MAIN CONTRIBUTORS Ithas always been the policy of Warship to publish che work ofthe world’ finest warship historians. Consequently, che contributions to this volume are by established and recognised authors David Topliss [with Chris Ware] rad history at King’s College Cambridge before joining the Ship’ Plans Section ofthe National ‘Maritime Meseum in 1988, In 1993 he started working on a hook fon Fist Class Cruisers but in. 1995, before he could finish the book, he was diagnosed with leukaetnia and died. These articles are based on his work forthe hook completed and edited were neces sary by his colleague Chris Wate. Pierre Hervicus has been interested in warships since 1945. He com tributed a chapter on the French Navy in Conay$ All The Words Fighting Shiss, 1922-46 and has previously published articles in Wership. His work concentrates on naval operations during the ‘Second World War, in particular the activities ofthe Kregmene. Peter Brook is a retired psychiatrist who hegan writing on war- ships tirey years ago in Warships Intemational. This is his third contribution to Warship; he has also recently published Warships {for Export: Armstrongs Warships 1867-1927. ‘Stephen McLaughlin works forthe San Francisco Public Library. He has been studying Russian warship design for over ten years and is currently writing a book on Russian battleships. In a previ- fous issue of Warship he examined the development of Russia's armoured ecuses Keith McBride has written numerous article for maritime period cals including Warship World, Warship Iuerainal and the Mariner: Minor Colin Jones formerly worked in Australian government adminis. tration while maintaining a lively interest in other matters, He thas written books on 2 number of subjects apart from the navy, including radio, trams and ferry boats. He has published articles in ‘wo previous sues of Warship. Peter Kelly develope a life-long incerest in ships and the sea as @ boy, He sailed in the Endeavour replica on her maiden voyage, and has previously published an article in Warship. Now retired, he ‘writes and researches naval and maritime history. Daniel Harris rurned his hand to maritime history in 1985, spe- cialising in Swedish naval procurement and contributing 10 the Maines’ Miror and World Warships. In 1991 he was awarded the Silver Medal of Merit by the Swedish Royal Society of Naval Sciences. He now resides in Canada David K Brown spent the whole of his working life 5. member ‘of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructor retiring at Deputy Chief [Naval Architect in 1988. He is eurrently Present of the World Ship Society. He has written many books anc has had articles in ‘every year of Warship. John Jordan has written widely on the post Soviet Navy and the modern navies of Western Europe. His current major interest i in the French Marine Nationale of the inter-war period. He has ‘examined the development of fst French battleships ina previous issue of Wer. Antony Preston was the fist editor of Warship. He has writen ‘numerous books on naval technology and history and was a major contributor to the Comuay’s All The World’ Fighting Ships series. George Moore is researching the warship building programmes of the Royal Navy, which evolved inthe Second World War. He has previously contributed articles to Warship on wartime cruiser proj- ects and the steam gunboats. £30.00 RRPWARSHIP 2000-2001WARSHIP 2000-2001 Edited by Antony Preston EeFrontispiece Included inthis year’s Warship Gallery are photographs ofthe US landings at Casablanca harbour on 8 November 1942, This strike ing image wns taken from USS Wilkes and shows tv ofthe three other destroyers (Swanson, Ludlow and Musphy) involved in the ‘operation. (Robert P Larges). © Conway Maritime Press 2000 Fist published in Great Betain in 2000 by Conway Maritime Pres, 9 Blenheim Court, Brewery Road, London N7 9NT ‘mitt cf Cr ‘All rights reserved. No part ofthis publication may be produced, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted in any form of by any ‘means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission ofthe publisher, British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A record ofthis title is available on request from the British Library. ISBN 085177 791 0 Convway editorial ream: Daniel Mersey and Martin Robson ‘Typesetting and layout by Stephen Dent Printed andl bound in Spain.CONTENTS Editorial FEATURE ARTICLES First Class Cruisers by David Topliss (with Chris Ware) German Type Il Submarines at War by Pierre Hervieusx ‘Armoured Cruiser versus Armoured Cruiser: Ulsan, 14 August 1904 by Peter Brook ‘The Retvizan: An American Battleship for the Tsar by Stephen MeLaughlin Nile and Trafalgar; the Last British Ironclad by Keith MeBride The Navy of Victoria, Australia by Colin Jones War Against the Wounded by Peter Kelly Swedish Steam Torpedo Boats by Daniel Harris Sir William White KCB, FRS, LLD, DSc by David K Brown The conere-tonpilleurs of the Le Fantasque class by John Jordan Soviet and Russian Air-Independant Submarines by Antony Preston The ‘Weapon’ and Gallant Class Destroyers by George Moore REVIEW SECTION ‘Navies In Review 2000-2001 by Antony Preston Naval Books Of The Year Warship Notes Warship Gallery Index 18 34 48 67 3 83 7 125 132 146 148 162 174 180 194 205EDITORIAL Ree cof Warship will, we hope, be cheered by the appearance ofthe latest volume, which i back on Schedule, roughly a year after its predecessor, ‘The pace of warshipeesign continues to advance at frightening speed. With bi of imagination we ean guess at the feeling of headlong change which must have affected naval observers in the mide of the nineteenth century and again fity years later. The new ships were not only fnter and bette-armed: they looked diferent, ven outlandish tothe traditional “Today we shilder atthe ‘ald! uncluttered appear- ance of ships like the US Navy's new Zumuele (DD-21) class destroyers or the Royal Swedish Navy's Visy class corvettes, uta previous generation was appalled tthe ‘anderanied? appenrance of post-1945 ships. ‘Stealth is not only transforming naval warfare, but also the way Ships ae built. Materials are changing, with composites used for superstructures n'a number of designs, and txvances in technology now permit all-electric drive replace traditional shatties. Iti all to0 easy to wal- Tow in nostalgia and regret the passing of veterans who wwould stand no chance of surviving modern battle Late Vietorian public opinion prevented the Admiralty fiom getting rid of ‘coffin ships, and vast sums were spent on reiting doughey veterans. The basic laws of conomics do not change; money spent on extending the lives of overage warships is better spent on new onstruction, The folly of the Reagan administration’ obsession with maintaining a °600 Ship Navy (a figure plucked from the air by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, incidentally) resulted in rfits of 50-year old auniliaies, and finaly left the US Navy with fewer than 300 ships Tt would be a pointless exercise to ist all the ‘theories and certainties" of sel-appointed prophets of naval trends, In my own lifetime I have read enaless cheoies bout the future, starting with the impotence of navies in the face of air power, the our-inute wat of mural nuclear destrition, the supremacy ofthe anti-ship mis- sil, the undefeatable’ fast attack craft, and the omnipo- tence of the submarine. As a university student [ was told by an older friend who ‘knew all about snitary strategy’ tha if navies had any fututeat all, hey would bo under che command of the ae force. With suc infl- Tie guidance a my disposal, [learned to avoid prophe- «and two maxima: never say ‘never agin’, and never say 'it wil be over by Christmas’ One of the purposes of Warship is to take note of bygone theories of warfare, and to trace their impact on. ship-design, and to examine the behaviour of ships in action, Battle experience remains the acid test of the validity ofall theories, and even if contemporary analy- sis was poor, we ought to try to match the conflicting evidence and produce credible answers to important questions. Another aim is to bridge the generations by illustrating the basic problems of matching ship-tech- nology to operational requirements, contemporary poli- tics and, ultimately, money. Naval architecture has always been a series of trade-off, and the ‘perfect ship’ thas yet to be invented. ‘Within that loose editorial framework, Peter Brook looks at the relatively obscure Battle of Ulsan in the Russo- Japanese War, one of only two occasions when armoured cuiser fought each other. The FirstClass cruiser (nowadays often confused with the armoured cruiser) marked another phase in theoretical warfare, this time to hunt down French and Russian commerce-rading cruisers. These ships ranged from medium displacement to huge 11,000-ton. ships ‘equivalent in some respects to Second Class battleships. Charis Wate has completed the work started by the late David Topliss, bur i¢ was intended to be published as a book, and has had to be divided into three sections. Stephen McLaughlin describes the Retvizan, che only American-designed and built battleship to serve in the Imperial Russian Navy, while Keith McBride does anoth- et excellent job on HMS Nile and HMS Trafalgar, famous for being described by the First Sea Lord as ‘posibly the last such ships to be built for the Royal Navy’, shortly before a series of much larger designs was built. Their imposing appearance endeared them to the public, and foreshadowed William White’ Royal Sovereign class, but they were soon overtaken by superior designs. ‘The navy built for the Australian State of Victoria was the frst colonial adjunet to the Royal Navy, and it too was predicated on a fear of Russian cruisers raiding ship- ping in the South West Pacific. Although limited to @ role of coast defence, Colin Jones shows that it included some of the most advanced warships available, including the turret ship Cerberus and torpedo boats. Tn the years after the Russian War and the American Civil War, the Royal Swedish Navy embraced the latest theories of coast defence, using pare torpedoes, ‘automo- bile’ torpedoes and mines. Daniel Harris shows how this translated into extensive programmes of torpedo boatWARSHIP 2000-2001 construction, culminating inthe fist destroyers It could be argued thac the Swedish taxpayers’ money was wasted, but equally, can we nule out the possibility tha the Swedish naval policy deterred the Russians? David Brown has provided another biographical sketch, this time of Sir William White, the great Vietorian Director of Naval Construction who gave the Royal Navy a magnificent set of some forty homogenous battleships. White was not only a brilliant naval archi- tect butalso a superb administrator His reorganisation of the Royal Dockyards to cope with Naval Defence Act ‘made them competitive with the best private shipyards Peter Kelly describes the German U-boats’ war against Allied hospital ships in the Fist Workd War, a tale of heroism, decency among some U-boat captains, and ruthlessness interpretation of official policy by others Although not warships in the technical sense, hospital ships play a vital part i naval warfare, and it entitely appropriate that we should know mote about their activ- ities in the Fast World War. Between the two world wats