Brazil: Legal Response to Covid-19

Brazil [br]

Octávio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Danielle Rached, Deisy Ventura,

Conrado Hubner Mendes, Marco Antônio Moraes Alberto

Content type: Encyclopedia entries

Article last updated: April 2021

General editors: Prof. Jeff King; Dr. Octavio Ferraz

Area editors: Prof. Tendayi Achiume; Prof. Alan Bogg; Dr. Natalie Byrom; Prof. Cathryn Costello; Prof.
Nicola Countouris; Prof. Colleen Flood; Prof. Eva Pils; Prof. Nico Steytler; Dr. Silvia Suteu; Dr. Bryan
Thomas; Dr. Michael Veale; Dr. Pedro A. Villarreal

© The several contributors 2021. Some rights reserved. This is an open access publication, available
online and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0
International (CC BY-NC 4.0), a copy of which is available at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
4.0/. Enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence terms should be sent to the Rights
Department, Oxford University Press.

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 DOI: 10.1093/law-occ19/e16.013.16

Except where the text indicates the contrary, the law is as it stood on: 12 April 2021

I.  Constitutional Framework

1.  Brazil is a presidential federal republic of approximately 210 million inhabitants, divided
into a federal union (União), a federal district (Distrito Federal), 26 states (estados), and
5.570 municipalities (municípios), all autonomous (Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988,
Article 18). The federal, state, and municipal executives are headed respectively by a
president, governors, and mayors, all directly elected by the population every four years
with the right of running for re-election once. In each of these federative units there is a
legislature, also directly elected by the population every four years. The federal legislature
(Congresso Nacional) is bicameral, composed of a lower chamber (Câmara dos Deputados)
with 513 members and a Senate (Senado Nacional) with 81 members, three representing
each state and another three representing the federal district. State and municipal
legislatures are unicameral. There are also federal and state courts with the power to
invalidate legislation and administrative acts that do not conform with the constitution or
the laws and a high level of judicialization.

2.  The Constitution allocates legislative competences among all federative units and
between the executive and the legislature. As well as areas of exclusive legislative
competences of the federal union (Article 22), the Constitution also establishes a long list of
concurrent legislative competences of the federal union, the federal district, and states
(Articles 23 and 24), eg education and health. These concurrent competences are not as
well harmonized as would be desirable, leading to uncertainties and conflict about whose
responsibility and power it is to deal with certain issues. Article 23, II of the Constitution
establishes that ‘to care for health and public assistance’ is a ‘common competence’ of all
spheres of government. Article 24, XII of the Constitution establishes that ‘social
providence, the protection and defence of health’ is a concurrent legislative competence of
the federal union and the states. After a dispute between the federal government, states,
and municipalities at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Supreme Federal
Tribunal (Supremo Tribunal Federal) (STF) decided that all federative units had the
concurrent competence to adopt measures to address the health crisis (see Part IV below).

3.  Article 21, XVIII of the Constitution ascribes to the federal union the responsibility to
‘plan and promote the permanent defence against public calamities, especially droughts
and floods.’ Public health is not expressly mentioned. In another section of the Constitution
(Title V), Articles 136 and 137 confer on the President the power to decree, with approval
from Congress, a state of defence (estado de defesa) or a state of siege (estado de sítio),
with significant further coercive powers to restrict rights, in cases of threat to the ‘public
order and social peace caused by grave and imminent institutional instability … or natural
calamities of great proportion.’ Again, public health is not mentioned expressly.

4.  So far, no such declaration has been issued by the President. The health crisis has been
dealt with within the regular framework of infra-constitutional laws, federal, state, and
municipal, and no constitutional rights or guarantees have been suspended, nor any
international treaties derogated from. The only constitutional right that the government has
tried to limit at the beginning of the pandemic was the right of access to information, but
this was suspended by the Supreme Federal Tribunal.1 There was also an attempt, by a
political party aligned with the government (Partido Progressista) (PP), to reduce
Parliament’s ability to scrutinize executive provisional measures during the health

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2021
 emergency, but the STF again rejected it (see Part IV below).2 No international law
provision was derogated from.

II.  Applicable Legal Framework

A.  Constitutional and international law
5.  No constitutional declaration of a state of emergency (state of defence and state of
siege) has been issued in Brazil to deal with the pandemic to date. A state of defence can be
declared by the President for the ‘preservation or prompt reestablishment of public order or
social peace, within limited geographical areas, in cases of grave and imminent threat of
institutional instability or in case of great environmental calamities’ (Article 136 of the
Constitution). The corresponding presidential decree has to specify in detail its duration,
geographic scope, and coercive measures imposed such as restrictions to rights of assembly
and to confidentiality of correspondence (Article 136 of the Constitution). No other right
can be suspended, and any arrests and detentions have to be brought immediately before a
judge and not last beyond 10 days without judicial approval (Article 136(3) of the
Constitution). A state of siege can be declared by the President in cases of ‘grave
commotion of national repercussion or occurrence of facts that demonstrate the inefficacy
of measures adopted during a state of defence’ (Article 137, I of the Constitution) or
‘declaration of a state of war or response to foreign armed aggression’ (Article 137, II of the
Constitution). Similarly to the state of defence, the decree has to specify its duration and all
specific measures adopted, including the suspension of constitutional guarantees (Article
138 of the Constitution). More rights can be suspended during a state of siege than during
a state of defence, including freedom of movement, freedom of the press, and the
inviolability of home (Article 139 of the Constitution). No suspension of the activities of
Congress, nor censorship of the pronouncements of its members is allowed (Article 139 of
the Constitution).

6.  A Public Health Emergency of National Importance (Emergência em Saúde Pública de

Importância Nacional) (‘ESPIN’), was declared by the health secretary via Ordinance 188 of
3 February 2020, which implements Executive Decree 7.616 (17 November 2011). Decree
7.616 sets out in significant detail what the health secretary ought to do in cases of public
health emergencies, limiting considerably the scope of that power-duty. There must be a
need for ‘urgent measures of prevention, control and limitation of risks, damages and
hazards to public health’ (Article 2 of Executive Decree 7.616).

7.  Ordinance 188 makes express reference to the World Health Organization (WHO)
declaration of a public health emergency of international importance (‘PHEIC’) three days
earlier. A Centre for Emergency Operations in Health (Centro de Operações de
Emergências em Saúde Pública) (‘COE’) was set up to manage a coordinated national
response to the crisis.3 Ordinance 188 also established the possibility of the COE to
recommend, if the need was justified, the temporary hiring of additional health
professionals, the acquisition of additional equipment and hiring of services, and the
requisition of private goods and services (Article 3 of Ordinance 188).

B.  Statutory provisions

8.  Three days after Ordinance 188 of 3 February 2020 was issued, a more elaborate and
detailed statute sailed through the Brazilian Congress in less than 48 hours: Federal Law
13.979 of 6 February 2020 (‘Quarantine Act’). As Brazil is a federal state and health is a
concurrent responsibility of all levels of government (federal, state, and municipal), the
Quarantine Act simply established the basic legal framework, in accordance with Article 24

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 of the Constitution, for the future adoption of necessary measures by each of these
governmental entities as required.

9.  Within another six weeks, all of Brazil’s 26 states and the federal district (Brasília) had
adopted executive orders and legislation, often declaring a temporary state of public
emergency or calamity and adopting comprehensive social distancing measures such as the
closure of schools, shops, beaches and parks, restrictions on public transport, and the
recommendation that people stay at home. At the time of writing, there were 1,838 federal
normative acts, 2,195 state and almost 45,083 municipal normative acts issued to address
the Covid-19 crisis in Brazil (see Part IV below for details). 4 It is expressly established in
the Federal Law 13.979 of 6 February 2020 (‘Quarantine Act’) that its validity will expire
when the WHO’s PHEIC is revoked.

10.  As the speedy approval in Congress of the Quarantine Act testifies, there was little
political opposition to it, although important amendments were added at the Chamber of
Deputies (the lower house of Congress). These amendments included: a sunset provision
conditioning its effects to the continuation of the WHO declaration of a PHEIC (Article 1(3)
of the Quarantine Act); an express guarantee of respect for dignity, and human rights and
liberties in the implementation of quarantine laws (Article 3(2), III of the Quarantine Act); a
weakening of the responsibility of individuals to supply information to public authorities,
replacing the word ‘duty’ with ‘collaboration’ and deleting from the Bill the obligation to
‘report to authorities symptoms of Covid-19’ (Article 5 of the Quarantine Act); and a
strengthening of the duty of the state to keep ‘public and updated information on case
numbers, confirmed, suspected and under investigation, on the sanitary crisis’ (Article 6(2)
of the Quarantine Act). But once state governors and municipality mayors started to
implement quarantine measures based on the Quarantine Act, via executive decrees, the
President himself fiercely opposed them, leading to a legal battle at the Supreme Federal
Tribunal that ended up in favour of states and municipalities (see Part I above).
Interestingly, thus, a ‘power grab’ by the executive, especially at the federal level, has not
been an issue in Brazil, but rather the omission of and objection to public health measures
by the President against efforts of governors and mayors (see Part IV below).

C.  Executive rule-making powers

11.  The large territorial extension of Brazil and its federative system leads to a complex
regulatory situation in the health crisis. State governors have by and large the main powers
to adopt measures by state executive decree, which have to be renewed from time to time
and follow the framework of the Quarantine Act,5 as interpreted by the Supreme Federal
Tribunal. But the federal legislature can also take the initiative of legislation and have done
so with laws to impose the use of masks and to establish a system of protection for
vulnerable groups (indigenous people, black communities). The federal government retains
concurrent competence to issue executive decrees but, as already mentioned, has not used
this power often, and has the exclusive competence to issue ministerial ordinances
regarding international and interstate travel, vaccination, isolation, and quarantine.
Municipalities’ mayors can also adopt more local measures in harmony with state
regulations.

12.  Any of these multiple measures can be, and have been, challenged in courts, which
simply fits the culture of intense judicialization that has been occurring in Brazil in all areas
in the past two decades. At the time of writing, the Supreme Federal Tribunal reported the
existence of 5,240 cases related to Covid-19 in its docket.6

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2021
 D.  Guidance
13.  Most of the measures in Brazil have been adopted through binding regulation, such as
ordinary legislation, executive (federal, state, and municipal) decrees, and ordinances,
which impose civil, administrative, and criminal liability on individuals. A joint Ordinance by
the health and justice secretaries established that non-compliance with public health
measures would attract civil, administrative, and criminal liability, in particular the
sanctions of Articles 268 and 330 of the Criminal Code, which punish the propagation of
contagious diseases and non-compliance with legal orders of public officials respectively.7
Enforcement has been attributed to medical doctors, health authorities, and the police.
According to Article 4 of Interministerial Ordinance n. 5, non-compliance with public health
measures may attract the sanctions of Articles 268 and 330 of the Criminal Code, if the
infraction does not constitute a more serious crime. There has also been non-binding
guidance conveyed in documents of the Health Ministry and also inserted in binding
instruments, for instance, in Amazonas (one of the two states highlighted in Part IV below)
the governor decreed the compulsory closure of state schools but only recommended the
closure of private ones in the same instrument.8 In Sao Paulo, there has never been a
binding imposition of movement restrictions on the population, but only a recommendation
that people stay at home and leave only to satisfy basic necessities such as the purchase of
food and medical care.9

III.  Institutions and Oversight

A.  The role of legislatures in supervising the executive
14.  Article 49, X of the Constitution establishes that one of the exclusive competencies of
the National Congress is to ‘oversee and control, directly or through one of the houses, the
acts of the Executive Power, included those of the indirect administration’. Other articles of
the 1988 Constitution specify further how this control can be performed, eg through the
summoning of ministers and other authorities to give explanations, whose disobedience is
considered a crime of responsibility (Article 50) and the establishment of parliamentary
inquiry commissions (Comissões Parlamentares de Inquérito) (‘CPIs’), (Article 58(3) of the
Constitution). This power extends to the scrutiny of states and municipalities, public
authorities in general, and also private entities and individuals whenever resources are
transferred to them from the federal level, which takes place regularly.10 The federal
legislature also has the competence to scrutinize and approve or reject the executive’s
accounts (Articles 70–75 and 84, XXIV of the Constitution), with the assistance of the
Federal Audit Tribunal (Tribunal de Contas da União).11 As Brazil adopts a presidential
regime (see Part I above), the legislature has no power to bring a government down
through a vote of no confidence, but it can use the procedure of impeachment (Article 85 of
the Constitution) and has done so twice already in the relatively short period of just over
three decades of the current Constitution. Although supposed to be an exceptional and
difficult to implement measure, conditioned on the existence of ‘high crimes’ (crimes de
responsabilidade), two out of the five presidents elected after the 1988 Constitution have
been removed through impeachment. At the sub-national level, identical or very similar
roles are attributed to states and municipalities’ legislatures. This is established both
generically, in the Federal Constitution (Article 31 for municipalities) and in more detail in
state constitutions and organic laws of municipalities.12

15.  As regards control of more specific executive normative acts such as decrees and
regulations, the situation is complex and depends on the type of normative act in question.
The federal executive has the power to issue different types of normative acts. Perhaps the
most important is the power to enact so-called provisional measures (medidas provisorias)
(‘MPs’). These are general norms with the force of legislation and immediate effect that the
President can enact in cases of ‘relevance and urgency’ (Article 62 of the Constitution). MPs

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 are valid for 60 days, automatically extendable by an equal period, after which they lapse if
not confirmed or rejected by Congress. As the agenda of Congress is automatically blocked
if it doesn’t accept or reject MPs after 45 days of their enactment, it is a powerful and often
abused instrument in the hands of the Brazilian executive. Congress can, and often does,
reject fully or partially MPs, yet its business can be significantly disrupted by them. See in
Part I above the dispute about the processing of MPs during the health crisis decided by the
STF as an example.

