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Module in Introduction To Comparative Politics

This Learning Material includes an introduction to the study of governmental and non-governmental political processes in selected industrialized and developing societies. This course aims to provide students with an understanding of the key concepts in comparative politics in terms of the political system, political institutions, the state, and government. It also includes approaches in comparing systems, states, and governments.
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100% found this document useful (4 votes)
8K views117 pages

Module in Introduction To Comparative Politics

This Learning Material includes an introduction to the study of governmental and non-governmental political processes in selected industrialized and developing societies. This course aims to provide students with an understanding of the key concepts in comparative politics in terms of the political system, political institutions, the state, and government. It also includes approaches in comparing systems, states, and governments.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Introduction to

Comparative Politics
Course Code: PS 5

SY 2021-2022

BACHELOR OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE


CATANDUANES STATE UNIVERSITY
Virac, Catanduanes

BRIEF OVERVIEW

This Learning Material includes an introduction to the study of governmental and non-
governmental political processes in selected industrialized and developing societies. This course
aims to provide students with an understanding of the key concepts in comparative politics in terms
of the political system, political institutions, the state, and government. It also includes approaches
in comparing systems, states, and governments.

This Self-Learning Material is designed for use as a guide for self-learning by the student
outside of the usual classroom setting. The student is therefore expected to achieve the learning
outcomes by him/herself, away from school, and with minimal intervention by the teacher.

Each student will be provided with a digital folder containing all the documents pertinent to
the course. The student is strictly prohibited to share any of such documents with anybody. Doing
so will be treated as a disciplinary case and the perpetrator will have to face sanctions.

DISCLAIMER: This learning material is used in compliance with the flexible teaching-
learning approach espoused by CHED in response to the pandemic that has globally affected
educational institutions. Authors and publishers of the contents are well acknowledged. As such
the college and its faculty do not claim ownership of all sourced information. This learning material
will solely be used for instructional purposes not for commercialization.

Rommel R. Regala, Ph.D.


CatSU College of Arts and Sciences

GUIDELINES IN STUDYING WITH THE LEARNING MATERIAL

1. Start by taking note of the objectives. Then at the end of each lesson, check if you have
fulfilled all the objectives.

2. Be sure to read first the required reading/s for each lesson before proceeding to the
summary provided in the “Content” part of the learning material. Remember, what is in the
lesson is only a summary which is not enough to gain an adequate understanding of the
topic/s covered in the lesson. Also, it will be most advantageous for the student to read
more materials over and above what is required here. You can search for them on the
internet and at the CSU Library.

3. Have a separate notebook. Make your notes as you read through the reading materials
and summary provided here. Transferring the ideas, organizing and rendering them in your
own words and understanding, help you to absorb and internalize the content.

4. Have a dictionary or thesaurus handy to be able to check out the meaning of words that
are not very familiar to you.

5. Do the self-assessment activity to end your work for each particular lesson.

6. Answers to your self-assessment questions must be written in digital word documents by


clusters and submitted either by email or in printed hard copies to your teacher. Clustering
and deadlines will be posted on Google Classroom.

7. Be sure to write your name on your submission. Submit on or before the deadline. Late
submission will not be accepted.

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CATANDUANES STATE UNIVERSITY
Virac, Catanduanes

8. Compose your answers to the self-assessment questions in your own words. Do not copy
any portion/s of the learning materials from any source (book or the internet). DO NOT
COPY FROM YOUR CLASSMATE, in part or in full.

Both the original and the copied


papers will be given “0” mark.

It is advised therefore that a student should not show his/her self-assessment activity paper
to any classmate to prevent copying.

9. The rubrics below will be used in assessing your answers to the self-assessment questions
that you will be submitted.

EXCELLENT – 10 Points (1.0)


• Concise and direct to the point
• Precise explanation of concepts and exact illustrations

VERY SATISFACTORY – 8 Points (1.5-1.1)


• Concise and direct to the point
• Explanation and illustrations are quite adequate

SATISFACTORY – 6 Points (2.0-1.6)


• Moderately concise
• Explanation and illustrations are moderately adequate

LESS SATISFACTORY – 4 Points (2.5-2.1)


• Fairly concise
• Explanation and illustrations are fairly adequate

POOR – 2 Points (3.0-2.6)


• Vague but intelligible
• Explanation and illustrations are minimally adequate

VERY POOR – 0 Point (5.0)


• Answers are thoroughly out of range, or no answer at all

10. There will be written midterm and final examinations. You have to come to school for the
examinations. Examination will be on the following schedules:

Midterm Examination - _________________________________


Final Examination - _________________________________

11. We will create a group chat on Messenger. This will be used only for clarifications regarding
lessons/topics in the course. No submissions will be accepted on group chat/messenger.
Socializing and raising unrelated issues should be minimized.

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CATANDUANES STATE UNIVERSITY
Virac, Catanduanes

LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this handout, you should be able to:

1. Understand what is meant by comparative politics and be familiar with the comparative
method.
2. Be familiar with the main debates and issues in the comparative study of political
institutions and processes.
3. Classify political systems according to different criteria.
4. Demonstrate a basic understanding of how executive, legislative and judicial
institutions are structured.
5. Demonstrate a basic understanding of how citizens behave politically concerning such
institutions.
6. Demonstrate a basic understanding of the intermediate actors that link citizens and
government (such as political parties, interest groups, and the media).
7. Be familiar with some of the major data sources in the sub-field of comparative politics
and with how they can be used to explore key questions addressed by the sub-field.

COURSE CONTENT

Desired Learning Course Content/


Outcomes Subject Matter

A. At the end of the unit, the students shall A. Introduction: What is Comparative
be able to: Politics?

1. Provide clear and simple answers to 1. Understanding or substance of


the question, what is comparative comparative politics
politics; illustrate the main periods of 2. The evolution of comparative politics
evolution of comparative politics; and 3. Comparative method
identify the best available
comparative methods for advancing
valid and cumulative knowledge
about politics.

B. At the end of the unit, the students shall B. The State


be able to:

1. Understand the concept, definitions, 1. Definitions of the state


and development of the state. 2. State institutions
3. Development of the modern state
4. Organization of the state

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CATANDUANES STATE UNIVERSITY
Virac, Catanduanes

Desired Learning Course Content/


Outcomes Subject Matter

C. At the end of the unit, the students shall C. Political Regimes


be able to:

1. Identify the main attributes of the 1. Definitions of different types of


most prominent types of the political political regime
regime without a claim to present an 2. Historical development and change
exhaustive list or an overall regimes
classification of such types. 3. Typologies of democracy and
authoritarian rule

D. At the end of the unit, the students shall D. Legislature


be able to:

1. Identify the most important institutions 1. Definition of legislature


in the modern state, the Legislature; 2. The role of the legislature
distinguish the main role of the 3. Control and oversight
legislatures; and illustrate its 4. Structures of legislature
structures. 5. Number, quality, and consistency of
members
6. Legislature’s power

E. At the end of the unit, the students shall E. The Executive


be able to:

1. Acknowledge that within the 1. Definition of the executive


institutional structure of modern 2. Evolution of the separation of
states/political systems the executive powers and contemporary types of
branch of government occupies a government
central position to be perceived 3. Government functions and autonomy
synonymously with ‘the government’ of action
or ‘the state’ itself. 4. The political capacity and
effectiveness of government
5. Internal composition and decision-
making of government: theoretical
models

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CATANDUANES STATE UNIVERSITY
Virac, Catanduanes

Desired Learning Course Content/


Outcomes Subject Matter

F. At the end of the unit, the students shall F. Political Participation and Elections
be able to:

1. Argued that the government works at 1. Understanding political participation


its best when the masses are 2. Modes and factors of political
allowed to participate as: voting in participation
elections, helping a political 3. Elections and electoral systems
campaign, giving money to a
candidate or cause, writing to or
calling officials, petitioning,
boycotting, demonstrating, and
working with other people on issues.

G. At the end of the unit, the students shall G. Political Parties and Party Systems
be able to:

1. Understand that political parties and 1. Understanding political parties


multiparty systems are constituent 2. Origins and organization of political
elements of the contemporary parties
representative democracy wherein it 3. Definition, structure, and
plays an exclusive role as the change of party systems
intermediate structures between
citizens and governmental
institutions in the internal political
environment of all contemporary
democracies.

H. At the end of the unit, the students shall H. Public Policy


be able to:
1. Historical changes in the policy
1. Understand that the major shifts in the agenda of the Western state
policy agenda of Western states 2. Conceptual models of policy-making
reflect evolving conceptions of the 3. The cycle of policy-making
state itself yet which, like other
aspects of policy analysis, remain
understated in descriptions of
government institutions.

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CATANDUANES STATE UNIVERSITY
Virac, Catanduanes

LESSON 1

AN INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS COMPARATIVE POLITICS?

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this lesson, the student must be able to:

1. Provide clear and simple answers to the question, what is comparative politics.
2. Illustrate the main periods of evolution of comparative politics.
3. Identify the best available comparative methods for advancing valid and cumulative knowledge
about politics.

MAIN REFERENCE

Krupavicius, A. et al. 2013. Introduction to Comparative Politics: Didactical Guidelines.


Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

CONTENT

• Understanding or substance of comparative politics


• The evolution of comparative politics
• Comparative method

Comparative politics is an integral and significant subdiscipline, and one of the three major
fields of political science, alongside political theory and international relations. Comparative politics,
as a field of study, provides us with a ready array of conceptual and analytical tools that we can
use to address and answer a wide range of questions about the social world (Lim, 2010: 2).

Understanding or substance of comparative politics

Many textbooks on comparative politics provide clear and simple answers to the question,
what is comparative politics? The goal of political science is to promote the comparison of different
political entities, and comparative politics is the study of politics within states (Fabbrini, Molutsi,
2011). As a subject of study, comparative politics focuses on understanding and explaining political
phenomena that take place within a state, society, country, or political system. In other words,
comparative politics focuses on internal political structures (like parliaments and executives), actors
(voters, parties, interest groups), processes (policymaking, communication, political culture), and
analyzing them empirically by defining, describing, explaining, and predicting their variety
(similarities and differences) across political systems – be they national political systems, regional,
municipal, or even supra-national political systems (Caramani, 2011: 2).

As Sodaro noted, it is ‘scientific’ when it engages in the following operations: definition,


description, explanation, prediction, and prescription. This might be done through the intensive
analyses of one or a few cases as well as extensive analysis of many cases and can be either
synchronic or diachronic. Comparative politics uses both qualitative and quantitative data and
research methods (Sodaro, 2011: 1).

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CATANDUANES STATE UNIVERSITY
Virac, Catanduanes

Figure 1. One view of political science

Source: Clark et al, 2009: 5

What is studying comparative politics? It is focused first of all on each country’s internal
politics, or how governments are structured, i.e., what are governing institutions and how their
function; how governments interact with their population and what decisions are made; how political
leaders and population behave in politics and how decisions are made; how and who makes or
influences decisions or policy orientations, leadership, and other attributes of political decisions are
vital components of comparative politics.

Famous American political scientist Robert Dahl was thinking that the essence of
comparative politics is a study of power distribution in decision-making situations. On the other
hand, Jean Blondel noted that a primary object of comparative politics is public policy or outcomes
of political action.

Why do we need to study comparative politics? According to Sodaro (2008: 28–29), the
main purposes of studying comparative politics are as follows:

– widen our understanding of politics in other countries;

– increase our appreciation of the advantages and disadvantages of our political system
and to enable us to learn from other countries;

– develop a more sophisticated understanding of politics in general e. g., the


relationships between governments and people, and other concepts and processes;

– help us understand the linkages between domestic and international affairs;

– help us see the relationship between politics and such fields as science and
technology, the environment, public health, law, business, religion, ethnicity, and
culture;

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Virac, Catanduanes

Box 1. What is comparative politics?

Traditionally, the field of comparative politics has been characterized


by many related, but distinct, endeavors. An influential comparative politics
textbook by Joseph LaPalombara (1974) is titled Politics Within Nations.
LaPalombara’s title distinguishes comparative politics from international
politics, which Hans Morgenthau (1948) famously calls Politics Among
Nations. This definition of comparative politics, with its complementary
definition of international politics, has one of the desirable features of all good
scientific typologies in that it is logically exhaustive. By defining comparative
and international politics in this way, these scholars have exhausted the logical
possibilities involved in the study of politics – political phenomena occur either
within countries or between countries.

Still, all good scientific typologies should also be mutually exclusive.


Whereas logical exhaustion implies that we have a place to categorize every
entity that is observed, mutual exclusivity requires that it not be possible to
assign any single case to more than one category. Unfortunately, the typology
just presented does not satisfy mutual exclusivity. A quick glance at today’s
newspapers clearly reveals that many contemporary political issues contain
healthy doses of both ‘within country’ and ‘between country’ factors. As a
consequence, the line between comparative and international politics is often
blurred. For example, because many violent anti-state movements receive
support from abroad, it is hard to categorize the study of revolutions, terrorism,
and civil war as being solely in the domain of either comparative or
international politics.

Nonetheless, it is possible to retain the basic insights of LaPalombara


and Morgenthau by simply saying that comparative politics is the study of
political phenomena that are predominantly ‘within country’ relationships and
that international politics is the study of political phenomena that are
predominantly ‘between countries’ relationships.

Source: Clark et al, 2009: 5

– enable us to become more informed citizens: form our own political opinions,
participate in political life, evaluate the actions and proposals of political leaders, and
make our own political decisions and electoral choices; and

– sharpen our critical thinking skills by applying scientific logic and coherent
argumentation to our understanding of political phenomena.

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CATANDUANES STATE UNIVERSITY
Virac, Catanduanes

Box 2. A Few definitions of comparative politics

‘Comparative politics involves the systematic study and comparison of


the world’s political systems. It seeks to explain differences between as well as
similarities among countries. In contrast to journalistic reporting on a single
country, comparative politics is particularly interested in exploring patterns,
processes, and regularities among political systems’ (Wiarda 2000, p. 7).

‘Comparative politics involves both a subject of study – foreign countries


– and a method of study – comparison’ (Wilson 1996, p. 4).

‘What is comparative politics? It is two things, first a world, second a


discipline. As a ‘world,’ comparative politics encompasses political behavior and
institutions in all parts of the earth. The ‘discipline’ of comparative politics is a
field of study that desperately tries to keep up with, to encompass, to understand,
to explain, and perhaps to influence the fascinating and often riotous world of
comparative politics’ (Lane 1997, p. 2).

‘Comparative politics involves no more and no less than a comparative


study of politics – a search for similarities and differences between and among
political phenomena, including political institutions (such as legislatures, political
parties, or political interest groups), political behavior (such as voting,
demonstrating, or reading political pamphlets), or political ideas (such as
liberalism, conservatism, or Marxism). Everything that politics studies,
comparative politics studies; the latter just undertakes the study with an explicit
comparative methodology in mind’ (Mahler 2000, p. 3).

Van Biezen, Caramani (2006) we understand comparative politics as


defined by a combination of substance (the study of countries and their political
systems, actors and processes) and method (identifying and ex- plaining
differences and similarities between cases following established rules and
standards of comparative analysis and using concepts that are applicable in
more than one case or country.

Source: Lim, 2010:10

The evolution of comparative politics

Edward Freeman in one of the first books in the field of comparative politics noted that ‘the
establishment of Comparative Method of study has been the greatest intellectual achievement of
our time’ (Freeman 1896: 1). However, the roots of comparative political analysis are found in
Ancient Greece as the first comparative studies begin with Aristotle (384–322 B. C. E), who studied
different constitutions of Greek city-states.

As Klaus von Beyme recently noted, Machiavelli in the pre-mod- ern era came closest to a
modern social science approach. Moreover, great social theorists made an invaluable impact on
the development of contemporary comparative politics. For instance, Machiavelli (1469–1527)
sought to compare and evaluate the merits of different forms of rule. Thomas Hobbes (1632–1704)
developed the idea of a ‘social contract’ and Karl Marx (1818–1883) developed the theory of
economic and political development and revolutionary change.

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Virac, Catanduanes

However, comparative politics was established as an academic discipline only in the very
late 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Still, before the 1950s comparative politics was
mostly normative and descriptive or dominated by the so-called traditional approach and being at
the pre-modern phase of its development.

In 1955 Roy Macridis launched a diatribe against traditional comparative politics. He


accused the discipline of being formal-legalistic because of the studying of formal institutions over
non-formal political processes, descriptive rather than analytic, case study-orientated rather than
genuinely comparative, and Eurocentric with its emphasis on Great Britain, France, Germany, and
the Soviet Union.

‘Scientific’ comparative politics begins mainly with the rise of behaviorism in social
sciences. Behavioralism in comparative poli- tics, as in other fields of political science, stood for
two distinct ideas. One concerned the proper subject matter of comparative politics. In this regard,
behavioralists reacted against a definition of the field that restricted its scope to the formal
institutions of government and sought to include a range of informal procedures and behaviors –
related to interest groups, political parties, mass communication, political culture, and political
socialization – that were seen as key to the functioning of the political system. A second key idea
was the need for a scientific approach to theory and methods. Behavioralists were opposed to what
they saw as vague, rarefied theory and atheoretical empirics, and argued for systematic theory and
empirical testing. The behavioral era in comparative politics is sometimes described as a modern
period of its evolution.

Table 1. Main periods of evolution of comparative politics

Source: adapted from Beyme, 2008: 24–32

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Virac, Catanduanes

Post-modernism in comparative politics meant first of all domination of new historical


institutionalism in a style of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim’s early system approach. Moreover,
economic theories and cultural approaches appeared in comparative research as well. Klaus von
Beyme noted that ‘the evolution of comparative politics was not a self-steering development, but
one that proved to be deeply influenced by political events’ (Beyme 2008: 35) such as de-
colonization, transition to democracy, and so on.

Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder traced key developments in the field of comparative
politics during the twentieth century in their book Passion, Craft, and Method of Comparative
Politics. They selected 15 of the most influential contributors to the field in the second half of the
20th century (see Table 2).

Table 2. The most influential researchers of comparative politics in the second half of the
20th century

Howard J. Wiarda once noted that comparative politics is the queen of the [political science]
discipline. Indeed, if we were to make an alternative list of the most important scholars from the
late 20th century until the beginning of the 21st century and looking exclusively at the recipients of
the Johan Skytte Prize in political science since 1995 (this award is given to the scholars who have
made the most valuable contribution to political science), it is obvious that most awardees belonged
to the field of comparative politics.

Moreover, the only recipient from political science of the Nobel Prize is Elinor Ostrom, who
might well be identified with comparative politics. All this shows the huge importance of comparative
politics in the discipline of political science.

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CATANDUANES STATE UNIVERSITY
Virac, Catanduanes

Table 3. Recipients of the Johan Skytte Prize in political science

CP = comparative politics; IR = international relations; PT = political theory.



Comparative method

In general, the comparative method is the oldest and most popular meth- od of acquiring
knowledge. Ph. Schmitter observed that comparison is an analytical method – perhaps, the best
available one for advancing valid and cumulative knowledge about politics (Schmitter 2006: 1).

The foundations of the comparative method were laid down in the mid-19th century by
John Stuart Mill, who described several methods for finding causal factors. In the case of Mill’s
method of agreement, one needs to look for events that occur whenever the phenomenon be- ing
studied occurs. The single event that is found to be common to all occurrences of the phenomenon
is said to be the cause. Mill’s method of difference asks to see if changes in a phenomenon occur
whenever a particular event changes. The single event that is found to change when differences
occur in the phenomenon is said to be the cause.

Arend Lijphart was among the first scholars who started a discussion on the comparative
method within political science. In his famous article Comparative Politics and the Comparative
Method, he described the comparative method as one of the basic methods, the others being: the
experimental, statistical, and case study methods of establishing general empirical propositions. It
is, in the first place, a method, not just a convenient term vaguely symbolizing the focus of one’s
research interests. Nor is it a special set of substantive concerns in the sense of Shmuel N.
Eisenstadt’s definition of the comparative approach in social research; he states that the term does
not ‘properly designate a specific method…but rather a special focus on cross-societal, institutional,
or macro-societal aspects of societies and social analysis’ (quoted from Lijphart 1971: 682).

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Virac, Catanduanes

As Charles Ragin points out, comparative researchers examine patterns of similarities and
differences across a moderate number of cases. The typical comparative study has anywhere from
a handful to fifty or more cases. The number of cases is limited because one of the concerns of
comparative research is to establish familiarity with each case included in a study. According to
Ragin there are three main goals of comparative research: 1) exploring diversity, 2) interpreting
cultural or historical significance, and 3) advancing theory.

Todd Landman noted that there are four main reasons for com- parison, including
contextual description, classification, and ‘typologizing’, hypothesis-testing, and theory-building and
prediction.

Description and classification are the building blocks of comparative politics. Classification
simplifies descriptions of the important objects of comparative inquiry. A good classification should
have well-defined categories into which empirical evidence can be organized. Categories that make
up a classification scheme can be derived inductively from careful consideration of available
evidence or through a process of deduction in which ideal types are generated (Landman 2008: 7).

The most famous effort at classification is found in Aristotle’s Politics, in which he


establishes six types of rule. Based on the com- bination of their form of rule (good or corrupt) and
the number of those who rule (one, few, or many), Aristotle derived the following six forms:
monarchy, aristocracy, polity, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy (Landman 2008: 7).

Figure 2. Aristotle’s classification forms of governance

Hypothesis-testing is the second step in a comparative analysis. Once things have been
described and classified, the comparative scholar can move on to search for those factors that may
help explain what has been described and classified. Since the 1950s, political scientists have
increasingly sought to use comparative methods to help build more complete theories of politics.
Comparison of countries allows rival explanations to be ruled out and hypotheses derived from
certain theoretical perspectives to be tested through examining cross-national similarities and
differences (Landman 2008: 6).

Prediction is the final and most difficult objective of the comparative study as it is a logical
extension of hypothesis-testing to make predictions about outcomes in other countries based on
the generalizations from the initial comparison or to make claims about future political outcomes.
Prediction in comparative politics tends to be made in probabilistic terms, such as ‘countries with
systems of proportional representation are more likely to have multiple political parties’ (Landman
2008: 10).
There are five options of comparative study (see Figure 3): 1) The single case study (either
a country, an event, or systemic feature); 2) The single case study over time (i.e. a historical study
or time series analysis); 3) Two or more cases at a few time intervals (i.e. closed universe of
discourse); 4) All cases that are relevant regarding the Re- search Question under review; 5) All
relevant cases across time and space (pooled time series analysis).

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Virac, Catanduanes

Figure 3. Options of comparative study

Contemporary comparative politics has tended to focus on variables. The antiquated


version tried to explain the behavior of whole cases – often one of them at a time. The usual
approach has been to choose a problem, select some variable(s) from an opposite theory to explain
it, decide upon a universe of relevant cases, fasten upon some subset of them to control for other
potentially relevant variables, and go searching for ‘significant’ associations (Schmitter 2006: 30).
With the comparative method, political scientists should be equipping themselves to conceptualize,
measure, and understand the great in- crease in the complexity of relations of power, influence,
and authority in the world that surrounds them (Schmitter 2006: 39).

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. What is comparative politics?


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

2. Who are the main contributors to contemporary comparative politics?


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

3. Explain the difference between hypothesis-testing and prediction.


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

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FURTHER READINGS

Caramani, D. (2011) Comparative Politics. 2nd (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Hague, R. &Harrop, M. (2004) Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction. 6th (ed.).
Basingstoke, New York: Pal- grave Macmillan.

Ragin, Ch. (1987) The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative
Strategies. Berkeley: California University Press.

The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

REFERENCES

Beyme von, K. (2011) The Evolution of Comparative Politics. // Caramani, D. Comparative


Politics. 2nd (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, p. 23–36.

Caramani, D. (2011) Comparative Politics. 2nd (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Clark, W.R., Golder, M., Golder S.N. (2009) Principles of Comparative Politics. Washington, D.
C.: CQ Press.

Fabbrini, S. & Molutsi P. (2011). Comparative Politics. // Badie, B., Berg-Schlosser, D., Morlino, L.
International Encyclopedia of Political Science. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, p. 342–360.

Freeman, E. (1896) Comparative Politics. London, New York: Macmillan. Reference Online. Web.
30 Jan. 2012: http://archive.org/

Hague, R. et al. 2016. Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, 10th Edition.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Landman, T. (2008) Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, London: Routledge.

Lijphart, A. (1971) Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method - The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, p. 682–693. Lim, T. (2010). Doing Comparative Politics:
An Introduction to Approaches and Issues. 2nd (ed.). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Macridis, R. C. (1955) A Survey of the Field of Comparative Government. // The Study of
Comparative Government. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Newton, K. & van Deth, J. (2010) Foundations of Comparative Poli- tics: Democracies of the
Modern World. 2nd (ed.). New York: Cam- bridge University Press.

Schmitter, P. (2006) Nature and Future of Comparative Politics. Reference Online. 30 Jan. 2012:

Sodaro, M. J. (2008) Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction. 3 rd (ed.). New York [etc.]:
McGraw-Hill.

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LESSON 2

THE STATE

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this lesson, the student must be able to:

1. Understand the concept, definitions, and development of the state.

MAIN REFERENCE

Krupavicius, A. et al. 2013. Introduction to Comparative Politics: Didactical Guidelines.


Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

CONTENT

• Definitions of the state


• State institutions
• Development of the modern state
• Organization of the state

The state is the main object of most discussions of comparative politics. This chapter
addresses the concept, definitions, and development of the state. As Gianfranco Poggi notes, ‘The
comparative analysis of the arrangements under which political activity is carried out refers chiefly
to a multiplicity of independent but separate, to a greater or lesser extent autonomous, units – let
us call them polities. Polities differ among themselves in numerous, relevant respects, and entertain
with one another relations – friendly or antagonistic – which reflect those differences. These exist
against the background of considerable similarities. The most significant of these qualify the polities
making up the modern political environment, for being called states’.

The expression of the state is sometimes used for some pre-modern polities such as
ancient Egypt or imperial China, but according to Poggi, the most appropriate use of this term would
be in the context of the modern political environment, which formed in Western Eu- rope at the end
of the Middle Ages.

In the words of Hague and Harrop (2004:7), ‘the state is a unique institution, standing above
all other organizations in society. The state can legitimately use force to enforce its will and citizens
must accept its authority as long as they continue to live within its borders’.