the French Navy produced a series of lange destroyers, of which the ultra-fast Fenuasque class contre-torplles were the only ones to see serious action in wartime. John Jordan assesses the per- formance and fighting power ofthese controversial ships. Pierre Hervieux examines the achievements of the Kriegsmarine's Type II coastal U-boats which formed the core of the U-boat Arm in the early months of the war. Despite their small displacement they saw service in a number of theatres, right to the end in 1945. George Moore examines the complex story of Royal Navy destroy- eedevelopment atthe end ofthe Second World Wat. The ‘Weapon’ class saw post-war service, but the enlarged Gillen clas never got beyond the drawing-board. ‘Asa short epilogue, the Editor has provided a short history of air-independent propulsion (AIP) for Russian and Soviet submarines. AIP experiments go back much further than previously thought, underlining the formi- dable ingenuity of Russian engineers. f only the pol cal system had been less mucderously inefficient these ideas might have given the Soviet Navy a vital advan tage over its adversaries. This edition is concluded by the usual round-up of important naval developments, it has been a particularly busy year for the world’s navies, with new programmes and policy initiatives. As always, comments and criticisms are welcomed, and we look forward to receiving submissions for next years Warship. My personal thanks go to the Conway team for their invaluable support in getting this volume completed, particularly Daniel Mersey and Martin Robson, and design- er Steve Dent, and of course the patient contributors who have to wait while the production process grinds on. Antony PrestonFIRST CLASS CRUISERS Part One This first article by David Topliss and Chris Ware outlines the reason for the develop- ment of the true Fitst Class cruisers for the Royal Navy. It looks at the debates fuelled inside and out of the Navy by the introduction of this type of vessel. Part two will look at later classes of protected and Armoured Cruisers as well as some more detailed discus- sion of their armament and armour and their performance in action. Orlando Class ‘The Orlandos were the Royal Navy's tue lage cruisers. Unlike previous ships, dhe Orns were tue cruising ships with igh speed, good armament, reasonable protection and a good radius of action. Buralthough they were always regi as cruisers, anc full the duties of eruses, his ‘eas not the purpose for which there were designed “The class grew out of the Northbrook programme of 1884 and were conceived in something of a panic. In the July of thae year Lord Northbrook had declared that, con- sidering the uncertain state of naval architecture: ‘The seat difficulty the Admiralty would have to contend with if they were granted £3,000,000 or £4,000,000 would be to decide how to spend the money’. In September the con- sequences of this rather rash statement came home to roost when the Pall Mall Gazette published the fist of series of articles called ‘What is the Truth about the Navy”. Written by W T Stead, the paper’ editor, with {information supplied by Caprain J A Fisher (later Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher) the articles caused a panie in Britain that only subsided when the Government under- took to order two fits clas ironelads ive fist class crus ets, six torpedo cruisers and fourteen torpeds boats in ‘xkltion to the normal yealy programme. The Orlandos emerged out of this programme, a5 a dlevelopment of the Mersey class of second class cruises. ‘The Mersey were the best British cruiser design to dae, and marked the definitive break fom the masted cruisers that had preceded them. But at the same time as they were lid down Armstrongs were building a cruiser for Chile, the Esmeralda. The Chilean ship, which was over a thousand cons lighter, ws faster, and eared cwo TOin guns compared to the two Bin of the Mersey’, had been designed by George Rendel of Armstrongs. Rendel and Lond Armstrong both believed that in the struggle between the gun and armour the balance had swung deci- sively in favour ofthe former and that the battleship was an obsolescent type, which would be replaced by swift, ‘well armed vessels which would be able to destroy the slow and now vulnerable battleships of the day. The Esmeralda was the product of this thinking and although the Chileans regarded her as a cruiser, Rendel had con: ceived her asa batleship destroyer. In 1881 Rendel had been appointed to the Admiralty as an additional Civil Lord, lagely to help sore out the navy’ problems with its ordnance, and he soon expressed his ideas on ship design. The Mersey’s had a designed armament of ewo Bin guns: it was suggested that one of these should be replaced by four 6in guns. Rendel dis- agteed fiercely with the proposed move and explained his thinking to Sir Astley. Cooper Key in October 1882 "These ships were especially designed to aecompany the jnonclad flet and to form with ita composite force which divas been agreed, value for value, will have more fight- ing efficiency than a flee composed of ironclads alone. Unless they ae to engage ironclads their value toa leet, ‘would be simply that of scouts and they must hold aloft from any action’. Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, the Director of "Naval Construction (DNC) had been locking atthe pos sibility of building @ moze powerful version of the Mersey clas at least since 1883, but the combination of the Northbrook programme and pressure from Rendel for ships that could act with the battlefleet was the force behind the design of the Orlando Barnaby was never realy happy with ships that did not clearly fall either into che small erising ship type or large ironclads, eo it is not surprising that it was hard for hima to decide what function he wanted che ships to ffl Rendel had earlier argued that the torpedo cruiser was misconceived, since the range of conternporary torpedoes ‘vas so much less than that of modem guns and that the ship would be fatally crippled before it got into a position ‘where it could fie its torpedoes. Barnaby on the other hhand thought that the rate of fire of heavy guns was $0 slow as to allow either a torpedo or ramming attack to succeed. Indeed he proposed that it should be made pos- Sible for offices to fire the guns from the conning tower, while withdrawing the gun ceews themselves undercover uring an attack, since presumably he thought it unlike- ly that the gums could be reloaded in time to fie again. ‘The fise drawing for an enlarged! Mersey shows what is clearly a torpedo vese, armed with no less than 8 torpe- do tubes, six forward and aft and two amidships. The design seus show differing armament, ether a uniform Gin battery oF a mixture of 9.2 and 6in guns. By June 1884 the displacement was beginning tose legely due to doubling the number of 6in guns from six to 12 andWARSHIP 2000-2001 Orlando. First ship ofthe fis class cniers bul under the 1884 Noval Defence Act. (NMM), increasing the thickness of the armour deck slopes from 2 to 6in, But itis possible that these were no more than exploratory studies? The Protection for designs up to June 1884 was formed by protective deck, horizontal above the water line, then sloping at an angle of 30 degrees to below the water line. From August 1884 this protective deck was replaced as the main form of protection by an armour belt 10in thick, reaching from one foot above the water line to four below, covering the magazines and machinery spaces. Beyond the ends ofthe belt fore and aft there was to be a further protective deck. Amidships the protective deck was to be horizontal and to be at the level of the upper edge of the armour belt. There had been a debate as to whether the protective deck should be above or below the waterline. [twas felt that the main objection to the underwater deck was that thete was a risk of water coming down through the openings into the hho ifthe hull was extensively damaged above the water line. The design of 30 October received the Board stamp of approval on the 18th of November 1884, Rendel wrote: ‘The ship is transformed and is brought up to something like the rank of a second class ironclad in point of protection at che water line while preserving much of the special qualities of the unarmoured cruiser’ The design continued to be developed, reaching its definitive form in early 1885, when invitations to tender were sent out to the major shipbuilders. The beam had srown to S6fe, there were to be two less 6in guns, and the torpedo armament was reduced feom 14 tubes to eight Almost immediately the lack of control over shipbuild- 10 ing that was the hallmark of Barnaby’s last years as DNC became apparent. Even before the tendering process was ‘complete, the shipbuilders had suggested the substication, ‘of horizontal triple expansion engines for the compound machinery specified in the design. The new machinery did indeed promise higher efficiency and more power but at the cost of greater weight and space. To counter this the coal supply was reduced by 60 tons. The designers seemed to accept any increase in weight without regard for cost, and certainly until the appointment of William White as DNC, without reference to higher authority ‘The weight of the new 9.2 gun came out at 22 tons each rather than the 18 allowed. Blectrie light and the machinery involved was installed, when none had been allowed for in the design, ata cost of 15 tons. The arma- ment, alterations in ammunition supply, and armour ammunition tubes for the 9.2in guns cost another 80 tons; increasing the complement from 350 to 421, another 60 tons. In all, the alterations added an extra 186 tons on the legend displacement, or Tin. extra draught at the load water line, The ships had been designed to have an armoured freeboard of 18in at load displacement, the alterations reduced this to Lin. At deep load the condition was much worse, if the fll load cof coal were caried the draught would increase by 17in, and the top of the armour bele would be six inches below the waterline. ‘White found himself in the unenviable position of try- ing to find a condition that would allow the ship to have some measure of protection, and to defend the Admiraltyto an angry House of Commons. The first was the easier ‘of the two. The adoption of triple expansion engines tmeant that the ships could achieve the designed radius of action, with much less coal, White recommended that the coal allowance should be set at 750 tons. In that con- dition the top of the armour belt would be about level with the waterline. With all bunkers empty the uppet cadge ofthe belt would be 2ft3in above the water line. Defending the ships to the House was more dificult. Sir Edward Reed, a former DNC, had, since resigning in 1870, been a constant thorn in the side, Reed’ criticism ‘was almost totally centered upon the position and extent ‘of the armoured belt. He believed that armoured ships should always be provided with adequate armoured free- hoard: for this reason he would like White's design no more than he had approved of Bamaby's. ‘The ‘Admiralty’ defence of the ships was led by White and involved a good deal of doublespeak. Like many others hie had favoured the system of protection using a curved steel deck and the careful positioning of coal bunkers tather