Christopher Duffy

First published in 1981

by Rout!edge & Kegan Paul Ltd
39 Store Street, London WC1E 7DD,
9 Park Street, Boston, mass. 02108, USA and
Broadway House, Newtown Road,
Henley-on-Thames, Oxon RG9 1 EN
Set in 10/12pt Press Roman by
Columns, Reading
and printed in Great Britain by
St Edmundsbury Press, Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk
© Christopher Duffy 1981
No part of this book may be reproduced in
any form without permission from the
publisher, except for the quotation of brief
passages in criticism

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Duffy, Christopher
Russia's military way to the West.
1. Russia — History, Military, to 1801
/. Title

947'. 046 DK51

ISBN 0-7100-0797-3

i
 Preface

One So Many Russias

Two Peter I, 'the Great' 1682-1725

Three The Age of Marshal Munnich 1725-41

Four Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

Five The Russian Soldier

Six The Russian Officer

Seven The Cossacks

Eight Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96

Nine Paul I 1796-1801

Ten Conclusions

Appendix

Select Bibliography

Index
 1 Peter the Great 9 26 Cuirassier on dismounted sentry duty,
2 Zar und Zimmermann — Peter the Great Seven Years War 101
in the guise of a shipwright on his 27 Artilleryman, Seven Years War 102
Western travels ^ 28 Petr Semenovich Saltykov 105
3 Fusilier of the Preobrazhenskii 29 Peter III 122
Regiment, 1700-2 13 30 Peter III and his suite 123
4 James Bruce, creator of the modern 31 Russian infantry of the later
Russian artillery 18 eighteenth century 127
5 Aleksandr Danilovich Menshikov 33 32 Grenadier, period of Catherine
6 Grenadier, 1700-2 « 34 the Great 134
7 Infantry officer, 1700-2 39 33 Officer of the Leibkompagnie 141
8 Burchard Christoph Miinnich 44 34 NCO and officer of the Chevalier
9 Elizabeth Petrovna 55 Garde, 1764-96 141
10 Petr Shuvalov 60 35 Officer of the Cadet Corps,
11 Cornet of cuirassiers, Seven Years War 65 1732-42 143
12 Dragoon, Seven Years War 66 36 Generals of Catherine the Great 149
13 Artillery of the Seven Years War 68 37 Kiril Razumovskii 150
14 Artillery of the Seven Years War 69 38 Cavalry officer, after 1769, probably
15 Artillery of the Seven Years War 69 a carabinier 152
16 Artillery of the Seven Years War 70 39 Infantry officer, period of Catherine
17 Artillery of the Seven Years War 70 the Great 152
18 Artillery of the Seven Years War 70 40 General of the 7th Jaeger Corps,
19 Details of the Shuvalov secret howitzer 71 1797-1801 153
20 Stepan Fedorovich Apraksin 74 41 Nikolai Vasilevich Repnin 155
21 Grand Prince Peter and Catherine, 42 Hussar of the Slobodskaya Ukraine,
leaders of the 'young court' 92 Seven Years War 157
22 Fusilier and sergeant of infantry, 43 Volga Cossack 160
Seven Years War 97 44 Charge of the Don Cossacks at the
23 Infantry officers, Seven Years War 99 battle of the Trebbia, 1799 163
24 Grenadier of a regiment of musketeers, 45 Catherine the Great 165
Seven Years War 100 46 Grigorii Grigorevich Orlov 166
25 Captain of a regiment of grenadiers, 47 Zakhar Grigorevich Chernyshev 167
Seven Years War 101
viii Illustrations

48 Field-marshal, period of Catherine 63 Paul I 202

the Great 167 64 Paul I in front of the Winter Palace 203
49 Central divisional squares at Kagul 170 65 Paul I 203
50 Rumyantsev in battle against the Turks 171 66 Musketeer, period of Paul I 204
51 Musketeer, 1763-C.1786 173 67 Paul I and Suvorov 206
52 Jaegers, 1765-C.1786 177 68 Grenadier of the Shlyushelburgskii
53 Grigorii Aleksandrovich Potemkin 180 Musketeer Regiment, period of
54 Musketeers in the 'Potemkin' uniform, Paul I 211
c.1786 183 69 Novi Castle 220
55 The'Potemkin'cap 184 70 Base of the interior tower at Novi Castle,
56 Suvorov the man-manager 193 looking at the western side 221
57 Suvorov in English caricature 193 71 At the gates of Switzerland 223
58 Aleksandr Vasilevich Suvorov 194 72 Forcing the Devil's Bridge, Andermatt 225
59 Catherine tempted by the Devil 195 73 Descent to the Muotatal from the
60 Catherine the Great with her family and Kinzig Pass 227
leading courtiers, 1782 197 74 Convent of St Joseph, Muotathal
61 Grenadier and musketeer of the village 228
Gatchina Corps, 1793 200 75 Eastern end of the Klontalersee 229
62 Inspection of the guard indoors 76 The entry to the Panixer Pass 231
at Gatchina 201

t
(by the author)

> >

Western Russia: political 3 Paltzig, 23 July 1759* 107

Western Russia: physical 5 Kunersdorf, 12 August 1759* 109
Narva, 19 November 1700 16 Kunersdorf: the defence of the Kuh-Grund* 110
The Baltic theatre in the eighteenth century 19 Kunersdorf: victory* 111
The way to Poltava, 1708-9 21 Campaigns of 1760 and 1761 113
Poltava, 27 June 1709 25 Rumyantsev's War, 1768-74 174
The Turkish campaigns, 1736-9 52 Kagul, 21 July 1770: attack in
The invasions of East Prussia 75 divisional squares 175
Gross-Jagersdorf, 30 August 1757* 76 The Turkish War, 1787-91/2 186
The central theatre . 84 North Holland, 1799 210
Campaign of 1758 85 Italy and Switzerland, 1799 213
Zorndorf: Prussian turning movement* 87 Novi, 15 August 1799 219
Zorndorf, 25 August' 1758* 88 Suvorov in Switzerland, 1799 224
Campaign of 1759 106 Rosenberg in the Muotatal, 1 October 1799 230

*There is a key to these maps on page 77.

There can be no doubt that the great and increas- by Russia, and the westward advance of Russia's
ing military might of Soviet Russia has become borders and influence in the period under con-
one of the dominating issues of international sideration;
affairs in the last four decades. The present study (b) the issue of how far the new Russian army
attempts not to explain this remarkable pheno- assimilated Western techniques and structures;
menon, but to provide the reader with historical (c) the question of the relative importance of
perspectives, by taking him back to the time when western European and native Russian influences
Russia acquired and began to exercise modern on the Russian army;
military power. (d) and finally the evaluation of the performance
A perceptive historian has noted that 'with of the Russian armies in Western theatres of war.
military scholars of the eighteenth century concen-
trating on central and western Europe, the study In the concluding chapter I also touch on the
of war in eastern Europe . . . was and remains an historiographical treatment of Russian military
unjustifiably ignored field' (Longworth, 1965, affairs in the eighteenth century, and venture some
301). The omission is all the more surprising when comments on the much-debated theme of con-
we consider that Russia, although the youngest tinuities between Tsarist past and Soviet present.
significant member of the European community, The present high costs of printing threaten to
played a leading part in smashing the Swedish put the purchase of books entirely beyond the
Baltic empire, and went on to find herself heavily means of private individuals. I have therefore
engaged against the two states that threatened established a number of firm priorities for space
most to disturb European repose — the Prussia of in the present volume, givingjust the bare minimum
Frederick the Great, and the resurgent France of of information on subjects which have been
the Revolution. treated in detail by expert authorities elsewhere.
The title of my book has been plundered from For naval affairs I refer the interested reader to the
Mediger's fine study of Russian mid-eighteenth- works of R.C. Anderson and N.E. Saul and Chapter
century statesmanship, Moskaus Weg nach Europa. 6 of the recently published work by A. G. Cross,
At once concise and ambiguous, the phrase, Russians in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Newton-
translated into military terms, indicates all the ville, 1980. The proper study of military costume
avenues which I have set out to explore, namely: also has significance, for it reveals a great deal
about the morale and discipline of armies, and the
(a) what you might call the 'snow on the boots' impression which sovereigns desire to make upon
question, asking whether you can establish a direct the world. Here I recommend the well-illustrated
relation between the application of military force volumes by the Funckens, the Mollos and Zweguint-
xi
xii Preface

zow. Copies of the huge old standard text by and Drums' {Military Affairs, 1979), John Keegan's
Viskovatov are available in the British Library and masterful study of the experience of combat (The
the library of the Victoria and Albert Museum. Face of Battle, 1976), and the long section of
likewise, the blow-by-blow narrative of the Michael Roberts's The Swedish Imperial Experience
Great Northern War can be readily retrieved from (1979), in which, after carefully turning over every
the histories of Peter the Great by M. S. Anderson, possible alternative explanation, he concludes that
and of Charles XII by R. M. Hatton. For detail on the loss of Sweden's eastern Baltic provinces was
the reign of Catherine the Great, please consult the an avoidable catastrophe, the responsibility for
monumental work by I. de Madariaga. which lies squarely with the Swedish kings. Writing
The Tartar and Turkish campaigns, for the same of this standard gives one the confidence to assert
reason, are examined here principally to help to that it was indeed a matter of some moment that a
explain what was specifically non-European about Rumyantsev commanded armies on the Danube in
the Russian art of war. Conversely, I devote a the 1770s, or that a Survorov led the Russians in
goodish amount of space to the still little-known Italy and Switzerland in 1799.
stories of Russia's intervention in the Seven Years The circumstances of my employment pre-
War and the War of the Second Coalition, and to cluded me from pursuing research in the Soviet
the work of that much-misrepresented gentleman, Union. As some compensation, the Lenin Library
Paul I. in Moscow kindly leant me a generous amount of
At the risk of appearing pompous, I must also otherwise inaccessible material. Moreover, the
clarify my historiographical standpoint. I would fund of relevant printed documents and contem-
certainly not deny that what is rather arrogantly porary memoirs at hand in this country has turned
called 'the new military history', with its emphasis out to be almost limitless, equalling in range the
on social, economic and political considerations, sources relating to the Prussian army of the period,
has done much to make for a more complete and and foreshadowing in its descriptive power and
satisfying kind of study than the old histories of psychological abcuracy the oeuvre of the Russian
the 'battles and kings' variety. At the same time, nineteenth-century novelists.
I am beginning to suspect that the vogue for 'war Rather more frustrating has been the business
and society', which lies at the heart of the new of evaluating the recent secondary material. Not
enthusiasms, is in danger of commanding a dispro- only do the general historians, almost without
portionate. amount of attention. A few of the exception, lack the military historical knowledge
protagonists of 'the new military history' appear required to distinguish between what is true and
to proceed from the assumptions that campaigns what is tendentious in Soviet writing on eighteenth-
and battles are unworthy of serious attention, that century warfare, but non-socialist authorities are
everything worth knowing about them has already in fundamental disagreement on some quite
been established, and that their outcome (as far as weighty matters of more pacific nature. Is it
it is relevant at all) is somehow determined with- correct, for example, to say that the concessions
out conscious human intervention. These are made by Russian monarchs in the matter of noble
presuppositions which I cannot share. Indeed, I service obligations were an intelligent response to
would contend that 'war and society', as an changed social conditions (Raeff), or merely the
historical exercise, is by its nature local, descrip- product of weakness? Were the later partitions of
tive rather than analytical, and,, oddly inert - Poland really powered by the land-hunger of the
explaining possibly less of what actually happened Russian nobility, 'concealed behind the lofty
than do the neglected subjects of military organisa- slogans of "national tasks" ' (Pipes)? Terms like
tion and military decision-making. 'feudalism', 'aristocracy' and 'autocracy' are liable
As a useful corrective to the excesses of military to explode under the boots of the military his-
sociology, I recommend a reading of the article by torian, who must look about him with care and
Dennis E. Showalter, 'A Modest Plea for Trumpets tread as lightly as he can.
 Preface xiii

An especially sharp controversy concerns the Profitable avenues of investigation were

very nature of the Russian body politic. Richard suggested by Philip Longworth, my colleagues
Pipes, in his beautifully written Russia under the Michael Orr and Christopher Donnelly, and
Old Regime (1974), claims to have identified a Iieutenant-General Pavel Zhilin, the President of
'patrimonial' character in the public affairs of the Soviet Commission on Military History.
ancient Muscovy, which set it apart from the Professor Bruce Menning introduced me to the
institutions of western Europe, and which, trans- considerable amount of work now going ahead on
muted through the centuries, helps to account for related themes on the far side of the Atlantic. At a
the emergence of the police state of the later moment's notice Herr Albert Schmied left his
nineteenth century, and the totalitarian regime of occupations, and conducted me around the
modern times. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, at the Muotatal, so unexpectedly rich in the sites, relics
other extreme, accuses Pipes and his followers of and living traditions of the passage of the Russians
racialism, and, by attributing every evil to a in 1799. I look back on those hours as some of the
basically non-Russian Soviet despotism, he cate- most enjoyable I have ever spent as an historian.
gorically denies any survival from the earlier Two people unselfishly read through the type-
period. The debate is of more than historical script of this book — a labour which was the
interest, for American politicians are unaccount- literary equivalent of hauling a barge one hundred
ably ready to lend an ear to academics and miles up the Volga. One was Richard Woff of the
visionaries. While I am in no way qualified to Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The other was
intervene in this battle of heavyweights, I must say Dr Isabel de Madariaga, Reader in Russian Studies
that I find both schools of thought equally uncon- at the University of London, who not only knows
genial. On instinctive rather than scholarly grounds, more about Catherine the Great than probably
I distrust the all-embracing Pipes interpretations, anyone else, but also, as people say, shares some of
and suspect that they are unduly influenced by a the characteristics (the good ones) of that remark-
dislike of things Russian. On the other side, the able woman. I benefited greatly from their con-
Solzhenitsyn thesis is tenable only if you are ready structive criticisms, and from their eagle-eyed
to ignore the mass of evidence which clearly points vigilance which exorcised the work of that devil
to significant continuities in the life of his great who unerringly guides you to write 'up' when you
nation. mean 'down', or 'east' when you really intend
I owe a great deal to the facilities made avail- 'west'. All remaining mistakes and misjudgments
able by John Hunt the librarian of the R.M.A. are entirely my own responsibility.
Sandhurst, and to the staffs of the London Library, This work was undertaken as a private venture.
the British Library, and the library of the School No passage therein should be taken as an expression
of Slavonic and East European Studies. of official opinion.
The bloody mire of Mongol slavery . . . forms the tion at large. Families like the Dolgorukov (lit.
cradle of Muscovy, and modern Russia is but a 'long arm') and Obolensky are still fond of tracing
metamorphosis of Muscovy. (Marx) their lines back to Rurik and his compatriots,
while the Nordic 'Helgas' were the etymological
From time immemorial the government of Russia
ancestresses of all those Russian girls called 'Olga',
has borne a despotic character. The liberty of a
who conjure up fantasies (according to one's
Russian subject has never extended so far as to
mood) of sultry spies, or brawny female tractor-
permit him to discuss the respective rights of
drivers.
sovereign and people . . . it is possible that no
If Novgorod was increasingly drawn to the
Russian has ever conceived that his country could
North over the centuries, the city of Kiev became
be governed otherwise than by an absolute
the main channel by which the culture of
sovereign. (C. H. Manstein)
Byzantium reached Russia, after Grand Prince
Not many areas in historical study offer quite Vladimir was baptised in 989. The Greek alphabet,
so much opportunity for unverifiable speculation culture, liturgy and belief helped to transform
as the origins and nature of The Russian Soul. The relationships and institutions, fusing the present
influence of foreigners has always claimed much with a timeless eternity, binding people and
attention in this respect, if only because it can be church together, and welding spiritual and tem-
endowed with seeming authenticity by referring poral authority into an indissoluble whole.
to places and dates. In the middle decades of the thirteenth century
In search of trade and plunder, the Norsemen the Russian heartlands underwent a conquest of a
of the ninth century drove and hauled their long- much less gentle nature. Having consolidated their
ships over the great tract of Slavonic lowlands power in the East, after Genghis Khan conquered
between the Baltic and the Black Sea, founding Pekin in 1215, the Mongol hordes turned west into
the northern trading centre of Novgorod, and Slavonic Europe in what became known as the
setting themselves up in 882 as princes in the Great Raid of 1237-9. Kiev was totally devastated
southern city of Kiev. The legacy of these in the process, and the Mongols established them-
Scandinavians was out of all proportion to their selves along the Volga, from where they demanded
small numbers. They founded the druzhinas, or tribute from all the princes of the land of Rus.
bands of feudal retainers, which were the remotest If we except the inhabitants of Kiev and Little
ancestors of the Russian military forces. They left Russia, lying in their heaps of whitened bones, no
the name of 'Rus' to the land as a whole, as well as population was more radically transmuted by the
adding to the fair-haired stock among the popula- Mongol presence than the folk of what later

1
2 S o M a n y Russias

became known as Great Russia — the area of heavy the seasons of the spring thaw and the torrential
forest that extended around little settlements like autumn rains.
Moscow. The princes of Muscovy became the most The Russian language was itself profoundly
enthusiastic and shameless of the Mongol surro- influenced by the forest experience. The word izba
gates, and much that was distinctive and unattrac- (log hut) originally bore the significance of 'heated
tive about the Russian character and Russian building', and like the Russian vocabulary describ-
institutions has been attributed to this experience. ing fire and the colour red it bore overtones of a
Mongol influence has been held variously respons- welcoming warmth, calling to mind the traditions
ible for the destruction of the urban classes, the of hospitality among rustic neighbours, and the
brutalisation of the peasantry, a denial of human dedicated feasting of their princes. Other usages
dignity, and a distorted sense of values which remind us of the isolation and fears of the Russian
t
reserved a special admiration for ferocity, tyran- communities. The collective name for something
nical ways and slyness. More specifically, we can that was strange or alien, chuzhoi, had strong
point to the Tartar derivation of many words pejorative implications. Nemets was even worse,
concerning trade, communications and repression, meaning a speechless foreigner, and more especially
and to the Mongol influence on the Muscovite a German one.
military forces, which found ready-made models in It is of the greatest importance for our story
Tartar weapons, formations and tactics, and that the power which came to represent 'Russia' to
borrowed the useful idea of entering people on the world was the Muscovy of the forest and the
conscript rolls for military service and taxation. Mongol absolutism, and not Kiev or Little Russia,
Muscovite notions of representative government with their outlook on Byzantium and Catholic
were likewise derived from the heirs of Genghis Poland, or Novgorod, with its openings to
Khan, extinguishing any hope of the emergence of Scandinavia and Hanseatic Europe. Indeed, a
the concept of land or peoples as entities distinct person of an uncharitable and legalistic turn of
from the personal property of the ruler. The Great mind might be inclined to claim that Muscovite
Russian populations, if they were not actually Russia survived into the twentieth century as the
born to be serfs, have certainly, over the centuries, last remnant of the Mongol empire, for the grand
inclined themselves to accept a degree of direction prince of Muscovy simply ceased to pay tribute to
which elsewhere might be regarded as frankly the Golden Horde in 1476, without having evicted
tyrannical. They justified it to themselves as, the Mongols by force, or renounced his allegiance.
variously, a safeguard against foreign invasion, a In the seventeenth century families of Tartar
curb on their anarchical instincts, or as a spur to a origin accounted for almost one in five of the
passive temperament which could supply no service nobility, and they comprised names as well-
initiatives of its own. known as Apraksin, Leontev, Rostopchin and
No less marked was the Muscovite inclination Turgenev.
towards communal living and collective action. The principality of Moscow had gradually
Here we can probably detect the working of the asserted its mastery of Great Russia during the
physical conditions of Great Russia. Only a eclipse of Kiev, and with the decline of Mongol
community labouring in concert could put forth power in the fifteenth century the Muscovites
the intense effort needed to exploit the brief began to behave towards their more distant
growing season and clear the dense and matted Russian neighbours in a notably high-handed style.
forests. Conversely, a resigned, almost comatose Grand Prince Ivan III (1462-1505) made use of the
passivity was the only reasonable response to the opportunities to the full, and not only annexed
long periods of the year when there was little of Novgorod in 1478, but appropriated the double
any use to be done in the open air. Once the eagle insignia and other trappings of the defunct
heaviest snows had fallen, the notorious winters Byzantine empire for himself. This exercise
were actually less paralysing in this respect than helped to lend credibility to Moscow's claim to be
3 So Many Russias
4 S o M a n y Russias

considered the 'Third Rome' — after Byzantium, With such experiences awaiting them in the
as the 'Second Rome', had disgraced itself by west, it was scarcely surprising that the Muscovites
compounding with the Latin Christians in 1439, should sometimes have turned their eyes to the
and undergone condign punishment when it was Don and the 'dear mother' Volga as they wandered
wiped out by the Turks in 1453. through woods, grasslands and desert steppe to the
Emerging from their forest refuge, the southern seas. The prospect was all the more
Muscovites found the landscape of Russia seamed tempting because the cohesion of their former
with meandering watercourses. A march of no overlords, the Tartars (Mongols), had dissolved in
more than 160 miles from their capital brought the course of the fifteenth century. In the process
them to the little rivers of the Valdai uplands, or the Golden Horde broke up into a number of
the regimes of the Volga, the Don and the Dnieper, khanates, only one of which, that of the Crimea,
and so offered them the potential of access to the had the power to withstand the Muscovites.
Gulf of Finland, the Black Sea and the Caspian. One of the doomed khanates had its seat at
In each of these directions, however, there existed Kazan, ensconced amid magnificent oakwoods at
peoples whose obduracy offered the kind of the great bend of the Volga, where it finally
barrier which geography had failed to supply. To settled on its southward course. After two years of
the west, the very formidable military power of effort, Prince Ivan IV 'the Terrible' conquered the
Poland disputed the Ukraine, Little Russia and place in 1552. This was an event of crucial impor-
White Russia, and retained the means of striking tance in Muscovite territorial expansion, unlocking
at the Muscovite heartland. Competition became as it did the avenues eastwards across the Volga
more intense the closer the Muscovites approached into central Asia, and southwards towards the
the Baltic littoral, for there they had to contend Caspian. Both routes were exploited with astonish-
not just with the Poles, and their Lithuanian and ing speed, with the help of water transport. In
Livonian associates, but with the newly arrived 1556 the Muscovites reduced Astrakhan, where
and aggressive Swedes. Livonia was abandoned to the Volga branched out for its final push to the
the Poles in 1582, and Estonia to the Swedes in Caspian Sea — an acquisition which gave them the
1595. Moscow itself underwent a period of Polish entire course of that great river, and an outlook on
occupation in the anarchic 'Time of Troubles' Persia and the back door of the Middle East. The
early in the next century. corresponding advance eastwards was spearheaded
From 1654 Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich took the in the 1580s by parties of Cossacks, who pointed
risk of committing Muscovy to the fringes of the the way for trading posts and settlements that
series of great wars that raged through Europe in were to extend thousands of miles across Siberia
the middle decades of the seventeenth century. to the Pacific.
The young Muscovite armies suffered appallingly The one surviving khanate was that of the
at the hands of the Poles, especially in a run of Crimea, which comprised the peninsula proper,
defeats at the turn of the 1650s and 1660s, when which was the home of the 'settled' Crimea Tartars,
10,000 men might be lost in a single battle. The and. the steppes of the Nogai nomads on the
Muscovites could not sustain the conquests that adjacent mainland. In 1475 the Crimean Tartars
they made from the Swedes in the Gulf of Finland became vassals of the aggressive Ottoman Turks,
in the concurrent war of 1656-61, and the cost of who enjoyed direct access to the Crimea and the
the thirteen years of struggle was disproportionately estuary of the Dnieper across the Black Sea, and
high, even taking into consideration the fruits of to the mouth of the Don by way of the Straits of
the peace treaty of 1667, which advanced the Kerch and the Sea of Azov. These circumstances
borders of the state across the Ukraine to the help to explain why the Crimean Tartars, instead
Dnieper, and, on the far side, gave Aleksei of being pushed into the sea by the Muscovites,
Mikhailovich the city of Kiev, in all its tarnished entered a new career as a strategic bridgehead of
glamour. militant Islam.
 16 S o M a n y Russias

MILES

(Contours at 1,000-metre intervals)

WESTERN RUSSIA
PHYSICAL

WATERS FROZEN IIM WINTER

Petrozavodsk

Onega IRON MINING & PROCESSING

Olonets
BLACK EARTH REGION

0>?ST PETERSBURG

Perm

)® K a z a n
© M O S C O W

Tula

Orenburg

KIEV
6 S o M a n y Russias

The reasons for Muscovite annoyance with the (lit. 'children of the boyars'), who owned an
Crimean Tartars remained remarkably constant average of five or six peasant households each, in
over the years. For three centuries the Tartars return for an obligation to perform wartime
were in the habit of raiding deep into Russia and service. This petty nobility was assiduous in its
the Ukraine, in search of slaves for the Levantine efforts to improve its social standing — in 1649,
market. On the defensive, the Tartars could for example, it won the full legal enserfment of its
embarrass the Russians simply by sitting behind peasants — but it became of less and less account
their massive Lines of Perekop, astride the narrow in warfare. In terms of numbers, its contribution
isthmus connecting the Crimea with the mainland. was not very significant, comprising in 1667 only
Here they were neatly positioned on the flank of about 19,000 out of the total of 42,500 cavalry.
any Russian drive around the shores of the Black Moreover, with its feeble, gun-shy ^horses, and its
Sea. The Russians consequently had to detach bows and arrows, lances and rusty swords, it
considerable armies to storm the Perekop Lines, or proved to be inadequate for combat against the
to stand watch on the steppes outside, which was Tartars, and almost completely useless when faced
a hardly more attractive prospect. with regular Western armies.
These considerations, taken together with the The failings of the feudal levy left the Streltsy
great physical effort involved in bringing the (lit. 'musketeers') for many years as the only
Russian armies across the steppes in the first place, reliable source of native troops. They were founded
made the decision to fight on the southern theatre by Ivan the Terrible in 1550, and soon proved
a matter of some moment, implying a major and their worth in the conquest of Kazan. Clad in their
perhaps permanent diversion of forces from the distinctive long coats, and armed with muskets and
north-western borders, where they might be halberds, they did excellent service for the rest of
needed for use against folk like the Poles, Swedes that century and for much of the next, and even
or Prussians. Experience showed that in order to survived to give Peter the Great some of the best
gain solid results in 'the south, Russia had to make stock for his regular army. Their numbers had
the commitment not just for a decade, but for a risen from the first 3,000 in 1550 to 33,775 in
whole generation at a time. 1632, and to no less than 50,000 in 1681, com-
With the young Muscovite state engaged along prising 45,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. By
so many frontiers, we have to examine the fitness then, however, the formation was failing to
of its institutions to stand the strain. measure up to the needs of the times. While
By the middle decades of the seventeenth maintaining a very high sense of self-importance,
century, the army had evolved into an extra- the Streltsy lacked good native leadership, and
ordinary rag-bag of formations, representing so their commitment to the military life often gave
many survivals from the past, borrowings from the second place to their peacetime civilian trades.
West, and experiments and expedients, expressing Long before the reign of Peter the Great, the
a general principle of setting the new alongside the tsars of Muscovy were alive to the importance of
old, without any attempt to transform the whole. acquiring useful military technology and skilled
The most ancient and in every way the most manpower from the West. Foreign gunfounders
unsatisfactory element was represented by the and military engineers had been active as far back
noble cavalrymen and their armed serfs. The as the reign of Ivan the Terrible in the middle of
greater landed boyars (numbering about 6,000 the sixteenth century. Modern ideas on military
males) derived prestige from their closeness to the organisation and the art of war were also prized.
person of the tsar, but now scarcely even went In 1621 Onisim Mikhailov produced a manuscript
through the motions of providing the state with an Code of Military and Artillery Practice, after many
effective military force. They were greatly out- years of study in foreign languages, and in 1649
numbered by the 50,000 or so males of the Middle the young Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich published a
Service Class - the dvoryane and the deti boyarskie volume of infantry regulations deriving mainly
 7 S o M a n y Russias

from the example of Maurice of Nassau — a docu- By the 1670s, Muscovy could certainly put
ment which Peter the Great himself recognised as forth vast forces, which amounted, according to
the foundation of the regular army of Russia. some estimates, to 200,000 or 300,000 men, but
Over the middle decades of the seventeenth in almost every other respect the rest of Europe
century the endemic wars of western Europe bred remained unimpressed. An Austrian diplomat
up generations of ambitious, discontented or claimed that 'from a slothful genius and habits of
dispossessed military men, many of whom found slavery, they have neither stomach for great things,
their way to Muscovy — English or Scots, made nor do they achieve them' (Korb, 1863, II, 35).
homeless by the defeat of Charles I, perhaps, or The boyars disliked campaigning, and thought
Dutch, Danes, Germans and Swedes who had only of returning to home comforts once the
been thrown out of work by treaties of peace. danger of invasion was past, while the muzhik
The first large batch of foreigners was enrolled infantry let themselves be herded forward in
in the early 1630s, as part of a recruiting drive in battle, then lost heart and were cut down in their
north-west Europe. The results did not entirely thousands.
meet expectations, for the foreign regiments did In the early 1680s a small group at the court of
not acquit themselves particularly well on cam- the juvenile Tsar Fedor Alekseevich tried to carry
paign, and the nobles of the Middle Service Class through a last reform of the old Muscovite forces.
were unwilling to serve under or alongside the In November 1681 a conference of generals,
newcomers. In 1647, however, Aleksei Mikhailovich boyars and leading citizens came together under
had the inspiration of cutting loose from the past, the presidency of Prince Vasilii Golitsyn to devise
and forming a body of native conscripts who were measures 'for the better organisation and direction
summoned for service on the basis of census rolls. of the army'. On 12 January of the next year it
The recruiting of foreigners went ahead, but now proclaimed the most ambitious of its resolutions,
with the particular purpose of buying individuals which abolished mestnichestvo, the 'system of
to officer the conscript army. places' according to which the old nobility had
The new regiments were formed in the early taken its place in the army according to elaborate
1650s as units of infantry, heavy cavalry and tables of ancestry. As had long been the case with
lancers — all in addition to an existing corps of the foreigners, ranks were now to be filled by the
regular dragoons. In wartime the new formations serving families regardless of their origins.
supplied a mass of up to about 60,000 infantry It was not easy to discern any beneficial effects
and 45,000 cavalry, who were supposed to be on the army, which needed nothing so much as
armed and organised on the Western model. In firm discipline and a period of peace; Instead,
time of peace, however, both the numbers of men Russia joined itself in 1686 to the Holy League
and the cadres were greatly reduced, and only a of Austria, Poland and Venice against the Turks.
few units were kept at a high standard of training. The army was twice directed towards the Crimea,
Not surprisingly, the state was thrown into a in 1687 and 1689, marching in a single unpaid and
convulsion whenever the tsar committed it to war. hungry mass. I. T. Pososhkov recalled how 'Prince
The noble cavalrymen groped around in dusty Vasilii Vasilevich Golitsyn moved against the
cupboards for their weapons, while generals for Perekop, accompanied by an army which some say
the conscript forces were sought out, or promoted amounted to 300,000 troops. The Tartars on their
on the spot, and severally assigned districts 'from side had but 15,000 men all told, yet our force for
which, according as the necessities of war may all its size did not dare give battle to such a tiny
demand, the serfs are to be driven from their huts band' (Pososhkov, 1951, 262).
into the ranks, until the requisite number be filled What had gone wrong? In the introduction to
up'. The product was all too often 'a mob of the his Military Code of 1716 Peter the Great acknow-
lowest and most uncouth ragamuffins' (Korb, ledged the pioneering work of Aleksei Mikhailovich,
1863,11, 138). whose army had accomplished 'glorious deeds'
8 S o M a n y Russias

in the wars against the Poles and Swedes. more recent events as with our experiences at
the hands of the Turks at Azov, and at the
And what happened then? The army proved
beginning of the present war at Narva.
incapable of standing not just against civilised
nations, but even against barbarians, of which we He traced the cause to a fundamental lack of
still have fresh memories . . . not only of what 'good order'.
happened . . . in the Crimean campaigns, but of
The young tsar

The early years of Russia's greatest ruler were

fraught with enough shocks and excitements to
derange the mind of a more stable person than the
juvenile Peter Alekseevich Romanov. The story is a
very familiar one, but it bears a little repetition.
The very fact that Peter came into the world at
all placed him in some peril. He was born in 1672,
as a fruit of the second marriage of Tsar Aleksei
Mikhailovich. During the subsequent reign of
Fedor Alekseevich, the young Peter lived in con-
stant danger from his violent and jealous half-
sister, Sophia, who was a product of the first
marriage, and in 1682 he and his mother
retreated to the doubtful safety of the village of
Preobrazhenskoe outside Moscow. Preobrazhen-
skoe signifies 'Transfiguration', and there was
indeed something almost miraculous about the way
this retarded, awkward and nearly uneducated boy
found the way to teach himself, and ultimately his
entire nation, about the basics of armed power.
Inspired partly by a youthful enthusiasm for
military games, and partly by a highly developed
instinct for self-preservation, Peter slowly formed
a miniature army about his person. To begin with,
the company lived up to its name of the Poteshnyi 1 Peter the Great
Company — plaything or entertainment — being
recruited from childhood playmates and the entered on the books as the 'First Russian Soldier'.
servants and retainers of his dead father. The first The necessary hardware was hauled up from
adult to present himself was the young groom wherever it could be found — artillery and stands
Sergei Leontev Bukhvostov, who in 1683 was of arms from storerooms and the Kremlin arsenal,

9
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 10

and an ancient English or Dutch sailing boat which ment than his reluctance to assume a post of
had been lying forgotten in the village of Izmailova. ultimate responsibility. Just as he did not take up
Peter had once shuddered at the sight of anything active field command until well into his war with
so large or so wet as a pond, but the little craft at the Swedes, so now the process of fitting himself
Izmailova became the inspiration for a whole to lead the army and state continued regardless of
navy. his victory over Sophia.
As Peter progressed through his teens, the From the Dutchman Franz Timmermann the
military games assumed a more professional air. young tsar absorbed the principles of fortification,
The Poteshnyi were organised as a company of ballistics and other mathematically based arts. The
bombardiers, and they embodied a strict principle Swiss Franz Lefort gave him an outlook on the
of promotion according to merit. Peter was wider world and its ways, as well as many useful
'concerned from the start to wean the nobility of notions on military affairs. From the unlikely
his state from their prejudices about birth. They background of a staid Genevan family, the latter
believed it was insulting for a man of illustrious gentleman had found his way through the French,
family to have to serve under a general of lower Dutch and Prussian services to Russia, where he
condition' (Manstein, 1860, II, 360). Peter had ended up penniless in the Foreign Suburb. Lefort
himself enrolled as nothing more grand than the saved himself by marrying a rich heiress, but he
'First Bombardier', and he put all promotion in did not hesitate to put his career at risk by pre-
the hands of Prince Fedor Romodanovskii, who, senting himself as one of the first supporters of
until his death in 1718, solemnly advanced the tsar Peter at his monastic stronghold. Peter prized
up through all the ranks of the military hierarchy. Lefort for his cheerful and energetic character,
Something approaching regular manoeuvres were as much as for his expertise and loyalty, and he
held around a miniature fortress, and in 1687 the made him his first general and admiral, and the first
corps received a significant accession of strength of the knights of the Order of St Andrew, which
in the form of drafts from the three elite Streltsy he founded in the same year of 1689. Lefort was
regiments from the Butyrki district of Moscow. capable of matching Peter bottle for bottle, and
These were formed into two complete regiments, his dissolute habits were said to have hastened his
the Preobrazhenskii and the Semenovskii (pron. death ten years later.
'Semionovsky'), so-called after Peter's refuge and A calmer, more staid and reflective influence
one of the nearby villages. The original bombar- emanated from the Catholic Scotsman, Patrick
diers of the Poteshnyi Company were assigned to Gordon, who had come to Muscovy in 1661.
them in two companies of fifty each. However, both Gordon and Lefort were active in
All of this helped to draw down on Peter and helping Peter to stage the very realistic manoeuvres
his party the attention of Sophia, who identified a that were held outside Moscow in the early 1690s.
threat to her tenure of power as regent. To put his A 'great and terrible battle' took place in the
person beyond the reach of her plots, Peter fled in autumn of 1691, and the series culminated in a
1689 to the sanctuary of the massive walls of the combat in September and October 1694, when six
Troitse-Sergiev monastery, to the north of Moscow. regiments of Streltsy tried to defend a fortress
The 'play regiments' lay at Peter's disposal, as was against 15,000 troops of the new foundation — the
only to be expected, but of far greater importance original Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii
'in building up his power base was his success in Regiments, two new regiments set up respectively
winning over the prominent boyars, the Western by Gordon and Lefort, and Colonel Scharf's
officers from the Foreign Suburb, and the mass of regiment of conscripts. Many were the men who
the Streltsy. Sophia was left without support, and were skewered by bayonets and swords, or blown
Peter returned to Moscow in the autumn as up by the cardboard bombs and pottery grenades.
acknowledged master of Russia. The next year the carefully nurtured new
Nothing is more surprising in Peter's develop- formations were pushed with the unregenerate old
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 11

army into war in earnest against the Turks, and capitulated in July, without putting Peter to the
the experience was to show how very far both necessity of storming the place. Peter at once
elements still fell short of measuring up even to repaired the fortifications of Azov town, but
these half-barbaric enemies. Peter had made up his preferred to plant his new harbour a little way out
mind to put new life into the War of the Holy along the northern shores of the Sea of Azov at
League which he had inherited from Sophia Taganrog.
the regent. He was actuated less by crusading Dissatisfied with having had to learn so much
zeal than by the desire to crack open the Turkish about Western ways at second hand, Peter left
fortress of Azov, and thus open the way through Russia in March 1697 under the thin guise of one
the mouth of the Don to the Sea of Azov, and so 'Peter Mikhailov', a gentleman. He spent well over
perhaps ultimately to the Black Sea. He had been a year in foreign parts, energetically questioning
entranced by two recent visits to his bustling port soldiers, sailors and technicians, measuring fortifi-
of Archangel on the aptly named White Sea, but cations against his own large frame, and leaving
he appreciated that these far northern waters, behind him a succession of smashed-up apartments
which were frozen for most of the year, would and gardens, and a slug-like trail of members of his
never give him a fitting avenue to the wider world. own party of 250 or so, who were left behind to
While 120,000 of the 'old' troops were sent investigate matters of interest. Vasilii Kochmin
towards the Dnieper, a force of more than 30,000 was one of the five bombardiers who stayed in
men of the new regiments made their way by Brandenburg to learn more about bombar die ring,
barge down the Volga, and thence a short distance and he wrote pathetically to Peter
overland to the regime of the lower Don. In July
our master [a lieutenant of artillery] is a good
1695 all the forces arrived before Azov. It soon
man; he knows a good deal, and teaches us well.
transpired that there was no way of stopping the
The one thing that stands in the way of our good
Turks from replenishing the fortress by way of
relations is that he asks for money for his teaching,
the river, or of curbing the sorties of the unusually
and without payment our instruction cannot
frisky garrison. Peter impatiently ordered a general
proceed. (Strukhov, in Skalon, 1902-c.l 1, VI,
assault, over the protests of Gordon, and when the
bk 1, pt 1,28)
attack went in on 5 August it was repulsed with a
loss of more than 1,500 killed. In September a After making an unannounced stop at Riga, in
second assault met with no greater success, and in Swedish Livonia, Peter proceeded to East Prussia
cold and damp weather the army undertook the (where he got on very well with the Elector of
seven-week journey home. Brandenburg), and then by way of Berlin to
Peter and his army made their way back to Holland to discover how to build ships. Britain was
Azov in 1696. This time the preparations were the westernmost destination of the grand tour.
much more thorough. From the experience of Here he found further opportunities for practical
the last campaign, Peter had learnt that 'in order shipbuilding, in the Thames dockyard at Deptford,
to take a fortified place' it was necessary to have as well as for researches into astronomy a little
suitable forces, directed by 'an expert in the art of way downriver at Greenwich Observatory, and
attacking towns' (Fabritsius, in Skalon, 1902 — into gunfounding at Woolwich Arsenal.
c . l l , VII, pt. 1, v). He therefore appealed for help Peter planned to make a leisurely return
to the Christian powers, and in the course of the journey by way of Austria and Venice, but an
campaign, large numbers of German techno- accumulation of bad news from home forced him
logists arrived at the trenches before Azov — to break off the tour in Vienna in July 1698, and
Brandenburgers like Kober and Schuster, and the head immediately for Moscow. He took back with
gunners Schmidt and Rosen who had been sent by him an incalculable store of knowledge, and a set
the Emperor of Austria. The attack went through of standards by which his transformation of
the due processes of regular siege, and the Turks Muscovy would have to be judged.
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 12

Moscow regiments were held to the obligation of

service, but scattered over the country as peasants,
while the regiments of provincial Streltsy were
absorbed over the years into the new regular army.

'The soldiers' hut at Preobrazhenskoe' — the

creation of the standing regular army of
Russia, 1699-1700

Peter's foreign tour and the gutting of the Streltsy

represented two stages in the tsar's process of
winning free of the legacy of ancient Muscovy. As
the new century approached, Peter believed that
the time had come to endow his Russia with one
of the most important attributes of a modern state
— a standing army of regular troops, 'most sagely
considering that it is only the veteran soldier who
has been broken in by many years of training that
is worthy of the glory of real warfare' (Korb,
1863,11, 141).
To begin with, the recruiting embraced both
volunteers and conscripts. The first published
notice relating to the new army appeared on 8
November 1699:
Concerning the enlistment of all willing men into
2 Zar undZimmermann — Peter the Great in the
service as soldiers. Whoever wants to join up, is to
guise of a shipwright on his Western travels
have himself enrolled at Preobrazhenskoe, at the
soldiers' hut. Such men will be given eleven
The reason for the sudden curtailment of the
roubles per annum, and they will be engaged in
western tour lay in the unrest among certain of the
the Moscow regiments as soldiers. When they are
Streltsy, who had been encouraged in their grumb-
on His Majesty's service, and wherever they
lings by Sophia, who had retained all her worldly
happen to be, they will receive rations of flour,
ambitions during her banishment in a nunnery.
fodder and wine on the same basis as the soldiers
Peter returned to Moscow in such an agitated and
of the Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii
unpredictable mood that it was physically
regiments.
dangerous to stand anywhere near him. He regarded
the Streltsy malcontents not merely as traitors, These terms were by no means unattractive, for
but as representatives of an old political, social and eleven roubles represented a very good working
military order which he was determined to crush. wage, and military service offered a means of
The interrogations, tortures, hangings, decapita- escape to peasantsfrom a servitude that was
tions and breakings on the wheel extended over becoming more and more oppressive. The enlist-
five months, and claimed the lives of probably ment of volunteers was made the particular
more than one thousand wretches. responsibility of General A. M. Golovin, who by
Four regiments of the Moscow Streltsy were the spring of 1700 had collected.more than 10,000
disbanded without more ado for their part in the men in his 'division' at Moscow.
rebellion. The men of the remaining sixteen Interestingly enough, Peter was forced from the
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 13

cavalry expressed the abhorrence of the petty

nobility for service under foreigners. The deti
boyarskie were guaranteed against such an affront
by being formed into regiments of dragoons,
officered and manned almost exclusively by
people of their own kind.
The establishment of the new regular army
comprised the two veteran regiments of
Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii, twenty-seven,
mostly newly raised, 'soldier'regiments of infantry,
and the two new regiments of dragoons, making a
paper total of about 32,000 men. In fact, the
complements of the infantry regiments fell very
far short of the target of 1,100 each, and the
officers and men alike were direly inexperienced.
It is easy to imagine the scenes of disorder as the
few veteran officers and NCOs assembled the
hordes of muzhiks at Preobrazhenskoe, depriving
them of their comfortable baggy clothes, and their
beards and flowing locks, and arraying them in the
unfamiliar 'German' gear of tricorn hat, green
coat, cross-belt and cartridge pouch, breeches,
gaiters and stiff black shoes.
The process took place without the help of
Peter's early mentors, the trusty Lefort and the
beloved Gordon, both of whom were dead by
3 Fusilier of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment, 1700. Fortunately, some basic written guidance
1700-2. Green coat with red cuffs, buttonholes was at hand. The essentials of Western practice
and lining; red breeches, light green gaiters or were transmitted through the agency of the young
stockings; hat with silver lace (Viskovatov, Adam Adamovich Weide (1671 or 1677-1720),
1844-56) who was to become one of the most valued of
Peter's servants. Weide was born in Moscow of
outset to make a number of concessions to Russian German parents who had settled in Russia. He was
ways and conditions. By raising conscripts, as well originally intended for a medical career, but he
as volunteers, he harked back to the levies of the opted instead for the military life. He was sent
old Muscovite host, if not to the Tartar way of abroad as a major to observe the newest military
doing things. This measure was aimed especially at developments, and was fortunate enough to serve
sweeping up some of the vast numbers of feudal as an aide-de-camp to Prince Eugene in the cam-
servants and hangers-on, who were to be recruited paign of Zenta in 1697. Weide returned to Russia
from clerical landlords at the rate of one man in time to advise on the formation of the new
from every twenty-five households, and from the army, and to be captured in the disastrous battle
men of the secular lords at the rate of one from of Narva. Peter ransomed this useful fellow in
every thirty to fifty households. General Weide 1710, and over the following years made him field-
saw to the recruitment of these people at Moscow, marshal and the Second President of the War
and Prince Repnin did the same in the little towns College. Weide expired in 1720 'very much
to the south and east. regretted by both their majesties, and by all ranks
Likewise, the character of the new regular of people; but more particularly by the army, who
 Peter I, 'the Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 14

adored him, notwithstanding his strict discipline' despotic will of their sovereign, however bizarre
(Bruce, 1782, 204). and unjust it might be'. Peasants found themselves
Of more immediate relevance for our theme banished from their families for years or life, while
were the regulations of 1698, in which Weide the comfortable old nobility could not understand
summed up for a Russian audience what he had why the tsar wanted to meddle with ways that had
learned in Austria and elsewhere. The first section served Russia perfectly well in the past. They bore
emphasised the importance of regular armies, no grudge against the Swedes or anybody else, and
which depended on sound rules and assiduous by the same token they were reasonably sure that
training to gain their victories. Weide then showed nobody else had a quarrel to pick with them, as
how armies were organised in the West. He took long as Russia minded its own business. 'But now
nothing for granted among his readership, and , we will have to abandon any such thoughts of
carefully explained that modern armies were repose, now that foreigners have imbued our
'organised into various subdivisions, namely sovereign with the principle that the army must be
companies, battalions, regiments and brigades', kept perpetually on foot in peacetime as well as
and that such armies were essentially made up of war' (Mediger, 1952, 110-12).
'infantry and cavalry'. Next came an elucidation of The one Russian to respond with public
the hierarchy of Western ranks, and Weide finished enthusiasm for the new order was I. T. Pososhkov,
with a section on tactical formations. Peter in his essay On the Conduct of the Army (O
reviewed the document with care, if he did not Ratnom Povedenii) of 1701. He wrote scathingly
actually re-write some of it himself, and one of the about the shortcomings of the feudal host, but he
passages certainly expresses a sentiment which he suggested that the boyars and other folk might be
made his own: 'The term "soldier" applies to tempted into the service if skill at horsemanship
everyone who belongs to the army, from the were properly rewarded.
highest general to the last man.' Weide's work was Foreigners were never in any doubt that the
circulated in the army in manuscript form, and emergence of the new force was a matter of
officers were expected to copy sections into their moment. The Swedes rightly saw the army as a
individual 'military books'. direct threat to themselves, while the Austrian
Further information was available from the pen ambassador reported that Peter was making ready
of A. M. Golovin, who was another of the 'divi- sixty or even eighty regiments, each with a com-
sional' commanders of 1699-1700, directly con- plement of 1,000 men. This exaggeration was
cerned with the formation of the regular army. In testimony to his concern, if not the accuracy of
his Military Articles ( Voinskie Artikuly), published his arithmetic.
in March 1700, Golovin went into some detail
about the formations and tactics of infantry, but
since neither he nor Weide had much to say about Debacle at Narva, 1700
the formation of raw troops, the best of their
teachings were incorporated with the current Peter was putting his army together with all the
experience of training the army into a comprehen- more urgency because a concatenation of circum-
sive Short Standard Instruction (Kratkoe stances seemed to present him with the oppor-
Obyknovennoe Uchenie) for infantry regiments, tunity of doing something spectacular and advan-
which held good until 1708. tageous on the northern theatre. The Baltic princes
Many years later the Prussian diplomat resented the pre-eminence of the Swedes, who by a
Vockerodt tried to bring home to his Crown Prince long process of conquest in the seventeenth
Frederick (later 'the Great') something of the century had wrested large pieces of territory from
impact of Peter's new army upon Russian society, their neighbours — Scania from the Danes on the
which saw the regular troops as so many shackles great Scandinavian peninsula, western Pomerania
'placing them without defence at the mercy of the with the mouth of the Oder in north Germany,
 Peter I, ' t h e G r e a t ' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 15

and, of more immediate moment to Russia, the buffoon.

Karelia and Ingria at the eastern end of the Gulf of All the same we have good reason to call Peter
Finland, and Estonia and Livonia on the southern 'the Great', when we deny the title to Louis XIV.
shores. These last acquisitions cut off Muscovy The magnitude of his achievement is undiminished,
from the sea and deprived it of direct access to even when we call to mind the creative ferment of
northern Europe. Muscovy earlier in the seventeenth century. More
Towards the end of the seventeenth century, a impressive still is the total lack of vanity and self-
refugee Livonian nobleman, Johann Patkul, seeking. His monuments and statues are the work
stimulated the Baltic powers into positive measures of his successors, not of himself. Even his great
to put an end to this unsatisfactory state of affairs. ferocity was probably a necessary measure of
The first of Patkul's converts was the massive state, in the context of the goals which he had set
figure of Augustus, who ruled the north-east before himself. 'We must establish a distinction
German state of Saxony as elector, and the semi- between bourgeois virtues, and the necessary
anarchical state of Poland as King Augustus II. attributes of sovereign lords and the leading men
Augustus found little difficulty in winning over in cabinet and in the field. What could have been
the Danes, who had some very old scores to settle achieved by gentleness and goodness alone?'
with the Swedes, and he sent General ICarlovich to (Helbig, 1917, 19).
Peter to outline the advantages of joint action. With so many attendant circumstances that
Peter fell in quickly with the scheme and promised were fresh and promising — the approach of the
his support, asking only for time to make an new century, and the advent of the new regular
accommodation with the Turks (which he actually Russian army to Western warfare — the near-
reached in July 1700). Nobody expected very catastrophic failure of the Baltic campaign of 1700
serious opposition from the object of all these was to prove all the more painful.
calculations. Sweden's great days seemed to lie in On 9 August 1700 the Russians declared war on
the past; its present ruler was the eighteen-year-old Sweden. By that time the basis of the joint plan of
lad, King Charles XII, who was notorious for his operations had already been overset. Exploiting
irresponsible and sadistic ways. the advantages of seaborne mobility and his
It is perhaps timely to take brief stock of central strategic position, Charles XII of Sweden
Russia's own young ruler, who was about to push had descended on Denmark with a small elite
his country on to the wider stage of European army, and almost simultaneously with the Russian
events. So much about the man called to mind not declaration, he forced the Danes to abandon the
just the appalling experiences of his youth, but the alliance. King Augustus and his Saxons worked
stirrings of his nation as a whole, emerging as if almost as feebly as the Danes, and they committed
from a long sleep like the giant of Lermontov's themselves to a half-hearted siege of Riga, the
poem. This latent strength lay at the command of fortress-capital of Livonia. All of this left Peter, at
a variety of alarming and unpredictable impulses. the eastern end of the Baltic, as the sole immediate
There was the drive of curiosity, which produced a target for the Swedes and their energetic king.
navy from the sight of the boat in the old store- Peter's own objective was the strong new
house, or created the persona of Peter the savant, Swedish fortress of Narva, which stood on a little
directing a correspondence with Leibniz on the river a dozen miles from the Gulf of Finland in
• origins of the Russian nation. There .was the Swedish Estonia. The Russian contingents were
demand for physical action, expressed in the image pushed forward with some difficulty from
of the 'worker-tsar' and 'skipper Peter', or in the Novgorod and Pskov, but by the middle of October
shocking personal brutalities. There were the Narva was surrounded by a mass of 34,000 men —
lingering insecurities, which had the power to regiments of the new formation, Streltsy and
reduce the despotic master to a state of shrieking noble cavalry.
panic. There was Peter the emperor, and Peter Two prominent Westerners were borrowed for
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 16

the occasion. The veteran Due de Croy came from beleaguered Narva. Peter now found that all sorts
the Emperor of Austria to act as field commander, of urgent business demanded his presence else-
while King Augustus sent Lieutenant-General where, and he made off early on 19 November,
Hallart to supervise the technical side of the leaving everything in the hands of de Croy. By the
operation. In the event, the siege artillery per- rules of war, the tiny Swedish army of about
formed badly, while the covering army was strung 11,000 men should now have approached the
out in the narrow space between two lines of Russians with some circumspection, and settled
earthworks, lacking alike in depth for manoeuvre into a fortified camp of their own. Instead, eight
and in co-ordination along its length. hours after Peter's departure, the Swedes emerged
Peter sensed that the doom of the Russians was from the woods, and without checking their stride
pronounced when Charles landed with his army at they broke into the Russian entrenchments in two
Pernau, and moved rapidly to the relief of columns.
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 17

The feudal cavalry on the Russian left fled in The defeat certainly had the negative advantage of
the snowy tracks of their leader, Boris Sheremetev, 'clearing the ground for rebuilding on new founda-
and before long they were spilling into the black tions. In terms of crude numbers, the 34,000-odd
waters of the river Narova. The corresponding troops who were available in October 1700 had
heroes on the right, or northern, flank stampeded approximately doubled by January the next year.
towards the Kamperholm bridge, which broke The recruiting system was reorganised in 1705
under their weight. The remaining divisions were (see p. 38), and two years later Peter had a total
forced to surrender one by one. The Swedes of about 200,000 men under arms.
relieved them of their weapons and their senior Some of the hardest work was put in by Prince
officers and then, as an ultimate insult, left the Boris Golitsyn, who had the job of creating
rank-and-file free to go back home. dragoons (the sole category of Peter's regular
Possibly' as many as 8,000 Russian regular cavalry) from an unresolved mass of 27,326 men.
troops were killed or wounded in the battle, in The first of the new regiments seem to have
addition to the drowned feudal cavalry and untold reached Sheremetev at Pskov in the spring of
members of canaille. The entire artillery, consist- 1701, and every year saw the formation of fresh
ing of 145 cannon and thirty-two mortars and units. Twelve regiments were set up in the period
howitzers, was abandoned to the Swedes, who 1705-7 alone. The noble character of the dragoons
themselves lost a mere 2,000 men. The Russian was already being diluted, and 'if we may form an
high command had disappeared, and Peter was so estimate from these fellows from the rash audacity
short of officers that he had to promote of their crimes, they are fitter for robbery than for
Sheremetev to field-marshal (only the second of rightful war' (Korb, 1863, II, 142-3). The last
this rank in the army to date), and entrust him unflattering sentiment comes from the Austrian
with guarding the border. secretary of legation, Johann-Georg Korb, who in
1700 published the first account of the new army
to reach the Western world. Peter tried in vain to
The restoration of Russian striking-power, 1701-7
track down and destroy every copy.
The artillery was another arm which had been
Long afterwards Peter wrote:
wiped out at Narva. The aged Andrei Vinius, the
The Swedes certainly beat us at Narva, but you Director of Posts, was commissioned to confiscate
have to ask yourself what kind of an army they bells from churches and monasteries, for the sake
overcame. There was just one veteran regiment, of the metal, and compel the town artisans to
that of Lefort. The two regiments of the Guard make the necessary gun carriages. His authority
had been in two attacks on Narva town, but they was backed by all the force of the Muscovite
had never fought a battle in the open field, let despotism, and in the early spring of 1701 the first
alone one against a regular army. In the rest of the batch of gleaming new ordnance was sent to
regiments, a few colonels excepted, officers and Sheremetev, in the form of 243 cannon, thirteen
men alike were the merest recruits. Is it therefore howitzers and twelve mortars. Hundreds more
surprising that such an army as the Swedish, pieces were produced by November, when Vinius
veteran, trained and experienced, should have reported that 'never before has such a quantity of
attained a victory over such an unskilful force as artillery been cast in such a short time and by such
ours? It is true that at the time the defeat "experts" ' (Korb, 1863, II, 75).
constituted a heavy blow — a desperate setback It proved easier to replace the vanished hard-
to our hopes that was ascribed to the anger of ware than to find good people to direct the
God. Now, however, when we look back on the artillery. Until then, nearly all the senior gunner
affair, we must confess that it was a sign of the officers had been foreigners, lent by other states
grace of God, not His disfavour, (Beskrovnyi, 'as a proof of amity' (Korb, 1863, II, 144). Vinius
1958,43-4) was too old, too corrupt and too limited to take
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 18

vehicles — a principle that was not taken up in a

country like France until as late as 1732. On the
organisational side, Bruce arranged the field
personnel into an artillery regiment, which first
appeared in the lists in 1702, and which received
a firm establishment in 1712 in the form of twelve
companies of gunners and one of bombardiers.
A generation later, Manstein emphasised the
debt which the Russians still owed to the work of
Bruce:
I confidently assert that the Russian artillery is in
such good order, and so well served, that I truly
believe that there is no other which is its equal,
let alone its superior. It is . . . the one branch of
the military art to which the Russians apply
themselves industriously, and in which they have
able native-born officers. (Manstein, 1860, II,
368-9)
Peter turned to another of his 'Scotsmen' for
advice on how to give some shape to the army as a
whole. This was the ex-Austrian Lieutenant-
General G. B. Ogilvy, who entered the Russian
service at the age of sixty on 14 November 1702.
4 James Bruce, creator of the modern Russian After a study of Russian conditions, he approached
artillery Peter in 1705 (some say 1704) with a thirteen-
article Plan and Arrangement for the Army
over the superior direction, and Peter instead According to Foreign Practice. Peter accepted the
placed all his trust in Major-General James Bruce. principle of organising the standard infantry
This excellent man was born in 1670, and repre- regiment as a unit of about 1,400 officers and
sented the third generation of his Scottish family men, arranged in two battalions. The correspond-
to live in Russia. He had served in the two Azov ing organisation for the dragoon regiment became
campaigns, and accompanied Peter on his Western one of six squadrons of two companies each. The
tour, when he took the opportunity to study the tsar, however, decided that Ogilvy's proposals for
process of artillery manufacture at Woolwich the size of the army were too modest, and settled
Arsenal. on an establishment of two regiments of Guards,
Bruce was in every sense a member of the wider forty-seven of line infantry, five of elite grenadiers,
European scientific community, and he brought thirty-three of dragoons and one of artillery. It
his knowledge to bear on the technical improve- was vital to have some bearings of this kind during
ment of the Russian ordnance. In 1705, for those years, when so many regiments were being
example, he adopted as the basis of his calcula- formed and re-formed, or simply extinguished in
tions the scala, or system of measurements, which combat. Peter would probably have been well
had been devised by the Nuremberg mechanic advised to put the individual regiments on a larger
Hartmann in 1540. He was able to reduce the establishment as well, bearing in mind the heavy
weight of the 12-pounder field gun from 112 puds attrition of manpower in the Russian service
to thirty, and together with Peter he worked out (see p. 235).
accurate plans for all the gun carriages and artillery There remained the problem of acquiring
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 19

combat experience in the field. In retrospect, one others, was glad to have six years respite in which
of the central themes of the Great Northern War to marshal his forces. He fed his armies cautiously
might appear to be a personal duel between the into his chosen theatre of war in the Baltic pro-
tigerish young kings, Peter and Charles, which vinces, whenever possible giving battle only when
culminated in the campaign and battle of Poltava. the odds were overwhelmingly on the Russian side,
In fact, the activity of the two parties was not and all the time learning by experience and training
congruent. Charles, the active army leader, spent the army accordingly.
most of the period chasing the Saxons around Field-Marshal Boris Petrovich Sheremetev
central Europe, and paid little heed to the doings (1652-1710) proved to be a steady and brave
of the Russians in the eastern backwaters of the commander, after his lapse from grace at Narva,
Baltic. He had let the Russians go, when they and with his superior forces he beat the Swedes at
stood at his mercy at Narva, and, like the Israelis »I
Eristfer on 30 December 1701, and again at
after their comparable victory in 1967, he was Hummelshof on 17 July the next year. The open
suffering from the affliction of 'wanton conceit'. country and little towns of Livonia now stood at
Peter, who excelled at organising the work of the mercy of the Russians, who devastated them
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 20

in a systematic fashion. Among the desirable items and given a Dutch name, Petersburg symbolised
which Sheremetev carried away from Marienburg the coming to Muscovy of the bleak Baltic ethos
was the seventeen-year-old girl, Catherine of administrative efficiency and military discipline
Skavronska, who was to become the wife of Peter which had dominated much of Germanic
and ultimately the Empress Catherine I. Protestantism' (Billington, 1966, 114).
Sheremetev was now ordered to move into the 1704 was a year of sieges, designed to crack
northerly province of Ingria, and concentrate his open the major Swedish fortresses in the country
30,000 men against the little fortress of Noteborg, to the south of the Gulf of Finland. Dorpat was
which stood on an island just where the waters of stormed on the night of 12-13 July, and ill-famed
the River Neva left Lake Ladoga on their way to Narva received the same treatment on the after-
the Gulf of ^Finland. The place was taken by storm noon of 9 August. However, the Russians enjoyed
on the night of 10-11 October 1702, and this less success when they began to intervene in the
conquest became: main theatre of war. A large Swedish garrison was
entrenched impregnably in the great fortress-port
of the greatest importance for operations against
of Riga, and in the early months of 1706 the
the Swedes, opening as it did the avenue to the
Russians were lucky to escape intact into the
Neva and the Baltic, and serving as the centre of
Ukraine, after the main Swedish army hounded
the strategic communications for both the right
them from Poland. Now that his rear seemed to
and left shores of the Gulf of Finland, as an
be free, Charles turned back west to settle accounts
alternative to the uncertainties of the sea route.
with Augustus, leaving behind a command of just
For these reasons Peter called the place
8,000 troops to confront the Russians.
'Schlusselburg', signifying 'key to the sea', and
At the bidding of Peter, an independent corps
after he surrounded it with new earthen
under the command of Aleksandr Menshikov
fortifications he returned to Moscow.
attacked the isolated Swedes at Kalicz on 1
(Bestuzhev, 1961, 93)
October 1706. At the end of three hours' fighting
The slow workings of Peter's cumulative the Swedish general, Mardefeld, was in Russian
strategy gave him the whole of the course of the hands, together with 1,760 of his men. This was
Neva and the neighbouring southern shore of the the most convincing victory so far attained over
Gulf of Finland in the course of 1703. The the Swedes in the open field, and the first combat
Russians had now completely secured the eastern in which the Russian dragoons had operated to
end of the Gulf of Finland, and Sweden's Baltic good effect, charging home with cold steel instead
empire was cut in two. of popping off with their firearms. It was all the
These acquisitions gave Peter the impetus to more galling to learn that Augustus of Saxony had
move his capital away from Moscow, so hope- already come to terms with the Swedes, and that
lessly sunk in the ways of the past, and plant it all the good work had gone for nothing. The
instead on the woody and marshy islands at the humiliating Treaty of Altranstadt was made public
estuary of the Neva. 16 May 1703 saw the laying in November. Augustus renounced the alliance and
of the foundations of a guardian fortress on his claim to the Polish throne, and he delivered up
Yanni-Saari (Hare Island). The work was called Patkul, the author of the coalition, to the savage
the Petropavlovsk Fortress, and was carried out at retribution of the Swedes.
first in timber, and then' in more permanent style
in bricks of a startling orange-red. The growing
settlement round about was given the name of The way to Poltava, 1707-9
'Sank.t Piter Burk', and the creation of this new
city helped powerfully to advance Russia into the For a time the whole gallant enterprise of a
ranks of European powers. 'Built with ruthless modernised Russia stood within measurable
symmetry on the side of an old Swedish fortress distance of the abyss, now that the Saxons were
Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 21
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 22

knocked out of the alliance, and the Russians were an easy crossing of the Berezina, and he pushed on
left to face the Swedes alone, very much as had through sodden woods in search of the Russian
happened in 1700, the terrible year of Narva. army. Peter at this time was still far to the north,
Peter's infantry were in a passable state, but the where he had expected the main Swedish attack,
dragoons were badly commanded and under- and the job of guarding the direct route to
strength. At home the population was groaning Moscow was left in the hands of Menshikov and
under the full weight of the new taxes and the new Sheremetev, who commanded the principal army
recruiting system, and armed rebellions were of 38,000 men. These were strung out east of
breaking out among the peoples of the Volga and Holovzin along more than six miles of the east
the Don. Worst of all, the able Hetman Mazeppa bank of the marshy little river Babich. The articu-
was secretly making plans to throw the support of lation of the line of battle was not a whit better
the Dnieper Cossacks behind the Swedes. than it had been at Narva, and Prince Repnin's
As he waited for the Swedes to erupt from division, in the centre, was separated by boggy
Saxony, Peter disposed his forces as best he could ground from Sheremetev's division to the right,
to cover both Moscow and St Petersburg. In and from the cavalry division of Lieutenant-
general terms, the strategy for the defence of General Goltz to the left.
Russia was worked out in the early months of In the event the Russians fought like men
1707. Peter and his councils of war did not need paralysed, except when it came to retrograde
much persuading to adopt the principle 'not to movement. Early on the morning of 3 July the
give battle in Poland, for if we suffer a reverse in Swedes waded the river under cover of a most
such an action, it would be difficult to retreat' effective cannonade, and engaged the Russian
(Beskrovnyi, 1958, 198). This was a helpful centre and left in a lively combat. By seven in the
suggestion of Sheremetev's. With a stand-up battle morning Repnin had lost control of his troops,
therefore ruled out, the Russians sought instead who had exhausted their ammunition and were
'to exhaust the enemy by denuding the country of falling back in some confusion, and he looked in
provisions and fodder' (Meshcheryakov, in vain for support from his left, where Goltz's
Beskrovnyi, 1969,101). troopers were fighting a series of private battles
Charles too was making his preparations. At with the Swedish cavalry under Rehnskold.
this stage his plan already diverged somewhat Repnin lost ten guns and more than 700 men, and
from the Russian expectations, for he seems to with the collapse of the centre the entire army
have intended to make his main effort not on the made off into the marshes and woods.
northern flank against St Petersburg, but straight The combat at Holovzin forced Peter to re-
through the centre towards the ancient capital of examine the state of tactical preparedness of his
Moscow. Forty-four thousand fine troops were to army. Over the years, the articles of Weide and
be devoted to the principal thrust, while Adam Golovin had been followed by a series of detailed
Lewenhaupt was to hold himself in readiness instructions, relating to the execution of drill
to move down from the Baltic in support. movements, and the responsibilities of officers.
Lewenhaupt had 12,500 men under his command, What was still lacking was a tactical overview,
and it was hoped that the supply train that he showing how each formation and arm could make
brought with him would keep the main army the most effective contribution to the fighting
amply provided, even if the Russians were ruthless of an action as a whole. This was now supplied by
enough to lay waste their own countryside. the Rules of Combat (Pravila Srazheniya, Peter the
In January 1708 a first, short bound brought Great, 1887-1975, vol. VIII, pt 1, 7-13), a docu-
Charles XII and the advance guard of his army to ment which reveals in almost every paragraph the
the Niemen at Grodno, compelling Peter to painful lessons of Holovzin, and gives the mislead-
scamper off in some haste. Charles was on the ing impression that Peter had been present in
move again in June. By speed and fraud he effected person on the unfortunate 3 July.
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 2 3

The first three paragraphs were concerned with Russian attack early on 29 August. The marshy
the means of nullifying or carrying off the enemy terrain prevented all the Russian detachments
artillery, which had worked such execution in the from arriving on the scene, but M. M. Golitsyn was
early stages at Holovzin. The Rules then proceed able to commit eight battalions to the action, and
to the main battle: push the Swedes back to the support of their main
army.
The infantry must not fire too often, and when
The encounter at Dobroe was more important
they do fire they must aim low . . . also they must
for what it signified than for what it achieved.
not jump to the conclusion that everything is
Peter wrote: 'Since I first entered military service,
lost, when the cavalry are separated from them;
I have never seen or heard of our soldiers having
on the contrary, they must offer a steadfast
.kept up such a heavy fire, or maintained such
resistance, so as to give time for the cavalry to
order in their operations' (Peter the Great, 1887-
join up again (point 4).
1975, vol. VIII, pt 1, 111). Peter's assessment
This was founded on the experience of Repnin's was realistic and balanced, as always, and it was
division. The next four articles relate just as clearly supported by the testimony of an Englishman in
to the loss of discipline among Goltz's horse: 'Our the enemy army:
cavalry must not go straight out and chase the
'tis true their [Russian] cavalry is not able to cope
enemy over a long distance, after defeating them.
with ours, but their infantry stand their ground
Instead they must assemble instantly by squadrons
obstinately, and 'tis a difficult matter to separate
in good order, and await the instructions of their
them or bring them into confusion if they be not
commanders (point 5).'
attacked sword in hand; nevertheless 'tis most
One of the articles (point 12) was devoted to
probable they will not hazard a battle with us,
the management of the heavy field artillery (the
but endeavour by surprises and by cutting off
6- and 12-pounders), which were to be sited on
of our provisions to moulder away our army. -5
elevations, and change position from time to time.
(Hatton, 1968, 266)
Two further articles (9 and 12) sharply reminded
the generals that, 'it is essential to observe mutual This was probably the first time the new Russian
support, so that if the enemy attacks one wing, army had come off better in a comparison with a
the other will take him in the rear or flank. . . . Western one.
None of the generals are to leave the field of battle The campaign of Poltava is famous as one of
until they receive an order to that effect from the classic invasions of Russia, and it highlights
their commander.' some of the salient features of warfare in that vast
It was not very long before the chastened land. Given the great depth and breadth of the
Russian troops were put to the test. Still hesitating theatre, and the shortness of the campaigning
a while at the gateway to Russia, Charles rested his season, the invader's choice of direction has
army at Mogilev on the Dnieper, then crossed to always been of absolutely crucial importance, for
the east bank between 4 and 8 August 1708. The once an army or corps has been committed along
bluecoats hung around on the far side, waiting for a particular avenue, it can be retrieved only with
Lewenhaupt to drop down from Livonia with his difficulty for other purposes before the end of
train of supplies, which before long might be the campaign. (Hence the German failures before
urgently needed in view of the way the Russians Moscow and ? Stalingrad in 1941 and 1942, when
were devastating the countryside. the armoured spearheads of Guderian and Hoth
For only the second time in the campaign to were diverted to the southern flanks.) Thus
date, the Russians took the initiative. The objec- Charles XII made a fateful decision in the middle
tive in this case was a little Swedish division of September 1708, when he renounced the direct
standing in an isolated position at Dobroe on the route eastwards to Moscow, with its endless
Chernaya Napa, which came under a heavy prospect of burning villages, and instead turned
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 24

his army south-east. He aimed first to reach the mother of Poltava' (Beskrovnyi, 'Strategiya i
Moscow by way of the untouched province of Taktika', in Beskrovnyi, 1959a, 39).
Severia, but after the Russians reached Pochep and In the winter and spring of 1708-9 the most
Starodub before him he plunged on in the direc- important campaign in Russian eighteenth-century
tion of the Ukraine, there to join forces with the history congealed into a struggle for strongpoints
Dnieper Cossacks under the hetman Mazeppa, and and supplies in the Ukraine, as Peter sought to
recruit his strength amid relative abundance for a hem in the 30,000-odd Swedes and 8,000 Dnieper
fresh advance on Moscow in 1709. Cossacks by a strategic blockade, while Charles
Later in Russian campaigning seasons, a vital tried to create a base for an advance northwards
significance is liable to be attached to some on Moscow in the following summer. Towards the
apparently insignificant encounter, if it happens end of April 1709 the Swedes clapped a siege on
to affect the reinforcement or supply of the Poltava, a little fortress standing on the Vorskla,
invading army, operating at such a distance from and a place which, in Swedish hands, would give
its homeland. This was why the little battle of Charles a covered communication back through
Maloyaroslavets in 1812, which forced Napoleon Cossack territory to the Crimea, and an avenue by
back along the exhausted route that he had way of Kharkov and Kursk to the prize of
followed on the outward journey, decided much Moscow.
more than the vast bloodletting of Borodino The siege of Poltava was crude and prolonged,
beforehand. In the same way, a great deal hung in and the delay imposed on the Swedes allowed the
1708 upon the fate of Lewenhaupt's corps, Russians to build up their forces in the offing, and
struggling through muddy roads to join Charles in meditate how best to bring relief to the beleaguered
southern Russia. Lewenhaupt's supply train did fortress, which lay on the far, or western, side of
not matter quite so much as before, since the main the Vorskla. Peter arrived on the scene on 9 June,
army was heading for the fertile Ukraine, but and for the first time in his career he took personal
Charles stood in desperate need of the reinforce- command of the main Russian army. On 16 June
ment of 12,500 men, to add to his own depleted he called together a council of war, which decided
force, which had sunk to 25,000. to 'cross the river and, with the help of God, seek
Now that the Swedish intentions were declaring our luck in combat with the enemy' (Peter the
themselves more clearly, Peter sent Sheremetev Great, 1887-1975, vol. IX, pt 1, 215). The main
with the main army to dog Charles on a parallel force duly effected the passage of the Vorskla just
course, to prevent him breaking through to the over six miles north of the fortress.
Kaluga road by way of Bryansk. Peter himself held It is evident that we are dealing with a new
back a 'flying corps' of 11,625 men and thirty style in Russian warfare, and that after all the
guns, as a personal weapon with which to destroy years of humiliation and preparation Peter was at
Lewenhaupt before he could join Charles. last willing to stake everything on a confrontation
Peter caught up with Lewenhaupt as he was between the two hostile armies. Certainly the odds
making for a crossing of the River Sozh, and were stacked heavily on his side. He now had
mauled him so badly at Lesnaya (28 September under his command a markedly superior force of
1708) and over the following days that the Swede 45,000 men and a mass of 102 guns. The Swedes,
was left with just 7,000 combatants to bring to on the other hand, were even worse off than their
Charles. The events at Lesnaya not only had an numbers might suggest. Many of their forces were
important strategic dimension, but actually tied down in the siege of Poltava, leaving them
signified a Russian success over superior forces, with only 24,000 or 25,000 troops free to give
which was a novelty to Peter's army. 'This may be battle. They were short of powder (the reports
termed our first victory, for never before have we of their undercharged muskets sounded like the
overcome a regular force . . . it was the first test of slapping of gloves), and their leader King Charles
our army, and greatly encouraged the men; it was had been wounded on 16 June, and had to be
 P e t e r I, ' t h e G r e a t ' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 2 5

QLTAVA, 27 June 17

O N E MILE • R U S S I A N S

l- •'•••'! = S W E D E S

Final Swedish

attack

carried around on a litter. movement (something lacking in their positions to

The first fortified camp of the Russians on the date), and the means of breaking up a Swedish
west bank of the Vorskla was in the nature of a attack before it could reach the main position.
bridgehead to their crossing point. From here Charles made up his mind to attack before the
Peter moved south on 25 June as close as he dared balance of forces swung still more to his dis-
to the Swedish positions before Poltava, and advantage. At two in the morning of 27 June 1709
planted himself three miles north of the town. Menshikov's dragoons detected the Swedes moving
The earthworks of the new camp were almost to the assault from the south-west.
complete by the morning of the 26th, and they In broad outline the subsequent battle may be
represented a marvel of military engineering. The divided into two phases. The first began at about
main position was roomy and well-sited, and gaps three in the morning, and ultimately carried the
were left in the fortifications to permit the launch- Swedes to the ditch of the Russian camp, with
ing of counter-attacks. In front, the only avenue their forces disrupted and heavily depleted. There
of approach was obstructed by an inverted 'T' of was a lull as the Swedes gathered their forces for a
redoubts (self-contained strongpoints). Altogether final attack, and they were astonished to see the
the Russians had both security and freedom of Russians winding out of their camp to give battle
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 26

in the open field. The Russians still had things well keep in Russia by teaching music, the dance,
in hand (which would have seemed incredible in languages and other accomplishments. They
their earlier battles), and Peter arranged his army earned respect through their quiet industry, and
in two lines in front of the position. brought the first knowledge of western manners to
The single weak line of Swedes moved forward many noble households.
some time after nine in the morning, and the On a wider theatre the stupendous victory of
challenge was answered by a corresponding advance Poltava helped significantly to advance the end of
on the part of the Russians. The superiority of the the sequence of Baltic wars in which Russia had
Russian artillery soon made itself felt in the tussle been engaged, with some interruptions, since the
that followed, and the bluecoats were in no state 1620s. The whole of the non-Swedish north once
to withstand a final genpral advance of Peter's more sprang into life, , with Saxony-Poland,
army. The Swedes made off in the direction of Denmark, Prussia and Hanover all showing an
their baggage train, leaving behind 10,000 dead, interest in the resurrection of the old alliances.
wounded and prisoners, 137 colours and standards, Poltava had been won deep in the Ukraine, but
and four guns. Russian losses amounted to 1,345 Peter was right to remark: 'Now indeed has the
dead and 3,290 wounded, giving a total butcher's foundation stone of St. Petersburg been laid'
bill of 4,635. (Peter the Great, 1887-1975, Vol. IX, pt. 1, 231).
Charles and a small knot of followers got across
the Dnieper and Bug into Turkish territory, not to
re-appear on the northern theatre of war until First exploitation, 1709-10
1714. On 30 June Menshikov overhauled
Lewenhaupt and the rest at Perevolochna on the The prosecution of the war against Sweden was
Dnieper, and bluffed him into surrendering his now essentially the affair of the siege trains and
entire force of 16,254 men, with twenty-eight the fleet. The field armies merely stood at hand to
guns and 142 colours and standards. This brought support and occupy.'After his first success in the
the total Swedish losses up to an estimated 9,234 south, Peter turned his attention to the task of
dead, 18,794 captured, thirty-two guns, 264 breaking through to the open waters of the Baltic,
colours and standards, and all the baggage, which from the first Russian holdings at the eastern end
spelt the ruin of the royal army. of the Gulf of Finland. These operations make for
In England Defoe was struck by what he saw as dull reading, but they were an important part of
a frightening combination of Peter's brutal methods the process of wearing down the considerable
and Russia's vast resources, and he maintained enemy resources which still remained on the
that there was something almost unfair about the northern theatre. 'The Swedish power was not
way the battle of Poltava had gone: 'an army of broken, and indeed could not have been broken by
veterans beaten by a mob, a crowd, a mere militia; the battle of Poltava' (Myshlaevskii, 1896, 3).
an army of the bravest fellows in the world, beaten On 13 June 1710a powerful siege train accom-
by scoundrels, old alms-women, or anything what plished the reduction of Vyborg, a Swedish strong-
you please to call them' (M. S. Anderson, 1958, point that was sited on the northern shore of the
58). The captured Swedish generals did not see Gulf within easy reach of St Petersburg, 'and so',
things in the same light. Peter invited these brave wrote Peter, 'the capture of this place has put St.
gentry to dine with him, and drank to the health Petersburg in complete security' ( S I R I O , 1878,
of 'my teachers in the art of war'. Karl Rehnskold XXV, 203-4). Nearby Kexholm also fell into
asked who these mentors were. 'It is you, gentle- Russian hands.
men', was the royal reply. 'In that case,' said On the southern shore of the Baltic, the Livonian
Rehnskold, 'the pupils have delivered a good fortress-port of Riga capitulated to Sheremetev in
return to their masters.' The Swedish officers were July, after a prolonged blockade and a short but
released on parole, and many of them earned their violent bombardment — a process typical of the
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 2 7

crude Russian siege methods. The smaller strong- crossings. In the event, Field-Marshal Sheremetev
holds of Pemau and Revel succumbed in August moved too slowly to anticipate the enemy at the
and September, which completed a useful corridor river barrier, and the Turks poured on to the north
of conquests stretching back to Ingria. bank. Peter came to join the army in person, but
Riga and Livonia were useful prizes on their he could do nothing to stay the flood of Turks
own account, since the flax, hemp and other and Tartars, who finally trapped him against the
products of the hinterland had a convenient outlet River Pruth. On 10 July the Russians beat off a
in the excellent port, and before long a timber series of fanatical assaults, but Peter was caught
town in the Muscovite style sprang up around the without hope of redemption, and two days later
walls of the old Hanseatic city. More important he was forced to make a costly peace, by which
still for our story was the fact that the acquisition he bought his army's freedom at the price of
of Livonia and nearby Estonia helped to accen- ceding Azov, Taganrog and their hinterland. Thus
tuate the Germanising tendencies within the the Russians lost the mouth of the Don and all
emerging Russian state. The Livonian and Estonian their other gains of 1699, and they were once
upper classes were Baltic Germans, lineal descen- more totally sealed off from the Black Sea. There
dants of the crusading Teutons of the middle ages, was no means of retrieving the ships at the fine
and being practical, hard-driving folk, who were new naval establishment at Taganrog, and the
given a favoured position by their new Russian craft were therefore burnt on the spot.
masters, 'they gained (out of all the foreign Russian historians like to attribute the sorry
elements) the most important role in the directing episode of the Pruth campaign to the failings of
class' (Amburger, 1966, 514). Peter's foreign officers, and they claim that he
used the opportunity to rid the army of these
alien elements. In fact there was every incentive
Misadventure on the Pruth, 1711 for foreigners to quit a service which seemed to
' have become notably hard and dangerous, and a
While matters were shaping in such an encouraging large number of officers of all ranks left the army
way in the north, Peter found himself compelled without taking the considerable back pay that was
to turn aside once more to the southern theatre, due to them. General Ginsberg went off proclaim-
where the Crimean khan and the refugee King ing that 'the Muscovite army has suffered so badly
Charles XII prevailed on the Turks to declare war that it cannot possibly be re-established for several
in 1711. years to come' (Baluze to Louis XIV, SIRIO,
Russia was still unacquainted with some funda- 1881, XXXIV, 89).
mental truths about campaigning against the Turks
(see p. 6), and Peter committed himself to a
plan of operations which in hindsight must appear Final exploitation and triumph, 1712-21
rash in the extreme. The Russian army of 44,000
men no longer took the relatively familiar route The diversion to the Pruth only served to postpone
down the south-eastern rivers, but instead executed the reckoning with the Swedes, and the new two-
a wide sweep around the western shores of the pronged advance along either side of the Baltic was
Black Sea, with the intention of raising the carried much further than in 1710. Peter put an
Christian peoples of Turkey's Danubian prin- army into the field in north Germany to aid his
cipalities. Peter did not know a great deal about Danish and Saxon allies in the work of evicting the
the theatre of war, but he trusted that the army Swedes from their holdings on the southern
would be able to find all the supplies it wanted in shores. The Swedish fortress of Stettin surrendered
the liberated lands. to the allies in September 1713, and Peter handed
Everything ultimately depended on the speed the place to the Prussians as a bribe, over the angry
with which the Russians could seize the Danube protests of the Danes. Both Prussia and Hanover
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 28

joined the alliance in 1715, but the internal ing for about six hundred miles of coastline from
dissensions remained as deep as ever, and the the inner corner of the Gulf of Finland to the
consequence was that the Russian troops were Baltic province of Livonia. The Muscovites had
actually absent when the major fortress-port of cast off the muzzle which had been clapped on
Stralsund capitulated on 12 December. Great them by the kings of Sweden, to use an image of
affront was caused by some further schemes of olden times, and the Hanoverian statesman
Peter's, when he tried to build up a power base in Joachim von Billow wrote anxiously:
the duchy of Mecklenburg, and when he urged —
for Germany and the whole Northern world,
and then arbitrarily abandoned — a grandiose plan
affairs have never looked so dangerous as at the
for the invasion of the Swedish mainland from
present time. The Russians are indeed much more
Denmark. ,
to be feared than the Turks. The Turks at least
The Russians had a much freer hand on the
remain sunk in their hoggish ignorance, and go
northern side of the Baltic, where they acted on
back home after they have ravaged abroad. The
their own account, and enjoyed all the advantages
Russians, however, grow in their knowledge and
of sea-borne mobility. They seized Helsingfors in
experience of military and international affairs
1713, which gave them an operational base half-
all the time, and actually surpass many other
way along the southern shore of Finland. In the
nations in slyness and dissimulation. (Mediger,
following year Golitsyn consolidated the earlier
1952, 58)
successes on land, while the new Russian fleet
annihilated a powerful Swedish squadron at Cape The British, quite apart from their new Hanoverian
Hango on 27 September. The victory afforded connection, were unhappy to see Peter build his
Peter every bit as much satisfaction as the triumph new fleet, and plant fortified bases at Kronstadt
of Poltava. Not only did he capture one frigate and (an island off St Petersburg) and Revel. Already in
nine galleys, but he now had strategic control of 1713 the Tory Examiner expressed the fear that
the Aland Islands and the direct sea route to the success of the Russians in the war might be
Sweden. Under the protection of the main fleet, 'the occasion of bringing down a foe upon Europe,
the Russian galley flotilla went on to raid the more formidable than the Goths and Vandals,
Swedish mainland in July 1719, and again towards their ancestors' (M. S. Anderson, 1958, 59).
the end of the year and in the early summer of On 22 September 1721, in the name of the
1720. people, the Senate offered Peter the titles of
Never before had Russian military power Father of the Fatherland, the Great, and the
reached so far to the west. Charles XII had been Emperor. Prussia and Holland recognised the
killed before the Danish fortress of Fredriksten in imperial title almost immediately, and Sweden did
Norway on 29 November 1718, which contributed the same in 1723. England and the proud
towards the general impression of Swedish power- Habsburgs finally unbent in 1743, and so did the
lessness, and the danger to the northern balance of French and Spanish in 1745. By then the Russians
power was such that the overmighty Peter was had diplomatic representation at almost every
deserted by his allies one by one. British squadrons major foreign court, and the House of Romanov
began to appear in the Baltic, but they were had renounced its custom of marrying into
unable to defend the Swedish coasts, or summon Russian noble families, and instead sought dynastic
up the resolution to attack the Russian shore matches in the West.
defences. It is not easy to assess the internal benefit to
A final raid helped to dispose the Swedes to Russia of her participation in the Great Northern
agree to terms of peace at Nystadt on 30 August War. The drive of the military machine undoubtedly
1721. The Russians evacuated nearly all Finland, advanced the Russian metal industries into a
but in return they gained Swedish recognition of leading place in Europe, and Peter was convinced
the other conquests made in the late war, extend- that he had effected a radical transformation of
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 2 9

Russia as a whole, by dint of organising institu- whether a land bridge existed between Asia and
tions and society to serve the ends of the war. the American Continent. Nearer to home, a defen-
However, the cost must seem excessive, if we sive line was built against the Crimean Tartars
once allow human happiness any weight in our across a neck of land between Pavlovsk on the
calculations. To the men lost in action we must Don and Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad, Volgograd) on the
add the untold thousands who died of disease, and Volga.
the probably still' greater numbers who were The creator of this and so much more died in
expended to build Peter's fortresses and naval his city of St Petersburg on 28 January 1725.
bases, and the huge enterprises of St Petersburg
and the Ladoga Canal, which were an essential
contribution to Russia's status as a Western power. Peter the Great and the art of war
»
Some time afterwards, Field-Marshal Miinnich
calculated that in the process there had scarcely When every allowance is made for foreign models
been a family in Russia which had not lost at least and foreign assistants, it is evident that the final
one son or brother in these years. and determining force in Peter's conduct of war
None of this deterred Peter from risking sub- came from his own intelligence and sense of
stantial forces in a new adventure, this time for purpose. Again and again in his codes we encounter
the sake of advantages which were by no means phrases like 'because I saw it in the last action',
so obvious as in the last war in the north. The indicating the extent to which hard-won experience
destination in this case was the western and went to shape the way the Russians were going
southern shore of the Caspian Sea, where the rule to fight the next battle or campaign.
of the ancient empire of Persia was weakening As the immediate threat from Sweden began to
under the impact of civil disturbances, and inter- decline, Peter meditated how to construct a more
vention by the Turks and Afghans. Peter resolved permanent framework that would support the army
to lead an army of his own to that part of the through war and peace. As early as 1712 Peter
world, and plant garrisons along the Caspian. He had started to put together a large military code
hoped thereby to divert the oriental silk trade 'to which he devoted several hours every evening',
through Russia instead of through Turkey, and and four years later there was published the great
perhaps ultimately to establish Russia as the Military Code of the Year 1716 (Ustav Voinskoi
principal intermediary for commerce between Asia 1716 goda). An historical introduction paid
and Europe. tribute to the pioneering work of Tsar Aleksei
The emperor sent a powerful flotilla and heavily Mikhailovich, while stressing how much had still
laden ammunition transports down the Volga, and remained to be done in the way of creating a
advanced by land and sea to the port of Derbent, regular army. The body of the work comprised:
which he seized on 23 August 1722. Peter returned
(i) a 'military code';
to Moscow in a state of bad health, but his sub-
(ii) a set of 'military articles and processes';
ordinates completed the work of conquest by
(iii) a 'book of drill'.
talcing Reshut and Baku in 1723. The Russians
won the recognition of their gains from the The original manuscript was written out in German
Persians in September 1723, and again, after a and Russian versions (indeed the Russian may well
threat of war, from the Turks in June 1724. have been a translation of the former), but in spite
Russian parties had meanwhile pushed through of its misty origins the language is remarkably
southern Siberia in the teeth of opposition from clear and unambiguous, and compares favourably
the Ustyak Tartars, and planted forts along the in this respect with the kind of material that was
Irtysh, Ob and Eniseisk. Russian posts now stood later penned by Peter Shuvalov, or Emperor Paul
on the far distant Kamchatka peninsula, and Peter and his cronies.
sent Captain Behring on a voyage to discover . At the same time, the Military Code of the
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 30

