General Principles of Law

Giorgio Gaja

Content type: Encyclopedia entries

Product: Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law
[MPIL]
Module: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law [MPEPIL]
Article last updated: April 2020

Subject(s):
Customary international law — State practice — Recognition and enforcement — International courts
and tribunals, decisions — International courts and tribunals, procedure
Published under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law under the direction of Professor Anne Peters (2021–) and Professor Rüdiger Wolfrum (2004–2020). 

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 A.  The Drafting of the Provision in the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice referring to General
Principles of Law
1  References to general principles of law may be found in arbitral decisions concerning
international disputes well before the adoption of the Statute of the → Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ). For instance, in the arbitration between France and Venezuela
in the Antoine Fabiani Case the arbitrator said that he would apply ‘the general principles
of the law of nations on the denial of justice’ and defined those principles as ‘the rules
common to most legislations or taught by doctrines’ (at 117). However, only Art. 38 (c) PCIJ
Statute gave great prominence to the role that general principles of law may play in
international adjudication when it stated that the PCIJ was required to apply the ‘general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ (→ Civilized Nations).

2  This wording—which was reproduced in Art. 38 (1) (c) Statute of the → International
Court of Justice (ICJ)—has given rise to criticism in recent times, since it appears to be
based on the dated concept that only certain nations may be rightly called civilized. This
criticism, which was voiced especially in Judge Ammoun’s separate opinion in the → North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases ([Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands] 132–33), led to a proposal, which was, however, not insisted upon,
by Guatemala and Mexico to amend the ICJ Statute by deleting the term civilized (United
Nations General Assembly ‘Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice: Report
of the Secretary-General’ [15 September 1971] 23–25). More significantly, this
inappropriate wording may partly explain why the ICJ has been so far reluctant to refer to
specific rules of one or other municipal system, lest it imply that some other systems had to
be regarded as less civilized.

3  A perusal of the preparatory work of the PCIJ Statute shows that the drafters had
different views about what the reference to general principles of law was intended to cover
(→ Travaux Préparatoires). Baron Descamps, the chairman of the Advisory Committee of
Jurists (‘Committee’) from which the text originated, had proposed to include among the
rules that the PCIJ would apply ‘the rules of international law as recognized by the legal
conscience of civilised nations’ (Permanent Court of International Justice: Advisory
Committee of Jurists Procès-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16th–July
24th 1920, with Annexes 306). As Baron Descamps later explained, he meant by this ‘the
law of objective justice, at any rate in so far as it has twofold confirmation of the concurrent
teachings of jurisconsults of authority and of the public conscience of civilised nations’ (ibid
324). The United States of America member, E Root, held that this reference was too wide
and would have empowered the PCIJ to ‘apply principles, differently understood in different
countries’ (ibid 308). In the following debate, Lord Phillimore, the United Kingdom member,
maintained that ‘all the principles of common law are applicable to international affairs.
They are in fact part of international law’ (ibid 316). E Root then submitted an amended
proposal, which referred to ‘the general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations’ (ibid 344). This text was adopted by the Committee without change (ibid 567, 584,
605, and 648). In the discussion relating to E Root’s proposal, the Brazilian member, M
Fernandes, suggested that the PCIJ should apply ‘those principles of international law
which, before the dispute, were not rejected by the legal traditions of one of the States
concerned in the dispute’ (ibid 346). On the other hand, in an often quoted passage Lord
Phillimore ‘pointed out that the general principles referred to … were these which were
accepted by all nations in foro domestico, such as certain principles of procedure, the
principle of good faith, and the principle of res judicata, etc.’ (ibid 335) (→ Good Faith [Bona
fide]; → Res judicata). The French member, M de Lapradelle, ‘admitted that the principles
which formed the bases of national law, were also sources of international law’ (→ Sources

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 of International Law); however, he ‘thought it preferable to keep to a simple phrase: such,
for example, as “the general principles of law”, without indicating exactly the sources from
which these principles should be derived’ (ibid 335–36). These excerpts from the summary
records of the debate show that the compromise text adopted by the Committee covered a
division of opinions, especially on the question whether a general principle was to be
regarded as part of international law only because it was already present in municipal
systems. The Committee’s report did not provide any additional explanation (ibid 729), nor
was there any substantial discussion on the principles of law in the debates that led to the
formal adoption of the PCIJ Statute by the → League of Nations (Documents concerning the
Action Taken by the Council of the League of Nations under Article 14 of the Covenant and
the Adoption by the Assembly of the Statute of the Permanent Court).