than an armoured belt: vessels using this system ‘were known as protected cruisers, White argued that the ‘effect of the overloading of the Orlando's was to convert them from belted to protected cruisers, and that they shared all the advantages ofthe later type. White stressed that che coal bunkers above the procective deck acked to the safety ofthe ship, even though this had been no part of the original scheme of protection. He also laid great stress on the fact thatthe extra weight had all come from measures to increase the offensive power of the design ‘Within the Admiralty, however, the resule of the fias- co was a major shake up in the design procedure, the First Lord wrote a damming critique ofthe process. As a resule in February 1887 new rules were laid down which were intended to ensure that much tighter control would be exercised in warship design, The Controller was to consult with the First Naval Lord as to the required speed, armament and complement, and then pass these requirements to the DNC. The DNC would then work with the Engineer in Chief the Director of Naval Ordnance to prepare the design. After the design had received the Board stamp no alterations were to be made without the approval of the Board. These regulations were added to in September when the Board laid down that when the ship's requirements had been met and the displacement calculated, the displacement should be inereased by 4.5 per cent as a margin against which alteration could be made Blake and Edgar William Whites return as DNC in 1885 carsied with it an expectation of radical change in ctuiser design. At Armstrong's White had earned a reputation for designing. fast heavily armed cruisers for Japan, as well as smaller ‘cruisers for Austria and Spain. His fist cruiser design for the Royal Navy, were 2nd class Medeas class under the 1886-87 programme. But the next year’s programme saw a requirement for two Ist class cruisers, which were to become the Blake and the Blenheim. These were followed " FIRST CLASS CRUISERS by the Edgr clas ofthe 1889 programme. It is sometimes thought, quite naturally, that the Edgar class wasa straight- forward development of the Blake design. The new ships were to be somewhat smaller, to reflect a proper regard for economy when a large number of ships were to be built tunder the Naval Defence Act of 1889. But the relation- ship between the two clases is more complicated: it would bbe more accurate to say chat the design of the Edgar retco- spectively influenced that of the Blake. Equally mosifca- tons made to the Blake were later applied to the Edgar “The design work for two firs cass cruisers to be includ ced inthe 1888 programme had begun in August 1887. The new ship, like the Medea design ofthe previous yeas, were to replace the armour belt of the Onlando with a curved protected deck, White’ reason fo the new scheme of pro- tection lay in the need to obtain high speed coupled with a lange radius of action while keeping the size ofthe ship within reasonable limits. Even so, when completed the Blake was the largest cruiser yet built. White stresed the need for high speed from the very beginning, intending, that the new ships would have a 2kt superiority over any existing cruiser. White instructed thar the design work was to be carried out by Assistant Constructor Benton, under the supervision of William Smith, The frst sketch shows a ship with an armament of four 9.2in guns eatied in single mountings, two abreast fore and aft, but this was quickly changed to two 9.2in guns, one each fore and aft. The sec ‘ondary armament, was to he a new 7Opde quick firing gun under development by Armstrong. But hardly had the design work stared when the repercussions of the Orlando being overweight were felt in the form of the Board Minute of 21 September 1887 which required that an allowance of 44 per cent over the design displacement shoul be added for growth. Inthe cruiser the result of this was that the displacement had to grow by 1000 tons and. Power increase from 18,000 to 20,000ihp if the basic fea- tures ofthe design were o be attained. These alterations aalded an estimated £25,000 to the cast of each ship. ‘The need for high sustained speed, coupled with a lange radius of action, resulted in an unusual machinery arrangement, which in tun determined the length of the ship. Four, rther than the normal two, triple expansion engines wete fitted in separate engine rooms, with two fengines connected to exch shaft. The forward engines could be disconnected for normal cruising, only being put in gear when the need came to make full speed. This alone would allow the ship to make between 15 and Tokts, while at the normal cruising speed of 10kts she would use only 7 per cent of her total power. This arrange- ‘ment was never again used by the Royal Navy and it was only copied by the US Navy in the cruiser Brooklyn and by the Russian Navy in the eruiser Ruri, both of which were intended as high-speed commerce raiders. The main disadvantage of the arrangement was that it was more expensive, both in engine and hull costs, than simply installing larger engines. It was also necessary to stop the engines in order to connect the front set not something desirable when chasing an enemy, and even less when t1y- ing to escape. It also seems that it proved extremely diffi cele to ensue that the two engines lined up perfectly on the propeller shafts and this caused excessive wear on theWARSHIP 2000-2001 shaft and engine bearings, White acknowledged that the increased length caused by the machinery arrangement would resul in loss of handiness but thought that this was of small concer in vessels of igh speed. Equally important to the nature of the design was the size ofthe coal supply, which was set at 1500 tons to pro- vide a range of 10,400nm at normal eruising speed Since the ships were specifically designed for continuous high, speed steaming, great attention was paid to the ease of working ofthe Coal: each ofthe four stokeholds was given its own cross bunker and White reported that the trans- Port of coal to these had been specially studied. But while the designed bunkerage allowed for up to seven days? steaming at 20kts and ten weeks at 10kts, White did not ‘consider that this really represented the designs fll eapa bilities. The wing compartments of both the engine and boiler rooms formed additional bunker space, which, would bring the total fuel capacity to nearly 1800 rons. ‘The extra capacity would in terms of weight be nearly ‘equal to the 4) per cent of the Board Margin, Alterations ‘and additions during building absorbed almost all of the Margin and in. the end it was only possible to carry the projected fuel supply by using the machinery wing come partments. To some extent this represented a reduction in coal capacity, since it was intended that the wing bunkers, next to the engine rooms would only be used in wartime, ‘and that the coal there, like much of that earried above the protective deck, was primarily intended as protection. ‘The most controversial aspect of the design was the ‘abandonment of the armour belt in favour ofa protective deck. The use of a curved protective deck had found favour with naval architects since its introduction by the Italian constructor Benedetto Brin in the battleship aia of 1880, The main advantage of the system over the ‘armour belt was that it offered equal, or better, eal pro- tection to the ships vitals for a much lower weight. The ‘weight thus saved could be used to gain greater speed from. tore powerful engines, or greater endurance from larger coal bunkerage. Yet many officers of the Royal Navy remained unconvinced and in both the Blake and the Eidgar classes White had to make provision for thet views. ‘Armament was originally set at two 9in guns carried fore and af, ten 7Opdr on the main deck and eighteen, 8pars distributed between the main and upper decks. ‘The 7Opdss which were tobe fitted to a new Vavasseur mount- ing, were regarded with some unease ftom the beginning and White asked Vavasseur if the mounting could take both a Gin BL and a 6in QF gun as well as the 7Opdr ‘Although the 70pde was at the time the largest QF gun in existence, neither White nor the DNO favoured the introduction of a new calibre between Sin and 6in. [twas with some relief therefore that news was received from. Armstrong that development work on the 7Opde gun was ‘not going well but that they had high hopes for a 6in QF gun and the substitution of the 6in QF gun was autho- rised. To help compensate for extra weight 3pdrs were fit ted, There were to be four torpedo tubes, two above water and two in submerged torpedo rooms. ‘The design was approved by the Board at the end of January 1888 and for the fist time the names Blake and Blenheim were mentioned. Blake was to be built at the 12 Royal Dockyard at Chatham and, even though there remained some items in the design'to be decided by the Board, the yard was sent a copy of the lines plan and tmidship section so that laying off could begin. The con- tract for the second ship, Blenheim, was put out to tender and was eventually awarded to the Thames Ironworks ‘Company at Blackwall ‘The Blake was laid down at Chatham in July 1888 and almost immediately design work began on what would become the Eugar class for the next year's programme. At the same time as the design for the Blake was being devel- ‘oped, another design team was working on a torpedojboat cartier, which was lid down as the Vadean in June of 1888 at Portsmouth, like the Blake the Vudean had a protective deck. She hai a high speed of 20kts and a respectable armament of eight 4.7in QF guns. Ir was the design of the ‘Valean that was chosen asthe stating point forthe Bigar class. Approval for the development of the new design. was given at a Board meeting held in mid-August 1888. It seem likely that White originally proposed a direct devel ‘opment ofthe Blake, there are two sketch designs with the Blale’s engine arrangement but with an extra boiler room, a speed of 23kts and four 9.2in guns on a displacement of {8900 tons. This proposal was quickly rejected, almost cer- tainly on account of eost, since no less than nine vessels ‘were to be provided under the 1889 Naval Defence Act ‘The new cruises were to have the same dimensions and engines as the Videan, with a protective deck Sin thick ‘The armament was to be the same as that of the Blake, but with the Gin QF guns arranged with four in easemates on the main deck and six on the upper deck This arrangement of the Gin battery was as a result of, the experiments on the old ironclad Resistance. ‘These showed that guns in unarmoured positions should have the widest possible degree of separation. This could be achieved by placing three of the guns on the upper deck, and increasing the spacing of these left on the main deck This would also allow for the main deck guns to be car ried in armoured easemates. White estimated the cost of the new ships would be £275,000 each as against £440,000 for the Blake's Tn October White suggested that the Blake's armament arrangements should be modified to match those of the Edgar. This would present no problems for the ship build- ing by contract, the Blenheim, but the construction of the Blake was well advanced at Chatham, and alteration of the design at this stage would seriously affect progress