Year 1716 serves to illustrate the characteristically the Great were left with a clear run of the field.
cumulative nature of Russian official military A more reflective tone was evident in Peter's
writing. It was intended to complement, not Journal or Daily Note (Zhumal Hi Podennaya
replace, the early tactical prescriptions, which Zapiska). Here Peter made a careful evaluation of
were already incorporated in the army's routine, the reasons for his early failures, and showed how
and so it has much less to say about drill than a series of small advantages culminated in the
about the details of marches, supply and everyday crowning triumph of Poltava. The Journal was not
routine of service in garrison and in the field. In published until 1771-2.
their turn, the subsequent codes of 1755 and 1763 From all of this it is possible to reconstruct
left these matters largely untouched, and so the Peter's notions on the management of his armies in
1716 code had enduring value, being reprinted some detail. Following the western European
thirteen times between its first appearance and practice, Peter recognised no permanent sub-
1826. divisions between the mass of the army as a whole,
The co-operative nature of the Petrine literary and the multitude of the individual component
oeuvre is also of some significance. Peter put his regiments. Formations like divisions and brigades
name to many memoranda and other productions were ad hoc groupings, made and re-made in the
that were plainly the work of other people, but by course of campaigns, and (in the case of divisions)
the same token he assisted fellow writers through existing in peacetime purely for administrative
his advice and criticism. His indirect contribution convenience. The Code of 1716 defined the
is particularly noticeable in the translations of division as 'an army formation, in which several
foreign works on fortifications and artillery which brigades come together under the direction of a
appear after 1706. We encounter editions of single general'. The brigade, in turn, comprised
Rimpler (1708), Braun (1709), Sturm (1709), two, three or more regiments.
Brink (1710), Borgsdorf (1710), Coehoorn (1710), Much more original was what Peter had to say
Buchner (1711) and Manesson Mallet (1713). about the kind of self-sufficient mobile formation
Peter told his translators to cut short the long- which he used to smash Lewenhaupt at Lesnaya
windedness they would find in the German texts, in 1708. He describes it as a light force,
and he kept a close eye on every stage of detached to lie at the disposal of the general,
production, so as to eliminate any ambiguities in whether to cut the enemy off, deprive them of a
the translation, and correct mistakes in the print- pass, act in their rear, or fall on their territory
ing and typefaces.
and make a diversion. Such a formation is called
The historical compilations of the period served
a 'flying corps' [korvolan], and it consists of
variously for propaganda, or Peter's self-instruc-
between six and seven thousand men. A force so
tion. The element of publicity was foremost in the
constituted can act without encumbrance in every
accounts of battles, sieges and campaigns which
direction, and send back reliable information of
first appeared in 1713 under the title of The
the enemy's doings. For these purposes we employ
Books of Mars (Knigi Marsovoi). The author was
not only the cavalry, but also the infantry, armed
M. P. Avramov, the director of the St Petersburg
with light guns, according to the circumstances
printing works. Peter's achievements as a whole
of time and place. (Code of 1716)
were glorified in Vice-Chancellor P. Shapirov's
A flying corps on the Petrine model captured
Discourse (Rassuzhdenie). The first printing of
Berlin in 1760, and these distinctive formations
1717 was succeeded by a second in 1719, and a
have reappeared in Russian strategy over the
third (to the number of 20,000) in 1722. It was
centuries.
something of a novelty for a Russian ruler to
justify his doings in this way to the public at large. Peter applied the word Generalitat* to the
Later in the century, however, Russia's case was *With the publication of the Table of Ranks it referred
specifically to the first four ranks, down to major-general
abandoned by default, and enemies like Frederick inclusive.
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 31

whole body of 184 generals, and their supporting whole platoons at a time according to the contem-
staff, and French and German terminology was in porary English and Prussian fashion. The dragoons
fact applied in transliteration throughout the were expected to master the intricacies of dis-
structure, resulting in the appearance of dignitaries mounted fire, as well as the charge with cold steel
like the Generalkvartirmeister, or the Kapitan and fire from the saddle. Peter stressed the impor-
Degidya (Capitaine des Guides). Supreme command tance of dragoon fire-power during the Turkish
was exercised by a generalissimo, or more nor- campaign of 1711, but at other times the emphasis
mally by a field-marshal. This individual was was on the attack with the sword, as at Kalicz and
responsible in one direction immediately to the Poltava, and in Menshikov's dragoon Artikul of
sovereign, and in the other to the body of his 1720.
generals assembled in council of war: 'Every After the excellent enunciation of principles in
important and weighty matter, and every enter- the Rules of Combat of 1708 (see p. 22) Peter
prise, is always to be decided with the council of was disinclined to enter into any great detail on
generals, and never at his own pleasure' (Code of the arrangement of the army in battle, for 'all of
1716). Diplomats and other civilian officials this depends on the prudence, skill and courage of
joined in the councils of war, when the delibera- the general. It is up to him to acquaint himself
tions turned on wider matters, and Peter some- with the nature of the terrain, and the strength
times submitted projects for his codes to the and methods of the enemy, and to manage his
examination of those present. Hence Russian army accordingly' (Code of 1716). He recom-
councils of war assumed a more important role mended in general terms that the army should be
than the councils in foreign armies, where they drawn up in two main lines and a reserve, with the
were a favourite resort of weak commanders. The cavalry on either flank (which approximates to the
Petrine version was designed partly to curb the conventional Western practice). The commander
arbitrary will of independently minded generals was to put the baggage in a safe place, and he
(like Ogij.vy at Grodno in 1706), and partly as a 'inspects the surrounding terrain, and the lie of the
means of educating the monarch and the senior ground, and, if it proves necessary, he arranges for
officers. the construction of redoubts and entrenchments'
A prime objective of the Code of 1716 was to (Code of 1716).
ensure that the holders of every rank were aware Peter explained that there were three methods
of their exact duties. At the lower level the regi- of moving across the theatre of war, depending on
mental hierarchy stood under a colonel, aided by a the proximity of the enemy. If there was no
lieutenant-colonel and first and second majors danger of an encounter, the army was to march by
who controlled the captains. The company officers widely separated corps, so as to alleviate the
were reminded in their turn of their responsibility burden of supply on the country. When the enemy
for the discipline and progressive training of their were in the offing, the corps were still to march in
men. A decree of 1722 told them that they must columns along separate roads, but take care to
behave like strict but kindly fathers, and 'as far as bunch together more closely so that they could
lies in their power work for the good of their concentrate when necessary. Lastly, when very
soldiers, and not just concern themselves with close to the enemy, the way ahead was to be
overloading them with unnecessary ceremonial, sounded by a powerful advance guard or force of
sentry duties and the like' (Stein, 1885, 77). massed cavalry. Peter was proud of the way he had
The stipulated tactics were of the linear kind, carried out the march through difficult terrain to
and were borrowed straight from the Western attack the Swedes at Lesnaya, and he wrote after-
practice. The original six-rank line was reduced wards to Apraksin: 'I beg you to operate not just
between 1704 and 1706 to the more handy one of in the open field but in woods as well, which can
four ranks, and the men were trained to fire in be extremely useful, as I saw myself (Peter the
mass volleys, both by individual ranks, and by Great, 1887-1975, vol. VIII, pt 1, 183).
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 32

If the army was to rest for some time in any of assistants, which by itself ensured an important
one place, it encamped in three lines in formation element of continuity. When he was absent from
of battle. Peter devoted much space to the details St Petersburg on campaign, Peter lived in simple
of routine service in these and other locations, and style, accompanied by a small Personal Field
the soldiers were to be instructed in all the minutiae Chancellery (Blizhnyaya Pokhodnaya
of sentry duty and the paying of 'compliments'. Kantselyariya), through which he exercised
All ranks were to be kept up to the mark by control of the army. Aleksandr Ivanovich
ferocious and comprehensive articles of war, which Rumyantsev (legal father of the famous Petr
made up the second section of the Code of 1716, Aleksandrovich) and other likely junior officers
and subsumed all the previous disciplinary regula- were assigned to the person of the emperor as
tions. Peter himself put together the 209 para- general-adjutants. Other folk appeared under the
graphs relating to the various punishments. Execu- odd name of 'batmen'. These were in fact a
tions were carried out through hanging and quar- collection of resourceful and nimble-witted young
tering, breaking on the wheel, burning or behead- men who were enrolled for form's sake in the
ing, and the victim might be put in the mood for Guard, and who carried out an almost infinite
the ordeal by having a red-hot iron bored through variety of tasks — galloping off with messages,
his tongue beforehand. Lesser punishments com- perhaps, reconnoitring enemy fortresses and
prised old Muscovite delights such as the knout, camps, organising the baggage, or preparing
as well as practices like running the gauntlet, confidential reports on officials. After such a
sitting astride a sharp plank (Eselsreiten), and useful grounding, a man like Vasilii Suvorov could
standing or walking on sharp stakes, which came rise in later years to the rank of generalanshef,
from the Danish or Swedish practice. while Aleksandr Buturlin became a field-marshal.
Otherwise the main external influences on Three of Peter's associates deserve special
Peter's codes stemmed from the example of the: mention. Much that was good in the reign derived
from the counsel of Prince ,Yakov Fedorovich
finest two services of the Europe of the time,
Dolgorukov (1639-1720), who had studied
namely the Austrian and the Prussian, the former
Swedish laws and institutions during eleven years
having been founded by Montecuccoli and brought
of captivity after the battle of Narva. Altogether
to perfection by Prince Eugene, and the second set
less respectable were the origins and ways of
up by the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau, who created
Prince Aleksandr Danilovich Menshikov (1673-
the Prussian army in the reign of the father of the
1728). According to a widely accepted story, he
celebrated Frederick. Peter the Great, however, as
made his public debut on the streets of Moscow,
a man of exalted intellect, was careful to select
selling the revolting Russian fish pies from a tray
only what was strictly suitable for adoption by
which he carried around on his head. Peter was
his army. He correctly appreciated that the
much the same age, and he listened with delight
climate, manners and ways of his country dictated
from his apartment windows, while Menshikov
some fundamental modifications (Vorontsov
directed telling retorts at the Streltsy who were
'Zapiski', AKV, 1870-95, X, 469-70).
trying to provoke him. Peter made him into an
intimate friend, and thereafter Menshikov's rise
paralleled that of the new Russian state. He did
Peter's military machine service in Peter's company of boy soldiers and in
the Azov campaigns, and he accompanied Peter on
It is remarkable how a person of Peter's eccentri- his journey to western Europe. In 1709, as prince
cities and animal energy was able to devise a and lieutenant-general, he contributed mightily to
military system that survived in some basics until the victory of Poltava, whereupon Peter hugged
the next century. him in front of the army, and promoted him to
On the human level, Peter made a wise choice field-marshal. Menshikov's military career was
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 3 3

(Helbig, 1917, 135). Peter sent him to France to

study at the feet of the foremost experts, and in
the course of his long career Hannibal became
generalanshef and director of the scientific
researches of the engineering corps. A Russian in
all but colour, he was a friend of Vasilii Suvorov,
and established a family which produced the poet
Pushkin as a great-grandson. Hannibal retired at
the time of the Seven Years War, and he died in
1782 at the age of ninety-two.
Hannibal and very many others helped to
ensure a living survival of Petrine tradition into the
second half of the eighteenth century. All the
same, an army cannot be run on memories alone,
and Peter's work would have gone for nothing if
he had not taken good care to collectivise and
depersonalise the direction of military affairs.
In the early years of the century the organs of
state administration still bore something of the
character of departments of the royal household.
In 1711, however, Peter set up a supreme execu-
tive organ, the Senate, which had the particular
5 Aleksandr Danilovich Menshikov responsibility of directing the war effort and
raising money when he was away on campaign.
crowned by the reduction of the fortress of The same year saw the foundation of a powerful
Stettin, and in 1714 he returned to St Petersburg reorganised Kommissariat, to manage the supplies
to begin his ascent in the administration, becoming of the army.
First President of the new War College when it was Towards the end of the Great Northern War
opened six years later. Peter went on to establish the 'collegiate' system
Menshikov was polished and hospitable to of administration, the principle upon which
foreigners, and indeed to anyone who could Russian civil and military affairs were to be run
promote his interests, but his behaviour towards for the rest of the century. The inspiration seems
people who crossed his path was coarse and to have derived variously from the councils of
vengeful in the extreme. These contradictions war (see p. 31), the advice of the German savant
contributed towards his downfall. He survived a Leibniz, and the workings of the Swedish college
first disgrace in 1724, and his power began to administration, which Dolgorukov had seen at
reach almost imperial heights under Peter's imme- first hand. However, the essential point was to run
diate successors. At last, however, his enemies bore every department like a miniature cabinet, in
him down, and he died in discredit in 1728. which authority was shared among the members
Both Menshikov and Peter had a hand in of the college. The organisation was a cumbersome
promoting the ascent of the most unlikely of all one, to be sure, but it was well suited to the Russia
the parvenus of eighteenth-century Russia. This of the time, when many of the officials were of
was the Ethiopian negro, Abraham Petrovich doubtful expertise or honesty.
Hannibal, who came to Russia as a slave. 'The The War College was entirely typical of the
young Moor had a sharp intellect, and showed a animal. The First President was duty-bound to act
great gift for acquiring knowledge of the science of in concert with a Second President, and later with
fortification. His industry was quite exceptional' one or more Vice-Presidents. The other permanent
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 34

or semi-permanent members were represented by a The new Russian army, the object of all this
lieutenant-general, a major-general, a colonel in weight of administration, was organised with a few
charge of the Secretariat, and a procurator who notable exceptions along conventional Western
kept order in the administration of the College and lines. The infantry was the heart of the force, and
at the meetings of its members, 'and if, during it was given a stable organisation in 1711, in the
their consultations, the members fall out or lose shape of two regiments of Guards (the
their tempers, the procurator bangs on the table Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii), five of elite
with his mallet and reduces them to silence' grenadiers, and thirty-five of ordinary fusiliers,
(Anon., Anecdoten . . . des Fursten Potemkin, making up a total of 52,164 combatants and
1792,37). 10,290 non-combatants. Contrary to the German
Further military men were seconded on a tem- practice, Peter deliberately fostered local loyalties
porary basis, and evdry now and then the War by endowing the regiments with the names and
College was told to set up a special ad hoc military arms of their local provinces, and not the names of
reform commission, to see to the overhaul of the their colonels.
army, such as those which came together in The dress was of a sober and surprisingly
1730-1, 1754-7, 1762 and 1763-5. The ordinary uniform character throughout the infantry, and
competence of the College was wide in any case,
and embraced the collection of the poll-tax,
promotion of all but the most senior officers, the
granting of leave, the running of courts martial,
the procurement of arms from factories, the
determining of camps, quarters and march routes,
and the forwarding of money to the army on
campaign.
The War College was formed in the years 1718
and 1719, and opened on 1 January 1720 with
Menshikov as First President. It got to work very
speedily indeed, and already on 9 February it was
able to issue a new establishment for the army, as
well as financial statements and a new code of
dress regulations. The old-fashioned surviving
departments of military administration were hard
put to it to hold their ground. Bruce reorganised
his Artillery Chancellery on collegiate lines, as the
best protection against the mighty newcomer, but
the Kommissariat was less adaptable, and in 1724
it forfeited its important food supply department.
The local administration of army affairs resided
in the hands of mixed civil and military adminis-
trations in territorial units called 'governments'.
The newly-conquered province of Ingria was
organised as such a 'government' in 1702-3, and
seven other governments were set up on the same
pattern from 1708. A rearrangement of Russia
into eleven governments followed in 1719, and 6 Grenadier, 1700-2. Green coat with red cuffs
one into five huge 'general governments' between and turn-backs; green waistcoat; green breeches;
1725 and 1727. green mitre cap (Viskovatov, 1844-56)
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 3 5

the dark green of the coat offered a marked fight equally well on horseback and on foot, and
contrast to the whites, reds or blues of the other for all their inadequacies they spared Peter from
European armies. Peter rejected the false economies total dependence for light cavalry work on the
he had observed in Prussia, and he gave his troops unreliable hussars and Cossacks.
cloaks and boots as protection against the weather. It was some compensation that the artillery was
The Russian infantry regiments retained a already showing signs of the immense power that
complement of pikes in the 1720s, as a reliable it was to develop in the Russian army (see p. 000).
short-range weapon against hordes of bloodthirsty likewise, if native Russians did not show the same
Turks. The principal arm was, however, the flint- aptitude or interest in tedious subjects like siege-
lock musket. The original Model 1700 was an odd work or permanent fortification, they became
weapon, rather heavy and short by Western masters in the art of throwing up light fortification
standards, with a large calibre (26-28.2mm), and a' on the battlefield, as they showed at Poltava and
conical constriction towards the breech — a again at Saltykov's camp at Kunersdorf fifty years
Russian peculiarity that was reproduced in the later.
artillery in the 1750s. The bayonet was of an old- Fortresses and frontiers were notorious for the
fashioned design, being a stout two-edged knife rate at which they sucked in manpower, but Peter
that was planted in the muzzle of the musket by appreciated just how many troops he was losing in
its wooden handle. In the middle of the reign the this way only in the years 1707 and 1708, when
old muskets were officially supplanted by the he was hard pressed to find the forces to put down
Model 1709, which was an up-to-date design of the rebellions of the Cossack Bulavin and the
18.5 mm (.78 inch) calibre, and weighed a toler- Bashkirs. In 1711, therefore, he founded a
able fourteen pounds. The matching bayonet was a separate Garrison Army of 58,000 men, drawn
slender triangular-sectioned sleeved weapon, also from the existing regiments on garrison duty, with
in the modern fashion. In practice the supply of the addition of invalids, veterans and spare troops
weapons from the factories was tardy and irregular, from the field army. In the 1720s the force
and for the rest of the century the Russian infantry reached a strength of more than 70,000 infantry
went to war with a variety of old and unreliable and dragoons, and in specific areas like the Baltic
muskets. provinces and the Ukraine it could be reinforced
Peter's cavalry could in no way compare in in time of war by a newly created Land Militia
quality with his sturdy, long-enduring infantry. of local levies.
The troopers on the whole were a mixed crew, We have the opportunity to deal only very
despite the noble pretensions of the arm, and they briefly with the subject of the new Russian navy,
were commanded by colonels who were notorious which was such a useful adjunct to the land army.
for their irresponsibility, greed and professional Three fleets came into being in the course of
ignorance even in the Russian army, which must Peter's wars — those of Azov, the Caspian and the
have made them very monsters of infamy by Baltic. By its nature the Baltic fleet was the one of
Western standards. To compound these fortunes, the greatest consequence. The first of all its ships
Russia was incapable of producing horses powerful was the 28-gun frigate Shtandart, which took to
enough to carry armoured cuirassiers for any the water on 22 August 1703. The first of the
distance, let alone across the vast tracts of ground corresponding ships of the line, the Poltava, was
which Russian armies had to traverse in order to launched in 1712, and by the end of the Great
reach their enemies. Peter therefore opted for the Northern War the strength of the Baltic fleet stood
type of light regular cavalry called 'dragoons', at 124 Russian-built sailing vessels, and fifty-five
which appear on the Establishment of 1711 to the craft which had been taken from the Swedes.
number of thirty-three regiments, with a nominal Peter had learnt the employment of galleys in
complement of 34,320 combatants and 33,000 his Azov campaigns, and he recognised how useful
horses. The dragoons were supposed to be able to these shallow-draft self-propelled vessels could
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 36

prove amid the islands and channels of the Baltic, isational means of tapping those resources. Peter
where they could manoeuvre in combat, carry out explored all the frustrations that lay in store for
reconnaissances and raids, bombard shore targets, Russian rulers, for he was seeking in a single
and transport troops and supplies. The coastal generation to set on foot a regular army and make
woods offered almost unlimited timber for galley his country self-sufficient in manufactures.
construction, and the handy Russian peasant- The story of the military finances is enlighten-
soldiers showed that they were able to build, row ing. Peter's work of modernisation increased about
and fight these vessels with the minimum of seven-fold the expenditure on the armed forces in
supervision. Such was the weapon which enabled his time. Thus the following figures:
Peter to carry the war to Sweden in the last years
of the Revenues Military expenditure
i . war,' which he ended with a force of 416
1680 1,500,000 roubles c.750,000 (total)
galleys. 1701 2,500,000 1,839,600 (total)
Galleys were unable to stay at sea for very long, 1710 3,133,879 2,566,324 (army)
which was one of the reasons why it was so 433,966 (fleet)
important for Peter to establish naval bases along 1724 8,546,000 4,003,348 (army)
the coasts at reasonably short stages. The seat of 1,400,000 (fleet)
Russian naval power in the Baltic was to be found
A great deal lies behind these bare and possibly
in the innermost waters of the Gulf of Finland, at
not very accurate statistics. No reliable means was
the naval base on Kronstadt Island and the
ever evolved of furnishing the army with what it
Admiralty Yard at St Petersburg. For more far-
needed in the way of pay, quarters and kind. In the
reaching operations, bases were established at
absence of barracks for all but the Guard, the
Revel and Vyborg in 1710, and along the shores of
army was scattered in peacetime in quarters among
Swedish Finland - at Helsingfors (1713), and at
the civilian population, which was common
Abo and in the Aland Islands (1714).
i practice even in the armies of the West. What was
The Russian navy was possibly the proudest of
peculiarly 'Russian', however, was the extent to
Peter's creations, but it was in every respect also
which the regiments were expected to feed and
the most perishable. The efforts were inevitably
pay themselves from their localities. This circum-
dispersed among separated seas (the bugbear of
stance, together with the cheapness of certain
Russian naval power), and the timbers of the
basic commodities, helped to eke out the state
principal concentration of vessels rotted with dis-
income.
turbing ease in the brackish waters of the Gulf of
Finland. Moreover, there was virtually no Russian Otherwise, the burden of supporting the
merchant navy which could have engendered a defence of the great empire rested on the bowed
reservoir of nautical expertise, and freed Russia shoulders of about five million taxable folk,
from a dependence on foreign naval officers. comprising the state peasants and privately-owned
serfs, and an urban population which had nearly
doubled between 1652 and 1722. These were
The material base entered first as 'households', and then for the
purposes of the new poll-tax as 'souls', but
Every now and then foreigners were reminded of throughout the reign the process of enrolment
the immense potential of the Russian empire, and was attended with extraordinary difficulties. The
of the apparently boundless writ of the sovereign, census of 1678 was wildly out of date, but no
which seemed to be able to set ordinary considera- better basis of calculations was provided by the
tions of economy at naught. It was perhaps revisions of 1715-22. All the ad ding-up was
fortunate for the West that the vastness of the land frustrated by an elusive population. Many indivi-
and its locked-in power were so exactly balanced duals had died off in the wars, which was very
by a countervailing paucity of physical and organ- annoying. Some had fled the country, or were
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 3 7

being concealed by their landlords. Others were At the beginning of the new century Peter
respectable people who objected to being embarked on a determined attempt to free himself
re-classified as peasants. from the need to import foreign weapons and
The poll-tax of the last years of the reign ammunition. He succeeded so well that by 1705
replaced the previous direct taxes, and it was he was meeting the immediate requirements for
assigned exclusively to military expenditure. The artillery, and by 1713 he was said to own a total
initial rate of eighty kopeks per annum was of no less than 13,000 pieces of ordnance of every
reduced to seventy-four in 1724, and to a final description. The Swedes were already dropping
seventy in 1725. The business of collecting the behind in the production of iron, and the British
cash was one of the forces which planted the army were soon outstripped as well, for they had
so firmly as a prop of the civilian administration. exhausted their Wealden forests, and they had yet
In the normal course of things tHe troops went out to open the coal-based industries of the North.
on expedition three times a year to beat the taxes Reckoned in puds (at forty pounds apiece), the
out of the peasants, and on occasion the visitations Russian output of iron stood at 120-130,000 in
were harsher still, as when Colonel Strogov and his 1700, rising to 1,165,000 in 1725, and about
regiment descended on the province of Velikolutsk, 5,000,000 by 1750. The manufacture of muskets
and discovered 388 men who had not been entered fell off sharply after the Great Northern War, but
in the census of 'souls': was boosted once more to meet the needs of
Empress Anna's Turkish campaigns, reaching a
He tortured and knouied a number of nobles
peak of 25,000 in 1736 and again in 1738. How-
[complained the voevoda], and one of them died.
ever, in neither quality nor quantity did the
A further seven nobles were crammed into barrels,
Russian-made muskets entirely answer the demands
and one of them was thereby crushed to death;
of the army.
seventy-one peasants and other people were
Under the impetus given by the Great Northern
likewise tortured and beaten, and one of them
War and the creation of the regular forces, centres
died; fourteen peasants and other folks were
of industrial production were expanded or created
belaboured with sticks. (Beskrovnyi, 1958, 116)
across two areas of Russia. The northern region
In the same way it was an accepted part of peace- embraced St Petersburg and its neighbourhood,
time military duty to assist in the collection of the and the shores of lakes Ladoga and Onega to the
revenues of customs and excise, to supervise the east, where production was facilitated by the ores
sale of salt and alcohol, to guard bridges, and to of Karelia and the abundant forests, and by the
patrol the streets and the countryside so as to nearness of the establishments to the theatre of
maintain order. All of Russian life was in fact war and the bases of the new navy. The southern
subjected to a high degree of authoritarian control. region was a broad one, and its plants were
Until the second half of the century men of even scattered from Moscow and the western tributaries
the highest rank had to obtain passports to travel of the Don and Volga to the Ural hills, with their
from one province to another, and Peter set an ores of copper and high-grade iron, their vast
example by having authentic papers made out for forests, and their rivers which provided power and
himself. 'Thus at this day [in the 1730s] even cheap transport. Altogether forty private and state
ambassadors, and field-marshals at the head of factories were in operation across the Urals region
their victorious armies, must have passports, and by the middle of the century, producing artillery,
consequently all inferiors must submit to the same ammunition, pig iron and some steel and copper.
regulation' (Cook, 1770,1, 20). Russia was almost entirely self-sufficient in
The development of the Russian war industry ready-made gunpowder, though some of the raw
must take some part in our story, even if the materials were obtained only with some difficulty.
details have been recounted many times in Quantities of sulphur had to be purchased abroad,
biographies of Peter and histories of his country. and in 1712 Peter ordered the governments of
 Peter I, ' t h e G r e a t ' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 38

Kazan, Azov and Kiev to increase their production powerful army of reliable troops, led by officers of
of salpetre, which was the scarcest and dearest of courage and expertise. Peter's successes and
the ingredients. failures in these last respects were to be to a
With a measure of state supervision, the great great extent the measure of Russia's military
quantity of dealers and small workshops were able performance in the eighteenth century.
to satisfy the requirement for leather for boots, Peter proceeded from drastic principles of
shoes, belts, cartridge pouches, saddles and the amazing scope, embracing nothing less than
like. The first paper mills were, however, set up compulsory lifelong service for the entire nobility,
only from 1705, and it was not until the middle of and for conscripted masses of the peasants. The
the century, when thirteen establishments were at machinery for conscription was in working order
work, that Russia was able to meet the very heavy by 20 February 1705, when on the basis of
demands of paper for the military bureaucracy and admittedly incomplete statistics the first orderly
for making up musket cartridges. levies went ahead, summoning one young man
The same held true of the supply of woollen from every twenty peasant households. In the
cloth for the uniforms, for the native textile event 44,539 men were called to the colours,
manufactures were in their infancy, except for the instead of the anticipated 40,000, which in itself
production of canvas, and the wool from the went some way to make up the total of 131,319
Russian sheep was very coarse. Britain and Holland regular levies who were raised between 1701 and
represented the chief suppliers in Peter's reign, but 1709. Recruits continued to be raised from
the Prussians took the leading place in the late households until 1724, when 'souls' became the
1720s and in the 1730s basis of calculations.
Although conscription was a striking manifesta-
after diverse attempts and stratagems, as the
tion of state power, unique in the Europe of the
making two suits of clothes as one suit of the best
time, it held elements of compromise with the old
Prussian cloth they could pick out, not wetted,
order (see p. 13). Already in December 1700
the other suit of the worst English cloth they
could find, wetted and rough dried in order to Peter had responded to noble pressure, and res-
make it look very ordinary and coarse. (C. cinded a decree of 1697, which freed voluntary
Rondeau, 7 October 1732,SIRIO, 1889, LXVI, recruits from serfdom. Military service was there-
516) fore seen by the populace as a hateful continua-
tion of subjection, with the added disadvantages of
The economic strain of the Petrine war effort a high risk of death from typhus, malaria or
was colossal, and the burden of taxation repre- wounds, and the near certainty of lifelong separa-
sented an embarrassing legacy for his immediate tion from home and village. Small wonder that so
successors. The plans for internal administrative many families escaped across the borders, or that
reform were abandoned as early as 1727, and the desertion was rife in the regiments.
impossibility of paying full salaries to state servants It is the miracle of the Russian army that an
led to the revival of the system of 'feeding', by unpromising stock like this should have engendered
which officials were expected to pay themselves some of the best infantry in the world. In con-
from the resources at their disposal, with all trast, the origins of the officer corps told all too
the consequent openings for corruption and heavily on the quality of the leadership of the
oppression. army. For such and such an appointment, the
choice frequently lay between a foreigner of
undoubted experience, but uncertain competence
The human base and loyalties, and a native Russian who added
a lack of inclination to an all-too-obvious
It was inherently easier to hew the forests, to dig, professional ignorance.
smelt and fashion the metals than to create a With the creation of the regular army at the
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 3 9

beginning of the century, many of the existing dants are from now on to be regarded as noble'
native officers who appeared on the books were (Beskrovnyi, 1958, 168). With variations from
found to be unsuitable for admission to the new year to year, native Russians accounted for about
regiments. Golovin was therefore ordered to draw two-thirds of the Petrine officer corps.
up a list of the nobles who could be taken on as The remaining third, the foreigners, were still
officers, which produced a first batch of 1,091 indispensable for leading the army in modern
individuals. Veterans, soldiers of the Guard and warfare, which made for all kinds of tensions and
other folk offered another resource, and Peter resentments. A first manifesto of April 1700 was
later decreed that 'all officers, who do not come published throughout Europe, opening the Russian
from noble families, are to be given patents of service to all but Jewish officers. Three further
nobility, and likewise their children and descen- invitations were published between 1702 and
1705, of which the last stipulated that Peter wbuld
admit officers 'of good reputation and skill, who
have reached their condition through military
service in the field, and not just as a result of
recommendation, winning ways or money'
(Beskrovnyi, 1958, 170). Again in 1711 James
Bruce was sent to look for likely candidates in
German towns, 'as an educated, skilled sort of
person, with a nice judgment where things and
men are concerned' (Strukov, in Skalon, 1902-
c.1911, VI, pt 1, bk 1, 103).
The first screening was normally carried out by
the Russian agents abroad, who had authority to
invite foreign officers to sign a 'letter of contract',
which set out the rank and pay they would enjoy
in the Russian service. A foreign captain, for
example, was normally entitled to a pay of eighteen
roubles per month, as opposed to fifteen for one
born in Russia of foreign parents, and a mere
twelve for a native Russian, which scarcely made
for good relations between the nationalities.
Once they arrived in Russia, the foreigners were
inspected and assigned by the War College, or its
administrative ancestors. In fact the Russian
authorities were by no means sure what qualities
they ought to be looking for, in view of their
grievous ignorance of how military affairs were run
in the West. James Bruce liked to tell how an
Austrian brigadier once came to Field-Marshal
Sheremetev, asking to be made a Russian major-
general. Sheremetev, 'conceiving that to be a step
7 Infantry officer, 1700-2. Green coat with red too much, told the gentleman he ought to be
cuffs; red breeches; hat with gold lace; gorget satisfied with being made first a lieutenant-general,
bearing the St Andrew's cross; sash in the national . . . and the marshal claimed a merit in having
colours (top to bottom) of red, white and blue satisfied the foreigner so easily' (Bruce, 1782,
(Viskovatov, 1844-56) 113).
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 40

the taxes and the conscription was accentuated by

Assessments a number of specific and deeply felt grievances.
Old Believer priests railed against Peter as the
When looking at Russian affairs, it is so easy to fix Antichrist, while the rank and file of the army
your attention on the patent inefficiencies and resented any intrusion of Germanism. Private
shortcomings that the magnitude of the achieve- Shmulov alleged that Peter 'beats people with the
ment is liable to escape from view altogether. For knout', and 'smokes tobacco with Germans'.
a comprehensive estimate of what Peter did, it is Another soldier, Oshivalov, grumbled that the
worth quoting a letter which the French diplomat 'German-style shoes have large heels and are heavy
de Campredon addressed to Louis XV in 1723: to wear, whereas the Russian boots were lighter'
(Golikova, in Beskrovnyi, 1959a, 283).
I must report to Your Majesty something of the
The resentments of the other classes went to
boundless efforts which he has expended in so
feed the xenophobic sentiments regarding the
many directions. He has regulated his peoples,
Western world which were already clearly evident
making them useful for the service of his state,
in the seventeenth century. From the start the city
and for exalting his glory to the highest possible
of St Petersburg was the object of the anti-Western
degree. He has worked to drag his nobility up from
feelings. Hie place was disliked as a forced, artifi-
the subhuman lassitude in which they were sunk,
cial creation, a symbol of Peter's military ambi-
and qualify them to serve in his armies and navies,
tions, and the home of foreigners and a parvenu
for which they harboured an invincible aversion
native nobility, in all of which it compared
until very recently. We have seen him perform the
unfavourably with the dirty, cosy and thoroughly
duties of drummer and carpenter, and rise
Russian Moscow. Edward Finch maintained that
gradually to the rank of general and admiral,
even the nobles who travelled abroad, and those
sedulously observing at every step the obedience
who made up the court at St Petersburg, were still
and subordination due to his superiors, and that
in their hearts:
discipline which he wished to be maintained in
the two arms of his service. And so, through
inconceivable labour and patience, he has managed downright errant old russ . . . there is not one of
to form some excellent military and naval them who would n o t wish St. Petersburg at the
officers, a body of splendid soldiers, an army of bottom of the sea, and all the conquered provinces
more than 100,000 regular troops, and a fleet of to the devil, so that they could but remove to
sixty vessels, including twenty of the line. Russia, Moscow. . . . Besides they are persuaded, that it
whose very name was scarcely known, has now would be much better for Russia in general to have
become the object of attention of the greater nothing more to do with the affairs of Europe,
number of the powers of Europe, who solicit its than it formerly had, but confine itself to the
friendship. (SIRIO, 1885, XLIX, 310-14) defence of its own ancient territories strictly
called s o . . . . All these gentlemen by consequence
The verdict of the native Russian depended on are utter enemies to the foreigners in their service;
the circumstances of the writer and his distance for though they may find the use of them in time
from Peter's time. In Peter's own generation a of war, yet would they have them all discarded
small circle of men like Yakov Dolgorukov and the moment after a peace. (2 June 1741, SIRIO,
Fedor Saltykov — widely travelled, and experienced 1894, XCI, 107-8)
in several departments of state — knew and fully
appreciated the motives for what their sovereign Convictions of this kind were ineradicable. How-
was doing. ever, a noticeable amelioration of opinion in
These sentiments by no means corresponded Peter's favour becomes evident as the eighteenth
with the general mood of the Russian people and century progresses. In part it proceeded from the
nobility. Among the common folk the hatred of publication of Voltaire's Histoire de laRussie sous
 Peter I, ' t h e Great' 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 41

Pierre le Grand (1763). The work brought on Prussian commander, excelled her in demonstra-
Voltaire's head the reproach of Frederick the tions of almost filial piety towards the shade of
Great of Prussia: 'Tell me, I beseech you, why you the great man.
took it into your head to write about the doings of Finally a new object of xenophobic resent-
those Siberian wolves and bears? . . . I can scarcely ments was provided by the outright Prussianising
live with the thought that they inhabit the same tendencies of the reigns of Peter III and Paul I.
hemisphere as ourselves' (Rambaud, 1895, 346). The policies of Peter the Great seemed moderate
Less prejudiced people awakened to the magnitude and patriotic in comparison, and by 1802 a person
of Peter's achievements and the changes which had like Semen Vorontsov was ready to rank Poltava
come over Russia, and Voltaire's words assumed along with Kunersdorf, Kagul and Izmail as a
the status of gospel in the West. victory obtained under a truly Russian dispensa-
Within Russia a consideration of some weight tion of military affairs: 'The institutions of Peter
was the devotion which some of Peter's successors the Great are the best for our army. The decline
felt towards his memory. Elizabeth Petrovna was of our army is the measure of our departure from
always aware of her responsibilities as his daughter, their principles' ('Zapiski . . . o Russkom
while Catherine II, although the daughter of a Voiske . . .\AKV, 1870-95, X, 492).

f
The turmoils of 1725-30 of the time. The two regiments of Preobrazhenskii
and Semenovskii had come into being as the
Peter built so well that his army survived, shaken nucleus of the regular army, and their commanders
but intact, through years of political instability were men of the highest influence in the state. The
that would have overthrown a structure built on ranks of NCOs and private Guardsmen, while still
less firm foundations. The upsets were largely the retaining an element of rough soldiery, were now
fault of Peter himself, for by the time of his death being filled out with wealthy and idle young
in 1725 he had made no proper provision for the nobles who could fulfil their duty of rising from
succession. Indeed he had killed off his own son the lowest grades without the inconvenience of
Aleksei in 1718, and abolished the 1 principle of having to do real military service. The Guards,
primogeniture. taken with the neighbouring line regiments which
The person best placed to seize power was his invariably followed their lead, made a mass of
second wife, the Empress Catherine, who had 30,000 troops which were concentrated around
entered the royal circle as a prize of war (see the capital.
p. 20). In her short reign Catherine I had to Peter II was a restless and irresponsible lad, but
reduce the oppressive poll-tax, but otherwise she he was able to strike at the over-mighty Menshikov
did what she could to run affairs as Peter would at a moment when the Guardsmen were marching
have wished. The projected Academy of Sciences back to their quarters. Menshikov was deprived of
became an accomplished fact, and on 21 May his offices and honours, and exiled first to his
1725 she instituted the Order of St Alexander estates, and then to Siberia.
Nevsky, which had been mooted by her late Peter died in 1730 of a sudden infection, and
husband three years before. for the second time in five years Russia was with-
When Catherine's own life was coming to its out a ruler. A cabal of magnates, dominated by the
end in 1727, she arranged for the succession to Golitsyn and Dolgorukov families, looked for a
pass to her twelve-year-old charge Peter, who was a candidate whom they could dominate, and to this
grandson of Peter the Great by his first marriage. end they whisked up from the Baltic coast the
Menshikov was confident of securing his position pudgy figure of Anna, Duchess of Kurland, who
in the new reign by marrying off his daughter to was a niece of Peter the Great, and persuaded her
the young emperor. He had a further source of to accept important limitations on her authority.
strength by his influence in the Guard. The Anna very quickly rediscovered her bearings in
political inclination of the Guards was in fact a Russia. With the counsel of a few well-disposed
weighty consideration in Russian political affairs persons, she declared herself colonel of the
 The Age of Marshal Miinnich 1725-41 43

Preobrazhenskii Regiment, and regaled the home-grown foreigners — the Baltic Germans of
Guardsmen with drinks. A little later a knot of Livonia, which was legally part of Russia, and of
the Guards broke into a meeting which Anna was Anna's own Kurland. Among the latter was
holding with the principal magnates in Moscow, numbered the favourite Ernst Johann Biron, who
and she accepted from their hands a 'spontaneous' instituted a reign of terror among his potential
invitation to arm herself with all the powers of the enemies, and was held responsible for the fate of
traditional sovereign. thousands of folk who disappeared without trace
Anna duly conferred hereditary nobility on all or were banished to Siberia.
the members of the grenadier company of the However, there is reason to suppose that on
Preobrazhenskii, but also, showing a grasp of balance the reign was one of good management
political realities, she established an additional and positive achievement. The person of the
regiment of foot guards, the Ismailovskii, so called Empress Anna was not unimpressive, as the
after the village near Moscow where she was Edinburgh doctor, Cook, discovered. She was no
staying at the time (17 August 1730). The rank great beauty, 'but had something so graceful and
and file were formed of picked specimens of the full of majesty, that it had a strange effect on me.
Ukraine Land Militia, but Germans and other I, at the same time, both revered and feared her'
foreigners were heavily represented in the officer (Cook, 1770, I, 102). Then again, the rogues,
corps. A corresponding body of Horse Guards was charlatans and murderers were a minority among
founded on 31 December 'on the foot of the late her foreign helpmates. External affairs were in the
King of Sweden's trabands' (C. Rondeau, 4 charge of the unselfish and wise Count Ostermann,
January 1731, SIRIO, 1889, LXVI, 272). Frederick who came from Westphalia. James Keith hailed
William I of Prussia sent several of his officers and from further afield, as a Jacobite who had fled
NCOs to introduce the Prussian drill, and Anna from Scotland after the defeat of the Old
reciprocated by exporting batches of tall grenadiers Pretender at Sheriffmuir, and who took service in
to Potsdam as a present. It became clear that France and Spain before coming to Russia in
'these two new regiments of Guards were raised so 1728.
as to counterbalance the old ones, and hold the
people in respect' (Manstein, 1860, I, 71). Anna He kept excellent discipline in the army, yet the
was convinced that she must keep her subjects soldiers called and esteemed him as their father.
firmly pressed dov/n, 'for if she did not, the russ He was never vainglorious, no high language did
were of such a nature, that they would dance on he ever utter; every expression was modest. But
her head' (C. Rondeau, 4 January 1731, SIRIO, the word of command was resolution itself.
1889, LXVI, 272). (Cook, 1770,1,451)
There was certainly a great deal in the new He was a lieutenant-general in 1734, and distin-
order of things to excite the hatred and contempt guished himself in the campaigns against the
of the native Russian. The capital moved back Turks and Swedes before an accumulation of
from Moscow (where it had resided in the last frustrations caused him to resign in 1747. He was
reign) to the detested St Petersburg, and the tone killed eleven years later as a Prussian field-marshal.
of court and society became German, and pro- 'He was in truth a man imbued with honourable
vincial German at that. Strangers claimed the instincts, and one whose modesty proceeded from
important positions of power and scorned the a courteous disposition' (Nashchokin, 1842, 177).
Russians. We may cite the case of Prince Ludwig The beloved Field-Marshal Peter Lacy was
of Hessen-Homburg, a landless, ill-educated numbered among Keith's closest associates. He
young boor, who was heaped with honours in too was a supporter of the Jacobite cause, and left
Anna's Russia, and ultimately became Master his native Ireland at the age of thirteen as an
General of the Ordnance. No less detested were ensign in the army of King James II. After spells
the people who now counted almost as Russia's in the French and Austrian services he arrived in
4 4 T h e A g e of Marshal Miinnich 1 7 2 5 - 4 1

Russia in the interesting year of 1700. He was

reputed to have done great things in the Narva
campaign, and to have set up the first grenadiers
in the Russian service, and in any event he earned
the distinction of being held in equally high
regard by the three sovereigns Peter the Great,
Anna and Elizabeth.
Lacy crowned his active military life by his
triumphant campaign against the Swedes in 1742.
He entered into prosperous semi-retirement as
governor at Riga, after having served in thirty-one
campaigns, three general battles, eighteen lesser
encounters and eighteen sieges. Lacy sent con-
siderable annual sums to the Bank of Amsterdam,
or so people said, and he had the satisfaction of
seeing his son Francis Maurice launched on a
career in the Austrian service, in which he was to
reach supreme command. 'This great good man'
died at Riga on 19 April 1751. Cook reported
that: 'All the citizens of Riga mourned for the loss
of the late field-marshal, and tolled their bells
eight days. The army were not behind them in
expressing their grief; and I lamented his death
with as much sincerity as is possible for a human
breast' (Cook, 1770, II, 618, 622). • 8 Burchard Christoph Miinnich
The doings of Keith, Lacy and the rest were
chronicled by Christoph Hermann von Manstein, able to develop his taste for military engineering.
who was a deserving figure in his own right. He As a young officer he was employed as an engineer
was described as a tireless soldier, and a humane by Prince Eugene of Savoy, and he embarked on a
and cultivated man. He knew and liked the Russian career in the armies of a succession of German
people and language, and had a fine command of princes. At the murderous battle of Malplaquet, in
German, Swedish, French, Italian and Latin. 1709, he was present as an officer in the Hessian
However, Manstein's narratives are devoted service. Three years later he fell into the hands of
above all to the deeds of Field-Marshal Burchard the French at Denain, but he was able to put the
Christoph von Miinnich, who was the dominating experience to good use by taking the opportunity
personality in Russian military affairs in the to strike up a friendship with the celebrated
second quarter of the eighteenth century, who Archbishop Fenelon of Cambrai, a man whom he
developed and completed in many respects the greatly admired.
work of Peter the Great, and who laid some of the The close of the War of the Spanish Succession
most important foundations on which the army put an end to the prospect of advancement in the
was going to fight the Seven Years War. West, and Miinnich entered a not very satisfactory
Miinnich was the eighteenth-century military spell of employment in the army of King Augustus
adventurer par excellence. He was born in 1683 in II of Poland, where he became a major-general.
Oldenburg, in the sodden, inhospitable north Miinnich was taken into the Russian service in
German plain. His father, who was a lieutenant- February 1721. Peter was at first disconcerted by
general, gave him a good educational grounding, Miinnich's dislike of strong drink, and his neat
and sent him to travel in France, where he was appearance, but he soon became entranced by the
 45 T h e A g e of Marshal Miinnich 1 7 2 5 - 4 1

German's technical expertise and ambitious he centralised all military administration under the
projects — 'the work of my good Miinnich does me authority of that body.
good!' (Fabritsius, in Skalon 1902-C.1911, VII, Oddly enough, the dictator Miinnich failed in
pt 1, xxvii) - and he put him in charge of impor- probably the most central of his concerns, which
tant works of civil engineering, like the Ladoga was to save about 650,000 roubles out of an annual
Canal, which had run into serious difficulties. military expenditure of four million. He hoped to
Miinnich rose steadily in the military hierarchy make considerable economies by reducing the
in the restless years after Peter's death. On 23 May army in peacetime to a special stripped-down
1727 he was appointed Ober-Direktor of fortifica- establishment. However, the expected savings were
tions, which made him supreme in all matters of not forthcoming, and the expenditure on the army
engineering. The veteran Huguenot de Goulon was actually rose to an annual five million roubles,f
disgusted, and left the corps altogether. The next three million of which was derived from the
prize was the artillery, which lay under the poll-tax.
authority of the General-Feldtseigmeister, or Elsewhere Miinnich's efforts were attended
Master General of the Ordnance. Miinnich was at with more success. It is of interest to note that
daggers drawn with the incumbent, the boastful Miinnich, the arch-German, went much further
and mercenary Johann Giinter, but when that than Peter had dared in the work of Russifying the
unpleasant gentleman died in 1729 he was able to officer corps. We have seen how Peter established
take over the post himself. Finally under Anna three rates of pay for his officers, of which the
came the rank of field-marshal and the presidency lowest went to the native-born Russian, but
of the War College, which gave Miinnich authority Miinnich 'represented that the Russian officers
over the field army as well. could not live on such modest pay, and that it was
The forcefulness and activity of this remarkable unjust for the foreigners to be treated better than
man were expressed in his gleaming eyes and rock- the natives' (Manstein, 1860, I, 87). Miinnich
like face, and are transmitted with almost remedied the anomaly by raising the pay of native
undiminished impact across the centuries. 'Robust officers, and reducing that of the foreigners, so
and active by temperament, he seemed to be a that for each rank the reward became the same.
born general. He was absolutely tireless' (Manstein, Miinnich was more concerned with the pro-
1860, II, 207). He did important things for the ficiency and enthusiasm of the officer than with
Russian army, but all the time his driving motive his origins. Foreigners were now admitted only
was pride, for which, according to the Prussian with imperial consent and under strict conditions,
envoy, he was 'prepared to put everything at stake, and Miinnich enforced professional standards
and run the risk (as he admitted himself) of seeing throughout the corps as a whole, if necessary by
his head parted from his body on the scaffold' subjecting officers to public humiliation. Another
(Mediger, 1952, 153). Indeed it very nearly came monument of Miinnich's care was the military
to that. academy (Noble Land Cadet Corps), which he
Early in the new reign Anna's advisers set in founded in July 1731 to provide a systematic
train the first systematic review of Russian military military education for at least an element of the
affairs in the eighteenth century. The matter was body of native officers.
of some urgency, in view of the neglect and abuses Otherwise Miinnich's dealings with the officer
of the last few years, and the burden of the poll- class reflected his principles of military economy,
tax. A decree of 9 June 1730 established a Military and the circumstances in which his sovereign Anna
Commission, which was to range over an extensive had come to the throne. In fact, after the death of
programme of fifteen points. On 14 March 1731 Peter the Great every revolution in regime was
Miinnich took over the management of the accompanied by an advance in the independence
Commission in person. In the next year he added and freedom of the service class. In Anna's time an
the full presidency of the War College, and in 1736 initial decree of 17 March 1731 confirmed Peter's
4 6 T h e A g e of Marshal Miinnich 1 7 2 5 - 4 1

measure of 1714, abolishing the distinction drills could lead on occasion to considerable
between service and hereditary holding of noble disorder and other evil consequences' (Gippius, in
estates, and thereby distanced the tenure of land Skalon, 1902-C.1911, IV, pt 1, bk 2, sect. 3, 40).
from the duties of state service. The new military The consequent codes for line infantry, grenadiers
academy began to offer a path to a commission and cavalry were already being circulated in
without even the nominal commitment to service manuscript in 1731. The flavour of the whole was
in the ranks, and finally on 31 December 1736 the decidedly German. The new uniforms too were
term of compulsory military service was limited to unmistakably Prussian in inspiration, what with
twenty-five years, and the noble father who had the slimmed-down coats, the powdered locks and
more than one son was given the right, to select the long whip-like pigtails, and the brass-fronted
individual who was to enter the army, leaving the grenadier caps of the grenadier companies. In the
others to manage the estate. Only sons were in any Seven Years War only the traditional green livery
case exempt from military service. of the infantry rendered the troops distinguish-
Miinnich levelled some radical criticisms at the able at first glance from the hated Prussians.
way the army was recruited. He regretted the With some success, Miinnich built up the
unpopularity of military service, which he attri- effectives of the ordinary infantry, the 'fusiliers'.
buted to the losses of the Great Northern War, and He increased the combatant strength of the
the misuse of soldiers as slave labour, and he company to 90 per cent, and disbanded the
complained that the enforced lifelong conscription separate regiments of grenadiers, redistributing the
was both inefficient and demoralising. Even men among the other regiments. Still greater
Miinnich was unable to dismantle such funda- numbers of troops were retrieved by doing away
mental features of the Petrine structure, but it was with the 'Persian Corps', which had been guarding
within his power to alleviate at least the incidental the Caspian provinces that were stolen in the
miseries of military life. He insisted that recruits 1720s. The British ambassador reported that you
must be properly paid, fed and sheltered during could 'scarcely imagine the number of officers and
the march to their regiments, and that, once they soldiers that die in that hot country. A major in
got there, they should be received and trained in this service assured me that he and twenty-six
an orderly manner. The pay of all troops was other officers were sent there three years ago,
effectively increased in 1731, when Miinnich did and in two years they all died except himself'
away with the deductions for clothing, and he (C. Rondeau, 30 May \130,SIRIO, 1889, LXVI,
made sure that the money was made over in 49). The provinces were returned to Persia in
regular monthly instalments. Corporal punishment 1734. The equivalent of about a dozen regiments
was no more severe under Miinnich's regime than returned to Russia, leaving the bones of perhaps
in other periods (despite what some Russian 130,000 of their comrades who had died there
historians have alleged). He promoted the public from disease during the period of occupation.
expressions of the Orthodox faith (even if he did Miinnich was probably less well advised when
not share it), and his concern for the humane he complicated the structure of the cavalry by
treatment of sick, wounded and prisoners made a introducing a new category of mounted troops,
good impression on Russian and Turk alike. the cuirassiers. The Commission declared
Miinnich had the satisfaction of seeing less than
3 per cent of the recruit levy of 1733 lost through The Russian army has never possessed any other
desertion, and when his work was complete this category of horse . . . than dragoons. Several
phenomenon became 'something almost unknown other armies, however, and especially that of
in the Russian armies' (Manstein, 1860,1, 264). Imperial Austria, own regiments of cuirassiers,
Point eleven of the Commission's instructions which have proved more effective than other
had dealt with the need of enforcing uniform kinds against the Turks. . . . Since light cavalry
tactics among the regiments, 'since the diversity of regiments are incapable of withstanding regiments
 47 T h e A g e of Marshal Miinnich 1 7 2 5 - 4 1

of heavy cavalry or cuirassiers with advantage, artillery — the 3-pounders — to 25 per cent of the
the Military Commission considers that, in the ordnance, while the ratio of Peter's favourite
present time of peace, v/e should establish ten 8-pounder sank from 40 to 18 per cent. Miinnich's
cuirassier regiments of this kind, mounted on intention was to endow the squares of Russian
German horses. (Baiov, 1906,1, 10) infantry with greater firepower against the Turks,
and he was now able to equip every regiment with
The 'cuirassiers' in question were heavy, part- four such 3-pounders instead of the previous two.
armoured men, riding powerful horses, and In 1727 Miinnich had taken over the combined
designed to deliver massive blows on the field of management of the schools of engineering and
battle. The Russian dragoons seemed by com- artillery, where he increased the number of pupils
parison puny, half-bred creatures, too feeble when and revised the syllabus. He circulated sets of
mounted to resist the cuirassiers in open combat, manuscript Instructional Articles (1731) to the
and presenting a clumsy imitation of infantry corps as a whole, and he sent trained men in eights
when fighting on foot. at a time to teach the service of the regimental
The formation of the cuirassiers proceeded artillery. The Russians responded to the encourage-
very slowly, and never approached the ambitious ment, and the gunners of this period are described
target which had been set by the Commission. The as 'a most glorious body of men' (Cook, 1770,
first of the breed appeared on 18 November 1731, 1,41).
when the Vyborg Dragoons were transformed Miinnich elevated his beloved engineers into a
into the Cuirassier Regiment Miinnich. Two more separate corps in 1728, and he arranged its affairs
regiments of dragoons were converted in 1732, on the best Western models. His work in creating
and a fourth and final regiment underwent the an independent, well-organised engineer corps was
process in 1740. The root of the problem was the of lasting value, for it enabled this important
shortage of native animals strong enough to bear branch of military affairs to survive the neglect of
the rider, together with all his gear and his twenty- successive Masters General 6f the Ordnance, who
three-pound breastplate. were interested only in the artillery, in so far as
The new regime actually had more luck with its they were interested in anything at all.
light cavalry. Miinnich reinforced Peter's regiment Miinnich managed both the engineers and
of Serbian hussars, and established new hussar gunners in a despotic fashion, as chief of a
companies of Balkan refugees and Georgian nobles. 'Chancellery' of artillery and fortification. He
He was anxious to improve the proficiency of the ultimately yielded the post of Master General of
Cossacks, whether for border defence or open the Ordnance to the loathsome Hessen-Homburg
warfare, and he was the creator of the regiment of in 1735, and relinquished that of head of the
Chuguevskii Cossacks, which became the most Chancellery in the following year, but by then his
expert and reliable of all the Cossack bands of the authority had little to do with formal titles, and it
middle decades of the eighteenth century. The remained intact until he fell in 1741.
main burden of guarding the Tartar borders rested,
however, upon the Ukranian Land Militia, which
Miinnich expanded to 21,000 men, and on a line Western excursions
of ramparts, stockades and strongpoints extending
across the steppes from the Dnieper to the Don. If Peter the Great had accomplished a physical
Miinnich was an engineer by origin, but he breakthrough to the Baltic, the Russian military
addressed himself to the affairs of the artillery enterprises of the 1730s and early 1740s represent
with all the enthusiasm of the late convert. He had a process of widening Russia's avenue to the West
a programme of re-casting carried out by the by means of an effective working alliance with
reliable old Wilhelm de Hennin, and in the process imperial Austria. As a result, French interests were
he increased the proportion of light regimental defeated three times over.
4 8 T h e Age of Marshal Miinnich 1 7 2 5 - 4 1

Poland, with its elective monarchy, had long The Russians were too late to take part in
been a scene of conflict between France and the hostilities before the Austrians and French con-
two great empires of eastern Europe, and 1733 cluded an armistice, but the expedition was in
found Russian forces committed deep in Poland in most respects a worthwhile enterprise, showing as
support of the joint Austro-Russian candidate it did the capacity of the Russians to intervene far
Augustus III. Small Russian detachments were afield on behalf of an ally, and reinforcing the
campaigning against the French sympathisers all demand of Anna to be treated with due respect.
over the land, and 'never in this war did parties as Keith made a point of insisting that the Austrians
small as three hundred Russians go a step out of must refer to his sovereign by her full imperial
their way to avoid three thousand Poles. They title.
could rely on beating the Poles in every encounter' With the defeat of their party in Poland, the
(Manstein, 1860, I, 132). The main concentration French turned in some despair to their old client
of 12,000 troops was, however, brought against state of Sweden as a last prop to shore up their
the free city and fortress-port of Danzig, where a collapsing interests against the Russian advance in
Polish garrison made a stand with the help of Europe. The older generation in Sweden had had
French advisers, and later with active French enough of wars and absolutism, but the French
participation. Miinnich impatiently, snatched the overtures met with a ready response among the
direction of the siege from Lacy, promising aggressive elements in the young nobility, who
energetic measures, but the operation proved to helped to stampede Sweden into declaring war on
be slow and costly, and dragged on until Danzig Russia in the high summer of 1741. The Swedes
submitted to King Augustus on 30 June 1734. hoped to profit by the political turmoils conse-
Poland was to remain under a passably acquiescent quent upon the death of Empress Anna in 1740,
regime for the next few decades, and offer a passage and they were further encouraged by the reports
for most of the Russian armies which wished to of their ambassador Nolcken, who wrote that the
march through the kingdom on their Way to more Russian army had been ruined by its recent
distant theatres of war. Turkish campaigns.
Anna's Austrian friends were meanwhile locked On the Russian side Miinnich put the fortresses
in combat with the French along the Rhine, a of the Gulf of Finland in a state of defence, and
circumstance which invited Russian troops deeper helped to rush the reinforcements which gave
into western Europe than ever before, and estab- Field-Marshal Lacy a small but excellent army of
lished a precedent for some very significant some 26,000 men in Russian Karelia. Among the
interventions later in the century. folk who arrived on the theatre was a body of Don
The immediate Austrian request was for the Cossacks under the seventy-year-old brigadier
assistance of 12,000 Russian troops on the Rhine. Krasnoshchekov (Red Cheeks), who aroused wide
Anna was agreeable, and in a rare demonstration comment by his determination to use the methods
of military ardour the younger generation of high of the Turkish war to accomplish the physical
nobility pressed forward to volunteer their services. destruction of the Swedish race.
Lacy led a parent body of sixteen regiments The negligent Swedes had only about 8,000
through Poland to winter quarters in the Austrian troops in Finland at the time they declared war.
province of Silesia, and from there a contingent of Lacy was not the person to miss such an oppor-
eight regiments, or 10-11,000 men, marched for tunity, and in a classic pre-emptive raid he crossed
the Rhine in the spring of 1735 under the com- the border at the beginning of September 1741,
mand of lieu tenant-General Keith. 'Everybody and marched through forests, rocks and marshes
was delighted and astonished by the good order to smash the Swedes outside Willmanstrand. Lacy
and discipline which the troops maintained on the stormed and razed the town, and returned with his
march and in their quarters' (Manstein, 1860, I, booty across the border. The Swedish officer
133). prisoners were treated with respect in the Russian
 T h e A g e of Marshal Miinnich 1 7 2 5 - 4 1 4 9

noble houses until one Lieutenant-Colonel 1952, 325). He began to warm in particular to the
Vasaborg, 'a man with a small brain but a big notion of the new crusade against the Turks, and
mouth' (Manstein, 1860, II, 180), spoke dis- on the eve of the campaign of 1736 he outlined to
respectfully of the Russian army, whereupon he Biron his scheme for a four-year programme of
and his companions were packed off to distant conquest. The first campaign was to give the
provinces.' mastery of the steppes, after which the army
The advent of Elizabeth as empress of Russia would proceed in 1737 to secure the Crimea and
promised the Swedes a little respite, but it was the Sea of Azov; in 1738 the Russians were to
clear that if the active war was resumed, it was move around the western side of the Black Sea to
going to be waged on terms fundamentally deliver the peoples of Moldavia and Wallachia,
unfavourable to Sweden. and 'in 1739 we shall raise the standards of
Her Imperial Highness. Where? Why over
Constantinople!' (Baiov, 1906,1, 199).
Miinnich's Turkish war, 1735-9 Miinnich now had to come to terms with the
peculiar demands of the southern theatre, and he
While Europe was beginning to feel something of addressed himself to the problem as a student of
the strength of the new army, Russia embarked on military affairs as well as an accomplished practical
the first of her great eighteenth-century Turkish soldier. He had published an edition of Saint-
campaigns, those experiences which were the most Remy's famous Memoires d'Artillerie in 1732, and
significant of all her schools of war, and formed his well-illustrated biography of his old master
the generals and the armies which were going to Prince Eugene of Savoy was to be translated into
fight in later decades in Finland, Prussia, Holland, Russian and published in 1740.
Italy and Switzerland. The most immediate problem was to gather
The quarrel of the 1730s was engendered as information about the scene of forthcoming
much by pressures within Russia as by the pro- operations. Neither the Russians nor any other
vocations of the Turks. Certainly, the Crimean power had reliable maps of the area, and indeed
Tartars were as vexatious as ever. They repeatedly the campaigns of Miinnich and Lacy were to do
raided into Russian territory on slave-gathering much to advance Europe's knowledge of that
expeditions, and by their forays towards the corner of the world. In February 1738 the British
Caspian they threatened to cut off the Russians ambassador wrote to London, concerning the
from Georgia. There were circles, in Russia which Crimea, that
were more than willing to take up the challenge.
as Field-Marshal Lacy has made a very curious
The usually pacific Ostermann was alarmed by
map of those parts, and has been so good as to
reports that the activity of the renegade Pasha
give me a copy of it, I take the liberty to send
Bonneval betokened a modernisation of the
the same enclosed, for I fear without such a map,
Turkish army, and even the oldfashioned Moscow
neither the King nor anybody else, will be able
nobility could sympathise with a war that might
to know where the russ army is. (C. Rondeau,
smash the Tartars, and liberate the Orthodox
7 February \13%,SIRIO, 1892, LXXX, 273)
peoples of the Balkans.
Miinnich, as usual, was spurred on by ambition For reconnaissance and other purposes Miinnich
and vainglory. He was disappointed that he had would have liked to have made full use of the
been unable to revive Peter's excellent system of Cossacks, but he found that only 32,000 of the
summer exercise camps, or to relieve the men nominal force of 110,000 actually turned up on
completely from works of civilian labour. As a campaign, since the stay-at-homes were concerned
matter of principle he was therefore searching for with protecting their camels, cattle and sheep
a war against almost any enemy, just 'to give the against Tartar raids, and because the Zaporozhian
troops opportunity to exercise at arms' (Mediger, Cossacks and the Kalmyks from beyond the Volga
50 T h e A g e of Marshal Miinnich 1 7 2 5 - 4 1

'wished to have themselves regarded not as Russian Black Sea, with its successive barriers of the Bug,
subjects, but only as friends and allies' (Vischer, the Dniester (with Khotin and Bendery), the Pruth
1938, 564-5). However, a small party of intelligent and the Danube Delta (with Izmail and Kilia), and
Cossacks was responsible for furnishing Miinnich finally the great looping course of the upper
with his first useful information as to the best time Danube (with Rushchuk, Silistria and Braila).
of the year to cross the steppes. These people had The Turks could be expected to make a deter-
been sent out in November 173 5, and they reported mined stand in their fortresses, bringing into play
that the best season to embark on campaign was their lively garrisons and powerful artillery. In the
in the spring open field the enemy were more dangerous still,
for they compensated for their lack of discipline
for at this time of year there will be no shortage
by their individual prowess and fanaticism, and by
of water, thanks to the recent snow and rain. Also
their masses of irregular cavalry, which lapped
the grass will be everywhere in full growth, and
around the Russian armies and cut them off from
impossible for the enemy to burn, and the spring
communication with their homeland. What with
will allow you to take advantage of the winter
the distances concerned, the featureless terrain,
wheat growing on the arable lands. (Baiov, 1906,
the isolation, uncertainties and dangers, a Russian
I, 198)
expedition against the Turks partook more of the
Unfortunately, the spring in those parts all too nature of a voyage into unknown seas than of a
soon gave way to the intense heat of high summer, campaign against an army.
which was likely to find the Russian armies short Miinnich's method of war in the southern
of wood and water, and toiling across the empty theatre evolved as a remarkable association of
steppes. The eerie landscape was dotted with offensive strategy, defensive minor tactics, and an
mounds, which some supposed to have been increasingly self-contained system of supply. He
erected as landmarks, and others (more correctly) was convinced of the value of offensive operations,
to be the tombs of Tartar chiefs. The nomads gave for 'the attack imbues the soldier with courage,
further evidence of their presence when they set and establishes respect for the attacker in the
fire to the seas of tall grass, which exploded into minds of the enemy. By remaining inactive, on the
walls of flame and smoke and placed the Russians other hand, you lower the morale of your forces
in physical danger, as well as denying pasture to and cause them to lose hope' (Baiov, 1906, II,
their multitudes of horses and oxen. Every time 301).
the Russians made themselves a camp they had to The last notion was explored in more detail in a
fashion fire brooms, and dig a fire break around Disposition for Military Arrangements and
the perimeter. The Russians could alleviate some Movements for a General Battle against the Turks,
of their difficulties by marching alongside the clear a document which Villim Villimovich Fermor
waters of the Dnieper, but the cataracts made composed at Miinnich's request in 1736, and
continuous navigation impossible for craft of any which was circulated in the army. Femor and
size, and in any case the army sooner or later had Munnich were well aware of what was at stake in
to abandon the river and cut across country to its open confrontation, since 'upon the issue of a
final destination. general battle depends not only the outcome of
A vital, though negative, aim of the Russians the campaign and the whole war, but nothing less
was to do something to conquer, devastate or than the welfare of the state and the security of
mask the Crimean peninsula and the adjacent the throne' (Baiov, 1906, I, 54). This sentiment
mainland, with their strategic flanks at Azov to was common at the time, but whereas in the West
the east, and Ochakov to the west. The more it induced a strategic paralysis, the Russified
positive ends of raising the Balkan Christians and Teutons, Femor and Munnich, were impelled in
perhaps even of reducing Constantinople itself the opposite direction, thanks to their confidence
drew the Russians around the western edge of the in the ability of the army to outmatch the Turks
 T h e A g e of Marshal Miinnich 1 7 2 5 - 4 1 51

through superior discipline, the capacity for rapid Munnich might establish magazines of cereals
movement, and the delivery of accurate and heavy for the war along the Dnieper and Don, and try to
fire from artillery and muskets - 'on our side we help himself out from local sources of supply, but
should not evade battle. On the contrary, we when it came to crossing the steppes, the army had
should seek it out as circumstances permit, so as to to carry along everything it might need, down to
defeat the enemy' (Baiov, 1906,1, 55). wood and water if needs be. The ratio of 'tail' to
Both the nature of the ground and of the 'teeth' therefore reached almost twentieth-century
enemy indicated an army formation in one or proportions. Altogether it probably took about
more great rectangles, which could move across one waggon to keep two men in the field. Experi-
country with the baggage in the centre. When the ences like these did much to colour the habits of
grass was green, the leading regiments 'could not the Russians when they came to fight in the West.
make a step without having to push their way The campaign of 1736 was a grandiose affair,
through the vigorous and tall grass, which was designed to inaugurate Miinnich's plan of conquest
often damp. The soldiers soon went barefoot, by a comprehensive assault on the Moslem strategic
which was the occasion of various maladies' bridgehead on the northern side of the Black Sea.
(Warnery, 1770, 57). The rest followed over the St Petersburg allowed Munnich considerable
trampled grass, forming a mass of men, animals freedom as to his line of march, 'for, as he was on
and vehicles which astonished people like Roman the spot, and most certainly the best judge, it was
Maksimovich Tsebrikov, when they experienced left to him to go which way he thought best'
the phenomenon for the first time: (C. Rondeau, 5 May 1736, SIRIO, 1891, LXXVI,
512). His 54,000 men followed the Dnieper from
Trumpets and woodwind resound on every side.
the Ukraine in five columns, then began to march
You are startled by the rattling of the regimental
in the classic oblong formation. The objective was
drums, while the terrible, majestic thunder of the
to break into the Crimean peninsula over the
kettledrums sends the blood coursing hotly
isthm,us of Perekop, which was barred by a massive
through your veins. The huge assembly aroused in
old earthwork. Munnich subjected the lines to a
me musings on life and death, on the power of
bombardment, then on the night of 19 May he
empires, and on their fall. (RS, 1895, LXXXIV,
executed a movement in six columns against the
152)
western sector. The soldiers climbed the obstacle
In Miinnich's time boar spears and pikes accom- by dint of plunging their pikes and bayonets into
panied the regiments by the cartload, to enable the rampart, and they mastered the position at a
the Russians to confront the enemy cavalry with cost of just thirty dead and 170 wounded. A little
a bristling barrier of chevaux de frise and levelled later a garrison of 2,554 surrendered the support-
pikes, but otherwise the Russians sought to break ing fortress of Perekop.
the Turks by weight of musketry and regimental After this splendid start there was little of per-
guns, and even the officers and the NCOs were manent good to be done in the Crimea. Munnich
expected to arm themselves with muskets so as to seized a number of little Tartar towns, but the
augment the firepower. Fermor here makes a clear elusive enemy burnt the provisions and poisoned
distinction between artificial parade ground drills, the wells, and by early September the Russians
and genuine combat tactics — a difference rarely were back on the mainland, prostrated by sickness
recognised by military historians. He maintained and the heat. No regiment could muster more than
that an individual rank within a single platoon was six hundred combatants.
the largest sub-unit which could be kept under Lacy had meanwhile brought a smaller force
effective control, and that the mass volleys of the against the stronghold of Azov. His proceedings
drill square were unworkable in action, on account were characteristically systematic and economical,
of the confusions consequent upon noise, smoke, and he was rewarded by an explosion of the main
broken ground and casualties among the officers. Turkish powder magazine, which ravaged the
52 The Age of Marshal Munnich 1725-41

THE TURKISH CAMPAIGNS, 1736 = 3

M U N N I C H = = ^ L A C Y O T H E R S

Azov

interior of the fortress. Azov capitulated on 1 July, phase of his plan of war against the Turks. He was
and so Lacy had attained with the minimum able to subsist for a time with the help of flatboats
expenditure of force an objective which had cost which brought provisions down the Dnieper, and
Peter the Great two campaigns. 28,000 carts and 2,000 camels were at hand to
In 1737 General Stoffeln successfully held support the move across the steppes to the Bug.
Azov against a determined siege by 40,000 Turks. He made the passage of the river at the end of
The Russian pikes on this occasion proved very June, only to find that 'Ochakov is farther from
useful in repelling the many furious storms, 'as the Bug than is marked in the map' (C. Rondeau,
the only weapons which were of any avail against 9 July 1737, SIRIO, 1892, LXXX, 165). The air
the Turkish sabres' (Manstein, 1860, I, 293). Now of confusion and uncertainty continued through
it was Lacy's turn to attend to the Crimea, and the campaign. Munnich needed to have Ochakov
this year and the next he led his army into the in his possession, to clear the way for a further
peninsula. Lacy was disappointed to find that his advance, and obtain desperately needed supplies
campaigns ended up as little more than extended of water and firewood, and without waiting for
raids, but the court was sympathetic to the diffi- his siege train to arrive he opened a generalised
culties he faced. cannonade on the night of 12-13 July.
Munnich had an army of 70,000 men at his Whole streets were aflame, and so as to divert
disposal for the campaign of 1737, and he under- the Turks from putting out the fires, Munnich at
took the westward shift which opened the second once launched an assault in almost total ignorance
 T h e A g e of Marshal Miinnich 1 7 2 5 - 4 1 5 3

of the nature of the defences. The Russians were and lend a more direct help to Russia's Austrian
beaten off in disorder. Next morning, however, allies, who were faring very badly in their own
the Turkish powder magazine blew up (as those campaigns against the Turks. The army of 65,000
establishments were prone to do), and the garrison troops set out from Kiev, and marching south-west
indicated its wish to surrender. While the negotia- it took a route comfortably distant from the Nogai
tions were going on a party of Don Cossacks steppes and the Black Sea lowlands. Miinnich led
fought their way into the town, and Miinnich the army across the Dniester well upstream, and
exploited the opportunity to throw in his regulars on 28 August he evicted the Turkish army from its
as well. Some 2,000 Turks escaped by water, and camp at Stavuchanakh, setting a precedent for
about 4,500 survived to surrender, but many of many such vigorous undertakings later in the
the townsfolk and garrison were cut down in century. Nearby Khotin surrendered upon the first
cold blood. * summons, and Miinnich pressed into 'Moldavia,
After the fall of Ochakov, Miinnich marched up where the Christian nobles pledged their allegiance
and down the Bug. Any ambition to press on to to Empress Anna. Just at that moment, when for
the Dniester was thwarted by the Tartars, who the first time Russia appeared to have a footing in
burnt all the grass between the two rivers, and the Balkans, Miinnich received news that the
towards the end of August he headed back to the Austrians had left their allies in the lurch, and
Ukraine. Manstein claims that during this cam- entered into humiliating terms of peace with the
paign sickness alone had killed off 15,000 regulars, Turks at Belgrade.
5,000 Cossacks, and probably more than 20,000 Russia reached her own accommodation with
peasant drivers and labourers. the Turks in 1740. All the gains of the war were
Miinnich's plan of aggrandisement was already abandoned, save for an advance of the frontier
dropping behind schedule, and the events of 1738 into the barren steppes. The top corner of the Sea
actually constituted a regression on the gains of of Azov fell just within the ceded zone, though it
the year before. Miinnich set out with 108,000 afforded little profit to the Russians, since the
men, and despite the huge size of the baggage train fortifications of Azov were to be dismantled, and
he chased the Turks with some energy all the way the Russians were not to be permitted to rebuild
to the Dniester, where they lined the steep and the naval arsenal at Taganrog. All of this offered
rocky right bank. The Russian casualties were precious little recompense for the thousands of
negligible in comparison with the havoc wreaked men who had disappeared into the southern
by the plague that was sweeping in from Moldavia steppes. The armies had probably never amounted
and Wallachia, and Miinnich was forced to turn to more than 120,000 troops at any one time, yet
back once more towards the Ukraine. The very they were said to have absorbed 50,000 reinforce-
air breathed of death, from the thousands of ments in 1738, and 100,000 in the following year:
unburied corpses from the war, and in one spot Though the Russians did not lose many men in
the bodies of no less than 4,000 Tartars were battle, yet it cannot be denied, that they lost great
lying in two soggy heaps, forcing everybody who numbers by fatigue, want of water, travelling
passed that way to make a circuit of six miles. It through these scorching deserts, and by the plague'
proved impossible to maintain a garrison in pesti- (Cook, 1770,1, 243).
lential Ochakov, which had already claimed
20,000 Russian lives, and so the place was razed
and abandoned to the Turks. Palace revolutions and the fall of Miinnich, 1740-1
In 1739 Russian strategy suddenly assumed a
bolder aspect, for Ostermann persuaded Miinnich Empress Anna died on 28 October 1740. The
and the empress's other advisers that the army leadership of the empire became the prize of
must strike directly across Polish territory into the contending factions, as represented by former
Balkans, where it could raise the local Christians favourites, some more-or-less remote scions of the
54 The Age of Marshal Miinnich 1725-41

imperial house, and finally and most importantly and unconcerned a countenance, as if he had been
by the Guards, who acted in some ways as the at the head of an army or at a review' (E. Finch,
unwitting conscience of Russia and put their SIRIO, 1894, XCI, 422). The executioner was
weight behind the candidate who showed the most already approaching Ostermann with an axe when
generosity and leadership. Russia underwent the a secretary came up and announced, 'God and the
process three times in the eighteenth century, empress grant you your life.' Ostermann and all
almost as if a working-out of tensions was a neces- the others were banished to exile in the provinces.
sary interval between one long reign and the next. Miinnich received the news with unaltered com-
The sordid strife of Biron, Miinnich and posure, but he was aware that his active public life
Ostermann inclined people more and more to look was over.
with favour on the undoubted claims of Princess The xenophobic historians of the later nine-
Elizabeth Petrovna. She was an affable soul, she- teenth century were fond of associating the name
had a strong legal title to the throne, and she was of Miinnich with that of Biron and the other
the daughter of Peter the Great, whose once tyrannical Teutons who made the air of Anna's
terrifying memory was already gilded with a reign alien to native-born Russians. Among men of
certain nostalgia. Elizabeth cultivated the society the field-marshal's own century, however, the talk
of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment, to the scorn of was not just of Miinnich's vaulting ambition, but
her enemies, but it was with the help of a com- of his military talents and his work in consolidat-
pany of its soldiers that she seized power in St ing the legacy of Peter the Great. We may cite the
Petersburg on 25 November 1741. favourable observations of the field-marshals
A reckoning was soon presented to the servants Apraksin and Buturlin, the gunner lieutenant-
of the old order. Miinnich, Ostermann and others general Tolstoi and the soldier and diplomat
were tried, convicted and sentenced to death for Semen Vorontsov. 'The name of Miinnich shines
an assortment of crimes. Miinnich in particular was brightly amid the memories of those gloomy
indicted for his dictatorial ways on campaign, times' (Wiegel, 1864-6,1, 14).
when he had failed to consult his generals, and When the Russians prepared for the Seven
inflicted demeaning punishments on senior officers. Years War, it was in the papers of Miinnich that
On 29 January 1742 a cortege duly made its way Petr Shuvalov found the principles on which he
to a crude plank scaffold standing in the wide designed his military reform (Zinzendorf, in Volz
square in front of the College Building. Ostermann and Kiintzel, 1899, 687). After the close of that
was in the leading sledge, and he presented a struggle old Miinnich was summoned back to
pitiful sight, dressed in his old fox fur, and literally court: 'He entered the hall clad in a soldier's
paralysed with terror. The civilians had grown long greatcoat. But written on his face was the com-
beards in their captivity, but 'the field marshal was posure, pride and dignity of a commander-in-chief
shaved, well-dressed, and with as erect, intrepid reviewing his army' (Lubyanovskii, 1872, 65).
 1741 -1761/2

Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the empress. Officials, who had weighty business
to conduct, testified that 'In the first years of her
In the middle of the eighteenth century Russia reign she was prepared to devote one hour a week
pursued an aggressive, Western-looking policy, and
took on and beat the best of all the European
armies, led by the finest soldier that the age had to
show. In the process Russia ceased to be merely a
formidable presence in the northern world, and
advanced into the select ranks of first-class
European powers. The wonder is that all this was
achieved without the intervention of any indivi-
duals of heroic stature, and during the reign of a
princess who abhorred conquests and bloodshed.
The clemency which Elizabeth extended to
Miinnich and Ostermann was the expression of one
aspect of a most attractive personality. Foreign
observers spoke with approval of her pleasant
rounded figure, her blonde hair, her 'almost
English face' with its high colour, and of her
benevolent character. She banished the small-town
German ways of the old regime from St Petersburg,
and set a fashion for Frenchified luxury that was
taken up with enthusiasm by the more open-
minded of the nobility.
At the same time, people had certain reserva-
tions about Elizabeth's conduct of public affairs.
She was notoriously 'a person of an amorous turn'
(Richard, 1780, 16), and so the element of per-
sonal attraction weighed considerably in the
choice of some of her servants. Important military
men like Petr Shuvalov and Field-Marshal Buturlin
owed their position directly to the inclinations of
5 6 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

for sessions with her Chancellor. According as her target for the rampant xenophobia of those years.
tenure on the throne became more secure, she gave Officers were liable to be manhandled by their
still freer rein to her bent for dissipation' own troops, or by thugs in the streets, and at court
(Zinzendorf, in Volz and Kiintzel, 1899, 680). they attracted the hostile glare of Bestuzhev.
Important questions of state might languish three Nobody grieved much for the departure of some
or four years before Elizabeth could be persuaded of the Germans, but the resignation of people like
to take an interest in them, while routine matters Keith was generally felt to be a severe loss.
were usually forgotten altogether. Only occa- Under the same dispensation, the unity of
sionally did Elizabeth bestir herself from her military affairs was destroyed for the sake of
lethargy, bursting out with foul language and building up the authority of the Senate, which was
physical violence, and giving herself over to bouts not only restored on its Petrine foundations, but
of work, and this ^as when her pride was endowed with law-making powers, and permitted
affronted, or when she felt herself or her country to carry the voice of the high nobility into the
under threat. management of state affairs. The War College
The lack of leadership in public life did much forfeited the supervision of all matters appertain-
to promote the rise of Count Aleksei Bestuzhev- ing to supply, provisions, and the administration
Ryumin, who became her Chancellor, or foreign of the artillery and engineers, which were taken
minister, in 1744. 'He was not without judgment', over by a number of bodies which answered to the
testified Manstein, 'and by dint of long routine he Senate — namely a Glavnyi Kommissariat, a
acquired a considerable knowledge of affairs, being Proviantskaya Kantselyarya, and a Kantselyarya
very industrious. At the same time he was afflicted Glavnoi Artillerii i Fortifikatsii. It was typical that
with a temperament that was haughty, debauched the post of Master General of the Ordnance was
and treacherous' (1860, II, 222-3). Here was a left unfilled between 1748 and 1756.
notable exception to our rule concerning physical In the process, a number of vital functions of
comeliness. Bestuzhev was equally hideous, administration were forgotten almost entirely,
whether his visage wore its habitual expression of particularly the ones relating to the supervision of
sour discontent, or was split in a horrid grin, accounts, and to the inspection of the regiments
revealing toothless gums. (so important for keeping up numbers and stan-
Elizabeth's guiding principles in the early years dards). Thus the army began to suffer arrears of
of her reign were to destroy the work of Anna's pay, which was a significant detail, since Miinnich
time, and rearrange affairs according to what she had always been meticulous in the matter. The
imagined to be the ideas of Peter the Great. The shortage of cash was accentuated by the extrava-
case of the drill regulations was typical. Elizabeth gance of the court, and the creation of fifty new
emphasised that the provisions were to be battalions in 1747, which brought the establish-
observed: 'in every respect according to the earlier ment of the regular army to 270,791 men. The
code, which was in force during the lifetime of government, therefore, had to raise the poll-tax
His Imperial Highness Peter the Great. This is to and the price of monopoly products, and cast
hold true for all regiments, without the slightest about for foreign subsidies. All of this provided a
exception, and the Prussian way is not to be very uncertain base for the great military effort of
followed' (Beskrovnyi, 1957, 128). Since,however, the Seven Years War.
the Code of 1716 did not enter into tactical
details, Peter Lacy had to supply the lack by
composing a Description of the Drill of an Infantry The reckoning with the Swedes, 1742-3
Regiment, which was circulated in manuscript
in 1746. Encouraged by some irresponsible advice from the
Although men like Lacy were absolutely indis- French, the Swedish government threw aside the
pensable, the foreigners as a whole became an easy chance of an accord with the new regime in Russia,
 57 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

and pressed for the return of all Karelia with Bestuzhev was all for annexing the whole of
Vyborg, which would have brought the Swedes Finland as a near-impenetrable obstacle against the
once more within eighty miles of St Petersburg. Swedes. The other leading members of the govern-
Elizabeth was inclined towards conciliation and ment were, however, unwilling to press home the
peace, but she was also the daughter of Peter the advantage, and they settled for an advance of the
Great, and 'that great prince knew the importance frontier sixty miles to the Kyumen, 'which river,
of being a European power, and would rather have as it traverses the whole country, is looked upon as
suffered a thousand deaths, than return again to a very necessary barrier to prevent the Swedes
be an Asiatic one, as his ancestors were' (E. Finch, from attacking Russia on the side of Finland'
1 December 1741, SIRIO, 1894, XCIV, 350). (C. Wich, 26 August 1742, SIRIO, 1897, XCIX,
Peace negotiations were broken off, and Elizabeth 50).
declared to the people of Finland that she would 1
make their country into an independent state, and
that it would serve as 'a barrier and division The march to Germany, 1748
between the Russian and Swedish borders'.
In Field-Marshal Lacy Elizabeth had a com- Long-term political considerations and the hope of
mander who excelled in the rapid and economical financial gain drew the piggy eyes of Bestuzhev to
style of campaigning that the situation demanded, the West, where the British and Dutch armies were
and who knew the theatre of war from his experi- being soundly beaten by the French in the last
ences in 1741 (see p. 48). He crossed the .borders campaigns of the War of the Austrian Succession.
of Swedish Finland on 24 June 1742, and drove Bestuzhev was genuinely anxious to do something
his 25,000 men in a single column down the coast to prop up the maritime powers, whom he saw as a
road, relying on his galley flotilla to keep him necessary counterbalance to the Swedes and
supplied. "The main road offered the only prac- Prussians, but he also hoped that these rich but
ticable route, since rocks, woods and marshes unlucky people would reciprocate by helping
stretched endlessly on either side' (Manstein, Russia in her financial straits. In 1747, therefore,
1860,11,250). a series of agreements bound the maritime powers
Lacy seized the advanced Swedish magazine at to make over 2,250,000 roubles (£500,000) to
Fredrikshamn without opposition, and ignoring Russia over a period of a year and a half, in return
the instructions from the court he pressed over the for which Russia was to maintain a corps in
River Kyumen in pursuit of the Swedes, who Livonia to hold the Prussians in check, and send
wanted to make good their escape at Abo. Lacy another powerful force marching against the
learnt from some Finnish peasants of a circuitous French.
track which Peter had cut through the same forests Russia was treaty-bound to dispatch 30,000
thirty years before, and a rapid march down this troops to Germany, but in the event 37,000
path brought him to the coast road just ahead of actually set out, which was a deliberate measure of
the Swedish army, which was consequently bottled military over-insurance. The officer complement
up in Helsingfors and forced to capitulate. was assembled only with difficulty, and consisted
For 1743 the Russian government decided to half of native Russians, and half of the best of the
prosecute the war with vigour, and pile as many of remaining foreigners. Old Field-Marshal Lacy was
their troops as possible on board the galleys for the most obvious choice for supreme command,
wide-ranging offensive operations. For this pur- but Elizabeth could not bear to let him leave
pose the army was formed into two divisions, with Russia, and the command of the columns was
Keith taking the lead. The Swedes feared for the entrusted to people like Prince Vasilii Anikitich
safety of their mainland, and in the face of the Repnin and Lieutenant-General Lieven, who were
amphibious threat they brought hostilities to an some of the best horses in the Russian stable.
end by coming to terms at Abo on 6 August 1743. Cook describes the ensemble as 'a body of the
5 8 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

most complete troops I ever saw, commanded by white uniform of our infantry and the diverse garb
choice generals' (Cook, 1770, II, 568). Everything of our cavalry, the appearance of the Russians was
about the expedition indicates that the Russians odd, with all their infantry clad in green, and their
were aware that their army was going to be on cavalry in blue. The Kalmyks in particular . . .
show before the world. made a strong impression on people who had not
As the Russian corps emerged into Central seen visages of that kind before.
Europe, it came under close scrutiny from Western
The Austrian military men concluded that, with
military men and students of human affairs. The
the exception of a few regiments, the 'Russian
British commissary, Major-General Mordaunt,
forces fully lived up to their renown' (Khevenhuller-
admired the soldierly air of the force, but he
Metsch, 1907-72, II, 241-2).
noticed that the Russians were:
While the Russians were marching through
behindhand with their neighbours in some Germany, still well short of their goal, they learnt
particulars. Alertness seems the very soul of our that their presence was unnecessary, for peace
[military] calling, and the Russian troops, negotiations were already well advanced at Aix-la-
appointed as they are, can never act with Chapelle. Prince Repnin was one peaceful victim
expedition. They always march in heavy, high- of the campaign, dying of an apoplectic stroke on
heeled boots, and each soldier carries a large 31 July. Otherwise, the losses on this long march
cloak, or what is worse, it must go with the were small, since the officers took good care of the
baggage. Their tents are made of a sort of sailcloth health and discipline of their troops, and less than
and consequently weighty, and to add to the eight hundred of the men deserted during the
weight all their tentpoles even go on the waggons. outward and homeward trek of eight months.
(9 June 1748, SIRIO, 1901, CX, 160) Bestuzhev calmly retained the whole of the
subsidy for Russia, which gave the Treasury a
Technically speaking, the Russians were acting clear profit of nearly one million roubles, and he
as auxiliaries of the Austrians, who were allies of reported with satisfaction to Elizabeth:
the British and Dutch, and the route took the
Russian corps by way of the Austrian province of The flames of war spread apace, as long as Your
Moravia. Towards evening on 16 June the first Imperial Majesty was content to be a spectator
regiments marched into Kremsier, with their while the intrigues [of France and Prussia] tore
cloaks slung over their shoulders like scarves, and Europe apart. Once, however, Your Imperial
they were greeted by the co-sovereigns of Austria, Majesty made clear Your desire to intervene with
the Empress-Queen Maria Theresa and her consort, an impressive force, the face of European affairs
Emperor Francis Stephen. Over the following days immediately assumed a very different aspect
the little army went through its evolutions under a . . . the Russian corps of observation advanced
burning sun, while the commanders dined with the only as far as was needed to imbue the whole of
two Imperial Majesties. An Austrian courtier noted Europe with a sense of the glory of the Imperial
that: arms, and win for Your Majesty the flattering
title of 'Peace-Giver of the Continent'. (Rambaud,
Repnin spoke excellent French and a little 1895,5)
German. Lieven (as a Kurlander) spoke German as
his native language, but Lopukhin needed an Here was a clear and significant statement of the
interpreter. Of the other generals and staff role of Russia as the resolver of muddled affairs in
officers, who included some foreigners, most the West, a theme to which the rulers of that
understood German, and they included in their country were to return in later generations. More
ranks a very large number of extremely handsome immediate precedents were set by the apparent
and fine-mannered men. winning of great political ends for the minimum
For us Austrians, who were accustomed to the expenditure of military force, and for the ease
 59 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

with which affairs had been directed from distant she was infuriated by the stories he was spreading
St Petersburg — all of which was going to colour about her manner of life.
Russia's intervention in the Seven Years War. At The foundation of Russian foreign policy was
the same time some useful lessons had emerged, the long-enduring alliance with Austria, with
particularly concerning the relative backwardness whom Russia shared common interests against
of the Russians in matters of drill and supply, and Turkey and France, as expressed in a treaty of
the pressure from Colonel Zakhar Chernyshev and 1726. The Empress Maria Theresa actually sur-
other young officers was to lead directly to the passed Elizabeth in her loathing of Frederick,
Military Commission of 1755 and the consequent whom she regarded as the enemy of her dynasty
reshaping of the army. and the robber of the rich Austrian province of
Silesia, and this further bond was cemented in a
defensive alliance of 2 June 1746. So as to lend
The approach to the Seven Years War — the weight to his dispositions, Bestuzhev held a heavy
Diplomatic Revolution and the rise concentration of forces in the Baltic provinces,
of the Shuvalovs despite the high cost of provisions in that part of
the world.
When the Russians returned to Central Europe, it An imperial conference of 25 and 26 May 1753
was by right of the sword, and to fight some of the constituted the most determined step so far
bloodiest battles of the century. The enemy towards achieving Bestuzhev's aggressive designs.
concerned was the new and most formidable Elizabeth and her ministers decided not merely to
power of Prussia under King Frederick II, the lend help to Russia's allies, if they came under
Great, and the man ultimately responsible for attack by Prussia, but to take positive measures to
bringing the Russian and Prussian armies into reduce Prussia once more to the category of a
conflict was Chancellor Bestuzhev, who detected a minor principality. With such an ambition in mind,
long-term threat to Russian interests in the Russia was to maintain a corps of 60,000 regulars
character and ambitions of Old Fritz. in Livonia, to gather a reserve force of another
The Prussians were already intriguing in Sweden 60,000 troops, and to undertake a large overall
and Poland, and Bestuzhev feared that Frederick's increase in the establishment of the army:
schemes of aggrandisement might extend to
As soon as our forces have attained the above-
Kurland (now virtually a Russian province) and
mentioned strength, we will be well-placed, both
Livonia. For ends such as this Frederick was likely
to make a diversion against Prussia, in case the
to sacrifice every engagement. Bestuzhev was well
King of Prussia attacks Hanover, and, if we find it
informed of the state of his own army through his
necessary in the future, to take the initiative in
connections with Marshal Apraksin, and he echoed
declaring and opening the war against him.
an old sentiment of Miinnich to the effect that
(Mediger, 1952,456)
some kind of war was desirable on first principles,
so as to afford the soldiers 'employment in their Bestuzhev's intelligence and consistency were
noble and proper calling, in which they can never no defence against a rival force that was gathering
be given sufficient practice' (Mediger, 1952, 325). at court around the glamorous and ambitious
Bestuzhev submitted a detailed memorandum Shuvalov clan. The three brothers Shuvalov
on the nature of the Prussian threat to the empress (pronounced Shuvarluv) came from an old but
as early as September 1745. For one who was poor noble stock, and they owed their collective
normally so pacific and unsystematic, Elizabeth place in the imperial confidence to the support
over the following years began to warm to the which they gave Elizabeth in her revolution of
scheme of the Prussian war with remarkable 1741. The young and gentle Ivan Shuvalov was
enthusiasm. She disapproved of Frederick as a now the object of Elizabeth's most tender affec-
man, as well as a potential enemy to Russia, and tions. Aleksandr Shuvalov, in contrast, had a firm
6 0 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

control of the physical instruments of power in he hoped to meet the deficit by raising the indirect
St Petersburg, as head of the police and the dreaded taxes, and by carrying through a profitable
state tribunal of justice. re-coinage by which the state called in the pieces
The Shuvalov who has the greatest relevance to of gold and silver, and issued a copper currency
our story is, however, Petr Ivanovich (1710-62), that was struck from the metal of obsolete guns.
'a man of enterprise and great thoughts' (Danilov, In 1756 Petr set up an 'Artillery Bank' to supervise
1842, 80). He became an influential voice in the the process, thereby anticipating the opening of
Senate (1744) and the new court conference, the first public bank in 1772. So it was that
generalanshef (1751), Master General of the financial affairs offered an exception to the
Ordnance (1756), and finally effective controller habitual slow pace of Russian government. Petr
of the war machine and the national finances, and Shuvalov did not neglect his own interests. His
commander of the Livonian division. house was stuffed with documents relating not just
His financial gifts by themselves made Petr to his public concerns, but to private enterprises
precious to the state. The cost of maintaining the like seal oil or mast timber, which gave him a
army in being rose from 5,428,108 roubles in personal income of an alleged 400,000 roubles a
1749, to 6,683,096 in 1756, and to 7,924,749 in year.
1760, independently of the costs of the war and As evidence of the impressive quality of
other additional expenses. Petr Shuvalov was Shuvalov's military thought, we may cite his
unwilling to increase the poll-tax still further, but projects for a Higher Military Department or
School, which he advanced in various forms in
1753, in 1755 and finally, with the help of
Lomonosov, in 1758. Shuvalov was convinced that
a sound knowledge of the mechanics and prin-
ciples of war must go towards the formation of the
young officer,' and that 'leadership is not enough'
(Shmidt, in Beskrovnyi, 1969, 393). To provide
this foundation, his Higher Military Department
was to instruct the students in military writing, the
paths of the transmission of orders, the means by
which ammunition, clothing, pay and provisions
reached the army, the laying-out of camps, and the
conduct of marches and movements in the field.
However, Shuvalov appreciated the dangers of a
narrow professionalism. He believed it important
'to consider all the well-known battles and encoun-
ters, evaluating the mistakes which caused them to
be lost, and exploring the action of artillery and
its employment in battles and sieges'. Likewise, on
Saturdays a professor was to discuss 'the present
political affairs of Europe, and the armed forces of
the European powers' (Shmidt, in Beskrovnyi,
1969, 400). These excellent proposals were put
before the Senate, but they were lost to view in
the turmoil of the later Seven Years War.
To begin with, Petr Shuvalov had opposed the
Bestuzhev policy of military build-up and con-
10 Petr Shuvalov frontation, but by 1755 he had seized the initia-
 61 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

tive in the matter for himself, declaring 'the an imperial conference resolved to make overtures
Prussians are certainly formidable people, and we to Austria concerning offensive action against
will have to work night and day in order to draw Prussia, and to carry out a mobilisation of forces
level. But the most important thing is not to be in the Baltic provinces. Over the next two months
afraid of them' (Zinzendorf, 1755, in Volz and nearly 130,000 troops were alerted to execute the
Kiintzel, 1899,688). great design (see p. 73). Galleys and warships
The Shuvalov tribe was well placed to profit assembled at Riga and Revel, and spies and topo-
by any miscalculation on the part of Bestuzhev. graphical experts began to sound out the land
The Chancellor offered an opening to his rivals avenues to the west. Kaunitz wrote in some alarm
through his obstinacy concerning the structure of to his representative in St Petersburg "The Russians
the alliance, which he conceived in terms of an are pushing ahead with far too much speed and
immutable grouping of Russia, Austria, the mari- violence, before affairs are ripe. This could ruin
time powers, Hanover and Saxony. The Shuvalovs everything' (Volz and Kiintzel, 1899, 370): On
were bound by no such commitments. 10 June the Russian government accordingly
Oddly enough, Bestuzhev failed to appreciate suspended the move to the frontiers.
that the increase in Russia's own power might It took a little time for the diplomats to catch
bring about a change in relations. This more than up with all the warlike enthusiasm. The initial
anything else was what concerned Frederick of agreements revolved around the First Treaty of
Prussia, who in his fear of Russian intentions was Versailles of 1 May 1756, which was a defensive
willing to throw over his old French connection agreement between the ancient enemies Austria
and make a deal with Hanover and Britain, as some and France. Frederick the Great sought to break
kind of insurance and restraint in respect of the the ring of his gathering enemies through military
Russians. The consequent Prusso-British accord action, and in the autumn of 1756 he launched his
was expressed in the famous Convention of splendid army into an invasion of the neutral state
Westminster of 27 January 1756. of Saxony, which had valuable resources and an
The Convention set in train two sequences of important strategic position. Thus, in spite of all
events. First, the French were appalled by the the provocations of the allies, Frederick had cast
treachery of Frederick, their old ally, and the himself in the role of the bad man of Europe,
Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz at last managed to which greatly assisted the diplomats in their work.
make some headway in his ambition to overthrow On 11 January 1757 Russia acceded to. the
'an ancient, deep-rooted prejudice' and win the First Treaty of Versailles, which made her for the
French over to an active alliance with the two first time an ally of France. Then, on 2 February,
empires of eastern Europe. The question of true the Russians and their old Austrian friends con-
French interests in the affair has long been a cluded a Convention of St Petersburg, which was
matter of debate among historians, but there is a programme for military co-operation against
little doubt that the weakening of the French Frederick of Prussia, as disturber of the public
position in the Baltic and the East helped signifi- peace. Austria and Russia accepted the common
cantly in the extension of Russian influence into obligation to put 80,000 troops each into the
Europe in the second half of the eighteenth field, while Austria promised to pay a subsidy of
century. one million roubles per annum, and the Russians
Second, the news of the betrayal by the British undertook to invade Prussian territory as soon as
served as a catalyst within Russia. The 'system' of possible. Russia asked for no territorial gains, yet
Bestuzhev lay in ruins, and in an explosion of rare bound herself not to lay down arms until Maria
energy Elizabeth worked with the Shuvalovs and Theresa was reinstated as mistress of Silesia and
the 'French' party of Vice-Chancellor M. Glatz. These proposals had been made by the
Vorontsov to visit punishment on the head of the Austrian ambassador Esterhazy, and they were
doubly perfidious Frederick. On 25 March 1756 accepted in toto by the Russians. Articles five and
6 2 Elizabeth P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

eleven dealt with practical questions of military Chernyshev of the St Petersburg Regiment, and
liaison. The armies were to help each other out they were what you might have expected of
with transport and supply, and they were to keen and professionally minded officers who had
exchange military plenipotentiaries who would little or no experience of warfare. It is not unkind
have a seat and voice in councils of war. to say that the 1755 Code sought to out-Prussianise
Although the Austrians had taken the initiative the Prussians through weight of fire, complexity of
in tying the great Austro-Russo-French alliance evolutions, and accuracy of execution. Almost
together, the power of Russia had worked to every formation, movement or method of fire
decisive effect in the interesting events of 1755-6, could be carried out in a variety of ways. Out of
and in the process of the Diplomatic Revolution combat the line was one of four ranks, disposed at
as a whole: f intervals of three paces, making a total depth of
line of between ten and twelve paces. The intervals
The calculation of Russia's enormous military
were closed up to deliver fire, with optional
potential was the key to Maria Theresa's
formations of three or four ranks; in the first
understanding of her role in European politics.
instance only the first rank loaded and fired in the
The fear that dominated Frederick was his belief
kneeling position, but in the case of the four-rank
that his territory would soon be invaded by tens
line, both the first and second ranks flopped to the
of thousands of Russian troops in the pay of
ground in the same way.
Great Britain. It was that conviction which made
As for the arrangement in width, the regimental
him conclude the Convention of Westminster.
adjutant made a tactical subdivision of the
(Kaplan, 1968, 125)
musketeers of the battalion into 'divisions' (usually
four), half divisions, and platoons (at two to the
half division). A grenadier company of six platoons
The approach to the Seven Years War — the stood on either flank of the battalion. As soon as
rebuilding of the army the fire-fight began, a small reserve was to be
formed from one platoon of the battalion of
In a characteristically Russian style the War College musketeers and two platoons from each company
entrusted the work of bringing the army up to the of the grenadiers, so as to cover the flanks, replace
times to a special Military Commission. Yurii any losses, and reinforce weak points.
Lieven was one of the leading lights in the first As was normal at the time, the men were
board, which came together in November 1755, expected to fire in massed volleys, which became
and worked out the establishment (size and com- an almost impossible ideal after a couple of
position) of the army, as well as putting together minutes of combat. On top of this, Chernyshev
new codes for the infantry and cavalry, and and his friends worked out wonderful arrange-
defining the organisation of the grenadiers, regular ments for rolling fire by Prussian-type platoons,
cavalry and Cossacks. The sessions of 1756 and whether standing (in the order 1, 3, 2, 4) or on the
1757 looked more to the management of rear march, as well as by various combinations for the
services, camps and the like. half divisions.
In 1755 Petr Shuvalov eagerly sought out the No less than four kinds of square are described
Austrian representatives in St Petersburg, so as to for defence against cavalry, namely, the regi-
talk of the 'novel evolutions he had made in mental square, the battalion square, the 'bent'
imitation of the Prussians' (Zinzendorf, in Volz square and the 'long' square. The regiments usually
and Kiintzel, 1899, 711). These were expressed in marched to the field in the standard mid-
the new infantry code, the Opisanie Pekhotogo eighteenth-century open platoon column, which
Polkovogo Stroyu, which was published on 15 made it possible to deploy into line by the proces-
December 1755. The articles were composed by sional movement (see Duffy, The Army of
Shuvalov and his favourite, Colonel Zakhar Frederick the Great, London, 1974, 83-4), but the
 63 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

