Inece Principles Handbook Eng
Inece Principles Handbook Eng
April 2009
Principles of Environmental Compliance
and Enforcement Handbook
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many individuals and organizations contributed time and energy to develop the second
edition of the Principles of Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Handbook. Special
mention goes to Durwood Zaelke, Tim Whitehouse, Jo Gerardu, and Thomas Higdon of the
INECE Secretariat, Davis Jones of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Ken Markowitz of
the law firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, and Meredith Reeves of the consulting firm
Earthpace. Other contributors include Angela Bularga, Tom Maslany, Mike Stahl, and members
of the INECE Executive Planning Committee. This work would also not have been possible
without the help of Heather Callan, Kirk Herbertson, Veronique Millon, David Newman, Adam
Pienciak at the INECE Secretariat.
The first edition of this handbook was developed in 1992 by the USEPA in consultation
with the Netherlands’ Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM), the
Polish Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry, and the Katowice
Ecology Department in Poland.
The principal author of that edition was Cheryl Wasserman of USEPA, with contributions
from Jo Gerardu of VROM. This new edition relies heavily on their pioneering work.
This text can be periodically updated to include new enforcement developments and
examples from INECE participants. Readers and users are encouraged to send their ideas,
examples, and comments to the Secretariat of the International Network for Environmental
Compliance and Enforcement at
2300 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Suite 300B
Washington, D.C. 20007, USA
[email protected]
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1
iii
6. COMPLIANCE PROMOTION ................................................................................... 35
6.1 Introduction.................................................................................................... 35
6.2 Compliance Assistance ................................................................................. 35
6.3 Compliance Incentives .................................................................................. 37
6.4 Market-Based Mechanisms........................................................................... 41
11. REFERENCES........................................................................................................ 116
iv
1. INTRODUCTION
1
looks at some of the issues to consider when designing effective requirements. Chapter 6
provides an overview of what makes up typical compliance assistance and compliance incentive
programs. The importance of compliance monitoring is discussed in Chapter 7, while Chapter 8
examines the basic elements of enforcement programs and types of enforcement responses.
Chapter 9 discusses how organizations build effective infrastructure and inter-organizational
communication, and how to do so in the context of an environmental management program.
Chapter 10 examines ways to develop, measure, use and interpret environmental compliance
and enforcement indicators.
2
2. OVERVIEW OF COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS
2.1 Introduction
Over the past forty years, environmental law has been central to government efforts to
implement a wide range of environmental programs designed to protect air, water, natural
resources, wildlife and public health. Countries throughout the world use environmental law to
help address problems such as the discharge of pollutants into the environment, the protection
of flora and fauna, the handling, storage and disposal of solid and hazardous wastes, the
application of pesticides, preventing air contamination, and protecting the quality and availability
of clean water.
However, simply having environmental laws in place is not enough to address these
problems. Governments must find ways to ensure that the regulated community meets the
requirements put forth in the environmental laws and their implementing regulations. Successful
strategies will both encourage and compel behavioral changes within the regulated community
that are needed to achieve compliance.
This chapter provides a basic overview of the concepts behind successful enforcement
and compliance programs. The first section looks at the context for compliance and
enforcement as a part of the environmental management cycle. The second section examines
the benefits of an effective compliance and enforcement program. The third section discusses
types of compliance activities. The fourth section discusses theories of compliance behavior.
The final section examines some of the general difficulties and obstacles that may exist to the
development of an effective program.
3
Figure 2-1 presents the environmental management cycle. This process is explained in
more detail below the figure.
Once program goals are set, the focus moves to selecting the most suitable
management approach or combination of approaches, in order to achieve program goals. For
purposes of this book, these approaches are categorized as voluntary, market-based, and
mandatory. These approaches are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
4
2.2.3 Developing Effective Requirements
The selected management approach may require specific laws or regulations. Laws and
regulations, in turn, include “requirements” that clearly define specific practices and procedures
to directly or indirectly reduce or prevent pollution. Effective requirements demand that specific
things be done or outcomes reached. Chapter 5 discusses the creation of effective
environmental requirements to implement the selected management approach.
5
BOX 2-1: CREATING VALUE THROUGH COMPLIANCE
Promotes the Rule of Law and Good Governance: The rule of law is essential to good
governance and sustainable development. When individuals or organizations ignore an
environmental requirement, they are not just hurting the environment, but also damaging the
rule of law in that jurisdiction. Corruption and legal uncertainty foster widespread non-
compliance, environmental or otherwise, and vice-versa, eroding the norms and values that
constitute healthy societies.
Ensures Fairness and Strengthens the Credibility of Requirements: A consistent and effective
compliance and enforcement program helps ensure that actors affected by environmental
requirements are treated fairly. Without an effective compliance assurance program, actors
who violate environmental requirements may benefit compared to actors who choose to
comply. Ultimately, actors will be more likely to comply if they perceive that the requirements
are fair and do not place them at a competitive disadvantage.
Protects Goods and Services: Compliance assurance protects natural resources so they can
continue to provide valuable goods and services to society, including renewable natural
resources, climate stability, clean air, and fresh water. A recent study, for example, found that
eco-system services amounted to roughly €22 billion or 25 percent of the Scottish GDP.
Protects Public Health: Compliance assurance helps protect public health. In Europe alone, air
pollution is responsible for over 300,000 premature deaths each year. Pollution imposes a
substantial social cost in terms of increased health care expenses and employee absenteeism.
Strong compliance assurance helps improve public health, economic productivity, and the
environment.
Creates New Jobs and Markets: Compliance assurance creates jobs in new industries. The
most visible beneficiary is the environmental goods and services sector, which includes,
among other things, pollution abatement technology, waste management, organic products,
eco-certified resources, and eco-tourism. These are among the fastest growing industries in
the world.
6
2.4 Types of Compliance Activities
Governments have developed a number of regional and context appropriate policies and
programs to encourage and compel the behavioral changes needed to achieve compliance.
Although definitions and ways of categorizing these policies and programs vary from country to
country, they generally involve four major categories of activities: compliance assistance,
compliance incentives, compliance monitoring, and enforcement. Most often effective
implementation will involve some combination of these four categories of activities.
Note: In this Handbook and in other contexts, the terms “compliance promotion” and
“compliance assurance” are used to categorize specific compliance programs. Compliance
promotion refers to both compliance assistance and compliance incentives programs.
Compliance assurance refers to all compliance-related activities, including enforcement.
Compliance incentives are a set of policies and programs that provide concrete benefits
to those organizations that meet certain compliance objectives. Examples include programs that
reward top-performers or that reduce or waive penalties for facilities that voluntarily discover,
promptly disclose, correct non-compliance, and prevent future environmental violations.
Information campaigns and market-based mechanisms can also include compliance incentives.
7
2.6 Enforcement
Enforcement refers to actions taken by the government against violators to compel
compliance the law. These provisions generally give a governmental entity authority to impose
sanctions, in either the administrative, judicial, or criminal forum, and require the violator to
come into compliance with the law. Some statutes contain provisions that require a violator to
remedy environmental damage caused by the violations or that allow the government to clean
up the damage and recover the cost from the violator.
The theories underlying these programs reflect two different government approaches to
achieving compliance, often referred to colloquially in English as the carrot and the stick, which
together both encourage and compel behavioral change. The carrot (compliance promotion
activities) and the stick (the threat of an enforcement action against non-compliers) are based
on the rationalists and normative models of behavior.
The rationalist theory posits that regulated actors follow the logic of consequence. Put
simply, everyone acts to maximize their own self-interest. If it is “cheaper” to violate an
environmental requirement, then regulated actors will do so. Therefore, rationalists argue that
policies must “deter” this behavior by raising the “costs” of non-compliance.2 Accordingly, they
advocate deterrence-based enforcement. Generally, for a policy to have a deterrent effect, the
individual or organization must believe that:
• There is a high probability of being caught.
• The response to violations will be swift, certain, and fair.
• The punishment will be severe enough to outweigh the benefits of non-compliance.3
Deterrence may be enhanced either by expanding monitoring activities, improving
enforcement capacity to investigate and prosecute violations, raising penalties, or increasing
awareness of enforcement.
Normative theory posits that regulated actors follow the logic of appropriateness and
often act in good faith. Compliance occurs (or does not occur) largely because of the regulated
actor’s “capacity” (e.g. knowledge of the rules, and financial and technological ability to comply)
and “commitment” (e.g. perception that the rule is fair).4 Accordingly, these theories call for
more compliance promotion in the form of assistance, incentives, and other activities.
The rationalist and normative models represent opposite ends of the spectrum and each
provides useful insights into the types of behavior that lead to compliance. Regulated
communities everywhere generally can be divided into three general categories: (1) those who
8
will not comply at all unless they are forced to; (2) those who are “impressionable,” and might
comply if presented with incentives, knowledge, or capacity to do so; and (3) those who will
cooperate in all circumstances. Which one of these categories predominates will vary from
country-to-country and can help inform individual country decisions about what mix of
compliance promotion and enforcement activities to stress in efforts to promote the rule of law
and the protection of public health and the environment.
9
the rule of law. Limited powers, scarce financial and human resources of
enforcement agecies are also major causes of low effectiveness in ensuring
compliance.6”
There are no standard ways to address these complex and difficult issues. In some
countries, efforts to improve compliance assurance programs must be closely tied to efforts to
improve the rule of law and governance, in others it may require placing greater emphases on
education and awareness, while in others it may be a question of finding new resources or using
exisiting resources more efficiently, and in still others, a heavier emphasis on legal sanctions
that compel behavioural changes and punish violators may be needed to demonstrate
increased importance of the law. In many countries it will be a combination of all of these, and
more.
Although each country and jurisdiction faces a unique set of political, economic, social
and culture issues, certain general principles have emerged as to what constitutes an effective
compliance and enforcement program. Understanding these principles will allow governments
and civil society to better evaluate and adapt their environmental compliance and enforcement
programs to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.
10
3. PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes principles of effective environmental compliance and
enforcement programs. These principles build upon the issues discussed in Chapter Two and
provide the underlying context for the Environmental Management Cycle discussed in section
2.2.
Each country faces a unique set of challenges and capacities to implement its
environmental laws. However, there are fundamental elements in all countries that form the
basis of effective environmental compliance and enforcement programs and of legal systems.
These common principles, based on the collective knowledge and experience of the
International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE) and reflective of
international good practice, may be used to improve national environmental compliance and
enforcement programs.
These principles are divided into five sections: (1) environmental results and shared
responsibility; (2) goals and strategies; (3) good governance, rule of law and compliance; (4)
structure and resources; and, (5) continuous evaluation and improvement.
11
independence to compliance and enforcement programs. Legislators must create clearly written
legislation that is sufficiently stringent to meet its environmental goals. The judiciary is
responsible for upholding the rule of law and ensuring that laws are interpreted and applied
fairly, efficiently, and effectively. The regulated community is responsible for complying with the
letter and spirit of the law. Non-governmental organizations play a leading role in public
education and assisting enforcement agencies. The media is responsible for raising awareness
by presenting objective information and analysis. The international community -- including
donors, international organizations, and networks – is responsible for strengthening domestic
efforts through capacity development and the promoting of conditions enabling more effective
compliance and enforcement.
The rule of law forms the basis for effective environmental compliance and enforcement.
Broadly speaking, ‘rule of law’ refers to the presence of legal requirements that are transparent
and fairly applied. The rule of law depends upon an independent judiciary that interprets and
applies the law in an impartial and transparent manner.
Competent authorities should have access to the physical, technical, and financial
resources that are adequate to their mandate and scope of work. Management should ensure
high levels of professionalism through proper remuneration, motivation, and professional
development opportunities for program staff.
13
3.6 Continuous Evaluation and Improvement
These principles, and the concepts and issues set forth in Chapter 2, provide a basis for
the chapters that follow. These chapters will discuss management approaches to improving
environmental performance and address issues to consider when designing effective
requirements. They will also discuss compliance promotion activities, compliance monitoring
programs, and enforcement programs. Finally, they will explore program infrastructure, inter-
organizational communication, and methods of measuring performance through compliance
indicators.
14
4. SELECTING A MANAGEMENT APPROACH
4.1 Introduction
Three different overlapping management approaches -- voluntary, market-based, and
mandatory -- make up the framework underlying most environmental programs. Mandatory and
many market-based approaches require effective environmental compliance and enforcement
programs to ensure that the underlying rules are understood and followed by the regulated
community. Voluntary approaches provide important tools to educate, inform, and motivate
polluters about the need to reduce their environmental impacts despite the lack of legal
requirements.
All three approaches can be designed to target activities posing the greatest risk to
human health and the environment, reduce pollution, and create incentives for individuals,
businesses, and governments to find new, more cost effective solutions to environmental
problems. What makes mandatory approaches different is that they usually work to establish a
base-line of what is required from individuals, companies, and governments in terms of
environmental performance.
This chapter begins by examining the three different management approaches. It then
examines the general function of laws, regulations, permits, and guidance. It ends by providing
an overview of the types of environmental requirements that are codified in laws and regulations
and that have served as the foundation of many of the environmental improvements made over
the past several decades.
Market-based approaches use the market to achieve desired behavioral changes. These
approaches can occur without regulation or build upon mandatory approaches. Introducing
market forces into a mandatory approach can encourage greater pollution prevention and more
economic solutions to problems. Market-based approaches include:
• Fee systems that tax emissions, effluents, and other releases into the environment.
• Emissions trading programs that allow companies to trade permitted emission rights
with other companies.
• Offset approaches that allow a facility to propose various approaches to meeting an
environmental goal, for example, by allowing a facility to emit greater quantities of a
substance from one of its operations if the facility offsets this increase by reducing
emissions at another one of its operations.
• Auctions whereby the government auctions limited rights to produce or release
pollutants.
• Environmental labeling/public disclosure, whereby manufacturers are required to
label products in a way that informs consumers about certain environmental benefits
or public health or environmental risks, allowing the consumer to make informed
choices.
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4.3 Finding the Right Mix
A number of factors can be considered in determining the right mix of voluntary,
mandatory, and market-based approaches to a particular environmental problem in a particular
jurisdiction. These factors include:
• Whether overall program goals are to require certain behavior.
• An understanding of what drives environmental performance of different sectors of
the economy.
• An understanding of what drives non-compliant behavior of entities on both a
sectoral basis and jurisdictional basis.
• The political, legislative, economic, and cultural realities of the society in question.
17
• Business requirements, such as those created within a supply chain, by business
contracts, or through industrial associations.
• The desire for regulatory compliance, which can have additional benefits such as the
increased likelihood of fewer inspections and less scrutiny.
• The desire to improve the relationship with government agencies, which can lead to
faster approval of projects.
Understanding how these drivers will influence different sectors of the economy and
types of organizations will help government agencies tailor policies and target resources,
particularly as they relate to voluntary and market-based programs.
Similarly, a number of factors can drive non-compliance. The reasons listed in Box 4-1
are those used by the Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment
as a way of classifying reasons for non-compliance. Many of these factors, plus others, will be
applicable in many jurisdictions throughout the world. Understanding these factors will help
program planners predict the likelihood of success of new mandatory programs and decide
where to target enforcement and compliance resources.
Aspects of monitoring
6. Informal report probability.
7. Monitoring probability.
8. Detection probability.
9. Selectivity of the inspector.
Aspects of sanctions
10. Probability of sanctions.
11. Severity of sanctions.
12. Political, legislative, economic, and cultural realities.
18
Each country will consider what management approach to take based on its political,
legislative, economic and cultural situation. Existing laws, regulations, and policies, as well as
cultural and societal norms, and those businesses, industries, and organizations with political
and economic influence will all greatly affect the environmental management approaches of a
particular country.