16.  As well as MPs, the executive has the power to issue, in very specific and exceptional
cases, delegated legislation (leis delegadas) (Article 68 of the Constitution) and also, much
more frequently, decrees (decretos) and regulations (regulamentos) to enable the
implementation of the laws enacted by Congress (Article 84, IV of the Constitution). These
executive normative acts must follow the limits imposed by the Constitution and ordinary
legislation, and are subject to judicial review in the courts. They are also subject to
nullification by the legislature (the so-called ‘political control’) through legislative decrees
(decretos legislativos) (Article 49 V of the Constitution).13 However, the term ‘nullification’
may be a little too strong. The Portuguese term used in the constitution is ‘sustar’, which
may be understood as simply ‘suspend’ rather than ‘make void’. Some claim there are limits
on this legislative power: (i) it can only be used to control strict illegality (contra legem,
extra legem, or ultra legem) and not unconstitutionality; (ii) it only applies to normative acts
that implement legislation and not to decrees in areas entrusted to the executive (so-called
‘regulamentos autônomos’) as specified in Article 84, VI of the Constitution; and (iii) it can
only be used against acts of the President, and not ministers.14 The use of Article 49, V
powers by Congress has not been frequent, unlike resort to the courts which has all but
exploded in the past two decades including during the pandemic. So far, although many
members of Congress have initiated legislative decrees’ bills proposing the suspension of
several executive acts related to the coronavirus crisis, none has yet been voted on, let
alone approved, in Congress. At the state and municipal levels, local legislatures have
similar powers.

17.  Last but not least, and especially relevant in the case of pandemics and other crises,
the legislative branches of each federal unit have the prerogative of approving declarations
of a state of public calamity (estado de calamidade pública) by the executive, which confers
on the latter the ability to spend resources, on an emergency basis, beyond those approved
in the budget.15

18.  On paper at least, the executive at all levels of the federation is subject to a reasonably
high degree of scrutiny by the legislature. In reality, however, whether and how this
scrutiny is exercised depends, of course, on the willingness of the particular legislature in
question, which, in turn, depends on a host of factors among which the most relevant is
perhaps the party-political makeup of the legislature. A city mayor, state governor, or
President whose party or coalition has a majority in the legislature will likely face less
scrutiny than one without it.

19.  In the specific case of the Covid-19 crisis, the legislative branches (at national and
subnational levels) across the country exercised variable degrees of oversight over
normative acts of the executive, as would be expected in such a large and diverse
federation.

20.  At the federal level, there was a reasonable degree of scrutiny through the debate and
amendment of MPs and bills proposed by the federal executive and the independent
initiation of bills by legislators which set the legal limits for the enactment of executive
decrees and regulations. As we saw in Part II above, the Quarantine Act received several
amendments in Congress and the imposition of the use of masks came from Congress

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 against the wishes of the Executive (see Part IV.A.6 below). As regards scrutiny of more
specific pandemic response measures enacted through decrees and regulations, it also
varied across the country. A good example here is a decree issued by the President
including in the list of essential services, ie activities that could remain open, barber and
beauty shops and gyms (Decree 10.344 of 11 May 2020). In Congress, a legislative decree
bill (PDL 213/2020) was initiated to make that executive decree void but remains pending.
In the meantime, however, a large number of state governors simply rejected to implement
the decree based on a decision of the Supreme Court confirming their competence to adopt
more restrictive measures than those proposed by the federal executive.16

21.  At the state and municipal levels, there has also been scrutiny by local legislatures,
though with significant variation across the country. The state and municipal legislatures of
São Paulo, for instance, both passed laws with measures to combat coronavirus, enacted
legislative decrees recognising a ‘state of public calamity’, and created Covid-19 working
groups to oversee the performance of the executive branch.17 How well they exercised this
scrutiny function is of course debatable.

22.  At least one governor and one mayor of an important capital have had impeachment
procedures started due to acts related to the health crisis. In Rio de Janeiro, governor
Wilson Witzel has been accused of misappropriating funds through emergency purchases
for acquisition of medical equipment; in Porto Alegre, mayor Nelson Marchezan has been
accused of diverting resources from the health fund to combat Covid-19 to spend on the
marketing of his government.18

23.  Last but not least, the executives at all levels cannot extend indefinitely, and without
legislative approval, their powers to address the health crisis through decrees and
regulations. As already mentioned, these powers derive from legislation that recognises the
existence of a health emergency and a state of public calamity. This legislation has expiry
dates and can be curtailed or extended at any time by the legislature.

B.  The functioning of parliament where its ordinary business is

disrupted
24.  The legislature has been able to meet during the period of pandemic disruption. The
Congress was never closed, but debating and voting procedures have been virtual for six
months and are currently ‘semi-presential’. There has been no interruption in the work of
the legislature, whether in the form of ‘suspension’, ‘recess’, ‘adjustment period’, or
‘extension’. On the contrary, the usual two-week recess in July 2020 was cancelled, due to
the urgency of some Covid-19-related legislation.

25.  The two Houses—the Senate and Chamber of Deputies—and their respective
committees were able to maintain their agenda with virtual meetings, which involves the
passage of legislation and parliamentary committee meetings. There were no abnormal
constraints on the process of voting, on the number of persons permitted to participate in
plenary debates, or on the process for posing questions and offering rejoinders to answers.
The measures to adapt the sessions to virtual meetings affected the parties that support the
government and the opposition parties in the same way.

26.  Similar adjustments were made at the state and municipal levels across the country
with similar effects.

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2021
 C.  Role of and access to courts
27.  The operation of the courts was not interrupted during the pandemic, yet wide-ranging
measures were taken to minimise the perceived health risk that being in the courtrooms
entailed and those may have affected access to justice. Resolution 313 (19 March 2020) of
the Brazilian National Council of Justice (Conselho Nacional de Justiça) put all courts
around the country on an Extraordinary On-call Regimen (Plantão Extraordinário) during
which courts ‘essential services’ would continue yet no presential work by judges, clerks,
trainees, and collaborators would take place (Article 2). The same resolution sets a list of
minimum services that ought to remain open and directs each tribunal to determine how to
organise them, preferentially in remote form. It also determines that individuals with high
risk and those returning from places with a high prevalence of Covid-19 should not be
required to work presentially, even in essential services. The resolution also sets a list of
cases that should be decided during the on-call period, such as habeas corpus, interim
injunctions, urgent issues related to prison orders, search and seizure, cremation of bodies,
and authorization of travel (Article 4), and suspends all deadlines (Article 5). It was also left
to each tribunal to institute and regulate remote work and virtual sessions (Article 6).

28.  Virtual sessions have been held both in the higher courts’ sessions and in first-instance
hearings (both civil and criminal proceedings), and were regulated by Resolution 329 (30
July 2020), of the National Council of Justice. In general, petitioning was already fully
digital in all Brazilian courts, being mandatory in higher courts.

29.  The use of advanced technology certainly poses challenges in terms of access to
justice, especially in highly unequal countries like Brazil. Whether it enhances significantly
the current obstacles such as lack of education, resources, access to legal counsel, etc is an
interesting question. Article 3(1) of Resolution 329 establishes that virtual hearings will not
take place if any of the parties involved declare a ‘technical or instrumental impossibility’ of
participation. Some complaints have been made against virtual hearings, especially in
criminal proceedings, as being harmful to the right to a fair trial. In civil proceedings more
than 90% of cases are decided without a hearing based on documentary evidence and those
few that require a hearing are often not urgent, so many judges have decided to wait for the
reopening of courts rather than use virtual hearings.19 The Brazilian Bar Association
(Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil) petitioned the National Council of Justice requiring that
virtual hearings be made voluntary only, so long as all parties agreed.20 The issue remains
controversial and has been the subject of litigation across the country.

30.  Brazilian courts do have review powers over declarations of states of emergency and
exception, yet only when provoked by a claimant. As seen in Part II above, there has been
no constitutional state of emergency declared in Brazil. As regards declarations of a health
emergency and of states of public calamity, there have been no court challenges to those,
although, as we will see in Part IV below, there has been rampant judicialization related to
the specific measures adopted to fight the pandemic.

D.  Elections
31.  The only elections so far impacted by the pandemic were those for mayors and local
legislators, which take place in all 5,570 municipalities of the country on the same day,
every four years. These elections were originally scheduled for 4 October 2020 and were
postponed by Constitutional Amendment n. 107 (2 July 2020) to 15 November 2020. The
elections took place following a health protocol (Health Safety Plan) issued by the Brazilian
Superior Electoral Court, but had a record rate of abstentions, attributed to the fear of the
virus.21 Some have argued that the elections have caused a rise in the number of infections

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2021
 and deaths, including those of candidates, some of whom became infected during the
campaign and died.22

E.  Scientific advice

32.  There is an express requirement in the Quarantine Act (Federal Law 13.979/2020) that
all measures adopted to combat the pandemic ‘can only be implemented based on scientific
evidence and on analysis of strategic information’ (Article 3(1)) The level of compliance with
such obligation is, however, debatable and difficult to measure. At the federal level, the
main provider of scientific information to the executive is normally the Ministry of Health.
The dismissal and resignation of two health secretaries during the pandemic due to
disagreements with the President shows how controversial the topic can be and how the
executive has ample scope to decide whether to follow scientific advice or not. At the state
and municipal levels, governors and mayors have set up scientific committees to aid in their
responses to Covid-19, yet, again, the independence and power of such committees are very
limited and their influence on policy is debatable.23

F.  Freedom of the press and freedom of information

33.  The government sought to suspend the deadlines for answering access to information
requests during the health crisis through amendments to the Access to Information Law
(Federal Law 12.527, of 18 November 2011) via a provisional measure (MP 928 of 23 March
2020). The MP received 51 amendment proposals in the lower chamber of Congress, but
simply lapsed without further deliberation on 20 July 2020. The MP has not produced any
effects as during this period its effects had been suspended by the Supreme Federal
Tribunal by interim injunctions in three constitutionality challenges brought by political
parties and the Brazilian Bar Association (ADI 6.347, ADI 6.351, ADI 6.353).