1755 Code has some interesting things to say that 'The chief strength of their army lies in their
about the offensive use of columns by the battalion regiments of grenadiers. The men are really tough
and the sub-units: and strong, if lacking in nimbleness and vivacity.
The officers are likewise splendid men, though cast
No formation may compare with the columns with
in the Russian mould' (AKV, 1870-95, VI, 48).
respect to the strength and solidity they derive
As for the horse, 'The whole activity and strength
variously from their depth, facility of movement,
of the cavalry . . . consists in the bravery of the men,
striking-power, and the quality of speedy and
in the good employment of the sword, in firm and
dogged marching. Such columns may therefore be
employed both to break the enemy front, and to compact formations, and in a ferocious impact
withstand attack by cavalry. (Gippius, in Skalon, delivered at a fast gallop' (Mikhnevich, in Skalon,
1902-c.l911, IV, pt 1, bk 2, sect. 3, 56) 1902-C.1911, IV, pt 1, bk 1, 169). This passage
from the new cavalry code of 1755 gives a clue to
Here we may detect the influence of authorities the nature of that clear, forceful and sensible
like the Frenchman Folard. document, altogether superior to the correspond-
The new infantry code was first applied by Petr ing regulations for the infantry. The tactical unit
Shuvalov to his Livonian division, and then, in the of the cavalry was established as the squadron of
course of 1756, huge printed volumes went out to about 150 men (138 in 1756), divided into two
all the infantry regiments. Officers and men had to companies of two platoons each. By the end of
re-learn their trade from scratch, and the conse- 1757, for the sake of greater flexibility, the
quent confusions lasted into the war years, at least squadron had been reduced to forty-six three-rank
according to the Prussian spy Lambert: files, and the company to twenty-three. The
squadron column was the usual formation for
The first rank always remains kneeling. They
movements on the battlefield, and the regiment
deliver fire very badly, and although deployment
deployed into line for combat by diagonal move-
into line has been introduced into their service,
ment of the component squadrons from' the
the infantry regiment is scarcely capable of
centre. The troopers were now drawn up in a line
arranging a line in less than an hour, and even then
three ranks deep, and upon the order to attack
the process is always attended with disorder.
they moved forward at the trot; at four hundred
(AKV, 1870-95, VI, 481)
paces from the enemy the trot gave way to a
In this matter, as in almost everything else, gallop, and this in turn broke into a wild carriere
people were willing to make an exception in before the final impact. Fire from the saddle
favour of the elite of the Russian infantry, the was positively discouraged, except in rare
grenadiers. Miinnich had done away with the circumstances.
original regiments of grenadiers in the 1730s, but It was a pity that the appearance of the cavalry
in 1742 Elizabeth (who liked big men on prin- regulations was overtaken so soon by the two
ciple) revived them in the shape of forty-five mobilisations for the Seven Years War, and by a
companies of 130 grenadiers apiece, who were very extensive reorganisation of the whole cavalry
attached to the regiments of musketeers, 'as fine arm. Rumyantsev's cuirassiers and the mounted
men, and as well exercised and appointed as . . . in grenadiers at Riga put a lot of effort into learning
any part of Europe' (C. Wich, 10 April 1742, the new ways, but the rest of the horse still carried
SIRIO, 1894, XCI, 456). On 30 March 1756 the out the rules of the 'Prussian Exercise' of 1731,
third, or reserve, battalion of each infantry regi- which was one of the less happy products of
ment was deprived of its grenadiers, and the troops Miinnich's time.
went to form four complete regiments (numbered A review of the cavalry was certainly an urgent
First, Second, Third, Fourth) which were accounted necessity, and in the busy year of 1755 a Cavalry
very fine, 'both in point of men and clothing' Reorganisation Commission was constituted with
(Tielke, 1788, II, 29). Even Lambert conceded the aim of making the Russian horse not just
6 4 Elizabeth P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

equal, but superior to the cavalry of the other stumble and decant their riders from the saddle.
powers, 'since experience shows that unsupported (AKV, 1870-95, VI, 483)
infantry is incapable of beating an enemy who has
effective cavalry at his disposal'. It was only too Six further regiments of dragoons were trans-
clear that the dragoons, the mainstay of the formed into mounted grenadiers, with rather more
Russian regular cavalry, were 'completely unsuit- success. The Commission hoped for great things of
able for mounted combat against the regular them, for no other army had anything of the kind,
cavalry of other European armies' (Maslovskii, and a Saxon officer testifies that the grenadiers
1888-93,1,317). were 'the flower of the dragoons', though almost
On 30 March 1756 Elizabeth approved a range as badly mounted as the rest (Tielke, 1788, II, 27).
of proposals from the Reorganisation Commission, On the field of battle they were to be employed as
relating to the doubling of the prices allowed for an elite reserve, holding themselves ready to charge
fodder, a raising of the sums paid for dragoon and home with cold steel when they were most needed.
hussar remounts-, a closer supervision on the part On campaign, however, they were to consider the
of regimental officers of the quality of the employment of their special attribute, the grenade,
remounts, the reduction of the regimental estab- of which every man carried two in a pouch. It was
lishments to forty-six files per squadron, and the thought likely that in East Prussia the main resist-
breaking of the near-monopoly of the dragoons in ance would be offered by hussars and peasants in
the regular cavalry. The last aim was to be achieved uniform, who might try to hold out in buildings or
through increasing the number of regiments of behind other cover. In such an event the grenadiers
cuirassiers, and by creating a new category of were to dismount and cast their grenades inside
horse — the mounted grenadiers. the strongpoint, where the explosions would work
Three regiments of cuirassiers survived from the to devastating effect in the confined space.
Miinnich era. They were now reinforced by three The regiments of mounted grenadiers were
more, those of Kazan, Novgorod and Astrakhan, accompanied by several carts with spare grenades,
which were simply conversions from the dragoons. and like the new cuirassier regiments and the
Indeed, until late in the war they were still clad in parent regiments of dragoons they were each
their infantry-type coats of light blue, and rode supported by mounted artillery in the shape of
light Russian horses that were quite unsuitable for two 3-pounders with horsed detachments.
the work of heavy cavalry. The veteran regiments The sad rump of eighteen regiments of dragoons
were not in much better state, at least according to still formed the basic stock of the regular cavalry.
Captain Lambert, who saw two of them in They came low in the order of priorities, and they
November 1757. They had to make up their arrived at the war with little training or sense of
deficiencies in horseflesh by buying up carriage cohesion, having spent the last years scattered in
horses as they marched through the Baltic penny packets along the Tartar and Polish borders.
provinces, and Nobody attempted to make much provision for
the Cossacks in time of peace, and not a great deal
They are very slow to form their squadrons, and could be expected of the other element of light
they deliver the charge at nothing faster than the irregular cavalry, the hussars, even though the
trot. When the order comes Halt! Dress! you might Serbian colonels Horvat, Depreradovich and Sevich
find twelve or more ranks piled up in one spot, had recently settled with thousands of their
while in other places there will be room for a Orthodox compatriots under this name in New
whole platoon to drive through. On these Serbia and Slavonic Serbia.
occasions they open fire by entire ranks, but with Even the more conscientious of the cavalry
such confusion that I still do not know what they officers were overwhelmed by the untimely
really intended to do, for the whole regiment coincidence between this fundamental re-making
subsides into a heap, where many of the horses of the cavalry and the arrival of the Seven Years
 77 E l i z a b e t h Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

11 Cornet of cuirassiers, Seven Years War. Straw-coloured elkskin collet (short coat); straw-coloured
waistcoat and breeches;'l731-model black cuirass. He carries a white (first squadron) standard. This
uniform, almost identical to that of the Prussian cuirassiers, was introduced by Munnich (Viskovatov,

1844-56)
 6 6 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

^mm
< ->>.

12 Dragoon, Seven Years War. Blue coat with red collar, cuffs and turn-backs; white, straw-coloured
blue waistcoat; white or straw-coloured breeches; hat with white border and white cockade (as with
infantry); white or yellow belts; blue or red shabraque and holster covers (Viskovatov 1844-56)
 67 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

War. In the winter of 1756-7 we find Rumyantsev The new Master General had a variety of
bombarding the colonels of his command with measures for keeping people up to their work. He
detailed and pointed rebukes and instructional issued appropriate codes to the branches of the
letters, calling company commanders to account artillery, and in the summer of 1756 the gunners
for negligence, and ordering physical punishments held a series of long exercise camps, where they
for cuirassiers who failed to keep their uniforms learnt to build up the speed and accuracy of their
and weapons in a clean and tidy state. fire. Within the artillery-engineer administration
The broken-backed double mobilisation of May (reunited in the 1740s) Shuvalov drew up a
and August 1756 was destructive enough in itself, detailed code for the conduct of business, and he
and some of the best of the regiments were ruined began to sound out how his staff actually spent
by forced »marches in the snowy spring of 1757. their time. It transpired that in the eighteen
The full establishment of the regular cavalry stood months from June 1756 to November 1757 the
at 39,546, yet for all his efforts Apraksin was able veteran Engineer General Hannibal reported for
to muster only 7,000 troopers at the battle of only seventeen days at his office; ninety-three
Gross-Jagersdorf. The cavalry therefore remained further days were allegedly spent on duty else-
the weakest of the Russian arms in the Seven where, and Hannibal gave out that for the rest of
Years War, despite all the care which had gone into the time he was unwell. The paperwork was in
its formation. arrears by literally thousands of documents, and
The management of the technical branches the blackamoor was ultimately forced to retire
engaged Petr Shuvalov more immediately, and his in 1759.
concern was evident even before he was appointed In virtue of the Artillery Establishment of 11
Master General of the Ordnance in 1756. Already January 1757 and subsequent ordinances the
in October 1755 the Austrian diplomat Zinzendorf artillery of the Seven Years War comprised four
wrote that in the field of artillery the Russians major formations, each commanded by its own
'have' made some astonishing advances which they general, namely:
are trying to keep secret' (Volz and Kiintzel, 1899,
687). On 31 May of the next year came Shuvalov's 1 the Field Artillery, which was made up of:
Master Generalship, and in September he took (a) a regiment of field artillery proper, with
under his wing the Oruzhennaya Kantselyariya, medium and light pieces (208 by 1759), destined
which was responsible for manufacturing the to form massed batteries;
artillery. 'Upon the count's assuming control of (b) a Regimental Artillery Regiment, with seventy-
the artillery, many projects saw the light of day, six commands of gunners, and 456 3-pounder
both sensible and useless, principally because the cannon and light coehorn mortars. Every
count was an inventor himself, and accordingly infantry regiment was allotted between two
asked all the officers what devices they might have and four pieces of each type, while every
to show him' (Danilov, 1842, 81). Ingenious folk regiment of horse had a 3-pounder cannon and
like the technicians Martinov and Danilov were one or two coehorns;
close to his heart, but he reposed his principal 2 the artillery of the Observation Corps, with
confidence in the excellent Major-General Kornelii 408 pieces (twenty-four 3-pounders and 384
Bogdanovich Borozdin (1708-73), who helped him coehorns);
to work out his regulations for the artillery. In 3 the specialised artillery of the Secret Howitzer
1757 Borozdin went off to the wars to take Corps;
command of the field artillery, and he distinguished 4 the siege artillery of three parks, those at St
himself at Zorndorf, Paltzig, and above all at Petersburg, Kiev and Belgorod. The only train
Kunersdorf. He was so badly shot up in the which actually appeared on the theatre of war was
process that he had to return to Shuvalov's side at a park of sixteen 18- and 24-pounders, seven heavy
St Petersburg. mortars and fifty coehorns, which was contributed
6 8 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

13 Artillery of the Seven Years War: cannon on sledge for winter campaigning

by the St Petersburg park. The pieces were landed Cannon: 3- (two horses), 6- (seven horses),
at Libau in 1757, and were later moved to 8- (nine horses), 12- (fifteen horses), 18- and
Konigsberg. Here they stayed idle, thanks to the 24-pounders;
indecision of the Conference at St Petersburg, and Howitzers: half-pwd (at forty pounds to the pud)
the burden of land transport, which would have (seven horses), one-pud (fifteen horses);
demanded 12,000 horses and ruined the economy Mortars: 6-pounder coehorn, 2-pud, 5-pud, 9-pud.
of East Prussia. The rest of the artillery was moved
by a Field Artillery Train of 2,052 personnel and The lighter cannon were each accompanied into
4,461 horses, which was put on a permanent the field by ammunition carts carrying 120 round-
footing in 1757. shot and thirty rounds of canister. The barrels of
all pieces were rather weighty by Western stan-
So far we have been describing conventional dards of the 1750s, and the carriages were of
artillery which approximated closely to the clumsy and rude manufacture, and indeed were
ordnance of other lands, to wit: often made by the regiments themselves.
 69 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

14 Artillery of the Seven Years War: 24-pounder

cannon (left) and 5-pud mortar (right)
15 Artillery of the Seven Years War: 24-pounder
cannon (top) and 5 - p u d mortar (bottom) (side
view)

Seized by an access of what the eighteenth- He wished to become Master General of the
century would have called 'enthusiasm', Shuvalov Ordnance, and so, even before he attained this
went on to develop a series of pieces that were post, he devised a certain howitzer with a bore
intended to dazzle the world through their that was not round, but oval . . . Since the piece
technical brilliance and originality. These were of scattered its small shot widely, it was called the
three types: 'secret howitzer', and nobody was allowed to see
the muzzle, which was shielded by a copper lid,
1 The Bliznyatki were tiny field mortars, cast which in turn was fastened with a lock. (Danilov,
two-and-two together, designed by the artillery 1842,80-1)
officer Mikhail Vasilevich Danilov after he had )

read Saint-Remy's Memoires d'Artillerie. Great The secret howitzer looked normal enough at first
quantities were sent to the army in 1757, but they sight, and attracted attention only through its
were soon discarded as useless. spindly wheels, and (in some pieces at least) the
fairly advanced feature of screw elevation. The bar-
2 The Secret Howitzer was a still more eccentric rel was eighteen calibres long, and conventionally
piece which owed its genesis directly to Shuvalov. round in exterior diameter, but if you got close
7 0 Elizabeth P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

16 Artillery of the Seven Years War: light field

gun (left). Note the tiny coehorn mortars set on
the brackets of the carriage. Conventional
half -pud howitzer (right)
17 Artillery of the Seven Years War: side view of
the conventional half -pud howitzer
18 Artillery of the Seven Years War: half -pud
unicorn (top) and half -pud Shuvalov secret
howitzer (bottom)

enough to see the muzzle you at once noted that active cavalry is in upon them before they can be
the bore was markedly flattened along the hori- loaded a second time, which was the case at
zontal plane, with a width equal to a 24-pounder, Zorndorf, where seventeen of them were lost'
but a height equivalent only to a 3-pounder. The (Tielke, 1788, II, 39-40). The round par
intention was to discharge a shower of deadly excellence of the secret howitzer was the
canister parallel with the ground at about the canister. The package of 168 2-ounce lead balls
height of a man. spewed out to three hundred paces, and that of
The propelling charges, the packages of shot, forty-eight 7-ounce lead balls carried up to six
and the specially-designed shells were all of oval hundred. It was probably the latter round that de
shape to match. The powder charge came in two la Messeliere saw demonstrated in winter quarters
weights - one of five pounds for normal ranges, in 1757-8, when he was informed that at six
and six pounds for longer ranges — and it was hundred paces the secret howitzer could shower a
wrapped in a flannel bag. The charge was first zone equivalent to the frontage of a battalion
positioned in the bore in a hollow cylinder of tin, (Messeliere, 1803, 116). The grape ranged up to
and then pushed home with the rammer. 'Their 1,200 paces, and was made of an agglomeration of
loading is . . . so troublesome and slow, that an 3-pounder balls which separated on leaving the
 71 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

19 Details of the Shuvalov secret howitzer. Figs 12 and 13 (centre) show the barrel of the unicorn

muzzle. Illuminating rounds and shell were also 3 The Unicorn, the last and most significant of
provided, though the shape must have made for a the new pieces, owed its name (odinorog) to the
very erratic performance. unicorn device of the Shuvalov coat of arms,
A first casting of about seventy secret howitzers which was reproduced in the design of the dolphins
was made before the war, and a Secret Howitzer (carrying lugs) cast into the top of the barrel.
Corps of three specially sworn-in companies was Danilov says that the distinctive feature of the new
assigned to their service. A few of the pieces weapon was the conical chamber 'which gave it
appeared in an experimental way at Gross- long range . . . it proceeded from a chance inven-
Jagersdorf, and then on a larger scale with the tion made by Martinov and myself, and we must
Observation Corps at Zorndorf in 1758. In the say in its favour that it was far more useful than
following year Shuvalov overruled the protests of the secret howitzer, and is now found of great
Fermor and distributed 181 pieces among the utility in the army and fleet' (Danilov, 1842, 82).
regiments as a replacement for 3-pounder cannon. Every feature of the design was carried through
It was generally felt that the performance of the with a curious logic, which came from the prin-
' secret howitzer did not live up to expectations, ciple that the unicorn was an exact compromise
though one of Frederick's officers describes it as a between the cannon, the howitzer and the mortar.
formidable weapon, capable of sweeping away a Thus the length of the barrel was determined as
whole platoon with a single round (Prittwitz, nine or ten calibres, and the weight of the propel-
1935, 233). It seems to have disappeared from the ling charge to that of the missile was fixed at 1:5,
inventories in the 1780s. as a mean between the heaviest charge for a
cannon (half the weight of the shot) and the
7 2 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

lightest charge for a mortar (one-tenth of the manned battery of the novel pieces, which reached
weight of the bomb). the testing grounds near Vienna after a very slow
The unicorn looked like a stubby cannon, and journey, and carried out a demonstration shoot on
was at once identifiable by a curious constriction 7 August 1759. Four secret howitzers and two
of the barrel towards the breech, corresponding to half-pud unicorns were sent on to the army of
the shape of the chamber inside. The lightest Field-Marshal Daun, but the Austrians were acting
member of the family was an 8-pounder, which only out of politeness, for they concluded that the
appeared in the spring of 1757. Shuvalov claimed effective range of the pieces was too short, and the
that it was equally successful at firing an 8-pound carriages unduly heavy. The train began its long
shell, six little 1-pound shells (up to two-thirds of homeward trek on 23 February 1760.
a mile), a fifty-ball round of canister (up to 360 In the Russian army, the Saxon volunteer
paces), and a fire ball with which he claimed to Tielke reached much the same conclusions (Tielke,
have set a building ablaze at 420 paces. Eight men 1788, II, 38). The misgivings were shared by
were sufficient to manhandle the carriage (which commanders like Fermor, and towards the end of
broke down into two pieces) and the wheels, and 1759 Shuvalov was infuriated by reports that
another two men could carry the barrel with ease people were saying that his new guns were inferior
on a stretcher. Otherwise the weapon was drawn to the conventional artillery. The War College
by two horses. The heavier unicorns ran as follows: arranged a shoot-off at Marienwerder in January
quarter-pw<i (three horses), half-pwc? (five horses), 1760, which failed to give Shuvalov the vindica-
1 -pud (six horses), 2-pud (twelve horses). Shuvalov tion he required, and at his insistence the Senate
probably hoped that the unicorn would ultimately issued a decree of 16 February 1761, explaining
replace all the conventional artillery. The lighter that although the tests were unsatisfactory, they
pieces up to the half-pud assumed the role of demonstrated that 'all the pieces of the new inven-
regimental and field artillery, though it was soon tion were considerably better than the old ones
found that the barrels were too light for the which were compared with them' (Maslovskii,
weight of charge (the original forty -pud barrel of 1888-93,111, 173).
the 1 -pud was accordingly changed for a new On balance, Shuvalov's interpretation was
version weighing 139 puds, and the propelling probably the correct one. The monstrous 2-pud
charge reduced from eight pounds to seven). unicorn was dropped from the inventory soon
Shuvalov claimed in addition that the whole range after Shuvalov's death in 1762, but the lighter
of unicorns was useful for siege work, whether unicorns answered a genuine need for a mobile and
laying down area fire in bombardments, or firing versatile artillery, and remained in service until the
directly at ramparts. second half of the nineteenth century.
The unicorns first appeared in quantity in We have dealt at some length on the work of
1758, when thirty-eight pieces were delivered to Shuvalov for the ordnance, for his pieces owed
the Secret Howitzer Corps, which was renamed the nothing to Western precedents (except for the ill-
'Bombardier Corps' and reconstituted into thirty- fated Bliznyatki) and they added greatly to the
five detachments, each equipped with two secret efficacy of the Russian army in the Seven Years
howitzers and a unicorn. In the same year War, giving it a killing-power and solidity that
Rumyantsev obtained some half-pud unicorns for compensated for the failings of the cavalry and the
his command of cavalry, and at the beginning of Russians' general lack of mobility. The impetus
1759 a further 105 unicorns were at hand to effect which Shuvalov gave to the Russian artillery was
a partial replacement of the conventional pieces of never entirely lost, and surviving every catastrophe
the field (medium) artillery. and change of regime the tradition of profes-
sionalism and inventiveness became the foundation
The unicorn met with a very mixed reception in of the terrifying potential of the modern Soviet
service. The Austrians asked for the loan of a fully- ordnance.
 73 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

Russia was about to embark on its first major anomaly was re-incorporated in the army only
war in the west for more than a generation, and its half-way through the war.
fitness to take on a redoubtable enemy like the The problems of raising an effective field force
Prussians was inevitably the subject of much were compounded by the peculiar circumstances
speculation. At first sight the size of the army of the double mobilisation of 1756. The first
seemed to correspond to the huge resources of mobilisation in April and May was halted in June,
manpower. On paper no less than 437,823 men out of political considerations (see p. 61). The
stood ready to spring to arms to execute movement to the west was resumed in August, but
Elizabeth's will. These consisted of: came to an end of its own accord within a few
weeks, thanks to the deficiencies in the magazines,
15,000 grenadiers
the lack of horses for the cavalry anc| the transport
145,000 fusiliers '
train, and the small numbers and low morale of
36,680 cuirassiers and dragoons
the recruits. When the army finally set off for war
7,000 hussars
in May 1757 it numbered just 72,000 infantry,
12,937 personnel of the Artillery and
7,000 regular cavalry and 16,000 Cossacks.
Engineering Corps
The Austrian observer Zinzendorf was impressed
74,548 troops of the Garrison Army
by the warlike ambitions of Zakhar Chernyshev
27,758 Land Militia
and some of the other young officers, but he was
44,500 Cossacks
disturbed by the thought that
74,400 Asiatic tribesmen
Russia has engaged in no regular war, in the proper
The numbers contract remarkably upon closer
sense of the term, since the time of Peter the
examination. The Garrison Army and most of the
Great. The siege of Danzig in the Polish war
Land Militia did not come into the reckoning for
hardly comes into the reckoning. The campaigns
offensive operations, and nobody expected the
against the Turks, or rather against the Tartars,
hussars, Cossacks or* Asiatics to put more than a
had substance only in the gazettes. The Swedish
small proportion of their complements into the
expedition was over in a moment. Hence the
field. The shortfall in horses told heavily against
Russians have had no opportunity to form their
the regular cavalry, and against the mobility of the
generals. (Volz and Kiintzel, 1899, 701)
army as a whole. Moreover, the ambitions of Petr
Shuvalov deducted considerably from the strength The programme of military reform had some
of the forces at the disposal of the field com- remarkable things to its credit, but it was under-
manders. Not content with managing the artillery, taken only on the eve of the war, far too late to
he desired to have a private army under his control. catch up with the headlong rush of the bellicose
For a little time the command of the division in foreign policy, and it never addressed itself to
Livonia satisfied his craving, and he was reported matters of fundamental importance like the
to be strict in managing its affairs. In 1756, how- structure of military administration, or the means
ever, the troops in Livonia went to form the field of organising supply in a western theatre under
army, and so Shuvalov persuaded Elizabeth to let operational conditions.
him set up a special 'Observation Corps', drawn As commander of the field army at the begin-
partly from recruits, and partly from men of the ning of the war, Field-Marshal Stepan Fedorovich
Land Militia and the unmobilised regiments. The Apraksin (1702-58) did not himself inspire bound-,
Corps was amply endowed with regimental and less confidence. He derived undoubted political
field artillery, and especially the secret howitzers power from his positions as President of the War
and unicorns, and the body was made up of one College and General-Kriegskommissar, and from
super-large regiment of grenadiers and five corres- his extraordinarily wide net of liaisons, extending
ponding regiments of musketeers, with a nominal in the one direction to his patron Bestuzhev, and
establishment of 30,000 men. This expensive in others to the 'young court' of Grand Prince
74 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

of the army was more recent, but when, shortly

before the Seven Years War, he ventured some
words in praise of the Russian troops, Frederick
rejoined 'the Muscovites are a heap of barbarians.
Any well-disciplined troops will make short work
of them' (Retzow, 1802,1, 182-3).

The first invasion of East Prussia and the battle of

Gross-Jagersdorf, 1757

As we have seen, Frederick the Great opened the

Seven Years War in the south by invading Saxony,
but the winter of 1756-7 found the Russian
infantry still accumulating in crowded and dirty
quarters in Livonia, and the wretched cavalry
trailing up from the interior of Russia. In February
1757 the government heard with despair that
Apraksin was still unable to march.
Ready or not, the Russians were galvanised by
the news that their Austrian allies had been
defeated by Frederick at Prague, and finally
towards the end of May 1757 the green columns
20 Stepan Fedorovich Apraksin
set out from the Dvina in a generally westerly
direction. The commands of Apraksin and
Peter and Princess Catherine, and to Petr Shuvalov Rumyantsev reached the Viliya opposite Kovno in
(who was carrying on an affair with his daughter). the middle of June, but in the absence of a bridge
When, however, foreigners came to look for a the whole force had to be ferried across the river
warrior, they discovered instead the 'snuff box on two boats — the consequence of 'the dire
general' who could produce a tabatiere for every disorder and terrible confusion which dominates
day of the year, and had a wardrobe stuffed with everything that relates to the Russian army'
hundreds of costly clothes. He was 'a man of most (quoted in Frisch, 1919, 28). Eleven thousand
impressive stature, prodigious in his size and girth' men had already fallen sick, and the difficulties
(Messeliere, 1803, 113). In practical matters he of supply were augmented when the army could
leaned very heavily on Major-General Ivan Ivanovich no longer avail itself of the facility of transport on
Weymarn, who was a former staff officer of the Viliya and Niemen, but had to strike across
Keith's, and on the old Generalanshef Yurii the. marshes and woods of Polish Lithuania, losing
Lieven. contact with the chains of magazines that stretched
Frederick of Prussia lived in fear of any Russian back to the Russian Baltic provinces and the
intervention in Western affairs, yet he was strangely Ukraine.
willing to lend credence to anything that people A spell of rain gave way to a period of intense
had to tell him about Russian extravagance, heat that was to last through the summer, and
corruption and muddle. Such reports had come return in almost every campaigning season of the
from the diplomats Vockerodt and Mardefeld, and Seven Years War. Weymarn writes that the result
from his bosom friend Winterfeld, who had seen was a greater mortality still, for 'the ordinary
the Russian army in 1741, when it was still in a soldier is tormented with heat under his covering
bad way after the Turkish war. Keith's experience of sweat and dust, and common experience shows
 75 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

that no force or punishment is capable of prevent- but the Cossacks gave a lead in rapacity and
ing him from drinking hard and long of the stink- vandalism to even the best regiments of the army.
ing, foul and muddy water, and letting it pour The movement as a whole resembled an emigra-
over his body' (Weymarn, 1794, 26-7). tion of nomadic barbarians. Apraksin never
The strategic objective was to reduce the bothered to sound the way ahead, and in this
sizeable enemy province of East Prussia, which was example the generals followed him religiously. All
weakly held by Field-Marshal Lehwaldt with of this was to have dire consequences for the out-
32,000 troops and militia, and conveniently come of the campaign, and for the West's impres-
isolated by the 'Polish corridor' from the rest of sion of the Russian army in the Seven Years War.
the King of Prussia's states. In August 1757 the At Kovno Apraksin had been joined by two
Russian host at last crossed into Prussian territory, southerly columns, and at Insterburg he was met
and the cavalry began to spread out. Like the by the light corps of Sibilsky, and the 16,000-
soldiers described in Solzhenitsyn's 1914, the strong detachment of Fermor, who had reduced
Russians of 1757 gazed in wonder at the almost the little port of Memel after a brief bombard-
inhuman cleanliness of the landscape and the ment. Finally, by the last week of August the
villages. Apraksin sought to maintain good order, movement coalesced into a single thrust north of
7 6 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

GROSS - JAGERSDQRF, 3 0 A u g u s t 1757

MOHIM £

ONE MILE
 77 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

K E Y TO T H E S E V E N Y E A R S W A R B A T T L E MAPS

Heights are given in metres.

Russian infantry regiment

Russian cavalry regiment

Austrian infantry regiment

Austrian cavalry regiment

Prussian infantry regiment

Prussian cavalry regiment

For identification of individual Austrian and Prussian regiments, please see the codes in The Army of Maria Theresa
( L o n d o n , David & Charles, 1977) and The Army of Frederick the Great ( L o n d o n , David & Charles, 1974).
For the sake of clarity, Russian regiments are numbered here according to order of seniority at the time of the Seven
Years War.

Guard 37 Narvskii 69 Rizhskii (Riga) Irregulars

1 Preobrazhenskii 38 Tobolskii 70 S t Peterburgskii 103 Don Cossacks
2 Semenovskii 39 Nevskii 71 Ryazanskii 104 Y a i k (Ural River) Cossacks
3 Ismailovskii 40 Koporskii 72 Astrakhanskii 105 Grebhinskii Cossacks
4 Horse Guards 41 Vyborgskii 106 Terek Cossacks
Dragoons
42 Uglinskii 107 Semenieskii Cossacks
Infantry 43 Kegsgolmskii 73 Moskovskii
108 Volga Cossacks
44 Ladozhskii 74 Troitskii
5 First Grenadiers 109 Orenburg Cossacks
45 Belozerskii 75 Vladimirskii
6 Second Grenadiers 110 Slobodskii Cossacks
46 Muromskii 76 Novgorodskii
7 Third Grenadiers 111 Little Russian Cossacks
47 Apsheronskii 77 Sibirskii
8 Fourth Grenadiers 112 Zaporozhian Cossacks
48 Shirvanskii 78 Pskovskii
9 Ingermanlandskii 113 Baptised Stavropol Kalmyks
49 Kabardinskii 79 Tverskii
10 Astrakhanskii 114 Chuguevskii Cossacks
50 Nasheburgskii 80 Permskii
11 Butyrskii 115 Astrakhan Cossacks
51 Nizovskii 81 Vyatskii
12 First Moskovskii 116 Azov Cossacks
52 Kuraskii 82 Nizhegorodskii
13 Second Moskovskii 117 Bakhmut Cossacks
53 Tenginskii 83 Rostovskii
14 Kievskii
54 Navaginskii 84 Arkhangelgorodskii
15 Troitskii
85 Azovskii
16 S t Peterburgskii
Observation Corps 86 Ingermanlandskii
17 Vladimirskii
87 Vologdskii
18 Novgorodskii 55 First Grenadiers (of
88 Yamburgskii
19 Shlyushelburgskii Observation Corps)
89 Tobolskii
20 Kazanskii 56 First Musketeers
90 Revelskii
21 Sibirskii 57 Second Musketeers
91 Oionetskii
22 Pskovskii 58 Third Musketeers
92 Lutskii
23 Smolenskii 59 Fourth Musketeers
24 Azovskii 60 Fifth Musketeers Hussars
25 Voronezhskii 93 Serbian
26 Nizhegorodskii Cuirassiers 94 Hungarian
27 Chernigovskii 61 Lifeguards 95 Gruzinskii
28 Ryazanskii 62 Heir Apparent 96 Moldavian
29 Suzdalskii 63 Third Cuirassiers 97 Wallachian
30 Rostovskii 64 Kievskii 98 Slobodskii
31 Velikolutskii 65 Novotroitskii 99 Macedonian
32 Arkhangelgorodskii 66 Kazanskii 100 Yellow
33 Yaroslavskii 101 Hussar regiments of
34 Permskii Mounted Grenadiers N e w Serbia
35 Vyatskii 67 Kargopolskii 102 Hussar regiments of
36 Vologdskii 68 Narvskii Slavonic Serbia
 7 8 Elizabeth P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

the Masurian Lakes in the direction of the provin- emerged alone into the clearing with his Second
cial capital of Konigsberg. Apraksin was disturbed Division. By the scheme of things the Second
to learn that an enemy army under Lehwaldt was Division was supposed to stand in the rearward
somewhere in the offing, but the Prussians were line in any engagement, and Lopukhin had been
decidedly inferior in numbers, and the constant forced to yield up his field artillery to the advance
daily false alarms from the Cossacks had succeeded guard and the First Division. He retained only his
in breeding attitudes of 'false security and con- regimental artillery and a complement of secret
tempt for the enemy' (Weymarn, 1794, 95). The howitzers, and Fermor told him that even these
29th of August found the army short of fodder, were unnecessary, 'since your force is tucked
and moving irresolutely just south of the Pregel away as securely behind the First Division as if
in a terrain of marshy streams and stands of dense you were sitting in your mother's lap' (Weymarn,
woodland. There was precious little space to draw 1794, 93). A Third Division under George Browne
up the regiments in order, if it came to a fight, was to follow up behind and cover the general
and the ailing Generalanshef Yurii Lieven urged baggage of the army.
Apraksin to hold the troops overnight in a pre- Such was the state of affairs when the little
cautionary battle position in the clearing of Gross- Prussian army erupted into the scene from the
Jagersdorf. Generalanshef George Browne sup- west. Lehwaldt had just 24,700 men to pit against
ported this opinion 'with his usual violence and the mass of 55,000 Russians, but he threw his
impetuosity' (Weymarn, 1794, 90). Apraksin force into the attack in unthinking obedience to
rejected these good ideas, and under the influence King Frederick's orders (for a resume of forces and
of Fermor he brought the army back for the casualties in the battles of the Seven Years War see
night to the site of the last camp, where the the author's Army of Frederick the Great, Newton
troops could eat and rest. The army slept well. Abbot, 1974, 234-5).
Early on 30 August The first effective Russian response was prob-
ably made by a battery of field artillery which
' a purple glow suffused the horizon, fortelling a
Major Tyutchev brought to a height near the
splendid day. The mist had set in heavily before
western salient of the Norkitten Wood, in the path
dawn, but now it began to thin out, and the air
of the leading Prussian cavalry under Lieutenant-
became clear and transparent. The sun, rising
General Schorlemer. The gallant Tyutchev usefully
above the hills, had already lit the whole horizon
delayed the enemy until Fermor unaccountably
when the sonorous signal of cannon fire broke
ordered the guns off the position. Now everything
our sweet slumbers, and set the whole army in
depended on how quickly the Russians could
movement. (Bolotov, 1870-3,1, 517)
transform their straggling line of march into a
At about four in the morning the army got once coherent battle frontage.
more to its feet and began to shuffle around the On the right, or northern, flank Browne and his
east flank of the wood of Norkitten, with the Third Division tried to cover the ground from the
leading elements striking south in the direction of Pregel to the western part of the Norkitten Wood.
Allenburg and a region of temptingly untouched On the right centre Fermor's First Division sought
pastures and barns. to hold the southern edge of the wood and reach
Sibilsky got successfully under way with an out to the right flank of the Second Division.
advance guard of 10,000 men (4,000 cavalry and Lopukhin (Second Division) and Sibilsky (advance
fifteen battalions of infantry). The main body was guard) in turn were strung along the Allenburg
supposed to follow in two parallel columns, but in road, and trying to form a line facing westwards
fact the appointed right-hand column (the First over the Gross-Jagersdorf clearing. The process was
Division, under Fermor) was still sorting itself out attended with some confusion, thanks to the way
behind the wood of Norkitten, and the stout and the troops became entangled with the divisional
comfortable Generalanshef Vasilii Lopukhin baggage trains. Andrei Timofeevich Bolotov was a
 79 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

company commander in the advance guard, and any rate the Cossacks put on a very convincing
he witnessed how the advent of the enemy reduced demonstration of headlong flight, and drew the
the columns to chaos. The commanders had no Prussians on to and through the regiments of
experience of this sort of thing, and never had Sibilsky's infantry and against his heavy guns.
Bolotov seen them: Many Prussians were shot down, many fled, and
'the survivors were caught like rats in a trap when
in such a state of bewilderment as at that moment. the infantry closed its lines again, and they were
One of the officers was galloping around cut down to the last man by the Russian horse'
distractedly, his face ashen grey, and shrieking, (Bolotov, 1870-3,1, 532).
and shouting out meaningless orders. A second
Towards six in the morning the main body of
officer concentrated on bringing up the carts,
the Prussian infantry arrived on the scene, and
and was swearing at the drivers and beating
pressed home a very dangerous attack against the
them. . . . Another, having got hold of some
First and Second Divisions as they tried to shake
regiment or other, forced a path with it through
themselves out into some kind of order on the
the baggage, smashing through the drivers and
southern flank of the Norkitten Wood. Bolotov
carts, without having any idea where he was
followed the Prussian move from his vantage point
taking his men. (Bolotov, 1870-3,1, 520-1)
to the south, and he gives us something very rare
The two Russian wings were soon battling to in eighteenth-century military literature — an
hold their ground against determined attacks of impression of a battle as seen by a spectator. He
Prussian cavalry. On the northern sector watched with his heart in his mouth as the
Schorlemer brought a powerful concentration of Prussians advanced in superb order, stopped to
thirty squadrons against the Russian right, scat- deliver a salvo, and then, reloading on the march,
tering a hastily formed screen of horse, and fired two more volleys at successively closer
threatening the infantry brigade of Leontev. This ranges. Bolotov and his friends could not under-
first thrust was parried by the quick reactions of stand why the Russian infantry remained so silent
the local Russian commanders. Lieutenant-General and passive:
Matvei Lieven made the First Grenadier Regiment
turn about and hasten from its place in the First 'This time', we exclaimed, 'it must all be up —
Division, while Browne brought up the brigade of they must all have been killed'. The words were
Major-General Johann Manteuffel (the Nevskii and still on our lips when . . . our muskets and cannon
Sibirskii Regiments) from his own second line. The replied, certainly not by salvoes — in fact in great
Prussian cavalry were driven off, and with the disorder — but shooting with considerably greater
further help of Major-General Rumyantsev, who speed than the enemy. From this moment the
advanced his brigade from the reserve, Browne Prussians too ceased to fire by volleys. The firing
went on to clear the Norkitten Wood of the left on both sides continued without a break, and we
wing of the Prussian infantry. All the time the were unable to distinguish the enemy fusillade
Russian artillery worked to great effect, whether from ours. Only the cannon shot could be made
lobbing shells at the Prussian cavalry in the open out, and in particular the discharges of the secret
ground, or clearing the infantry from thickets with Shuvalov howitzers, which could be detected by
blasts of canister. the peculiar sound and dark smoke.
In the Gross-Jagersdorf clearing the Russian
Only the extremities of the two battling lines were
centre and southern flank had preoccupations of
to be seen through the smoke, but:
their own, for twenty Prussian squadrons under
the Duke of Holstein were coming through Our army was ranged immobile for the whole
Uderballen with amazing speed. The Russian duration of the combat, with the first rank
response was probably concerted between Sibilsky kneeling and sitting. The Prussian line appeared
and hetman Serebryakov of the Don Cossacks. At to be in ceaseless movement. It would advance a
8 0 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

few paces, then retire again, but all the time Prussian Feldwebel, who relieved him of his order
fighting with no less courage and steadfastness of St Alexander Nevsky.
than our own men. . . . Behind the two lines we The offensive effort of the Prussians was spent,
could discern a great number of people on various and the bluecoats melted away into the smoke of
occupations. An officer was racing about on the battle and the burning villages, leaving some
horseback, bearing, no doubt, some important 4,000 men on the field alongside still greater
order — then suddenly he was shot, and flew quantities of dead and wounded Russians. The
headlong to the ground. An individual fled from Prussian dead were stripped with miraculous speed
the ranks, but, overwhelmed by wounds, he could by the Russian camp followers, who left them
not keep his feet, and collapsed. Dead and with only the wooden blocks from the cartridge
wounded were being carried back, while pouches, and the rounds themselves, wrapped in
ammunition and reinforcements came up in the blue paper. '
opposite direction. (Bolotov, 1870-3,1, 527-8) Sibilsky took off in pursuit with three regiments
of mounted grenadiers and some Cossacks, but he
Quartermaster-General Weymarn could not take had no infantry with him (for reasons which have
such a detached view of affairs, for he was stand- never been properly explained), and he had no
ing with the Second Division. He confirms that the means of stopping the Prussians from re-crossing
first three salvoes of Prussian musketry caused the Pregel and making good their escape. Probably
little execution, 'but the fourth enemy volley the Russians were more disorganised by their
worked to deadly effect, and our men responded victory than the Prussians had been by their
with a fire of considerable violence, with every defeat. The ammunition carts for the infantry and
lad firing at the instant he had finished loading, artillery had been left uselessly in the rear, with
without awaiting the orders of his officer' their teams unhitched, and even the most devoted
(Weymarn, 1794, 198). The Russians, however, troops were sagging in depleted ranks in a state of
had no field guns (see p. 78) with which to total exhaustion.
counter the Prussian artillery, and the Second Russia's first stand-up battle with the Prussian
Grenadier Regiment was driven back into the army had been completely unsought. Tielke
wood, which threatened the collapse of the centre. remarked:
Fortunately the Narvskii Regiment stood its
ground, and victorious cries spread along the line. In the battle of Gross-Jagersdorf the Russians had
neither time nor opportunity to form a square,
and yet they did extremely well. It is very certain,
Wherever the shouting came from, it had the good
that if these people, who are brave in the extreme,
effect of restoring the countenance of the Second
had better regulations respecting their baggage,
Grenadiers, who advanced anew against the
provisions etc., and were equal to the Prussians in
enemy. The Narvskii Regiment meanwhile pushed
manoeuvring, which may possibly be the case
forward with levelled bayonets under a continuous
some time or other, it would be very difficult for
fire. Most of its officers had already been killed
any army to withstand them. (Tielke, 1788,
or wounded, and its formation dissolved so
11,171)
completely that you could make out neither
rank nor file. (Weymarn, 1794, 200) As the Russians were then little known [wrote
Lloyd], 'tis no wonder the Prussian general should
The crisis of the battle was over, but the intensity think his troops superior to theirs, and therefore
of the fighting on this sector is betrayed by the did not think it necessary to oppose anything but
casualties among the Russian commanders. infantry to infantry, and cavalry against cavalry.
Weymarn, Yurii Lieven andMajor-General Villebois But experience has proved, that the Russian
were wounded, while Lopukhin was hit by three infantry is far superior to any in Europe; and, as
musket balls, and fell dying into the hands of a their cavalry is not so good as other nations,
 81 Elizabeth P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

reason dictates, that a mixed order of battle alone his heremetical tendencies. All this, of course, was
can conquer them. (Lloyd, 1781,1, 145-6) relative to Russian standards. Otherwise his habits
were luxurious in the extreme:
We might add that the Russian artillery had shown
The baggage and its escorting columns always went
a clear superiority over the Prussian, while the
ahead, with Count Fermor's tent and other effects,
divisional and brigade commanders gave evidence
which were borne on camels. Then came the train
of initiative and a spirit of mutual support in this
of the commander-in-chief. And how did he
desperate scramble of an encounter battle.
travel? — well, first of all we encounter the
Having moved to within scarcely thirty miles of
commander's escort, namely two thousand
Konigsberg, Apraksin shocked every person of
Cossacks and Kalmyks, riding in splendid order.
good will by taking the decision to retreat. The
Thei} follow a company of cuirassiers with
army straggled back through autumn rains to
kettledrums, keeping up an incessant din like the
winter quarters behind Memel, nearly breaking up
rest of the music. Behind the music ride two
in the process. Talk of treason was rife among the
adjutants, and finally come Fermor in person and
officers, while in France the government feared
his party of generals, followed by a numberless
that Apraksin had taken the 'first step towards
host of retainers under the escort of several
the disintegration of a system so well begun'
thousand Cossacks. (Tage,iL4, 1864, II, 286)
(Oliva, 1964, 82). Apraksin was ordered back to
St Petersburg to undergo investigation, and the Fermor spent the nights in his tent, so as to set an
revelation that he had been in touch with the example of hard living to the rest of the army.
'young court' leant colour to the reports that he This was no great ordeal, since the shelter in
had been counting on the early death of Elizabeth. question was a massive Turkish affair of dazzling
Bestuzhev was caught up in the ruin of his protege white cloth, which was draped over a lattice frame-
and was exiled to his estates. Apraksin himself work. The interior was hung with blue and white
escaped further earthly punishment by dying of an ibrocade, and provided a suitable ambience for the
apoplectic seizure. count's ponderous feasting, when he and his
guests dined off silver plate, and drank deep from
gilded cups.
Fermor's command, and the occupation of Few people, however, gave proper credit to
East Prussia, 1758 Fermor's grasp of military realities. His comments
on tactics were invariably interesting, and • he
The departure of Apraksin delivered the leadership brought some order to the matter of supply by
to the most un-Russian of all the commanders in insisting that the commissariat officials must be
the war, Cavalry General Villim Villimovich physically present on the theatre of war, and by
Fermor (1702-71). He was a Baltic Lutheran of sending home the more useless of the Cossacks and
German and Scots ancestry, who in his younger tribal Asiatics, retaining only the Don and
days enjoyed the patronage of Miinnich and had a Chuguevskii Cossacks, the hussars and five hundred
certain name as a designer of imperial buildings Volga Kalmyks. The ordinary soldiers benefited
and parks. He owed his present command to the greatly from Fermor's solicitude. Their loads were
fact that he was the one man of undoubted lightened, they were allowed to dispense with the
technical competence who happened to be with pigtail and hair powder, and they were given warm
the army. As 'a very regular sober man' (G. shoes, ample sheepskin jackets and lined bonnets.
Riniking, 27 December 1757, PRO SPF91/65), Fermor's talents showed to the best advantage
Fermor was happiest in the company of his in his opportunistic and well-calculated winter
German officers, but he was treated with disdain campaign of early 1758, when he made good the
by the noisy Irishman Browne and the majority unfinished business from the year before, and
of the Russians, which only served to accentuate moved the army back into East Prussia. Lehwaldt
8 2 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

was conveniently away in the west facing the uniforms of the Russian officers'. Indeed, one of
Swedes, who had joined the great coalition, and the natives of Konigsberg was willing to ascribe
Fermor was so confident of the outcome that he the arrival of prosperity and fine manners in that
did not even bother to take his artillery along with city to the coming of the nominal enemy
him. The style of the operation was altogether (Scheffner, 1823, 67). The young Aleksandr
different from that of Apraksin's horde of 1757. Romanovich Vorontsov happened to pass through
The 72,000 men were divided into five columns, Konigsberg on the way to his studies in France,
and moving with remarkable speed they covered and he was surprised to see the Fincks, the
the 125-odd miles to Konigsberg in between six Donhoffs and many others of the leading nobility
and nine days of January snow. present in the place, and 'they all seemed quiet
The people of East Prussia were treated with and happy under our domination' (.AKV, 1870-95,
sedulous regard, and instead of fire and sword the V, 39). The stiff and provincial Prussian aristocrats
Russians bore proclamations from Empress were introduced by the Russians to the Western
Elizabeth which apologised for the ravages of the fashions of masquerades, Frenchified small-talk,
last campaign. At Marienwerder, at the start of the and the drinking of tea and punch, and in the
next campaign, the Lutheran pastor Tage and his relaxed atmosphere they even learnt to enjoy the
flock awoke one morning to find the town full of company of the Prussian middle classes and of
Cossacks and Kalmyks, their own womenfolk, who had hitherto been
excluded from high society. In their turn the
proceeding down the streets with their long beards
Russian officers attended the public sessions of
and grim faces, and armed with bows and arrows
Konigsberg University, where they could hear
and other weapons. The sight was at once alarming
lectures from luminaries like Immanuel Kant, the
and majestic. They rode through the town in
mathematician and philosopher.
silence and good order . . . and we were actually
less afraid of the Cossacks than of some of the Sixteen Russian subjects actually enrolled at
other armies we had seen pass through the university during the war, and they afterwards
Marienwerder. They gave us not the slightest rose to eminence in public and academic life in
cause for complaint, since they were maintained in their homeland (see Amburger, 1961, 220).
exemplary discipline. (Tage,iL4,1864, II, 276) Away in Berlin there gradualiy collected a
number of Russian officer prisoners on parole —
Tage himself was summoned to Fermor's presence, gentlemen like Zakhar Chernyshev (later
and told that he was to go campaigning with the exchanged) 'whom you might have almost taken
Russians as a regimental chaplain. for a young Frenchman, from his lively, restless
The Russian occupation of East Prussia is a and elegant ways' (Lehndorff, 1910-13, I, 194).
little-known episode of the Seven Years War, but it Chernyshev and his companions wrought havoc
was fraught with all kinds of social, cultural, among the Prussian ladies, and in 1759 one witty
strategic and political significance. The Russians soul posted a notice on the arcade of the royal
knew that they were on parade before Europe, and Schloss, detailing the names of all the females who
they clearly regarded their dominion in East had thus succumbed. The city commandant made
Prussia as a test of their civilisation as much as of things worse by having the placard torn down
their power. Slipping easily and unobtrusively into almost immediately, which left the entire female
the seat of government, they confirmed the func- society of Berlin under suspicion.
tionaries of the province and of the 'Imperial In fact the Russo-Prussian interchange could be
Russian City' of Konigsberg in their authority, defined as one of social amenity for intellectual
and they changed the official Prussian gazette into challenge. The Western Enlightenment worked to
a Russian one, bearing the double eagle, and given devastating effect on the beliefs of someone like
to boasting of the 'exquisite taste which is the Andrei Bolotov, who had bidden a thankful
distinguishing feature of the rich and costly farewell to campaigning, and taken up a post as
 83 E l i z a b e t h Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

translator to the Russian governor of Konigsberg. Frederick behaved in his conquest of the electorate
He had been brought up in the closed world of of Saxony.
Orthodoxy, and his childhood faith was no proof Again the Russians were far too restrained in
against the rationalism he encountered among the the matter of the free city and fortress-port of
more free-thinking Prussians. It took the sage Danzig, which stood in the 'Polish corridor' beside
words of a Prussian pastor to restore his trust in the Vistula delta. The possession of Konigsberg
divine verities. certainly gave the Russians a useful place to land
In the harsher world of international politics, provisions and equipment, but the unrestricted use
foreign governments were alarmed to see how of Danzig would have been more valuable still,
well the Russians were settling down in their offering them a strategic flank towards Prussian
conquest. Frederick the Great was all the more Pomerania, as well as the means of turning the
outraged because he derived his royal title from Vistula into a base of supplies. The citizens and
there, being technically 'King in Prussia' (i.e. East magistracy were German, and they made little
Prussia), and because the land was the spiritual secret of their support for Old Fritz. They refused
home of his nobility. Russia's allies harboured a Russian garrison, they permitted the Russians to
reservations of their own. Elizabeth had at first land cargoes only in small and grudging amounts,
envisaged the seizure of East Prussia as a tem- and finally in the autumn of 1759 Shuvalov
porary affair, designed to win her certain advan- proposed to punish the place by subjecting it to a
tages at the peace, but in proportion as she, her bombardment. The Russians, however, held back
generals and her ministers gained confidence in the out of consideration for their Saxon, Austrian and
power of Russian arms, they made bold to claim French friends, who were unwilling to countenance
possession of East Prussia by right of conquest as a any infringement of the rights and neutrality of
full belligerent. The Austrians tried to make the Danzig and Poland in the matter. Elizabeth could
Russians abate their claim, and at Versailles the not refrain from drawing a comparison with the
Due de Choiseul wrote to his representative in way the French had made free with Frankfurt-
St Petersburg that 'it would be contrary to our am-Main, nominally the most privileged city of the
political interests in the north to give East Prussia German empire.
to Russia. This would make Russia the mistress of
the Baltic. Fears of such an event are pronounced
in Sweden and Denmark, our true allies' (Oliva, The march to Zomdorf, 1758
1964, 150).
Paradoxically, the very success of their occupa- East Prussia was a comprehensible, manageable
tion of East Prussia restrainted the Russians from objective compared with the main body of the
deriving full benefit from their conquest. The Prussian state, which reached across the great
Russian governor, Lieutenant-General Nikolai north European plain from the sandy Baltic
Korff, set himself against any attempt to tap the coastlands of Pomerania to the ranges of wooded
physical resources of the province, or to raise hills where Prussian Silesia adjoined the Austrian
recruits there, for like Petr Shuvalov, Chancellor provinces of Moravia and Bohemia. The lowlands
Vorontsov and the German-Russian generals he were traversed by a series of river lines which
was anxious to avoid any possible accusation of mostly trended from the south-east to the north-
'barbarism'. Only on 25 January 1761 were orders west, which was a direction calculated to be of
sent from St Petersburg to Field-Marshal Buturlin, little use to the Russian communications. More
telling him that Russia might after all have to face annoying still the greatest river of all, the
up to the relinquishment of East Prussia, and that Oder, lay almost completely within Prussian
the considerations which caused it to be spared no territory, and was studded with a series of strong-
longer applied. Even then the Russians treated the holds - Breslau, Glogau, Ciistrin, and the fortress-
land in a far more gentlemanly fashion than port of Stettin - which gave it the character of a
84 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

THE CENTRAL THEATRE

 85 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

powerful transverse barrier. From the point of way of diversion in favour of the hard-pressed
view of the Russians the most interesting stretch whitecoats.
of this river was the central one between Frankfiirt- In the spring the Russian army began a straggl-
an-der-Oder and Custrin, for it owned direct ing, disjointed march across western Poland.
communication by way of the Warthe to the Fermor had been forced to get under way before
Russian depot of Posen in Poland, and it lay all his arrangements were complete, and to a casual
closest to Berlin and the heartland of the Prussian eye, at least, the Russians seemed to revert to
state. Unfortunately some unkind god decreed some of the worst habits of 1757. Fermor led the
that this axis of advance must stand at an equally main body on the central axis from Posen. The
unfavourable distance from support on either troops marched in one or two massive columns,
flank — whether from the seaborne supplies and and although precious little was known about the
the allied Swedes on their right, or the Austrians theatre of war or the location of the enemy,
on their left, skulking in the border hills with Fermor scarcely bothered to scout the ground.
Saxony and Bohemia. Frederick of Prussia and his The baggage trailed behind, at least as long as ever,
hard-marching army were able to exploit to the full and when the army entered enemy territory the
all the consequent uncertainties of the alliance. Cossacks began to behave in the bad old style.
At the start of the campaigning season of 1758 Fermor called the Cossack leader, Demicoud, to
Frederick caught the Austrians at a disadvantage, account, but that gentleman was able to prove
when he pushed into Moravia and threatened that matters were beyond his control. Demicoud
Vienna itself. In these circumstances no set plan of (or Demiku) often told his friends that he 'consi-
joint operations was worked out, beyond a general dered it as the greatest misfortune to have Coss-
desire to see the Russians march west and act by acks under his command' (Tielke, 1788, II, 78).
8 6 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

In the middle of August Fermor's progress of the Oder, but in the event Frederick cast a
came to a halt in front of the fortress of Custrin pontoon bridge over the river at Alt-Gustebiese,
on the Oder. The place was small and not parti- between the two Russian forces, and his army
cularly strong, but the Prussian general Dohna was completed its crossing by three in the morning of
able to feed in reinforcements and supplies from 23 August.
the far bank of the river, and Fermor had no siege Still ignorant of whether he was dealing with a
artillery with which to batter down the walls. detached corps or a royal army, Fermor decamped
Since it was important to conserve the solid shot on 24 August and marched his troops some six
for combat in the field, Fermor was reduced to miles north-east to confront the Prussians some-
employing the explosive shells of the howitzers where beyond the village of Zorndorf. The generals
and unicorns in a generalised bombardment of the were left in ignorance of his intentions, and so
town. The fortifications remained undamaged, and they were to remain.
the episode added to the unfortunate impression Prince Charles of Saxony had proposed that the
given by the Russian army at this time, as an Russians should draw themselves up on the high
organisation that was at once murderous and ground near Gross-Cammin. Fermor said he would
blundering. fall in with the suggestion, but instead he merely
The Russians were plainly doing little good at deposited the main baggage in a fortified
Custrin, but 'Count Fermor did not wish to hear Wagenburg by the village, and pushed the army
anything about crossing the Oder, saying that he into a potentially disastrous position in a marshy
could not take such a step without a specific order hollow that was intersected with watercourses, and
from the court' (Prince Charles of Saxony, AKV, overlooked by higher ground on all sides.
1870-95, IV, 16). Fermor was therefore stranded Rumyantsev was lost beyond recall well down the
in a static position with a disintegrating army. The Oder, but as some compensation Browne arrived
infantry were worn out with having to stand guard with 9,000 or so men of the Observation Corps
in the trenches, and their effective numbers were and took up position on Fermor's right od eastern
reduced still further because so many men had to flank, giving the Russians a total of about 43,000
be set to work to grind flour and bake bread. men, or, in other words, a paper superiority of
Likewise, the cavalry had to go foraging far afield, 6,000 troops over the enemy. In fact the advan-
because the grass of the locality was soon eaten tage of the Russians in infantry was balanced by
up. The Observation Corps had still to arrive in the the fragmentation in command and position, and
offing, and Rumyantsev was sent with a precious by the overwhelming weight of the Prussians in
11,854 men (eight regiments of infantry, eleven heavy cavalry (10,500 troopers as against 3,282).
squadrons of cavalry, eleven field pieces) to guard Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the
a possible crossing point of the Oder downstream Observation Corps the Prussian army bore down
at Schwedt. from the north. The Russian hussars had sent in
The detachment of Rumyantsev was occasioned no reports of any value, and so Frederick was
by the news that King Frederick of Prussia had left allowed to prosecute an overnight outflanking
his main army behind in the south in Silesia and march which took him on an easterly circuit to
was hastening against the Russians with a compact an. advantageous position overlooking the rear of
striking force. On 21 August Frederick reached the Russians. This horrid sight forced the Russians
Dohna at Custrin, and his hussars brought him to undertake a total change of front to the south
twelve captured Cossacks, the first he had ever in the early morning of the 25th. The second line
seen. The king examined them attentively, then now became the first, the right wing became the
exclaimed: 'Just look at the kind of scum I have to left, and vice versa, and the troops now stood
fight!' (Archenholtz, 1840, I, 164). Fermor sent with their backs to the Mietzel stream, which
Rumyantsev orders to hold Schwedt at all costs, threatened to become an embarrassment in the
to prevent the enemy reaching the 'Russian' side case of a defeat. Inside the wings, the infantry
 87 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

ZORNDQRF: Prussian turning movement

countermarched by regiments, so as to restore an dawn that many of the combatants were to know.
element of the original order of battle, and on the The Cossacks proceeded to open the great battle
new right flank the dragoons and Cossacks of 25 August in characteristic style by setting fire
changed places. to the abandoned village of Zorndorf. The Prussians
Fermor and the main army were now properly hesitated to feed their artillery ammunition carts
designated the right wing, and they occupied the through the blazing streets, but in compensation
western side of the field up to the doubtful flank the smoke blew into the faces of the Russians,
protection of the marshy Zabern hollow. Browne's along with the dust raised by the thousands of feet
Observation Corps constituted the left wing and and hooves. Among his new Russian comrades the
extended to the village of Zicher. The position of exhausted Pastor Tage had slept until he was
the Russian infantry was scarcely one and a half awakened by a cry of 'The Prussians are coming!'
miles in breadth, and the troops were packed
together line upon line with the light baggage in The sun was already shining brightly. We leapt on
the centre. our horses, and from the top of a ridge I saw the
A beautiful starlit night gave way to the last Prussian army as it marched towards us. Their
8 8 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

ZORiMDQRF, 25 August 1758

weapons flashed in the sun, and the spectacle was think that people will consider it odd when I say
frightening,. . . Never shall I forget the silent, that never since in the course of my long life have
majestic approach of the Prussian army. I only I heard that tune without experiencing the
wish that my readers could imagine to themselves utmost emotion. (Tage, 1864, II, 295-6)
in all its immediacy that splendid but alarming
moment when the Prussian array suddenly The respite came to an end when the Prussians
deployed into a thin, staggered line of battle. . . . arranged their heavy guns on the heights north of
Then the menacing beat of the Prussian drums Zorndorf, and opened fire against the densely
carried to our ears. For a time their woodwind packed masses of the Russian right wing below.
was inaudible, but as the Prussians approached we The 18- and 24-pounders fired showers of grape at
could hear the oboes playing the well-known short range, and the solid shot operated to prob-
hymn Ich bin ja, Herr, in deinerMacht! I cannot ably greater effect still. 'It was scarcely surprising
express what I felt at that instant, but I do not that a single enemy cannon ball should have killed
 89 Elizabeth P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

or wounded forty-eight men when it hit one of our First and Second Grenadier Regiments held out as
regiments of grenadiers' (Bolotov, 1870-3,1, 784). coherent units, enabling a few other knots of
Tielke exclaims that: heroes to stand their ground with levelled bayonets
and save the fugitives from complete destruction.
the extraordinary steadiness and intrepidity of the
The rest of the Prussian army collided piece-
Russians on this occasion is not to be described;
meal with the Russian host over the following
it surpassed everything that one has heard of the
hours. Having missed its way at the beginning of
bravest troops. Although the Prussian balls mowed
the battle, the main body of the Prussian left
down whole ranks, yet not a man discovered any
under Lieutenant-General Kanitz buried itself in
symptoms of unsteadiness, or inclination to give
the multiple lines of the Russian centre, which
way, and the openings in the first line were
gave rise to a battle of extraordinary ferocity.
instantly filled up from the second, or the reserve.
Fermor was nowhere to be found at this critical
(Tielke, 1788,11, 180-1)
moment. It was later given out that he had been
The Russian artillery offered a spirited reply, but bruised or lightly wounded, but Prince Charles of
could only inflict insignificant damage on the Saxony records that at two in the afternoon he
more thinly spread Prussian lines. met the commanding general:
After two hours of cannonade the main Prussian
who was making off with a great quantity of
attack declared itself in a concerted move against
hussars and Cossacks. He called out to St. Andre
the badly shot-up Russian right wing. At eleven in
(the Austrian liaison officer) 'General St. Andre,
the morning an advance guard of eight picked
I shall try to get through to Schwedt!', and then
battalions strode boldly ahead, followed in a more
he disappeared from my sight, on account of the
tentative manner by the main body of the Prussian
dust raised by the swarms of men who were
left wing which lost its bearings in the smoke and
fleeing with him. (AKV, 1870-95, IV, 120)
began to veer off to its right. Finally the redoubt-
able Lieutenant-General Seydlitz was at hand with At about the same time the Prussian right or
thirty-six squadrons to close up the flank and seek eastern wing under General Dohna began to bear
targets of opportunity. down on the hitherto unengaged Observation
The unsupported enemy advance guard was met Corps, and the events on the western wing were
by a devastating fire of musketry and artillery here reproduced in a curiously similar sequence.
from Fermor's main army, and the Prussians had Demicoud with the left wing of Russian cavalry
already lost about one-third of -their numbers responded to the threat by launching some lively
when they came under a flank attack from the attacks against the open Prussian flank. Dohna's
first line of the right wing of the Russian cavalry. troops wilted, but Seydlitz restored the day when
The wretched Prussian infantrymen had memories he came hastening up all the way from the far side
of a similar experience at the hands of the of the field and rushed a powerful force of cavalry
Austrians at Kolin in the year before, and they into the action. The Prussian infantry now began
collapsed and fled. The Russian cavalry was in its to push in earnest, and the Observation Corps was
turn overthrown by Seydlitz, who carried on in bent back at an angle until it came to a disorderly
the direction of Fermor's infantry, who were soon stand amid the trees and marshes of the Hofe-
caught up in the exciting events. The first line of Bruch. Zakhar Chernyshev fell into the hands of
greencoats had executed a more or less spontaneous the enemy at this dangerous stage of the proceed-
advance to cries of Ura!, but the movement ings, and George Browne was severely wounded.
staggered to a halt after two or three hundred This very long-drawn-out battle had by now
paces under the double ordeal of being fired on by escaped the control of the generals, and it was
its own second line in all the confusion, and then prolonged into the evening by the frenzy of the
receiving the attack of Seydlitz. Now it was the troops. The Russian army had collapsed into an
turn of the Russian infantry to scatter. Only the irregular square around the light baggage. Many of
9 0 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

the horses were maddened by the incessant whistle at more than 6,000 killed or captured, and nearly
and smack of the Prussian shot and shell, and 12,000 wounded, together with 53,000 roubles in
plunged through the ranks dragging their carts the money chests. Also, 'to the great annoyance of
behind them. Other waggons were plundered by Count Shuvalov at that time, the Prussians cap-
the infantry of the Observation Corps, and: tured some of his secret howitzers in that battle —
the pieces which had those muzzles that even his
the confusion in the Russian army was much
own Russians had not been allowed to see'
increased by the soldiers getting possession of
(Danilov, 1842, 110).
several casks of brandy, of which the Russians
The indecisive slaughter of 25 August 1758 has
always carry a great quantity with their baggage.
gone down as the archetypal Russian battle of the
It was to no purpose that the officers broke the
eighteenth century. 'Since the invention of gun-
casks in pieces, for the men threw themselves on
powder, no battle has been fought which could
the ground, and drank the liquor out of the dust:
equal this for duration, obstinacy, and the
.this made them quite mad and ungovernable.
uncommon proofs of valour displayed on each
(Tielke, 1788,11, 185)
side' (Tielke, 1788, II, 194). The enemy and the
In the rear the Prussian cavalry had a free hand at whole of Europe were made aware for the first
Quartschen, where they seized the money chest of time of the power of elemental resistance pos-
the Observation Corps, but the suicidal resistance sessed by Russian infantrymen and gunners. After-
of the Russian gunners helped to maintain a wards Old Fritz affected to despise the Russians
semblance of cohesion around the perimeter. for their performance in the battle, but he let slip
Speaking of the Russians, an enemy officer a number of expressions which indicated how
testifies that: close he had come to disaster. Speaking of the
achievement of his right wing, and especially the
these warriors offered the Prussians the vision of a
regiments of Forcade and Prinz von Preussen, he
kind of battle they had never seen before . . . even
declared: 'These regiments and General Seydlitz
a shot through the body was often not sufficient
were my salvation!'
to bring them to the ground. The Prussians were
In contrast with the steadfast performance of
therefore left with no alternative but to hack
most of the troops, the Russian higher manage-
down anyone who refused to give way.
ment of the battle inspires very little respect.
(Archenholtz, 1840,1, 167)
There was no attempt to deny Frederick the
As the sun was setting a final outburst of Russian crossing of the Mietzel, or to obstruct his conse-
fire showered the Prussian ranks so thickly that it quent progress around the Russian flank and rear
seemed as if they were being pelted with peas, and on to the higher ground at Zorndorf. The chosen
the ground was left littered with bullets. field was not only low-lying but uncommonly
This bloody day's work cost the enemy 355 cramped, which prevented the local commanders
officers and 12,442 men, or nearly one-third of from acting with the freedom they had shown at
their complement: Gross-Jagersdorf. The outnumbered cavalry showed
great enterprise and courage, and the infantry as a
The battle ruined the East Prussian infantry,. . .
whole fought extremely well, though the
and since then the regiments of that region have
Observation Corps with its untried regiments
been worthless. Mass desertion set in among the
showed less discipline and steadiness than the
soldiers who had left their wives and children in
veterans on the right. The disbandment of this
East Prussia, or who had some property or goods
private army could not long be postponed. 'From
there, not least because the Russians promised to
the beginning, as far as its. organisation was con-
leave them at peace in their homes, and exempt
cerned, it was an abortion' (Maslovskii, 1888-93,
them from military service. (Warnery, 1788, 276)
II, 202). Petr Shuvalov suffered a further dis-
Modern Russian estimates put Fermor's own losses appointment when he evaluated the performance
 91 E l i z a b e t h Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

of the artillery. Many of the gun detachments crossing the Oder, the omission to occupy the
fought on until they were physically annihilated, little hills on the south of the field, and the
but they were often reduced to these sore straits charge that 'all the generals declare that they
simply because the rest of the army did not give received no orders during the battle, or in fact any
them the support they needed — whether tactical instructions at all, apart from a Disposition that
cover for the field batteries, or infantrymen to was issued several days beforehand' (AKV, 1870-
help to serve the regimental pieces. 95, VII, 355).
In his first relations concerning the 'unfortunate Both armies were too exhausted to renew the
affair' at Zorndorf, Fermor wrote to Elizabeth battle after the bloodbath of 25 August, and the
that the poor discipline of the army had prevented outcome of the campaign now depended on the
him from 'attaining such a complete victory over respective power of the Prussians and Russians to
the enemy as was desirable' (Korobkov, 1940, outlast one another on the theatre of war.
186). In response, the Conference furnished him Frederick had to march away to face the
with a notorious manifesto, which Fermor distri- Austrians, leaving Dohna with just 17,000 men in
buted to every company of the army for public the east. From St Petersburg the Conference urged
reading on two days of every week. After uttering Fermor to do something to exploit this state of
some dry words in praise of the courage of the affairs, and at headquarters Prince Charles of
soldiers, the document accused the army as a Saxony begged him at least to reoccupy the field
whole of drunken rioting (which in fact occured of Zorndorf, as a matter of honour. Instead,
only in the Observation Corps), and of breaking Fermor remained inactive at Landsberg on the
into the money chests (which was the doing of the Warthe, until the difficulties of supply became so
Prussian cavalry). Every soldier was physically acute that he had to retreat to winter quarters
searched for the plundered coins, even in the behind the Vistula.
division of Rumyantsev, which had not taken part As the city of Danzig still refused free access to
in the battle. The episode reflects badly on the the Russians, the only hope of retrieving some-
sense of man-management of Fermor and the thing in return for the great effort of 1758 was to
Russian bureaucracy. On the subject of this capture the useful little port of Colberg, as George
offending manifesto, with its convoluted style, Browne had urged some time before. Colberg
an historian observes that: stood at the mouth of the Persante, on a long and
otherwise featureless stretch of the sandy
nothing gives a clearer indication of the length of
Pomeranian coast, and with this place in their
the road which Elizabeth's Russia still had to
possession the Russians might have been able to
travel before it deserved the title of 'European'.
maintain themselves through the winter in enemy
While the Russian armies were already capable of
territory, instead of having to fall back deep into
taking on the army of Frederick in battle,
Poland.
Elizabeth's pen-pushers (and indeed the Empress
When Fermor told off General Palmenbach to
herself) remained on the intellectual and literary
attend to Colberg the season was already far
level of the logothetes of Byzantium. (Rambaud,
advanced, and 'the enterprise became an operation
1895,198)
which was monumentally bad in execution and
Fermor's own role in the affair underwent a consequences' (Bangert, 1971, 363-4). The sup-
searching investigation by Iieutenant-General porting squadron kept so far off shore that its fire
Kostyurin (a brother-in-law of Aleksandr Shuvalov), had no effect. The land forces had no map of the
who was sent by the Conference to make enquiries fortress, and no proper siege artillery, and they
in the army. He completed his report in April were so short of ammunition that they had to wait
1759, and detailed all the failings of the campaign for the Prussians to fire, so that they could pick up
— the miscalculations concerning the siege of the cannon balls and shoot them back. The siege
Custrin, the failure to prevent Frederick from corps finally decamped on 1 November, and 'thus
9 2 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

ended a siege, which may justly be called too kind of personal guidance that was given elsewhere
serious for a joke, and too trifling for earnest' by the King of Prussia or (in a different style) by
(Tielke, 1788,11,361). Maria Theresa. The virtual abdication of the
empress, therefore, left the management of the
war in the hands of an institution, the Conference
The Russian army in the early Seven Years War at the Imperial Court (Konferentsiya pri
Vysochaishem Dvore).
The bare narrative of events gives only passing Since the late 1740s the chancellor, Bestuzhev,
clues as to the nature of the Russians' performance had been in the habit of calling together officials
in their first three campaigns against the leading for meetings on inter-departmental affairs, but in
army of the West. February 1756 the approach of the war persuaded
In the first place the character of the war him to put the thing on a more formal basis. The
direction helps to make sense of much that would immediate objective, he announced, was to alle-
otherwise be inexplicable. Empress Elizabeth viate the 'grievous state' of the commanding
Petrovna never altered in her antagonism towards officer in the field, by providing him with a
Frederick of Prussia, but through her temperament unified source of political, military and administra-
and physical constitution she could lend only tive support. The Austrian ambassador, Esterhazy,
fitful support to the prosecution of the war. Her
distrust of her servants encouraged her to throw
together irreconcilable enemies in the various
departments of state, as Maria Theresa of Austria
was quick to notice. Her sensitive humanity was
another disqualification for high command. The
news of Gross-Jagersdorf, for instance, was enough
to disquiet her conscience for weeks.
Most disturbing of all, the empress was liable to
throw herself into such excesses of social pleasure
and religious enthusiasm as to leave her in a state
of physical and mental prostration, and arouse
fears of her death. Elizabeth lived on in sluggish
acquiescence in the fact that she would be suc-
ceeded by a man who was an admirer of Old Fritz
and a declared enemy of the war. This was her
nephew Grand Prince Peter, who had been snatched
from his beloved duchy of Holstein-Gottorp, and
put through a thoroughly unconvincing course of
Russiflcation as the heir apparent. His wife was the
intelligent and dominating German lady Catherine
(born Sophie of Anhalt-Zerbst), who spent her
time in political and amorous intrigues, and was
the soul of the 'young court'. Field-Marshal
Apraksin was not the only military man who was
probably unwilling to compromise himself in the
eyes of the new generation through an over-
enthusiastic conduct of the war against the
Prussians. 21 Grand Prince Peter and Catherine, leaders of
The Russian state was therefore deprived of the the 'young court'
 93 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

took an important part in the formation of the which put artificial restraints on some wild-eyed
body, and arranged for the once-weekly proceed- Suvorov of a commander, who was dying of
ings to be summed up in a paper and put before mortification because he was not allowed to get
Elizabeth for her decision. to grips with the enemy. However, the Seven Years
The Conference first came together on 25 War general was more typically a soul like Fermor,
March 1756. Bestuzhev sat as the first president, who invoked St Petersburg as cover for his own
and the regular membership comprised such irresolution, and thus the Conference was often
important men as Apraksin (in his capacity as in the position of having to urge some positive
President of the War College), Count Mikhail course of action which the commander was
Bestuzhev (President of the Admiralty College), disinclined to take, whether assuming the offen-
the Vice-Chancellor M. Vorontsov, and Petr sive against Lehwaldt on Dohna, or resorting to
Shuvalov and his brother, the mighty Aleksandr. the drastic method of requisition to obtain his
Elizabeth herself was spurred into taking an supplies.
interest in public affairs, though in later years The determination of grand strategy rested
she did not bother to so much as inform herself of above all upon the connection with Austria, since
what the Conference was doing in her name. the French had renounced any direct interest in
At the highest level of its work, the Conference the eastern theatre, and the allied Swedish army
resolved fundamental questions of state policy. On was a shadow of its former self and very disinclined
successively less exalted planes it sent operational to venture beyond the bounds of Swedish
orders to commanders in the field, it directed Pomerania. By the middle of the war the allies had
trade and all matters of military supply (down to arrived at some remarkably astute assessments of
the purchase of Kalmyk caftans), and it inter- the strengths and weaknesses of their enemy. The
vened to make or break the careers of quite lowly Conference told the Russian representatives with
officers. the Austrian headquarters in 1759 that while
The Conference has been accused of all the Frederick of Prussia was a practitioner of the
vices of the Austrian Hofkriegsrath (itself a widely offensive a outrance, there was now evidence to
misunderstood institution). There was something show that he was easily downcast if events did
evidently absurd in the principle of a committee not conform with his expectations (Thilo von
of amateurs seeking to dictate the operations of a Trotha, 1888, 23). The Austrian major-general,
general who might be 650 miles distant by Tillier, told the Russians with equal sagacity that
eighteenth-century roads. The detail was certainly Frederick's advantages could be traced to his
badly managed. The renderings of foreign docu- central position, and his strategy of concentrating
ments were clumsy and obscure, thanks to the his forces against one enemy at a time (16 January
incompetence of the translators, and in the summer 1759, AKV, 1870-95, CI, 393-4). The Russians
of 1758 Fermor was in the receipt of four and Austrians concluded that Frederick was not
contradictory sets of orders in the space of a fundamentally unbeatable, and that the best
month. means to bring him down was to act with concerted
These manifest shortcomings can sometimes forces. The physical means of liaison were at hand
conceal the fact that no other source of authority in abundance. A message could be got from one
had the will to address itself to the important commander to the other in about a week through
things that the Conference set out to do. The War couriers or lancer-post, and each army had
College and the Admiralty College proved slow a representative in attendance at the other's
and obstructive in their dealings with the com- headquarters.
manders, as Bestuzhev had foreseen, and the With all these considerations in mind, how was
College of External Affairs attempted to manage it possible for the Russians and Austrians to let
foreign policy as a private domain. It is easy to Frederick escape destruction? In part the failure
imagine the Conference as a body of bureaucrats, proceeded from the forces which drew the allies
9 4 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

aside from the natural theatre of joint operations of sustaining an army during a heavily contested
on the lower middle Oder and in Brandenburg. campaign in a Western theatre. There were no
The Russians felt that they could not ignore their Russian-born contractors of any expertise, no
northern flank, whether to secure their territorial regulations or routine, little geographical or statis-
expansion along the Baltic coastline, or to safe- tical knowledge of the Oder country, and a wholly
guard against a counter-offensive from Pomerania. inadequate staff in the departments of the General-
The Austrian concern with the Oder theatre was Kriegskommissar (which saw to supplies and
liable to decline once they had a footing in Silesia, transportation), and the General-Proviantmeister
they were uncomfortable in the open plains, and (which obtained the foodstuffs). These last two
their dynastic interests all the time attracted them functionaries actually remained at St Petersburg
westwards, in the direction of Saxony and the rest until Fermor hauled them up nearer the army
of the German empire. (see p. 81). All of these difficulties were com-
For most of the war, therefore, the Austrians pounded by the desire to spare East Prussia for
thought of the Russian action in terms of indirect political reasons, and the need to have regard for
relief, counterweight and diversion. One exception the prickly sensibilities of the Polish nobility. Thus
relates to the interesting idea of incorporating a the Conference wished to pay for everything in
Russian auxiliary corps in the Austrian army, cash, so as to shame Frederick for his brutal
which would have given Maria Theresa a useful exactions in Saxony.
accession of force, while enabling a cadre of Much of the Russian system of supply evolved
Russian officers to profit by the instruction and upon conventional lines. Broadly speaking, an
example of the Austrians. The Austrians wished to eighteenth-century army needed three main types
see George Browne take command of the corps, of commodities:
for he was an active commander, related to some
1 clothing, artillery, ammunition and other
of Austria's own Irishmen. They also knew and
items of military hardware, which almost
trusted Zakhar Chernyshev, and would have liked
invariably had to come all the way from the
to have him appointed as an assistant. Russia
home base;
steadfastly rejected the whole scheme, as an
2 grain and flour for the men, and perhaps
infringement of her status as a full puissance
also some beef cattle, which were usually obtained
belligerante.
nearer the theatre of war;
The two Austrian triumphs of the middle of the
3 fodder for the horses, which in view of its
war, at Hochkirch in 1758 and Maxen in 1759,
bulk had to be sought on the scene of operations.
came very late in the season, when the Russians
had already left the scene of the campaign. The All possible use was made of river transport — the
Russians' own cycle of operations was of no great Niemen for the operations against East Prussia,
use to the Austrians. It used to open with a series and then the Vistula and the Warthe for the later
of discussions at the Conference, which rarely campaigns. Posen on the Warthe became the focal
reached any concrete understanding with the allies point for the whole war, receiving supplies from
by the time the army straggled on to the theatre of Russia and Poland, and dispatching boats and carts
war. Some great blow would be struck against the to the field army. Provisions for man and beast
Prussians in July or August, and then in the late were obtained for preference by way of contract
autumn the Russians began the long march back to or direct purchase from the locality, since the
the Vistula. Russians still shrank from forcible exactions. On
The indecisive outcome of so much effort had a the immediate scene of operations, however, all
great deal to do with the question of supply, armies of the time found that their calculations
which the Conference defined as the 'first and were dominated by the need to keep their animals
principal' question in a war against Prussia. The alive. While a field battle remained the supreme
Russians were aware that they had no experience test of an army's fighting qualities, the outcome
 95 E l i z a b e t h Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

of the campaign was more likely to depend on an probability, like the Tartars. They will overrun a
army's ability to sustain itself on the contested country, ravage and destroy it, and so leave it;
ground (see the author's The Wild Goose and the because they can never, according to the method
Eagle. A Life of Marshal von Browne 1705-1757, they now follow, make a solid and lasting
London, 1964). The very fact of remaining in a conquest. . . . Their own light troops, and the
single locality was enough to exhaust the barns want of a solid plan of operations, will one day
and the grazing, hence the urgent need to move on ruin their army. (Lloyd, 1781,1, 146)
Allenburg in 1757 (see p. 78). While the Austrians
were able to wage an effective war for territorial Later in the war, instead of just sending armies to
control with their hussars and Croats, the Russians glorious battles, it might have been better to
proved their own worst enemies in this kind of pursue a strategy of industrious advantages, and
warfare, for their Cossacks chased the peasants brought up the siege train to batter the Oder
away and wasted the resources of the country. fortresses, as well as making better use of the
The Russians resorted to a number of expedients neglected fleet to mount a proper expedition
to help themselves along. The artillery and baggage against Colberg. The Russians could then have
horses were turned out to graze during halts on the spent their winters in enemy territory, something
march, while the cavalrymen were sent to mow that they consistently failed to do, as the Marquis
hay and gather fodder, which menial tasks reduced da Silva indicated (Silva, 1778, 41).
their combat strength still further. Most charac- We now turn to the instruments of Russian war-
teristic of all, the Russians reverted to some of the making. The lack of good generals was always a
habits of their Turkish wars, and hauled around weighty factor in allied calculations. Already in
with them a vast train of carts which held cereals 1756 Esterhazy wrote that the Austrians must give
and even fodder for twelve days' consumption or 'due consideration to the fact that they do not
more, giving them a certain independence of the have one capable general who is up to command-
neighbourhood, though at a heavy cost to their * ing the Russian army' (to Maria Theresa, 22 April
mobility. 1756, Volz and Kiintzel, 1899, 319). The succes-
In happy contrast to the state of affairs obtain- sive leaders were certainly more notable for their
ing in Austria, the Russian war effort experienced political connections than outstanding military
few limitations through lack of economic backing, talent. Apraksin was a favourite of Bestuzhev, just
even towards the end of the war. The Russian as Fermor was a client of Vice-Chancellor
finances were innocent of debts or credit, and Vorontsov and the 'French' party. The honest
although the army experienced some shortfalls in Saltykov was appointed at the urging of Austria,
pay, the despotic power of the government was while Buturlin owed his position directly to the
sufficient to exact what was usually needed in cash empress. Men such as these were accustomed to
and commodities from the Russian people. return to St Petersburg in wintertime as much to
However, a fundamental shortcoming in logis- test their standing in the court circle as to prepare
tical support resulted from the failure of the for the coming campaign. The outstanding middle-
Conference and the high command to consider the ranking generals, Browne and Golitsyn, lacked the
war in terms of more than one campaign at a time. necessary influence and seniority for the top
Henry Lloyd pointed out that the Russians could command, and the same disqualifications applied
have usefully .planted magazines at the East with still greater force to Chernyshev, Rumyantsev,
Prussian port of Memel, after Fermor conquered Villebois and Volkonskii, who were to become
it in 1757: famous in the reign of Catherine the Great.
All grades of generals were given to insub-
The want of this precaution, both this and all the ordination, tale-telling and quarrelling of a most
following campaigns, rendered their victories damaging kind. Petr Shuvalov fell out with Fermor,
useless. They made war, and always will, in all after the latter's rude comments on the new
9 6 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

artillery. Fermor was at daggers drawn with NCOs of the Guard and pupils of the Cadet Corps,
Rumyantsev, and Rumyantsev in turn was seen to which went a little way to meet the deficiency,
enter into an undignified quarrel with Golitsyn but promotion for the ordinary soldier remained
over the possession of a couple of stolen geese. almost unknown. Also, the Russians were not
Some people were beyond all control. From St disposed to look benevolently on the foreign
Petersburg Petr Shuvalov managed the Observation gentry who took advantage of their need, and
Corps as a private army, and insisted that its field streamed out to the army, drawn variously by
commander must render his reports direct to him, curiosity, love of adventure or hope of distinction.
and not to the War College. Then again, the 'flying The highest-born of this tribe was Prince Charles
corps' of light troops operated as an independent of Saxony, who was given a magnificent send-off
entity under its successive chiefs Sibilsky (1757), to the wars at St Petersburg, and repaid his hosts
Demicoud (1758-9) and Totleben (1759-61). They by commenting adversely on every aspect of
felt only distantly answerable to the commander- Fermor's generalship.
in-chief, and their indifferent performance in the The rank and file appeared on the theatre of
pursuit detracted considerably from the worth of war in numbers that were startlingly small, in
hard-won victories like Gross-Jagersdorf and proportion to the extent of the Russian empire. In
Kunersdorf. September 1759 Montalembert wrote to Paris that
If the staffs had been properly organised, they the last campaigns showed that the Russians could
could have acted as a restraint on the childish ways put no more than 40,000 effectives into the field
of the generals. Excellent men such as Weymarn (Montalembert, 1777, II, 87), yet since 1755 a
and Stoffeln held the post of quartermaster- total of 231,644 men had been called to the
general at times during the war, but they were colours. These had been through the standard
overwhelmed by a mass of unrelated detail which procedure of the conscription of a proportion of
produced more paperwork than 'in ten German the 'souls', or taxable male population, in the ten
armies taken together' (Lambert, AKV, 1870-95, governments of Great Russia (1:135 in 1756,
VI, 492). Weymarn explained that his work 1:194 in 1757, 1:116 in 1758, 1:128 in 1759).
involved negotiating with the Polish magnates, However, the process operated so slowly that the
selecting and staking out camp sites, interrogating recruits raised through the levy of 1 October 1756
Prussian prisoners and deserters, arranging supply only reached the regiments over a period extend-
in enemy land, and composing a journal of opera- ing from the summer of 1757 until the beginning
tions that was written out first in German, and of 1758. Many others had died or fallen sick on
then translated into Russian, all of which left him the march, and the chaos and suffering reached
with very little time to consider the future course such proportions that the third battalions of the
of the campaign. The same extravagance prevailed infantry regiments were eventually told off to
at every kind of headquarters. After Count Hordt, remain in the rear, where they were to act as
a Swedish mercenary, was taken prisoner after centres for reception, training and reconvalescence.
Kunersdorf, he was brought to dine with Totleben The Garrison Army (see p. 35) was supposed to
and found him in the company of a host of provide a first-line reserve for the field forces, but
adjutants and half a dozen clerks. 'It is well known', this too failed to meet the demands of the war,
he commented, 'that Russian generals invariably thanks to its poor discipline and material condi-
drag along with them a whole office staff in their tion. When Petr Shuvalov formed his Observation
suite'(Hordt, 1805,40). Corps in 1756, he was disappointed to find that he
While the military bureaucracy swelled to an could raise only 7 or 8,000 good quality men from
inordinate degree, the ranks of the line officers this source.
were heavily depleted by the war. By 1759 Fermor An Austrian officer wrote in November 1757 of
estimated the shortfall at more than 422 officers the horrid sight of the sick, who were 'stretched
of all grades. The Conference released a number of out on the grass without tents or covering. . . .
 97 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