B.  The Reference to General Principles of Law in the Statute of

the International Court of Justice
4  As was noted above (para. 2), in Art. 38 (1) (c) ICJ Statute one finds the same wording as
in Art. 38 (c) PCIJ Statute. No discussion took place at the San Francisco Conference about
the reference in the ICJ Statute to ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations’.

5  The chapeau of Art. 38 PCIJ Statute underwent an expansion. While it originally read:
‘The Court shall apply’, it now states: ‘The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance
with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply’. This change had the
purpose of stressing the Court’s function with regard to international law (see the
statement of Al-Faray as Rapporteur of Committee IV/1, United Nations Information
Organization [ed] Documents of the United Nations Conference on International
Organization: San Francisco, 1945 [United Nations Information Organization New York
1945] vol 13 Commission IV: Judicial Organization 427). It was not intended to affect the
meaning of any of the references to the various sources listed in Art. 38 ICJ Statute.

6  GI Tunkin argued that

the amendment invalidates the understanding of Art. 38(1)(c) that was prevailing in
the Commission of Jurists in 1920. It makes impossible the interpretation of Art.
38(1)(c) according to which ‘general principles of law’ are simply principles
‘common to all civilised nations’. It clearly defines that ‘general principles of law’
are principles of international law (Tunkin 525; → International Commission of
Jurists [ICJ]; → Interpretation in International Law).

However, even the drafters of the original text had not stated that the reference to general
principles of law would entitle the ICJ to decide on a basis other than international law.
They had rather viewed general principles of law as part of international law.

C.  The Application by the International Court of Justice of

Principles of International Law that Find a Parallel in Municipal
Laws
7  General principles that exist in municipal systems of law do not necessarily form part of
international law (→ International Law and Domestic [Municipal] Law). The main reason lies
in the difference in structure between international society and municipal societies. This

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 difference may make it inappropriate to transpose to international relations a principle that
is part of municipal law.

8  When a principle exists both in municipal laws and in international law, the origin of the
principle is likely to be in municipal systems, given the greater development and wider
practice relating to those systems. However, the application of the principle in international
law does not necessarily depend on the fact that the principle is common to a number of
municipal systems.

9  The case law of both the PCIJ and the ICJ provides some examples of decisions in which a
principle of international law was regarded as having a parallel in municipal laws. For
instance, in the Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland), the PCIJ
found that

It is … a principle generally accepted in the jurisprudence of international

arbitration, as well as by municipal courts, that one Party cannot avail himself of the
fact that the other has not fulfilled some obligation or has not had recourse to some
means of redress, if the former Party has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter
from fulfilling the obligation in question, or from having recourse to the tribunal
which would have been open, to him (Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów
[Germany v Poland] [Claim for Indemnity] [Jurisdiction] 31; see also → German
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Cases).

This passage was approvingly quoted by the ICJ in the → Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case
(Hungary/Slovakia) (at para. 110).

10  In the → Corfu Channel Case the ICJ noted that

By reason of [a State’s] exclusive [territorial] control, the other State, the victim of
a breach of international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving
rise to responsibility. Such a State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to
inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in
all systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions (The Corfu
Channel Case [United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania]
[Merits] [‘Corfu Channel Case’] 18).

The reference to ‘all systems of law’ has apparently the purpose of confirming what is
already established under international law.