Compliance officials can influence overall program direction by understanding society’s
overall environmental goals, the factors driving environmental performance, and the factors
affecting non-compliance. With this understanding, they can operate more effectively within the
political, legislative, economic, and cultural norms of their jurisdiction.
19
definition, not part of an approach designed to motivate voluntary changes in behavior, but
instead attempt to compel compliance with legal mandates.
Constitution
Some nations’ constitutions guarantee their citizens a clean and healthy environment,
giving those governments and others the responsibility to protect that right.
Laws
Laws provide the vision, scope, and authority for environmental protection and
restoration. In some countries, laws also encompass the types of general requirements that
other countries describe in regulations.
Regulations
Regulations establish the details of a law, e.g., criteria for issuing permits and licenses,
how and when to test for harmful substances, how the government will conduct itself in an
enforcement action, etc. Regulations are most often developed by the implementing agency that
is charged with compliance and enforcement under the law.
5.1 Introduction
Effective requirements are critical to the success of any compliance and enforcement
program. Without adequate legal authorities, enforcement programs will generally be ineffective.
Unclear, imprecise, ambiguous, inconsistent, or contradictory requirements may be difficult or
impossible to enforce. Requirements that rely on expensive, unreliable, or unavailable
technologies will make compliance difficult or impossible.
This chapter outlines some steps that can be taken to design effective requirements.
These include explanations about some of the basic legal issues in drafting requirements,
balancing the stringency and feasibility of requirements, designing effective general and specific
requirements, and developing strategies for involving stakeholders in the drafting process.
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5.2.2 Clear Standards
Ambient Standards
Ambient standards, or media-quality standards, are goals for the quality of the ambient
environment (e.g. air, water). Ambient standards are usually written in units of concentration.
In the US, ambient standards are used as environmental quality goals and to plan the level of
emissions from individual sources that can be accommodated while still meeting the area-
wide goals. Ambient standards may also be as triggers, e.g., when the standard is exceeded,
monitoring or enforcement efforts are increased. Enforcement of ambient standards usually
requires relating an ambient measurement to emissions or activities at a specific facility.
Technology Standards
These standards require the regulated community to use a particular type of
technology to control and/or monitor emissions. Technology standards are particularly
appropriate when the equipment is known to perform well under the range of conditions
generally experienced by sources in the community. It is relatively easy for inspectors to
determine whether sources are in compliance with technology standards: the approved
equipment must be in place and operating properly. It may be difficult, however, to ensure
that the equipment is operating properly over a long period of time. Technology standards can
inhibit technological innovation and pollution prevention if they are not continually readjusted.
Practice Standards
These standards prohibit certain work activities that have significant environmental
impacts or require certain mitigating activities. For example, a standard might prohibit carrying
hazardous liquids in uncovered buckets. Like technology standards, it is easy for program
officials to inspect for compliance and take action against non-compliant sources, but difficult
to ensure ongoing compliance.
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Information Requirements
These legal provisions require a source of potential pollution (e.g., a pesticide
manufacturer or facilities involved in generating, transporting, storing, treating, and disposing
of hazardous waste) to develop and submit information to the government. Sources
generating pollution may be required to monitor, report, and maintain records of levels of
pollution generated and whether or not they exceed performance standards. Information
requirements are often used when the potential pollution source is a product such as a new
chemical or pesticide, rather than a waste. Manufacturers may be required to test and report
on potential harmful effects of new products on the environment.
Environmental laws should also create an institutional framework that specifies the roles
and responsibilities of the various levels of government and agencies. Laws and regulations
need to be clear about the process and procedures by which the government can take an
enforcement action.
When laws are developed and proposed, legislators, government agencies, and interest
groups should work to understand how those laws will affect other environmental laws and laws
in other related sectors. Other sectors with laws that overlap pollution control and natural
resource protection may include:
• Health—food safety, occupational health and safety, drinking water, consumer
products, pesticide use, etc.
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• Land use planning - transportation, development, siting, etc.
• Industry and commerce.
• Agriculture.
Rational coordination of laws can be especially important in countries with many
agencies sharing responsibility for environmental protection. Brazil, in a situation common to
many countries, faces the challenge of coordinating over 69 environmental laws and 53
international environmental-related treaties across the national, state, and municipal levels.12
General requirements are those that apply to a class or group of entities or people
and/or a class of activities.
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5.4.1 Basic Design Principles
General requirements are most frequently implemented in the form of (1) laws, (2)
regulations, or (3) general permits or licenses that apply to a specific class of facilities (e.g. dry
cleaners). General requirements may apply directly to a group of facilities or may serve as the
basis for developing facility-specific requirements. Requirements should:
• Be clear and understandable.
• Precisely define the sources or activities that are subject to requirements.
• Precisely define the requirements and any exceptions or variances (such as when
regulated entities may petition the government for an exemption from a general
requirement).13
• Clearly address how compliance is to be determined by specifying test methods and
procedures.
• Clearly state deadlines for compliance.
• Identify what types of compliance assistance will be offered to the regulated
community (e.g., training, technical assistance, etc.).
• Describe how compliance will be monitored.
• Establish enforcement responses for non-compliance.
• Be flexible enough to be constructively adapted through individual permits, licenses,
or variances to different regulatory circumstances.
• Be written clearly enough to be the basis of criminal prosecution (which is the most
serious enforcement action).
• Be based on technology (e.g., control or monitoring equipment) and methodologies
that are or soon will be available, reliable, and affordable.
Box 5-2 provides examples of basic questions that can be asked when legal
requirements are being drafted into regulations, general permits, or licenses that will be
effective.
Definitions
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license clearly define the regulated
community, the regulated activities, and the regulated substances?
• Are any exceptions to defined terms narrow enough to avoid having the exceptions
undermine the defined terms?
• Are the definitions and exceptions precise enough so that compliance assurance
personnel can identify instances of non-compliance?
25
• Are defined terms used consistently throughout the text of the regulation, general
permit, or general license?
• Is the legal authority underlying the regulation, general permit, or general license
clearly articulated?
• Are exceptions to the regulation, general permit, or general license defined precisely
enough to make it clear which groups are exempted? If sources under a certain size
are exempted, does the regulation identify how the size of a particular source is to be
determined?
• Are requirements or other end results measurable? Are the units of compliance clear?
• Are more enforceable requirements available, i.e., requirements that are easier to
measure and less resource-intensive?
• Are exceptions clearly described? Is the calculation for exceptions clearly specified?
If the regulation, general permit, or general license grants exceptions based on
malfunctions or changes in local conditions, does it specify what emission levels may
be excused, when, and who makes this determination?
• If changed circumstances may raise or change a requirement, does the regulation,
general permit, or general license clearly specify these circumstances? Are the
changes that must be made clearly defined?
• If the requirement is an emission limit or concentration value, does it explicitly state
the time frame associated with the limit (e.g., instantaneous, two-hour average, daily)?
Monitoring
• Does the regulation clearly state exactly what the regulated community is required to
monitor? Do these requirements support the compliance goals of the environmental
law? For example, if the compliance goal is to demonstrate that facilities are in
compliance each day, does the regulation, general permit, or general license require
daily self-monitoring and recordkeeping [and reporting]?
• What test methods are needed to determine whether a facility is in compliance? Are
the methods clearly described? Are any allowable averaging times clearly specified?
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license make falsifying self-monitoring
data a separate and enforceable violation?
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license authorize inspection
procedures that will enable inspectors to gather data needed to determine
compliance?
• Do the procedures cover entering a regulated facility, inspecting documents, and
collecting samples?
• Will inspectors be readily able to determine which facilities are not in compliance?
• Will the requirements for inspection and self-monitoring help reduce enforcement
costs and increase the effectiveness of inspections?
Self-monitoring
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license provide a clear schedule for
self-monitoring?
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license state the methods to be used
for self-monitoring?
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license clearly state what data the
regulated community is required to record and report?
• Will these data show whether or not a facility is in compliance? Will these data provide
sufficient evidence to document a violation?
26
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license provide a clear schedule and
format for recordkeeping and reporting?
• Are the reporting requirements frequent enough to allow timely response to a
violation?
• Is the regulated community required to retain information long enough for enforcement
purposes?
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license make failure to maintain or
report records a separate and enforceable violation?
• Is the regulated community required to make records available to inspectors upon
request?
• Are any exceptions to the recordkeeping and reporting requirements clearly
defined/stated?
• Will the requirements for reports, records, and inspection/monitoring techniques help
reduce enforcement costs and increase the effectiveness of inspections?
Demonstrating Compliance
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license clearly describe what
constitutes compliance and how compliance is determined? Is compliance
determined by field inspections and desk reviews of reports submitted by the
regulated community, or is the regulation, general permit, or general license self-
enforcing?
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license clearly state who (i.e., the
government or the facility) is responsible for proving compliance or non-compliance?
Can the environmental management program independently determine compliance?
Can the program require the facility to perform certain tests and determine
compliance?
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license define time limits by which a
member of the regulated community must reach compliance? Do the time periods
have specified beginning and end points? If compliance is defined by occurrence of
an event, rather than by a date, is the event discrete enough for an inspector to
determine whether the facility is in compliance?
• Is the evidentiary burden required to prove a violation clearly described? Can third
party data be used as evidence?
• Does the regulation, general permit, or general license describe the extent to which an
inspector can use professional judgment in determining whether a facility is in
compliance?
• If different government levels are involved in enforcement programs, does the
regulation, general permit, or general license clearly describe the responsibilities of
each level of government?
If possible, regulators should determine the size of the regulated community prior to
implementing environmental laws; otherwise governments may find that their environmental
requirements are unmanageable.
For example, a province in the Netherlands passed a law requiring companies to apply
for an exemption if they wanted to use a processing installation to dispose of their wastes. After
the law was passed, the government discovered that 100,000 companies would need an
27
exemption. Inspections alone would have required hiring an additional 200 to 300 inspectors.
The provincial government decided to revise the regulation. Exemptions are no longer required.
Companies must keep a record of their waste deliveries and periodically report information on
the most hazardous wastes. Compliance assurance efforts now focus on the waste processors
(about 1,000) rather than the waste producers.
The economic and environmental significance of small and medium size businesses
(SMEs) is significant. For example, in Canada, Mexico and the United States over 98 percent of
the businesses are Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs). Although most SMEs serve
local markets, they increasingly operate as part of a global market place, purchasing products
produced abroad, supplying multinational companies and selling directly to overseas buyers.
SMEs face widely differing environmental issues based on the economic sector,
employee base and jurisdiction in which they operate. A study prepared by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that in the United States, SMEs are
significant contributors to pollution in three branches of manufacturing: chemicals, primary
metals, and building materials (e.g., stone, clay, glass). The largest impacts from SMEs were on
biological oxygen demand in water and suspended particles in air, followed by release of toxic
chemicals.
Because of their size, governments should consider these factors when developing
initiatives for SMEs: (1) The power of the supply chain, business contracts, and industrial
associations can be significant for many SME sectors; (2) A tailored outreach can be helpful.
Official efforts narrowly tailored to the business sector, size, and location of the SME will be far
more successful than generic outreach efforts; (3) The right partners are essential. When
governments involve business associations that have SMEs as members, the likelihood of
success is greater; (4) Regulatory compliance pressure can motivate the search for the least
expensive solutions that are lawful.
Regulators should also consider the size of the regulated entity and adjust outreach and
enforcement strategies accordingly. Smaller entities are a major source of pollution and often
may not have in-house expertise or the resources to comply with complicated requirements.
Governments may need to provide greater compliance promotion activities and work with local
governments and trade associations to help understand the capabilities of these types of
businesses and the extent of environmental problems at their facilities. (See Box 5-3).
Requirements that are very specific may leave little room for open interpretation. While
such requirements may be easier to enforce, they might not allow the flexibility that will
28
encourage compliance. Environmental management programs often use facility-specific
permits or licenses to provide the flexibility that individual circumstances often warrant.
29
BOX 5-4: CHECKLIST FOR DEVELOPING ENFORCEABLE FACILITY SPECIFIC
REQUIREMENTS
General
• Is the length of time that the permit will be valid clearly stated? Is a date specified to
indicate when the permit must be reissued and when an application for a new permit
should be filed?
• Does the permit contain a provision stating that the permit must be modified if
ownership of the facility changes, or if the facility makes changes to its regulated
processes?
• Do the permit conditions conflict with conditions in any other of the facility’s permits?
• Is there a provision specifying that the permit can automatically be revoked if it is
discovered that the applicant deliberately submitted false, misleading, or incomplete
information during the application process?
• Does the permit state whether the owner or operator will be liable for non-
compliance?
Requirements
• Are the requirements measurable? Are the units of compliance clear?
• Does the permit specify that a modification will be required if the requirements or
criteria change?
• If the requirement is an emission limit, does the permit explicitly state the time frame
associated with the limit (e.g., instantaneous, 3-hour average, daily) and the location
of where the measurement shall take place?
Monitoring
• Does the permit clearly state exactly what the facility is required to monitor? Do these
requirements support the compliance goals of the environmental regulation?
• What test methods are needed to determine whether the facility is in compliance?
Are the methods clearly described and available to the permittee? Are any allowable
averaging times clearly specified?
• Does the permit make the act of falsifying self-monitoring data a separate and
enforceable violation?
• Does the permit provide a clear schedule for self-monitoring?
• Does the permit authorize inspection procedures that will enable inspectors to gather
data needed to determine compliance? Do these procedures cover entering a
regulated facility, inspecting documents and collecting samples?
• Will inspectors be readily able to determine which facilities are not in compliance?
• Will the requirements for inspection and self-monitoring help reduce enforcement
costs and increase the effectiveness of inspections?
Self-Monitoring
• Does the permit clearly state what data the facility is required to record and report?
• Will these data show whether or not a facility is in compliance? Will these data
provide sufficient evidence to document a violation?
• Is the facility required to report non-compliance with permit requirements? If so, does
the permit specify a deadline for reporting non-compliance, and the person to whom
30
non-compliance should be reported?
• Does the permit provide a clear schedule and format for record-keeping and
reporting?
• Does the permit specify to whom the information should be reported?
• Are the reporting requirements frequent enough to allow timely response to a
violation? Is the facility required to retain information long enough for enforcement
purposes?
• Does the permit make failure to maintain or report records a separate and
enforceable violation?
• Is the facility required to make records available upon request?
• Are any exceptions to the record-keeping and reporting requirements clearly spelled
out?
• Will the requirements for reports, records, and inspection/monitoring techniques help
reduce enforcement costs and increase the effectiveness of inspections?
Demonstrating Compliance
• Does the permit clearly describe what constitutes compliance and how compliance is
determined?
• Does the permit clearly state who is responsible for proving compliance or non-
compliance (as established by applicable law)?
• Does the permit define time limits by which the facility must reach compliance? Do
the time periods have specified beginning and end points? If compliance is defined
by occurrence of an event, rather than by a date, is the event discrete enough for an
inspector to determine whether the facility is in compliance?
Special institutional channels and procedures should allow compliance assurance staff,
including inspectors and prosecutors, to provide meaningful input in the drafting of general
requirements. Enforcement and compliance officials often have unique and real world
experience with different regulatory programs and can see the strengths and weaknesses for
the enforceability of regulatory proposals.
One option is to create committees that include both policymakers and enforcement
officials. These committees can include representatives of all government levels (national,
regional, provincial, and local) that may be involved in the process of assuring compliance with
the requirements. Committee members can be responsible for ensuring that the appropriate
individuals within the environmental management program are involved in drafting and
reviewing the requirements.