22 Fusilier and sergeant of infantry, Seven Years War. Green coat with red collar and cuffs and brass
buttons; red waistcoat; red breeches; black gaiters (red in the Apsheronskii Regiment, in honour of the
bloody day of Kunersdorf); hat with yellow lace (Viskovatov, 1844-56)
9 8 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

What kind of an impression must this make on with the units, it was almost impossible to sort it
their comrades?' (Rambaud, 1895, 53). By this into proper order in the event of an enemy attack,
time men were dying at the rate of fifty a day, and with consequences that were evident at Gross-
the healthy troops were far outnumbered by the Jagersdorf and Zorndorf.
sick, yet the director of medical services was living All of this harked back to the practice of the
in fine style at Riga, and downing oysters by the Turkish wars, and was reinforced by the experience
score at his dinners with Apraksin. of having to march across the sandy heaths of the
Such troops who survived the marches and the new theatre of operations. Fermor appears to have
diseases were all too often diverted to drive or conceded defeat, after his first ambitions to reduce
escort the vast quantity of baggage carts, and 'the the train. lieutenant-General Kostyurin inter-
consequence of all this is, that on the day of battle viewed him at length on the subject on 14 March
full a fourth part of the fighting men are absent' 1759, and reported to the Conference:
(Tielke, 1788, II, 32). The general baggage (trans-
port train) of the army carried the reserves of You may imagine the difficulty that is experienced
ammunition, and provisions for sometimes as in feeding such a mass of animals. Also, when the
much as one month. On the battlefield it was baggage is constituted on this scale, great numbers
leaguered up into a defensible Wagenburg, like the of men must be detached to guard it, if the enemy
one that was left at Gross-Cammin on the day of is in the offing or intends to give battle. Count
Zorndorf. On the move, it was inserted somewhere Fermor has certainly given consideration to these
behind the marching columns. matters, but he remains absolutely convinced that
The regimental baggage was if possible more such an establishment is necessary to feed the
burdensome still. The regulation allowance of men of his army. (AKV, 1870-95, VII, 357)
transport for the infantry regiment stood at two
hundred two-horse train and baggage carts, four- For these reasons the marching formations of
teen two-horse carts for the musket ammunition, the Russians in the early Seven Years War did not
and two two-horse ammunition carts for each of differ in kind from the monstrous oblongs of
the four 3-pounders. As for the cavalrymen, they Munnich. On the way to Custrin in 1758 Prince
had 'no bags or portmanteaux; but all their Charles of Saxony affected surprise to see the
baggage, of which they carry a great deal, and army blundering forward in two massive columns,
more than the infantry, is loaded on waggons' giving 'evidence of very little training in the
(Tielke, 1788, II, 20). Everything possible was various military movements and evolutions, which
thrown on to the carts, down to the hats of the they carry out by the whole army in entire corps,
troopers, and the coats of the infantry in summer- as events and circumstances dictate' (AKV, 1870-
time, as well as intrinsically heavy items like the 95, IV, 114). As quartermaster-general of
tent poles and chevaux de frise. In addition every Apraksin's army the year before, Weymarn con-
artel, or mess, of the troops had its jealously ceded the advantages of movement by small
guarded cart, driven by one of the men, and each columns, but he maintained that such a formation
officer was entitled to a private train of ten or was impracticable, because of the general ignor-
more vehicles — a limit that was often surpassed ance of the theatre of war. In this respect the
many times over. 'No matter how much I try to Cossacks did far more harm than good, for they
reduce my train', wrote Apraksin, 'I cannot get by spread false alarms, and forced the local popula-
with less than 250 draught horses, in addition to tions to scamper off to the woods. The same
the riding horses, of which I cannot possibly have inflexibility was evident in the choice of camps,
less than thirty' (17 April 1757, SIRIO, 1872, for the army arranged itself on no set principles,
IX, 465). The sutlers, or private dealers, swelled and 'usually occupied sites of the most disadvan-
the mass still further. Since the regimental and tageous kind in hollows, making no attempt to
private baggage was so intimately intermingled exploit low outlying hills of the kind which always
 99 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

23 Infantry officers, Seven Years War. Green coat with red collar and cuffs; red waistcost; green breeches;
black leather waist pouch with brass plate; yellow and black sash; silver gorget. The musket replaced the
officers' spontoon in Munnich's time (Viskovatov, 1844-5.6)
1 0 0 Elizabeth P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

prove so useful' (Prince Charles of Saxony, AKV,

1870-95, IV, 122).
Gross-Jagersdorf was an untidy encounter
battle, fought out and decided as a series of local
combats. For Russian notions on the management
of a large-scale action we therefore have to turn to
the reports of observers, and evidence like Fermor's
General Disposition for Battle with the Enemy
(14 July 1758), and the details of the clash at
Zorndorf which shortly followed it. According to
the English captain Lambert, the Russians were
confident that their chevaux de frise would make
their infantry invulnerable to cavalry, which helps
to account for the fact that they disposed all their
own cavalry in Western style, on either flank. The
two main lines of battle stood between three and
five hundred paces apart, with an intermediate
force of infantry (what Buturlin called 'regimental
reserves') stationed between. The regimental
artillery was deployed immediately in front of its
various parent units, while the batteries of field
artillery took up station before the flanks of the
army according to the dictates of the brigade
commanders. The rearward line of the army was
to reinforce the first only upon specific command,
'for otherwise the losses cannot be made good
again from the reserves positioned between the
two lines' (Fermor, in Maslovskii, 1893, II, 129).
On basic tactical principles, Fermor declared in
1758 that

Everybody is aware that in the last campaign both

the Prussian infantry and cavalry launched
themselves recklessly into the attack, and opened
fire before they came within range. Consequently
. . . we must meet them with a brave demeanour,
24 Grenadier of a regiment of musketeers, Seven
and pay due regard to the effect of our artillery.
Years War. The mitre cap with the plate and
Then you must open fire by platoons at the
leather neck guard was introduced in 1756. The
command of the officers, aiming at the enemy
brass plate bears the regimental badge (Viskovatov,
soldiers' middles. When the Prussians come
1344-56)
nearer still you employ divisional fire, and
continue the fight with the bayonet until,
infantry more than surpassed every expectation.
through the help of God and the courage of
Their brothers in the regular cavalry fought with
the Russian army, the enemy are beaten and
dash at Zorndorf, but they were still suffering
chased away. (Fermor, in Maslovskii, 1893, II,
from the reorganisation that had been so unwisely
344)
undertaken on the eve of the war, from their lack
In the first two battles of the war the Russian of training, and from a grievous shortage of horses.
 101 E l i z a b e t h Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

25 Captain of a regiment of grenadiers, Seven

Years War (Viskovatov, 1844-56)
26 Cuirassier on dismounted sentry duty, Seven
Years War. Uniform as in 11, except for 1% inch
wide border to collet (Viskovatov, 1844-56)

Rumyantsev wrote to the War College early in the Georgian [Gruzinskii] ). However, they proved
1759 that the only way to remedy the last failing to be a poor investment, despite Rumyantsev's
was to make the squadron commanders personally efforts, for they were as incompetent as the
responsible for the selection and welfare of the Cossacks, while costing far more.
mounts. The Cossacks themselves failed dismally at
Rumyantsev himself had done excellent work almost every task they were set. On the march
as a trainer of horse, and with the regular cavalry they devastated the countryside and terrorised the
so far behindhand, he did his best to make the population, with dire consequences for the supply
regiments of hussars as adept in the Code of 1755 and intelligence of the army, and yet they failed to
as in their own irregular style of combat. Four provide an effective tactical screen. Prince Charles
regiments of hussars actually reached the army of Saxony saw them in 1758, and claims 'they
(the Serbian, the Hungarian, the Moldavian and proceed a little way in front of the advance guard,
1 0 0 Elizabeth P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

prove so useful' (Prince Charles of Saxony, AKV,

1870-95, IV, 122).
Gross-Jagersdorf was an untidy encounter
battle, fought out and decided as a series of local
combats. For Russian notions on the management
of a large-scale action we therefore have to turn to
the reports of observers, and evidence like Fermor's
General Disposition for Battle with the Enemy
(14 July 1758), and the details of the clash at
Zorndorf which shortly followed it. According to
the English captain Lambert, the Russians were
confident that their chevaux de frise would make
their infantry invulnerable to cavalry, which helps
to account for the fact that they disposed all their
own cavalry in Western style, on either flank. The
two main lines of battle stood between three and
five hundred paces apart, with an intermediate
force of infantry (what Buturlin called 'regimental
reserves') stationed between. The regimental
artillery was deployed immediately in front of its
various parent units, while the batteries of field
artillery took up station before the flanks of the
army according to the dictates of the brigade
commanders. The rearward line of the army was
to reinforce the first only upon specific command,
'for otherwise the losses cannot be made good
again from the reserves positioned between the
two lines' (Fermor, in Maslovskii, 1893, II, 129).
On basic tactical principles, Fermor declared in
1758 that

Everybody is aware that in the last campaign both

the Prussian infantry and cavalry launched
themselves recklessly into the attack, and opened
fire before they came within range. Consequently
. . . we must meet them with a brave demeanour,
24 Grenadier of a regiment of musketeers, Seven
and pay due regard to the effect of our artillery.
Years War. The mitre cap with the plate and
Then you must open fire by platoons at the
leather neck guard was introduced in 1756. The
command of the officers, aiming at the enemy
brass plate bears the regimental badge (Viskovatov,
soldiers' middles. When the Prussians come
1344-56)
nearer still you employ divisional fire, and
continue the fight with the bayonet until,
infantry more than surpassed every expectation.
through the help of God and the courage of
Their brothers in the regular cavalry fought with
the Russian army, the enemy are beaten and
dash at Zorndorf, but they were still suffering
chased away. (Fermor, in Maslovskii, 1893, II,
from the reorganisation that had been so unwisely
344)
undertaken on the eve of the war, from their lack
In the first two battles of the war the Russian of training, and from a grievous shortage of horses.
 101 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

25 Captain of a regiment of grenadiers, Seven

Years War (Viskovatov, 1844-56)
26 Cuirassier on dismounted sentry duty, Seven
Years War. Uniform as in 11, except for 1 % inch
wide border to collet (Viskovatov, 1844-56)

Rumyantsev wrote to the War College early in the Georgian [Gruzinskii] ). However, they proved
1759 that the only way to remedy the last failing to be a poor investment, despite Rumyantsev's
was to make the squadron commanders personally efforts, for they were as incompetent as the
responsible for the selection and welfare of the Cossacks, while costing far more.
mounts. The Cossacks themselves failed dismally at
Rumyantsev himself had done excellent work almost every task they were set. On the march
as a trainer of horse, and with the regular cavalry they devastated the countryside and terrorised the
so far behindhand, he did his best to make the population, with dire consequences for the supply
regiments of hussars as adept in the Code of 1755 and intelligence of the army, and yet they failed to
as in their own irregular style of combat. Four provide an effective tactical screen. Prince Charles
regiments of hussars actually reached the army of Saxony saw them in 1758, and claims 'they
(the Serbian, the Hungarian, the Moldavian and proceed a little way in front of the advance guard,
1 0 2 Elizabeth P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

moving very sluggishly at that, and they do not

attempt to reconnoitre to the side of the route,
which means that the army could well be exposed
to an unexpected enemy attack on the march.' If
the camps were badly chosen in the first place,
'the Cossacks are in no position to render any
service in this respect. They have no officer with
the understanding or capacity to render reports
detailing the position or strength of the enemy
army' (AKV, 1870-95, IV, 114, 122; see also
Lambert, ibid., VI, 486).
The Cossacks' undoubted skills at evasion were
mostly practised at the expense of their own
commanders:
The Cossacks, in general, when they go out upon
party, lead a horse, on which they get when the
one they are mounted upon is tired; thus they
will go ten or twelve German miles in one
excursion, plunder and burn one or two villages,
and be in the camp again almost before they are
missed (Tielke, 1788, II, 78).

The feigned retreat and subsequent counter-attack

at Gross-Jagersdorf was the one notable feat of
arms to their credit, but before the next great
battle they had once more largely escaped from
control. After Zorndorf they became almost
totally unmanageable, because so many had
dispersed during the action. The Dnieper Cossacks
were generally recognised to be the worst of the
lot, while the people from the Don were of higher
intrinsic worth, but managed by poorish officers.
The Ukranian variety was more tractable and
better-organised, but the men were of limited
military value, and they never recovered from the
hardships of the campaign of 1757. 27 Artilleryman, Seven Years War. Red coat with
Although the Russian artillery still lacked a black collar, cuffs and turnbacks; red waistcoat;
certain ensemble, it already commanded wide red breeches; brass-fronted box and priming flask
respect on account of the power of its ordnance, (Viskovatov, 1844-56)
and the devotion and skill with which the detach-
ments served their pieces. Prussian officers like
Retzow and Prittwitz were struck by the suicidal while the Russians sought to take fortresses like
dedication of these gunners in the great battles, Custrin and Colberg by field artillery alone. These
and even Lambert found some good words to say attacks were very perfunctory indeed, by the
about the prominent artillery commander standards of siege operations in the West.
Lieutenant-General Tolstoi. It was unfortunate While the Russians performed with valour and
that the heavy siege train languished atKonigsberg, credit in the open field, they were losing very
 103 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

heavily to Frederick in a war of another nature. Niederlage der Russen bei Zorndorf (March 1759),
The Prussian veteran, Archenholtz, draws atten- where he described how the Russians, 'more
tion to the peculiar importance of 'public relations' ravenous than an army of locusts', worked their
at this time: way through the blessed land of Brandenburg,
reducing it to an image of their native steppes.
Never had there been a war in which so many
Likewise, after the occupation of Berlin in 1760,
battles were fought. No less remarkable was the
Frederick got Finckenstein to compose a Kurze
great quantity of official pronouncements that
Anzeige, indicting the Russians for their barbaric
were published during this period of general
behaviour.
distress. The great monarchs were anxious to
The Russian response was confined to private
justify their strange doings in the eyes of all the
outrage and the sending of diplomatic notes. The
world, and even win the approval of such people
foreign public was left in general ignorance of
whose opinions they could easily have ignored.
episodes like the brutal Prussian exactions in
Such was the victory of 'Enlightenment', which
Saxony, while in the Russian homeland the
at that time was beginning to radiate its beneficial
character of the enemy was transmitted merely
beams over Europe. (Archenholtz, 1840,1, 95-6)
through the medium of fantastic folk tales, in
We may speculate that the propagandists had in which the 'cruel king' Frederick repeatedly escaped
mind such targets as British political opinion, and his just deserts by assuming the various forms of
neutral bankers and contractors, as well as a public blue pigeon, grey cat, falcon, crow, duck or fish.
which followed the events of the wars with much Thus the Frederickian version of the Russian
closer interest than most commentators on the behaviour in the Seven Years War has come down
eighteenth century are prepared to admit. to modern times unchallenged, and has succeeded
A particularly damaging document was in brilliantly in distorting the West's perception of
circulation in 1758 — an alleged Lettre d'un the eighteenth-century Russian army. The atro-
Voyageur, which was composed at Riga on 8 cities were in fact confined to the Cossacks, and to
November 1757. The author enumerated the occasional failings on the part of the regulars. As
shortcomings of the Russian army in scathing a general rule, wrote the Saxon Tielke,the 'Russian
terms, describing the generally poor state of the regular troops yield to none in Europe in point of
infantry, the parlous condition of the cavalry, and exact discipline, and perhaps surpass, in this
the limited capacity of nearly all the generals. The respect, most armies' (Tielke, 1788, II, 16). There
Russian resident, Simolin, forwarded a copy of is a good deal of evidence to support this conten-
the paper from Augsburg on 12 August 1758: tion. The Russians behaved impeccably during
'Thoroughly contemptible in all respects, this their long tenure of East Prussia, and their even-
letter is nothing but a tissue of accusations and tual departure was seen with some regret. After
false charges, intended to detract from the quality the action at Paltzig, in 1759, General Petr
of our army and the ability of our commanders' Ivanovich Panin wrote to his brother Nikita how
(AKV, 1870-95, VI, 478). At the instructions of even the Russian wounded were concerned to drag
the Vice-Chancellor, Fermor identified and arrested the Prussian casualties to a place of safety. One of
the author, who turned out to be the English the Prussian injured in that encounter was
captain Lambert, who was acting as a Prussian Lieutenant Lemcke, who testified that the Russian
spy and publicist. officers treated the Prussian wounded with the
As the war went on, the Prussian propaganda greatest generosity and kindness, and gave each of
concentrated on atrocity stories. Ortmann pub- them a Russian soldier as an attendant. 'I had a
lished long accounts from East Prussia and the good old lad, who looked after me most atten-
Neumark, detailing the Russian misdeeds at great tively and served me day and night. I only regretted
length. The poetaster Gleim took up the theme in that I could not speak with him' (Lemcke, 1909,
Der Grenadier und die Kriegesmuse nach der 3940). The more cultivated Russian officers were
1 0 4 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

distressed to learn that the celebrated poet Major the entire army of Her Imperial Highness, from the
Kleist had died in their hands, after he had been highest commanders to the lowliest soldiers, is
struck down by a canister ball at Kunersdorf, and imbued with an invincible courage. We may expect
maltreated by the Cossacks. The Russian officers a correspondingly good performance in action,
joined the dons of Frankfurt University in the when the army is provided with its needs. (14
funeral train, and one of them laid his own sword April 1759, AKV, 1870-95, VII, 356)
on the coffin.
In their private memoirs, the Prussian military What was still lacking was confidence in the top
men spoke of the prowess of the Russians with leadership. Keith noted that Fermor was 'dis-
respect, and after Zorndorf the open-minded agreeable to, and despised by, the troops. And it is
Seydlitz did not hesitate to take Frederick up on added, that the uneasiness of his situation has
his disparaging remarks about the enemy. Indeed, drawn him into a state of habitual drinking, which,
Old Fritz's pretended contempt seemed to grow in if true, must lessen him still more in their eye'
proportion to his increasing comprehension of the (29 May 1759, PRO, SPF91/67). In his assessment
Russian fighting-power. of the state of the army, Kostyurin reported that
'most people are discontented, if they do not
actually complain, and in their conversation many
Saltykov's command, 1759 of the generals and officers remarked that they
would like to be commanded by a Russian' (AKV,
The Russian army slowly gathered its strength for 1870-95, VII, 356).
what was to be its most glorious campaign of the Fermor was still considered indispensable to the
war: army on account of his technical competence, but
he had to abdicate the leadership in favour of
The season of Lent arrived. Skylarks climbed to
General Petr Semenovich Saltykov (1698-1772),
the sky, and flowers and plants appeared' in the
who in his sixties was still the least known of the
fields. The soldiers cleaned their weapons, while
senior commanders.
the officers arranged their accounts and fitted
out their vehicles. Everybody put themselves in
He is a gentleman of family and very fair character
readiness, awaiting the order to advance. (Tage,
[noted Keith], but has had very little experience
RA, 1864,11,308)
as a soldier, for having passed his younger days at
court, and being made a chamberlain, which in this
The provision magazines at Dirschau, Elbing,
country gives the title and the rank of a major-
Marienwerder, Kulm and Graudenz were filled by
general, he took that opportunity of entering into
20 March, and the British diplomat Keith was
the army, and accordingly served in that character
already aware of an accelerating pace in the war:
in the last campaign of the Swedish War under
I see no appearances here that seem any ways to Marshal Lacy, which was the only occasion he ever
tend towards peace. On the contrary, the military had of learning his trade. He afterwards
preparations go on with vigour. Four hundred commanded in the Ukraine, but in the time of
thousand roubles have been ordered for General profound peace. (29 May 1759, PRO, SP 91/67)
Shuvalov's new corps, of which several regiments
have lately passed through this city [St When the Russian military bureaucrats turned out
Petersburg] on their way to the army, and to see Saltykov arrive at Konigsberg, they were
recruits are pouring in from all quarters daily. disappointed to find an insignificant, greying
(2 February 1759, PRO, SPF91/67) figure, walking through the streets in a plain white
militia coat. Opinions of Saltykov could only
Lieutenant-General Kostyurin reported to the improve. Some of the officers remained aloof, but
Conference that: the army began to warm to his concern for its
 105 Elizabeth P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

welfare, and his comfortable and systematic way the desires of the French, who feared any more
of life. He was good at joking with the soldiers, he positive moves on the part of Russia, but the
had the eccentric habit of checking the reliability scheme was overtaken by an initiative of the
of information by going to see things for himself, Austrians, who for the first time in this war
and he even maintained that something might be showed themselves willing to bring about an inter-
made of the Cossacks, with proper direction. action of the two imperial armies in the Prussian
heartland. Vienna desisted from its long-standing
demand for a Russian auxiliary corps, and instead
Paltzig (Kay) and the second march agreed with the Russians as to the strength of the
to the Oder, 1759 two main armies, the selection of a common objec-
tive on the middle Oder, and the choice of 25
Plans of campaign were already being revolved at June as the day the forces were to set out — the
St Petersburg. To begin with the Russians thought Austrians from Bohemia, and the Russians from
in terms of devoting the effort to the reduction of Poland. The other theatres of war were for the
Stettin. This would certainly have accorded with time being regarded as subsidiary. An army of
Austrians and troops of the German empire was
to attend to affairs in Saxony, while the Russians
would gather a corps for an eventual siege of
Colberg.
The Russian army assembled at Posen in a
strength of 60,000 men, including Cossacks, and
under its untried leader it set off across the plain
for the middle Oder. The main Prussian army
under Frederick had occupations elsewhere, but
the command of the Oder was disputed by the
combative if rather stupid Lieutenant-General
Wedel, who had a corps of 28,000 men in position
at Zullichau.
Declining the obvious challenge, Saltykov side-
stepped with notable adroitness on the night of
22-23 July, and brought his army around the
north of Wedel's force to a blocking position at
Paltzig, which threatened the Prussian communi-
cations with Crossen. In the early morning of the
23rd the huge clouds of dust told the Prussians
that Saltykov was on the move, and a few hours
later they knew that they would have to improvise
some kind of attack if they wished to restore their
lifeline.
Saltykov gave further proof of his profes-
sionalism in the way he set out his army to receive
the Prussians. The broad and swampy Eichmiihlen-
Fliess afforded him a good frontal barrier, and the
troops were arranged in two main lines in a well-
articulated fashion on the higher ground on the
west bank. The left was teased out rather thinly to
28 Petr Semenovich Saltykov face an almost impassable stretch of the stream,
1 0 6 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

but the right was disposed in depth in a zone of responded to the pressure by interleaving his
sandstone hillocks behind Heidemuhl, and Saltykov cavalry with lines of infantry, and bringing up two
retained the capacity to move further troops to regiments of musketeers from his left wing. A
this sector as occasion might demand. Eight useful force of cavalry (three regiments of regulars,
batteries of field artillery were planted in hastily three of hussars, and the Don and Chuguevskii
constructed entrenchments (the first the Russians Cossacks) had already been summoned up from
had ever built in this war), and those on the right the east of Paltzig, and was hovering around the
were artfully sited on some commanding knolls Crossen road.
between the two lines. These balanced dispositions were enough to
Wedel moved to the attack at four on the repulse not only the frontal assaults, but also a
extremely hot afternoon of 23 July. He had at dangerous move by four regiments of Prussian
first calculated on making the assault on a broad cuirassiers, which worked their way across the
frontage, but the difficulty of passing the swampy ground beyond the Russian right, and
Eichmuhlen-Fliess eventually compelled the managed to drive some way into the flank before
Prussians to advance by divisions across the single they were shot up by the rearward batteries of
stretch between Heidemuhl and Glogsen and up field artillery, and forced back by the Russian
the ridge that led to the Russian right. The generals cavalry.
Manteuffel, Hiilsen, Kanitz and Wobersnow each
had their commands smashed in turn. Saltykov All those who were present at this action have
 107 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

Wobersnow moving
to third attack

First
attack

Flanking a t t a c k
Kanitz moving
of c u i r a s s i e r s to second attack

testified that no battle had so far proceeded in This destructive little battle ended at about
such an orderly fashion. Nowhere was there the eight in the evening, with up to 8,000 Prussians
slightest disorder on either side during the whole left on the field, and the rest in full retreat.
continuance of the combat, and so the victory Saltykov lost about 4,700 in dead and wounded
may be attributed above all to the superiority of out of the 40,500 or so men he had in the action.
our force, to the advantage of a well-chosen 'The whole army drew encouragement from its
position, and to the good effect of our unicorns victory over the enemy, and began to repose
and Shuvalov howitzers. (Bolotov, 1870-3,1, 907) greater trust in its elderly leader. Saltykov had
1 0 8 Elizabeth Petrovna 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

been fortunate enough to enjoy the love of his had no German with which he could communicate
soldiers from the time he first arrived, but now with Loudon.
they positively adored him' (Bolotov, 1870-3, The Russians and the Austrian fragment were
I, 907). On the day after the action Wedel with- still stranded uselessly on the east bank when their
drew across the Oder, abandoning the east bank time of grace elapsed, and King Frederick arrived
to the Russians. Saltykov moved to Crossen, and on the scene with an army of 50,000 troops.
on 1 August he occupied the city of Frankfurt- Saltykov's watch along the Oder was uncharac-
an-der-Oder with a combined force of all arms. teristically lax, and Frederick was able to bridge
and ford the river a short distance below Frankfurt.
Just as had happened last year in the campaign of
Kunersdorf, 1759 Zorndorf, the Russians were left to face a royal
army without support from their allies.
Now that he had fought his way so manfully to Saltykov had a combined army of about 52,000
the Oder, Saltykov had every right to expect that infantry and 12,000 cavalry under his command.
the Austrians would live up to their part of the Rather than undergo the danger of coming under
bargain and come to join him for the campaign in attack on the march, he dug himself in along a low
the centre of the Prussian state. In June the main ridge extending in a north-easterly direction from
Austrian army marched down from the Bohemian Frankfurt. At six thousand paces the position was
hills into Silesia, but it moved only very pon- considerably longer than the one at Zorndorf,
derously across the plain in the direction of the though much more shallow. The fortifications
Russians, and finally came to a halt about fifty were dug from the sandy soil, and formed curtains
miles short of Saltykov and on the 'wrong', or and angular redans around most of the position,
western side of the Oder. The Austrian com- with batteries of field artillery positioned on
mander, Field-Marshal Daun, was temperamentally especially vital sectors. Two such strongpoints
unsuited for wide-ranging offensive operations in were to figure prominently in the story of the
the open field, and he displayed little interest in battle of Kunersdorf — the central battery on the
joining the Russians, or even keeping Saltykov Grosser-Spitzberg hill, which was defended by
au fait with what was going on. The Austrians had seventeen Russian regiments under the command
promised to take over the supply of the Russians, of Rumyantsev, and the outlying fortifications on
if they crossed to the west bank, but there was the north-eastern salient on the Miihl-Berge, which
no sign of Daun making any active preparations to were separated from the main position by the
that end. hollow of the Kuh-Grund. The Russian infantry
Finally, as a compromise strategy, Lieu tenant- regiments were largely committed to the defence
General Loudon crossed to the Russian bank with of the perimeter, but the cavalry and the Austrians
a corps of some 24,000 Austrian troops. Embarras- were held ready as a reserve of intervention.
singly enough, Loudon had just lost his supply Frederick made a distant and uninformative
train to the Prussians, and once he arrived among reconnaissance of the bristling position from the
his allies he had to go begging for rations for his north-east, and reached the false conclusion that
men. He was one of the best of the younger the south-eastern, or further side was unpro-
generation of Austrian generals, and far more tected, and therefore vulnerable to his favourite
enterprising than Daun, but he at first found it by device of the flanking attack. Oddly enough the
no means easy to strike up a friendly relationship Russians assumed that they would be assailed
with Saltykov, whom he described as 'all too along this sector all the time, for they had not
evidently a fundamentally evil man, in whom it is anticipated that Frederick might cross the Oder
impossible to repose any trust' (Bangert, 1971, in their rear. At two in the morning of 12 August
277). On his side, Saltykov was an old-fashioned 1759 the Prussian columns were set in motion.
Muscovite who did not believe his translators, and While a diversionary force under lieutenant-
 109 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

KUNERSDORF, 12 August 1759

First positions

(Loudon) e ^ 1
? BerQ

(Comb'd crs).

General Finck picked its way across a marshy of the Prussian onset. The unfortunate regiments
heath and made directly for the northern front, of the Observation Corps, wilted under a con-
Frederick led the main army on a wide circuit certed pounding from a wide arc of Prussian guns,
through a tract of woods, and finally emerged and they gave way under the assault which
opposite the supposedly open allied 'rear' towards followed. Saltykov moved up the twelve elite
the end of a brilliant morning. Old Fritz could companies of Austrian grenadiers in support, but
now see that his calculations had gone astray, they were unable to stay the flight of the Russians
but by this time his army was irrevocably across the Kuh-Grund.
committed to the attack. Having carried the Muhl-Berge, the Prussian
The Muhl-Berge salient took the first impact advance guard put in the first of a series of attacks
110 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

against the main position behind. The corps of to assist him in this extremity of misfortune, and
Finck closed in from the north, while Frederick's save his men from total ruin. Who knows? This
main army occupied the smoking ruins of prayer, offered by a virtuous old man in all the
Kunersdorf village and began to climb the purity of his mind and heart, may well have
southern slopes. The Russians were taken on three carried to Heaven. In any event the face of affairs
sides, with the salient facing the Kuh-Grund changed almost instantly, and there ensued a
coming under the heaviest pressure. sequence of events which nobody could have
Saltykov brought up the Austrian regiment of conceived or imagined. (Bolotov, 1870-3,1, 917)
Baden-Baden to support its brothers in the grena-
diers, as well as General Panin with the Russian By the middle of the afternoon the infantry battle
regiments of the second line, but for the rest he had become a standing fire fight, and the Russians
was: were 'jammed eighty or one hundred men deep,
forming a disorderly mob on an eminence. But this
in such a state of perturbation and despair that he mob was protected by fifty cannon, which rained
dismounted, fell to his knees, raised his hands down a hail of canister' (Archenholtz, 1840, I,
and with tears in his eyes beseeched the Almighty 255).
 111 E l i z a b e t h P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

With the Prussian infantry making so little of two squadrons of the Leib-Cuirassiers was over-
progress beyond the Kuh-Grand, Lieutenant- whelmed by the Chuguevskii Cossacks, who
General Platen began to feed the cavalry across the captured their commander and a standard. The
line of ponds by Kunersdorf and threaten the king himself was saved only through the courage
southern flank of Saltykov's position. However, of Rittmeister Prittwitz and one hundred escorting
the five squadrons of the Schorlemer Dragoons hussars.
were destroyed by the fire from the Grosser- Loudon set off to chase the Prussian cavalry,
Spitzberg, and before the rest of the Prussian horse while Totleben with the light troops was sent in
could assemble it was hit in the left flank by a pursuit of the main body. The Russians were
series of attacks by the united Russo-Austrian feeble in the way they exploited their successes,
cavalry, which had been brought together by but even so the enemy loss amounted to about
Loudon. The Prussians fled through the passages 19,000 men, and Frederick by his own admission
between the ponds, or made a circuit to the north was for a time left with just 3,000 formed troops.
of Kunersdorf and plunged into their own infantry. Considering the calibre of the enemy and the
.The Prussian foot soldiers had been on their feet scale of the combat, the battle of Kunersdorf
now for sixteen hours or more, they had seen ranks as the greatest Russian feat of arms of the
thousands of their comrades killed at their sides, eighteenth century. In Vienna Empress Maria
and towards six on this burning afternoon they Theresa was genuinely horrified by the slaughter
gave way en masse. A mob of men were caught on of the Russian soldiery, but she consoled herself
the Muhl-Berge and massacred by the Russian with the thought that Frederick would no longer
bayonets and secret howitzers, while a last reserve be able to use the strategic potentialities of the
112 Elizabeth' P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2

Oder for splitting the allied armies. The French Now that the main Prussian army was for the
were, however, not pleased at all, for they were time being eUminated from the strategic map,
weary of the war, and feared the westward expan- there seemed to be no good reason why the
sion of Russia. Nothing could have been less Russians and Austrians should not have joined
welcome to them than the new confidence of their forces and advanced to the capture of nearby
Russian allies, who declared with daunting Berlin. Frederick called their failure to do so the
enthusiasm in October that they were prepared to 'Miracle of the House of Brandenburg'. It was, in
continue the fight for several more campaigns, and fact, the product of slowness and lack of goodwill
would demand East Prussia at the eventual peace. on the part of Daun, and the unwillingness of the
Saltykov and his army had every reason to Russians to put themselves out any further for the
congratulate themselves. The battle had been won allied cause, after two pitched battles which had
through a combination of static defences, massed cost them nearly one-third of their effectives,
batteries and mobile reserves. Moreover, Saltykov namely the 4,700 at Paltzig, and another 19,000
and Loudon had worked together with complete at Kunersdorf.
freedom — the Austrian infantry and guns had Saltykov was persuaded to bring his army to
fallen naturally under Russian direction, while the west bank of the Oder four days after his great
Loudon commanded the joint cavalry with as victory. Daun took over the supply of the Russians
much authority as a Russian general. Saltykov on this side of the river, but he wished to postpone
wrote in his relation that the victory was an any further operations until the city of Dresden
example to the world of the 'unity and harmony had been captured and secured by the force of
of allied forces'. As an historical document Austrians and Imperial Germans acting in Saxony.
Saltykov's account of the battle was clear and Saltykov was in despair:
accurate, and supported by detailed maps for the
We had it in our power to terminate the war, by
benefit of the Conference, and it confirms the
imposing a peace or finishing the thing off in
impression that he was one of the very few people >
some other kind of way . . . the [Prussian] royal
who ever had a grasp of the terrain and of the
family sought refuge in Magdeburg, and Berlin
sequence of events. Frederick was never able to
was expecting from one day to the next to act as
sort out what really happened.
host to us or the Austrians. (21 September 1759,
Elizabeth had a special medal issued to all those
SIRIO, 1872, IX, 491)
who had . taken part in the battle, and elevated
Saltykov to the rank of field-marshal. The empress The project of uniting the armies was abandoned
wrote to him that Frederick might have been able on 15 September. Over the next few weeks Daun
to find excuses for the maulings the Prussians had led his Austrians away to Saxony in the west,
received at Zorndorf and Paltzig, but the great day while the Russians made an unconvincing lunge
of Kunersdorf must have shown him that he could upriver against the fortress of Glogau. Vienna
not overthrow the Russian army even when he had trusted that the Russians could still salvage some-
significant advantages. Instead of following the thing from the year's work by settling down for
sequence through to what we might think was a the winter in quarters along the Oder. On 29
natural conclusion, Elizabeth ends by explaining November Saltykov instead embarked on the
to Saltykov that big battles were irrelevant and march all the way back to winter quarters on the
risky. Frederick knew very well, she wrote, that Vistula, thus returning a poor reward for all the
the Russians would always fall back again to the sacrifices of this glorious campaign.
Vistula in the autumn, whatever victories they had
gained in the campaign. Also, a general action was
to be shunned as a matter of principle, for battles The collapse of Saltykov, 1760
were becoming 'more bloody and hard-fought'
(Rambaud, 1895,290). Russia faced the campaigning season of 1760 with
 Elizabeth' P e t r o v n a 1 7 4 1 - 1 7 6 1 / 2 1 17

a reasonably well-found field army of about ment. General Loudon was assigned to command
60,000 men. Saltykov at first projected a cam- the Austrian force in Silesia, and Saltykov
paign conceived purely in Russian interests, 'expressed public satisfaction concerning the
designed to open up the Baltic coastline by reduc- appointment of this fine general, which augments
ing Colberg or some other port. The scheme was, the hope that the two sides will offer each other
however, rejected by the Conference on 30 March, the most energetic assistance' (Count Briihl, 4
for St Petersburg genuinely desired to make June 1760, Eelking, 1854, 16). For their part the
another trial of co-operation with the Austrians, Austrians were glad to hear that Saltykov had
and substituted a plan for an advance in several been ordered by his government to heed all the
columns to the middle Oder between Glogau and directions that were relayed to him from Vienna
Crossen, there to establish points d'appui for through the medium of the Austrian deputies.
eventual winter quarters. General Totleben was This time it was the Austrians who took the
meanwhile to operate with the flying corps in initiative. Loudon irrupted into Silesia, and on 23
•Pomerania. Somewhat later an amended, plan June he defeated and captured the Prussian general
directed the march further upstream against the Fouque at the road junction at Landeshut. Another
Silesian capital of Breslau, where the army could important strategic point, the border fortress of
act in closer proximity to the Austrians. Altogether Glatz, was taken on 26 July. Unfortunately
it was possible to heap up 375,000 allied troops Loudon did not have the physical means of
against Frederick's 200,000 Prussians. Various reducing the city of Breslau, which would have
details gave the allies further cause for encourage- been the most valuable prize of all.
114 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

The Russian army lurched into motion only grenadiers; four battalions of foot grenadiers, and
on 26 July, and although Chernyshev hastened fifteen guns), while Lieutenant-General Chernyshev
ahead with an advance guard of 25,000 men, the came pounding up behind with a main body of
Austrians were already at grips with the King of 12,000 (seven infantry regiments and some
Prussia. On 15 August Chernyshev listened cavalry).
impotently to the sounds of battle from Liegnitz, Totleben set out on 26 September, and prose-
where Frederick was beating off a badly cuted a march by way of Sagan, Sorau, Guben,
co-ordinated Austrian attack on his position. Beeskow, and Wusterhausen, which he reached on
The Russians spent the next weeks in useless 2 October. On that day Chernyshev arrived at
marching and counter-marching. The provisions Fiirstenwalde, having taken the route Christianstadt
promised by the Austrians had not materialised, — Sommerfeld — Guben — Beeskow. The Russians
and the Russians had no siege artillery with arrived in dribs and drabs outside Berlin, almost
which to reduce Glogau, which would have given simultaneously with three small contingents of
them a firm footing in the theatre. These dis- Prussian reinforcements which rushed in through
appointments accentuated a malaise which had the gates. On 3 October Totleben's Cossacks
gripped the Russian army for some time. Saltykov reconnoitred the defences, to the consternation
felt miserably tired and unwell, and Chernyshev of the citizens, and his main force was up later in
had to write to St Petersburg that he had virtually the day. Chernyshev's troops streamed in between
abdicated the command, and that the army was 5 and 7 October. On the last of these days Lacy
sinking into disorder. arrived with his Austrians and Saxons, and by 8
On 12 September Saltykov was compelled to October allied troops to the number of 37,000
resign in favour of Fermor, in the capacity of were arranged around Berlin on both banks of the
acting commander. Fermor could not be admitted Spree. The Prussian garrison amounted to no more
to the permanent command, in view of his than 14,000 men, in spite of the reinforcements,
unpopularity, but the Conference hoped that he and the allies prepared to deliver an assault at
would serve well enough for immediate purposes. seven on the morning of 9 October. According to
Chernyshev it was 'impossible to describe the
impatience and greed with which the army awaited
The Berlin raid, 1760 this attack. Expectation was written on every
countenance'(Korobkov, 1940, 128).
Fermor's first mandate was to give effect to a Very early on the 9th, two Prussian commands
remarkably enterprising scheme which had first slipped away from the city, and at four in the
been suggested by Montalembert, the French morning Totleben on his own authority allowed
representative at Russian headquarters. This very generous terms of capitulation to the com-
envisaged nothing less than a land of commando mandant, von Rochow. Chernyshev did what he
raid writ large, in the form of a joint Austro- could to remedy the damage. The Brandenburg
Russian descent on Berlin, the capital of Prussia. and Plalle gates were delivered up to the Austrians,
Montalembert rightly calculated that this blow with the promise that 50,000 thalers would be set
would compel Frederick to hasten towards the aside for them from the 'contributions', while
threatened city, and so break up his concentration Panin managed to overhaul the Prussian troops on
in Silesia. For this purpose the Austrians told off the way to Spandau, and eliminated 3,300 of them
lieutenant-General Lacy (son of the Russian field- in the process.
marshal Peter) with a force of 18,000 Austrians This episode, like the events which followed, is
and bitterly anti-Prussian Saxons. On the Russian possibly explicable by reference to the character
side Major-General Totleben was to lead the way of Totleben. He was notorious as an 'ignorant
with an advance guard of 5,600 men (three regi- braggart' (ligne, 1795-1811, XVI, 42), entirely
ments of hussars, three of Cossacks, two of mounted typical of the contemporary tribe of 'worthless
 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2 115

self-made gentlemen, devoid of honour and feel- pressure Totleben agreed to blow up the powder
ing, unprincipled and bold' (Totleben, 1762, II, 5). mill — an operation that was carried out so
Count Totleben came from a Thuringian family, clumsily that fifteen Russians were killed in the
and he had seen service in the Saxon, Prussian and explosion.
Dutch armies before he came to Russia early in the The Austrian and Saxon diplomats would have
Seven Years War, allegedly drawn by the prospect liked to have seen the allies plant themselves for
of fresh employment. Palmenbach praised his the winter around Berlin. However, the expedition
activity in the 1758 siege of Colberg, which helped had been conceived only as a short-term raid, and
to secure him the rank of major-general in the Frederick was likely to arrive in the neighbour-
Russian service, and Apraksin and Fermor gave hood in considerable force. The Russians and
him the money and facilities to raise a corps of Austrians accordingly evacuated Berlin on the
light troops in the conquered provinces and St night of 11 October and on the following day, and'
Petersburg. Totleben's clownish escapades gave rise they made for their parent armies with some
to a host of stories, and nobody paid much atten- speed. Chernyshev reached Frankfurt on the 13th,
tion to a warning which was dispatched by the and Totleben arrived on the 14th.
Russian resident in Danzig, who had heard from The only other event of note was staged on the
Hamburg that this individual's loyalty was suspect. Pomeranian coast, where a desultory siege of
Now at Berlin the wilder elements among the Colberg was broken by the Prussians in September.
Austrian and Saxon forces gave full vent to their This disappointment did not detract from the
hatred of things Prussian. The Russian regulars in glory of having lorded it in the enemy capital for
contrast behaved with scrupulous concern for a few giddy days. Confidence and self-satisfaction
private property, as we might have expected from were evident in the St Petersburg cabinet, and the
their exemplary conduct in East Prussia, but there Vice-Chancellor, Vorontsov, who was normally so
at first seemed no explanation for the excessive sensitive to French feelings, remarked to a French
regard for the wealth of the community and state. diplomat that Poland was 'a poor country, which,
Totleben was under orders to exact the greatest within the next fifty years, ought to be divided
possible contribution from the municipality, and among its neighbours' (Oliva, 1964, 179). The
destroy all the war industries and objects of more than generous conduct of the army produced
military significance. Instead he almost imme- in Voltaire's words 'a more favourable impression
diately abated the initial demand for four million in Berlin than all the operas of Metastasio', and the
thalers to one of one-and-a-half million, payable in operations had been conducted so economically
instalments. Totleben was persuaded to spare the that after a campaign spent in enemy territory the
gold and silver factory and the Splitgerber und army ended with only 131 combat deaths, and a
Daum bronze foundry as private property, and complement of manpower that was more than
instead of confiscating the weapons held by the 9,000 over strength.
citizens en masse, he arranged to have a few While it would be unhistorical to condemn
hundred old firearms delivered up at a designated these feeble proceedings from a neo-Clausewitzian
spot. The pieces were thrown into the Spree and viewpoint, there were some Russians at the time
promptly fished out afterwards. who felt that they ought to have exploited the
Only 62,000 thalers are said to have been advantages of 1760 with more resolution. On 6
confiscated from the state treasury, and historians November the Prussian merchant Gotzkowsky
are in disagreement as to the real amount of reached Fermor's headquarters and delivered a
damage inflicted on the archives, the clothing request to reduce the outstanding instalments of
factories, the Mint and the Arsenal (see Grosser Berlin's contribution still further. Gotzkowsky
Generalstab, 1890-1914, pt 3, XIII, 267; Korobkov, relates that Fermor turned down the plea, remind-
1940, 284). At any rate, many of the Russians ing him that the Russian demands were modera-
were furious at the leniency, and under some tion itself, compared with the ones which
116 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

Frederick had made on the merchants of Leipzig, of such a character that unless advantage can be
and 'some of the generals, who were present at this taken of it, he will build up his force to a still
conversation, declared that if they had been in greater degree than before' (Korobkov, 1940,
charge of this expedition, they would have dealt 291). Under the influence of Buturlin, the
with us in a very different manner' (Gotzkowsky, Conference directed the main army along the
1768-9,1, 64). familiar axis towards the middle Oder, from
where it could reach out to an army of 70,000
whitecoats under Loudon, who was now the
Buturlin's command, 1760-1 Russians' favourite Austrian general. At the same
time there lingered a hankering after Saltykov's
By December 1760 the Russian field army of plan for an offensive in Russian interests through
'83,000 men had almost completely forsaken the Pomerania to the fortress-port of Colberg.
Prussian heartland, and was drawing up winter Totleben was therefore to inaugurate a secondary
quarters along the Vistula and in East Prussia. Its operation in this direction with his flying corps,
generally excellent condition reflected not just which was reinforced by a brigade of infantry to a
an easy campaign, but something of an administra- strength of 14,000.
tive triumph on the part of its new commander, Totleben's troops scampered over Pomerania in
Aleksandr B. Buturlin. To all appearances this the early weeks of 1761, and he actually began a
gentleman's accomplishments were more modest distant blockade of Colberg before he was driven
still than those of the self-effacing Saltykov. Tales back by superior Prussian forces in the middle of
were current concerning his noisy, night-long February. Thereafter, Totleben's conduct became
drinking orgies, and people were willing at the less and less explicable except in terms of treason-
most to allow Buturlin a certain talent for survival. able correspondence with the enemy. He was
He had begun his career as one of Peter's 'batmen', finally arrested at the end of June, when confiden-
and was bound to the great man's daughter- tial documents were discovered in one of the boots
Elizabeth by ties of lifelong friendship. of his go-between, the Silesian merchant Isaac
Opinions began to change in Buturlin's favour Sabatky. Totleben was court-martialled and
when he got to work on the army in the autumn sentenced to death in 1763, but his good luck did
of 1760, armed with a severe instruction from the not desert him even in these dire straits. The
empress. While he carried out a reduction of the sentence was commuted to one of exile, and he
baggage of all ranks, he filled the magazines with was able to return to the Russian service after an
requisitions and purchases from the people of East interval of six years.
Prussia, clothed and armed the troops from the
convoys that were coming through from the home-
land, and exchanged the broken-down horses for The capture of Colberg and Schweidnitz, 1761
good remounts. At the close of 1760 the
Conference presented an eulogy of Buturlin's The operations on the Baltic theatre languished
efforts to the empress, and one month later the until early September, when a detached corps
Marquis de l'Hopital testified that the army was descended on Colberg under the command of
'in a splendid state' (Rambaud, 1895, 338). Lieutenant-General Rumyantsev, one of the ablest
of the younger generation of Russian leaders.
7
Frederick had been given ample warning by
Totleben's treason, 1761 Totleben of the threat to this vital port, which
enabled him to strengthen the defences, and bring
The Conference based the planning for 1761 on the garrison of the fortress and the adjacent
the sensible principle that 'the diminution in the entrenched camp to 16,000 men. In addition, a
King of Prussia's strength is only temporary, and force of Prussian cavalry under Platen executed a
 Elizabeth' Petrovna 1741-1761/2 117

destructive raid on the great magazines at Posen, compelled the allies to break up their concentra-
and carried on to the hinterland of Colberg, where tion of force. The assault on the Prussian position
he hovered in Rumyantsev's rear and constantly was three times postponed, and finally abandoned
threatened to break through to the relief. in early September, when Loudon appeared at the
Rumyantsev's own command was reinforced to Russian headquarters and announced that the lack
20,000 troops, and finally to 35,000 by the end of forage must force the two armies to draw apart.
of November. As an earnest of co-operation, however, the
For these reasons Rumyantsev's attack on Austrian corps of Beck (eight hundred infantry
Colberg resembled a miniature campaign rather and forty squadrons) came to Buturlin, while the
than a regular siege. The Russian squadron under 20,000-strong corps of Chernyshev (twenty
Admiral Polyanskii lent effective inshore support battalions and three regiments of cavalry) went to
until the onset of bad weather compelled the the Austrians.
ships to return to Revel. Rumyantsev was there- Buturlin fell prey to pitiful irresolution, once
fore reduced to his own resources, and he kept his he was separated from the vital influence of
force in being through organising a systematic Loudon. The Conference urged him to strike once
programme of requisitions from the locality. Two more at Berlin, but his nerves were shaken by the
battalions of jaegers (the first of the kind in the news of Platen's circuit in his rear, and after
Russian army) operated to good effect in the assembling a series of councils of war he made
broken country, and General Berg proved to be a back to quarters on the lower Vistula.
more than adequate replacement for Totleben as Only Chernyshev was left to uphold the honour
commander of the light horse. Colberg finally of Russian arms on the main theatre of war.
surrendered on 16 December, after most of the Loudon was not the man to be disheartened by
defenders had broken out. The enemy field forces the departure of most of his allies, and when he
withdrew into Mecklenburg after a clash with heard that Frederick was once more manoeuvring
Berg's cavalry four days later, and all Prussian in the open field, he took the opportunity to
Pomerania was left in the hands of the Russians. pounce on the fortress of Schweidnitz, where
On the main, or southern theatre, Buturlin's Old Fritz had left a small garrison. On the early
army moved into Silesia to a strength of 50,000 morning of 1 October the allies marched to the
men. By the second half of August the force was assault to the number of twenty battalions of
across the Oder and acting jointly with Loudon's Austrians and eight companies of fine Russian
70,000 Austrians. For the first time in this war the grenadiers. While the Austrians assailed • the
Russians and Austrians had met in a spirit of Galgenfort, the leading Russian grenadiers threw
whole-hearted co-operation, and over a period of themselves into the narrow ditch of the Bogenfort
three weeks they stood within reasonable distance in a human wave, which enabled their comrades to
of attaining the goal for which their sovereigns had march over the bodies and carry the parapet
gone to war. Frederick and his 55,000 troops behind. The Russians were said to have been fired
stood at a disadvantage of more than two to one, by drink, but when they reached the ramparts of
and they were hemmed into a small tract of land Schweidnitz town they remained in perfect order,
in southern Silesia, where they dug themselves into and not a single grenadier left the ranks to plunder
an entrenched camp at Bunzelwitz, and lived off the houses. Under the influence of this blow
convoys of precious supplies from the powerful Frederick abandoned southern Silesia and recoiled
new fortress of Schweidnitz. All the armies were to Breslau.
suffering equally from exhaustion and thirst in Though barren of 'decisive battles', the campaign
one of the hottest of those torrid summers of the of 1761 significantly altered the strategic map of
Seven Years War. Europe in favour of the alliance. Just as the reduc-
The same question of supplies, and especially tion of Colberg gave the Russians a firm footing in
fodder, was the consideration which finally Pomerania, and an advanced landing point for
118 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

seaborne supplies, so the storming of Schweidnitz Industrial Revolution and les droits de I'homme
afforded the Austrians an open door into Silesia. are only just around the corner. The Age of
Frederick's two flanks therefore crumbled away, Methodicism is passing. The Age of Reason is
and in the winter he learnt that a new government in its high summer (Young, 1970, 49).
had come into power in Britain, and was declining
to renew the subsidy to Prussia. Under the weight In this war we gain an impression of some interest-
of this accumulation of misfortunes, Frederick ing advances in the expertise of the various belli-
wrote to Finckenstein on 6 January 1762, gerents. The British acquired a formidable
instructing him to prepare for negotiations to save amphibious striking power. On the Continent the
the remnants of the Prussian monarchy. armies learnt to operate in semi-independent
formations, as witness the Austrians at Hochkirch
>
in 1758, the French at Bergen in the following
The Russian army in the later Seven Years War year, and the Prussians at Burkersdorf in 1762.
However, the relative advance of the Russians was
The nature of intensive and prolonged wars is to the most striking of all, because their programme
drive forward the military art in an almost geo- of military reform had begun so late, and because
metrical rate of progress, so that the struggle in the they needed time to learn the conditions of war-
final years may share more in common with the fare in a Western theatre. Whereas the Austrian
next conflict, albeit lying decades in the future, effort fell away after 1760, and the French and
than with the first campaigns of the original war in Prussians approached exhaustion, the Russian
question. These comments apply with particular army continued to increase in combat effective-
force to the Russian army of the Seven Years War. ness and strength (to more than 100,000 in 1761).
More than in later ages, armies in the eighteenth The improvement of the Russian army could be
century needed the stimulus of actual warfare in seen in many particulars. Fermor had the sensible
order to spring into life — rather like blood drip- idea of grouping the regiments together into
ping on Dracula's ashes. Hence the repeated permanent divisions and corps. Nothing came of
appeals of commanders to their sovereigns to the project, but as some compensation the army
commit the troops to war, almost any war, in underwent a number of beneficial reorganisations.
order to keep the forces en haleine. In peacetime The third battalions of the infantry regiments had
the men were usually in poor physical condition, been left behind in East Prussia towards the end
and schooled in tactics which were of little rele- ..of 1757 as a measure of desperation, consequent
vance to real combat. By the same token the on their parlous state. Later in the war, however,
officers were devoid of the experience of moving these units came to be seen as a most useful
large formations, and they lacked the guidance of device for receiving and training up recruits, and
anything but regulations of the most routine kind. Buturlin gave a proper organisation to these
It was accepted that commanders would give 'supply' battalions, and to the corresponding
directions of a more relevant nature on the actual 'supply' squadrons of the cavalry regiments. This
theatre of war. excellent system was abandoned after the war,
A military historian most sagely remarks that: much to the regret of Rumyantsev. A further
useful measure was the break-up of the Observation
Between 1748 and the outbreak of the Seven Corps, after the battering at Zorndorf and
Years War in 1756 we seem to step from one era Kunersdorf, and its re-constitution in 1760 as
to another. When we read of the operations of three regiments of artillery (see p. 121).
the latter war, we seem at last to be dealing with As the war went on, Elizabeth and the
modern times, to be reading about officers who Conference were increasingly concerned to see
. . . are living in a world where the ideas which their commanders tighten up the discipline of the
still affect us are beginning to germinate. The army, while assuming more initiative and responsi-
 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2 119

bility in operational matters. The empress wrote to thousand roubles.

Buturlin on 28 September 1760 'We cannot at the Transport animals were so scarce that seven
present moment prescribe your operations, since thousand oxen were brought from the Ukraine to
time is short, and you are on the spot, and better enable the army to retreat from Pomerania to
placed to see and direct everything' (.AKV, 1870- Posen in the late autumn of 1760. Horses were
95, VII, 442). When the Conference intervened in therefore rounded up in the Neumark and
Buturlin's proceedings in the next campaign, it was Pomerania to help to make up for the deficiencies,
to chide him for holding so many councils of war, and in East Prussia Vasilii Suvorov made the
and urge him into offensive operations. The population form a transport train of two thousand
Conference deserves credit for working out plans horses, with which they had to deliver up their
of campaign more speedily than earlier in the war, quotas of provisions at assigned spots.
while their application on the theatre of opera- The new means of subsistence were applied
tions was facilitated by the relatively genial with notable success by Rumyantsev in his Colberg
relations which now obtained between the Russian campaign of 1761. He raised the supplies in the
and Austrian commanders. first instance by a scheme of orderly requisitions,
Following the strictures of Kostyurin and then forwarded the foodstuffs to his corps by
Elizabeth, the baggage of the army showed some means of a chain of provision magazines which were
diminution of the monstrous trains of 1757 and planted along the principal roads and waterways.
1758. .The abandonment of the chevaux de frise Greater vigilance may be detected at all levels.
and the advent of a new canvas pontoon afforded In 1759 Rumyantsev furnished the commandant
some alleviation, and it was hoped to reduce the of the Vistula fortress of Thorn with a compre-
official baggage still further by restricting the hensive set of instructions, telling him to subject
infantry regiment to ninety-six carts, and the all travellers 'save well-known noblemen of sub-
cavalry regiment to fifty-five. Scales of private stance' (24 May 1759, Rumyantsev, 1953-9, I,
baggage were also stipulated, if not' exactly 241) to narrow questioning, and set out his own
adhered to. spies in places of public resort. Two years later
In the distant days of 1757 Apraksin had trans- Rumyantsev provided the final evidence which put
ported his supplies bodily with the army, just as if an end to the treacherous career of Totleben.
he had been campaigning in the steppes. Over the While the cuirassiers were retained with the main
following years the Russians, however, felt their body of the army, the light cavalry ranged afield
way towards more flexible means of subsistence. with increasing confidence, in the knowledge that
First of all, Fermor brought the chief supply if needs be they could bring into play their muskets
officials closer to the army (see p. 81), and then and carbines, and their complement of mobile
in the last campaigns the Russians began to exploit unicorns. It was a pity that the flying corps
the resources of the theatre of war in an energetic remained so long under the command of Totleben,
way. This was a policy especially associated with who gave way to Berg only in the final campaign.
Vasilii Suvorov, who became the new General- Saltykov was the first to see some potential in
Proviantmeister, and who replaced Korff as the Cossacks, who for most of the war had been
governor of East Prussia in September 1761. The regarded as an unmitigated curse. Saltykov's
regiments were allowed considerable freedom to patrols failed him badly during Frederick's passage
collect grain on their own account, while supplies of the Oder before Kunersdorf, but the Russians
for the army as a whole were raised by compulsory were not to be caught off their guard so embarras-
exactions in East Prussia and even on occasion in singly again. Seven thousand of the Don Cossacks
neutral Poland, and assembled by contractors in were available by the second half of 1760, and
magazines along the Vistula. By the end of 1760 they were used in large formations backed up by
Buturlin calculated that the requisitions in East artillery, and not dispersed in penny packets
Prussia had already saved Russia four hundred among the divisions as before. Good leadership
120 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

from regular officers and firm support from brigades were to be earmarked for this purpose in
dragoons helped to improve the performance of advance, so that they would know exactly where
the Cossacks still further, and the Prussian cavalry- to go when they were called upon. On the level of
man Warnery reckoned that 'the Cossacks present minor tactics,
a very dangerous enemy for the Prussian hussars,
since the enemy usually open fire first, and launch
on account of their speed as much as because of
a lively attack, we should counter by sparing our
their numbers' (Warnery, 1788,313).
men and cartridges, and seek to anticipate the enemy
Developments like these helped the main
fire by opening up with our artillery at a suitable
Russian army to move across the theatre of opera-
range, and especially when they begin to deploy in
tions with more freedom than before, as was
our presence. (Maslovskii, 1888-93, II, 347)
evident in Saltykov's advance from Posen to
Paltzig in 1759. The regiments now marched by All of this relates to the standard linear tactics
divisions in separate columns, instead of in a single of the eighteenth century. However, in his little
mass, and the daily rate of march increased from campaign around Colberg in 1761 Rumyantsev
four or five miles to a respectable ten. Detached showed that he was ready to explore new avenues
corps could press on with still greater speed when of thought with as much enthusiasm as some of
necessary, as when Panin hastened to Chernyshev the pioneers who were appearing in France and
at Berlin in 1760, and Dolgorukov marched to Germany. In accordance with an instruction of
join Rumyanstev at Colberg in 1761. 24 June, the corps was trained to move across
If the congealed heap of regiments and baggage country in columns of various sizes and patterns,
at Zorndorf represented the nadir of Russian but more particularly in regimental column of
battle tactics, the later actions show the Russians 'divisions' (see p. 62), and by a two-regimental
feeding unengaged units to threatened points with square formation of four battalions, which could
impressive skill, as happened with the regiments of face to front or flank as occasion demanded.
the left wing at Paltzig, and of the right at Rumyantsev envisaged his columns as compact,
Kunersdorf. It became a rule to form a third line defensible formations, which could march and
of all arms as a general reserve. Paltzig likewise deploy into line with speed and convenience.
represents the first occasion in the war that the However, despite what Soviet historians have
Russians had resort to fortifications on the battle- written on the subject, we are still very far from
field. Works of this kind became one of the keys the notion of employing columns as a formation
to victory at Kunersdorf in 1759, and from that with which to deliver attacks with cold steel.
time both infantry and cavalry regiments were For some time now Rumyantsev had been
furnished with entrenching tools which they meditating how to form bodies of light troops.
carried around on carts. Lambert met him at Riga in 1757, and 'frequently
Fermor's General Disposition of 14 July 1758 chatted with him about the service of light
(see p. 100) remained the general guide for the infantry, in which matter he was a complete
management of battle, though in 1761 Buturlin imitator of Brigadier Turpin de Crisse'* (AKV,
added a number of points which were derived 1870-95, VI, 490). The final spur came with the
from the experience of the more recent campaigns. impending operation against Colberg, and the need
He was concerned in particular to endow the to match the Prussian jaegers and free battalions.
battle formations with depth. The third line, or On 18 August 1761 he told Second Major Ivan
reserve, was to be stationed 150 paces to the rear. Ivanovich Meller-Zakomelskii of his decision to set
No less importantly, 'the practice of the enemy up a force of 1,040 light infantry. These were to
offers clear proof that they direct their main be arranged in two battalions of five companies
attack against the flanks of the army, and not the each. The troops were to be drawn as far as
centre. We must therefore do everything we can
to fortify and strengthen the flanks.' Certain * Author of Essai sur I'Art de Guerre, Paris 1754.
 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2 121

possible from men who had been hunters in ing the first line they had the very important task
civilian life, and who had lived together in the of preventing the enemy from penetrating between
same regiments. Their equipment was to be light, the lines from the flanks. Such an arrangement of
though for the sake of self-sufficiency they were artillery in depth proved most effective at Paltzig
to carry provisions for three days in their knap- in 1759. So as to provide a final resource of fire-
sacks. This command was to act in co-ordination power and ammunition, Glebov made provision
with Berg's cavalry, and its mode of operation was for a 'reserve' artillery of field pieces and ammuni-
so alien to the mentality of the times that tion carts. The reserve artillery moved separately
Rumyantsev had to spell out the tactics very from the army on the march, lest it should get in
specifically, instructing Meller-Zakomelskii that he the way of the columns, and on the battlefield it
was to employ the men in woods, villages, ravines was held ready to intervene in the case of neces-
and similar broken terrain wliere they could take sity. Glebov made his reserve park the subject of a
advantage of the ground. very detailed instruction, which remained in force
In the later years of the war the Cossacks were into the second half of the nineteenth century.
largely purged of their old vices, as we have seen, Glebov likewise penned a useful Verordnung
while the performance of the regular cavalry shows on the relations between the field artillery and the
a sustained and impressive improvement, first officers of the line. At the highest level the chief
evident in the counter-attacks at Zorndorf, and of the field artillery answered directly to the
culminating in the victorious hammer-blow at commander-in-chief. By the same principle, the
Kunersdorf. other artillery officers accepted the directions of
Artillery pieces of the new invention continued the local senior officers of the field army, while
to reach the army throughout the war, and by remaining under the obligation to report to the
1760 the Russians owned a powerful and balanced chief of the field artillery.
park of artillery, comprising: At Zorndorf the total complement of profes-
sional gunners stood at ! 1,576 men. This paltry
1 field artillery: 218 cannon, 224 unicorns,
establishment had serious consequences, for the
168 howitzers
artillery was always dependent on the infantry to
2 regimental artillery: 175 cannon, 21 unicorns
some degree to serve as well as protect the pieces.
3 siege train: 210 cannon, 1 howitzer, 35
On this bloody day of battle the infantrymen
unicorns, 117 mortars.
found more pressing occupations, and the artillery
However, the events at Zorndorf brought home to suffered so badly that on 29 April 1759 Petr
Shuvalov and others that the artillery stood in as Shuvalov asked Fermor to set up three special
much need of reorganisation as of new hardware. artillery regiments, which could provide the
The first reforms were undertaken in 1759, and necessary support. little could be done until
they received a new impetus from January 1760, Shuvalov's beloved Observation Corps was dis-
when Major-General Aleksandr Glebov assumed banded in 1760, releasing 14,000 men who were
command of the artillery of the field army, and reassigned by Tyutchev in May of that year to
Colonel Tyutchev (the hero of Gross-Jagersdorf) three full Artillery Regiments, which were formed
took the regimental artillery in hand. on the plan of 1759.
The field artillery was arranged in four adminis- Hard experience also helped to determine the
trative brigades, which were in turn divided into tactical handling of the artillery. At Zorndorf the
tactical batteries of very unequal size. The largest ammunition carts had been stationed close behind
batteries amounted to as many as twenty-four the parent pieces, which brought with it crowding,
cannon and unicorns, and were to be found to the confusion and a series of devastating explosions.
number of three along the front of the first line From 1759, therefore, just one cart accompanied
of the army. The batteries of the second line had the relevant pieces at a distance of thirty paces,
each about nine pieces, and in addition to support- while all the rest were kept under cover at fifty
122 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

paces. Glebov expected the heavy pieces of the Peter III and the great betrayal, 1762
first line to open fire at about 1,700 paces. The
lighter field pieces and the regimental artillery Shortly after Elizabeth's death, Princess Dashkova
added their voices at just over 900. At 600 paces saw the Semenovskii and Ismailovskii regiments
or less most of the pieces changed their loads from pass beneath her windows to render homage to
roundshot to canister, though the 8-pounder the new sovereign. The soldiers 'appeared sad and
unicorns and the 3-pounder cannon were to downcast. They were all talking at the same time,
reserve their canister until 160. Glebov adds: but in a murmuring undertone, a suppressed and
sinister muttering that was so disturbing and tense
When our infantry and cavalry undertake an
that I wished myself a hundred leagues away'
attack, the artillery must cease to fire with
(AKV, 1870-95, XXI, 35).
canister, so as not to hurt our own men, but
Almost every gloomy prediction was confirmed'
instead cast shells over their heads, so as to
in the brief but extraordinarily damaging reign of
damage the enemy reserves and deter them from
Emperor Peter III. With the Third Reich behind
joining their forward troops. (Maslovskii,
us, we can see Peter more clearly than ever as an
1888-93, III, 173)
object lesson in the fascination which the trap-
This must be one of the earliest provisions ever pings of Prussian militarism can exercise over
made for indirect fire on the battlefield. people of weak mind. Peter's leanings were evident
The cumulative effect of the labours of Shuvalov
and his associates was most impressive, and matched
in its own time only by the achievement of Prince
Liechtenstein in Austria. In the process the Russian
artillery lost the last traces of the Streltsy guild,
and emerged as a professional and self-sufficient
arm of the Russian military power.'

The death of Elizabeth, 1761-2

Only the. death of Russia's sovereign was capable

of setting at naught the magnificent work of her
soldiers. Early in December 1761 the Austrian
ambassador Mercy reported scenes of indescribable
panic in St Petersburg, consequent on a dangerous
turn in Elizabeth's health. As the empress became
weaker, Mercy pressed Vorontsov to exact from
Grand Prince Peter, the heir apparent, a formal
promise that he would hold to the alliance. So
valiant on the battlefield, the Russians were
contemptibly craven at court, and Vorontsov took
to his bed rather than have to face Peter. After
long agonies, Elizabeth died between three and
four in the afternoon of 6 January (new style
date) 1762, leaving the memory of perhaps the
most beloved of the rulers of Russia. 29 Peter III. He is wearing the gorget of the two
senior regiments of the Guard, with the
commemoration of Narva, 1700
 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2 123

30 Peter 111 and his suite

from his early days as Prince Ulrich of Schleswig- Peter worked out his fantasies in the world of
Holstein. He constituted his corps of troops in the statecraft. Each step seemed more extreme than
likeness of the Prussian army, and he brought the the last — first an armistice agreement with the
menagerie with him when he came to Russia. Prussians on 16 March 1762, then a treaty of
peace on 2 May, and active steps to evacuate East
As if his features were not sufficiently repugnant Prussia, when no conceivable power could have
and grotesque, he planted on his head a tricorn got the Russians out, if Peter had ordered them to
with a vertical forepeak, like that of his model, stay. Most intolerable of all, Peter commanded
the King of Prussia. However he resembled Rumyantsev to prepare an army for war against
Frederick to about the same degree as an Denmark, as Holstein's dynastic rival, and he put
orang-utan resembles a human being. Chernyshev's corps of 20,000 troops at the
(D'Eon, 1837,1, 127) disposal of Frederick in Silesia. The Austrians
therefore found themselves outnumbered in their
We could scarcely expect an energetic prosecu- last campaign of the war, and some of Chernyshev's
tion of the war from a man who could refer to Cossacks actually raided across the border into
Frederick as der Konig, mein Herr. Old Fritz now Bohemia.
played up his part to perfection, awarding Peter Such proceedings outraged many thinking
the order of the Black Eagle, and reducing him to military men. The Guards knew that Peter spoke
gibbering joy when he made him a Prussian of them as 'Janissaries', and they feared for their
lieutenant-general. place in the new order, while many of the active
As the new sovereign, Peter did much the kind officers could not live with the idea of ranging
of thing that was expected of him. He invited back themselves alongside the Prussians. The resentment
old Miinnich from his long exile, he sought to was channelled and directed by that most unlikely
introduce uniforms of skimpy Prussian cut, and he of patriots, Peter's German wife Catherine (see
renamed the regiments after their colonels, which p. 92). Just like Elizabeth twenty years before,
was another Prussian fashion. Catherine was assiduous in building up a military
Far more shocking was the extent to which power base in St Petersburg, and drawing useful
124 Elizabeth Petrovna 1741-1761/2

men to herself through her physical charms and status of a great power was no longer to be
the justice of her cause. withstood. Russia's place and role in the circle of
The Semenovskii Guards came over to European states was consolidated. (Korobkov,
Catherine, and so did the Ismailovskiis under their 1940,328)
lieutenant-colonel, Count Kiril Razumovskii.
Almost alone among the belligerents, Russia at the
Finally, with 14,000 troops on her side, Catherine
end of the war gave the impression of total invul-
was able to force the virtual abdication of her
nerability, and the sense of having something
husband on 8 July 1762. He was killed shortly
mighty in reserve for the rest of the century.
afterwards in a drunken brawl.
Thanks largely to the presence which had been
The new empress temporarily countermanded
established by Elizabeth, her successor Catherine
the evacuation of East Prussia, and put Chernyshev
was able to advance Russia's borders 'deep into
on his guard against Frederick in Silesia. It was,
Poland and the Middle East, and become the
however, impossible for Catherine to renew the
arbiter of the quarrels of Western Europe. Frederick
war, for her country was in need of rest and
of Prussia assiduously avoided the occasion of any
consolidation, and her allies were fading fast. On
further conflict, and in 1769 he described Russia
6 August 1762 the people of Konigsberg were
told that East Prussia once more stood at the to his brother Prince Henry as 'a terrible power,
disposal of its king, and the Russian columns which in a century will make all Europe tremble'
began their long eastward march. (Rambaud, 1895, 11).
Considerations like these have weighed heavily
with strategists, statesmen and historians, but
The place of the Seven Years War they were not so evident to many Russians of the
'In this bloody war the Russian army won great time, who felt themselves cheated of an adequate
glory, advancing considerably in the estimation return for all their sacrifices. Chernyshev urged
of all peoples' (Saikin, 1818, 7). some compensation in Poland, by pushing the
frontiers to the Dvina and Dnieper at the next
The intervention of Russia represents her supreme change of throne in that benighted country. The
military effort in the eighteenth century, and response of Princess Dashkova was no less heart-
though barren in immediately tangible results, it felt. Travelling to the west in the winter of 1769-
advanced her well on her way to the West. 70 she put up at the Russia Hotel in Danzig,
Viewed in one perspective, the Russian military which was the resort of all people of distinction,
achievement represents the culmination of the and in the principal public room she found two
work of Peter the Great and Miinnich, and the paintings of battle scenes from the Seven Years
fitful inspirations of the generation of the 1750s. War, full of victorious Prussians, and heaps of
Not many people would quarrel with the judgment dead, dying or crawling Russians. She enlisted the
that: help of two Russian diplomatic officials, who
went out to buy oil colours in blue, green, red
The Russian army, for all the inadequacies of its
and white:
organisation, and despite the perfidy and treason
of some of its commanders, and ultimately of the After dining we barricaded the door, so that
emperor in person, nevertheless showed itself nobody could surprise us at our work. Then I
the most victorious of the allied forces. Even the and these two gentlemen, who were expert with
action at Zorndorf was an indecisive battle, the brush, repainted the uniforms of the troops,
rather than a victory for Frederick. The Russian so that the Prussians, the alleged victors in the
soldiers gave Europe a model of valour and two battles, became Russians, whereas the beaten
endurance, and if the flag they raised over troops were rigged out like Prussians. We passed
Konigsberg was finally pulled down . . . Europe the entire night in this occupation. ( A K V ,
was forced to see that the rise of Russia to the 1870-95, XXI, 128)
Five The Russian Soldier

Origins and recruitment 3.1 per cent in the 1790s.

The system of compulsory military service
We break the thread of our narrative to devote a certainly produced vast phantom armies, which
little attention to some questions of wider signifi- existed on paper to a strength of 200,000 men at
cance. Many famous armed forces have had one the beginning of the century, and more than
salient characteristic which has seized the imagina- 400,000 at the end. However, very little convinc-
tion of the commentators — the leadership of a ing detail ever came to light from official sources,
great commander, perhaps, or the existence of an and informed observers put the effectives a good
officer corps of peculiar pride and pretensions. deal lower. Manstein reckoned that in the Turkish
However, the authorities leave us in no doubt and Swedish wars of the 1730s and 1740s the
that, alone among armies, the Russian has com- number of the combatants in the various Russian
manded attention over the centuries through the armies never reached more than 100,000 together
outstanding quality of its rank and file. (Manstein, 1860, II, 366-7), while at the end of
the reign of Catherine II, Langeron rated the
He is the finest soldier in the world [declared the
regular forces at 140,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry
emigre Count Langeron]. He is as abstemious as
and 8,000 gunners. Coming down to individual
the Spaniard, as enduring as a Bohemian, as full
operations, we note that no more than about
of national pride as an Englishman, and as
60,000 troops took the field in the campaigns of
susceptible to impulse and inspiration as French,
Peter I, or the great battles of the Seven Years
Walloons or Hungarians. He combines all the
War. Suvorov had 16,000 effectives at the storm
qualities which go to make a good soldier and a
of Praga in 1794, and only about 20,000 men on
hero. (RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 199-200)
his Swiss campaign of 1799.
Our Russian paragons of military virtue prove Patently 'in all the armies of Europe, there
to be oddly elusive, when we try to determine obtains a huge difference between the forces
their numbers. Out of the vast geographical extent which exist on paper and those which actually
of the Russian empire, only certain areas came appear under arms. But nowhere does this discre-
into the reckoning for human resources, and in pancy reach such proportions as in Russia'
particular the historic heartland of Great Russia, (Langeron, RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 197). For a start
where the taxable males amounted by the middle we have to strike off the garrison regiments, the
of the century to only about seven million. Just Land Militia, and the unmobilised masses of the
3.3 per cent of the Russian male population was to Cossacks and Asiatics. This leaves the rump of the
be found in military service in the 1760s, and only regular field regiments, which in their turn had to

1 2 5
1 2 6 T h e Russian Soldier

set aside thousands of men to drive and escort the blood. (Beskrovnyi, 1958, 307)
carts and tend to the officers' needs, as well as
The foot soldiers were defined as the repository
losing many more to the civil administration,
of firepower, which was the most important
which employed them on police and tax-collecting
element in tactics, and so the infantry were to
duties. Long-dead heroes might remain on the
stand to the cavalry in the ratio of two to one. The
regimental books for years on end, to the benefit
Commission also mentioned that the army must be
of the company commander or the colonel, and
disposed in such a way as to provide for the
when the fiction became difficult to sustain, it
defence of the land against all likely enemies,
was the custom to write the ghosts off as casualties
which gave rise to some interesting memoranda
in the first battle of the next war, which conse-
over the following years. In 1777, soon after the
quently appeared in the official lists as a
Pugachev rebellion, Rumyantsev penned the most
bloodbath.
stimulating of these essays, a comprehensive set of
To the outright casualties we have to add the
Thoughts Concerning the Composition of the
many more men who were lost on forced marches
Army. He asked the government to provide for the
of a thousand or more miles across the vast
needs of 'internal peace', as well as to evaluate the
expanse of Russia. Once the process of destruction
threat to 'external security' according to the
was begun, the losses progressed at a geometrical
extent of the country and the nature of the
rate, for the survivors had to cover for all the
potential enemies. He therefore proposed a
duties of their defunct comrades. Writing of the
balanced disposition of forces between:
First Grenadiers, Semen Vorontsov explains that
'during all the years I commanded a regiment, I 1 a coastal army in the Baltic provinces and
never had more than eight hundred men under Finland;
arms out of an establishment of 1,360, even 2 a Ukranian army in the Ukraine proper and
though my regiment was always the best up to White Russia;
strength of the army' ('Zapiski', 1802, AKV, 3 an army on the Volga, to keep an eye on the
1870-95, X, 479). Turks;
In the middle of the century we encounter the 4 a reserve army in central European Russia.
first notions as to the proportions and distribution
of the armies. As regards the positioning of the In one perspective Rumyantsev's paper (which
regiments, Peter the Great, Miinnich and even Petr was never taken up) would have helped to resolve
Shuvalov seem to have been guided above all by the old conflict between the Western and Eastern
considerations of economy, but for strategic commitment (see p. 6), by institutionalising the
reasons Bestuzhev and Apraksin wished to hold a differences between the two. In another it
powerful concentration against the Prussians and embodied the military, political and geographical
Swedes in the comparatively barren Baltic pro- considerations that were going to shape the
vinces, even though provisions were more expen- 'theatre' concept, so powerful in later Russian
sive there. From 1746, therefore, forty regiments military history.
of infantry were stationed in the north, as opposed Calculations of this kind were based on the
to a mere six in the interior of Russia. system of compulsory military service, which was
The debate was widened by Catherine's Military established in 1705 and maintained throughout
Commission of 17634, which declared that: the century. Miinnich set himself against the
principle, as did Potemkin later in the century, but
the strength of the army consists not in great the facility of voluntary enlistment was extended
numbers, but in the upholding of good discipline, only in very exceptional cases. The scheme of
the quality of the training, sound maintenance, things scarcely permitted otherwise. The peasants
firm loyalty, but most basic of all, the existence lost more and more of their freedom with almost
of common language, religion, customs and every decade of the eighteenth century, and the
 127 T h e Russian Soldier

31 Russian infantry of the later eighteenth century. Probably a more accurate representation than the
stiff and gloomy figures of Viskovatov. Note the medals worn by the musketeer on the left

lords rightly feared that the serfs would desert another on his left cheek, a sword gash in the hand
them in droves for the relative attractions of the and three more on his head. The state allowed this
army, if they were ever given the chance. The state hero a temporary release from service, on condi-
was willing to placate the nobility in this respect, tion that he submitted himself for re-examination
for the advantage of employing willing recruits was no later than twelve months hence, on pain of
offset by the administrative difficulties of having death.
to make provision for volunteers. Service was Manpower was summoned for the army (and in
literally lifelong in the first half of the century, smaller numbers for the fleet) from the product of
and afterwards defined as twenty-five years, which proportional levies on the liable male population.
for most individuals probably amounted to the This grew nearly three-fold in the course of the
same thing. Sick leave was granted grudgingly, and century (5,528,742 in 1722; 6,643,335 in 1743;
under the most exact conditions. We have the case 7,363,348 in 1761; 14,532,200 at the end of the
of one of Peter's dragoons, Fedor Durakov, who century). Altogether seventy-three levies were
collected a bullet wound in his right temple, raised between 1705 and 1802. The heaviest
1 2 8 T h e Russian Soldier

recruiting of all fell in the middle years of the College (from 1757). These people were concerned
Great Northern War, when between 1705 and to see that the recruits met the specified require-
1715 40,000 males were raised annually, many of ments for age (usually from seventeen or twenty
them being lads of fifteen or sixteen. Anna's to thirty-five) and height (usually at least five feet
Turkish wars also made considerable calls on man- two inches), and that they were in prime physical
power, but Elizabeth's peacetime army was so condition. The soldier needed a good set of teeth
fully up to strength than no conscripts were to bite open his musket cartridges, and a full
summoned between 1749 and 1754. However, complement of digits to hold the stock and press
231,644 men were called up between 1754 and the trigger. This was why the country abounded
1759 for the confrontation with Prussia, and with gap-toothed muzhiks and ones who had been
Catherine's first Turkish venture weighed so careless enough to lose their fingers. (The avail-
heavily on the population from 1768 as to account ability of conscript manpower permits the same
for some of the support for Pugachev's rebellion. principle of narrow physical selectivity to be
The frightened government raised no levies in applied today by the Soviet Army, which chooses
1774 or 1775, which was anyway the beginning of little men to crew its tanks.)
a period of external peace, and took in only Certain regional characteristics became evident
small numbers between 1776 and 1781. * as the geographical basis of recruiting was widened
The priests were exempted altogether and a in the course of the eighteenth century. The
series of local and occupational concessions per- people of Little Russia and the southern 'free
mitted many merchants, manufacturers, free- provinces' provided the regular army with its best
holders and the like to furnish substitutes or buy natural horsemen. These folk had something of the
exemptions, which effectively reduced the product spirit and liveliness of the Poles, and RumyantseV
of each levy by up to ten per cent. The popula- thought it significant that in that part of the world
tions outside Great Russia escaped entirely until 'every peasant has a saddle, and rides around on
1776, when an obligation of fifteen years' service his horse, which he loves, manages and tends to
was imposed on little Russia, the Baltic provinces, perfection'. Semen Vorontsov was in agreement,
and the odnodvortsy (freeholders) of southern and said that he could invoke the whole army to
central Russia (at least according to Mikhnevich, in 'bear out the assertion that none of our regiments
Skalon 1902 : c.l911, IV, pt 1, bk 1, sect. 1, of cuirassier or carabiniers may be compared with
p. 191. Madariaga enters Little Russia as 1773, the hussars recruited from provinces like Kharkov,
and the Baltic provinces as 1783). Akhtyrka, Izyum or Sumy'.
Almost every year the machinery of conscrip- The people of Great Russia were of a heavier
tion was set in motion on the grandest possible cast, and their tendency towards high cheekbones
scale by the Senate and the War College, which and slit eyes betrayed an ancient mixture of
worked out the deficiencies in manpower from the Finno-Ugric blood. Here the horse was degraded
army returns, and raised the appropriate numbers to a draught animal, and when the peasant returned
simultaneously throughout all the liable 'govern- from his fields he led his plough-horse by hand,
ments'. The system was clumsy and inconvenient, rather than risk a ride. 'If, however, the Little
as Petr Shuvalov pointed out in a memorandum of Russians are incomparably superior as horsemen
August 1757 (AKV, 1870-95, VII, 428-9). to the Great Russians, the latter are beyond doubt
At the local level, the inspection and assembling the finest infantry in the world' (Vorontsov,
of recruits was managed by appointed functionaries 'Zapiski', 1 8 0 2 , A K V , 1870-95, X, 480). Langeron
— originally by appointed voevodas and officials of notes that among this race 'the Siberians are the
the governments (from 1711), then by military best-looking and the strongest, but the men raised
officers (from 1732), and finally by local from around Moscow are the most intelligent' (RS,
authorities working under the eye of regimental 1895, LXXXIII, 150). Vorontsov regretted that
officers and senior officers appointed by the War towards the end of the century this excellent stock
 129 T h e Russian Soldier

of infantry was diluted by the recruiting of Finns compares with the march of Russian recruits to
and Estonians, who were fit to be employed only their regiments. Peter the Great's immediate con-
as batmen or drivers. cern was to prevent the men from escaping from
The officials at the collecting stations had no the fate that was determined for them, hence the
concern with the initial rounding-up of the recruits, notorious if short-lived 'branding decree' of 1712.
which distressing business was left to the land- It soon became clear that the losses from desertion
owners and their stewards, and the choice of the were far exceeded by those resulting from cold,
village communes. With the end of voluntary starvation and exhaustion. Almost every reign
enlistment, military service came to be seen as a therefore saw the publication of sets of rules,
sentence of exile and death. Russian rural life designed to regulate the movement, rations and
certainly had its sordid aspects, which caused a quartering of the recruits, and the way they were
traveller to exclaim that 'to pass to leeward of a received in the regiments. The Petrine ordinances
Russian peasant is really so terrible an event that of 1713 and 1719 were succeeded by those of
I always avoid it if possible' (Reginald Heber, in Miinnich in 1734, and these in turn by Elizabeth's
M. S. Anderson, 1958, 95). However, the existence recruiting codes of 1757, which became the
of many peasants was far removed from a state of foundation of Catherine's General Establishment
brutish misery: of 1766, which remained in force until 1802.
Nothing was capable of improving the recruit's lot,
They enjoy good bread, frequent meals of meat except perhaps the attention of a Miinnich or the
and fish, good beer and spirits, as well as garden temporary expedient of the 'supply battalions' in
produce in considerable quantity if no great the later Seven Years War. In the 1770s
variety. A warm sheepskin, and a small but Rumyantsev was shocked by the pitiable sight and
well-heated house gives them ample protection deplorable waste of the recruits who straggled
against the cold. (Wonzel, 1783, 21) through to his army on the Turkish theatre, only
A certain tension was therefore evident when to die from the first fatigues of military duty.
the landowner had to raise his quota of recruits: Twenty years later Langeron could still put the
mortality of every recruit levy at fifty per cent.
If among his peasants or servants there is an
For such recruits as survived this experience,
incorrigible thief, then he will send him. In the
the initiation into regimental life was probably
absence of a thief, he will dispatch a drunkard or
managed with a little more sense and humanity
an idler. Finally if his peasants are made up only
as the century wore on. A final sorting-out of men
of honourable men (which is almost impossible),
according to arm and regiment was undertaken
he will consign the feeblest person he can find.
when they reached their destination, and the
(Langeron, RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 148)
recruit was assigned as soon as possible to artel
The last that the friends and relations were likely and company, where his training was taken in
to see of the recruit was a scarcely recognisable hand by designated officers and NCOs. Com-
being, who was shaven and shorn, and stumbling manders like Rumyantsev introduced systematic
at the end of a chain. Nobody dared to rescue or programmes of instruction, beginning with the
shelter him in this state, and his acquaintances perfection of the individual, and the various
saw him off 'as if it was his funeral, with tears, private and public regulations emphasised the need
lamentations and songs, the purport of which is , for positive motivation in the process of trans-
that they shall never see him more' (Parkinson, forming peasant into soldier {Instruction for
1971, 103). Cavalry Colonels, January 1760; Major-General
Except possibly for the trans-Atlantic passage Bibikov's Instructions for Infantry Colonels,
of the negro slaves, it is difficult to think of a November 1764; Semen Vorontsov's Instructions
collective ordeal in the eighteenth century which for Company Commanders, January 1774).
1 3 0 T h e Russian Soldier

menfolk on campaign, where they made them-

The life and spirit of the Russian soldier selves generally useful by washing the soldiers'
linen and other services. Something which
It requires an impossibly great effort of the his- approached a normal family life was possible in
torical imagination to recreate the mentality of the the garrison regiments, for here the husband had a
eighteenth-century Russian soldier, so alien to the settled abode, and the opportunity to follow a
thought-processes of Western man. While seeming spare-time civilian trade. The offspring received a
to endure so much with bovine apathy, he main- good basic education in the famous Russian
tained a self-sufficiency of body and mind that 'garrison schools', the first of which were founded
were beyond the ability of his masters to crush, by Peter in 1721. The number was augmented by
just as they defy our feeble investigations. Miinnich in 1732, and again through the incor-
Like his counterpart in foreign armies, no poration of the 'counting schools' in 1744. Four
Russian soldier ever made his fortune from his thousand pupils were entered on the books by
pay. The rate for a Petrine infantryman was eleven 1765, and 16,500 by the time Paul I established a
roubles a year, which was handsome in itself, but unified system in 1798. Already in the 1730s a
soon reduced to about half that sum by the heavy garrison school was established in principle in
deductions made for the cost of clothing, equip- every garrison town, and open to all the children
ment and cleaning materials. In 1731 Miinnich of the garrison and the marching regiments of the
gave the private a full nine roubles free of deduc- locality. The instruction was in the hands of
tions. Early in Catherine's reign, however, the NCOs, who taught th&lads reading, writing, arith-
generals reckoned that this liberality was metic, and sometimes also the art of playing on
encouraging 'drunkenness and various disorders' the drum and fife.
(Klugin, VS, 1861, XX, no. 7, 86), and reduced It is of some significance to note that the first
the emolument to seven roubles fifty kopeks. Russian national civilian schools were opened in
The young soldier soon became aware1 of 1786. Indeed, in Central and Eastern Europe the
compensations that could not be measured in cash. advance of education owed less to the vapourings
In the reigns of Peter I and Catherine II the of Rousseau than to the state's need for minor
soldiers were likely to spend the summer months functionaries and NCOs. The 'genuine' Russian
in strenuous exercise camps, but each September NCOs (as opposed to the officer candidates) were
they settled down for eight months of reasonable usually of excellent standard, thanks to the large
plenty in billets among the civilian population. number of literates, and a commitment to the
Every regiment was assigned a town or a zone of military life which often proceeded from
villages for its quarters. The officers liked to set childhood.
themselves up like little princes in country man- Even the unmarried soldiers had the support of
sions, while individual soldiers requisitioned the a family of sorts in the shape of the artel, an
resources of up to four houses at a time. On the ancient, sacred and uniquely Russian institution. It
whole the troops treated the peasants of Great is best described as a little community of soldiers,
Russia with more regard than elsewhere, but even organised on the basis of about four to every
here it was possible for the householders to return company, and run by veteran corporals who were
to the little villages around Moscow after the great designated artelchiki by election of the men. Signi-
manoeuvres of 1799, and find their homes fying far more than the German Kameradschaft,
'wrecked and plundered as completely as if in the the artel had roots deep in Russian village society,
time of the Nogai Tartar raids' (Turgenev, RS, with its peasant meetings and sense of joint enter-
1885, XLVIII, 77). prise. 'Looking at our soldiers' way of life, we
We learn from a few stray references that a notice something of the same phenomenon. We
number of the soldiers of the marching regiments discover that the Russian soldiers too have a pecu-
were married, and that the wives accompanied the liar form of shared possession, and similar
 131 T h e Russian Soldier

communal assemblies' (Klugin, VS, 1867, XX, seldom, however, eat it without bruising it, and
no. 7, 82). making it into a porridge, with boiling water, salt,
The artel received all the tangible assets of the and a spoonful of flour (Tielke, 1788, II, 99).
soldiers — spare pay, plunder, and the proceeds
When cabbages were available, they were
from the sale of the civilian clothes of the recruits
chopped up and cooked with lard into a kind of
and of the effects of dead soldiers. The monies
sauerkraut called shchi, which was lightly fer-
were used to buy meat and vegetables, as well as
mented and eaten as a soup with great quantities
the horses and carts necessary to transport them.
of water. Kasha was a glistening, greyish-brown
Considerable sums of money were often lodged in
preparation of buckwheat, which to Western tastes
the artels, and hard-up Russian officers and regi-
reeked of a rancid poverty, but was eaten with
mental commanders would go cap in hand to the
relish by the Russians. -i
soldiers to request a loan. An officer could commit
The soldiers' requirements in drink were
no more disgraceful offence than to fail to pay
equally modest, since, with a few lapses from
back an advance from this source. Suvorov
grace, their habits stood in marked contrast to the
cashiered one of his colonels who had offended in
drunkenness of civilian society. For most of the
this respect, and gave out the reason as simple
time they were content with water, though they
military incompetence, so as to conceal the crime.
liked to brew up fermenting flour and the remains
The self-sufficiency of the troops was further
of their biscuit in earthen pots, producing a
promoted by their habits of eating — 'no soldier is
yellowish small beer that went by the name of
easier to feed than the Russian' (Silva, 1778, 53).
kvas, 'which they prefer to ordinary water, though
The rations were distributed by the company
it tastes disgustingly to anyone who is not used to
captain, at a daily rate of a little salt and a couple
it' (Masson, 1859,328).
of pounds of rye or barley, which came either as
Many of the soldiers renounced meat altogether,
flour, or as grain which the soldiers ground for
during the season of the Lenten fast, and the
themselves in their little hand mills. Vegetables,
Prince de Ligne saw 'religious fanatics who pre-
meat and everything else were provided from the
ferred to die rather than take a meat broth'
soldiers' own resources.
(ligne, 1890, 73). Peter had to compel the soldiers
Flour for up to ten days was usually carried in to eat flesh by force, while Apraksin persuaded the
the company transport, and the basic diet of bread Synod to dispense his army from the fast when on
and water permitted the Russians to launch campaign.
expeditions with the minimum of preparation, Marching with his regiment to the Crimea in
which was useful when campaigning in the sandy 1783, Pishchevich admired the tirelessness and
Mark of Brandenburg, and vital when it was a resource of these folk. He noted how the Russian
question of outmarching the French of the soldier:
Revolution. When opportunity offered, the
soldiers excavated a hole to serve as an oven. The manages to appear all neat and prepared for the
cavity was heated to a high temperature with fire- next march, after a whole day on his feet. At the
wood, after which the ashes were raked out and end of each day's progress, if he is not required
cakes of dough inserted to bake. The blackened to perform sentry duty or look after the horses,
pieces of sukhare were then retrieved from the he at once betakes himself to the river, where he
hole, and either cut into lumps the size of walnuts, washes his small clothes. These are still not dry
or put in to bake a second time. when a mighty voice summons him back to drill
in the ranks. Nothing is more agreeable than to
This biscuit, if one may call it so, looks like the pass through a camp site, and watch as the
burnt mortar that comes out of an oven, and it soldiers pitch their tents with miraculous speed
requires good teeth, and better gums to chew it, amid the steppes, and then get down to their
which latter often bleed in the operation. They various occupations (Pishchevich, 1885, 36).
1 3 2 T h e Russian Soldier