11  While references to Art. 38 (1) (c) ICJ Statute are few in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, in
some decisions the ICJ appeared to endorse the view that a general principle of law applied
in municipal systems is relevant as such for an international court or tribunal. In a passage
of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, the ICJ noted that the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal was ‘an independent and truly judicial body pronouncing final judgments without
appeal within the limited field of its functions’ and said: ‘According to a well-established and
generally recognized principle of law, a judgment rendered by such a judicial body is res
judicata and has binding force between the parties to the dispute’ (Effect of Awards of
Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal [Advisory Opinion] 53;
→ Administrative Boards, Commissions and Tribunals in International Organizations;
→ Advisory Opinions). The ICJ hinted again at the existence of ‘general principles of
procedural law’ in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute ([El
Salvador/Honduras] Application of Nicaragua for Permission to Intervene [Judgment] para.
102; → Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case [El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua
Intervening]). A reference to the principle of res judicata as a ‘general principle of law’ was

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 made also in later decisions of the ICJ, most recently in its judgment on the Question of the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200
Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Preliminary Objections) (at para. 58).

12  The ICJ may have referred to a general principle of law existing in municipal systems
also in the → Temple of Preah Vihear Case when it found that

It is an established rule of law that the plea of error cannot be allowed as an

element vitiating consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to
the error, or could have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that
party on notice of a possible error (Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
[Cambodia v Thailand] [Merits] 26).

13  In several decisions the ICJ concluded that there was no general principle of law that
could be applied to the questions raised. Thus, for instance, in the South West Africa Cases
the ICJ noted that an argument raised by the claimant State amounted to

a plea that the Court should allow the equivalent of an ‘actio popularis’, or right
resident in any member of a community to take legal action in vindication of a
public interest. But although a right of this kind may be known to certain municipal
systems of law, it is not known to international law as it stands at present: nor is the
Court able to regard it as imported by the ‘general principles of law’ referred to in
Article 38, paragraph 1 (c), of its Statute (South West Africa Cases [Ethiopia v South
Africa; Liberia v South Africa] [Second Phase] para. 88; → South West Africa/
Namibia [Advisory Opinions and Judgments]).

14  In the advisory opinion on Application for Review of Judgment No 158 of the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, the ICJ held that there was no

general principle of law which requires that in review proceedings the interested
parties should necessarily have an opportunity to submit oral statements of their
case to the review tribunal. General principles of law and the judicial character of
the Court do require that, even in advisory proceedings, the interested parties
should each have an opportunity, and on a basis of equality, to submit all the
elements relevant to the questions which have been referred to the review tribunal.
(Application for Review of Judgment No 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal [Advisory Opinion] para. 36; → United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Applications for Review [Advisory Opinions])

15  Should there be a convergence of the relevant norms of municipal laws, the principle
emerging from those norms may be applied by an international court or tribunal only if it is
compatible with the framework of international law. For instance, the possible convergence
of municipal rules concerning intervention by a third party in judicial proceedings may not
be significant for international law, under which jurisdiction is based on the consent of the
parties (→ International Courts and Tribunals, Intervention in Proceedings). When referring
to general principles, especially in the passage of the South West Africa Cases quoted above
(in para. 13), the ICJ has hinted at the test of transposability, but has not elaborated it.

16  The great variety of approaches that are taken on specific legal issues by municipal
laws—even when they may lead to the same practical result—often makes it difficult to
ascertain whether a general principle may be drawn from this source. A doubt was even
expressed by H Kelsen ‘whether such principles common to the legal order of the civilized
nations exist at all’ (Kelsen 539). Often general principles that may be drawn from
municipal laws are only vague and of little use. The ICJ has been understandably reluctant
to apply general principles in a way that would imply a selection among municipal rules and

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 thus the use of a large amount of discretion in finding the more appropriate rule. The ICJ
would not only run into the difficulty of engaging itself in a comparative analysis. It would
also have to face the risk of transgressing into the application of equity (→ Equity in
International Law), which according to Art. 38 (2) ICJ Statute would require the specific
→ consent of the parties to the dispute. As was observed by G Fitzmaurice,

the concept of the general principles is so fluid that a quasi-legislative element

would often be introduced into the Court’s decisions by any ‘bold’ application of
them, and … considerable harm might be done to the desideratum of increased
resort to the Court unless a reasonable predictability as the basis of its decisions
can be maintained (Fitzmaurice 325).

