THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY

AND DEVELOPMENT

Elias G. Carayannis, John Draper,

and Charles David Crumpton,

“Reviewing Fusion Energy to

Address Climate Change by 2050,”
Volume 47, Number 1

Copyright 2022
 REVIEWING FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS
CLIMATE CHANGE BY 2050

Elias G. Carayannis, John Draper, AND Charles David Crumpton*

Introduction

U sing agent-based modelling, with early entry scenarios featuring technological

breakthrough from 2030 onwards and other approaches, realistic economic
modelling for the diffusion of fusion pilot plants (FPPs) from 2050 now exists.1
This modelling now consciously operates within the framework of the Paris Agree-
ment,2 or policy climates that prioritize a renewables mix.3 For the pace of develop-
ing fusion science into fusion energy, much depends on assumptions regarding

*Elias G. Carayannis (ORCID: 0000-0003-2348-4311) is full Professor of Science, Technology,

Innovation and Entrepreneurship at the George Washington University School of Business in
Washington, D.C. An engineer with training in management, innovation, and entrepreneurship studies,
his career has spanned roles as scientist, technologist, innovation economist, and entrepreneur. He has
been involved in strategic government-university-industry R&D partnerships, technology road-
mapping, technology transfer and commercialization, international science and technology policy,
technological entrepreneurship, and regional economic development. He has published numerous
books on entrepreneurialism and science and technology and over a hundred academic articles, being
most recognized for his work in innovation economics, especially the quadruple and quintuple helix
frameworks. He is Director of Research on Science, Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship of
the School of Business’ European Union Research Center, where he heads the Fusion Diffusion Team,
working on accelerating the arrival of fusion energy.
John Draper (ORCID: 0000-0002-3626-533X) holds a B.A. in Modern History from Oxford
University, an M.A. in Applied Linguistics from the University of Southern Queensland, and a Doctor
of Public Administration from Khon Kaen University, where he was Director of the Social Survey
Center and specialized in United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goal 10, reducing inequality.
(continued)

The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. 47, Nos. 1-2

Copyright # 2022 by the International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development
(ICEED). All rights reserved.
1
2 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

national government policy influence and international cooperation. However,

nationally and internationally, what is critical is the adoption of a transition to low-
and non-carbon emission technologies, now exemplified by initiatives like Mission
Innovation (MI).4
MI is a form of “transformative innovation policy” (TIP)5 launched in 2015
from a Bill Gates initiative associated with the Paris Agreement to accelerate public
and private clean energy innovation in the 2016-2020 timeframe in order to address
climate change. In the process, MI, renewed for the 2021-2025 timeframe as MI
2.0, seeks to make clean energy affordable to consumers and to create “green” jobs
and commercial opportunities for business. According to MI itself, MI is the
world’s only “dedicated forum for clean energy innovation and advancement, for
developing humanity’s last best hopes for securing solutions to this existential
threat” of global warming,6 i.e., MI is the world’s main vehicle for TIP.
According to G. Diercks et al., TIPs typically possess three characteristics.7
Firstly, they embrace aspirations for purposive and directional innovation that is
missing in mainstream innovation policy,8 very unlike conventional innovation poli-
cies’ general focus on national competitiveness and economic growth. Secondly,
they do not derive from the traditional domain of innovation policy but from climate
action, as with the U.S. desire to bring fusion online by around 2040 to contribute to
the clean energy transition. As such, they are a challenge-led response to anthropo-
genic climate change, existing as one of a set of interconnected societal challenges,
including, for example, food security and resource scarcity.9 Moreover, the sphere

He is presently a Research Associate with the UN-accredited Honolulu-based Center for Global
Nonkilling, on its Nonkilling Economics and Business Research Committee. He has co-authored
several articles on accelerating the arrival of commercial fusion energy while reducing inequality in
fusion energy development, published in the IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Fusion
Engineering & Design, and the Journal of the Knowledge Economy. In addition, he is Secretary of the
UN Global Ceasefire to Universal Global Peace Treaty Project, a peacebuilding NGO-led attempt to
establish world peace via a UN treaty.
Charles David Crumpton (ORCID: 0000-0002-1996-8746) received his doctoral degree in public
administration and policy from Portland State University (USA). He is a Senior Research Associate at
the Institute for Governmental Service and Research at the University of Maryland, College Park,
Senior Researcher at the Centre for Public Sector Study and Applied Research at the Federal University
of Goi
as (Brazil), and Senior Associate at the South East Asia Research Initiative at the University of
Canterbury (New Zealand).
He has served as senior level state and local public executive and public sector consultant in seven
states in the United States. His international work has included Fulbright Specialist Grants in Brazil and
Thailand and a Fulbright Scholar Grant in Thailand. Dr. Crumpton’s published scholarship has involved
subnational governance, intergovernmental relations, justice, police operations, child welfare,
education, leadership, technology innovation in state and local governance, mental health, comparative
public administration and policy, transitional justice/injustice, indigenous peoples in Southeast Asia and
Brazil, intimate partner violence, social policy, and grassroots-governance building in developing
settings. He has researched and taught at eight universities in the United States, Brazil, and Thailand.
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 3

of sustainability, expressed primarily in the climate-change and environmental pol-

icy domains, has linked the global debate on societal challenges with the need for
TIPs10 leading to geopolitical initiatives like MI. Thirdly, TIPs address societal chal-
lenges that involve global aspirations, necessitating boundary-spanning collabora-
tions across a variety of countries, disciplines, and organizations11 as with the new
mechanism of global commissions. This interconnected global challenge-led
approach differs from conventional innovation policies, where the agendas are sci-
ence oriented and usually executed through national ministries or agencies.12
TIP can be narrow in terms of the actors, activities, and modes of innovation,
but it can also be broad, in that it involves not just the traditional triple helix of
academics, the public sector and industry, but also e.g., civil society; incorporates
both demand-side and supply-side economics; and involves the social processes of
doing, using, and interacting in addition to the classical policy paradigm of science,
technology, and innovation. MI is viewed as narrow TIP because of its focus on
accelerating and achieving cost-effective scientific breakthroughs in clean energy
technologies,13 whereas the global commission we describe in this article as at the
design stage is broad TIP, as it also addresses North-South R&D and energy coop-
eration and incorporates e.g., fusion’s peace-building aspect, while in terms of
actors it is being designed to involve broader civil society.
Innovation policy is viewed as most effective if it sets ambitious direction, mile-
stones, and specific steps.14 Presently, the fusion industry, championed by the
Fusion Industry Association, is already seeking to incorporate fusion energy into
MI, as this would unlock further funding, specifically private-sector funding,
through access to the Breakthrough Energy Coalition, MI’s private-sector aspect,
but also public-sector funding. Although the Breakthrough Coalition initially men-
tioned fusion energy as a future potential target for investment, and e.g., China
includes fusion spending in MI reporting, fusion is not one of MI’s eight innovation
challenges. Moreover, MI is still dominated by leading countries and large econo-
mies, with little representation from emerging and developing economies, meaning
it has been criticized for not engaging in North-South innovation partnerships,
which might embrace the goal of developing new solutions or technological inno-
vations for less developed markets.15 With fusion having been under development
for decades, our review suggests that proving that future prototype FPPs are now
ready for the substantial R&D funding that MI could bring to bear must involve an
effective temporary consensus-building mechanism, a global governance regime, to
review the feasibility of accelerating fusion science into fusion energy, necessarily
involving factors such as funding and technological maturation rates.
The mechanism presently in play is an International Energy Agency (IEA)-
backed high-level global commission, a de facto Global North-South-oriented
consensus-building mechanism, first deployed in 2019-2020 for urgent action on
energy efficiency16 and subsequently in 2021-2022 for a similar commission on
people-centered clean energy transitions.17 The Global North-South politics of the
4 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

energy transformation is complex because of the argument that the Global North
and West is responsible for the majority of historical greenhouse gases and should
now transfer technology to the Global South, and the global commission
consensus-building route has been deployed by other agencies, such as the Interna-
tional Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), in its 2018-2019 study of the geopoli-
tics of the energy transformation,18 which, however, did not consider fusion.
The Global Commission for Urgent Action on Energy Efficiency was designed
to compensate for the IEA’s traditional institutional bias towards traditional energy
and the Global North. Not explicitly North-South, it was nonetheless chaired by
then Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar due to Ireland’s historical success in bro-
kering North-South agreements. The Global Commission involved national leaders
and key ministers, including from the Global South, together with representatives
of fossil fuel businesses, e.g., the CEO of Royal Dutch Shell and the President of
the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center, as well as international
civil society. The Commission was designed to accelerate progress on energy effi-
ciency through stronger global policy action, including funding recommendations,
within a one-year timetable.19 In June 2020 it announced ten recommendations to
accelerate energy efficiency progress globally, including that financing be mobi-
lized to drive market-scale approaches,20 essentially the stance of the present arti-
cle with regard to fusion, applied to the MI initiative.

Research Method

Commencing in late 2018 and as of April 2021, we reviewed at least six years of
material in order to produce a multidimensional narrative review. For academic liter-
ature, we employed SCOPUS, using the terms “fusion energy” and “fusion power”
(132 articles). Of these, we discounted purely scientific articles, selecting only
articles that on the socioeconomics or geopolitics of fusion. This resulted in less
than ten articles, none of which addressed the geopolitics of fusion energy. Conse-
quently, we extended our search for geopolitics to a decade’s worth of material,
again finding no articles, suggesting the present article may be the first for many
years.
We also reviewed U.S. government and National Academies reports, including
nearly two decades of U.S. fusion and plasma reports, together with academic
books, fusion research databases, news stories (using Google News), government
legislation, and industry association policy statements, covering public- and espe-
cially private-sector fusion, including corporate websites. Because the majority of
private-sector fusion industry is located in the United States, there was an inevita-
ble bias towards U.S. sources.
Additionally, we selected key literature and developments on climate change
management and the role of leadership in governance regime formation, from the
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 5

fields of public administration and international relations. Finally, we asked senior

fusion representatives, including industry association representatives, government
employees, private sector employees, and independent energy consultants, to
review the manuscript.
The present state of the Global Commission is that it is with senior bureaucrats
and politicians within a major regional socioeconomic and geopolitical bloc while
a United Nations-accredited peace-building NGO has agreed to facilitate a Global
North-South dialogue on the matter including the chair of the Group of 77 Global
South bloc.