The more acute observers resisted the tempta- cruelty into the 1790s. Potemkin alone sought to
tion to regard the Russian soldiers as superhuman. ameliorate the barbarities as a matter of principle,
Speaking from long experience, Manstein detailed with the full support of Catherine and her laws.
the hardships consequent upon the religious fasts, It would certainly be difficult to maintain that
the endless marching of the Turkish campaigns Russian discipline was more draconian per se than
and the almost total lack of medical care, which the codes that were enforced, for instance, in the
combined to kill off the soldiers through scurvy, British Navy, or the army of Frederick the Great.
malaria, dysentery and other maladies (Manstein, Where, however, Russian punishments probably
1860, I, 265). Another formidable indictment differed in kind from those of the West, was in
comes from the Due de Richelieu, who saw the their casual nature. On parade the NCOs
Russian army in the campaign of 1790, and belaboured individuals with hundreds of little
f
remarked on 'the little attention which is generally blows of a stick at a time, delivered with a flicking
paid to the care of the men — a neglect which is as motion that was compared with that of a valet
impolitic as it is barbaric, when you bear in mind beating dust from his master's clothes. In contrast,
that the population is pretty small in relation to the Austrians awarded punishment only after a
the great size of the land' (SIRIO, 1886, LIV, formal court martial, and then fifty of their
162). Richelieu attributed these wasteful ways to blows were enough to consign the man to hospital.
the facility of raising fresh recruits through con- Captain Gryazev explained that the difference
scription. Then again, in 1799 the Russian prisoners 'proceeds from the fact that the foreign armies are
of the French were amazed at the good treatment composed of freemen, and ours of serfs. The
they received in the hospitals, and at the skill of first kind $f person must be treated with some
the French physicians and surgeons, so unlike their circumspection, whereas our men are long-enduring
own butchers, who were liable to carry out every and docile'(Orlov, 1898,161).
surgical procedure with a single blunt knife. More demeaning than some of the outright
It is notoriously difficult to evaluate the punishments was the practice of treating soldiers
severity of the discipline of a military institution. as the merest chattels of their officers. These
If our attention is drawn by punishments of a gentry were accustomed to hauling off the men as
spectacular and barbaric nature, we can easily the impulse took them to serve as orderlies and
overlook the small currency of blows and torments servants, or to perform unpaid labour in the
which have been meted out in every army known regimental workshops or on private estates. Some
to history. Severe corporal punishments have been of the worst instances of cruelty were associated
linked in Russian historical folklore with the rule with the generals and regimental commanders who
of Empress Anna and her Germans. In fact the trained up troupes of musicians and acrobats for
native Russians were as ferocious as any Teuton. the delectation of themselves and their guests.
The discipUnary code of Peter the Great is asso- Langeron claims that these sadists were quite
ciated with the sound of crunching bones and the happy to see nine men die under the stick for
stink of roasted flesh, and while the death penalty every one who survived to give an accomplished
was effectively abandoned by his daughter performance.
Elizabeth, the result was to add to the severity of Coercion ought to have been unnecessary, for
the allegedly non-corporal punishments. The the Russian soldiers had an inborn love of music,
ordeal of the gauntlet was liable to result in the and 'it is by no means unusual to hear them sing
death of the victim, after about eight runs, while a for five or six hours at a stretch without the
single stroke of the knout, a long whip of untanned slightest break' (Richelieu, SIRIO, 1886, LIV,
elkskin, could crack a spine or spill out intestines 161). Every company had. sbme jolly men who
on the ground. Rumyantsev brought a tradition of were pleased to cavort in front of the troops on
severity into the reign of Catherine the Great, the march, and lead the singing, and Langeron
which was perpetuated by individual monsters of himself experienced no difficulty in summoning
 133 T h e Russian Soldier

up a choir of up to three hundred soldiers to grace Russian soldier, as Bolotov discovered when he
festivities. was training his company in the 1750s. Two
We can only admire the courage of those decades later Vorontsov told the officers of his
soldiers who entered protests and petitions against regiment, Ht is harmful and indecent when a
the more outrageous of their commanders. In the soldier comes to hate his musket. This can happen
early part of the century the plaintiffs were all too easily, if he is beaten during instruction,
actually questioned under torture (which was and sees his weapon only as the instrument of his
Peter's way of discouraging litigation), and if their torture'' (Tnstruktsiya Rotnym Komandiram' 17
story failed to stand up they were themselves January 1774, VS, 1871, LXXII.no. 11). Potemkin
liable to be sent to the scaffold or the galleys. set his face against all cruelty, and purged the
Some of the malcontents made common cause officers who maltreated the men. Emperor Paul
with peasant or tribal rebels, as happened fti was no less attentive in this regard, though he has
1705-6, in 1707-8, and during the last great been given precious little credit for it by the
uprising of 1773-5, when 240 NCOs and men of Russians.
the First Saratov Fusilier Regiment embraced the It was, however, still more important for the
cause of Pugachev,. Many more troops simply senior commander to be aware that the soldiers
deserted, hoping to escape across the borders or expected him to be immediately accessible as a
melt into the civilian community. Desertion was friend. Saltykov, Rumyantsev and Suvorov had the
already evident in the first months of Peter's new gift of exchanging jocular repartee with the troops,
army, and it reached massive proportions in the who responded by composing little songs in their
years from 1705, when the nation began to feel honour. Conversely the men were affronted if the
the full rigours of conscription. In the autumn of general showed himself unaccountably ignorant of
1707, for example, desertion left the twenty-three their names and circumstances. The lenient
dragoon regiments on the Vistula with 8,000 men Potemkin never established fully cordial relations
out of an establishment of 23,000. In 1710 with his troops, nor did his contemporary Count
20,000 recruits from Moscow alone deserted on Panin,
the march to their units. Draconian decrees against
who was considerably more indulgent towards
desertion were published in 1705, but they worked
the soldiers than Count Rumyantsev, but was
to no better effect than the amnesty which
much less loved by them than the latter . . .
followed in 1711.
simply because he did not talk with the other
Few detailed researches have been pursued in
ranks. Inhibited by a reserved and austere
the desertion in the post-Petrine period, though it
character, he believed that he could gain the
seems to have fallen off considerably in the 1730s.
affection of his troops and of mankind in general
The dismal phenomenon made a reappearance in
through just and honourable conduct alone,
the reign of Catherine the Great, as a response to
regarding any other means of winning the soldiers'
the tyrannical conduct of the colonels. Semen
regard as useless and downright ignoble.
Vorontsov claims that he encountered 'thousands
(Strandmann, 1882, XXXV, 317)
of our brave compatriots serving in the Paissian
and Austrian armies, and people who have been to When both generosity and encouragement
Sweden assure me that they have seen more than failed, the Russian officer was left with no alterna-
two thousand Russians in the ranks of the Swedish tive but to set a personal example: 'in this army
army at Stockholm and Gothenburg' ('Zapiski', rash bravery is much respected, and, if an officer
1 8 0 2 , A K V , 1870-95, X, 472). wishes for the esteem of his troops, he must
Alongside these indictments it is only fair to set expose himself with them in a manner that would
the many instances of leadership of a more be esteemed absurd in any other army' (Tielke,
enlightened kind. Fair and considerate treatment 1788, II, 133). Langeron noted how at the bloody
could go some way towards winning over the storms of Ochakov and Izmail the officer casualties
1 3 4 T h e Russian Soldier

were one-third heavier in proportion than those of how easily they could be re-fashioned for their
the rank and file. new life. Thus the Russian regiment became:
The distribution of decorations was another
a nursery for every kind of art and craft. The low
positive strain in Russian military leadership. At a
pay of the ordinary soldiers makes it vital for
time when recognition for private soldiers was
them to stretch their imagination, and make
almost unknown in the West, Peter the Great gave
themselves self-sufficient in every respect. They
out silver medals en masse to the regiments which
become their own bakers, brewers, butchers,
had taken part in his victories. This good Custom
tailors, cobblers, perruquiers, locksmiths,
was followed by Elizabeth and Potemkin. The
wheelwrights, saddlers, blacksmiths, carpenters,
veterans sported the decorations proudly in their
masons, coppersmiths, musicians and painters —
buttonholes, and it never occurred to them to sell
in other words, any occupation which comes to
the medals for cash, even when they might be
mind. Nowhere in the world are there people who
starving in enemy captivity.
are so resourceful. (Wonzel, 1783, 183)
Semen Vorontsov observed that the reputation
of the individual regiments was known throughout Surprisingly enough, the same nation gave
the army, and jealously guarded over the decades. evidence of an ineradicable vein of slavish
The Astrakhanskii and Ingermanlandskii regiments,
for example, earned a glorious name in the wars of
Peter the Great, while the First Grenadiers had
distinguished themselves at Gross-Jagersdorf and
again at Kunersdorf. Vorontsov believed that his
officers had the duty of inculcating such traditions
as a matter of policy, but in fact they can have
been carried on only by the soldiers themselves,
for individual companies knew up to three or four
captains in a single year, while the whole corps of
regimental officers usually changed with the arrival
of a new colonel. Out of necessity Peter the Great
made and re-made regiments after the bloody
battles of the Great Northern War. Thus seven
regiments went into the melting pot after the
action at Fraustadt in 1707, and they emerged as
one. Catherine herself was no great respecter of
tradition. She casually allowed the Butyrskii
Regiment to be absorbed in the Kuban Jaeger
Corps, thus extinguishing the oldest regiment in
the army, which had its roots in the time of the
Streltsy. Conversely, she created an instant elite
when she formed ten regiments of grenadiers from
the villagers of the monastic estates.
Here we have, an indication of the curious
malleability of the Russian soldiers, who rapidly
became the masters of whatever calling they were
told to pursue. Masson, admittedly a hostile wit-
ness, asserts that the colonel of the Moscow
Grenadiers did not even bother to find out the 32 Grenadier, period of Catherine the Great
peacetime trades of his recruits, because he knew (Viskovatov, 1844-56)
 135 T h e Russian Soldier

stupidity. An order, once given, was liable to be cannot at once break through the enemy ranks,
executed to the letter: they come crashing back, and let themselves be
hacked down by their victors . . . without
During a naval battle with the Swedes, a galley
offering resistance or asking for quarter.
sank with several of our Guards officers on board.
(Stiessius, 1706, 204)
The commander of the neighbouring galley called
out to his men 'Save the officers of the Guards!' Hence the words of Frederick, to the effect that
One of these unfortunates stretched his hand it was not enough to kill Russians in action, for
from the water and called for help. A soldier, you still had to knock them to the ground. Hence
before he would consent to haul him out, asked also the Russian soldiers' saying: 'The Turks are
him 'Do you belong to the Guards?' Incapable of tumbling like ninepins, but through the grace of
making a reply, the officer sankbeneath the God our men stand firm, though headless.'
surface and drowned. (Masson, 1859, 181) The force which resolved every contradiction,
and distinguished Russian soldiers from all others
Many Westerners were forced to the conclusion
in Europe, came from the circumstance that they
that the Russians • must ultimately be guided by
formed a purely national body of troops, bound
force. 'It is scarcely possible for a people to be as
together by a belief in a national God. The service
fitted for slavery as the Muscovites. They are so
of this deity had not much to do with morals, but
corrupt by nature that they will do nothing of
a great deal to do with the hatred of foreigners,
their own free will, but must be driven by hard
and the performance of rituals of a kind which
and cruel blows' (Stiessius, 1706, 197). Manstein
were calculated to bind all classes of Russian
cites the action of Munnich in reducing one of his
society. At St Petersburg, at the end of the Easter
major-generals to an ordinary dragoon in the
Sunday service, the archbishop's announcement
militia:
of the risen Christ was the signal for all the men
It might seem a fairly steep punishment for a and women present to exchange Easter eggs and
single instance of cowardice, or rather a lack of kisses. 'These last ceremonies are reckoned so
expertise in working out an effective plan. But essential, and are so strictly adhered to, that if a
this kind of thing is absolutely essential in common soldier were to meet the empress, and
Russia, where good treatment makes less offer an egg, declaring his belief, he would have
impression than severity. They have become the honour of an imperial kiss' (Cook, 1770, I,
accustomed to acting only under duress. Indeed, 49).
you can hardly give a set of orders to an officer As the century wore on, the soldiers lost their
without adding a whole chapter of threats, trust in some of the beliefs that had sustained
which you will put into execution if he falls them in earlier times, like the one which imagined
short. (Manstein, 1860,1, 177) that a man killed in battle came to life on the third
day, free and happy in his native village. A great
There was something passive in the very endur-
deal still remained, for the Russian God kept his
ance which the Russians showed in battle — 'taken
watch over the armies and 'Suvorov, more than
as individuals the Russians are gentle, even
anybody else, had a blind faith in this Divinity,
timorous. But massed in battalions they manifest
and more than anybody else he fostered His cult.'
a herd-like cohesion which makes them redoubt-
On the field of Zurich, after the battle of 1799,
able, and sometimes unbeatable' (Masson, 1859,
'there was hardly one of the mortally-wounded
343). It had already been noted that in the wars
Russians who had not clutched at the image of the
of the later seventeenth century:
patron saint which he wore about his neck, and
they are lively and ferocious in their first onset, pressed it to his lips before drawing his last breath'
like the Poles and Turks. When, however, they (Masson, 1859,351,365).
The native officer with Field-Marshal Ivan Trubetskoi in 1750, it was
still possible towards the end of the century to
For most of us terms like 'the Russian officer' or point to grandees who maintained the old stan-
'the Russian aristocrat' have connotations of dards. In Count Ivan Ivanovich Saltykov:
dissolute young wastrels, who were freed of care
you could see the type of the old boyar, though
and responsibility by the labour of thousands of
one who had already become accustomed to
serfs, who spent their evenings throwing vodka
European ways. His style of living was grand rather
glasses against the wall, and who finally subsided
than whimsical. He owned a large but well-dressed
into unconsciousness among a wreckage of gilded
train of servants, expensive carriages, and fine,
furniture. Patient scholars have shown that the
splendidly-harnessed horses. A very large number ^
ability, let alone any inclination to lead this land
of people, if not absolutely everybody, had the
of life was restricted to a very small proportion of
right to sit at his abundant and tasteful table.
the folk who had the right to call themselves
His manners, though simple, always bore the
nobility. The highest and proudest Muscovite
imprint of precedence and authority. (Wiegel,
aristocracy . entered the eighteenth century as a
1864-6,1, pt 1,97)
tight group of 137 families, which owned a dispro-
portionate share of the 360,000 peasant house- Prince Nikolai Vasilevich Repnin was described in
holds, and whose names have become familiar to almost identical terms (Lubyanovskii, 1872,
us as leaders of the army and the state. The 166-7).
Golitsyns were masters of the fate of 7,860 In modern academic circles few subjects are
peasant families, and they were rivalled by the capable of arousing as much rancour as the question
Saltykovs, who had an establishment of 7,758. of the status of a nation's gentry — whether in a
Lesser potentates like the Dolgorukovs, the g$en period they were rising or falling, and who
Sheremetevs, the Golovins and the Volkonskiis indeed could be classified as gentry at all. Here we
still had a clear pre-eminence over all but the give only very broad indications of the people who
wealthiest of the mass of 3,264 noble families lost or gained in the eighteenth century after Peter
which comprised the dvoryane, or Middle Service gave definition to the social system, and bent it to
Class of lesser gentry. the purposes of the state.
The old Muscovite families maintained their At the lower end of the social scale, immobile
relative dominance during the vast expansion of elements like the freeholders and the very poor
the nobility which ensued in the eighteenth squirearchy found themselves subject to conscrip-
century. While the formal title of 'boyar' died out tion and the poll-tax of 1724, and therefore hardly

1 3 6
 The Russian Officer 137

distinguishable from state peasants. The middle the newly conquered provinces of Estonia and
class, or rather the town-dwellers, almost doubled Livonia. The Baltic Germans were hungry and
in number between 1652 and 1722, and by their warlike folk, very much like their cousins the
taxes they enabled Peter to rebuild the army and Prussians, and though they were allowed the
government on modern lines. These townsmen choice of their manner of life, many of them
too were parcelled and categorised, being classified presented themselves to the army of their own
in 1720 respectively as 'irregular'manual workers, accord.
or the 'regular' professional men, merchants and Over the decades the iron simplicities of Peter's
smaller dealers. dispensation were gradually eroded. 1736 brought
Moving up the scale, Peter sought to raise up a the limitation of the term of service to twenty-five
privileged but dedicated mass of military men and years, and in 1762 Peter III wrought the most
bureaucrats, whose status would stand in direct fundamental change of all, when on 18 February
relationship to their service to the sovereign. Peter his decree Concerning the Granting of Freedom
introduced Western military ranks at the beginning and Liberty to the Entire Russian Nobility allowed
of his reign, and a corresponding civilian hierarchy his officers to retire at will from the service. The
appeared in 1709. Finally, in 1722, the famous peasants hoped that they too might benefit from
Table of Ranks matched a system of fourteen the break in the chain of obligation, and their later
equal grades of military, bureaucratic and court disillusionment did much to account for the
service — a classification so fundamental that it support which some of them gave to Pugachev's
endured until 1917. As we might have expected, uprising. Catherine did not attempt to reinstate
the magnates of ancient stock gravitated effort- the old social contract, for mass conscription of
lessly to the highest ranks. At the same time, the nobility had been a crude and indiscriminate
lesser folk were fired by the prospect now held means of enlisting officers, and in any case the
out to them of climbing to position and honour social and economic advantages of a military
through state service — an ambition that led to a career offered sufficient inducement in their own
great increase in the Middle Service Class of lesser right. By a decree of 1785 she confirmed the
gentry (since commissioned rank now brought nobles' right to freedom from service, except for a
nobility), and provided the Russian army with primordial duty in 'necessary' time of war, as
most of its officers. defined by the sovereign.
Whether grandees or parvenus, Peter's nobility The gentry numbered 108,000 males in 1782
was supposed to earn its privileges in a very hard (including those of the Ukraine), and by the end
way. The names of the male children were entered of the century a mass of possibly as many as one
on official rolls at the age of sixteen, and all save million people of both sexes had pretensions to
the only sons were assigned to lifelong service to nobility. The word 'pretensions' is here used with
the state — about two-thirds in the army or fleet, some care, for if princes and the like abounded, it
and the remainder in the civilian administration. was only because the absence of effective primo-
Decrees of 1714 and 1723 bound all young nobles geniture divided up patrimonies of title and land
to undergo courses of education, and such lads as equally among the males of every generation, a
were destined for the army were told in addition process which reduced many of the nobles to the
to undergo a period of service in the Guards. Peter status of little more than free peasants. Holdings
thereby intended to put an end to the scandal of of land and serfs were, in any event, widely scat-
the well-connected young men who appeared as tered, and changed hands very frequently among
officers, yet were 'either ignorant of the funda- these restless folk.
mentals of soldiering, or if they have served in the Clearly, for a great number of the nobles the
army, have done so only for show and for a matter concessions outlined above signified very little,
of weeks or months' (Beskrovnyi, 1958, 169). for state service continued to offer the only
No such compulsion was exercised in respect of prospect of escape from the soil, if not immediate
 The Russian Officer 138

fortune. Pishchevich recalls that as a young officer Vorontsov could write in 1792 that peasant
he was so poor that on the Crimean expedition of officers were infecting half the army at a time
1783 he had to sit with his soldiers and share the when all Europe was threatened by the overthrow
kasha from their kettle: of the established order. Among many frightening
instances he knew 'the case of one of Count
The soldiers imagined that I was doing this out of
Skavronskii's laqueys, who thirteen years ago
special affection, and liked me all the more on
served me at table in Italy, and whom I encoun-
this account. I must avow to my discredit that at
tered three years later as an officer'. Two thousand
the beginning I was ashamed to sit among them
sons of merchants had entered the Guards as
. . . conceiving it shameful to show familiarity
NCOs, and were procured officer places in the
with the kind of men whom the supercilious
army en masse, and 'so at a stroke they and their
nobility call, I do not know by what right, the
issue are as noble as the Pozharskois and the
'dark people'. (Pishchevich, 1885, 38)
Sheremetevs. Can you wonder if the nobility is
Wiegel (Vigel) declares with some exaggeration despised in Russia?' (7 November 1792, AKV,
that in contrast to the state of affairs in western 1870-95, IX, 270).
Europe, It is possible to piece together a fairly repre-
sentative picture of the kind of influences which
in our country the path to glory, rank and riches
shaped the Russian officers. Generally speaking,
is open to people of every condition. To the
the native flavour was strongest in their earliest
Russians there is something very attractive in the
years. Again and again the veterans harked back to
idea of a new name winning great eminence and
general renown, and in the very contrast between a childhood spent in the surroundings of a smallish
low birth, and the high position which lucky or country estate, remote from the modern elegance
able men can attain. We consider it ludicrous of St Petersburg. Andrei Bolotov (born 1738)
when men who are devoid of personal merit like recalls the bare rooms of his house, furnished with
to boast about their ancestors. simple tables and benches, and lined with dark
wooden walls hung with pictures of saints. Many
He conceded, however, that grandees who did not of the womenfolk were also constructed in the old
give themselves airs could win 'new claims on our Russian style, like Bolotov's mother, or the doting
respect', and that the Russian nobility as a whole grandmother of Lev Nikolaevich Engelhardt (born
possessed something unique in Europe — 'the right 1766), who called him after a son killed in the
of owning people of their own race' (Wiegel, Seven Years War, and let him run around in a
1864-6,1,97). peasant shirt and bare feet. 'Physically my educa-
The constant recruitment of fresh faces into the tion resembled the system outlined by Rousseau.
nobility was not to the taste of the aristocrats who But I know that my grandmother was not only
were already firmly entrenched. The conservatives ignorant of that work, but had a very uncertain
had a second line of defence in the process of acquaintance with Russian grammar itself'
admitting a new officer to the regiment, which '(Engelhardt, 1868,3).
demanded the assent of the community of the The family home was likely to be found in or
regimental officers. Such agreement was not near a small provincial town such as Penza formed
always forthcoming from the military caste in in the 1760s:
later years, and on 18 May 1788 Catherine found
it advisable to give fresh encouragement to the Penza at that time consisted of ten or so not
commoners to present themselves for admission to particularly large wooden-built seignorial
the officer corps, and thus to the nobility. On his mansions, and a few hundred huts of the ordinary
side, Potemkin offered commissions on a sliding people, many of which were roofed with thatch
scale of rank for people who brought appropriate and had wattle walls. . . . The only architectural
numbers of settlers to New Russia. Thus Semen adornment was the principal church, which was
 The Russian Officer 139

built of stone . . . a certain Mikhail Ilich Martinov establishment in Smolensk. The Russians seemed
was the owner of one thousand souls, and was to have taken readily to the French language,
more hospitable and lavish than the rest of the though German became something of an ordeal in
nobles. He had . . . a set of silver spoons, which he the second half of the century, when it lost its
set before the more important guests, leaving the place as an important medium of administration
others to manage with spoons of pewter. (Wiegel, and culture. Some people entertained the suspicion
1864-6,1,21-2) that the available foreign tutors were not always
the best of their trade, and that something provin-
The occasional passage of great people and cial still hung around the culture of St Petersburg
great events left a deep impression in these simple itself. Even by the middle of the century,
communities. In the southern provinces the Westerners noted the icons on the walls of gilded
triumphal progress of Potemkin and Catherine ballrooms, the fleas and bugs in the furnishings,
was treasured in the memory of many individuals. the collections of monstrosities in the St Petersburg
Older traditions spoke of the march of the Swedes Academy of Sciences (opened 1724), and the hint
and King Charles, 'gaunt, pale and ugly' of cabbage and sewerage in the air.
(Lubyanovskii, 1872, 9). At Revel on the Baltic In the earlier period Peter was probably right to
the twelve-year-old Waldemar Lowenstern was hold that a direct acquaintance with the Western
fortunate enough to witness the sea fight in which world was almost indispensable for men who were
Admiral Chichagov destroyed the Swedish fleet of to be responsible public servants. He sent batches
the Duke of Sodermanland on 2 May 1790. Count of promising young men abroad in 1690 and again
Bobrovskii whisked the lad off in a boat to the from 1700 to 1705. However, as the eighteenth
battery at the entrance to the harbour. century progressed, the drive to travel in foreign
parts lost something of its force. Large establish-
He was decked out in the magnificent uniform of
ments of education were now opening in Russia,
the Horseguards, in which he was a captain, and
and in particular the various military and naval
so nobody thought of preventing us from landing
academies, while St Petersburg began to take
at the battery. I followed at his heels with
wholeheartedly to the rococo culture of France,
unaffected youthful joy. Swedish cannon shot
and the secular spirit spread to the provinces. At
came in our direction, and the whistle they made,
the same time, observers harboured doubts as to
as they passed over our heads, put me in a
the wisdom of letting young Russians roam
transport of delight. Some of the shot crashed into
abroad, with their wealth, their ignorance and
the side of the old wooden battery, and I noticed
their strong passions. They seemed to learn little,
that the people around me did not share my
and they reverted to the worst of their old habits
happy mood. Some of the old warriors turned
when they returned home. In 1717 the tutor Petr
positively pale (Lowenstern, RS, 1900, CIII,
Fedorov had to report to Field-Marshal Anikita
no. 3, 268-9).
Repnin on the sorry state of his two sons, who
Further acquaintance with the outside world had gone to join Prince Eugene's army before
was likely to come from an attentive father and a Belgrade:
small but good domestic library, such as the one in
the Suvorov household. Tutors, governors and They are living in the utmost misery on this
. literate NCOs were often hired to inculcate the campaign. The two princes left great debts behind
first rudiments of knowledge, and some of the them when they set out from Vienna. When they
arts and accomplishments of a gentleman. Many were still there, they maintained two French
young folk were then sent to perfect their educa- companions at their own cost, and this pair led
tion in provincial noble schools, like the Kharkov them into great losses. Now that they have
College or the Revel Ritterakademie, or in board- arrived at the theatre of war, one of the
ing schools (pansions) such as Ellert's hard-driving Frenchmen has robbed your two children and
 The Russian Officer 140

gone over to the Turks, taking with him . . . a told him 'I would rather hear that you had been
horse of Prince Vasilii Anikitich, and from killed, than that you had brought shame on
Prince Yurii a saddle, a pair of pistols . . . a sword, yourself', whereupon they shed a few manly tears
a sword knot embroidered in gold, and a pair of and parted (1868, 68). Adrian Denisov relates an
breeches. (Strukov, in Skalon, 1902-c.l 911, almost identical ritual, and Tolstoy reproduces
VI, bk 1, pt 1, p. 200) the scene for Prince Andrei's farewell to his father
in War and Peace.
Some young folk of a more responsible kind At leisure moments Engelhardt put himself
contrived to benefit from life among the through a course of self-education in fortification
foreigners. It is significant that two of the greatest and engineering, 'preparing myself to serve with
military men of the third quarter of the century distinction and qualify myself for suitable employ-
had youthful experiences in Russian embassies in ment when the occasion might arise' (1868, 95).
foreign countries — Petr Rumyantsev in Berlin, Engelhardt's bookish concerns were shared by
and Zakhar Chernyshev in Vienna. Rumyantsev many other members of the officer corps, or at
actually enlisted in the Prussian army before he least the ones who bothered to write their
was hauled back to Russia. Chernyshev, more memoirs. Ldwenstern was categorised as a 'pedant'
fortunate, was able to return to Austria as Russia's by his young acquaintances, while Pishchevich
military deputy, and he took part in Field-Marshal claims that by his fifteenth year he was 'already
Daun's victory at Kolin in 1757. familiar with all the great commanders, and the
In Russia the fledgling officer's introduction to history of their campaigns was always before my
military life was almost invariably attended with eyes. I preferred Prince Eugene above all. . . . I
ludicrous circumstances. Peter desired potential spent much of every night with a book in my
leaders to go through service in the ranks, as we hands' (Pishchevich, 1885, 14). Even the ape-like
have seen, and in 1736 Anna stipulated that such Aleksei Arakcheev assembled a library of 11,000
young noblemen as were destined for the army volumes, while Rumyantsev, 'whenever he was
had to sign themselves up with regiments as recovering from the labours of his campaigns,
'supernumerary soldiers' at the age of thirteen. The showed the same thirst for knowledge as in his
idea was a superficially attractive one, but like all youth. If he heard anybody praising his deeds, he
experiments of the kind it resulted in hypocrisy would point to his books and say: "there are my
and evasion. The case of Lev Engelhardt was teachers!" ' (Saikin, 1818,67).
typical. His father secured him a cadetship in the A much more detached approach to their
hussar regiment of the wealthy Colonel Drevich, profession was shown by those officers who kept
and he later remembered his 'infantile joy when their names on the rolls of the Guard Regiments
I dressed up in my hussar uniform, and how I for any length of time. The Guards had entered
was more delighted still when I could play with the century as the hard core of Peter's new regular
the sabre and its sabretache' (Engelhardt, 1868, 6). army, and distinguished themselves at Narva when
Over the following years Engelhardt passed rapidly the rest of the regimSftts had earned the contempt
through the Ellert and Shklov colleges and the of Europe. In later years, however, their concerns
Preobrazhenskii Regiment, and he did a spell of lay far from the battlefield, for 'through the many
duty as an aide to Prince Potemkin, but his changes in regime the Guard regiments had to
military education proper began only at the age some degree acquired the habit of overturning the
of twenty, when he was taken on as a super- government by force' (Wonzel, 1783, 47). The
numerary ensign in a marching regiment. successors of Peter the Great sought to direct the
All of this helped to postpone the young Guard, not by cutting down on its numbers or
officers' first serious break with their families, influence, but by adding new units which they
which in many cases occurred when the summons hoped would be devoted to their interests, like
came to serve on campaign. Engelhardt's father Anna's Ismailovskii Regiment of 1730. Elizabeth
 The Russian Officer 141

m
33 Officer of the Le/bkompagnie, formed by 34 NCO and officer of the Chevalier Garde,
Elizabeth from her adherents in the 1764-96. Full court dress of blue surcoat edged
Preobrazhenskii Regiment. Black cap with yellow with gold; red coat edged with gold with blue
metal decoration and white plume (Viskovatov, turn-backs and silver lace on sleeves; polished
1844-56) white metal helmet with ostrich plumes
(Viskovatov, 1844-56)

showed the greatest consideration for the feelings it with a battalion of jaegers, a regiment of hussars
of the Guards, after the part they had played in and a regiment of Cossacks, so creating the balanced
her accession, and she never called on them to take corps which went to war against Napoleon.
the field in the Seven Years War. Catherine the The social pretensions of the Guard soon
Great was no less beholden to the Guards, and in matched its political ones, for it offered facilities
her reign the bloodless glory of this splendid body to the sons of the higher aristocracy to fulfil their
reached its apogee. Closest in every sense to the obligation of service in the ranks in a most agree-
person of the sovereign was the one hundred- able way. The sprigs of the nobility were entered
strong company of Chevalier Gardes, composed on the books on the day of birth, and by the age
entirely of men of noble blood. of fifteen or sixteen or earlier they were doing
None of this prepared the Guard for the rude nominal duty as supernumerary sergeants, to the
affronts it received at the hands of Paul I, who number of a thousand or more in each regiment.
stuffed it with officers of low birth, and augmented The young gentlemen of the Moscow or provincial
 The Russian Officer 142

nobility scarcely bothered to report for service at oils. Many officers came to the school to see what
all, while the St Petersburgers or exceptionally I had done, and the compliments of these spec-
enthusiastic folk could always find servants or tators . . . increased the application and bent I
substitutes to clean muskets or take over annoying had for my art.' The quality of instruction was
spells of duty on guard. It was pleasing to know extraordinarily diverse: 'The director of the school
that a rank in the Guards was one grade higher was Captain Giinter, an obliging and quiet sort of
than the equivalent rank elsewhere in the army, man, who was one of the foremost experts of the
and that the difference jumped to two ranks if the time, and who brought good proportion to the
Guardsman chose to transfer to a marching regi- design of the whole artillery' (Danilov, 1842, 58).
ment. Langeron cites the case of the Siberian At the other end of the scale stood brutes like the
Grenadier Regiment, which had lost eight of its drunken and quarrelsome Styk- Yunker Alabushev,
captains in the bloody storm of Praga in 1794. who committed no less than three murders before
The surviving lieutenants began to dream of he was finally disgraced.
promotion, after ten years of service, but they had At the end of three or so years of study, the
to give way to eight sergeants from the Guard, products of the technical schools became variously
who became captains in their place, probably NCOs, tradesmen or clerks in the corps of gunners
without having seen a private soldier in their lives. or engineers, from where a few ultimately rose to
By the 1790s, therefore, ex-Guardsmen account become senior generals.
for between forty and fifty per cent of the regi- As we might have expected, technical education
mental commanders, and very many of the field formed one of the first objects of attention for
officers. Petr Shuvalov, after he became Master General of
Throughout our period, only a small proportion the Ordnance in 1756. He combined the artillery
of the leaders of the army followed a formal and engineering academies, with an establishment
course of military education. Things had promised of 135 pupils, and he widened the syllabus to
well in the early years of the new army, when embrace civil architecture, Latin and French,
Peter was inspired to set up a number of useful dancing and painting. The facilities of the academy
establishments on the Western model. Such were included a printing shop, a hospital, a gallery of
the School of Mathematics and Navigation (1701), fortress models, and a small library where the
the two Moscow artillery schools (1701 and 1712) cadets could read foreign publications. Shuvalov
and the two engineering academies (Moscow, selected the instructing staff, and he often attended
1712-24 and St Petersburg, 1719). the teaching periods in person.
However, the life in the technical schools was At the beginning of her reign Catherine the
of an exacting kind, which of itself was calculated Great approved a code for the management of the
to limit the interest of the nobility. Clothing came Shuvalov establishment, and renamed it the
to the pupils free, but most of them had to lodge 'Artillery and Engineering Noble Cadet Corps'.
in private houses, where they lived in conditions of The year 1783 saw some important developments.
near-starvation. These wretches had to turn out of The engineer and artillery elements once more
bed at six in the morning, and they pursued went their way as independent schools, but in
courses of instruction until six in the evening. compensation the reorganised artillery academy
Mikhail Vasilevich Danilov was admitted to the St was increased to admit 400 pupils, and it entered
Petersburg artillery school in 1740, and he explains one of the most prosperous periods of its existence
that the noble pupils were divided into three under a new director, General P. I. Melissino. This
classes, according to specialisation. He himself was ingenious Greek maintained the broad educational
admitted to the first class, or the 'School of ideals of Shuvalov, and his pupils were to be
Draftsmanship', where in addition to technical largely responsible for carrying through the
drawing he 'also executed some paintings and important artillery reforms of the Napoleonic era.
other works, including landscapes and portraits in While the beginnings of technical education
 The Russian Officer 143

may be traced to the earliest years of the new

Russian army, the notion of forming young men
for the field arms was not taken up until the reign
of Anna. The immediate inspiration came from a
project of Count P. I. Yaguzhinskii, who, as
ambassador in Berlin, had become acquainted with
the famous Prussian corps of cadets. Yaguzhinskii's
scheme of 1730 was' given practical form by
Miinnich, and on 17 February 1732 the Noble
Cadet Corps (1742 renamed the Noble Land Cadet
Corps, Sukhoputnyi Shlyakhetskii Korpus)
admitted its first pupils. The full corps of 360
cadets was lodged in the spacious Menshikov
Palace in St Petersburg, and the fledglings pursued
a wide course of military and polite education for
five or six years from the age of about ten. Munnich
turned to Potsdam for inspiration on the practical
side, for he believed that French military methods
were falling out of date, and 'the King of Prussia
sent a number of officers and NCOs to help in
setting up the corps, and instructing the young
pupils in the Prussian drill' (Manstein, 1860, I,
85).

Bearing in mind the difficulty

a of procuring
adequate education at home, and their ambition
to compare in knowledge with the Germans who
held the foremost positions at that time, the better
nobility and even the greatest magnates were only
too glad to have the opportunity to place their
.^hildren in the Noble Land Cadet Corps. (Wiegel,
1864-6,1, 14)
Anna was delighted with the almost immediate
success of the Cadet Corps, and she sent it a white
colour with the Imperial arms, exclaiming that
'from these brave sons I will be able to furnish
my regiments with able officers' (Anon., 1792, 1).
The first graduates (who must have been fairly
elderly) sallied forth in 1734 to the number of
eleven. Seventy-eight more appeared in 1736, and
.from then until the end of the Seven Years War
the yearly average remained at about fifty-five.
Nearly one-fifth of these entered the civilian
service, and the rest were assigned to the army as
NCOs, ensigns, second lieutenants or lieutenants.
If these numbers were capable of supplying only 35 Officer of the Cadet Corps, 1732-42
a tiny proportion of the needs of that large army, (Viskovatov, 1844-56)
 The Russian Officer 144

they represented 'almost all the great public From the first, Catherine the Great showed a
servants who were to be one of the glories of the lively interest in the progress of the corps. In
reign of Catherine II' (Wiegel, 1864-6,1, 14). August 1762, just two months after her accession,
Experience shows that the very title of 'military she increased the establishment of cadets to six
academy' is a notorious contradiction in terms, hundred, and three years later she appointed the
and that over the years many establishments of civilian 'lieutenant-general' Betzkoi as head, with
the kind oscillate between the respective extremes the commission to carry out a radical transforma-
of the military university, and the blood-and- tion. Betzkoi and his sovereign were led by the
bayonets trade school, without finding a place of writings of Locke, Montaigne, Fenelon and
equilibrium. The movement to one side or the Montesquieu to the conviction that enlightened
other has less to do with the merits of the case schooling had the power to 'inculcate proper
than the ambitions of the men who happen to be behaviour and a love of industry, and to confer,
in charge at the time. In Russia in the middle by a new education, a new mode of life'. These
decades of the eighteenth century the civilian ideals words are taken from the code which Betzkoi
gained a clear ascendancy. From the beginning the gave to the corps in 1766. Declaring his intention
Cadet Corps was a stranger to the harsh regimes of to introduce the cadets to their studies 'as if to an
the other academies, and under Elizabeth the agreeable field, adorned with flowers' (Petrov, in
range of activities was such as to fit a young Skalon, 1902-C.1911, X, 35), he had the children
gentleman for almost any station in life. Before taken into the corps as early as five or six, so as to
the Seven Years War some of the cadets came separate them from the harmful influence of their
together in a Company of Lovers of Russian families. In fact the whole is permeated by that
Literature, where they read out and discussed mixture of sentimentality and coercion which
poems of their own composition. Aleksandr became the essence of the socialist ideal.
Petrovich Sumarokov, one of the graduates of the Altogether the instruction in the Betzkoi period
corps, was impelled by the resonance of Racine's embraced nineteen subjects of general education,
tragedies to compose a native counterpart, Khorev in addition to foreign languages, three specialised
(1747), which the company rendered with such military subjects (the art of war, fortification and
distinction that they were invited to deliver a artillery) and nine extra-curricular classes of an
performance on the court stage on 8 January artistic nature. The encyclopaedic character of the
1750. The. piece was repeated many times, and led education accorded well with the philosophic
ultimately to the formation of an imperial Russian mood of the 1760s, but it was incapable of incul-
Theatre, where Russian plays replaced the French- cating a core of solid knowledge.
and German-language dramas which up to then A chill air began to blow through the corps
had dominated the Russian stage. when the humane old director Count Friedrich of
The sense of identity was further promoted by Anhalt-Bernburg died in 1794, and was succeeded
the lively feud which the cadets maintained with by Mikhail Kutuzov. 'Count Anhalt treated you
the Guards, who lived on the southern side of the like children', Kutuzov announced to the cadets,
Neva, 'but I shall deal with you like soldiers.' The
instruction under the new regime was brisk and
the effects whereof are sometimes very terrible, practical, and it was driven home with the stick.
and numbers are killed on both sides. The Guards One of the cadets was so shattered by the experi-
are all accoutered with broadswords, the cadets ence that he threw himself from an upper gallery
with small tucks. If the Guard soldier gets one to his death on the stone floor below.
blow, the cadet is no more. But very frequently Finally in 1800 Paul renamed the establishment
the cadet shuns the blow, and before the Guard the First Cadet Corps, and reconstituted the
soldier can be ready to give another, the cadet engineer academy as a corresponding Second
runs him through. (Cook, 1770,1, 42) Cadet Corps. Military education as a whole lay in
 The Russian Officer 145

the hands of Grand Prince Constantine, who Foreign officers

appointed German instructors who could be relied
upon to inculcate high standards of drill and The eighteenth century was the age par excellence
bearing. Everything else was neglected, and the of the cosmopolitan officer, but in Russia the
products of the corps arrived at their regiments as dependence on aliens went far beyond the norm in
fourteen- or fifteen-year-old ignoramuses. other services, for in neither quantity or com-
It was probably fortunate that the Noble Land petence was the native nobility capable of supply-
Cadet Corps, which underwent such extremes of ing the higher leadership which the army required.
regime, was complemented by a number of smaller The resentments were correspondingly acute. If
establishments which stood in a roughly similar Manstein claimed that the Russians needed plenty
relation to the corps as do the Virginia Military of foreign officers, 'because the soldiers repose
Institute or the Charleston Citadel to West Point. more confidence in tfiem than in the officers of
One of the most celebrated of the kind was the their own nation', he also had to admit that among
Greek Cadet Corps (1775-96), which contributed the Westerners were 'the most useless throw-outs
altogether about one hundred officers to the from the rest of Europe' (Manstein, 1860, I, 298;
army, and gave an excellent military and general II, 366). Military tourists and sightseers were a
education both to the Russian nobility and to the kind of humanity which came in for some parti-
young Greek refugees for whose sake it was cularly harsh words. Fermor detested this breed of
founded. 'volunteer', and in the next generation the Prince
Another deserving institution was the private de Ligne had to warn Potemkin against the host of
Shklov Cadet Corps, which began life in 1778 as a charlatans who passed themselves off as military
diversion for the eccentric Major-General S. G. men. 'Do we stand in need of so many foreign
Zorich on his estates in Livonia and White Russia. officers?' asked General Rzhevskii. 'It is displeasing
By 1800 the Shklov Corps had produced a total to see . . . servants, merchants and teachers assum-
of 47Q officers, who followed a balanced and ing the guise of Russian staff officers, which
enjoyable course lasting up to eight years or more. demeans the service, and occasions injustice to
Lev Engelhardt passed just one year at the place, many meritorious natives' (RA, 1879, XVII,
but he remembered how Shklov was packed with pt 1, 362).
As we might have expected, foreigners took
human beings from every kind of family, position
many leading places in the army of Peter the
and nation. Many of them were relations of
Great, who stood in urgent need of Western
Zorich, or his colleagues from the time he served
expertise, and again in the Germanising period of
as a major in an hussar regiment, and they lived
Empress Anna. The climate of Elizabeth's Russia
totally at his expense. The rest of the staff and
was by no means so welcoming to foreign inter-
the other officers were people like gamblers and
lopers. All the same, at the first siege of Colberg
adventurers of every kind who had no other
in 1758 we encounter a Berg in charge of the
shelter, or French, Italians, Germans, Serbians,
infantry, a Vermeulen leading the cavalry, an
Greeks, Moldavians and other assorted foreigners
Ettinger directing the engineers, a Felkers manag-
— altogether a motley rabble. At Shklov were
ing the artillery, and the whole standing under the
staged balls, masquerades, carousels and
command of General Palmenbach — all Germans
fireworks, and sometimes Zorich's cadets used to
or Russo-German Baits. Meanwhile, (the volunteer
carry out military evolutions, or go boating in
(or spy) Totleben was making himself busy and
sloops. (Engelhardt, 1868, 29-30)
useful.
Under Catherine, native Russians took most of
the leading places in the command of armies and
in the imperial favour. However, a warm reception
was still extended to people of foreign birth and
 The Russian Officer 146

ancestry, if they had something useful to contri- At times it almost seemed that there was some-
bute to the state. Such a person was Major-General thing in the Russian air which infected the
Friedrich Wilhelm Bauer, who re-founded the Westerners with some of the most abandoned
general staff in 1770 (see p. 166). Teutonic habits of their hosts. Peter's close associates Lefort
experts of the same kind included the Westphalian and Villebois gave themselves up to riotous
Jakob Pfister, who was Quartermaster-General in drunkenness, while the statesman Ostermann lived
the later Turkish campaigns, and the enterprising in conditions of more-than-Slavonic squalor. The
'Ivan Ivanovich' Meller-Zakomelskii, who became generals Rosen and Lowendahl brought a reputa-
acting Master General of the Ordnance in 1783. tion of Muscovite barbarity to the sieges they
A certain eccentricity becomes evident in some conducted when they returned to the West (Derry,
of the foreigners towards the end of the long reign. 1689; Bergen-op-Zoom, 1747), and there was
We note people like the Livonian-Irishman Boris something pathetic in the last'years of Manstein,
Petrovich Lacy, who was a devotee of rostbif and who was rejected in his native Russia as a foreigner,
plum-pudding (Lubyanovskii, 1872, 155), and used yet appeared to the Prussians as a hideous, ill-
councils of war as an opportunity to catch up on mannered Asiatic.
his sleep. His contemporary, the colossal Danish- The Slavonic Russians made no fundamental
born cavalry general Numsen, was something of a distinction between outright foreigners from
natural curiosity, for his head had absorbed a Germany and the home-grown breed of aliens, the
canister shot in the Seven Years War, without Germanic Baltic upper classes of the conquered
apparent trace. He hauled his massive bulk over provinces in the north. The German element in the
the ground on crutches, and his breastplate was so officer corps was very significant indeed, to judge
capacious that one of his sprightly young officers by the evidence of the list of officers prepared for
found it would float on water like a boat. Catherine II in the early years of her reign
Entirely characteristic of this generation was (Lebedev, 1898). Here we find a grand total of 402
Friedrich of Anhalt-Bernburg (see p. 144), who active senior officers (from field-marshal down to
was a veteran of the Prussian and Saxon armies, second major inclusive), from which we may
and entered the Russian service as lieutenant- derive the figures in the table, which are to be
general in 1783. Shortly afterwards he prevailed treated with the caution with which all sensible
on Lev Engelhardt to introduce him to a post of people approach statistics. Our 'foreigners' com-
Russian grenadiers. prise not only Poles, Danes, Swedes, French,
Hungarians, Serbs, and an occasional Scot, but
Arriving at the location, he began to chat with probably also a few Germans whose names have
each grenadier in turn. He had learnt a sequence been mangled beyond recognition by the Russian
of questions by heart, and he reiterated them in a clerks. Even the older 'Russian' nobility, with
comical German accent: 'Are you well, my thoroughly Russified names, was of very diverse
friend, and what is your name? What town are you provenance, as Amburger (1966) has pointed out.
from? Are you married? Do you have any Thus we can say that Germans and Baits repre-
children? How many sons do you have? How sented well over one-third of the officers of field
many daughters?' Even when the soldier rank. Russians are perhaps unexpectedly dominant
announced that he was unmarried, the count in the staff, though this is in the period before the
followed his catalogue through from beginning Bauer reforms. From the distribution of titles, it
to end, and then seized each man by the hand. appears that the Russian nobles disliked regimental
There was one grenadier who concluded that soldiering at a lowly level, though they congre-
Anhalt wished to test his strength. He in his turn gated at the rank of colonel, which probably
gripped the count so firmly that he was almost represented an agreeable combination of material
reduced to tears, and only broke free with some reward and lack of higher responsibility.
difficulty. (Engelhardt, 1868, 62) It is worth mentioning that inside the cavalry,
 The Russian Officer 147

to call somebody by surname without the German

Rank Total Native Baits Foreign-
honorific Von'. Although I cannot abide this
Russians and ers (%)
Germans nation, I was forced to adapt myself to all the
(%)
trifles which they cultivate with such industry,
(%)
and so I rapidly earned their good opinion, as
All ranks 402 58.7 31.3 10.0 well as adding the German 'von' to the Serbian
Field-marshal 3 100.0 None None 'Pishchevich'. (Pishchevich, 1885, 187)
Generalanshef 16 56.2 37.5 6.2
45.4 It is curious to find some officers with German
Lt .-general 11 36.3 18.1
Maj.-general 48 47.9 37.5 14.5 names who did all they could to distance them-
Staff 14 64.2 21.4 14.2 selves from their Teutonic forbears. Lev Engelhardt
Colonels 82 63.4 29.2 7.3 conceived a loathing for the German language,
(Colonels of after his Jesuit tutor beat him every month for the
horse) 33 63.6 30.3 6.0 slow progress he made in it. More remarkable still,
(Colonels of F. F. Wiegel (Vigel), the son of a German favourite
foot) 49 : 63.2 28.5 8.1 of Peter III, used to thank God for the integrity of
Lt.-colonels 81 60.4 28.3 11.1 his 'Russian' character. He wrote bitterly of the
(Lt .-colonels Germans of the newly acquired Baltic provinces,
of horse) 32 56.2 31.2 12.5
who had been confirmed in their privileges by
(Lt.-colonels
Peter the Great: 'We all know how they repaid
of foot) 49 63.2 26.5 10.2
76 65.7 28.9 5.2 us at the time of Biron, these conquered tyrants of
First majors
(First majors ours. Under Catherine II things proceeded differ-
of horse) 30 66.6 26.6 6.6 ently, and a rapprochement became possible, but
(First majors upon her death they once more distanced them-
of foot) 46 65.2 30.4 4.2 selves from us' (Wiegel, 1864-6,1, 83).
Second majors 71 52.1 35.2 12.6
(Second majors
of horse) 26 50.0 42.3 7.6 Promotion and reward
(Second majors
of foot) 45 53.3 31.1 15.5 The Russian nobility laboured under a seemingly
ftn appalling obligation of service to the state, which
in theory doomed every suitable lad to serve in the
ranks from his early teens. We have noted how
however, some of the regiments from the Baltic
easily and widely the letter of the law was circum-
provinces appear to have been run entirely by
vented. With any contrivance at all, a noble youth
Germans, to wit the Tverskii Carabiniers, and
could be whisked through the ranks of NCOs while
the Olonetskii, Vyborgskii, Ladozhskii and
he remained at home, or performed only the most
Shlyushelburgskii Dragoons. This corresponds with
nominal service in the Guards. The best-connected
the anecdotal evidence of Pishchevich, who came
of all were able to continue their painless ascent
from Saratov to the Narvskii Carabiniers in 1794,
by becoming aides-de-camp to the sovereign
and found the regiment stuffed with Livonian and
(Catherine had two or three hundred of them), or
Kurland Baits:
joining the hangers-on who clustered about great
In the whole regiment there were no more than men like Potemkin or Suvorov. If this last resort
five Russian officers. Thus I had left one German was not available, then in the corrupt atmosphere
colony on the Volga, only to find myself in of Catherine's later years it was easy for rich
another, in which the pedantic etiquette so noblemen to buy themselves promotion by paying
beloved of that nation was observed to the set fees to lieutenant-Colonel Stavitskii of the
highest degree. They regarded it as a great offence War College.
 The Russian Officer 148

Enjoying the protection of his uncle, the made for a high degree of military commitment or
powerful Count Benckendorff, it was possible for expertise.
the sixteen-year-old Waldemar Lowenstern to be It is perhaps useful to enumerate the scale of
admitted as orderly to Count Nikolai Saltykov, the junior and middle ranks of the corps; namely:
the later prince and field-marshal. "This appoint-
Praporshchik ensign
ment was exceedingly flattering to my self-esteem,
Podporuchik second lieutenant
since the post gave me the right to wear spurs,
Poruchik lieutenant
which was claimed by only four officers in my
Kapitan captain
regiment.' Two more very rapid promotions
Major (second and first) major
followed, and at seventeen our young hero was a
Polkovnik colonel
captain in the Ukranian light horse:
Brigadir brigadier
My uniform was of Prussian blue, with red cuffs The promotion to first major was a step of some
and silver buttons and aglets. It was run up in moment:
twenty-four hours, permitting me to appear at the
Till a person arrives to the rank of premier major,
court ball of 1 January [1795]. I had the good
which is the first commission signed by the
fortune to be able to present my congratulations
empress, he is regarded as nothing. A captain even
to the Empress, who graciously extended her hand
is regarded as nothing. But once having obtained
for me to kiss. (Ldwenstern, RS, 1900, CIII,
the rank of premier major, he is considered on the
no. 3, 270, 274)
road to preferment: he is looked upon as a
gentleman. (Parkinson, 1971, 168)
The actual award of the commission in a
regiment was effected after a cursory test, and the
However, the Russian officer first tasted the
affirmation of the body of the officers of the unit.
delights of arbitrary power when he became
Thereafter the rise of the young man was supposed
colonel and received a regiment of his own. 'The
to be determined by seniority, and by the writ of
colonel was the despot of his regiment. Companies,
the War College, which in this matter ran through-
and the business of administration and economy —
out the army. In fact the College fell so hopelessly
all lay at his disposal' (Masson, 1859, 81). While
behind in its paperwork that it was quite possible
the Code of 1716 endowed the colonel with
for individual regiments to be left for a long time
considerable powers, he was in some degree
without effective command, yet carry on their
answerable not only to the very strict govern-
books up to two or three colonels and thirty
mental fiscal authorities, but to the body of the
supernumerary majors. Zinzendorf noted another
officers of the regiment. These restraints were
inconvenience, 'namely that advancement is
weakened by the codes and instructions of 1763,
effected not in the branch of service, but in the
1764 and 1766, which emphasised the wide
army as a whole. At every promotion they there-
powers of the colonel as the bearer of the honour
fore pass to a new regiment. They never get to
and glory of his regiment. The unchecked abuse of
know their men, and their men never know them'
these freedoms drew down the criticisms of sober-
(Volz and Kuntzel, 1899, 702). Such trans-
minded officers like Rumyantsev, Rzhevskii and
ferences were also carried out between arms as
Langeron. Semen Vorontsov went so far as to
diverse as the cavalry and the engineers. The arrival
claim that the new dispensations represented the
of a fresh regimental commander in any event
first decisive break with the military system of
occasioned an involuntary exodus, for the new-
Peter the Great:
comer brought his own officers with him, and
evicted the sitting tenants. longeron knew of I saw for myself how in less than seven years the
officers who had served in fifteen regiments, and colonels set about exploiting the liberty which
been expelled from each in turn. None of this had been so unwisely extended to them, in order
I

36 Generals of Catherine the Great, From left to right: generalanshef, lieutenant-general, major-general.
Green coat with red collar and gold lace; red waistcoat with gold lace; red breeches; hat with gold border,
white cockade and white feathers (Viskovatov, 1844-56)
 The Russian Officer 150

mm

mm
HI • i MW

9G
mm

l i l i l l

37 Kirii Razumovskii
 The Russian Officer 151

to perpetuate scandalous abuses which tended to 'I see. We don't have anybody like that here'
their own profit. The crown was plundered with (Helbig, 1917, 206).
inconceivable effrontery, while the soldiers were Russian sovereigns and commanders had an
inhumanly deprived of what little money was impressive variety of devices at their disposal when
theirs by right. ('Zapiski', 1 8 0 2 , A K V , 1870-95, they wished to encourage their subordinates. Peter
X, 472) set an inspiring example when he showered his
armies with commemorative medals, chains, cash
Brigadiers retained the proprietorship of their
and promotions, and when he instituted the first
regiments, with all the agreeable appurtenances,
of a new generation of orders of chivalry, designed
but their assignment to the actual command of
to reward military valour, after the model of the
brigades hung entirely on the arbitrary will of the
French Order of Saint-Louis of 1693. This was the
divisional commander. 'Those among the generals
St Andrew (enamelled dark blue St Andrew's
who have neither protection nor status, they send
cross, on broad light blue ribbon and cordon),
to Siberia, Orenburg, the Caucasus and places like
which was created in 1698, and bestowed on
that . . . the favourites, on the other hand, serve in
officers who had distinguished themselves in the
Moscow, St. Petersburg and so on' (Langeron, RS,
Turkish war and the suppression of the Streltsy.
1895, LXXXIII, 146).
In 1725 the widowed Catherine I brought a
In ascending order the ranks of general officers
scheme of Peter's to fruition when she founded
ran:
the second great order of the time, the St
Major-General = major-general Alexander Nevsky (red enamelled cross formy on
General Poruchik = lieutenant-general bright red ribbon and cordon).
Generalanshef = full general Catherine the Great felt the need to reward the
General Feldmarshal = field-marshal soldiers of her own age with a new military
order in four grades, the St George, which was
The supreme title of Generalissimus was bestowed (instituted in 1769 at the beginning of her first
just twice in the century — on Peter's favourite Turkish war. The badge was a gold cross formy
Menshikov, and on Suvorov after the campaign of enamelled in gold and white, and the cordon and
1799. ribbon were of orange with three black stripes.
Westerners were astonished at the ease with The order was conceived in the spirit of the
which outright civilians were clad in the dignity famous Theresian Military Order of Austria, and
of Russian officers. Laqueys, perruquiers, riding it carried with it emoluments amounting to the
instructors, cooks and the like were frequently equivalent of £8,000 a year, 'a very noble benefac-
made into sergeants, and ultimately commissioned, tion and a very useful in a service where the
while at more exalted levels the workings of establishment is so low with respect to pay, and
Peter's Table of Ranks suddenly catapulted some the expenses officers are exposed to are so high'
peaceable denizen of office or ante-chamber into (Lord Cathcart, 30 July 1770, PRO, SPF 91/85).
important military command. Only the Russian Finally, Emperor Paul I introduced to Russia two
army could have witnessed a career like that of orders which celebrated his ancestry and ambitions,
Kiril Razumovskii (brother of the favourite), who namely the Schleswig Order of St Anne, and the
was born to a family of Ukranian Cossacks. He Order of St John of Jerusalem. There was always
took a prominent part in the revolution which an element of the arbitrary in the distribution of
brought Catherine to the throne in 1762, and she Russian decorations. Engelhardt was wryly amused
rewarded him with further military honours. He to have put in years of unrewarded campaigning
once went to Berlin, where Frederick is reported against the Turks and Poles, and then receive the
to have asked him: last two orders simply because he happened to
'Have you ever commanded an army?' please the emperor at a review near Kazan in 1798.
'No, I am only a civilian general.' The generosity of Russian sovereigns was
 T h e Russian O f f i c e r 152

38 Cavalry officer, after 1769, probably a 39 Infantry officer, period of Catherine the
carabinier. Coat of light greenish blue with red Great. Dark green coat with red collar and lapels.
collar and lapels and gold shoulder strap. He is He wears the red cross of the St Alexander
wearing the St George Nevsky, with red ribbon and red cordon

further expressed in the granting of promotions, tunity of voluntary retirement, which officers
golden presentation swords, pensions, estates and often chose to embrace at the rank of major:
serfs. It was possible for the Cossack leader Thedor
The Russians are so fond of the country life,
Petrovich Denisov to inherit a little plot with five
particularly as it gives them an opportunity of
peasant households, yet receive such bounty from
acting the despot, and tyrannising over their
Catherine as to end his days with 7,000 peasants,
peasants, that almost all of them who have estates,
two diamond-studded sabres, the title of count,
quit the army and n a ^ as soon as they can, and
the rank of full general of cavalry, and the orders
retire into the country. (Anon., c.1787, 11)
of St Alexander Nevsky, the St George second
class, and the Prussian Black Eagle.
Peter the Great had insisted that officers who Between East and West, the character of
were no longer fit for field service had to transfer the Russian officer
to garrison regiments, or go to the provinces to
instruct recruits. These dreary prospects were When they voyaged to Russia, or watched Russian
banished by Peter III, who introduced the oppor- armies as they marched into western Europe,
 The Russian Officer 153

sion of their counterparts in the army of Empress

Elizabeth, and, in its turn, the series of Russian
military forays to the West 'having occasioned the
gentry to travel, it has in some measure opened
their ideas, and given them more relish for polite
arts' (Richard, 1780,32).
Occasionally the more perceptive Westerners
began to wonder whether the transformations
were complete, or, per se, desirable. Those who
knew Russia best used to value the domestic
virtues of the conservative nobility, or even, like
Manstein, find a great deal to admire in the
Russian peasants, the 'dark people' of the vast
countryside.
Certain traits among the officers impressed
themselves with particular force. Observers noted
a childish innocence that was evident in the most
surprising quarters. They saw also that some
individuals, less happily, combined the cruelty of a
child with all the despotic power which lay at the
disposal of Russian commanders. L a n g e r o n believed
that Catherine's Turkish wars exercised a brutalis-
ing effect, and he drew attention to the case of
Generalanshef Mikhail Kamenskii, whose

talents were marred by one of the most frightful

characters that has ever disfigured mankind. His
40 General of the 7th Jaeger Corps, 1797-1801 ferocity was positively tigerish, and on drill
(Viskovatov, 1844-56) manoeuvres he was seen to bite his soldiers,
tearing away their flesh with his teeth. (Langeron,
RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 160; see also Segur, 1824-6,
foreign observers gained some inkling of the forces
III, 62-3)
that were contending for the mastery of the
Russian character in the eighteenth century: Miinnich compiled some telling descriptions of
the generals who served under him in the 1730s.
There can e x i s t . . . striking differences between
Amongst others, he categorised Aleksandr
individual officers of the same regiment. While
Ivanovich Rumyantsev (legal father of the cele-
you may observe a considerable degree of
brated field-marshal) as brave and intelligent, but
education, elegance and polish among certain
groups, you can be equally surprised by the total also fond of his enjoyments, being given to
absence of those qualities among others. (Masson, downing a goblet of wine in the mornings and
1859,438) another at noon. He gambles until late in the
night, and gets up late the next day. He is polite
It was tempting to give unqualified approbation
in the extreme, when he is sober, but most brutal,
to every advance which brought the service
and most unbridled in his language when he has
nobility closer to the standards of culture and
had too much to drink. (Vischer, 1938, 552)
behaviour observed among the superior classes in
the West. Already in the 1740s and 1750s the Indeed Westerners could never accustom them-
censorious Austrians formed a favourable impres- selves to the contrast between the Russian soldier,
 The Russian Officer 154

so frugal and hard-living, and the sybaritic officer porate the skulduggery into the system of adminis-
of the same nation. tration. Every year the regiments chose from their
midst personnel to do duty as treasurers and
You will probably find a number of things quite
commissaries, yet Langeron could urge with the
unbelievable [observed Langeron]. A Russian
greatest passion that 'of all the thieves spread over
officer will never undertake a journey on
the face of the earth, these functionaries are the
horseback, but only in a carriage. He cannot
most impudent and the most foul' (RS, 1895,
contemplate travelling as much as ten versts
LXXXIII, 162). Likewise, every officer of the
without having his bed brought with him. He finds
regiment was expected to sign his name twice
champagne and English beer quite indispensable.
yearly to attest to the correctness of the thirteen
Finally he is quite incapable of wearing his own
books of regimental administration, and he almost
sword, but must have it carried with him by an
invariably continued to do so even when he knew
orderly. (RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 189)
that the accounts had been systematically falsified
Orders of dress were a matter of individual whim. by the regimental commander. An individual
Strict prohibitions forbade officers' wives from might object,
accompanying their menfolk into the field. They
but what happens to this poor officer, simply
did so anyway, under a variety of guises, and
because he does not wish to violate his conscience
Masson makes the point that famous generals like
or his oath? Having been thrown out of his
Ivan Saltykov were terrorised by their ladies.
r e g i m e n t . . . he betakes himself to another,
Whether sanctioned or not, sexual congress was
clutching a bad personal report, and there he finds
pursued with the same ardour and brutality that is
exactly the same state of affairs as in his original
evident in Russia today.
regiment. (Rzhevskii, RA, 1879, XVII, pt 1, 361)
The Russian officers' capacity for alcoholic
consumption was huge (Langeron rated it at While no part of Europe was a stranger to
almost three times the Prussian), and the studious human fallibility, visitors to Russian encountered
Pishchevich was often a witness of the 'quarrels habits and assumptions that brought home to
and other unpleasantnesses which frequently ensue them how radically concepts of honour in that
among people whose reason has been clouded by land differed from the values obtaining in the
alcoholic vapours' (Pishchevich, 1885, 40). How- West. In fact the Russian officer was almost
ever, drunkenness almost certainly worked less entirely void of those ideals of corporate pride and
destructively on mind and fortune than the knightly values which were an attribute of aristo-
inordinate addiction to cards, which was noted cracy as it was known elsewhere in Europe. A
by Lambert in the 1750s, and again by Wiegel and proclivity to theft was not considered particularly
Langeron in the 1790s. Furious play set in as soon reprehensible or demeaning, for it was to be found
as the officers received their pay, and 'when they at all levels of society: 'It sometimes happens that
have run out of money, they continue to gamble in the apartments of the court, accessible only to
on their pledged word, making over their houses, authorised personnel and superior officers, your
their porcelain, their carriages, their shirts' briefcase can be lifted with as much facility as at a
(Langeron,RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 188-9). public fair' (Masson, 1859, 174). Trickery at
The corruptibility of public men in Russia was cards was dismissed as a joke, where it would have
notorious and extreme. Zinzendorf attributed the led to a duel in the We^j.
phenomenon to the physical impossibility of Just as undignified, in Western eyes, was the
effective government, which rendered all decrees almost Asiatic subservience which subordinates
ultimately dependent upon 'the good will of were accustomed to display in front of their
subordinates' (1755, Volz and Kiintzel, 1899, masters. Field-Marshal Nikolai Vasilevich Repnin
705). When safeguards were introduced, they only was noted for the consideration he showed to his
made the evil worse, for their effect was to incor- suite, and yet Masson claims that:
 The Russian Officer 155

misconduct, a measure which would have been

considered subversive of discipline in most Western
armies. Oddly enough, the same code of conduct
permitted a junior officer to present himself
before a senior and ask for promotion and
decorations, shamelessly detailing his own merits.
Throughout our period the bleak Western ideal
of a glorious 'death for the fatherland' remained
largely alien to the Russian mentality. In Peter's
early days, when the nation went to war, the last
of the feudal cavalry used to buckle on their
swords
with hearts full of dismay.. . . Nor do they
consider it any disgrace to purchase at great cost
the permission to live sluggishly at home, and
deprecate the perils of war. Nay, they go to the
length of contending that some Germans of
chivalrous mould must be demented when they
strive and labour and entreat to be allowed to
follow the army into the field, and into all the
very manifest dangers that attend military service.
(ICorb, 1863,1, 141-2; see also Mediger, 1952,
110, 115)
In later years the sentiments of the younger,
superficially Westernised nobility were not
different in kind. In the Seven Years War Bolotov
41 Nikolai Vasilevich Repnin. Sober, grave and
showed a typical reluctance at the prospect of
circumspect — a model of magnificence in the old
returning to active service with his regiment, and
boyar style
'being exposed to daily fatigues and dangers' after
a spell of agreeable office work. Catherine's first
people at Berlin were astonished to see how military adventure, the Turkish war of 1768-74,
Repnin used to go for a walk, all decked out in caused consternation in the same circles, and when
his orders, and proceeding gravely in solitary state, young Count Semen Vorontsov volunteered to
while his nephew Prince Volkonskii, several join the field army at the outbreak of war, he was
aides-de-camp and the mystic Thielmann, his told that he was the only person to have done so,
secretary, followed several paces behind. Every and that four hundred other officers had already
time Repnin turned to say a word, the members asked to resign. The French envoy, Sabatier de
of his suite came to a halt like a platoon of Cabres, asserted how at the end of the first cam-
soldiers, removing their hats as one man. paign the gilded youth abandoned the service en
(Masson, 1859,149) masse, and came streaming back to St Petersburg.

Things had been worse in the first half of the The foreign volunteers, who saw them on this
century when public servants lived under an occasion, talk of them with the utmost scorn. The
arbitrary authority that was capable of depriving Prussians have been chewing their finger nails with
generals and ministers of state of their positions mortification, and say they feel like dying from
and fortune in an instant. Even in Napoleonic shame for having been ever beaten by such a vile
times officers could be reduced to the ranks for rabble. (SIRIO, 1913, CXLIII, 68)
 The Russian Officer 156

The last sentence opens the possibility that infantile but workable concept of what war was
Sabatier was not the most astute of observers, for about.
the contemptible Russians had indeed beaten the All their principles of war come down to their
Prussians, and they were shortly going to do the bayonets and their Cossacks. Indeed, with the
same to the Turks. Alexandre Langeron knew the exception of Rumyantsev, Kamenskii, Igelstrom
Russian army much better, and elaborated its and Prozorovskii, I am not aware of a single
shortcomings in much more detail, yet he was general of Russian origin who is not imbued with
driven to the conclusion that all the corruption, these extraordinary ideas. And, after all, they
irresponsibility and professional ignorance did not could be right. They put these notions into
fundamentally matter, given the endurance of the practice, and all their enterprises have been
Russian soldier, and his masters' dedication to an crowned with success. (RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 195)
Seven The Cossacks

Cossack origins and types

It is perhaps worth trying to lend some identity,

definition and character to those almost legendary
sons of the southern rivers and plains, the Cossacks,
who went so far to shape Western thinking on the
Russians and their army.
Although the origins of the name 'Cossack' are
still obscure, the term came to be applied in early
modern times to the peoples who migrated to 'the
middle and lower reaches of the great rivers in
order to escape from the depredations of
Lithuanians or Mongols, or from feudal or state
oppression. By the eighteenth century the Cossacks
existed in three main groupings. Moving from west
to east, we encounter first the somewhat colour-
less Little Russian Cossacks of the Ukraine,
deficient alike in the Cossack virtues and
vices, then the picturesque and reprehensible

42 Hussar of the Slobodskaya Ukraine, Seven

Years War. Russian hussars were frequently
recruited from the same stock as the Cossacks,
but were organised and uniformed on the model
of the Hungarian light horse. The gear of this
Slobodskii Hussar comprises: white mirliton cap;
dolman, barrel sash and pants, all in light purple
with white decoration; white pelisse with black
edging, light purple buttonholes and brass buttons;
white sabretache and shabraque with light purple
edges (Viskovatov, 1844-56)

1 5 7
1 5 8 T h e Cossacks

Zaporozhians, and lastly the formidable warriors behind Mazeppa in 1708, and suffered terribly in
of the Don. consequence, but they survived as 'a very strong
The first of these folk, the little Russians, and indefatigable people' (Rondeau, 4 April 1736,
originally owned strong links with Poland, whose SIRIO, 1891, LXXVI, 503) with their character
flanks in the Ukraine (Ukraina, lit. 'border') they and institutions essentially intact. Arable farming
helped to protect against the Turks. In point of did not accord with the Zaporozhian character,
religion, however, they had more in common with but in compensation the Dnieper was teeming
the Orthodox Russians, and in the period of unrest with sturgeon and other fish, and the plains
from 1640 the Ukrainian Cossacks transferred formed 'one immense and fat pasture' (Masson,
their support to the Muscovite tsar. Under the 1859, 301). Every man had his little stock of
patronage of Aleksei Mikhailovich, parties of these horses, which could be traded for corn or other
folk moved east and formed little settlements at necessities, or carry him on the plundering expedi-
Kharkov, Sumy, Akhtyrka and other locations in tions for which the Zaporozhians were chiefly
the area of Belgorod. They became known as the famous.
Cossacks of the Slobodskaya Ukraine. The Sech was rebuilt after it had been des-
Over the following decades the Little Russians troyed by the Russians in 1709, and it formed the
underwent taming and 'registration', and were centre of the bizarre social life of the Zaporozhians.
given a characteristic form of military and political No woman was supposed to set foot in the settle-
organisation by regiments, by sotnyas (of 200-930 ment, and in ignorance of this custom a regular
serving Cossacks) and by kurens (or thirty-five to lieutenant-colonel brought his wife with him to
forty). The main body of settled territorial the Sech in the 1730s.
Cossacks (gorodovye kazaki) formed ten large
He had no sooner arrived when all the Cossacks
regiments under starshinas. They lived with their
surrounded his house in a mob, demanding that
families from their own resources, and upon the
.he should produce all the women who were
call of the tsar and their hetman, or chief, they
inside, so that everybody could have a share. The
were bound to report for military service with
lieutenant-colonel was hard put to it to calm
appropriate provisions and clothing. Each of the
them down, and he succeeded only after he had
regiments comprised infantry and mounted men,
given them several kegs of spirits. (Manstein,
with the cavalry predominating. A body of 'hired'
1860,1, 29-30)
Cossacks was maintained on low salaries, and was
organised on the same unit basis as the territorial The able-bodied male population was nevertheless
men, though with smaller establishments. maintained at about 15,000, thanks to the con-
Gradually the Little Russian Cossacks lost the stant influx of deserters and runaways from Russia,
identity and free-living character which had Poland, Turkey and their cousins of the Don, as
distinguished themselves from the rest of the well as through the offspring of the unions with
people of the Ukraine. Their military qualities the women who were allowed to live along the
were rated poorly by Manstein and Rumyantsev, banks of the river.
and in the middle of the eighteenth century they The easternmost of the great Cossack peoples,
put forth just a spiritless mass of about 22,000 the horsemen of the Don, supported the risings of
mounted men. Stenka Razin and Bulavin, and underwent the
Much less biddable were the Cossacks of the usual castigation from the Muscovites. The losses
lower Dnieper. They ranged with freedom across were more than made up through natural increase
a wide tract of steppes, but they owed their name and the arrival of refugees, and by the end of the
and allegiance to the Sech, or defensible settle- eighteenth century the stock of both sexes reached
ment, of Zaporozhe (lit. 'beyond the cataracts'), some 300,000, far outnumbering the eccentric
which occupied an island set amid the rapids of bachelors of Zaporozhe. At the time of the Seven
the Dnieper. The Zaporozhians threw their support Years War the active Don forces amounted to
 T h e Cossacks 1 5 9

about 15,700 men, who were divided into twenty- protect their homes against Tartar raids (see p. 49).
two regiments of five sotnyas apiece. Nine thousand He did what he could to make the Cossacks of
were actually called up for the first campaign, and, some use. Three hundred Cossacks and two
under the authority of the Russian government, hundred baptised Kalmyks were brought together
the administration and command were exercised on the Donets to form the regiment of Chuguevskii
by an ataman and elected starshinas and sotniks. Cossacks, which was given proper pay and a
While the ways of the Zaporozhians attracted regular organisation. An observer wrote in the
more attention from foreign travellers, these Seven Years War:
Cossacks of the Don were the people who accom-
they are clothed in red, and the officers have
panied the Russian armies when they campaigned
commissions and rank like the other officers of
in the West, and their attributes were inevitably
the army. This pullc was not only very brave, but
attached to the Cossacks as a whole.
also particularly well disciplined. It would be
Lastly, almost unknown to the Westerners,
doing them an unpardonable injustice to compare
small bodies of Cossacks and 'hussars' were created
them in the least to the other Cossacks, who do
and re-created to see to the security of specific
not deserve to be honoured with the name of
stretches of the Asian borders. They were known
soldiers, being without either pay or discipline.
by the names of their principal settlements, or the
(Tielke, 1788,11, 14)
rivers entrusted to their guard, and they rarely if
ever appeared on a European theatre of war. However, regular Cossacks of this kind remained
an exception in the hordes of Cossackdom, and
even towards the end of Catherine's reign they still
The decline of Cossackdom represented only about 1,245 men. The irregulars
amounted to 73,651, of which the Don Cossacks
In the eighteenth century the free and democratic (28,125) formed the largest single contingent.
traditions of the historic Cossack peoples became Prince Potemkin did something to earn his
increasingly difficult to reconcile with the advance title of 'the final protector of the Cossacks'
of Russian state power, and the strategic and (Masson, 1859, 304). In 1775 he gave Cossack
economic needs of the time. The Zaporozhians officers equivalent status to their counterparts in
and the Don Cossacks had settled where the mood the regular army, and amongst other indications
had taken them and not where the government of his benevolent concern he conceived the idea
necessarily wanted them to be, and while the in 1787 of forming a regiment of Jewish Cossacks,
Tartars of the Nogai steppes and the Crimea the 'Israelovskii'. The Prince de Ligne remembers
presented a diminishing threat, new and exposed that: 'we already had a squadron with us, and it
frontiers were opening to the south-east and east, occasioned me endless amusement. They resembled
towards the Caucasus and Siberia. It was all the nothing so much as monkeys, what with their
more intolerable to find that the depredations of beards descending to their knees, their short
the Zaporozhians actually endangered the more stirrups, and the terror they showed at being on
settled peoples of the old frontiers, and that in horseback' (ligne, 1890, 178). Otherwise the
1769 twenty regiments of Don Cossacks adamantly story is one of oppression. In a single year, 1775,
refused to set off for the Turkish war. Destructive the Sech was destroyed for a second and final
forces were also at work within the Cossack time, and the Zaporozhians dispersed to the wind,
communities, with the spread of a conventional while the Yaik Cossacks of the eastern frontier
agricultural economy, and the emergence of a were savagely tamed on account of the support
Russified and serf-owning class among the leaders. they had given to Pugachev. The very name of
Already in the 1730s, Munnich calculated that the Yaik River was changed to the 'Ural', and the
only 32,000 of the approximately 110,000 town of Yaitsk became 'Uralsk'. Further drastic
Cossacks turned out for service, leaving the rest to things were done after Potemkin's death. Russian
160 The Cossacks

'governments' absorbed large tracts of traditional

Cossack land, while the inhabitants were either
enserfed, or resettled en masse in the newly
annexed territories of the Crimea and the Kuban.