on the ship. White suggested that the yard should complete the framing and plating of the hull, then the four ease- mate openings on the main deck could be cut out at a later stage. The revised layout of the guns led to alter- ations in the system of ammunition supply: the casemate suns were to have ready-use magazines holding 30 rounds Of 6in shell, st into the coal bunkers ahove the protec- tive deck, The cost in weight terms of these alterations ‘was 300 tons, or about 7.5in on the draught, and White suggested that rather than increase the legend displace- ment there should be a corresponding reduetion in coal carried. This also meant that the engine room wing bunkers would have to be used as normal bunkerage space if the coal supply was to be kept at 1500 tonsBlake, developed from the Orlando, with old pace ‘Meanwhile the design team was working on the task of turning the Vadean into a fist class cruiser. Crew size was set the same as forthe Blak, but with the Vadeam engine room complement. Range with 850 tons of coal was 10,000nm at 10kts, 40 per cent greater than the Orlando, while at 18kes range would be about 2600nm. Teal speed was 20kts with forced draft, but continuous sea speed would be 18kts. Total bunker eapacity was to be 1000 tons, only two thirds that ofthe Blake, the extra 150 tons cover the legend would increase the draught by 4-5in and reduce the speed by Mkt. So that the ship could maintain prolonged cruising at high speed, additional cross bunkers were fitted. These ‘would also mean that when in action the bunkers above the protective deck would not be required for the stoke holds. The cross bunkers alone could hold 600 tons of coal and would provide for four days steaming at 18k. This resulted in a ship ten feet longer and two feet broader than Videan with a displacement 400 tons greater at 7000 tons. However compared with the Blake there was no provision for ready-use magasines of for armoured tubes for the ammunition hoists, except for the 9.2in runs. Only 100 cons had been allowed for the casemate armour, which would limit the casemate protection to 4in faces and Zin sides, against 6in thick fronts in the Blake. White sugested that these differences compared to the Blake could be avercome by using 160 to 180 tons of the Board Margin. There would be a need to ad 6in to the beam, and speed at the legend draught would be reduced by Make to 19%kts at forced draft. However the financial secretary suggested that it would make more ee = 9.2n and Gin breecloaders not yee the Qs wo overwhelm the enemy. (NMM). FIRST CLASS CRUISERS —= sense to simply make the ships bigger rather than use any of the Board Margin; this must be one ofthe few times in history when an accountant took a long term view. Compared with the Vulean, the Edgar was to have the thickness of her protective decks increased; in both ships the thickness was Sin over the engine and boiler spaces, but in the Vulean this thinned to 2.5in over the mazar zines. In the Edgar the thickness over the magacines was to be mised to 4in and there were to be improvements too in the protection of the ends ofthe ship. Outside of the main protected deck the Valean was fitted with a flat armoured deck | to 1.Sin thick forward and 2in aft over the steering gear. In the Edgar this was replaced by a 2in thick curved deck, These alterations to the protective deck absorbed an extra 100 tons of weight. “The Resistance experiments raised again the question of protection, There was a very voeal body that had never accepted the arguments put forward by the supporters of the protective deck and the tests seemed to prove the value of side armour over protective decks, White responded to these arguments in a long minute in March 1889 entitled ‘On the use of side armour and casemate protection’. First White reiterated the advantages of using protective decks and coal bunkers as the major means of protection. Coal closely packed into the bunkers above the protective deck would smother the effects of high explosive shell, and restrict the entry of water into the hull, Damage conttol parties working behind the watertight cofferdams at the rear of the coal- bunkers would be able to deal with any leaks while under cover from enemy fireWARSHIP 2000-2001 Edgar. The next sage inthe developmene of the frst class cruisers, pictured here in mid carer. (NM). White then examined the possiblity of fitting on armour belt to the Edger design, It would be posible fit a 3in thick belt, bolted to lin thick plating. If this belt were to extend along the length of te engine and boiler rooms, and to cover the depth from the lower edge of the protective deck up to the main deck it would absorb tlimost 280 tons, or the entie Board Margin allowed for the ship. The Resistance experiments had shown that a fin bele was feely penetrated by both 4.7 and 6in shell, and that the effects of the explosion behind the armour were worse than if there had been no armour there White pointed out tha the power of shells and explo- sives were increasing, reducing still further the effective- hes of thin armour belts. He then put forward a skilful compromise intended no doubt to molly the suppers of armour belts while leaving the protective decks sytem tinchanged I would be posible, he wrote, to provide the necessary support for-an armour belt, in thick, if it should become desirable to fit ne ata later stage, The support would be in the form of an extra lin thick hall plating, vetted fash, fora lenge of 150 fet in the Blakes and 130 feet in the Edgars. The cost in terms of wht would be about 55 and 45 tons respectively. I however, che Board did decide to order the fing of armour belts, then White strongly felt that these should run for the whe length ofthe ships, or ta minimum ll the way to the hows, This would involve an additional 700 tons in weight in the Blake, which could only by found by reducing the thickness of the protective deck, the plating for which had already been ordered. In the Edgars the armour belt would weigh 650 tons, which 4 could only be found by a complete re-casting of the design. Faced with such consequences the Board approved White's compromise proposal and instructions were issued to double the plating amidships in both classes In late April 1889 the Edgars design team realised that the ships would be under-powered. The power specified was for 8000ihp at natural draft co give a speed of 1Skes, with 12,000ihp forced draft for 20kts. However White had become convinced that forced draft, while giving impressive results on trials, was impracticable in service conditions. He persuaded the Board that from now on. Royal Navy ships should have their speed and machinery performance specified at natural daft. It was realised that if the Edgar's were to be able to steam continuously at 18kts with two thirds power then the boilers would have to be able to deliver 12,000ihp at natural rather than at forced draft This increase in horse power could not be supplied with four boilers ofthe standard pattern, while six would mean enlarging the ship. An altemative would be to increase the size of the boilers and ie was suggested that by increasing the boiler diameter by 18in to 16ft chat 10,000ihp could be obtained for an extra 90 tons Installation of the larger boilers would mean some loss of bunker capacity if ease of access was to be maintained, but this would be minimal Te was not simply a matter of installing bigger boiler, the proposed change threw into question the Navy’ whole policy on machinery, and a meeting was held berween the First Lord, Durston (the Engineer in Chief) and White. There was a fear, shared by both White andDurston, that increasing the size of the boilers would produce more steam than the engines could handle, with fn attendant risk of damage to both, Durston was often the butt of public criticism over the performance of the Navys machinery and was worried that increasing the machinery weight without an increase in trial perform- ance would be grounds for still more attacks from the press. White argued that the real point was not whether the ships should have sufficient boiler power at natural dlaft, but whether the siz of ships in general should be increased to allow it Even though the new boilers would eat up 90 tons of the Board Margin and cost an extra £4000, the change was approved. ‘The Edger class were all laid down between June 1889 and July 1899, five tobe buile by contract and four in the Royal Dockyards. In eatly April 1890 it was suggested that the two ships being buile in Portsmouth, Crescent and Centaur (renamed Royal Arthur before’ launch), should have theie design modified by having the forecas- tle raised one deck level. This would provide for extra accommodation for ships intended to act as flagships on foreign stations, as well has giving improved sea going performance. There was, as always, a penalty to be paid for any alteration ofthe design and it was decided that i would be necessary to replace the forward 9,2in gun with ‘two 6in QFs if sufficient stability was to be maintained. Both White and the Board viewed the reduction in gun power forward with equanimity, White in. particular believing that it was more important to have heavy gun power aft rather than forward. Hs reason for this was the rational observation that since any desiga would be out- classed by newer, more powerful, vessels in time, the ships could well have to run away and heavy armament aft would stand a ship in good stead when trying to slow clown a pursuer. Having only 6in guns forward would be no teal disadvantage since the ships would only be likely FIRST CLASS CRUISERS to chase protected or unarmoured ships, and the increased rate of fire in these circumstances would be a positive advantage. However the high forecastle brought Such an improvement in seakeeping that it became a per- manent feature of Whites designs. Five of the ships, including Crescene and Royal Arthur, were sheathed in ‘wood and copper for overseas service. Powerful ‘The cruiser programme for 1893-94 was to be dominated by the Royal Navy’ response to the construction by Russia of a eruiser designed for commerce raiding, the Rusk, Designed to combine high speed, heavy armament, good protection and with the ability to steam from the Baltic to Viadivestock without coaling, the Russian ship appeared on paper to bea threat ro which the British had to reply. The resule of what ean only be described as a naval panic was two ofthe largest and least useful vessels yet but forthe Royal Navy. “The Rurik had been laid down in May 1890, but the need to complete the ships ordered under the Naval Defence Act meant that the British response would be delayed until 1893. Bven so the DNC was discussing the Royal Navy's counter to the Rusia ship by November 1891. Based on reports that the Rurik would have @ machinery weight of 2050 tons, White argued that her published sea speed of 18kts must be a deliberate under- estimate, and that in all probability the true sea speed would be 19kts. To obtain a Tkt superiority over the Ruaik, 20k sea speed, the new British ship would have to have a tral speed of 22kts. White als estimated the cndurance of the Russian ship not asthe published fi ‘ure of 16,000nm but as haf that, 8500nm. White the fore saw the design requirements for the new cruisers as Blenheim shows the inevemencal development ofthe eye before the next le to the Powerful and her sister the Terrible. (NMM). 