Canadian Military History

Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 19

1994

Intelligence Secrets
David Stafford
University of Edinburgh

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Stafford, David "Intelligence Secrets." Canadian Military History 3, 1 (1994)

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 Stafford: Intelligence Secrets

BOOK REVIEWS
Intelligence Secrets
David Stafford
James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbour: How Churchill Lured
Roosevelt into World War II. Toronto: Summit Books, 1991, 302 pages, $19.95 US.
Bradley Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship 1940-
1946. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993, 276 pages, $24.95 US.

R ecently I was contacted by Radio Wales.

An eager young producer had heard I
was writing a book on Churchill and secret
Singapore (Britain's Far Eastern code breaking
operation) before 1941 and the events in
question- claim that the British were reading
intelligence. What, he asked, did I make of the Japanese Navy's main cryptosystem, JN-
the news that the prime minister's top secret 25, and therefore must have known of
wartime intelligence files had been declassified Japanese intentions. Indeed they were, or
and placed in the Public Record Office; would rather had been. But by December 1941 the
they reveal that Churchill had indeed known basic JN-25 had received several additives
in advance about the Japanese attack on and was almost impenetrable. Code breakers
Pearl Harbour and deliberately withheld that in the Far East were actually READING (as
intelligence from Roosevelt? distinct from intercepting) very few JN-25
messages, and none of them from significant
Inwardly I groaned at the reappearance operational traffic. That was why Malcolm
of this canard. It used to be that Roosevelt Kennedy, a Japanese expert at Bletchley Park,
knew but failed to tell the American people. was pestered by telephone calls from Churchill
Now, according to James Rusbridger and Eric throughout the week preceding Pear Harbour
Nave in their 1991 book Betrayal at Pearl for any indications of Japanese intentions.
Harbour; How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into When the attack was announced, Kennedy-
World War II, 1 Roosevelt is the victim and on duty on 7 December - was taken
Churchill the villain, as suggested by the completely by surprise.
subtitle. The argument is nonsense on at
least two counts. The first is a matter oflogic An extensive demolition of the
and common sense. If Churchill had indeed Rusbridger-Nave conspiracy theory has
known about Pearl Harbour in advance, it recently appeared in the International Journal
would have made far more sense for him to ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence. 2 This,
have told Roosevelt. The Japanese attack however, was far too complex an argument
would have failed, the United States would for the soundbite offered me by Radio Wales.
have gone to war with its Pacific Fleet So I contented myself with assuring listeners
unscathed, and Churchill would have that undoubtedly the new PRO files would lay
accumulated an enormous credit with the the matter to rest for once and for all. But
President. just to be on the safe side, I decided to take a
look at them myself.
But Churchill did NOT know about Pearl
Harbour in advance. Rusbridger and Nave- The files, released only last November,
a wartime Far East cryptolinguist who had contain signals intelligence that was passed
left the Far East Combined Bureau in directly to Churchill by the Government Code

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 Canadian Military History, Vol. 3 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 19