Reviewing the Literature

Introducing and Framing Fusion: Interrelated with the recent economic

modelling of fusion, increasing evidence from reputable sources such as the United
States’ (U.S.) Department of Energy’s (DoE) Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory
Committee’s Long Range Planning initiative21 and the independent National Acad-
emies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (“the National Academies”),22 rein-
forces the notion that fusion could contribute to global decarbonization from 2040
and substantially so by 2100. Nonetheless, expert opinion sharply differs as to
whether fusion will be cost-effective23 or little better than the cost of fission,
including due to the possibility of generating intermediate level waste.24 One cru-
cial factor will be that fusion be developed prior to decarbonization due to
expected decreases in the price of renewables,25 endorsing the concept of accelerat-
ing fusion development, as outlined in recent DoE thinking, which views planning
for one or more FPPs completed by 2028 and fully implemented by circa 2040.26
The main obstacle concerns the massive investment required for upgrading the
global fusion ecosystem such that it can transform fusion science into energy in areas
like plasma-facing wall materials and tritium breeding and then of constructing large
first-generation fusion reactors with no return on investment.27 In innovation theory,
the latter is the “valley of death” problem; a related problem is developing new supply
chains.28 For fusion energy innovation the main technological solution appears to be
smaller, theoretically postulated, “compact” power plants.29 These are being devel-
oped in parallel in countries like Canada, China, the United Kingdom and especially
the United States, by both the public sector and particularly by private companies. A
2021 National Academies report notes: “there is far more private investment in fusion
technologies today compared to 10 years ago … a positive development because it
enables parallel developmental paths, which is key to realizing success in this chal-
lenging technology.”30 Private-sector developments are particularly highlighted in
this review because venture capital expects a rapid return on investment.
Developing fusion is a complicated scientific and engineering problem that has
challenged plasma physicists and engineers for over five decades.31 In the past two
6 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

decades, following the 1985 U.S.S.R.-U.S. decision to jointly develop fusion,

global public-sector funding to demonstrate fusion power’s scientific feasibility has
concentrated on “one big machine,” the international France-based ITER (formerly
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) tokamak. Fusion follows its
own Moore’s Law of technological emergence and diffusion. Its key metric, the
“triple product,” doubled every 1.8 years in fusion research’s early decades. In the
1990s this indicated that an FPP would be available in the 2020s via ITER.32 Due
to delays, ITER’s deuterium-tritium experiments will now only occur in 2035.33
Scheduled to attain net energy gain for a brief duration in the late 2030s, ITER
is projected to cost at least $22 billion, with contributions from six countries and
the European Union,34 with the United Kingdom as an associated state. Its near
monopolization of public funding has inadvertently limited innovation in other
mainstream fusion fields.35 Still, it represents fusion’s main technological pathway,
i.e., magnetic confinement, and its DEMO phase, the design of FPPs36 has already
commenced via the “Broader Approach Agreement” and work undertaken by
EUROfusion as part of the DEMO Gate Review, with the ambition of an FPP
achieving fusion power in the 2040s.37
However, based on the ITER experience, transforming science into fusion
power and overcoming the “valley of death” for a rollout of a first cohort of toka-
mak FPPs from around 2070 may ultimately be prohibitively expensive.38 Acceler-
ating fusion via much smaller, more efficient, and potentially national cost-sharing
or private-sector developed “compact” reactors via accelerated DEMO-phase plan-
ning has become of critical interest to the fusion community, especially since an
American Security Project white paper advocated the concept in 2014.39
Interest in accelerating fusion presently focuses on initiatives like seed money
for innovative compact reactor technologies via agencies such as Advanced
Research Projects Agency–Energy (ARPA-E) or on venture capital rounds for next-
generation compact tokamaks like spherical tokamaks (STs) featuring high-
temperature superconductors.40 Assumed commercial opportunities associated with
increasing confidence in plasma physics and fusion engineering, together with the
emergence of enabling technologies like high-temperature superconductors, have
resulted in an increasing number of private-sector companies entering this market.41
November 2018 witnessed two fusion milestones that began to offer hope for
transforming fusion science into commercial viability. The first was the publication
of the draft U.S. National Academies’ Report of the Committee on a Strategic Plan
for U.S. Burning Plasma Research (henceforward “the Report”).42 The Report’s
main recommendation is that the U.S. fusion program is now mature enough to
transform its science experiments into energy production via a national “burning
plasma” facility, i.e., one that generates a self-sustaining alpha-powered net energy
reaction, or system “ignition.”43
Regarding funding, this and other reports indicate that full public-sector funding
of the U.S. FPP is unlikely. Rather, in 2019 Congress directed the DoE’s Fusion
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 7

Energy Sciences Advisory Committee (FESAC) to investigate developing a

national FPP via public-private cost-sharing.44 This idea was emphasized in the
Report’s chapter on organizational structure and program balance, which includes
a discussion on the private sector’s role in accelerating U.S. fusion research. Subse-
quently, the 2021 National Academies report on bringing fusion to the U.S. grid
also stressed this approach.45 Alternatively, the private sector could develop its
own burning plasma facilities.46
Illustrative of private-sector progress, a 2018 fusion milestone was the public
launch of the U.S.-based Fusion Industry Association (FIA).47 Most FIA members
are pursuing the goal of developing a compact prototype fusion reactor to produce
energy before or around 2030 and as of January 2022 have amassed over $5 billion
in milestone-linked private capital from diverse sources.48 For instance, Common-
wealth Fusion Systems has raised $1.5 billion, TAE Technologies has raised
around $880 million, and Helion has raised $500 million, with a further $1.7 bil-
lion in milestone-linked funding. However, other companies with promising tech-
nologies like the stellarator have raised far less. Moreover, $5 billion is far short of
the investment we estimate is necessary to achieve and then commercialize a
fusion energy breakthrough for 2030-2035, as this requires development of the
overall global fusion ecosystem in areas like the materials sciences of reactor walls
and very likely fuel type. As we outline in this article, funding several private-
sector companies in parallel through to prototype stage in order to identify the
most cost-effective technology in the 2030s, thereby contributing greatly to the
global fusion ecosystem and likelihood of commercial fusion energy by 2040,
would certainly involve tens of billions of dollars.
The milestones achieved that are outlined above signify a degree of maturation
in fusion, timely due to their coinciding with the need to develop DEMO-phase
machines. Yet, to transition from fusion science to fusion energy and also over-
come the “valley of death,” resulting in grid-connected commercial prototypes in
the 2035-2050 window, the funding obstacle must be addressed. Both raising and
appropriately expending the funding is a problem at the level of energy technology
and innovation management, which combines technology forecasting, technology
assessment, evaluation, technology transfer, and related disciplines.49
In this article, we consider how a path towards incorporating fusion energy into
Mission Innovation via a global commission is being developed, including a novel
role for the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) of Global South coal and petrostates,
whose economies could otherwise be disrupted if they did not participate in commer-
cial fusion due to fusion potentially being the ultimate source of cheap and ubiquitous
energy. In addition, unless they benefited from fusion, these fossil fuel-based states
could otherwise seek to exercise monopolistic price-limiting behavior, especially
with regard to oil and gas production, to impede fusion energy’s entry to the market.
Consequently, through the lens of transformative innovation policy we advise
that securing Mission Innovation approval for accelerating fusion energy globally
8 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

must involve Global South participation, meaning additional Global South invest-
ment beyond the couple of Global South countries already investing in fusion com-
panies, i.e., Malaysia and Singapore, and the handful of Global South countries
participating in both fusion R&D and MI, i.e., Brazil, India (including through
ITER), and Indonesia. We also advise that accelerating fusion energy through a
global commission requires an inter-sectoral and inter-regional consensus-building
exercise grounded in transformative innovation policy and innovation economics
and management that can overcome the conceptual chasm between fusion energy
technology development and commercial fusion power viability. Thus, a basic
research question guiding our review is: To what extent does a review of the litera-
ture suggest that it is viable to accelerate the arrival of fusion such that fusion
energy can address the need for a low-carbon energy transition by 2050?
Crucially, funding does not yet exist to transform the global fusion science eco-
system into a fusion energy ecosystem that can contribute towards a low-carbon
energy transition by 2050 or even within this century. According to the 2021
National Academies report, the national fusion funding climate requires urgent
investments by the DoE and private industry, “both to resolve the remaining tech-
nical and scientific issues and to design, construct, and commission a pilot plant.”50
The same report notes that requires assessing fusion technology’s ‘state-of-the-art’
and then backing multiple potential pathways for an FPP, with associated timelines
and costs, as in the report’s recommendation that the DoE should, in the 2021-
2028 timeframe,
… move forward now to foster the creation of national teams, including public-
private partnerships [PPPs], that will develop conceptual pilot plant designs and
technology roadmaps and lead to an engineering design of a pilot plant that will
bring fusion to commercial viability.51
We highlight here that the plurality of such teams could offer international
investors a portfolio approach to investing.
To review these issues, from the field of knowledge management this review
identifies in play “managed co-opetiveness,” with co-opetiveness denoting a
“formalized arrangement of N competitors collaborating to achieve some common
objective,”52 with “managed” denoting steering roles for countries and organizations
like the U.S., IEA, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These bodies
are engaged in devising policy, prioritizing co-development, and eliciting investment
by the Global South, as in the IEA’s global commission approach, which included
representatives from the African Union Commission, Colombia, India, Morocco, the
Philippines, and Saudi Arabia.
The Global South co-developing fusion may initially appear strange, but in fact
this has already begun in a piecemeal fashion: the Malaysian and Singaporean
SWFs are already investing nominal sums at least one fusion company, i.e., the
Canadian General Fusion, and Global South countries like Brazil and Thailand are
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 9

also home to fusion laboratories. Here, adopting the IEA-supported global commis-
sion route adds a public-sector “steering” aspect to the knowledge transfer concept
of co-opetiveness developed by Brandenburger and Nalebuff.53 It integrates a
GEO-PEST-driven external independent review (EIR) of fusion science to a simi-
lar end, i.e., a “Future Fusion Economy” (FFE), beginning in the 2040s.54
Finally, without delving into the issue in depth, this review also recognizes the
international relations literature that emphasizes the importance of national level55
and individual level56 leadership to the creation of effective energy technology and
social governance regimes. In other words, accelerating fusion to the extent it is
adopted by Mission Innovation requires a champion at both state and individual
levels.
Addressing Climate Change from 2040 through Fusion Energy: Climate
change is affecting most of the world’s most vulnerable biomes, economies, and
people.57 It is problematic in terms of effecting remedial social change via consis-
tent rational long-term climate policy due to complexities in human behavioral psy-
chology and environmental law-making. In particular, the science of the greenhouse
effect, the stock/flow nature of atmospheric chemistry, and the spatial dimension of
climate change present challenges to human comprehension due to cognitive psy-
chology factors like myopia regarding climate change’s temporal dimension; the
“availability heuristic,” i.e., the perception of a risk of over legislating owing to the
complex spatial nature of climate change, and the representativeness heuristic, i.e.,
the difficulty in comprehending cause and effect in complex systems.58
Moreover, addressing climate change within democratic systems requires
“ambitious policies within stable policy frameworks,”59 which in turn depends on
favorable public opinion and political systems capable of promoting multilevel
governance and political cross-party consensus.60 Consequently, K. Levin et al.
advocate progressive incremental path-dependent policy interventions to entrench
political and public support in order to expand a consensus for social change in
support of durable long-term policy interventions.61 In this viewpoint, the align-
ment of acceptance of evidence on climate change and the political will and mobi-
lization of governance structures and processes to address it is a complex and
incremental matter that primarily relies on the development of innovative technol-
ogy solutions that must actually forestall complexity.
The Paris Agreement can be seen as a triumph of the approach to establish
political will and mobilize governance structures. Nonetheless, incremental climate
policy via carbon pricing, its most effective instrument, cannot effect the deep
decarbonization required to stabilize the climate in order to achieve its 1.5 C
“ideal” target.62 In fact, in its current form, the Paris Agreement is not capable of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions below 3 C above pre-industrial levels by 2100,
let alone the 2 C defined in the Agreement. The likelihood of more extreme cli-
mate change scenarios developing by 2100 is accentuated by the evidence of the
Climate Action Tracker initiative, which shows that progress towards the 2 C
10 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