D.  References by the International Court of Justice to

Principles that are Relevant only under International Law
17  When referring to principles of international law or to general principles the ICJ often
considered principles that do not find a parallel in municipal laws. Thus, for example, in the
Corfu Channel Case the ICJ found that the Albanian authorities were under the obligation to
notify the existence of a minefield in their territorial waters (→ Territorial Sea) and to warn
the approaching ships of the imminent danger. The ICJ said

Such obligations are based … on certain general and well-recognized principles,

namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than
in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime communication; and every State’s
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other States (Corfu Channel Case 22).

In its advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (→ Genocide Convention, Reservations [Advisory Opinion]; see
also → Genocide), the ICJ noted that ‘the principles underlying the Convention are
principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
conventional obligation’ (ibid 23). Again, in its advisory opinion on Western Sahara the ICJ
stated ‘the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely
expressed will of peoples’ (Western Sahara [Advisory Opinion] para. 59; → Western Sahara
[Advisory Opinion]; see also → Self-Determination). As a further example of references to
principles which do not have a parallel in municipal laws, the Chamber judgment in the
→ Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) considered ‘the principle of uti
possidetis juris’ as ‘a firmly established principle of international law where decolonization
is concerned’ and as ‘a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon
of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs’ (at para. 20; → Uti possidetis
Doctrine).

18  The relatively frequent reference by the ICJ to principles that are not part of municipal
laws is explained, at least in part, by the narrow definition of → customary international law
that is provided in Art. 38 (1) (b) ICJ Statute. Should custom be regarded, as stated in that
provision, as ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’, several norms of
international law which are not based on → treaties would not fit in the definition of custom
given the scarcity of practice. Hence the reference to principles or general principles. Only
in certain cases could these principles appear as an abstraction from specific norms of
customary international law. This would be, for example, the case of the principle of the

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 freedom of maritime communication, which is referred to in the passage quoted from the
Corfu Channel Case (see para. 17 above).

19  Art. 38 (1) (c) ICJ Statute requires a general principle of law to be ‘recognized by
civilized nations’. When a given principle is not based on the convergence of municipal
laws, recognition of that principle would need to reflect the attitude that is taken in its
regard by the → international community, and thus essentially by States. In other words, for
a principle to exist it would be necessary that States acknowledge, albeit implicitly, that this
principle applies to their → international relations. Thus, for instance, in its advisory opinion
on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, the ICJ noted that the principles underlying
the Genocide Convention ‘are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as
binding on States, even without any conventional obligation’, and that such recognition was
expressed in resolution 96 (I) of the General Assembly, which marked ‘the intention of the
United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as a “crime under international law”’ (at
23). As another example, in the Frontier Dispute Case, when assessing whether the
principle of uti possidetis applies in international law, the Chamber of the ICJ noted that

the numerous solemn affirmations of the intangibility of the frontiers existing at the
time of the independence of African States, whether made by senior African
statesmen or by organs of the Organization of African Unity itself, are evidently
declaratory rather than constitutive: they recognize and confirm an existing
principle, and do not seek to consecrate a new principle or the extension to Africa of
a rule previously applied only in another continent (Frontier Dispute Case para. 24;
see also → African Union [AU]).

20  When asserting the existence of a principle that does not find a parallel in municipal
systems, the ICJ has only rarely accompanied its statement with an adequate demonstration
of the existence of that principle in international law. A similar remark could be made with
regard to the ascertainment by the ICJ of customary principles and rules of international
law.