Comments on the proposed requirements should follow administrative procedures that
allow for written comments and that establish a record of the decision-making process.
Lessons learned about what makes existing requirements effective or ineffective in a
particular region or country might be recorded, studied, and communicated to those involved in
developing new requirements. For example, selected requirements could be reviewed one year
after coming into force in order to analyze their effectiveness and make any necessary
32
adjustments and to establish an expedited process that can be used to correct specific types of
deficiencies by making limited revisions to general requirements.
Involving the regulated community and civil society in developing requirements helps
build support, reduces resistance and conflict, and eases implementation. It can also make
requirements more practical, and therefore more enforceable, and it publicizes the requirements
at an early phase, thus “setting the stage” for compliance. Below are three basic ways to
involve the regulated community and civil society in the process of drafting environmental
requirements: informal consultations, formal comment, and field testing. (See Box 5-5).
Informal Consultations
Policymakers can consult with key representatives of the regulated community and civil
society informally before developing general requirements. These consultations can be helpful
in sorting out future problems early and eliminating resistance.
Formal Comment
U.S. legal systems require the federal government to publish draft regulations and
solicit comments from the regulated community and the public. Widely distributed, low-cost
government periodicals provide advance notice that new regulations are being developed and
announce when they will be available. Any organization or individual can easily obtain and
review the proposed regulations when they are issued. Written comments from the public are
usually accepted for a limited period of time (30 to 90 days in the United States) after the
proposed regulation has been issued. The environmental agency prepares and publishes
detailed responses to the comments. Many of the comments directly concern the difficulty or
unanticipated effects of compliance. These comments provide regulators with an opportunity
to rethink their approach. The formal responses to comments reassure commenting parties
that their comments were considered.15
Field Testing
In field testing, specific members of the regulated community volunteer to test general
requirements to determine whether the requirements are clear and understandable, and to
assess/evaluate the ease and cost of compliance. Policymakers can then make changes to
the general requirements before they are finally implemented. Though field testing can
lengthen the total time it takes to develop a general requirement, it can expose weaknesses
that might otherwise render it unenforceable. Where field testing is used, policymakers will
need to determine who will fund it—the enforcement program, the test facility itself, a trade
association representing the regulated community, or a combination of these.
33
Involving the non-regulated community (e.g., the general public and non-governmental
organizations) can also be very helpful. Such involvement is an opportunity to solicit creative
ideas from knowledgeable groups. Civil society has an interest in clear and effective
environmental requirements. Laws, regulations, and permits that provide specific substantive
requirements make it easier for members of civil society to participate in citizen based
compliance promotion, monitoring, and enforcement. In addition, the involvement of civil society
helps shield the program from isolation and builds broad-based popular support for the
requirements and their implementation.
In China, for example, the State Environmental Protection Administration recently
passed a regulation to allow greater public participation in Environmental Impact Assessments.
These Assessments will be more widely distributed to the public, and citizens will be able to
participate in the process through opinion surveys, consultations, seminars, debates, and
hearings.16
34
6. COMPLIANCE PROMOTION
6.1 Introduction
In many countries, traditional environmental regulatory programs are being carried out in
conjunction with non-regulatory voluntary programs designed to promote changes in behavior.
Voluntary programs are different from compliance promotion activities, as voluntary programs
have no mandatory component while compliance promotion activities encourage and help the
regulated community to comply with environmental laws and requirements through assistance
and incentive activities.
This chapter provides an overview of some of these compliance assistance and
compliance incentives activities. It begins by examining educational, technical, and financial
assistance programs that make up compliance assistance efforts. It then examines compliance
incentives efforts, such as auditing policies, recognition programs, efforts to provide the public
with information, and market-based mechanisms.
Education and technical assistance lay the groundwork for compliance. These efforts
can help businesses and individuals fully understand their legal responsibilities, and how they
can meet those responsibilities. Education and technical assistance are particularly important in
the early stages of a new program or when legal and regulatory requirements change.
Education and technical assistance programs can help the regulated community understand:
• Who is subject to requirements?
35
• What are the requirements?
• Why are these requirements important?
• What changes (including technical and managerial changes) can be made to comply
with the requirements?
• How can these changes be made (e.g. equipment, operations, human resources)?
• What are the consequences of non-compliance (both in terms of costs and benefits)?
Education and technical assistance outreach can be made through publications (such as
brochures and guidance manuals); websites; “hot lines” or dedicated telephone numbers;
conferences and other meetings; or as part of media announcements.
Technical assistance can be provided by trained government personnel who visit
individual members of the regulated community to assist them in making changes, and as part
of special assistance programs, set up for example at universities or non-governmental
institutions, that provide a central resource for information and advice on how to comply with
legal and regulatory requirements.
Professional associations are important government partners for compliance assistance
activities. These associations usually have established communication networks and access to
industry experts. They can provide forums for the regulated community and enforcement
program personnel to exchange information and ideas.
Even with education and technical assistance, cost may be a significant barrier to
compliance. In some instances, the government may want to provide direct assistance to the
regulated community in order to help them deal with the initial cost of compliance.
In the late 1990s, for example, selected firms in Sri Lanka’s distillery, textile, and metal
finishing sectors were shown ways to reduce waste generation quantities through simple
process and raw material changes, as well as good housekeeping practices. Demonstration
waste minimization projects such as these help industries to meet the required environmental
standards while at the same time reducing end-of-pipe treatment costs.
Some international organizations and national development aid agencies provide funds
to developing countries that could not otherwise afford to comply with environmental
requirements. The Compliance Assistance Programme of the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal
Protocol, for example, has a successful capacity building program that places teams in regional
offices to deliver technical assistance on Protocol requirements directly to developing
countries.19
Compliance incentives consist of a set of policies and programs that eliminate, reduce or
waive penalties under certain conditions for business, industry, and government facilities that
voluntarily discover, promptly disclose and correct non-compliance, and prevent future
environmental violations. Many audit and special recognition programs are examples of
compliance incentive programs. These programs provide concrete benefits for companies,
agencies, and individuals that actively monitor their facilities and report problems to appropriate
authorities. Other compliance incentive programs provide the public with specific environmental
37
performance information on companies in order to motivate them to improve their environmental
performance.
39
Ideally, an information strategy should be flexible enough to accommodate regulated
firms with different characteristics. It should be simple and easily understandable by the public.
Finally, it should offer the regulated firm a chance to improve its performance before the
information becomes public. Many firms will take this opportunity to come into compliance
rather than risk damage to their reputations or more severe fines. (See Box 6-3 for an example
from China).
The effectiveness of public involvement in information strategies will vary with the nature
of the sectors and firms regulated. It will be a challenge to bring market pressure on firms that
provide products or services in sectors with limited competition or where a brand name is not
dependent on public good-will. Closely held and government-owned enterprises also have a
degree of insulation from external pressure. But all of these firms can be reached with carefully
planned strategies.
40
BOX 6-3: INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS IN CHINA24
Faced with difficulty ensuring companies’ compliance with pollution regulations, China
began a program, informally called “GreenWatch,” for disclosing industry pollutant discharges
to the public. Pilot efforts, such as those in Hohhot Municipality and Zhenjiang City,
demonstrated that public disclosure of environmental performance could impact a company’s
public image. The results were that “enterprises that improved their performance immediately
requested new monitoring reports so that their public ratings could be improved as well.
Enterprises with poor ratings shifted from passive resistance to active solicitation of
inspections, as a means of improving their performance ratings. At the same time, enterprises
with good ratings felt continued pressure to maintain their environmental performance to
avoid complaints from the public about backsliding.” In November 2006, the Chinese
government decided to extend GreenWatch to every city in the country by 2010.
41
BOX 6-4: EXAMPLES OF TAXES AND FEES
In 1995, the Netherlands enacted a tax on the landfilling of waste. The purpose of this
tax is to address environmental issues of waste and to better distribute tax burdens across
different groups by introducing a new tax base. The tax is calculated based on the weight of the
waste. As of 2004, those dumping waste had to pay € 84.78 per ton for waste less than 1,100
kg/m3 and for certain waste streams like dangerous waste and shredder waste and € 13.98 per
ton for waste more than 1,100 kg/m3. Studies have shown that the tax has contributed to a shift
from dumping to prevention, recycling, and incineration of waste.
Colombia has demonstrated how discharge fees can create incentives for regulatory
authorities to improve permitting, monitoring, and enforcement. In 1997, to reduce water
pollution, Colombia began charging polluters a fee per unit of pollution emitted. The fees were
determined based on whether overall pollution reduction targets were being met. By allowing
Colombia’s regional environmental authorities to keep the fees, but requiring reporting of fees to
a centralized authority, this system creates incentives for improved monitoring and enforcement.
42
7. MONITORING COMPLIANCE
7.1 Introduction
Monitoring compliance is essential to the success of an environmental management
program. The collection and analysis of compliance information improves decision making
through the following:
• Evaluating program progress by establishing compliance status.
• Detecting and correcting violations.
• Supporting information strategies to promote compliance.
• Providing evidence to support enforcement actions and deter non-compliance.
There are four primary sources of compliance information discussed in this chapter:
• Inspections.
• Monitoring environmental conditions near a facility.
• Self-monitoring, recordkeeping, and self-reporting by the regulated community.
• Citizen monitoring.
These are described in detail below. Box 7-1 summarizes the advantages and
disadvantages of these four information sources. Additional information may come from reports
of other national, regional, provincial, or local agencies that have related jurisdiction over the
facility; requests for modifications to permits or licenses; and environmental audit reports
provided by the facility. However, as information on compliance status is gathered, an
enforcement program needs a system (computerized if possible) to store, access, and analyze
the information as needed.
43
BOX 7-1: COMPARING SOURCES OF COMPLIANCE INFORMATION
INFORMATION SOURCE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
Inspections Provide the most relevant Can be very resource-intensive.
and reliable information.
Monitoring Useful for detecting possible Can be difficult to demonstrate a
Environmental violations without entering connection between the pollution
Conditions Near a the facility. detected and a specific source.
Facility
Useful for determining Difficult or impossible to obtain
whether permit or license precise information.
requirements are providing
adequate environmental Resource-intensive in areas of
protection. multiple sources.
7.2 Inspections
Inspections are the backbone of most enforcement programs.26 Inspections are
conducted by government inspectors or in some cases by independent parties hired by and
reporting back to the responsible agency. The inspector’s role is not to interpret the law and
44
make the final institutional or agency determination of compliance, but rather to gather facts
about a facility, collect and analyze documentation, and record observations. The inspector
then organizes those observations and supporting documentation into a report for review
against standards set forth in law.
Inspectors plan inspections, gather data in and around a particular facility, record and
report on their observations, and sometimes make independent judgments about whether the
facility is in compliance. Inspection activities may include, but are not limited to: observing and
documenting observations; sampling, measuring, and photographing; coring, drilling, and
excavating; reviewing and copying records; and seizing equipment, products, materials, or
records. Inspections can be very resource-intensive and therefore require careful targeting and
planning. By standardizing inspection procedures, enforcement officials can help ensure that all
facilities are treated equally and that all the appropriate information is gathered. By specifying
deadlines for inspection reports, program managers can help ensure that reports can be made
available to enforcement personnel without delay if there is a possibility of non-compliance.27
In 1997, Vietnam for the first time implemented a large-scale, nation-wide inspection for
compliance with environmental requirements. This process entailed close coordination between
branches of the national government (e.g., environment, energy, defense), between central and
local levels of government, and with the mass media. The investigations helped to increase the
role and influence of the environmental inspectors in society and helped introduce the Law on
Environmental Protection to the public.
The 1994 Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides Control and Management Act gives
inspectors broad powers to investigate potential violations of laws governing pesticides and
other hazardous chemicals. The Act provides that an “inspector may, in the performance of his
duties…at all reasonable times without [a] warrant enter on any land, premises or vehicle
where a chemical or pesticide is or may be reasonably suspected to be manufactured, stored,
sold, distributed or used to determine whether the provisions of this Act are being complied
with.” Moreover, the inspector may “take samples of any articles and substances to which this
Act relates and, as may be prescribed, submit such samples for test and analysis.”
1. Targeting Inspections
Inspection sites are selected using four criteria: 1) random selection of sites from all of
the identifiable members of a regulated community, frequently referred to as a “neutral
inspection scheme;” 2) a selection that emphasizes a specific sector of the identifiable regulated
community, usually based on enforcement history, potential threat, or other clearly researched
criteria; 3) a selection based on information received from the public or other external sources
such as a tip or complaint; and 4) emergency responses. An agency must explain how it
weighed each of these criteria in a compliance monitoring report made available to the public to
show it that the selections were made in a fair and transparent manner.
4. Opening Conference
The purpose of an opening conference is to let the facility know what the agency plans
to do and why, and also to learn more about the facility operation, plant layout, management
structure, plant processes, plant safety, and other information relevant for the investigation.
48
6. Collecting Evidence from Records and Reports
A record is any means of memorializing an event, person, place, or thing. Inspectors
have the authority to review relevant firm records to determine compliance. The following are
some common records that may be of relevance for inspectors: annual reports; production
records; shipping reports; manifests; inventory records; sales reports; process records; permits;
quality control records; waste management records; documentation of environmental
management systems; employee training records; self-monitoring records; discharge monitoring
reports; licenses; articles of incorporation; property records; logs; maintenance records; spill
reports; safety records; and accident reports.
7. Closing Conference
The closing conference provides an opportunity to confirm inspectors’ observations and
review preliminary findings with facility personnel. This may also be the opportunity to explain
observed violations to the company.
8. Report Writing
The objective for generating the report is to organize and coordinate all documentation
and potential evidence in a comprehensive, understandable, and usable manner.
50
a risk that the evidence may be rejected in a court of law and that the time and expense
invested in building a case will have been wasted. Standard checklists are often developed for
different types of inspections to ensure that the inspections properly cover all of the necessary
aspects and are fair and objective. Sometimes inspectors are responsible for determining
whether a violation has occurred, while other times, program staff or legal staff make this
determination. Involvement of legal staff is essential in interpreting requirements, to determine
whether there has been a violation. Because of the potential risk to subsequent enforcement
cases, most inspectors in U.S. enforcement programs do not make decisions about whether a
violation has occurred.
Objectives
• What is the purpose of the inspection?
• What is to be accomplished?
Tasks
• What information will be reviewed (e.g., permits, licenses, regulations, previous
inspection reports, and information on the history of compliance)?
• What coordination with laboratories, other environmental programs, lawyers, or
government agencies is required?
Procedures
• Which specific facility processes will be inspected?
• Have inspectors established a right of entry to the facility?
• Will the inspection require special procedures?
• Has a quality assurance/quality control plan been developed and understood?
• What equipment will be required?
• What are the responsibilities of each member of the team?
Resources
• What personnel will be required?
• Has a safety plan been developed and understood?
Schedule
• What will be the time requirements for and order of inspection activities?
• What will be the priorities? What must be done, and what is optional to complete?
51
7.5.4 Step 4: Written Inspection Report
The inspector must record notes on every aspect of the inspection and gather additional
evidence, such as physical samples, photographs, and copies of facility documents. As soon as
possible following the inspection, the inspector must prepare an inspection report which
references any additional evidence collected (photographs, documents, etc.). The final report
will serve as the basis for any testimony by the inspector and will likely be used as evidence if
enforcement actions are taken.
Prior to finalizing the report, any samples collected must be sent to a laboratory for
analysis, in accordance with the protocol outlined by the agency to ensure reliable evaluation of
samples. It is also important to establish and preserve the chain of custody. The evidence
should remain under the care of an appropriate authority in order to reduce the possibility of the
evidence being corrupted. The subject of the inspection, however, may be given the right to
have the samples examined by their own experts, provided that rules and procedures are in
place to protect the evidence from tampering.