and Cypher School at Bletchley Park. encouraged us to expect. On 6 December

Invariably, they contain a cover note signed 1941 we can see that Churchill read the text
by "C," Sir Stewart Menzies, head of the of a message from the Foreign Minister in
Secret Intelligence Service, in his famous Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in London
green ink. The selection usually has three that heralded an imminent crisis. It instructed
elements: reports relating to enemy ground him to destroy all except certain key codes
and air forces derived from high grade ciphers and burn files and secret documents. "As
such as ENIGMA; naval headlines with these are precautions envisaging an
summaries of German, Italian (and Spanish) emergency" Tokyo told the Ambassador, "you
activity; and BJ reports- selected transcripts should communicate this to no one but your
of intercepted diplomatic telegrams. There own staff and you should redouble your
are over a thousand files. The first dates from attention to your duties and maintain your
27 September 1940, the request from calm and respect." No wonder Churchill was
Churchill to Menzies that he receive daily on the telephone to Kennedy at Bletchley
briefings. asking if he knew where the first blow would
fall.
What Churchill made of the material is
difficult to say. Occasionally he underlines The files received by Churchill on 6
items in his red ink, sometimes he asks for December make no mention of Pearl Harbour.
clarification, and often he makes no comment There is, however, an omission in the PRO
at all. As Hinsley has pointed out, the volume material. On that day Churchill received
of material was enormous, it took an expert three Bletchley files. The first (HW /302)
analyst to understand its significance, and contains 22 "special messages," i.e. Enigma
by the end of the war the Bletchley park intercepts. All relate to enemy activity in
output was so immense that Churchill could North Mrica. The third (HW /304). likewise
not possibly have mastered it. For all his contains nothing relating to the Far East.
desire to be his own intelligence officer, the The blue cover note on the second, HW /303,
very success of Bletchley Park prevented this says that it contains 17 BJs, 3 special
from happening. 3 messages, and 1 summary of a naval message.
In fact it contains only the BJs, all of them.
What the material did do, however, was The other items are missing. What were
provide Churchill with a means of keeping his they? Where have they gone? In such gaps do
chiefs of staff and commanders in the field on conspiracy theories flourish, although for the
their toes. They knew that he relished his reasons given above there's no reason to
"golden eggs" and that secret intelligence was believe that this one would support the
manna to the prime minister. Even if he Rusbridger /Nave thesis.
swallowed it undigested, they knew he would
almost certainly regurgitate it at some Another file, however, grabbed my
unwelcome moment. Red ink or not, the files attention in the few hours I had to spare at
were weapons of war in Churchill's adamant Kew. The second in the special intelligence
demand that he, and he alone, bore the series, dated February 26, 1941 (why such a
supreme responsibility for the British war long gap since the first?) is indexed as follows:
effort. "C to PM requesting permission to reveal to
US progress with German armed forces
Without a mastery of the military cryptography." Alas, thefilewasouttoanother
background and a full understanding of the reader, and I did not get to see it. Another
enemy order of battle at any given moment, series, however, touched on the same delicate
the researcher in the PRO is worse off than issue of intelligence sharing. The Joint
Churchill, at least where the Enigma material Intelligence Committee (JIC) files up to the
is concerned. The diplomatic intercepts make end of 1941 have now been released. Trawling
more immediate sense, and there is a large around the Pearl Harbour date in this series
number of them, more than the recent I found nothing suggesting foreknowledge -
concentration on military intercepts has indeed the Committee's last meeting before

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 Stafford: Intelligence Secrets

the day of infamy was 3 December 1941, and Churchill in particular, who was rightly
none of the items dealt with the Far East. But obsessive on the subject.
on 30 December, with the Americans now
fully engaged against both Japan and Subsequently, the British opened up
Germany- and with Churchill in Washington only very slowly, and there was intense
wining and dining with Roosevelt- it turned bargaining between the two allies. Co-
its attention to what the Americans should be operation, Smith insists, was driven by hard-
told about Britain's intelligence. The headed operational need, not sentiment. No
committee concluded that most secret general British-American agreement on
methods of intelligence acquisition should military cryptanalytic co-operation was
not be divulged to the Americans. reached until May 1943, with the Washington
BRUSA accord, when the needs of joint army
This might come as a shock to those operations made it imperative and the British
who have bought into the Churchill-Roosevelt had come to see that only the Americans
buddy theory of the Second World War, the could pay for the huge technical infrastructure
tale of how two friendly nations linked arms required to maintain and increase the
and unreservedly shared their most intimate cryptanalytic effort required for victory. Per
secrets from the beginning to the end. It was contra, they were ready much earlier to share
not quite so simple. Indeed, the issue of cryptanalytic information with the U.S. Navy.
wartime intelligence sharing was extremely This was because of desperate needs in the
complex. Seeing the JIC decision in black Atlantic; a naval agreement about this was
and white drove home what I had just been signed between the U.S. Navy's
reading about in a superb piece of research communications wizard, Commander Joseph
by Bradley Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals and Wenger and GC and CS director Edward
the Most Secret Special Relationship 1940- Travis on 1 October 1942.
1946. 4 I can recommend it to anyone.
It is always easy to get too close to a
In a detailed examination of sources in subject- especially the raw documents- to
Washington and London, Smith traces the see it properly. For all his emphasis on the
slow and uncertain evolution of SIGINT- obstacles along the way and the pragmatic
sharing (signals intelligence) between the concerns that governed so much of the
British and the Americans, covering in some exchanges, Smith avoids the danger. He
200 pages what Hinsley and the official acknowledges the importance of the personal
historians dealt with in fewer than 20. 5 The Churchill- Roosevelt link. Their early
path to co-operation and collaboration was determination to work closely together
strewn with difficulties and suspicions on provided the basic groundwork on which co-
both sides. On the British side, showing the operation would eventually be built. Had
product of Ultra to the Americans was not the either leader been opposed, there would be no
problem. Sources and methods, as the JIC story to tell. And he acknowledges that the
meeting I've quoted indicates, were. Smith transatlantic intelligence relationship was,
shows that the service intelligence heads, as when finally consummated, unique and
well as 'C', were adamantly opposed to opening unprecedented, providing the essential basis
cryptanalytic doors any further to the for postwar collaboration. "Here," he writes,
Americans at this stage. In the Atlantic, they
were receiving all they needed through Ultra was a true revolution in interstate relations
material that was 'wrapped up' in items they that would . . . guarantee a postwar
already received from the Admiralty's continuation of the special relationship,
Operational Intelligence Centre. As for the because once the two countries so
U.S. Army, it had no operational need of such completely opened up their cryptanalytic
high grade intelligence at this stage of the secrets to each other, there was no way to
war. Besides, American security was not yet terminate the arrangements without
seriously lessening the intelligence-
good enough for the British in general or
gathering capability of both partners. 6