34.  There has been no direct and frontal generalised attempt by the government to
obstruct reporting on Covid-19 by the media, but some measures and incidents have made
reporting more difficult. More noteworthy has been the botched attempt by the federal
government to exclude from its official webpage the accumulated number of deaths, in
early June 2020, which made Brazil disappear from the renowned Johns Hopkins University
world database for a few hours.24 The attempt failed as states and press vehicles
immediately started to divulge the numbers on alternative webpages and the domestic and
international outcry was so strong that the government backtracked. There was also a court
challenge and an interim injunction at the Supreme Federal Tribunal ordering the state to
resume publication of data according to the original methodology (ADPF 690). Also
concerning was the discovery that the mayor of Rio de Janeiro was financing disruptions of
TV live broadcasts outside municipal hospitals by ‘passers-by’.25

G.  Ombuds and oversight bodies

35.  There is a mosaic of numerous oversight bodies in Brazil with different names, remits,
composition criteria, institutional locations, and independence levels, being simply
impossible to describe and analyse the individual work of any of them during the
pandemic.26 Judged simply by what is publicised in the press, one is led to think that they
have not played a key role in the pandemic, but this could be a false impression due to the
traditional focus of the press on the legislatures and courts. A notable exception is the
Federal Accounts Tribunal (Tribunal de Contas da União) (TCU), an independent oversight
body whose remit is to aid Parliament in the so-called external control of the executive, ie in
the scrutiny of its accounts. The TCU adopted a Special Plan to Monitor Actions to Combat
Covid 19 and has already issued two critical reports, highlighting the lack of ‘strategic

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2021
 planning’ and ‘coordinated management and communication’ on the part of the federal
government.27 Similar initiatives can be found at state and municipal levels.

36.  No special reviewer of legislation has been appointed to monitor the response to
Covid-19 in Brazil.

IV.  Public Health Measures, Enforcement and Compliance

A.  Public health measures
37.  As seen in Part II above, the federal government of Brazil reacted swiftly to the
pandemic in terms of normative activity. A health emergency was declared on 3 March
2020, ie within 72 hours of the declaration of a PHEIC by the WHO, three weeks before the
first confirmed case of Covid-19 arrived in Brazilian territory (imported from Italy), and six
weeks before the first death, which occurred in the state of São Paulo. A framework
Quarantine Act (Federal Law 13.979 of 6 February 2020) sailed through the Congress in
less than 48 hours, setting out what health authorities of all levels of the Brazilian
federation (federal, state, and municipal) could do to address the impending health crisis.

38.  Within six weeks of the Quarantine Act, all of Brazil’s 26 states plus the federal district
(Brasília) had adopted executive orders and legislation, often declaring a state of public
emergency and/or state of calamity (see Part II above) and adopting public health measures
to try to tackle the health crisis. At the time of writing, there were 2,195 state and almost
45,083 municipal normative acts issued to address the crisis in Brazil.28 Notwithstanding
this regulatory effort, Brazil has experienced one of the highest levels of reported infections
(13.2 million cases) and one of the highest numbers of reported deaths (345,000) in the
world according to official, and likely underreported, figures.29

39.  Article 3 of the Quarantine Act is the crucial provision in that regard and worth quoting
in full:

Article 3. 
In order to address the health emergency of international importance regulated in
this law, the authorities may adopt, within their competences, among others, the
following measures: I – isolation; II – quarantine; III – determination of compulsory
submission to: a) medical exams; b) lab tests; c) collection of clinical samples; d)
vaccination and other prophylactic measures; e) specific medical treatment; III.A-
compulsory use of individual protection masks;30 IV – epidemiological studies or
investigations; V - exhumation, necropsy, cremation and corpses manipulation; VI –
exceptional and temporary restriction, by road, ports or airports, of: a) entry to and
exit of the country; and b) interstate and intermunicipal mobility;31 VII - requisition
of assets and services from individuals and companies, in which case future
payment of just compensation is guaranteed; VIII – exceptional and temporary
authorization for the importation and distribution of any materials, medicines,
equipment and supplies in the field of health subject to sanitary surveillance
without registration by Anvisa considered essential to aid in the combat of the
coronavirus pandemic, on condition of: a) registration by at least one of the
following foreign health authorities and authorization for commercial distribution in
their respective countries: 1. Food and Drug Administration (FDA); 2. European
Medicines Agency (EMA); 3. Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA);
4. National Medical Products Administration (NMPA).The Quarantine Act proceeds,
still in Article 3, with several provisions setting out the manner and form of how
these measures ought to be adopted. In its paragraph 1, it is determined that any
measure adopted must be ‘based on scientific evidence and analysis of strategic

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 health information’. They must also be ‘limited in time and space to the minimum
necessary to the promotion and preservation of public health’. Paragraph 2
recognises the right of affected individuals to ‘be permanently informed about
theirs and their families’ health state’ (I); the right to receive free treatment (II); full
respect to their dignity, human rights and fundamental liberties’ (III)’. Many of
these were included through amendments in Congress. Paragraph 3 recognises the
right of workers not to be penalised for absences resulting from public health
measures and paragraph 4 reiterates the legal liability of individuals to comply with
those measures.

40.  Several provisions in the Quarantine Act allocate, not always very clearly, competence
among authorities to adopt the measures listed in its Article 3. Previous authorization of the
Health Secretary is required for the imposition of isolation and quarantine (see Part IV.A.7
below), compulsory use of masks (Article 3, III-A of the Quarantine Act), exhumation,
necropsy, cremation, and corpse manipulation (V); exceptional and temporary restriction, by
road, ports or airports (VI). As regards determination of medical exams; lab tests; the
collection of clinical samples; vaccination and other prophylactic measures, and specific
medical treatment (III); epidemiological studies or investigations (IV); and requisition of
assets and services (VII), local administrators are free to adopt those measures
autonomously. To complicate matters, Article 4 of Ordinance 356 (11 March 2020), allocates
to all spheres of government, concurrently, the power to adopt ‘quarantine’, defined broadly
as aiming to ‘guarantee the maintenance of health services’.

41.  This complex web of measures and overlapping responsibilities generated significant
political conflict between the federal level, in particular the President, and many states and
municipalities. The President has been fiercely against any public health measures to
combat the pandemic (eg mobility restrictions, closure of premises, etc) and has repeatedly
denied the gravity of the crisis, most notably dismissing Covid-19 as a ‘little flu’ in an
official national broadcast, urging people not to stay at home, and appearing in public
repeatedly in the middle of crowds of supporters without a mask and shaking hands.32 He
has also dismissed the health secretary who devised the initial response to the pandemic for
being in favour of social distancing measures, and is thought to have practically forced the
second one to resign for being against the President’s request that unproven drug
Chloroquine be used in the public system, a request that his new (third) Minister of Health,
a military official with no experience in health, Eduardo Pazuello, immediately complied
with.33 After 10 months in the post, Pazuello too was dismissed and is currently the subject
of an investigation to determine his liability for the dire situation Brazil currently faces with
record infections and deaths, and in particular for the oxygen shortages that led to many
deaths in the state of Amazonas.34

42.  The conflicts between the President and states and municipalities were inevitably
judicialized and reached the Supreme Federal Tribunal in three separate proceedings. In all
of them, the Court confirmed the concurrent competence of states and municipalities to
adopt and keep public health measures in place to combat the pandemic.35 After the
decision in the first two proceedings, the President retreated from his threat to attempt to
revoke, via presidential decree, the measures adopted by states and municipalities, but
continued to consistently deny the relevance of the pandemic, to breach public health rules
himself, such as social distancing and the use of masks, and to use his decree and veto
powers whenever possible to try and undermine public health efforts of the federal
legislative and states and municipal executives.36 Most of these vetoes have been
overturned by Congress and/or the Supreme Court.

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 43.  As a result of the opposition of the Brazilian president to public health measures to
combat Covid-19 and the federalist structure of the Brazilian state (see Parts II and III
above), most of the public health measures adopted in Brazil have been taken at the state
and municipal levels, with some important exceptions indicated below.

44.  To fully understand the response to Covid-19 across the whole Brazilian territory it
would be necessary to analyse all of the responses of each individual political-administrative
unit of the federation, ie the Federal Union, the federal district, 26 states, and 5,570
municipalities, which is not feasible in the limited space of this report. This report will thus
focus on two representative states, São Paulo and Amazonas, and refer to the Federal
Union, other states, and municipalities only occasionally, if relevant.

São Paulo
45.  The state of São Paulo is the most populous (46 million) and the richest of Brazil in
GDP terms (second in GDP per capita). Covid-19 was first detected there on 26 February
2020, with the first death on 17 March 2020, and has grown to become the state with the
highest number of infections (2,597,366) and deaths (80,742), reaching a mortality rate of
175.8/100,000, one of the highest in the world. The governor of Sao Paulo decreed a
‘quarantine’ in late March 2020 (State Decree 64.881 of 22 March 2020 (‘Quarantine
Decree’)), ordering the closure of non-essential activities, including schools and suspending
public events, but not imposing strict mobility restrictions (ie ‘lockdown’). These measures
were to last originally until 7 April 2020 but were extended several times through executive
decrees and were still in place at the time of writing, with some variations reported in detail
below. On 15 June 2020, State Decree 64.994 of 28 May 2020 created the São Paulo Plan to
coordinate the state and municipalities in the fight against Covid-19, and manage the
flexibilization of quarantine measures according to four phases (red, orange, yellow, and
green), attributing to municipalities with sufficient capacity the competence to gradually
reopen non-essential services.

46.  It is not helpful to talk of waves of infection and deaths in São Paulo as is common in
Europe, for instance, as in São Paulo cases and deaths have never brought down
significantly, ie anywhere close to zero, since the beginning of the pandemic, apart from a
very brief period of a few days in the beginning of November 2020, when things started to
worsen significantly and achieved the worst peak, with over 1,000 deaths per day in late
March and early April 2021.

47.  Critics have observed a lack of consistency in public health measures and the gravity of
the crisis. Already on 1 June 2020, a flexibilization plan was put in place, allowing
municipalities to enable non-essential activities to reopen according to pre-established
public health criteria related to the occupation rate of Covid-19 intensive care unit (ICU)
beds, the number of new admissions of infected patients, and the number of infections and
deaths, all supposedly based on scientific evidence. This so-called São Paulo Plan operated
according to a five phase spectrum of seriousness, ranging from ‘maximum alert’ (red),
passing through ‘control’ (orange), ‘flexibilization’ (yellow), ‘partial opening’ (green), and
‘normal controlled’ (blue).

48.  The Plan was heavily criticised by academics and public health experts for being
implemented to soon, and in particular for being implemented without an efficient testing
strategy, and even the Secretary of State for Health criticised mayors for reopening non-
essential activities without supporting data.37

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 49.  On 3 March 2021, with the significant worsening of infections and deaths and the fast
depletion of the capacity of the health service, all 645 municipalities of the state were put
under the most restrictive, red phase of the plan from 6 March 2021 for two weeks.38 With
a further worsening of the situation, the state governor decided to add another, more
restrictive phase to the Plan on 11 March 2021,39 the ‘emergency phase’, which the whole
state was placed under on 15 March 2021, which lasted till 11 April 2021, when the whole
state moved back to the red phase.40

Amazonas
50.  The State of Amazonas has the largest territorial area in Brazil (1,559,167,889 km² in
2019), and an estimated population of 4,207,714 people (in 2020), with the second lowest
demographic density in the country (2.23 inhabitants per square metre).41 Its territory is
home to an important part of the Amazon—Amazon means the vast complex of ecosystems
located in the hydrographic basin of the Amazon River, which has a total surface area of just
over 7 million km² (that is, approximately 40% of the South American continent)—the
largest tropical forest in the world. The arrival of the pandemic coincides with the
worsening of chronic problems in the region, such as the invasion of protected lands, the
increase in illegal logging, and the deforestation of forest areas to create space for
agribusiness,42 in addition to what some argue is the genocide of indigenous populations
(see Part VI below).

