Public Office, defined

The term “public office” is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public. Fernandez vs. Sto.
Tomas, 242 SCRA 192, G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995

A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging his duties under
color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.

With the respondent’s appointment as the MENRO having been rendered ineffective by the lack
of the appropriation ordinance, he was nonetheless a de facto officer whose acts were as valid
as those performed by a de jure officer. A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an
office, and is discharging his duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority
derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a
mere volunteer. Consequently, where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good
faith, has possession of the office and discharges the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled
to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and
other compensations attached to the office. Civil Service Commission vs. Unda, 839 SCRA 569,
G.R. No. 213237 G.R. No. 213331 September 13, 2017

Verily, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a “[p]ublic office is a
public trust [and] [p]ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.”

This high constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric and taken
lightly as those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply with this standard or run the
risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service. Erring public officials may also be held personally liable for
disbursements made in violation of law or regulation, as stated in Section 52, Chapter 9,
Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, public officers, as recipients
of public trust, are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully,
and to the best of their ability. Unfortunately, Espina failed miserably in this respect. Office of
the Ombudsman vs. Espina, 820 SCRA 541, G.R. No. 213500 March 15, 2017
Threefold Liability Rule

The “threefold liability rule” holds that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may
give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. This simply means that a public officer may
be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation
or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to
reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may
also be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from
office, or other administrative sanctions. The action that may result for each liability under the
“threefold liability rule” may proceed independently of one another, as in fact, the quantum of
evidence required in each case is different. Thus, in Reyna v. Commission on Audit, 642 SCRA
210 (2011), we held that a criminal case filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is distinct
and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the COA. Ramiscal, Jr. vs.
Commission on Audit, 842 SCRA 317, G.R. No. 213716 October 10, 2017

The right of the government to exercise administrative supervision over erring public officials
is lost when they cease their functions in office; even if an administrative case may no longer
be filed against public officials who have already resigned or retired, criminal and civil cases
may still be filed against them.

Consequently, the government must commence an administrative case while they are in office;
otherwise, the disciplining body would no longer have any jurisdiction over them. The same is
not true with civil and criminal cases. We have ruled in the past that even if an administrative
case may no longer be filed against public officials who have already resigned or retired,
criminal and civil cases may still be filed against them. The administrative case contemplated
under the threefold liability rule is one that goes into the conduct of the public official and is
intended to be disciplinary. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Commission on Audit, 842 SCRA 317, G.R. No.
213716 October 10, 2017

Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees, mandates all officials and employees in the government
service to accomplish and submit, under oath, declarations of their assets, liabilities, net
worth and business interests including those of their spouse and unmarried children below
eighteen (18) years of age.

It must be emphasized that the filing of SALNs is obligatory on the part of all officials and
employees of the government. A SALN is a pro forma document which must be completed and
submitted under oath by the declarant attesting to his/her total assets and liabilities, including
businesses and financial interests that make up his/her net worth. In Re: Alleged Immorality
and Unexplained Wealth of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado and Clerk of
Court IV Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City, 822 SCRA 250,
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 10-21-SB-J April 4, 2017

Upon assumption of office and every year thereafter, it is mandatory for all public officials
and employees, whether regular or coterminous, to file their Statements of Assets, Liabilities
and Net Worth (SALNs).

In completing the SALN, particularly the portion requiring the declaration of real properties, it is
compulsory for the declarant to disclose the kind, location, year, and mode of acquisition, the
assessed value, current fair market value and the acquisition cost of the property including the
improvements thereon. Before 2011, public officers and employees accomplished their SALNs
by accomplishing the pro forma form drawn up by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). During
the time, a general statement of one’s assets and liabilities would suffice, as the declarant had
no obligation to enumerate in detail his assets and liabilities. In Re: Alleged Immorality and
Unexplained Wealth of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado and Clerk of Court
IV Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City, 822 SCRA 250, A.M.
OCA I.P.I. No. 10-21-SB-J April 4, 2017

Unlike the old form, the new Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) form is
more restrictive as it requires a more detailed and sworn statement of the declarant’s assets,
liabilities and net worth, including disclosure of business interests, financial connections,
relatives in the government service, and amount and sources of income for the preceding
calendar year.