15WARSHIP 2000-2001 having a speed ane radius of action superior to the Rurik, ‘with a more powerful armament, and protection at least equal to her, all of which would mean a ship largee than its Russian rival. The demands of speed and range would dlominate the design. The Blake, the Royal Navy's largest cruiser, had a range at 10kts of 1200nm less than the Rue, while the Edgar's could steam only. 5300nm. In a ship designed to counter the Rurik, fuel consumption would be greater by a factor of 8 to'7 compared to the Elgar, once aguin pushing up the displacement. ‘The dimensions of the new ships were largely deter- mined by the size of the available dry docks. There were few docks in Britain or the Empire which could accommo- dla ships as long asthe new cruiser would have to be, and ‘even fewer that could cope with the combination of great length and the beam necessary ifthe required stability was to be obtained. These restrictions set the length at 500ft pp and the beam at 70.5ft. Compared to both Blake and Edgar, the Powerfls were to be much longer ships for their beam, the beam to length ratio rising from an average of 5.6 to 7.04, There were some on the Board who were unhappy at the building of such a huge vessel, and sug- gested thatthe length be reduced to 450%. White’ reply to this was threefold, firstly that the machinery spaces required would remain the same in a ship 450f¢ long, andl thac the reduction in length could only be obtained by giv- ing up a submerged torpedo room; secondly, that shorten- the ship would so alter the form of the hull that a sea speed of 20kts could not be guaranteed unless the size and power ofthe machinery plant were increased; and thinly, that a length of 450f¢ would not improve the situation as regards the availability of dry docks. ‘Within the set length, the sie of the machinery plant was crucial. [t was evident from the beginning that the Royal Navy's machinery types could not supply enough power within che constraints of weight and space, and that che only solution would be to adopt the water tube boilers developed by the Frenchman Julian Belleville, ‘These boilers promised much higher working pressures, against those ofthe Eigar class, The Belleville boiler also required les water to proxluce steam, reducing their over- all weight and increasing the speed at which steam can be raised. That these improvements were necessary is shown by the fact that compared to the Edgar the Powerful required 60 per cent more power a all speeds up to 16kts, Ie was originally proposed to camry a mixture of water tube and cylindrical boilers, with two out of six boiler rooms having the eylindrical type, but the finalised design had a uniform steam plant of 48 Belleville boilers. ‘The decision to instal a uniform type of boiler was taken, to avoid having to have stokers tained in handling both cylindrical and water tube boilers. The ships were unuste al in that they were to be able to steam at their maximum ctusing speed continuously. Normal practice was to pro- vide enough stokers to supply steam for only 60 per cent of the natural draft (ND) power, The Powerful was to have the boiler room complements increased so that 100 per cent ND power would always be available without calling the off watch and The boilers were to be arranged with their backs to a longitudinal bulkhead on the middle line of the ship. 16 This removed the need for cross bunkers and helped to reduce the overall length of the machinery compart iments: ofthe proposed 500f length of the ship 240ft was taken up by the machinery. IFthe machinery spaces were ignored the Powerfuls were only 40ft longer than the Edgars, and tis difference was largely the result of a se: ‘ond submerged torpedo room. Protection was to be in the form of a curved protec: tive deck. Unlike the two previous classes the deck was to be of uniform thickness, 4n on both the flat and the slopes. In this class White, for the first time, adopted what was to become normal practice in almost all war- ships, two ammunition passages ran the full length of the machinery compartments underneath the protective deck. This not only gave greater protection to the ammunition supply, but ensured that, even ifthe mage zines at one end of the ship were put out of action, all the guns could be supplied from the other magazines. The DNO suggested that the ammunition passages should be used for the storage of ready use ammunition, rather than storing it in the casemates to reduce the danger of explosions in action. The original proposal for armament was for a uniform battery of 20-6in QF guns. These were to he arranged with one on the centre line forward and aft, eight in two storeyed casemates, two forward and aft, giving a theo- retical bow and stem fire of 5-6in guns, and five more fzuns on each broadside in casemates on the main deck. ‘There were 10-25pars in open shields on the upper deck. The uniform armament was probably a reflection of the views of Fisher who, even at this stage, was firm believ- erin the value ofa single calibre armament. White stat- ed that the object was to maximise the number of guns that could be carried and supplied, while protecting as ‘many of the gun crews as possible in casemates. Also the se of the 6in gun would avoid the use of power handling and loading machinery, This was an important consier- ation since the total weight allowed for armament was 1500 tons. But the DNO took great exception to the proposed armament, which he saw as being fundamentally fauly in both its composition and its disposition, and so provoked a heated exchange of papers. The DNO's view was that the most valuable gun positions in the ship were those for ward and aft on the forecasfe and poop, and that in these positions a 6in gun was clearly inadequate. He pointed ‘out that the disposition of 6in guns forward in the Royal ‘Arthur and Crescent was adopted to secure better sea- ‘keeping and accommodation, and not asa change in tac- tical doctrine. For the DNO the primary function of cruisers was to chase and destroy other ships, and for this ‘purpose it was vital that there should! be heavy guns for ‘ward and at. In these positions the destructive power of the shell counted for far more than rapidity of fire. Nor did the DNO perceive high rates of ir, an advantage dur ing a chase in which the range would change slowly, as would the rate of change of range. In these circumstance a slow and deliberate fire would be the most suitable. He compared the new design’s armament unfavourably with that of the American cruiser Brooklyn with its 88in guns in four turrets. The Brooklyn's disposition of armamentwould allow her to concentrate almost all her heavy guns fon any target. Assuming that the Brooktym was being chased by the Powerful, which was to have a one knot advantage in speed, it would take an hour to reduce the distance betvreen the ships from 3000 to 2000yds, during which the Powerfl would be under fre from heavy guns, while her own 6in guns could do no damage to the vital parts ofthe Brooklyn. The DNO therefore advocated that 4 new Sin 40cal gun should be developed. He was sure that Acmstrongs could develop both the gun and a twin ‘mounting quickly, and that the new ship should be armed with 4-8in, 16 or 14-6in QR 16-12pde QF guns. The Bin suns were tobe placed in twin mounts, protected only by Tight shields. ‘Whites reply to these arguments bordered on the dis- missive. The Resistance experiments had shown that the {in shell could do all that was necessary in wrecking an ‘enemy cruiser and destroying the lives of its crew. White seems to have felt that the DNO had misunderstood what the ships were meant to dor if the task ofthe new cruisers was to hunt davin enemy commerce raiders then the 6in ‘mun was more than adequate. If on the other hand they were intended to fight, rather chan flee from, enemy bat- tleships, then the 8in gun was completely inadequate and the minimum gun necessary would be the 9.2in. He saw no need to restrict the rate offre against afleing enemy, especialy since slow alterations in range made good, fast shooting comparatively easy. The DNO's advocacy of the 8in gun, rather chan the established 9.2in, came from his belief that it could be hand loaded, White replied thatthe Bin shell would be just as dificult to handle in a seaway. Fisher urged the Board to confirm is original decision for the uniform 6in armament. The issue was finally brought to the Board fora decision, with both White anc the DNO being present, and resulted in an outcome that probably pleased neither. Lore! Walter Kerr thought that the argument for @ uniform Gin gun armament convine- Jing, and would certainly not be prepared to see heavy guns in twin mountings protected only by light shields. Others thought thae while the balance of the argument lay with Fisher and White, none the les the DNO' general point, that there should be heavy chase guns fore and aft, was valid, and thac the ship should carey 9.2in guns well pro- tected by armour even if some of the 6in gun casemates Jad to be given up. Bu twas agreed thar the toral weight of the armament should not exceed the 1500 tons laid low in he original legend. The 9.2in guns were to be carried in shallow barbers, protected by armour 6in thick. Like the 6in guns dhe 9.2in ‘were to be of a new pattern and Armstrong, Whitworth and Woolwich Arsenal were all asked to submie designs for the new gun. The extra weight involved in the dect- sion to carry 9.2in guns meant that sacrifices had to be made elsewhere: the numberof 6in guns was reduced from 20 to 12 and the 25pde guns replaced by [2p ‘With the final decision on the ship’ armament made in July 1893 the detailed design work could finally begin ready for submission to the Board in October. The caleu lated weights required a displacement of 14,000 tons without any allowance for a Board margin. The size of the Board margin became a subject of serious debate: if 7 FIRST CLASS CRUISERS the current rules were to be applied the margin would be 630 tons. Butas experience with the Blake had shown the size of the ship would have tobe increased by much more than the straight figure if the performance ofthe ship was not to be adversely affected. The course taken was to modify the rules for the size of the margin. From now on the margin for large vessels was to be fixed at 200 tons rather than ata percentage of the displacement. For the Powerful the addition of the Board margin meant that the beam had to be increased by Gin and the draught by 3in. White explained that the critical point was that it was unknown where the extra weight would come from. Experience would suggest that it was most likely tobe in the form of extra topweight, from additions to the guns andl equipment. But the adoption of Bellevile boilers had meant that they could not be sure where the centre of gravity of the machinery would be, making nec- essary an increase of beam to ensure stability ‘As the design neared completion White personally toured the major ship building yards to ensure that they could build a vessel 500ft long. Many would only be able to undertake the work if modifications were made 10 their building slips, while there were doubts as to the financial health of Palmers and Earls