E.  The Relations between General Principles and Customary or

Treaty Rules
21  Even if general principles of law are often vague, they may complement to a certain
extent other rules of international law and thus contribute to filling in gaps (→ General
International Law [Principles, Rules and Standards]). However, principles do not
necessarily have a subsidiary character. Some of the principles referred to in the preceding
paragraphs clearly do not have that character. In any event, their character would not
depend on whether or not they find a parallel in municipal systems.

22  One cannot assume that treaty rules always prevail over general principles of law. This
would normally be the case when the treaty and the general principle cover the same
ground. However, a general principle could also affect the way in which a certain treaty rule
is to be applied. It could impinge on the application of the treaty rule in limited
circumstances. In that case it would be more appropriate to say that the principle prevails.

23  The position of general principles of law in the list of sources of international law
contained in Art. 38 (1) ICJ Statute is not indicative of their rank. As Lord Phillimore
pointed out during the preparatory work of the PCIJ Statute, ‘the order mentioned simply
represented the logical order in which these sources would occur to the mind of the

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 judge’ (Permanent Court of International Justice: Advisory Committee of Jurists Procès-
verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16th–July 24th 1920, with Annexes 333).

24  A general principle of law may be embodied in a treaty provision or become part of
international customary law. The origin of a treaty or customary rule in a general principle
of law would not be material. The ICJ gave an example of such an embodiment in the Case
of the Monetary Gold removed from Rome in 1943 when it stated that ‘[t]o adjudicate upon
the international responsibility of Albania without her consent would run counter to a well-
established principle of international law embodied in the Court’s Statute, namely, that the
Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent’ (Case of the Monetary
Gold removed from Rome in 1943 [Italy v France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and United States of America] [Preliminary Questions] 32; → Monetary
Gold Arbitration and Case; see also → International Courts and Tribunals, Jurisdiction and
Admissibility of Inter-State Applications). Certain principles asserted by the ICJ have
developed into principles pertaining to customary international law. The ICJ acknowledged
this evolution with regard to the principle of self-determination. In its advisory opinion on
the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in
1965 (→ Chagos [Advisory Opinion]) the ICJ set as its task to assess ‘when the right to self-
determination crystallized as a customary rule binding on all States’ (at para. 148).

F.  The Application of General Principles of Law by International

Tribunals
25  General principles are often applied by international tribunals irrespective of whether
there is a specific reference in their constituent instrument. Certain decisions refer, like the
ICJ, to principles that find a parallel in municipal systems.

26  Thus, the arbitration award in the Boundary Dispute between Argentina and Chile
concerning the Frontier Line between Boundary Post 62 and Mount Fitzroy stated that

A decision with the force of res judicata is legally binding on the parties to the
dispute. This is a fundamental principle of the law of nations repeatedly invoked in
the legal precedents, which regard the authority of res judicata as a universal and
absolute principle of international law (para. 68).

Similarly, the arbitration award in the Case concerning the Loan Agreement between Italy
and Costa Rica referred to the fundamental character of the principle of good faith in
international law and included it among the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations (para. 14).

27  When there are differences in the way in which municipal systems address an issue, the
Appeal Chamber of the → International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
noted in the → Tadic Case that

national legislation and case law cannot be relied upon as a source of international
principles or rules, under the doctrine of the general principles of law recognised by
the nations of the world: for this reliance to be permissible, it would be necessary to
show that most, if not all, countries adopt the same notion … More specifically, it
would be necessary to show that, in any case, the major legal systems of the world
take the same approach to this notion (Prosecutor v Tadic [Judgment] para. 225).

This cautious attitude corresponds to that of the ICJ, but is more explicitly defined.

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 28  Other international tribunals have had less hesitation in applying general principles of
law even in the presence of discrepancies among municipal systems. For instance, in BP
Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, the
arbitrator was required to interpret the relevant contract

in accordance with the principles of the law of Libya common to the principles of
international law and in the absence of such common principles then by and in
accordance with the general principles of law, including such of those principles as
may have been applied by international tribunals (at 303).