CSC Resolution No. 1300174, dated January 24, 2013, was circulated prescribing the new SALN
Form and Guidelines in the Filling Out of the SALN Form. This was, however, revised again thru
CSC Resolution No. 1500088, dated January 23, 2015. CSC Resolution No. 1500088 is the current
SALN that must be accomplished by all government officials and employees. xxx With respect to
real property, the declarant is mandated to disclose the description and the exact location of
the property involved. In Re: Alleged Immorality and Unexplained Wealth of Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado and Clerk of Court IV Mona Lisa A. Buencamino,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City, 822 SCRA 250, A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 10-21-SB-J April 4,
2017

Republic Act (RA) No. 6713 does not expressly state the prescriptive period for the violation of
its requirement for the Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs). Hence, Act
No. 3326 — the law that governs the prescriptive periods for offenses defined and punished
under special laws that do not set their own prescriptive periods — is controlling.

Section 1 of Act No. 3326 provides: Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a
year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but
less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or
more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by
imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after
twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Del Rosario vs. People, 868 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 199930 June 27, 2018

Condonation Doctrine is Bereft of Constitutional or Statutory Basis

The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to
the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with
the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office,
or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative
offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 (1991), to apply to
administrative offenses. Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431,
G.R. Nos. 217126-27 November 10, 2015
Abandonment of Condonation Doctrine is Prospective

The abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the
reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the
sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its
interpretation. Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431, G.R. Nos.
217126-27 November 10, 2015

Suspension as Preventive Measure vs. Suspension as Penalty

The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as
they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive
measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the
powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records
which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the
charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431, G.R. Nos. 217126-27
November 10, 2015

Two kinds of Preventive Suspension

The first is the preventive suspension pending investigation, and the second is the preventive
suspension pending appeal where the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is either
suspension or dismissal but after review, the respondent official or employee is exonerated.

The nature of preventive suspension pending investigation has been explained in the following
manner: Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended
to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the
latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him.

If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the
suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after
investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be
reinstated. Francisco T. Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. Nos. 188681 and 201130, March
8, 2017

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not violative of the Constitution because it is

not a penalty.

It is authorized by law whenever the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave

misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or whenever there are reasons to believe
that the respondent is guilty of charges that would warrant removal from the service.

If the proper disciplinary authority does not finally decide the administrative case within a
period of 90 days from the start of preventive suspension pending investigation, and the
respondent is not a presidential appointee, the preventive suspension is lifted and the
respondent is “automatically reinstated in the service.” In the case of presidential appointees,
the preventive suspension pending investigation shall be “for a reasonable time as the
circumstances of the case may warrant”. Francisco T. Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R.
Nos. 188681 and 201130, March 8, 2017

There shall be no indefinite suspension pending investigation, whether the respondent

officials are presidential or non-presidential appointees.

The law abhors indefinite preventive suspension because the indefiniteness violates the
constitutional guarantees under the due process and equal protection clauses, as well as the
right of public officers and employees to security of tenure. Francisco T. Baculi v. Office of the
President, G.R. Nos. 188681 and 201130, March 8, 2017

Rules on preventive suspensions pending investigation.

 1) Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a
maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuance thereof, and this applies to all public
officers, (as defined in Section 2[b] of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said
Act.

2) Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or
employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under
Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807; and shall be limited to a maximum period of
ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the
case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case
the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
stated; provided, that, if the person suspended is a presidential appointee, the
continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the
case may warrant Baculi v. Office of the President, citing Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan,
201 SCRA 417 (1991)

A public officer improperly placed under preventive suspension should be restored to his
original position, and accordingly, should have earned his salaries as if he was not
preventively suspended for the pertinent period.

In this case, since the propriety or impropriety of petitioner Purisima’s preventive suspension
would essentially determine his entitlement to back salaries during the six-month period
therefor, the Court holds that despite the lapse of the period of his preventive suspension,
there remains some practical value or use in resolving his petition assailing the Ombudsman’s
December 3, 2014 Order. Police Director General Alan La Madrid Purisima v. Hon. Conchita
Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 219501, July 26, 2017

The right to retirement benefits accrues only upon certain prerequisites. First, the conditions
imposed by the applicable law must be fulfilled. Second, there must be actual retirement.