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 Canadian Military History, Vol. 3 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 19

Hence, in September 1945, HarryTruman States and the British Commonwealth. "8 It
agreed to continue the transatlantic SIGINT was especially so in the light of Denniston's
relationship. Two years later Washington concerns about the security of Ultra and his
and London signed the UKUSA agreement of belief in the importance of human
194 7, the cornerstone of Cold War relationships in such a sensitive field. His
transatlantic SIGINT co-operation and the establishment on this trip of a good personal
very heart of the "special relationship." bond with the U.S. Army's cryptographic
genius, William Friedmann, marks an
Smith touches only lightly on two important stage in the story that Smith has to
important aspects ofthe story. The first is the tell. What he does not tell us, however, is that
question of non-military SIGINT. BRUSA, this friendship was greatly helped by the
while extensive, did NOT cover diplomatic removal of an obstacle that had threatened to
traffic. This, by and large, still remains a sabotage it from the outset. The name of the
neglected story in the history of intelligence obstacle was Herbert Yardley, and at the time
during the Second World War (although, of of Denniston's visit he was head of Canada's
course, Magic- the intercepts of Japanese codebreaking operation, the Examination
diplomatic traffic- has always loomed large in Unit. Yardley had notoriously revealed U.S.
the literature). Interestingly, the first venue codebreaking secrets in his bestselling The
in which American personnel were actually American Black Chamber (1931). In spite of
allowed to screen traffic decrypted by the this, Ottawa had chosen him to head up
British was at the Berkeley Street operation Canada's first independent codebreaking
run by Bletchley Park's former commander, effortinJune 1941. LondonandWashington
Alastair Denniston. Here the target was quickly declared Yardley persona non grata
enemy and neutral commercial and diplomatic and said that Canada could expect no allied
traffic. Much of it came from the tapping of co-operation until it got rid of him.
cables, and, despite the BRUSA exclusion, by Denniston's visit put the final boot in, and
October 1943 the Americans were receiving Yardley was fired.
"almost all the diplomatic traffic that goes
over cables other than the cables passing Canada, the Yardley fiasco, and
through the United States." 7 Not a bad Canada's role in wartime SIGINT, including
achievement, as Smith says, for an agreement diplomatic SIGINT, have now been treated in
not intended to cover such traffic! There is another recent book, by John Bryden. 9 To
still plenty of work to do on this story. To tell that, I will turn my attention next time.
how we spied on the enemy is one thing. But
governments have been super-sensitive in
concealing the extent to which they spied on
neutrals, and even allies.

The other issue barely dealt with, of NOTES

course, is Canada, invariably the neglected
partner in stories of transatlantic intelligence
1. James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl
sharing. There are only a few references to
Harbour; How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War
Canada in Smith's account, and in one of II. London: Michael O'Mara, 1991.
them he omits its particular significance for 2. "A New Pearl Harbor Villain: Churchill." Introductory
the Canadian side of the story. In late August/ Commentary by Louis W. Tordell and Edwin C. Fischel;
"A Cryptologic Analysis" by Donald M. Gish, in Interna-
early September 1941 Alastair Denniston,
tional Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
still at that time head of Bletchley Park, Volume 6, No. 3, Fall 1993, pp.363-388. See also an
visited Ottawa and Washington. It was the earlier critique by Richard M. Aldrich in Intelligence and
first transatlantic visit by a senior National Security, Volume 7, July 1992, No. 3, pp.335-
346, "Conspiracy or Confusion? Churchill, Roosevelt
representative of Britain's codebreakers, and
and Pearl Harbour."
Smith rightly sees it as highly important in 3. F.H. Hinsley, "Churchill and the Use of Special Intelli-
the move towards "full, high-level gence," in Churchilt edited by Robert Blake and Wm
cryptanalytic co-operation between the United Roger Louis (Oxford U.P. 1993) pp.407-426.

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 Stafford: Intelligence Secrets

4. Bradley Smith. The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most

Secret Special Relationship 1940-1946. Shrewsbury:
David Stafford's books include Britain
Airlife Publishing Ltd. 1993.
5. British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 2, and European Resistance 1940-45 and
(London 1981) pp.41-58. Camp X: Canada's School for Secret
6. Smith, p.157 Agents. He is currently at the University
7. Ibid., p.161 of Edinburgh. Dr. Stafford is a
8. Ibid., p.88
9. John Bryden, Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelli- Contributing Editor for CMH and will
gence in the Second World War. Toronto, Lester Publish- also write a regular book review column.
ing, 1993.

War Through the Ages

Robert Vogel

John Keegan. A History oJWaifare. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, 432 pages, $36.95.

K eegan's A History of Warfare is a long

and very uneven account of the
"organized violence" which has dogged the
pages, of which thirteen are devoted to the
Second World War.

history of humanity since the beginning of Had Keegan restricted himself to the
organized society. The attempt to encompass history of warfare he would have produced a
the whole of the human race in his account is reasonable and sometimes stimulating
wholly praiseworthy as are his divisions of account. Unfortunately he tries to do much
warfare into four main sections - stone, more than that. The whole first section, some
flesh, iron and fire - which roughly 60 pages, seems to be a speculative essay,
correspond with the weapons at the disposal entitled "War in Human History" which has
of the combatants. These sections are less to do with history and more to do with an
interrupted by four quite separate and often attack on Clausewitz. He begins with the
quite unrelated essays on topics such as portentous statement that "War is not a
"Limitations on Warmaking," "Fortifications," continuation of policy by other means" [p.3].
"Armies" and "Logistics and Supply." Keegan's Contradicting Clausewitz is hardly an earth-
military history is conventional; he deals shaking position. The problem is, however,
adequately with various well-rehearsed topics that from there on, and for the next twenty-
from Alexander the Great to Hitler, adding five pages, Clausewitz serves as a kind of
little to what he and many other historians whipping-horse for some of Keegan's less
have said in similar but usually less ambitious carefully considered flights of fancy.
accounts. One drawback of trying to do so Clausewitz becomes a symbol for all things
much, however, is that the period for which that Keegan considers have gone wrong with
there is most evidence, that is the last five ancient society. This is apparently because
hundred years, is covered in a rather Clausewitz was a "child of Aristotle" and
breathless fashion in the chapter entitled therefore believed in the supreme importance
"Fire" which attempts to encompass the of "politics." Warfare, argues Keegan, is not
history of warfare for the whole world from an extension of politics but of"culture." That
the first cannon to the hydrogen bomb in 69 may be an entirely defensible position but

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