Susan Craig

R ed Teams have been recommended and legislated as a way to

prevent the kinds of failures of imagination and critical thinking that
were apparent in the wake of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. But how, when,
and where exactly should red teams be employed? While the Army and
the intelligence community continue to grapple with this, those of us who
attended the first University of Foreign Mili-
tary and Cultural Studies’ Red Team Leader
Training course at Fort Leavenworth in 2006
were challenged to get outside of our tradi-
tional ways of thinking and to become more
culturally aware (of both our own culture and
others), more effective in communicating and
negotiating, and more critical and creative. We
had to examine our most closely held beliefs
and assumptions and fundamentally transform
the way we think. Regardless how our red team
skills are deployed, our new perspective and
approach will undoubtedly serve our respec-
tive organizations and our Nation well. I share
the following observations and reflections so
that you may better understand what a red team is and, further, because it
seems that, in our increasingly complex and demanding operational environ-
ment, these lessons are relevant to everyone.

Critical and Creative Thinking

● Being a good red teamer is about asking good questions. Questions
should stimulate thought, not cause alienation; they should be more help-
Ms. Susan Craig is a red team analyst ful than critical; and they should point out assumptions or factors that are
at the Joint Intelligence Operations
Center at U.S. Pacific Command. not being addressed. Most importantly, you can’t ask a blue question of a
She has an M.P.A. in international red system and expect a blue answer—it is imperative to think within the
security policy from Harvard’s Ken- construct of the culture you are examining. For example, the extensive
nedy School of Government and an
M.A. in political management from interviews conducted by U.S. Joint Forces Command published in the
George Washington University. Prior Iraqi Perspectives Project demonstrated that both the Americans and Iraqis
to her present assignment, she served
as a China analyst at the U.S. Army’s
failed to think outside of the context of their own cultures, so the informa-
Foreign Military Studies Office at tion gathered both prior to and during Operation Iraqi Freedom was used to
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and as a reinforce their preconceived notions.
staff officer and counter-proliferation _______
analyst in the Defense Intelligence PHOTO: Two North Korean soldiers observe the south side at the truce village of Panmunjom in the demilitarized
Agency in Washington, D.C. zone, 24 July 2006. (AP Photo/ Lee Jin-man)

Military Review  March-April 2007 57

 ● Doing nothing is a course of action. This may ● Training and Doctrine Command’s Threats
seem contrary to our military’s can-do, action-ori- Division developed twelve critical variables to
ented culture, but in order to fully gauge the second define the contemporary operational environment:
and third order effects of our deeds, sometimes you physical environment, nature and stability of state,
just need to wait and see. sociological demographics, regional and global
● When you interact within a complex system relationships, military capabilities, information,
(such as an economy or ecosphere), you cannot technology, external organizations, national will,
precisely predict the results. Accept that you will time, economics, and culture. These variables serve
never be able to predict this, but if you watch closely as a useful frame of reference with which to view
and choose appropriate metrics, you should at least the operational environment, and we spent much of
be able to recognize patterns. Challenge constructs our class time trying to characterize these variables
(such as Operational Net Assessment) that assume in any given situation. But more importantly, we
that such complexity can be easily understood. found that it is essential to understand how they
● Identifying the problem is the first, most impor- influence one another. Identifying a culture’s geog-
tant, and often most overlooked task of solving it. raphy is not difficult; how it affects the culture’s
This is difficult, which is why it is often skipped. concept of time, its economic capabilities, or the
● Using measures of effectiveness is the only stability of the state is.
way to prevent what we call ballistic decision ● That said, avoid using a single construct to
making—making quick decisions without follow- define the operational environment, and be wary of
ing up to ensure the intended outcome of the deci- inappropriate metaphors or analogies. The myriad
sion has indeed occurred. If you execute without constructs for defining the contemporary opera-
a method to track and measure the results, you’ll tional environment demonstrate its complexity. For
never know whether the action was successful. But example, some useful ways to bound a problem
finding the right metric that truly measures whether include using the above 12 critical variables, using
you’re on the right path is difficult. It is not neces- Thomas Barnett’s “core and gap” model (detailed
sarily up to the red team to develop such metrics, but in The Pentagon’s New Map), or categorizing
it is up to them to identify poor measures of effec- challenges as traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or
tiveness and to think creatively about behaviors or disruptive (as defined in the 2004 National Defense
indicators that could provide better feedback. Strategy).1 But strict adherence to only one model or
● Decision making is heavily dependent on application of an inappropriate analogy allows for
experience and instinct: the value of these should mental shortcuts that lead to failure. An example of
not be underestimated. Good decision makers are a construct that may limit our understanding is the
flexible, appreciate the complexity of their situation, “network” construct of terrorism. As guest lecturer
and ask more “why” than “what” questions. Too and terrorism analyst from the Institute for Defense
much information can impede decision making. Analysis Mark Stout argued, the network construct
Compiling data just to reduce the sense of complex- limits our analysis to links and nodes, while terror-
ity and uncertainty is not necessarily helpful. ism may be more accurately portrayed through a
● Coalitions are a difficult but necessary compo- “movement” lens, which would require a broader
nent of military operations. An important part of the focus on hearts and minds.
Army’s definition of red teaming is to understand ● Two things to remember about your adversary:
not only our adversaries, but also our partners. A red the enemy gets a vote, and they shouldn’t be under-
team leader who understands a partner’s constraints, estimated. The U.S. claims that the war on terror
capabilities, and political will can facilitate the is not about religion. Problem is, the enemy thinks
development and maintenance of these important otherwise. To them, it is most definitely about reli-
relationships. gion. Failing to take their position into account only