The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government.
Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain
qualified employees in the government service. These benefits are meant to reward them for
giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country. However, the right to
retirement benefits accrues only upon certain prerequisites.
The conditions imposed by the applicable law must be fulfilled. Second, there must be actual
retirement. Prior to retirement, an employee who has served the requisite number of years,
such as Demonteverde, is only eligible for, but not yet entitled to, retirement benefits.

Retirement means there is a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the
employer and the employees whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees and/or
consents to sever his or her employment with the former. Government Service Insurance
System Board of Trustees vs. Court of Appeals — Cebu City, 867 SCRA 460, G.R. No. 230953
June 20, 2018

Severance of employment is a condition sine qua non for the release of retirement benefits.
Retirement benefits are not meant to recompense employees who are still in the employ of
the government; that is the function of salaries and emoluments.

Retirement benefits are in the nature of a reward granted by the State to a government
employee who has given the best years of his life to the service of his country. While
Demonteverde met the two conditions for entitlement to benefits under R.A. No. 8291 in 2001,
i.e., she had rendered at least fifteen (15) years in government service as a regular member,
and she turned sixty (60) years of age, she continued to serve the government and did not, at
that time, sever her employment with the government. Thus, not having retired from service
when she turned 60 on February 22, 2001, she cannot claim that her right to retirement
benefits had already accrued then. Government Service Insurance System Board of Trustees
vs. Court of Appeals — Cebu City, 867 SCRA 460, G.R. No. 230953 June 20, 2018

As a general rule, factual findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals (CA).

In this case, except as to the legal conclusion on what administrative offense was committed by
Espina, the Ombudsman and the CA both found that Espina signed the IRFs even if there were
actually no tires delivered to the PNP and no repair and refurbishment works performed on the
LAVs. Accordingly, these findings of fact are conclusive and binding and shall no longer be
delved into, and this Court shall confine itself to the determination of the proper administrative
offense chargeable against Espina and the appropriate penalty therefor. Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Espina, 820 SCRA 541, G.R. No. 213500 March 15, 2017

The designation of the offense or offenses with which a person is charged in an administrative
case is not controlling, and one may be found guilty of another offense where the substance
of the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently proves one’s guilt.

Notably, the FFIB-MOLEO’s supplemental complaint accused Espina with failure to exercise due
diligence in signing the IRFs, which is sufficient to hold him liable for Gross Neglect of Duty.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina, 820 SCRA 541, G.R. No. 213500 March 15, 2017

While Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) declares the Ombudsman’s
disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the
President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.

While the Ombudsman’s authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the
Philippines, 679 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

The Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out
administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service. However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority
with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit
under specified conditions.

Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the
President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have
prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner through its
Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President’s assumption of authority,
especially when the administrative charge involved “demanding and soliciting a sum of money”
which constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds reserved for
the President’s exercise of his authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman. Gonzales III vs.
Office of the President of the Philippines, 679 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

As a general rule, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him except
when the law expressly provides otherwise—that is, when the power to remove is expressly
vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power.

Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As
a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. The
exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise—that is, when the power to
remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some
cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President’s power to
appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the
Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section
2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue
of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The
Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX(B)],
the Commission on Elections [Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the Commission on Audit [Section
1(2), Article IX(D)] shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only
by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be
appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines,
679 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

Paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be
removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through
impeachment, namely, “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”

Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from
political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two
restrictions on the President’s exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman,
namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due
process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may
be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through
impeachment, namely, “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” Thus, it cannot be rightly said that
giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for
that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the
Ombudsman’s Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their
removal can only be had on grounds provided by law. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of
the Philippines, 679 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers.

However, by providing for their removal from office on the same grounds as removal by
impeachment, the legislature could not have intended to redefine constitutional standards of
 Page

culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
as well as betrayal of public trust, and apply them less stringently. Hence, where betrayal of
public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official
wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of
removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the
grounds for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President
of a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their
nature nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly “overreach” to
cover acts that are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for
impeachment. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines, 679 SCRA 614, G.R.
No. 196231 September 4, 2012
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