Democratization in Philippines

Philippines gained independence in 1946 from the United States and since it was under the tutelage of
United States, it adopted the much of the US political structure.
Although there is a strong correlation between democracy and development, Philippines failed to live up
to its economic potential mainly due to crony capitalism and corruption. Corruption led to high foreign
debt and pervasive poverty in Philippines. However, after Marcos's era, Philippines witnessed steady
growth in terms of real income along with democracy.
Transition to democracy after Independence:
Initially, Philippines possessed very few characteristics of an Asian democracy model. Being influenced by
United States, Philippines used western democracies to shape their government, a system that promoted
provincial political elites and the oligarchs from Manila, the capital . These provincial elites were expected
to deliver votes to national candidates and the oligarchs financed the campaigns. Philippines had "a
patronage-oriented civil service and political parties; industrialists protected from domestic and foreign
competition" (Hawes, 1989). This framework led to bleak economic prospects for the Philippines and it
had staggering economic growth ever since it gained independence in 1946 .
Development after democracy in Philippines:
The Philippine economy suffered the most under Marco's, a dictator, rule as the country slipped into deep
recession in 1983, which led to a negative growth rate. For instance; annual growth rate was -7.3% in 1983
. Hutchcroft suggests that this was because of a) poor decision-making by Marcos who generally
implemented too expansionary in its fiscal and monetary policy, b) due to capital flight from the Philippines
treasury and lastly due to the assassination of Aquino which striped away investors' confidence in the
political and economic stability of Philippines.
However, the People Power 1 movement in 1986 forced Marcos out of power and Cori Aquino, widowed
wife of Aquino (who was Marcos's competitor in the elections) came in power. After Marcos, Cory Aquino
became the first female president of Philippines and led a country's transition from dictatorship to
democracy. The National Democracy movements took place under Aquino's presidency in attempt to
transition from dictatorship to democracy. Aquino was determined to lift Philippines up from severe
recession in 1983-85, (this economic recession took place under Marco's administration). Aquino's
presidency was widely viewed as having made little impact on Philippines' deeply rooted economic and
social problems . However, contrary to popular belief, the restoration of democracy led by Aquino led to
immediate improvement in GDP however, due to the Asian crisis and several coup attempts at Aquino,
Philippines went through economic slowdown 1991 onwards . Hence, although disappointing, Aquino's
presidency provided somewhat smooth transition from dictatorship to democracy.
When the leadership transition switched to Ramos's era, democracy returned effectively in Philippines.
Ramos made the greatest and the most honest stride towards Democracy by taking on the task of
implementing the appropriate political and economic reforms. During his presidency, Ramos restored
democracy by implementing 1991 Local Government code which comprised of 229 structural laws out of
which 79 were economic reforms, 85 were social reforms, and the remaining were political, electoral,
defense and administrative reforms . This code initiated decentralization, which allowed democracy to
grow.
Ramos also initiated foreign investment in an effort to integrate Philippines into the global economy. Ramos
also enforced a liberalizing economy to bring peace within Philippines especially in the South (affected by
Muslim separatist movements). This reform improved the economy by reducing poverty levels and
increasing FDI . GDP growth rate (%) increased from 0.5% in 1991 to 7% in 1996 under Aquino's
administration but induced by Ramos's growth policies. The GDP increased from $ 58.7 Billion to $81
Billion in 2000 during Ramos's regime. Exports increase by 29% in 1995, and 16.6% in 1996 because tariffs
dropped by 5% and 25% of trade restrictions were abolished . Foreign investment also grew for instance;
Hopewell Holdings in Hong Kong invested large power plants, which will be inherited by Philippine 15
years later. FDI was beneficial for Philippines as it increased exports, increased the productivity of local
industries via capital and introduced Philippines to technology. Hence, Ramos's administration really paved
the way for sustainable development in Philippines.
Between 2000 and 2002, under Estrada's administration, the annual growth rate was 3.8% and GDP
increased from USD 76.3 Billion to USD 81.4 Billion . The targeted revenues weren't reached and
implementation of policies became very slow, some profound policies were executed. Estrada focused on
population control (budget allocated for family planning and contraceptives) and Poverty Alleviation Plan
(delivery of social services, basic needs and assistance to poor families, inequitable control over resources).
In 2002 through 2005 was when most economic development took place. Average growth rate was 6%
under Arroyo's administration. Policies under Arroyo's administration promoted tourism, foreign
investments and regional development. Emergence of Overseas Filipino workers (OFW) and the Business
Process Outsourcing (BPO) increased the amount of remittances (10% of GDP in 2010) which encouraged
growth via investment and spending . Lastly, from 2009 onwards the Philippines was the fastest growing
economy in the South East Asia with a GDP growth of 7.3% driven by the growing business process
outsourcing and overseas remittances. Under Aquino's presidency, the credit rating increased, debt
decreased and fiscal management improved. This also led to increase in exports as shipments rose about 12
percent in 2014. Currently, the GDP growth rate is 6.0% derived by investment, recovery of exports and
expanding of private consumption and higher remittances.
Current State and Conclusion:
Any country that democratizes goes through three stages of democratization. The first is political
liberalization, which signifies the loosening of overt authoritarian controls and democratic procedures are
formalizing. The second step is formal transition to democracy. A country adopts new laws and procedures.
The third step is internalization of democracy where there is a "normative acceptance of new democratic
procedures and major political actors" (Armijo, 8). Aquino, in essence was an appointed transitional
political leader. She aimed to enforce the government polities firmly in stage three of democratization.
However, her term ended before she could achieve her aim. Conversely, it was more crucial to feed
democratic ideals in public perception because at that time, the voters were skeptical of Ramos's (president
after Aquino) intentions. Ramos won by a really close margin and obtained only 24% of all the votes.
Ramos, through his presidency, iterated the confidence in the renewed democratic political system. Ramos
encouraged transparency and demanded positive economic performance. Milton Friedman once said,
"democracy and development are mutually reinforcing and no person comprehends this more than Ramos.
Ramos was arguably one of the most influential advocates for democracy. Although it is important to
mention that Philippines in some ways still practice patrimonialism in the way that the politicians govern
the public office as their own personal property, Philippines is becoming more democratic as means of
achieving political, economic and social development.
work cited