The arbitrator found that the corporation was entitled to → compensation but not to
→ restitution, which would have been required under certain municipal systems, because
‘[a] rule of reason … dictates a result which conforms both to international law, as
evidenced by State practice and the law of treaties, and to the governing principle of
English and American contract law’ (ibid 354; → State Practice; see also → Corporations in
International Law).

29  In the first → International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
arbitration award in Amco Asia Co v Republic of Indonesia (→ Amco v Indonesia Case), the
panel found that ‘the full compensation of prejudice, by awarding to the injured party the
damnum emergens and lucrum cessans is a principle common to the main systems of
municipal law, and therefore, a general principle of law which may be considered as a
source of international law’ (Amco Asia Co v Republic of Indonesia [Award of 20 November
1984] para. 267).

30  The selection of what is considered the better law under the guise of the application of
principles of law is frequent in commercial arbitration, where the reference to general
principles provides an apparently objective criterion (see also → Commercial Arbitration,
International). A similar approach is taken by the European Court of Justice, which only
rarely refers to the pertinent rules of municipal laws and attempts to find a genuinely
common denominator (→ European Union, Court of Justice and General Court).

G.  Assessment
31  When determining the applicable law, references to general principles of law
undoubtedly provide international courts and tribunals with discretion. Only rarely could
one say that a certain principle may be inferred from more specific rules of international
law. While the distinction between principles and rules has not been elaborated in judicial
or arbitral decisions, the use of the term principles denotes the general nature of the norm
in question.

32  Principles drawn from municipal laws have been applied only with caution by the ICJ.
On the contrary, some arbitration tribunals have shown less hesitation in referring to
municipal systems even when they arguably offer a variety of solutions and the adoption of
one or the other solution necessarily implies a considerable discretion.

33  The ICJ often asserted the existence of principles in international law irrespective of
their correspondence to principles pertaining to municipal laws. The ICJ thus included in
general international law norms that could not be defined as part of customary law. This
aspect of the ICJ’s jurisprudence is to some extent controversial, as shown by the
discussions prompted by the study of general principles of law initiated in 2019 by the
→ International Law Commission (ILC) (UN Doc A/74/10).

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 Select Bibliography
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Internationale’ (1935) 52 RdC 191–251.

F Dehousse ‘Les Principes du Droit des Gens dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour

Permanente de Justice Internationale’ (1936) 17 Revue de droit international 85–117.

L Kopelmanas ‘Quelques Réflexions au Sujet de l’Article 38, 3° du Statut de la Cour

Permanente de Justice Internationale’ (1936) 43 RGDIP 285–308.

HC Gutteridge ‘Comparative Law and the Law of Nations’ (1944) XXI BYIL 1–10.

AM Stuyt The General Principles of Law as Applied by International Tribunals to

Disputes on Attribution and Exercise of State Jurisdiction (Nijhoff Gravenhage 1946).

B Cheng General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals

(Stevens London 1953).

G Pau ‘I Principi dell’Ordinamento Interno degli Stati Civili nella Teoria delle Fonti del
Diritto Internazionale’ (1954) VI Comunicazioni e studi 100–78.

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 AP Sereni Principi generali di diritto e processo internazionale (Giuffrè Milano 1955).

L McNair ‘The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations’ (1957)

XXXIII BYIL 1–19.

RB Schlesinger ‘Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized

Nations: Outline of a New Project’ (1957) 51 AJIL 734–53.

PG Vallindas ‘General Principles of Law and the Hierarchy of the Sources of

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Rechts (Schimmelbusch Bonn 1957) 425–31.

I Seidl-Hohenveldern ‘General Principles of Law as Applied by the Conciliation

Commissions Established under the Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947’ (1959) 53 AJIL
853–72.

FT Freeman Jalet ‘The Quest for the General Principles of Law Recognized by
Civilized Nations—A Study’ (1962–63) 10 UCLALRev 1041–86.

W Friedmann ‘The Uses of “General Principles” in the Development of International

Law’ (1963) 57 AJIL 279–99.