Table 1. 1. UN member states

Source: http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml#2000

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Definitions

The state is a dominant principle of political organization in the mod- ern world (the number
of states grew from 59 to 193 over the past 60 years (see Table 1); however, there is no single
definition of this concept. According to Bob Jessop, it is not clear how we should define ‘state’– by
its legal form, coercive capacities, institutional composition, or sovereign place in the international
system. Is the state a subject, a social relation, or a construct that helps to orient political action?
The German sociologist Max Webber (1978:56) tried to distinguish characteristics of the state,
according to him:

‘The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: it possesses an
administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities
of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system
of order claims authority, not only over the member of the state, the citizens, most of whom
have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large ex- tent over all action taking place
in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis.
Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is permitted by
the state or prescribed by it.’

Michael J. Sodaro (2008:124) defines the state as a ‘totality of country’s governmental


institutions and officials, together with the laws and procedures that structure their activities.’
Sodaro agrees that ‘the most important feature of the state that distinguishes it from other entities
– such as social groups or private firms – is that the state monopolizes legal authority. In other
words, only the state possesses the legal authority to make, and coercively enforce, laws that are
binding on the population. This legal authority makes the state’s decisions ‘authoritative’’.

Hague and Harrop (2004:8) note that even though ‘state’, ‘country’, and ‘territory’ are
related concepts, they are not the same. According to them, ‘The state is a political community
formed by a territorial population which is subject to one government. A country usually refers to a
state’s territory and population, rather than its government. In international law, a state’s territory
extends to its airspace, continental shelf, and territorial waters.’

In talking about the definition we have to address the question of the purpose of the state.
Why do we have a state? What should a state do? There is no universal answer to these questions.
The de- bates about the purpose of this institution have raged for several ages. According to
Thomas Hobbes, ‘the state’s main purpose would be to leave humanity free to pursue science, art,
exploration, and other aspects of civilization without the pressures of continual fear, and danger of
violent death.’ In other words, the main purpose of the state is to guarantee security and order.
John Locke saw humans as born free and having the natural rights to life, liberty, and property, so
the main purpose of the state is to protect the possessions of its citizens as well as their rights and
freedoms. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘the chief purpose of the state is to enable the
sovereign people to express and carry out their general will. In practical terms, he believed that this
goal could be accomplished by a small elite making day-to-day decisions, as long as the citizens
exercised their supervisory authority by meeting periodically in popular assemblies.’ To Adam
Smith, ‘state’s chief purpose should be to promote private enterprise and allow the forces of the
market economy to work without excessive government interference’. In Smith’s view, ‘the state
should limit itself to providing a legal system designed to enable commerce to flow smoothly and
to undertaking large projects that are too unprofitable for private entrepreneurs to take on
themselves, such as building bridges and canals and funding public education and cultural
activities’.

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Even though there is no common understanding of what a state is, according to Gianfranco
Poggi, there are five main elements typical to any state – monopoly of legitimate violence,
territoriality, sovereignty, plurality, and relation with the population.

The monopoly of legitimate violence. Poggi (2011) notes that ‘states are in the first-
place polities where a single center of rules has established its executive entitlement to control and
employ the ultimate medium of political activity – organized violence – over a definite territory.
Individuals and bodies operating within that territory may occasionally exercise violence, but if they
do so without mandate or permission from the center of rule, the latter considers that exercise
illegitimate and seeks to suppress it’. States which cannot control and suppress illegitimate violence
in their territory are considered ‘failed states’. According to Sodaro (2008:124), such states lose
their monopoly of coercive power and are seriously challenged by domestic groups that routinely
ignore the laws. A failed state is a state that has little or no ability to govern its entire territory.’
Territoriality. One of the most significant elements of the state has to be its territory. If polity is to
qualify as a state it must not only be able to manage internal conflicts, but also defend its territory
from external threats. Relation between state and territory is an intimate one. The territory is not
simply a locale of the state’s activities (violent or other), or it’s however cherished possession.
Rather, it represents the physical aspect of the state’s own Identity, the very ground of its existence
and its historical continuity.’ (Poggi 2011)

Sovereignty. Sovereignty is one of the key elements of a state. Michael J. Sodaro


(2008:126) defines it as ‘exclusive legal authority of a government over its population and territory,
independent of external authorities’.

Box 1. 1. Types of Sovereignty

Source: Hague & Harrop 2004:8

In other words, a sovereign state rejects the rights of any external actor to impose its rules
or interfere in a state's domestic policies. As Gianfranco Poggi (2011:68) puts it a sovereign state
‘recognizes no power superior to itself. It engages in political activity on nobody’s mandate but its
own commits resources of its own, and operates under its own steam, at its own risk. It is the sole
judge of its interests and bears the sole responsibility for pursuing those interests, beginning with
its security’ However, that doesn’t mean that the state is above the law. Newton and van Deth
(2010:21) notes that ‘most states constrain their sovereign power by subjecting them to the rules
of a constitution’. There are two types of sovereignty – internal and external (see Box 1. 1).

Sovereignty was developed in Europe and as Hague and Harrop (2004:8) note, ‘beyond
Europe …the notion of sovereignty remained weaker. In the federal ‘United States’, for instance,
political authority is shared between the central and state governments, all operating under the
constitution made by ‘we, the people’ and enforced by the Supreme Court. In these circumstances,
the idea of sovereignty is diluted and so too is the concept of the state itself.’

Plurality. In the words of Poggi (2011:69), ‘the modern political environment consists in a
plurality of territorially discrete, self-empowering, self-activating, self-securing states. Each of these
presupposes the existence of all others, and each is in principle their equal since it shares with
them (and acknowledges in them) its characteristics.’

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Relation with the population. The population is an integral part of every state. According
to Poggi (2011:69), ‘the relationship between the state and its population is not a purely factual
one; the population is not perceived as a mere demographic entity but as a people. As such it
entertains a more significant, more intimate, one might say constitutive, relation with the state itself.’

If we take a more expansive concept of the state, Gianfranco Poggi suggests adding the
role of law. Law may be understood as a set of rules, commands, and prohibitions, which help to
prevent antisocial behavior and distribute material resources between social groups and
individuals. But ‘in the West, however, the law has been put to a third use in establishing polities,
deciding issues of policy, instituting public agencies and offices, activating and controlling their
operations.’ (Poggi 2011:70). In other words, the state is bound to the laws it created.

It is important to make a distinction between state and society. According to Gianfranco


Poggi (2011:71), ‘the state, in principle, is an ensemble of institutional arrangements and practices
which… address all and only the political aspects of the management of a territorially bounded
society’. The state represents itself through political activities such as legislation, jurisdiction,
military action, etc. Society, on the other hand, is not necessarily linked to political activities.
‘Individuals undertake those activities in their private capacities, pursuing values and interests of
their own, and establishing among themselves relations which are not the concern of public policy’
(Poggi 2011:71).

State institutions

Institutions are an inseparable element of the state. According to Michael J. Sodaro,


‘political outcomes – such as government decisions that determine ‘who gets what’– are often
decisively affected by a country’s institutional framework, and not simply by the direct impact of
influential social groups or nongovernmental organizations. …different outcomes may result
depending on how a country organizes its executive branch, its legislature, its judiciary, and other
institutions, and how these organs function in practice’. According to Bob Jessop, (2006:112), there
is ‘a core set of institutions with increasingly vague boundaries. From the political executive,
legislature, judiciary, army, police, and public administration, the list may extend to education, trade
unions, mass media, religion, and even family. Such lists typically fail to specify what lends these
institutions the quality of statehood’. However, Michael J. Sodaro distinguishes the five most
important governmental institutions – the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the bureaucracy,
and the military.

The Executive. The executive is a primary branch of the political system. Generally, the
head of executives – may it be prime minister or president, is on the very top in the governmental
hierarchy and is the one who shapes a state’s policies and is responsible for its outcome. It is
important to stress the difference between the head of state and head of government. The head of
state ‘is a ceremonial position that carries little or no real decision-making power’ (Sodaro
2008:129). It is a symbolic, prestigious but politically neutral post, which represents a nation’s unity
and is above political battles. The head of government ‘is usually the country’s chief political officer
and is responsible for presenting and conducting its principal policies… He or she normally
supervises the entire executive branch of the state, including its senior ministers (who together
comprise the cabinet) and their respective ministries, as well as a host of executive-level agencies
designed to propose and execute government policies.’ (Sodaro 2008:129). This distinction
between the head of government and head of state according to Hague and Harrop (2004:7) shows
that state is not the same as government – ‘state defines the political community of which
government is only the executive branch.’

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Box 1. 2. Difference between the head of state and the head of government

Source: Sodaro 2008:129

The Legislature is a very important state institution whose main function is to make laws
and represent citizens in the lawmaking process. The legislature may also monitor and investigate
executive branch activities. In parliamentary systems (such as Britain, Germany, or Italy) the
legislature elects the head of the government, therefore, he or she is accountable to the parliament.
In presidential systems (such as the US) the powers of the executive and legislative branches are
more or less even. According to Michael J. Sodaro (2008:130), ‘even authoritarian regimes often
have legislative bodies that play a certain role in the political system, though their real law-making
powers may be negligible or nonexistent.’

The Judiciary. The significance of the judiciary according to Michael J. Sodaro (2008:131)
varies from place to place.

All states have some form of legal structure, and the role of judiciary is rarely limited to such
routine tasks as adjudicating civil and criminal cases. Inevitably the system of justice is
intimately bound up with state’s political essence. Justice is not always blind; it is often keenly
political. The political importance of the judiciary was especially evident when the US Supreme
Court decided the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. When the dispute arose over
whether George W. Bush or Al Gore should be awarded Florida’s Electoral College votes, The
Court sided with Bush by a 5–4 vote.
The judiciary around the world may differ in a variety of ways – in some countries, it is
relatively independent and may even impose some restrictions on political leaders, in other
countries (especially authoritarian) it may be a highly politicized, judiciary system and can be based
on secular or religious law (such as shariah law in Iran). Some countries have constitutional courts
which interpret the highest law of the state. Some of these courts have the power of judicial review
which is ‘the right to invalidate laws made by the legislature and executive bodies as
unconstitutional.’ (Sodaro 2008:131)

Bureaucracy is a necessary part of every government. ‘With- out a well-developed


network of state organs charged with advising political decision-makers about different policy
options and implementing policies once they have been decided upon, governments could not
govern. The modern state invariably includes a vast array of ministries, departments, agencies,
bureaus, and other officiously titled institutions whose purview may range from the domestic
economy to education, health, the environment, international trade, foreign relations, and so on.
The growth of bureaucracy has been a long-term political phenomenon in most countries, as have
more recent efforts in some countries (including the United States) to trim their size to less costly
proportions.’ (Sodaro 2008:131).

The Military. According to Michael J. Sodaro (2008:132), ‘military establishments can have
a formidable impact of their own on the organization of institutional authority’. The state can be
ruled directly by the military, or military officials may try to influence civil government indirectly. This
is especially evident in the states which are in the transitional period to democracy (it was the case
in the transition of Spain, Portugal, or Greece). A coup d’ état is ‘a forceful takeover of state power
by the military’. Studies show that the main causes of a coup d’état are economic stagnation,
breakdown in law and order, poor governmental performance, etc.

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Poggi also adds citizenship as an important institution. According to Hague and Harrop
(2004:11), ‘citizenship refers to the rights and obligations following from membership of a state; it
represents a political and legal status which can, in principle, be shared by people with different
national identities.’

Development of the modern state

The modern state and all its features are a result of a long historical evolution (you can see
aspects of the growth of the modern state in table 1. 2.). Gianfranco Poggi distinguishes three
broad phases in the development of the state.

Consolidation of rule. It is estimated that ‘consolidation of rule’ took place between the
12th and 17th centuries. During this period the number of political centers decreased, and the
remaining ones expanded their territories. ‘The political map of the continent (Europe) becomes
simpler, for each center now practices rule, in an increasingly uniform manner, over bigger
territories. These, furthermore, tend to become geographically more continuous and historically
more stable…’ (Poggi 2011:76). The process of consolidation of the rule could happen peacefully,
through royal marriages for instance, but in most cases, consolidation was the outcome of military
conflicts.

Military activity itself requires and produces rules on its own, the very core of an
emerging body of law seeking, more or less successfully, to regulate aspects of the relations
between states. Another significant part of such law makes conflict over territory less likely by
laying down clear principles of succession into vacant seats of power, which generally make
the exclusive entitlement to rule dependent on legitimate descent. (Poggi 2011:77).
Developments in cartography also allowed states to determine their geographical borders
more precisely, so each political center could rule in clearly delimited borders.

Rationalization of the rule is the second phase in state development, and it determines
in which ways the power of the state will be exercised. Rationalization can be characterized in three
aspects – centralization, hierarchy, and functions.

Centralization is the building of bureaucracies. The process of consolidation of rule forced


rulers to co-operate with various subordinate but privileged power holders such as aristocratic
families. These power holders maintained to some degree autonomous control over certain
resources or manpower. So, to use those resources, the ruler had to make arrangements with
these groups or families. This considerably limited the rulers’ freedom of action. In the long run,
‘instead of relying on their former co-operators, they choose to avail themselves of agents and
agencies, that is individuals and bodies which the rulers themselves select, empower, activate,
control, fund, discipline, and reward.’ (Poggi 2011:78). For this rea- son, some institutions had to
be built –such as the police to maintain domestic order, the military to ensure external security, or
taxes to finance state affairs (Newton, van Deth 2010:25).

‘Ensembles of individuals who carry out political and administrative activities – the
bureaucratic units- must be hierarchically structured. At the bottom of the structure, even lowly
office-holders are empowered to give orders (issue verdicts, collect taxes, conscript military
recruits, deny or give permissions) to those lying below the structure itself. Those holders
themselves, however, are supposed to do so in compliance with directives communicated with their
superiors… Law plays a significant role in structuring these arrangements of rule. First, the law
itself is a hierarchically structured set of authoritative commands. Second, the law can be taught
and learned, and the knowledge of it (at various levels) can determine, to a greater or lesser extent,
the content of the agents’ political and administrative operation.’ (Poggi 2011:79)

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The third element of the rationalization of the rule is function. A centralized system is
internally differentiated, which means every office is responsible for a specific field and has to deal
with the corresponding problems. To solve those problems every office has to have required
resources (be a certain type of knowledge or some sort of material resources).

Traditional power holders had usually engaged in collaborating with rulers’ material ant
other resources from their own patrimony; their collaboration was self-financed and unavoidably
self-interested. Now agencies operate by spending public funds allocated to them on the basis
of express, periodic decisions (budgets) and are held accountable for how those funds are
spent. Office holders are typically salaried, manage re- sources that do not belong to them but
their offices, and as they comply with their duties are not expected to seek personal gain, except
through career advancement. (Poggi 2011:79)

In the long run, the masses acquired the right to participate in governmental decision-
making. ‘Political parties were founded to link citizens with elites in assemblies and parliaments.
Less visible – but certainly not less significant – was the institutionalization of opposition parties:
gradually these political systems accepted the idea that peaceful opposition to the government was
legitimate and even the idea of peaceful change of groups or parties in government’. (Newton, van
Deth 2010:26) The legitimacy of political power was achieved through mass elections.

The expansion of rule. For a long time, the main concerns of the state were recognition
and the ability to pursue its interests on the international scene and maintain law and order within
its territory. However, in the second half of the 19thcentury states became more and more active
in a diverse range of social interests. According to Gianfranco Poggi (2011:79):

Essentially, the state no longer simply ordains through legislation the autonomous
undertakings of individuals and groups or sanctions their private arrangements through its
judicial system. Increasingly, it intervenes in private concerns by modifying those arrangements
or by collecting greater resources and then redistributing them more to some parties than
others. Also, it seeks to manage social activities according to its own judgments and
preferences, for it consider the outcome of those activities as a legitimate public concern, which
should reflect a broader and higher interest.

After World War II in Europe, ‘the warfare state gave way to the welfare state, with
governments accepting direct responsibility for protecting their citizens from the scourges of illness,
unemployment and old age’ (Hague and Harrop 2004:20).

Rokkan also names nation-building as one of the phases in the development of the state.
Nation-building concerns cultural issues such as a common language, history, religion, etc. The
goal of nation-building was to create a common identity, a feeling of belonging, and allegiance to
the state. This was mainly achieved through the compulsory education of every child. ‘To heighten
national identity, ‘systems of symbols’ – such as a national hymn, national flag, and national heroes
– were emphasized. By developing this sense of ‘belonging’, elites tried to transform their states
into nation states’ (Newton, van Deth 2010: 25).

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Table 1. 2. Growth of the Western state, 1789–1975

Source: Adapted from Hague & Harrop 2004, Box 2. 2, p. 21

Organization of the state

States can be classified by their organizational structure. Nation- al government is one of


the most important elements of the state; however, local governments can also play a significant
role. The importance of sub-national governmental bodies varies from state to state, but basically,
three main models can be distinguished. In unitary states ‘decision-making, authority, and
disposition over revenues tend to be concentrated in the central institutions’. Examples of such
states are France and Japan. Federations ‘seek to combine a relatively strong central government
with real authority for various administrative units below the national level’. Even though sub-
national units in federations are dependent on national governments for some part of their budget,
they can collect local taxes, elect local officials, and to a certain degree pass their laws. Examples
of federal states are the USA, Germany, or the Russian Federation. Confederation ‘is an even
looser arrangement characterized by a weak central government and a group of constituent sub-
national elements that enjoy significant local autonomy or even independence as sovereign states’.
In confederal states, the national government performs only the basic tasks such as national
defense or national currency. For the national government to take action, the consent of the sub-
national government is needed. Examples of confederations are Switzerland and the United Arab
Emirates.

We can also classify states into nation-states and multinational states. Nation-states
contain only the people belonging to their nation. Even though there are not many pure nation-
states nowadays (Iceland could be one example), this term is still significant. In France or Germany,
the state is still based on a strong national identity despite numerous minorities in these countries
–‘in essence, these countries remain nation-states, even if they lack the ethnic homogeneity of
Iceland’ (Hague &Harrop 2004:11). Multinational states contain people belonging to more than one
nation, for example, Great Britain or Belgium. These examples show that multinational states can

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achieve political stability; however, some multinational states – like Bosnia experienced vicious
conflicts between inner national groups.

***

The state is one of the main concepts in comparative politics. Even in the age of
globalization, when some scientists are talking about the ‘withering away’ of the state, this concept
is one of the most important building blocks of comparative politics. As Newton and van Deth
(2010:13) note, we cannot ‘understand the politics of the European Union, a form of political
organization that is above and beyond individual states, unless we understand what states are and
what they do’. So the concept of the state is still essential for understanding the political
organization of the modern world.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. What are the key elements of the state?


__________________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

2. Why is bureaucracy essential to the modern state?


__________________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

3. Explain the term sovereignty. What is the difference between internal and external
sovereignty?

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__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

4. What is citizenship?
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5. What is a failed state?


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__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

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6. What is the difference between the head of government and the head of state?
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

7. What is the role of law in the modern state?


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__________________________________________________________________________

8. What is meant by ‘expansion of rule’?


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FURTHER READINGS

Elias, N. (2000) The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychoge- netic Investigations. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers; 1stedn 1938.

Poggi, G. (1978) The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction. Stanford,
Califf.: Stanford University Press.

Tilly, C. (ed.) (1975) The Formation of National States in Western Eu- rope. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

Webber, M. (1994) ‘Politics as a Profession and Vocation (1919), in Weber: Political Writings,
(ed.). p. Lassman and R. Speirs. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press.

WEBLINKS

Website of the Thirty Years’ War which gave rise to the modern states after the Peace of
Westphalia I1648)

www.pipeline.com/~cwa/TYWHome.htm - Website on the French Revolution

http://userweb.port.ac.uk/~andressd/frlinks.htm -

Website about Italian unification, independence, and democratization


www.arcaini.com/ITALY/ItalyHistory/ItalianUnification.htm -

Website about the American Civil War. http://americancivilwar.com/ -

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REFERENCES

Poggi, G. (2011) The nation state // Caramani., D. (ed.) Comparative Politics. 2nd (ed.). New York:
Oxford University Press, p. 68–83.

Sodaro, M. J. (2008) Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction. 3 rd (ed.). New York [etc.]:
McGraw-Hill.

Jessop, B. (2006) The state and state-building// Rhodes, R.A.W., Binder, S. A., Rockman, B. A.
(ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Po- litical Institutions. Oxford University Press. p. 111–129.

Newton, K. & van Deth, J. (2010) Foundations of Comparative Poli- tics: Democracies of the
Modern World. 2nd (ed.). New York: Cam- bridge University Press.

Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004) Comparative Government and Poli- tics: An Introduction. 6th (ed.).
Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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LESSON 3

POLITICAL REGIMES

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this lesson, the student must be able to:

1. Identify the main attributes of the most prominent types of the political regime without a
claim to present an exhaustive list or an overall classification of such types.

MAIN REFERENCE

Krupavicius, A. et al. 2013. Introduction to Comparative Politics: Didactical Guidelines.


Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

CONTENT

• Definitions of different types of political regime


• Historical development and change of regimes
• Typologies of democracy and authoritarian rule

The multiplicity of forms that modern states take is an obvious fact, but there is no one
criterion for classifying them. Probably the most holistic criterion that defines the political system of
any state as a whole is its political regime. According to Philippe C. Schmitter and Guillermo
O’Donnell (1986: 73), a political regime is an aggregate of:

Patterns, explicit or not, that determines the forms and channels of access to principal
governmental positions, the characteristics of the ac- tors that are admitted or excluded from
such access, and the resources and strategies that they can use to gain access. This
necessarily involves institutionalization, i.e., the patterns defining a given regime must be
habitually known, practiced, and accepted, at least by those which these same patterns define
as participants in the process. For the purposes of summary comparison and generalization,
these ensembles of patterns are given generic labels such as authoritarian and democratic,
and occasion- ally broken down further into subtypes.

Thus, even if a state is defined as a democratic republic by its constitution, it may not be a
democracy in terms of the habitual practices that define its political regime. Regimes describe
informal institutions as much as the formal or the official form of government – be that a republic, a
monarchy, a theocracy, or any other. The latter is not the same variable in cross-national
comparative research as a political regime.

As was mentioned above, the most general patterns of the political process that amount to
the two broadest categories of the political regime are the democratic and authoritarian rule.
Although historically countries were governed by authoritarian regimes (normally, absolute
monarchies), the rapid increase in democratic polities over the last century has boosted a scholarly
interest in cross-national studies of democratic institutions and democratization. Authoritarian
regimes, however, have not perished and those that have survived up until nowadays are mostly
systems of a new kind, very different from ancient monarchies. Some states are still, and some

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would argue will permanently be, in a transitional phase between authoritarianism and democracy.
The scope of this chapter, therefore, is to identify the main attributes of the most prominent types
of the political regime without a claim to present an exhaustive list or an overall classification of
such types.

Definitions of different types of political regime

Given that by political regime we simply mean accepted and institutionalized ‘procedures
that regulate access to state power’ (Munck, 2001: 123), any particular type of regime must be
defined concerning the concrete procedures and practices it involves. Democracy, for example, is
ultimately defined by free (i.e., unrestricted) competition for power and popular choice of the ruling
few, usually through free and popular elections. Except for cases of collective decision-making of
the whole population – direct democracy – which is highly unsuitable for such populous polities as
modern nation-states, in democratic regimes people nominally rule through their representatives.
A procedural definition of democracy was best articulated by the economist and political theorist
Joseph A. Schum- peter more than half a century ago; according to him, democracy is:

An institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals


acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. This is
of course no more definite than is the concept of competition. To simplify matters we have
restricted the kind of competition for leadership, which is to define democracy, to free
competition for a free vote (Schumpeter, 2003 [1943]: 269–271).

The modern-day conception of democracy, however, goes beyond mere procedures of


political competition. As Michael J. Sodaro (2008: 171) notes, ‘democracies also impose legal
limits on the government’s authority by guaranteeing certain rights and freedoms to their citizens.’
Some would argue that such a definition only applies to a particular subtype of democracy, a liberal
democracy. If the definitive features of democracy, as mentioned above, are free competition for
state power, a universal right to vote for any of the competing parties, and civil liberties guaranteed
to every citizen, then a regime lacking any of these pillars can be considered only partially
democratic. Neither is a polity fully democratic if the popularly and freely elected government does
not effectively control the policymaking and the main policy decisions are made or influenced by
some unelected and publicly unaccountable body (the military, religious clergy, etc.). Political
scientists have introduced several terms to describe such regimes that David Collier and Steven
Levitsky (1997) wittily call ‘democracies with adjectives’. Table 2.1 shows what shortcomings of
democracy some of these terms primarily refer to and the names of the political scientists who
established them.

The bottom line, however, is that any regime which does not secure both political and civil
liberties, as well as electoral control over pol- icy outcomes is only semi-democratic – something
between democracy and authoritarian rule. As Peter Mair (2011: 89–90) notes, ‘with real-world
cases, we see not only a separation between the pillars of democracy in theory, but also in practice.
In other words, many new democracies are seen to have democratized only in terms of the election,
and to have neglected the building of corresponding constitutional guarantees and liberties.’ For
the last thirty years or so it was conventional wisdom to believe that new democracies which have
not yet acquired all the democratic characteristics are in a transitional phase to becoming liberal
democracies. However, political scientists like Thomas Carothers have recently suggested that
some of these countries have habitualized non-democratic practices as part of their hybrid political
regimes. In his seminal article ‘The end of the Transition Paradigm,’ Carothers (2002: 18) argues
that:

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What is often thought of as an uneasy, precarious middle ground between full-fledged


democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most common political condition today of
countries in the developing world and the post-communist world. It is a state of normality for
many societies.

Table 2. 1. Examples of diminished subtypes of democracy

Source: Collier and Levitsky, 1997: 440

Rod Hague and Martin Harrop (2004: 47) further developed a distinction between ‘new
democracies’ that are still developing in terms of political regime and already established semi-
democratic regimes:

A semi-democracy blends democratic and authoritarian elements in stable


combination. By contrast, a new democracy is one that has not yet had time to consolidate;
that is, democracy has not become the „only game in town’. In practice, new democracies and
semi-democracies show similar characteristics but a new democracy is transitional while a
semi- democracy is not. Assuming a new democracy does not slide back into authoritarian rule,
it will develop into either an established democracy or a semi-democracy.

There is no particular timeframe of when to ‘call off the jury’ on a new democracy and
simply label it as a semi-democratic regime, but it involves a relatively deep institutionalization of
certain un-democratic elements. Box 2.1. sums up some of the most important definitions regarding
democratic and semi-democratic regimes.