When the United States colonised the Philippines in 1898 it planned to gradually grant self-determination
to the country as the principles of democracy were imbibed by the population. As education was not
widespread, the elite and the educated benefitted most from the system instituted by the US, which was
largely executed by officers of the US army. Filipinos worked in the American administration and quickly
came to value the concept of self-government. By 1917, when the US decided to institute its policy of
‘Filipinisation’ , the elite was ready to assume positions vacated by departing US military officers.
Between 1917 and 1935, when the Commonwealth came into existence, political parties were formed and
most of the population was educated into accepting the principles of democracy, which meant having a
ruling party and an opposition. In this respect, the Philippines was significantly different from many
Asian countries which gained independence a few years later. As Apter (1962:154) points out: these
countries did not generally accept an opposition as a normal feature of a democracy. The small elite who
controlled the political process realised that each party would have its turn in government. The
Nacionalista and Liberal parties, which differed little ideologically, dominated politics, and politicians
switched parties to gain office. But the democratic system that developed did not represent the majority of
the population.

The Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated in 1935 under a democratic constitution patterned after
the United States bicameral system. ‘The ideology of American ‘democracy’ which emphasised the
limitation of state power was very different from the philosophy of the French in Indo-China, the Dutch in
the Indies and the British in Malaya. It played into the hands of the elite to whom the Americans, always
ambivalent colonial rulers, proceeded to hand over political power as soon as possible’ (Overholt
1986:1136).

For most Filipinos, American-style democracy meant little more than elections every few years. Beyond
this, the colonial authorities made sure that only the candidates who represented colonial interests first
and last won. This practice did not die with colonialism. The ensuing political order, which persisted long
after independence, was one where a handful of families effectively and ruthlessly ruled a society riven
by inequality. It was democratic in form, borrowing as many American practices as it could, but
autocratic in practice (World Bank report cited in Chomsky 1991:237).