Analytical data should be interpreted and presented in the final inspection report.
Elements of an inspection report may include:
• The specific reason for the inspection.
• Participants in the inspection.
• Statement that all required procedures for conducting the inspection were obeyed.
• A chronological list of all actions taken during the inspection.
• An inventory of the evidence obtained during the inspection.
• Observations made during the inspections.
• The results of sample analyses related to the inspection.
52
and assistance programs. A program should not assign inspectors to monitor the same facilities
where they have provided special technical assistance. This will help minimize the risk (and
appearance) of preferential treatment by agency staff members who have spent considerable
time and energy consulting with a firm. In some instances, however, resource constraints and
the need for particular expertise make this difficult. For example, there may be a limited number
of energy plant inspectors with the requisite technical expertise so an agency may not have
enough manpower to change inspectors every visit. In cases such as these, the agency should
set a goal of changing the inspector responsible for that facility as often as practicable –
perhaps every few years.
7.6.2 Training
Inspectors require training in a broad range of skills: legal, technical, administrative, and
communication. (See Box 7-7). They need to be technically competent in the subject matter of
the inspections they perform and skilled in obtaining crucial facts and collecting and preserving
evidence of non-compliance. They also need to be skilled in managing projects, working as part
of a team, and communicating effectively. Communications range from entry conversations to
complex cross-examination in cases of serious violations. It is useful if inspectors are trained in
negotiation techniques and conflict resolution, because some inspections may become
adversarial. In such cases, inspectors must be able to prevent a hostile situation from
escalating. The training and integrity of inspectors are critical to effective enforcement
programs.
The kinds of equipment required to support an inspection vary depending on the type
and purpose of inspection. Equipment needed may include:
• Safety equipment to protect the inspector from any hazards that may be
encountered during the inspection.
• Documentation equipment to record information and evidence, including cameras,
film, pocket calculators, tape measures, and logbook.
• Sampling equipment to take samples of soil, water, or air.
• Equipment to transport samples to avoid contamination.
• Analytical equipment to examine the environmental samples taken at the facility.
53
BOX 7-7: ELEMENTS OF INSPECTOR TRAINING
Pre-inspection Activities
• Pre-inspection Planning and Preparation
• Administrative Considerations for Inspectors
On-site Activities
• Gaining Entry and Opening Conference
• Ensuring Inspector Health and Safety
• Records Review
• Physical Sampling
• Interviews
• Observations and Illustrations
• Closing Conference/Travel Security Measures
Post-inspection Activities
• Reports and Files
• Laboratory Analysis
• Enforcement Proceedings
Communications
• Serving as an Expert Witness at Enforcement Proceedings
• Press and Public Relations
• Communications Skills
Policymakers have many issues to consider when designing an inspection program. For
example:
• Selecting Facilities for Inspection. How are facilities chosen for inspection? What
proportion of inspections should be “routine,” and what proportion should be “for
54
cause”? How can routine inspections be distributed fairly and neutrally across the
regulated community?
• Announced Versus Unannounced Inspections. When should inspections be
announced versus unannounced? If inspections are announced, the facility’s
managers can make sure that the information requested and any essential plant
personnel will be available when the inspector arrives. Thus, announced inspections
can be more efficient and comprehensive. Unannounced inspections, however, are
more likely to discover the plant’s true operating conditions. They are particularly
useful when there is reason to believe the source is in violation and is
misrepresenting its self-reported data or is likely to destroy evidence if the inspection
is announced. On the other hand, if inspectors need to collect particularly detailed
information, it may be necessary to announce the visit so that the relevant experts
are available.
• Frequency of Inspection. How often should a particular facility be inspected?
Policymakers will need to balance the cost of inspections with the expected
compliance benefit, while also considering the results of earlier inspections. Sources
that are more likely to fall out of compliance may require more frequent inspections.
• Who Should Inspect? Which level of government will provide the most effective
inspection force: national, regional, provincial, or local? Would it be more effective
for the government to contract with an independent group to perform inspections?
Numerous variables need to be considered when making these determinations,
including cost, resources, experience, and political considerations.
• Objectivity of the Inspector. Care is needed to ensure that inspectors do not
become so familiar with and sympathetic to certain facilities and facility managers
that their objectivity is compromised. Some enforcement programs periodically
rotate inspectors to avoid this possibility.
• Legal Authority. What legal authority do inspectors have to enter facilities? What
form of identification is used to prove the inspector’s authenticity? What procedures
will be taken if the facility refuses to allow the inspection? Must the inspector have
consent before entering? Does the inspector need a warrant?
• Role of the Inspector. Should the inspector determine whether a violation has
occurred or simply gather information? Without a clear role and authority, the
inspection may fail to meet the needs of enforcement.
55
• Comprehensiveness of the Inspection. What data should inspectors gather?
Should inspections focus on data needed under a particular regulation, permit, or
license, or should inspectors try to gather data relevant to several environmental
regulations, permits, or licenses? The advantage of focused inspections is that it is
easier to train inspectors for these inspections. The disadvantage is that more
focused inspections may fail to detect non-compliance in areas not specifically
covered by those inspections.
• Inspection of Related Activities. To what extent should inspectors gather data on
related company activities that may have an effect on environmental quality, such as
preparedness for chemical emergencies, pollution prevention activities, and waste
minimization programs? Which environmental media, including land, air, and water,
should inspectors examine?
• Data Quality. How can the quality of data be ensured? Ways to help ensure data
quality include initial reporting procedures, processes for review and confirmation of
the data, and schedules and procedures for auditing the program’s reporting and
recordkeeping system. Guidance also should be developed to ensure the quality of
the laboratory analysis supporting the inspection.
• Consistency of Sampling and Analytical Procedures. Use of consistent methods
and procedures for sampling and analysis is important to ensure data quality,
fairness of enforcement, and the value of the results for legal proceedings. Both
inspectors and analytical laboratories require guidance on appropriate procedures.
• Documenting the Violation. How should the information gathered by the inspector
be documented? The information’s value to the program may depend on factors
such as its clarity, completeness, and utility as evidence in a court of law.
• Closing Conference. Should the inspection include a closing conference? A
closing conference provides an opportunity for the inspector to make company
managers aware of any violations and what the consequences of continuing non-
compliance would be. In some cases, the inspector may suggest ways to correct the
violation. A closing conference helps educate the regulated community. However,
information conveyed by the inspector could undermine subsequent legal actions
taken against the facility. For example, facility managers could claim the information
conveyed by the inspector contributed to non-compliance if the information was in
any way misleading or not sufficiently comprehensive. Program lawyers may prefer
56
that inspectors draw no initial conclusions and convey no information about
compliance to the facility.
• Inspector Training. How can inspectors be adequately trained to gather accurate
information and (if relevant) provide technical assistance? What training is needed
to ensure the health and safety of inspectors? Are the inspectors conscientious of
ethical conduct and quality assurance?
57
7.7.2 Why choose self-monitoring, self-recordkeeping, and self-reporting?
58
• Technology Requirements. Is technology available for monitoring? How much
does it cost? How accurate and reliable is it? How easy is it to learn how to operate
the equipment to get accurate results?
• Data Use. How exactly will enforcement officials use the data? What information
will the data provide about violations or compliance success? What is the minimum
amount of data that will be useful?
• Extent of Requirements. Should the source be required to report all data or just
data that indicate a potential violation? Proponents of the “all data” requirement
argue that management pays more attention to routine reporting and that
enforcement officials can better control the quality of data. Proponents of
exceptional reporting36 argue that this approach is much less expensive, and that the
“all data” approach may discourage sources from voluntarily conducting additional
monitoring that they feel may be valuable.
• Public Disclosure. Should the self-reported data be made available to the public?
Most U.S. environmental laws require that self-reported data be made available to
the public. This publicity deters violations and failure to report, especially when the
law gives citizens the right to sue sources.
• Self-certification. Should senior industry officials be required to certify that the
facility is in compliance? Increasingly, U.S. laws are introducing this requirement
and making senior officials personally and criminally liable for false reporting. This is
an effective way to elicit the attention and cooperation of senior management in
achieving compliance. Such requirements are meaningful only if they are backed by
clear guidance and procedures for self-certification. Self-certification may also
include a requirement to report violations and efforts to correct them.
Different compliance monitoring program objectives require different capabilities in a
self-monitoring system. As a result, the structure of a self-monitoring program is affected by the
program’s objectives. For example, a self-monitoring program that is used to identify cases
warranting enforcement action must identify violations of applicable standards in sufficient detail
and be based upon sufficiently reliable data in order to support initiation of an enforcement
action. In contrast, a program that uses source self-monitoring primarily to increase awareness
in the regulated community with regard to its environmental compliance status (and perhaps,
secondarily to deter environmental violations) may be broad in scope but require less active
data management by the regulatory agency.
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With fixed interval reporting,37 infrequent reporting may make it difficult for the regulatory
agency to make accurate assessments of an entity’s environmental performance, as the reports
will not provide a cohesive, continuous picture of a facility over time. On the other hand,
reporting too frequently may result in unnecessary burdens on both the regulatory agency and
regulated entities and may also result in information being collected and submitted that has little
added value. The regulatory agency must ensure that the reporting intervals are appropriate to
meet its goals. Interval reporting may also be dependent on an entity’s compliance history or
size. Entities with good compliance records may not be required to report as often as those with
poor compliance records. Likewise, smaller entities (both in size and discharge amounts) may
have less of a reporting burden.
Canada requires self-monitoring for pulp and paper manufacturers and metal
mining operations. Frequency of monitoring can range from continuously to monthly. Pulp
and paper mills are required to monitor Biochemical Oxygen Demand three times a week,
Total Suspended Solids daily, acute lethality weekly (using Daphnia magna) and monthly
(using rainbow trout), and pH, flow, and electrical conductivity continuously.
If a facility fails the monthly acute lethality test using rainbow trout, the test
frequency is increased to weekly. In addition, pulp and paper facilities are required to self-
monitor the chemicals 2,3,7,8-TCDD and 2,3,7,8-TCDF during each month in which the
chlorine bleach plant was operating. If no measurable concentrations are detected for
three months, the frequency is dropped to quarterly. The regulated facility may have a
qualified laboratory onsite to collect and analyze the samples, or it may hire outside
contractors to collect or analyze the samples.
Citizen monitoring can help government agencies identify violations and is particularly
important when resources for government monitoring are scarce or insufficient. Citizens can
contribute to enforcement efforts by tracking industrial environmental performance through
independently compiled emissions data or compliance reports produced by regulated entities.
In some countries, governmental institutions make use of citizen monitoring that may
already be taking place, independent of any authorizing legal provisions. Formal cooperative
partnerships are also sometimes established between citizens and the government for
monitoring. For example, in the United States, a number of citizen organizations teach citizens
to walk streams, identifying locations of pollutant emissions and observing the effects of those
60
emissions on water quality or indicator species. The Izaak Walton League of America is one
such organization that trains citizens to monitor the environment. Their findings are reported to
federal and state agencies through a national clearinghouse. State agencies also help to fund
the League’s training and reporting programs.39
Another formal vehicle for public participation in monitoring is the establishment of
coordination agreements between the government and citizen organizations. In the Philippines,
multi-party monitoring has enabled local community residents, NGOs, and industrial project
proponents to join representatives from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
to undertake post-environmental impact analysis compliance monitoring. The Department
institutionalized multi-party team monitoring by creating, in each regional office, a Regional
Community Advisory and Monitoring Committee whose membership includes NGOs and the
private sector. The law requires that committees be involved in all phases of the environmental
impact analysis, including compliance monitoring.40
An increasingly useful monitoring mechanism for citizen enforcement of industrial
environmental standards is the use of pollutant release and transfer registers. These registers
enable citizens to monitor industrial environmental performance by providing detailed facility-
specific data on types, locations, and amounts of hazardous substances released on-site and
transferred off-site. In several countries, including Canada and the United States, certain
corporations are required by law to compile and submit this data to the federal government,
which then makes the information publicly accessible. Equipped with detailed information on
facility-specific emissions, citizens can track compliance, work directly with corporations to
encourage compliance, and help governments identify violations.
The specific type of information reported in pollutant release and transfer registers and
the range of facilities covered vary from country to country. Key elements that define the scope
of such registers include: the types of facilities required to report; the thresholds for staff size
and chemical use above which a facility must report; and the types of pollutants covered and
how their use is quantified.
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groups or other associations to enlist their assistance in inspection efforts. (See Box 7-9 for
examples).
In some countries, government agencies are allowed to contract with citizen groups or
other associations to enlist their assistance in inspection efforts. For example, under Estonia’s
Nature Protection Act, citizens can be deputized as “public inspectors” to monitor compliance
with laws, regulations, and permits concerning hunting, fishing, and forestry.43 They are
permitted to write protocols about violations of nature protection rules, but they cannot take
payment.
Some countries allow citizens to demand inspections under limited circumstances. For
example, in the Czech Republic, under the Building Act, parties to the land planning decision
and investment permitting process have the right to demand the inspection of facilities before
and after completion.44
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Citizens may also be able to use informal complaint mechanisms or petitions to draw
government attention to enforcement issues. In Mexico, for example, the Federal Ecology Law,
and parallel state laws, enables any person to file a complaint with the Federal Environmental
Protection Agency regarding acts or omissions causing ecological imbalance or injury to the
environment.46 The Agency then is required to investigate the problem and issue publicly
available, non-binding recommendations. These recommendations may have evidentiary value
for future litigation. If the Agency finds violations, it may take immediate administrative action.47
Throughout Mexico, this process is the principal vehicle for public participation in administrative
enforcement matters, and it seems to be an important mechanism for focusing government
attention on enforcement problems. To receive complaints, two states have established toll-free
telephone “hotlines,” and another staff has set up a green mailbox.
Ambient monitoring includes any monitoring to detect pollutant levels in the ambient air,
ground, or surface waters near a facility. The main problem with ambient monitoring is that it
can be difficult to demonstrate that the pollutants measured came from a particular facility.
Ambient monitoring is most useful when a source is the only significant polluter in the area or
when its emissions have a characteristic composition that serves to “fingerprint” them. In these
cases, ambient measurements clearly suggest potential violations at a facility and can be used
to target inspections. Otherwise, ambient data rarely can be used alone to prove a violation
because of the difficulty of proving a connection to the source.
Satellites and aircraft can be used as remote tools to monitor compliance with
environmental requirements and help target inspection activities. Satellites can provide detailed
information on indicators of non-compliance, such as chemical spills, impervious surface area,
forest cover, oil discharges, smoke plumes, illegal development or logging, and mining
operations. Commercial satellite imagery is available in sub-meter resolution.
Similarly, aircraft over flights can be used for compliance monitoring and promotion.
Over flights can be used to make detailed, time-sensitive observations of potential areas of
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illegal activity. For example, aircraft-mounted cameras can monitor the location and condition of
dikes and fences at a regulated facility, observe loading and unloading of hazardous materials,
and even record physical evidence such as license plate numbers. Over flights may also be
used to detect facilities subject to environmental requirements, detect facilities that may not
have registered for a program or filed required notifications, and determine the relative locations
of wastewater discharges, air emissions, hazardous waste management facilities, water supply
intakes, populated areas, etc. Box 7-10 offers an example of over flights in the Netherlands.