of Hull. In the end the order for the Powerful went to Vickers Barrow and the Temile to Thompsons of Clydebank. ‘The design was heavily criticised almost from the beginning on account of the large size and apparently ‘weak armament. To a particularly trenchant critic pub- lished in the magazine Engineering, the DNC's depart ment felt it necessary to make a pointed rebuttal. In eply to the alleged underguning of the Powerful it was pointed ‘out that the weight given over to armament represented a 27 per cent increase over that of the Blake, while the ‘weight of armour used to protect the guns was 340 tons in the Blake as against 660 tons for the Powerful. White argued that there was no point in having lage nurnbers ‘of guns unless they could be supplied with adequate ‘quantities of ammunition, and since it was impossible to crease the size of the magazines, the fitting of ational ‘guns was pointless. Yet the general feeling that the ships were undezgunned persisted, and during the ships’ 1902- 1904 refit four extra Gin guns were provided by turning the broadside casemates into two story positions, like those at bow and stem. ‘The Admiralty almost certainly regarded the type as an expensive mistake. Compared to the Edger, the Powerful hud a erew that was 64 per cene large. Exclusive of arma- ‘ment they cast 61 per cent more, yet the ships only ca ried two more 6in guns. The size of the mistake seemed ceven greater when the true nature of the Rurk became clear, Far from being the great threat so much to be feared, she proved to be very much of a damp squib, so ‘much so that the French thought chat the guns had been, put on as an afterthought. [The second part of ‘Fist Class Cruisers’ will look at the subsequent development ofthe frst class cruisers, Ie wil also discuss how successful chese cruisers were in action, in terms of the inevitable trade off between speed, armament and a@rmow.. [twill appear in Warship 2001-2002}GERMAN TYPE II SUBMARINES AT WAR In this study Pierre Herviewx considers an under-examined aspect of the German submarine campaign during the Second World War. With a lin ted operating radius ‘Type Il U-boats, nicknamed ‘the canoes’ by their crews, were designed for warfare in the littoral areas of the North Sea, Baltic and Black Sea. Engaged in successful operations throughout the war in this latter theatre the Kriegsmarine remained undefeated. F ity coastal submarines of this class were launched in Germany between June 1935 (U-I) and December 1940 (U-152), being commissioned respec- tively in June 1935 and January 1941. They were divide ed into: type IIA U-I/U-6, type IIB U-7/U-24 and U- 120-121 (these last two were being built forthe Royal Yugoslav Navy when acquired at the outbreak of the Second World War), type IIC U-56/U-63, type IID U- 137]U-152. All types were first employed operationally and later for training, to prepare crews for bigger and ‘more modern U-boats. They were used offensively in the North Sea, the Baltic, the Black Sea and even the Atlantic for the type IID. This latter model had much bigger bunkers (38 tons of fuel oil) compared to the types IIA (12 tons), IIB (21 tons) and IC (23 tons). To give an idea, the types IA, VIA and IXA were carrying, respectively 96, 67 and 154 tons of fuel oll Their respec- tive radius of action was: ILA 1050 miles } IIB 1800 miles } TIC 1900 miles } ID 3450 miles } ~ surfaced at 12kts All type II submarines could carry 8 mines. On 22 November 1936, U-18 sank after a collision with the submarine tender 7-156 (ex-torpedo boat) and was later salvaged. 1939 At 04:45 on 1 September 1939 the German attack on Poland began. In the Baltic, under the command of regatten-Kapitin Schomburg, Officer Commanding U- Boats in the East, U-5, U-6, U-7, U-I4, U-18, U-22, U- 57 and three type VIIA submarines were included in the naval German forces. Submarine operations were quite limited against Polish warships, echree of their four destroyers having sailed for Britain on 30 August, two days before the German attack. That measure of security 18 proves that the Poles knew the date of the impending invasion and were not, therefore, taken by surprise. Before they were either interned in Sweden or sailed to Britain, two of the five Polish submarines escaped destruction because of premature German torpedo explo- sions. These two missed occasions were the first ofa long series of torpedo faults which lasted for about a yeat. First, con 3 September, at 22:10 (all the times given are German, except when a ship was sunk on a mine), U-14 (Kapixanleuenant Wellner) launched one torpedo at a Polish submarine off the Island of Aland and claimed to hhave sunk het. That submarine was the Sep, but the sin- tle torpedo, fired from a distance of less than 1100 ‘metres, detonated prematurely and then Sep crash-dived. On 7 September at 23:09, U-22 (Kapitinlewinant Winter) launched one torpedo at the Polish submarine Zbik and also claimed wrongly to have torpedoed and sunk her, in about the same position! In the North Sea, U-13 (Kapivinleumnant Daublesky Von Eichhain), U-I5 '(Kapiténleumnant Buchholz), U-16 (Kapiineumane Weingaertner) and U-17 (Kapcinieumant Von Reiche) sailed from the German Bight on 3 September and laid magnetic mines on the British east coast, off Orfordness, Flamborough, Hartlepool and the Downs. U- 1 laid her mines on 4 September, sinking the British cargo ship Maglapur (launched. in 1921, 8641 tons) on 10 September, at 17:25, position 52° LINIOI*43E, damaging the British cargo ship City of Pais (1922, 10902 tons) on 16 September, at 52°14N/01°%3E, and sinking the French cargo ship Phryne (1938, 2660 tons) on 24 September, at 01:00, 3 miles east of Aldeburzh. U-15 laid her mines on 6 September, on which sank the British cargo ship Goodwood (1937, 2796 tons) on 10 September, at 06:10, one mile south-east of Flamborough Head and another British cargo ship, the Orsa (1925, 1478 tons) on 21 October, 15 miles from Flamborough Head, Between 3 and 10 September, U-I2, U-56, U-58 and U-59 were stationed in the North Sea, on Great Fisher Bank, and U-9 and U-I9 off the Scottish east coast ‘against British naval units, No result was obeained. U-20 operated off Southem Norway. Off the Scottish east oust, on 22 September, at 14:18, U-21 (KapivinleuenaneU-58 (type IC) survived the war and was scutled on 3 May 1945 in Kiel, (Detippel) rauenheim) missed British destroyer because of torpe- do defects. Between 15 September and 4 October, four type II and one type VIIA submarines operated off the Norwegian southem coast in mercantile warfare, in accordance with prize regulations. U-3 (Kapivneurnane Schepke) sank two ships: on 30 September, at 11:00, 35 miles north-west of Hanstolm, the Danish cargo ship Vendia (1924, 1150 tons) with gunfire and torpedo. On the same day, at 21:30, she boarded and sank, with scut tling charges, the Swedish cargo ship Gun (1891, 1198 tons), 30 miles north-west of Hansthole. Following the British Admiralty’ advice, the Gun tried to ram and sink U.3 before her boarding party came on board, but the U- boat succeeded in avoiding damage with an’ emergency UA. (Kapitlewnant Von Klot-Hleydenfelde) sank three ships: on 22 September, at 23:00, she boarded and scuttled the Finnish cargo ship Mani Raguar (1903, 2262 tons), 5 miles south of Arendal. On the following day, at 11:20, she boarded and scuttled another Finnish cargo ship the Walma (1908, 1361 cons), at 58°4ON/09°S2E. UAT (Leunant zur See Heidel) sank three ships: on 22 September, at 14:30, she torpedoed and sank the British cargo. ship Akenside (1917, 2694 tons), at 60°07N/04°37E. On 28 September, U-7 torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Solas (1917, 1368 tons), 25 miles south-west of Lista light. On the same day at (08455, she torpedoed and sank che Norwegian cargo ship Takstaas (1916, 1830 tons), at 60°1SN/O4°41E. U-16, on 28 September at 00:30, torpedoed and sank the Swedish cargo ship Noland (1909, 3378 tons), 45 miles south-west 19 GERMAN TYPE II SUBMARINES AT WAR of Stavanger. Because of torpedo defects, off the Scottish east coast, U-14, U-24 (Kapinleutnant Behrens) and U- 22 missed respectively submarine, a destroyer and a sub- ‘marine, all British, on 24, 24 and 29 September! The Royal Navy laid deep anti-U-Boat barrages i the Struts cof Dover, with a total of 3636 mines, between Folkestone and Cap Gris Nex, from 25 September to 23 October. ‘One of them was tesponsible for the loss of U-12 (Von der Ropp) on 8 October. In the North Sea, on 4 October, at 06:00, U-23 (Kaptdnlentnane Keetschmet) sank the Britis cargo ship Glen Parg (1937, 876 tons) with gunfire and torpedo, at SS°S2NJOL°31W. U-Boats laid magnetic mine barrages off the British east coast: U-16 (Kapiténleutnant Wellner) in the Stats of Dover on 22 October. The next day she was depth, charged by the patrol sloop HMS Pugin anc the armed trawler HMS Cayton Wyke. On 24 October, U-I6 ran on a British mine and sank at $I°O9NJOL°28E. U-19 (Koptanleutnant Meckel) laid her mines off Inner Dowsing on 17 October, U-21 in the Fish of Forth on 3 and 4 November, U23 off Cromarty and U-24 (Kapténleuenane Jeppencr-Haltenbof) off Hartlepool on 27 October. The following losses occurred in these bar- rages: on 21 October, at 02:00, the French cargo ship Capitaine Edmond Laborie (1923, 3087 tons), 2 mes ast ‘of Inner Dowsing Light Vessel, On the same day, the Norwegian tanker ship Deodata (1897, 3295 tons), 5 miles fom Inner Dowsing Light Vessel: On 24 October, at 09:00, the Greck cargo ship Konstantinos Heapateras (1913, 5962 tons) near the Inner Dowsing Light Vessel “These three vessels were sunk by mines laid by U-19. On.WARSHIP 2000-2001 9 November, at 07:20, the British cargo ship Carmarthen Coast (1921, 961 tons) sank on a mine laid by U-24, 3 miles east of Seaham harbour. On 21 November, the French auxiliary minesweeper Sainte Clair (1906, 58 tons) sank, 10 miles south-east of Folkestone, on @ mine laid by U-16. On the same day, in the Firth of Forth, the light cruiser HMS Belfast (1938, 10550 tons) was heavily damaged on a mine laid by U-2/ and, in addition, that submarine’ mines sank two ships: as late as 21 December, the netlayer HMS Bayonet (1938, 605 tons) and on 24 February 1940 (1) the British cargo ship Royal Archer (1928, 2266 tons), at S6°06N/02°55W. HMS Belfast's damage was bad, for the mine exploded below the for- ward engine room, broke the ship's back and fractured all the machinery supports. She did not return to service until October 1942. From 24 October to 13 November, four U-Boats oper- ated against units of the Home Fleet, west of Orkneys, and subsequently against merchant ships. On 30 October, at 10:00, U-56 (Kapiténleumant Zahn) attacked a ‘British force comprising the battleships Nelson, Rodney, Hood and 6 destroyers. A full salvo of three torpedoes was launched at the Nelson, hit the bat- tleship and did not explode! To have succeeded getting through the sereen of destroyers for such a result was ddemoralising and, in addition, Churchill was on board! Zahn was so depressed that Admiral Dénite sent him to a Submarine Training School to take care of future crews. On 23 October, at 03:05, U-59 (Leumant zur See Jirst) sank, with gunfire and ‘scuttling changes, the British trawler St. Nidan (1937, 565 tons) at 59°50N/04°20W. On the same day, at 06:55, in the same pesition, U-59 sank, in the