400 20th Street North
205‑581‑0799 fax
B rm ngham, AL 35203
jsewe @ ghtfoot aw.com
lightfootlaw.com
Page 1 of 26
DOCUMENT 282
Jay –
We cannot agree that the 30b6 deposiKon in which Hrinsin tesKfied may also serve as his personal
deposiKon. I tried to work that out during the 30b6 deposiKon, but you insisted on objecKng. Please let me
know when he will be available here in Mobile.
As I told you during the deposiKon, the law allows me to go beyond the scope of the 30(b)(6) areas of inquiry,
and obtain informaKon that is within the knowledge of the witness, (King v. Pral& Whitney, 161 F.R.D 475,
476 (S.D. Fla. 1995)), so as to avoid having to re-noKce the witness individually – absent some compelling
reason. In this case, Hrinsin has knowledge regarding his invesKgaKon into this incident, and I am enKtled to
discover this informaKon, parKcularly now a]er Ms. Munksgaard’s tesKmony.
Finally, we learned last week that Exxon created a Risk Assessment document post-accident. PlainKff’s RFP
number 13 sought producKon of “All correspondence, e-mails or memoranda of all communicaKons between
or among the Defendants, other than direct communicaKons with their alorneys, relaKng in any way to the
incident resulKng in PlainKff’s injuries on February 15, 2018.” Clearly, this Risk Assessment is related to the
PlainKff’s incident, and is a communicaKon between or among the Defendants. Do I need to file a moKon to
compel the producKon?
I also want Exxon to confirm, in wriKng, that no other documents exist that may be responsive to RFP number
13, that have not already been produced, in light of Exxon’s withholding of the Risk Assessment.
Best Regards,
Robert Hedge
Hedge Copeland, P.C.
1206 Dauphin Street
Mobile, Alabama 36604
251-432-8844 (Office)
Page 2 of 26
DOCUMENT 283
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
8/31/2021 4:49 PM
02-CV-2018-903102.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
JOJO SCHWARZAUER, CLERK
EXHIBIT V
DOCUMENT 283
Subject: RE: Harrington v. ExxonMobil Corpora5on - Documents for Corporate Representa5ve Deposi5on
Date: Monday, June 28, 2021 at 4:17:12 PM Central Daylight Time
From: Robert Hedge
To: Robert J. Sewell, 'Richard Fuquay (rwf@fuquaylawfirm.com)', Jon M. Lieb, Brian McCarthy
CC: M. Chris5an King, Mila Hubbard, Jennifer Wright, Ashley Odom
Best Regards,
Robert Hedge
Hedge Copeland, P.C.
1206 Dauphin Street
Mobile, Alabama 36604
251-432-8844 (Office)
Robert J. Sewell
Attorney
205-581-0700 ma n
The C ark Bu d ng
205-581-0731 d rect
400 20th Street North
205‑581‑0799 fax
B rm ngham, AL 35203
jsewe @ ghtfoot aw.com
lightfootlaw.com
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