Cossack institutions and leaders

In the eighteenth century it is possible to discern

three rather ill-defined periods in the relations
between Cossackdom and the Russian state. In the
first years the eastern Cossack leaders retained
some vestiges of independent command. After
Poltava the sovereign began to subject the Cossacks
to centralised control, while allowing them con-
siderable freedom in the running of their internal
affairs. Finally, towards the end of the century,
the Cossack ruling class became to some degree
separated from the mass of its own people, while
accepting honours and positions from the state.
At the beginning of the century the Cossacks
lived by a code of rough democracy, electing
regimental commanders (starshinas) and chiefs
(hetmans or atamans) who combined civil and
military authority. The starshinas were accus-
tomed to working out whatever plans of campaign
might prove necessary, though the local Russian
commanders were likely to be brought into the
deliberations as a matter of convenience and
courtesy. Following the invasion of Charles XII,
however, Peter began to assert Russian authority
over all the Cossacks, regardless of whether or not 43 Volga Cossack, described (1774) as wearing
they had supported the Swedes. The loyal red hat and red caftan (Viskovatov, 1844-56)
Skoropadskii had contributed to the victory of
Poltava, but he protested in vain when later in minimum of instructions concerning the numbers
1709 Peter placed the Little Russian starshinas to be raised (e.g., 'recruit as many Cossacks as
under the command of Russian generals. By the possible from the up-river settlements', 1735), and
end of the reign the Cossacks had to accept the indicated the assembly points of the regiments,
fact that where the hetmans or atamans had not and the route of the subsequent march. Once the
been abolished altogether, they were to be elected Cossacks reached the field army, the body was
only with the consent of the Russian sovereign. placed at the entire disposal of the Russian com-
Having gained these essential points, the govern- mander, and the ataman was left with just the
ment was content to let the Cossacks run lesser tactical command of one of the regiments. Finally,
matters themselves. The War College merely in the 1760s, precise orders began to go out, which
maintained registers of those Cossacks who were defined the numbers of regiments to be raised,
liable to serve, and when the time came to enter and the size of each.
on campaign the bureaucrats dispatched a bare Adrian Karpovich Denisov has left probably the
 T h e Cossacks 161

best account of the sort of thing which went on consent of its fellow Cossacks than to the recogni-
during these processes, and indeed of the life of tion conferred by the Russians. Denisov's father
the eighteenth-century Don Cossacks as a whole. and uncle won high rank and honours, as we have
He was born in 1763 to a famous military line. His seen, while the Platov so often mentioned in his
uncle was the redoubtable Thedor Petrovich (see memoirs became lieutenant-general and ataman
p. 152), while his father Karp Petrovich became a of the Don Cossacks. The Cossack leaders were
starshina and ended his career with the rank of granted minor nobility in 1775, and hereditary
major-general. While Westerners might imagine nobility in 1796. In 1798 the junior officers were
that family and race gave Adrian an instinctive given the status of gentry as well, and the peasants
knowledge of what a Cossack leader ought to do, on the starshinas' estates were legally enserfed.
he admits that he was totally nonplussed when in Philip Longworth calculates that by 1802 these
1787 Colonel Platov sent him 1 a quantity of developments had formed a Don Cossack upper
clothing, cloth, leather and other equipment, and class amounting to more than one thousand
assigned him a village where he was to raise a generals and officers.
regiment of 1,400 men. Denisov gives us some indication of the outlook
Adrian Denisov's first measure was to seek out on life of a young Cossack leader at this interesting
a number of reasonably intelligent and literate period. He was still illiterate at the age of twelve,
men who could draw up lists of such folk as were but over the next few years he picked up the
fit to serve, while making sure that every family rudiments of an education from a regimental
was left with a breadwinner. officer in St Petersburg and at two pansions in the
same place. He returned to his home on the Don
Having made out the effectives of the regiment,
still largely ignorant of the manners of polite
I divided them into sotnyas, and promoted two of
society. His father suggested that it was time to
the Cossacks from each sotnya to serve as
find a wife, and agreed that Adrian should travel
commanders. I wrote out an instruction which
to Moscow to learn something of the way of the
detailed the duties of every individual, while at the
world. Adrian attended the theatre two or three
same time I fitted out the regiment and distributed
times, and made the acquaintance of several great
the saddles, and had the missing items
men, but he sadly misread the welcome he received
manufactured. (Denisov, 1874,^6", X, 33)
from a wealthy hostess and the three daughters
It is surprising to hear that the new Cossacks were of the house. He was amused to hear the girls
unable to manage their horses, which were wild, chatting about him in French, which (unknown to
and that the veterans were unable to teach them them) he could understand:
what ought to be done.
Encouraged by this circumstance, and by the fact
In this as in all other matters I was in some that the second daughter had taken a great fancy
perplexity, but I worked until I dropped. Our to me, I made bold to propose to her in a letter.
chief Platov had his regiment not far from me, The refusal was not slow in coming. . . . Taking
and so I took steps to be informed of all the stock of my condition and the place of my abode,
more important things his regiment was up to, I thereupon concluded that it was not a wise
and I made a point of being present, so that I thing to go wooing in Moscow. (RS, 1874, X, 24)
could try the same exercises with my
After his excursion into a Westernised Russia,
regiment. . . . Finally, at the beginning of 1788,
Denisov discovered unsuspected virtues in the girls
in the spring, my regiment was fully equipped,
of his homeland, with their natural good manners
and the number of horses brought up to strength.
and their skill at dancing. He eventually married a
The names cited by Adrian Denisov are fre- young lady from the Volga, and with his usual
quently those of the emerging upper class of honesty he tells us that the match turned out to
Cossackdom, which owed its status less to the be a complete disaster. The girl was a neurotic slut,
1 6 2 T h e Cossacks

and Denisov became so bored with her that he The standard of equipment actually declined in
was glad when the summons came to go to the the course of the century, with the expansion of
wars. the eastern Cossacks. Some folk had to make do
with lance points of sharpened wood, and in many
Equipment and tactics localities the Cossacks still put their trust in the
bow as their main missile weapon. The shafts of
It seemed impossible to imagine the trained the arrows were made of reed or birch, and were
Cossacks as entities separate from their mounts: fitted with four flights and a warhead of iron or
'Their horses are small and thin, incapable of great bronze with four edges. Bows were obtained
effort, but utterly tireless. Having being raised in variously from the Mongols, Kalmyks, Bashkirs or
the steppes, they are indifferent to the rigour of Chinese, but the compound Turkish bows were
the climate, and used to putting up with thirst and regarded as the best of all.
hunger — pretty much like their masters' (Masson, In open battle against regular forces the
1859, 308).' Every Cossack had two of these Cossacks proved more useful than might have
animals — one for riding, and the other for carry- been supposed. They hung annoyingly around the
ing the supplies which gave the Cossacks such a enemy cavalry, fleeing whenever they came under
useful degree of self-sufficiency. The saddles were threat of charge, but using their individual prowess
light, and in place of spurs the rider urged his to lethal effect if the troopers got out of forma-
horse forward with a large whip which hung from tion. We have seen how at Gross-Jagersdorf the
his left wrist. Don Cossacks on the far left under Serebryakov
The Cossack usually provided his own weapons were able to draw the Prince of Holstein's cavalry
and equipment, which consequently gave some on to the fire of fifteen battalions and forty-four
clue as to his status. The wealthy officers could be guns. Again at Novi in 1799, Denisov made devas-
identified by signs like a fine sabre of Persian or tating use of the retreat and the counter-attack
Turkish manufacture, an armoured coat of mail or against the French. These were the tactics of the
plate, a mace, a small ornamental axe (<chekan), or 'fish trap' which the Cossacks had learnt from the
perhaps a superior musket or brace of pistols. Tartars. Once an enemy formation was broken,
However, the majority of the Cossacks went to the long lances of the Cossacks came into their
war clad in long woollen coats, and carrying the own: 'In an instant the Cossacks litter the field
traditional weapon of the lance. This was a pine with dead, and they would be capable of wreaking
shaft, about one-and-a-half inches thick, and greater execution still if they did not give them-
between twelve and eighteen feet long. The butt selves over to searching the men they have killed or
was furnished with a loop, to facilitate carrying, wounded' (Langeron, RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 192).
and the upper end terminated in a three-sided iron Experts harboured the most various opinions
head. A plume of horsehair or black silk waved concerning the value of Cossacks on campaign.
from the point where the shaft entered the tip. The Cossacks ought to have been able to form
Cossacks employed the lance with great dexterity impenetrable screens around the army, throwing
when they vaulted into the saddle, when they out swarms of patrols, and reporting the move-
caught a hat in the air in play, and when they ments of the enemy. In the Seven Years War,
levelled the weapon at an enemy, in which even- however, the Cossacks worked as effective light
tuality 'many a cavalryman or hussar was liable to cavalry only in the final campaigns, and in
find himself skewered and hoisted into the air' Potemkin's Turkish expeditions the Prince de
(Wonzel, 1783, 180-1). Adrian Denisov conceived Ligne noticed that the Cossacks were surprisingly
a very un-Cossack-like distaste for the lance after bad at relaying any kind of information. In part, at
an incident in Bessarabia in 1789, when his weapon least, the failings of the Cossacks proceeded from
caught in the clothing of a Turk and he was unable the way the regular commanders split up the
to tug it free. regiments in order to use the manpower for
 T h e Cossacks 1 6 3

44 Charge of the Don Cossacks at the battle of Trebbia, 1799

convoy escorts, fatigues and other menial duties. guished themselves by the merciless way they
The most serious reservations of all concerned could go to work in cold blood. On occasion there
the Cossacks' penchant for despoiling innocent seemed little in common between the two peoples
civilians. Indeed, the presence of Cossacks on a except the Orthodox religion and the Russian
theatre of war often did more harm than good, language.
for they wasted the resources of the countryside,
and their reputation for infamy was liable to cling Taken as a whole the Cossacks are more
to the army as a whole. Here again, the Cossacks handsome, tall, active and agile than the Russians,
were not entirely at fault, since the men received and individually more brave. Being unaccustomed
no pay at all, and less than the barest minimum of to servitude, they are more open, proud and
subsistence. Langeron points out that whereas a outspoken. Their cast of features is less uniform
Cossack regiment could be a model of discipline, than the Russians, and does not yet show the
under a good colonel or starshina, a number of deformities . . . that are imprinted by slavery.
regular commanders actually encouraged the (Masson, 1859,300)
Cossacks in their frightfulness, like Suvorov in
The Cossack at his best was mild, impulsively
Moldavia and Poland.
generous and capable of extraordinary devotion.
Langeron remembered how at the battle of Machin
(1791) he had a Cossack attendant who remained
The Cossack character constantly at his side:

If the savagery of the Cossacks burst forth in the However there was a time when I launched a
heat of sack or battle, the Russian soldiers distin- charge with the hussars and we were surrounded
1 6 4 T h e Cossacks

by Turks. The Cossack was unsaddled, wounded stature, and generally bow-legged, occasioned by
and thrown to the ground, losing in the process their being so continually on horseback, or sitting
one of the pistols I had entrusted to his keeping. with their legs below them. Their faces are broad
When he found me again he cast himself at my and flat, with a flat nose and little black eyes,
feet, and begged me to forgive him for having lost distant from each other like the Chinese. They are
the pistol, uttering not a word about his wounds of an olive colour, and their faces full of wrinkles,
or the perils he had undergone. I raised him up with very little or no beard. They shave their
and gave him a ducat. He was amazed. He crossed heads, leaving only a tuft of hair on the crown.
himself ten or a dozen times and rushed off to (Bruce, 1782, 24)
retail the story to his comrades — he was unable
to recover from his astonishment that I had not The Kalmyks were at perpetual war with .their
ordered him to be soundly thrashed for losing tribal neighbours, the Kirgiz, and although fire-
the weapon. (.RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 193) arms were known to them, they put their trust in
bow and arrow, with which they could achieve
The Asiatics considerable accuracy and range in calm and
dry weather.
Occasionally a Western theatre caught a glimpse of
Heavily escorted by regular Russian cavalry,
some of the most authentic remnants of the
parties of these tribesmen made their way towards
Golden Horde, summoned up from the wilds of
the theatre of operations early in the Seven Years
Asia by their Russian masters. Ethnically quite
War. Perhaps as many as 2,000 Kalmyks were
distinct from the Russians and Cossacks, the
ultimately dispatched to the army, together with
principal groupings of the 'various nations' com-
2,000 more of the other Asiatics. Apraksin desired
prised the Kazan Tartars, the Bashkirs of the Urals
their presence with the army less for their value in
and the Irtysh, and above all the Kalmyks of the
combat than 'because their very name instils
Astrakhan steppes:
terror among the enemy' (Maslovskii, 1888093,
As to their persons, they [the Kalmyks] are of low 1,35).
The new empress

Historians and students of human affairs have been

fascinated by the work and character of Empress
Catherine II. They accord her the title of 'the
Great', but otherwise they find in her reign a
multitude of paradoxes — how the perfect pupil of
the Enlightenment became the enslaver of the
eastern Poles, or how, without fighting an aggres-
sive war in the West, she became the doyenne of
the crowned heads of Europe after the death of
Frederick the Great. Her army, never committed
in action against the Prussians or French, grew by
up to 200,000 men, and evolved a philosophy of
warfare which commands respect two centuries
later.
Sympathetic observers noted that Catherine
lacked something of the magic of a Maria Theresa,
but they felt that they had ample compensation in
a generous and commanding personality. Already
by the 1770s she was something of a tourist
attraction in her own right:
Though she is now become rather corpulent, there
is a dignity tempered with graciousness in her
deportment and manner, which strikingly
impresses. . . . She does not exceed, if she reaches,
45 Catherine the Great
the middle size. Her features are small, and her
eyes blue, but her neck is exquisitely white.
of the North, and her court became a model of
(Wraxall, 1776, 201, 205-6)
agreeable luxury and public decorum.
Her capital began to assume the neo-classical air The Prince de Ligne, who was no respecter of
which accorded strangely well with the cold light reputations, expressed genuine admiration for her

1 6 5
1 6 6 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

intelligence, grasp of reality and sense of duty. duties, and during his seventeen-year tenure as
With undue modesty she dismissed his praise of director of the technical arms the artillery stood in
her sense of judgment in public affairs, but she did danger of losing the impetus which had been given
admit to a certain skill in choosing men for high • to it by Petr Shuvalov, while the engineers and
military command. fortresses suffered from a total neglect. Orlov
It is all the more surprising to find that these ultimately lost his power to Grigorii Aleksandrovich
finely attuned instincts were so often swayed by Potemkin, who was a much more considerable
private passion. Amid an atmosphere of gossip and character, and he died in a state of dementia in
speculation she liked to select personable young 1783.
men from the Guards and train of adjutants, and
reward them with a generosity that was totally
incommensurate with their modest talents and The army in the early years of the reign
services. Physical allure certainly helped to account
for the honours paid to Grigorii Grigorevich We are acquainted with the term 'Potemkin
Orlov, the second of a set of brothers who had villages', which signifies the construction of a
startled St Petersburg by their extravagance and deceptively impressive facade, with little of sub-
splendid looks in the 1750s, and who helped to stance behind it. The term originated from the
engineer the palace revolution of 1762. show villages which, according to legend, Prince
Grigorii Orlov had 'every advantage of figure, Potemkin was supposed to have built for Catherine
countenance and manner' (Lord Cathcart, 29 on her journey to the Crimea in 1787, but it
December 1769, PRO, SPF 91/82), and his applies with particular relevance to the work of
influence knew scarcely any bounds. His know- the Military Commission which first met under the
ledge was of the most superficial kind, yet in 1765 presidency of Field-Marshal Petr Saltykov in 1763.
he became Master General of the Ordnance. He Saltykov and his colleagues reorganised the
failed to pay so much as a nominal attention to his peacetime administration of the army into an
initial eight divisions. They began to break up the
useless Land Militia, they set up novel units of
jaegers and the unarmoured heavy cavalry called
'carabiniers', and they issued new tactical codes
for the foot and horse (1763). Also, they under-
took to remedy something which had been sadly
lacking in the Seven Years War, when in 1763 they
re-made the old department of the quartermaster-
general into a permanent general staff. Six years
later the German staff officer Major-General
Friedrich Wilhelm Bauer came to Russia at the
invitation of Zakhar Chernyshev to review the
progress which had been made. Bauer had con-
siderable experience of this sort of thing from his
service with Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick in the
Seven Years War, and on 30 January 1770 he
constructed a new staff establishment which
provided for a corps of thirty-seven senior officers,
and increased the number of the vital column
guides to sixty. Bauer's main objective was to
augment the number of officers who could be
46 Grigorii Grigorevich Orlov attached to the field armies.
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 167

47 Zakhar Grigorevich Chernyshev 48 Field-rnarshal, period of Catherine the Great

(Viskovatov, 1844-56)

Within a few months Bauer was called on to Chernyshev 'had an innate and unfailing gift of
apply his talents to actual warfare, as chief of staff being able to reduce everything to order, and you
to Rumyantsev. He not only became Rumyantsev's could say that under his leadership military affairs
'sole adviser, and the moving spirit behind all his proceeded as harmoniously as a musical composi-
actions' (Sabatier, 14 September 1770, SIRIO, tion' (Dolgorukov, RS, 1889, LXIII, 509). He
1913, CXLIII, 188), but proved himself to be an gained the right of weekly access to the sovereign,
aggressive divisional commander at Ryabaya and he set up a college printing press to facilitate
Mogila and other actions. 'General Bauer . . . has communications with the army.
an extreme solicitude for the honour and glory of These achievements were undermined by the
our arms. In his activity, skill is invariably com- state's withdrawal from the management of the
bined with daring' (Semen Vorontsov, 18 June forces, a process of contracting out which went far
1110, AKV, 1870-95, XVI, 118). beyond anything that might have been expected
Meanwhile the War College grew in indepen- even under a woman sovereign. The effect of the
dence and power under the presidency (1763-74) regulations of the middle 1760s was to dismantle
of Zakhar Chernyshev, who was 'active, artful, the rigorous economic controls which had been
designing', and 'suspected of deep foreign connec- set up by Peter the Great, and over the following
tions' (Cathcart, 31 December 1770, 29 December years the colonels found all kinds of means to
1769, PRO, SP 91/86 and 91/82). However, exploit their new freedom to their own advantage,
1 6 8 Catherine II, ' t h e Great' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

to the damage of the state and their soldiers. From leading them to the theatre of war.
1767 promotion in the whole state service pro- For a young general, Rumyantsev made a
ceeded by the automatic working of seniority, or considerable impression on the Westerners who
rather seniority modified by corruption, and saw him during this period. The Prussian spy
Catherine left her servants to enrich themselves as Lambert characterised him as being hot-headed,
they saw fit from the resources at their command. ambitious and well-read, while Messeliere wit-
nessed a revealing incident in the spring of 1758,
when the Prussians were on the move, and
Rumyantsev's War, 1768-74 Rumyantsev came across a body of Russian troops
who were resting along the banks of a frozen river,
Count Petr Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev (1725-96) waiting for the ice to break so that they could
has a key place in our story, as a channel by which cross on rafts:
some of the most advanced military thinking of
He said in his own language to the soldiers: 'My
the West reached Russia, and the founder of a new
children, I hardly think you are going to let an icy
military tradition which was to be developed in
little river hold you up for three days from getting
full by Potemkin and Suvorov.
at the Prussians!' At these words the twelve
Peter was the legal son of Aleksandr Ivanovich
hundred men got to their feet, crying pobedal,
Rumyantsev, who sprang from an obscure Little
which means victory, and prukil, signifying that
Russian family to become generalanshef,
the Prussians were scum. On the instant, they
lieutenant-colonel of the Preobrazhenskii
broke the ice with their axes and sticks. . . .
Regiment, and one of Peter the Great's closest
Rumyantsev made a lavish distribution of money,
advisers. He is described as 'a man of cheerful
and announced 'I will tell our army that some
disposition', who 'owed rather more to luck than
good comrades are coming to join them!'
was consistent with somebody having the manage-
(Messeliere, 1803, 251)
ment of such high affairs' (Nashchokin, 1842, 91;
see also p. 153). The mother was an intelligent and For one who is upheld by Soviet historians as
lively lady, who in the middle 1780s could still an exemplar of a purely Russian art of war,
entrance people with tales of Louis XIV, Mme de Rumyantsev was to a remarkable degree fascinated
Maintenon, Marlborough and the day that Peter by the ways of the Prussian army. Wiegel points
the Great laid the foundation stone of St out that Rumyantsev was educated in the Cadet
Petersburg. She liked to hint that this energetic Corps in the Germanising period of Anna:
monarch had enjoyed her favours, which raises
intriguing possibilities concerning the true He then fought under the command of Count
paternity of her son. Fermor against Frederick the Great, but even
during our victories over this royal commander
The young Rumyantsev soon proved that he
he admired his skill and genius. Later Rumyantsev
had a will of his own, and he contrived to sign
had the opportunity to become personally
himself up with the Prussian army before he was
acquainted with Frederick, and he could not speak
brought back home under a cloud (see p. 140).
of him without enthusiasm. He had no great
After a period of mostly unsung service, Petr
opinion of his fellow countrymen, and he
Aleksandrovich went on to play an active part in
invariably lived surrounded by Germans.
the Seven Years War, commanding a brigade at
(Wiegel, 1864-6,1, p t l , 8 0 )
Gross-Jagersdorf, and the central division at
Kunersdorf. Finally, in 1761, he had complete Following the dethronement of Peter III,
charge of the well-managed campaign which Rumyantsev actually debated for a while whether
reduced the fortress-port of Colberg. Between to return to the Prussian service of his youth (see
times, Rumyantsev was chiefly occupied with p. 140). Frederick certainly considered it worth
organising and training bodies of cavalry, and his while to cultivate Rumyantsev's good opinion,
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 169

and he sent him a message of congratulation after some officer or other in the camp who can help
the victory of Kagul. Langeron thought it signifi- you out.' (Masson, 1859, 146)
cant that Rumyantsev retained the Prussian-style
locks and pigtail for his Little Russia Grenadier Rumyantsev read and reflected deeply upon his
Regiment, when the rest of the army had gone chosen profession. He maintained that a high
over to the unpowdered basin cut. commander must be fully informed of all relevant
Elsewhere Langeron describes Rumyantsev as, developments in the external relations of his
beyond doubt: country, and he once gave vent to the almost
Clausewitzian statement:
the most brilliant of all the Russian generals, a A man who simply looks at what lies immediately
man endowed with outstanding gifts. He possesses before his eyes will be unable to see what
a most serious and broad education, high advantages may derive from the perception of the
intelligence, astonishing powers of memory, less obvious attendant circumstances. I could
sound judgment, considerable resolution and the easily go astray if I left myself in ignorance of the
art of inspiring respect. He owes this latter political side of affairs, for this lays down the
advantage as much to his open and attractive guidelines for the military aspect. (To N. I. Panin,
exterior and refined manners, as to a well- 2 February 1771, Rumyantsev, 1953-9, II, 226)
considered and civil firmness. I cannot think of
any other man with whom it is so interesting and Though he kept himself abreast of modern
entertaining to converse. (Langeron,RS, 1895, military thinking, Rumyantsev rejected the ten-
LXXXIII, 153) dency towards geometric and 'scientific' formalism
which was beginning to grip some lesser minds in
While it sometimes amused Rumyantsev to play the West:
the Little Russian peasant, he accumulated a great
Our trade has its rules, but they are in many cases
fortune, and renovated or built nine or more
indeterminate, and devoid of concrete substance
residences. He always kept 'from eight to ten
and precision, for they proceed essentially from
musicians, with a set of Russian comedians, and a
the judgment of the commander. What the whole
number of domestics, and from his mode of living,
art of war comes down to is this . . . to hold the
gives one a very adequate idea of the ancient
main objective of the war constantly in view, to
feudal magnificence' (Anon., c.1787, 37).
be aware of what proved useful or damaging in
In fact Rumyantsev's rare qualities were accom-
similar cases in past times (giving due weight to
panied by a dry, detached and selfish temperament,
the lie of the ground and the associated advantages
which held him aloof from human commitments.
and difficulties), and to evaluate the intentions of
His wife corresponded with him assiduously, but
the enemy by working out what we might do if
Langeron claims that at bottom he 'loved and
we were in his place. (To N. I. Panin, 27 January
respected nobody in the world' (Langeron, RS,
1769, Rumyantsev, 1953-9, II, 64)
1895, LXXXIII, 155). Rumyantsev was certainly
a stranger to his offspring: Rumyantsev was also an enemy to what became
known as the 'cordon system' — the Austrian
One of his sons, upon completing his studies, strategy of stringing out troops in defensive
sought him out to find employment. 'Who are positions over wide stretches of ground. He main-
you?', asked Rumyantsev. 'Your son!' 'Yes, how tained as a matter of principle that attacking
pleasant. You have grown'. Rumyantsev went on forces held a constant moral ascendancy over
to pose a number of questions in a passably those that were defending (Rumyantsev, 1953-9,
paternal fashion, after which the young man asked I, xviii).
where he could put up, and what he was to do. However, Rumyantsev remained a man of his
'Certainly', said his father, ^you must surely know time to the extent that he was willing to assert
170 Catherine 11, 'the Great' 1762-96

CENTRAL DIVISIONAL SQUARES AT KAGUL

49 Central divisional squares at Kagul

that 'nothing is more imprudent than to despise an tions, and then return again to the point of
enemy, or by any means to excite his indignation, departure.
revenge, or any other passions of a violent nature, Second, Rumyantsev evolved a flexible and
which may make up for any deficiency in skill or responsive alternative to the massive army block of
courage' (Anon., c.1787, 36). While some hideous Munnich's time, bristling with chevaux de frise and
scenes of carnage were staged after the Russian encumbered with hundreds of waggons as it made
victories, Rumyantsev set his face against unneces- its stately way across the steppes. At the battle of
sary bloodshed, even if the blood happened to be Ryabaya Mogila (1770) Rumyantsev carried the
Turkish. Turkish camp by an assault delivered in a dispersed
In two respects Rumyantsev's conduct of his formation of four squares, which were able to
Turkish campaigns represents an important advance 'attack the enemy from different directions, while
on the doings of Munnich a generation before. being close enough to lend mutual support'
Already in the approaching winter of 1761 he (Klokman, 1951, 96). The tactic was employed
contrived to keep his troops in temporary quarters with no less success at Larga, and again at Kagul,
close to the Prussian positions around Colberg, where he formed five squares of divisions. These
and in Catherine's Turkish wars he developed the advances were summed up in Rumyantsev's
technique still further when it was a question of General Rules of 1773, where he explained that
holding the army throughout the winter months 'every corps must be arranged in oblong square,
on the approaches to the Balkans. As well as in such a way that the lateral sides must corres-
keeping the troops adequately fed so far from pond to half the face'. The sides in question were
home, he had to dispose them in compact groups usually composed of infantry regiments with
so as to be ready to assemble in case of a Turkish cannon in the centre, and howitzers on the
attack. Many of the soldiers suffered severely in flanks. Between the squares the jaegers were
these advanced winter quarters, at least during the disposed in battalion squares, and the cavalry in
first years. However, the losses were probably a lines two ranks deep. Rumyantsev taught the
small price to pay for the facility of maintaining infantry to maintain the impetus of their advance
the army within such close reach of the theatre of unchecked, relying on the cavalry to counter the
war. Munnich sacrificed far more men during the Turkish horse, and on the fast-moving artillery to
inordinately long marches he had to prosecute subject the entrenchments to enfilade fire. The
every year in order to reach the scene of opera- baggage train came up in the rear, where it could
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 171
not encumber the army. One of Rumyantsev's I must confess that some able generals hold that
generals, Aleksei Khpuschov, testifies that: 'in they seem to be an unnecessary burden for the
place of a beautifully-formed line he substituted soldiers, and cause more trouble than they are
an habituation to battle, and by his constant run worth. However I have never campaigned against
of successes he engendered that courage which the Turks, and all those who have so served are
nothing has so far extirpated from the hearts of ready to affirm that chevaux de frise form the best
our troops' (Klokman, 1951, 173). and most reliable kind of obstacle. (Rumyantsev,
In the field of minor tactics Rumyantsev had 1953-9,11, 54)
above all to make provision to stave off the mass
assaults of the Turkish hordes, 'for if the Turks In the event Rumyantsev decided to put his trust
once break in, there is no resisting their in firepower instead, though not with total convic-
impetuosity' (Anon., c.1787, 37). From the tion. He wondered whether Plemyannikov's square
beginning Rumyantsev doubted whether chevaux at Kagul had suffered unduly through the neglect
de frise were the most effective counter to the of the chevaux de frise, and many years later he
threat. In November 1768 he asked the War asked for Potemkin's opinion. Potemkin answered
College to send him a quantity of these devices, that he would always defer to Rumyantsev's
but at the same time wrote to N. I. Panin: authoritative decision on this point, and that the

50 Rumyantsev in battle against the Turks

1 7 2 Catherine II, ' t h e G r e a t ' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

battle of Kagul would always redound to his glory. instructions of recent years. To put things right he
Once Rumyantsev had made the break, the issued a supplementary Order of Service {Obryad
chevaux de frise disappeared not only from the Sluzhby) in March the next year. The Order was
Turkish theatre but also from the repertoire of composed of seventeen passages for the infantry
tactics to be employed against Western enemies. and.four for the cavalry, and laid down clear rules
Rumyantsev simplified still further the methods for the management of marches, baggage trains,
ordained in the Infantry Code of 1763, and fined camps, pickets, sentries, hospitals and foraging, as
down the number of ranks in a line from three to well as simplified tactical formations. This excellent
two. While his line infantry was trained to deliver document received the approval of the War College
formal volleys by rank, battalion or platoon, in 1776, and was adopted by Potemkin for the
Rumyantsev employed his jaegers with increasing field army .in 1788.
freedom, in association with parties of grenadiers, Rumyantsev was much concerned with the
dragoons and batteries of guns. These mobile physical conservation of his troops, and it was his
formations scouted ahead of the army on the misfortune that he commanded Russian armies at
march, securing river crossings and other passages, a time when it was beyond the power of an
and in time: of battle they helped to guard the individual to stay the appalling mortality. Doctors
flanks of the squares, and the communications were so scarce that whole corps of several regiments
between them. were left without any medical assistance whatso-
While Rumyantsev was 'a great admirer of the ever, and between 1769 and 1773 a devastating
Prussian army . . . this admiration was always free plague overtook the Russian and Turkish armies
of the prejudices which weigh down lesser spirits' and spread to much of Russia. Rumyantsev
(S. Vorontsov, 'Zapiski', 1802, AKV, 1870-95, devoted sums of money to setting up improvised
X, 482-3). In particular, Rumyantsev was an hospitals, but otherwise he had to be content with
implacable opponent of the Prussian-style heavy ordering the officers to pay close attention to the
cavalry which had been such a notable feature of cleanliness of their men.
the period immediately after the Seven Years War. In the exercise of man-management,
Towards the end of the campaign of 1770 he Rumyantsev resorted variously to corporal punish-
wrote to Catherine: ment, telling rebukes, and surprises and compli-
ments of the most agreeable kind. 'Promotions and
The cuirassier and carabinier regiments are
decorations were certainly difficult to come by,
mounted on breeds of horses which are at once
when he was in command, but in compensation he
expensive, delicate and heavy, and which are
awarded them justly, and to such men as deserved
better for parades than operations. During the
them for real service' (Engelhardt, 1868, 93). An
whole campaign we had to feed them on dry
Englishman once heard Rumyantsev say:
fodder, since they wasted away when they grazed
on pasture. The very equipment of the heavy 'A general must be easy and affable to his troops,
cavalry is burdensome, weighing down both rider without descending to meanness, or being too
and horse. (Rumyantsev, 1953-9, II, 382) often seen by them, which must render him less
respected.' He himself had learned so much
Potemkin shared these views, and as President of
affability by practice, and so rigidly observed his
the War College he effected a lightening of the
own rules, that he constantly took off his hat to
cavalry, reorganising the cuirassiers as carabiniers,
the very children of his o wn peasants when they
and restoring the historic primacy of the dragoon
bowed to him. (Anon., c.1787, 36)
in the Russian army.
When Rumyantsev took over the First Army Rumyantsev's successes in this respect became
from Prince Golitsyn at the end of 1769, he found legendary, and a generation later Aleksandr
a wide diversity of practice obtaining among the Mikhailovich Turgenev remarked that his style of
regiments, in spite of all the regulations and command was 'not what you find nowadays. He
 Catherine 11, 'the Great' 1762-96 173

knew every single one of his clerks, and every

captain of the army which was entrusted to him'
(Turgenev, RS, 1886, LII, 49). On the march,
Rumyantsev insisted that the officers must forsake
their carriages and ride on horseback with their
platoons.

The soldiers sang as the mood took them, and

when the field-marshal rode by they usually struck
up some martial song in his honour, like Akh ty,
nash batyushka, Graf Rumyantsev general!
Sometimes he gave the singers a couple of ten-
rouble pieces, and he also deigned to chat with
several officers of the staff and regiment. Indeed
his friendliness drew the hearts and minds of all
people towards him. (Engelhardt, 1868, 79)

This remarkable man represented probably the

most important single formative influence on the
Russian army in the second half of the eighteenth
century. Many of the initiatives that were associated
with Potemkin came in the first place from
Rumyantsev. Greater still was the impression made
on Suvorov, in whom he foresaw 'a worthy
successor in glory and deed' (Saikin, 1818, 62-3).
Suvorov commanded his officers to observe the
Order of Service, and incorporated some of its
thinking in his own Art of Victory, and in 1789,
when his old chief had lost favour, he was sedulous
in showing Rumyantsev every mark of attention
and respect. Count Thedor Rostopchin once
penned a gushing eulogy to the effect that 'where
Rumyantsev was a hero for his own time, Suvorov
is a hero for all times!' The statement was read to
Suvorov. 'It's not true!' he exclaimed, 'tell them
"Suvorov is the pupil of Rumyantsev!" ' (Fuchs,
1827,41).
Catherine's first military enterprise became
known in popular parlance as 'Rumyantsev's War'.
In fact, in the contest with the Turks between
1768 and 1774 Rumyantsev was just an executive
instrument of Catherine, or rather of a Russian
geo-political will which sought to exploit an 51 Musketeer, 1763-C.1786. Green coat with red
almost uniquely favourable state of international collar, lapels (an innovation in Russia), cuffs and
affairs. In the one direction, Zakhar Chernyshev turn-backs; red waistcoat; red breeches; hat
and the resurgent expansionist party sought some bordered with white, and white plume
compensation for the sacrifices of the Seven Years (Viskovatov, 1844-56)
1 7 4 Catherine II, ' t h e Great' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

War, and spoke in favour of pushing Russian install a puppet king in Warsaw, and leave Polish
borders deep into anarchic Poland, so as to open sovereignty nominally intact, but a party of
water routes all the way from Riga to Kiev. To the Polish irreconcilables looked to Turkey for
south and east, commercial interests demanded an support, and by the end of 1768 a major border
outlet to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, to incident helped to draw Russia and Turkey into
compare with the one which Peter had gained to direct confrontation. Now that she was committed
the Baltic, as also the opening of trade with India, to war, Catherine could no longer deny her lust for
and the colonisation of the steppes, after the aggrandisement.
Tartars had been evicted from the northern Black The Russian schemes certainly developed on a
Sea littoral. Little interference could be expected spectacular scale in 1769, what with the main
from the Swedes, or from the Prussians, Austrians armies campaigning on the river lines at the north-
or French, who had been enfeebled by the Seven west corner of the Black Sea, a corps operating in
Years War. the northern Caucasus, and squadrons being got
Catherine was satisfied for the moment to ready for the Mediterranean.
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 175

KAGUl, 21 July 1770: Attack in divisional squares

On the principal theatre of war, the Dniester, Rumyantsev had meanwhile been given a free
Prince Aleksandr Golitsyn and his First Army of hand with his First Army, which amounted to
80,000 men finally entered into possession of between 35,000 and 40,000 men. Talcing a route
Khotin after a laughably muddled campaign. well to the rear of the garrison of Bendery, he
Rumyantsev assumed control after Golitsyn was advanced with extraordinary confidence towards
recalled to St Petersburg, and in the autumn he the Danube. Again and again he overcame the
sent detached corps ranging over Moldavia and forces in his path by dint of fixing them frontally
into Wallachia, awakening hopes of the overthrow by one of his divisional or corps squares, while
of Turkish domination in the Balkans. turning their flanks and rear with the rest of the
The successes of 1770 turned out to be some of army. Seventy-two thousand Turks and Tartars
the most brilliant which the Russians ever attained were evicted from their camp at Ryabaya Mogila
in the century. The main operation of that year on 17 June, and the process was repeated at a
was supposed to be the siege of the fortress of position beside the river Larga on 7 July. Finally
Bendery, which was sited on the lower Dniester, the main Turkish army of 150,000 warriors met
and the capture of which'would complete the Rumyantsev in a murderous battle near the Kagul
work of 1769, and give the Russians the command on 21 July. The day ended with the surviving
of the whole river. Prince Petr Panin moved slowly Turks in flight, and 138 guns, 2,000 prisoners and
against it with a powerful and well-found army, perhaps as many as 20,000 of their dead and
and he finally reduced it by storm on 16 wounded left on the field. This victory earned
September. Rumyantsev the rank of field-marshal, and the
1 7 6 Catherine II, ' t h e Great' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

felicitations of Frederick of Prussia. Rumyantsev under Suvorov, Saltykov and others. On 10 June
was now free to move to the lower Danube, and in Suvorov's division of 8,000 men defeated the
the course of three weeks he prised Izmail, Kilia 40,000-strong army of Abder-Rezah at Kozludzhi,
and Braila from the nerveless grip of the Turks. which placed Shumla in peril, while Rumyantsev
Catherine's joy was crowned by news from the moved against Silistria, and Saltykov blockaded
Mediterranean, where by May 1770 the Russians the upstream fortress of Rushchuk.
had assembled four squadrons, which had sailed The Grand Vizier feared that nothing short of
all the way from the Baltic. On 26 June Admiral major concessions would stop the Russian army
Greig assailed the Turkish fleet in its refuge in the from advancing on Constantinople. Using his
Bay of Chesme in Asia Minor with a force of four plenipotentiary diplomatic powers, Rumyantsev
of the line, two frigates, one bomb vessel and four was therefore able to bring the Turks to immediate
fireships. One of the Turkish vessels caught alight terms of peace at Kutchuk-Kainardji and win two
during the exchange of gunfire, which disordered major advantages on behalf of Russia. He eroded
the Turkish array, and the sparks and the advent the Turkish strategic bridgehead on the northern
of the fireships completed the work of destruc- shores of the Black Sea by having the Tartars of
tion. The Turks lost fifteen of the line, and nearly the Crimea and the Nogai steppes declared
forty smaller craft, and before long they found independent of Turkey, and gaining the outright
themselves blockaded in the Dardanelles and cut cession to Russia of Azov, Kerch, and Kinburn
off from Greece, which was in full revolt. with a stretch of land between the Bug and
In 1771 the main offensive role on land was Dnieper. Second, he advanced Russian influence
assumed by Generalanshef Prince Dolgorukov, into the Balkans when he won favoured treatment
whose Second Army stormed into the Crimea in for Russian subjects in Turkey, as well as the right
the middle of June, and proceeded to overrun the to speak on behalf of the Christian peoples of
peninsula. The plan of operations and the system Moldavia and Wallachia.
of supply had been carefully worked out by The long-term economic benefits were still
Chernyshev at the War College, so as to avoid the more significant. Not only were the southern
collapse of administrative arrangements which steppes opened to settlement, and the raising of
had been seen in the 1730s. The resistance was cattle, sheep and grain, but the extinction of the
minimal, because the main Tartar hosts were away age-old Tartar threat opened to a full interior
on the Danube theatre, getting themselves killed colonisation the historic Russian lands south of
by Rumyantsev. the Muscovite forests. "The soil of this region is
Faced with military collapse, the Turks entered probably the most fertile in all Russia, and as
into peace negotiations. These dragged on from black as coal. Except for occasional hills, the
the spring of 1772, and finally broke down on the terrain is virtually one continuous plain, so level
Turks' refusal to cede their rights over the Crimea. and huge that it extends beyond the limit of your
When fighting resumed in 1773, Rumyantsev had sight' (Strandmann, RS, 1882, XXXV, 291). Thus
at his disposal scarcely 35,000 combatants, and Russia began to exercise the mastery of the
with these he made a short-lived excursion beyond whole belt of lowlands from the Baltic to the
the Danube. Black Sea.
At last in 1774 Rumyantsev was given not just For all the waste and blunders, 'Rumyantsev's
a respectable army, but a high degree of military War' had given ample proof of a new style and
and political freedom. He used the opportunities confidence in Russian campaigning. The staff
to the full. While a separate force operated against work reached a high standard (indeed, it declined
distant Ochakov and Kinburn, Rumyantsev fed the afterwards), and the orders were issued as coherent
main army of 55,000 men across the Danube by 'dispositions', systematically outlining the tasks
carefully calculated detachments — first of each element of the army. The field guns were
Kamenskii's division in April, and then commands employed not just in large batteries, as in the
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 177

Seven Years War, but they moved with freedom on New regiments of hussars, lancers and other light
the battlefield, achieving impressive concentrations horse were raised during the war, which effectively
of fire. A French officer considered the Russian reversed the policies of the 1760s, and after the
emphasis on artillery important, 'particularly in a peace the number of dragoon regiments was
century when this element in warfare has the augmented to ten, and those of hussars to sixteen.
principal influence on all operations' (Anon., 'Rumyantsev's War' was staged at a time of
1788, 327). For the acknowledged expert, the peace elsewhere in Europe, and the Westerners had
Marquis da Silva, the performance of the troops every opportunity to evaluate the significance of
of the line yielded further proof that the Russian what was going on. A large number of foreign
infantry had become 'one of the finest in Europe. volunteers had accompanied the Russian armies
It has a consistency and endurance of its own. It and fleets, and the record of their experiences
' is a veritable wall' (Silva, 1778, 53). helped to swell the growing military literature of
However, the light forces were the ones which the period. Furthermore, Western commentators
had shown to the best advantage. In 1774 the and statesmen were somewhat exercised by the
scattered companies, of jaegers were accordingly threat to European interests and security implicit
brought together into six battalions, and later in in what later became known as 'The Eastern
the reign the number of such battalions was Question'. Some of the French, Swedes, Prussians
increased to the extremely large total of forty. and Austrians began to look with a little trepida-
tion on the changes in the balance of power on
Europe's Asian borders, and on the further proofs
of the endurance of Russian armies: 'A nation of
men of such powerful physical constitution is very
suited to conquering whole empires' (Wonzel,
1783,22-3).
Other observers maintained that there was as
yet no real cause for alarm. An anonymous English
author certainly wrote:
It is not without reason that many politicians
dread the further aggrandizement of the Russian
Empire. No power, within the century past, has .
made such important acquisitions. It has also
adopted those very principles which rendered
Rome the mistress of the world: the first of
which was, to borrow from its neighbours every
useful institution; and the second, to embrace
every opportunity, whether fair or otherwise, of
adding to its territory and its power. (Anon.,
c.1787, 15)

He added, however, that Russian ambitions were

directed towards the east, and that if the Russian
armies turned against Europe a million troops
would stand in their way in Germany alone. The
British ambassador, Lord Cathcart, likewise main-
52 Jaegers, 1765-C.1786. Drab green jacket, tained that Russia's eastward enterprises were
greatcoat and trousers; black felt cap with green harmless to British interests, and that the same
edges (Viskovatov, 1844-56) held true of the worm-eaten Russian fleet, which
1 7 8 Catherine II, ' t h e Great' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

must always be dependent on British expertise main body of his states and East Prussia.
(PRO, SPF 91/80-7). The notion of a theft of Polish territory fitted
Most detailed of all was the special report in well with the desires of Chernyshev and the
which Sabatier de Cabres, the French envoy in military party, and in August 1772 Russia, Prussia
St Petersburg, drew up for Louis XV in 1772. As and Austria signed an unholy agreement by which
a hostile witness, he maintained that Russia could they helped themselves to large slices of the outer
never become a great power, since all classes were Polish territories. Catherine's share amounted to
ignorant and vicious, trade and the useful arts were 40,000 square miles, and the new frontier along
sunk in irredeemable backwardness, and the the Dvina and the Dniester usefully eliminated the
population of eighteen million could never fill the wriggling salients of Polish land which had inter-
vast geographic extent of the empire. On the vened between Livonia and the Ukraine. For the
military side, Sabatier had always entertained a first time for half a century Russia's 'way to the
low opinion of the Russian performance, and by West' was therefore expressed in territorial terms.
dint of a series of careful calculations he put the Young Russian officers like Pishchevich were
strength of the Russian army in regular troops at astonished by the flirtatiousness of the Polish girls,
no more than 210,000, which was probably not 'but I must do them justice by saying that in
far off the mark. If the Russians ever sought to addition to their agreeable manners and careful
intervene again in Europe, they would present education, which are obvious to all, they draw one
merely: still more through their great sweetness of
character' (Pishchevich, 1885, 31).
an auxiliary force of 50 or 60,000 men, badly
The Russians repaid the Poles most brutally. In
organised, incomplete, demanding, expensive and
the little towns and villages the Russian soldiery
extravagant. They will be a burden for the country
used to tyrannise the people on whom they were
which feeds them, and their intervention will be
billeted, smashing up their houses, and making
clumsy and short-lived. With commanders of
free with their property and womenfolk. Wiegel
suspect loyalty and boundless greed, they will let
noted how in the cities the commanders of German
a whole campaign pass before delivering a few
blood behaved with the cruel oafishness of their
tardy blows, and then they will go home again.
ancestors in the Thirty Years War, while in Warsaw,
In other words, they will act just as they did when
still nominally independent, even the gracious
they were allies of the Austrians. (SIRIO, 1913,
Prince Repnin, the Russian ambassador, subjected
CXLIII, 613)
Polish society to the most pointed snubs. 'A proud
people may resign itself to being beaten,' com-
mented de Segur, 'but never to seeing itself
The first partition of Poland, 1772 humiliated' (Segur, 1824-6, III, 17).

During the Turkish war Russia had made a signifi-

cant though bloodless westwards advance of her Pugachev's rebellion, 1773-4
boundaries at the expense of Poland, which was
now entering on the last anarchical years of its The St Petersburg government was soon given
independent life. For several years now the anti- further occupation by the last, and one of the
Russian party among the Poles had been disputing most dangerous of the great peasant revolts of
the virtual Muscovite protectorship over their Russian history. The impetus was given by a man
land, but the impetus for a partition came not of charismatic gifts, the Don Cossack deserter
from Major-General Suvorov's storm of the castle Emilian Pugachev, who appeared among the Yaik
of Cracow in February 1772, which put an end to Cossacks in the guise of the dead Peter III. His
the rebellion, but from the desire of Frederick the initial band of three hundred supporters grew
Great to establish a land corridor between the rapidly to a force of 30,000, drawing in elements
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 179

of nearly all those who had been alienated over the concerns were established in the Urals, and the
years by the enforced modernisation of Russian majority were managed through private con-
society — Old Believers, Cossacks, serfs, workers tractors. Russian artillery was capable of meeting
from the Ural mines and factories, and dispos- the need for ordnance and most of the ammuni-
sessed Bashkirs and Kalmyks. The choice of the tion, though three million roubles-worth of foreign
persona of Peter III was significant, for that gunpowder had to be purchased in the 1780s and
monarch had freed the nobles from their obliga- 1790s.
tions, and so (reasoned the downtrodden) he By the nature of things the manufacture of
would surely do the same for the masses. small arms had more the character of a craft
Some time before the outbreak, a council of industry, and even after it underwent reconstruc-
war had dismissed the first reports of unrest, tion in 1767 and 1776 the famous and ancient
declaring 'the feeling of malcontency will have no factory at Tula could not satisfy the demand for
consequences apart from occasioning some disorder smooth-bore weapons, let alone the requirement
in the levy of recruits, and increasing the number of rifles for the jaeger NCOs. Rumyantsev testified
of dissidents and outlaws' (Andryshchenko, in 'from actual experience, that the muskets in every
Beskrovnyi, 1969, 341). The field army and the infantry regiment are completely unfit for use',
reserves were therefore committed without hesita- and that the soldiers spent a great deal of time and
tion to the war against the Turks, delivering the a lot of their own money in vain attempts to effect
initiative to the rebels from the autumn of 1773 repairs (17 October 1768, P. A. Rumyantsev.
to the high summer of 1774. The insurgents Dokumenty, 1953-9, II, 15). In the 1780s an
hounded the nobles and gentry, seized the towns Englishman reported 'their firearms are very bad,
of Kazan, Penza and Saratov, and blockaded the and one thousand men are never exercised without
garrisons of Orenburg, Yaitsk and Ufa. two or three muskets bursting, and killing or
At last, however, Pugachev was defeated in the wounding some of their men' (Anon., c.1787, 9).
field outside Kazan, and the signing of peace with During the same period, however, native cloth
Turkey permitted the government to mass its manufactures developed on a significant scale,
forces to put down the revolt. The ferocious more especially through the establishment of
Colonel Ivan Ivanovich Michelson broke the power twenty contract factories which were permitted to
of the rebellion in an action at Tsaritsyn on the employ peasant labour, thus avoiding some of the
Volga, and Pugachev was delivered by his own feudal restrictions which tended to hold back
companions to the vengeance of the government, heavy industry. As regards both quantity and
which was carried out at Moscow in 1775. quality, the Russian soldiers could now be properly
fitted out with uniforms of domestic manufacture.
In the domain of finance, the expanding
Russia builds an army resources of the nation were finally outpaced by
increasingly urgent military demands, and the
We gain some inkling of the scale of the Russian result was the abandonment of the glorious self-
military effort in the later part of the century sufficiency of cash and kind which had seen the
from the huge demands made on industry. state through the wars of the earlier part of the
In absolute terms, the production of domestic century. The taxable male population rose from
. concerns was impressive, that of pig and cast iron less than 8,000,000 in 1762, to 12,500,000 in the
rising from an annual 15,000 tons during Peter's early 1780s, and to the 17,800,000 of the census
reign to nearly 160,000 at the end of the century. of 1794-6. The costs of active military operations
By that time between fifteen and seventeen varied greatly from year to year, but they were
factories were casting artillery, four were produc- much easier to bear than the price of the annual
ing small arms, and seventy more were supplying maintenance of the army, which after having been
other military needs. The most important of these held at or under 10,000,000, climbed rapidly in
1 8 0 C a t h e r i n e II, ' t h e G r e a t ' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

the 1780s and reached a new plateau of 28,100,000

in 1792. The government had recourse to large
foreign loans and the issue of paper money or
'assignations'; 210,000,000 roubles of paper
money were in circulation in 1799, and they
exchanged hands at just651/2kopeks each.
It is sad to reflect that so much of the produce
of the taxation of peasant 'souls', earned in cir-
cumstances of dreadful hardship, was allowed to
run to waste in a supply system of notorious
corruption and inefficiency. (Paul I has the credit
of bringing the reign of misrule to at least a
temporary end, when in 1797 he installed the
offices of Food Supply (Proviant) and the
Commissariat in St Petersburg, and reduced them
to the rank of 'expeditions' of the War College.)
Catherine's Russia was rich most of all in gifted
commanding personalities, who make a much
greater impact on the imagination than the leading
men of the Seven Years War. If Rumyantsev has a
claim to be considered the founder of a new way
in warfare, then Field-Marshal Prince Potemkin was
the individual whose name was most often on the
53 Grigorii Aleksandrovich Potemkin
lips of contemporaries. He has a place in our
story as coming closest to a. purely Russian ideal
of what many officers would have liked to have
been. Chernyshev or even Suvorov, Potemkin seemed
After toying with the idea of entering the to luxuriate in all the trappings of Asiatic des-
church, Grigorii Aleksandrovich Potemkin (1739- potism. In his garb he variously affected a
91) enlisted as a trooper in the Regiment of Horse favourite bearskin wrap, a luxurious version of a
Guards, and it was as a young officer in this Cossack hetman's clothes, or the plain uniform of
splendid unit that a chance encounter brought an ordinary soldier, such as the one he had made
him into conversation with the empress. She was up in 1787, so as not to shame the poorer officers.
much taken by his passion, boldness and colossal His suite of adjutants, lackeys, spongers and
height. As Masson remarked, these two larger- confidants amounted to two or three hundred.
than-life characters seemed to be made for one With all of this:
another. 'He is the only man that the empress
stands in awe of, and she both likes and fears No great man up to that time had put his power
him'(Anon., c.l787, 29). to less evil ends. He was devoid of vengeful or
Potemkin reached field rank in 'Rumyantsev's rancorous feelings. . . . He was daring and lustful
War', and in the early 1770s it became evident that for power. On some occasions he was insouciant
his radiant presence had eclipsed the Orlovs in the to the point of immobility, and on others
imperial favour. The year 1774 brought the rank capable of putting forth incredible exertions. . . .
of generalanshef and the Vice-Presidency of the Altogether he summed up everything which
War College, and ten years later he became full redounds to the glory of the Russian nation,
President and field-marshal. and everything for which it has justly been
Far less of the European than Rumyantsev, reproached. (Wiegel, 1864-6,1, pt 1, 291)
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 181

He could not hear a cannon shot without fearing (Zatvornitskii, in Skalon, 1902-C.1911, III,
that it might have cost the lives of some of his pt 6, 94)
soldiers, and his dislike of corporal punishment
At this he hit the plate in front of him with his
went so far as to endanger discipline. He dispensed
fist, breaking it in pieces. He left the table and
his wealth with the same unconcern as he received
went to his bedchamber.
it, and while affecting the greatest delicacy, he
From 1774 until he died in 1791 Potemkin was
ignored the extremes of heat and cold and every
effective head of the ¥/ar College, a position
personal danger whenever he felt his presence
which, as somebody put it, 'gave him to some
was needed.
degree the power to bind the whole body of
Potemkin's headquarters were notable for their
generals to him, and offered him the opportunity
dirt and disorder, and he showed little aptitude for
to assist and oblige the junior officers and even
the detail of military operations. However, the
the private soldiers' (Anon., 1792, 35). In 1781 he
prince had the undeniable gift of creating excite-
re-created the College's accounting department
ment and activity in those about him: 'When he
(Schetnaya Ekspeditsiya), which had been formed
was absent, he was the sole topic of conversation.
by Miinnich but abolished in the reign of Elizabeth,
When he was present, he was the cynosure of all
and in 1785 he appointed an inspector-general and
eyes' (Masson, 1859, 103). Pishchevich began to
four ordinary inspectors who were to enforce
perceive a pattern:
standards in the army, aided by an Inspektorskaya
I saw him in the Crimea, lying on a sofa, Ekspeditsiya of the War College. Unfortunately
surrounded by fruits and apparently oblivious of Potemkin's talents were not of a nature to shine in
all care — yet amid all the unconcern Russia routine administration. His dislike of paperwork,
conquered the peninsula. I saw him again in idle his favouritism and his lack of system combined to
mood at Elizavetgrad, looking on while the thirty- reduce the running of the army to 'hopeless
four generals, who were residing at headquarters confusion' (Langeron, RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 150).
without any command, took it in turns to play at The War College lost track of appointments, and
billiards — and shortly afterwards the bitterly- the processes of promotion were upset by the
contested storm of Ochakov signalled his spirit of intervention of Potemkin, Suvorov, Zubov and
enterprise to the world. (Pishchevich, 1885, 128) others on behalf of their proteges.
Operational management likewise fell into some
Indeed, it was easy for a less astute observer to disorder. Friedrich Wilhelm Bauer, as virtual chief
overlook the vast range of Potemkin's activities, of staff, had alienated Potemkin and other native
which embraced diplomatic and administrative Russians by his pushy and independent ways, and
affairs, as well as the command of the army. in 1774 he found it expedient to leave the country.
Towards the end of his life, Potemkin remarked Catherine retrieved him in the following year, but
at table to a circle of friends: for the rest of his career (he died in 1783) he was
employed merely on works of civil engineering and
Is there a man who has been more fortunate than
public building. The staff corps was virtually
me? Everything I have ever wanted, all my whims,
moribund by the end of the reign, and Langeron
have been fulfilled as if by magic. I desired high
ruminated:
ranks — I have them. Orders of chivalry — I have
them also. I loved to gamble — I won incalculable The French and Austrian general staffs are
sums. I loved to stage festivities — and they brilliant organisations, but in our own corps I
turned out to be magnificent ones. I liked to buy have never encountered the kind of officers who
up estates — I have them. I was fond of building were capable of putting together far-reaching
houses — and I have built veritable palaces. I dispositions or plans of campaign, of or leading the
craved precious things — and no other private columns with any degree of skill. This corps was
person has had so many of them or such rare ones. in an excellent state when it was set up by General
1 8 2 Catherine II, ' t h e Great' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

Bauer in 1769 [sic, actually 1770], but now in class German Lutheran family, and rose from the
Russia it scarcely exists, even though it ought to ranks of the Russian artillery by long service. He
be the nursery of future generals. (Langeron, commanded the guns at Rumyantsev's siege of
RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 165) Colberg, and afterwards he exercised a wide
supervision over the ordnance as a whole, on
In fact the staff always had the nature of an alien account of the long absences of the nominal
graft, and it was ultimately rejected by the Master General, Grigorii Orlov.
Russians. The Due de Richelieu went so far as to The Supplement of 1788 was a practical docu-
declare: 'Prince Potemkin is a declared enemy of ment, devoted almost entirely to telling the
tactics and science in military affairs. He has gunners how to work the greatest execution
succeeded in inculcating this opinion throughout among the Turks, and perhaps it also helped the
almost the whole army, which could occasion Russians to derive some benefit from the first
considerable inconveniences' (SIRIO, 1886, LIV, significant improvements which had been effected
149). in the artillery for thirty years. The secret canister
Potemkin's instincts were much more sure howitzer was taken out of use, which cut the size
when he turned to more comprehensible matters of the field (medium) artillery to 244 pieces, and
like arming, equipping and training troops, and an extensive programme of recasting reduced the
imbuing them with a warlike spirit. In 1778 he weight of the 12-pounder cannon barrel from
began to create new regiments of grenadiers, by eighty puds to sixty, and that of the 6-pounder
dint of selecting peasants from the former monastic from fifty to thirty-one. The intermediate 8-
estates of Little Russia. Extraordinary transforma- pounder cannon was abolished altogether, as was
tions were wrought in this unpromising material, the cumbersome 9-pud mortar.
as was the Russian way, and the new grenadier Potemkin reminded his officers that 'the name
regiments took a leading place in the assaults that of "soldier" is an honourable one'. He was as
were delivered on Ochakov and Izmail. Otherwise, severe in punishing officers who maltreated their
Potemkin's inclination was to form bodies of men, as he was attentive in distributing medals
troops that were capable of acting with facility in among the rank and file after victories. By 1788
difficult terrain, and sustaining the long marches 'none of the officers or staff dared to punish the
which the army had to prosecute on the Turkish soldiers, for these folk had the right of carrying
theatre. These considerations led to a vast increase their complaints direct to His Highness'(Tsebrikov,
in the number of jaegers, and a lightening of the RS, 1895, LXXXIV, 172).
cavalry (see p. 172) which caused a revival of the The most characteristic product of the age of
cross-bred dragoons, for 'being trained to act both Potemkin was in fact the radical transformation
as infantry and cavalry, they may be used for both which he undertook in the uniforms of all the
purposes as the situation demands, without having troops save the Guards and the Cossacks, begin-
to borrow infantry or cavalry for assistance and ning in 1786 with the forces he had under his
support' (Mikhnevich, in Skalon, 1902-C.1911, immediate command in the southern provinces.
IV, Introduction, 201). The changes concerned not just cut and style, but
In contrast to the developments among the a rejection of Western values and a fundamental
other field arms, Catherine's artillery held largely reorientation of the purpose for which military
to the organisation and regulations which had been . clothing was worn at all. Potemkin explained that
worked out by Shuvalov and Fermor for the great when
war against Prussia. Only in June 1788 was the
army issued with an official Supplement concerning the concept of regularity was first introduced to
(Artillery) Fire. This was the work of a deserving Russia, there came also some foreign officers who
individual, Generalanshef Ivan Ivanovich Meller- were imbued with all the pedantry of their time.
Zakomelskii (1725-90). He was born of a middle Our own officers were ready to honour all of this
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 183
as something holy and secret, for they did not The standard coat of the new uniform was a
know what military order was really about. It short drab green tunic, or kurtka, which could be
seemed to them that it had to do with pigtails, closed across the chest with buttons in winter. The
hats, facings, the manual drill of arms, and things eminently practical trousers were edged with
like t h a t . . . altogether the clothing and leather at the bottoms, and the shoes or light
equipment of our army were ideally suited to boots were of soft but durable leather. The hair
torment the _oldiers. was done in a rather ugly, unpowdered basin cut,
and the ensemble was crowned by a round felt
The outfit looked well on parade, but Potemkin helmet with a peak. The commodity of the uniform
maintained that 'the true beauty of military dress was admired by foreign observers, and looking
consists in its uniformity, and the extent to which back on the former fashions, Langeron wrote that,
the component items correspond to their use. 'it now seems quite incomprehensible to me how
Clothes are for dressing a soldier, and not for we could for such a long time have subjected
loading him with a burden' (Mikhnevich, in Skalon, ourselves to such a torment, forcing ourselves to
1902-C.1911, IV, Introduction, 198-9). curl, pomade and powder our locks, and lose two
hours of every day in this ludicrous occupation'
(Langeron, RS, 1895, LXXXIII, 146).
The summer exercise camps were another
expression of the spirit of the times. These useful
institutions had fallen out of use under Peter's
successors, but they entered a new lease of life in
the new reign. The biggest affairs of the kind were
held in the 1760s, at Tsarskoe Selo, Smolensk,
Kazan, Orenburg, Moscow and other places, and
they involved infantry and cavalry to the number
of as many as 30,000 at a time. When they were
not engaged in the larger assemblies, the individual
regiments called in their component companies to
camp sites designated by the War College, and they
exercised from about the middle of May to the
middle of August.
On such occasions the senior officers enjoyed a
considerable freedom of interpretation:
Every regimental commander uses his own
discretion to make up whatever rules he desires
for his u n i t . . . one might wish to introduce his
regiment to the principles of the French codes of
1773 or 1788, while others would try to imitate
Prussian tactics, and so on. (Langeron, RS, 1895,
LXXXIII, 196)
This creative ferment engendered some initiatives
54 Musketeers in the 'Potemkin' uniform, c.1786. which became famous in their own generation, or
Green kurtka coat with yellow shoulder strap and which reveal the thinking of men who later rose to
red collar, lapels, cuffs and turn-back stripes; red high rank. Semen Vorontsov's Instruction for
trousers with yellow braid; white belts Company Commanders of 1774 was originally
(Viskovatov, 1844-56) composed for the First Grenadier Regiment (see
1 8 4 Catherine II, ' t h e G r e a t ' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

55 The 'Potemkin' cap, showing the brass band and the yellow transverse crest of wool. The long black
cloth flaps at the back could be tied under the chin to protect the ears against the cold (Viskovatov,
1844-56)

p. 129), but the approval of Rumyantsev com- known by the 1770s for the breadth of his military
mended it to a wider audience. Rumyantsev's own knowledge. As commander of the Bugskii Jaeger
Order of Service achieved semi-official status, and Corps, Kutuzov composed a set of Notes on
his memoranda on artillery, as also K. B. Borozdin's Infantry Service in General, and that of Jaegers in
Precept (Nastavlenie) of 1769, helped to make up Particular (dated 1782 or 1785). Kutuzov regarded
for the long silence of the War College on this accurate fire as the essence of jaeger tactics, and he
important branch of the service. maintained that the purpose of the jaegers' life was
Considerable biographical interest attached to to second the work of the. troops of the line by
the instructions and tactical drills of Aleksandr operating in woods, villages, defiles and other
Suvorov (see p. 191), and to the teachings of kinds of difficult terrain that were inaccessible to
Mikhail Ilarionovich Kutuzov, who was already their heavier-footed brethren.
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 185

Knowledge of a wider military world was could provide — new flotillas swimming on the
diffused through translations of the classics of southern waters, gardens that sprang up overnight,
foreign lands and Antiquity. The middle decades and Balkan and Caucasian princes who prostrated
of the century saw the appearance in Russian of themselves at her feet. The Prince de Ligne was
editions of Vauban (by Vasilii Suvorov, 1744), de glad to see that Catherine did not permit her
Saxe (1751), Montecuccoli (1760), Vegetius judgment to be swayed.
(1764) and Folard (1781). Frederick's instructions All of this was achieved without battles or
to his generals were published four times between sieges, and during the whole period Western
1761 and 1791. Journals of every description Europe showed an astonishing complaisance
flourished in later years. towards the extension of Russian power. Maria
Theresa and Joseph II were glad to have the good
offices of Catherine to bring to an end the costly
The New Byzantium, the Turkish war of 1787-92 little War of the Bavarian Succession with Prussia.
Russia promised to act as a guarantor of the
In 1775 Potemkin was made governor-general and accord, and on 13 May 1779 the Russian delegate
viceroy of the southern provinces of New Russia, Prince Nikolai Repnin could report that an agree-
Azov and Astrakhan. Two years later he toured ment had been reached at Teschen:
these extensive territories, and revolved schemes
The peace has been signed. . . . I make bold to
for the implementation of a grandiose 'Greek
congratulate Your Imperial Highness for this
Project', which might expel the Turks from
achievement — indeed the credit belongs to no
Europe, and re-establish the Byzantine empire
one more properly than to Yourself. It was the
under a sovereign of Russian blood. Romantic and
exertion of Your power, directed by Your genius,
chimerical in appearance, Potemkin's design
which gave peace to that part of the world, and
embodied something of the irresistible southward
now Germany will unite with Russia to bless
drive of Catherine's Russia, as expressed in the
Your reign. Your glory is already immortal, and
colonisation of the steppes, and the striving to rid
now it has acquired a new brilliance. Admiration,
Russia once and for all of the surviving Moslem
respect and love are the sentiments which will draw
bridgeheads on the northern shores of the Black
towards You not just the hearts of Your own
Sea.
subjects, but of Europe in its entirety. (SIRIO,
On two occasions after the peace of 1774 1888, LXV, 487)
Catherine's armies invaded the Crimea on behalf of
the Russian party among the Tartars, and finally in The episode lent further encouragement to the
1783 the Russians dared to annex the Crimea and Russian perception of herself as a lofty arbiter in
the Kuban outright, and extend their protector- the quarrels of Western Europe.
ship into Georgia. A further reaching-out of The grateful Austrians went on to conclude a
Russian ambitions was implicit in the creation of defensive alliance with Russia in 1781, and six
the Black Sea Fleet, which owned bases at years later they became a partner in the new war
Nikolaev, Kherson and Taganrog on the mainland, against the Turks. Britain and France were mean-
and the newly founded port of Sevastopol in the while engaged in a struggle of their own. The
Crimea. British looked to Russia for help in concluding
Catherine travelled south in 1787, and by her the Peace of Versailles in 1783, and the
imperial presence she drew international attention impoverished French went on to sign a treaty of
to the importance of the annexations. At the trade with the mighty eastern empire in 1786.
rebuilt town of Kherson she met Emperor Joseph After so many years of provocations on their
II of Austria, no less, and she continued her part, it is odd to find the Russians taken by surprise
famous progress into the Crimea. The journey was when the Turks finally opened hostilities in 1787.
attended with all the tasteful details that Potemkin The new annexations stood in some danger, and
186 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96

THE TURKISH W A R , 1787-91/2

 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 187

notably the Crimea and its hinterland, which Catherine's armies.

formed a vulnerable appendage within easy reach In 1789 Rumyantsev was eased out of the
of the Turkish fortress-port of Ochakov. Aleksandr command against the Turks, and Potemkin was
Suvorov had the command in the Crimea, and he invested with the direction of all the forces on the
performed a valuable service when in the late southern theatre. The Turks were in an aggressive
autumn he beat off and ultimately destroyed a mood, being determined to strike at the junction
Turkish amphibious force at Kinburn. between the Russian and Austrian forces, and in
The Russians therefore won the time to build the event the hottest combats and the most
up two forces to act against the Turkish holdings strenuous marches were endured by the division of
on the north-west corner of the Black Sea in 1788. Suvorov, which was assigned to co-operate with
The veteran Rumyantsev led 37,000 men the Austrian corps of Saxe-Coburg. This Third
across the Dniester, while Potemkin in person Division, or the 'Suvorov division', became
assumed command of a host of 93,000 troops, or something of an elite force, and it twice executed
two-thirds of the available force. His objective was forced marches to come to the help of the
to reduce Ochakov, and so eliminate the possibility Austrians, and twice joined with them to defeat
of the powerful new Turkish fleet throwing forces the Turks in the open field — at Fokshani on 20
on to the northern shore of the Black Sea. July, and again at Rymnik on 11 September, when
Potemkin arrived before Ochakov in June, but the allies killed 5,000 of the enemy. These victories
he was so unwilling to compromise his reputation helped to secure Moldavia for the Russians, and
by any risky venture that he established the army Suvorov was rewarded with the St George first
into an entrenched camp for what turned out to class, and the title of count with the suffix of
be a long stay. On a bitterly cold 6 December, 'Rymnikskii'.
after he had exhausted every other expedient, In 1790 Catherine stood in need of spectacular
Potemkin was reduced to throwing six columns at and clear-cut victories. She aimed no longer to
the fortress. The Russians stormed over the implement the 'Greek Project', but to enable her
Turkish entrenchment, the fortress ramparts diplomats to free Russia from its military entangle-
proper, and finally the Hassan Pasha Castle at the ments on honourable terms. France was in a state
tip of the peninsula behind. They lost 956 dead of revolution, which was fraught with incalculable
and a nominal 1,829 wounded, though many consequences, and elsewhere in Europe the mood
more men probably died over the following days of acquiescence had passed. Prussia was building
from wounds and cold. The Turks had more than up concentrations of force in Silesia and in the
4,000 of their men captured, and over 9,500 Baltic provinces, while the British Prime Minister
killed. When the carnage was over, Pitt was wondering whether to resort to some
military action on behalf of the Turks (even if he
piles of naked corpses were heaped on the frozen
was unable to find Ochakov on his map). Sweden
Liman. They remained there until the thaw, and
made peace with Russia on 14 August, which put
the Russian ladies made circuits of the human
an end to an irritating diversion in the Baltic (see
pyramids in their sleighs, so as to admire the fine
p. 189), but in the next month Russia's Austrian
bodies of the Moslems, all rigid with cold.
allies dropped out of the war with Turkey.
(Masson, 1859, 199)
The Russian army of 31,000 men was set the
Potemkin returned to St Petersburg in triumph, task of reducing the newly strengthened fortress of
and ribbons, gold crosses and silver medals rained Izmail, which offered the Turks a bridgehead on
down on the army. Ochakov was an undeniable the north bank of one of the main arms of the
gain, but the inordinate delays and the final Danube delta. The Russians arrived before Izmail
bloody storm revealed a total lack of Russian very late in the season, and the lack of shelter
competence in formal siegework, and conse- and the mounting sickness so depressed the
quently an important gap in the repertoire of generals that they decided to call off the opera-
1 8 8 Catherine II, ' t h e Great' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

tion. On 2 December, however, Suvorov arrived to June he turned 10,000 Turks out of their camp at
take over the local command. He rejected all the Babadag. Then Prince Repnin assembled the
defeatist counsels, and his presence made an entire army, and advancing in the customary
immediate impact on the spirit of the troops. To Russian formation of squares he broke the main
the Due de Richelieu it seemed that his style was Turkish force at Machin on 28 June.
that of a Cossack or Tartar chieftain, rather than After long negotiations, Turkey and Russia
the commander of a European army. signed a treaty of peace at Jassy on 29 December
Suvorov did not hesitate to pronounce that the 1791/9 January 1792. The new and advantageous
place must be taken by assault. Within ten days Russian borders ran along the Dniester to the
the troops had put together 27,000 fascines for west, and the further edge of the Kuban plain to
filling the ditches, and forty ladders for scaling the the east, and in between Russia gained undisputed
walls, and they were made to carry out mock attacks possession of the Crimea, Ochakov and all the
on a facsimile of a fortress rampart which was northern coast of the Black Sea.
built nearby. 'In these rehearsals Suvorov carried Concerning the Russian military performance,
realism so far that he trained the recruits to thrust we have detailed evaluations from the Frenchmen
their bayonets into fascines which had been set up Richelieu and Langeron, and the Austrian de
specifically for the purpose' (Richelieu, SIRIO, Ligne. They expressed their admiration for
1886, LIV, 174). Potemkin's new uniforms, for the spirit and
The assault on Izmail was delivered under cover cheerfulness of the troops, and the excellent
of a dense mist at half past five on the morning of quality of the infantry, and especially the grena-
11 December 1790. The nine columns came in diers. They deplored the feebleness of the cavalry,
from all sides at once. By the late morning the the excessive quantities of baggage and hangers-on,
Russians had mastered three of the gates, but the the lack of care for the welfare of the men, and a
fight was prolonged inside the town for several disregard for professionalism and military science
hours more, and the Russians frequently had to which seemed to bode ill for the Russians in any
bring up artillery to overcome the resistance of the confrontation with a Western army. As a student
Turks in the narrow streets and the stone-built of military history, the adopted Russian Pishchevich
houses. One of the bloodiest days of the century concluded that the Turks had been a considerable
ended with an estimated 26,000 Turkish soldiers offensive force in the early eighteenth century,
and civilians dead, and 9,000 more prisoners in and that they were still capable of putting up a
the hands of the Russians. The assailants them- good fight in Rumyantsev's War. During the last
selves lost 1,815 dead and 2,445 wounded, 'but it war, however, they had shown themselves to be
is impossible to deny, from the political and timorous in combat, and thus 'the fates decreed
military point of view, that they were more than that Russia should complete the process of des-
compensated by the total destruction of an army truction which had been begun by Prince Eugene
of nearly 40,000 men, and the conquest of one of of Savoy' (Pishchevich, 1885,143).
the keys of the Ottoman empire' (Richelieu, Catherine was aware of the kind of thing that
SIRIO, 1886, LIV, 192). people were saying about her armies, and she put
In 1791 the last campaign of the Turkish war the more unfavourable comments down to the
was prosecuted in an atmosphere of international West's hatred and ignorance of Russia. She pointed
tension, for it seemed quite possible that Prussia out how after recent wars the Russians had
was about to open hostilities on the northern restored vast conquests which it had been in their
theatre. The Russians, therefore, had to do some- power to retain — namely East Prussia and part of
thing energetic to break up the concentration of Pomerania to Frederick, and the Greek archipelago
80,000 men that the Turks were building up in the to the Turks. As for the capacity of her military
neighbourhood of Izmail. First of all Kutuzov leaders,
sallied out of Izmail with 12,000 men, and on 3
 Catherine 11, 'the Great' 1762-96 189
our generals have some claim to the esteem of the Finland in the midsummer of 1788, but he essayed
critics, taking into account the manifold wars in nothing more than a feeble bombardment of
which they have served, all the battles they have Fredrikshamn and a vain siege of Nyslot before the
won, all the towns they have taken, the variety sickly and demoralised forces had to retrace their
of European and Asiatic troops they have beaten, steps.
and the multitude of provinces they have More interesting were the events at sea, where
conquered. Altogether it has been possible for a the Swedes made their main effort with their well-
single individual in our own time to have done more found fleet and galley flotilla. However, the
and seen more than entire generations in times Swedes lost most of the encounters in the more
past. (To J. Zimmermann, 26 Jan. 1191, SIRIO, open waters, and their galley flotilla, after a
1888, LV, 274) spirited performance, was finally shut up in the
Bay of Rochensalm. Gustavus had to contend with
a vociferous political opposition at home, and on
Westward diversion — the Swedish War 1788-90 3 (14) August 1790 the Swedes came to terms at
Verela, and recognised the line of the border as
At a time when Russia's main forces were engaged it had run before the war.
on the southern theatre, Catherine was presented The Western world was changing fast. Two
with an annoying and potentially dangerous threat years after the peace, Gustavus III was killed by an
from Sweden in the Baltic. In 1788 King Gustavus assassin. Catherine was horrified by the deed,
III of Sweden made some patently impossible which she attributed to Jacobins, and she began to
demands for the restitution of all Finland to cast about for allies as a security against the
Sweden, and of the Crimea to the Turks. When bellicose Revolution which had overtaken France.
Russia refused, he opened hostilities on land and
sea.
The embarrassment, to the Russians came not The emergence of Suvorov
from any major resurgence of Swedish military
power, but from the fact that Catherine's best In the last decade of the century the Russian army
forces and best generals were committed against lost two of its heroes of olden times. In the
the Turks, and because the theatre of war so autumn of 1791, after a final glorious reception in
directly concerned Russia's outlets to the West. St Petersburg, Potemkin travelled south to the
Semen Vorontsov wrote that for this reason the territories which he had helped to make secure'for
smallest reverse in the Swedish war would prove Russia. On 5 October he was taken ill on the way
more serious than a full battle lost against the to Nikolaev. He was helped from his carriage, and
Turks: 'I would be prepared to yield up thirty died on a cloak that was spread out for him on the
Crimeas for the gain of Helsingfors and Sveaborg, road.
without which St Petersburg will never live in For years now the crusty old Field-Marshal
security against a coup de main' (to A. Vorontsov, Rumyantsev, as governor of Little Russia, had seen
31 May 1790, AKV, 1870-95, IX, 173-4). his officers starved of promotion, and his ragged
As things turned out, the fighting on land was troops suffer from material want. The preference
confined to feeble demonstrations on either side was given in every way to the armies and provinces
of the border. In the perilous first year of the war lying at the disposal of Potemkin. The final
the Russians held their part of Finland with less disappointment came in 1789, when Rumyantsev
than 20,000 men, standing under the command of was removed from active field command in the
Generalanshef Musin-Pushkin, who was 'certainly war against the Turks. He retired to his estates,
no sage, but at least an honourable and brave man' where he was sought out only by friends like
(Petr Zavadovskii, 1 June 1789, AKV, 1870-95, Suvorov, or curious foreign tourists. An Englishman
XII, 62). Gustavus III crossed the border of Russian succeeded in tracking him down in one of his
1 9 0 Catherine II, ' t h e G r e a t ' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

castles in little Russia, and found that the field- Astrakhanskii and Ingermanlandskii regiments,
marshal's conversation was easy and undogmatic, which were old and famous units, yielding in
and enlivened with a caustic humour. prestige only to the Guards.
Suvorov was given his practical schooling in the
Even the dishabille of such a man is worth
Seven Years War. He received his baptism of blood
remembering. It consisted of a white cotton night
in 1759, in the campaign of Kunersdorf, and two
cap, a brown old greatcoat, a grey silk quilted
years later he experienced independent command
waistcoat, dark casimir breeches and boots. In
as leader of bodies of Cossacks and hussars against
his stature he is tall and lusty, though his tallness
Platen and other elusive enemies. In August 1762,
is concealed by his being so ill of foot. His face
immediately after the war, Suvorov was appointed
is large and protuberant so as to remind me, as
his person likewise did, of old Mr. Boucherett colonel of the Astrakhanskii:
and Lord North. (Parkinson, 1971, 206) He was most desirous to show the regiment how a
storm ought to be carried out. On the march they
Rumyantsev was recalled to the service in 1794,
came across a monastery, and from his ardent
but he fell into disfavour with the new Emperor
imagination Suvorov immediately conjured up a
Paul, after some remarks he made on the subject
plan of assault. At his signal the regiment threw
of the novel infantry code, and he died on 8
itself at the walls, according to the accepted rules
December 1796.
for storming a fortress, and the victory was
Long afterwards veteran commanders used to
crowned by the capture of the monastery.
assert that 'Potemkin's soldiers were quite different
Catherine expressed a desire to see the madman
from those of Rumyantsev' (Lubyanovskii, 1872,
who was responsible for this deed, and their first
92). Troops who knew them both used to recall
meeting, as Suvorov says, opened for him the road
Potemkin with affection,
to glory. (Fuchs, 1827, 115. This was a good
but it cheered us up to go campaigning with our exercise, since monasteries constituted some of
little father Count Petr Aleksandrovich, even the very rare stone-walled buildings in Russia.)
though he filled us with terror. He was bursting
A few months later Suvorov assumed command
with life, and when he looked in our direction he
of the Suzdalskii Regiment, and put it through a
used to give us some roubles, and somehow he
rigorous programme of training according to his
made us feel very brave. (Quoted in Engelhardt,
'Suzdal Regulations' of 1763-4. At the beginning
1868,130)
of the troubles in Poland, in the early winter of
A third leader, greater in his way than 1768, Suvorov executed a celebrated one-month
Rumyantsev or Potemkin, was shortly going to forced march from Lake Ladoga to join a corps at
bring the Russian army to the attention of the Smolensk. He went on to become one of the few
West in a very dramatic manner. We have encoun- leaders to emerge with an enhanced reputation
tered Aleksandr Vasilevich Suvorov as the victor of from these peculiarly frustrating campaigns, first
Fokshani and Rymnik. He was bom in 1725 to a as brigade commander, then, from January 1770,
noble family settled in reasonably comfortable as major-general.
circumstances in the province of Orel. His father, After the Polish and Turkish wars, Suvorov held
Vasilii Ivanovich, was a well-read soldier, who was manoeuvres in the conquered southern provinces,
the author of the first Russian translation of the and for the sake of the participating regiments he
works of Vauban. Young Aleksandr devoured the issued his new instructions 'for the Kuban and
tales of military heroes in his father's library, and Crimean corps' on 16 May 1778. Suvorov here
after studies in the Cadet Corps and along spell as a allowed himself considerable freedom, because the
supernumerary NCO in the Semenovskii Regiment, official codes had little to say on the subject of
he was commissioned into the army proper in warfare against the Turks.
1754. He saw his first real soldiers in the The early 1790s brought Suvorov the St George,
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 191

and fame and a certain amount of notoriety for kind, Suvorov attained his results not by driving
the bloody storms of Izmail and Praga. Suvorov his men into the ground, but through regular,
used the subsequent lull veiy much as he had done easy progress, and good administration.
in similar circumstances twenty years before, Suvorov gave much thought to the choice of
training his command of troops in southern tactical formations. In his Crimean and Kuban
Russia, and putting together his notions on war- instructions of 1778 he was willing to uphold an
fare. The product in this case was the celebrated essential distinction between the methods to be
Art of Victory (Nauka Pobezhda), which was employed on Western and Eastern theatres.
first circulated in 1795. The document comprised
Against regular armies we use lines — as in the
two sections — a Vakht-Parad, instructing the
late war with Prussia. Against irregular forces we
officers on tactical formations, and then an
employ the formations in use in the last Turkish
exposition of the underlying principles of combat.
war. Deep squares are clumsy. Regimental
No less revealing were the many instructions which
squares are the most flexible of all, but battalion
Suvorov penned for the benefit of the astonished
squares are best for laying down a cross-fire. . . .
Austrians who found themselves under his
Such formations worked to terrible effect against
command in north Italy in 1799. In all of this
whole hosts of Stamboulers in the recent war.
Suvorov wrote and spoke in his characteristically
Woods, water, mountains, ravines — nothing was
lapidary style, which comes across well in Russian,
capable of stopping them (Gippius, in Skalon,
with its lack of articles, but is reduced to clumsy
1902-c.l 911, IV, pt 1, bk 2, sect. 3,118).
circumlocutions when rendered into English.
For Suvorov, training was the foundation of the The advent of the Revolutionary Wars induced
military art: 'Train hard, fight easy. Train easy, Suvorov to consider applying something of the
and you will have hard fighting' (Mikhnevich, in same principles on the Western theatre as well. In
Skalon, 1902-C.1911, IV, Introduction, 208). The The Art of Victory he wrote that the lunatic
.process of military education embraced everyone, French were in the habit of using columns in
from recruit to army commander, and it was to be regular warfare, which might compel the Russians
systematic and realistic throughout. Progress was to do the same, and on arriving in Italy in 1799
to be achieved through patience, repetition and he advised the Austrians to attack the enemy in
practical demonstration. During the season of multiple columns or ranks. In his more detailed
summer manoeuvres, Suvorov assembled the prescriptions, however, he recommended that the
regiments under his command in three or four army should deploy at one thousand paces from
camps, and put the troops through the complete the enemy, and continue the advance in a forma-
repertoire of military operations — forced marches, tion of two lines, with the cavalry drawn up on the
mock battles, and storms on fortresses and camps. flanks, or placed in the rear as a third line. Perhaps
Lives were always lost in the process. No other he believed that the Austrians were not suffi-
army of the age subjected itself to such an ordeal ciently schooled in his methods to be able to
in peacetime, and Langeron admits that he had abandon the conventional linear tactics.
been horrified by some of Suvorov's practices, like Suvorov had no such hesitations about recom-
sending cavalry to charge flat out against infantry. mending the use of the bayonet in Western war-
He afterwards recognised that there could have fare, maintaining that this weapon had decisive
been no better training for real combat. moral and physical advantages over the musket
From Suvorov's teachings and campaigns we ball, that 'crazy bitch'.
can arrive at some comprehension of the great
man's way of warfare. Speedy movement was We must attack!!! [he urged the Austrians in
fundamental to Suvorov's strategy, and many were 1799] Cold steel - bayonets and sabres! Push
the famous marches to his credit. Like Marlborough, the enemy over, hammer them down, don't lose
Stonewall Jackson and other commanders of the a moment! Overcome everything that stands in
1 9 2 Catherine II, ' t h e Great' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

your way, however insurmountable it might necessary and useful, providing it is very loud.
appear! Follow on their heels, destroy them to Music doubles, trebles the force of the army. When
the last man! The Cossacks will catch the I took Izmail, it was with the cross in the hands of
fugitives and all their baggage. Forward without the priest, with flying colours, and with loud
rest, exploit the victory! . . . As for drawing up music' (Fuchs, 1827,45).
the order of battle, that's Chasteler's affair In the tradition of Rumyantsev, Suvorov got his
[Chasteler was Suvorov's Austrian chief of staff]. officers and doctors to keep the welfare of the
(Suvorov, 1949-53, IV, 13) men in the forefront of their attentions. Officers
who failed in this respect were placed under arrest,
It is by no means certain that Suvorov really and NCOs were flogged. Suvorov prided himself,
expected that his men would be engaged at with no very good reason, on the extent of his
bayonet point. In the wars of the period the herbal and medicinal knowledge. Some of his
number of verifiable instances of such encounters peasant remedies probably did more harm than
is extraordinarily rare, for it is not in human • good, and on occasion Suvorov chased the patients
nature to withstand the ordeal. The one exception from the hospitals, declaring that his soldiers were
is offered by the fighting for fortifications or not allowed to be sick. However, the troops only
entrenchments, since the defenders were often accepted these attentions as further evidence of
inclined or forced to stand their ground. When their commander's concern. 'Suvorov was a
Suvorov advocated his 'through attack' with cold barbarian and a clown, but at the same time
steel, he probably intended to overcome the possibly the general best suited to the genius of
natural instinct of the infantry, which was to come the Russians. The soldiers loved him. The officers
to a wavering halt at about three hundred paces thought he was odd, but they fought with con-
from the enemy, and open a ragged and ineffective fidence under his command' (Masson, 1859, 331).
exchange of fire. It seems likely that Suvorov's It was characteristic that Suvorov reserved his
bloodthirsty exhortations were designed to carry sharpest asperities for his officers rather than his
his troops through this zone with momentum men. Nothing was better calculated to arouse his
undiminished, which would indeed have caused ire than vagueness or irresolution — 'God save us
the enemy to collapse in the way he so often from the "don't knows"!' (Engelhardt, 1868,
described. 183). He liked to test people by putting to them
In fact all of Suvorov's operations were 'so the most arcane questions, and he was delighted
disposed as to work on the morale of men — when he received an answer which betrayed expert
whether his own troops or the enemy's' knowledge, or at least confidence and a ready wit:
(Engelhardt, 1868, 183). He had at his command a 'How many fish are there in the Danube?'
range of artful effects, calculated to strike the 'Forty-two-and-a-half million!'
imagination of the soldiers. Deliberately rejecting 'How far is it to the sky?'
pomp and state, he stumped around the army in a 'For Suvorov, two campaigns!'
ragged soldier's coat, and when he had to go 'How many stars are there in the heavens?'
somewhere on horseback he borrowed the first nag 'I'll begin counting — one, two, three, four . . .'
to come to hand. He shared likewise the soldiers' 'What do they eat in Revel on Thursdays?'
belief in the 'Russian God', and was ready to take 'Cabbage soup!' (This from an officer who knew
issue with anybody who maintained the superiority that they consumed this substance on every day
of the French language and manners. 'Speak and of the week.)
read French, by all means, but do so in such a way Suvorov wished operational orders to be clear
that everybody knows that you are a Russian' and concise, and to allow plenty of freedom to the
(Fuchs, 1827, 145). He rejected a suggestion that men on the spot. For general guidance, however,
the Russians should rid themselves of their cus- he stressed the importance of three fundamental
tomary hosts of musicians: 'No! Music is both principles of warfare, namely coup d'oeil, speed
 Catherine 11, 'the Great' 1762-96 193

56 Suvorov the man-manager 57 Suvorov in English caricature

and impact. By coup d'oeil Suvorov understood the taut intelligence of a von Moltke the Elder, but
the ability to size up a military situation, and devise the gaunt cheeks and staring eyes imprinted the
the appropriate response swiftly and accurately. expression with the fanaticism of the Old
As for the other two principles, 'speed and impact Testament prophet. Oblivious of who might be
are the soul of present-day warfare. A fleeing present, Suvorov doused himself with cold water,
enemy can be destroyed only through pursuit' and capered naked on the grass until he was dry
(undated 1799, Suvorov, 1949-53, IV, 20). and warm. He might then get his army under way
Suvorov's behaviour and character were the by crowing three times like a cock.
subject of unfailing interest for his contemporaries. Suvorov took his simple lunch on a wooden
From his rough-sounding name ('Souworow') and platter at any time between eight and eleven. He
his rougher reputation, English caricaturists used downed a large glass of vodka beforehand, and up
to represent him as a bullet-headed and bewhiskered to two glasses of wine during the actual meal, but
thug, quite at variance with the thin, stooping his servant Timchenko was always at hand to
figure which actually emerged from lodging or prevent him from emptying a third. A less narrow-
tent at about six every morning. The face had the minded retainer, a Cossack, accompanied him into
wrinkled aspect of a Voltaire, and something of the field with a bottle of very strong punch.
1 9 4 Catherine II, ' t h e Great' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

his army or on parade Suvorov could stand for half

an hour at a time on one leg, shouting or singing.
In a salon, in the midst of a most numerous
company, he was liable to jump onto a table or
chair, or throw himself flat on the floor. On one
occasion he gave vent to lamentations on the death
of a turkey, which had been decapitated by a
soldier. He kissed the defunct fowl, and tried to
set the head back on the neck. (Langeron, RS,
1895, LXXXIII, 156)
Those who knew Suvorov were aware that he
was not the lunatic that he pretended to be.
Fuchs was at a loss to account for the eccentri-
cities, but Engelhardt and Segur believed that they
were a device to disarm potential enemies in the
army and at court. Langeron noticed how Suvorov
exploited these occasions to convey some sharp
comments or telling lessons, and he suspected that
the inspiration went back to a comment of
Catherine, who once said in Suvorov's hearing that
all great men were slightly odd.
Behaviour of this kind encouraged a belief that
Suvorov's knowledge of the art of war was purely
instinctive. In fact, Suvorov was one of the best-
read commanders of the time, being acquainted
with the doings and writings of the military heroes
of classical antiquity, as well as more recent
58 Aleksandr Vasilevich Suvorov. The decoration
authorities like Vauban, Coehoorn, Montecuccoli,
on the far right is the Austrian Military Order of
Turenne, Eugene and Frederick the Great. He had
Maria Theresa
a fluent command of French, German, Greek and
'Suvorov called it his "lemonade", and drank it Turkish, in addition to the Latin of his Roman
unceasingly, as a result of which he rapidly attained authors, and his knowledge of current military
what you might term an excitable condition' events enabled him to pass some extremely acute
(Langeron, i^iS", 1895, LXXXIII, 159). judgments. Count Rostopchin once asked him to
select the greatest commanders of history, and
In the late afternoon Suvorov selected his next
himself made a few suggestions to that end. At
resting place, in which matter he had certain
each contribution Suvorov crossed himself, and
preferences. The first man on the scene was an
then he whispered a few words in Rostopchin's
officer, who was careful to remove the windows
ear — to wit, Hannibal, Julius Caesar — and
and any other objects of glass, whereupon an
Napoleon Bonaparte.
orderly brought in a mobile thunderbox, and a
bale of straw which he dumped on the floor to As a man of wide culture, Suvorov was able to
serve as Suvorov's bed. converse with the Austrian general Zach on
Cervantes' Don Quixote, and talk sensibly about
When Suvorov wished to put on a special
the canvases he saw in the Italian galleries on his
performance, some of the details almost surpass
campaign of 1799. Like Bonaparte and other men
belief:
of action at the time, he was also given to occa-
All sorts of oddities might be seen. At the head of sional 'Ossianising' — best described as moods of
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 195
faintly melancholy reflection on the mutability of Kosciuszko with his inferior forces at Dubienka on
human affairs. 18 July. On 23 January the next year Russia and
It was therefore with the authority of a true Prussia concluded the second of the series of
intellectual that Suvorov could maintain that infamous treaties of Polish partition. The 1793
brainpower alone had a very limited capacity to version enabled the Prussians to occupy the salient
influence events in the real world. He was scornful of Polish territory between West Prussia and
of the proliferation of French literature on the art Silesia, while Russia's new border was carried
of war: westward by an average of two hundred miles,
taking in the extensions of White Russia and the
It is amazing . . . how more was written about
Ukraine, and giving the Russians a direct and
tactics in the reign of Louis XV than at any other
secure avenue to the Balkans. The rump of Poland
time, and yet how appalling was the role of the
came under Russian and Prussian 'protectorship'.
French army in military events. Who were its
Polish defiance burst forth in an insurrection in
leaders? My God, Soubise and Clermont! What
the spring of 1794. General Tormasov with about
were it's examples of the military spirit? Why,
3,500 Russians were defeated at Raclawice on 4
Rossbach and Minden! (Fuchs, 1827, 101).
April, which gave the signal for a general uprising,
and on 17 and 18 April the Russian and Prussian
garrisons were evicted from Warsaw. The Patriots
The extinction of Poland, 1792-5 did remarkably well, considering that their leaders
were given to seeking ill-judged actions in the open
Having annihilated the Turkish army at Izmail, field, and that their small forces of regular troops
Suvorov and his Russians before long wrought the and Polish ex-Russian deserters had to be filled
same carnage among the Poles. Now that she was out with masses of scythe-wielding peasants.
free of the war in the south, Catherine made ready Kosciuszko was defeated at Rawka on 6 June,
to send her armies into Poland, where a party of which led to the loss of Cracow, but the spread of
Patriots was taking active steps to reverse the the insurrection to western Poland caused the
process of decline and partition which threatened Prussians to steal away from the scene of opera-
to destroy their country. Russian columns marched tions at the beginning of September.
briskly into Poland in the high summer of 1792, While the Poles fortified Warsaw as a central
defeating the Patriot commander Thaddeus point d'appui, the Russians were active on two
theatres — in the east, where Suvorov was coming
up with an army from the Ukraine, and in the
south, where the Russian forces lay under the
command of the German general Johann Fersen, a
quiet man with a tremendous presence, who was
'genuinely attached to our great fatherland, and
served it not as a mercenary but as a devoted son'
(Wiegel, 1864-6,1, pt 1,96).
Seeking to prevent a junction of the Russian
forces, Kosciuszko and his 7,000 men were caught
at Maciejowice on the Dniester by Fersen, who
enjoyed a two-fold superiority. The Poles were
attacked and annihilated on 10 October.
Kosciuszko himself was gravely wounded, and
shortly afterwards he fell into the hands of a party
of marauding Cossacks. Colonel Adrian Denisov
59 Catherine tempted by the Devil was the first Russian officer to arrive on the scene,
1 9 6 C a t h e r i n e II, ' t h e G r e a t ' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

and found that Kosciuszko was alive A third, complete and final partition was
accomplished by Russian treaties with Austria on
but so pale that he looked like a corpse. His head
3 January 1795, and with Prussia on 24 October.
was covered with blood, and his feet were without
In the process Poland disappeared from the map
boots. He was dressed in a kaftan, done up with a
altogether. Russia's new borders now marched for
great number of buttons, and in satin waistcoat
about 360 miles each with those of Prussia and
and pantaloons. I remembered that I had with
Austria, taking in 45,000 square miles of Kurland,
me an engraving of his portrait for just such an
Samogitia, Lithuania, Podlesia and Volhynia.
eventuality. I took it out, and found a very
Between 1772 and 1795 the process of partition
strong likeness. (Denisov, RS, 1874, XI, 407)
had advanced Catherine's frontiers three hundred
The disaster of Maciejowice left Warsaw as the miles to the west on a frontage of no less than six
only major seat of the insurrection. Here about hundred miles, and acquired six million new
30,000 Poles were ensconced on the east bank of subjects for the delights of Russian rule. Poles
the Vistula in the bridgehead fortifications at made up more than half of the 800,000 serfs who
Praga, determined to resist to the last. Suvorov were granted to the nobles in Catherine's reign.
came up with an army reduced by its exertions
to perhaps as little as 16,000 men, but in com-
pensation these troops were infuriated by the The last years of Catherine
Polish resistance, and by the tales of the atrocities
inflicted on the Russian garrison in Warsaw in the The Russians were scarcely likely to be downcast
spring. by the work of killing Poles and Turks, or by the
Without going through so much as a pretence at disapprobation of men of sensibility. The empress
formal siege, Suvorov committed his army to an herself is supposed to have criticised Prince Nikolai
outright assault on 24 October (4 November) Vasilevich Repnin for the sainte humanite he
1794. In three hours of fighting, and in the subse- displayed in Lithuania. The undeniable malaise of
quent butchery, an estimated 13,000 rebels and the final years of Catherine's army proceeded not
unarmed civilians were killed, about 14,500 were from any events in the field, but from an all-
captured, about 2,000 more perished in the pervading atmosphere of corruption. The scandals
Vistula in the attempt to reach the Warsaw bank. could be attributed in general terms to the
weakening of Catherine's physical and moral
You would have had to have been an eyewitness, forces, as the future Emperor Alexander believed,
to form a picture of the frightfulness of the storm but more specifically to the failings in the
towards the end. Every conceivable form of commissariat.
violent death had been perpetrated on every yard
of ground as far as the Vistula, while the bank The frightful abuses and waste which crept into
of the river was piled with heaps of the bodies of this branch of the state first took root and
the dead or dying — warriors, townspeople, Jews, developed from 1775. They proceeded by no
monks, women and lads. (Engelhardt, 1868,177) means from the institutions as such, but from the
influence of powerful favourites, and so they
Warsaw surrendered without resistance, and the
became general, extending beyond the military
remnants of the Polish army were overhauled and
machine to all departments of government.
forced to lay down their arms. For this achieve-
(S. R. Vorontsov;v4^K, 1870-95, XXIX, 465)
ment Suvorov received the rank of field-marshal,
and a vast estate at Kobrin with 6,922 male serfs. In the matter of the commissariat proper, the
A superb new uniform arrived as a personal frauds endemic in the equipment department
present from Catherine, and as was his wont, were far exceeded by those perpetrated in that
Suvorov greeted the object with hugs, kisses and of food supply (Proviant), where the fraudulent
signs of the cross. dealings alienated 'all those honest contractors
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 197