The first duty of the Commonwealth government was national security. President Manuel Quezon
procured the services of General Douglas MacArthur, who was about to retire as US Army Chief of Staff,
to establish the Philippine military. MacArthur and his US military advisory team used the Swiss army as
a model for the Philippine army. A military academy, patterned after the US military academy at West
Point, was designed in which officers were to be instructed in the techniques and skills of the military and
taught that the proper role of the military in a democracy was one of subservience to civilian government.
In practice, however, these ideals were not easily imparted to the new recruits, many of whom attained
their place at the academy through political patronage rather than merit (Selochan 1990:57). Courses at
the academy were oriented towards equipping cadets to maintain internal law and order through combat
techniques. The curriculum did not address subjects in the humanities. Maintaining law and order, more a
policing than military function, required more emphasis on domestic politics than military skills. Officers
recruited from the Reserve Officers Training Course (ROTC) conducted at the universities were more
amenable to humanitarian considerations, but they did not generally hold command positions in the
military as they were seen as part-time soldiers. Yet with a liberal education they were possibly more
attuned to the democratic process than the officers trained at the Philippines Military Academy (PMA)
under an authoritarian military system.
Officers’ adherence to democratic practices also suffered under the Commission on Appointments (CA),
instituted to vet appointments under a functioning democracy. Politicians who were members of the CA
sought and gained allegiance from officers in exchange for approving their promotion. Many officers
consequently remained indebted to politicians and were unable to conform strictly to the military chain of
command. While the Philippine military was still being developed World War II abruptly interrupted the
military training and education program. To defend the islands, the fledgling Philippine military was
incorporated into the United States Armed Forces for the Far East (USAFFE) under the command of
General MacArthur.

At the termination of the war, the Philippines had suffered severe damage. It also had over one million
people claiming to be guerilla fighters and thus seeking a place in the military. Reconstruction of the
Philippine economy and the reconstitution of the military became priorities of the newly-installed
government under President Osmeña. Independence was also granted during this period. But the country
was inadequately equipped to assume full sovereignty.

The 1935 constitution, which was adopted at independence on 4 July 1946, provided the framework
within which a democratic state could develop.

The Constitution was supplemented by laws enacted by legislatures at the national, provincial, and
city/municipal levels of government. A centralised court system which was headed by the Supreme Court
performed the judicial function of the state and a career national bureaucracy administered the policies of
the government. In other words, the political and institutional infrastructure of a democratic government
was in place in the Philippines at the time of independence. What was not altered was the distribution of
wealth, economic power and social status (Lapitan 1989:236).

The American-style democracy exported to the Philippines was bound to encounter problems: ‘Except in
rare instances, democracy does not work when foreign models are imposed, and many features of
American democracy are ill-suited to poor, unstable and divided countries’ (Diamond 1992:27).

The President, the Military and Democracy

The President, the Military and Democracy

Soon after independence, Philippine democracy was threatened by the communist-inspired Hukbalahap
movement. The insurgents who had fought against the occupying Japanese forces resumed their fight
against the newly-installed administration; they had little confidence in the Philippine democratic process
which they saw as favoring the ruling elite. Appointed Defense secretary, Ramon Magsaysay was,
however, determined to restore faith in democracy, and especially the electoral system. Historically,
elections in the Philippines were characterised by vote-buying, vote-rigging and the use of private armies
to intimidate voters. Magsaysay used the AFP extensively to ensure that the 1951 elections were
conducted fairly, and indeed they were alleged to have been the fairest in Philippine electoral history.
Although he did not completely restore the Huks’ faith in democracy, Magsaysay reformed the military
with assistance from the US and defeated the Huks.

Having worked closely with the military, Magsaysay realised that the skills of the officers could be
harnessed to develop the country. When he became presi-dent in 1953 Magsaysay decided to use the
military in government. He appointed active duty officers to perform a range of functions in his
administration. By 1954 Congressman Bengson claimed that over 122 active duty officers were
performing duties formally the prerogative of civilians (Selochan 1990:118). Justifying this action, the
president said that he was weary of the civilian bureaucracy as a whole. Furthermore,

I have needed men of my absolute confidence to undertake delicate missions of investigation and cleaning
up … In other cases, specialised skills and technical know-how were required for quick and official
results … In still other instances, the new administration came upon officers so deeply entrenched in
dishonesty and corruption that only the most ruthless, uncompromising kind of military discipline could
redeem them from the mire and restore them to gainful usefulness to our people (Magsaysay, quoted in
Abueva 1971:315).

Magsaysay, who probably would have been re-elected in the presidential elections of 1957, died in a
plane crash that year. Knowing Magsaysay’s attitude to the vice-president, Carlos Garcia, many officers
who had been closely associated with Magsaysay were reluctant to allow Garcia to assume the
presidency. Abortive plans to seize power before the inauguration were hastily and poorly designed
(Selochan 1990:122-23), and Garcia assumed the presidency, aware of the military’s attitude to him and
to the democratic process. For these and other political reasons, Garcia was determined to rid the
administration of officers appointed to government by his predecessor. By this stage AFP officers were
pervasive in the government. They were in the cabinet positions normally occupied by civilians. After
acrimonious debate, Garcia was able to persuade some officers to return to the AFP; others retired their
commissions and ran unsuccessfully for office in the 1961 congressional elections.

Many of the officers who had been in Magsaysay’s administration believed that they were more capable
of governing than civilians. Some officers also believed that these civilians had achieved their positions as
a result of political patronage rather than merit. That civilian politicians were corrupt was evident from
their activities during elections and from the manner in which they used their positions to acquire favours
from businessmen and the AFP. Democracy in the Philippines, according to many of these officers,
benefitted the elite who controlled the political process. The majority of Filipinos, they argued, did not
understand the concept of democracy; for them it meant being paid to vote for a candidate at elections.
Many officers believed that Philippine-style democracy could not contribute to the economic
development of the country but was being abused for the benefit of the elite. Authoritarian rule provided
the means of addressing the situation. But the military was neither united in this view nor capable of
seizing political power.

Abrogating Democracy

A civilian politician, Ferdinand Marcos, was elected president in 1965. Marcos, who claimed a
distinguished career as a guerilla fighter during World War II (later disproved), courted the AFP while he
was a congressman, but was generally believed to be suspicious of the AFP, which was rumoured to be
planning to seize power in 1965. These rumours were taken seriously by many including the Garcia
administration, as there was a series of successful coups in Asia during this period. Concerned about the
military’s political ambition and believing that a closer relationship with senior officers would serve his
long-term interests, Marcos retained the Defense portfolio for the first thirteen months of his
administration. During this period he reshuffled the officer corps, promoting officers favourable to his
political agenda and retiring others less amenable. The military was subsequently enlisted to assist in his
re-election campaign. Marcos became the first Philippine president to be re-elected in what became one of
the most violent and fraudulent elections in the country’s history. Increasingly during his second term he
became dependent on the AFP to remain in office. To serve the interests of the president, the military
harassed the opposition and violently quelled demonstrations against the government.

Constitutionally prevented from remaining in office for a third term, Marcos declared martial law in 1972,
with the consent of the military, under the pretext of saving the country from Communist and Muslim
insurgencies. Martial law allowed the AFP to play a larger role in government. Because democracy was
so easily abrogated it has been argued that it had not in fact taken root in the Philippines. But then, ‘A
democratic constitution does not make a democracy; only democratic, constitutional behaviour that
follows a long period of experience and education can truly constitute democracy’ (Gastil 1985:161).
Although the 1935 constitution had enshrined democratic principles and structures of government,
political practice differed considerably from the theory (Reyes 1988:268).

Marcos argued that the democratic system would not allow him to develop the ‘New Society’ he
envisaged for the Philippines. For him, the practice of democracy was ‘energy-consuming’ and ‘time-
wasting’; authoritarian rule allowed him to make the changes he wanted without having to endure
democratic procedures (Hernandez 1985:243). Under his self-styled constitutional-authoritarianism the
institutions of democracy were dismantled: Congress was disbanded, political parties were declared
illegal, and civil and political rights were sus-pended. Freedom, a fundamental tenet of democracy, was
taken away from Filipinos. As commander-in-chief, Marcos directed the AFP to carry out martial law
functions. The military was, according to the principles of democracy, to remain subservient to the
civilian head of state. But the head of state had abrogated the constitution under which he was elected and
which officers were sworn to uphold. Third World armed forces have typically justified seizing political
power in terms of preserving the constitution and the nation. In the Philippines, however, the military was
incapable of governing. Having played a large part in the Magsaysay administration, where it developed
its abhorrance of civilian politicians, the AFP was willing to resume a role in government decision-
making.

Martial law gave the military the opportunity to get rid of civilian politicians who they believed were self-
serving and had little respect for the majority of the people. Junior officers found themselves performing
duties for which they were not adequately trained. Reservist officers were considered more capable of
performing civilian functions as they had acquired a more liberal education.

To better prepare PMA officers to perform martial law duties, Marcos shortened the cadetship and
modified the academy’s curriculum in the early 1970s. Courses on democratic principles had still not
been introduced to the Academy, but cadets were taught the concept of civilian supremacy over the
military. Other significant changes to the curriculum included placing more emphasis on courses in the
humanities as opposed to engineering. This, according to some officers, was designed to better equip
cadets to work with civilians and in many cases to replace them. In fact, as martial law became
entrenched in the Philippines, AFP officers replaced civilians in many government departments, and also
in private corporations which Marcos sequestered from his opponents.

Martial law lasted from 1972 to 1981. These nine years had a profound effect on the society and the AFP.
The AFP was no longer the protector of the nation. Instead, like a private army, it served Marcos and his
cronies. Officers became deeply involved in politics as they rigged elections and suppressed the
opposition. Self-interest led officers to pursue activities which lost them the respect of the people. And in
turn the military lost its raison d’être. More concerned with government than military duties, the AFP
was incapable of defeating the growing Communist and Muslim insurgencies; by 1985 the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) was claiming control over most of the barangays (villages) in the country.
The AFP was even incapable of performing the functions of a conventional armed force in conjunction
with American forces.

By and large the AFP remained loyal to an authoritarian civilian leader who satisfied its corporate
interests and had no intention of restoring democracy. But some officers came to the conclusion that the
prolonged period of martial law was working against the president. Widespread dissatisfaction among
intellectuals and the middle-class finally surfaced after the 1983 assassination of popular opposition
leader Benigno Aquino. Concurrently, factionalism developed in the military as the gap between those
benefitting from the system and those fighting the insurgency in the war-torn areas of the countryside
increased. The result was that soldiers lost interest in fighting the insurgents, who they believed were
justified in their claims, though the military resented their ideology.

A consensus therefore developed among the senior military leadership that ‘if the country was to survive
as a political system’, especially with the CPP/New Peoples Army rapidly gaining ground against the
regime, Marcos had to be replaced (Lapitan 1989:237). These views were shared by secretary of defense,
Juan Ponce Enrile, and AFP vice chief of staff, General Fidel Ramos. Plans to replace Marcos by a
military coup were hastily abandoned when he suddenly announced on television that elections were to be
held in February 1986. Surprisingly, the opposition was able to unite against Marcos, backing the widow
of Benigno Aquino.

The battle to stop Marcos from cheating Aquino of victory and the defection of elements of the AFP,
including General Ramos, culminated in what became popularly known as the ‘EDSA revolution’ of
February 1986. Yet this was not the outcome envisaged by the senior military leaders who had conspired
to replace Marcos. Defense Secretary Enrile had nurtured a group of reform-minded officers who shared
some of his frustrations with the Marcos regime. These officers formed the Reform the Armed Forces
Movement (RAM). With Enrile, they planned to seize political power and install an interim military-
civilian council. Aquino was considered a likely member of the council. But when the coup was
discovered by Marcos, Enrile joined General Ramos at the armed forces headquarters in Manila and they
declared their support for Corazon Aquino. People power resulted from this rebellion which saw the
military conceding its desires for political office to Aquino.

The accession of Aquino to the presidency, however, did not stop elements in the military from
conspiring to seize political power. Enrile’s actions while in the Aquino government, and his subsequent
links to a number of the coup attempts, clearly demonstrated his – and the RAM faction’s – desire to have
a continuing role in government. RAM believed that its claims to a place in government decision-making
were justified because it was responsible for assisting Aquino to achieve office (Selochan 1989:8). Enrile
also believed that his role in the rebellion against Marcos justified his having a greater role in decision-
making. Vice-President Salvador Laurel shared a similar belief, having conceded his presidential
ambitions in the interest of Aquino in 1985. Having united in their opposition to Marcos, divisions now
appeared in the groups that were contending for power – a pattern common in countries that have
experienced transition from authoritarian to democratic systems (Huntington 1991).