Over flights have been used very successfully in the Netherlands. Airplanes and
helicopters are used in a pollution context to detect illegal discharges and dumps and in a
biodiversity context to detect illegal timber removal or illegal land clearing. The responsible
parties are notified about the detected violations and requested to act where necessary. The
program became more successful when helicopters began to work simultaneously with ground
vehicles. Sighted violations were reported to ground personnel who immediately proceeded to
the scene and dealt with the situation. Periodic aerial photographs of wreck yards and
dumpsites provide a good record of these operations and chronicle the change enacted by
these enforcement activities. Where appropriate, these photographs can be used in later
investigations.
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8. ENFORCEMENT
8.1 Introduction
Enforcement is the backbone to any compliance program. Strategies involving education
and assistance, monitoring and inspections, and incentives are only effective if backed by a
credible threat of enforcement sanctions.
Effective enforcement programs deter illegal conduct by creating negative
consequences for those who violate the law. A single enforcement action can have a cascading
effect on potential wrongdoers, encouraging them to change their behavior to comply with the
law. For deterrence to be effective there must be: 1) a high likelihood that the violation will be
detected; 2) swift and predictable responses to violations; 3) responses that include appropriate
sanctions; and 4) a perception among violators that all of these elements are present.
This section discusses the enforcement process, designing an enforcement response
policy, types of enforcement responses, choosing between enforcement responses,
negotiations and settlements of disputes, and citizen enforcement.
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In general, the more an enforcement action would restrict individual rights, the more
protection the enforcement process provides, and the longer the process may take before final
action is initiated.
In typical enforcement actions, targeted parties will challenge findings, and officials will
have to defend them in administrative proceedings or court. Therefore, enforcement officials
should always be prepared to:
• Prove that a violation has occurred.
• Establish that the procedures and policies were fairly and equitably followed and that
the violator is not being unduly “picked on.”
• Demonstrate the underlying environmental or public health need for the requirement
being violated. This need is often met when the requirement is developed. However,
it may be necessary to reiterate the importance of compliance with the requirement
to justify and support an enforcement case. This is particularly true when a case is in
a jurisdiction where the rule of law is well developed and it is being argued in front of
an independent decision-maker who is not familiar with the requirement or its
environmental or public health basis.
• Demonstrate that a remedy for the violation is available (e.g., pollution control
equipment, stopping a particular activity). Even though this is not usually the
responsibility of the government, this information can be important to negotiations.
• Justify the proposed penalty.
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8.3 Designing an Enforcement Response Policy
Whether a facility is in compliance is not always obvious. Specific guidelines and criteria
are needed to distinguish compliance from non-compliance. These standards help ensure that
all members of the regulated community are treated consistently and that enforcement is
perceived as fair.
8.3.2 Authorities
Informal or Formal
Civil Criminal
Administrative Judicial
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8.4.1 Informal Mechanisms
Informal responses include phone calls, site visits, warning letters, and notices of
violations. (See Box 8-2). Informal responses advise the facility manager what violation was
found, what should be done to correct it, and when. The goal of informal action is to bring the
violator into compliance. Many environment ministries prefer using informal, cooperative
methods to gain compliance. Informal responses themselves do not penalize and cannot be
enforced, but often lead to more severe response if they are ignored.49
Telephone Call
This is the easiest way to notify or remind a source that a violation has occurred and
must be corrected. The caller may also request that the violator follow up with a letter that
describes what action was taken to correct the violation.
Inspection
An inspector can make facility managers aware of a problem and provide assistance in
correcting the problem. At the same time, an inspector can gather data about the problem.
This better prepares the program for taking further action, if necessary, and displays the
program’s seriousness about following up if compliance is not achieved.
Warning Letters
Warning letters let facility managers know that they are violating the law and must
correct the situation or face adverse legal action and other consequences. A warning letter may
describe the potential sanctions for continued non-compliance, require a response from the
violator detailing the corrective action taken, and suggest that the violator meet with compliance
officials to discuss a plan for compliance. Other responses are considered if the violator fails to
take advantage of this opportunity within a reasonable time.
Notice of Violation
Notices are more formal than warning letters. They notify a source that a violation has
been detected and often give a deadline for taking corrective action. Notices of violation also
warn about legal action and consequences that will follow if the violator does not take action by
the deadline.
Formal enforcement mechanisms are backed by the force of law and are accompanied
by procedural requirements to protect the rights of the individual. Formal mechanisms may be
either civil or criminal as described below. Many countries have both civil and criminal
remedies, while some have only criminal and administrative options. As indicated in Figure 8-1,
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civil actions may be either administrative (i.e., directly imposed by the enforcement program) or
judicial (i.e., imposed by a court or other judicial authority). Law must provide authority enabling
the enforcement program to use formal enforcement mechanisms.
There are two major types of civil administrative enforcement actions: orders and field
citations.
Civil administrative orders are legal, independently enforceable orders issued directly by
enforcement program officials. The order defines the violation, provides evidence of the
violation, and requires the recipient to take corrective action within a specified time period. If the
recipient violates the order, program managers usually can take further legal action using
additional orders (or a court system) to force compliance with the order directly. What
distinguishes administrative response from judicial response, defined below, is that the legal
action is handled by an administrative system within the organization responsible for
implementing the enforcement program. The administrative processes may be similar to those
provided by the court system.
In the United States, administrative enforcement has two advantages. First, it does not
require coordination with a separate prosecutorial agency. The other is that the administrative
organization’s own administrative law judges are specialized and usually more familiar with
environmental requirements than judges in the general court system may be. Therefore,
administrative actions usually are resolved more quickly and require less time and expense than
judicial actions. This benefit may not exist, however, in countries where administrative law
judges preside over cases from various administrative agencies, not just environmental
agencies.
In the United States, as in most countries, administrative orders are not self-enforcing. If
there is not compliance with the order, further enforcement action must be pursued through the
judicial system.
Field citations are administrative orders issued by inspectors on-site in the regulated
facility or “field.” Typically, they require the violator to correct a clear-cut violation and pay a
small monetary fine. Field citations are much like motor-vehicle traffic tickets. Depending on
the procedural steps defined by the program, the violator can appeal the citation, pay it, or do
nothing and risk more formal enforcement action. Recipients of field citations are often given
opportunities to be heard and present evidence, but they usually do not have access to the full
procedural protections provided by other enforcement actions.
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Field citations can be a relatively efficient means to address certain violations that are
clear and do not pose a major threat to the environment. To issue field citations, inspectors
need training to identify the particular violations for which citations can be written.
Civil judicial enforcement actions are formal lawsuits before the courts. Some nations
with civil environmental enforcement authority rely exclusively on civil judicial actions to enforce
environmental laws. Other nations have adopted both administrative and judicial mechanisms
to carry out civil enforcement actions. Where available, administrative enforcement generally is
preferred as a first response (with some exceptions), because judicial lawsuits are far more
expensive, require more staff time (and often more sophistication), and may take several years
to complete.
However, judicial enforcement has several advantages. It is often perceived as having
greater significance than administrative enforcement and therefore more power to deter
potential violations and set legal precedents. Also, the courts are often uniquely empowered to
require immediate action to reduce more severe threats to public health or the environment. In
particular, courts can usually grant preliminary injunctions, which order the suspension of
activities that could cause irreversible harm pending trial. Thus, judicial enforcement can be
essential in emergency situations. The courts also play an important role in enforcing
administrative orders that have been violated and in making final decisions regarding orders that
have been appealed. Therefore, when both administrative and judicial enforcement
mechanisms are available, civil judicial responses are generally reserved for more serious or
recalcitrant violators, cases where precedents are needed, or situations where prompt action is
important to shut down an operation or to stop an activity.
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BOX 8-3: BRAZIL'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES LAW50
The Brazilian Environmental Crimes Law was passed in March of 1998 and is
considered to be one of the most modern and comprehensive legal texts focusing on
environmental crime. Some of the specific articles that give this law force are highlighted and
explained below.
Broad Culpability
Article 2 is important because it establishes culpability, not only for the person who
actually breaks a law, but notably also for any person in a position of authority who knew about
the illegal activity and failed to stop it or inform the appropriate authorities.
Assignment of Penalties
Article 6 outlines three general criteria that should be considered in the assignment of
penalties for an environmental law violation. They are:
• The seriousness of the act and the intent of the person who committed the act and
additionally the seriousness of the repercussions of the act on the environment and
human health.
• Whether the person who committed the act has a history of environmental law
violations.
• The financial situation of the person who violated the environmental law.
“Mitigating circumstances” are factors that can make a penalty less severe. The law requires
that these factors be considered when assessing the seriousness of a crime:
• Low educational level of the offender.
• The offender's remorse, exhibited by spontaneous reparation of the environmental
damage or limitation of the harm caused.
In many jurisdictions, administrative, civil, and criminal charges can be brought for
violations of environmental laws. Serious violations are usually met with criminal charges.
Many authorities believe that criminal charges should be imposed the second time a company is
found to be out of compliance. Administrative sanctions include shutting down all or part of a
company’s operations and fining the company for each day it remains out of compliance.
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Criminal sanctions include prison sentences, fines, forfeiture of property, and publicizing the
court’s verdict.
This issue is relevant only to countries that have or are considering implementing both
civil and criminal authorities. In some jurisdictions, criminal enforcement actions are generally
reserved for actions that deserve punishment, rather than correction (e.g., where the violation is
intentional). Criminal actions are also used to ensure the integrity of the regulatory scheme,
(e.g., to prevent facilities from operating without a permit or license). Factors that many
jurisdictions consider when deciding whether to initiate a criminal enforcement action include
actions that involve:
• Falsifying documents.
• Operating without a permit.
• Tampering with monitoring or control equipment.
• Repeated violations.
• Intentional violations (e.g., decisions to violate based on greed).
In addition to these considerations, environmental management programs must weigh
the following when choosing the type of enforcement:
• Cost. Civil proceedings are generally less taxing on program resources (e.g., time,
money, and personnel). Administrative proceedings tend to be the least costly of the
three.
• Resistance. Criminal cases evoke stronger resistance from the targeted actor than
civil litigation, and administrative action receives less resistance.
• Control. Regional program personnel typically have more control over
administrative proceedings. Civil cases usually involve more “headquarters”
personnel. Criminal cases are often litigated by a separate entity (e.g., the
Department of Justice in the United States). Administrative actions also avoid use of
external judges and juries. (See Box 8-4).
In 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released guidance to help
determine which criminal enforcement actions to pursue under its “high impact policy.” This
policy is intended to focus EPA enforcement actions on those cases with the greatest potential
to protect human health and the environment. The policy is a response to criticism that the EPA
has pursued fewer case referrals for civil and criminal violations of environmental laws in recent
years. In selecting environmental violations against which to bring enforcement actions, the
guidance considers whether a violation carries significant harm or risk of harm, what cases are
likely to promote deterrence, and what cases would promote agency and national enforcement
priorities.
There are two basic approaches to this issue. One approach does not seek a sanction
for a first violation but imposes a stiff sanction if non-compliance continues. This approach is
based on the belief that every facility should be given at least one opportunity to correct its
problems before it receives a sanction. This first approach is most successful when violations
are easy to detect, and when the enforcement program has an excellent track record of
detecting violations, diligently following up on violators to verify compliance, and imposing stiff
sanctions for continued non-compliance.
The second approach is to impose sanctions for first violations. This is based on a belief
that lack of a penalty may encourage facilities to postpone compliance activities until the
violation has been detected. This approach is essential for violations that are difficult to detect.
Without the threat of a sanction, a facility might be willing to play the odds that it will not be
detected, with the thought that it will only fix the problem if detection occurs.
Depending on the authorities provided in environmental laws (see Box 8-1), enforcement
officials often have a choice among several types of sanctions. As mentioned above, sanctions
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range from issuance of formal administrative orders, formal notices of non-compliance, and
administrative consent orders to fines, property seizures, facility closures, and imprisonment.
The enforcement policy will need to provide guidance on when these various types of sanctions
are appropriate.
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companies to use a range of inputs more efficiently. Ultimately, this enhanced resource
productivity can make companies—and countries—more competitive.52
Gravity of the Actual or Potential Harm to the Environment and Human Health.
Gravity-based penalties are graduated to reflect the seriousness of the violation. This
sends a deterrence signal to the regulated community: the more serious the violation, the
greater the penalty will be. Gravity may be calculated based on factors such as:
• Volume of release.
• Toxicity of release.
• History of non-compliance.
• Environmental and public health risk or impact.
• Importance to maintaining the integrity of the enforcement program.
Economic Benefit
Penalties can remove the economic advantage of non-compliance by recovering the
economic benefit a violator may have gained by not complying. This type of penalty is important
to maintaining fairness by ensuring that compliant facilities are not economically disadvantaged
relative to non-compliant ones. These penalties remove the economic benefits of non-
compliance, which include both avoided costs and profits from postponed expenditures.
Avoided costs include operation and maintenance expenses that cannot be spent later, while
benefits from postponed costs capture the time value of money or the interest earned when
infrastructure or equipment is not installed when required. Penalties must be calculated to
cancel out both benefits.
Ability to Pay
Enforcement officials must often consider a violator’s ability to pay when calculating a
monetary penalty. Penalties that are large compared to the facility’s resources could force a
facility to shut down, which can harm the overall community. Facilities that are given a severe
monetary penalty may also threaten to move to another area where environmental regulation
and enforcement are more lax. In such cases, enforcement officials may want to consider the
deterrence benefits of severe penalties against the cost and hardship that the resulting
unemployment would cause in the local community. Public pressure may have substantial
impact on the monetary penalty level when jobs are threatened. Asking for substantial penalties
also raises a risk that violators may choose to contest the penalty in court rather than pay it. A
series of payments can be arranged in situations where a violator may have difficulty paying the
full penalty at one time.
Other Factors
Other factors may include:
• Degree of cooperation by facility personnel with environmental officials.
• Whether the violation was self-reported by the facility.
• Degree of remorse by the responsible parties.
• The strength of the case—a weak case is less likely to withstand appeals on the part
of the violator. In such cases, enforcement officials may lower the penalty to avoid
making it worthwhile for the violator to try to appeal the penalty.
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8.5.4.5 Prison Sentences
Criminal sanctions for managers or employees of violating facilities can be an extremely
effective deterrent. Criminal sanctions can be imposed only where allowed by the legal system.
For example, criminal sanctions can be sought if someone knowingly violates an environmental
requirement or fraudulently reports data. Under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, sentences for
environmental crimes committed by corporations can be reduced if the corporation can
demonstrate a comprehensive and committed corporate compliance program. This set of
conditions in the United States seems to be improving corporate concern for compliance.
Criminal sanctions may be a difficult tool to utilize due to the extreme stigma associated
with prison and/or the amount of resources often necessary to operate environmental crimes
programs capable of routinely winning criminal convictions. In societies that place great
emphasis on economic development, corporate or industry management officials may command
large amounts of esteem and stature. This can make regulators hesitant to request
enforcement measures as harsh as jail terms, and difficult for judges to impose criminal
sanctions. It could also pressure regulators to discriminate when applying such measures.
Both such results would tend to undermine respect for the regulation and would therefore
impede compliance.53
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8.5.5 Compensation for Environmental Damages
Environmental damage compensation can take two basic forms, monetary payments or
restoration actions. Both require measurement of the environmental harm that was caused,
sometimes a difficult task as intrinsic environmental benefits may be hard to put into economic
terms. In addition to determining the amount of lost resources a monetary damage assessment
also requires an estimate of the cost of restoring the resource and economic estimates of the
value of the resources lost.