threshold by the majority of major economies is “insufficient,” “highly

insufficient,” or “critically insufficient.” While the United States and China now
have lofty goals of net zero emissions, fundamentally, change is threatened by
most developed countries not meeting their 2016 Paris Agreement Nationally
Declared Contributions (NDC) target and by wide resistance to carbon taxes. Pres-
ently, negative emissions are required to meet a 2 C by 2100 target.63
Another fundamental problem is the lack of financing for the Agreement’s
Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF is designed to be the centerpiece of climate
financing and to subsidize renewable energy technologies and fund technology
transfer to developing, mainly Global South, countries so that they can pursue their
NDC targets. It was created in 2010 within the UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change and is viewed as essential to short- and long-term climate gover-
nance. However, it presents challenges for effective governance due to of the lack
of a shared conceptualization of what forms transformative change should take,64
institutional effectiveness,65 and access by developing countries.66 To provide suf-
ficient funding, the Fund must raise $100 billion per year by 2020. At $8.4 billion
committed as of May 2021, international commitment thus far has fallen patheti-
cally short. The abortive U.S. exit from the Paris Agreement further highlights the
difficulty of obtaining $100 billion per year,67 worsened by a COVID-19 recovery
situation, and the fragility of the capitalization and governance needed for a coordi-
nated response to climate change. 68 Even with a new U.S. administration, there
are no indications that the United States will commit hundreds of billions of dollars
to the Fund over three decades.
Underlining the severity of the situation, a recent global stock take found that
the international community will not meet the Paris Agreement targets and that
only the development and application of non-fossil fuel-based technology and mas-
sive energy efficiencies can put the planet back on track.69 This picture of a weak
consensus threatened by individual states acting against premise and governance
mechanisms early on led to the characterization of the Paris Agreement as “wishful
thinking and bravado,”70 a diagnosis that has not significantly changed.
Consequently, a challenge-based “transformative innovation policy” heuristic71
for developing a low-carbon FFE model that could be deployed soon after the 2040s
has merited investigation.72 China,73 the United Kingdom,74 and the United States75
now have proposals or commitments to FPPs by 2040, as does the European
Union.76 If urgently funded, the FFE that these countries seek to operationalize
might contribute to fusion offering an industry-led partial “solution” to the problem
of persistent fossil fuels both prior to and after 2050.77 The global commission cur-
rently in the design phase will also situate fusion energy in the broader context of
the need for much improved management of a climate transition as outlined above.
Overcoming Global Collective Social Change Problems: The Role of
“Whole of World” Leadership: For a fusion power framework for a clean energy
transition to “stick,” in the contentious context of international relations, i.e., for it
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 11

to overcome the collective social change problem represented by fusion energy

and power technology forecasting, development, and diffusion, it must be embed-
ded in the sort of international governance regime that has typified the post-World
War II global order.78 The forces of globalization and the growing threat of com-
plex problems that do not respect national boundaries, and which defy single state
or NGO capacity to address, such as climate change and nuclear proliferation,
have added impetus to the importance of international cooperation through new
“whole-of-world” governance regimes,79 with global commissions being but a
recent development within this paradigm.
Crucially, international governance regimes are not spontaneous phenomena.
They are products of overlapping national self-interests that emerge to respond to
individual and collective national actor interests.80 Key to the emergence of
technology-based international governance solutions is leadership, usually demon-
strated by national and individual actors concurrently. Leadership by national
actors is essential to create structural terms for cooperation, particularly with regard
to providing the physical and normative capacity and legitimacy. National actors,
particularly great powers, provide leadership in determining the terms of coopera-
tion and the rules and norms of governance solutions.81 Individual or collectives of
national actors set governance formation agendas and serve to broker national and
collective interests to realize long-term social change objectives.82
Leadership provided by individual actors is also essential.83 Young84 has led in
dimensional sing individual leadership in international affairs. His typology of
leadership comprises three forms.85 Structural leaders form effective coalitions
and act to prevent or eliminate alterative coalitions. They form coalitions around
proposals that possess, or have the potential for possessing, consensus value among
coalition members. Entrepreneurial leaders possess bargaining skills demonstrated
through agenda-setting, popularization of the importance of issues at hand, devis-
ing innovative options that overcome impediments to bargaining, and making deals
and finding support for desirable policy options. The entrepreneurial leader’s work
is facilitated by association with a powerful state. The intellectual leader
[produces] intellectual capital or generative systems of thought that shape the per-
spectives of those who participate in institutional bargaining and, in so doing, plays
an important role in determining the success or failure of efforts to reach agreement
on the terms of constitutional contracts in international society.86
Young summarizes the importance of and interaction among the three forms of
individual leadership in three hypotheses:
1. Institutional bargaining cannot yield agreement concerning the provisions of
constitutional contracts in the absence of leadership.87
2. No one form of leadership is adequate by itself to produce constitutional
contracts in institutional bargaining at the international level.88
12 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

3. Much of the real work of regime formation in international society occurs in

the interplay of bargaining leverage, negotiating skill, and intellectual
innovation.89
To sum up the review in this section, national and individual actors serving as
leaders must be engaged with, serve as representatives of, and/or be part of the
fusion innovation economics and management framework as the global commis-
sion to accelerate fusion energy progresses. In the case of the IEA-supported global
commission on energy efficiency, Ireland played such a leadership role, while with
the global commission on people-centered clean energy transitions, Denmark is the
chair; both are well known for their development contributions to the Global
South, and in the case of Ireland, for its struggle for decolonization. For the
IRENA global commission on the geopolitics of energy transformation, Iceland,
another recently decolonized, demilitarized, and highly democratic state, and neu-
tral host to the historic 1986 Reagan–Gorbachev Reykjav
ık Cold War nuclear sum-
mit, served as the chair.
Reviewing the Progress of Fusion: Given the geopolitical constraints on the
Paris Agreement, accelerating a fusion breakthrough to the 2030-2040s timeframe,
as with private sector claims and now Chinese, U.K., E.U., and U.S. FPPs, could
greatly assist in reducing global energy carbon emissions to zero within this cen-
tury.90 The need to leapfrog ITER technology to develop one or more compact
fusion reactor technologies is no longer viewed as contentious even by ITER mem-
bers and may in fact be the only way for fusion to contribute substantially this
century.91
This is because, given the difficulty of transitioning from fusion science to
energy and then the valley of death problem, based on the ITER tokamak-based
pathway it is unlikely that fusion energy can be deployed rapidly enough because
the funding problem, generation divide between prototype and mature reactors, and
the innovation cycle, are deep, wide, and long, respectively.92 Fundamentally, devel-
oping fusion power involves highly complex science and engineering, is not globally
coordinated, as even the ITER project is limited to six countries and the E.U. bloc,
and due to mandatory multi-billion dollar contributions is viewed as expensive.
The merits of establishing a global multi-pathway fusion ecosystem accelera-
tion regime as the ITER project enters DEMO-phase planning appear obvious.
This section reviews the state of maturation of fusion, with a focus on develop-
ments in private-sector fusion as indicated in major U.S. government and National
Academies reports, complemented by a review of related material, including the
FIA’s emergence.
While we begin by considering the DoE’s 2018 Transformative Enabling Capa-
bilities Efficient Advance toward Fusion Energy,93 the principal report sources for
this assessment are twofold. First is the National Academies’ 2019 Final Report
of the Committee on a Strategic Plan for U.S. Burning Plasma Research
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 13

(“the Report”),94 a follow up to the 2004 National Research Council’s (NRC) pre-
liminary burning plasma report.95 Second is the National Academies’ 2021 Bring-
ing Fusion to the U.S. Grid report,96 a follow-up to the Report requested of the
National Academies by the DoE. Closely reviewing such reports is particularly
valuable because they themselves are in part reviews.
Assessing Private-Sector Fusion Progress: Recent Major Reports: The
fusion industry has in recent years realized notable technological and innovation
advancements such that multiple projects in different countries with different tech-
nological pathways, in both the public and private sectors. While highlighting
significant technological developments still required to enable fusion power de-
velopment, including key areas like diagnostics, actuators, and control, as well as
plasma-material interactions, the DoE’s 2018 report identified diverse already
made by various actors. These include advanced algorithms, high critical tempera-
ture superconductors (HTCs), advanced materials and manufacturing, novel tech-
nologies for tritium fuel cycle control, and fast flowing liquid metal plasma-facing
components. Moreover, same report mentions the need for dialogue involving both
public and private sectors, of the sort a global commission could facilitate, to lever-
age these developments.97
The National Academies’ 2019 “burning plasma” report98 was commissioned
by the Secretary of Energy as a follow-up to the 2004 NRC report and to a May
2016 report to Congress on U.S. participation in ITER.99 The Report stresses the
DoE’s governance and guidance and the involvement of various national laborato-
ries. It represents a consensus study designed to formulate a U.S. national fusion
program within the international context of ITER and other developments in fusion,
including the private sector’s commodification of necessary advanced materials.
As a consensus report, its assessment of fusion’s state of development is natu-
rally conservative. According to its terms of reference, the assessment is dominated
by the current mainstream fusion confinement technology, i.e., the tokamak, as
opposed to other fusion approaches, such as laser-based inertial confinement fusion
or non-tokamak magnetic confinement approaches. The Report states that magnetic
fusion energy research is currently in the second, “development” stage of technol-
ogy maturation, while the proposed successor to the Chinese Experimental
Advanced Superconducting Tokamak (EAST), the China Fusion Engineering Test
Reactor (CFETR), is a two-phase “system testing” and “demonstration” machine
for a burning plasma due to be completed in 2041.100 Its two main recommenda-
tions, for continued U.S. support for the international ITER tokamak program and
for the United States to initiate its own FPP, are largely informed by U.S. tokamak
community senior management.
Fundamentally, the Report’s recommendation for funding of a U.S. “burning
plasma” facility is a result of the slow progress and high costs of ITER and a
response to China’s (an ITER member) intent to build a tokamak FPP on an accel-
erated DEMO-phase timeline that could leapfrog ITER’s. The CFETR, planned for
14 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

the 2020-2030s, includes two operational phases. Phase One would demonstrate
steady-state operation and tritium breeding using a liquid lithium blanket, while
Phase Two would update the technology to obtain fusion power production of
1 GW, twice that of ITER’s proposed 500MW, and approximately 10-15 years
faster. Using the latest in materials sciences, such as superconducting toroidal and
poloidal magnets, it envisages a burning plasma and tritium self-sufficiency.101
Subsequent to the Report’s publication, the U.K.’s Atomic Energy Authority
(AEA) adopted a similar approach via its Spherical Tokamak for Energy Produc-
tion (STEP) machine.102
These ambitious DEMO-phase plans are predicated on China’s progress with
EAST, the HT-7U reactor,103 and on the U.K. AEA’s experience running the Joint
European Torus and Mega Ampere Spherical Tokamak Upgrade. The Report
unambiguously pointed out that U.S. dominance in fusion research is threatened,
suggesting it is now in competition with other ITER members:104
… the nation’s strategic plan for fusion should combine its ITER experience with
the additional science and engineering research needed to realize reliable and eco-
nomical fusion electricity. Without this additional research, the United States risks
being overtaken as other nations advance the science and technology required to
deliver a new and important source of energy.
In fact, the involvement of a plurality of international players should be wel-
comed, including via a global commission, to support competitive innovation
within the global fusion ecosystem.105
The Report sees public funding playing a key role in fusion development
towards the FPP via “a national program [of] research and technology leading to
the construction of a compact pilot plant that produces electricity from fusion at
the lowest possible capital cost.”106 Emphasizing the coordinating role of the pub-
lic sector, the DoE would control this facility and steer, at the national level,
“managed co-opetiveness” between the public and private sectors in fusion
development.
The Report is significant because for the first time, a major U.S. fusion report
forecast the private sector playing a major fusion innovation role, via cost-sharing
PPPs, breaking the ground for subsequent reports. The National Academies invited
the two largest U.S. private-sector fusion companies to provide evidence: TAE
Technologies, the world’s largest fusion company with over 100 employees and
over $800m in private venture capital,107 and Commonwealth Fusion Systems, an
MIT-backed start-up with over $1.8 billion in venture capital. Both companies are
pushing the boundaries of the innovation cycle by applying the latest developments
from university research. For instance, TAE Technologies is applying cloud-
sourced AI algorithms to optimize its fusion shots,108 while Commonwealth is
incorporating HTC magnets into a tokamak-based reactor109 to substantially reduce
costs.110
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 15