60 Catherine the Great with her family and leading courtiers, 1782. Left to right: Potemkin, Bezborodko,
the juvenile grand princes, Alexander and Constantine, Grand Princess Maria Theodorovna, Catherine the
Great, Betzkoi, Grand Prince Pavel Petrovich (the future Paul I), Repnin, Panin, Lanskoi, Naryshkin,
Ostermann. In the background is the 'bronze horseman', Catherine's monument to Peter the Great

who were willing to provide the sustenance of the in 1789, at a time when he was the only present-
army at an infinitely cheaper rate' (Rzhevskii, RA, able junior officer in sight, and Catherine accord-
1879, XVII, pt 1, 358). Altogether, wrote ingly made him an aide-de-camp and installed him
Langeron, 'there never existed, and never will in the customary apartment of her favourites at
exist, more barefaced swindlers than the personnel Tsarskoe Selo. Zubov became lieutenant-general
of these departments' (Langeron, RS, 1895, in 1792, and in the following year he was appointed
LXXXIII, 150). The glorious example of the chiefs Master General of the Ordnance instead of the far
was sedulously imitated by the petty functionaries better-qualified Melissino.
at the regimental level. In such an atmosphere, well-placed generals
As for the favourites, we have seen how the attracted trains of toadies of the sort described in
reign of the Orlov dynasty was succeeded in the unbridled terms by one of Potemkin's secretaries
1770s by that of Potemkin, which lasted until in the Ochakov campaign of 1788:
1791. The existence of these virtual aimants en
My God! What outbursts of temper, what
titre by no means deterred Catherine from seeking
defamations and slanders gush forth at
a little variety in her menfolk. Nobody could say
headquarters and in the staff when the officers
much to the discredit of Aleksandr Dmitrevich
consider the new promotions. If one of them has *
Lanskoi or Semen Gavriilovich Zorich, who were
received a rapid advancement, the others in their
reasonably honest as well as handsome. However,
rage will invent and attribute to him every possible
a great deal of harm was done by the last of the
shortcoming. (Tsebrikov, RS, 1895, LXXXIV,
lesser favourites, Platon Aleksandrovich Zubov.
201-2)
This fortunate young gentleman was said to have
been introduced to the empress by Nikolai Saltykov There existed no individuals or organisations
1 9 8 Catherine II, ' t h e Great' 1 7 6 2 - 9 6

strong enough to withstand the tide of corruption. It is impossible for the soldier to stand, sit or walk
At the War College, the upright but ineffective comfortably. His sword seems to shine like fire,
Nikolai Ivanovich Saltykov (not the same as the but the blade is rusted into the scabbard. His
celebrated Peter Semenovich) took over as act- musket is as bright as a mirror, but it cannot be
ing president after the death of Potemkin in fired with accuracy, on account of the
1791, and he left affairs in the same state of deformation of the stock, which is purposely
disorder as before. At a lower level of military designed to make the weapon impossible to aim,
administration, the inspectors neglected their but merely to seat it directly on the shoulder.
fundamentally important duty of enforcing (Rzhevskii, RA, 1879, XVII, pt 1, 359-60)
standards throughout the army. Typical of the
level of interest of these people was the case of By the nature of things, the mounted arm
Prince Vasilii Vasilevich Dolgorukov, who had the suffered the most from the indifference and
inspectorate of Little Russia. Engelhardt remem- criminality of the colonels. The horses were under-
bered how pleasant it was for young officers to fed and under-exercised, which made for feeble
come under his authority, mounts and inexperienced riders. Most cavalrymen
rode just five or six times a year, and Langeron
since instead of carrying out strict inspections, he could name only four regimental commanders
was interested only in holding festivities in the who were actually capable of staying in the saddle.
camp, so as to entertain his wife, whom he had Among the gunners, Semen Vorontsov observed
just married. He always announced beforehand that the standard of expertise of the officers was
which regiment was to undergo inspection, and pitiable:
for this event the colonels prepared feasts,
illuminations and fireworks. (Engelhardt, I have known some of those people who were
1868,60) ignorant of what elevation to give to their cannon
for ricochet fire. As for the science of higher
If an inspector went so far as to insist on viewing mathematics — so indispensable for mortar fire,
the regiments, the respective colonels conspired to where you have to calculate the trajectory of the
cover their deficiencies. 'In 1796,' says Langeron, bombs — it is something totally unknown to us.
I saw with my own eyes how a very strict inspector (Vorontsov, 'Zapiski', 1 8 0 2 , A K V , 1870-95,
ended up by rejecting one and the same horse in X, 483-4)
four different regiments, without ever noticing the If the artillery was spared the full degradation of
animal's identity' (Langeron, RS, 1895, LXXXIII, the cavalry, it was because the ordinary gunners
199). were chosen from the strongest and most lively of
In these circumstances, all effective authority the recruits, and because at different periods the
was invested in the colonels of the individual arm had enlightened leadership from men like
regiments, which resulted in atrocious abuses that Meller-Zakomelskii or the exotic Petr Ivanovich
were explained in detail by Langeron and Melissino.
Lieutenant-General Stepan Matveeich Rzhevskii. Born to a Greek family of Cephalonia, Melissino
Even where outright corruption was held within was educated in Russia in the Cadet Corps, where
bounds, standards of professionalism were eroded he excelled in the celebrated amateur theatricals of
by officers who took themselves off on long that institution. He picked up his practical know-
leaves, or to early retirement, or who simply left ledge of gunnery in the later campaigns of the
the performance of their duties to others. Seven Years War, and in 1770 as a major-general
There was seldom any doubt as to the battle- he commanded the artillery of Rumyantsev's
worthiness of Suvorov's lean and ferocious infantry. army, and contributed greatly to the victories of
Elsewhere, however, outward appearances were all Larga and Kagul. 1783 brought the rank of
that mattered. lieutenant-general and the post of Director of the
 Catherine II, 'the Great' 1762-96 199

Artillery and Engineering Cadet Corps, though he reign — the westward and southward expansion of
never attained the final prize of the Master lands and population, the foundation of 250
Generalship of the Ordnance. towns, the build-up of the army (from a nominal
This vain, showy and extravagant individual 303,529 in 1765 to 413,473 in 1795), the advance
commanded genuine respect on account of his in society and national self-esteem, and the place
military record, his fluency in eight languages, and secured for Russia in the regard of Europe. Even
his knowledge of gunfounding, mechanics and the stern critic Masson had to admit:
chemistry, as well as the mumbo-jumbo of fashion-
able Freemasonry. Melissino improved the method Taken together, the generosity of Catherine, the
of boring out the artillery in the St Petersburg brilliance of her reign, her magnificent court, her
works, and, braving the contempt of Zubov, he institutions, monuments and wars constituted for
went on to establish six large companies of horse Russia what the century of Louis XIV was for
artillery in the last three years of the reign. Europe. But Catherine was personally greater than
Empress Catherine died on 6 November 1796. that monarch. The French were the glory of
Looking back on her life, people were willing to Louis XIV, whereas Catherine was the glory of the
set aside the weaknesses of the final period, and Russians. (Masson, 1859, 83)
wonder at the great cumulative achievement of her
Nine Paul I 1796-1801

The new Potsdam

The career of the 'great and most wise mother' was

followed to the end by the unblinkingly hostile
gaze of the heir apparent, Grand Prince Pavel
Petrovich. Paul had always considered himself far
less the son of Catherine than the successor of his
putative father, Emperor Peter III. His bent
towards things military had been cultivated by
some devoted tutors — men like Semen Andreevich
Poroshin, and Nikolai Ivanovich Saltykov. Models
of all the types of Russian ordnance had been
prepared for the edification of the tsarevich, and
likewise a number of simplified editions of the
standard books on fortification. However, the
most formative experience of Paul's life was
undoubtedly a visit to Prussia in 1776. On this
occasion Old Fritz explained that he and Paul's
father had been the best of friends, and he put his
perfectly drilled troops through their paces for the
benefit of his young visitor. Paul returned home
more dissatisfied than ever with what he saw of
the Russian army. 'Everything proceeds according
to individual whim,' he complained to General
Petr Panin, 'and this fancy consists of doing
nothing except gratifying one's unbridled passions.
This is the deplorable condition to which our 61 Grenadier and musketeer of the Gatchina
armed forces have sunk' (P. S. Lebedev, RS, Corps, 1793. Sober, neo-Prussian uniforms of
1877, XVIII, 577). green, with red facings and white breeches. The
It is interesting to observe how Paul, apparently 'Union Jack' on the grenadier's mitre cap is the
so Prussian in all his instincts, reverted to the St Andrew's cross of blue on a red field
practice of the young Peter the Great a century (Viskovatov, 1844-56)

2 0 0
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 0 1

62 Inspection of the guard indoors at Gatchina

before, and set up a. private army to give concrete how Frederick used to spend his day. Paul learnt
form to his fantasies. He assembled his first his role to seeming perfection, and he liked to
recruits at the palace of Petrovsk in 1782, and station himself on a terrace near Pavlovsk, from
then in the next year he purchased from the Orlov where he could examine the palace guards with his
family the dank estate of Gatchina, lying about telescope. When he noticed that something was
forty miles from St Petersburg. Here Paul estab- wrong, he would dispatch a lackey with an appro-
lished the base of the 'Gatchina Corps', a complete priate message, or arrive on the scene in person to
miniature army which reached the strength of do or undo a button, or correct the carriage of a
1,601 infantry, 590 cavalry and 214 gunners. musket. Altogether, nothing could have been
calculated to afford Paul greater pleasure than the
Catherine permitted the existence of the Gatchina comment of the Prussian veteran Baron Driesen,
Corps, to provide the tsarevich with a measure of who, at the sight of the emperor riding past, once
occupation and diversion, but this force, organised cried out Ganz wie der Alte Fritz!
and trained on the Prussian model, represented a In Catherine's last hours Paul and a party of the
kind of silent protest against Catherine's military Gatchina inmates hastened to St Petersburg to
system. (Kvardi, in Skalon, 1902-C.1911, II, bk 1, secure the imperial palace. The whole Gatchina
261) circus then undertook a forced march on St
Petersburg, and on 9 November Paul brought
Among the curious beings who flourished amid the about its mass incorporation into the Guard,
drill squares, lakes and soggy woods of Gatchina which signified to the capital that he was at last
the most prominent was the gargoyle-like Aleksei firmly in command. At court
Arakcheev, who arrived in 1792 with a good
character from Melissino as an expert in artillery. the former atmosphere of freedom, ease and
Arakcheev threw himself into the work with brutal gallantry gave way to an intolerable repression.
zeal, and in 1795 he was rewarded with the title Almost at once the yelling of orders, the noise
of 'Governor of Gatchina'. Scarcely less influential of iron and soldiers, and the clatter of great boots
were ex-Prussian dugouts like Steinwehr, Diebitsch and spurs rang through the apaitments where
and Iindener, who lent a certain authenticity of Catherine had just entered on her eternal sleep.
antique detail, and fascinated Paul by telling him (Masson, 1859, 77)
202 Paull 1796-1801

Paul and his officials got down to work early

each day,
and opposite the Winter Palace, in the building of
the Vice-Chancellery, you could see all the
chandeliers and fireplaces glowing brightly. The
Senators were in session at their fine mahogany
table from eight in the morning. The renaissance in
military affairs was even more striking — and it
began at the top. Silver-headed commanders,
wearing the star of the Order of St. George, had
to learn how to march, deploy, and salute with the
spontoon. (Lubyanovskii, 1872, 94)

The new administrative structures were less

complicated than they appeared, for they were all
designed to enable Paul to reassemble the military
machine in a manageable form. In January 1797
the Chancellery of Artillery and Fortification, and
the notoriously maladministered offices of the
Commissariat and the Proviant, were reduced to
'expeditions' of the War College. Paul retained his
old tutor Saltykov as President of the College, but
he kept him under close supervision, and made the
College give up much of its authority to a new and
more responsive body, the Mobile Military
Chancellery of His Imperial Highness. The com-
petence of the Chancellery was much wider than
its title might suggest. It exercised the higher
management of military affairs, as well as a degree
of civil administration when Paul took it with him
on his travels, and it represented an important
stage of the transformation of the old collegiate
form of administration into the modern ministerial
one, which was accomplished early in the next 63 Paul I
reign.
On 13 November 1796 the General Staff was the General Staff was almost defunct (see p. 181),
abolished and its personnel dispersed, and the but Paul was much at fault in failing to make sure
maps, plans and registers were delivered up to that the Suite fulfilled its essential task of planning
General-Adjutant Kushelev as head of a novel and directing military movements. Thus, when his
organisation, the Suite of His Imperial Highness armies went to war in 1799, they were to be
Concerning the Affairs of the Quartermaster. fatally dependent on such guidance as might be
Lying at the direct disposal of the sovereign, the provided by the Austrians.
members of the Suite were liable to find them- Under Paul the daily watch parade at St
selves on distant military or diplomatic missions, Petersburg assumed extraordinary significance,
as well as being appointed inspectors, or assigned being at once an endurance test for the officers,
the job of arranging the imperial journeys. The the chief ceremony of state, and a means by which
break from the old system was no great crime, for Paul could exercise direct personal control of the
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 0 3

The Fliigel-Adjutant du Jour or another aide did

his best to keep up with the flow of instructions,
scribbling heavily abbreviated words in a note-
book, ultimately to be written up by the
Chancellery into proper decrees.
Where Paul could not be present in person, he
sought to inculcate habits of obedience and uni-
formity through the inspectors — one for each
of the three arms of the service — who were
established in the twelve former administrative
'divisions' of Catherine's reign. A number of junior
officers from Gatchina were among those appointed
to carry out this work, which exacerbated the
resentment of Suvorov and other veteran generals.
As regards the outward appearance of the
troops, 'the form of a hat, the colour of a plume,
the height of a grenadier cap, and boots, gaiters,
cockades, pigtails, belts and things like that
became great matters of state' (Masson, 1859,
124). A series of Reglements imposed on the army
the Gatchina uniforms, which were themselves
modelled on the Prussian dress of the period of the
Seven Years War. Captain Gryazev conveys a good
impression of the garb when he described the

64 Paul I in front of the Winter Palace. Behind him

are (left to right): Count C.A. Leiven (head of the
Mobile Military Chancellery), T. P. Uvarov (the
general-adjutant du jour), and the Fliigel-Adjutant,
A. I. Gorchakov

empire. The issue of the parole, or password, had

always been an essential feature of Frederick's
watch parades, but when Paul transferred it to
Russia he used the opportunity to dictate instruc-
tions of the widest possible import, ranging from
grand state affairs, to kindly messages like:

Lieutenant Shepelev, of the Preobrazhenskii

Regiment, is transferred to the Eletskii Musketeer
Regiment on account of his ignorance of his
duties, his sloth and his negligence - habits picked
up in the company of the princes Potemkin and
Zubov. (Kvardi, in Skalon, 1902-C.1911, II, bk 1,
281) 65 Paul I
204 Paul I 1796-1801

uniform in which his regiment marched to Italy

late in 1798:
a heavy dark green coat with lapels, turned-down
collar and cuffs of brick red with white buttons.
Also a long waistcoat and short breeches of a
uniform yellow colour. Our hair was cut close in
front and covered with stinking grease . . . a pigtail
twenty-eight inches long was tied down as far as
the nape of the neck and powdered with flour.
We had a hat with wide bands of silver braid, a
large buttonhole of the same material and a black
bow — this headgear was of an amazing form and
gave our heads little cover. A flannel stock was
pulled as tight as possible around the neck. Our
feet were pushed into snub-nosed black shoes, and
the leg as far as the knee was encased in black
cloth gaiters which were done up along the whole
length with red buttons. (Orlov, 1898, 27)

Traditions were dealt a further blow by a

decree of 20 August 1798, which did away with
the old denomination of regiments according to
place of origin, and imposed instead the name and
person of a new dignitary, the Prussian-style chef,
or colonel in chief. The chef was invariably a
general, and so was usually absent on business
elsewhere, but his very existence curbed the
authority of the acting colonel — which was
probably no bad thing. Less happy was the effect
on the soldiers. Semen Vorontsov recalled:

When I had the misfortune to take over the

command of the corps which returned from the
North Holland Expedition [1799], I went to see
the soldiers in the hospital at Portsmouth, and
asked them what regiment they belonged to. A
typical reply would run as follows: 'I used to
66 Musketeer, period of Paul I (Viskovatov,
belong to such and such a regiment (supplying the
1844-56)
name). But now, little father, I don't know where
I am. The emperor has given it to some German or
other.' ('Zapiski', 1 8 0 2 , A K V , 1870-95, X, 470) tion of Grigorii Kushelev and the restless and fussy
Thedor Vasilevich Rostopchin, and derived mostly
Paul's new infantry code was issued on 29 from a poor French translation of the Prussian
November 1796, or in other words just twenty- infantry code, which had appeared in 1760.
three days after his accession. This apparently Another text of the Gatchina days, Tactical Rules
remarkable promptitude is explained by the fact (1794), was published as a supplement.
that the document had already been printed for The Pauline tactics came straight from the era
the use of the Gatchina Corps. It was a compila- of the Seven Years War, what with the platoon
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 0 5

column for approach marches, the simple two-line officers which were staged by Arakcheev in St
order of battle, and the companies drawn up three Petersburg from 1796. The incongruity of the
ranks deep, with the component platoons firing in scenes was still capable of raising a laugh fifty
the order 1 — 2 — 3 — 4. By 1799 the innovations years later. Suvorov declared that the classes were
of Catherine's era had disappeared as if they had a case of the blind leading the crippled, but
never been, at least where Suvorov.was not present Kutuzov, assiduous courtier that he was, could not
with the armies in person. Sir Henry Bunbury say enough in their praise, and was assiduous in his
wrote of the greencoats in North Holland as: attendance.
In the field the ordeal of the watch parades was
exactly the stiff, hard, wooden machines which
writ large at the major manoeuvres that were
we have reason to figure to ourselves as the
staged by several regiments, at a time. The units
Russians of the Seven Years War. Their dress and
were disposed as they actually tried to fight in
equipments seemed to have remained unaltered.
1799 on the Adda, Tidone and Trebbia, and at
They waddled slowly forward to the tap-tap of
Zurich and Bergen, namely in an advance guard
their monotonous drums; and if they were beaten
pushing ahead, and a main force marching in two
they waddled slowly back again, without
parallel columns as a prelude to the 'processional'
appearing in either case to feel a sense of danger,
deployment into line.
or of the need of taking ultra tap-taps to better
The management of the artillery at first
their condition. (Bunbury, 1927,145)
promised well. On 6 December Paul ousted the
The codes held sway until 1808, or in other words hateful Zubov from his post as head of the artillery,
well into the Napoleonic era. Thus in 1805 the and replaced him by Melissino, who enjoyed the
Russian army advanced over the fields of Austerlitz power, if not the title, of Master General. Having
in Frederician arrangement of open platoon waited so long for a position that was rightfully
column, and was caught in this formation when his, the Greek was forced by ill health to give up
the French irrupted out of the mist. office on 24 September 1797, and died on 26
As regards organisation, Paul abolished the December of the same year.
grenadier regiments outright, and reduced the The care of the artillery now passed to the
battalions of jaegers to so many companies. Alto- veteran gunner major-general Aleksandr Ivanovich
gether the general down-grading of the infantry Chelishev, who wrought changes in a routine of
reduced the establishment in 1800 to 203,228 business which had remained unaltered since the
men, as opposed to 218,386 in 1786. time of Petr Shuvalov. He was probably also
A matching series of reductions in the lighter responsible, with Melissino, for a number of useful
elements of the cavalry brought the establishment technical improvements — the gun carriages were
down to 32,968 mounted regulars, and thirty-nine given longer trails, for the sake of stability, the
regiments instead of the original fifty-four, which capacity of the ammunition chests was increased
probably corresponded to the number of horses to thirty rounds, and the ammunition itself was
actually available. Paul's genuine interest in the rendered more effective through more powerful
cavalry arm is shown by the relevant regulations — gunpowder, and the substitution of canister shot
the principal Military Code of Field Cavalry of iron instead of lead.
Service of 1796, and the supplementary Rules and The reign of Chelishev came to an end on 4
Precepts. The tactical line was reduced to two January 1799, when he was ousted by Arakcheev.
ranks, as opposed to the three of 1755 and 1763, This grotesque being too was dethroned on 1
and the Code rightly scorned foot drill, 'since October, after he was detected in an attempt to
experience shows that the employment of dragoons cover up for the negligence of one of his brothers.
as infantry is virtually impossible'. Thus the artillery was left without effective
The essential principles of the new dispensa- direction at the time of the War of the Second
tions were inculcated at special classes for senior Coalition. The gunners lent inadequate support
206 Paul I 1796-1801

to the other arms at Zurich and elsewhere, and the Code of 1796 as a rat-chewed parchment, found in
neglect of the horse artillery is notable, in view of a castle, and at the sight of the new uniforms he
the fine state to which Paul had brought the declared: 'You can't explode hair powder! You
Gatchina detachments as tsarevich. can't shoot buckles! You can't bayonet somebody
At times Paul almost seemed to be at war with with a pigtail!' (Masson, 1859,130).
elements in his own army. The Guard, as the home In some circles a notice of dismissal was con-
of the 'parasite nobility', was subjected to imme- sidered a sign of honour, and there were officers
diate and far-reaching transformations. who deliberately appeared at court in irregular and
untidy dress, or talked and argued on the watch
Gentlemen [Paul once said], word reaches me that
parade. Lowenstern writes proudly of a deceit he
the Guards officers grumble and complain that I
practised when his squadron of cuirassiers joined
am freezing them to death on the watch parade.
the rest of the regiment on a march through Riga
But you can see for yourselves just how badly
in parade order. The cobblers had been unable to
the Guard does its service. Nobody knows
make enough of the new, Prussian-style boots,
anything. To make you do your duty, it is not
but:
enough to explain and demonstrate things to you
— you have to be led by the hand. (Volkonskii, then I was seized with the inspiration of dressing
RS, 1876, XVI, 183) each cuirassier in just one of the high boots, since
The first mass transfer of Gatchina officers to the
Guard was effected in November 1796, and Paul
went on to reshape the household troops into a
coherent fighting force, compelling the golden lads
to think for the first time about serious military
service. De Sanglein exclaimed indignantly that:
to convert Guards officers from imperial to army
soldiers, to introduce strict discipline, and in
short to turn everything upside down, signified
a contempt for public opinion, and the destruction
of a whole prevailing order that had been
sanctified by t i m e . . . . The consequence was that
the greater part of the Guards officers entered
into retirement. Who was to replace them?
(De Sanglein, RS, 1882, XXXVI, 475)

The answer was readily supplied by a fresh influx

of the Gatchina product, which gave rise to all
sorts of bizarre juxtapositions of young resentful
nobility, and the inarticulate and awkward men
from Gatchina, who hung about the palaces like
lumpish ghosts.
The army as a whole was purged of no less
than seven field-marshals, 330 generals and 2,261
junior officers, many of whom were reinstated
after Paul felt the lesson had sunk home. Suvorov's
order of dismissal came on 6 February 1797. His
offence was to have spoken so loudly about the
new order of things. He described the Infantry 67 Paul I and Suvorov
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 0 7

they rode in the usual order by ranks of two at a In this context, there was a lot to be said for
time. I had them wear the high boots on the the objectives which Paul put before himself.
outside leg, while retaining the half-boots on the These may be summed up as follows:
inside leg. Nobody detected this ruse, which was
(a) to subject the army to the control of the
taken up by the whole regiment. The emperor
sovereign;
received from the military governor a report on
(b) to eradicate the corruption and tyrannical
the exemplary martial bearing of our regiment,
power of the colonels and senior officers;
and he showered us with eulogies. (Lowenstern,
(c) to recall the officers as a whole to their
RS, 1900, CIII, 283)
professional obligations, and curb their notorious
drinking and gambling (here Langeron was in no
Bearing in mind the theme of our book, the
doubt as to the necessity and effectiveness of the
Pauline episode is of crucial importance in evaluat-
Pauline visitation);
ing the impact of the outside world on Russian
(d) to improve the lot of the private soldier, who
military affairs. Soviet historians regard it as a
had been so cruelly abused in the reign of
totally foreign intrusion, misconceived at the
Catherine.
outset, and completely harmful in all its workings.
Certainly there was a good deal that was odd in its Striving towards the last aim, Paul augmented the
outward manifestations, which made it appear a musketeer's pay to 9 roubles 4 0 ^ kopeks a year.
reproduction of Peter Ill's counterfeit, an imitation He increased the number of pupils in the garrison
at two removes of an alien Frederician original, schools to 16,500, and on 23 December 1798 he
valid only in its own time and place. Semen founded a Military Orphanage, accommodating
Vorontsov makes the telling point that Paul 200 sons of officers and 800 of private soldiers.
missed the true significance of Frederick's achieve- His Code of 1796 spoke of the importance of
ment, which lay in the field of grand tactics, while spurring on the troops by encouraging words,
copying externals which Old Fritz had inherited instead of belabouring them with the stick, and
from his father and never bothered to change. the Tactical Rules of the following year, so often
In justice, however, it is worth making some cited as evidence of blind reaction, told the
effort to discover what exactly Paul set out to do. officers, 'The soldier must always be regarded as a
His oeuvre makes sense only in the context of the human being, for almost anything can be attained
run-down, mismanaged army which he had through friendly dealings. Soldiers will do more
inherited from the last reign, 'when, thanks to the for an officer who treats them well, and receives
lack of vigilance, the fitful gleams of glory were their trust, than for one whom they merely fear.'
everywhere interspersed with dark shadows . . . What of the person of Paul, outwardly ridiculous
you must agree that it was a good idea to stir with his pug nose and bald box-like cranium, his
things up and give them a new impetus, especially stick and his hat a la Old Fritz? Much has been
in the red glow of the French Revolution' made of the personal savagery of Paul in his
(Lubyanovskii, 1872, 92-3). Wiegel disliked the dealings with the army, and of his readiness to
new uniforms, but he too conceded that 'along assail his officers with the stick. There were
with such measures there were introduced a actually just three cases of the kind, and on each
number of reforms which were most useful for occasion the emperor later relented and expressed
the service' (Wiegel, 1864-6, I, pt 1, 82). If the his apologies. Indeed, there is much evidence to
experience of the older generation was set at show that Paul was a man of idealism, honesty and
naught by the novel codes, younger officers (we have to say) sweetness and courtesy. Some of
found that 'the new evolutions were simple, the worst asperities of the time are associated not
demanding only a certain accuracy and attention with Paul or the Prussian freaks from Gatchina,
to detail in the execution' (Engelhardt, 1868, but with men of old-fashioned Muscovite cast like
208). the simian Arakcheev, or Paul's son, Grand Prince
208 P a u l l 1796-1801

Constantine, the leader of the xenophobic party. refugee knights, but approached Britain with a
In all seriousness, Constantine once propounded view to joint action against the French.
two basic Maxims on Military Discipline: The British Cabinet was willing to accommodate
this 'natural ally', and in the middle of 1799 it
First Maxim. The officer is purely and simply a
undertook to make over £181,000 per month for
machine
90,000 Russian and 20,000 Swiss troops to act
Second Maxim. Everything which a superior
against the French in central Europe, and an
commands of his subordinate must be carried
additional £44,000 for an army of 17,500 Russians
out, even if it is an atrocity
for service in Holland. Other agreements linked
Constantine drew a number of monstrous conse- Russia with the kingdom of Naples and with
quences, and rounded off by declaring that 'educa- Turkey, the ancient enemy, and the battered
tion, reasoning, and feelings of honour and justice Austrians joined the league as well.
are prejudicial to good discipline. . . . An officer The War of the Second Coalition was to be
must never make use of his good sense or intelli- fought on a truly continental scale, with the
gence. The less he has of honour the better he is. peripheral forces of Russia, Austria and Britain
(SIRIO, 1870, V, 58-9) seeking to concert operations against 240,000
French troops who were arrayed across a wide
tract of Europe — of whom 27,000 stood under
War against the Revolution Brune in Holland, 45,000 under Jourdan and
Bernadotte on the Rhine, 48,000 under Massena
It took some years for the monarchies of old in Switzerland, 58,000 under Scherer in north
Europe to appreciate that in Revolutionary France Italy, as well as 25,000 in garrison in the north
a power of quite extraordinary malevolence had Italian fortresses, and 34,000 under Macdonald in
emerged — an armed people interested no longer in southern Italy (all figures approximate).
readjusting borders and maintaining the balance of It was some comfort that at least the French
power, but in overthrowing states and the social army in Egypt was incapable of returning to add
and religious order upon which they had been to these considerable masses. The sealing-off
founded. The early and middle 1790s found process was accomplished by Admiral Nelson, who
Russia preoccupied with affairs in Poland, and the. closed with Brueys in the Battle of the Nile on
anti-French First Coalition came and went before 1 August 1798. As the Soviet historians would
Catherine or Paul could take a direct hand in have it, 'at Aboukir, using the methods of Ushakov,
affairs. Prussia dropped out of the league in 1795, Nelson defeated the French fleet as it lay at
and the alliance collapsed altogether after anchor' (Beskrovnyi, 1958, 600). Suvorov liked
Bonaparte beat the Austrians in north Italy in the style of the thing, and was much taken with
1796 and 1797. Nelson's exclamation before the battle: 'Tomorrow
As Suvorov already sensed, the advent of I shall be a lord or an angel!' This, at least, was
Bonaparte signified a marriage between supreme how it was transmitted to him. The original (less
military genius and the crusading enthusiasms of telling) ran: 'Before this time tomorrow, I shall
the Republic. In 1798 this bold Corsican embarked have gained a peerage or Westminster Abbey.'
on the expedition which took a French army to This victory isolated the French garrisons in the
the shores of Egypt. Paul was now at last awakened Mediterranean, and spared the Russian Black Sea
from his torpor by the news that on their way to Fleet, when it arrived on the scene, the ordeal of
the Orient the French had captured the island of having to face the French in the open sea. The
Malta, and expelled the Knights of St John from fleet in question was that of Admiral Ushakov,
their seat. The thing appealed to the emperor's consisting of six of the line and seven frigates. At
love of lost causes, and he not only accepted the Constantinople it picked up a number of Turkish
Grand Mastership Extraordinary from a party of vessels, and in the autumn the united armada
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 0 9

proceeded to the Ionian Islands, which guarded enterprise against the northern flank of French-
the access to the Adriatic and thus to the eastern dominated Europe. This took the form of an
flank of Italy. Cerigo, Zante and Marva were amphibious descent on Holland, and more
secured with no great difficulty, but the blockade specifically North Holland — the tongue of land
and siege of Corfu dragged on until the capitula- which enclosed the western side of the Zuider Zee.
tion of 3 March 1799. The Russians then sailed The initiative throughout rested with the British,
without hindrance to the Italian coast, where they who effected the first landing at The Helder on
seized Brindisi and laid Ancona under blockade. 27 August 1799. They soon found that they had
Ushakov had a landing force of Russian troops on underestimated the defensive strength of this
board his vessels, but the prowess of Paul's army terrain of ditches and dykes, and that they had
was not to be tested until it came to grips with overestimated in equal proportion the willingness ^
the French on three theatres of mainland Europe. of the Dutch to rise in their favour.
Some dismal sentiments were being expressed Meanwhile, the Russian transports had been
concerning the outcome of such a confrontation. making their way from the Baltic, attended by
Rzhevskii had little . hope of finding courage in some of the oafish pupils of Gatchina, one of
such a debauched army. Masson doubted the whom demanded to see the King of Hamburg in
Cossacks' ability to cope with the conditions of passing. The Russian force was commanded by
war in western Europe, and Langeron argued that Lieutenant-General Johann Hermann, a Saxon
the Russians were too accustomed to easy victories who had entered the Russian service in 1769, and
over backward opponents like the Turks and Poles. was described as being 'a brave, zealous and
straightforward fellow' (Bunbury, 1927, 15),
Where are our officers and generals? [asked Count
though bad at maintaining discipline and ignorant
Rostopchin] The last Turkish war spoilt even
of the higher reaches of the military art. The last
those commanders who showed some glimmerings
of the 11,000 or so Russians came ashore on 26
of talent. The leaders displayed no other merit
September, by when the British had had the
than that required to sustain the cold and
opportunity to form some opinions of these
hardships of those long campaigns, which ended
apparitions from the East.
with assaults in which the meanest soldier counted
Edward Walsh wrote that the Russians were
for as much as his general. (0. V. Rostopchin,
'robust and muscular . . . to those who were
5 November 1796, AKV, 1870-95, VII, 148-9)
unaccustomed to view them, they seemed even
repulsive and ferocious'. However,
North Holland, 1799 the general appearance of the Russian army, when
drawn up under arms, announced at the first
Paul did not share the fainthearts' reservations. glance that it was composed of troops formed
altogether for service, and not for show. There
The crazy tsar was at this time at the highest pitch
appeared to have been established throughout all
of his ardour for crushing French democracy. He
ranks the most absolute subordination. (Nostitz,
was eager to send his Muscovites everywhere and
1976, 239)
anywhere, provided that other governments (and
the English in particular) would bear a large share Those with an eye for detail noted that these
.of the expenses. Paul seems never to have doubted sallow, smelly people ate a bread that looked like
of the superiority of his rude soldiers over those an oily cattle cake, and that they were delighted to
of Western Europe. He expected his Russians to be able to smear this substance with axle grease.
conquer, if they found the opportunity to fight, William Surtees, as a light infantryman, took a
as a matter of course. (Bunbury, 1927, 26) professional interest in a party of their jaegers:

Unfortunately for Paul's stability of mind, a if we appeared irregular and grotesque, I know not
contingent of his troops was engaged in a disastrous well how to describe them. Their riflemen were
210 Paul I 1796-1801
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 211

shod with boots very much resembling those of chief requisites in a rifle corps. They also wore
our fishermen, coming up considerably higher than large cocked hats and long green coats. Their
the knee, thus rendering them, I should say, grenadiers were dressed [no] more apropos, having
incapable of celerity of movement, one of the high sugar-loaf caps, mounted with a great deal of
brass, and projecting forward at the top, with long
coats, and gaiters reaching above the knee. Their
regular infantry were nearly similar to the
grenadiers, only they wore cocked hats instead of
caps. The regiment we saw on this occasion had
with it, I should think, full half as many followers
as soldiers, some of whom carried immensely
large copper kettles. . . . The officers, I remember,
carried what was formerly used in our service, a
long sort of pole, with a head like a halberd, and
called, I believe, a 'spontoon'. This, on passing a
general at a review, the officer twists and twirls
around his head, precisely as a drum-major in our
service does his cane. (Surtees, 1973, 8-9)

Hie first offensive action was launched on 19

September, and its outcome was to be fatal to the
working together of the allies. The scheme for this
Battle of Bergen was a fairly complicated one,
involving a frontal attack by three main columns,
and a sweeping movement by a fourth column by
way of Alkmaar so as to exploit any opportunities
on the eastern flank. Hermann's Russians were
massed on the corresponding western flank, in the
coastal sand dunes, and they constituted the first
of the columns of the principal force.
On the appointed day of the attack the Russians
got under way two hours before sunrise, stampeded
by one of Hermann's subordinates. The agile
French delivered a deadly cross fire from the sand
dunes, and the Russians, unable to deploy into
line, pushed forward in a single confused mass as
far as the village of Bergen. Russian corpses were
everywhere, and Captain Herbert Taylor 'observed

68 Grenadier of the Shlyushelburgskii Musketeer

Regiment, period of Paul I. Dark green coat with
light green collar, lapels and cuffs and red turn-
backs; red stock; mitre cap with light green and
dark green back, white metal frontal plate and
white pompom; the devices on the cartridge pouch
are of brass (Viskovatov, 1 8 4 4 - 5 6 )
212 Paul I 1796-1801

to General Hermann that the troops in the rear triple appeal for the British paymasters. First of
must have fired upon those in front, which he all, the St Gotthard Pass offered a much more
admitted was more than probable' (20 September, direct line of communication between Italy and
'Dropmore Papers', V, 1906, 418). Under pressure Germany than the Brenner. Second, the allies,
from the enemy the Russians then executed a once masters of Switzerland, could open up a
fighting retreat, leaving behind about 1,700 dead weakly fortified sector of the French frontier.
and wounded and their chief, Hermann, a prisoner Finally the Swiss, 'the gallant poor little fellows
of the French. Elsewhere along the front the in the little cantons' (Lord Mulgrave, 15 September
British columns failed to reach their objectives. 1799, 'Dropmore Papers', V, 1906, 406) were
General Essen, who took the place of Hermann, already invested with a certain aura of cleanliness
was said to be 'false, intriguing, and ill-disposed and the love of liberty, and it was hoped that up
towards the British' (Bunbury, 1927, 15). His to 20,000 of these virtuous people would join
conduct, wrote Semen Vorontsov, was 'a mixture with the Austrians and Russians to evict the
of ignorance, base conduct and pride . . . what French under Massena, who were holding on to a
hurts me the most is to know that our contingent corner of Switzerland along the River Limmat, in
has been totally disgraced by the incapacity of the the neighbourhood of Zurich.
commander and those dreadful officers who make The main army of 45,000 Russians was admitted
up nine-tenths of all the commissioned ranks' to be composed of 'the best and finest Russian
(30 October 1799, AKV, 1870-95, X, 64-5). troops' (Sir Charles Whitworth, 30 April 1799,
A little ground was gained in a further assault PRO FO 65/42), and 'the march of the force was
on 2 October, in which the Russians were com- held up, so as to bring the drill to a final peak of
mitted well inland, but the territory was lost again perfection' (Masson, 1859, 357). The command
towards the close of a confused and unplanned was invested in Generalanshef Rimskii-Korsakov,
fight which broke out on 6 October. Twelve days who had commended himself by his enthusiasm
later an agreement was reached with the French, for Paul's methods, and his confidence that the
in virtue of which the demoralised allies were Russian troops, with their high morale and superior
evacuated from The Helder. discipline, would surely acquit themselves better
The British had little idea what to do with the than the Austrians, whom he had seen in the
contingent of Russians, which was now left on Netherlands in 1794. As if these recommendations
their hands. The Cabinet actually contemplated were not enough, Paul was entranced by a slow
sending 5,000 of the troops to help to hold down march which Korsakov (a member of a musical
Ireland, but the scheme was rejected by the Chief family) had composed for the Semenovskii Guards,
Secretary for Ireland, and by Lord Cornwallis, and he had it played over on many occasions.
who wrote that it would give rise to scenes of Lieutenant-General John Ramsay came out to
'indescribable plunder and murder' (Nostitz, see that the British got good value for their
1976, 82). The Russians were finally decanted in subsidies, and in the third week of July he
the isle of Jersey, which at least served to forward watched the Russian columns as they wound
the education of one of the Gatchina officers, who through Prague in Bohemia. The weather was hot,
had always assumed that the place was part of the and the march was hurried, but Ramsay was
mainland. impressed by the generally sound state of the
army, and he assured his masters that 'good justice
has been done, both with respect to the selection
Disaster at Zurich, 1799 of the troops, as also in respect to the essential
part of their equipments'. He liked what he saw of
The main Russian striking force was destined to the artillery, and noted that the regular cavalry
act in association with the Austrians in Switzerland was fitted out in the Prussian style (20 July 1799,
in the heart of Western Europe. The theatre had a PRO, FO 74/28).
Paul I 1796-1801 213
214 Paul I 1796-1801

One of the cuirassiers, the young officer Meanwhile some disturbing evidence was coming
Waldemar Lowenstern, found time to make the to light concerning the leadership of the Russians.
rounds of polite society in Prague, where he Ramsay was pained to see that Korsakov was not
caused a sensation in the circle of French emigres. particularly
It is difficult to imagine the absurdity of the aware of the necessity of those precautions which
kind of question that was put to me. One of the other armies adopt in particular circumstances,
ladies asked me in all seriousness 'Is it true that and which he will in all probability feel inclined
your soldiers eat young children?' 'Not only small to attend to, when more acquainted with the
ones', I replied, 'but big ones as well, if they are stratagems and proceedings of an active and clever
as pretty as you, mesdamesV enemy who acts scientifically and with system.
The same deficiency appears evidently to be
At their request he produced his batman for
general among the officers, from the manner in
inspection, so that they could see what an
which the service is carried on, and particularly
ordinary Russian looked like. The company stood
that of the advanced posts, where we have seen
in appalled fascination, and Lowenstern had to the troops with their baggage and baggage waggons
admit that with his slit Kalmyk eyes 'he really did as if in perfect security. The pickets of Cossacks,
look rather like a cannibal' (Lowenstern, RS, notwithstanding the reputation they have for this
1900, CIII, 288). species of service, having their horses unsaddled
It was no fault of the Russians that the coali- and at grass, within pistol-shot of the enemy's
tion strategy now fell apart. The Austrian chan- vedettes. (5 September 1799, PRO, FO 74/28)
cellor, Thugut, conceived of the war in purely
dynastic terms, and he was displeased to hear of During the peaceful weeks of late summer,
the impetuous progress of Suvorov in Italy (see Lowenstern's regiment of cuirassiers progressed
p. 217), and the field-marshal's eagerness to slowly towards the theatre of operations in
restore the House of Savoy as ruler of Piedmont. Switzerland. He spent two agreeable weeks in
As the best means of removing the Russians from Lindau, 'the Venice of Lake Constance', and
Italy, and simultaneously forwarding the Habsburg halted again at Schaffhausen, beside the famous
designs on Alsace and Lorraine, Thugut decided to Rhine Falls. 'Sitting on a fragment of rock, I was
transfer Archduke Charles with the main body of struck by the melancholy character of the noise
the Austrians from Switzerland to the middle produced by the falling water. People explain it by
Rhine, and bring up Suvorov from Italy to replace reference to a hidden affinity with the onward rush
him at Zurich, in the meantime leaving only a of our life' (Lowenstern, RS, 1900, CIII, 291).
number of Austrian staff officers and a corps of Lowenstern soon heard a noise of a more
23,000 troops under Hotzein support of Korsakov. melancholy nature still carrying from the direction
This complicated reshuffle of the allied armies of Zurich, where early on 25 September Massena
gave Massena the time to build up his own strength launched about 39,000 troops against the Russian
to 70,000 men, and exploit the advantages of his positions. From 7.30 a.m. Korsakov's left, or
central position to the full. As a first move, he sent southern flank, was heavily engaged with the
General Lecourbe and 12,000 troops marching division of Mortier, which made a heavy demon-
south in late August to seize the St Gotthard. stration attack against the Russians at Wollishofen,
Meanwhile, the main force continued to hold its between Mont Albis and the Lake of Zurich. The
positions near Zurich in the close proximity of Russians responded to the invitation, and counter-
the Cossack outposts. 'Sometimes the French attacked in force in the direction of the mountain.
musicians came to play martial airs on the banks They ran up the heights like madmen, and, says
of the beautiful Limmat. Then the Cossacks would Wickham,
spring to their feet of their own accord, and dance
and jump in circles' (Masson, 1859,437-8). the hedges and vineyards all about the village
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 1 5

were full of wounded and dead Russians, though

I do not recollect having seen five dead Frenchmen With Suvorov through Italy and Switzerland
on the whole ground. This is easily accounted for
from the nature of the country, which is Hie third element of the Russian forces, amounting
particularly well calculated for the French manner to about 25,000 men, had meanwhile made its
of fighting, and from the mode of attack of the way to Italy. At the request of the Austrians the
Russians who appear to trust wholly to the command was given to the sixty-nine-year-old
bayonet, which the French never attempt to Suvorov, who was thereby rescued from his
stand. (30 September 1799, 'Dropmore Papers', disgrace. In other circumstances Suvorov would
V, 1906,441) have been content to remain in his opulent retire-
ment, but in taking up the charge he said that he
Meanwhile, on the Russian right, the French was
division of Lorge effected a crossing of the weakly
influenced alone by an anxious wish for the
held Limmat at Dietikon, and by two in the
emancipation of Europe, and the deliverance of an
afternoon, when Korsakov finally became aware
extensive empire from a savage and ambitious
of the threat, the . French had already pushed
government, pretending to the name of a republic,
dangerously far in the direction of Zurich. Instead
but being in fact the tyranny of usurpation of the
of making a stand on the commanding Ziirichberg,
meanest birth and basest minds. (Mulgrave,
Korsakov elected to fight in the confined space
12 September 1799, PRO, FO 74/27)
close under the town walls, feeding his troops to
their destruction by dribs and drabs. The British The old field-marshal received at Mitau the
and Austrian observers watched with admiration blessing of the exiled Louis XVIII on his enter-
and horror while the French tirailleurs and batteries prise, which probably encouraged Masson to make
of horse artillery ravaged the dense Russian the ignorant charge that when Suvorov confronted
formations. 'Whole files collapsed forwards, and the Revolution, he thought that he was dealing
entire ranks were struck down in enfilade. The with a band of mutinous slaves. On the contrary,
Russians trampled their dying comrades underfoot Suvorov was a man of cosmopolitan culture, very
so as to close up in good order and reload by well acquainted with the historical and philo-
platoons and divisions' (Masson, 1859, 364). By sophical origins of the beast in question. He also
nine in the evening the Russians were shut up in grasped some important truths about the nature of
Zurich, and before midnight the able-bodied ideological totalitarianism. Earlier generations had
survivors forced their way out of the trap and encountered Moslem religious fanaticism, but 'it
retreated on Eglisau. has been left to us to witness another phenomenon,
At the same time as these combats were raging just as frightful, namely political fanaticism'
on the north-west side of Lake Zurich, a French (Fuchs, 1827, 36). He deplored the vandalisms
detachment under Soult meted out much the same perpetrated by Berthier in Rome, and drew
treatment to the troops of Hotze, holding the line attention to the way the French concealed their
of the Linth as it ran into the opposite corner of crimes through the distortion of language, using
the lake. Over the following days Korsakov and paranyms like gagner or republicaniser where
the Austrians were bundled back towards 'outright thievery' would have been more in order.
Schaffhausen and the upper Rhine, leaving the 'Can you show me,' he asked, 'a single Frenchman
French in firm command of central Switzerland, who has been made a whit happier by the
and Suvorov in deadly peril. Revolution?' (Fuchs, 1827, 160).
Suvorov maintained that any war against
enemies like these must be prosecuted with the
utmost seriousness, and he scarcely dared mention
what he knew of the military genius of Bonaparte
216 Paul I 1796-1801

(see p. 194). As for the manner of operations, he the order of the day was dictated to a victorious
made some notes for the eyes of Paul: and confident army, and it worked
disadvantageously on the morale of the troops.
1 act only on the offensive The army felt itself humiliated, offended. Trust
2 be speedy on the march, and attack furiously in the leadership disappeared. The consequence
with cold steel was an extraordinary division between the allied
3 abhor methodicism — see and decide on the forces — a division which extended all the way
instant up to headquarters. (Regele, 1957, 58)
4 give full authority to the commander-in-chief
5 attack and beat the enemy in the open field The general Austrian opinion was that the Russian
6 don't waste time in sieges . . . . (Meerovich troops were savage marauders, and that their
and Budanov, 1978, 253) leaders were blockheads. Even Chasteler attracted
the hatred of his former comrades by taking the
Suvorov followed in the track of his troops part of Suvorov.
through Vienna and so over the Alps. The Austrian On the Russian side, Captain Gryazevharboured
capital found him laconic in conversation, 'but this what was probably the common opinion of the
singularity was disregarded, thanks to the con- middle ranks of Suvorov's officers. He was ready
fidence which everyone reposed in his military to praise the good condition of the Austrian
talents and personal bravery' (Runich, RS, 1901, muskets, the practicability of their greatcoats, and
CV, 329). On reaching the Italian plain in April, the imposing appearance of their grenadier bear-
Suvorov was enraptured by the sights and sounds skins, but he maintained that the Austrians had
of a land which he had come to know so well forgotten that 'what is needed in action against the
from his books. Every landscape spoke to him of enemy is not hair powder, polished belts, or
the glorious campaigns of the past, and he loved glittering metal accoutrements, but courage, daring
to hear the peasant songs as they carried across and composure'. If the Hungarian troops made a
the fields, for they reminded him of the melodies good impression, the native Austrians struck him
of home. Chasteler, his borrowed Austrian chief as being spiritless and sheep-like, and their officers
of staff, travelled with him in his coach and tried self-indulgent — 'everything reeks of phlegmaticism
to draw his attention to matters in hand, but and pedantry' (Orlov, 1898, 162, 163). It was all
Suvorov just muttered 'Bayonets! Bayonets!' the more galling for the Russians, who lacked
In an access of enthusiasm the Austrians had trained staff officers, to be so dependent on the
made Suvorov a field-marshal in the Austrian Austrians for everything that had to do with
service, and commander-in-chief of all the forces supply, movement and the mechanics of military
in north Italy. The Austrian staff officers Chasteler, operations.
Zach and Weyrother learnt to value some of Tensions were also inherent in the conduct and
Suvorov's unusual qualities, and some at least of objectives of the campaign. Suvorov's strategy was
the Austrian rank-and-file responded to Suvorov's conceived as a 'right-flanking' movement, designed
attempts to enkindle their enthusiasm. In private to carry the allies around the Alpine flank of the
he told William Wickham of his admiration for Lombard plain, beating the French field forces,
the professionalism of the Austrian officers, and and leaving their isolated garrisons to wither away.
the efficiency of their administration. It appeared quite incomprehensible to the Russians
Many sources of friction remained. On arriving how their allies were determined to fritter away
at the army Suvorov issued the first of the series their field forces for the sake of conducting
of tactical instructions to which he expected the 'irrelevant' sieges in accordance with the dictates
Austrians as well as the Russians to conform. of the Hofkriegsrath, sitting in far-off Vienna.
Wenzel Anton Radetzky, who was then a young More was at stake than a divergence of military
officer, explained that technique. The Austrians, as we have seen, were
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 1 7

interested above all in consolidating once more the land and the enemy.
their mastery of Lombardy, and delaying or While Kray was detached with 20,000 Austrians
frustrating the return of the King of Sardinia as to garrison the base at Verona, and mask Peschiera
ruler of Piedmont. Suvorov, on the contrary, and Mantua, the main force concentrated against
wished to restore the old order of things in its the northern flank of the French positions. Brescia
entirety, after which he would be free to launch was seized on 20 April, and a little later Denisov
the allied army in an outright invasion of France took Bergamo by a coup de main. By late April,
by way of Dauphine. therefore, Suvorov was ready for his intended
By now we have stolen somewhat ahead of our blow against a thirty-five-mile stretch of the upper
story, having left Suvorov in mid-April when he Adda. Here the river formed a kind of sump of
assumed command of the Austro-Russian army in Lake Como, where the long south-eastern arm
north-east Italy. He had at his disposal a combined 'narrowed into sheets of water and reedy bogs.
force of 48,500 troops, of which the active Russian Inside the chosen sector, Suvorov built up heavy
element comprised about 24,500 men and forty- local concentrations of troops. The operation was
four pieces of field artillery. The French com- inaugurated on 25 April, when Suvorov sent Prince
mander was the rigid and unimaginative Scherer, Bagration with 3,000 men to attack the powerful
who had 28,000 troops dispersed along the length French forces on both banks of the Adda upstream
of the Adda, a north-bank tributary of the Po. In at Lecco. On the 26th, aided by this auxiliary
front of this main defensive position there was a attack, the allies effected crossings downstream at
scattering of garrisons — Brescia and Bergamo Trezzo and Cassano. The French were unable to
towards the Alpine foothills, Peschiera on the redispose their forces in time, and the day ended
southern shore of Lake Garda, and the powerful with their beaten army in retreat, prodded on its
fortress of Mantua. way by the Cossacks. French losses were estimated
In the whole of the French army there was at 2,000 dead, 5,000 captured and twenty-seven
probably 'not a single officer who knew the guns. 'Those famous demi-brigades the terror and
different branches of the Russian army, who admiration of Europe . . . now presented to the
possessed the slightest notion of their language, Russian army no more than scattered bands'
or of their ways of marching, camping or fighting'. (Masson, 1859,334-5).
(Masson, 1859, 431). The ignorance was sustained Suvorov exclaimed, 'the Adda is our Rubicon!',
by the work of the Cossacks, who, far more meaning that the passage of the river had opened
successfully than their comrades in Switzerland, the plain of Lombardy. General Moreau, Scherer's
prevented the French from taking prisoners and successor, withdrew the chastened French army to
conducting reconnaissances. Suvorov had the approaches to Genoa, leaving garrisons in the
instructed Adrian Denisov to manage the business citadels of Milan, Turin, Alessandria and Tortona,
in close concert with Chasteler, and Denisov now but abandoning everything outside their confines
had to tell the Austrian that the Cossack officers to the enemy. The allied army entered Milan, the
could not read maps, and that most of them were capital of Austrian Lombardy, on 29 April.
too poor to own watches. In place of these con- Suvorov found in the Austrians 'an army
ventional means of orientation, Denisov therefore bigotted to a defensive system, afraid even to
divided the Cossacks into four or five handy pursue their successes, when that system permitted
commands, with instructions to explore passages them to obtain any' (Mulgrave, 12 September
across rivers and canals, to bring back prisoners, 1799, PRO, FO 74/27). Seeking to consolidate the
and to make detailed descriptions of the places ground which had been won already, Thugut
they had seen, even if they were unable to ascer- insisted that the allies must provide for the sieges
tain the names. From these clues the Italians on of Mantua and the citadels - a strategy which
Chasteler's staff were able to identify the localities reduced Suvorov's concentration around
in question, and build up an accurate picture of Alessandria to less than 40,000 troops. This state
218 Paul I 1796-1801

of affairs encouraged the French to regain the weight of the battle, was borne by the allied right
initiative by taking him between the two jaws of a wing, where Prince Bagration with the Cossacks
strategic pincers. While Moreau with a 'western' and other elements of the right-wing advance
force of 25,000 men threatened Suvorov from the guard launched an attack against the hated emigre
direction of Genoa, General Macdonald was to Poles of Dombrowski. Macdonald brought his
strike across the Apennines with the French troops forces in this sector up to a strength of 15,000, and
from central and southern Italy and come at the in their turn the allies advanced Schweikowsky's
allies from the east. In early June 1799 Macdonald Austrians and Rosenberg's Russians from the
irrupted into the plain, and gathering troops to main body of the right wing. Altogether the
the number of about 35,000, he chased the small French counter-attack burst twice across the
Austrian detachments from Modena and Parma. Trebbia, but it was unable to overcome the 'Russian
The main 'Austrian force in that part of the world impassivity, that herd-like stubbornness against
stood under the command of Kray, and it was which the discipline of the Prussians and the
inextricably committed by the Hofkriegsrath to tactics of Frederick the Great had so often failed'
the siege of Mantua, leaving the defence of the (Masson, 1859, 344). Frohlich and Ott, standing
middle Po entirely to Ott's command of an initial respectively to the centre and left, were engaged
6,000 Austrians. too late to affect the outcome, and the combat
The sun of mid-June beat down with relentless ended with the armies facing each other across the
heat as the armies disputed the outcome of the Trebbia.
campaign on the levels south of the Po — an The contestants had all their forces at hand for
expanse of poplar-lined fields, interspersed by the final combat of 19 June. Macdonald now had
drainage channels, and the broad white gashes 33,000 troops to match Suvorov's 28,000, and he
where shallow rivers made their way northwards built up a crushing concentration of 12,000 men
through beds of white pebbles. For Suvorov the on the southern flank of the field with the inten-
first priority was to get help to Ott, as he recoiled tion of turning Suvorov's right. Once more
in the face of Macdonald. Suvorov could spare Dombrowski's division was the first major forma-
only 17,000 men to leave under Beliegarde to tion to make contact, and once more it was
mask Genoa, and with the remaining 22,000 he defeated by Bagration. The very impetus of the
hastened east, covering thirty miles a day. Russian counter-attack opened a gap in the allied
The first clash was staged on the afternoon of line, and Schweikowsky was for a time surrounded
17 June, and took the form of an encounter by the divisions of Victor and Rusca. Suvorov
battle, in which the Russian advance guard and hastened up in person and helped to push the
Cossacks came to the help of the hard-pressed Ott, French back towards the Trebbia, but 'Papa'
and persuaded the French to withdraw across the Melas, the overall commander of the Austrian
Tidone. contingent, was very slow about feeding the
On 18 June the allies undertook a full offensive central division of Frohlich into the action, and
against the French, as they stood beside the the French were able to consolidate along their
Trebbia. Suvorov disposed the main body in three start line. Much the same thing had happened the
columns, or divisions, along a frontage of five or day before.
six miles, and stipulated that 'if, contrary to Although Suvorov resigned himself to a further
expectations, the enemy encounters us, we are to battle on the next day, Macdonald made off
form line immediately in an orderly fashion, eastwards during the night, having lost 6,000 dead
though without pedantry or an excessive appear- and wounded and 5,000 men prisoner over the
ance of exactitude' (Suvorov, 1953, IV, 154). The three days of combat, as compared with the allied
approach march was hot and exhausting, and the butcher's bill of 5,000 casualties. Before Macdonald
armies came into contact only at three or four in could escape across the Apennines, a further 7,500
the afternoon. For two hours almost the whole French were overtaken and captured at Piacenza.
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 1 9

The events on the Tidone and Trebbia repre- Alessandria, and most welcome of all at the
sented a fair trial of strength between Suvorov and fortress of Mantua, which set free General Kray
the Revolutionary French, and the happy outcome to join Suvorov with his 20,000 Austrians. The
enabled him to return west and settle accounts reinforcements brought the allied army to about
with the French lurking in the Ligurian Alps. The 50,000 combatants, a respectable total with
Austrians now began to reap the reward of their which to face General Joubert, the third and
persistence in the matter of the sieges, and news least lucky of the French commanders.
began to arrive on the surrender of the isolated As Suvorov looked south in the direction of
French garrisons — at the citadels of Turin and Genoa, the verdant plain of Marengo was rimmed

N OVS ROSENBERG

M E L A S
S U V O R O V

FRESONARA

BASALUZZO BASSANO

PASTURANA

\ \ FRANCAVllLA

oTAZZANO f

T A S S A R O L O 'SERRAVALLE
220 Paul I 1796-1801

along the horizon by the bluish hump-backs of the his Austrians against the French left. He began the
peaks of the Ligurian Alps, where Joubert could first of ten attacks at five in the morning, and
have offered a strong resistance with his 40,000 or ultimately forced his way to the valley between
so French. Instead, the doomed young man Pasturana and the River Lemme. At the outset of
advanced to the edge of the plain, and ensconced the combat General Joubert had rushed up to
himself along a frontage of a dozen miles in a encourage his tirailleurs, only to be shot dead for
region of low, grassy foothills. The one post of any his pains, and his successor, Moreau, became so
great strength was on the French right centre at alarmed by developments on this flank that he
Novi, where a little town crowded into a perimeter sent thither the brigade of Colli from his. right,
of medieval walls of brown brick. Inside the town, thereby massing no less than 20,000 men in the
a steep little hill was crowned by the remains of a west.
castle, partially adapted into a renaissance fort. From eight in the morning the centre of the
Suvorov's army converged on the Novi position French position at Novi came under attack by
on 14 August. Kray's Austrians were in possession Bagration and Miloradovich. This sector was held
of a little verse from Suvorov, in praise of their by the division of Gardane, which could dart out
leader, and indeed the combat turned out to be a from the perimeter of the town walls at will, and
latter-day Kunersdorf, with Russians and Austrians which enjoyed the support of three batteries on
working together in harmony to produce a the castle hill, 'erupting in flames and incessant
resounding victory. The thing could be done, if thunder like some fire-spitting Etna' (Gryazev, in
only once in every generation. Orlov, 1898, 66). Much against his will, Adrian
On the next day Suvorov impatiently fed his Denisov obeyed orders to position his regiment of
forces into the attack as soon as they arrived, and Don Cossacks within lethally close range of 1,600
the battle gradually unfolded from west to east French infantry. Sixty of his men were hit, and his
until almost the whole of the Novi position was horse, 'terrified by the shot striking in the earth
taken in the allied embrace. Kray begged, and nearby, made three or four involuntary bounds,
received, the permission to open the action with and on one occasion reared up so high that it was

69 Novi Castle
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 221

70 Base of the interior tower at Novi Castle, looking at the western side. The surface is pitted with
hundreds of holes from the action of cannon shot, canister and musket balls, with particularly heavy
concentrations at waist height, indicating a heavy, accurate and short-range fire coming from the west and
north (the regularly spaced oblong holes are for scaffolding)

with difficulty that I could keep in the saddle'. The enemy line was now so depleted that the
Denisov ordered his men to pull back some way, Russians were finally able to break through the
which had the effect of luring a swarm of French town and assault the castle hill. They overcame the
tirailleurs from the security of their position. French resistance in the castle compound in a fire-
Seizing his opportunity, he launched his Cossacks fight of the utmost ferocity, and a party of Austrian
in a charge, and the enemy were 'so astonished hussars was able to get across the path of the
that they made no attempt to stand their ground, enemy retreat to Gavi, which contributed to swell
but took to their heels. Nearly all the Cossacks the French losses to 6,600 dead and wounded and
managed to kill two or three Frenchmen apiece' 3,000 prisoners. The allied casualties amounted to
(Denisov, RS, 1874, XII, 33, 34). 8,750, most of whom were Austrians.
This was poor consolation for the allies, who The bloody but little-known battle of Novi
saw Bagration's command shot up and beaten back brought Suvorov the title of Prince, with the
when it tried to approach the walls. Even the suffix of 'Italiiski', and it secured the Papacy and
advent of the rest of the Russian infantry, from the royal thrones of Naples and Sardinia. It might
about eleven in the morning onwards, failed to also have led Suvorov and the Austrians on to an
dislodge the French from their defences. The last outright invasion of France, if the machinations of
remaining resource was the Austrian division of Count Thugut (see p. 214) had not forced them to
Melas, which worked its way around to the east of part — the Austrians remaining in Italy, there to be
Novi, and delivered a deadly attack against the beaten by Bonaparte in 1800, and Suvorov taking
weakened French right at three in the afternoon. off with his Russian regiments to Switzerland,
222 Paul I 1796-1801

where the winter was already closing in. to act merely as auxiliaries, and unprovided with
Affairs in Switzerland were beginning to assume staff, commissariat, pontoniers, pioneers and in
a still worse aspect than Suvorov had anticipated. short with almost everything requisite for an
He had put the enemy forces in that part of the army to enter into campaign, consequently from
world at a mere 60,000, whereas Massena had the moment of their quitting the Austrian army in
70,000 in his main concentration on Lake Zurich, Italy, the regularity of which prevented the
and he had another 12,000 under Lecourbe marshal [Suvorov] from perceiving these
disposed behind the St Gotthard Pass, by which deficiencies, everything has been one scene of
Suvorov proposed to enter Switzerland. On the confusion. The want of arrangement in procuring
allied side, the doomed Korsakov and Hotze had provisions . . . has authorised and even encouraged
43,000 troops on either side of Lake Zurich, and a pillaging in a ferocious soldiery . . . the Russian
scattering of smaller Austrian detachments soldier is brave and hardy in a great degree, but the
extended some way in the direction of Suvorov — officer is [ j u s t l a s ignorant [as he is], and without
namely those of Jellacic (5,000), Linken (3,500), any of those qualities which might occasionally
Strauch (4,500), Auffenberg (3,000) and Haddik supply the want of knowledge in the field.
(4,500). Of these forces, Suvorov hoped to join (Clinton, 10 October 1799, PRO, FO 74/27)
Strauch and Auffenberg soon after his entry into
The one advantage of the delay at Taverne was
Switzerland (as actually happened), and to meet
that it enabled Suvorov to compile a long instruc-
Linken at Schwyz before proceeding to unite with
tion for his army, detailing the orders of march
Korsakov.
and tactics to be adopted in mountain warfare. In
Travelling north, Suvorov bade an ironic fare-
contrast to movement in the plains, where the
well to Italy, the land of hospitality, pasta and
Cossacks could go scouting ahead, the Russians
'sublime natural beauty' (Fuchs, 1827, 1834). On
now had to move in a tight, well-regulated march
15 September, having marched 116 English miles
formation of three divisional columns, each
in five days, Suvorov's command reached the little
consisting of an advance guard (twenty-five
Swiss town of Taverne, set amid round tree-
Cossacks, twenty pioneers, a battalion of jaegers
covered hills on the road to the St Gotthard. After
or grenadiers, and one gun) and a main body (in
this considerable effort, he was chagrined to have
order of march — three battalions, one gun, two
to lose five precious days in the place, sorting out
battalions, one gun, two battalions, one gun, and
transport arrangements. The Austrians had failed
two spare guns). In most eventualities the columns
to furnish him with the promised supplies and
were to proceed along the same route, one after
train of 1,429 mules he needed for the push on
another, separated by an interval of only sixty
Schwyz. On the suggestion of Grand Prince
paces. When the allies had to attack a mountain,
Constantine, the Russians therefore helped them-
the breadth of their deployment was to be in
selves out with 1,500 horses from the Cossacks,
proportion to that of the French. The troops were
leaving their masters to fight on foot as infantry.
to assault uphill with the bayonet, if the sharp-
The Russian artillery was sent on a circuitous
shooters failed to dislodge the enemy by fire,
route in the direction of the Upper Rhine, and for
though 'it will be evident to all that it is not neces-
the fighting ahead Suvorov relied on twenty-five
sary to ascend a mountain frontally, when it is
mountain pieces, which he had borrowed from
possible to turn it from the sides' (20 September,
the Piedmontese.
Suvorov, 1949-53, IV, 333). The document shows
The Austrian commissaries seem to have been
a remarkable degree of perception, considering
at fault in the affair, but in any case the break
that it originated from an army of plain-dwellers.
with the system of Austrian support would have
At the same time
occurred very soon. The Russians had marched to
Italy the Russians, as foreign to the Alps as the
Austrians would have been to the Caucasus,
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 2 3

7 1 A t the gates of Switzerland. Dismounted Cossacks burning their useless lances

inevitably had to allow themselves to be directed The main body of 15,000 (including the Austrian
in this respect by their allies, who had been brigade of Strauch), held on its path, and made
campaigning for a considerable time in the very ready for the frontal assault.
mountains that would have to be crossed. And so At Airolo the road deserted the Ticino valley,
the enterprise was directed by a numerous and and climbed the wall-like massif to the right, zig-
well-qualified Austrian staff. (Anon., 'Relation zagging through a landscape of bare rocks, thin
Raisonnee de la Marche de l'Armee de Suwarow', grass, and dark upland ponds. Lecourbe was taken
in Jomini, 1840, IV, 142) completely by surprise by the advent of the allies,
but when they set themselves at the slopes on
The little army set out from Taverne on 21 and 24 September he was able to build up the equiva-
22 September. The mountains began to rear lent of a brigade in their path. Bagration with the
impressively on either side of the road, and with advance guard was supposed to turn the positions
the knowledge of the fearsome barrier of the St of the French from their left, or eastern flank, and
Gotthard lying ahead, Suvorov decided to take the according to some authorities he actually did so.
position by a pincer movement. The Russian However, the heaviest fighting was occasioned by
general Rosenberg with a detachment of 6,000 the direct assault on the 2,108-metre-high pass,
men struck out on an easterly circuit by way of which cost the allies some twelve hundred men.
Disentis and the Oberalp Pass, with the commis-
sion to come at the St Gotthard from the rear. We flew up like eagles, and pressed them back ever
 2 2 4 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1

further and higher towards the heavens. Indeed, us or glided over our heads. . . . Climbing steadily
every now and then the operations were in this way we reached a summit, which to all
interrupted by wandering clouds, which enveloped appearance was the last one, but there succeeded
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 2 5

another that was steeper still, and so on, until we French must have been ultimately forced back
finally came to the loftiest of them all, where the by two wide outflanking movements, over the
enemy held the steep and rocky eminence, and Bazberg from the west and from the Oberalp
put up a long and bitter resistance. Our brave and valley from the east (Reding-Biberegg, 1895, 45,
tireless warriors, helping each other up the stony 172). However, this circumstance does not detract
crags and bare rocks, beat them and forced them from the drama of 25 September, when a force of
back. (Gryazev, in Orlov, 1898, 86-7) Russians came at the Urnerloch from the front.
The French were ready with a gun at the far
The Russians pushed on for five exhausting miles end of the rocky tube, and greeted the Mansurov
downhill as far as Hospenthal, where the leading Regiment with a blast of canister. About 260
troops spent the night. On the same day Rosenberg yards short of the reeking entrance, Colonel
had accomplished his passage of the Oberalp, and Trubnikov is said to have led three hundred men
so the two wings of the force were reunited. up the cliffs to the right, and picked his way to the
The northern exit from the mountain-rimmed 'French' end of the tunnel. Miloradovich seconded
amphitheatre of Hospenthal and Andermatt lay by the attempt by rushing a fresh wave of troops
a V-shaped cleft, beset by a remarkable series of through the tunnel, whereupon the enemy threw
natural and artificial phenomena. Converging their gun into the Reuss and retired.
sheets of grey-green rock closed in on the little Emerging into the open air, the Russians came
River Reuss so narrowly that the industrious under fire that crackled from cliffs to their left
Swiss had been forced to drive a 190-yard-long front, dominating a gulf where the stream plunged
tunnel, the Urnerloch, to enable the road to pass half right into a narrow gorge. The road clung to
to the right. Considering the natural strength of the walls of the torrent on its dizzy descent, and
the position, the number of defenders (two on the way down it passed to the left side over
battalions), and the steep slopes on either side, an the hump-backed Devil's Bridge, and thence over
expert Swiss authority has reckoned that the two arches which had been built on to the far

72 Forcing the Devil's Bridge, Andermatt. The picture correctly shows the bridge itself as intact
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 226

side of the gorge. One of these arches had been discovered that it was impossible to strike directly
considerately broken by the French. Below it, the for Schwyz and Zurich, because the expected road
Reuss surged 'with great impetuosity and noise along the east side of Lake Zurich simply did not
down to the stony bottom of the gorge, where, exist. Since the waters of Lake Lucerne were
meeting the rocks that rose out of the water, it commanded by the French, Suvorov and the
rebounded in spray, and coursed around them in generals met in council of war on the evening of
foaming waves' (Gryazev, in Orlov, 1898, 92). the 26th, and decided to make for Schwyz by an
Major Trevogin took charge of two hundred anti-clockwise circuit inland over mountains and
men, and splashed across the Reuss to the left valleys. The matter was something more than an
bank, just before the waters gathered themselves inconvenience, for the troops had eaten all the
for the plunge into the void. This move gave the food they had carried with them, and the supply
French sharpshooters some occupation while a train of pack animals stretched all the way back
number of gallant souls addressed themselves to to Airolo.
the task of binding together some planks of a The supposed oversight of the staff has always
dismantled shed with officers' sashes, so as to been difficult to explain, if only because the rest
serve as a crossing for the gap in the arch. Major of the march argues a very considerable local
Meshcherskii was the first to attempt the passage, knowledge on the part of the Austrians. The
and he paid for it with his life, as did the Cossack French certainly had the advantage of being able
behind him. The third man survived, and the rest to consult the Pfyffer relief model of Switzerland,
of the Russians followed in the path of the heroes, and the corresponding Johann Meyer map (the
regardless of casualties. The action ended with the best of the land until 1864), but:
Russians chasing the French down the rocky
did Suvorov really end up in a cul de sac as a result
descent to the floor of the wide but gloomy valley
of ignorance of the terrain and inadequate maps?
that led to Lake Lucerne.
We should not assume that the Austrian liaison
Colonel Strauch had been left behind to secure
officers, who knew the region in detail from their
the St Gotthard, but in compensation Suvorov was
earlier operations, had not acquainted him with
met at Amsteg by General Auffenberg with 2,000
the fact that Schwyz could be reached from
Austrians who had come to join him from the
Altdorf only by mountain paths. In that period it
Upper Rhine valley by way of the Maderanertal.
was a matter of routine for whole armies to
Suvorov now had a combined force of about
traverse passes which to-day are frequented only
22,500 troops.
by occasional hikers. (Schweizerische
On the afternoon of 26 September Suvorov
Verkehrszentrale, 1974,3)
reached Altdorf, less than two miles short of Lake
Lucerne, and he made ready to intervene in the On 27 September Suvorov's leading troops
quarrels of Korsakov and Massena. addressed themselves to the first stage of the
march, making the steady climb eastwards up the
He wore a shirt, with an open black waistcoat,
grassy Schachental, then striking left in disorderly
and hose which were open at the sides. As he rode
columns along drovers' tracks which took them
past he held a whip in one hand, and with the
through a landscape of rocky fangs, grey scree and
other he dispensed blessings like a b i s h o p . . . . He
sheets of snow to the Kinzig Pass (2,073 m.; 6,800
then delivered himself of a speech in broken
feet). On the downward path beside the Huribach
German, announcing himself as the saviour and
a cleft in the rocks gave access to a final zig-zag
liberator of the world, which he had come to free
which led to the pretty, flat-bottomed valley of
from the tyranny of the infidels. (Dr Lusser,
Muotatal. It is easy to imagine the astonishment of
in Re ding-Bib eregg, 1895, 49)
the population when, towards the middle of the
The standard accounts claim that through some afternoon of the 27th, a black mass flooded
oversight of the Austrian staff, Suvorov only now through the gap, with Prince Bagration and the
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 2 7

73 Descent to the Muotatal from the Kinzig Pass. The course of the Huribach is indicated by the
diagonal line of trees on the right

advance guard leading the way for a host of 'hard, Rosenberg was apparently the one least likely to
tough, warlike folk . . . dark brown in complexion', be able to live up to this important responsibility.
and all decked up in antique garb (Fassbind, in He was an old German, who had visited St
Re ding-Bib eregg, 1895, 355). The chaplain of the Petersburg only in his younger days, and who for
Franciscan convent of St Joseph told a little more than twenty years now had held insignificant
gathering that the day of deliverance from the and quiet commands in the Caucasus and the
French was at hand. He was still speaking when a Crimea. People were unsettled by his dry humour.
party of Cossacks appeared, stretched him out on He was thrifty, not to say mean, and although he
the ground, and relieved him of his shoes with never married he liked to summon pretty girls to
their silver buckles. A party of forty or fifty serve him tea and other commodities.
French were unaccountably slow in getting away. Now, in Switzerland in 1799, Rosenberg's
They were wiped out in the night by a patrol of 'calm and courageous management of military
Cossacks, who afterwards laughed wildly as they affairs caused Suvorov to bemoan that he had
washed their sabres in the waters of the Muota. not made use of him earlier' (Wiegel, 1864-6, I,
Lecourbe still had about 7,500 troops hovering pt 1, 101). On 27 September Rosenberg imposed
dangerously about the lower Reuss. Luckily, the monstrously on Lecourbe by a show of aggressive
Swiss people refused to enlighten him as to the activity. He made soundings along the Reuss, he
allies' movements, and the mist and the heavy, put in a feint attack against the hamlet of Erstfeld,
continuous rain concealed from him the march up and when the French responded by seizing Altdorf,
the Schachental. To keep the Frenchman in he promptly pushed them out again. On the next
perplexity was the task of Infantry General day he made good his escape over the Kinzig Pass,
Rosenberg, who guarded the rear of the army with leaving Forster to follow up with three regiments
his own corps and the rearguard proper under of infantry and a body of Cossacks. Lecourbe
Forster. remained passive on the lower Reuss, allowing the
Of all the Russian commanders, Andreas Russians to get clean away.
228 Paul I 1796-1801

74 Convent of St Joseph, Muotathal village, seen from the west

On 28 September Suvorov crossed the pass on a a reasonable rate. (Fassbind, in Reding-Biberegg,

litter borne by peasants, and he and his staff made 1895,353)
their headquarters just outside the village of
Muotathal in the convent of St Joseph, with its Early on the 29th, Suvorov and his generals
neat and fragrant rooms of wood panelling. The met in an anxious council of war in the meadows
troops were fit and lively, but the march over the outside the convent. On the day before they had
Kinzig had taken a heavy toll of the footwear, and suffered a double disappointment. Not only was
the only food readily available was the white and there no sign of Linken's command of Austrians
green cheese of the locality, which was not to the (they had fallen back to the Upper Rhine), but a
Russian taste. The memories of those days are series of reports left no doubt that Korsakov and
still strong in the Muotatal, and the taciturn Hotze had been broken by the French. Thus the
peasants occasionally relate how the Russian whole scheme of campaign had collapsed, and the
soldiers stripped the unripe fruits from the trees, French were now free to locate and destroy
and founded the stock which, so they say, is Suvorov's little army. From being a participant in
perpetuated in the high cheekbones and slant a grandiose scheme for a general offensive, Suvorov
eyes of certain families. However, the Russians was in danger of becoming the quarry in a hunt
were: in which his own survival was at stake. The council
therefore decided to strike eastwards to the valley
most restrained and pious, and did not the of the Linth, there to orient themselves afresh.
slightest violence to clergy, sacred property or By itself the initial stage was one of the most
women . . . they were willing to pay amply for difficult operations that could be imagined, for the
everything, but since the Muotatalers asked long drawn-out columns had to traverse the
exorbitant prices, and the Russians were driven Muotatal from south to north-east, exposing their
by hunger, they changed their tune, and took by flank to the French who were advancing up the
force what the people were unwilling to offer at valley from the open western end.
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 2 9

75 Eastern end of the Klontalersee, viewed from near the French blocking position of 30 September -
1 October

As commander of the advance guard, Prince fires of Rosenberg's command in the Muotatal,
Bagration had the task of ensuring that the allies resting before it faced the enemy. The French first
were able to make their escape at all. On the 29th tested the resistance of the rearguard on the
General Auffenberg's brigade led the way over the following day, when the division of Mortier
Pragel Pass, which formed the north-eastern exit advanced up the Muotatal from the west.
from the valley, and initiated two days of heavy Rosenberg hung back for some time before sup-
fighting in the Klontal against General Molitor, porting his outposts, but once he got on the move
who ultimately brought up eight or more battalions he threw the French back smartly by the way
(5,500 men) to dispute the passage. On the even- they had come.
ing of the 29th, Molitor was able to make a stand The arrival of Forster's division brought
at the near end of the fiord-like waters of the Rosenberg's force in the Muotatal to 8 or 9,000
Klontalersee, and when Bagration arrived on the effectives (sixteen depleted battalions, three
30th the French merely fell back to a new position regiments of Cossacks, and a nominal fifteen
at the eastern end of the lake. The allies renewed guns). Every last man was needed, for Massena in
the frontal assault on 1 October, this time in person concentrated 9-10,000 troops (Mortier's
conjunction with a turning movement by way of division and a brigade of Molitor's) for a new
the steep slopes to the north, all covered with sweep up the valley on 1 October. The French
larches, and ancient mossy beeches. Bagration now were checked for a time by the Russian outpost
carried the position, and in a day of bloody regiment, which occupied a feature which barred
fighting he pushed on to the relative civilisation the narrow valley of the lower Muota. However,
of the Linth valley and Glarus. Rosenberg deliberately made his stand well up the
On the night of the 29th Forster's Cossacks valley, knowing that if he fought too far forward
were still leading their ponies by hand over the he would be exposed to any outflanking move on
Kinzig. A scattering of what appeared to be stars the part of the French, who were probably the
could be seen in the gloom below. These were the superior of the Russians in grand tactical move-
230 Paul I 1796-1801

ment. Conversely, the Russian infantry, and even mighty bounds over hedges and ditches. The
the Cossacks, were proving surprisingly adept in French made off down the narrowing valley, and
making use of the ground, and launching short- jammed together on a stone bridge which carried
ranged hooks through steep and woody terrain. the track high above the waters of the Muota.
Rosenberg accordingly ranged his forces just in Whole clumps of panic-stricken soldiery plunged
front of Muotathal in two lines, filling the 1,000- into the gorge, and many of the men who reached
yard-wide valley from one side to the other. The the far side were shot down by the laughing
valley floor was more heavily wooded then than Russians. Altogether the little battle of 1 October
now, and the villagers noted that the Russians cost the French five guns, one thousand dead and
were well concealed. wounded and at least as many taken prisoner. The
The French advanced in three dense columns, Russians also had about one thousand casualties in
preceded by a thick cloud of skirmishers. They this, their last indisputably victorious passage of
were checked and surprised in the first exchanges arms in the eighteenth century.
of fire, but they renewed the attack with the help Having won precious time for the escape of the
of reinforcements, and began to make a per- main army, Rosenberg followed in Suvorov's
ceptible impression on the Russians. The Russian muddy tracks over the Pragel, leaving the floor of
second line was now brought up three hundred the Muotatal Uttered with the bodies of men,
paces to be incorporated in the first, and after an horses and mules. Finally on 4 October the entire
interlude of musketry the whole rushed forward Russo-Austrian forces assembled at Glarus, where
with loud cries. The Swiss looked on with admira- the leading troops had already spent two days'
tion as the Russians scoured the valley floor like rest.
a wave, and the Cossacks darted ahead, executing On the same 4 October Suvorov assembled a
 Paul I 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 2 3 1

76 The entry to the Panixer Pass (left centre), seen from the Sernftal

council of war. He and his Austrian staff officers were lost on the passage, many of them very
wished to rescue something from the campaign by probably on the steep descending zig-zag which
barging northwards down the Linth valley and lay beyond the pass. A final push through a forest
joining up with Jellacic's isolated command of of conifers brought the Russians on 7 October to
Austrian troops. However, the Grand Prince the valley of the Upper Rhine at Ilanz, where not
Constantine and the rest of the Russian generals even the French would venture to follow them.
could think of nothing but putting the greatest Suvorov and his survivors trailed down the
possible distance between themselves and the valley by way of Chur, and on 18 October he was
French, in other words, taking a route south to joined by the sorry remnants of Korsakov's army
the Upper Rhine. Indeed, Auffenberg and his near Lindau. From here the view across Lake
Austrians had already taken off in that direction. Constance to the snowy peaks reminded every
Suvorov could only give way. man of the ordeal he had endured in Switzerland.
This time Bagration was assigned with his For the winter the army was withdrawn to quarters
2,000 or so jaegers and grenadiers to constitute the in southern Bavaria, while Suvorov in person was
rearguard, enabling the main force of 15,000 to summoned back to Russia. He stopped for some
scuttle southwards up the narrow Sernftal by way time in Prague, feasting and conversing with the
of Matt and Elm. On 6 October the army turned many foreigners who had collected there. 'But this
up a gorge-like valley, skirted the eerie little was a swan song on the waters of the Meander. In
Haxenseeli water, and made the strenuous crossing Cracow there awaited him both physical and
of the Panixer Pass (2,407 m.; 7,900 feet), lying mental collapse, which hastened the end of his
under two feet of fresh snow. The artillery, the notable life' (Fuchs, 1827, 46).
pack animals and more than two hundred men The ailing soldier travelled on to his estate at
232 Paul I 1796-1801

Kobrin, and so to his final place of rest at St state of almost drunken exaltation at their
Petersburg. Paul had created him generalissimo deliverance. It took half a minute to inform
for his last achievements, but he did not feel Lieven that Emperor Paul was dead, and that he
bound to wait on Suvorov in his final hours. must pay his respects to his successor. The door
Suvorov died at two in the afternoon on 6 May of the office opened, and Emperor Alexander
1800, 'the greatest commander which Russia had emerged, asking 'Where is Lieven?' The emperor
ever produced' (Langeron, RS, 1895, LXXXIII, fell on his shoulder and sobbed 'My father, my
160). poor father!' (Kvardi, in Skalon, 1902-C.1911,
There was no prospect of the orphaned army II, bk 1,310)
being employed once more against the French.
Captain Gryazev, a survivor of Suvorov's
Paul's unstable temperament had been a prime
campaign, tried to sum up the prospects for his
moving force in the creation of the Second
nation in the new century. He conceded that the
Coalition, and it was now the cause of its dis-
French were very formidable enemies, and he
integration. The Austrians had angered him by
was:
their blatant pursuit of short-term ends in the late
campaign, while the British infuriated him still unaware of any other nation, save the Russian,
more when they refused to deliver Malta to his which is capable of withstanding them. With the
keeping as Grand Master of the Order of St John. passage of time we may well see my prophecy
He laid an embargo on British shipping, and sent come to pass. We shudder at the extraordinary
an armed expedition some way on the path to chains of events, the revolutions which may lie
India, and only the lack of time and resources ahead of Europe in all its turmoil. We draw
prevented an all-out shooting war between the comfort from the many things that elevate us
former allies. above the other civilised nations of that
Russia was returned to normality in the most continent — the good state of our monarchy
drastic way, when a group of palace conspirators in every respect, our inexhaustible riches, power
assassinated Paul on 11 March 1801. One of his and constancy, the inviolability of property
general-adjutants, Count Christoph Lieven, was which is enjoyed by all classes of society, and
summoned to the Winter Palace to see Paul's son the nobles in particular, and our condition of
Alexander, who had been deposited on the throne unshakeable repose.. . . God grant that we may
in the place of his murdered father. lieven knew continue to live as we do now — enjoying the
nothing of the change in affairs, and: protection of a wise government. Then the
coming century will proceed in the same way as
he found Grand Prince Constantine and a number the last one, and we may always take pride in the
of generals in the waiting room. The grand prince name of Russian] (Gryazev, in Orlov, 1898,
was bathed in tears, but the generals were in a 166-7)

•t
Ten Conclusions

Russia's military way to the West satisfactory ends to the wars of the Polish and
Austrian Successions, while Catherine's good
Now that we have spent some time in the company offices in the Teschen peace conference of 1779
of eighteenth-century Russian armies, it is prob- drew the most flattering expressions from diplo-
ably evident how very little outright combat with mats and sovereigns. In the new age of ideological
the Western powers had to do with Russia's and national war, the same interventionalist urge
territorial gains in Europe, at least after Peter the was transmuted into the messianic crusades of Paul
Great's push to the Baltic. When Lacy and Miinnich I, Alexander I and Nicholas I, which carried Russian
besieged Danzig in 1734, it was in the interest of armies into so many parts of Europe.
puppets and allies, and if Elizabeth's Russia began When we attempt to evaluate the degree to
to harbour designs on East Prussia, this very which Russia acquired European military modes, it
considerable prize was cast away with unconcern is perhaps better to employ the term 'modernisa-
by Peter III, and not retrieved by Catherine the tion' than 'Westernisation'. This is because Peter
Great. However, by participating so mightily in the the Great made the fundamentally important
Seven Years War Russia had secured an entree into decision, which shapes Russia still, to adopt what
the ranks of the greatest European monarchies, was useful from European practice, while rejecting
and in the later part of the century she joined many of the values and the land of society which
Prussia and Austria as a more than equal partner had accounted for the technical advance of the
in the dismemberment of Poland. The only enemy West in the first place. The contradictions were
blood that was shed in the process was Polish, and overcome by the autocratic power that lay at the
then by way of suppression rather than conquest. disposal of the Mongol-Muscovite monarchy,
Hence the unresisted westwards encroachments of enabling it to concentrate national effort on the
Catherine's realm. We may apply to Russia as a armed forces. An Englishman travelled through
whole the comment which Wiegel made about Russia in the 1770s and noted that:
Potemkin: 'He was feared not so much for what he
really did, as for what he might have done'(Wiegel, in point of education, the military science is the
1864-6,1, pt 1,291). most cultivated. In absolute governments the army
Less obvious to the West was the generation in takes the lead in everything; by the prevailing
Russia of a concept of herself as a kind of panto- argument of a musket, submission is obtained; the
mime fairy queen, alighting on the European stage regulation and discipline of that army, will ever be
to sort out the tangled affairs of other nations. a primary interest in those governments.
The expeditions of 1735 and 1748 helped to bring (Richard, 1780,30)

2 3 3
2 3 4 C o n c l u s i o n s

Society was militarised to a degree unknown in the ranging operations, and encouraged generals like
West outside Prussia, and even in the nineteenth Fermor, Miinnich, Rumyantsev and Suvorov to
century a military career offered many gentlemen develop an offensive philosophy of warfare, which
the only alternative to the tedium of work in the stood in interesting contrast to the outlook of
civil service or life on a provincial estate. Thus the some of the Austrians, who had been campaigning
military episodes in the lives of writers like against the Turks on the Danube. Unfortunately,
Tolstoy, Lermontov and Dostoevsky. the otherwise praiseworthy self-sufficiency of
Russian logistics became a liability in the Seven
In Russia peculiar circumstances forced into the
Years War, when the huge trains of waggons
regular army men who, in other countries, would
obstructed the operations, and restrained the
scarcely have dreamed of it. Amongst such men
commanders for far too long from looking for
there were inevitably those who would, in due
means of subsistence better suited to a Western
course, emerge as writers. In consequence we have
theatre. It also appears likely that the comparative
an imaginative and interpretative literature about
ease of victories over people like the Turks and
the occasions and emotions of regular soldiering
Poles left the Russians unprepared for combat
such as is to be found in no other country.
against disciplined enemies like the French.
(Luckett, in Best and Wheatcroft, 1976, 30)
Here the very needful tightening of standards by
How complete was the modernisation of the Paul I probably stood the Russians in better
Russian army? With the impetus given to it by stead than most commentators have been prepared
Peter, the process extended to the acquisition of to admit.
Western-style ranks, tactics, weapons, and (with We shall touch later on the sterile controversies
some modifications) regimental organisation and about the alleged conflict between Western and
uniforms. Self-sufficiency in war production was national Russian influences on the army of the
already well advanced in Peter's time, and by the eighteenth century. In his own age, Peter the Great
end of the century the independence was nearly was seen as neither a Muscovite nor a Western
complete. However, certain areas remained largely European, but a frightful phenomenon suigeneris.
untouched. It would be difficult to maintain, for It is just as difficult to detect the supposed
example, that the Russian officers took as readily polarisation in later generations. If the arch-
to the Western aristocratic military ethos, or a Teuton Miinnich worked for the Russification of
Prussian sense of responsibility, as they did to the officer corps, then the native Russians
European languages and manners. More happily, Rumyantsev and Suvorov were neither totally self-
the private soldier retained his primitive virtues in sufficient pioneers (as the Soviets claim), nor
full measure, deriving not just from physical passive recipients of a superior Western knowledge,
constitution, but a sense of community which he but active and creative members of the cosmo-
carried from his village life. politan European military community. Only in the
Two things above all distinguished the Russian person of the semi-Oriental Potemkin do we
army from its Western counterparts. The first was encounter somebody who deliberately set himself
the fact that it was constituted as a national army, against some Western ways of doing things.
which further promoted the extraordinary tough- As for the impact of the Russian army on the
ness and consistency of the Russian infantry. Peter West, we have noticed again and again how men
the Great recognised the priceless value of this who saw the Russians with their own eyes com-
asset when he preserved local loyalties in the mented on the urbanity of the officers, and (with
nomenclature and recruiting of his regiments. the occasional failing) the fine discipline of the
Second, whole generations of commanders men. Western public opinion in general was,
were shaped by campaigning against the Tartars however, persuaded otherwise, thanks to the
and Turks. On the positive side, the steppe experi- effective propaganda of Frederick the Great,
ence habituated the Russian armies to wide- and the misdeeds of the Cossacks, which were
 C o n c l u s i o n s 2 3 5

wrongly laid to the account of the entire army. political stability itself could no longer be guaran-
Some genuine alarm was occasioned in the West by teed, a failure evident in the dramatic withdrawals
the Russian destruction of Swedish power in the from the Seven Years War and the War of the
Great Northern War, and (in certain circles) by Second Coalition.
the revelations of Russian potential in the Seven While the sheer size of the Romanov empire
Years War, but in general the frissons were calmed lent Russia, if not St Petersburg, a high degree of
by the risible incompetence of the Russians in invulnerability, the distance which separated the
matters of military detail, and the fact that Russian Russian heartland from the Western theatres of
ambitions were so strongly diverted towards the war told heavily on every operation of an offensive
East. kind. The face of military and political affairs was
Without detracting from the achievements of liable to change considerably by the time Russian
Russian armies in the Seven Years War, or the armies approached their objectives. Active opera-
heroism so often displayed in 1799, it is worth tions ceased while the expeditions of 1735 and
asking why Russia, with her immense geographical 1748 were still on the march, which occasioned a
extent, failed to make a greater impact on cam- measure of frustration. However, outright disaster
paigns in Europe than she did. In the first place, stared Suvorov and Kutuzov in the face, when
the available resources of manpower were modest, they finally arrived in the depths of Europe in
and badly conserved, permitting the Russians to 1799 and 1805, only to find the allied plans in
emerge on Western theatres in adequate but by no disarray, and themselves the object of the enemy's
means overwhelming force. More surprising still, undivided attention.
the stock of native horses was not only small in The Russians could have done a lot to assist
numbers, but poor in quality, which had far- themselves through suitable structures and
reaching consequences for the tactical efficiency, strategies. Instead of the small, Western-type
security and logistic support of the army. Much regiment, a super-large unit establishment would
effort must have been required to build up the have made allowance for the inevitable wastage of
cavalry that launched the devastating charge at manpower, as Semen Vorontsov suggested. Third
Kunersdorf, and to provide the motive power battalions, of the kind evolved in the Seven Years
which enabled the excellent artillery of Shuvalov War, could have been retained permanently to
to engage the Prussians to such good effect. serve as reception and training centres for the
Good staff work would have enabled the recruits marching to the theatres of war. Lastly,
commanders to make the best use of what troops no Russian commander, save Rumyantsev, seems
and horses lay at their disposal. However, this to have grasped the importance of establishing
kind of mental activity remained totally alien to forward bases, where the army could have restored
the Russian temperament, as witness the failure of its strength during the winter months, instead of
Shuvalov to interest the government in his projects losing time and men by prosecuting a lengthy
for a staff college in the 1750s, or the persecutions retreat at the end of each campaign.
undergone by Bauer in the 1770s. It was a pity Movements within Russia themselves called for
that the Russian officers were frequently on bad prodigious efforts. When Paul ordered 100,000
personal terms with their most steadfast allies, the troops to assemble for a review outside Moscow
Austrians, who were qualified and willing to help in May 1799
them out in this respect. >

No firm operational guidance came from above, most of the regiments which were summoned to
after the end of the Great Northern War. Peter the the event had to traverse seven or eight hundred
Great was the only true soldier-king that Russia versts to the place of assembly, and there was not
knew in the eighteenth century, and even he was a single one which had to march less than five
very slow to intervene directly in the business of hundred. This diversion cost millions of roubles,
command. Under his successors, the element of and we commented at the time that the burden
2 3 6 C o n c l u s i o n s

was borne not by the treasury, but by the people The 'Russian' school, on the other hand, was
of the areas through which the forces marched. stridently nationalistic, drawing attention to a
The regiments had to set out from their garrisons Russian way of war that was original, and generally
in March, according to the movement orders . . . superior to that of the West. Probably the most
and anybody who has the slightest acquaintance productive of such 'Russians' was Dmitri
with Holy Russia knows that in this season it is Fedorovich Maslovskii, who edited several collec-
almost impossible to progress by road, a state of tions of material from the archives, and wrote a
affairs summed up in the ancient proverb: 'In heavily documented history of the Seven Years
Russia, March is a month without water, and War.
April is a month without grass'. By this we mean In the early twentieth century, by when passions
that in March the rivers are still frozen, and had abated somewhat, the formidable capacities of
cannot be navigated by rafts, and yet the ice is Russian military scholarship and, indeed, of
too thin to bear your weight in safety. As for the Russian printers found their final expression in
absence of grass in April, this comes from the two multi-volumed works. The centenary of the
continuous thawing of the snow, which War Ministry in 1902 prompted the moderate
transforms the soil into a liquid dough . . . there 'academic' D. A. Slcalon to supervise the publica-
were instances when the barrels, wheels and tion of a detailed and wide-ranging collective study
appurtenances had to be removed from the gun of Russia's military past, the Stoletie Voennago
carriages, and the whole lot carried by hand — Ministerstva. A more straightforwardly narrative
and in this case the hands were those of peasants. approach was adopted for the Istoriya Russkoi
Nobody can estimate how many of these folk Armii i Flota (A. S. Grishinskii, V. Nikolskii,
were killed or crippled by the labour. Peasants N. L. Klado), which began publication in 1911.
are not soldiers, and so in Russia they are not The Great War, the Bolshevik Revolution and
accounted human beings. (Turgenev, RS, the Civil War between them accomplished an
1885, XLVIII, 74-5) apparently complete physical eradication of the
sturdy growth of Russian military history. From
1934, however, the first new shoots struggled into
The historians' verdict the light, encouraged by some resolutions of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
To a greater or lesser extent, every historian of the USSR, which spoke of the usefulness of the study
old Russian army has lived parasitically off the of military history in the schools and in the
mighty product of the Russian scholars of the services. The Voenno — Istoricheskii Zhurnal was
second half of the nineteenth century. In those founded in 1939, and the next year saw the
years a series of voluminous record publications publication of N. M. Korobkov's useful new study
brought to light a great quantity of memoirs and of the Seven Years War.
other documents, and helped to furnish ammuni- Military history became a prime governmental
tion for two contending schools of military history. concern when Stalin sought to marshal older
One band of scholars became known as the 'acade- national enthusiasms behind the Party in the
mics', and maintained that they could trace a ordeal of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-5. The
'single highway' through Russian military affairs, shade of Suvorov was conjured up to give his name
by identifying successive periods of foreign to a new order for military bravery, which was
influence — Scandinavian, Byzantine, Mongol, instituted in 1942, and again to a system of junior
Swedish and so on. For them, the eighteenth military academies which came into being in 1943.
century was clearly an epoch when Prussian The tsarist military uniforms were re-introduced,
fashions were in the ascendancy (G. A. Leer, P. A. and Stalin himself assumed the Suvorovian title of
Geisman, P. 0 . Bobrovskii, M. Bogdanovich, N. P. generalissimo, and gave out that the retreat of
Mikhnevich, A. Baiov, etc.). 1941 was a carefully considered move, inspired by

r
 C o n c l u s i o n s 2 3 7

Kutozov's fabian strategy of 1812. Poles in 1794.