Damages are not the same as penalties. Both damages and penalties may be sought
for the same action or event, for example, the release of a hazardous substance. Penalties are
punitive and are paid to the government for violating the law. Damages are not punitive; they
are compensation paid, or actions taken, to restore the environment and people injured by the
event. The government acts in the public interest in seeking restoration damages in the same
way that a company would seek damages for harm done to their property.
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BOX 8-6: SAMPLE WORKSHEET TO CALCULATE A MONETARY PENALTY54
SUBTOTAL
Subtotal = (a) + (d) (e) $45,000
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8.6 Negotiations and Settlements of Disputes
Enforcement actions create a stimulus and context for discussion and resolution.
Negotiation is an integral part of enforcement. It is often used within the context of legal
enforcement proceedings, and it enables both the facility and the concerned party or parties to
consider the accuracy of facts, circumstances of the case, and variety of alternative responses.
Negotiation provides an opportunity to obtain additional information and correct
misinterpretations before pursuing legal action. It also provides an opportunity to reach a
solution that satisfies all parties. Compliance can be enhanced when a signal is sent to the
regulated community that, while pursuing an enforcement response, the government is willing to
be responsive to the concerns and difficulties faced by the regulated community in achieving
compliance and to work cooperatively to develop a satisfactory solution.
BOX 8-7: ASSESSING AND VALUING DAMAGE UNDER THE COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT ACT OF BARBADOS57
The Coastal Zone Management Act, Law No. 1998-39, stipulates that any person
damaging coral is guilty of an offense and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of $300.00
BBD (approximately $148.50 US) for every square meter of coral reef damaged,
imprisonment for five years, or both. There is a standard procedure to determine the extent of
damage to the coral reef area; the extent is usually spatial (length by width), but in some
cases the depth of damage is also considered. This is mainly focused on anchor damage
from dragging or chain sweeps. Fines are set forth in the Act. This method of valuing coral
reef damage informs all processes of assessing compensation (including out-of-court
settlements).
The Act also provides that any person who breaks off a piece of coral from a reef is
guilty of an offense and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of $5,000.00 BBD
(approximately $2,475 US), imprisonment for two years, or both. This fine is applied to
persons caught “picking” corals for sale. As a practical matter, these cases can be difficult, as
it is necessary to capture the individual with the corals in their boat while in the process of
harvesting.
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The negotiation process will vary from one culture and program to another. Some
negotiations may be face-to-face between enforcement officials and the violator. Others may
involve a variety of concerned parties (e.g., representatives of the local community, workers,
and non-governmental organizations). In some negotiations, particularly where an impasse is
reached, an experienced third party may be used to change the dynamics, provide new
perspectives, and propose possible solutions that had not previously been considered. Box 8-8
describes some typical dispute resolution procedures.
The result of negotiations is a settlement—a documented official resolution to the
situation, referred to as an “administrative consent order” or a “judicial consent decree” in the
United States. The settlement is a legally binding agreement between the violator and the
enforcement program (administrative) or a negotiated agreement that must be submitted to a
court for consideration and final approval (judicial).
Two types of enforcement response usually are not negotiated. One is a request by
enforcement officials for information from the violator. This usually is not controversial and
therefore does not require negotiation. The other is the exercise by the enforcement program of
emergency powers to protect public health and the environment. In an emergency, there is no
time to negotiate.
Settlements can include any provisions that the enforcement program is authorized to
impose on a violator. Depending on their legal authority, environmental officials may have some
latitude to develop creative approaches for solving environmental problems through settlements.
Creative settlements can also be used to leverage a single case to gain either greater
environmental benefit or greater deterrence than would have occurred with a conventional
settlement. Examples of creative settlements are described below.
Creative settlements often are linked to some limited reduction in monetary penalty or to
an agreement to extend compliance schedules. Creative settlements also may be sought for
violators with limited ability to pay or who demonstrate a strong level of cooperation with the
government/enforcement program. In order to be effective, creative settlements should at the
very least seek to capture the economic benefits of non-compliance.
Settlements can be negotiated in which the violator agrees to reduce pollution beyond
the level required for compliance with the requirements.58 For example, a violator may agree to
install more effective control technologies that reduce the overall discharge of pollutants.
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auditing as an essential tool for regulated facilities to ensure compliance and effectively manage
their environmental risks.
Environmental audits are sometimes required as part of settlements in two situations.
First, they have been used where a source shows a clear pattern of violations that suggests a
management problem. In such cases, a settlement may include an agreement that the source
pays for an environmental audit to identify and correct the internal management problems that
led to the repeated violations. Second, if a violation is likely to be repeated at other facilities
owned by the same company, a settlement may include an agreement that: 1) the company or a
third-party auditor will audit for that violation at the other facilities owned by the company; and 2)
any violation will be reported and corrected.
8.6.2.5 Publicity
8.6.2.6 Training
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8.6.2.7 Alternatives for Sources Unable to Pay Penalties
Some violators cannot afford to pay the monetary penalty normally imposed for the
particular type of violation. If the authorities decide they should continue to operate, they may
agree to alternatives that do not present an undue financial burden that would force the
company to close. In such cases, they may reduce the penalty, allow for payment over time, or
look for alternatives to monetary payment such as donation of their time and effort for voluntary
improvements to environmental quality.
Some jurisdictions give private parties the right to bring enforcement actions before
agencies or the courts. There are numerous benefits to providing opportunities for citizen
enforcement. First, local citizens, directly affected by the behavior in question, are oftentimes
better situated to detect and evaluate the impact of that behavior on the environment and their
community. (See Box 8-9). Second, citizen enforcement saves the environmental management
program money. Finally, private enforcement offers political cover to the environmental
management program when the violator is a wealthy and powerful influence in the jurisdiction.
The Philippines, which consists of more than 7,000 islands, is characterized by great
marine biodiversity. However, coastal resources are being severely degraded, in large part due
to over-fishing and destructive fishing practices. One important aspect of efficient fisheries
management is the enforcement of fishery regulations. Against this background, the “Bantay
Dagat” is one strategy for protecting marine resources and environments. The Bantay Dagat is
a unique participatory approach designed for coastal law enforcement, which has existed in the
Philippines since the 1970s. “Bantay Dagat” literally means “safeguarding the sea.” A Bantay
Dagat consists of a group of fishing community members who are usually trained and deputized
as fish wardens and who cooperate with government law enforcement agencies in the local
enforcement of fishery laws. It is a well-recognized participatory approach at local levels, and is
generally comprised of volunteers. Successful Bantay Dagat groups contribute to a decreased
use of illegal fishing methods, such as the use of dynamite or poisonous substances in fishing,
and aim at raising the level of community awareness with regard to environmental protection
and fisheries management. This, in turn, contributes to increased daily fish catches and greater
municipal revenues from fisheries.
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Typically, it is the government’s role to enforce environmental laws in court. However, in
many countries, citizens are given the right to assume or share this function through citizen suit
provisions in the law. Citizen enforcement suits generally take one of two forms. Members of
the public or environmental associations can bring an action against industrial facilities directly
for violating applicable laws or rights.
Alternatively, members of the public can bring an action against the government for
failure to perform nondiscretionary enforcement duties, with the aim of obtaining a court order
requiring the appropriate agency to enforce the law. In either case, citizen enforcement suits
are designed to protect the public interest by allowing citizens to help ensure that environmental
laws and rights are properly upheld. To achieve this purpose, different countries have
established mechanisms for authorizing citizen enforcement suits. (See Box 8-10).
For instance, some countries grant citizens access to courts for the express purpose of
environmental enforcement and institute specific provisions in their environmental statutes
authorizing citizen suits for violations of those laws. In the United States, all major federal
environmental statutes grant citizens the right to bring suit against “any person” for violation of
that statute, with “person” defined broadly to include individuals, corporations, associations, and
governments.
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In some countries, the right to enforce environmental laws in court is derived from
general provisions of the civil code. In Hungary, the civil code allows individuals to sue others
for interfering with or endangering the use of land or property by others. While this provision is
not specific to environmental law, citizens can use it to address environmental violations.61
Some countries allow citizens to go to court to enforce environmental laws in the public
interest.62 For example, in India, citizens are granted broad access to bring public interest law
suits to defend their human and social rights. Litigants need not prove a violation of law, as in
countries where access to courts is established in environmental statutes, but they must
demonstrate a violation of natural rights. Because these suits are filed in the public interest,
citizens must base their claims on damages to society—not solely to themselves. Many
countries, particularly those in Latin America, authorize citizens or citizen organizations to bring
popular actions to enforce environmental laws. In Colombia, citizen groups can bring suit
against any public or private entity causing threat of harm.
Similarly, the Brazil constitution allows any citizen to file a popular action (acao populare)
to nullify a public administrative act that is injurious to the public property or to state property of
environmental, cultural, or historical heritage. Except in cases of proven bad faith, the
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complainant is exempt from judicial costs. To undertake this litigation, the constitution also
provides for public prosecutors (the Ministério Público), who are charged with undertaking public
civil actions required to protect the environment and social heritage.64
If the law does allow citizen enforcement, it needs to take precautions to minimize the
overlap with official enforcement actions. It is advisable to require citizen groups to file a notice
of intent to sue, giving the environmental management program the opportunity to bring an
action first superseding the citizen complaint. This is to avoid a situation where the same actor
risks having an enforcement action brought against them by both the government and a private
party, which would be perceived as unfair and thereby undermine the legitimacy of the entire
environmental management program.
It is common in the United States for environmental cases, including citizen enforcement
suits, to be settled outside the courtroom through negotiations. To ensure enforceability,
settlements are often crafted as court-negotiated consent decrees, with interim deadlines for
specific actions and penalties for failure to comply. In many cases, there is a role for citizens in
this process. In addition to citizen suit settlements, citizens who are parties to, or have an
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interest in, a government enforcement suit often may participate in negotiating the terms of the
consent decrees.
In several citizen suit agreements under the U.S. Clean Water Act, the alleged violators
have avoided civil penalties by instead paying a sum of money to an environmentally beneficial
project. The U.S. government looks upon settlements involving third-party payments with some
suspicion and carefully examines consent decrees containing payments to environmental
organizations. However, courts have upheld consent decrees containing such payments. For
example, in 1995, the National Environmental Law Center negotiated a consent decree in the
course of a citizen enforcement suit involving the discharge of pollutants by an oil company into
the San Francisco Bay. In addition to obtaining the rights to future monitoring data, the Center
negotiated for the oil company’s $2.2 million (US) in punitive damages to be distributed among
more than twenty local education, restoration, and research projects in the Bay’s watershed.65
Another mechanism in the United States for achieving citizen-industry partnerships
during the settlement of an enforcement case is the use of Good Neighbor Agreements. Under
Good Neighbor Agreements, companies enter into negotiated contracts with workers, local
community members and associations to establish a framework for public assessment of
industrial environmental conditions. Common elements of these agreements include provisions
for public disclosure of relevant company information and stakeholder audits, wherein citizens
engage in direct, on-site evaluations of facilities to identify changes that may be needed to
ensure environmental compliance, safety, and sustainability. Good Neighbor Agreements can
also provide a forum for addressing community recommendations for improvements in
environmental protocol.
Each Good Neighbor Agreement is unique, because the parties, conditions, and issues
vary significantly among cases. However, the Rhone-Poulenc Community Audit Agreement in
Texas serves as a good example for illustrating the fundamental elements of a typical
agreement.66 The agreement arose in the 1990s after an accident at the Rhone-Poulenc plant
released poisonous sulfur dioxide gas into the community. The agreement provided for a safety
and environmental audit to be financed by Rhone-Poulenc and integrated into the company’s
hazardous waste facility permit. Under the agreement, the auditor was to be approved and
accompanied by a committee comprised of community group members and facility workers.
Citizens were also given permission to conduct additional inspections by appointment. The
scope of the audit included regulatory compliance, safety training, accident prevention,
emergency response, waste analysis and information systems, monitoring programs, and waste
minimization practices. The agreement also provided for public disclosure of company
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documents including: a hazard assessment and risk analysis; lists of accidents, upsets, and
corrective actions; and waste minimization and reduction plans. In the agreement, Rhone-
Poulenc consented to “negotiate in good faith” any recommendations resulting from the audit.67
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9. BUILDING EFFECTIVE PROGRAM INFRASTRUCTURE
9.1 Introduction
The previous chapters introduced the basics of compliance assurance, including
planning, developing environmental requirements, promoting compliance, monitoring, and
enforcing requirements. As with any other organization or program, the effectiveness of the
environmental management program will also depend on its managers, employees, institutional
design, and ability to communicate with other institutions. This chapter discusses how
organizations generally build effective infrastructure and inter-organizational communication and
how they do so in the context of an environmental management program. A well-designed
program infrastructure will allow regulators to use their limited resources in a way that
maximizes compliance. In particular, this chapter will address:
• Designing compliance assurance institutions.
• Dividing responsibilities among levels of government.
• The role of civil society in compliance assurance.
• Facilitating national and international networking.
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departments’ fields, and even by territoriality, managers need to coordinate department
activities carefully to reach the common goals.
In industry, this structure means that each department is in charge of certain products.
In environmental agencies, “products” could be characterized in terms of the issues treated, the
industry sector policed, or the media, such as air or water, controlled.
This type of structure has the advantage of focusing on results, with greater orientation
towards public service and satisfaction, easily identifiable accountability for results achieved,
and more personnel in a position to develop management skills. But product structures can be
more expensive than functional structures, because at the lowest level there can be substantial
redundancy of skills among personnel. Conversion from product divisional to functional
structure can bring impressive savings in administrative costs.
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9.2.1.5 Horizontal Structures and Downsizing
This type of structure arose from dissatisfaction with the layers of middle management
resulting from organizational growth. Called “downsizing” because of the reduction in number of
employees, it is accompanied by two major interrelated changes:
• Elimination of one or more hierarchies, usually at the level of middle management.
• Delegation of decision-making to a lower level.
The goal of this structure is to reduce costs by cutting bureaucracy; however, if decisions
are shifted to a higher level rather than a lower level, the top-level management will probably
become overloaded.
Among different programs and organizations, even those serving similar mandates,
there are many different variations on the above listed structures. Factors that may influence
the choice of a given structure include:
• Scope of activity.
• Complexity of the regulatory framework.
• Size of the organization and increasing specialization.
• External political, economic, and social factors.
• Whether the strategy is preventative, curative, or both.
A mission statement needs to communicate to the stakeholders and the public the
essence of the organization or environmental management program. It should be no more than
a few sentences. It should include a “purpose statement” of the program’s goals, a “business
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statement” outlining a plan to reach those goals, and a “values statement” of the basic beliefs
underlying the program.
A vision statement also helps to define the scope of the program’s mandate. It provides
an image of success, describing the purpose of the group’s work, in terms of the expected
contribution to society.
If the mandate of the program is general, e.g., “Improve environmental conditions,” the
institution needs to articulate more specific goals in the strategic plan that will help it fulfill this
overall mandate. With such a mandate, there are innumerable ways to define success. If the
mandate is more specific, e.g., “Reduce water pollution by reducing tons of pollutants released
into the ecosystem,” there are fewer ways to define success, and the strategic plan will be more
easily focused.
At the institutional level, some agencies have more independence from the legislative or
executive bodies than do others. The environmental management program’s mission may be
clearly and narrowly defined by statute, in which case the institution will have little autonomy.
But in other cases, the program may be free to produce its own regulations within very general
statutory bounds, or the head of the program might be appointed by the executive, but might not
be removable by the executive. Then the degree of autonomy of the program will be much
greater. When designing the program’s infrastructure, it is important to consider the degree of
autonomy that the program is expected to have.
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• Isolation of employees from one another.
• Lack of cooperation or Team Spirit.