H Kelsen Principles of International Law (RW Tucker ed, 2nd edn Holt Rinehart and
Winston New York 1967).

LC Green ‘Comparative Law as a “Source” of International Law’ (1967–68) 42

TulLRev 52–66.

A Blondel ‘Les principes généraux de droit devant la Cour Permanente de Justice

Internationale et la Cour Internationale de Justice’ in Faculté de Droit de l’Université
de Genève and Institut Universitaire de Hautes études Internationales Genève (eds)
Recueil d’études de Droit International: en Hommage à Paul Guggenheim (La Tribune
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A Favre ‘Les principes généraux du droit, fonds commun du droit des gens’ in Faculté
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A Verdross ‘Les principes généraux de droit dans le système des sources du droit
international public’ in Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Genève and Institut
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Paul Guggenheim (La Tribune Genève 1968) 531–54.

G Herczegh General Principles of Law and the International Legal Order (Kiadó
Budapest 1969).

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 GI Tunkin ‘“General Principles of Law” in International Law’ in M René and others
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G Fitzmaurice ‘The Future of Public International Law and of the International Legal
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centenaire 1873–1973: Evolution et perspectives du droit international (Karger Bâle
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H Akehurst ‘Equity and General Principles of Law’ (1976) 25 ICLQ 801–25.

M Bothe ‘Die Bedeutung der Rechtsvergleichung in der Praxis Internationaler

Gerichte’ (1976) 36 ZaöRV 280–99.

B Vitanyi ‘La Signification de la “Généralité” des Principes de Droit’ (1976) 80 RGDIP

536–45.

M Bogdan ‘General Principles of Law and the Problem of Lacunae in the Law of
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NK Hevener and SA Mosher ‘General Principles of Law and the UN Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights’ (1978) 27 ICLQ 596–613.

SC Hicks ‘International Order and Article 38(1) (c) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice’ (1978) 2 Suffolk Transnational Law Journal 1–42.

A Sinagra ‘I Principi Generali di Diritto nelle Concezioni Socialiste del Diritto

Internazionale’ (1978) XV Comunicazioni e studi 417–68.

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Kalshoven PJ Kuyper and JG Lammers (eds) Essays on the Development of the
International Legal Order (Sijthoff & Noordhoff Alphen aan den Rijn 1980) 53–75.

LJ Maki ‘General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized by All Nations:

Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention’ (1980) 10 CalWIntlLJ 272–313.

H von Mangoldt ‘La Comparaison des Systèmes de Droit comme Moyen d’élaboration
de la Procédure des Tribunaux Internationaux’ (1980) 40 ZaöRV 554–72.

HS Schrader ‘Custom and General Principles as Sources of International Law in

American Federal Courts’ (1982) 82 ColumLRev 751–83.

B Vitanyi ‘Les Positions Doctrinales Concernant le Sens de la Notion de “Principes

Généraux de Droit Reconnus par les Nations Civilisées”’ (1982) 86 RGDIP 48–116.

P Weil ‘Principes Généraux du Droit et Contrats d’état’ in Le Droit des Relations

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EK Banakas ‘The Use of Comparative Law in Public International Law: Problems of

Method’ (1982–83) 35–36 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 121–29.

A Brimo ‘Les Principes Généraux du Droit et Les Droits de l’Homme’ (1983) 28

Archives de Philosophie du Droit 257–69.

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 H Mosler ‘To What Extent Does the Variety of Legal Systems of the World Influence
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R Kolb ‘Principles as Sources of International Law (With Special Reference to Good

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 International Lawmaking (Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham/Northampton MA
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J d’Aspremont ‘What Was Not Meant to Be: General Principles of Law as a Source of
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BP Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic

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The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v
Albania (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4.

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.
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 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
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League of Nations: Permanent Court of International Justice Documents concerning

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South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) (Second
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August 2019) GAOR 74th Session Supp 10 UN Doc A/74/10.

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