same way, the Brieish trawler Lynx I! (1906, 250 tons). Two days later, at 23:35, U-59 toxpedoed and sank the armed trawler HMS Northen Rover (1936, 655 tons), near Kirkwall in the Orkneys. On the same day 100, at 22:50, U-13 torpedoed and sank the British cargo ship Caim Mona (1918, 4666 tons) from convoy HX.5B, ar 57°38N/01°45W, ‘Magnetic mines were lai, on the British east const, by US (Kapivinleumane Fralsm) off Lowestoft, on’ 17 November, and sank with one of them the British trawler Resercho (1917, 258 tons) 6 miles south-east of Flamborough Head, on 28 December at 22:53. U-19 (Kapinleunant Miller-Amecke) also laid hers on 17 November, off Orfordness, and was responsible for sink ing the Yugoslavian cargo ship Carica Milica (1928, 6371 tons) on the following day at 11:55, 3.5 miles. off Shipwash Light Vessel. Finally, U-20_(Kapitdnleumant Moehle) laid her mines on 22 November near Newaep Light Vessel, two ships being sunk: on 29 November, at 01:30, the British cango ship Ionian (1938, 3114 tons) from convoy FN.43, 1.5 miles from Newarp Light Vessel and, on 10 December, at 16:00, the British cargo ship Willowbool (1925, 4815 tons), 3 miles east of Newarp light Vessel Tn simultaneous operations on the cast coast, U-57 (Kapitéeumane Korth) on 17 November, at 20:15, tore pedoed and sank the Lithuanian cargo ship Kaunas (1931, 1566 tons), 6.5. miles _west-north-west of Noordbinder Light "Vessel. U-18 (Leumnant zur See 20 Mengersen) corpedoed and sank the British trawler Wigmore (1928, 395 tons), on 18 November, at 21:16, by 57°S9N/O206W. The Wigmore belonged to an Iceland fishing convoy. U-22 on the same day, at 23:10, torpe- ded and sank the British cargo ship Parti (1915,500 tons), at 58°07N/O2°18W. On 19 November, a 02:13, U-57 torpedoed andi sank the British cargo ship Stanbrook (1909, 1383 tons), near the Noordkinder Light Vessel, as she was sailing from Antwerp to the Tyne. On 20 November, at 01:00, near Rattray Head, U-18. missed with torpedoes the destrayer HIMS Inge Between 27 November and 7 December, U-Boats laid magnetic mines on the British east coast and attacked shipping “with torpedoes: U-38(Kapitdnleumane Kuppisch) laid her mines off Lowestoft, obtaining no result, U.59 laid hes off the Cockle Light Vessel on 5 December and, the following day, at 10:32, the armed teawler HMS Washingion (1909, 209 tons) was sunk en ‘oute for Great Yarmouth, On 12 December, at 0815, the British eargo ship Marvick Head (1920, 496 tons) was sunk by another U-59 mine, 0.5 miles south of north Caister Bay. U-61 (Kapitanieumant Oesten) laid her mines on 2 December, off Newcastle, and on 22 December, at 13:49, the British cargo ship Grofeale (1929, 4434 tons) was damaged, 3-miles east ofthe Tyne Piers. On 1 December, at 04:53, U-21 torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Arcturus (1910, 1277 tons), olf the east Sottsh const. Kapitdnleunant Zahn, hhaving recovered, and being back ro operations with his U.S6, succeeded in hitting two cargo ships, both of ther at 22°40, on 2 December: the British Eskedene (1934, 3829 cons), who was damaged at 56°30N/01°40W, an the Swedish Rudolf (1922, 2119 tons) who sank at 56°1SN/O1"25W. Between 7 and 22 December che ‘canoes’ as the Type I submarines were nicknamed by their crews, laid may- netic mines on the British east Coast and also attacked shipping with torpedoes in thae area and in the southern part of the North Sea, On 12 December, U-13 (Kapitanleumnane Scheringet) lad her mines off Dundee, ‘fier the aso ofthe U-61 (type IIC) in Wilhelmshaven, ding ‘winter 1939-40, Kapitinleutnant Oesten is welomed by ‘Admital Dente. He was later in command of U-106 and U-861 cand survived the war, (ECPA).resulting in the sinking of the Estonian cargo ship Anu (1883, 1421 tons), on 6 February 1940, off the river Tay U-22 (Kapicanleuenant Jenisch) lad hers on 15, 20 and 22 December off Blyth, sinking four ships: on 20 December, at 14:30, the Swedish cargo ship Mars (1924, 1877 tons), | mile east of St-Mary’s Light Vessel. On 25 December, at 07:45, the armed trawler HMS Lach Doon (1937, 534 tons). On 28 December, at 09:32, the Danish eargo ship Hanne (1905, 1080 tons), 1 mile eas of Blyth, Finally, on 28 January 1940, the British cargo ship Eston (1919, 1487 tons) from convoy FN.81, 1-60 (Kapitdnlewmant Schewe) laid her mines on 17 Decembet, off Cross Sands, and sonk the British cargo ship City of Kobe (1924, 4373 tons) from convoy FS.56, fon 19 December, at 03:35, by 52°35N/01°59E. U-61 laid her mines on 11 December, off the Firth of Forth, and sank the British cargo ship Feryil (1919, 1086 tons) on 21 January 1940, at 14:30, 1.5 miles north of Se. Mary. In attacks against shipping, U-20 torpedoed and sank the Danish cargo ship Magnus (1906, 1339 tons) on 9 December, at 18:41, at 57°48N/00°35W. U-21 on 21 December, at 07:25, torpedoed and sank the Swedish cargo ship Mars (another of the same name, 1882, 1475 tons), east north-east of May Island, and on the same day, ten minutes lates, torpedoed and sank another Swedish cargo ship, the Carl Henckel (1882, 1352 tons) at ST°00N/OO°I7E. U-23 on 7 December, at 23:26, tor- pedoed and sank the Danish cargo ship Scotia (1924, 2400 tons), at 57°3IN/OZ°I7E. U-57 on 13 December, at 19:15, torpedoed and sank the Soviet cargo ship Mina (18991173 tons), near Cross Sands. U-59 on 16 December, at 00:28, torpedoed and sank the Swedish cargo ship’ Lister (1928, 1366 tons), at 55°13N/01°33E. On the same day, at 12:49, U-59 compe- dloed and sank the Norwegian ‘cargo ship Glierell (1934, 1568 tons), 56°14N/O1°04E. On 17 December, at 02:34, U-59 toxpedoed and sank the Danish cargo ship Bogo (1920, 1214 tons), 75 miles east of May Island. On the same day, at 05:36, 59 alo claimed to have toxpe- doed and sunk an unknown cargo ship of about 3000 tons. To compare, it must be recalled that the Bogo had been also estimated 3000 tons. Kretschmer, with his U- 23, also claimed to have torpedoed and sunk, on 9 December, an unknown cargo ship of about 2500 tons, in the area where the Magnis was sunk. Between 28 December 1939 and 12 January 1940, U-56 and U-58 operated in the North Sea. On 31 December, off the ‘Scottish east coast, U-58 missed a British destroyer, posi- tion being about 58°NO2"W. 1940 ‘On 1 January 1940, at 10:58, U-58 tompedoed and sank the Swedish cargo ship Lars Magnus Trozeli (1920, 1951 tons) at 58°14N/01°36W. On 3 January, at 09:11, anoth- cer Swedish cargo ship, the Svarton (1906, 2475 tons) from convoy HN.61, was torpedoed and sunk at 57°48NO1°47W, by U-58. On 8 January, U-56 laid mines ‘on Cross Sands, sinking the Finnish cargo ship Ono (1918, 1333 tons), on 23 January, a 22:13, 2.7 miles from a GERMAN TYPE II SUBMARINES AT WAR Smith's Light Vessel. From 6 to 16 January, four U-Boats operated off the Scottish ‘east coast, U-19 (Kapicdaleunant Schepke) on 9 January, at 02:21, tompee ddoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Manx (1916, 1343 tons), 58°30N/01°33W. U-23 on LT January, at 16:32, torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Fredoile (1917, 1150 tons), at §8°25/01°10W and, on the following day, at 06:50, the Danish tanker ship Denmark (1931, 10517 tons) by 58°59N/02"53W. U-20 on 13 January, at 04:30, torpedoed and sank the Swedish cargo ship Sylvia (1883, 1524 tons), north-east of Aberdeen. Further successes by U-24 were frustrated by torpedo failures. From 18 to 27 January, no fewer than twelve U- Boats operated on the British east coast and in the south- cern part of the North Sea, On 18 January, a 23:53, the ‘Swedish cargo ship Flandria (1898, 1179 rons) was torpe- dloed and sunk by U-9 (Lewmant zr See Lath) at S4°00N/03°40E. On the following day, at O1:45, the ‘Swedish cargo ship Patria (1915, 1188 tons) was also tor- pedoed and sunk by U-9, at 54°00N/03°30E. On 19 January, at 21:00, the French cargo ship Quiberon (1922, 1296 tons) was torpedoed and sunk by U-59 off Great Yarmouth. On 21 January, at 05:35, U-22 tompedoed and sank the destroyer HMS Exmouth (1934, 1519 tons), off Tarbeet Ness in the Moray Firth; she sank with all her crew of about 200, At 07:11, U-22 torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Miranda (1920, 1328 tons), at 5BL4N/O205W. (On 22 January, U-57 laid mines off Cromarty and, in that barrage, the base ship HMS Daakam Caste (1904, 8240 tons) sank on 26 January. On 22 January too, at 21:27, U-61 torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Sydvold (1918, 2434 tons), at 58°40N/00°30W. On 23 January, at 07.01, the Norwegian cargo ship Bisp (1889, 1000 tons), sailing from Sunderland. to ‘Andalsnes, was torpedoed and sunk by U-18. On the same day, st 08:40, U-19 torpedoed and sank the British cargo. ship Baltanglia (1921, 1523. tons), at 55°35NJO1°27W. Bight minutes later U-19 torpedoed tnd sank another eargo ship, the Norwegian Pluto (1918, 1598 cons) in the same position. On 24 January, at 19:08, U-23 torpedoed andl sank the Norwegian cargo ship Vand (1910, 1086 tons) as she was sailing from Horten to Sunderland. On 25 January, at 02:30, U-I4 (Leumant zur See Wohlfarh) torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Biarite (1922, 1752 cons), at 52°39NJO4°15E. On 25 January, at 21:12, U-i9 compe doed and sank the Latvian cargo ship Everene (1906, 44434 tons) near Longstone L.-T Bighteen minutes later, U-I9 tompedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Gudveig (1919, 1300 tons), 4.5 miles east of Longstone. On 27 January, at 20:03, U-20 (Kapitinleumant Von, Klot-Heydenfelde) torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Fara (1918, 844 tons) 15 miles south-east of ‘Copinsay, in the Orkneys. Later in the day, in the same place, U-20 torpedoed and sank three other cargo ships: at 20:52, the Danish Fredensburg (1922, 2094 tons), 5825N/0153W; at 21:24, the Danish England (1930, 2319 tons) and at 23:13 the Norwegian Hosamger (1911, 1591 tons), U-15 and U-60 retumed, without success, ‘owing to torpedo failures.GERMAN TYPE II SUBMARINES AT WAR Four views of U-9 (eype IIB) coming back home, after the war patrol in which she sank the French submarine Doris on 9 May 1940. The U-9 was the only U-Boat to wear an Iron Cross on her conning-tower, to commemorate the sinkings ofthe large covuisers HMS Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue, by the the Fist World War U-9 on 22 September 1914, Leutnant zur See Lith is wearing his white cap, (ECPA), From 27 January to 10 Febuary, seven U-Boats operat cedon the British east coast and in the Seottish part of the North Sea. U-13 (Obereumant zur See Schulte) claimed to have torpedoed and damaged a cargo ship of about 44000 tons, which so far has not been identified, early on 29 January, off the Norther East Scottish coast. On 30 January, in the North Sea, U-15 was sunk on the return voyage in a collision with the torpedo boat Is. On 31 January, at 00:43, U-13 torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Start (1923, 1168 tons) as she was sailing ftom Sunderland to Oslo. On the same day, at 19:54, U-21 (Oberleutnant zur See Stiebler) torpedoed tnd sank the Danish cargo ship Vidor (1925, 1353 tons) at 58°39N/02°00E. On 1 Febuary, at 01:43, U-13 torpe doed and sank the Swedish cargo ship Fram (1897, 2491 tons) at 57°43NO2°06W. On the same day, at 20:44, U- 59 torpedoed and sank the British cargo ship Ellen M (1938, 498 tons) at 52°33NJO2°15E. On 2 February, at 06:24, U-59 torpedoed and sank another British mer- chant ship, the tanker Creofield (1928, 838 tons) at 52°33N/02"25E. On the same day, at 20:40, U-59 torpe- ddoed and sank the British eargo ship Porelet (1918, 1064 tons) at 52°40N/02°13E. The same evening, at 22:41, in the same area, U-59 claimed to have torpedoed and sunk an unidentified cargo ship of about 2000 tons. On 3 February, at 09:36, U-58 torpedoed and sank the 2B Estonian cargo ship Reet (1904, 815 tons), in approxi mate position 58°NO2°E, as she was sailing from Meth to Goteborg. On 4 February, at 21:04, U-21 rompedoed and sank the Yugoslav cargo ship Vid (1910, 3547 tons) at 58°15NO0°48W. U-17 (Kapitanleuenant Behrens), U- 24 and U-56 had no success. During Operation ‘Nordmark’, against convoy trafic between Britain and Scandinavia, as well asin the southe ean part of the North Sea, nine U-boats were employed. ‘On LI February, at 18:20, U-9 torpedoed and sank the Estonian cargo. ship. Linde (1899, 1213 tons) at 5851N/OL54E, On 14 February, at 01:35, U-S7 torpedoed and sank the British tanker ship Gretafeld (1928, 10191 tons) belonging to convoy HX.18, at 58°27N02°33W. On 15 February, at 23:55, U-I4 torpedoed and sank the Danish cargo ship Sleiimer (1915, 1066 tons) at 58°18N/01°46W. Five minutes later, she torpedoed and sank another Danish cargo ship, the Rhone (1915, 1064 tons). On the same day, at 21:25, U-14 torpedoed and sank the Swedish cargo ship Osmed (1903, 1526 tons), 20 rnles north of Kinnaird Head. Ten minutes late, she tor- ppedoed and sank another Swedish eargo ship, the Liana (1898, 1664 tons), 24 miles north of Kinnaird Head. On 17 February, at 02:05, U-10 (Oberleutnant zur See Preuss) torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Kuernaas (1918, 1819 tons) at 51°50N/03°19E. On 18 February, atWARSHIP 2000-2001 00:23, U-61 toxpedoed and sank the Panamanian cango ship El Sonador (1897, 1406 tons), east ofthe Shetlands. (On the same day, at 03:54, U-23 torpedoed and sank the destroyer HMS Daring (1932, 1397 tons) from a Bergen- Methil HN convoy, at 58°40N/01°40E; there were only 15 survivors ‘On 18 February too, at 06:09, U-16 torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Sangstad (1925, 4297 tons) at 9°00N/00°25E. Also on the samme day, at 09:26, J-10 torpedoed and sank the Dutch cargo ship Ameland (1930, 4537 tons) at 51°54N/03°OLE. On 20 February, at (00:15, U-19 missed the British oil tanker Daghestan, at S°2INJO1°48W, because of torpedo defect. On 21 February, at 06:26, U-22 had the same problem with the British trawler Scathclova north of Fair Island. On the same day, at 18:09, U-57 torpedoed and damaged the British cargo ship Loch Maddy (1934, 4996 tons) from convoy HX19, 20 miles from Copinsay Lighthouse in the Orkneys. U-23 finished her off with a torpedo, on 22 February, at 01:07. On 24 February, at 21:00 (British time), U-63 (Obereumant er See Lorentz) rorpedoed and sank the Swedish cargo ship Santos (1925, 3840 tons) from the Britain-Norway convoy HN.14, 59°17NI00°42W. A few hours later, on 25 February, in trying to attack again the convoy, U-63 was sighted by the submarine HMS Narwhal and sunk, south-east ofthe Shetlands, by the escorting destroyers HMS Escort, HMS. Imogen and HMS Inglefild, the latter being herself sunk An unidentified type IIA or IIB, back (EcPA). from an operation, entering the harbour of Wilhelmshaven, lke the U-9 om the same day. ‘on 25 February 1944 by a German glider bomb, four years later, co the day! U-63 was the fist type II Usboat sunk by surface forces after six months of operations. U-63 was abrand new submarine, lamnched on 6 December 1939 and commissioned in January 1940, She was, infact, tak- ing part in her fist operational sorte when sunk. From 29 February to 9 March, three U-boats operated off Cross Sands and in the southern part of the North Sea. On 29 February, at 22332, U-20 (Kapiednleutant Von Klot-Heydenfeldt) torpedoed and sank the Italian cango ship Maria Rosa (1914, 4211 tons), at 52°24NJO1°59E. (On the next day, at 03:15, U-20 torpedoed and sank a second Italian cargo ship, the Mirella (1918, 5340) at 52°24NJO2°02E. It must be mentioned that, on 9 February, U-9 laid mines in approximate position S8°NJO°E and, on 4 May 1940, the British tanker ship San Tiburcio (1921, 5995 tons) was sunk, 4 miles from “Tabet Ness, Moray Firth, by one of them. On 2 March, ‘at 21:59, U-I7 torpedoed and sank the Dutch cargo ship Rijstroom (1937, 695 tons) at 51°36N/02°54E. On 5 March, at 20:38, U-17 torpedoed and sank the Dutch ‘cargo ship Growo (1925, 920 tons) ac 51°41N/O2°47E. ‘On 7 March, at 04:30, 'U-I4 torpedoed and sank the Dutch cargo. ship Veckt (1917, 19 65 tons) at 51°45N/03°05E, On 9 March, at 05:42, U-I4 tompedoed and sank the British cargo ship Borthuick (1920, 1097 tons) at 51°44N/03°22E, On the same day, at 23:30, U- 14 torpedoed and sank another British cargo ship, theGERMAN TYPE II SUBMARINES AT WAR ‘The U-l (eype IIA) which was probably sunk in Apri 1940, by a mine lal by the submarine HMS Narwhal on 4 April 1940. (Driippel). Abbowsford (1924, 1585 rons), in the same area. Fifteen ‘minutes later, U-14 torpedoed and sank another British cargo ship, the Akeld (1922, 643 Tons) at S1°44N/03°22E. From 14 March an unsuccessful operation took place to hhunt down British and French submarines in the North Sea, by U-7, U9, U-I9, U-20, U-23, U-24, U-56, U-57 and UL59 and, off southern Norway by U-1, U-2, U3 and U-4 Then the U-Boats were ordered to the British East Coast. On 19 March, at 22:21, U-19 sank with gun- fire and torpedo the Danish cargo ship Minsk (1911, 1229 tons) at S8°O7N/02"39W. Sixteen. minutes later, U-19 torpedoed. and sank another Danish cargo ship. the Charkow (1913, 1026 tons). On 20 March, at 0457, U- 19 torpedoed and sank the Danish cargo ship Viking (1893, 1153 tons) at 58°21N)02°22W. Finally, twenty fone minutes later, U-19 torpedoed and sank. a fourth Danish eargo ship, che Botha (1920, 2109 tons). On 21 March, U-37 sighted a cango ship, who had been bombed and damaged the day before by a German aircraft. She torpedoed and finished her off, 4.75 miles east of Gopinsay Lighthouse, in the Oskneys. She was the Norwegian Svinta (1916, 1267 tons). U-22 departed 20 rarch for the south of Lindesnes. On 24 March she was off Pentland Forth and she was lest, from unknown cause, about 31 March (probably the last date of her transmis- sions) whilst operating in the Moray Firth, On 25 March, at 20:11, U-57, specialising in the coup de geace, rorpe dloed and finished off another ship, the British tanker Dagheszan (1921, 5742 tons), 9 miles east of Copinsay Lighthouse. This ship had also been damaged on 20 25 March by the bombing of a German aircraft, and had ‘escaped destruction for U-19 thanks to torpedo failure ‘on 20 February! On 27 March, following a navigational ‘error, U-21 grounded in Norwegian waters on a reef, neat Mandal, and was interned by Norwegian authorities; not fora long time! ‘On 6 April Operation ‘Weserubung’ started forthe sur- face ships and U-Boats of the Kriegsmarine (the invasion of Norway). Thirty-one submarines were involved, among them 18 type Il boats: For the Bergen area, U-9, U-14, U-56, U-60, and U-62, Stavanger, U-1 and U: Pentland Firth, U-13, U-19, U-57, U-58 and U-59, Tindesnes, U-2, U-3, U-5 and U-6, ShetlandsjOrkneys, U-7 and U-10. ‘The U-boat operations ended with incomplete achieve ments, despite favourable firing opportunities, because of defects in the depth-keeping mechanisms and in the ‘magnetic fusing of the torpedoes. On 6 April at 03:16, on outward trp, U-59 torpedoed and sank the Norwegian cargo ship Navara (1920, 2118 tons) at 59°N/04°W. On 10 April, at 02:13, U-t (Kapinleumnane Hinsc) torpedoed and sank the subma- rine HMS Thisle (1938, 1326 tons), north-west, of Stavanger, off Skucesnes. U-I (Koruetenkapitin Deccke) ‘was recorded in every source available as having been tor- pedoed and sunk by the submarine HMS Porpose on 16 ‘April 1940. Research has indicated that the boat attacked by the Porpoise was U-3, which escaped undamaged. U-1WARSHIP 2000-2001 ‘The U-4 (type IIA) who torpedoed ane sank the submarine HIMS ‘Thistle on 10 April 1940. (Driippel). ‘wus probably lost on a mine laid on 4 April 1940 by the submarine HMS Narukal, which lid 50 mines ara depth of ight feet within a five mile radius about postion 54°37N/06°35E. U-1 left Wilhelmshaven on 6 April with onders to patio off Stavanger. She was never heard frm after she sailed. On 16 April, at 15:19, U-13 missed a British destroyer, off the Shetland, because of torpedo defect. On the next day, at 1733, U-13 tompedoed and sank the British eargo ship Swainby (1917, 4935 tons), 25 miles north of Muckle Flug, in the Shetlands. On 20 April, a 12:48, an attack by U-9 on the Polish destroyer Blyskawica filed because ofa premature torpedo fuze, in approximate postion 61°N/02°E. On 26 April at 01:17, U-13 claimed to have torpedoed and sunk’ a so far unidentified cago ship of about 4000 tons who sank in 45 seconds, in approximate position 59°NO4°W. On 28 April, a 01:29, U-13 torpedoed and damaged the British tanker Scottish American (1920, 6999 tons) at SB>4IN/O44OW. From 6 May, tvelve Allied submarines operated unsuc- cessfully off the Dutch coast anal in the southem part of the North Sea, to cover the eastern entrance to the English Channel. The submarines HMS Seawolf, HMS ‘Shark, HMS Snapper, HMS Sturgeon and HMS Triad, the French submarines Antiope, Calypso, Circe, Doris, La Sibyile, Orphee and Thetis were’ employed. ‘The Kriegsmarine had sent two submarines to operate in the same area, U-7 and U-9, On 9 May, at 0:14, U-9 torpe- doed and’sank the French submarine Dons (1927, 615 tons) at 53°40N/04°E, On 11 May, at 00:49, U-9 toxpe- sdoed and sank the Estonian cargo ship Vit (1917, 1908 tons) near the Westhinder Buoy. On the same day, at 14:00, U-9 torpedoed and sank the British cargo ship ‘Tinga (1925, 1930 tons) at 51°2IN/02°25E. In the southern North Sea too, U-9 torpedoed and sank, on 23 ‘May, at 12:54, the German cargo ship Sigurds Faulbaums (1913, 3256 tons) who, captured by the British, was sail- ing to England, at 51°29N}02°386. (On 29 May, west of Dunkirk, U-62 (Oberleuenant er See Michalowski) torpedoed and sank the destroyer HMS Grafton (1935, 1355 tons) at 51°22N/02°45E. Attacks on the Polish destroyer Blyskavica and the destroyer HMS Vimy by U-0 failed because of torpedo defects. Between 22 May and 12 June, U-8, U-56 and U-58 operated from Bergen, west of the Orkneys and in the North Minch. Torpedo defects prevented suecesses. For instance, on 30 May, at 05:17, U-56 (Kapiinlewnat Harms) missed the British cargo ship Ulster Prince, at $9°32N/06*23W. On 31 May, in tying to attack the troop transport convoy FN.184, U-13 was sunk by the sloop HMS. Weston, off Lowestoft, at 52°27/02°02E. On 1 June, at 23:48, U-58 torpedoed and sank the British cargo ship Astronomer (1917, 8401 tons) at 58°01NJO2°12W. Between 16 June and 2 July, U-61 and U-62 operated from Bergen in the area ofthe Hebrides. On 26 June, at 07:19, U-62 torpe: doed and sank the British trawler Castleron (1904, 211 tons) in the vicinity of the Orkneys. U-62 missed two ships and an attack by U-61 on an auxiliary cruiser failed, in the three cases probably because of torpedo defects. A type IIC submarine. In wartime manbers were no painted on the conning-tower, (ECPA). 26