• Slow or cumbersome processes.
• Lengthy and unnecessary meetings.
• Transparency.
Transparency is important to maintaining public confidence in an environmental
management program’s activities. Increasing transparency entails helping the regulated
community and others to understand what is expected of them and what they should expect
from the program. It also means making clear why an inspector intends to, or already has, taken
enforcement action.
Transparency on the part of inspectors is particularly important during enforcement
actions in the following situations:
• Where remedial action is required. Not only must the action be clearly explained in
writing, but also, if requested, a written explanation of why the action is necessary
and when it must be carried out should be provided. A distinction should be made
between best practice advice and legal requirements.
• Where opportunity is provided to discuss what is required to comply with the law
before formal enforcement action is taken (unless urgent action is required, for
example, to protect the environment or prevent evidence being destroyed).
• Where urgent action is required. A written explanation of the reasons should be
provided as soon as practicable after the event.
• Where rights of appeal apply. A written explanation of any rights of appeal against
formal enforcement action must be given at the time the action is taken.
The development of multi-year and annual strategic plans serves to promote institutional
stability and continuity. In some countries, an environmental management program’s policies
may be closely tied to the philosophy of the current government. If the government changes
frequently, it is wise to have a safeguard against a rapid reversal of regulatory policy. For
example, a notice and comment period might be required before the program or agency can
change rules. In this way, the regulated community is informed and may participate in rule-
changing. This is important because regulations that change too quickly may fail to elicit
compliance, and that failure in turn promotes a loss of confidence in the regulations, which
causes another decrease in compliance, and so on. The resulting cycle leads to a devaluation
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of regulatory instruments, government, and the rule of law. Regulations certainly can change
without creating such a vicious circle, but it is important to ensure that the regulated community
can keep pace with the changes.
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BOX 9-1: CAPACITY BUILDING FOR DISTRICT BY-LAW FORMULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT IN UGANDA68
The targeted audience includes local leaders, district and sub-county councilors, district
technical staff, sub-county chiefs, resident state attorneys, and local police. These various
officials and staff play distinct, key roles in formulating and enforcing environmental by-laws,
including:
• Identifying environmental problems that need regulation.
• Drafting by-laws.
• Passing and enacting by-laws.
• Monitoring compliance with by-laws and enforcing them as necessary.
Where authorized by environmental law to do so, the national agency may establish
criteria for an acceptable sub-national environmental program. These criteria generally cover
three areas: legal authority, resources, and personnel. A sub-national program meets these
criteria for its program to be approved and start running. If an appropriate sub-national program
has not been approved by the time enforcement is slated to begin, then the national level
agency can administer its own program.
The national agency may provide provincial and local governments with funding for staff
and equipment through an annual grant process. When the national agency sets program
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priorities annually in consultation with the sub-national units, agreements reached can specify
national, regional, and local priorities.
Direct national level enforcement may become necessary when at least one of these
conditions apply:
• The sub-national level requests national involvement.
• The sub-national level action is not timely or appropriate.
• A case at the sub-national level would set a national legal or program precedent.
• A national agency or court order has been violated.
The national agency may also consider additional factors, such as whether:
• The case is nationally significant.
• The violation significantly threatens public health or environmental quality.
• The violator is gaining significant economic benefit.
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• The case involves more than one sub-national entity.
• The case involves a repeat violator.
If the national agency does become involved, it should do so with maximum respect for
the efforts at the sub-national level. Adequate notice and consultation should occur before
national action. In some cases, the national and sub-national level agencies may take joint
action.
Industry or trade associations track and publicize developments that may affect their
members. Therefore, they can be important dissemination channels for communicating
requirements, methods of compliance, and compliance activities. These associations also
usually try to influence environmental legislation and programs.
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9.4.3 Trade Unions and Workers’ Councils in the Regulated Community
Workers are generally members of the local community and would therefore benefit from
localized improved environmental quality. But enforcement actions that result in substantial
process changes or shutdown of an operation may cause unemployment. Consequently,
workers often have strong opinions about some types of enforcement actions. The participation
of workers’ councils is important to the success of local compliance and enforcement actions.
These organizations may become involved in the development of requirements and policies for
compliance assurance. When worker groups are vested in the environmental improvements,
individual workers may be more likely to report violations by their facilities.
In the Philippines, protected areas are established and managed through the National
Integrated Protected Areas System. Participatory management for each established
protected area is central to effective implementation of the System.
Management of each protected area is supervised by a Protected Area Management
Board. The Board is composed of representatives of the various local stakeholders such as
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director,
the Provincial Development Officer, representatives from the Municipal Government, tribal
communities, concerned NGOs, and other agencies in the area. The Board members are
formally appointed by the DENR Secretary and serve for a term of five years, without
compensation. If a protected area has a large Board membership, the Board creates an
Executive Committee that is chaired by the Regional Technical Director or Provincial Officer
of the Department and composed of at least two representatives from the local government,
concerned NGOs, and indigenous communities.
Involvement of local stakeholders in protected area management through the Board
has improved public support for the protected areas and the management decisions. Indeed,
the public has participated at the early stages of establishing many protected areas and
developing the management plans. This, in turn, has increased the compliance of local
stakeholders with the Integrated Protected Areas System.
In many countries, citizens can sue firms for personal injury or property damages caused
by environmental damage. Therefore, the insurance companies that end up paying firms’
lawsuit costs have an incentive to educate their clients about environmental requirements, and
to assist them in maintaining compliance. These companies are a potential ally, and enlisting
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their support for an enforcement program could make that program both more efficient and
more effective.
Networks are formed across different boundaries and for different purposes. They range
from domestic to international and from informal to more institutionalized organizations. They
are located within existing organizations, are created by agreements, or arise spontaneously
through regular contact. They can also involve somewhat surprising participants.
For instance, judges are starting to network more, whether by means of information-
sharing and mutual citation, or actively by means of forming organizations and cooperating on
transnational litigation. At the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in
2002, for instance, UNEP, INECE, and others organized a Global Judges Symposium. This
symposium brought together judges from around the world to review their role and the rule of
law in the context of sustainable development.
Networks can be more flexible and thus potentially more effective, than the large formal
institutions of international governance when it comes to certain functions. By working directly
peer-to-peer, trans-governmental networks can quickly distill and disseminate information,
enhance enforcement cooperation, harmonize laws and regulations, and address common
problems from a shared perspective shaped by experience and expertise. See Box 9-3 for
examples of enforcement-related networks.
Interpol – the international police network, facilitates information exchange and provides
assistance to local police efforts. Interpol has also created an environmental crime network,
called Ecomessage, to facilitate information-sharing and enhanced coordination of enforcement
efforts.71
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Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network for Accession (ECENA) –
established by high level officials from the environmental ministries of South Eastern Europe in
2005, as an informal network of environmental authorities from pre-candidate, candidate, and
acceding countries. ECENA’s mission is “to protect the environment in its member countries
through effective transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU environmental legislation
by increasing the effectiveness of inspectorate bodies and promoting compliance with
environmental requirements.”73
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10. MEASURING AND MANAGING PERFORMANCE THROUGH COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT INDICATORS
10.1 Introduction
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TABLE 10-1: THREE-STAGE MODEL FOR IDENTIFYING, DESIGNING,
AND USING INDICATORS
Select appropriate
combination of indicators
A fundamental issue that needs to be resolved at the beginning of any effort to develop
indicators is the scope of the effort. Two questions need to be answered to determine the
scope:
1. Will the indicators be comprehensive (that is, will they cover all the legal and regulatory
frameworks and programs for which the agency is responsible) or focused (covering only
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a specific law or requirement, industry sector, geographic area or non-compliance
pattern)?
2. Will the indicators be national (that is, covering the national compliance and enforcement
program) or sub-national (covering a program at the regional/district, state, or
local/municipal level)?
A logic model can be a useful tool for identifying performance indicators. Logic models
graphically depict the relationships between resources invested, activities undertaken, and the
results of those activities. It should clearly demonstrate a results chain from activities to
outcomes and serve as a “road map” of how the program will achieve its goals.
To use a logic model is to observe linked stages and consequences of the program:
inputs, outputs, intermediate outcomes, and final outcomes or results. For purposes of
identifying meaningful compliance and enforcement indicators, the logic model can elucidate
what outputs and outcomes need to be measured. If insufficient inputs or resources are
available to yield the desired outcomes at the scope intended, then the scope may be reduced
or outcomes modified to match available resources. Table 10-2 below presents a generic logic
model example.
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TABLE 10-2: LOGIC MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT INDICATORS
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TABLE 10-3: WORKSHEET FOR IDENTIFYING AND SELECTING ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT INDICATORS
A. Indicator Summary
B. Indicator Description
Briefly present an objective description of what the indicator is and how the data should be
collected.
D. Limitations
Explain any limitations to measuring this indicator.
E. Data Sources
List necessary information and note whether data is currently available.
F. References
List any references that may be useful when measuring this indicator, including examples from
other countries, research documents, etc.
G. Selection Criteria *
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10.2.5 Select Criteria for Evaluating Potential Indicators
After external stakeholders, program managers, and staff have identified potential
indicators, those indicators will need to be evaluated to determine whether they should be
implemented. A set of criteria should be used for this evaluation. The discussions with
stakeholders can be useful for identifying such criteria. The following are some suggested
selection criteria for a project to consider:
• Relevancy: Is the indicator relevant to goals, objectives, and priorities of the agency
and to the needs of external stakeholders?
• Transparency: Does the indicator promote understanding and enlighten users about
program performance?
• Credibility: Is the indicator based on data that are complete and accurate?
• Functionality: Does the indicator encourage programs and personnel to engage in
effective and constructive behavior and activities?
• Feasibility: Does the value of the indicator to the program outweigh the cost of
implementing and maintaining the measure?
• Comprehensiveness: Does the indicator address all the important operational
aspects of program performance?
Proposed indicators should be ranked in terms of the feasibility criteria, using the
worksheet provided in Table 10-3 or other appropriate methodology. These rankings should be
used, along with comments from key stakeholders, program design guidelines, and other
information, to select indicators to carry over into the next stage of the project.
The importance of having a clear set of definitions at the beginning of any effort to
develop indicators cannot be overstated. Defining key terms that will be used in discussions
with stakeholders provides a framework for organizing ideas and allows agency managers and
external stakeholders to see how potential indicators might be used to improve management of
the program. Of particular importance is the distinction between output and outcome (Box 10-1).
Assessment of existing data available to support indicators is a key step for identifying
environmental compliance and enforcement indicators. Are data being collected that can be the
basis for useful indicators? Are the data current, or are they the result of a study or survey that
is out-of-date or no longer conducted? Is there an existing data system that collects timely and
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accurate data? Can it be enhanced to accommodate new indicators? For example, if data are
being collected about enforcement actions issued by regional or district offices and by the
national program, then such data should provide basic output indicators that can be valuable in
monitoring operations. Collection of enforcement action data might also be expanded to begin
gathering information about results from enforcement actions (that is, pollutant reductions),
thereby providing intermediate outcome indicators.
Input indicators include time, staff, funding, materials, equipment and the like that contribute
to an activity. While of limited usefulness by themselves, input indicators reflect the
government’s commitment and are important components for determining efficiency and
return on investment. When considered together with outcomes, inputs can be used to
determine the level of effort required to achieve an outcome. Managers can use this
information to analyze efficiency in their programs.
Output indicators are activities, events, services, and products that reach a regulated firm.
Examples include the number of inspections performed, the number of compliance assistance
workshops provided, and the number of enforcement cases issued. These indicators
demonstrate a level of effort toward an outcome, but they do not indicate the degree to which
the outcome is achieved.
Outcome indicators measure the results of an agency’s outputs and are generally divided
into two categories: intermediate and final outcomes.
Final outcome indicators measure the ultimate result the program is designed to
achieve, such as an improvement in ambient air quality or a reduction in the number of
people living in areas in which pollutant standards were exceeded. When final outcome
indicators are designed with the program’s goals and objectives in mind, they should
enable managers and others to determine whether the program’s activities, or outputs,
are achieving those goals.
One approach for completing the design is to develop teams within the organization to
define the selected indicators in precise detail, review available data, develop information
collection and reporting processes as needed, and establish a schedule for testing and
implementing the indicators. Since they are comprised of the organizations’ own internal staff,
these work groups are often able to readily identify and overcome barriers to effective
implementation. Another benefit of involving internal staff is that it increases their sense of
ownership of the new indicators.
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10.3.2 Conduct Pilot Projects
When sufficient internal expertise does not exist, agencies should not hesitate to bring in
outside experts to fill in knowledge gaps when developing performance indicators. This can be
particularly helpful when developing complex measures, such as statistically valid compliance
rates. Experts in sampling, statistical analysis, and performance-based management of public
programs can provide useful assistance.
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The plan should also clearly spell out the uses for the new indicators. The plan should be
disseminated to program managers and staff and to external stakeholders as appropriate.
Data from indicators can be used to review the effectiveness of particular programs
(e.g., compliance with clean water laws or requirements). Studies of the effectiveness of
specific programs can be organized around six performance-based questions that provide a
framework for analysis. The six questions are:
1. Is the program contributing to the goal of protecting human health and the environment
through its actions and strategies?
2. Is the program changing the behavior of the regulated community in ways that lead to
improved environmental performance?
3. Is the program achieving appropriate levels of compliance in key populations?
4. Are we achieving the appropriate levels of enforcement activity in the regulated
community?
5. Is the program providing appropriate assistance to our state, provincial, and local
partners to support their work to improve environmental performance?
6. Are resources being used efficiently to achieve optimal results?
Under each question, the relevant performance indicators are arrayed to address the
question as thoroughly as possible. The framework allows data about results and the activities
that produced them to be analyzed. These data can be examined for patterns and more can be
learned about the combinations, types, and amounts of activities that produce the most
desirable results.
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regulated industries, and environmental organizations. Such programs can be well-served by
providing an annual report to external audiences. Reports that emphasize results and
outcomes achieved through activities and outputs of the program can enhance support for the
compliance and enforcement mission. By describing accomplishments in terms that emphasize
results – for example, pounds of pollution reduced through enforcement actions, improved
practices at facilities from compliance assistance, or improved rates of compliance in an
industry sector – an account of performance is provided that is meaningful to multiple
audiences.
As work on programmatic indicators evolves, common lessons that have emerged include:
• A combination of indicators – outputs and outcomes, quantitative and qualitative,
statistical and narrative, aggregated and disaggregated, national and local – is
necessary to measure performance, inform management, and serve the full range of
audiences and purposes.
• Performance indicators are most effective when they reflect management priorities
and are linked to a limited number of program goals and objectives.
• Increased use of outcome indicators presents many challenges, because agencies
or programs may influence – but not necessarily control – outcomes.
• Problem-specific, tailor-made performance indicators are effective for evaluating
performance in solving specific environmental and non-compliance problems.
• Performance measures should be used principally to improve effectiveness and
manage more strategically, rather than simply to report accomplishments to the
public in a more interesting way.
• When using indicators to improve performance, program managers and staff should
understand that data from indicators have their limitations. Such data need a context
(e.g., a time period, a benchmark, or standard for comparison, etc.) to realize their
full value as a management tool. In many instances, data from indicators provide a
kind of warning light that signals a need for deeper analysis or further investigation to
understand the forces and influences that shape program performance.
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11. REFERENCES
1
This section is based on a number of important publications and studies,
including: Inter-American Development Bank website, “Rule of Law,” available at
http://www.iadb.org/sds/SCS/site 2776e.htm; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Communications Strategies for Enforcement Programs, Capacity Building Support
Document, International Training Workshop, 21 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of
creating the right perception: “It is crucial to make [the regulated community] see and
believe there is a good chance to get caught if they offend the rules.”);
Williams, E. et al., The Value of Scotland’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, J.