51.  The response to Covid-19 in the State of Amazonas is considered one of the most
disastrous in Brazil, with 355,987 confirmed cases and 12,202 deaths at the time of writing,
and a mortality rate that is a staggering 294.4 deaths/100,000,43 the highest in Brazil and
higher than the any country in the world.44 Epidemiological studies unequivocally reveal
the high excess mortality in Manaus and the epidemic’s severity in contexts of great social
inequality, weak effectiveness of public policies, and fragility of health services.45

52.  Amazonas was the first Brazilian state to suffer the collapse of its health system.46 In
the absence of care, at the height of the pandemic in Manaus, 30% of deaths occurred at
home or on the street.47 The scarcity of ICU beds (7 per 100,000 inhabitants, one of the
worst rates in Brazil)48 is compounded by the fact that they are concentrated in the capital,
Manaus, forcing the State to transfer patients from the interior to the capital in aerial
ICUs.49 In many cases this transfer was determined by court decisions.50 There was also a
collapse of the funerary system in several cities, including Manaus.51

53.  In Amazonas—mostly Manaus, the capital city, where most of the population live and
most Covid-19 cases concentrate—unlike in São Paulo, it is perhaps more appropriate to
talk in terms of waves, with a first peak happening in May 2020 and the second one, much
more severe, in January 2021, resulting in significantly more deaths and an even worse
collapse of the health system, this time with horrific scenes of patients dying of asphyxia
due to the severe shortages of oxygen in the hospitals.52 What puzzled most experts was the
fact that studies had shown that Manaus had achieved herd immunity with more than 70%
of the population having been infected, but it was later discovered that a new variant, the
P1 variant, was likely the main cause of the new surge.53

1.  Individual mobility restrictions on citizens (stay-at-home, curfews, etc)

54.  At the time of writing, no mobility restrictions had been imposed on the whole territory
of Brazil at the same time, despite many calls from public health experts and some local
politicians. This would have been legally possible according to the Quarantine Act (Article

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 3) but would have required a federal order, either by the President or by his Health
Secretary, which was never forthcoming.

55.  As we saw in the introduction to Part III, the first Health Secretary was dismissed from
office in April 2020 for being in favour of more restrictive measures than the President, and
the second for disagreeing with the President about the prescription of the drug
hydroxychloroquine. The following (so far) two health secretaries are widely regarded as
having been carefully chosen for their alignment with the views of the President, or their
willingness to simply obey them.54 The current Health Secretary, Marcelo Queiroga, has
expressly stated that the ‘[health] policy is that of Bolsonaro, not the Health Secretary’s’,
and that the Secretary ‘executes the government’s policy’.55 Some thought that the
President would change course when he invited doctor Ludhmila Hajjar to be the Health
Secretary in March 2021, but she alleges to have declined the invitation precisely because
of divergences with the President’s views on the topic.56

56.  Also in March 2020, when Brazil surpassed 250,000 deaths and the health system
collapsed in some states (most notably in Amazonas) and approached collapse almost
everywhere, all Health Secretaries published a letter emphasising that the lack of a ‘unified
and coherent national leadership made the adoption and implementation of measures to
reduce social interaction more difficult’, aggravating the crisis. They also mention that the
suspension of the emergency grant in late January 2021 aggravated both the health and the
social crisis.57

57.  Mobility restrictions were therefore imposed only at the state and municipal levels and
were highly variable across Brazil. As a general rule, during the whole of 2020, they were
not very strict with the exception of a few municipalities and a couple of states, did not last
very long in the few places where they were imposed, and were often resisted and not
adhered to by significant parts of the population. Some states and municipalities adopted,
for some period, stricter prohibitions of circulation, including the closure of public spaces
such as parks, squares, beaches, the erection of barriers and checkpoints in roads, and the
imposition of fines to those caught breaching the rules (see Part IV.2 and IV.4 below).
Amapá was the first, and one of the few states, to adopt such measures in all municipalities.
The state of Pará also adopted ‘lockdown’ measures in the Capital, Belém, and a few other
municipalities. The cities of São Luis (MA) and Recife (PE) also adopted stricter
‘lockdowns’.58

58.  With the significant worsening of the situation in 2021, especially after the calamitous
scenario of Manaus (Amazonas), stay-at-home and curfew measures became more
widespread, but still fiercely resisted. By 14 March 2021, 15 of the 27 states had imposed
curfews (toque de recolher) between 8–10pm and 5–6am. By 18 March 2021, another three
states had imposed such measures.59 Yet, as far as we were able to establish, strict
enforcement of these measures is not the norm and no restrictions on visitors or the
number of people able to meet inside households have been imposed with the exception of a
few municipalities. In gated residential compounds (condomínios), very common in Brazil,
residents’ councils have themselves imposed some restrictions on the use of communal
barbecue and leisure areas. In one municipality in the south region of Brazil, Criciúma, a
municipal decree forbade private parties and events in individuals’ homes and imposed
fines.60

59.  For the whole first year of the pandemic circulation was never legally forbidden in Sao
Paulo. Rather, a non-binding recommendation was made on 22 March 2020 that individuals
should only leave home for ‘immediate necessity of nourishment, healthcare and exercise of
essential activities.’61 On 23 April 2020, a sentence was added to the decree recommending
the use of masks.62 Another relevant change took place to clarify that hairdressers, barber

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 shops, and all modes of sports facilities were suspended, contrary to what the President
announced and tried to impose via decree.63 It was only on 3 March 2021 that a ‘soft
curfew’ (toque de restrição) was adopted, ie only as a recommendation that ‘circulation of
people … be limited to the exercise of essential activities, in particular from 8pm to 5am.’64
On 11 March 2021, when hospital ICUs occupancy reached alarming levels across the state
(87.6%), the governor imposed the first mandatory work from home order (yet limited to
administrative activities), and forbade take away services in restaurants (but allowed drive-
thru from 5am to 8pm and home deliveries 24 hours a day).65 The effects of such
recommendations on actual mobility varied with time (see Part IV.B.2 below on compliance).

60.  Stricter mobility restriction measures were considered and at times imposed in several
municipalities. In the capital city of São Paulo, the most populous of Brazil and one of the
highest in infections and deaths, due to a surge in hospitalizations in April 2020 the mayor
tried to block roads and avenues, to stop the circulation of 50% of vehicles on alternate
days, and then declared a bank holiday of almost a week (megaferiado),66 all of which were
attempts to avoid an even stricter lockdown.67 Resistance was so fierce, however, that he
had to backtrack. In Araraquara, a city of 238,000 inhabitants 285km away from the capital,
and where the strictest mobility restrictions of the state of Sao Paulo were adopted in
February 2021, the mayor was subject to death threats.68 The ‘lockdown’ in Araraquara
involved a complete restriction of the circulation of people and vehicles in public roads, first
for two days (21–23 February 2021), then extended for a whole week (until 27 February
2021), and the closure of all premises outside the health sector, including the closure of
supermarkets for the public (deliveries were allowed), and the suspension of public
transport, for 10 days (from 20 February 2021).69

61.  The picture was similar in the state of Amazonas, with no state wide strict mobility
measures implemented until 2021, but with some individual municipalities enacting more
stringent temporary measures, such as a total blocking of the circulation of people in public
roads and spaces. For example, Barreirinha, São Gabriel da Cachoeira, Silves, and Tefé
during part of the month of May 2020.70 The State Public Prosecutors Office was also very
active and filed lawsuits demanding a judicially imposed lockdown decree in several
municipalities, including Manaus,71 but failing in all apart from Tefé.72

62.  With the surge in infections, hospitalizations, and deaths in December 2020, the
governor tried to introduce stricter restrictions through a decree on 23 December 2020 to
last through the whole post-Christmas and New Year celebrations period (26 December
2020 to 10 January 2021).73 The reaction of the public, in particular businesses for whom
the period is the most lucrative in the year, was so fierce that the governor backtracked
barely two days after the new restrictions had come into force (28 December 2021).74 With
the surge in cases, hospitalizations, and deaths of early January 2021, and prompted by a
court injunction,75 the decree of 23 December was reinstated on 4 January 2021.76 With a
further worsening of the situation, a curfew was implemented on 14 January 2021 between
7pm and 5am.77 Ten days later, the curfew was extended to 24 hours, initially until 31
January 2021 and then extended to 8 February 2021, when it went back to between 9pm
and 6am, remaining so until 5 April 2021,78 when it was further reduced to between
midnight and 6am.79 Exceptions were allowed for essential services such as food and health
related services.

63.  According to studies that try to measure the effectiveness of social distancing rules and
recommendations across Brazil through Google maps and surveys, adherence was never

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 very high and decreased gradually, reaching around 40% in September 2020 (see Part IV.B.
2 below).80

2.  Restrictions on international and internal travel

64.  Restrictions on international travel are the competence of the federal government,
through joint Ordinances of the Civil House, Infra-structure, Justice, and Health ministries,
based on recommendations of the National Sanitary Vigilance Agency (ANVISA). Foreigners
without permanent residence or relatives in Brazil were forbidden from entering the
country from 17 March 2020 until the time of writing.81 But there is a lot of variation
regarding nationalities and means of transport used (water, air, land). Restrictions were
applied firstly to Venezuelans (17 March 2020), then to most South Americans, to nationals
of China, the European Union, many European countries, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, and
South Korea (19 March 2020), then to Uruguayans (22 March 2020), and finally to all
foreigners via water, air, and land by 29 March 2020. Water and land entry restrictions
remain in place to the time of writing. Entry by air was completely allowed again, without
any quarantine or testing restrictions, on 29 July 2020, making Brazil an exception among
most countries,82 and restrictions reintroduced to flights from the United Kingdom,
Northern Ireland, and South Africa—due to variants of Covid-19 that emerged in those
countries—on 25 January 2021.83

65.  As regards internal (ie inter-state and inter-municipal) travel, restrictions varied
significantly across the country. Some states prevented internal travel for short periods of
time, leading to protests and challenges in courts. In the state of Bahia, for example, 83% of
the territory was affected.84 In at least 22 of the 26 states some restriction was imposed,
often closing state borders and generating significant controversy.

66.  In the state of São Paulo, for instance, there was significant concern from mayors
about coastal municipalities during extended bank holidays such as New Year and Easter,
when millions of people tend to travel to the beach. Some of these municipalities (eg
Mongaguá, Itanhaém, Peruíbe, and Itariri e Pedro de Toledo) even erected sanitary barriers
to prevent entrance into their territory, but these actions were quashed in interim
injunctions by the President of the state of São Paulo Court of Appeal for causing
deleterious economic effects.85

67.  In the state of Amazonas, all inter-municipal travel by public servants outside the
health and public security systems was suspended for 15 days on 17 March 2020.86 On 19
March 2020, all river transport within the state was suspended.87 On 20 March 2020, all
road transport between municipalities was also suspended for 15 days.88 These restrictions
were quashed by the Federal Court of Appeal on 30 March 2020, but reconsidered by a
different judge on the same day.89 On 4 April 2020, all intermunicipal and interstate
terrestrial transport (ie bus, vans, taxis, and transport apps) was suspended for 15 days by
a decree from the state governor.90

68.  With the second and more severe peak in January 2021, the Public Defensory, which
had been very active in the judicial saga to protect the governors’ measures of the first
peak, urged the governor of Amazonas to suspend internal transport again, noting the
findings of a study arguing that such measure may have prevented 123,000 infections and
1,200 deaths in 2020.91 The governor eventually did so on 12 January 2021.92

69.  It is important to note that Brazil’s continental dimensions and extensive rural and
forest areas make the closing of internal and external borders rather challenging to

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 implement. Moreover, the closing of internal borders in such a large federal state inevitably
gave rise to conflict between different administrative units.

70.  Restrictions on internal travel have generated conflict between the federal union and
several states and municipalities over ‘lockdown’ measures in particular inter-municipal
and inter-state transport. In an attempt to stop governors from restricting travel, the
President issued a decree including inter-municipal and inter-state transport in the list of
essential activities.93 The decision was declared unlawful by courts in Amazonas and
confirmed by the Supreme Court, leading to the exclusion of inter-municipal transport from
the list of essential activities.94 This lead to a provisional measure by the President in
March 2020 declaring such transport an essential activity with a view to impeding
measures such as those of the Amazonas state reported above.95

3.  Limitations on public and private gatherings and events

71.  Limitations of gatherings and events in public spaces were the earliest and most
widespread measure adopted across Brazil.

72.  In the state of São Paulo, events with more than 500 people were already forbidden by
a provisional decree in mid-March 2020 (State Decree 64.682 of 13 March 2020), and were
completely suspended when the Quarantine Decree came into force nine days later. These
measures were to last originally until 7 April 2020 but were extended several times through
new state decrees and were eventually replaced on 28 May 2020 by the five-phase system
(the Sao Paulo Plan) explained in Part IV above. According to that system, events and public
gatherings are forbidden in cities in phase 1 (red), and can take place with time restrictions
and protective measures (eg social distancing) in phases 2 (orange) and 3 (yellow) with a
maximum of 40% capacity. The capacity is raised to 60% in phase 4 (green) and all
restrictions are removed in phase 5 (blue).

73.  As already mentioned, the whole state of Sao Paulo was back to the most restrictive
phase (red plus, or emergency phase) at the time of writing. During the first year of the
pandemic, municipalities moved up and down phases. In September 2020, for instance, of
the 22 administrative regions of the state of São Paulo, no region was in the most restrictive
phase 1, only one (Barretos) was in phase 2, 10 were in phase 3, and 11 were in phase 4,
including the capital city, São Paulo.

74.  In the state of Amazonas, limitations on public gatherings and events were also the
first measure taken, on 16 March 2020. Unlike in São Paulo, all events were suspended
irrespective of size so long as they took place in state premises, as were, in the same
decree, visits to prisons and detention centres and trips by civil servants (Executive Decree
42.061 of 16 March 2020). One day later, any agglomerations of more than 100 people was
forbidden.96 Events in private venues were suspended only in September 2020, when cases
started to surge again. Social events were restricted to 50% of capacity, a limit of 200
people, and a midnight curfew. Conferences were limited to 40% capacity and a maximum
of 500 people, so long as social distancing was possible.97

75.  Interestingly, neither São Paulo nor Amazonas, and so far as we could check any other
state, has introduced limits on private gatherings inside peoples’ homes, with the exception
of individuals in isolation (see Part IV.A.7 below). Some private residential compounds have
established their own restrictions, often leading to disputes and judicialization.98

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 4.  Closure of premises and facilities (eg schools, shops, services, parks,
churches, sport facilities)
76.  The other group of measures adopted ubiquitously across Brazil was the closure of
premises and facilities for all activities regarded as non-essential. School, shops, beaches,
and parks have been closed, for varying periods of time, across the whole country.

77.  In the state of São Paulo, the Quarantine Decree suspended the operation of all
presential commerce and services with the exception of essential ones (health, food, fuel,
security, and communications), and of construction and certain industries from 24 March
2020.99 When the state moved to the five-phased system in late May, total closure as
instituted in the Quarantine Decree applied only to phase 1 (red) cities, and gradual
reopening, with varying degrees of limitations, applied to all other phases, up to normal
unlimited reopening in cities in phase 5. As already mentioned, cities have moved up and
down phases since the beginning of the pandemic, but none has ever reached phase 5. At
the time of writing (April 2021) all cities were back to phase 1 (red), the most severe, and
Brazil as a whole was the epicentre of the pandemic. The table below summarises the rules
for phases 2–4.

Sao Paulo Plan—State Decree 64.994 (28 May 2020)

Type of activity Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4

Shopping malls, Maximum occupancy Maximum occupancy Maximum occupancy

galleries, and reduced to 20% of full reduced to 40% of full reduced to 60% of full
commerce services capacity. capacity. capacity.

Reduced opening Reduced opening times to

times to a maximum of a maximum of 10 hours
4 hours per day. per day.

No food courts Food courts allowed only

allowed. in open air or well-
ventilated areas.

Bars and restaurants Not allowed to Maximum occupancy Maximum occupancy

function. reduced to 40% of full reduced to 60% of full
capacity. capacity.

Reduced opening times to Curfew at 5pm, or 10pm

a maximum of 10 hours if more than 14
per day. continuous days in phase
4.
Allowed only in open air
or well-ventilated areas.

Curfew at 5pm, or 10pm

if more than 14
continuous days in phase
3.

Barbers and beauty Not allowed to Maximum occupancy Maximum occupancy

shops function. reduced to 40% of full reduced to 60% of full
capacity. capacity.

Reduced opening times to

a maximum of 10 hours
per day.

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 Sao Paulo Plan—State Decree 64.994 (28 May 2020)

Type of activity Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4

Gyms and sports Not allowed to Maximum occupancy Maximum occupancy

facilities function. reduced to 30% of full reduced to 60% of full
capacity. capacity.

Reduced opening times to

a maximum of 10 hours
per day.

Only individual classes

allowed.

78.  Similarly to São Paulo, the state of Amazonas already implemented comprehensive
closure of premises in March 2020. On 23 March 2020, Amazonas declared a state of public
calamity,100 and determined the suspension of all non-essential activities,101 which was
extended by successive decrees,102 and then started to gradually reopen in early June.
Unlike São Paulo, however, it adopted a plan103 based on criteria of relevance of the
economic sector and risks of transmission to be applied only to the capital, Manaus,104 and
to be implemented in so-called ‘four cycles’, starting on 1 June 2020 at midnight (cycle 1),
then 15 June 2020 (cycle 2), 29 June 2020 (cycle 3), and 6 July 2020 (cycle 4). In each cycle
a set of activities were allowed to reopen (see table below). Manaus concentrates more than
53% of the population of the state of Amazonas (2.2 million people out of 4.2 million in the
state as a whole). The other municipalities were given autonomy to implement their own
responses.

Amazonas ‘Four-cycle’ plan—State Decree 42.330 (28 May 2020)

Cycle Activities reopened

Cycle State public Churches and Shops selling sports items, home
1 bodies. temples: with 30% utensils, clothes and shoes, furniture,
capacity, limited to watches and jewellery, medical
1 1.5-hour articles, pet shops, cars, flowers,
June continuous slots, opticians, on-street newsagents, and
2020 and minimum travel agents.
breaks of 5 hours

Cycle Accountants, Restaurants, cafes Shops selling IT, telecommunications,

2 state agents, and bakeries, and and photographic materials, toy
and electronics fast-food. shops, bookshops and stationery,
15 and appliances cosmetics and personal hygiene,
June repair. department stores, electronics and
2020 domestic appliances, living animals,
bijuterias, musical instruments and
accessories, office equipment and
materials, and indoor newsagents.

Cycle Barbers, Gyms and sports Shops selling arts, crafts, and Parks,
3 hairdressers, facilities. souvenirs, sweets and cakes, fishing, public
and hunting, and camping goods, spaces, and
beauticians.

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2021
 Amazonas ‘Four-cycle’ plan—State Decree 42.330 (28 May 2020)

Cycle Activities reopened

29 fireworks, arms, and munitions, and tourist

June estate agents’ showrooms. attractions.
2020

Cycle High risk Private nurseries, Cinemas with a maximum of 50% All other
4 groups can schools, and capacity. activities
stop shielding. universities. with the
6 July exception of
2020 bars, discos,
and event
venues.

79.  The cycles also applied to shopping malls according to the nature of the activity
involved, and they could operate only at 50% capacity (Article 8 of Decree 42.330/2020).
Interestingly, throughout the crisis shopping malls were able to operate drive-thru systems
so long as clients did not step out of their vehicles and the purchase lasted no longer than
15 minutes (Article 9 of Decree 42.330/2020).

80.  With the new surge in cases in December 2020, which worsened in early 2021, a new
and more restrictive package of closures was enacted on 23 December 2020,105 which were
backtracked barely two days after the new restrictions came into force (28 December
2021),106 and, prompted by a court injunction,107 reinstated on 4 January 2021.108

81.  The closure of schools was one of the most contentious issues in Brazil’s response to
Covid-19.109 Given the high level of inequality and functional illiteracy, as well as limited
access to the internet, education was significantly affected in Brazil, in particular for the
vast majority (over 80%) enrolled in state schools. At the other end of the spectrum, there
was discontent among upper middle-class parents who had to keep paying high tuition
fees.110 Some claim that Brazil was among the countries with the highest average number
of weeks of school closure across the world.111

82.  In the state of São Paulo, state and municipal schools closed fully on 23 March 2020,
affecting 3.5 and 1 million students respectively.112 There was some debate about whether
private schools were legally obliged to shut but they followed the government’s
recommendation, affecting another 2.3 million students spread across 10,000 schools.113

83.  On 13 July 2020, the governor issued a decree specifying rules for a gradual reopening
of schools (35%, 70%, and 100% of capacity) according to complex epidemiological criteria
tied to the phases of the Sao Paulo Plan explained above, but allowed municipal and private
schools autonomy to decide whether to reopen or not.114 State and private schools started
to reopen at reduced capacity (35%) in September and municipal ones in October 2020.115
Some private schools decided to shut again in November 2020 due to a surge in
infections.116

84.  Resumption of enhanced presential schooling was planned for the start of the academic
year in February 2021 but the new surge in infections again disrupted the plan. Some
private schools decided to remain closed despite the possibility of reopening,117 and the

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2021
 mayor of Sao Paulo city, for instance, suspended all presential schooling from 14 March to 1
April 2021.118

85.  As in most of Brazil, suspension of education in Sao Paulo has been a very controversial
matter and often ended up in the courts. With an increase in the pressure from parents to
reopen schools,119 the governor of Sao Paulo allowed the gradual reopening of schools in
early 2021 even in cities in phase 1 (red),120 and later issued another decree including
education on the list of essential activities.121 Teachers unions went to court and managed
to suspend both decisions, but it was promptly reversed by the Court of Appeal.122

86.  In Amazonas, state schools in the capital, Manaus, were first closed for 15 days on 16
March 2020 and the same was recommended for private schools (Executive Decree 42.061
of 16 March 2020). A day later closure was extended to all municipalities of Greater
Manaus and also to the municipalities of Parintins and Tabatinga (Executive Decree 42.063
of 17 March 2020) and to all municipalities of the state on 19 March 2020 (Executive
Decree 42.087 of 19 March 2020). During the period of closure, which lasted until 6 July
2020 in private schools (the earliest place in Brazil to resume presential teaching) and until
10 August 2020 in state schools, the state secretariat for education set up a scheme for
remote teaching.123 Municipal schools were the last to resume, in September 2020, yet only
for students and teachers without access to the internet at home.124 It is believed that the
reopening of schools led to a significant increase in infections (342 teachers were already
infected 20 days after reopening),125 as a study by the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz)
had already predicted,126 yet the governor refused to shut the schools again.127 Schools
remained opened in Amazonas for the whole of the remaining 2020 academic year. With the
surge of early 2021, only remote schooling was allowed at the time of writing in state
schools.128 No prohibition seemed applicable to private schools, prompting a request from
the public prosecutors for the governor to extend the prohibition to them.129

5.  Physical distancing

87.  Mandatory physical distancing was not implemented as a general rule, but rather as
protocols for the functioning of private and public facilities. At the federal level, the
Ministry of Health recommended a minimum distance of one metre in public spaces.130 It
was set at 1.5 metres both in the state of São Paulo131 and the state of Amazonas. In both
states, it has always been publicised alongside measures of personal hygiene such as
handwashing and respiratory etiquette, such as the use of masks. In the state of Amazonas,
minimum physical distancing was set at 1.5m ‘preferably’, or the use of a physical barrier
such as a facial protector or screen and, as already mentioned in Part IV.A.3 above, no limit
on the number of people gathering was established, but rather a vague ‘avoidance of
agglomeration’ in public and private facilities (Article 13 of Decree 42.330/2020).

6.  Use of face coverings and personal protective equipment (PPE)

88.  The mandatory use of masks in public and private places is perhaps the best example
of a measure introduced by federal legislation against the opposition of the President,
which went through the Congress entirely via the new remote system implemented due to
the pandemic (see Part III above). Several bills were proposed by members of the lower
house, the first as early as 3 April 2020.132 After receiving several amendments and being
approved in the Lower House, PL-1562/2020 was sent to the Senate on 20 May 2020, where
it received further amendments and returned to the Lower House, which approved it on 9
June 2020.133

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 89.  The Bill was then sent to the sanction of the President on 12 June 2020. On 3 July 2020,
the President sent the Bill back to Congress with no less than 25 vetoes,134 including the
obligation to use masks in: prisons, commercial and industrial premises, religious temples,
educational premises, and other closed spaces; the obligation of employers to provide
masks to employees in the place of work; the imposition of fines; and the destination of
fines’ revenues to the health services. Most of the presidential vetoes (18 out of 25) were
not accepted by the Congress and PL-1562/2020 became Federal Law 14.019/2020.135
Another two vetoes (the obligation of premises to display informational posters on the
correct use of masks and the maximum number of people allowed, and the obligation of use
of masks in prisons) were quashed by the Supreme Court as they were exercised by the
President outside of the deadline of 15 days established by the Constitution.136

90.  The use of masks was also made compulsory at the state and municipal levels. In the
state of São Paulo, it was made compulsory by State Decree 64.959 (4 May 2020) in all
spaces where there is access to the public and fines are imposable to both citizens and the
owners of the facilities (Resolution SS 96 of 29 June 2020). In the state of Amazonas masks
were made compulsory in public and private facilities (Article 13, II of State Decree
42.330/2020) and also in schools and educational settings by members of staff involved in
transportation of students and teachers working in close proximity with young children.137

7.  Isolation of infected individuals and quarantine of individuals suspected of

infection
91.  Article 2 of the Quarantine Act (Federal Law 13.979/2020) defines isolation and
quarantine in the precise terms set in the WHO’s International Health Regulations, ie
isolation applies to infected individuals and quarantine for those suspected of infection.
Article 2(5), I of the Quarantine Act empowers the Health Secretary to determine the
duration and conditions of isolation and quarantine, which he did through Ordinance 356
(11 March 2020), setting out that such measures can be imposed only by a ‘medical
prescription’ or by a ‘recommendation by an epidemiological surveillance agent’ and can
last only for 14 days, and be extended by the same duration (Article 3(1) of Ordinance 356).
Article 3(2) of Ordinance 356 states that isolation should take place preferably in the
patient’s home but also in public or private hospitals, depending on clinical assessment. It
must be based on a positive result for Covid-19 (Article 3(3)) and must be accompanied by
an informed consent form (Article 3(4)). Isolation determined by a public health agent can
take place only in cases of the contact with symptomatic individuals or asymptomatic
carriers and should take place at home (Article 3(5)). Where no public health agents exist,
the Secretary of State should determine isolation (Article 3(6)). On 20 March 2020 the
Health Secretary issued another ordinance allowing the isolation of individuals with
symptoms and those living in the same household.138

92.  On 17 March 2020, an inter-ministerial ordinance issued jointly by the Health and
Justice secretaries affirmed the compulsory nature of the public health measures adopted to
combat the pandemic and alerted for the potential civil, administrative, and criminal
liability of those who disrespect those measures (see also Part IV.B.1 below).139 Unlike data
on infections and deaths, data on the number of people in isolation and quarantine is not
often publicised nor widely available, making it harder to scrutinise.

8.  Testing, treatment, and vaccination

93.  The Quarantine Act enables the state to adopt the compulsory realization of medical
examinations, testing, collection of samples, vaccination and other preventive measures,
and medical treatment (Article 3). This general power was further regulated by Ministerial
Ordinance 5 (17 March 2000),140 which emphasises that disrespect of public health
measures adopted to combat the pandemic may result in civil, administrative, and criminal

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2021
 liability.141 As regards testing and treatment, however, there are no reports that compulsory
measures have been used so far.

94.  As regards vaccination, due to statements by the Brazilian president that everyone had
the right to refuse to be vaccinated,142 three proceedings ended up in the Supreme Court,
which ruled by a majority that compulsory vaccination was constitutional and could
therefore be imposed, including by states and municipalities (ADI 6586, ADI 6587, and ARE
1267879, decided on 17 December 2020).143 By ‘compulsory’ vaccination it is not meant
forced vaccination, but rather the possibility of imposition of sanctions such as fines,
exclusion from certain places, enrolment in schools, etc. ARE 1267879 invoked the right to
freedom of religion as the basis for vaccination refusal. The president of the Supreme Court
sped up the processing of these cases to avoid uncertainty and the potential growth of
vaccination hesitancy.144

95.  Another interesting and controversial issue that erupted in Brazil in relation to
vaccination was the possibility of private providers offering vaccines outside of the public
immunization programme, creating what many saw as ‘queue jumping’ by those with the
economic means. After a vigorous public debate,145 Congress passed Law 14.125 (10 March
2021),146 determining that, before all priority groups in the National Immunizations
Programme (PNI) had been vaccinated (approximately 77 million people), any vaccines
acquired by private companies ought to be donated to the PNI and, after that, half of the
doses ought to be donated to the PNI (Article 2). A first instance judge in Brasilia declared
the unconstitutionality of Article 2 of Law 14.125, yet, at the time of writing, his decision
had been suspended by the Federal Regional Tribunal. It is likely that the case will reach
the Supreme Court in the near future.147

9.  Contact tracing procedures

96.  Contact tracing, as it is known, is strongly dependent on testing. According to the data,
Brazil has done neither well. In July 2020, testing was very low at 7500 tests per million
people, almost 10 times lower than in the United States (74,927 per million), and was
described as a ‘major failure’ by the organisation Medecins sans Frontiers.148 The situation
improved slightly and achieved a peak of 65,000 daily tests in December 2020 (still way
below other countries, eg 1 million daily tests in the US) but worsened again, going down to
44,000 daily tests in early March 2021.149

97.  With such low numbers of testing, any policy of contact tracing is significantly limited,
but Brazil’s reasonably well developed and well distributed primary care network in the
national health system (SUS), which reaches almost all areas of Brazil, provided another
good opportunity for tracing based on symptoms rather than testing. In September 2020,
the Ministry of Health issued Ordinance 2.358 (2 September 2020) establishing a
programme of financial incentives to help municipalities strengthen their tracing and
monitoring capacities.150 An important part of that programme was the obligation of each
municipality to feed information to a centralised system at the federal Ministry of Health (s-
SUS Notifica). How well municipal tracing and monitoring is working is hard to know given
the paucity of available data, but the explosion of infections and deaths in Brazil since
January 2021 seem to provide some indication that either the programme is not working or,
if it is, tracked individuals are not complying with isolation (see Part IV.A.7 above).

98.  States have also implemented tracing programmes. The Department of Health of the
State of São Paulo published a Protocol for the Tracing and Monitoring of Contacts of
Confirmed and Suspected Cases of Covid-19 on 25 August 2020.151 The State of Amazonas
adopted an App on 6 April 2020.152 Again, how well such programmes work is hard to

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2021
 establish due to lack of data but not difficult to presume given the significantly high levels
of death in both states (see the introduction to Part IV above).

10.  Measures in long-term care facilities or homes for the elderly, restrictions
on visitors etc.
99.  As in most countries, in Brazil the greatest burden of infection and death has been
born by the elderly, although at a lower rate than in European countries. A study published
in September 2020 estimated that almost 50% of deaths would occur in long-term care
facilities for the elderly.153 No reliable data exists on the actual number of deaths in such
facilities, which were estimated to be home to approximately 90,000 people in the latest
study available.154

100.  As regards measures adopted to prevent infections and deaths, the Department of
Social Assistance of the Citizenship Ministry published an ordinance on 6 May 2020 with
detailed guidance and recommendations for institutions caring for the elderly and the
disabled.155 Among the recommendations were the realization of testing in all symptomatic
persons, the maintenance of close communication with the local primary health unity,
reduction of agglomeration through transfer of patients and personnel to local hotels or to
the home of relatives able to care for them during the pandemic, temporary suspensions of
visitors, etc.156

101.  How well these measures have been implemented is, again, difficult to know for lack
of available information. Non-governmental organizations that work in the field were far
from optimistic at the beginning of the pandemic, noting the lack of structure and resources
in most care homes, in particular the lack of personal protective equipment (PPE).157

B.  Enforcement and Compliance

1.  Enforcement
102.  The enforcement of the public health measures was attributed to health authorities,
the civil guard, and the police.

103.  In the state of Sao Paulo, from 1 July 2020 to 24 March 2021, the Department of
Health Surveillance conducted 230,515 inspections and imposed 5,019 fines for breaches of
agglomeration rules (eg parties), use of masks, and opening time limitations in bars and
restaurants. These numbers rose significantly in 2021, as from July to August 2020 there
had been 1,786 fines.158 The fine for not using a mask is R$551 (USD $100) for an
individual, and R$5,278 (USD $1,000) for a company for each individual not wearing a
mask. The maximum amount of a fine is R$290,000 (USD $60,000).159

104.  In the state of Amazonas, with the second surge in infections, hospitalizations, and
deaths at the end of 2020, the governor issued a decree establishing a fine of R$50,000
(USD $10,000) for premises that breached the limits to opening times.160 The fine for not
wearing a mask in Manaus (Amazonas), is R$108 (USD $20).161

105.  In March 2021, ANVISA established a new fine for those not wearing masks in airport
terminals of R$2,000 (USD $400).162

106.  Although non-compliance with public health measures are crimes according to the
Criminal Code (Articles 268 and 330), which punishes the propagation of contagious
diseases and non-compliance with legal orders of public officials respectively, there have

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2021
 been only a few reports of arrests, often for aggression to police officers trying to enforce
the rules.163

2.  Compliance
107.  As there have not been strict mandatory ‘lockdowns’ in Brazil apart from very
temporary and geographically circumscribed ones (see Part IV.A.1 above), compliance here
refers to adherence of the population to stay at home recommendations and to compulsory
use of face covering and isolation. As regards mobility, the Brazilian government has
received aggregated and anonymised information from telecommunications companies,
specifically data on geo-mobility of the 220 million mobile phones registered in the country,
since April 2020. At first the Health Secretary requested individualized personal data,
including name, national insurance number, and address, but this was regarded as unlawful
by the Federal Advocate General as an undue intrusion on the right to privacy, only possible
with judicial order.164

108.  Data collected through this method indicates that the highest adherence to stay at
home recommendations occurred at the beginning of the pandemic, in March 2020, but
then fell gradually and never went up again to those levels, not even during the latest more
deadly surge—with the exception of the few places that adopted a more rigorous
‘lockdown’, such as in Araraquara, Sao Paulo. (see Part IV.A.1 above).

109.  Google’s Community Report, which assesses mobility through its apps Waze and
Maps, shows that at the end of March 2020, it recorded significant reductions in
agglomerations in restaurants, shopping malls, cinemas, and parks (70%), workplaces
(34%), and pharmacies and bakeries (30%).165 In its latest report of 7 April 2021, parks
were down 38%, retail and recreation across Brazil was down 34%, transit stations (public
transport) were down 28%, and workplaces were down 12%, but groceries and pharmacies
were up 17%.166

110.  In the state of Sao Paulo, an agreement between the state and mobile phone
companies led to the creation of the Sao Paulo Intelligent Monitoring System (Sistema de
Monitoramento Inteligente de São Paulo (‘SIMI-SP’), which has been measuring mobility
since mid-March 2020. Consistently with national averages, the highest level of adherence
was recorded from the end of March 2020 to the beginning of April 2020, when the index
achieved its highest point (59% on Sunday, 46–7% during the week), falling gradually to a
low of 39% towards the end of 2020, and going back up a little in 2021 with the surge in
infections and strengthening of restrictions, but not much (51% on Sundays, 42–3% during
the week).167

111.  In Manaus, Amazonas, a similar pattern appears. The highest level of adherence to
mobility restrictions was reported at the beginning of the pandemic (60% in April 2020) and
again in January 2021 (61%), but these were both recorded on Sundays. When the week
average is taken into account, it was 48% in January 2021 and as low as 35% in October
2020.168

Octávio Luiz Motta Ferraz (School of Law, King’s College London)

Danielle Rached (School of Law, Fundação Getúlio Vargas)

Deisy Ventura (School of Public Health, University of São Paulo)

Conrado Hubner Mendes (School of Law, University of São Paulo)

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 Marco Antônio Moraes Alberto

Footnotes:
1
  ADI 6351 [2020] STF (Supreme Federal Ct).
2
  ADPF 6351 [2020] STF (Supreme Federal Ct).
3
  Secretary of State for Health, ‘Centre for Emergency Operations in Health’ (1 September
2020, updated 21 January 2021).
4
  Leis Municipais, ‘Be aware of the Laws created by your municipality and State
Government, regarding the new Coronavirus (COVID-19)’ (accessed 12 April 2021).
5
  Federal Law 13.979 (the Quarantine Act) has been partly amended by Federal Law
14.006 of 28 May 2020; Federal Law 14.019 of 2 July 2020 (use of masks); Federal Law
14.023 of 8 July 2020 (protection of key workers); Lei 14.028 of 27 July 2020; Lei 14.035 of
11 August 2020 (purchase of goods and services to address the pandemic); moreover,
several of its provisions have been questioned in ADI 6341, ADI 6343, ADI 6351, ADI 6353,
ADI 6347, ADPF 714, ADPF 715, and ADPF 718 [2020] STF (Supreme Federal Ct).
6
  Supreme Federal Tribunal, ‘COVID-19 ACTION PANEL’ (accessed 12 April 2021).
7
  Interministerial Ordinance n. 5 of 17 March 2020, art 3.
8
  State Decree 42.061 of 16 March 2020 (Amazonas), arts 2, 3.
9
  Decree 64.881 of 22 March 2020 (Sao Paulo), art 4.
10
  Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988, art 70, VI.
11
  Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.
12
  Eg the Constitution of the State of São Paulo (5 October 1989), art 20, X, repeats almost
exactly the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988, art 49, X; as does the Organic Law of the
Municipality of São Paulo (4 April 1990), art 14, XV.
13
  See A C C Ferraz, ‘Conflito entre poderes: o poder congressual de sustar atos
normativos do poder executivo’ (1994) Revista dos Tribunais; M A P Valadão, ‘Sustação de
atos do Poder Executivo pelo Congresso Nacional com base no artigo 49, inciso V, da
Constituição de 1988’ (2002) 38(153) Revista de Informação Legislativa 287–301.
14
  See M A P Valadão, ‘Sustação de atos do Poder Executivo pelo Congresso Nacional com
base no artigo 49, inciso V, da Constituição de 1988’ (2002) 38(153) Revista de Informação
Legislativa 287–301, 293; but see, arguing that acts of ministers are also subject to
legislative nullification, S Ferraz ‘Controle da administração pública na Constituição de
1988’ (1993) 23(4) Revista Trimestral de Direito Público 243.
15
  At the federal level, approval was given through Legislative Decree n. 6 of 3 March
2020.
16
  ADI 6341 [2020] STF (Supreme Federal Ct).
17
  Legislative Decree 2.493 of 30 March 2020 (State Assembly of São Paulo); Act 1.465 of
26 March 2020 (Municipal Chamber of São Paulo).

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 18
  A Shalders, ‘Covidão' já atinge governos de nove Estados e valor investigado chega a R$
1,32 bilhão’ BBC (Online, 19 August 2020).
19
  Virtual interview with two judges in São Paulo (21 October 2020).
20
  Brazilian Bar Association, Federal Section, Ofício n. 339/2020-GPR (21 May 2020).
21
  Senado Noticias, ‘Especialistas analisam abstenção recorde nas eleições de 2020’ (30
November 2020).
22
  C Madeiro, ‘Com campanha nas ruas, aumentam casos e mortes por covid entre
candidatos…’ UOL (Online, 16 October 2020).
23
  A L Azevedo, ‘Um abismo entre ciência e governantes no combate ao coronavirus’ O
Globo Analitico (Online, 3 June 2020).
24
  M Novaes, ‘Governo Bolsonaro impõe apagão de dados sobre a covid-19 no Brasil em
meio à disparada das mortes’ El Pais (Online, 7 June 2020).
25
  C Campos (et al), ‘“Guardiões do Crivella”: funcionários da prefeitura fazem plantão na
porta de hospitais para impedir trabalho da imprensa’ O Globo (Online, 31 August 2020.
26
  For an excellent overview and analysis, see M E A Camargo e Gomes, ‘Modelos de
Ouvidorias Públicas no Brasil’, in Ouvidoria Pública Brasileira: reflexões, avanços e desafios
(IPEA 2016).
27
  Federal Accounts Tribunal, ‘ACÓRDÃO 2092/2020 - PLENÁRIO’ (Online, 12 August
2020).
28
  Leis Municipais, ‘Tenha conhecimento das Leis criadas pelo seu município e Governo do
Estado, a respeito do novo Coronavírus (COVID-19)’ (Online, 9 April 2021).
29
  Johns Hopkins University, ‘Coronavirus Resource Center’ (Online, 9 April 2021).
30
  This was included by Federal Law 14.019 of 2 July 2020.
31
  This was included by Federal Law 14.035 of 11 August 2020.
32
  E Londono (et al), ‘Bolsonaro, Isolated and Defiant, Dismisses Coronavirus Threat to
Brazil’ New York Times (Online, 1 April 2020, updated 18 June 2020).
33
  A L Leão, ‘“Óbvio que antecipar o uso da cloroquina teve peso”, diz Teich sobre saída do
Ministério da Saúde’ O Globo (Online, 24 May 2020).
34
  T Phillips, ‘Brazil set to lose its third health minister amid pandemic as Covid death toll
rises’ The Guardian (Online, 15 March 2021).
35
  See ADI 6.341 [2020] STF (Supreme Federal Ct); ADPF-MC 672 [2020] STF (Supreme
Federal Ct).
36
  For a detailed survey of all presidential action to undermine public health efforts see D
Ventura and R Reis, ‘An unprecedented attack on human rights in Brazil: the timeline of the
federal government’s strategy to spread Covid-19’, Bulletin Rights in the Pandemic 10
(CEPEDISA/USP and Conectas Human Rights, January 2021).

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2021
 37
  ‘SP: Secretário critica interior por flexibilizar e 'banalizar' isolamento’ UOL (Online, 23
July 2020).
38
  Sao Paulo Department of Health, ‘SP volta para fase vermelha em todas as regiões com
piora da pandemia’ (3 March 2021).
39
  Decree 65.563 of 11 March 2021.
40
  ‘SP deve permanecer na fase vermelha se a emergencial não for novamente prorrogada,
aponta coordenador do Centro de Contingência da Covid’ Globo (Online, 5 April 2021).
41
  Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, ‘Amazonas’ (accessed 12 April 2021).
42
  M Lima, ‘Amazônia, uma história de impactos e exposição ambiental em paralelo à
instalação de grandes empreendimentos na região’ (2016) 7(2) Revista Pan-Amazônica de
Saúde 9–11.
43
  Government of Brazil, ‘Painel Coronavirus’ (updated 11 April 2021); State of Amazonas,
‘Painel COVID-19 Amazonas’ (updated 10 April 2021).
44
  Johns Hopkins University, ‘Coronavirus Resource Center – Mortality Rates’ (accessed 9
April 2021).
45
  J D Y Orellana (et al), ‘Explosion in mortality in the Amazonian epicenter of the
COVID-19 epidemic 19’ (2020) 36(7) National Library of Medicine.
46
  E Bertoni, ‘Por que o Amazonas e o 1° estado a ter um colapso na saude’ Nexo (Online,
14 April 2020).
47
  Y Boeacht, ‘Durante crise da Covid-19, mais de 30% dos óbitos ocorrem em casa em
Manaus’ Globo (Online, 4 May 2020).
48
  Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, ‘Informações de saúde: subsídios ao
enfrentamento regional à COVID-19 - Notas Técnicas’ (7 May 2020).
49
  State of Amazonas, ‘Governo do Amazonas amplia oferta de UTI aérea para atender
demanda de remoções de pacientes do interior para a capital’ (22 May 2020).
50
  For example, at the initiative of or from Public Defender of the State of Amazonas,
‘Defensoria consegue na Justiça transferência para Manaus de paciente em estado grave no
interior’ (25 April 2020); and State Prosecutor’s Office, Petition of Mandamus (Mandado de
Segurança) (4 July 2020).
51
  The Redaction, ‘Sistema funerário em Manaus está em colapso, diz Arthur, e acesso a
cemitério é limitado’ Amazonas Atual (Online, 21 April 2020).
52
  M Malta, ‘The brazilian tragedy: Where patients living at the ‘Earth's lungs’ die of
asphyxia, and the fallacy of herd immunity is killing people’ The Lancet (Online, 12
February 2021).
53
  E C Sabino (et al), ‘Resurgence of COVID-19 in Manaus, Brazil, despite high
seroprevalence’ The Lancet (Online, 27 January 2021).
54
  D Rothenburg and I Medeiros, ‘Queiroga avisa que seguirá cartilha de Bolsonaro à
frente da Saúde’, Correio Braziliense (Online, 13 April 2020).

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 55
  Ibid.
56
  Lusa, ‘Ludhmila Hajjar recusou a proposta de Bolsonaro para ser ministra da Saúde do
Brasil’ Publico (Online, 15 March 2021).
57
  Health Secretaries of Brazil, ‘Conselho de Secretários de Saúde orienta medidas
restritivas nos estados diante do pior momento da pandemia’ (2 March 2021); F Betim,
‘Governadores elevam pressão sobre Bolsonaro enquanto Brasil mira caos no pior momento
da covid-19’ El Pais (Online, 2 March 2021).
58
  See J Pacheco ‘Governo do AP decreta lockdown em todo o estado; Macapá terá rodízio
de veículos’ Globo (Online, 15 May 2020).
59
  T Arbex, ‘Em meio a caos na saúde, chega a 18 o número de estados com toque de
recolher’ CNN Brasil (Online, 18 March 2021).
60
  See LR Domingos, ‘Prefeitura de Criciúma proíbe confraternizações particulares com
reunião de público’ Engeplus (Online, 25 June 2020).
61
  State Decree 64.881 of 22 March 2020, art 4.
62
  State Decree 64.949 of 23 April 2020.
63
  State Decree 64.975 of 13 May 2020.
64
  State Decree 65.545 of 3 March 2021.
65
  State Decree 65.563 of 11 March 2020; T Stochero (et al), ‘Toque de recolher das 20h às
5h em SP terá mais blitzes e fiscalização: 'pessoas serão orientadas a ir para casa', diz SSP’
Globo (Online, 11 March 2021).
66
  M Rossi, ‘São Paulo se aproxima de colapso de hospitais, mas planeja megaferiado para
tentar evitar ‘lockdown’’ El Pais (Online, 19 May 2020).
67
  V Azevedo, ‘Covas troca rodízio radical pelo normal e pede antecipação de feriados para
'parar' cidade frente ao coronavírus’ Folha de Sao Paolo (Online, 17 May 2020).
68
  S Cowie, ‘Brazilian mayor gets death threats after imposing COVID curbs’ Al Jazeera
(Online, 6 April 2021).
69
  Decree 12.490 of 19 February 2021; A Biernath, ‘Covid-19: a cidade brasileira que viu
casos desabarem após 'lockdown de verdade’ BBC (Online, 11 March 2021).
70
  See E Nascimento, ‘No AM, quatro cidades do interior decretam ‘lockdown’ como
medida de prevenção ao novo coronavírus’ Amazonas (Online, 13 May 2020).
71
  State of Amazonas, ‘COVID-19: Ministério Público ajuíza agravo e pede, em segunda
instância, o lockdown para a cidade de Manaus’ (12 May 2020).
72
  State of Amazonas Public Prosecutors Office, ‘Em Tefé, Justiça determina que Município
adote medidas para evitar proliferação do novo coronavírus’ (6 May 2020).
73
  Decree n. 43.234 of 23 December 2020.

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 74
  Decree n. 43.236 of 28 December 2020; ‘Após protestos, Governo do AM decide
autorizar reabertura do comércio a partir de segunda (28)’ Amazonas (Online, 27 December
2020).
75
  ACP 0600056-61.2021.8.04.0001 (State of Amazonas Ct of Appeal).
76
  Decree n. 43.269 of 4 January 2021.
77
  Decree 43.282 of 14 January 2021; A Rodrigues, ‘Amazonas decreta toque de recolher
devido a covid-19’ Agencia Brasil (Online, 14 January 2021).
78
  State Decree 43.303 of 23 January 2021; extended by Decree 43.340 of 29 January 2021;
modified by Decree 43.376 of 5 February 2021.
79
  Decree 43.650 of 31 March 2021.
80
  D Amorim, ‘IBGE: brasileiros reduzem adesão às medidas de isolamento social, diz Pnad
Covid’ UOL (Online, 25 September 2020); R Garcia (et al), ‘Adesão à quarentena no Brasil
foi relativamente pequena, e está enfraquecendo’ O Globo (Online, 21 May 2020).
81
  Ordinance 120 of 17 March 2020 (Venezuelans, via land); Ordinance 125 of 19 March
2020 (most South Americans, via land); Ordinance 126 of 19 March 2020 (China, the
European Union, European countries, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, and South Korea);
Ordinance 132 of 22 March 2020 (Uruguay); Ordinance 133 of 23 March 2020 (China, EU,
European countries, Australia, Japan, Malaysia and South Korea), Ordinance 47 of 26
March 2020 (all foreigners, via water); Ordinance 149 of 27 March 2020 (all countries with
restrictions themselves); Ordinance 152 of 27 March 2020 (all foreigners, via air);
Ordinance 158 of 31 March 2020 (Venezuelans, via land); Ordinance 8 of 2 April 2020
(several South Americans, via land); Ordinance 195 of 20 April 2020 (Uruguay, extension 30
days); Ordinance 201 of 24 April 2020 (all foreigners, via water); Ordinance 203 of 28 April
2020 (all foreigners, via air); Ordinance 204 of 29 April 2020 (all foreigners, via land);
Ordinance 255 of 22 May 2020 (all foreigners, via any means); Ordinance 319 of 20 June
2020 (extension, 15 days); Ordinance 340 of 30 June 2020 (all foreigners, all means, 30
days); Ordinance 1 of 29 July 2020 (except via airplane, valid until 26 September 2020);
Ordinance 419 of 26 August 2020 (except via airplane, valid until 26 September 2020).
82
  C Tombesi, ‘Coronavírus: na contramão do mundo, Brasil segue sem restrições à entrada
de estrangeiros por aeroportos’ BBC (Online, 21 October 2021).
83
  Ordinance 652 of 25 January 2021.
84
  State Decree 19.586 of 27 March 2020; see also W Moreira, ‘Restrição ao transporte
intermunicipal atinge 83% da Bahia com mais liberações’ Diario do Transporte (Online, 11
August 2020).
85
  T Stochero, ‘TJ derruba restrição de acesso a cidades do litoral paulista durante
'feriadão' feito contra Covid-19’ Globo (Online, 20 May 2020).
86
  State Decree 42.063 of 17 March 2020.
87
  State Decree 42.087 of 19 March 2020.
88
  State Decree 42.098 of 20 March 2020.

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 89
  A Richter, ‘Justiça anula decisão que suspendeu transporte fluvial no Amazonas’ Agencia
Brasil (Online, 30 March 2020); ‘Justiça Federal restabelece decreto que proíbe transporte
fluvial no AM’ A Critica (Online, 30 March 2020).
90
  Executive Decree 42.158 of 4 April 2020.
91
  ‘Justiça Federal restabelece decreto que proíbe transporte fluvial no AM’ A Critica
(Online, 30 March 2020).
92
  State Decree 43.277 of 12 January 2021.
93
  Executive Decree 10.282 of 20 March 2020.
94
  For the Supreme Court decision, see Rcl 39.871 (Supreme Ct); for the decree, see
Decree 10.329 of 28 April 2020.
95
  Provisional Measure 926 of 20 March 2020.
96
  Executive Decree 42.063 of March 17 2020.
97
  Executive Decree 42.794 of 24 September 2020.
98
  L R Domingos, ‘Prefeitura de Criciúma proíbe confraternizações particulares com
reunião de público’ Engeplus (Online, 25 June 2020).
99
  State Decree 64.881 of 22 March 2020.
100
  Executive Decree 42.100 of 23 March 2020.
101
  Executive Decree 42.101 of 23 March 2020; Executive Decree 42.106 of 24 March
2020.
102
  Executive Decree 42.165 of 6 April 2020; Executive Decree 42.216 of 20 April 2020;
Executive Decree 42.247 of 30 April 2020; Executive Decree 42.278 of 13 May 2020.
103
  State Decree 42.330 of 28 May 2020; altered by State Decree 42.460 of 3 July 2020;
and State Decree 42.550 of 24 July 2020.
104
  See State Decree 42.330, art 2.
105
  Decree n. 43.234 of 23 December 2020; modified by Decree n. 43.277 of 12 January
2021; and extended by Decree n. 43.284 of 15 January 2021.
106
  Decree n. 43.236 of 28 December 2020; ‘Após protestos, Governo do AM decide
autorizar reabertura do comércio a partir de segunda (28)’ Globo (Online, 27 December
2020).
107
  Decree n. 43.269 of 4 January 2021.
108
  Decree n. 43.269 of 4 January 2021.
109
  E Oliveira, ‘Um ano após suspensão de aulas presenciais, estudantes e famílias ainda
enfrentam incertezas com reabertura das escolas na pandemia’ Globo (Online, 13 March
2021).

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 110
  P Sampaio, ‘Escola cobra 12 mil por mês e não dá aula on-line na quarentena, dizem
pais’ UOL (Online, 12 July 2020).
111
  K Watson, ‘Coronavirus: The realities of schooling in rural Brazil’ BBC (Online, 19
November 2020).
112
  ‘Escolas públicas e particulares de SP começam suspensão das aulas nesta segunda’
Globo (Online, 16 March 2020).
113
  R Cafardo, ‘Sao Paulo vai fechar escolas publicas e particulares a partir do dia 23’
Estadao (Online, 13 March 2020).
114
  Decree n. 65.061 of 13 July 2020.
115
  State of Sao Paulo, ‘Governo de SP anuncia retomada das aulas presenciais para o dia 7
de outubro’ (7 August 2020).
116
  I Palhares, ‘Escolas particulares em SP suspendem aulas presenciais após alunos
contraírem coronavírus’ Folha de Sao Paulo (Online, 17 November 2020).
117
  I Palhares (et al), ‘Mesmo autorizadas, escolas particulares de SP restringem e
suspendem aulas presenciais’ Folhas de Sao Paulo (Online, 4 March 2021).
118
  L Machado (et al), ‘Prefeitura de SP suspende aulas presenciais em toda rede de ensino
da cidade de 17 de março a 1° de abril’ Globo (Online, 12 March 2021).
119
  I Quintella (et al), ‘Educação é atividade essencial’ Folha de Sao Paulo (Online, 26
January 2021).
120
  State Decree 65.384 of 18 December 2020.
121
  State Decree 65.597 of 27 March 2021.
122
  L Arcoverde, ‘Justiça proíbe convocação de professores para aulas presenciais em
escolas públicas e privadas de São Paulo’ Globo (Online, 9 March 2021); W Galzo, ‘TJ-SP
derruba liminar que proíbe aulas presenciais e convocação de professores’ CNN Brasil
(Online, 14 March 2021); I Palhares, ‘Justiça barra retorno das aulas presenciais no estado
de SP’ Folha de Sao Paulo (Online, 28 January 2021).
123
  Ordinance 311 of 20 March 2020.
124
  ‘Escolas da rede municipal serão abertas para alunos e professores que não têm acesso
à internet em Manaus’ Amazonas (Online, 1 September 2020).
125
  A Castro, ‘Amazonas registra 342 professores com covid vinte dias após volta às aulas’
UOL (Online, 2 September 2020).
126
  N Pinto, ‘Estudo da Fiocruz Amazônia aponta que Manaus já vive segunda onda de
Covid-19’ Amazonas (Online, 10 September 2020).
127
  ‘Governador do AM descarta lockdown e anuncia volta às aulas do fundamental’ UOL
(Online, 30 September 2020).
128
  State Decree 43.342 of 29 January 2021.
129
  Recommendation 02/2021 of 23 January 2021 (Amazonas).

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 130
  Ordinance 1.565 of 18 June 2020 (Health Secretariat).
131
  State Decree 64.994 of 28 May 2020 (Department of Health of the State of Sao Paulo,);
Sao Paulo Plan.
132
  At least the following bills (Projetos de Lei, ‘PL’) related to the use of masks were
introduced in the lower house in 2020: Projeto de Lei 1824/2020; Projeto de Lei 2059/2020;
Projeto de Lei 2118/2020; Projeto de Lei 2138/2020; Projeto de Lei 2335/2020; Projeto de
Lei 2348/2020; Projeto de Lei 2362/2020; Projeto de Lei 2.156/2020; Projeto de Lei
1772/2020; Projeto de Lei 2462/2020; Projeto de Lei 2457/2020.
133
  Projeto de Lei 1562/2020.
134
  Message n. 374 of 2 July 2020.
135
  Federal Law 14.019 of 2 July 2020.
136
  ADPFs 714, 715, and 718 [2020] (Supreme Federal Ct).
137
  Decree 42.461 of 3 July 2020.
138
  Portaria nº 454 of 20 March 2020.
139
  Portaria Interministerial 5/2000 of 17 March 2020.
140
  Portaria Interministerial 5/2000 of 17 March 2020.
141
  Decree-Law 2848 (7 December 1940 - Criminal Code), art 268 (disrespect of public
health measures aimed at the prevention of the introduction and propagation of contagious
disease), art 330 (crime of disobedience).
142
  Reuters Staff, ‘Brazil's Bolsonaro says COVID-19 vaccinations will not be mandatory’
Reuters (Online, 3 September 2020).
143
  For a summary and links to each of the proceedings, see Supreme Federal Tribunal
(Brazil), ‘Plenário decide que vacinação compulsória contra Covid-19 é constitucional’ (17
December 2020).
144
  Ibid.
145
  For a summary and further links, see O L M Ferraz, D R Coutinho, and CH Mendes, ‘Lei
Fura Fila da Vacina’ Revista Piauí (Online, 7 April 2021).
146
  Federal Law 14.125 of 10 March 2021.
147
  M Rocha, ‘Presidente de tribunal barra compra de vacinas pela iniciativa privada sem
doação ao SUS’, Folha de São Paulo (Online, 8 April 2021).
148
  J Thornton, ‘Covid-19: Lack of testing in Brazil is a ‘major failure,’ says MSF’ (2020)
BMJ 370.
149
  P Fonseca, ‘Brazil COVID-19 testing shrinks as cases and deaths accelerate’ Reuters
(Online, 12 March 2021).
150
  Ordinance 2358 of 2 September 2020 (Ministry of Health).

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021
 151
  State of Sao Paulo, ‘Protocolo estadual de rastreamento e monitoramento de contatos
de casos confirmados e suspeitos de COVID-19’ (20 August 2020).
152
  State of Amazonas, ‘Governo do Amazonas adota aplicativo para monitoramento de
pacientes com Covid-19 em isolamento domiciliar’ (6 April 2020).
153
  C Machado (et al), ‘Estimativas de impacto da COVID-19 na mortalidade de idosos
institucionalizados no Brasil’ SciELO (September 2020).
154
  ILPI, ‘Urgente! COVID 19 e as instituiçoes de longa permanencia para
idosos’ (accessed 12 April 2021).
155
  Portaria n°65 of 6 May 2020 - Technical Note n°12/2020’ (Department of Social
Assistance of the Citizenship Ministry).
156
  Portaria n°65 of 6 May 2020 (Department of Social Assistance of the Citizenship
Ministry).
157
  ILPI, ‘Urgente! COVID 19 e as instituiçoes de longa permanencia para
idosos’ (accessed 12 April 2021).
158
  L Arcoverde, ‘Vigilância Sanitária estadual aplica 38 multas por dia por desrespeito à
quarentena durante a fase emergencial em SP’ Globo (Online, 28 March 2021).
159
  Ibid.
160
  Decree n° 43.234 of 23 December 2020 (State of Amazonas).
161
  The Redaction, ‘Lei multa em R$ 108 quem não usar máscara em Manaus, mas não
define quem fiscaliza’ Amazonas Atual (Online, 31 July 2020).
162
  M Castro, ‘Anvisa fiscaliza uso de máscara em Aeroporto de Manaus; multa pode
chegar a R$ 2 mil’ Globo (Online, 25 March 2021).
163
  V Vidigal, ‘Casal que descumpriu quarentena e agrediu policiais no AP tem prisão
preventiva decretada’ Globo (Online, 23 March 2020).
164
  M Magenta, ‘Coronavírus: governo brasileiro vai monitorar celulares para conter
pandemia’ BBC (Online, 3 April 2020).
165
  J Valente, ‘Covid-19: iniciativas usam monitoramento e geram preocupações’ Agencia
Brasil (Online, 12 April 2020).
166
  Google, ‘COVID-19 Community Mobility Report Brazil April 7, 2021’ (accessed 12 April
2021).
167
  State of Sao Paolo, ‘Sao Paulo Intelligent Monitoring System’ (updated 11 April 2021).
168
  D Graça, ‘Manaus chega ao maior indice de isolamento social desde o inicio da
pandemia’ A Critica (Online, 13 January 2021).

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 23 August
2021