The other ideal type of political regime which diametrically contrasts democracy is
authoritarianism. There are, however, two meanings in which political scientists use this term:
according to Hague and Harrop (2004: 52), ‘authoritarian rule’ can mean ‘1) any form of non-
democratic rule or 2) those non-democratic regimes which, unlike totalitarian states, do not seek to
transform society and the people in it’. The first usage implies that a totalitarian regime is just an
extreme version of authoritarianism; in the second case, totalitarian and authoritarian rule are two

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ideal types in their own right. Two of the most prominent scholars of non-democratic regimes Juan
J. Linz and Alfred Stepan use four key dimensions (pluralism, ideology, form of leadership, and
political mobilization) to define political regimes and eventually came up with three (instead of two)
ideal types – democracy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. They define authoritarian regime as:

Political system with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and
guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities [of the people, without extensive nor intensive
political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or
occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits, but actually quite
predictable ones (Linz and Stepan, 1996 [2010]: 207).

Box 2. 1. Definitions of democracy

Source: Hague and Harrop, 2004: 35

At the same time, they define totalitarianism as a regime that ‘has eliminated almost all
pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism, has a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian
ideology, has intensive and extensive mobilization, and has a leadership that rules, often
charismatically, with undefined limits and great unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and
nonelites alike’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996 [2010]: 208). The same authors also speak of post-
totalitarian regimes, such as the post-Stalinist Soviet Union or post-Maoist China, where there is a
considerable shift from a commitment to a certain social utopia towards pragmatism (although the
ideological façade remains), some checks on leadership via party structures and ‘internal
democracy’ with top regime officials being less charismatic, and some limited social and economic
(but not political) pluralism often spawning a ‘second (unofficial) culture’ or ‘parallel society’ (Linz
and Stepan, 1996 [2010]: 209-215). Box 2.2 includes some important definitions regarding non-
democratic regimes.

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Box 2. 2. Definitions of authoritarian rule

Source: Hague and Harrop, 2004: 52-53

Historical development and change of regimes

As was already mentioned in the introductory section:

Until modern times states were normally ruled by authoritarian regimes and most of
these were hereditary monarchies. These monarchical authoritarian regimes were based on a
traditional form of inherited personal rule that was restrained to varying degrees by traditional
customs and institutions. However, once democracy began to compete with the monarchies,
the latter would increasingly be replaced by at least semi-democratic republics or constitutional
mon- archies (Brooker, 2011: 103).
In his highly influential book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century
(1991) American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington suggested that historically there were
three major periods of transition from various forms of authoritarian rule to democracy worldwide.
He calls them waves of democratization (see Table 2. 2). In between these waves, there were
significant shifts back to authoritarianism in some of the newly democratized countries (reverse
waves).

The first wave had its roots in the American and French revolutions. The actual
emergence of national democratic institutions, however, is a 19th century phenomenon. In most
countries during that century democratic institutions developed gradually. One can say that the
United States began the first wave roughly about 1828 when universal manhood suffrage
boosted to well over 50% the pro- portion of white ma les actually voting in the 1828 presidential
elections. In the following decades other countries gradually expanded the suffrage, reduced
plural voting, introduced the secret ballot, and established the responsibility of prime ministers
and cabinets to parliaments.

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The first reverse wave began in 1922 with the March on Rome and Mussolini’s easy
disposal of Italy’s fragile and rather corrupt democracy. The dominant political development of
the 1920s and 1930s was the shift away from democracy and either the return to traditional
forms of authoritarian rule or the introduction of new mass- based, more brutal and pervasive
forms of totalitarianism. These regime changes reflected the rise of communist, fascist, and
militaristic ideologies.

Starting in World War II a second, short wave of democratization occurred. Allied


occupation promoted inauguration of democratic institutions in West Germany, Italy, Austria,
Japan, and Korea. In the late 1940s and early 1950s Turkey and Greece moved towards
democracy. In Latin America Uruguay, Brazil and Costa Rica shifted to democracy in the 1940s.
Meanwhile, the beginning of the end of Western colonial rule produced a number of new states
and in a few new states – India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Israel – democratic institutions
were sustained for a decade or more.

By the early 1960s the second wave of democratization had exhausted itself and
regime transitions were taking on a heavily authoritarian cast. The change was dramatic in Latin
America, but the decolonization of Africa led to the largest multiplication in independent
authoritarian governments in history. The global swing away from democracy in the 1960s and
early 1970s was impressive: in 1962, by one count, 13 governments in the world were the
product of coups d ’etat; by 1975, 38 were. This wave of transitions away from democracy [i.e.,
second reverse wave] was even more striking because it involved several countries, such as
Chile, Uruguay („the Switzer- land of South America’), India, and the Philippines, that had
sustained democratic regimes for a quarter century or more.

Once again, however, following the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974,
democratic regimes replaced authoritarian ones in approximately 30 countries in Europe, Asia
and Latin America. This third democratic tide manifested itself first in Southern Europe. Three
months after the Portuguese coup, the military regime that had governed Greece since 1967
collapsed and a civilian government took over. On November 20, 1975, the death of Gen.
Francisco Franco ended his thirty-six-year rule in Spain. In the late 1970s the democratic wave
moved on to Latin America and in 1977, the premier democracy of the Third World, India, which
for 1,5 years had been under emergency rule, returned to the democratic path. In 1980 the
Turkish military for the third and the last time took over the government of that country; in 1983,
however, they withdrew, and elections produced a civilian government. At the end of the de-
cade, the democratic wave engulfed the communist world. Overall, the movement towards
democracy was a global one. In 15 years, the democratic wave moved across Southern
Europe, swept through Latin America, moved on to Asia, and decimated dictatorship in the
Soviet bloc. By 1990, close to 39% of humankind lived in free societies (Huntington, 1991: 16–
25).

Table 2. 2. Samuel Huntington’s three waves of democratization

Source: Hague and Harrop, 2004: 40

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Rather than identifying prominent periods of regime change throughout human history,
some political scientists are more interested in the particular path (or paths) of how the democratic
regimes replaced authoritarian ones, first and foremost the traditional rule of the blue-blooded
dynasties. For example, Robert A. Dahl argued that early democracy in Western countries was
developed in three stages: 1) incorporation of the masses into political society, 2) parliamentary
representation of politically active groups, and 3) organization of the opposition to vote out the
government. Mair (2011: 91) notes that:

Dahl was referring primarily to the stages that were reached during Huntington’s long
first wave of democratization, in which these mile- stones were passed one by one, and often
over an extended period of time. During the third-wave transitions, by contrast, the milestones
were reached more or less simultaneously.

The first milestone [incorporation] was reached when citizens won the right to
participate in government decisions by casting a vote, which implied a widening of political
society and the opening up of the polity to the involvement of – eventually – all adult citizens.
Among the older and more long-standing democracies, this milestone began to be passed in
the mid-19t h century.

Such Western European countries as France, Germany, and Switzerland had introduced
universal male suffrage already by the 1840s, but the universal female suffrage was not adopted
to a worldwide extent until the beginning of the 20thcentury (see Table 2. 3.).

Table 2. 3. The introduction of voting rights

Source: Mair, 2011: 91

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The second of Dahl’s milestones was the organization of politically active people into
parties and the representation of such parties in parliaments. As Mair (2011: 92) suggests, ‘one
useful if not wholly accurate indication of the passing of this milestone was the shift from the
conventional majoritarian voting systems that characterized more exclusive regimes in the
19thcentury to a more open and proportional voting formula’ (see Table 2. 4).

Dahl ’s third milestone was marked by the right of an organized op- position to appeal
for votes against the government in elections and in parliament. In parliamentary systems, this
milestone is reached when the executive becomes fully responsible to the legislature, and
hence when it can be dismissed by a majority in parliament. One rough indicator of when this
milestone was reached among the more long-standing democracies can be seen in the timing
of the first acceptance of socialist or social democratic parties into government. Given that
these parties constituted the last major opposition to develop in most democracies prior to 1989,
their acceptance into executive office marked a crucial watershed in democratic development
(Mair, 2011: 92–93).

Table 2. 4. The Adoption of Proportional Voting Formulae

Source: Mair, 2011: 92 (*Alternative votes in single-member districts)

Table 2. 5. shows the dates of when left-wing parties first assumed top executive offices in
the oldest democracies of the Western world. In some well-established democracies, such as
Canada and the USA, the socialist opposition never effectively challenged the ruling elite, but these
countries nevertheless managed to develop a bipolar party competition with major parties or
coalitions regularly altering each other in the government.

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Table 2. 5. The inclusion of socialist parties in cabinets

Source: Mair, 2011: 93

Historically Dahl’s milestones were reached selectively and in different orders across
different polities. Some of them took the path of 1) liberalization by allowing more political groups
to be represented in the parliament and opposing the government without extending universal
suffrage to the masses. Such polities, which were classified as competitive oligarchies by Dahl,
included the parliamentary regimes of the UK and France before World War I. Other countries
chose 2) inclusiveness over public competition for government office, thus relying on a non-
competitive mass electoral process. Among such inclusive hegemonies were Nazi Germany and
the Soviet bloc countries. According to Mair (2011: 94), ‘the polities that became effectively
democratic did so by both liberalizing and becoming more inclusive, whether simultaneously or in
stages’ (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2. 1. Robert Dahl’s typology of democratization processes

Source: Mair, 2011: 94

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Typologies of Democracy and Authoritarian Rule

Both democratic and authoritarian regimes are often further divided into subtypes although
political scientists rarely include more than one criteria for classification. This section will only deal
with the most recognized and most holistic typologies that take into account various aspects of the
given type of political regime.

Models of democracy. According to Peter Mair (2010: 95):

There have been only a handful of attempts by scholars to devise typologies of


democracies as whole systems, and the most comprehensive of these has been the influential
distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies that was elaborated by Arend
Lijphart.

Lijphart’s ideal models of majoritarian and consensus democracy were fashioned


inductively and based on real-world political systems: the first is best represented by the UK and
some of its former colonies (hence the majoritarian model is sometimes also called the
‘Westminster model’) and the second – by such continental European countries as Switzerland and
Belgium. The basis of this typology is implied by the idea of democracy itself and the different ways
it is interpreted in practice. In the words of Lijphart (1999: 1–2):

Defining democracy as „government by and for the people’ raises a fundamental


question: who will do the governing and to whose interests when the people are in
disagreement and have divergent preferences? One answer to this dilemma is: the majority of
the people. This is the essence of the majoritarian model of democracy. The alternative answer
to the dilemma is: as many people as possible. This is the crux of the consensus model. It does
not differ from the majoritarian model in accepting that majority rule is better than minority rule,
but it accepts majority rule only as a minimum requirement: instead of being satisfied with
narrow decision-making majorities, it seeks to maximize the size of these majorities. Its rules
and institutions aim at broad participation in government and broad agreement on the policies
that the government should pursue. While the majoritarian model concentrates political power
in the hands of a bare majority the consensus model tries to share, disperse, and limit power
in a variety of ways. In a nutshell the majoritarian model of democracy is exclusive, competitive,
and adversarial, whereas the consensus model is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining,
and compromise.

Majoritarian democracies, however, are not ‘less democratic’ in the sense that today’s
minority has the full institutional capacity to become tomorrow’s majority. While the majoritarian
model involves a regular alternation of the ruling party, in consensus democracies ‘a change in
government usually means only a partial change in the party composition of the government’
(Lijphart, 1999: 6). Naturally, the institutional arrangement in majoritarian systems is much more
suitable for a regular and complete swap between the position and the opposition: this includes a
two-party system, a disproportional (usually majoritarian) electoral system, single-party cabinets,
etc. Overall, Lijphart uses 10 institutional variables to distinguish be- tween majoritarian and
consensus models. These ten variables cluster rather neatly in two separate dimensions: the first
(which Lijphart himself calls the executives-parties dimension) describes the horizontal power
relation among the main political institutions – the legislature, the executive, political parties; the
second (federal-unitary dimension) mostly deals with the vertical concentration/dispersion of power
among different levels of government. Table 2.6 shows the institutional features of Lijphart’s ideal
models against the 10 variables suggested by the author.

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Table 2. 6. Majoritarian and Consensus models of democracy

Source: Mair, 2011: 86

A more recent attempt to construct a holistic typology of democracies was set forth by John
Gerring and Strom Thacker (2008). Much like Lijphart, these authors distinguish between two
contrasting ideal types of decentralist and centripetal democracy. Although these theoretical
models also reflect first and foremost on the centralization of power within democratic polities,
unlike Lijphart’s pure majoritarianism, which denotes exclusive and concentrated power, Ger- ring
and Thacker’s centripetalism involves both inclusiveness and powerful authority:

Institutions in a centripetal system] must be inclusive – they must reach out to all
interests, ideas, and identities and they must be authoritative – they must provide an effective
mechanism for reaching agreement and implementing that agreement. The concept of
centripetalism thus implies both (a) broad-based inclusion and (b) centralized authority.
Centripetal institutions thus encourage a search for common ground and culminate in an
authoritative decision-making process, one not easily waylaid by minority objections (Gerring
et al., 2005: 569–570).

Similarly, to Lijphart’s consensus model, the decentralist democracy of Gerring and


Thacker is also based on such organizing principles as:

Diffusion of power, broad political participation, and limits on govern- mental action.
Decentralist government is limited government. Each independent institution acts as a check
against the others, establishing a high level of interbranch accountability. The existence of
multiple veto points forces a consensual style of decision-making. Decentralized authority
structures may also lead to greater popular control over political decision-making. Efficiency is
enhanced by political bodies that lie close to the constituents they serve.

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What are the specific institutional embodiments of decentralism? Separate powers


implies two elective lawmaking authorities as well as a strong and independent judiciary.
Federalism presumes the shared sovereignty of territorial units within the nation-state. Both
also suggest a bicameral legislature, to further divide power at the apex and to ensure regional
representation. The decentralist model seems to imply a written constitution, perhaps with
enumerated individual rights and explicit restrictions on the authority of the central state. Most
decentralists embrace the single-member district as a principle of electoral law, maximizing
local-level accountability. Some advocate preferential-vote options or a system of open
primaries, thus decentralizing the process of candidate selection (Gerring and Thacker, 2008:
8–9).

Such institutional arrangement is approximated by the political system of the USA. The
centripetal democracy, by contrast, results from a completely different institutional juncture:

Unitary (rather than federal) sovereignty, unicameralism or weak bi- cameralism,


parliamentarism (rather than presidentialism), and a party-list proportional electoral system. In
addition, the centripetal polity should be characterized by a strong cabinet, medium- strength
legislative committees, strong party cohesion, no limits on tenure in office, congruent election
cycles, closed procedures of candidate selection (limited to party members), party-centered
political campaigns, multiparty (rather than two-party) competition, centralized and well-
bounded party organizations, centralized and party-aligned interest groups, a restrained
(nonactivist) judiciary, and a neutral and relatively centralized bureaucracy (Gerring et al.,2005:
570).

Table 2. 7. indicates the 21 most significant institutional differences between centripetal


and decentralist systems. Gerring and Thacker make clear that the centripetal model does not fully
correspond to the Westminster system defined by Lijphart; in empirical terms, the former is best
represented by the Swedish, Danish and Norwegian polities rather than the UK.

There are at least two problems with the holistic models of democracy, such as those
proposed by Lijphart and Gerring et al. Ac- cording to Peter Mair (2011: 97), ‘in practice, <...>
democracies rarely prove as sharply bounded or as internally coherent as the various theoretically
informed whole-system models might suggest.’ Most real-world cases usually have certain features
of both of the contrasting ideal types. What is more:

Holistic models are increasingly undermined by cross-national learning processes, and


the diffusion of particular institutional arrangements. Democracies, in short, are less and less
likely to be closed or self-contained systems, and in this sense they are also less and less likely
to reflect totally consistent patterns when subject to comparative whole- system analysis (Mair,
2011: 97–98).

Types of authoritarian rule. Since all democracies, by definition, must fulfill the minimum
institutional requirement of a popularly elected government, political scientists use other
institutional variables to distinguish between subtypes of democratic regimes. By contrast, the
origin of the ruling elite may vary substantially across authoritarian regimes.

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Table 2. 7. Decentralist and centripetal paradigms of governance

Source: Gerring et al., 2005: 571

As Paul Brooker (2011: 105) notes:

The question „who rules?’ has long been used to categorize regimes. In the case of
authoritarian regimes an obvious distinction is between rule by an organization and rule by the
leader of an organization. But often priority has been given to the distinction between rule by
two different forms of organization: a professional military and a political party. The emphasis
on either the military or the party as the subject of study has sometimes resulted in the personal
dictatorship by either a military or party leader being included as part of the study of military
regimes or one-party states.

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Personal rule, however, is very different from the organizational rule. Although
occasionally a personal dictator may have been brought to power by the military or a party, he ‘has
loosened the principal-agent relationship between him and the military or party organization to such
a degree that he can ‘shirk’ his responsibilities to his organizational principal. Indeed, he may have
gone even further and reversed the relationship by converting the military or party organization into
merely an instrument of his rule, as in the classic Stalin’s achievement of absolutist ‘totalitarian’
personal rule in the 1930s’ (Brooker, 2011: 107). In addition to such organization-based but
personal dictatorships, personal authoritarian regimes are also exemplified by ruling monarchies
(as opposed to merely reigning ones) and populist presidential dictatorships. The former is very
rare in the contemporary world (found only in the Arabian/Persian Gulf region) and presumably
have survived until nowadays only because ‘their royal families are very large and have shown
willingness to ‘engage in public service’ in government, the civil service, and the military. This gives
the dynastic royal families the sort of extensive control over the state‘(Brooker, 2011: 106). The
latter subtype is historically novel but has spread worldwide since the third wave of democratization
of the 1970s–1990s. According to Brooker (2011: 108), populist presidential authoritarianism:

Emerges through an elected president’s personal misappropriation of power, which


Latin America long ago labelled an autogolpe or ‘self- coup’’. Although [it] does not involve any
military or party organization, it can be analyzed in principal–agent terms as a reversal of the
relationship between the electorate as principal and the elected president as its agent. By
reversing the relationship, the president makes the electorate the instrument of his personal
rule in the sense of providing him with a claim to democratic legitimacy, which he usually
confirms by having himself re-elected. These new elections will be un- democratic, but the
populist president may be genuinely popular with a wide section of the people.

Organizational authoritarianism, as mentioned above, has been recognized to take two


forms: military and one-party rule (see Figure 2.2). Military regimes are highly unstable with an
average lifespan of several years rather than decades (except for Burma/Myanmar). Usually
resulting from military coups d’état, they may continue their existence as an open military rule (with
top military officials forming a ruling junta or occupying key government positions) or they can
‘disguise’ themselves in civilian façade. In the words of Brooker (2011: 109), ‘the civilianization o a
military dictatorship involves a highly publicized ending of such obvious features <...> as a junta or
a mili- tary officer holding the post of president, though often the supposed civilianization of the
presidency involves no more than the military incumbent [officially] resigning or retiring from the
military.’

The one-party rule can produce more long-standing dictatorships than a military coup
d’état. An authoritarian regime of this kind ‘comes about through a dictatorial party either seizing
power through a revolution or misappropriating power after it has won key government positions
through democratic elections’ (Brooker, 2011: 109). A one-party state can be established legally
banning all other parties, or effectively preventing them from competing properly against the ruling
party. However, as Brooker notes (2011: 109), ‘a one-party state is not necessarily a case of one-
party rule. The various structural forms of one-party state have sometimes been established by
military dictatorships, personal dictators and even ruling monarchs’ (as did the Shah of Iran several
years before the 1979 revolution). The one official party may be merely an instrument in the hands
of the actual ruler(s) of the country who does (do) not play by the institutional rules of that party.
Internal party cohesion is best secured by some guiding ideology; that is why party dictatorships
are usually categorized by political scientists according to their ideological/policy orientation.
Fascist regimes have historically been the rarest subtype of one-party rule and have been extinct
since the military defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. By contrast:

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The communist regime is historically the most important as well as most numerous
subtype. It produced one of the 20t h century’s super- powers, the Soviet Union, and seems
set to produce another superpower in the 21st century if China maintains its rate of economic
progress. At their numerical peak in the 1980s there were nearly two dozen regimes that
espoused the basic communist ideolog y of Marxism-Leninism. But about a third of these
regimes were actually personal dictatorships, which left less than a dozen „true’ cases of
organizational rule by the communist party. And so many communist regimes collapsed in the
late 1980s and early 1990s that now only three of these organizational dictatorships still survive
– China, Vietnam, and Laos (Brooker, 2011: 110).

***

The political regime is arguably the most holistic criterion that defines the political system
of any state. Covering all patterns that deter- mine the actors, procedures, and resources to access
state power, political regimes ultimately fall under the two main categories known to political
science – democracy and authoritarian rule. There are, however, real-world political systems that
manage to incorporate both democratic and authoritarian institutions. Some of them are in a
transitional phase on the way to either authoritarianism or democracy. The others, as the post-
transition paradigm in comparative politics would have us believe, have reached a stable
institutional condition and are best classified as hybrid semi-democratic regimes.

Figure 2. 2. Typology of authoritarian regimes

Source: Brooker, 2011: 109

From a historical point of view, certain types of the political regime have been more
prevalent at some points in human history than others. The authoritarian rule of absolute monarchs,
which was the dominant type of political regime since the advent of the modern (nation-)state,
throughout the last hundred years or so was gradually supplanted by democracy (at least in the
Western world). So far political science has identified three major waves of worldwide transitions
to democracy and two periods of backsliding to authoritarianism. Notably, ‘each reverse wave has

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eliminated some but not all of the transitions to democracy of the previous democratization wave’
(Huntington, 1991: 25), thus according to democracy the upper hand in the 21st century. Although
most of the democratic countries of today reached all the institutional milestones of democracy
simultaneously (which is especially characteristic of third-wave democracies), some have taken a
‘detour’ of first liberalizing the political competition for government office and then caught up with
universal suffrage later. Others (notably one-party regimes) chose the path of including the masses
into the electoral process without real competition among elite groups and thus it took them a few
more decades and the de- mise of one-party rule to establish real democracy.

For comparison and causal explanation, both democracies and authoritarian regimes are
further subdivided into subtypes. Democracies mainly differ in terms of horizontal and/or vertical
concentration of power and such binary divisions as Arendt Lijphart’s majoritarian vs. consensus
democracy or John Gerring et al.’s centripetal vs. decentralist democracy are meant to correspond
to these differences. Authoritarian regimes are differentiated according to who controls the state
apparatus. In practice, it can be either an individual dictator or an organization, whether the military
or the ruling party. However, all these subtypes of democracy and authoritarianism are merely ideal
models created by political scientists trying to make sense of the vast variety of political units ‘out
there’; real-world polities hardly ever manifest all the definitive features of such models.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. How would you define a political regime and how is it different from the official form of state
government (usually indicated in the constitution)?
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

2. What are the main pillars that define democracy?


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

3. What is the difference between a new democracy and a semi- democracy?


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

4. What is the difference between a totalitarian regime and an authoritarian regime in the narrow
sense?
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
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5. What examples of first, second, and third wave democracies do you know?
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________________

6. What historical paths towards democracy were identified by Robert Dahl?


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________________

7. What overall principle sets apart majoritarian from consensus democracies according to Arendt
Lijphart?
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

8. How are John Gerring and Strom Thucker’s classification of democracies different from that of
Lijphart?
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

9. What are the problems of using holistic (multivariable) models of democracies in comparative
research?
__________________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

10. What forms of authoritarian rule have been recognized so far?


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
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FURTHER READINGS

On democracies, democratization, and semi-democracies:

Dahl, R. A. (1998) On Democracy. New Haven, London: Yale Uni- versity Press.

Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six


Countries. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.

Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Sørensen, G. (1993) Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing


World. Boulder: Westview Press.

Norris, P. (2008) Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? New York: Cambridge
University Press.

Keman, H. (ed.) (2002) Comparative Democratic Politics: A Guide to Contemporary Theory and
Research. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.

Zakaria, F. (2003) The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York,
London: Norton W. W. & Company.

On authoritarian and totalitarian regimes:

Brooker, P. (2000) Non-democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics. Basingstoke:


Macmillan.

Linz, J.J. (2000) Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

WEBLINKS

International Forum for Democratic Studies: http://www.ned.org/research

Freedom House: http://www.freedomhouse.org

Website covering events in the twenty-eight post-communist countries: http://www.tol.org

Amnesty International: http://www.amnesty.org

REFERENCES

Brooker, P. (2011) Authoritarian regimes // Caramani., D. (ed.) Com- parative Politics. 2nd (ed.).
New York: Oxford University Press. p. 102-117.

Mair, P. (2011) Democracies // Caramani., D. (ed.) Comparative Poli- tics. 2nd (ed.). New York:
Oxford University Press. p. 84–101.

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Carothers, T. (2002) The End of the Transitions Paradigm // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1.
p. 5–21.

Collier, D. & Levitsky, S. (1997) Democracy with Adjectives: Con- ceptual Innovation in
Comparative Research // World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3. p. 430–451.

Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004) Comparative Government and Poli- tics: An Introduction. 6th (ed.).
Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Huntington, S. P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press. Gerring, J. & Thacker, S. (2008) A Centripetal Theory of
Democratic Governance. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gerring, J.; Thacker, S.; Moreno, C. (2005) Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and
Global Inquiry // American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4. p. 567–581.

Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six


Countries. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.

Linz, J. J. & Stepan, A. (1996) Modern Nondemocratic Regimes // O’Neil, p. & Rogowski, R. (eds.).
(2010) Essential Readings in Com- parative Politics. 3rd (ed.). New York, London: Norton
W. W. & Company. p. 206–219.

Munck, G. L. (2001) The Regime Question // World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 1. p. 119–144.

O’Donnell, G. & Schmitter, P. C. (1986) Transitions from Authori- tarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.

Schumpeter, J. A. (2003 [1943]) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London, New York:
Routledge.

Sodaro, M. J. (2008) Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction. 3 rd (ed.). New York [etc.]:
McGraw-Hill.

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LESSON 4

LEGISLATURE

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this lesson, the student must be able to:

1. Identify the most important institutions in the modern state, the Legislature; distinguish
the main role of the legislatures; and illustrate its structures.

MAIN REFERENCE

Krupavicius, A. et al. 2013. Introduction to Comparative Politics: Didactical Guidelines.


Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

CONTENT

• Definition of legislature
• The role of the legislature
• Structures of legislature

Legislatures are one of the most important institutions in the mod- ern state; they are
present throughout the world and play a central role in almost all political systems. However,
according to Amie Keppel (2011:122), ‘Different scholars have come to very different conclusions
about political power and policy influence of legislatures general evaluations vary depending on the
cases that are studied, the theoretical framework employed, the historical period under
examination, and the precise understandings of ‘power’ and ‘influence’ invoked.’

Nonetheless, legislatures are symbols of representation in poli- tics. According to Hague


and Harrop (2004:247), ‘they are not governing bodies, they do not take major decisions and
usually, they do not even initiate proposals for laws. Yet they are still the foundation of both liberal
and democratic politics. How then does their significance arise? Legislatures join the society to the
legal structure of authority in the state. Legislatures are representative bodies: they reflect the
sentiments and opinions of the citizens’.

Definition

Even though legislatures are present in almost all political systems there is no single
definition for this institution. Hague and Harrop (2004:247) define legislature as ‘a multimember
representative body which considers public issues. Its main function is to give assent, on behalf of
a political community that extends beyond the executive authority, to biding measures of public
policy.’ However, it is not so easy to answer the question ‘what is a legislature?’ The terms may
vary from ‘assembly’, ‘congress’ to ‘parliament’ (see Box 3. 1). According to Amie Keppel
(2011:122), ‘all four are defined as a ‘legislative body’ or a ‘body of persons having the power to
legislate’, making efforts to clearly distinguish between them difficult. And yet, most would agree
that the terms are not interchangeable and that there are differ- ent meanings implied by the use
of one rather than the others.’

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Box 3.1. Definitions.

Source: Adapted from Kreppel 2011, Box 7. 1., p. 12

Assembly in the broadest definition – ‘a group of persons gathered together, usually for a
particular purpose, whether religions, political, educational, or social. This understanding of
legislature is expansive enough to include a wide array of very different institutions, while still
distinguishing between the legislature and other types of assemblies organizes for religious,
educational or social purposes.’ (Keppel 2011:122). Hague and Harrop distinguish two types of
assemblies – talking assembly and working assembly (see Box 3. 2.).

Box 3. 2. Types of assemblies

Source: adapted from Hague &Harrop 2004, p. 251

In parliamentary systems, legislatures are referred to as parliaments. As Kreppel


(2011:123) puts it: ‘this name reflects not only the type of system in which the legislature resides
but also its central task. The word parliament is derived from the French verb parler, to speak the
name is well-chosen as the institutional and political constrains on parliaments generally serves to
focus their activities on debate and discussion.’

Congress is a different type of legislature most commonly present in presidential


(separation of powers) systems. In these systems ‘the legislative and executive branches are
selected independently and neither can dissolve or remove the other from office (except in the case
of incapacity or significant legal wrong- doing). The use of congress to denote legislatures within
separation-of-powers systems, in general, is justified by the policy-making focus of the primary
activities they tend to pursue, as well as the increased likelihood of a more conflictual relationship
with the executive branch when compared to fused power systems.’ (Keppel 2011:123).

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The role of legislatures

The roles of the legislatures can significantly vary according to the broader political
environment; however, Keppel distinguishes three main categories – linkage and representation;
oversight and control; and policy-making.

Linkage and representation. Many scholars see citizens’ linkage to the government as a
fundamental task of any legislature. As Kreppel (2011:125) puts it:

Even when the legislature is weak in terms of its other roles, it is always able to serve
‘as an intermediary between the constituency and the central government. In this context,
legislatures act as a conduit of information allowing local-level demands to be heard by the
central government and the policies and actions of the central government to be explained to
citizens.

According to John M. Carey (2006:432), ‘legislatures are plural bodies with a larger
membership than executives, and so offer the possibility both to represent the range of diversity in
the polity, and to foster closer connections between representatives and voters.’

However, legislatures are expected not only to provide linkage between citizens and
government but also to represent their constituents. As Kreppel (2011:125) puts it, ‘legislators are
responsible for advocating for their constituents in their stead, ensuring that the opinions,
perspectives, and values of citizens are present in the pol- icy-making process’. However, there
are different interpretations of a legislator’s responsibility to represent its constituent. That depends
on how members of the legislature are understood – as delegates, or as trustees (see Box 3. 3).

Box 3. 3. Interpretations of the representative responsibility

Source: adapted from Kreppel 2011, p. 125

An important function of the legislature is to be a stage for public de- bate, where different
opinions and opposing views engage with one another.

According to Kreppel (2011:126), ‘debate function will be a more central and important
activity in those legislatures with limited direct control over the policy-making process, which
includes most non-democratic systems. This is because public debate within the legislature can
affect public opinion, thus providing legislators with an opportunity to influence policy-making
indirectly by increasing public awareness of critical issues’. All in all ‘the ability of the legislature to
create links between citizens and government by providing adequate representation to critical
groups and minority interests and fostering public debate will determine both its institutional
legitimacy and its ability to provide legitimacy for the political system as a whole.’ (Keppel 2011:
126).

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Control and oversight

One of the foundations of representative democracy is the ability of the governed to control
the government. Generally, this is achieved through free and fair elections, however, according to
Kreppel 2011:126, ‘in most cases citizens lack sufficient time, access, and in- formation, as well as
the technical skills needed, to effectively over- see the details of the daily political activity of the
executive branch. It is the task of the legislature to fill this lacuna.’ (See Box 3. 4).

Box 3. 4. Legislatives’ control functions in different systems

Source: adapted from Kreppel 2011, p. 126

According to Carey (2006:433), ‘notwithstanding the privileged place of majorities in almost


all democracies, unrestrained majority rule is widely mistrusted as subject to excesses and abuse
of minority rights. Opposition groups may use the legislature as a forum to oppose, and perhaps to
obstruct, actions by majority coalitions’. That is why according to Keppel (2011:127):

Legislatures in both separation-of-powers and fused-powers systems (see box 3. 4.)


play critical role in ensuring proper oversight of both the budgetary implications of policies and
their implementation. Legislative oversight of the executive branch is generally quite broad,
entailing both the monitoring of executive agencies tasked with implementation of poli- cy
decisions and regular engagement with the political.

Oversight can be conducted in several ways from question time to investigative committees
(see Box 3. 5.). Control over expenditure is one of the oldest functions of the legislature, and even
though, according to Hague and Harrop, nowadays it became nominal, Kreppel (2011:127) argues
that ‘control and oversight of expenditure, even if limited by entitlements and other political artifices,
is a powerful tool that can provide even the weakest of legislatures the opportunity to influence
policy decisions. Few policy goals can be achieved without some level of funding. As a result, the
ability of the legislature to withhold or decrease funding for initiatives sup- ported by the executive
branch can become a useful bargaining tool.’

Policy-making. There are several ways in which legislators can affect policy-making.
Kreppel distinguishes three main ways – consultation, delay and veto, amendment, and initiation.

According to Kreppel (2011:128), ‘the most basic, and generally least influential, type of
legislative is consultation. This power grants the legislature the authority to present an opinion
about a specific legislative proposal, general plan of action, or broad policy program. Consultation
in no way guarantees that the executive branch will abide by the opinion of the legislature. Yet, the
ability to present an opinion and to differentiate the views of the legislature from that of the executive
can be important in many contexts.’

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Box 3. 5. Ways of conducting oversight

Source: adopted from Kreppel 2011, p. 127

Delay and veto can be called a negative power of the legislature. De- lay can only slow
down the process of legislation, despite this, ‘the ability to delay passage of a proposal can be an
effective bargaining tool when the executive branch prefers rapid action’. Veto power can block
policies from being adopted regardless of the position of the executive. That’s why, according to
Kreppel, it can be an ‘effective bargaining tool for the legislature when the executive bargaining
tool for the legislature when the executive branch has a strong interest in changing the policy status
quo.’ (Keppel 2011:128).

Of course, the most important positive legislative tool is the right to amend and initiate
proposals. As Kreppel (2011:128) puts it, ‘the ability to substantively amend bills allows the
legislature to change aspects of the executive branch’s proposal to achieve an outcome more in
line with the preferences of a majority of its members. Frequent restrictions to amendment power
include limitations on the stage in the process at which amendments can be introduced (Spain),
the number of amendments that can be introduced (Austria), or the ability of the legislature to make
changes that would incur additional costs (Israel).’ However, according to Hague and Harrop
(2004:254), ‘legislation is rarely the function where ‘legislatures’ exert the most influence. At
national level legislatures must approve bills but effective control over legislation usually rests with
the government.’ It is difficult to note what functions of the legislature can be called central, or most
influential. For some legislatures (like the UK or Greece) over- sight functions are pre-eminent, but
on the other hand, in the US or Italy legislatures place far more emphasis on policy-making.

Structures of legislature

Every legislature has its internal structure. According to Keppel (2011:129), ‘that allows for
an effective division of labor, the development of specialized expertise, access to independent
sources of information, and other basic organizational resources.’

The number of chambers. The most obvious and important variation that exists between
legislatures is the number of chambers.

There is an ongoing debate about whether unicameralism is better than bicameralism, or


vice versa. More detailed arguments of both sides are presented in Box 3. 6.

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‘In most cases legislature have either one chamber (unicameral) or two (bicameral).
Multi-chamber legislatures are generally created to ensure adequate representation for
different groups within the political system. The lower (and usually larger) chamber provides
representation for the population as a whole, while the upper chamber represents specific
socially or territorially different groups. These can be political subunits such as states (US),
Länder (Germany), or cantons (Switzerland), or different groups of citizens such as aristocrats
(UK) or ethnicities (South Africa under apartheid). Unicameral legislatures are more likely to be
found in unitary political systems with comparatively homogeneous populations (such as
Scandinavia).’ (Keppel 2011:129).

Box 3. 6. One chamber or two?

Source: adapted from Newton and van Deth 2010, p. 78

Not only the number of chambers but also the relationship between them is very important.
‘In the unicameral system, all of the powers of the legislative branch are contained within the single
chamber. However, in bicameral systems these powers may be 1) equally shared (both chambers
can exercise all legislative powers), 2) equally divided (each chamber has specific, but more or less
equally important powers), or 3) unequally distributed (one chamber has significantly greater
powers than the other). The first two cases are considered symmetric bicameral systems, while the
latter are asymmetric bicameral systems.’ (Keppel 2011:129). Symmetric (also known as strong)
bi- cameralism may lead to serious conflict or even deadlock, that is why according to Newton and
van Deth (2010:79), ‘there are rather few cases of successful strong bicameralism.’ Most bicameral
systems are asymmetric (or weak). Typically, in such systems ‘the lower house initiates legislation
and controls financial matters and the upper house has limited powers to delay and recommend
amendments’ (Newton and van Deth 2010:79). The two-chamber structure also raises the question
of how second the chamber should be chosen. According to Hague and Harrop (2004:249), ‘the

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three main methods are: direct election (used by 27 of 66 upper houses), indirect election through
regional or local governments (21/66), and appointment, usually by the government (16/66).’

Number, quality, and consistency of members

A few basic descriptive statistics, such as the size of the parliament, the length of a session,
or the extent of professionalism of members (that is are they allowed to maintain additional
employment) can also reveal a great deal about the political role and characteristics of the
legislature.

Table 3. 1. Size of legislatures (lower house) in some Central East European countries

For example, size is important, because it is harder to reach coherent decisions in large
and diverse parliaments. Hague & Harrop (2004:248) note, ‘With legislatures – unlike countries –
size rarely indicates strength. Rather the opposite applies: very large chambers are rendered
impotent by their inability to act as a cohesive body. By contrast, a very small chamber – say, under
100 – offers opportunities for all deputies to have their say in a collegial environment.’

Box 3. 7. Types of the parliamentary committee

Source: adopted from Hague & Harrop 2004, p. 251

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The rightsizing of the legislature is a frequently discussed issue in democratic countries,


especially in new democracies. The size of the legislature is usually measured according to cube-
root rule, i.e. a legislature should have several members equal to the cube-root of the population
being represented.

The length of sessions can also be an indicator of the role of the legislature in a political
system – ‘at one extreme is legislatures that are formally or functionally ‘in session’ more or less
year-round. On the other end of the spectrum are ‘part-time’ legislatures that meet for only a few
days of the year and must accomplish all of their pol- icy-making and oversight tasks during these
limited periods.’ (Keppel 2011:130).

Committees. According to Hague and Harrop (2004:250), ‘given the complexity of modern
politics, a powerful assembly needs a well-developed committee structure if it is to develop the
detailed expertise needed for real influence. Committees have become the working horses of
effective legislatures’. That is why the internal organization of almost all legislatures is based on
the committee system. However, there can be numerous variations that may exist between these
committees (see Box 3. 7).

According to Kreppel (2011:131):

One of the most important aspects of committees is their permanency. Committees


that are created on an ad hoc basis not only tend to be less efficiently organized, but their
members lack the opportunity to develop area-specific expertise or the contacts with external
actors that facilitate independent and informed decision-making. Given the size of most
legislatures committees often serve as a forum for the bulk of legislative activity, including the
bargaining and coalition-building that must often be achieved between (or even within), political
parties. The smaller size and less public nature of committees increase their utility as a forum
for these types of activities. However, if the committees are not permanent, they are unlikely to
provide the necessary level of stability required to reap these benefits.

According to Hague and Harrop (2004:252), ‘apart from the party system, the key to the
influence of committees lies in three factors: expertise, intimacy, and support.’ (see Box 3. 8.)

Box 3. 8. Influence of committees

Source: adopted from Hague & Harrop 2004, p. 252

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The order in which proposals move between full plenary and commit- tees is an indicator
of the role of committees in a particular legislature. According to Kreppel (2011:134), ‘if legislation
is fully vetted on the full floor before being sent to committees, committees are unlikely to play a
substantial role in policy-making. In contrast, when bills are reviewed and amended within the
committees first, the legislature is more likely to have a more substantial influence on policy
outcomes.’

Legislature’s power

According to Keppel (2011:135), ‘there are two aspects of legislature’s relative autonomy
that are important: the independence of the institution as a whole; and the independence of its
members individually.’

Institutional independence. The level of institutional autonomy of the legislature depends


on its relationship with the executive branch. In the fused power systems, legislative authority tends
to be central, while in the separation of powers systems legislative decision-making is
decentralized.

The impact of the interdependent relationship that exists between the executive and
legislature in fused-power systems is particularly important. The responsibility of the legislature
for both installing and maintaining the executive branch severely constrains its ability to pursue
independent legislative action. Majorities must remain comparatively stable in their support for
the executive and by extension the executive’s policy initiatives. In many (if not most) cases the
defeat of an executive initiative of even moderate significance is considered de facto vote of no
confidence with potential to force the resignation of government. The resulting instability,
including the potential for new legislative elections, makes such actions risky for legislatures in
fused-powers systems’ separation-of-powers systems do not place any of these restrictions on
the legislature. Because the executive branch is wholly distinct there is no need for the
legislature to maintain any form of support for it. The defeat of policy proposal from the
executive branch in the legislature has no capacity to impact the tenure of the executive branch
or the timing of legislative and the executive branches frees the legislature from the burden of
maintaining the executive in office. At the same time, it liberates both branches from any need
for ideological affinity or policy consensus. (Keppel 201:137)

Member independence. Two main factors indicate legislature mem- ber – party system
and electoral system. Depending on the party system, the party elites’ role in the re-election of
legislature members may be very different.

If candidate selection (or the ordering of the party lists) is controlled by the party elite,
those wishing to be re-elected must maintain the support of their party leaders. On the other
hand, in parties that allow local party organizations to select candidates or in which the ordering
of the party lists is either predetermined or decided by a broad spectrum of party members,
individual legislators will enjoy a comparatively high level of independence from party
leadership. In other words, the greater the party leadership’s control over a member’s re-
election, the smaller the member’s autonomy. (Keppel 2011:137)

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Electoral systems can also significantly influence members’ independence:

In single-member districts voters are generally asked to select between in- dividual
candidates, while in PR systems the choice is usually between political parties. The latter
method highlights the importance of parties and reinforces their primacy in mediating the
citizens-government relation- ship. In contrast, in candidate-centered elections the political and
personal attributes of the individual candidate are primary and, in some cases, may even
overshadow the significance of party affiliation. (Keppel 2011:138)

***

There is a variety of types of legislatures, differing on central function, power, size,


structure, etc. But ultimately there is no ‘best type’ of the legislature – there is no reason to propose
that legislature with two chambers or one chamber, more powerful or less influential should be
considered ‘better’ than the other. But it is important to under- stand what kind of legislatures exist,
what are the strengths and weaknesses of each model, how are they linked to other institutions,
and how they may affect the whole political system.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. What are the core tasks of a legislature in a democratic society?


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

2. How are the oversight and control functions of legislatures different in fused powers and
separation of powers systems?
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

3. Why are political parties influential in determining the autonomy of a legislature?


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

4. Explain the strengths and weaknesses of bicameral and unicameral systems.


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

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5. How can legislators affect the policy-making process?


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

6. Explain the difference between delegates and trustees.


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

7. What are the types of parliamentary committees?


__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

8. Why are legislatures generally better able to represent the interests of citizens than the
executive branch?
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FURTHER READINGS

Döring, H. (ed.) (1995) Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.

Döring, H., Halleberg, M. (eds.) (2004) Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior: Passage of Legislation
Across Western Europe. Alder- shot: Ashgate.

Kurian, G. Th., Longley, L. D., Melia Th. O. (1998) World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and
Legislatures. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.

Inter-Parliamentary Union (1986) Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference


Compendium. Aldershot: Gower House, 2nd edition.

Loewenberg, G., Patterson, S. (1979) Comparing Legislatures. Boston: Little Brown & Co.

Jewell, M. (1985) Handbook of Legislative Research. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Norton, Ph. (1999) Parliaments in Asia. London: Routledge.

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WEBLINKS

Inter-Parliamentary Union’s websites of national parliaments www.ipu.org/english/parlweb.htm

Electionworld. org’s Parliaments around the world website www.electionworld.org/parliaments.htm

C-span.org’s clearing house of televised legislatures and legislature websites from around the
world. www.c-span.org

Congressional Quarterly Press electronic version of the Political Handbook of the World.
www.cqpress.com/procuct/Political-Handbook-of-the-World-2000.html

REFERENCES

Kreppel, A. (2011) Legislatures // Caramani., D. (ed.) Comparative Politics. 2nd (ed.). New York:
Oxford University Press. p. 121–140. Newton, K. & van Deth, J. (2010) Foundations of
Comparative Politics: Democracies of the Modern World. 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge
University Press.

Hague, R. &Harrop, M. (2004) Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction. 6th (ed.).
Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carey, J. M. (2006) Legislative organization// Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, S. A., Rockman, B. A. (ed.)
The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford University Press. p. 431–451.

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LESSON 5

THE EXECUTIVE

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this lesson, the student must be able to:

1. Acknowledge that within the institutional structure of modern states/political systems the
executive branch of government occupies a central position to be perceived
synonymously with ‘the government’ or ‘the state’ itself.

MAIN REFERENCE

Krupavicius, A. et al. 2013. Introduction to Comparative Politics: Didactical Guidelines.


Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

CONTENT

• Definitions
• Evolution of the separation of powers and contemporary types of government
• Government functions and autonomy of action
• The political capacity and effectiveness of government
• Internal composition and decision-making of government: theoretical models

Within the institutional structure of modern states/political systems, the executive branch
of government occupies a central position to be perceived synonymously with ‘the government’ or
‘the state’ itself. As Wolfgang Müller notes (2011: 142), a broad definition of government includes
all public institutions that make or implement political decisions – the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. Most common, however, is to refer to a country’s central political executive as
‘the government’’ and so it will occasionally be done in this chapter. Although in common parlance
the term ‘government’ implies a collective agency, the executive power can be vested with
individual actors (presidents, prime ministers, dictators, governing monarchs, etc.) as well as
collectives (cabinets of ministers, Swiss Bundesrat, etc.). In some cases, there can even be a ‘dual
executive’ with the president (or a relatively powerful monarch) and prime minister sharing the
executive power (Sodaro, 2008: 130).

According to Rod Hague and Martin Harrop (2004: 268), ‘the executive is any regime’s
energizing force, setting priorities, making decisions and supervising their implementation.
Governing without an assembly or judiciary is perfectly feasible but ruling without an executive is
impossible.’ Although a particular government’s powers and ability to control political outcomes
vary across cases and according to established institutional rules and practices:

Even weak governments tend to be the political system’s most important single political
actor. This is a major reason why individuals and political parties mostly want to be in
government.

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And because government is so important, positions in the central executive tend to


come with other goods that make them even more attractive: social prestige, decent income,
public recognition, and privileged access to other powerful and/or famous people. The chance
to govern the country and enjoy these privileges is meant to motivate the best people to
compete for government office. In democracies, such competition ultimately is tied to elections.
Either the government is directly elected, or it is responsible to a parliament that results from
general elections (Müller, 2011: 142).

Even more privileged and powerful are the executives in the authoritarian (not to mention
totalitarian) regimes. In the words of Hague and Harrop (2004: 268), the very ‘categories of
democracy and authoritarian rule are defined by how the executive operates. Established
democracies have succeeded in subjecting executive power to constitutional limits. In an
authoritarian regime, by contrast, constitutional and electoral controls are either unacknowledged
or ineffective. The scope of the executive is limited by political realities but not by the constitution.’
All in all, the powers and operational modes of the executive branch of government are determined
by how well and in what particular fashion the principle of the separation of powers is implemented.

Definitions

A textbook definition of the political executive is implied by the term itself (exsequi means
‘carry out’ or ‘implement’ in Medieval Latin) and it is essentially tied to the principle of the separation
of powers. It is ‘the branch of government concerned with implementing domestic and foreign policy
and applying the law’ (The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought, 2007: 232–233)
adopted by the legislative branch. However, being the single most powerful actor in modern political
systems the government assumes a much greater role and has developed functional capacities
beyond pure implementation. Kenneth Newton and Jan van Deth (2010:75) provide the fol- lowing
definition: ‘the executive [is] the branch of government mainly responsible for initiating
governmental actions, making and implementing public policy, and coordinating the activities of the
state.’

Hague and Harrop (2004:268) offer a similar definition, however, putting special emphasis
on the political mobilization and leadership potential of the executive as the perceived embodiment
of the state/nation. They define it as ‘the top tier of government that directs the nation’s affairs,
supervises the execution of policy, mobilizes support for its goals and offers crisis leadership.’ As
the primary institution that represents the whole nation and sets its political course, the central
executive is bound to view things from a national standpoint as opposed to parochial. In the words
of Mathew Shugart and John Carey (1992: 3–4):

Legislative assemblies, or at least lower houses of assemblies, are intended to be


representative of the population. A typical democratic assembly is elected for the purpose of
giving voice to the interests of localities or to the diversity of ideological or other partisan
divisions in the polity. That is, assemblies are ordinarily expected to be parochial in nature.
Executives, on the other hand, are charged with acting to address the policy questions that
affect the broader interest of the nation, as well as to articulate national goals.

Although the few men and women at the apex of the executive apparatus (presidents,
members of the cabinet) are usually the best known to the public and are considered the most
powerful, it is beyond their human capacities to run the whole country on their own. The top
government officials inevitably rely on lower-rank executive officers (civil servants) to put their
decisions into practice. Some of them are more important than others in carrying out the definitive

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functions of the executive. Rod A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, therefore, coined the term
‘core executive’ which they define as ‘all those organizations and structures which primarily serve
to pull together and integrate central government policies or act as final arbiters within the executive
of conflicts between different elements of the government machine’ (Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1990:
4). According to Müller (2011: 142):

It is difficult to pin down the precise composition of the core executive. While the
government in the narrow sense constitutes its center, the core executive also comprises top
civil servants, the key members of ministers’ private cabinets, and a list of actors that varies
over time and space. Realistically, the demarcation line between what constitutes the core and
what belongs to the remaining parts of the executive also depends on the analyst’s perspective
and judgement.

The main point, however, is that, unlike the legislative branch, the executive – even the
core of it – by definition, includes not only politicians elected by popular vote, but also unelected
officials holding their office based on professional performance.

Evolution of the separation of powers and contemporary types of government

As it has already been mentioned above, modern executives historically owe their position
within a state’s institutional structure to the separation of powers doctrine:

Today’s governments emerged through the piecemeal splitting-off of the state functions
from a traditionally undivided central government – mostly a monarch. In other to limit the
government’s power, judicial functions were transferred to courts, and legislative functions to
parliaments. This process began in 12th- and 13th-century England. It had many national
variations and, in Europe, was not completed before the 20th century. The constitution- al
doctrine of the separation of powers – as developed first and foremost by the political
philosophers Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison – provided a normative justification for the
separation of legislative, judicial, and executive institutions in order to guarantee liberty and
justice (Müller, 2011: 142).

Throughout history, however, different polities arrived at qualitatively different


‘constitutional designs’ to institute the separation of powers. In their seminal book, ‘Presidents and
Assemblies’ Shugart and Carey (1992: 1–17) suggest that the choice of a particular constitutional
design was historically first centered on the question of preserving the institution of hereditary
monarchy. The initial model of an executive without a monarch was the American Presidency which
was ironically designed to emulate the British executive:

The Framers of the US Constitution did not even contemplate an executive responsible
to the representative assembly. Indeed, such a type, which we would now know as
parliamentarism, had yet to exist. In Britain, the cabinet was still the responsibility of the
monarch, whose authority, of course, did not rest upon any connection, direct or indirect, with
the electorate. Thus, the Framers were in effect replicating the essentials of a form of
government that then existed in Britain only with the ‘monarch’’ i.e., the President] popularly
legitimated (Shugart and Carey, 1992: 5–6).

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Therefore, historically the first type of executive was in essence the ‘presidential’
government (although the chief executive was not directly elected in any country before the
adoption of the US Constitution).

Scholars typically identify three ‘versions’ of the separation of powers: parliamentarism,


pure presidentialism, and semi-presidentialism. The distinctions across democratic regimes
center around the process of selecting the executive and legislative branches, and the way in
which the executive and legislature subsequently interact to make policy and ad- minister [state
affairs] (Samuels, 2007: 704–705).

More precisely, Robert Elgie singles out three criteria that the classification of
contemporary government regimes is primarily based on.

The first characteristic which serves to distinguish regime types concerns the
procedures for electing political leaders i.e. the chief executives]. Most notably, it concerns the
issue of whether political leaders assume office by way of some process of direct or quasi-direct
popular election or as a result of the direct or quasi-direct approval of the legislature. The
second characteristic concerns the procedures for dismissing political leaders. It concerns the
issue of whether political leaders remain in office for a fixed term during which time they cannot
be removed from power or whether they remain in office only for so long as they have the
confidence of others. What is important is whether or not the chief executive – usually meaning
the prime minister – is responsible to the legislature or whether or not the executive as a whole
is subject to this requirement. The third characteristic which serves to distinguish regime types
concerns the constitutional and political powers of political leaders (Elgie, 1998: 221–222).

Box 4. 1. Government creation and accountability under different regime types

Source: Müller, 2011: 311

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Based on these three characteristics political scientists can develop an infinite number of
classifications, the ideal types, however, always being parliamentary, presidential, and semi-
presidential governments. Box 4.1 shows the definitive characteristics of these ideal types. The box
also includes two contemporary systems of government that have exceptional characteristics and
therefore are best classified as distinct types. These are the directorial government of Switzerland
and the system with a directly elected prime minister, which is a significant modification of
parliamentarism but in practice, has seldom been applied (except in Israel from 1996 to 2003).

Government functions and autonomy of action

The very definition of the executive branch of government suggests its main functions and
scope of responsibility within modern political systems. According to Newton and van Deth
(2010:75):

The executive branch of government, being at the top of the political pyramid, performs
three main functions:

1. Decision-making – initiating government action and formulating public policy;


2. Implementation – executives implement (apply) their policies, which means they must also
run the main departments and bureaucracies of state;
3. Coordination – coordination and integration of the complex affairs of state.

The actions of the central executive, however, cannot be analyzed in isolation from its
environment. In carrying out its functions the government can be an agent of a more powerful actor
within the given polity. In political science literature, two ‘lenses’ are more prevalent than others in
defining the autonomy of a particular government: those are government–party and government–
bureaucracy relations.

Government autonomy: the party dimension. According to Müller (2011: 147):

it is the electoral connection that makes governments democratic, and it is political


parties which play a crucial role in structuring elections, even when the electoral system allows
the choice of individual candidates. Modern democracies, therefore, have party governments
in a general sense. Yet, what role parties have after the elections is subject to normative and
empirical discussions.

In other words, whereas the term ‘party government’ marks an ideal model of full party
control over government, empirically it is possible to speak of different extents to which the goals
and policies of the executive are based on their party line. Here one particular index – that of the
‘partyness of government’ proposed by Richard Katz – is worth mentioning. According to Katz
(1986: 45), this variable ‘indicates the proportion of formal governmental power exercised following
the ideal model of party government. To the extent that system is high in partyness of government,
what formal government there is will be party government.’ He also singles out several
characteristics of a political system that determine the partyness of the executive:

1. Presidential or parliamentary government. Party government is more likely in parliamentary


systems because a parliamentary cabinet needs a continuous majority of those voting to remain
in office. Party is a device by means of which stable majorities may be achieved. Presidential
government, on the other hand, makes personalism more likely.

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A president, with the resources of the state at his command, the status and visibility of head of
state and head of government, and the security of a fixed term is likely to think of himself as
separate from and independent of his party. Directly elected presidents tend to appoint officials
with weak or no party ties.

2. Integration and centralization. Decentralized government also makes the centralization of


the party more difficult to maintain. This is especially so if the basis of decentralization is
geographic. Implementation of policies initiated at one level may depend on cooperation of
officials at another level where government has a different partisan complex- ion. Responsibility
[to the party] is naturally obscured.

3. Electoral system. Various aspects of the electoral system should have an impact on the level
of party government. Probably the most significant is the presence or absence of some form of
intraparty electoral choice. In some systems, voters can choose only parties; the choice of the
particular individuals who will be elected if their parties are victorious is an internal party
decision. In other systems, however, voters either can influence or entirely determine the choice
of persons. It gives a successful candidate an independent base; not owing his election only to
the party, he has less reason to be loyal to it. Electoral systems in which the choice of
candidates may cut across party lines – single transferable vote, PR with panachage, or the
open primary – should be particularly inhibitive of party government.

4. Size of the public sector. Enlargement of the public sector is likely to decrease the partyness
of government. Firstly, a large public sector makes the ruling party more dependent on outside
experts. Secondly, the larger the sphere of government activity, the more difficult will be the
problem of coordination and the greater degree of bureaucratic uncontrollability [as such].
Thirdly, expansion of government gives more groups a greater stake in politics, but many of
these groups are rivals for party. Fourthly, as more of the economy comes under public control,
the need for stability, the party’s desire to evade responsibility if things go wrong, all grow. This
has led to the creation of nonpartisan boards of executive control, for example, in banking and
nationalized industries.

5. Private [as opposed to public] government. To maintain the collective responsibility that is
the hallmark of party government is easier if the public is denied access to intraparty decision-
making. Unable to attribute blame to any particular individual or faction, the voters are
encouraged to reward or punish the party as a whole. This, in turn, gives each member of the
party a stake in the success of its policies, even if he opposes them personally.

6. Input, representation, and communication. When party is the primary channel for public
participation, demand articulation and aggregation, and communication from leaders to
followers, party government will be stronger. Where other structures, e.g., mass media and
interest groups, share in performing these functions, party control over politics will be weaker.
In particular, if the party is sufficiently in control of communication to control the political agenda,
party government will be stronger.

7. Bureaucratic anonymity. Bureaucrats are both potential rivals for party politicians and
potential scapegoats for their failures. Party government is furthered when politicians cannot
avoid responsibility by blaming the bureaucracy and bureaucrats are more likely to implement
policies they personally oppose if they know they will not suffer for efforts made. Party
government is undermined whenever the bureaucrats can appeal around their political masters
directly to the public or to a powerful interest group clientele.

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8. Social segmentation. Where each party represents a clearly discernable interest, segment,
class, or viewpoint within society, party unity will be easier to maintain, the distinction between
parties will be clearer, and party government will be more likely (Katz, 1986: 55–59).

Presidentialization of politics. The most recent academic debate concerning government


autonomy (first and foremost vis-à-vis political parties) is centered on the idea of the
presidentialization of politics. As R. A. W. Rhodes suggests (2006: 327):

It is difficult to overstate the scale of this debate in the academic literature. It refers to
three main claims: there has been a centralization of coordination, a pluralization of advice, and
the personalization of party leadership and elections.

In simple terms, the concept of presidentialization ‘means the strengthening of the chief
executive which affects the internal working of the executive, the running of political parties, and
the functioning of the electoral process’ (Müller, 2011: 148). The most systematic treatment of the
concept in comparative research has been put forward by Thomas Poguntke, Paul Webb, and
collaborators (2005). According to their framework, the empirical inquiry of the presidentialization
phenomenon starts with:

Two crucially important political arenas: the political executive of the state (for
governing parties) and the political party itself (for all parties). Thus, one way in which we might
expect to find evidence of presidentialization of power would be through a shift in intra-executive
power to the benefit of the head of government – whether this is a prime minister or a president.
At the same time, executives as a whole would become increasingly independent of direct
interference from ‘their’ parties. While partified government [as described above] means
governing through par- ties, presidentialized government implies governing past parties. This
brings us to the third face of presidentialization, which concerns electoral processes. Again, it
involves a shift from partified control to the ‘personalized’ or ‘candidate-centered’ campaigns of
certain leaders and the growing significance of leader effects in voting behavior (Poguntke and
Webb, 2005: 8–10).

To sum up, although the presidentialization of politics – where it is evident – implies a


greater government autonomy vis-à-vis parties, it also involves a greater personal power of the
chief executive vis-à-vis the rest of the government and his/her party.

Government autonomy: the bureaucratic dimension. While the concept of party


government describes a certain party control over the executive, the term bureaucratic government
denotes a similar influence from the part of the state bureaucracy. As Müller puts it (2011: 149):

The idea of bureaucratic government rests on the assumption that such a small group
cannot run the whole show and critically depends on the permanent bureaucracy. Bureaucrats
can set the agenda of their political masters by identifying problems that need to be addressed;
[thus] they can limit political choices by presenting a narrow set of alternatives and by
undermining the viability of ideas that run counter to the department’s common wisdom. Such
ideas are labelled, for instance, as not workable, too expensive, having huge undesirable side
effects, etc.

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Under the strong bureaucratic influence, the politicians may continue to dominate the public
stage so that they seem to be the decisive actors, but they are often just ‘flying the flag’ of policies
thoroughly worked out by their subordinates.

The political capacity and effectiveness of government

Whatever the influence on government policy-making, the implementation of those policies


is not always plain sailing, and its effects are not always anticipated. The policy success of any
particular government is always dependent upon certain economic, social, and political conditions.
The scope of this section does not allow us to discuss the former two sets of factors, although the
state of the global economy, the investment decisions of private firms, and the reaction of citizens
and interest groups to government decisions, often turning to mass strikes and popular unrest, can
bring any executive to its knees. What follows next is first and foremost an overview of political
conditions under which governments can theoretically find themselves working.

Majority vs. minority government. Governments that are supported by the majority of
members of the legislature (at least 50% of the seats plus one) are not only better positioned to
enact their political program, but – in the case of parliamentary and semi-presidential systems –
can be more secure about their very survival. Governments that do not enjoy such support – so-
called minority governments – are not, however, an uncommon phenomenon. They are neither
less stable nor less effective than majority cabinets (see Table 4. 1.).

Table 4. 1. Cabinet majority status, duration (1945–2007), and government


effectiveness index* (1996–2008)

Source: Müller, 2011: 152, 159 (*produced by the World Bank. possible scores lie
between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher scores indicate the better outcome of government policies)

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In his book-length study ‘Minority Government and Majority Rule’ (1990) Kaare Strøm
proposed and empirically verified several theoretical assumptions why the party forming the
government would not seek to include additional parties to share cabinet portfolios so that
parliamentary majority would be secured, and why the remaining parties would be disinterested in
joining the government:

A parliamentary majority need not be a functional requisite for government formation.


At the same time political parties are not motivated solely by office / power considerations, but
also to a significant extent by opportunities for policy influence. One need not hold government
office in order to gain policy influence, much less pleasing policy outcomes. Even opposition
parties can enjoy some policy influence in most parliamentary democracies. Finally, full
explanation requires that we investigate the costs of holding office as well. The typical trade-off
parties face is between power (and policy influence) now and electoral success in the future.
The reason this temporal trade-off exists is that government incumbency typically represents
an electoral disadvantage, which we can call the incumbency effect. Several empirical studies
have shown that governing parties do in fact tend to lose votes in subsequent elections (Strøm,
1990: 38–46).

Yet some policy initiatives (e. g. constitutional reforms) require the support of a qualified
majority (e. g. 2/3 of the seats) in the parliament which is almost impossible to achieve on an ad
hoc basis, so the cabinet majority status does affect a government’s political capacity in a major
way.

Unified vs. Divided Government. To put it simply, divided government means that the
presidency is held by one party and at least one of the two chambers of the legislature by another;
unified government, in turn, signifies a situation when all three are under the control of the same
party. According to Mathew Shugart (1995: 327):

Divided government has been a common occurrence in the United States. A substantial
[academic] literature has developed, mostly arguing that divided government leads to
undesirable policies and interbranch stalemates. Surprisingly there has been no or very little
literature specifically devoted to divided government in other presidential systems. In two-party
system, like that of the United States, a president lacking a compartisan majority in one or both
legislative chambers is the same as a president facing an opposition majority. However, in the
multiparty systems, typical of other presidential systems, these phenomena must be kept
conceptually distinct. The term „divided government’ refers only to those situations in which a
legislative majority is held by a party that is different to that of the president. A situation in which
no party holds a legislative majority suggests the category of no-majority. It is useful to keep it
distinct, as it includes phases in which the chief executive’s usually president’s party, albeit a
minority in the legislature, may be a part of most legislative coalitions along with one or more
other parties. No-majority situations are much more common than divided government in
presidential systems outside the United States. Party system variables are obviously important.

Although the concepts of unified and divided governments were invented by political
scientists investigating the US political system – which is the finest example of presidentialism –
according to Robert Elgie (2001: 5), ‘the arithmetical definition of divided government does have its
logical equivalent in non-presidential regimes. In the case of parliamentary regimes, it corresponds
to minority governments. In the case of semi-presidential regimes, it corresponds to periods of
‘cohabitation’, or split-executive government’, when the presidency and the parliamentary majority
(usually delegating the prime minister) are controlled by different parties. However, the terms
‘unified’ and ‘divided’ government are not normally used outside the context of presidentialism.

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Single-Party vs. Coalition Government. Unlike the concepts of minority and divided
government that refer to the arithmetic of parliamentary support to the executive, the difference
between single-party and coalition governments primarily concerns intra-governmental cohesion.

Single-party governments have the distinctive advantage that no party line of division
runs through the government. That implies that the government goals will be relatively
uncontroversial internally, they can make decisions quickly, avoid foul compromises, and
maintain a common front. Coalition governments, in turn, need to satisfy at least some of the
ambitions of each of the government parties. This typically lengthens the internal decision-
making process and often exposes internal divisions to the public. The alternative of one party
quietly submitting would allocate the costs of coalition one-sidedly: that party would be
considered to be selling out to its coalition partner(s) by its activists and voters. These problems
tend to remain modest in ideo- logically homogeneous coalitions but accelerate in
heterogeneous ones (Müller, 2011: 154).

Despite a higher propensity towards internal quarrels, coalition governments do not last
significantly shorter than single-party cabinets (see Table 4. 2.). The latter often have their reasons
to end their term beforehand, for example, because of a high chance of winning in an early election.

Table 4. 2. Party composition of the government and cabinet duration (1945–2007)

Source: Müller, 2011: 154

Internal composition and decision-making of government: theoretical models

This final section will focus on the internal process of government decision-making and
power relations among the members of the (core) executive, thus leaving aside any external
influences discussed above.

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The constitutional texts are typically silent about the internal working of government,
much is left to the political actors. Over time conventions may establish themselves.
Conventions are normative rules that are generally respected although they are not backed up
by law or other formally binding rules. Political science has established a number of descriptive
models of government. These models are partly derived from the constitutional order, but try to
highlight how the government actually works and arrives at decisions. The following models
thus capture which actor or actors are typically able to leave their imprint on the outcome of the
government decision-making process to a greater extent than others (Müller, 2011: 144).

The main actors that can be identified within the core) the executive is the chief executive
(i.e. the president or prime minister), the cabinet as a collective body, and ministers as
representatives of their departmental expertise; although different political scientists may give
different names to theoretical models of executive politics, ‘an exhaustive set of models must
capture the full range of power relations that may logically occur amongst this set of actors’ (Elgie,
1997: 222).

Monocratic government. According to Robert Elgie (1997: 222):

Monocratic government may be defined as the exercise of personal leadership. It has


two variants, presidential government and prime ministerial government, the latter also
corresponding to equivalent terms, such as chancellor democracy in Germany. Clearly, in
parliamentary monarchies the former [term] is inappropriate, while in regimes where there are
only figurehead presidents, such as Austria, Germany, Iceland, Ireland and Italy, it may be
unlikely ever to apply. Nevertheless, there is still a need for two variants because of the
experience of certain semi-presidential regimes, such as France, Finland, and Poland where a
monocratic leadership may be exercised at one time by the president and at other time by prime
minister. Whatever the variant, it remains the case that this model is characterized by a
generalized ability by the president or prime minister to decide policy across all issue areas in
which he or she takes an interest; by deciding key issues which subsequently determine most
remaining areas of government policy. In this situation the cabinet is a mainly residual
organization in all policy areas, and the individual ministers are generally agents of the
president’s or prime minister’s will.

Collective/cabinet government. Governments that deliberate and arrive at their most


important decisions collectively are historically typical of parliamentary monarchies since the
strengthening of prime ministers was for a long time withheld by monarchs. Theoretically ‘collective
government may be defined as continuing political leadership structures and practices through
which significant decisions are taken in common by a small, face-to-face body usually a cabinet of
ministers with no single member dominating their initiation or determination. Under this model, no
individual is in a position to direct the decision-making process and all decision-makers have more
or less equal influence’ (Elgie, 1997: 223). Although, as Müller argues (2011: 145):

Classical cabinet government is a thing of the past, a number of authors have identified
important issues that are still decided by the cabinet in substance and have stressed the role
of the cabinet as ‘court of appeal’ for both minsters radically out of sympathy with a general
line, and for a premier confronted by a ministerial colleague who insists on ploughing her or his
furrow. If a cabinet fulfils these functions, i.e., deliberates and decides important issues and
also functions as court of appeal, then we can speak of post-classical cabinet government.

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Ministerial Government. Contrary to power concentrated in the hands of the chief


executive or the cabinet acting as a single body, the model of ministerial government describes a
situation where the decision-making power is dispersed among individual cabinet members
according to their departmental field of responsibility. In the words of Michael Laver and Kenneth
Shepsle (1994: 8), ‘individual ministers, under their positions as the political heads of the major
departments of state, can have a significant effect on policy in areas that fall under their jurisdiction.
This entails a ‘division- and specialization-of-labor arrangement’ with the cabinet humbly ratifying
departmentally ‘precooked’ decisions.

Shared Government. In addition to the ideal types of monocratic, collective and ministerial
government, several mixed models can be identified across cases, with the shared government
being a common pattern. As Elgie puts it (1997: 224–225):

Shared government is a mixed system in which a highly restricted number of people – two
or three individuals and rarely more – have joint and equal decision-making responsibilities. It may
occur both in semi-presidential regimes between the president and prime minister, or in
parliamentary regimes between the prime minister and the deputy prime minister. It may also occur
in either of these regimes between the president / prime minister and a senior minister, such as the
finance minister; or between a ‘troika’’ consisting of, say, the president / prime minister, finance
minister, and foreign affairs minister. The main task of other political actors will be to implement
and publicly defend decisions made by these people.

An observable long-term transition from collective governments to monocratic or ministerial


governments worldwide suggests that government working modes are not fixed and depend on
several factors: the personality of the chief executive, cabinet coalition status (single-party
governments are more likely to become monocratic than coalition cabinets), and the peculiarity of
issues on the government’s agenda.

***

The executive branch of government is the single most important actor in modern-day
political systems. Although according to the separation of powers doctrine the executive is
nominally entrusted with implementation tasks only, modern governments tend to assume as many
functions as to determine the very direction a country will take. This is especially characteristic to
polities where cohesive political parties allow the fusion of executive and legislative powers. This
chapter has been primarily concerned with how and under what conditions modern governments
carry out their functions.

First, the autonomy of government decisions and actions can be prominently restricted by
political parties and state bureaucratic apparatus since the members of the central executive
ultimately rely on their parties for re-election and bureaucrats for policy resources. Secondly, the
effective functioning of any government and its capacity to arrive at important decisions depends
on the political support from other political actors, first and foremost the legislature. The executive
is empowered to act in the majority or unified government situations and less politically capable
when faced with only minority support or divided government. Another major factor in terms of
government’s capabilities is cabinet coalition status, although empirical data show that coalition
governments are just as stable as single-party cabinets. The last dimension that describes
governments is their internal working; political scientists normally single out at least three ideal
models of government decision-making – monocratic, collective, and ministerial – as well as some
mixed modes of working. These modes, however, are bound to change according to the prevailing
political conditions and the century-long transition from cabinet to prime ministerial or ministerial
government in parliamentary democracies worldwide is probably the most prominent long-term
trend.

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SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. How throughout the course of history did the modern institution of executive power come into
being?
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2. What is the ‘core executive’?


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3. What functions does the executive branch of government usually carry within modern political
systems?
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4. What are the main forms of government in democratic regimes and how are they distinguished?
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5. Which actors limit the autonomy of government action and under what conditions is a party
government likely to appear?
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6. What features define the presidentialization of politics?


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7. Why do minority governments form?


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8. What kind of government is theoretically most stable and effective?


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9. What are the main models of executive decision-making?


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10. What factors determine the change in government working mode?


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FURTHER READINGS

On presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential governments:

Lijphart, A. (ed.) (1992) Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press.

Elgie, R. (ed.) (1999) Semi-Presidentialism in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press.

On party government:

Blondel, J., Cotta, M. (ed.) (2000) The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European
Perspective. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

On divided, coalition, and minority governments:

Elgie, R. (ed.) (2001) Divided Government in Comparative Perspective. New York: Oxford
University Press.

Müller, W., Strøm, K. (eds.). (2000) Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

Strøm, K. (1990) Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cam- bridge, New York: Cambridge
University Press.

On different models of executive politics:

Laver, M., Shepsle, K. (eds.). (1994) Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government. New York:
Cambridge University Press.

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On the cabinet–core executive nexus:

Rhodes, R. A. W. & Dunleavy, P. (eds.). (1995) Prime Minister, Cabinet, and Core Executive.
London: Macmillan.

WEBLINKS

Basic introduction to the presidential system:


http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/presidential%20system Basic introduction to
parliamentarism: http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Parliamentarism Webpage of
Governments on the WWW: http://www.gksoft.com/govt/

REFERENCES

Müller, W. (2011) Governments and Bureaucracies // Caramani., D. (ed.) Comparative Politics. 2nd
(ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 141–161.

Dunleavy, P. & Rhodes, R. A. W. (1990) Core Executive Studies in Britain // Public Administration,
Vol. 68, No. 1. p. 3-28.

Elgie, R. (1997) Models of Executive Politics: A Framework for the Study of Executive Power
Relations in Parliamentary and Semi- presidential Regimes // Political Studies, Vol. 45, No.
2. p. 217–231.

Elgie, R. (1998) The Classification of Democratic Regime Types: Conceptual Ambiguity and
Contestable Assumptions // European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 33, No. 2. p. 219–
238.

Elgie, R. (2001) What is Divided Government? // Elgie, R. (ed.) Divided Government in Comparative
Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 1–20.

Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004) Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction. 6th (ed.).
Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Katz, R. (1986) Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception // Castles, F. G. & Wildenmann, R.


(eds.). Visions and Realities of Party Government. Berlin: de Gruyter. p. 31–71.

Laver, M. & Shepsle, K. (eds.). (1994) Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government. New
York: Cambridge University Press. Newton, K. & van Deth, J. (2010) Foundations of
Comparative Politics: Democracies of the Modern World. 2nd (ed.). New York: Cam- bridge
University Press.

Poguntke, T. & Webb, P. (eds.). (2005) The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of
Modern Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (2006) Executives in Parliamentary Government // Rhodes, R. A. W.; Binder, S.;


Rockman, B. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. New York: Oxford
University Press. p. 323–343.

Samuels, D. (2007) Separation of Powers // Boix, C. & Stokes, S. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 703–726.

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Scruton, R. (2010) The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought. 3rd (ed.). Basingstoke,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Shugart, M. S. (1995) The Electoral Cycle and Institutional
Sources of Divided Presidential Government // American Political Science Review, Vol. 89,
No. 2. p. 327–343.

Shugart, M. S. & Carey, J. (1992) Presidents, and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral
Dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sodaro, M. J. (2008) Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction. 3 rd (ed.). New York [etc.]:
McGraw-Hill.

Strøm, K. (1990) Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cam- bridge, New York: Cambridge
University Press.

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LESSON 6

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND ELECTIONS

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this lesson, the student must be able to:

1. Argued that the government works at its best when the masses are allowed to participate
for example: voting in elections, helping a political campaign, giving money to a candidate
or cause, writing to or calling officials, petitioning, boycotting, demonstrating, and working
with other people on issues.

MAIN REFERENCE

Krupavicius, A. et al. 2013. Introduction to Comparative Politics: Didactical Guidelines.


Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

CONTENT

• Understanding political participation


• Modes and factors of political participation
• Elections and electoral systems

More than two thousand years ago Aristotle noted that a citizen is not a citizen because he
lives in a certain place, but the citizen is a member of a community (Aristotelis, 1997: 133–134).
Moreover, he suggested that a citizen is someone who shares in the administration of justice and
the holding of public office, i. e. in the polis, assemblies of citizens made decisions in bodies whose
modern equivalents are law courts and city councils, and these assemblies rotated membership so
that every citizen served a specific term. Aristotle ultimately argued that just government works
best when the masses are allowed to participate.

Understanding political participation

In contemporary politics political participation refers to the activities of the mass public in
politics, including, for example, voting in elections, helping a political campaign, giving money to a
candidate or cause, writing to or calling officials, petitioning, boycotting, demonstrating, and working
with other people on issues.

Political participation is usually understood as an activity that is intended to influence


government action, either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or
indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies. Participation of individual,
collective, or institutional actors is a constituent feature of any kind of socio-political structures and
processes, including nation-states (Kaase, 2011).

However, scholars differ in their definitions of political participation. Huntington and Nelson
argued that by political participation we mean activity by private citizens designed to influence
government decision-making (Huntington, Nelson 1976: 3). Verba and his colleagues described
political participation as an activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action

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either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing
the selection of people who make those policies (Verba et al., 1995: 38). The restriction to private
citizens is meant to exclude from the concept activity undertaken in their official capacity by those
for whom politics and governing are a vocation. A few scholars (cf. Milbrath 1965) include political
involvement and activities to support the regime as participation. For these scholars, reading about
politics is also political participation, while under the dominant definition it is not since it does not
have direct effects on others. Verba et al. (1995) restrict their study of participation to voluntary
activity, which they define as follows: ‘by a voluntary activity we mean participation that is not
obligatory – no one is forced to volunteer – and that receives no pay or only token financial
compensation’ (Verba et al, 1995: 38–39).

Well-known comparativists as Hague, Harrop, and Breslin noticed that:

‘Political participation is activity by individuals formally intended to influence who


governs or the decisions taken by those who do so. In a liberal democracy, people can choose
whether to get involved in politics, to what extent and through what channels. For most people,
formal participation is confined to voting at national elections; more demanding acts, such as
belonging to a party, have become less common. However, less conventional participation
through social movements and promotional groups demonstrates a continuing interest in
political issues. Participation is also found in some non-democratic regimes. Totalitarian states
required citizens to engage in regimented demonstrations of support for the government. Other
non-democratic regimes often demand at least a facade of participation though this too is
manipulated so that it supports rather than threatens the existing rulers.
(http://www.palgrave.com/politics/hague/site/dictionary/search.asp#L)

In democratic societies, the voluntary nature of citizens’ political participation means that
anyone who does not wish to participate will not. In this context, many researchers speak about
political involvement as an individual psychological predisposition for political actions. It is an
empirical question as to what extent and under which conditions political involvement precedes
political action. Jan van Deth (2008) proposed, based on 19 countries in Round 1 of the European
Social Survey, four separate elements of the involvement concept: 1) political interest, 2) frequency
of engaging in political discussions with friends and family, 3) the personal importance of politics,
and 4) the saliency of politics (politics is the most important of the seven life domains).