The historians responded with an enthusiasm It is perhaps of interest to see what judgments
that was to embarrass some of their successors. A the Soviet historians have passed on the Russian
title like The Destruction of the Prussian Forces army of the eighteenth century. With some reser-
by the Russians 1756-1762 (Korobkov) is suffi- vations, the work of Peter the Great has always
cient explanation by itself, while E. V. Tarle been held up for admiration. The Soviets write
and his associates completed Napoleon's Invasion that this energetic gentleman appreciated that
1812 with the declared aim of 'popularising one Russia's general backwardness was derived from
of the most brilliant pages of Russian military an economic backwardness, and that this in turn
history in terms that would broaden the struggle proceeded from the denial of access to the seas.
of the Russian people against the German fascists'. Hence he opened the Baltic as a national task.
In the 1960s and 1970s scholars found it necessary Furthermore, Peter founded heavy industries, and,
to point out that the old Russian army was, after while making a modicum of borrowings from the
all, an upholder of the 'feudal' absolutism. West, he determined the application in the light of
The era of patriotic enthusiasm was succeeded his own experience and the particular needs of
by that of the peacetime Stalinist personality cult, Russia. Peter saw the Great Northern War as a
which engendered some undeniably useful editions school for the nation, not just the army, and in his
of printed documents relating to famous leaders supreme effort against the Swedes in 1708-9 he
like Rumyantsev and Suvorov. The year 1955, was in turn powerfully aided by the people at
however, produced a revolution that was as far- large. Indeed, 'Soviet historiography is favourably
reaching in historical studies as it was in politics. distinguished from the pre-Revolutionary and
'The overcoming of the error of subjectivism began bourgeois historiography, which grossly under-
after the Twentieth Session of the Communist estimated the significance of the struggle of the
Party of the USSR, which signified a new stage popular mass against the Swedish aggressors in the
in the development of the historical art'(Klokman, course of the Great Northern War' (Klokman, in
in Beskrovnyi, 1969,42). Researches now became Beskrovnyi, 1969,33).
more wide-ranging in character, as a matter of Most far-reaching of all, Peter is supposed to
policy, and they resulted in the publication of have founded a specifically Russian school of war,
works like the collective commemorative volume characterised by a search for a 'general battle',
Poltava (1959). Most active and influential of the and an emphasis on offensive action and moral
newer generation was Lev Beskrovnyi, a slightly- qualities. The torch is alleged to have been taken
built and intense man who was the teacher of up in later generations by Rumyantsev, Potemkin,
Lieutenant-General Pavel Zhilin and other Suvorov, Kutuzov and the admirals Spiridov and
prominent historians, and who was himself the Ushakov. The contrary school is represented by
author of important bibliographical studies (1957 foreign, and more particularly Prussian leaders,
and 1962), and the sizeable Russian Army and and those who fell under their influence. Harsh,
Fleet in the Eighteenth Century (1958). cold and alien, the foreigners are described as
The value of the post-Stalin military-historical defensively-minded, blind to the virtues of the
oeuvre is by no means easy to assess. The school native Russian, and obsessed with routine, linear
is remarkably good (thanks to Beskrovnyi) on the tactics, and a discipline which held the soldier in
bibliographical side, and has much of worth to say robot-like subjection. (The Soviets' attempt to fit
on war production, recruiting, and military train- Miinnich into the latter category undoubtedly
ing and education. Regarded as a whole, however, renders a severe disservice to the man who alle-
it is nationalistic, uneven and unconvincing, and viated the lot of the recruits, and who, by found-
given to attaching undue importance to certain ing the Cadet Corps and raising the pay of the
developments, while ignoring such episodes as do native officers, sought to break the domination of
not serve its purpose, like the hammering of the the foreigners in military affairs.)
2 3 8 C o n c l u s i o n s

Moving to the middle of the century, we find conviction. Thus the dismal phenomenon of
that, with the exception of Saltykov, the com- desertion is glorified as a proletarian instrument in
manders of the Seven Years War have aroused little the 'class war'. Thus, in accordance with Lenin's
enthusiasm among the Soviets, which possibly views on the direct relationship of tactics and
helps to account for the comparative neglect of technology, Beskrovnyi and his school enter into
this important episode in Russian military history. considerable detail on the production of pig-iron
Hence the best of the modern insights come from and the like, but fail to establish any credible
Western historians like Mediger, Bangert, Kaplan, connection between the alleged superiority of
Oliva and Kunisch. Russian weaponry and the Suvorovian art of war.
However, there is a good deal of solid worth in There is reason to suspect that in Russia the
Soviet evaluations of the leaders of the reign >of ramshackle apparatus of Marxism-Leninism is
Catherine the Great, and indeed some of the more driven not by its own feeble motive power, but by
extravagant claims of the 1940s have since been some much more powerful forces. Chief among
repudiated. No longer do historians seek to estab- these is the outright nationalism which sustains the
lish a direct correspondence between Suvorov's Soviet historians as strongly as it did the 'Russian'
enlightened military practice, on the one hand, school of the 1880s and 1890s. 'These historians,'
and his social and political aims, which are now writes Beskrovnyi, 'were correct to emphasise that
admitted to have been devoted to the interests of military affairs in Russia bore a national character,
his class and the monarchy. that their development reflected internal needs
As might have been expected, the wretched and not foreign influences, and that the Russian
Emperor Paul is comprehensively damned as one school of war was in no way inferior to that of
who set himself against common humanity and the Western Europe' (Beskrovnyi, 1957, 154).
principles of the 'Russian school of war'. Little Altogether Marxism-Leninism has served merely
account is taken of Paul's idealism, or his ambi- to complicate the task of the Soviet military
tions to destroy all that was cruel and rotten in the historians. It compels them to search for formulae
army that was left by Catherine. Interestingly that will reconcile the paradox of the imposition
enough, the Soviets here range themselves along- of Germanic materialism on Holy Russia, forcing
side the true reactionaries of the 1790s — the them to establish connections between Russian
xenophobes and the corrupt nobility — and they nationalism and a whole variety of disparate
reject the opportunity to construct what could technical, economic, social and military processes.
have been a passably convincing 'proletarian' The many consequent absurdities throw the
interpretation of the eighteenth-century army, credibility of the whole into doubt, and do the
based on the worth of the private soldier and his greatest possible disservice to the memory of some
enlightened champions. of the truly remarkable phenomena of eighteenth-
Anomalies of this kind give some clue as to the century Russia — the national army, the victories
inspiration behind the work of Soviet historians. of the Seven Years War, the inspirations of
Marxism-Leninism defines the eighteenth century Shuvalov and Potemkin, the timeless genius of
as a period of equilibrium, when neither the Suvorov, and the endurance of the ordinary
decaying feudalism nor the rising bourgeoisie had soldier, a man who never knew when he was
the upper hand, and when both had an interest in beaten, and who by his fortitude so often made
strengthening the new bureaucratic state. The good the blunders and negligence of his chiefs.
Russian monarchy is said by the Soviets to have
played a progressive role at that time, for its desire
to develop the economy demanded a forward Continuities and discontinuities
foreign policy, a centralised governmental
apparatus, and a regular army. The detailed The Russian army survived until 1917 as recog-
application of the analysis, however, carries little nisably the same animal which had gone to war in
 C o n c l u s i o n s 2 3 9

the eighteenth century. Did the October Revolution expenditure and resources to its armed forces. On
and the consolidation of the new regime then its side, the army still helps to repay the attention
mark a complete break with the old continuities? by lending itself to be used as an instrument of
In many fields of national activity this was appar- civilian control and support. The result is an over-
ently the case, not least concerning the ease with directed nation which excels at one thing only —
which the bulk of the population seemed to acquiring the capacity to wage war.
transfer its loyalty from tsar and church to the A continuity of practice between the old and
new gods of Soviet atheism. However, some new regimes was reinforced by the influence of
enduring constants have become more evident ex-tsarist officers like Brusilov and Tukhachevsky,
with every decade which separates us from the and it is evident in the primacy given to mobility
Revolution. * and mass, as well as the principle of the rolling
The old tyrannies of distance, terrain and deployment, and significant details like the symbols
climate have been eroded, but not destroyed, by used to denote military units on maps. We have
modern technology, leaving Russia still (by Western noticed how patriotic Russians were also unable
standards) a vast, underpopulated, underdeveloped to ignore the achievement of their remoter military
and ill-articulated mass, where space acts at least past. Indeed, military history in the Soviet Union
as much to the disadvantage of the regime as in its has assumed dimensions that are now unknown in
favour. Tyranny of a governmental kind was taken the West, being considered at once a source of
over almost without a break from the old order. patriotic inspiration, and a fund of experience
'Dissidents' and the like remain a tiny, unrepre- from which military doctrine may be extracted or
sentative minority, and the people have proved supported. Suvorovian formations are still upheld
perfectly ready to accept the apparatus of controls, as praiseworthy examples of the vital principle of
passports and directions with which they have depth, and with extraordinary consistency the
lived for centuries. The rulers — Peter, Catherine peculiarly Russian concept of the corps volant has
or Stalin — have not shrunk from removing whole reappeared in almost every generation since Peter
populations from the map, changing or annihilat- first wrote about it in the 1700s. This type of fast-
ing in the process the very names of their old moving, semi-independent formation took Berlin
habitations. from the Prussians in 1760. It is seen again in
The ancient hatreds and suspicions of the Rumyantsev's Turkish campaigns. It was employed
outside world endure unabated, and in the twen- in various guises in the two World Wars, and it has
tieth century have been extended to such Soviet assumed its most modern guise in the shape of the
soldiers who have ever fallen into the hands of the units of reidoviki, designed to roam around in the
enemy, or who have come into contact with alien rear of NATO forces. If the corps volant was one
civilian populations. Writing of the dangers of such expression of the impact of distance and space on
contamination, a Russian explained that 'it could the Russian art of war, we may also trace in the
happen all too easily that our troops could absorb eighteenth century the forces which made for the
dangerous principles in foreign countries, where emergence of the later concepts of 'theatre' (see
the form of government differs from ours, and p. 126) and 'front', and the force of meaning
bring these ideas back to our own land' (Mediger, behind the word 'operation' (subtly different from
1952, 273). The words might have come from the Western understanding of 'campaign'), which
Stalin, but they were penned by Vice-Chancellor conveys the idea of a sequence of military activity
Vorontsov in 1745. pursued through to the accomplishment of a set
As regards warlike affairs in particular, the objective — a term probably fixed by the exhaus-
sentiment of J. Richard concerning Russian tion of supplies. The designation of 'operation',
military priorities (see p. 233) applies with equal therefore, applies as usefully to Fermor's seizure
force to a government which devotes many of its of East Prussia in 1758 as to the Russian push
best brains and a substantial proportion of public from the Oder in 1945.
2 4 0 C o n c l u s i o n s

In the eighteenth century the artillery offered sacrifice of the Great Patriotic War with a rever-
the one occasional exception to the almost uni- ence that was once reserved for the Divinity.
formly depressing story of Russian technical One of the most remarkable continuities of all
backwardness, and with their stress on the weight resides in the very potent attractions and repul-
of artillery and missile fire the present generation sions which have coloured relations between
of Soviet gunners has placed itself in the direct line Russia and Germany over the ages. We have often
of descent from Shuvalov, Martinov, Glebov, noticed the emotions generated by this connection
Melissino and the other gifted artillerymen of two in the eighteenth century. In the succeeding
centuries ago. As for the infantry, the tales of Napoleonic period, in an episode much celebrated
tenacity from Brest and Stalingrad do not differ in propaganda today, parties of liberty-loving
in kind from those that were current at the time Prussian officers sought refuge in Russia, and
of Zorndorf or Borodino. The present intakes of before long the Prussians as a whole welcomed the
Soviet recruits have nine or more generations of Russians as comrades in arms in the crusade which
conscription behind them, enough to invest the freed Europe from The Ogre in 1813 and 1814. In
young mens' entry into military life with some- the second quarter of the century the German way
thing of the aura of the sacrament of confirma- in public affairs was upheld as a model by Nicholas
tion, even if the soldiers of peasant stock are now I, and in the 1880s the Germans and Baits, having
outnumbered by the townsmen. braved the onset of Pan-Slavism, occupied the
The Soviet concern for traditions is both fascin- majority of posts in the Foreign Office and the
ating and amusing. Sergei Bondarchuk and other systems of transport and communication, and held
directors have created films of the tsarist past with about one-third of the senior commands in the
an almost unfailing sense of period, and with army (the same proportion as a century before).
rather less discrimination. General Rennenkampf led the Russian First Army
to its doom at Tannenberg in 1914. The corres-
the new regime appropriates whatever was good
ponding Second Army, on the left flank, was
and universally recognised as such . . . the old
originally entrusted (according to Solzhenitsyn) to
onion-domed churches, Pushkin and Tolstoy,
a General Rausch von Traubenberg, who did not
ballet and caviare are wrenched from their
bear the most Muscovite of names.
historical contexts and become creations of the
Russian people in so far as it is now represented After the Great War the German army and the
by the Soviet regime . . . if an izba is gracefully new Soviet Red Army embarked on eleven years
proportioned, it is the creation of the Russian of very profitable association, the Soviets deriving
people; if it is full of vermin, it is the creation of as much benefit from the German military instruc-
capitalism (Besan$on, 1978, 82). tion as the Germans did from their secret testing
grounds and industrial plants in Russia. As
Alain Besan^on regards such manifestations as Tukhachevsky remarked: 'The Reichswehr has
sterile and artificial, a mere dressing-up of the been the teacher of the Red Army, and that will
crudities of the Soviet present with artefacts from never be forgotten' (Laqueur, 1965, 131). There
a museum. Solzhenitsyn would probably agree. existed no inherent ideological antagonisms
However, it is possible to argue at least as con- between the early Nazis and the Soviets, whom
vincingly that over the decades the Soviet regime Josef Goebbels was prepared to see as companions
has chosen to respond to a quiet; spontaneous on the road to socialism, and when the breach
but ultimately irresistible popular demand for the came in September 1933 it was largely at the
symbolic and immaterial. The nationalistic revival instigation of Alfred Rosenberg, who was himself
of 1942 was just one manifestation of a pheno- a German Bait, and not untypical of that brand of
menon which has surrounded every major stage Russian.
in the course of military and civilian life with a Employing the term 'military culture' in its
sense of ritual, and causes people to invoke the widest sense, we discover all sorts of details which
 C o n c l u s i o n s 2 4 1

confirm the impression that the Russian and the countries a totalitarian system of a kind that had
Prusso-German armies partake of a common north- flourished in Russia for centuries' (J. Mollo, 1972,
east European tradition. Families like the Mansteins 232). The parallel is enlightening, even if some
and Manteuffels contributed with distinction to might prefer to describe the Russian regime as
both armed forces. The typically 'German' goose- 'authoritarian', rather than 'totalitarian'.
step and spiked helmet were in fact joint produc- In Russian military history, Germany has
tions, and the Germans turned again to certain been at once the arch-enemy and guide and
Russian motifs for inspiration for the uniforms of helpmate, a necessary check on the extravagances
the Nazi regime. An historian of costume believes of what the poets called 'vagabond Russia', and
that 'it is not surprising that both the German the ultimate standard by which Russia's military
National Socialists, and the Italian Fascists, should efforts must be measured. It is almost as if the
have modelled their uniforms on those of Russia, Russians have had to render constant account to
when they had already imposed on their respective this foremost representative of the hated West.
Measurements

Time Length

The Russian calendar ran eleven days behind that Of the measurements in most common use, the
of western Europe. In the present work the sazhen was the equivalent of seven feet, and the
Russian old style dates have been retained for verst (of 500 sazhens) corresponded to two-thirds
events in Russia and the East, and the Western of a mile.
new style adopted for campaigns and actions in
western Europe.

Weight Money

The Russian pound approximated to the pound as One hundred kopeks made one rouble, and two
known in other European countries (itself subject roubles made one ducat. The subsidy agreement
to national deviations). It comprised ninety-six with the Maritime Powers in 1747 put the value
solotnik. Forty Russian pounds made one pud of the British pound sterling at 41/2 roubles, though
(not to be confused with 'pound'), which was a it is very difficult to establish the equivalents in
unit much in use in the artillery. purchasing power.

2 4 2
Abbreviations Anderson, R. C. (1952), Naval Wars in the Levant,
Princeton.
AKV Arkhiv Knyazya Vorontsova (1870-95), Andolenko, C. R. (1967), Histoire de I'Armee
40 vols, Moscow. An important collection Russe, Paris.
of documents from the archives of the Andryshchenko, A. I., 'Pugachevskoe Vosstanie i
Vorontsov family. Kyuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii Mir', in Beskrovnyi
PRO Public Record Office, Kew. (1969).
Anon. ('By an officer on board the Russian fleet')
(Periodicals) (1772), An Authentic Narrative of the Russian
RA Russkii Arkhiv, Moscow. Expedition against the Turks by Sea and Land,
RS Russkaya Starina, St Petersburg. London.
SIRIO Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Anon, (c.1787), General Observations Regarding
Istoricheskago Obshchestva, St Petersburg. the Present State of the Russian Empire,
VS Voennyi Sbornik, St Petersburg. London.
Anon, (from a French ms.) (1788), Historisches
Tagebuch des Krieges zwischen Russland und
Adamczyk, T. (1936), Furst G. A. Potemkin, der Pforte von 1 768 bis 1 774, Vienna.
Emsdetten. Anon. (1792), Anecdoten zur Lebensgeschichte
Altshuller, R.E. 'Kutuzov kak Voennyi Pedagog- des Ritters und Reichs-Filrsten Potemkin,
Direktor Kadetskogo Korpusa', in Beskrovnyi Freistadt.
(1969). Anon, (wrongly attributed to the 'Sieur de
Amburger, E. (1961), Beitrage zur Geschichte der Villebois') (1853), Memoires Secrets pour
deutsch-russischen kulturellen Beziehungen, Servir a I'Histoire de la Cour de Russie, Paris.
Giessen. Anon. (1872), 'Petr Velikii i ego Armiya', VS,
Amburger, E. (1966), Russische Regierung und LXXV, pt 1, St Petersburg.
Entwicklung von Anfangdes 1 7ten Jahrhunderts Anon. (1883), 'Petrovskaya Brigada: Polki Leib-
bis 1917, Leiden. Especially for national Gvardii Preobrazhenskii i Semenovskii, 1683-
origins of Russian nobility. 1883', RS, XXXVIII, St Petersburg.
Anderson, M. S. (1958), Britain's Discovery of Archenholtz, J. W. (1840), Geschichte des
Russia 1553-1815, London. Siebenjahrigen Krieges in Deutschland, 2 vols,
Anderson, M. S. (1978), Peter the Great, London. Berlin.
The most reliable and accessible guide. Auty, R., and Obolensky, D. (eds) (1976), An
Anderson, R. C. (1910), Naval Wars in the Baltic Introduction to Russian History (Companion
during the Sailing Ship Epoch, 1552-1850, to Russian Studies, vol. 1), Cambridge. A useful
London. guide to the present state of scholarship.
2 4 3
2 4 4 Select Bibliography

Avtorkratov, V. N., 'Voennyi Prikaz', in Bogdanovich, M. (1873), Russkaya Armiy a v Veke

Beskrovnyi (1969). Imperatritsy Ekateriny II, St Petersburg. Very
Baiov, A. (1906), Russkaya Armiyav Tsarstvovanie elementary.
Imperatritsy Anny Ioannovnyi, 2 vols, St Bolotov, A. T. (1870-3), Zhizn, 4 vols, St
Petersburg. A detailed and important study by Petersburg. One of the most vivid of all
a pro-Miinnich member of the 'academic' eighteenth-century military memoirs.
school of historians. Bruce, P. H. (1782), Memoirs of Peter Henry
Bangert, D. E. (1971),DieRussisch-Osterreichische Bruce, Esq., London.
Militarische Zusammenarbeit im Siebenjahrigen Buerja, A. (1785), Observations d'un Voyageur sur
Kriege in den Jahren 1758-1759, Boppard. An la Russie, Berlin.
excellent work. Contains many illuminating Buganov, V. I., 'Streletskoe Vosstanie 1698 g. i
details. Nachalo Likvidatsii Streletskogo Voiska', in
Basov, P. (1874), 'Suvorov i ego Obraz Deistvii', Beskrovnyi (1969).
VS, XCVI1I, St Petersburg. Bunbury, H. (1927), Narratives of Some Passages
Beauclair, P. (1774), Histoire de Pierre III, London. in the Great War with France, London.
Bellamy, C. (1979), 'Seventy Years on: Similarities Buturlin, G. (1819-23), Voennaya Istoriya
between the Modern Soviet Army and its Pokhodov Rossiyan v XVIII Stoletii, 4 vols,
Tsarist Predecessor', RUSI Journal of the Royal St Petersburg.
United Services Institute, London, Sept- Cook, J. (1770), Voyages and Travels through the
ember. Russian Empire, 2 vols, Edinburgh.
Bescanpon, A. (March 1978), 'Soviet Present and Curtiss, J. C. (1965), The Russian Army under
Russian Past', Encounter, London. Nicholas I, 1825-1855, Durham, N. Carolina.
Beskrovnyi, L. G. (1957), Ocherki po Highly recommended.
Istochnikovedeniyu Voennoi Istorii Rossii, Danilov, M. V. (1842, written in 1771), Zapiski
Moscow. A good survey of sources. Artillerii Maiora Mikhaila Vasilevicha Danilova,
Beskrovnyi, L. G. (1958), Russkaya Armiya i Flot Moscow. Especially on the conditions of
v XVIII Veke, Moscow. A massive and indis- technical education, and the development of
pensable work, though marred by the selective Shuvalov's new ordnance.
coverage and the heavy Marxist-Leninist bias. Danilov, N. A., 'Istoricheskii Ocherk Razvitiya
To be used with caution. Voennago Upravlenie v Rossii', in Skalon
Beskrovnyi, L. G. (as ed.) (1959a), Poltava. K (1 902-c.l 911), I.
250-Letiyu Poltavskogo Srazheniya, Moscow. Denisov, A. K. (1874), 'Zapiski Donskago Atamana
A useful collection of commemorative Denisova', RS, X-XII, St Petersburg. An impres-
essays. sive evocation of an upper-class Cossack's life.
Beskrovnyi, L. G. (1959b), 'Strategiya i Taktika D'Eon (1837), Memoires du Chevalier D'Eon, 3
Russkoi Armii v Poltavskii Period Severnoi vols, Brussels.
Voiny', in Beskrovnyi (1959a). Dirrheimer, G., and Fritz, F. (1967), 'Einhorner
Beskrovnyi, L. G. (1962), Ocherki Voennoi und Schuwalowsche Haubitzen', in Maria
Istoriografii Rossii, Moscow. A most valuable Theresia. Beitrage zur Geschichte des
bibliographical summary. Heerwesens ihrer Zeit, Graz. On the Austrian
Beskrovnyi, L. G. (essays presented to) (1969), evaluation of Shuvalov's artillery.
Voprosy Voennoi Istorii Rossii. XVIII i Pervaya Dolgorukov, Yu. V. (1889), 'Zapiski Knyazya
Polovina XIX Vekov, Moscow. Yuriya Vladimirovicha Dolgorukova, 1740-
Bestuzhev, N. I. (1961), Opyt Istorii Rossiiskogo 1830', RS, LXIII, St Petersburg.
Flota, (new edn), Leningrad. Donnelly, A. S. (1968), The Russian Conquest
Billington, J. H. (1966), The Icon and the Axe. An of Bashkiria, 1552-1740: A Case Study in
Interpretive History of Russian Culture, Imperialism, New Haven.
London. 'Dropmore Papers' (1906), Historical Manuscripts
Bobrovskii, P. O. (1900), Suvorov na Kubanu v Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of
1778 godu i za Kubanyu v 1783 godu, St J. B. Fortescue, Esq., Preserved at Dropmore,
Petersburg. V, London.
 Select Bibliography 245

Dyadichenko, V. A., 'Ukrainskoe Kazatskoe Doppelaar, Konigsberg.

Voisko v Kontse XVII - Nachale XVIII v.', in Hatton, R. M. (1953), 'Captain James Jefferye's
Beskrovnyi (195 9a). Letters to the Secretary of State, Whitehall,
Eelking, M. (ed.) (1854), Correspondent des from the Swedish Army, \101-\109\Historiska
Kurfurstlich Sachsischen Premier-Ministers Handlingar, pt 31, i, Stockholm.
Graf en von Briihl mit dem Sachsischen General- Hatton, R. M. (1968), Charles XII of Sweden,
Lieutenant Freiherrn von Riedesel, Leipzig. London.
Engelhardt, L. N. (1868), Zapiski LvaNikolaevicha 'H. D.' (1877), 'Voina Rossii s Turtsieyu . . .
Engelgardta 1766-1836, Moscow. One of the Vtoraya Voina v Tsarstvovanie Imperatritsy
best of the many good memoirs of the period. Ekateriny II 1787-1791 gg.\ VS, CXII, CXIV,
Fabritsius, I. G., 'Glavnoe Inzhenernoe Upravlenie. St Petersburg.
Istoricheskii Ocherk', in Skalon (1902-c.l 911), Helbig, G.A. (1917), Russische Gunstlinge, Berlin.
VII, pt 1. Unreliable but entertaining.
Fisher, A. W. (1970), The Russian Annexation of Hellie, R. (1971), Enserfment and Military Change
the Crimea 1 772rl 783, Cambridge. in Muscovy, Chicago.
Frisch, E. (1919), Zur Geschichte des russischen Hingley, R. (1978), The Russian Mind, London.
Feldziige im Siebenjahrigen Kriege nach den Hordt, Comte de (1805), Memoires Historiques,
Aufzeichnungen und Beobachtungen der dem Politiques et Militaires de M. le Comte de
russischen Hauptquartier zugeteilten oster- Hordt, 2 vols, Paris.
reichischen Offiziere, Heidelberg. Disappoint- Horward, D.D. (ed.) (1980), Proceedings of the
ingly impersonal. Consortium on Revolutionary Europe,
Fuchs (Fuks), E. (1827), Anekdoty Knyazya Tallahassee.
Italiiskago Grafa Rymnikskago, St Petersburg. Jenkins, M. (1969), Arakcheev. Grand Vizier of
Affectionate and informative. the Russian Empire, London.
Funcken, L. and T. (1977), Arms and Uniforms. Jomini, Lt.-Gen. (1840), Histoire Critique et
The Lace Wars, pt II, London. Militaire des Guerres de la Revolution, 4 vols,
Gippius, A. I., 'Ustavy i Nastavleniya', in Skalon Brussels. Especially for 'Relation Raisonnee
(1902-c.l911), IV, pt 1, bk 2, sect. 3. Help- de la Marche de l'Armee de Suwarow, d'ltalie
fully reprints long extracts from rules and en Suisse', by an eyewitness, in vol. IV.
regulations. Jones, D.R. (ed.) (forthcoming), The Military-
Glinoetskii, N. (1871), 'Nekotorya Svedeniya ob Naval Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet
Obuchenii Russkikh Voisk vo Vtoroi Polovine Union, Gulf Breeze, Florida.
Proshlago Veka', VS, LXXXII, pt 1, St Josselson, M., and Josselson, D. (1980), The
Petersburg. Commander. A Life of Barclay de Tolly,
Golikova, N. B., 'Iz Istorii Klassovykh Protivorechii Oxford. Michael Josselson's untimely death
. v Russkoi Armii (1700-1709 gg.)', in Beskrovnyi deprives us of something almost unique in
(1959a). Good on the conditions of private military history — an independent writer who
soldiers. has pursued researches into the Russian army
Golitsyn, N. S. (1890), 'Russkie Soldaty v Prusskoi and its campaigns from original sources.
Sluzhbe', RS, LXVI, St Petersburg. Although primarily concerned with the
Gordeev, N. V., and Portinov, M. E., 'Pamyatniki Napoleonic period, Josselson has much of value
Poltavskogo Srazheniya', in Beskrovnyi (1959a). to say about the viewpoint of the Baltic
Gotzkowsky, J. C. (1768-9), Geschichte eines Lutherans in general.
Patriotischen Kaufmanns, 2 vols, Augsburg. Kaplan, H. H. (1968), Russia and the Outbreak of
For the allied occupation of Berlin in 1760. the Seven Years War, Berkeley.
Grosser Generalstab (1890-1914), Die Kriege Kapustina, G. D., 'Guzhevoi Transport v Severnoi
Friedrichs des Grossen, 20 vols, Berlin. Voine', in Beskrovnyi (1969).
La Harpe, F. C. (1978), Correspondance de Keep, J.L. 'Response of the Russian Army to the
Frederic-Cesar de la Harpe et Alexandre ler, French Revolution', in Horward (1980).
Neuchatel. Keralio, L. (1773), Histoire de la Guerre entre la
Hasenkamp, X. (1886), Ostpreussen unter dem Russie et la Turquie, St Petersburg.
2 4 6 Select Bibliography

Khevenhuller-Metsch, J. J. (1907-72), Aus der Germany, 2 vols, London.

Zeit Maria Theresias. Tagebuch des Fursten Longworth, P. (1965), The Art of Victory. The
Johann Josef Khevenhuller-Metsch, Kaiserlichen Life and Achievements of Generalissimo
Obersthofmeisters 1 742-1 776, 8 vols, Vienna. Suvorov 1729-1800, London.
Klokman, Yu. R. (1951), FeldmarshalRumyantsev Longworth, P. (1969), The Cossacks, London.
v Period Russkogo-Turetskoi Voiny, Moscow. Another valuable work from an outstanding
Klokman, Yu. R., 'Voprosy Voennoi Istorii Rossii authority.
XVIII-Nachala XIX v. V. sovetskoi Istoriografii', Longworth, P. (1980), 'War and Cossack Society
in Beskrovnyi (1969). in the Eighteenth Century', Brooklyn College
Klugin, L. (1861), 'Russkaya Soldatskaya Artel', Studies on Society in Change, Brooklyn.
VS, XX, no. 7, July, St Petersburg. Lowenstern, V. I. (1900), 'Zapiski V. I.
Korb, J.-G. (1863), Diary of an Austrian Secretary Levenshterna', RS, CIII, no. 3, St Petersburg.
of Legation at the Court of Czar Peter the Lubyanovskii, Th. P. (1872), Vospominaniya Th.
Great, 2 vols, London. For the defects of the P. Lubyanovskago, Moscow.
old military organisation. Luckett, R. (1976), 'Pre-Revolutionary Army Life
Korobkov, N. (1940), Semiletnyaya Voina (1756- in Russian Literature', in War, Economy and
1 762 gg:), Moscow. Detailed and very useful. the Military Mind, Best, G., and Wheatcroft, A.,
Koslov, E. E. (1959), 'Artilleriya v Poltavskom eds, London.
Srazhenii', in Beskrovnyi (1959a). Lukyanov, P. M., 'Proizvodstvo Porokha v Rossii v
Kunisch, J. (1978), Das Mirakel des Hauses Pervoi Chetverti XVIII v.', in Beskrovnyi
Brandenburg, Munich. Balanced and well- (1959a).
informed. Lyons, M. (1968), The Russian Imperial Army. A
Kvardi, V. V., 'Imperatorskaya Glavnaya Kvartira. Bibliography of Regimental Histories and
Istoriya Gosudarevoi Svity', in Skalon (1902- Related Works, Stanford.
c.1911). Mackesy, P. (1974), Statesmen at War. The Strategy
Langeron, A. (1895), 'Russkaya Armiya v God of Overthrow, 1798-1799, London.
Smerti Ekateriny II', RS, LXXXIII, St McNeill, W. H. (1964), Europe's Steppe Frontier,
Petersburg. Possibly the most detailed and 1500-1800, Chicago.
judicious contemporary account of the Russian Madariaga, I. de (1981), Russia in the Age of
army in the eighteenth century. Catherine the Great, London.
Lantzeff, G. V., and Pierce, R. A. (1973), Eastwards Manstein, C. H. (1860), Memoires Historiques,
to Empire, London. Politiques et Militaires sur la Russie, 3 vols,
Laqueur, W. (1965), Russia and Germany. A Paris. One of the classics of military literature.
Century of Conflict, London. Maslovskii, D. F. (1888-93) (trans, and ed.
Lebedev, A. (1898), Russkaya Armiya v Nachale Drygalski, A.), Der Siebenjahrige Krieg nach
Tsarstvovaniya Imperatritsy Ekateriny II, Russischer Darstellung, 3 vols, Berlin.
Moscow. Has useful lists of senior and middle- Maslovskii, D. F., Sbornik Voenno-Istoricheskikh
ranking officers. Materialov, especially vols II (1892), III and
Lebedev, P. S. (1877), 'Preobrazovateli Russkoi IV (1893), St Petersburg. Helpful collections
Armii v Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Pavla of military documents.
Petrovicha, 1796-1801', RS, St Petersburg. Masson, C. F. (1859), Memoires Secrets sur la
Very good. Russie pendant les Regnes de Catherine II et
Lehndorff, A. H. (1910-13), Dreissig Jahre am de Paul ler, Paris. Good for details of military
Hofe Friedrichs des Grossen . . . Nachtrage, life, but heavily prejudiced against Catherine.
2 vols, Gotha. Mediger, W. (1952), Moskaus Weg nach Europa,
Lemcke, J. F. (1909), 'Kriegs und Friedenbilder', Brunswick. A first-class study.
Preussische Jahrbucher, CXXXVIII, Berlin. Meerovich, G. I., and Budanov, F. V. (1978),
Ligne, C. J. (1795-1811), Melanges Militaires, Suvorov v Peterburge, Moscow. Good on the
Litteraires et Sentimentaires, 34 vols, Dresden. contemporary background.
Ligne, C. J. (1890), Oeuvres Choisies, Paris. Menning, B. W., 'G. A. Potemkin and A. I.
Lloyd, H. (1781), History of the Late War in Chernyshev: Two Dimensions of Reform and
 Select Bibliography 247

the Military Frontier in Imperial Russia', in Parker, W. H. (1968), An Historical Geography of

Horward (1980). Russia, London.
Messeliere, M. (1803), Voyage a Petersbourg, Parkinson, J. (1971), A Tour of Russia, Siberia
Paris. Experiences of a French diplomat in the and the Crimea 1 792-1 794, London.
interesting years of 1757-8. Pavlenko, N. I., 'Produktsiya Uralskoi Metallurgii
Meshcheryakov, G. P., 'Iz Istorii Voenno- v Nachale XVIII v.', in Beskrovnyi (1959a).
Teoreticheskoi Mysli v Rossii v Pervoi Chetverti Peter the Great (1887-1975), Pisma i Bumagi
XVIII V.', in Beskrovnyi (1969). Imperatora Petra Velikogo, 12 vols, Moscow.
Mikhnevich, N. P., 'Vooruzhenyya Sily Rossii do Petrov, P. V., 'Glavnoe Upravlenie Voenno-
Tsarstvovaniya Imperatora Aleksandra I', in Uchebnykh Zavedenii', in Skalon (1902-
Skalon (1902-c.l911), IV, Introduction. c.l 911). Important.
Mikhnevich, N. P., 'Komplektovanie Vooruz- Pinter, W. M. and Rowney, D. K. (eds) (1980),
hennykh Sil v Rossii do 1802 g.', in Skalon Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratisation of
(1902-c.l911), IV, pt 1, bk 1, sect. 1. Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the
Minzloff, R. (1872), Pierre le Grand dans la Twentieth Century, Chapel Hill.
Litterature Etrangere, St Petersburg. Pipes, R. (1974), Russian under the Old Regime,
Mollo, B. (1979) (illus. Mollo, J.), Uniforms of London. Lively and controversial.
the Imperial Russian Army, Poole. Pishchevich, A. S. (1885), Zhizn A. S. Pishchevicha
Mollo, J. (1972), Military Fashion, London. 1764-1805, Moscow.
Mollo, J. (1977) (illus. McGregor, M.), Uniforms Podyapolskaya, E. P. (1959), 'Voennye Sovety
of the Seven Years War, Poole. 1708-1709 gg.', in Beskrovnyi (1959a). Shows
Montalembert, M. R. (1777), Correspondance de councils of war as part of the educational
Monsieur le Marquis de Montalembert, London. process of Peter and his army.
Myshlaevskii, A. Z. (1896), Petr Velikii. Voina v Porfirev, E. I. (1959), Poltavskoe Srazhenie 27
Finlandii v 1 712-1 714 gg., St Petersburg. Iyunya 1 709 g., Moscow.
Nashchokin, V. A. (1842), Zapiski Vasiliya Poroshin, S. (1844), Semena Poroshina Zapiski,
Aleksandrovicha Nashchokina, St Petersburg. St Petersburg.
Neplyuev, I. I. (1893), Zapiski Ivana Ivanovicha Pososhkov, I. T. (new edn 1951, written 1701),
Neplyueva (1693-1773), St Petersburg. 'O Ratnom Povedenii', in Kniga o Skudosti i
Nolde, B. (1952-3), La Formation de VEmpire Bogatstvie i Drugie Sochineniya, Moscow.
Russe, 2 vols, Paris. Preobrazhenskii, A. A., 'Voennye Postavki
Nostitz, F. A. (1976), Der Westfeldzug Suvorovs Nevyanskogo Zavoda Nakanune Poltavskogo
in der Offentlichen Meinung Englands, Srazheniya', in Beskrovnyi (1969).
Wiesbaden. Contains many interesting insights Prittwitz, C. W. (1935), Unter der Fahne des
and details. Herzogs von Bevern, Berlin.
Obolenski, M. A., and Posselt, M. C. (eds) (1849- Prokofev, A. S., 'O Deistviyakh Povstantsev
51), Tagebuch des Generals Patrick Gordon, Pravoberezhya k Krestyanskoi Voine pod
2 vols, Moscow and Leipzig. Predvoditelstvom E. I. Pugacheva', in
Oliva, L. J. (1964), Misalliance. A Study of French Beskrovnyi (1969).
Policy in Russia during the Seven Years War, Rabinovich, M. D., 'Formirovanie Regulyarnoi
New York. Russkoi Armii Nakanune Severnoi Voiny', in
Oreus, I. I. (1876), 'Ivan Ivanovich Mikhelson. Beskrovnyi (1969).
Pobeditel Pugacheva', RS, XV, St Petersburg. Raeff, M. (1966), Origins of the Russian Intelli-
Uncritical. gentsia. The 18th Century Nobility, New York.
Orlov, N. (1898), Italyanskii Pokhod Suvorova v Especially valuable on the relaxation of service
1 799 g., St Petersburg. Prints extensive quota- obligations.
tions from Captain Gryazev's high-flown Rambaud, A. (1895), Russes et Prussiens. Guerre
account, which cannot always betaken literally. de Sept Ans, Paris. Still worth reading. Catches
Pallas, P. S., et al. (1774), Histoire des Decouvertes the flavour of the time and place.
Faites par Divers Savans Voyageurs, 2 vols, Reding-Biberegg, R. (1895), 'Der Zug Suworoffs
Berne. durch die Schweiz', in Der Geschichtsfreund,
2 4 8 Select Bibliography

L, Stans. The most detailed and reliable account do justice to Paul I.

of the famous campaign. Scheffner, J. G. (1823), Mein Leben, Leipzig.
Regele, O. (1957), Feldmarschall Radetzky, Schmidt, C. (1770), Briefe iiber Russland,
Vienna. For Austrian opinions on the Russians Brunswick.
in Italy, 1799. Schweizerische Verkehrszentrale (1974, Sep-
Reimers, H. (1883), 'Peterburg pri Imperatore tember), 'Auf Suworows Spuren', in Schweiz,
Pavle Petrovich 1796-1801 gg.', RS, XXXIX, Zurich. A fascinating study of topography and
St Petersburg. Suvorovian relics. Typical of the lively interest
Repninskii, G. K. (1885-9), 'Gr. Gotlob-Kurt- which the campaign of 1799 still commands in
Genrikh Totleben v 1715-1763', RS, XLVII, Switzerland.
XLVIII, XLIX, LII, LIII, LX, LXI, LXI1, Segur, Comte de (1824-6), Memoires, ou Souvenirs
LXIV, St Petersburg. et Anecdotes, 3 vols, Paris.
Retzow, J. A. (1802), Charakteristik der Semenyik, G. I., 'Oruzhie, Voennaya Organizatsiya
Wichtigsten Ereignisse des Siebenjahrigen i Voennoe Iskusstvo Kazakhovv XVIII-XIX w.',
Krieges, 2 vols, Berlin. in Beskrovnyi (1969). Good.
Richard, J. (1780), A Tour from London to Semevskii, M. (1862), 'Protivniki Fridrikh Velikago.
Petersburgh, London. Apraksin i Bestuzhev-Ryumin', VS, XXV,
Richelieu, A. E. (1886), 'Dokumenty i Bumagi', XXVIII, St Petersburg.
SIRIO, LIV, St Petersburg. Sheremetev, B. P. (1808), Zhizn, Anekdoty,
Rozhdestvenskii, S. V. (1912), Ocherki po Istorii Voennya Politicheskiya Deyaniya Rossiiskago
Sistem Narodnago Prosveshcheniya v Rossii v General-Feldmarshala Grafa Borisa Petrovicha
XVIII-XIX Vekakh, vol. 1, St Petersburg. Sheremeteva, St Petersburg.
Rumyantsev, E. M., (1888), Pisma Grafina Shmidt, S. O., 'Proekt P. I. Shuvalova o Sozdanii
E. M. Rumyantsovoi k eye Muzhu, Feldmarshalu v Rossii Vysshei Voennoi Shkoly (1755 g.)',
Grafu P. A. Rumyantsov-Zadunaiskomu 1762- in Beskrovnyi (1969).
1779 g., St Petersburg. Shuvalov, I. I.'(1872), 'Iz Bumag Ivana Ivanovicha
Rumyantsev, P. A. (1872), 'Perepiska Grafa Petra Shuvalova', SIRIO, IX, St Petersburg.
Aleksandrovicha Rumyantseva s Grafom Silva, Marquis da (1778), Pensees sur la Tactique,
Nikitoyu Ivanovichem Paninym v 1765 i 1771 et la Strategique, Turin.
godakh', SIRIO, IX, St Petersburg. Skalon, D. A. (ed.) (1902-c.l 911), Stoletie
Rumyantsev, P. A. (1953-9), P. A. Rumyantsev. Voennago Ministerstva 1802-1902, St Peters-
Dokumenty, ed. Fortunatov, P. K., 3 vols, burg. This vast compilation covers almost every
Moscow. A rich source. aspect of the organisation, regulation and train-
Runich, D. P. (1901), 'Iz Zapisok D. P. Runicha', ing of the army from the time of Peter the
RS, CV, vol. 1, St Petersburg. Great, and may be seen as the crowning achieve-
Rzhevskii, S. M. (1879), 'O Russkaya Armiya vo ment of the pre-Revolutionary military historio-
Vtoroi Polovine Ekaterinskago Tsarstvovaniya', graphy. The total number of volumes and the
RA, XVII, pt 1, Moscow. A scathing indictment final publication date are difficult to ascertain.
of the state of the army, by a Russian general. Solovev, N. (1893), 'Kratkii Istoricheskii Ocherk
Sabatier de Cabres (1913), 'Catherine II. Sa Cour Organizatsii Russkikh Regulyarnykh Voisk v
et la Russie en 1772', SIRIO, CXLIII, St Pervoi Polovine XVIII Stol. (1700-1761 gg.)',
Petersburg. Also printed Berlin 1869. All VS, CCIX, St Petersburg.
Sabatier's reports must be treated with some Stein, F. (1885), Geschichte des Russischen
caution. Heeres, Hanover. Especially good for lists of
Saikin, I. (1818), Anekdoten und Charakterzuge regiments and changes in organisation.
des Feldmarschalls Graf en Peter Alex- Stiessius, C. (1706), Relation vom dem Gegen-
androwitsch Rumanzow-Sadunaiskoi, Dorpat. wartigen Zustande des Moscowitischen Reichs,
Sanglein, J. J. de (1882), 'Zapiski', RS, XXXVI, Frankfurt.
St Petersburg. Strandmann, G. (1882-4), 'Zapiski Gustava fon-
Saul, N. E. (1970), Russia and the Mediterranean, Shtrandmana 1742-1803', RS, XXXV, XLIII,
1797-1807, Chicago. One of the few works to St Petersburg. The publication of this interest-
 Select Bibliography 249

ing account appears to have been discontinued Hochverrater, Frankfurt. Good.

prematurely. Viskovatov, A. V. (1844-56), Peremeny v
Strukov, S. P., 'Glavnoi Artilleriiskoe Upravlenie. Ohmundirovanii i Vooruzhenii Voisk Rossiskoi
Istoricheskii Ocherk', in Skalon (1902-c.l 911), Imperatorskoi Armii, 30 vols, St Petersburg.
VI, bk 1, pt 1. C o m p i l e d at i m p e r i a l c o m m a n d , this is t h e
Strumilin, S. G., 'K Voprosu ob Ekonomike most detailed review of Russian military
Petrovskoi Epokhi', in Beskrovnyi (1959). c o s t u m e . Well, if s t i f f l y , i l l u s t r a t e d .
Surtees, W. (1973), Twenty-Five Years in the Rifle V o d a r s k i i , Ya. E., 'Sluzhiloe D v o r y a n s t v o v
Brigade, London. For descriptions of the Rossii v K o n t s e X V I I - N a c h a l e X V I I I v.', in
Russians in North Holland 1799. Beskrovnyi (1969).
A. V. Suvorov. Dokumenty (ed. Meshcheryakov, V o l k o n s k i i , P. M. ( 1 8 7 6 ) , ' R a z s k a z y K n y a z y a
G. P.) (1949-53), 4 vols, Moscow. One of the P. M. V o l k o n s k a g o ' , RS, XVI, St P e t e r s b u r g .
useful Stalin-period documentary collections. Volz, G. B., a n d Kiintzel, G. ( 1 8 9 9 ) , Preussische
No authoritative text of the Art of Victory und Osterreichische Aden zur Vorgeschichte
yet exists. Versions were published in 1 806 and des Siebenjahrigen Krieges, Leipzig.
1809, and in 1940 the Soviets first brought out V o r o n t s o v , S. R. ( 1 8 7 1 , N o v e m b e r ) , ' I n s t r u k t s i y a
a new but unreliable edition, allegedly based R o t n y m K o m a n d i r a m ' (of 1 7 7 4 ) , VS, L X X I I ,
on authentic material from the late eighteenth St P e t e r s b u r g .
century. V o r o n t s o v , S. R. ( 1 8 7 0 - 9 5 ) , 'Zapiski S. R.
Tage, Pastor (1864), 'K Istorii Semiletnei Voiny. Vorontsov o Russkom Voiske, Predstavlennaya
Zapiski Pastora Tege', RA, II, Moscow. I m p e r a t o r u A l e k s a n d r u Pavlovichu v 1 8 0 2
Tarle, E. V. (1958), Severnaya Voina, Moscow. g o d u ' , AKV, X, M o s c o w . Heavily p a t r i o t i c in
Thilo von Trotha (1888), Zur Geschichte der t o n e . F o r e s h a d o w s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e
Russisch-0 sterreichischen Kooperation im Feld- ' n a t i o n a l ' s c h o o l of m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s .
zuge von 1759, Hanover. Warnery, C. E. (1770), Remarques sur le Militaire
Tielke, J. G. (1788), An Account of some of the des Turcs, Leipzig a n d D r e s d e n .
most Remarkable Transactions of the War Warnery, C. E. (1788), Campagnes de Frederic II
between the Prussians, Austrians, and Russians Roi de Prusse, Amsterdam.
from 1756 to 1763, vol. II, London. The vivid Weber, F. C. (1744), Das Veranderte Russland,
testimony of a Saxon officer who was on 3 p t s , F r a n k f u r t a n d Leipzig.
attachment with the Russians. W e y m a r n , H. H. ( 1 7 9 4 ) , ' U e b e r d e n e r s t e n F e l d z u g
Tomasic, D. (1953), The Impact of Russian des Russischen Kriegsheeres gegen die Preussen
Culture on Soviet Communism, Glencoe. im Jahr 1757', in Neue Nordische Miscellaneen,
Totleben, G. K. (1762), Memoires de la Vie du Riga. A n h o n e s t a n d descriptive r e l a t i o n by
Comte de Totleben, 2 pts, Zalt Bommel. A p r a k s i n ' s chief of s t a f f .
Entertaining. Wiegel, F. F. ( 1 8 6 4 - 6 ) , Vospominaniya F. F.
Tschitschagoff (Chichagov, P.V.) (1&62), Memoires Vigela, 3 vols, M o s c o w . E x c e l l e n t .
de VAmiral Tschitschagoff (1767-1849), Leip- Wonzel, P. (1783), Der Gegenwartige Staat von
zig. Of doubtful authenticity. Russland, St P e t e r s b u r g a n d Leipzig.
Tsebrikov, R. M. (1895, July), 'Vokrug Ochakova Wraxall, N. (1776), A Tour through some of the
1788 god', RS, LXXXIV, St Petersburg. A Northern Parts of Europe, London.
critical and deeply-felt account by one of Young, P. (1970), History of the British Army,
Potemkin's secretaries. London.
Turgenev, A. M., 'Zapiski Aleksandra Mikhailovicha Yukht, A. I., 'Russkaya Promyshlennost i
Turgeneva' (1885-9), RS, XLVII, XLVIII, Snabzhenie Armii Obmundirovaniem i
XLIX, LII, LIII, St Petersburg. A m u n i t s e i ' , in B e s k r o v n y i ( 1 9 5 9 a ) .
Venturi, F. (1979), Settecento Riformatore III. La Zatvornitskii, N. M., 'Voennye Ministry i
prima Crisi dellAntico Regime 1768-1776, Glavnoupravlyayushchie Voennoyu Chastyu
Turin. For the effect on Italy of the arrival of v Rossii s 1 7 0 1 p o 1 9 1 0 g o d ' , in S k a l o n ( 1 9 0 2 -
the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean in 1770. c . 1 9 1 1 ) , III, p t 6.
Vischer, M. (193 8), Miinnich. Ingenieur, Feldherr, Zhuravskii, D. P. (1858-9), 'Statisticheskoe
2 5 0 Select Bibliography

Obozrenie Raskhodov na VoennyyaPotrebnosti Zweguintzow, W. (1967), L'Armee Russe, vol. I,

(s 1711 po 1825 god)', VS, St Petersburg, II, Paris. A useful compilation, too little known
pt 2, X, pt 2. On military budgeting. outside France.

NB. This bibliography does not attempt to repro- Society, Russia and East Europe, ed. Prof. B. W.
duce the full range of articles and conference Menning, Dept. of History, Miami University,
papers recently published in the West. Details are Oxford, Ohio, OH 45056, USA.
available in the excellent Newsletter: Military and

t
Abo, 36; peace of (1743), 57 codes and regulations, 6-7, 18, the Great (1762-96), 166-78,
Adda River, action (1799), 205, 217 20-2, 62-3, 100, 118, 129, 179-85, 196-9; Turkish War
Aland Islands, 28, 36 133, 137, 166, 170, 172, (1768-74), 168-74; against
Alessandria, siege (1799), 217, 219 1 8 3 4 , 190, 191-2, 204-5, Pugachev (17734), 178-9;
Aleksei Milchailovich, Tsar, 4, 6-8, 9, 206,207 Turkish War (1787-92), 185-8;
11,158 Cossacks: character, 1 6 3 4 ; Swedish War (1788-90),
Alexander (Aleksandr Pavlovich), Chuguevskii Cossack 188-9; against the Poles
Grand Prince (later emperor), Regiment, 47, 81, 106, 111, (17924), 195-6; in reign of
196,232 159; Dnieper, or Zaporozhian, Paul I (1796-1801), 200-8;
Allenburg, 78, 95 Cossacks, 22, 24, 49, 102, War of Second Coalition
Altdorf, 226, 227 158, 159; Don Cossacks, 48, (1798-1800), 208-31;Turkish
Altranstadt (Peace of, 1706), 20 53, 81, 102, 106, 119, 158-9, theatre, conditions and
Ancona blockade (1799), 209 161, 162; indiscipline, 75, 82, influence of, 6, 27, 49-52, 73,
Andermatt, 225 85, 87, 95, 98, 101-2, 104, 95, 119, 126, 153, 162, 170-2,
Anhalt-Bernburg, Count F., 144, 146 227, 234-5; Israelovskii, or 176,188,189,191,209,234;
Anna, Empress: accession, 42-3; Jewish, Cossacks, 159; Western impressions of, 7, 14,
character, 43; War of Polish organisation, 157-8; origins, 17,23,26,48,58,63,72,73,
Succession, 48; death, 48, 53 158, 159-61; tactics and 74, 80-1, 82-3, 86, 90, 1 0 3 4 ,
Apraksin, family, 2 proficiency, 78, 79, 80-1, 85, 115, 125, 134-5, 152-6, 177,
Apraksin, Stepan Fedorovich, 54, 59, 101-2, 119-20, 162-3, 192, 188-9, 193, 205, 209-15, 216,
67, 7 3 4 , 75, 78, 81, 93, 9 5 , 9 8 , 214, 217, 221, 222, 230; 227, 228, 234-5
126,131,164 Ukranian Cossacks, 102, 151, finances, taxes and subsidies,
Archenholtz, J.W., 103 157, 158; Yaik Cossacks, 178; 36-7,38,45,56,57,58,60,
Arakcheev, Aleksei Andreevich, 103, mentioned, 64, 81, 82, 157-64 61, 95, 126, 179-80, 208,
201,205,207 disease and medical services, 46, 235-6
army, Russian, and related topics 53, 74-5, 96-8, 129, 132, 172 flying corps, 30, 172, 239
administration, 32-4, 35, 45, 56, evolution and experiences: Garrison Army, 35, 73, 96
6 0 , 6 2 , 7 3 , 9 3 , 9 4 , 126, 128, medieval and early modern Guard, 32, 3 4 , 4 2 , 4 3 , 5 4 , 1 2 3 4 ,
148, 166, 167,180, 181, origins, 1,6-8; modernisation 137, 138, 140-2, 144, 201,
196-7, 2 0 2 4 ; Conference, by Peter the Great, 10-14, 206; Chevalier Garde, 141;
92-3, 119; War College, 13, 17-18, 22-3, 2 9 4 1 ; Great Ismailovskii Regiment, 43,
3 2 4 , 35, 56, 128, 147, 148, Northern War (1700-21), 124, 140; Preobrazhenskii
160, 167, 180, 181, 198, 202 19-28; Pruth campaign (1711), Regiment, 10, 12, 1 3 , 4 2 , 4 3 ,
artillery, 1 7 - 1 8 , 2 3 , 4 7 , 6 6 - 7 2 , 27; under Miinnich, 45-7, 54; 54, 140, 141, 203;
79, 81, 89, 90-1, 102, 121-2, Polish Succession 1733-5,48; Semenovskii Regiment, 10,
166-70, 172, 177, 182, 198, Swedish War (174143), 48-9, 12,13,42,124,212
205, 2 1 2 , 2 3 5 56-7; Turkish War (1735-9), industry, war, 37-8, 179, 238
cavalry (regular), 17, 22, 23, 35, 48-53; march to Germany infantry, 23, 34-5. 62-3. 120-1,
46-7,63-7, 100, 121, 128, (1748), 57-9; preparation for 128-9, 170-2, 177, 204-5;
166, 170, 172, 177, 182, 198, Seven Years War, 56, 62-74; grenadiers, 44, 46, 63, 172,
205, 212, 235;hussars, 47, 64, Seven Years War (1756-63), 182, 205, 211; jaeger, or light
101, 128, 177 74-124; in reign of Catherine infantry, 117, 120-1, 170,

2 5 1
2 5 2 I n d e x

172, 177, 182, 184, 205-6, Regiment, Second, 80, 89; Azov, 27, 35, 37, 176, 185; sieges
209-11, 222 Grusinskii (Georgian) Hussars, (1695 and 1696), 11; (1736 and
Land Militia, 35, 43, 47, 73, 125, 101; Hungarian Hussars, 101; 1737), 51-2
166 Ingermanlandskii (Ingrian)
logistics (supply and transport), 6, Infantry, 134, 190; Kazan Babadag, battle (1791), 188
31,50,51,52,58,64,68,73, Grenadiers, 64; Kharkov Bagration, P.I., 217, 218, 220, 221,
74, 80, 81, 85, 86, 94-5, 98, Hussars, 128; Kuban Jaeger 223, 226-7, 229, 231
116,117, 119,120, 131,176, Corps, 134; Ladozhskii Baiov, A., 236
188, 196-7, 198, 226, 228, Dragoons, 147;Lefort Baku,29
234, 235-6 Infantry, 17; Little Russian Baltic Sea, 4, 14, 35-6, 126
maps and topography, 49, 52, 57, Grenadiers, 169; Moldavian Bangert, D.E., 238
61, 94, 96, 98, 202, 217, 226 Hussars, 101; Narvskii Bashkir tribesmen, 164, 179
men: conditions of life, morale, Carabiniers, 147; Narvskii Bauer, F.W., 146, 166-7, 181,235
90, 91, 129-30, 131-5, 190, Infantry, 80; Nevskii Infantry, Bavarian Succession, War of
192, 234, 238; desertion, 38, 79; Novgorod Cuirassiers, 64; (1778-9), 185
46, 133; discipline and Olonetskii Dragoons, 147; St. Behring, I.I., 29
punishments, 32, 115, 117, Petersburg Infantry, 62; Belgorod, 67, 158
132, 182, 207, 228, 234; Saratov Fusiliers, First, 133; Belgrade, Peace of (1739), 53
education, 130;pay, 46, 130; Serbian Hussars, 101; Bendery, siege (1770), 175
recruitment, 6, 7, 12-13, 38, Shlyushelburgskii Dragoons, Berezina, River, 22
46, 96, 118, 125-39, 2 3 5 4 0 147; Shlyushelburgskii Bergamo (seized, 1799), 217
military literature, 30, 120, 140, Infantry, 211; Sibirskii Bergen, action at (1759), 118
142, 185, 190, 194 Grenadiers, 142; Sibirskii Bergen, action at (1799), 205,
navy, 26-8, 35-6, 57, 177-8, 185, Infantry; Suzdalskii Infantry, 211-12
189,208-9 190; Tverskii Carabiniers, 147; Berlin, 85; raided (1760), 114-16
Observation Corps, 73, 86, 87, Vyborgskii Dragoons, 147 Beskrovnyi, L.G., 237
89, 90, 91, 96, 104, 109, 118, staff work, 96, 166, 176, 181-2, Bestuzhev, Aleksei Petrovich, 56, 57,
121 202,216,235 58,59,60-1,73,81,93,95,126
officers: corruption of, 126, 132, strategic and political geography, Bestuzhev, M., 93
147, 148-51, 154, 167-8, 2,4-6,11,14-15,20,23-4, Betzkoi, I.I., 144
196-8; decorations and 26,27,28,29,36,37,49,53, Bibikov, A.I., 129
rewards, 10,42, 81, 151-2, 5 7 , 6 1 , 7 4 , 8 3 4 , 9 4 , 117-18, Biron, E.J., 43, 49, 54, 147
187, 196; education, 4 5 , 6 0 , 173, 176, 185, 188, 189,196, Black Sea, 4, 2 7 , 4 9 , 50, 173, 176,
138-45; foreign officers and 235-6 186,188
Baits, 27, 3 8 - 9 , 4 3 , 4 5 , 54, 56, strategy, 19, 30-1, 93-6, 105, 112, Bobrovskii, P.O., 236
58, 81, 132, 145-7, 178, 182, 116,172,176,202,239 Bolotov, A.T., 78-80, 82-3, 138, 155
227, 237; origins and service tactics, 22-3, 31-2, 46, 50-2, 6 2 4 , Bondarchuk, S., 240
obligations, xii, 6, 7, 13, 14, 7 9 - 8 1 , 9 0 , 9 8 , 100, 106-7, Borozdin, K.B., 67, 184
3 9 , 4 0 , 4 5 - 6 , 81, 130-43, 147, 108, 112, 120-2, 170-2, 204-5, Braila, siege of (1770), 176
152;proficiency, 38, 95, 96, 211-12, 214-15, 222-3, 230 Brescia (seized, 1799), 217
119, 135, 141-2, 155-6, 182, uniforms, 6, 13, 34-5, 3 9 , 4 6 , 58, Brindisi (seized, 1799), 209
188, 198, 214; promotion and 65-6, 97, 99, 100-1, 102, 122, Browne, G. (Yurii Yurevich), 78, 81,
ranks, 14, 30-1, 51, 64, 119, 123,127, 134, 141, 143, 148, 87,94,95
145-51, 179, 197; social life, 149, 152, 153, 157, 160, 161, Bruce, James, 18, 34, 39
58, 82-3, 103-4, 136-42, 148, 162,167, 169, 173, 177, 180, Brusilov, General, 239
151, 152-5, 234 182-3, 184, 188, 200, 2 0 3 4 , Bryansk, 24
regimental organisation, 13, 34-5, 206-7, 209-11, 227, 241 Bug, River, 2 6 , 5 0 , 5 2 , 53, 176
46, 58, 65-6, 97, 99, 100-1, westward advance of Russian Bukhvostov, S.L., 9
102, 123, 127, 134, 141, 143, power, 14, 20, 26, 28,40-1, Bulavin, K., 35, 158
148, 149, 152, 153, 157, 160, 4 7 , 4 8 , 55, 58-9, 61-2, 83, Bunzelwitz, camp (1761), 117
161, 162, 169, 173, 177, 180, 112, 124, 177-8, 185, 187, Burkersdorf, action at (1762), 118
182-3, 184, 188, 200, 203-4, 196,233,235,237,239 Buturlin, Aleksandr Borisovich, 32,
206-7, 209-11, 227, 241 Astrakhan, 4, 164, 185 54,55,83,95,100,116,117,
regiments (mentioned in text): Auffenberg, General, 222, 226, 229, 119, 120
Akhtyrka Hussars, 128; 231 Byzantium, 1, 2, 4, 236
Apsheronskii Infantry, 97; Augustus II, King of Poland, 15, 20,
Astrakhanskii Infantry, 134, 44 Caspian Sea, 4, 29, 35, 49
190; Astrakhanskii Cuirassiers, Augustus III, King of Poland, 48 Cathcart, Lord, 177
128; Bugskii Jaeger Corps, Austria, 11, 13,47, 59, 9 3 4 , 105, Catherine I, Empress, 20, 42, 151
184; Butyrskii Infantry; 1 7 8 , 1 8 5 , 1 8 7 , 1 9 6 , 233 Catherine II, 'the Great', Empress,
Grenadier Regiment, First, 79, Avramov, M.P., 30 41, 137,138, 139, 152; accession,
89, 126, 134, 183; Grenadier Azov, Sea of, 4, 11, 49, 53 7 4 , 9 2 , 1 2 3 4 ; achievement, 165,
 i n d e x 2 5 3

199; character, 165-6, 180; Dolgorukov, family, 1, 42, 136 Gatchina Corps, 201, 203, 204, 206,
Crimean journey (1787), 166, Dolgorukov, Vasilii Mikhailovich, 207,212
185; favourites, 166, 180-1, 197; 176 Geisman, P.A., 236
military reform, 142; and Swedish Dolgorukov, Vasilii Vasilevich, 198 Genghis Khan, 1, 2
War (1788-90), 189; and Turkish Dolgorukov, Ya.F., 32, 33 Genoa, 217, 218, 219
War (1768-74), 173-4; and Don, River, 4, 11, 27, 37, 47, 51 Georgia, 49
Turkish War (1787-91/2), 187-9 Dorpat, siege of (1704), 20 Glebov, A., 121, 240
Charles, Archduke of Austria, 214 Dresden, siege of (1759), 112 Glogau, 83, 112, 113, 114
Charles, Prince of Saxony, 86, 89, Dubienka, battle of (1792), 195 Golitsyn, Aleksandr Mikhailovich,
91, 98, 101-2 Durakov, F., 127 95,96,172,175
Charles XII, King of Sweden, 15-16, Dvina, River, 74, 124, 178 Golitsyn, Boris A.lekseevich, 17
19, 22-6, 27, 28, 139 Golitsyn, family, 42, 136
Chasteler, staff officer, 216 East Prussia, 68, 75, 81-3, 90, 94, Golitsyn, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 23
Chernyshev, Zakhar Grigorevich, 59, 1 0 3 , 1 1 6 , 1 1 9 , 123, 124, 233 Golitsyn, Vasilii Vasilevich, 7
62, 73, 82, 89, 94, 95, 114, 115; Egypt, 208 Golovin, Avtomon Mikhailovich,
117, 120, 123, 124, 140, 166, Elbing, 104 12,14,39
167, 173, 176, 178 Elizabeth Petrovna, Empress: Golovin, family, 1 36
Chesme, naval battle of (1770), 176 accession, 54; character, 4 1 , 5 4 , Gordon, P., 10, 11, 13
Chichagov, P.V., 139 . 55-6, 59, 63; death, 122; and Gotzkowsky, J., 115-16
Choiseul, Due de, 83 military reform, 56, 64, 119; and C-raudenz, 104
Coehoorn, M., 30, 194 ' Seven Years War, 59, 92-3, 95, Great Britain, 28, 185, 187
Colberg (Kolberg), 95, 113; siege of 112, 118; and Swedish War Greece, 176, 188
(1758), 91, 102, 145; (1759), (1741-3), 57 Greenwich Observatory, 11
105; (1761), 116-18, 119, 120, Engelhardt, L.N., 138, 140, 145, Greig, S.K., 176
168,170,182 146,147,151,198 Grishinskii, A..S., 236
Constantine (Konstantin Pavlovich), Eniseisk, River, 29 Grodno,22,31
Grand Prince, 49, 50, 145, 207-8, Eristfer, action at (1701), 19 Gross-Jagersdorf, battle of (1757),
222 Erstfeld, 227 67, 71, 76-81, 92, 96, 98, 100,
Corfu, siege of (1799), 209 Essen, I.I., 212 102, 121, 134, 162, 168
Cracow, 23;siege of (1772), 178; Esterhazy, Count, Austrian Gryazev, Captain, 132, 216, 232
siege of (1794), 195 ambassador, 61, 92-3, 95 Giinter, J., 45
Crimea, 4, 6, 24, 49-52, 160, 176, Estonia, 4, 15, 27 Giinter, Captain, 142
188, 189, 190; annexed (1783), Eugene, Prince of Savoy, 1 3 , 3 2 , 44, Gustavus III, King of Sweden, 189
131,185 49, 139, 140, 188, 194 Hallart, General, 16
Crimean Tartars, 4, 29, 49, 53, 159, Hango, Cape, action at (1714), 28
173,185 Fedor Alekseevich, Tsar, 7, 9 Hannibal, A.P., 3 3 , 6 7
Croy, Due de, 16 Fenelon, Archbishop, 44 Helsingfors, 36, 189; captured
Ciistrin (Kiistrin), 83, 85, 98; siege of Fermor, Villim Villimovich, 50, 71, (1713), 28; captured (1742), 57
(1758), 86, 91, 102 72, 75, 78, 81-2, 85, 86, 87, 89, Hennin, W., 47
9 1 , 9 3 , 9 5 , 9 6 , 9 8 , 103, 104, Hermann, J., 209, 211-12
Danilov, M.V., 67, 69, 71, 142 114, 115-16, 119, 121, 239 Hessen-Homburg, Prince L : of, 94',
Danube, River, 175-6 Fersen, J., 195 118
Danzig, 83, 91; siege of (1734), 48, Finck, F., 108-9, 110 Holland, North, expedition (1799),
233 Finland, 4, 15, 20, 26, 28, 36, 48 205, 209-12
Dardanelles, 176 Finland, Gulf of, 4, 15, 20, 26, 28, Holovzin, action at (1708), 22, 23
Dashkova, Princess E.R., 122, 124 36,48 Holstein, Duke G.L. of, 79
Daun, L., 72, 108, 112 Fokshani, battle of (1789), 187 Holy League, 7
Defoe, D., 26 Folard, J.C., 63, 185 Hotze, General, 215, 228
Demicoud (Demiku), T., 85, 96 France, 48, 61, 105, 112 Hummelshof, action at (1702), 19
Denisov, Adrian Karpovich, 140, Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, 85, 108
160-2, 195-6, 217, 220 Fraustadt, action at (1707), 134 Ingria (Ingermanland), 15, 34
Denisov, Karp Petrovich, 161 Frederick II 'the Great', King of Ionian Islands, 209
Denisov, Thedor Petrovich, 152, 161 Prussia, 14, 41, 59, 74, 78, 83, Ireland, 212
Denmark, 15, 123 85, 86, 9 1 , 9 2 , 93, 103, 105, 108, Irtysh, River, 29
Deptford, 11 109, 111-12, 114, 115-16, 118, Ivan III, Grand Prince, 2
Derbent, 29 119, 123, 124, 151, 168-9, 176, Ivan IV, 'The Terrible', 4, 6
Dnieper, River, 26, 47, 50, 51, 124, 178, 185, 194, 200, 207, 218, Izmail, siege of (1770), 176; siege of
176 234 (1790),41, 1 3 3 4 , 187-8, 195
Dniester, River, 53, 175, 178, 187, Fredrikshamn: captured (1742), 57;
188 bombarded (1788), 189 Jassy, Peace of (1791-2), 188
Dobroe, action at (1708), 23 Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, 185
Dohna, C., 86, 89 Joubert, B.C., 220
 2 5 4 Index

Kagul, battle of (1770), 41, 169, 48,49,51-2, 56,57, 104,233 Mediger, xi, 238
170, 171, 175-6, 198 Ladoga Canal, 29, 45 Mediterranean, 173, 208-9
Kalicz, action at (1706), 21, 31 Ladoga, Lake, 37, 190 Melas, General, 218, 221
Kalmyks, tribesmen and auxiliaries, Lambert, Captain, 63, 64, 100, 102, Melissino, Petr Ivanovich, 142, 197,
49, 58, 81, 82, 162, 164, 179 103, 120, 154, 168 198-9,201,205,240
Kamchatka peninsula, 29 Langeron, Alexandre, 125, 129, 132, Meller-Zakomelskii, I.I., 120-1, 146,
Kamenskii, M., 153, 156, 176 133, 142, 148, 153, 154, 156, 182,198
Kanitz, H.W., 89 163, 169, 188,191, 194 Memel, 81;siege (1757), 75, 95
Kant, I., 82 Lanskoi, A.D., 197 Menshikov, Aleksandr Danilovich,
Kaplan, H.H., 238 Larga, (battle 1770), 170, 198 20,22,25,26,31,32-3,34,42,
Karelia, 15, 3 7 , 4 8 , 57 Lecourbe, C.J., 214, 222, 227 151
Kaunitz, W.A., 61 Leer, G.A., 236 Meshcherskii, Major, 226
Kay .see Paltzig Lefort, F., 10, 13, 146 Michelson, I.I., 179
Keith, James, 43, 48, 56, 57 Lehwaldt, H., 75, 78, 81-2 Mikhailov, O., 6
Kexholm, siege of (1710), 26 Leibniz, G.W., 15, 33 Mikhnevich, N.P., 236
Kerch, Straits of, 4, 176 Lemcke, J., 103 Milan, 217
Kharkov, 24, 139, 158 Leontev, family, 2 Modena, 218
Kherson, 185 Leopold, Prince of Anhalt-Dessau Mogilev (Mohilev), 23
Khotin (Choczim), 50; siege of ('Old Dessauer'), 32 Moldavia, 49, 53, 176, 179, 187
(1769), 175 Lesnaya, action at (1708), 24, 30, 31 Molitor, G.J., 229
Khpuschov, A., 171 Lewenhaupt, A., 22, 23, 24, 26, 30 Mongols, see Tartars
Kiev, 1 , 2 , 4, 37, 53, 67, 173 Libau, 68 Montalembert, M.R., 114
Kilia, siege of (1770), 176 Liegnitz, battle of (1760), 114 Montecuccoli, R., 185, 194
Kinburn: siege of (1774), 176; Lieven, Matvei, 79 Mordaunt, General, 58
action at (1787), 187 Lieven, Christoph (Khristofer Moreau, J.V., 217, 218, 220
Kinzig Pass, 226, 227, 229 Andreevich), 232 Mortier, A.E., 214, 229
Kirgiz tribesmen, 164 Lieven, Yurii, 62, 78, 80 Moscow, 2, 4, 10, 20, 22, 24, 37, 40,
Klado, N.L., 236 Ligne, C.J. de, 145, 162, 165-6, 43, 183
Kleist, E.C., 104 185,188 Miinnich, Burchard Christoph, 29,
Klontal, 229 Limmat, River, 212, 215 56, 153, 159; achievement, 54,
Kochmin, V., 11 Lindau,214 237; character and rise, 44-5, 54;
Kolin, (battle 1757), 89, 140 Linth, River, 215, 229, 231 and military reforms, 45-7, 124,
Konigsberg, 78, 81, 82, 83, 102, 104, Lithuania, 74, 196 126, 135, 158, 159; and Turkish
124 Livonia, 4,19-20, 26-7, 28, 43, 59, War (1735-9), 48-53; preparations
Korb, J.G., 17 73, 178 for Swedish War (1741), 48; fall,
Korff, N.A., 83, 119 Lloyd, H., 95 54,123
Korobkov, N.M., 236, 237 Lopukhin, V.A., 78 Muotatal valley, 226-30
ICorsakov, see Rimskii-Korsakov Loudon, G.E., 108, 111, 113, 117 Muotathal village, 228, 230
Kosciuszko, T., 195-6 Louis XVIII, 215 Muscovy, 1-8, 15
ICostyurin, General, 91, 98, 104, 119 Lowenstern, W., 139, 140, 148, Musin-Pushkin, V.P., 189
Kovno, 74, 75 206-7, 214,226
Kozludzhi, action at (1774), 176 Napoleon Bonaparte, 194, 208, 221
Krasnoshchekov, I.M., 48 Macdonald, E.J., 226 Narva, battle of (1700), 15-17, 19,
Kray, P., 218, 219, 220 Machin, (battle 1791), 163, 188 22,140
Kronstadt, 28, 36 Maciejowice, battle of (1794), 195 Neva, River, 20
Kuban, River, 160, 188, 190 Malet, A. Manesson, 30 New Russia, province, 185
Kunersdorf, battle of (1759), 41, 67, Malta, 208, 232 Niemen, River, 22, 74, 94
96,97,104,108-12,118,119, Manstein, C.H., 44, 145, 146, 158 Nikolaev, 185, 189
120, 121, 134, 168 Manteuffel, family, 241 Nikolskii, V., 236
Kunisch, J., 238 Manteuffel, J., 79 Nile (Aboukir), battle of (1798), 208
Kurland, 59, 196 Mantua, siege of (1799), 217, 219 Nolcken, Swedish ambassador, 48
Kursk, 24 Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria, Noteborg (Schliisselburg), siege of
Kushelev, G., 202, 204 58, 61, 62, . (1702), 20
Kutchuk-Kainardji, Peace of (1774) Marienwerder, 72, 104 Novgorod, 1, 2, 15
> 176 Martinov, technician, 67, 71, 240 Novi, battle of (1799), 162, 219-21
Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich, 144, Maslovskii, D.F., 236 Numsen, Th. M., 146
184, 188, 235, 236-7 Massena, A., 212, 214, 222, 229 Nyslot, siege of (1788), 189
Kyumen, River, 57 Masson, C.F., 154, 199, 209 Nystadt, Peace of (1721), 28
Masurian Lakes, 78
Lacy, Boris Petrovich, 146 Maxen, capitulation of (1759), 94 Ob, River, 29
Lacy, Francis Maurice, 44, 114 Mazeppa, hetman, 22, 24, 158 Oberalp Pass, 223, 225
Lacy, Peter (Petr Petrovich), 43-4, Mecklenburg, 28 Ochakov, 50, 176, 188; siege of
 Index 255

(1737), 52, 53; siege of (1788), Piedmont-Sardinia, 214, 217 Richelieu, A. du P., Due de, 188
1 3 3 4 , 187 Pishchevich, A.S., 131, 138, 140, Riga, 1 1 , 2 0 , 4 4 , 6 1 , 9 8 , 1 7 3 , 2 0 6 ;
Oder, River, 83-94, 86, 91, 108, 147, 154, 178, 181, 188 siege of (1700), 15; siege of
111-12, 113, 117, 119 Platen, D.F., 111,116-17 (1710), 26
Ogilvy, G.B., 1 8 , 3 1 Platov, M.I., 161 Rimskii-Korsakov (Korsakov), A.M.
Oliva, L.J., 238 Plemyannikov, P.G., 174 212, 214-15, 222, 228
Onega, Lake, 37 Pochep, 24 Rosen, C., 146
Orenburg, 151, 179, 183 Podlesia, 196 Rosenberg, Alfred, 240
Orlov, Grigorii Grigorevich, 166 Poland, 4, 48, 94, 119, 124, 173, Rosenberg, Andreas, G., 218, 225,
Ostermann, H.J., 43, 49, 53, 54, 146 174, 190, 195-6; First Partition 227, 229-30
Ott, General, 218 (1772), 178; Second Partition Rostopchin, family, 2
(1793), 195; Third Partition Rostopchin, O. 209
Pacific Ocean, 4 (1795), 196 Rostopchin, Thedor Vasilevich, 204
Palmenbach, General, 91, 145 Poltava, campaign, siege and battle of Rumyantsev, Aleksandr Ivanovich,
Paltzig (Kay): action at (1759), 67, (1708-9), 19, 23-6, 28, 31, 32, , 32,153,168
103, 105-8, 112, 120, 121 41,160 Rumyantsev, Petr Aleksandrovich,
Panin, Nikita Ivanovich, 103, 171 Polyanskii, A.I., 117 63,65,74,79,86,91,95,96,
Panin, Petr Ivanovich, 103, 175 Pomerania, 83, 91, 94, 113, 117, 188 100-1, 116-18, 119, 120, 128,
Panixer Pass, 231 Poroshin, S.A., 200 148, 156, 158; achievement, 173,
Parma, 218 Portsmouth, 204 237; character and early years,
Patkul, J., 15, 20 Posen, 85, 120 140, 168-9, 182; leadership, 133,
Paul I, Emperor, 7, 8, 126, 133, 152; Pososhkov, I.T., 7 , 1 4 168, 1 7 2 4 , 190; military thought
accession, 201; character, 200, Potemkin, Grigorii Aleksandrovich, and practice, 126, 129, 169-72,
207; and Gatchina Corps, 201, 138, 139, 140, 145, 147, 172; 176-7, 184; Turkish War
206; and military reforms, 141, achievement, 237; character and (1768-74), 167, 173-6; retirement
144-5, 200-7, 234, 238; and War early years, 180-1, 233; and death, 187, 189-90
of Second Coalition (1798-1800), leadership, 133, 134, 182, 190; Rushchuk, 176
and military reforms, 126, 144, Ryabaya Mogila, battle of (1770),
208, 209, 232; murder of (1801),
172, 181-3; and origins of Turkish 167, 170, 175
232
War (1787), 185; and Ochakov Rymnik, battle of (1789), 187
Penza, 138-9, 179
(1788), 187; death (1791), 189 Rzhevskii, S.M., 145, 148, 198
Perekop Lines, 6 , 5 1
Pozharskoi, family, 138
Perevolochna, capitulation of (1709),
Praga, storm at (1794), 125, 142, Sabatier de Cabres, 155-6, 178
26
Pemau, 16; siege of (1710), 27 191,196 Sabatky, I., 116
Persia, 4, 29, 46 Pragel Pass, 229 St Andre, General, 89
Peschiera, blockade of (1799), 217 Prague, 214, 231;battle of (1757), St Gotthard Pass, 214, 222, 233-5
Peter I, 'the Great', Emperor, 7, 8, 74 St Petersburg, 20, 22, 26, 29, 36, 37,
126, 133, 152; achievement, 28-9, Pregel, River, 78, 80 4 0 , 4 3 , 5 5 , 6 7 - 8 , 123, 139, 168,
40-1,42, 44, 124, 234, 237; Preobrazhenskoe, 9 , 1 2 189, 199, 2 0 1 , 2 3 2 , 2 3 5
character and early years, 9-12; Prussia, 178, 195, 196, 208, 233 Saint-Remy, S., 49, 69
and Cossacks, 158, 160; and Pruth, campaign and Peace of (1711), Saltykov, Ivan Ivanovich, 136, 154
military administration, 32-4, 27 Saltykov, Nikolai Ivanovich, 197,
126; and military education, 139, Pskov, 15, 17 198
142; and military reform in Pugachev, E.I., 133, 178-9 Saltykov, Petr Semenovich, 95,
. general, 10, 12-14,17-18,22-3, Pushkin, A.S., 33 104-5, 106, 107, 108,109-10,
29-39; navy, 35-6; regulations, 112, 113, 114, 116, 119, 120,
22-3, 29-32; St Petersburg, 20, Rac/awice, action at (1794), 195 133, 166, 238
36; social organisation, 137, 139, Radetzky, W.A., 216 Samogitia, 196
151; strategy and tactics, 22, 23, Ramsay, J., 212 Saratov, 147, 179
25, 30-2; war industry, 36-8; Rawka, battle of (1794), 195 Saxe, Marshal M. de, 185
Azov campaigns (1695-96), 11; Razin, Stenka, 158 t Schachental, 226, 227
Razumovskii, K.G., 124, 150, 151 x
Narva campaign (1700), 14-17; Scharf, Colonel, 10
Poltava campaign (1708-9), Repnin, Anikita Ivanovich, 13, 139 Scherer, B.L., 217
22-6; Pruth campaign (1711), 27; Repnin, Nikolai Vasilevich, 136, Schliisselburg (Noteborg), 20
victory over Sweden in Great - 154-5,178,185,196 Schwedt, 86
Northern War, 28-9 Repnin, Vasilii Anikitich, 57, 140 Schweidnitz, storm of (1761), 117-18
Peter II, Emperor, 42 Repnin, Yurii Anikitich, 140 Schwyz, 222, 226
Peter III, Emperor, 41, 42, 7 3 4 , 92, Reshut, 29 Serebryakov, hetman, 79, 162
1 2 2 4 , 137, 200, 233 Reuss, River, 225-6 Sernftal, 231
Petrovsk, 201 Revel, 36, 61;siege of (1710), 27; Sevastopol, 185
Pfister, J., 146 action off (1790), 139 Seydlitz, F.W., 8 9 , 9 0 , 104
Piacenza, 218 Rhine, River, 48, 226, 231 Shapirov, P., 30
2 5 6 I n d e x

Sheremetev, family, 136, 138 Sweden, 4, 14-15, 28, 48, 56-7, 189 Viliya, River, 74
Sheremetev, Boris Petrovich, 17, 19, Switzerland, 212, 214, 221-31 Villebois (Vilbua), Aleksandr
24,26,27,39 Nikitich, 146
Shklov, 145 Taganrog, 11, 27, 53, 185 Villebois, Nikita Petrovich, 80, 95
Shumla, 176 Tage, Pastor, 82, 87-8 Vinius, A., 17
Shuvalov, Aleksandr Ivanovich, Tannenberg, battle of (1914), 240 Vistula, River, 94, 116, 117, 119
59-60, 91, 93 Tarle, E.V., 237 Vladimir, Grand Prince, 1
Shuvalov, Ivan Ivanovich, 59 Tartars, 1-6,53, 162; see also Volga, River, 1 , 4 , 1 1 , 2 9 , 3 7 , 4 9 ,
Shuvalov, Petr Ivanovich, 54, 55, 90, Crimean Tartars 126,147
93, 95, 96, 121, 122; career and Taverne, 222, 223 Volhynia, 196
character, 60; artillery reform, Teschen, Peace of (1779), 185, 223 Volkonskii, family, 136
67-72; officer education, 60, Thugut, Chancellor, 214, 221 Volkonskii, General, 95
142; Infantry Code (1755), 62-3 Tidone, battle of (1799), 205, 218 Voltaire, 40-1, 115
Siberia, 4, 29, 151, 159 Tielke, J.G., 103 Vorontsov, Aleksandr Romanovich,
Sibilsky, cavalry commander. 74, 78, Timmermann, F., 10 82
79,96 Tolstoi, Matvei Andreevich, 54, 102 Voronstov, Mikhail ilarionovich, 61,
Silistria, 176 Tolstoy, L., novelist, 54, 102 83, 95, 115, 122,239
Skalon, D.A., 236 Tormasov, A.P., 195 Vorontsov, Semen Romanovich, 41,
Smolensk, 139, 183, 190 Totleben, G.K., 96, 111, 113, 114-15, 54, 126, 128, 129, 133, 134, 138,
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, xiii, 75, 240 116,145 148, 155, 183-4, 189, 198, 204,
Sophia, regent, 9, 10, 12 Trebbia, battle of (1799), 163, 205, 207, 212
Sozh, River, 24 218-19 Vorskla, River, 24, 25
Spiridov, G.A., 237 Trevogin, Major, 226 Vyborg, 36, 57; siege (1710), 26
Stalin, 236-7 Trezzo, 217
Starodub, 24 Trubnikov, Colonel, 225 Wallachia, 49, 176, 179
Stavitzkii, Colonel, 147 Tsaritsyn, 179 Warsaw, 195, 196
Stavuchanakh, storm of (1739), 53 Tsarskoe Selo, 197, 183 Warthe, River, 85, 94
Stettin, 83, 105; siege of (1713), 27, Tsebrikov, R.M., 51 Wedel (Wedell), J., 105, 106, 108
33 Tukhachevsky, Marshal, 239, 240 Weide, A.A., 13-14
Stoffeln, General, 52, 96 Turenne, Marshal, 194 Westminster, Convention of (1756),
Stralsund, siege of (1715), 28 Turgenev, A.M., 172 61
Streltsy, 6, 12, 15, 134 Turgenev, family, 2 West Prussia, 195
Strauch, Colonel, 222, 223, 226 Turin, citadel besieged (1799), 217 Weymarn, H.H., 74-5, 80, 96, 98
Sumarokov, A.P., 144 Turkey, 4, 27, 29, 49 White Russia, 195
Sumy, 158 Tyutchev, Major (later Colonel), 78, Wiegel (Vigel), F.F., 147, 154, 168,
Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilevich, 147, 121 178,207
173, 176; achievement, 237; Willmanstrand, storm of (1741), 48
character and rise of, 139, 178, Ufa, 179 Woolwich Arsenal, 11,18
184, 187, 188, 189, 190-1, 193-5, Ukraine, 4, 6, 74, 126, 137, 158,
226; field routine of, 193-4; 178,195 Yaguzhinskii, P.I., 143
leadership, 131, 133, 135, 192-3; Ural, River, 159 Yaik (Ural), River, 159
principles of war, 192-3, 215-16; Urals, 37, 164 Yaitsk (Uralsk), 159, 179
training and tactics, 188, 190, Urnerloch, 225
191-2, 222-3; at Kinburn (1787), Ushakov, F.F., 208-9, 237 Zante, 209
187; at Moldavia (1789), 187; Ustyak Tartars, 29 Zaporozhe, 158
Izmail (1790), 188;Praga (1794), Zhilin, P., 237
125,196; relations with Paul I, Vauban, S. le P., 185, 190, 194 Zorich, S.G., 145, 197
203, 205, 206; against the Vegetius, 185 Zorndorf, battle of (1758), 67, 70,
Revolution, 208, 215-16; Italy Velikolutsk, 37 71, 86-91, 98, 100, 102, 104,
(1799), 216-21; Switzerland Verona, 217 112, 118, 121, 124, 240
(1799), 222-31; death (1800), Versailles, First Treaty of (1756), 61 Zubov, P.A., 197, 199, 203, 205
231-2 Ziillichau, 105
Versailles, Peace of (1783), 185
Suvorov, Vasilii Ivanovich, 32, 33, Vienna, 216 Zurich, battle of (1799), 135, 205,
119,185,190 Vigel, see Wiegel 214-15
Sweaborg, 189 Vikings, 1, 236 Zurich, Lake, 226 •>