Decision making is heavily dependent on experience and instinct…

58 March-April 2007  Military Review

 THINKING LIKE A RED TEAMER

makes the fight harder. Underestimating them, most ability to influence it in a fundamentally different
of all their will and their public support, will also way than others. First, Western culture values the
make the mission to defeat them more difficult. individual and his/her free will. Both Eastern and
● In the words of experienced red team leader Islamic culture give precedence to the community
Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper (USMC, and believe that destiny plays a role in determining
Retired), “cast your net widely.” It is only through reality (demonstrated through shi as described above
a wide diversity of readings and experiences that and Inshallah, loosely translated as, “if Allah wills
one can think creatively and independently. In other it”). Second, Western culture emphasizes rational
words, go to the opera, read a lot, learn a language, thought. We think of things as right or wrong, black
travel–maintain broad and diverse interests, and or white. But much of the rest of the world allows
never stop learning. for more grey. Eastern use of dialecticism (recog-
nizing the possibility that both the thesis and anti-
Cultural Awareness thesis may be correct) and the Muslim concept of
While a red team leader can never understand Taqiyya (the dispensation given to Muslims to deny
every culture, he/she can know what to look for in their faith under threat of persecution) demonstrate
a culture. A red team should be able to ask the right these cultures’ acceptance of cognitive dissonance,
questions and find the right experts. We can also contrary to our notion of rational thought.
understand our own culture enough to appreciate ● While such differences are important, there
how and why it is perceived as it is by others. So are also commonalities that provide valuable
instead of an impossible ‘round-the-world culture opportunities for communication, understanding,
survey, the red team leader course curriculum took and shared terms of reference. For example, lead-
a comparative approach, with studies in both West- ership, training, preparation, morale, the power of
ern and Eastern military theory and doctrine, and the people—these are important concepts in both
offered a heavy dose of anthropology. Eastern and Western military thought. There are also
Understanding our own culture and how it is per- several themes that Christianity and Islam share:
ceived by others was the first step in our growing cul- the importance of faith, giving alms, heaven and
tural awareness. It was only after studying Western hell, a belief in one God, and the significance of
military theory that we could recognize the dramatic individuals such as Abraham and Jesus.
differences—and similarities—between our military ● Applying anthropological concepts is a good
culture and Eastern military culture. Studies of Arab start to understanding a culture. These concepts
civilizations led to the same finding. The following include examining a society’s formal and informal
are some insights from this approach. economy; sociological, political, and religious
● There are several enduring themes in Eastern systems; sociolinguistics; semiotics; and its con-
military thought that distinguish it from Western cept of violence. For example, much of North
military theory. The most important of these is the Korea’s economy is informal, as citizens barter
uniquely Chinese concept of shi, which loosely and exchange commodities and the government
translated means the strategic configuration of engages in illicit activities outside the boundaries
power. Shi is about managing reality through maxi- of international law, such as counterfeiting currency
mizing circumstances, or recognizing what one can and narcotics trafficking. Appreciating that much
and cannot control and then preparing to leverage of North Korea’s economy is unregulated and non-
that which you can control when the time is right. quantifiable goes a long way toward understanding
This concept elucidates the Chinese emphasis on how the country sustains itself.
preparation, seizing the strategic initiative, and ● An even greater understanding can be gained
their holistic, “win-win” perspective. Other themes by identifying a culture’s ceremonies, rituals,
enduring to Eastern military theory that set it apart symbols, and myths. Through these, you can effect
from Western theory include deception, subtlety, sur- change, by either working through these cultural
prise, harmony, and reliance on the unorthodox. specificities or by challenging them. Using North
● There are several themes that set our culture Korea as an example again, the country is bound
apart and cause us to think about the world and our together by a very strong myth of the “people’s