According to Newton and van Deth, among the forty-five countries surveyed in 1999-2002,
an average of 45 percent of citizens described themselves as ‘very or somewhat interested in
politics. Of the democracies, the highest placed were Austria, the Czech Republic, Israel, The
Netherlands, Norway, and the USA (80–66 percent). The lowest places were Argentina, Chile,
Finland, Portugal, and Spain (all below 30 percent). On average, 75 percent of people across forty-
three countries claimed to discuss politics ‘frequently’ or ‘occasion- ally’ with their friends. The
highest placed were East Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (all new democracies, 90
percent or more), and the lowest were Belgium, Italy, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey
(less than 60 percent). Feelings of personal effectiveness are frequently crucial for taking part in
political activities. In Round 5 of the European Social Survey in more than twenty countries in 2010-
2011 an average of 36 percent of the citizens surveyed or a minority indicated that ‘politics too
complicated to understand.’ In fourteen West European democracies in 1974–1990, between a
quarter and a third of the population had no interest and took no part in political life. Another 25–
40 percent were ‘active’ in the sense that they had an interest and did engage in some way in
political life (Newton and van Deth, 2005:153).

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Modes and factors of political participation

The most common explanation for long-term developments in political participation comes
from modernization theories advanced by Daniel Bell, Ronald Inglehart, and Russell Dalton, among
others, suggesting that common social trends such as rising standards of living, the growth of the
service sector, and expanding educational opportunities have swept through post-industrial
societies, contributing towards a new style of citizen politics in Western democracies. The
socioeconomic context represents one plausible determinant of dimensions of political
participation, like an inevitable tide sweeping across the globe, but significant comparative research
also highlights the importance of political institutions (Figure 5.1). The structure of opportunities for
civic engagement within each society may be shaped and influenced by the state and the
constitutional rules of the game, such as the type of majoritarian or proportional electoral system,
the level of competition and fragmentation in the party system, and the degree of pluralism or
corporatism in the interest group system, as well as by overall levels of democratization, and the
existence of political rights and civil liberties. Rosenstone and Hansen noticed that people
participate in politics not so much because of who they are but because of the political choices and
incentives they are offered, and the greater role political parties, trade unions and churches,
voluntary associations, and the news media play in activating citizens’ participation. But even within
particular contexts, some individuals are more actively engaged in public life than others. At the
individual level, various resources facilitate political action as education is one of the best predictors
of participation, furnishing cognitive skills and civic awareness that allow citizens to make sense of
the political world. The resources of time, money, and civic skills, derived from family, occupation,
and associational membership, make it easier for individuals who are predisposed to take part, to
do so. Participation also requires the motivation to become active in public affairs. Motivational
attitudes may be effective, meaning that these attitudes are related to the emotional sense of civic
engagement, for example, if people vote out of a sense of duty or patriotism (Norris, 2002: 10-18).

Many individuals, having an interest in politics, possessing sufficient amounts of political


information, and feeling politically effective is not enough to motivate them to participate and join
political organizations. Many individuals act as free-riders, while others choose to co-operate even
if facing the same cost and benefit structures. In addition to motivation, citizens need to be able to
participate: they need resources for political action. Political action is costly and participants,
therefore, need resources – whether economic, social, cognitive, or time-related. Moreover,
citizens do not act in a vacuum: most political activities are collective in nature and require
coordination and/or cooperation between several citizens (Morales: 15–16).

Figure 5. The theoretical framework of political participation

Source: Norris P., 2002: 10.

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Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) stated that many citizens do not engage in political
activities simply because nobody asked them. As they emphasize, recruitment and mobilization
initiatives are crucial for our understanding of political participation. In particular, one important
aspect of the recruitment and mobilization processes is that they frequently interact with individual
resources. Past research has shown that organizational strategies for political mobilization are
selective: the effectiveness of the mobilizing action is maximized by aiming it at people who are
most likely to respond positively (Rosenstone, Hansen 1993). The institutional opportunities for
participation that citizens have are also important because they frequently affect different types of
individuals differently (Morales: 19).

In the context of factors that encourage political participation individual attitudes and values
have essential importance. Trust between fellow citizens is said to be a crucial underlying condition
for democracy and participation. The World Values Studies showed that the less democratic a
system, the lower its social trust. Among the democracies, countries such as Argentina, Chile, the
Dominican Republic, and Ghana have comparatively low levels of social trust (10–20 percent),
whereas Canada, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have high scores (50–
65 percent). Satisfaction with democracy also stimulates political activity. In forty-nine countries
surveyed in 1999–2002, an average of 49 percent of people expressed satisfaction with democracy
in their country. The figures are much higher in democracies, but even so, they vary quite a lot. The
lowest placed are Croatia, Ireland, Lithuania, Northern Romania, and Slovakia (all below 30
percent), and the highest placed are Austria, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
and Portugal (all above 66 percent). Post-material values encourage political participation as well.
The highest levels of post-materialist values in the late 1990s were found in the comparatively
wealthy democracies of Argentina, Austria, Australia, Canada, Italy, and the USA (all above 25
percent), and the lowest in Estonia, Hungary, India, Israel, and Slovakia (all below 5 percent)
(Newton and van Deth, 2005: 146).

Ronald Inglehart in his classical book Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (1990:
361–362) found that:

‘Postmaterialists are more likely to engage in unconventional political protest than are
Materialists. Moreover, one’s values interact with cognitive mobilization in such a way that at
high levels of cognitive mobilization, the differences between value types are magnified
considerably. Among those with Materialist values and low levels of cognitive mobilization, only
12 per cent have taken part, or are willing to take part in a boycott or more difficult activity.
Among Postmaterialists with high levels of cognitive mobilization, 74 per cent have done so or
are ready to do. The process of cognitive mobilization seems to be increasing the potential for
elite-directing political action among Western publics.

In the seminal study Political Action, Samuel Barnes et al. (1979) spoke of an extended
repertory of political action available to citizens and coined the terms conventional and
unconventional political participation to combine the elitist and participatory theories of democratic
political participation. As major forms of conventional participation usually are named voting,
reading newspapers, watching TV news, talking about politics, joining a political group (voluntary
organization, party, or new social movement), involvement with a client body or advisory body for
public service (consumer council, school board), attending meetings, demonstrations, rallies,
contacting the media, elected representatives, or public officials, contributing money, volunteering
for political activity (organizing meetings, election canvassing), standing for political office, and
holding political office (Table 5. 1.). Unconventional participation means radical and direct action
including unofficial strikes, sit-ins, protests, demonstrations, civil disobedience, breaking laws for
political reasons, political violence.

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Table 5. 1. Political participation in selected countries

Source: The ESS5–2010 Edition 2.0 released on 28 March 2012

Conventional and unconventional dimensions of participation were positively correlated in


all countries, thereby suggesting an increase in the political action repertoire of citizens and not the
demise of liberal democracy. The most important antecedents of protest potential were high levels
of education and young age. On the other hand, the term unconventional participation is losing
meaning as through processes of socio-political change these acts have become a regular and
legitimate part of citizens’ action repertoires.

In today’s world, according to Newton and van Deth (2005: 153), the major forms of political
action are as follows:

• Direct action. Research shows that ‘protest behavior in the form of strikes, sit-ins, protests,
marches, and boycotts, is now a widely accepted part of the political repertoire of west
European citizens, but that only a very small minority (1–3 percent) engages in such
behavior.

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• Protest behavior. Among forms of direct action, signing a petition is the most frequent (an
average of 43 percent across forty nations in the early 1990s), followed by lawful
demonstrations (21 percent), boycotts (9 percent), unofficial strikes (6 percent), and the
occupation of buildings (2 percent).
• Revolutionary action. Among the democracies, no more than 2 percent of the Austrians,
Danes, Dutch, Japanese, Norwegians, and (West) Germans now believe in radical change
by revolutionary action, but the figures are much higher in the new democracies of Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and South Africa (19–32 percent)’.

However, participation in free, equal, and secret voting during democratic elections is the
most important form of political activity in democratic politics. Moreover, this action is a legitimating
mechanism by which representatives are chosen for a political office and they are entitled to take
major political decisions for a limited period. Mark Franklin’s comparative study Voter Turnout and
the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945 ad- dressed three
major questions: a) Why do people vote at all given that according to rational choice theory,
individual votes do not influence the aggregate outcome of elections? b) Is there a general decline
in turnout, and, if so, what can one learn concerning whether such a decline has happened because
of changing civic virtues and political disaffection? c) What are the major macro and micro-factors
that influence variations in turnout within and across countries (Mark Franklin, 2004)?

Looking retrospectively, it is possible to notice that voter turnout in established


democracies increased between 1950 and 1965 and since then has gradually declined until the
present period. André Blais (2007) calculated an 8-percentage-point decline for 106 countries and
a 9-percentage-point decline for 29 established democracies. Analysis by Franklin shed light on
the reasons for this decline in attributing it to three macro-developments: a) changes in the size of
the electorate through generational replacement with young cohorts less inclined to vote; b)
lowering of the voting age in many countries in the late 1960s, and c) the degree and nature of
party competition. On the other hand, declining trust in institutions decreases the civic-mindedness
of citizens, and disaffection with democracy does not contribute to the observed decline. Regarding
levels of turnout, there is a lot of path dependency in the sense that major ad hoc variations in
turnout are unlikely, due to stable institutional factors such as electoral laws, registration rules, or
compulsory voting (Kaase, 2011).

It is important to observe that turnout differences between European countries are


considerable. In some countries, i. e. In Austria, Belgium, or Italy, virtually everyone votes. In other
countries such as Switzer- land or Lithuania turnout barely reaches 50 percent. These differences
are especially visible between new and old democracies in Europe as voter turnout in new
democracies is considerably lower. (Table 5. 2).

Table 5. 2. Voter turnout in the last parliamentary and 2009 EU Parliament elections.

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Source: Voter turnout database: http://www.idea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm; data


calculated on a basis voting age population (VAP), i. e. it includes all citizens
above the legal voting age.

Newton and van Deth described determinants of voter turnout (2005: 207) naming as most
important: a) the importance of elections and citizens vote if they think that the election is important;
b) democracy, as turnout in older, established democracies tends to be about 15 percent higher
than in all other countries (73 percent and 59 percent respectively), but the gap between them has
been closing slowly since 1945, and is now less than 10 percent; c) electoral system, as average
voting turnout in PR systems (68 percent) is higher than in semi-PR systems (59 percent) and in
plurality–majority systems (59 percent); d) competitive elections, where the largest party wins less

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than half the votes, have a turnout 10 percent higher than less competitive elections, where the
largest party wins more than 50 percent of the poll; e) frequency of elections, as in countries where
citizens vote too often turnout is lower.

Voting is technically compulsory in a few countries, including Argentina, Australia, Belgium,


Costa Rica, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands (before 1970). However, voter turnout is
only about 4–5 percent higher in these countries compared with non-compulsory systems. This is
partly because the formalities of compulsory voting are sometimes not followed up in reality.
Turnout is not closely related to national wealth or population size, but it is closely associated with
the UN Human Development Index1. Countries with the highest HDI ratings had an average turnout
of 72 percent, those with the lowest 56 percent (Newton, van Deth, 2005: 201).

In addition to voting, a whole range of non-electoral activities such as signing a petition,


boycotting, donation of money, contacting politicians and media, attending demonstrations and
rallies are used by citizens to get involved in politics. Moreover, since the mid-1960s the rise in
protest activities, in particular petitions and demonstrations, was observed especially in the United
States, Western Europe, and Japan. Russell J. Dalton defined protest as a ‘direct-action technique
of confronting political elites, instead of participating within a framework defined by elites’ (1988:
59). Cross-national comparisons reveal that protest levels are higher in more affluent nations. The
fact that these nations’ levels of participation in moderate forms of unconventional politics are now
as high as those of activity in more conventional forms has prompted some to assert that protest
has become a regular form of political action in advanced industrial societies. As Dalton noted
recently the participation repertoire also includes more direct and individualized forms of action.
The cognitively mobilized, engaged citizen favors direct action over campaign work, and
volunteering is preferred to party activity (2008: 92).

And last but not least, what are the predictors of political participation on an individual level.
Dalton organized potential predictors of political participation into three groups: a) personal
characteristics, b) group effects and c) political attitudes. Such personal characteristics as
socioeconomic status, education, age are still very important determinants of political activity. In
general, a political activist in the United States or even in Western Europe is a white, rich, educated,
religious, middle-aged man. Individual predisposition to participation is also positively affected by
group-based factors such as party preferences, membership in voluntary organizations, and trade
unions. Individual political beliefs and values are the third factors of influence on political
participation, i.e. a high sense of political efficacy, political trust, self-expressive values, and
democratic beliefs about the citizen’s role might stimulate political involvement.

Elections and electoral systems

Free and competitive elections are an essential vehicle through which ‘the full array of
institutions that constitute a new democratic political society, such as legislatures, constituent
assemblies, and competitive political parties simply cannot develop sufficient autonomy, legality,
and legitimacy’ (Linz, Stepan, 1996: 71). Moreover, free elections mean that the major political
players accept political competition as the only meaningful way of establishing a sustainable
democratic order, and it also means that these actors make ‘the convocation of elections an
increasingly attractive means for conflict resolution (O’Donnell, Schmitter, 1993:40).

In brief, an election is a formal decision-making process by which the population chooses


an individual to hold public office.

Elections were used as early in history as ancient Greece and ancient Rome, and
throughout the medieval period to select rulers such as the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope. In
ancient India, around 920 AD, in Tamil Nadu, Palm leaves were used for village assembly elections.
The palm leaves with candidate names were put inside a mud pot for counting. This was known as
the Kudavolai system.

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Elections have been the usual mechanism by which modern representative democracy has
operated since the 17thcentury. Today elections may be enacted for offices in the legislature,
sometimes in the executive and judiciary, and for regional and local government.

The question of who may vote is a central issue in elections. The electorate does not
generally include the entire population; for example, many countries prohibit those judged mentally
incompetent from voting, and all jurisdictions require a minimum age for voting. If we speak about
the major constraints of voting, two of them stand out, i.e. minimum voting age and voter
registration. The minimum voting age in the vast majority of countries is eighteen. Voter registration
varies from 42 percent in Switzerland, 58 percent in India, and 66 percent in the USA, to 91 percent
in Belgium, 92 percent in Iceland, and 96 percent in Australia. It averages 75 percent in established
democracies.

Electoral systems translate the votes cast in an election into results – mandates/seats –
won by parties and candidates. Electoral rules for a given office have six basic components: 1)
determination of who is eligible to be on the ballot (e. g. parties only or also individual candidates),
2) internal party rules for determining who is to be a given as the party’s candidates and/or for
specifying candidate rankings within a party list, 3) specification of ballot type, 4) specification of
constituencies (districts), 5) determination of election timing, and 6) rules for ballot aggregation
(tallying rules). However, sometimes the term electoral system is used in a broader sense to include
other aspects of elections and their regulation, such as rules for voter suffrage, campaign finance,
campaign advertising, location of and times of access to polling stations, and so on (Grofman,
2011).

Following Rae (Rae D. W. 1971 The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 2nd (ed.).
Yale University Press, New Haven, CT), many scholars distinguish between three main elements
of an electoral system: ballot structure, constituency structure, and the electoral formula.

There are three main ways to distinguish the types of ballots:

1. Ballot complexity;
2. Number of rounds of balloting; and
3. Types of alternatives.

Ballot complexity refers to the kind of information that voters are required to provide. The
simplest ballot is one where voters mark an X for some prespecified number of alternatives, or for
up to some prespecified number of alternatives–for example, approval voting, where every voter
may indicate that up to M alternatives are ‘satisfactory,’ with the M alternatives receiving the most
‘approval’ votes being the ones that win; or limited voting, where each voter has a fixed number, k,
of X ballots to cast, where k is less than the number of seats to be filled, M; and the most common
case where voters have but a single X to cast, for example, plurality voting in a single-seat district.
Another important type of X ballot is pure List PR, where there is a list prepared by each party, and
a certain number of the top candidates on each list are elected, with that number determined by
the proportion of (viable) votes cast for that party. More complex ballots require voters to rank order
alternatives (Grofman, 2011).

For constituencies, a key distinction is between single-member districts (SMDs) and multi-
member districts (MMDs). The specification of constituency boundaries, called redistricting in the
United States and boundary delimitation in much of the rest of the English-speaking world, is an
important topic from both a legal and a theoretical point of view. For example, rules about the
degree of population equality required across constituencies can be instrumental in permitting or
preventing malapportionment, which, whether deliberate or unintended, can have substantial
consequences for the translation of votes into seats and the representation of groups that differ in

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their geographical locations and degree of geographic concentration, such as blocs of ethnic voters
or party supporters (Grofman, 2011).

The third most important component is the electoral formula or seat allocation formula. No
two countries have identical electoral systems, but there are three main ballot aggregation methods
each with its variations, i.e., a plurality–the majority, proportional representation (PR), mixed or
semi proportional (Table 5 .3.).

Table 5. 3. In the electoral system families

The principle of plurality–majority systems is simple. After votes have been cast, those
candidates or parties with the most votes are declared the winners. Five varieties of plurality–
majority systems can be identified: first past the post (FPTP), block vote (BV), party block vote
(PBV), alternative vote (AV), and the two-round system (TRS).

In the first-past-the-post electoral system (also known as the single-member plurality


system) the candidate securing the most votes (not necessarily a majority) is elected on the first
and only ballot within each single-member district. This method is mainly found in the United
Kingdom and its former colonies, notably the United States, also in Argentina, Bolivia, Jamaica,
Mauritius, the Philippines, and Thai- land. Italy adopted the main plurality–majority system with
single-member districts in 1994.

This method can lead to a victory in seats for a party coming second in votes and also
discriminates against those minor parties whose support is evenly distributed across the country.
Where strong national parties exist (as in the UK and the USA), the system can deliver a majority
government by a single party even though no single party normally secures a majority of votes. Its
advantage is simplicity and direct democratic accountability because each district is represented
by only one representative. This system is also likely to produce single-party governments with
stable majorities, and this favors clear lines of political accountability. The disadvantage is
disproportionality in election results. The FPTP system favors large parties and discriminates
against small ones, to the extent that voting for one of them is often seen as a ‘wasted’ vote (Newton
and van Deth, 2005: 203).

A variation on FPTP is the block vote which combines first-past-the-post counting with
multi-member districts. Voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and the highest-
polling candidates fill the positions regardless of the percentage of the vote they achieve. This
system ‒with the change that voters vote for party lists instead of individual candidates‒ becomes
the party block vote (Newton and van Deth, 2005: 203).

Majoritarian systems, such as the alternative vote and the two-round system, try to ensure
that the winning candidate receives an absolute majority (i.e. over 50 percent). The two-round
system tries to avoid the disproportionality problem of FPTP systems by requiring the winning
candidate to get an absolute majority of the votes (i.e. 50 percent + 1) in the first round – or if not,
a second run-off ballot is held between the two strongest candidates. The advantage is simplicity;
the disadvantage is the need for a second ballot shortly after the first. France uses this system in
presidential elections.

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Alternative vote (AV) is a variation on simple plurality. Voters mark their first and
subsequent preferences among the candidates for their constituency. If no candidate receives an
absolute majority of first-preference votes on the first count, the candidate with the smallest number
of first-choice votes is eliminated, but their second-choice votes are redistributed among the
remaining candidates. This process continues until one candidate has an absolute majority. The
system is simple to understand, but its results are no more proportional than the FPTP system, and
it can produce unpredictable results. It is used only in Australia (Newton and van Deth, 2005: 203).

Proportional Representation (PR) allocates seats according to a formula that tries to ensure
proportionality, or consciously reduce the disparity between a party’s share of the national vote and
its share of the parliamentary seats; if a major party wins 35 percent of the votes, it should win
approximately 35 percent of the seats, and a minor party with 10 percent of the votes should also
gain 10 percent of the legislative seats. Proportional representation requires the use of electoral
districts with more than one member as it is not possible to divide a single-seat elected on a single
occasion proportionally.

There are two major types of PR system List PR and single transferable vote (STV). Some
researchers, for example, Newton and van Deth, classify the mixed-member proportional system
as a form of proportional representation. Proportionality is often seen as being best achieved by
the use of party lists, where political parties present lists of candidates to the voters on a national
or regional basis, but preferential voting can work equally well as the single transferable vote, where
voters rank-order candidates in multi-member districts.

List PR system is one of the simplest ways of ensuring proportionality and distributing the
seats on a national basis or else on a large regional one. Parties rank their candidates in order of
preference, and they are elected in proportion to the number of votes for that party, starting from
the top of the list. The advantage of this system is simplicity and the proportionality of the results.
The disadvantage is that voters cast a preference for a party, though they may prefer to vote for an
individual candidate. The system also gives power to party leaders, who decide the rank order of
candidates on their lists. Because List PR voting requires multi-member districts it also breaks the
direct and simple link between representatives and their districts. List PR is highly proportional, and
it can encourage very small parties and fragmentation of the party system (Newton and van Deth,
2005: 204).

An electoral threshold can overcome the fragmentation problem, but this increases
disproportionality.

Box 5. 1. An electoral threshold.

A level of electoral support below which a party receives no seats, whatever its
entitlement under other rules of the electoral system. Explicit thresholds are often introduced in
list systems of party list proportional representation and are typically no more than four or five
per cent. Operating at district or national level, thresholds help to protect the legislature from
extremes. Thresholds can also be used as a tool by the main parties to keep small parties out
of the assembly. Implicit thresholds can also operate, as in the single-member plurality system
under which a party coming second in every district would win no seats.
http://www.palgrave.com/politics/ hague/site/dictionary/search.asp#A

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Many democratic countries have adopted the List PR system, including Belgium, Chile,
Costa Rica (compulsory voting), Cyprus (compulsory voting), Czech Republic, Denmark,
Dominican Republic (compulsory voting), Estonia, Finland, Greece, Israel, Italy (before 1994),
Latvia, The Netherlands (compulsory voting before 1970), Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland (compulsory voting) (Newton & van Deth, 2005: 204).

Table 5. 4. Five electoral system options: advantages and disadvantages

Source: Reynolds A. et al., 2008, p. 120–121.

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In the single transferable vote (STV) system voters rank candidates according to their order
of preference, and elected candidates must either get a specified number of first preferences or
else the second preferences are taken into account. If no candidate has an absolute majority, the
third preferences are counted, and so on until all seats are filled. STV must be used in conjunction
with multi-member constituencies. The advantage of the system is its proportionality and the
avoidance of ‘wasted’ votes. The disadvantage is the complexity of the STV formula (although this
is now easily and quickly done by computer) and the fact that multi-member constituencies do not
create a direct link between constituencies and a single representative. The system is used in only
a few countries, in Australia, Estonia (1989–92), and Ireland (Newton and van Deth, 2005: 204).

The mixed-member proportional system, in which some candidates are elected for
electoral districts while others are chosen through PR, runs two voting systems at the same time.
Voters normally have two votes. A plurality–majority districts are used to keep the link between
representatives and constituencies, but a List PR system is added for a certain number of seats
(usually 50 percent) to compensate for any disproportionality that arises from the plurality–majority
system. In Germany, half the seats are allotted at the district and half at the national level, and
citizens have two votes, one for their district and one for the national list. The second vote is used
to compensate for disproportionality in the district vote. The mixed-member proportional (MMP) is
also known as the mixed-member compensatory system. In the German case, parties that win
more district seats than the total to which they are entitled under the party vote retain these excess
mandates, causing the size of the Bundestag to expand. MMP is found in Germany, Hungary, New
Zealand (since 1996), and Uruguay (Newton and van Deth, 2005: 204).

Mixed electoral or semi-proportional systems attempt to combine the positive attributes of


the plurality–majority (or other) system and the PR electoral system. In a mixed system, two
electoral systems are using different formulae running alongside each other. The votes are cast by
the same voters and contribute to the election of representatives under both systems. One of those
systems is a plurality–majority system, usually a single-member district system, and the other a
List PR system. There are two forms of a mixed system, i. e. parallel systems and the single non-
transferable vote (SNTV). Parallel systems like the MMP systems use the plurality–majority system
together with a PR system, but unlike MMP the PR system does not compensate for any
disproportionality resulting from the plurality–majority system. It is used in Japan (from 1994),
Lithuania, and South Korea. The single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system combines multi-
member constituencies with simple majority vote counting and one vote for each elector. It is used
in Japan (before 1994) and Taiwan (for 78 percent of seats) (Newton and van Deth, 2005: 205).

Table 5. 5. Electoral system families: Number of countries and territories

Source: Reynolds A. et al., 2008, p. 32.

In 2004 about half (91, or 46 percent of the total) of the 199 countries and territories of the
world which have direct elections to the legislature use plurality–majority systems; another 72 (36
percent) use PR-type systems; 30 (15 percent) use mixed systems; and only six (3 percent) use
one of the other systems (Reynolds et al., 2008: 29).

In terms of the number of countries which use different electoral systems, List PR systems
are the most popular, with 70 out of 199 countries and related territories, giving them 35 percent of
the total, followed by the 47 cases of FPTP systems (24 percent of the 199 countries and territories).

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If we look at electoral systems in ‘established democracies’, then we find that PR systems are more
numerous, with 21 (31 percent) out of the 68 countries. There are a disproportionate number of
MMP systems among established democracies – 6 percent of the total, while worldwide MMP
systems are found in only 4.5 percent of all countries. Both the world’s examples of STV, the
Republic of Ireland and Malta, fall into the category of established democracies. FPTP systems
make up approximately 35 percent of the total in Africa, the Americas, and Oceania. The system is
less common in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East (Reynolds et al., 2008: 30, 32–33).

Table 5. 6. The distribution of electoral systems across national legislatures

Source: Reynolds A. et al., 2008, p. 31.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. How did Aristotle interpret citizenship?


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2. How is political participation defined in comparative politics?


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3. What are the main modes of political participation?


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4. How are electoral systems categorized?


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5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the five most popular electoral systems?
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FURTHER READINGS

Cox, G. (1997). Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. New
York: Cambridge University Press. Gallagher, M. (1991). Proportionality, disproportionality,
and electoral systems. Electoral Studies, vol. 10, p. 33–51.

Grofman, B. (1999). SNTV, STV, and single-member district systems: Theoretical comparisons
and contrasts. In B. Grofman, S.-C. Lee,

E. Winckler & B. Woodall (eds.), Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the single non-
transferable vote: The comparative study of an embedded institution (p. 317–333). Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Handley, L. & Grofman, B. (eds.). (2008). Redistricting in comparative perspective. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1994). Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies,
1945–1990. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Rae, D. (1971). Political consequences of electoral laws (2nd (ed.) New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.

Reynolds, A.et al. (2008). Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook.
Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Shugart, M., & Wattenberg, M. (2001). Mixed-member electoral systems: The best of both worlds?
New York: Oxford University Press.

Taagepera, R. (2007). Predicting party sizes: The logic of simple electoral systems. New York:
Oxford University Press.

Taagepera, R., & Shugart, M. (1989). Seats and votes: The effects and determinants of electoral
systems. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

WEBLINKS

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA): http://www.idea.int

Centre for Voting and Democracy: http://www.fairvote.org/

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Comparative Study of Election Systems: http://www.umich.edu/~cses/

Database of Parties and Elections: http://www.parties-and-elections.de Election resources:


http://www.electionresources.org

Manuel Įlvarez-Rivera’s Election Resources: http://www.electionworld.org

Lijphart Election Archive: http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij

CIVNET, Civitas International: http://www.civnet.org

Inter-Parliamentary Union: http://www.ipu.org

IFES: http://www.ifes.org/

REFERENCES

Aristotelis (1997) Politika. Vilnius: Pradai.

Barnes, S. H., Kaase, M., Allerback, K. R., Farah, B., Heunks, F., Inglehart, R., et al. (1979).
Political action: Mass participation in five Western democracies. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Blais, A. (2007). Turnout in Elections. In R. J. Dalton, & H.-D. Klingemann (eds.), The Oxford
handbook of political behavior. Ox- ford, UK: Oxford University Press p. 621–635.

Dalton, R.J. (1988) Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in
the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France. Chatham: Chatham House
Publishers

Dalton R.J. (2008) Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation. Political Studies,
Vol. 56, p. 76–98.

Grofman, B. (2011) Electoral Systems. In International Encyclopedia of Political Science. Ed.


Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE,
p. 750–57.

Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.

Kaase, M. (2011) Participation. In International Encyclopedia of Political Science. Ed. Bertrand


Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, p. 1778–
89.

Linz, J. J., Stepan A. (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press

Milbrath, L. W. (1965). Political participation: How and why do people get involved in politics?
Chicago: Rand McNally.

Morales, L. (2009). Joining Political Organizations: Institutions, Mobilization, and Participation in


Western Democracies. European Consortium for Political Research Press.

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Newton K., van Deth J. W. (2005) Foundations of Comparative Politics. New York: Cambridge
University Press.

Norris, P. (2002) Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. New York: Cambridge
University Press.

O’Donnell G., Schmitter Ph. C. (1993) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Reynolds, A. et al. (2008). Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook.
Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Van Deth, J. W. (2008). Political Involvement and Social Capital. In H. Meulemann (Ed.), Social
capital in Europe: Similarity of countries and diversity of people? Multi-level analyses of the
European Social Survey 2002. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, p. 191–218.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American
politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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LESSON 7

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this lesson, the student must be able to:

1. Understand that political parties and multiparty systems are constituent elements of the
contemporary representative democracy wherein it plays an exclusive role as the
intermediate structures between citizens and governmental institutions in the internal
political environment of all contemporary democracies.

MAIN REFERENCE

Krupavicius, A. et al. 2013. Introduction to Comparative Politics: Didactical Guidelines.


Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

CONTENT

• Understanding political parties


• Origins and organization of political parties
• Definition, structure, and change of party systems

Political parties and multiparty systems are constituent elements of contemporary


representative democracy. Political parties play an exclusive role as the intermediate structures
between citizens and governmental institutions in the internal political environment of all
contemporary democracies.

Understanding political parties

Political parties are the linkage-making institutions between political leadership and voters,
the political elite and civil society, the rulers and the ruled in all representative democracies. Political
parties are thought to perform numerous roles critical to the functioning of a democracy. They are
said to aggregate interests, thereby translating ‘mass preferences into public policy (Key, 1964: 43)
and serve as both tools of representation and ‘channels of expression’ (Kuenzi and Lambright,
2001: 437).

The word party refers to one of the oldest concepts used in political science. James Bryce
in his Modern Democracies noted that ‘party organization is a natural and probably an inevitable
incident of democratic government’ (Bryce, 1921: 23). Moreover, depending on the era chosen to
determine the beginning of the scientific analysis of political facts in the modern sense–for example,
if one goes back to Arthur Bentley, James Bryce, Robert Lowell, or André Siegfried, that is, to the
beginning of the 20thcentury the concept of the party could be older than that of political science.
Its use in historical, philosophical, or polemical vocabulary appeared in the 17thcentury with the
memoirs of Cardinal de Retz in France, Viscount Bolingbroke in England, and above all, David
Hume, who in the early 18th century initiated what was to become the analysis of parties. Even the
etymology of the word party is telling: parti in French, Partei in German, partido in Spanish, and
even partia in Russian and Polish and in many other languages–derived from the verb partir, which
in medieval French meant to split into parts or divide (Seiler, 2011: 1792).

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The definitions of the concept of the party are, therefore, older and more numerous than
for the concept of social class: there are more than 100 of them, provided by authors from Edmund
Burke to Alan Ware, including Leon Epstein, Joseph LaPalombara, and Myron Weiner. All
definitions can be grouped into three broad categories, which are sometimes combined. First of all,
following Burke, parties can be defined according to the ideas that they convey. Then, following
Max Weber, Robert Michels, and Maurice Duverger, one can define parties as organizations.
Finally, the trend since the end of the 20th century has been to use the criterion of elections and
the existence of a representative, or at least democratic, regime. A remark attributed to Max Weber,
’parties are the children of democracy and universal suffrage, is put forward to support this thesis.
Nevertheless, one should not forget the classical definition given during the reign of George III by
Edmund Burke: ‘A party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national
interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.’

Recently Daniel-Louis Seiler defined a political party in the following way:

A party is an organization of individuals engaged in collective action, in order to


mobilize as many individuals as possible against other equally mobilized individuals in order to
accede, either alone or in coalition, to the exercise of government functions. This engagement
and this claim for power are justified by a particular conception of the national interest (2011:
1793).

This definition has four major elements:

1. Parties are the product of a collective organized action that is permanent and continuous
in time. Parties are in the category of association-type organizations that is, based on
voluntary membership and the choice of the actors: members, militants, elected
representatives, and leaders. If membership is automatically granted based on birth, family,
or clan, it is not a party.

2. Any organization is structured according to an objective, which, in the case of a party, is to


accede to the different functions of government: national, regional, and local. A political
organization that does not strive for power but merely for influence is not a party.

3. Claiming power is not an end in itself; it is justified for the sake of the national interest that
the party intends to defend or pro- mote depending on the particular conception of the
actors involved. Claiming power in the name of a particular conception of the national
interest constitutes the raison d’ être of a party and a condition sine qua non for a political
organization to be a party.

4. The way to reach the objective of the party to which its organization is rationally conditioned
is the mobilization of as many individuals as possible. The most frequently used means is
electoral mobilization, and most parties were born with the establishment of more or less
competitive representative political systems. Partisan mobilization is carried out against
individuals who are also organized to accede to the government in the name of a different,
often opposite, conception of national interest. As we have seen, party means ‘part’
(division) and therefore implies conflict. Jean Blondel (1978) sees behind every party ‘a
protracted social conflict’ (Seiler, 2011: 1794).

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Political parties are often described as institutionalized mediators between civil society and
those who decide and implement decisions. By this, they enable their members’ and supporters’
demands to be represented in parliament and government. Political parties perform key tasks in a
democratic society, such as:

1. Aggregating and articulating needs and problems as identified by members and


supporters;

2. Socializing and educating voters and citizens in the functioning of the political and electoral
system and the generation of general political values;

3. Balancing opposing demands and converting them into general policies

4. Activating and mobilizing citizens into participating in political decisions and transforming
their opinions into viable policy options;

5. Channeling public opinion from citizens to government; and

6. Recruiting and training candidates for public office (Roles and Definition).

Origins and organization of political parties

The origin of political parties and their existence before a representative regime depends
on the definition. If we retain the three pro- posed criteria–a particular conception of the national
interest, free organization, and mobilization, the Guelphs (13th century) were a party, even if their
means of action were different from those of modern parties. Their fight against the Ghibellines,
however, degenerated into a struggle between factions. The Cavaliers and the Roundheads, the
Whigs and the Tories were also parties. With the extension of the electoral franchise and civil rights,
they were studied as organizations: James Bryce, Robert Michels, Moisey Ostrogorsky, and Max
Weber laid down the foundations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Finally, the study of
parties as the mobilizational actors began in the 20th century with Siegfried on electoral geography
and Duverger on circles of participation in the partisan activity (Seiler 2011).

Lipset and Rokkan described four thresholds in the evolution of a party: legitimization,
incorporation, representation, and majority power. Lipset in Political Man sees in parties the
expression of social classes of which, for him, there are three: 1) the upper class, supported by the
Church, which is expressed in conservative parties; 2) the secular middle class, expressed in liberal
parties; and 3) the working class, expressed in labor, socialist, and social-democratic parties.

Most contemporary parties originated from the radical socioeconomic and political changes
between the mid-nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth. Lipset and Rokkan
(1967) distinguish two aspects of this transformation: 1) the Industrial Revolution refers to changes
produced by industrialization and urbanization; 2) the National Revolution refers to the formation of
nation-states (culturally homogeneous and centralized political units), and liberal democracy
(parliamentarism, individual civil and voting rights, rule of law, and secular institutions) (Caramani,
2011: 238).

In the transformation of the nineteenth century, socioeconomic and cultural conflicts


emerged simultaneously with democratic re-forms, i.e. the creation of modern parliaments, free
competitive elections, and the extension of civil and political rights. Conflicts of that time were
expressed in organizations that were typical of this new regime. Political parties are the product of
the parliamentary and electoral game, and party systems reflect the social oppositions that
characterize society when parties first appear. The fundamental features of today’s party systems

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were set during the early phases of the mobilization of, at first, restricted electorates (only very few
people had the right to vote when the liberals and conservatives dominated in the nineteenth
century) and later, of ‘massifying’ electorates when socialist parties mobilized the vast working
class that emerged from the Industrial Revolution (Caramani, 2011: 240).

Table 6. 1. Stein Rokkan’s cleavages and their partisan expression

Source: Caramani 2011: 239

Political parties are formal organizations, or a group of people formally constituted and
endowed with an official mission, a hierarchy (more or less elaborated), as well as a structure of
internal coordination, boundaries (more or less open), and some kind of task specialization (more
or less developed) (Panebianco, 2011: 1818).

From a historical-institutionalist perspective, understanding party organization requires an


analytical reconstruction of each political party’s origin and specific institutionalization. The features
of parties’ organizations depend on history: how the organizations originated and how they
consolidated. Path dependency rules explain why every organization, including political parties,
bears the mark of its origin and consolidation (institutionalization) even several decades later.
Reconstructing the genetic model (Panebianco,1988) of political parties means considering three
elements:

1. The organizational development: The birth of a party can be due to territorial penetration
or territorial diffusion, or their combination. Penetration means that a ‘center’ organizes,
controls, and directs the development of a territorial ‘periphery.’ Diffusion means that party
organization is the product of the aggregation/federation of previous local groups and
elites. In the first case, the party will probably become a strong, centralized organization
controlled by a unified central oligarchy. In the second case, the party will be a
decentralized organization with many diversified and competing groups: a stratarchy, as
described by Samuel Eldersveld in 1964, in which every subgroup fights for power, making
precarious and in- stable compromises with other subgroups.

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2. The presence or absence of an external sponsor of an institution (a church, trade unions,


the Comintern) as the actual founder of the party: If an external sponsor exists, the party
is its ‘political weapon.’ The external sponsor is the main center of loyalties and
identifications for party followers and members as well as the source of legitimation for
party leaders. Therefore, externally legitimated parties (confessional parties, labor parties,
communist parties) and internally legitimated parties can be distinguished. This
circumstance will influence all aspects of future organizational developments.

3. The presence or absence of a charismatic leader as founder of parties: Charismatic parties


have very special features. The leader holds full control of the party’s dominant coalition.
He or she is the de-facto owner of the party (Panebianco, 2011: 1818–1823).

The characteristics of the genetic model influence the manner of institutionalization and
the process of structural consolidation of parties. Institutionalization is the process by which an
organization incorporates its founder’s values and aims, by which it becomes an institution,
develops boundaries, an internal career system, a consolidated hierarchy, and a professionalized
leadership. Two ideal types can be distinguished: strong institutionalization and weak
institutionalization. Strong institutionalization means high autonomy from the environment and high
interdependencies and coherence among its internal components. Weak institutionalization means
low external autonomy and a low degree of internal interdependence. In the first case, the party
will be a centralized, bureaucratic, organization led by a strong central oligarchy. It will hold the
control of many external organizations (unions, interest groups, etc.), and it will adopt an
aggressive, expansionist policy toward the external environment.

In the second case, the party will be a decentralized organization, controlled by external
groups (external organizations) and/or local notables, with a poorly developed internal
administration system.

The official mission comprises the ideological goals, the organizational constitution, and
the power structure, which are the three (related) aspects that define the physiognomy of party
organizations (Panebianco, 2011: 1820).

The official mission of the party, its manifest ideological goals, in- fluences both its
organizational structure and its culture. Many for- mal and informal rules depend on the features of
the official mission. But the official mission is also too vague an indicator of the characteristics of
party organizations. Moreover, the original official mission is usually transformed during the process
of institutionalization and also after. Party members need to believe in those goals, and the
capability of mobilization of followers by party leaders depends on their capacity to demonstrate
themselves as defenders of the ideological goals. But the role of the official mission will vary. For
example, when parties are in power, there is less need of mobilizing members and followers and
the official mission becomes less important. On the contrary, when parties are in opposition, there
is a greater urgency to mobilize people. In this case, the official mission, the ideological goals, will
be emphatically affirmed organizations (Panebianco, 2011:1820).

The second aspect is the organizational constitution. The constitution defines the rules of
the game: the distribution of formal authority in the party, the ways of coordination among the official
party roles, the type of task specialization, and the organizational boundaries or who is a member
and who is not.

The third aspect regards the power structure. In every party, there is a dominant coalition,
a group of leaders who control the organization. The physiognomy of the dominant coalition is an
essential defining feature of party organizations. In the case of the internally legitimate party, the
dominant coalition comprises only party members. In the case of externally legitimated parties, it
includes the leaders of the external sponsor organizations: for example, the top officials of the
British trade unions were, for a long time, members of the Labor Party’s dominant coalition.

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Furthermore, dominant coalitions can be oligarchies (cohesive and stable, without a single
prominent leader), monocracies (a single leader, usually of the charismatic type, controlling the
dominant coalition and, as a result, the party), or poliarchies (divided and unstable, usually a
collection of factions) (Panebianco, 2011: 1821).

The concept most commonly used to classify partisan organization is the opposition
between mass parties and cadre parties. In his classic Political Parties (1951), Maurice Duverger
proposed a famous classification of party organizations. In the Western historical experience, he
identified four fundamental types: 1) the cadre party, 2) the mass party, 3) the cell party, and 4) the
militia party. The first two types were the most important and diffuse. But Duverger’s analysis was
not original. It followed the classical works of Moisey Ostrogorski, Robert Michels, Max Weber, and
James Bryce (Panebianco, 2011: 1818–1823).

Duverger’s great contribution was to distinguish between parties of inside creation and
parties of outside creation, depending on whether the founders were in parliament – a typical
example is that of the Whigs and Tories who were outsiders that had no access to power, not even
to parliament. The groups that could exist before the organization of a party are labor unions,
associations, Masonic lodges, or leagues, including terrorist ones. The cadre parties are therefore
parliamentary parties resulting from the widening of the electorate, aimed at inciting new voters to
enroll on the electoral register and support the party and the electoral committees of the candidates.
Mass parties are created outside the spheres of power, and their only means of access is to have
the largest possible number of voluntary activists and regular financial contributors (Seiler, 2011:
1792–1804).

The cadre party is the traditional bourgeois party: a loose electoral organization, without
party discipline, financed by notables and controlled by the parliamentary elite. Some of these
parties have kept an archaic organization: a federation of electoral committees composed of local
personalities, headed by a much more undisciplined parliamentary party and with weak leadership.
These less developed cadre parties are to be found in countries such as France, Spain, Portugal,
and, to a lesser degree, Italy. Jean Charlot suggests calling them partis de notables (Seiler, 2011:
1792–1804).

The mass party is a very strong organization. It is a membership party. Its organizational
‘inventions’ are the territorial section, the membership card, the party bureaucracy, and the
periodical congresses in which the leaders are officially selected, and the political strategy is
approved. An ‘inner circle’ (the general secretary, the party headquarters) controls the mass party.
Usually, the parliamentarians are dependent on the inner circle. The mass party is the organization
that can proselytize among the popular classes of the society: manual workers, peasants, and
artisans. During the 100 years from 1860 to 1960, technical development favored mass parties that
in certain cases – Catholic Zentrum and the social democrats in Ger- many; the Catholic and
socialist parties in Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands; French and Italian Communists –
managed, in the words of Siegmund Neumann, to ‘take charge of voters from the cradle to the
grave’ (Seiler, 2011: 1798).

According to Duverger’s views, the mass party would become the dominant type of party
in mature Western democracies. Like Michels 40 years earlier, Duverger was influenced by the
history of the European socialist parties. Sixteen years later, Otto Kirchheimer (1966) reversed the
perspective. A new form of the party was emerging: the catch-all party. The catch-all party was
different from the mass party of the past. Its communicative style was pragmatic, not ideo- logical,
and its linkages with the traditional classegardée (the manual workers and the religious voters)
were declining. The transformation of the mass party into a catch-all party was an effect of the
social and political transformations of European societies: the economic development, the rise of
mass education levels, the new role of the mass media, and so on (Panebianco, 2011: 1822–1823).

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Party organizations were changed too. New types of professional figures slowly took over
the old mass party bureaucracy: mass media experts, marketing and fund-raising specialists,
among others. The traditional role of the membership, so important in the old mass party, was
declining. From an organizational viewpoint, the passage from the mass party to the catch-all party
has been synthesized as the transformation of the bureaucratic party into the professional electoral
party (Panebianco, 2011: 1823).

After Duverger and Kirchheimer, there have been many attempts to identify
transformations of Western parties. The cartel party model (Katz, Mair 1995) is one of these
attempts. In this perspective, the most important change is about the ‘etatization’ of parties, their
new relationship with state agencies, and its impact on the traditional party organization. Some
empirical analyses confirm that cartelization is one of the possible transformations of Western
political parties (Detterbeck 2005).

In K. Carty’s interpretation, Western political parties are becoming franchise systems in


which a central organization provides ideological arguments and material services to a lot of
autonomous sub-party organizations. The franchise model implies the end of the traditional internal
party hierarchy, where stratarchies are everywhere replacing the traditional oligarchies (Carty
2004).

Since the seminal contribution of Key, scholars have analyzed American parties as
tripartite structures: 1) the party in the electorate, 2) the party organization, and 3) the party in
government. The party in the electorate refers to the loyalty and identification of the voters, whereas
the party in government refers to public office holders from the president to local councilors; the
party organization is structured, in a manner defined by Sam Eldersveld (1982), as a stratarchy
which ‘is an organization with layers, or strata of control, rather than centralized leadership from
the top down (1982: 106).

However, it is inaccurate to imagine that some type of party organization is becoming the
dominant type and that all the existing parties will imitate that type. A plurality of very different party
organizations always coexists in democracies. Parties are influenced by their original missions, by
the personality and roles of their founding leaders, and by the crucial organizational decisions that
accompanied their birth and institutionalization (Panebianco 2011: 1818-1823).

Definition, structure, and change of party systems

The party system is conceived of as a set of patterned relationships between political


parties competing for power in a given political system. Such a notion assumes the existence of
rules, norms, and regularities in party interactions, concerning mainly coalition-building efforts and
electoral competition. This implies also that a party system is composed, like any other system, of
distinguishable parts and the empirically testable quality of its ‘systemness’ (Markowski, 2011:
1825).

Box 6. 1. What are party systems?

• Party systems are sets of parties that compete and cooperate with the aim of increasing
their power in controlling government.
• What determine interactions are (1) which parties exist, (2) how many parties compose a
system and how large they are, and (3) the way in which they maximize votes.
• It is appropriate to speak of a party system only in democratic contexts
in which several parties compete for votes in open and plural elections.

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Descriptions of party systems rely on their widely accepted, numerous attributes. One finds
a rich array of proposals concerning these attributes and their relevance and importance for party
systems, depicting at the same time both the essence and the dynamics of a given party system.
The most popular describe a party system concerning the number and the size of parties
considered relevant (Markowski, 2011: 1827), or two main elements of the morphology of party
systems are: 1) the number of competing units, that is, parties, and 2) the size of these units. How
many players are there and how strong are they? The number and strength of actors can be
observed at two levels: the votes parties get in elections and the seats in parliament. Two types of
party systems do not fulfill the democratic conditions of party competition: a) single-party systems
in which one party only is legal: these are the totalitarian and authoritarian experiences of the
Communist Party in the Soviet Union and the National Socialist Party in Germany in the 1930s; b)
hegemonic-party systems in which other parties are legal but are satellites, under the strict control
of the hegemonic party with whom they cannot compete to control government: these are the
totalitarian or authoritarian systems existing in Algeria today and in Egypt until very recently, and
also in many former communist regimes before 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe. There are
four-party system types in democratic countries: 1) dominant-party system, 2) two-party system, 3)
multi-party system and 4) bipolar system (Caramani, 2011: 244).

Dominant-party systems are characterized by one very large party that dominates all others
with a large majority (well above the absolute majority of 50 percent of parliamentary seats) over
protracted periods (several decades). In these systems, all parties are legal and allowed to compete
in free elections with universal suffrage to challenge the dominant party. However, no other party
receives enough votes to come close to 50 percent. Electors vote massively for the dominant party
(Caramani 2011: 244). Dominant one-party systems are found in India (the Congress Party), Japan
(the Liberal Democratic Party), South Africa (the African National Congress, ANC), and Sweden
(The Social Democratic Workers’ Party).

A fundamental distinction was made in the mid-20th century be- tween two-party and
multiparty systems in respect of their causes, and consequences. The major cause was seen in
the respective electoral laws: simple plurality rules (first-past-the-post) applied in single-member
districts tend to produce two-party systems, while two-round majoritarian and proportional rules
favor the creation of multiparty constellations. The consequences, it was assumed, were essential
as well: a two-party system was believed to create a stable political system, with moderate
centripetal competition, based on clarity of responsibility and accurate attribution of accountability
(Markowski, 2011: 1825–31). The main examples of two-party systems are Canada, New Zealand
(until constitutional reform in 1966), the UK (Labour and Conservatives), and the USA (Democrats
and Republicans).

Multiparty systems, by contrast, were believed to enhance extremism, centrifugal


competition, limited alternation of governing parties, unclear accountability due to complex coalition
formation procedures, and vague responsibility for the policies implemented (Markowski, 2011:
1825-1831). Multiparty systems are the most frequent type of party system. These are also the
most complex types. In a multiparty system, the number of parties ranges from three to double-
digit figures. Three to five parties exist in Canada, Ireland, Lithuania, Estonia, Japan, and Norway.
Party systems in which the number of parties approaches ten (or even more) are Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland. None of the parties in a multiparty system is majoritarian (with 50
percent of the votes or seats). Furthermore, the parties that compose a multiparty system are of
different sizes: some are large (say, 30 percent of the votes) some small (less than 5 percent)
(Caramani, 2011: 245).

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Table 6. 2. Typology of party systems

Source: adapted from Caramani, 2011: 246

This numerical criterion used in distinguishing party systems faces many problems, the
crucial one being how parties should be counted. It is, and always has been, obvious that parties
cannot be treated equally, mainly because of their divergent electoral support, legislative strength,
the potential for entering coalitions, and the peculiarities of their social following. Scholars dealing
with this problem are aware of the difficulty in finding adequate criteria by which to include or
exclude parties or assign them a proper ‘weight.’ In the mid-1970s, a solution seemed to be found.
Giovanni Sartori offered the criterion of the relevance of parties. To be relevant, a party had to
disclose its coalition and/or blackmail potential. The first feature, the coalition potential, depends
on whether a party is attractive enough, because of its size or a unique, pivotal position in the space
of political competition, to effectively join governmental coalitions and share executive
responsibility. The second, party blackmail potential is less obvious as it refers to a specific factor
that depends on interpretations: a party exerts blackmail potential if it can influence the behavior of
other systemic and relevant parties, even though it cannot itself participate in a coalition
government. This applies to systems in which sizeable parties are excluded from mainstream

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politics by the other parties because of alleged anti-systemic features or traits pointing to their
radicalism and destabilizing potential. Good examples of such parties are the former Italian
Communists or the contemporary Czech/Moravian Communist Party (Markowski, 2011: 1825–
1831).

Irrespective of how important the relevance criterion is, Sartori’s proposal still focuses on
the number of parties and their respective ideological and programmatic distance as the main
features of a party system. Combining these two criteria the proposal allows us to distinguish
between what he calls, moderate (limited) pluralism and polarized (extreme) pluralism. In the first
instance, a party system usually consists of three to five parties and reveals relatively little
ideological distance between them. In the second case (of polarized pluralism), the party system is
usually composed of six or more parties and manifests significant ideological distance between the
parties. The clear virtue of this proposal is its dynamic nature. The variables used to interact with
each other, allowing one to predict more or less accurately the development of a system in practice.
For instance, moderate pluralism not only reveals a smaller number of relevant parties and lesser
ideological distance, but it is also very likely to develop a centripetal direction of systemic
competition be- tween two distinguishable blocs, whereas polarized pluralism is most likely to
develop centrifugal competition with various opposition parties, leading to their irresponsible
behavior, poor accountability mechanisms, and destabilizing effects (Markowski, 2011: 1825–
1831).
Given the impact of party system fragmentation on government stability, accountability,
and responsiveness, as well as on the type of consensus vs. majoritarian decision-making, a large
amount of comparative politics has been concerned with establishing the causes for the varying
numbers of parties and their size. Two sets of causes have been identified: 1) the electoral system
and 2) the number of cleavages in the society (Caramani, 2011: 248).

Among 73 liberal democracies in the 1990s, 36 had PR electoral systems and 37 non-PR
systems. Of the 36 PR countries, 81 percent were multiparty and the remaining 19 percent were
two- or dominant one-party systems. Of the 37 non-PR countries, 13 percent were multiparty and
50 percent were two- or dominant one-party systems.

Large numbers of parties are also the result of social and cultural pluralism. The presence
of few social and cultural cleavages leads to fewer parties. Several measures are available to
determine varying degrees of party system fragmentation, but the most popular is the Laakso-
Taagepera index of the effective number of parties:

In this formula, N stands for the effective number of parties, and pi de- notes the fraction
of the seats held by each party i in the assembly. All parties are accorded some weight, but the
index weights the largest parties most. Theoretically, if there are 2 parties of the same size, the
effective number of parties is 2.0. The dynamics of electoral systems go a long way toward
explaining why some countries have fragmented party systems while others do not. Single-member
plurality (SMP) systems effectively reduce the number of parties that gain representation, while
proportional (PR) list systems are conducive to fragmentation, especially when electoral districts
are large. Among democratic countries with SMP systems, the mean effective number of parties
since 1960 is 2.1, while the corresponding figure for democracies with PR list systems is 3.9
(Karvonen, 2011:1823–1825).

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Box 6. 2. The influence of electoral systems on party systems?

Source: adapted from Caramani, 2011: 250

Many scholars define the party system not only by referring to the number of parties and
their patterned relationship but also by indicating their belonging to a particular party family. The
latter, in turn, is defined as a group of parties in different countries that have similar ideologies and
party programs. Each country has a unique party system: a unique combination of parties,
ideological and programmatic profiles, size of electoral support, and coalitions. The most important
party families are as follows: Socialists, Chris- tian Democrats, Agrarian, Liberal, Conservative,
Regional and Ethnic as well as new parties.

Last but not least is the question of party system dynamics or change. Party system change
may take a variety of forms, from marginal change to the alternation of its essential features. A
change of party system might be manifested in four ways: 1) incidental swings, 2) limited change,
3) general change, and 4) alternation of the system. Incidental swings are usually temporary
distortions in the patterned way a party system operates, and they might be related to the
establishment of some new small parties. Limited change is prolonged or even permanent, but this
change is restricted either to one area or confined to the emergence of a party that replaces another
one. General change is more serious and relates to several aspects, that is, the fact that changes
are multifaceted and prolonged and that they concern salient features of the system. The
alternation of the system signifies a dramatic change in most of its aspects, i.e. the party
composition, its strength, alliances, and leadership. Party systems also change their format due to

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long-term social and economic developments. The processes of dealignment or realignment of


party affiliations result from structural demographic changes, ac- companied by culture shifts
(Markowski, 2011: 1825–1831).

Table 6. 3. Party families

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Source: adapted from Newton, van Deth 2010: 226–227

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. What are political parties?


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2. What does ‘an effective number of parties’ mean?


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3. What are Stein Rokkan’s four main social cleavages and which party families emerged from
them?
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4. How are party systems categorized?


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5. How should the number of parties in a system be counted?


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FURTHER READINGS

Blondel, J. (1978). Political parties: A genuine case for discontent? Lon- don: Wilwood House.

Daalder, H. & Mair, P. (Eds.). (1983). Western European party systems. London: Sage.

Dalton, R. & Wattenberg, M. P. (eds.). (2000). Parties without parti- sans. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.

Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties. London: Methuen.

Eldersveld, S. (1982). Political parties in American society. New York: Basic Books.

Kitschelt, H. (2009). Party systems. In R. Goodin (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of political science
(pp. p. 616–647). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

LaPalombara, J. & Weiner, M. (Eds.). (1966). Political parties and political development. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lipset, S. M. (1981). Political man. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S. M. & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1967). Party systems and voters alignments. New York: Free
Press.

Mair, P. (1999). Party systems change. Oxford, UK: Oxford University


Press.

Mair, P., Muller, W. C. & Plasser, F. (Eds.). (2004). Political parties and electoral change. London:
Sage.

Merkl, P. H. (Ed.). (1980). Western European party system. New York: Free Press.

Michels, R. (1962). Political parties. New York: Free Press.

Panebianco, A. (1988). Political parties. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Pennings, P. & Lane, J. E. (Eds.). (1998). Comparing party system change. London: Sage.

Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.

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WEBLINKS

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA): http://www.idea.int

Database of Parties and Elections: http://www.parties-and-elections.de

Richard Kimber’s website on Political Science Resources: http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk

Political Resources on the Net: http://www.politicalresources.net

Citizendium: http://en.citizendium.org

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Bryce, J. (1921) Modern Democracies. Vol. 2. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Caramani, D. (2011) Comparative Politics. 2nd (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

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Karvonen, L. (2011) Party System Fragmentation // Badie, B., Berg- Schlosser, D., Morlino, L.
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Katz, R. S., Mair, p. (1995) Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The
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Online. Web. 30 Jan. 2012: http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/pc/pca/pca01/pca01a.

Seiler, D. L. Parties // Badie, B., Berg-Schlosser, D., Morlino, L. Inter-


national Encyclopedia of Political Science. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, p. 1792–804.

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LESSON 8

PUBLIC POLICY

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this lesson, the student must be able to:

1. Understand that the major shifts in the policy agenda of Western states reflect evolving
conceptions of the state itself yet which, like other aspects of policy analysis, remain
understated in descriptions of government institutions.

MAIN REFERENCE

Krupavicius, A. et al. 2013. Introduction to Comparative Politics: Didactical Guidelines.


Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University.

CONTENT

• Historical changes in the policy agenda of the Western state


• Conceptual models of policy-making
• The cycle of policy-making

Public policies are the main outputs of political systems from a structural-functionalist
perspective. The preceding chapters mostly dealt with the structures and institutions that ultimately
produce public policies, but the making, content, and outcomes of such policies is the central focus
of a relatively distinct subfield of comparative politics, known as comparative policy analysis, or
policy studies. In the words of Rod Hague and Martin Harrop (2004: 309), whereas orthodox
political science examines the organization of the political factory, policy analysis examines the
products emerging from it. Needless to say, that:

Almost everything we do is affected by public policies, sometimes in many trivial ways,


but also in many crucial ones. They determine which side of the road we drive on, whether we
receive a free university education, have to pay for health care, pay a lot or a little tax and, in
the extreme, whether we are sentenced to death if we are found guilty of murder. Because
public policies are so important, they are the focus of fierce and constant political battles. A
public policy is the ‘end product’’ of the battle between [different] political forces. Consequently,
public policies and political decision-making tell us a lot about how political systems actually
work, and about who is powerful (Newton and Van Deth, 2010: 316).

In conceptual terms, a policy is more than a government decision, although it necessarily


involves the latter. Kenneth Newton and Jan van Deth (2010: 315) define public policy as a ‘series
of activities, decisions, and actions carried out by officials of the government in their attempts to
solve problems that are thought to lie in the public or collective arena.’ In this regard, it means that
public policies are always designed to achieve particular goals, employ particular instruments, and
have a specific area of application. Regulatory policies (e.g. environmental protection, migration
policy, consumer protection) set the conditions, standards, and prohibitions on the behavior of
individuals and collectives. Redistributive policies (e.g. progressive taxation, land reform, national
insurance) are based on transferring the resources from one societal group to another. Distributive

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policies (e.g. agriculture subsidies, public works) distribute state resources (although in the long
term all policies of public provision are essentially redistributive). Finally, constituent policies (e. g.
constitutional reform, electoral legislation) aim at establishing new or modifying the old state
institutions (Knill and Tosun, 2011: 374). Some policies do not fit neatly into either of these broad
categories but correspond to the definitive elements (goal, instruments, and scope) and general
stages of making to be called public policies.

This chapter first reviews ‘the major shifts in the policy agenda of Western states which
reflect evolving conceptions of the state itself yet which, like other aspects of policy analysis, remain
under-stated in descriptions of government institutions’ (Hague and Harrop, 2004: 315). Then the
theoretical models of policy-making and policy feedback are presented that serves as the principal
framework in public policy analysis.

Historical changes in the policy agenda of the Western state

According to Hague and Harrop (2004: 315), ‘broadly, we can divide the history of public
policy in what have now established democracies into three phases: 1) the night-watchman or
liberal state of the 19th century and earlier, 2) the welfare state of the later 20th century, and 3) the
emerging regulatory state of the 21st century (see Table 7. 1.). Although these descriptive
categories fit the experience of North-Western Europe rather accurately, the US, for example, never
developed a welfare regime, yet was one of the first to introduce independent regulatory agencies.

Table 7. 1. Changing agenda of the Western state

Source: Hague and Harrop, 2004: 315

The Night-watchman / Liberal state. The metaphor of the state as a night-watchman


originated in the liberal philosophy of the 17th century, notably in the writings of the English
philosopher John Locke (1632-1704). Up to the 19th century, the governments of the Western
world maintained a very limited state apparatus responsible only for the upholding of law and order,
conducting foreign policy and external defense. According to the liberal doctrine, no other sphere
of public life needed government regulation, the economy least of all (the laissez-faire policy). In
the words of Walter Opello and Stephen Rosow (1999: 97; quoted in Hague and Harrop, 2004:
316):

The liberal state, then, is in one respect a minimal state; that is, it is deliberately
structured not to be itself a threat to the ‘natural right’’ of property ownership, which is the
ultimate justification for the dominant position of the bourgeoisie within the state.

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The Welfare state. Compared to the night-watchman state, the welfare state, which
reached its zenith in Western and especially Northern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, was based
on a more expansive and positive view of the state’s role’ (Hague and Harrop, 2004: 316). In terms
of public policy, the establishment of the welfare regimes first required setting boundaries on the
laissez-faire. Regular inspections of the working conditions at factories and limits on working hours
had been sanctioned by most Western governments by the end of the 19th century, but the state-
sponsored provision of collective welfare did not occur on a major scale until the interwar period of
the 20th century. Germany was the pioneer of most social insurance schemes in Europe (see Table
7.2) but was later surpassed by Scandinavian countries. According to Kees van Kersbergen and
Philip Manow (2011: 390), a ‘welfare state is first and foremost a democratic state that in addition
to civil and political rights guarantees social protection as a right attached to citizenship’. Therefore,
some countries (e. g. France) even embedded welfare rights in their constitutions.

Table 7. 2. Introduction of social insurance to some Western countries

Source: Hague and Harrop, 2004: 316

The immediate post-WW II decades were the ‘Golden Age of the welfare policies. However,
as Gusto Esping-Andersen (1996: 4) notes, ‘the harmonious coexistence of full employment and
income equalization that defined the postwar epoch appears no longer possible. Western Europe,
with its comprehensive industrial relations systems, welfare states, and powerful trade unions, has
maintained equality and avoided growing poverty, but at the price of heavy long-term
unemployment, and swelling armies of welfare defendants, that overburden social security
finances.’ Countries with substantial job security guarantees and high wages are becoming less
competitive in the global economy. At the same time, a change in the family structure (e. g. the rise
of single-parent households), demographic trends (an aging population), and the post-industrial
occupational structure (less demand for unqualified low-wage labor) has added up to the crises of
the Western welfare regimes at the end of the 20th century (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 4–9).

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The Regulatory state. According to Hague and Harrop (2004: 318):

Although the crisis of the welfare state may have been overplayed, the final decades
of the 20th century did witness a fundamental shift in the agenda and focus of public policy in
many established democracies, especially in Europe. In social welfare, service delivery was
increasingly contracted out to private agencies; in the economy, public industries were
privatized. The key point, though, was that creating private monopolies – as with telephones,
gas and electricity – required the creation of new offices of regulation, at least until competition
became established.

The best example of the ‘retreat of the state’ from the direct provision is the massive scale
privatization policy of the UK Government under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. However, selling
off government as- sets in major industries was not the only policy course characteristic to
governments of the late 20th century. As Colin Scott (2006: 651) suggests:

Policies of privatization were accompanied by processes of public management reform


within bureaucracies. These reform processes have, in many countries, liberalized some
aspects of central public management, while at the same time being accompanied by the
creation of new layers of regulation over public sector activities, frequently in new or remodeled
freestanding agencies.

Thus, not only newly privatized industries were regulated, but also previously self-
regulating public institutions as universities and financial markets were subjected to governmental
supervision. According to Scott (2006: 652), ‘the central concern of the public policy literature in
understanding this transformation in governance has been with the emergence of the regulatory
state’, although the term itself has not yet been as well defined as, for example, ‘the welfare state’.

Conceptual models of Policy-Making

In addition to comparing and categorizing public policies according to their content, policy
analysts investigate the process of policy-making in an attempt to build theoretical models of how
particular policies come to being. The main models found in the public policy literature are 1) the
rational, 2) the incremental, and 3) the process model. As Christoph Knill and Jale Tosun (2011:
375) suggest, ‘these models are not competitive but rather complementary as they focus on
different aspects of political life, and hence concentrate on separate characteristics of policies. The
main implication of these models is that they make different assumptions about the importance of
the actors involved and their rationality’. The first two models are briefly presented in this section,
whereas the different stages of the policy-making process are the focus of the last section.

Rational model. The rational model of decision-making originated in economics and is


often associated with the name of Herbert Simon. The main assumption underlying the model is
that actors are rational, i.e. they always try to achieve their goal with minimum cost. To apply the
model in explaining real-world policy decisions, one must know what the goal and the options are.
If the decision-maker has more than one goal, in the words of Simon himself (1995: 48): A decision
is only rational if it achieves the best possible outcome in terms of all the goals. Appealing to all the
goals requires that there be a way of adjudicating among them, and that means some sort of
weighting function. Economists postulate such a function which they call the utility function. And
which they require to be consistent. In particular, if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then
A must be preferred to C. Beyond requiring that the utility function be consistent, no specific content
is specified for it.

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Policy analysts usually infer that governments not only seek to solve particular problems in
the public realm but also want to get re-elected (or maximize power); however, to deduce the
adequate utility function of policy-makers may be an overwhelming methodological puzzle. In terms
of policy options, ‘the theory assumes that all the options are given or the alternatives may be
searched for, at a cost. Then the problem for the rational actor is to stop searching exactly when
the marginal cost of continuing would just equal the expected marginal increase in the value of the
best option discovered to date’ (Simon, 1995: 48). Although the rational model can be significantly
upgraded by taking into account social learning (from the consequences of policy decisions in the
past and other countries) in reality policy-makers never possess perfect information about the costs
and benefits of different policy options. The grounding assumption about perfect information has
been the central point of criticism against the rational model. Yet ‘despite this criticism, the rational
model remains important for analytical purposes as it helps to contrast ideal policy decisions with
actual ones’ (Knill and Tosun, 2011: 374).

Box 7. 1. Rational and incremental models of policy-making

Source: Hague and Harrop, 2004: 311

Incremental model. The incremental model is a response to the rational model (see Box
7.1). The purpose of the incremental model is a reality rather than an ideal description of decision-
making. It is founded- ed based on ‘bounded rationality and takes into account ‘the limitations of
both knowledge and cognitive capacities of decision- makers’ (Knill and Tosun, 2011: 376). Another
important concept in the incremental model is ‘bounded learning’. According to Weyland (2006;
quoted in Knill and Tosun, 2011: 376), ‘governments likewise engage in information-gathering
activity but do not scan all available experience. Instead, they use analytical shortcuts and cognitive
heuristics to process the information.’ The most common example would be the adoption of
successful policies from other countries.

Incremental model sees policy as resulting from a compromise between actors who
have goals which are ill-defined or even contradictory. Put differently, where the rational model
seeks the best policy in theory, incremental framework seeks out a practical policy acceptable
to all the interests involved (Hague and Harrop, 2004: 311).

The main shortcoming of the incremental model is that it does not explain how decision-
makers arrive at these incremental adjustments’ (Knill and Tosun 2011: 376). More so, as Lindblom
(1977, 1990; quoted in Hague and Harrop 2004: 312) notes, ‘incremental policy formulation deals
with existing problems rather than with avoiding future ones. It is politically safe but unadventurous;
public policy be- comes remedial rather than innovative’. Generally, incremental decisions have
only limited ability to change existing policies. However, according to Hague and Harrop (2004:
312), ‘this approach may not lead to achieving grand objectives but, by taking one step at a time it
does at least avoid making huge mistakes.

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The cycle of policy-making

The model of the policy-making cycle (or the process model) is a simplification. However,
according to Knill and Tosun (2011: 377), it provides a useful heuristic for breaking policy-making
into different units to illustrate how policies are made. Several characteristics of policy-making can
be noted. First of all, multiple constraints are surrounding the policy-making process, such as public
opinion, limited time or resources, etc. Secondly, since governments consist of various
departments, which may overlap or even compete with each other, policy-making involves various
policy processes. Thirdly, the policy-making process is an infinite cycle of decisions and policies,
since all current decisions are more or less dependent on the decisions made in the past, and will
affect decisions made in the future (Knill and Tosun 2011: 377).

Figure 7. 1. The Policy Cycle

Source: Knill & Tosun, 2011:377

Bearing in mind these characteristics – five main stages of the policy-making cycle can be
distinguished:1) agenda setting, 2) policy formulation, 3) policy adoption, 4) implementation and 5)
evaluation (see Figure 7. 1.). All five stages will be briefly presented in this section.

Agenda setting. This is the first stage of policy-making. As Knill and Tosun (2011: 377)
put it, ‘there are many societal problems, but only a small number will be given official attention by
legislators and executives. Those that are chosen by the decision-makers constitute the policy
agenda’. In other words, agenda-setting is an identification of problems that require the intervention
of the state. This may be an important source of political power ‘as it is policy consequential, i.e.
legislative institutions grant an advantage to the first movers as compared to the second movers’
(Knill and Tosun, 2011: 377). For this reason, ‘an important part of the political struggle is the
attempt by different groups and interests to put their issues at the top of the agenda, or at least to
push them up the agenda so they have a better chance of being considered’ (Newton and van
Deth, 2010: 319). On the other hand, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) note that the opposite process
– exclusion of societal problems from the policy agenda – is also a significant source of political
power. However, according to Hague and Harrop (2004: 309), agenda-setting cannot be controlled
by one group (at least within democracies), ‘in most cases, the policy agenda is set by four types
of actors: 1) public officials, 2) bureaucracy, 3) mass media, and 4) interest groups’ (Knill and
Tosun, 2011: 377).

Policy formulation. The second stage of the policy-making cycle in policy formation.
According to Newton and van Deth (2010:322), Having decided upon the priorities of the political
agenda, decisions must then be taken about them. A major decision is usually the end product of
a series of decisions leading up to it, each preceding decision being made by different individuals
and bodies that feed into the process. In democracies, major policy decisions should be taken by

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publicly accountable bodies, normally the elected executive or legislature, or both. Nonetheless,
many other public and private organizations and officials may have an impact on a particular
decision, and they, in their turn, will have to make many decisions to exercise influence.

The main shortcoming of the incremental model is that ‘it does Policy formulation is a more
complex process than agenda-setting, and requires more political craft, in such that it takes place
within the broader political and technical context. According to Thomas R. Dye (2005: 42; quoted
in Knill and Tosun, 2011: 378), policy formulation occurs in government bureaucracies; interest
group offices; legislative committee rooms; meetings of special commissions; and policy-planning
organizations otherwise known as ‘think tanks. The details of policy proposals are usually
formulated by staff members rather than their bosses, but staffs are guided by what they know their
leaders want.’

Policy adoption. This is the third stage of the policy-making cycle. This stage is usually
determined by government institutions and, according to Knill and Tosun (2011: 379),
predominantly dependent on two sets of factors – the necessity to build majorities for policy
approval and the competencies between the actors involved in policy-making.

With respect to building majorities, several criteria, which are important to the decision-
making process, must be taken into ac- count. First of all, party loyalty, as Knill and Tosun (2011:
379) note, ‘party affiliation is a central predictor for the likelihood of a member of parliament to
approve a policy draft’. Second, the costs and benefits of a policy proposal, a member of parliament
is expected to adopt a policy option if the benefits for the constituency prevail, although
considerations about re-election might lead to suboptimal policy projects’ (Weingast, 1981; quoted
in Knill and Tosun,2011: 379). Third, public opinion also may affect the policy-making process.
Decision-makers also might try to affect public opinion. As Newton and van Deth (2010: 323) note,
some governments carry out intensive and expensive publicity campaigns to persuade people.

According to Knill and Tosun (2011: 379), ‘the second set of factors refers to the allocation
of competences between the actors involved in policy-making. Cross-national research concludes
that the type of state organization, whether federal or unitary, affects the success, speed, and
nature of governmental policy-making.’

Implementation. Implementation is the conversion of policies into practice. It is only


natural that when a policy is set it must be put into effect. Without proper implementation, the policy
has neither substance nor significance. Thus policy success depends on how well bureaucratic
structures implement government decisions. At the first glance, implementation appears as an
automatic continuation of the policy-making process. Yet there often exists a substantial gap
between the passage of new legislation and its application’ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973;
quoted in Knill and Tosun, 2011: 379).

The main shortcoming of the incremental model is that ‘it does According to Newton and
van Deth (2010: 323), ‘policy-making is supposed to be the responsibility of elected and
accountable politicians, whereas implementation is mainly a matter for state bureaucracies’. Such
a situation is contradictory. As Knill and Tosun (2011: 380) put it, ‘[o]n the one hand, bureaucracies
are essential for making policies work. On the other hand, senior bureaucrats are often more
experienced and better trained than their political masters, which paves the way for ‘bureaucratic
drift’’. In other words, the process of implementing the policy might change (and according to
Newton and van Deth, often does) from the originally intended form.

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Scholars distinguish three main models of policy implementation – top-down, bottom-up,


and hybrid (see Box 7.2).

Box 7. 2. Theoretical models of policy implementation

Source: Knill and Tosun, 2011: 380

Evaluation. The final stage of the policy-making cycle is evaluation. To put it simply: ‘the
job of the policy evaluation is to work out whether a policy has achieved its goals’ (Hague and
Harrop 2004: 313). According to Knill and Tosun (2011: 381), ‘evaluation is often a formal
component of policy-making and is commonly carried out by experts who have some knowledge
about the processes and objectives about the issue undergoing review’. It can be implemented in
several different ways (see Box 7.3), but it does face numerous challenges:

Citizens and governments alike tend to interpret the actual effects of a policy so as to
serve their own intensions. Often governments avoid the precise definition of policy objectives
because otherwise politicians would risk taking the blame for obvious failure. Further, policy
decisions cannot be limited to intended effects only. An additional problem stems from the time
horizon: program circumstances and activities may change during the course of an evaluation
design, and the wide diversity of perspectives and approaches in the evaluation field provide
little firm guidance about how best to proceed with an evaluation (Knill and Tosun, 2011: 381).

Nevertheless, Hague and Harrop (2004: 314) stress that evaluation is vital to the policy-
making cycle, ‘without some evaluation of policy, governments will fail to learn the lessons of
experience’.

Box 7. 3. Different ways of policy evaluation

Source: Knill and Tosun, 2011: 380

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***
This chapter presented a short overview of the public policy process, in historical as well
as theoretical terms. Comparative policy studies are a challenging field of inquiry; policy analysts
have come up with several conceptual models to understand public policy, none of which, however,
can fully explain the complexity of the policy-making process.

Policy analysts agree that there have been at least three historical shifts in the policy
agenda of the Western state which changed the notional role of the state itself. The most recent
change has arguably involved the rise of regulatory policies that surpassed the importance of
(re)distributive policies, a definitive element of the welfare regimes of the 20th century. Not all
governments worldwide have progressed from extensive welfare policies towards regulatory
regimes, and some of those that did, have not yet reached the evaluation stage of their long-term
policies. As Newton and van Deth (2010: 325) note, ‘no policy works quite as well as it is supposed
to, but many of them work nonetheless and, for the most part, they manage to avoid the worst
disasters’.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. What public policies do you know and how can you categorize them?
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2. What main ideas (or ideology) helped to maintain the night-watchman state of the 19th century?
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3. What factors caused the crises of the Welfare state at the end of the 20th century?
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4. How is a regulatory regime essentially different from a welfare regime?


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5. What are the main assumptions of the rational model of policy-making?


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6. What are the advantages and shortcomings of the incremental model?


__________________________________________________________________________
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7. How can you explain the difference between policy formulation and policy adoption?
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8. Why is the role of bureaucracy important but controversial in the policy implementation
process?
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9. What challenges does the evaluation of policy involve?


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FURTHER READINGS

Dye, Th. R. (2012) Understanding Public Policy. 14th (ed.). New York: Pearson/Longman.

Compston, H. (ed.) (2004) Handbook of Public Policy in Europe: Brit- ain, France, and Germany.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sabatier, P. A. (ed.) (2007) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hill, M. (2009) The Public Policy Process. 5th (ed.). Harlow, London, New York [etc]:
Pearson/Longman.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Oxford: Polity Press.

Pierson, P. (1994) Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of
Retrenchment. Cambridge, New York: Cam- bridge University Press.

WEBLINKS

The Policy Agendas Project: http://www.policyagendas.org

The Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy: http://www.defendingscience.org

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The OECD Webpage: http://www.oecd.org

International Labour Organization: http://www.ilo.org

World Health Organization: http://www.who.int

Links to Social Security in all countries: http://www.ssa.gov/international/links.html

REFERENCES

Knill, C. & Tosun, J. (2011) Policy-making // Caramani, D. (ed.) Comparative Politics. 2nd (ed.).
New York: Oxford University Press. p. 373–388.

Van Kersbergen, K. & Manow, P. (2011) The Welfare State // Caramani., D. (ed.) Comparative
Politics. 2nd (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 389–407.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1996) After the Golden Age? Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global Economy
// Esping-Andersen, G. (ed.) the Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in
Global Economies. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage. p. 1–31.

Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004) Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction. 6th (ed.).
Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Newton, K. & van Deth, J. (2010) Foundations of Comparative Politics: Democracies of the Modern
World. 2nd (ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Opello, W. & Rosow, S. (1999) The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to
Contemporary Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Scott, C. (2006) Privatization and Regulatory Regimes // Moran, M., Rein, M., Goodin, R. E. (eds.).
The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 651–668.

Simon, H. A. (1995) Rationality in Political Behavior//Political Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 1. p. 45–61.

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