Additionally, the Report includes a section on “the need to encourage growth of

private-sector capabilities in fusion energy technology.”111 This is especially note-
worthy because fusion was until the 2010s dominated by academia and the public
sector.112 This change reflects other, more mature energy sectors in which the pri-
vate sector is a standard part of the innovation cycle. The Report underlines this
maturation with a graphic from the 2017 Annual Report of the State of US DoE
National Laboratories that illustrates how “universities emphasize early discovery
and tend to focus on research associated with individuals or small groups of faculty
members” while “[c]ompanies respond to market needs and typically focus their
R&D on near-term solutions or the integration of multiple technologies,”113 citing
DoE.114 This implies that a cost-sharing burning plasma program is now a near-
term development.
Also important is the interrelationship of technology innovation with acade-
mia115 and civil society.116 Given the public sensitivity to most things “nuclear,”
civil society engagement is important to the generation of public and policy support;
it was a focus in the IEA’s Global Commission for Urgent Action on Energy Effi-
ciency. Academia and the private fusion sector have already begun partnering in the
United States, via advocacy initiatives such as the American Fusion Project (AFP).
The AFP is a 16-member educational organization composed of fusion academia
and industry that informs the public about the benefits of accelerated development
of fusion as a solution to energy, economic, and environmental challenges.117
The growing role of the private fusion industry is also evident in the Report’s
recommendations regarding ITER. Given the rapid rate of technical progress in the
private sector, the Report recommends that the United States not participate in the
ITER FPP DEMO phase. It notes,
… science and technology innovations and the growing interest and potential for
private-sector ventures to advance fusion energy concepts and technologies suggest
that smaller, more compact facilities would better attract industrial participation
and shorten the time and lower the cost of the development path to commercial
fusion energy.118
Given that no national DEMO-phase projects are yet fully designed and funded
to the FPP stage, save perhaps China’s, private-sector claims regarding technologi-
cal maturation stages are extremely ambitious. Despite being included in the Report,
some of their claims regarding timetabling are not generally viewed as credible by
mainstream tokamak-oriented fusion experts. That said, TAE Technologies states
that it will soon progress with a field-reversed configuration (FRC) reactor capable
of sustaining a deuterium-tritium energy-producing reaction, the Copernicus device,
with commercialization envisaged to begin from around 2024.119 Like Phase One of
the Chinese CFETR, Copernicus appears to be a demonstration machine, with its
current device, the C-2W (“Norman”), being a system-testing device. Other U.S.
private-sector companies, such as Commonwealth, are also at the development
16 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

stage. If Commonwealth’s proposed Soonest/Smallest Private-Funded Affordable

Robust Compact system is successful, it plans a deuterium-tritium demonstration
machine for around 2025, with commercialization around 2030.120
Regarding non-U.S. companies, the Canadian General Fusion, the world’s sec-
ond largest fusion company, already has a cost-sharing arrangement involving the
Canadian government, has completed its system testing phase, and plans to com-
plete a magnetized target fusion FPP by approximately 2025, with commercializa-
tion around 2030.121 The ENN Group, a Chinese natural gas distribution company,
has also begun a major fusion program, and has fielded FRC and ST devices. The
ENN Group envisages at least one system testing device by 2022 and is working
towards a ten-year timeframe for a commercial reactor, although its website only
forecasts a commercial demonstration device around 2043,122 perhaps to avoid
challenging the state funded CFETR. Other private-sector fusion companies’ tech-
nological maturation status is not public or is more speculative (see Supplementary
Material Tables in the Appendix).
The Report acknowledges the FIA’s launch and states that it can “provide
important input to implementation of the national fusion research strategy,”123 thus
giving credence to the notion of accelerated fusion power. It also forecasts that the
next phase of U.S. fusion commercialization could either be similar to that of the
space industry, with the emergence of players like SpaceX, or similar to that of
the nuclear power industry “with a substantial entry of smaller, modular advanced
fission concepts,” including the emergence of “private venture burning plasma
machines,”124 with the DoE still playing a major role in funding and in organiza-
tional support. It emphasizes the U.S. public sector will likely dominate for years,
suggesting managed co-opetiveness via the global commission presents the most
realistic approach to globally accelerating fusion power’s arrival.
The second major report, the 2021 National Academies report, was commis-
sioned to identify the key goals of a U.S. FPP in the context of the low-carbon
electricity transition as well as “the principal innovations needed for the private
sector to address, perhaps in concert with efforts by DOE, to meet the key
goals.”125 The report outlines obstacles mainly related to required engineering and
construction design innovations in fusion confinement concepts and technology to
extract fusion power and close the fusion fuel cycle, to improve technology readi-
ness levels.126 It emphasizes private-sector involvement in that
For the United States to be a leader in fusion and to make an impact on the transi-
tion to a low-carbon emission electrical system by 2050, the Department of Energy
and the private sector should produce net electricity in a fusion pilot plant in the
United States in the 2035-2040 timeframe.
This is the first U.S. mainstream mention of an FPP in a 20351 timeframe and
requires the design of a government-backed cost-sharing multi-phase machine127 to
be finalized by 2028.128 While this report focuses on understanding the parameters
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 17

for FPP economic viability and sought electricity industry input, including from
private-sector “potential manufacturers of fusion power plant components,”129 it did
not investigate in depth the role of private-sector fusion companies.
What it did do is highlight that
to meet the aggressive development timeline to meet the 2050 timeframe of con-
necting an FPP to the grid, it will be required to rapidly develop new programs and
facilities to accelerate the scientific and technical innovation needed to finalize the
engineering design of the fusion pilot plant.130
in areas like plasma-facing first wall structural and functional materials, tritium
breeding, ash removal, and materials design, i.e., the entire fusion process, via par-
allel development along multiple pathways.
In the section on “Participants in Developing a Pilot Plant,” the report notes the
role of private industry in that
Teams made up of private industries, national labs, and universities bring together
important strengths: industry brings the focus on deploying a usable product on a
timeframe that will meet market needs, and national labs and universities bring
innovation and deep technical expertise.
It recommends that the DoE should “further encourage access of private industry
to the broad range of technical experts resident at the national laboratories and uni-
versities” and so expand new DoE programs, such as BETHE, GAMOW, and
INFUSE, to “partner with industry in support of the pilot plant design.”131 The
report also examines PPP models, including NASA’s Commercial Orbital Transpor-
tation Services (COTS) program, and finds that, while the DoE should continue to
sustain a strong base program in fusion energy science and technology, “at national
laboratories and universities,” including via the FPP, it should also “evaluate and
identify the best model for PPPs to accelerate development and reduce government
cost,” including for different phases of the development of the FPP, namely, concep-
tual design and technology roadmap, detailed engineering design, and construction
and operation, potentially involving different or incremental PPP models.132
Crucially, the 2021 report stresses that if the United States is the first to deploy
a fusion reactor, it will obtain a “foreign policy benefit” that could improve its
global influence, including by subsequent export of a prestigious high-technology
energy source that enhances energy security.133 As such, the report emphasizes a
policy of mutually beneficial international collaboration, including with ITER
countries, and including in areas where the U.S. research may be weak.
Finally, the report recommends that for the 2035-2040 timeframe “[e]lectricity
generation market policy and incentives” should drive “low-carbon emission gen-
eration resources including non-carbon emission fusion, in the future for baseload
as part of a national strategy to ensure national security and the lowest cost path to
a low-carbon emission future.”134 While this may be ideal, the report presents no
18 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

real mechanism to fund the multiple national teams that it also recommends to real-
ize this recommendation,135 except to state that it will most likely be by “a combi-
nation of government and private funding.”136 The report’s emphasis on
international collaboration on FPP development as well as the need for funding are
the kind of areas that a global commission will likely study and make recommen-
dations about.
Assessing Private-Sector Fusion Progress: The Fusion Industry Associa-
tion: In November 2018, the Fusion Industry Association (FIA), now with 25
members and 27 affiliates from six countries (see table 1 in the Appendix Supple-
mentary Materials and FIA website), was registered as a non-profit organization.
Briefly reviewing the FIA’s progress helps confirm the 2040s timeline for fusion
commercialization because of advances in the overall fusion industry and because
the venture capitalists funding this industry expect more immediate returns on
investment. Fusion’s history has been largely influenced by publicly funded pro-
grams in the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and more recently,
the European Union, via ITER.137 However, over the past two decades, the emer-
gence of several medium-sized private-sector fusion companies, with over $2 bil-
lion in venture capital invested,138 and with substantial scientific progress and
Intellectual Property (IP),139 indicates the maturation of fusion into a true industry.
The FIA coordinates with the American Fusion Project (AFP) and includes
many of the same players. On its launch, it immediately initiated a campaign to
grow support for commercializing fusion energy as a power source through a
leveraging of potential synergies among diverse players. In addition to academia
and government, the FIA has also involved the general public via civil society and
the media.
On its website and in promotional material, the FIA has three strategic priorities
for accelerating the development of fusion energy:140
1. Partner with Governments for Applied Fusion Research: The private sector
should have access to the pathbreaking research that governments have pur-
sued for decades. Likewise, the public sector should be able to benefit from
exchanges with private scientists working on fusion.
2. Drive Financial Support: Sustained financing is needed to accelerate fusion
from early-stage research to demonstration levels of energy production.
PPPs that include government support can multiply private financial support
by reducing risk.
3. Ensure Regulatory Certainty: Fusion research, development, and deployment
should be subject to appropriate regulation when experiments are built and
sited.
The FIA advocates focusing on energy problems through three prisms: the envi-
ronment, geopolitics, and availability. Under the Trump administration, the FIA
did not specifically address climate change, although several of its members’
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 19

websites mention it (see table 1 in Appendix Supplementary Materials). For

instance, the affiliate member Stellar Energy Foundation’s main mission is to
“bring fusion energy to the zero-carbon power portfolio soon enough to make an
impact on climate change.” Also, the FIA website features a pertinent Dr. Stephen
Hawking quote: “I would like nuclear fusion to become a practical power source.
It would provide an inexhaustible supply of energy, without pollution or global
warming.” Presently, the FIA appears to be taking a stronger stance on how fusion
can address climate change, especially given the 2021 National Academies’ report,
including through including fusion energy in MI as its ninth challenge.
The FIA website also does not consider the geopolitical implications of fusion,
save for an aspirational quote by the CEO of Seattle-based CT Fusion: “This is
about changing the geopolitical landscape of the entire planet and transitioning
from a fuel source based on scarcity like fossil fuels to a fuel source that is easily
available to everyone.” That said, the FIA is lobbying for the U.S. FPP to be the
First of a Kind (FOAK).
The FIA has a close relationship with the DoE’s ARPA-E, which has awarded
grants to many FIA members through its grants programs, specifically ALPHA,
BETHE, and GAMOW. The FIA’s first podcast, on February 23, 2019, was an
interview with Scott Hsu, an ARPA-E fusion program manager. ARPA-E’s mis-
sion is to bridge the gap between academia and industry in order to increase U.S.
energy efficiency, reduce imports, and reduce pollution across the whole energy
space. Its ground-breaking “Accelerating Low-cost Plasma Heating and Assembly”
(ALPHA) fusion program’s objective was “to catalyze research and development
efforts to enable substantially lower-cost pathways to economical fusion power,”
and it awarded grants to several FIA members.141
In the first podcast, Hsu voiced support for multiple synergetic initiatives within
the U.S. fusion ecosystem: (i) competitive PPPs to bridge the gap between academ-
ia’s ability to innovate and industry’s ability to assess the market and scale up; (ii)
a diversity of fusion techniques to address uncertain fusion market requirements,
including in non-energy markets; (iii) both international collaboration and private-
sector competition; (iv) the ability of small commercial companies to innovate in
ways which contribute to larger academic and public-sector fusion programs; and
(v) innovative ways of funding small fusion companies with high potential for
which federal agencies could provide early funding and increasing amounts of pri-
vate capital as development progresses.142
Hsu also acknowledged a possible role for some form of independent “vetting’”
of private-sector companies to catalyze increased access to private capital, i.e., the
centralized “authoritative” aspect of our managed co-opetiveness. Hsu affirmed
that fusion could be facing a “tipping point” and could address climate change.
ARPA-E’s February 13, 2020, launch of its GAMOW program builds on ALPHA
and the related BETHE programs and aims to assist in establishing fusion energy’s
“technical and commercial viability within the next several decades.”143
20 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Since the FIA is still relatively small, the global commission will test its ability
to accommodate larger companies already entering the fusion industry, such as
General Atomics and Lockheed-Martin, as well as its skill at developing synergies
with the public sector and at negotiating geopolitics. For instance, it must recruit
private companies in non-Western countries, potentially China’s ENN Group. It
must also negotiate the geopolitics of fusion and climate to win allies and partners
in the global “environmental lobby,” which involves civil society and the media,
effectively enhancing fusion’s “quality of democracy.”144
Since the FIA’s 2018 launch, concrete signs of managed co-opetiveness involv-
ing the DoE’s influential “mainstream” Office of Fusion Energy Sciences and the
U.S. fusion private sector have emerged that seek to accelerate cost-sharing FPP
maturation pathways.
Firstly, the new “Innovation Network for Fusion Energy” (INFUSE) program
(https://infuse.ornl.gov/) promotes public-private collaboration by allowing private
companies to apply for vouchers redeemable at DoE public laboratories. INFUSE
thus addresses the IPR issue that can impede cooperation between the public and
private sectors by enabling U.S. companies to work directly with government sci-
entists on government assets, potentially facilitating access to computational
modeling, design validation, and experimental testing, together with collaborative
public-private publication of cutting-edge research.145
Secondly, given several U.S. FPPs are now possible,146 a supportive regulatory
regime is being established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, at the lat-
est by December 31, 2027, per the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization
Act, which was signed into law on January 16, 2019.147
Thirdly, the National Academies’ 2018 “burning plasma” Report’s thinking
was further developed in the March 2020 Community Plan for Fusion Energy and
Discovery Plasma Sciences.148 This seminal report recommended to the DoE’s
Office of Fusion Energy Sciences “multi-institutional, multidisciplinary program
for exploring FPP designs, together with industry, to drive and integrate the latest
scientific innovations, identify the critical cost drivers of an FPP, and inform
research priorities accordingly.”149 The aim is to establish U.S.-based FPPs by
2040 that rely on tokamak, stellarator, or alternate concepts “utilizing partnerships
with private industry and interagency collaboration”150 in inertial fusion energy
and magnetic fusion energy, including via INFUSE and an FPP conceptual studies
program involving private industry, and through PPPs and dialogue with venture
capital, with a view to fusion power commercialization. This CPP plan was then
basically adopted by the DoE’s Fusion Energy Sciences Long Range Planning
Committee’s draft fusion and plasma report.151
Finally, on April 20, 2020, the DoE issued a “Request for Information on Cost-
Sharing Partnerships with the Private Sector in Fusion Energy.”152 The PPP
approach was then endorsed in the December 27 H.R.133 Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act, 2021, which authorizes $325 million over five years for a partnership
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 21

program to build fusion demonstration facilities, with matched private-sector

funding.153
Reviewing Recent Progress towards Fusion Energy Commercialization: As
a disruptive technology that could replace fossil fuels and meet baseload require-
ments without significant fuel import costs, but only if urgently developed if it is
to compete with Gen IV fission and renewables, as outlined in recent DoE think-
ing,154 fusion power, i.e., grid-connected fusion reactors, have been on the radar
for years.155 In developing a globally integrated approach to fusion innovation
management,156 three potential strategies can be employed, with different advan-
tages and disadvantages. These are the authoritative approach, the competitive
approach, and the collaborative approach.157 The global fusion commission that is
emerging involves centrally managed (authoritative) co-opetiveness, i.e., collabora-
tive competition, which combines the advantages of all three approaches.
Given the need to build domestic legitimacy for the project, the approach may
also incorporate initial task forces or presidential commissions of a similar nature
to the U.S. Acheson-Lilienthal Report for fission or the build up to the Atoms for
Peace initiative.158 The present framework is for managed co-opetiveness to be
achieved by a lead G20 country with an extensive fusion ecosystem, like Canada,
an E.U. country, the United Kingdom, or the United States. The lead country is
then empowered by this preliminary task force or presidential commission and
could act in concert with, for example, the COP 26 United Nations Climate
Change Conference. The G20 lead country sets the structural conditions to frame a
collaborative regime, perhaps initially consulting fossil-fuel regional or thematic
blocs, like the Gulf Cooperation Council or OPEC, through the IEA, as with the
two previous global commissions.
The G20 lead country is also considering a Global South co-chair. This could
be obtained by directly approaching the G77 UN voting bloc (the largest Global
South bloc;)159 via its Chair (presently Guyana), likely advised by a leading fusion
G77 power, like Singapore.160 Throughout the process, the G20 representative and
G77 chair would need to act geopolitically to serve as honest brokers regarding
New Cold War tensions, to negotiate on behalf of its members’ SWFs, and so to
manage an equitable distribution of returns.
The emerging IEA-backed Global Commission on Fusion Energy thus com-
bines academia and the public sector (centrally managed), the private sector (com-
petitive) and civil society and the public, to accelerate the global fusion ecosystem
(collaborative). Concerning the elephants in the room, accelerating the global
fusion ecosystem requires “new” money and accommodation of geopolitical inter-
ests. Here, we highlight that involving the Global South opens up the possibility of
accessing fossil-fuel states’ SWFs to invest in the multiple FPP pathways that the
DoE is recommending, perhaps via a portfolio approach, already suggested to the
IAEA.161 This funding would be in addition to the existing Global North venture
capital and SWF funding of nearly $2 billion.
22 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

We also suggest that the G20 nation—presently being selected due to it pos-
sessing the best available individual leader with the necessary entrepreneurial and/
or intellectual capabilities to take advantage of their national leadership advan-
tages162—go beyond service as honest broker and financial guru and, together with
the G77 chair, lead as co-chair or at least provide the secretariat for building the
necessary governance regime that offers structural stability and durability grounded
on overlapping national self-interests and “knowledge-based cognitivism,” i.e.,
geopolitical common sense.163
The G20-backed independent IEA/IAEA-supported commission, similar to the
IEA energy efficiency global commission, would also involve the IEA Fusion
Power Coordinating Committee, an existing body. To initially design the fusion
global commission, we combined the IEA global commission concept with our
understanding of IAEA fusion committee structures and advice from senior repre-
sentatives of different fusion development sectors to create a set of Draft Terms of
Reference (ToR; see Appendix Supplementary Materials). We also suggested that
the fusion global commission adopted an External Independent Review (EIR)
mechanism, specifically a GEO-PESTLE analytical and forecasting approach that
incorporates the geopolitical, economic, sociological, technological, legal, and
environmental challenges facing fusion power.164 The resulting commission struc-
ture presently incorporates six subcommittees:
a) Technological Forecasting;
b) Economic Forecasting;
c) International Cooperation and Peacebuilding;
d) Intellectual Property Rights;
e) Regulatory Issues; and
f) Environmental Issues.
The energy technology forecasting component is set to be a meta-review that
employs standard mechanisms and strategies already applied in the National Acade-
mies and DoE reports, such as the Delphi method, extrapolation, forecast by analogy,
and growth curves, to create business scenarios.165 To increase validity for forecast-
ing a disruptive technology, it interacts with all the other subcommittee components.
The resulting combined forecast constitutes an EIR of global progress on fusion and
concomitantly creates a global funding regime by building on the ITER countries’
existing academic-public-private sector synergies, combined with expanding the
global fusion ecosystem through new partnerships with the Global South.
This is set to occur through existing organizations like the G77’s Consortium
on Science, Technology and Innovation for the South and the Asian African Asso-
ciation for Plasma Training, while the Global South’s SWFs would meet the chal-
lenge of funding a new business model to support the development of a highly
innovative technology sector,166 and G77 fusion powers like Singapore167 are to
advise.
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 23

The Global South is home to most of the world’s socio-economically disadvan-

taged populations. Yet it also is home to OPEC countries and Middle Eastern pet-
rostates. As a bloc, it is already engaged in environmentalism and in seeking to
address the damage caused by climate change.168 Particularly relevant to commer-
cializing fusion is the Global South’s perspective on “energy justice”: that the
Global North needs to find ways to transfer clean energy technology to attain
United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 7 of affordable, reliable, sustainable
and modern “energy for all”169 and via the Paris Agreement’s GCF.
The Global South’s willingness to involve itself in commercializing fusion is
already established, with both Malaysian and Singaporean SWFs already backing
fusion companies, and it could occur at different levels of managed co-
opetiveness. It could be centrally coordinated under the IEA/IAEA commission
approach via multiple policy Delphi rounds, leading to investment rounds poten-
tially involving various forms of PPP, including portfolio approaches.170 If the
G77, which is yet to be approached, so chose, this could be overseen by a Fusion
Energy Task Force comprising innovating regionally representative G77 countries
like Uruguay, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and Kazakhstan,
all of which demonstrate high degrees of innovation.171
Global South backing of the commission and investment regime management
structure, yet to be confirmed. would create a sense of truly global ownership of
accelerating the development of FPPs to address climate change. G77 Member
State investment via their SWFs would reinforce the centralized authoritative
“managed co-opetiveness” route, both by adding a layer of external oversight per-
spective and by creating a new clearing house for information on fusion, i.e., the
EIR, sparking dialogue with civil society, the media, and the Global Green Lobby.
For instance, recipients of G77 investment could publish high-level reports and
inform the global media, while DoE involvement in the commission’s secretariat
compartmentalizes and protects core U.S. private sector IP while also promoting it.
In return for investment, select G77 fossil-fuel states’ SWFs naturally obtain shares
in the FPPs, which could even be obtained collectively on behalf of the Global
South, especially if it a fusion portfolio approach emerges as a recommendation. It
has already been argued that substantial investment in this developing energy sec-
tor could be achieved for less than 1% of these countries’ SWFs’ value (see
Appendix Supplementary Materials).
This managed co-opetiveness approach to commercializing fusion is being
adopted because both informs G77 countries and provides them with a source of
future revenues through sales to Global North countries. G77 countries, now
investors in, and co-owners of, fusion IP, would enjoy knowledge transfer and also
be incentivized to purchase commercial fusion reactors, via build–operate–transfer
(BOT) or build–own–operate–transfer (BOOT) contracts. Thus, the prospect of
sales to both Global North and Global South countries would more likely over-
come the valley of death and rapidly create a global market. This would facilitate
24 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

mass production, allowing fusion to play a role in a stable low-carbon transition

from Global South fossil fuel economies, while generating significant profits for
the SWFs of investing countries.
Global South countries would be incentivized to participate because the approach
“insures: them against the socioeconomic effects of fusion energy commercialization,
which to these economies could be an especially disruptive innovation in energy tech-
nology.”172 By involving the G77, together with global civil society and the media,
the approach would also increase the overall global quality of democracy as regards
global innovation in fusion, at present dominated by the Global North, in the form of
ITER, and, over time, improve the equitability of the global energy market.173
Fusion science is now approaching a stage of maturation. To emphasize, theo-
retical fusion energy breakeven has already been achieved in a tokamak, in the
1990s, in both the Joint European Torus and the Japan Torus 60 (JT-60), as
deuterium-tritium equivalent.174 No formally established fusion version of the
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) exists, but fusion energy as a whole is around
TRL 3 (scientific feasibility), while ITER will bring the tokamak-based fusion
approach to perhaps TRL 6 (engineering feasibility).175 Multiple large FIA mem-
bers (Commonwealth Fusion Systems, CTFusion, General Fusion, TAE Technolo-
gies; Tokamak Energy; see Appendix Table 1) all aspire to net gain by around
2025 and to FPPs from around 2030.
However, these claims are extremely ambitious. As David Kirtley, the CEO of
Helion Energy, has made clear, these timelines assume aggressive and full fund-
ing.176 Presently, no Western fusion companies are funded to this extent.177 A
private-sector prototype demonstration reactor will cost anywhere from $50 million
to $500 million, depending on the technology,178 and a grid-connected power plant
will cost several times more. Nevertheless, fully funded continuous fusion innova-
tion operations recently approached reality in China. In 2018-2019, the Center for
Compact Fusion at the ENN Energy Research Institute, part of the Chinese gas
giant the ENN Group, constructed a new fusion innovation facility using continu-
ous construction.
Moreover, China funded the facility to the tune of $15m for 2018 to 2019, then
will fund $45m per year for 2020 to 2028-2030, then $150m per year for the subse-
quent decade and a half, with associated aggressive construction of medium-sized
and large reactors until it develops a commercial compact FPP.179 The purchasing
power parity between China and the West for the fusion industry was estimated by
the Chinese in 2006 to be 1:15 to 1:20,180 because of cheaper construction costs,
labor costs, materials costs, and overheads, and though the gap has since reduced,
this represents a multi-billion dollar commitment.181 ENN intends to employ 300
researchers during the $45m per year phase. Its ambitions are backgrounded by a
substantial Chinese expansion of its plasma physics innovation ecosystem.182
To indicate ballpark figures for the global commission, we reviewed the litera-
ture to obtain a preliminary target figure, beginning with the cost to reach a
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 25

commercialization phase for a compact reactor, one with substantially lower costs
and a faster innovation cycle than the tokamak. Our estimate is based on the pro-
gress of the world’s largest fusion innovation company, TAE Technologies. Over
$800 million of the just over $5 billion raised by FIA members has been raised by
TAE Technologies.183 TAE Technologies is presently in system testing. In addition
to the nearly $800m already raised, it would likely require hundreds of millions of
dollars to build a demonstration plant and then $2-3 billion more for a grid-
connected commercial prototype plant, as well as several hundred million dollars
to fund operating costs over a decade. This implies a total budget of well over $3
billion, while the 2021 National Academies report envisages total overnight con-
struction costs of substantially below $5-6 billion for a .50 MWe FPP with an
estimated 40-year lifespan.184
However, this is only one project, and to ensure at least one successful FPP for
the 2040 timeframe, as well as growing of the global fusion ecosystem, the litera-
ture suggests coordinated development of multiple compact fusion projects, from
the mainstream, like spherical tokamaks and stellarators, to alternatives like the
TAE FRC approach. Funding six-to-eight such projects would imply additional
global expenditure of a maximum of $30 billion in new money if all projects met
their milestones, a tiny proportion of the Green Climate Fund and just over seven
times more than invested to date in the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation
of the Montreal Protocol on the ozone layer.185
Thus, the global commission regime under construction will kick-start major
investment of multiple potentially viable candidate technologies in both the private
and public sectors, globally, with a focus on cost-sharing solutions, as this would
more likely result in a successful commercial FPP. Investing in a mix of DEMO-
phase projects via a portfolio approach, while aiming to leapfrog the ITER timeta-
ble, as with STEP, would maximize synergies by building on initiatives like the
INFUSE and GAMOW programs, and proposed DoE cost-sharing FPP programs.
A portfolio approach is deemed most realistic, and has already been adopted by the
FIA, in its May 2020 submission to the DoE in response to the agency’s April
2020 Request for Information.186
The global commission EIR approach respects national sovereignty and IP. It is
building a clear coordinating role for the public sector, i.e., managed co-
opetiveness. In the United States, this includes the DoE, the Department of State
(DoS), and the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoE is presently being sug-
gested as co-secretariat for the commission, and, playing a role in providing techni-
cal information and forecasting input for IEA/IAEA-organized and sponsored
workshops, seminars, and conferences to update global non-specialist audiences in
fusion developments, including by involving the media and the increasing number
of civil society organizations tackling climate change. Meanwhile, the DoS would
provide the necessary permissions for fusion technology to be exported, thus
26 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

enabling co-development, while DoD involvement ensures national security-

related IP is protected.

Conclusion

This article has reviewed the prospects of fusion commercialization for around
2040-2050, as an output of an international fusion development and commerciali-
zation acceleration governance regime capable of effecting social change in the
low-carbon energy space, including through the Paris Agreement-related Mission
Innovation initiative. Multiple relevant milestones we have presented include the
publication of the National Academies’ 2019 “burning plasma” and 2021 reports,
together with the DoE’s follow-up community planning process report and fusion
and plasma draft long range report. A further milestone is the launch of the FIA,
marking the formal emergence of an innovating private sector developing
advanced energy technology pathways.
The emergence of national DEMO-phase planning by several ITER consortium
members, and Canada, strongly suggest a fusion energy breakthrough within two
decades. However, without significant acceleration, the core ITER tokamak tech-
nology is not viewed as lending itself to commercialization, and while multiple,
alternative technology pathways exist, such as the stellarator, these are largely
underfunded. The global governance regime under development may be capable of
urgently accelerating fusion development, providing leadership, and creating novel
investment solutions, to overcome the main impediments of funding and geopoliti-
cal backing. This review article stresses that the degree of success will depend on
the quality of national and individual leadership available to the commission.
Simultaneously, the global “quality of democracy” of the fusion innovation and
management ecosystem, i.e., country participation in fusion energy development
and commercialization, and the energy market more generally, will be enhanced
when the Global South plays a greater role in co-developing fusion energy. This
will reduce the global North-South divide, which is particularly evident in high-
technology sectors. The global commission also engages competitors, within both
public and private fusion sectors and internationally, as stakeholders, together with
academia, including national laboratories and entrepreneurial universities, as well
as international civil society and the media. One recommendation will likely be
that fusion energy technology will not be supplied to the Global South as a form of
aid; instead, core fusion technology will be co-developed and co-owned by the
G20, ITER consortium countries, and the Global South.
The completed commission will, depending on its recommendations, almost
certainly accelerate the international progress begun by ITER, and it will likely
lead to advances in the frontiers of knowledge in plasma physics, which has
diverse applications in research, technology, and industry.187 It will also greatly
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 27

empower the Global South in terms of knowledge, education, and fusion energy
sector IP. In this way, humanity would have a more accurate understanding of its
options for substantively addressing climate change by 2050 and beyond.

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84

Knowledge, Cutting-Edge Themes, and Research Strategies.”

32 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT
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89
Ibid., p. 306.
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Energy;” and E. Surrey, op. cit.

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95
O. R. Young, “Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Existing Knowledge,
Cutting-Edge Themes, and Research Strategies.”
96
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103

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104
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E. G. Carayannis et al., “Nuclear Fusion Diffusion Challenges and Opportunities: Theory,

105

Policy, Practice and Politics.”

106
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 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 33
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M. Claessens, op. cit.
113
National Academies, Final Report of the Committee on a Strategic Plan for U.S. Burning
Plasma Research, pp. 6–8.
114
U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), Annual Report on the State of DoE National Laborato-
ries (Washington, D.C.: DoE, 2017), Figure 2.2.
115
National Academies, Final Report of the Committee on a Strategic Plan for U.S. Burning
Plasma Research, p. 154.
116
D. F. J. Campbell, E. G. Carayannis, and S. S. Rehman, “Quadruple Helix Structures of
Quality of Democracy in Innovation Systems,” Journal of the Knowledge Economy, vol. 6, no. 3
(2015), pp. 467–93.
117
American Fusion Project, A Bold Goal: Power America with Fusion Energy (Washington,
D.C.: American Fusion Project, 2018).
118
National Academies, Final Report of the Committee on a Strategic Plan for U.S. Burning
Plasma Research, p. 12.
119
B. Wang, op. cit.
120
A. J. Creely et al., op. cit.

A. Boyle, “Canadian Government Invests $38M in General Fusion to Boost Energy

121

Research,” GeekWire, October 26, 2018.

122
ENN Group, “Compact Controlled Fusion Technology,” 2018, available at http://www.
ennresearch.com/uploads/pdf/Compact%20Controlled%20Fusion%20Technology.pdf.
123
National Academies, Final Report of the Committee on a Strategic Plan for U.S. Burning
Plasma Research, p. 164.
124
Ibid., p. 165.
125
National Academies, Bringing Fusion to the U.S. Grid, p. xi.
126
Ibid., p. 4-2.
127
Ibid., pp. 3-1 and 3-2.
34 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT
128
Ibid., p. 4-2.
129
Ibid., p. xi.
130
Ibid., p. 4-3.
131
Ibid., p. 4-14.
132
Ibid., p. 4-16.
133
Ibid., pp. 2-9 and 2-10.
134
Ibid., p. 2-5.
135
Ibid., p. ES-2.
136
Ibid., p. 2-9.
137
M. Claessens, op. cit., and D. Clery, A Piece of the Sun.
138
National Academies, Bringing Fusion to the U.S. Grid and A. Holland, “Political and Com-
mercial Prospects for Inertial Fusion Energy,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A,
vol. 378 (2020), DOI 20200008.
139
E. G. Carayannis and J. Draper, “The Growth of Intellectual Property Ownership in the
Private-Sector Fusion Industry,” manuscript under review.
140
A. Holland, op. cit.
141
C. L. Nehl, R. J. Umstattd, W. R. Regan, S. C. Hsu, and P. B. McGrath, “Retrospective of the
ARPA-E ALPHA Fusion Program,” Journal of Fusion Energy, vol. 38, nos, 5–6 (2019), p. 506.
142
FIA, Starlords podcast #1: Scott Hsu, FIA, February 23, 2019, available at https://www.fu-
sionindustryassociation.org/blog/starlords-podcast-1-scott-hsu.
143
ARPA-E, GAMOW, 2020. https://arpa-e.energy.gov/?q5arpa-e-programs/gamow.
144
D. F. J. Campbell et al., op. cit.
145
FIA, Fusion Industry Association Applauds Creation of the “Innovation Network for Fusion
Energy (INFUSE),” FIA, June 5, 2019.
146
FIA, Request for Information on Cost-Sharing Partnerships with the Private Sector in
Fusion Energy.
147
National Academies, Bringing Fusion to the U.S. Grid, p. 3-13; B. J. Gordon, T. L. Peckin-
paugh, R. P. Stimers, M. L. O’Neill, and K. A. Berry, “Capital and R&D Support Emerging for Pri-
vate Energy Fusion Development, But Questions Remain as Fusion Sector Evolves,” Pratt’s Energy
Law Report, vol. 19, no. 2 (2019), pp. 37–46; and FIA, “NRC Hosts Virtual Public Meeting on
Developing Options for a Regulatory Framework for Fusion Energy,” FIA, January 28, 2021.

S. Baalrud, N. Ferraro, L. Garrison, N. Howard, C. Kuranz, J. Sariff, and W. Solomon, “A

148

Community Plan for Fusion Energy and Discovery Plasma Sciences,” American Physical Society
Division of Plasma Physics, 2020.
149
Ibid., p. 44.
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 35
150
Ibid., p. 85.
151
National Academies, Bringing Fusion to the U.S. Grid.

U.S. Department of Energy, “Cost-Sharing Partnerships with the Private Sector in Fusion
152

Energy,” Federal Register, docket number DOE-HQ-2020-0021 (2020), p. 21842.

153
FIA, “Fusion Legislation Signed into Law,” FIA, January 5, 2021.
154
National Academies, Bringing Fusion to the U.S. Grid.
155
National Research Council, Persistent Forecasting of Disruptive Technologies (Washington,
D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2010).
156
E. G. Carayannis et al., “Nuclear Fusion Diffusion Challenges and Opportunities: Theory,
Policy, Practice and Politics.”
157
N. C. Roberts, “Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution,” International
Public Management Review, vol. 1, no. 1 (2000).
158
D. W. Kearn, “The Baruch Plan and the Quest for Atomic Disarmament,” Diplomacy &
Statecraft, vol. 21, no. 1 (2010), pp. 41–67.
159
J. Toye, “Assessing the G77,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 10 (2014), pp. 1759–774.
160
W. Wade and J. Tyrone, “Bezos-backed Fusion Startup Raises $100 Million for Demo Sys-
tem,” Bloomberg, December 16, 2019.
161
E. Ingersoll, “A Portfolio Approach to Funding and Commercialization,” Workshop on
Fusion Enterprises, June 13-15, 2018.
162
T. Skodvin and S. Andresen, op. cit.
163
A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, “Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of
International Regimes,” Mershon International Studies Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (1996), p. 177.
164
E. G. Carayannis et al., “Nuclear Fusion Diffusion Challenges and Opportunities: Theory,
Policy, Practice and Politics.”
165
A. L. Porter, S. W. Cunningham, J. Banks, A. Thomas Roper, T. W. Mason, and F. A. Ros-
sini, Forecasting and Management of Technology (Wiley, 2013).
166
S. P. Philbin, “Emerging Requirements for Technology Management: A Sector-based Sce-
nario Planning Approach,” Journal of Technology Management and Innovation, vol. 8, no. 3
(2013), pp. 34–44.
167
W. Wade and J. Tyrone, op. cit.
168
L. Guruswamy, “The Contours of Energy Justice,” in International Environmental Law and
the Global South, eds., S. Alam, S. Atapattu, C. G. Gonzalez, and J. Razzaque (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2015) and K. Kheng-Lian and N. A Robinson, “South–South Coopera-
tion: Foundations for Sustainable Development,” in International Environmental Law and the
Global South, eds., S. Alam, S. Atapattu, C.G. Gonzalez, and J. Razzaque (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015).
36 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT
169
L. Guruswamy, op. cit.
170
E. Ingersoll, op. cit.
171
K. Schwab and S. Zahidi, The Global Competitiveness Report 2020 (Geneva: World Eco-
nomic Forum, 2020).

F. P. Adams, B. P. Bromley, and M. Moore, “Assessment of Disruptive Innovation in

172

Emerging Energy Technologies,” in Proceedings—2014 Electrical Power and Energy Conference,

February 27, 2014, Article 7051685 (Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2014), pp. 110–15.

E. G. Carayannis et al., “Nuclear Fusion Diffusion Challenges and Opportunities: Theory,

173

Policy, Practice and Politics.”

174
M. Kikuchi, “The Large Tokamak JT-60,” The European Physical Journal H, vol. 43
(2018), pp. 551–77.
175
Scott Hsu, personal communication, June 24, 2019.
176
A. Boyle, “Commercial Fusion Ventures Learn Lessons about Engineering and Expect-
ations,” GeekWire, February 14, 2018.
177
Scott Hsu, personal communication, July 12, 2019.

A. Rathi, “In Search of Clean Energy, Investments in Nuclear-Fusion Startups Are Heating
178

Up,” Quartz, September 26, 2018.

Y. Zhu, “Perspectives and Plans for Fusion Energy Development at ENN,” Paper presented
179

at the First International Conference on Innovative Fusion Approaches, May 26-28, 2019, Xi’an
JiaoTong University, Xi’an, China.

People’s Daily Online, “China to Build World’s First ‘Artificial Sun’ Experimental Device,”
180

January 21, 2006.

181
OECD, Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) (indicator), 2019, available at https://data.oec-
d.org/conversion/purchasing-power-parities-ppp.htm.
182
Y. Song, “China’s Fusion Roadmap,” Nuclear Engineering International, October 3, 2019.
183
National Academies, Bringing Fusion to the U.S. Grid and A. Rathi, op. cit.
184
National Academies, Bringing Fusion to the U.S. Grid, pp. 3-18 and 3-19.
185
United Nations Environment Programme (UNDP), Report of the Eighty-Fourth Meeting of
the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
(UNEP, 2019).
186
Fusion Industry Association(FIA), Public Submission by the Fusion Industry Association
and its Members in response to Fusion Energy Sciences Program, Office of Science, Department
of Energy Request for Information on Cost-Sharing Partnerships with the Private Sector in Fusion
Energy.
187
R. Hiwatari and T. Goto, op. cit.
 APPENDIX SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

Table 1
FULL MEMBERS OF THE FUSION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, MAIN TECHNOLOGIES, AND ESTIMATED
TECHNOLOGY MATURATION a
Mention of
Climate Change Energy Technology Maturation Stage and
Full Members Headquarters Technology on Website? Timeframe
Agni U.S. Accelerator Yes Not known.
Commonwealth Cambridge, MA, Tokamak Yes Development (integration and validation of
Fusion Systems U.S. YBCO into SPARC); prototype reactor
connected to energy grid by end of 2033
(Devlin, 2018).
Compact Fusion Santa Fe, NM, Liquid liner No Development (Compact Fusion Systems
Systems U.S. compressor Prototype)
CTFusion Seattle, WA, U.S. Spheromak No Development (validation of IDCD compact
spheromak via HIT-SIU project);
commercially viable, grid deployable power
plant design by 2030s (Conca, 2019).
EMC2 U.S. Inertial electrostatic No Between development and system testing
confinement (between validated “wiffle ball” state and
e-beam IEC wiffle ball system testing of
polywell).
First Light Fusion U.K. Impact inertial No Development (First Light Machine 3)
confinement
Fuse Energy Canada Promotes awareness No Not applicable
Technologies of fusion and funds
FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE

concept research
General Fusion Burnaby, British Liquid liner Yes System testing (Mini-Sphere MTR [Magnetized
Columbia, compressor Test Ring], PI-1 [Plasma Injector], PI-2
Canada [Plasma Injector], SPECTOR PI-3 [Plasma
37

(continued)
 Table 1 (continued)
38

FULL MEMBERS OF THE FUSION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, MAIN TECHNOLOGIES, AND ESTIMATED
TECHNOLOGY MATURATION a
Mention of
Climate Change Energy Technology Maturation Stage and
Full Members Headquarters Technology on Website? Timeframe
Injector], PCS, SWC); commercial prototype
by around 2028 (Boyle, 2018).
HB11 Energy New South Wales, Hydrogen-Boron 11 Yes Development
Australia laser fusion
HelicitySpace Berkeley, CA, U.S. Merging plasma No Development
plectonemes
Helion Energy Redmond, WA, Field reversed Yes Between development and system testing
U.S. configuration (FRC) (validating and integrating Venti, FEP
[Fusion Engine Prototype], IPA [Plasma
Accelerator] towards developing a 50 MW
H3-deuterium pilot reactor).
Horne Technologies Longmont, CO, Inertial electrostatic No Between development and system testing
U.S. (building second-generation continuous
operation REBCO Icarus device for system
optimization).
HyperJet Fusion Corp Chantilly, VA, Plasma Jet Magneto Yes Discovery (still conducting basic research with
U.S. Inertial Fusion PLX-a).
(PJMIF)
Innoven Energy Colorado Springs, Inertial confinement No Not known
CO, U.S.
LPP Fusion Middlesex, NJ, Dense plasma focus Yes Discovery (still conducting basic research).
THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

U.S.
MIFTI Tustin, CA, U.S. Staged Z-pinch No Between discovery and development (moving
towards integrating and validating Staged
Z-pinch on Zebra Driver).

(continued)
 Table 1 (continued)
FULL MEMBERS OF THE FUSION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, MAIN TECHNOLOGIES, AND ESTIMATED
TECHNOLOGY MATURATION a
Mention of
Climate Change Energy Technology Maturation Stage and
Full Members Headquarters Technology on Website? Timeframe
NK Labs Cambridge, MA, Not applicable No Not applicable
U.S.
Princeton Satellite Princeton, NJ, U.S. Direct fusion drive, No Discovery (still conducting basic research based
Systems based on the on PFRC-1, PFRC-2, PFRC-3).
Princeton Field-
Reversed
Configuration
(PFRC)
Proton Scientific Oak Ridge, TN, Electron beam inertial No Between discovery (pulsed power electron beam
U.S. generator Thunderbird device) and
development (of a prototype achieving
breakeven energy output).
Renaissance Fusion Grenoble, France Stellarator No Between system testing (Wendelstein 7-X) and
demonstration.
Starflight Not known Not known Not known Not known
TAE Technologies Foothill Ranch, Field-reversed Yes System testing (“Norman”) device, with planned
CA, U.S. configuration (FRC) demonstration (“Copernicus”) device;
commercialization to begin in 2023 (Wang,
2019).
Tokamak Energy Abingdon, U.K. Compact spherical Yes System testing (testing a compact spherical
FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE

tokamak tokamak [ST-40] with HTCs); commercially

viable fusion power by 2030 (Tokamak
Energy, 2019).

(continued)
39
 40

Table 1 (continued)
FULL MEMBERS OF THE FUSION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, MAIN TECHNOLOGIES, AND ESTIMATED
TECHNOLOGY MATURATION a
Mention of
Climate Change Energy Technology Maturation Stage and
Full Members Headquarters Technology on Website? Timeframe
Type One Energy U.S. Impact inertial No Hight temperature superconductor stellarator.
confinement
Zap Energy Seattle, WA, U.S. Z-pinch No Discovery (still conducting basic research).

a
Sourced from the FIA website (https://www.fusionindustryassociation.org/), with additional information from the Fusion Energy Base (https://
www.fusionenergybase.com/organizations/) and correct as of April 12, 2021.
Note: Assessment of energy technology maturation stage and timeframe is an estimate that relies in part on company-provided information and should
not be used for investment decisions.
References: A. Boyle, “Commercial Fusion Ventures Learn Lessons about Engineering and Expectations,” GeekWire, February 14, 2018; J. Conca,
“CTFusion—Bringing the Sun’s Power to Earth,” Forbes, February 26, 2019; H. Devlin, “Nuclear Fusion on Brink of Being Realised, Say MIT
Scientists,” The Guardian, March 9, 2018; Tokamak Energy, “Tokamak Energy Believes the World Can Have Abundant Energy That Doesn’t Harm the
Planet,” 2019; and B. Wang, “CEO of TAE Technologies Says They Will Begin Commercialization of Fusion by 2023,” Next Big Future, January 16,
2019
THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 41

Table 2
GLOBAL SOUTH SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDSa
Assets (in billions
No. Country SWF Name of U.S. dollars) Origin G77
1 China CIC / SAFE / 1,554.8 Non-commodity No
NCSSF / CADF
2 United Arab Emirates ADIA / ADIC / 1,298.7 Oil Yes
EIA / ICD /
MDC / SAM [1]
/ RIA
3 Norway GPF 1,063.0 Oil No
4 Singapore GIC / TH 764.0 Non-commodity Yes
5 Saudi Arabia PIF / SAMA 697.0 Oil Yes
6 Canada AHSTF / CPPIB 548.9 Oil / Non- No
commodity
7 Kuwait KIA 524.0 Oil Yes
8 Hong Kong HKMA 456.6 Non-commodity No
9 Qatar QIA 320.0 Oil Yes
10 United States APF / NMSIC / 150.8 Oil & Gas / Non- No
PWMTF / commodity /
SIFTO / IEFIB Minerals /
PSF / PUF / Public Lands
ATF / NDLF /
LEQTF / CSF /
WVFF
11 Australia AFF / WAFF 134.5 Non-commodity No
12 Kazakhstan SKJSC / KNF / 127.6 Oil Yes
NIC
13 South Korea KIC 122.3 Non-commodity No
14 Russia RNWF / RRF / 101.4 Oil No
RDIF
15 Iran NDFI 91.0 Oil Yes
16 France BPIfrance 68.4 Non-commodity No
17 Libya LIA 66.0 Oil Yes
18 Brunei BIA 40.0 Oil Yes
19 Azerbaijan SOFAZ / [2] 39.0 Oil No
20 Malaysia KN 34.9 Non-commodity Yes
21 Chile SESF / PRF 24.1 Copper/ Non- Yes
commodity
22 Oman OIF / SGRF 24.0 Gas / Oil Yes
23 New Zealand NZSF 22.7 Non-commodity No
24 East Timor TLPF 16.6 Gas / Oil Yes
25 Bahrain MHC 10.6 Oil Yes
26 Ireland ISIF 8.5 Non-commodity No
27 Peru FSF (or FEF) 7.9 Non-commodity Yes
28 Algeria RRF 7.6 Oil Yes
29 Brazil SFB 7.3 Non-commodity Yes

(continued)
42 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Table 2 (continued)
GLOBAL SOUTH SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDSa
Assets (in billions
No. Country SWF Name of U.S. dollars) Origin G77
30 Mexico ORSFM 6.0 Oil No
31 Botswana PF 5.7 Diamonds / Yes
Minerals
32 Trinidad and Tobago HSF 5.5 Oil Yes
33 Angola FSDEA 4.6 Oil Yes
34 India NIIF 3.8 Non-commodity Yes
35 Colombia CSSF 3.5 Oil / Mining* Yes
36 Nigeria NSIA / BDIC 2.9 Oil / Non- Yes
commodity*
37 Panama FAP 1.2 Non-commodity Yes
38 Bolivia FINPRO 1.2 Non-commodity Yes
39 Senegal SSIF - FONSIS 1.0 Non-commodity Yes
40 Iraq DFI 0.9 Oil Yes
41 Palestine PIF 0.8 Non-commodity Yes
42 Venezuela FEM 0.8 Oil Yes
43 Kiribati RERF 0.9 Phosphates Yes
44 Vietnam SCIC 0.5 Non-commodity Yes
45 Ghana GPF 0.5 Oil Yes
46 Gabon GSWF 0.4 Oil Yes
47 Mauritania NFHR 0.3 Gas / Oil Yes
48 Mongolia FSF 0.3 Mining Yes
49 Equatorial Guinea FFG 0.1 Oil Yes
Total Global 4,096.1
South
Total Global 3,236.1
South (Fossil
Fuels Only)**
Proposed funding 30.0
via global
commission
mechanism:
As a percentage 0.73
(Global South)
As a percentage 0.93
(Global South
[Fossil Fuels
Only])

a
This dataset relies on consolidated data from the Wikipedia page on sovereign wealth funds (https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_sovereign_wealth_funds) as of January 1, 2020, which
primarily relies on data from the Sovereign Wealth Institute (https://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-
rankings/sovereign-wealth-fund).
**Note that this total is a conservative estimate as it does not include the SWFs of Colombia and
Nigeria, where value of SWFs by sector are not differentiated.
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 43

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

Global Commission for Urgent Action on Fusion Energy

The Global Commission on Urgent Action for Fusion Energy (GCUAFE)

shall be an ad hoc body of senior government officials and private sector repre-
sentatives holding national responsibilities for developing fusion energy in both
the public and private sectors. Its draft initial report shall be delivered jointly to
the International Energy Agency (IEA) and International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) within six months of its launch and a final report within one year.
The Commission has a special overview role with regard to accelerating the
global development of nuclear fusion, including policies and funding options,
similar to the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel of the Montreal
Protocol, and, mindful of the ITER DEMO Phase, shall provide advice to the
IEA and IAEA on the overall global programme on the development of fusion
energy, including technology, socioeconomic impact, geopolitical context, Intel-
lectual Property Rights, regulation, and the environment.
The Commission shall have the standing to set up subcommittees, drawing
on experts from both the public and private sectors, as well as on experts from
relevant international agencies such as the IAEA, and from different countries,
with special regard to narrowing the global North-South divide in fusion and
addressing the transitional requirements of states whose economies are largely
dependent on the production and export of fossil fuels. It shall on its launch set
up six subcommittees, namely
a) The Subcommittee on the Technological Forecasting;
b) The Subcommittee on the Economic Forecasting;
c) The Subcommittee on International Cooperation and Peacebuilding;
d) The Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Rights;
e) The Subcommittee on Regulatory Issues;
f) The Subcommittee on Environmental Issues;
and any other subcommittees as are required.

Functions

The functions of the Commission are:

 To provide guidance on the forecasting approach and strategy for establishing a
global policy approach to accelerating nuclear fusion, particularly in order to
ensure coherence and collaboration between the public and private sector and
between different countries;
 To forecast technology and make recommendations on the technical feasibil-
ity of accelerating the development of fusion power plants to approximately
44 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

the 2040 timeframe for grid-connected affordable prototypes, including both

neutronic and aneutronic scenarios, involving public and private sector proj-
ects, and considering different international and national approaches.
 To investigate and make recommendations on the impact on the environment
of accelerated fusion, including different scenarios, focusing on the one hand
on savings in greenhouse gas emissions and on the other on the impact of
radiation.
 To investigate and make recommendations on different socioeconomic conse-
quences of accelerated fusion in different scenarios, particularly on econo-
mies with a significant reliance on fossil fuels and especially developing
countries.
 To investigate and make recommendations on the international geopolitical
consequences of accelerated fusion, including impact on peacebuilding initia-
tives and the possibility of worsening conflicts.
 To investigate and make recommendations on the role of the developing
world in accelerated fusion, including the possibility of co-development, co-
ownership, and funding, through blocs such as the G77, OPEC, and the Alli-
ance of Small Island States.
 To investigate and make recommendations on a global mechanism for the
management of Intellectual Property Rights in an ’urgent action’ scenario,
including a robust sanctions regime.
 To resolve any outstanding issues referred to it by subcommittees involved in
the Commission’s work.
 To provide general advice and guidance on policy direction, funding options,
relevant regulatory issues, and related programmes, including those of other
organisations and agencies.

Membership

 Member States will be requested to nominate senior officials (and private sec-
tor executives for subcommittees) holding responsibilities in national organi-
zations (and private sector fusion companies for subcommittees) and having
recognized expertise in fusion policy, fusion technology, fusion and the envi-
ronment, the socioeconomics of fusion, and the geopolitics of fusion. In
appointing the Commission members, the Chair will seek to ensure a balance
of regional approaches and experience in the areas covered, with special
regard to the involvement of the developing world. The Chair will appoint
the members for an initial term of four years. The members may each be
accompanied by one technical adviser when attending the Commission meet-
ings. In addition, the Chairpersons of the six Commission subcommittees will
be invited to participate fully in the Commission meetings.
 FUSION ENERGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 45

 Observers from specialized international organizations and relevant non-

governmental bodies may be invited by the Chair to attend CSS meetings.
 The Chair or a designated substitute will participate in all CUAFE meetings.

Working Methods

 The Chair will appoint a Chairperson for each Subcommittee from among the
Commission members for the full term.
 A Scientific Secretary to serve the Commission will be designated by the
Deputy Director General, Department of Nuclear Energy, IAEA.
 Ordinarily, the Commission will meet every month for up to two working
days. Extraordinary meetings may be called as required.
 Meetings will be conducted in English.
 The Commission will submit a mid-term report within six months and an end
of term report within one year on its work to the International Energy
Agency, copied to the Director General, IAEA.

Resources

 The Secretariat will provide all the resources necessary to permit the efficient
working of the Commission.
 All costs involved in the participation of each Commission member and sub-
committee member, including travel and per diem expenses, will be borne by
the nominating Member State/organization.