Military Review  March-April 2007 59

paradise.” It is widely accepted
by North Koreans that they are
the most spiritually and tech-
nologically advanced country
on earth, and their Western
counterparts are decadent and
corrupt. Recognizing this myth
serves first to provide insight
into North Korean culture. But
further, it creates opportunity.
If this myth can be disproved
and North Koreans no longer

AP Photo/APTN
believe it to be reality, Kim
Jong Il’s power and legitimacy
in the eyes of his people are
significantly weakened.2 Visitors attending the Kimjongilia Flower Exhibition in Pyongyang, North Korea,
14 February 2007, pass by a poster showing North Korean leader Kim Jong II
holding a child. The flower exhibition was held to celebrate the leader’s 65th
Red Teaming birthday.

Lastly, here are a few of the

lessons learned specific to the role of red team lead- have access to the people and information it needs
ers and how they can function most effectively. to make a good assessment. But in order for a red
● A red teamer is different from an intelligence team’s recommendations to be implemented, they
analyst in several important ways. First, the red team need more than access; they need top engagement,
is not bounded by the construct/plan developed by the or leadership that is committed to making changes
staff or by the need for evidence and corroboration; based on red team findings.
next, the red teamer is more like a historian (whose ● Understanding the organization, its proce-
job is to ask big, broad questions) than an intelligence dures, the personalities within it and their relation-
analyst (whose job is often to answer very specific, ships, and the overall dynamics of the system in
narrow questions); and finally, the red team’s job goes which you are inserting yourself is necessary to
beyond understanding the environment to include affect change. It is also important to appreciate the
understanding how we can shape it. organizational impetus not to change. Advocacy,
● Effective communication is vital. This means persuasion, and vigilance are thus required of a
knowing how and when to ask questions, knowing good red team leader.
your audience and the personalities with which you While you may never interact with a red team
are dealing and for whom you are crafting your mes- in your organization, the mindset and the skills
sage, and using and demanding precise language. needed to be a red teamer can serve us all. We all
● Diversity in red team composition is very know the mistakes that have been made as a result
important. The value of diversity—in rank, service, of not questioning our assumptions, not thinking
expertise, age, and gender—was evident just by our like the enemy, or not voicing our dissent more
class composition, which included not only officers persuasively. The above insights and reflections can
and warrant officers from the Army’s Active and help us avoid similar mistakes in the future. MR
Reserve Components, the Marine Corps, and the
Navy, but also civilians. Our varied experiences, NOTES
perspectives, and expertise fostered dynamic class-
room dialog and debate. 1. Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-
● To implement a red team’s recommendations first Century (New York: GP Putnam’s Sons, 2004); The National Military Strategy for
the United States of America 2004 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the
requires not just top cover, but also top engagement. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/
d20050318nms.pdf.
Top cover, meaning buy-in and protection of the 2. Montgomery McFate, “Manipulating the Architecture of Cultural Control: A
Conceptual Model for Strategic Influence Operations in North Korea,” Journal of
person at the top, is required for the red team to Information Warfare (2005): 36.

60 March-April 2007  Military Review