OF EUR. ENVTL. POL’Y, vol. 13, no. 2, Mar.-Apr. 2003;
see also USEPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 (1997)
available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/sect812/copy.html; Friends of the Earth Europe et
al., Reaching the right conclusions: Economic facts and figures on the REACH proposal,
Sept. 2006;
http://www.foe.co.uk/campaigns/safer_chemicals/chemical_reaction/REACH_facts&figur
es_Oct06.pdf ;
see also, Pedersen, Finn, et al., Rpt. for DG Environment, The impact of REACH on the
environment and human health, ENV.C.3/SER/2004/0042r,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/pdf/impact_on_environment_report.pdf;
116
See J. Spigelman, Address at the ICAC-Interpol Conference, Hong Kong; Carothers,
Thomas The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 95, 97 (1998).
See Porter, Michael E. & van der Linde, Claas, Green and Competitive: Ending the
Stalemate, HARVARD BUS. REVIEW (1995); Porter, Michael E. & van der Linde, Claas,
Toward a New Conception of the Environment – Competitiveness Relationship, J. OF
ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Vol. 9(4), p. 97 (1995 reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, vol. 2, at
441 (discussing how environmental regulation can encourage innovation);
Cambridge Econometrics & AEA Technology, The Benefits of Greener Business (2003),
http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/commondata/acrobat/benefits_of_green_business1.pdf;
See generally, Dowell, Glenn, Hart Stuart, & Yeung, Bernard, Do Corporate Global
Environmental Standards Create or Destroy Market Value?, 46(8) MGMT. SCI. 1059
(2000), reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, vol. 2, at 465; Network of Heads of European
Environment Protection Agencies, The Prague Statement: The Contribution of good
environmental regulation to competitiveness (2005), available at
http://inece.org/praguestatement.
2
Becker, Gary S., Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2) J.
POLITICAL ECON. 169 (1968), reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, vol. 1, at 115 (explaining
that potential offenders respond to both the probability of detection and the severity of
punishment).
3
Rechtschaffen, Clifford & Markell, David L. ,REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP, Chps. 2 & 3 (2003), reprinted in
MAKING LAW WORK, vol. 1, at 157; Silberman, Jon B., Does Environmental Deterrence
Work? Evidence and Experience Say Yes, But We Need to Understand How and Why,
30 ENVTL. LAW REPORTER 10523 (2000), reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, vol. 1, at 379.
4
Cohen, id. (citing Burby, R.J. & Paterson, R.G. , Improving Compliance with
State Environmental Regulations, 12(4) J. POLICY ANALYSIS & MGMT, 753-72 (1993)).
5
See, OECD, Guiding Principles for Reform of Environmental Enforcement
Authorities in Transition Economies of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia
(2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/51/26756552.pdf.
117
6
Id. at p. 3.
7
ISO, The ISO 1400 Essentials, available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_standards/iso_9000_iso_14000/iso_14000_e
ssentials.htm.
8
Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care® Program web site, available at
http://www.responsiblecare.org.
9
U.S. Department of Energy’s Climate Challenge Program web site, available at
http://www.climatevision.gov/climate_challenge/factsheet.htm.
10
See generally IMPEL Project “Developing a checklist for assessing legislation
on practicability and enforceability” (2006) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/impel/pdf/pe_checklist.pdf.
11
Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B, Regulator Reputation, Enforcement &
Environmental Compliance, J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. (2005) (discussing the need to
design enforcement systems that enable the regulator to maintain credibility); see also,
Bowles, Chester, PROMISES TO KEEP: MY YEARS IN PUBLIC SERVICE, 1941-1969, 25
(1971) (estimating that 20% of the regulated population automatically complies with any
regulation, 5% attempts to evade it, and the remaining 75% complies as long as they
think that the 5% will be caught and punished).
12
De Aragão, Murillo & Bunker, Stephen, Brazil: Regional Inequalities and
Ecological Diversity in a Federal System, in Engaging Countries: Strengthening
Compliance with International Environmental Accords 437-474 (Weiss & Jacobson, eds.,
1998), reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, Vol. 1, 337.
13
Environmental laws may contain provisions that allow a regulated source to
petition the government for an exemption from a general requirement. This exemption is
called a “variance” and contains specific terms and conditions similar to a permit.
Facilities may request variances for many different reasons. For example, their
operating conditions are different from those that were assumed when the standard was
set, or peculiar physical circumstances (such as naturally contaminated intake water)
make it impossible to comply.
14
CEC, Successful Practices of Environmental Management Systems in Small
and Medium-Size Enterprises (2005) available at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/ECONOMY/EMS-Report_en.pdf, p 4, 27.
118
15
For a database of U.S. laws and regulations currently open for public
comment, see http://www.regulations.gov.
16
China Watch, SEPA Releases New Measure on Public Participation in
Environmental Impact Assessment Process, 2006, available at
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3886 .
17
For a list of USEPA Compliance Assistance Centers, see
http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/assistance/centers/index.html.
18
Environmental Compliance Assistance Centers Deliver Targeted Help to the
Regulated Community, Thomas, Deborah Limanon, Watcharee, Simachaya, Wijarn,
Nepomuceno, Dolora, http://www.inece.org/conference/8/papers.html.
19
UNEP, Saving the ozone layer: UNEP responds to evolving needs of
developing countries in implementing the Montreal Protocol (2002) available at
http://www.unep.org/Ozone/Press_Releases/25March_2002.pdf.
20
For USEPA’s Audit Policy, see
http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/incentives/auditing/auditpolicy.html.
21
For information about Profepa’s environmental audit policy (in Spanish), see
http://www.profepa.gob.mx/PROFEPA/AuditoriaAmbiental/.
22
Krahn, Peter, Enforcement versus Voluntary Compliance: An Examination of
the Strategic Enforcement Initiatives Implemented by the Pacific and Yukon Regional
Office of Environment Canada, 1983 to 1998, reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, Vol. 2, at
305.
23
Afsah, Shakeb, Laplante, Benoit & Wheeler, David, Regulation in the
Information Age: Indonesian Public Information Program for Environmental Management
(World Bank, New Ideas in Pollution Regulation, 1997), reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK,
Vol. 2, at 75, 78.
24
Wang, Hua, et al, Public Ratings of Industry’s Environmental Performance:
China’s Greenwatch Program, 6th INECE Conference Proceedings, vol. 2 (2002),
reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, Vol. 2, at 85, 87; see also, World Bank, Press Release,
Polluters in China Face Public Scrutiny, 17 May 2006.
25
For an overview, see, Potter, S. and Parkhurst, G., Transport Policy and
Transport Tax Reform (2005), available at
http://oro.open.ac.uk/4380/1/Potter_and_Parkhurst_17_2_05.pdf.
119
26
For more information on inspections and other types of compliance monitoring,
see Zaelke, Durwood, Kaniaru, Donald and Kružíková, Eva, eds., MAKING LAW
WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Vol. 2,
at 372-75 (2005) (discussing the literature on inspections as a means of ensuring
compliance and enforcement) [hereinafter MAKING LAW WORK].
27
See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, CONDUCTING ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS, INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, INTERNATIONAL EDITION (2002),
available at http://www.inece.org/manual [hereinafter EPA Field Manual].
28
Nguyen, Ngoc Sinh & Phung, Van Vui, A Large Scale Survey Using
Environmental Inspections to Assess and Enforce the Implementation of the Law on
Environmental Protection in Vietnam, 1997, 5th INECE Conference Proceedings, Vol. 1
(1998), reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, Vol. 1, at 415, 421.
29
As defined by the U.S. EPA, “audit” means a “systematic, documented,
periodic, objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related
to meeting environmental requirements.” Environmental Auditing Policy Statement,
OPPE-FRL-3046-6, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, at 20,006 (July 9 1986).
30
UNEP, MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (2006) [hereinafter UNEP MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE]; see
also, Gambia Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides Control and Management Act
(1994).
31
See EUROPEAN UNION NETWORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, IMPEL REFERENCE BOOK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTION
120
35
“Process-based investigations are comprehensive facility evaluations that
initially focus on a comprehensive understanding of all facility operation and
maintenance processes. The process-based investigation includes tracking raw
materials through the industrial and support operations; identifying by-product, co-
product and products; identifying wastes generated; and determining how these wastes
are ultimately managed.” U.S. EPA, “National Enforcement Investigations Center,” at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/neic.html.
36
“Exceptional reporting” is reporting that is only required when a violation or
potential violation has been detected.
37
Whereas “exceptional reporting” only occurs when a violation has been
detected, “fixed interval reporting” occurs at regularly scheduled times, regardless of
whether a violation has been detected.
38
INECE, International Comparison of Source Self-Monitoring, Reporting, and
Recordkeeping Requirements (1996), available at
http://www.inece.org/PDFDocs/source.pdf .
39
Casey-Lefkowitz, Susan, et al., The Evolving Role of Citizens in Environmental
Enforcement, 4th INECE Conference Proceedings, Vol. 1 (1996), reprinted in MAKING
LAW WORK, Vol. 1, 559, 566-567; see also, Izaak Walton League of America website,
http://www.iwla.org .
40
DENR Administrative Order 96-37 (2 Dec. 1996), “Revising DAO 21 To Further
Strengthen the EIS System,” http://www.emb.gov.ph/laws-eia.htm.
41
Ley 13.577 Creacion de la Obras Sanitaria de la Nacion, art. 31 and 32,
Decreto 674/89 Reginman contra la Contaminacion de Rios Bs. As. 29/V/89.
42
Casey-Lefkowitz et al., supra note 39, at 568-569.
43
Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Status of
Public Participation Practices in Environmental Decisionmaking in Central and Eastern
Europe, Sept. 1995; Casey-Lefkowitz et al., supra note 39.
44
Act No. 183/2006 Coll., on Territorial Planning and the Building Code [The
Building Act] (an amended version of this Act came into effect on 1 January 2007); see
also, Casey-Lefkowitz et al., supra note 39.
45
The Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection website, available at
http://www.rpo.gov.pl/index.php?s=3.
121
46
Citizen Enforcement: Tools for Effective Participation, INECE 5th Conference
Proceedings (1998), available at http://www.inece.org/CBldg%20Docs/citenf.pdf ;
Environmental Law Institute, Draft Report of Environmental Authority in: A Review of the
Legal and Institutional Framework for Environmental Protection at the State Level
(1996); Ley General de Ecologia Equilibrada y Proteccion Ambiental, art. 189, discussed
in Katherine M. Bailey, Note: Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement in
Mexico and the United States: A Comparative Study, 16 GEO. INTL. ENVTL. L. REV. 323
(2004).
47
Bailey, id.
48
This list of enforcement authorities is a hybrid and does not appear in any one
law or country. Depending on the jurisdiction, each authority may be granted directly by
statute or through court order.
49
Panek-Gondek, Krystyna, Experience of the Inspectorate for Environmental
Protection in Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law in Poland, INECE
6th Conference Proceedings (2002), http://www.inece.org/conf/proceedings2/23-
Inspectorate.pdf.
50
UNEP MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 30.
51
See U.S. EPA website, “Compliance and Enforcement,”
http://www.epa.gov/compliance; see also, “U.S. EPA to Release Guidance on Which
Criminal Enforcement Actions the Agency Will Pursue,” INECE Newsletter 14,
http://www.inece.org/newsletter/14/.
52
Porter, Michael E. & van der Linde, Class ,Green and Competitive: Ending the
Stalemate, HARVARD BUS. REVIEW (1995); see also, Porter & van der Linde, Toward a
New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9(4) J. OF ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 97 (1995), reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, Vol. 2, at 441.
53
Oposa, Jr., Antonio A., A Socio-Cultural Approach to Environmental Law
Compliance: A Philippine Scenario, INECE 5th Conference Proceedings, vol. 1 (1998).
54
This is loosely based on a worksheet used for a U.S. environmental program.
55
Adjustments may range from -20% to +20% for factors 1, 2, and 3, and from -
100% to 0% for factor 4. Selection of appropriate percentages is based on subjective
judgment and should be fair relative to adjustments made when calculating penalties for
other similar violations.
122
56
Supplemental environmental projects are projects the facility is conducting or
will conduct to benefit the environment.
57
UNEP MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 32.
58
Beyond compliance has been described as a “[v]oluntary overmeeting of
environmental standards.” See Arora, Seema & Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis, Toward a
theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance, 28 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 289
(1995); see also Bruce Smart ed., BEYOND COMPLIANCE: A NEW INDUSTRY VIEW OF THE
ENVIRONMENT (1992).
59
Excerpts for this text box are drawn from: Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Participatory Coastal Law Enforcement Practices in
the Philippines (2003), available at http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-lesson5.pdf.
60
Kravchenko, Svitlana, Citizen Enforcement of Environmental Law in Eastern
Europe, 10 Widener L. Rev. 475 (2004), reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, Vol. 1, 591,
592.
61
Bandi, Dr. Gyula, Environmental Enforcement in Hungary – Today and
Tomorrow, http://www.inece.org/2ndvol1/bandi.htm; see also, Global Legal Group,
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: ENVIRONMENT LAW 2006, 196,
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/735.pdf.
62
For more information on public interest litigation and citizen suits, see
Thompson, Jr., Barton H., Symposium: Innovations in Environmental Policy: The
Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. of Illinois L. Rev. 185 (2000),
reprinted in MAKING LAW WORK, Vol. 1, at 577; for general background on the
procedures for initiating public interest litigation in India, see Helpline law website,
http://www.helplinelaw.com/docs/pub-i-litigation/index.php.
63
BRAZIL CONSTITUTION at art. 5, § LXXIII.
64
BRAZIL CONSTITUTION at art. 129.
65
Nat’l Envtl. Law Center website, “About NELC,” available at
http://www.nelconline.org/nelc.asp?id2=15157.
66
Citizen Enforcement: Tools for Effective Participation, 5th INECE Conference
Proceedings (1998), http://www.inece.org/CBldg%20Docs/citenf.pdf; for examples of
Good Neighbor Agreements, see Civic Practices Network website, “Good Neighbor
123
Agreements: A Tool for Environmental and Social Justice,” available at
http://www.cpn.org/topics/environment/goodneighbor.html.
67
GOOD NEIGHBOR AGREEMENTS, supra note 66.
68
UNEP MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 30.
69
U.S. EPA website, “About Performance Partnerships,” available at
http://www.epa.gov/ocirpage/nepps/about.htm .
70
UNEP MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 30.
71
For more information, see Interpol, “Ecomessage: Briefing Document,”
available at
http://www.interpol.int/Public/EnvironmentalCrime/Pollution/Eco_message.pdf .
72
European Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental
Law, About IMPEL, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/impel/introduction.htm .
73
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network for Accession (ECENA)
website, “Introduction,” available at
http://www.rec.org/REC/Programs/rerep/ecena/Introduction.html .
74
Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in the Maghreb
(NECEMA) website, available at http://www.inece.org/mena/necema/index.html .
75
Gerardu, Jo J.A. & Zaelke, Durwood, The Importance of International
Environmental Enforcement Networks – INECE as an example, ELNI REVIEW, No. 2,
2005, at 3-7.
76
UNEP MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 30.
77
INECE Secretariat, Performance Measurement Guidance for Compliance and
Enforcement Practitioners, Second Edition, April 2008, available at
http://www.inece.org/indicators/guidance.pdf.
124
USEPA Document Number 300F09002
I N E C E
International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement