Digest of available

enhancements

A320
Family
2017 edition

AIRBUS S.A.S. 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France

© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2017 - All rights reserved, Airbus, its
logo and the product names are registered trademarks.
January, 2017.
Concept design by Multi Media Support 20170078.
Photos by Airbus: H. Goussé, S. Ramadier.
Computer renderings by Airbus, Fixion. 
Printed in France by Airbus Print Centre.
 Table of contents

ATA 21 Introduction of a brush to prevent ATA 34

foreign objects jamming pedal
Introduction of a label to remind Introduction of new Collins MMR
mechanism 18
precautions during ground air to avoid cases of Localizer and/or
Dear customers, pre-conditioning 2 Seal improvement on spoiler actuator Glideslope capture inoperative
servovalve fitted in position 2 & 3 19 during ILS approach 37
The objective of this leaflet is to present Introduction of new OFV, CPC,
and Flight Deck Monitoring 3 Introduction of Flight Control Data Introduction of new Honeywell ADIRU
an updated overview of operational/safety with ADR monitoring enhancement
Concentrator (FCDC) standard 58 20
enhancements for your fleet, in response Introduction of new Avionics Equipment on static pressure comparison 38
Ventilation Computer (PN-07) NEW 4
to the in-service experience of the fleet. Replace Side Stick Unit Dampers on
Introduction of improved thermal
Captain and F/O Side NEW 21
ATA 22 insulation on Honeywell ADM 39
This extract focuses on selected items
Activation of the triple click Aural ATA 28
considering their potential benefits and also alert and PFD display enhancement 5 Introduction of Flight Path Angle
Wiring modification to provide
with the objective to reduce the number adequate FUEL L (R) XFR VALVE
display improvement 40
of OEBs which are still applied on some Introduction of FMS2 Release 1A
Standard H2C (Honeywell) 6 FAULT or FUEL L (R) WING TK Introduction of New Honeywell software
aircraft despite the availability of fixes to close OVERFLOW ECAM procedure 22 radio altimeter ALA52B-0232 41
such OEBs. Introduction of FMS2 Release 1A
Introduction of fuel overflow Improved electrical installation
Standard S7A (Thales) 7
monitoring function 23 of RA antennas 42
This list does not pretend to be exhaustive,
Activation of the Automatic Nav
nor does it include items already covered engagement at Go-around 8 Introduction of fuel leak Introduction of static pressure
by mandatory actions. detection function  24-25 monitoring on ground 43
Introduction of speed protection
For detailed description/guideline on any package and FD disengagement ATA 29 Improved initialization function
to prevent potential speed Activation of the PTU inhibition logic during ADIRS alignment 44
items included in this leaflet you must
overshoot or undershoot 9 to prevent potential loss of hydraulic Improved TAT probes 45
refer to the last revision of the Airbus systems 26
documentation. AP/FD Logic Enhancements 10 ATA 36
ATA 31
Tail strike indication on PFD and Introduction of modification
Should you have any specific questions, “PITCH PITCH” call out at landing 11 Activation of ATC/Transponder package (TCT, FAV, TLT)
please do not hesitate to contact Airbus monitoring function 27 to reduce dual bleed loss rate 46
either through your Field Representative or ATA 23
Activation of AVAIL indication ATA 49
your Customer Support Director. Modification of AMU power on Engine Warning Display (EWD) 28
supply to prevent loss of all audio APU Bleed Air Contamination
We hope that, while each operator has communications in case of failure Stall Warning awarness Prevention 47
the responsibility to adapt its operations of the DC essential Bus 12 enhancement NEW 29
ATA 53
to local airworthiness rules and to define ATA 24 ATA 32 Introduction of new refuel panel
training and procedures in line with its Upgrade to new Generator Control Improve MLG door actuator hose 30 access door 48
own operational conditions, this leaflet Unit standard 5.2 13
will be beneficial to your operations as Implementation of the heat shrink Introduction of new Blue Hydraulic
ATA 26 colour coding on the landing gear Service Panel Door (197FB) NEW 49
a complement to the topics presented tachometer harness 31
Spurious Smoke
during the Flight Safety Conference. Warning Prevention 14
ATA 71
Activation of the parking brake
Introduction of Improved Oil Filler
Best Regards, Engine Fire extinguisher Pipe monitoring function 32
Door Latches on IAE V2500 50
Installation improvements NEW 15
Yannick Malinge New landing gear selector valve 33
ATA 73
SVP and Head of Product Safety ATA 27 Introduction of BSCU Introduction of new Electronic Engine
Upgrade of Spoiler Elevator Computer standard L4.10 34 Control (EEC) software SCN22/AB51
to improve ground spoiler/reverser
availability and reduce hard landing LG Door Bypass Valves 35 Introduction of new ECU Software
during bounce 16 (FADEC 5BT)52
Decrease Inflation pressure of Yellow
Park Brake Accumulator NEW 36
Activation of visual and aural indications Abbreviations  54-55
in case of side stick dual inputs 17
Prerequisite summary 56
Notes 58
02 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 03

Introduction of a label to remind precautions Introduction of new OFV, CPC and Flight Deck
during ground air pre-conditioning Monitoring
_ _
No Ground personnel injury prevention No
OEB Aircraft damage prevention ATA 21 OEB
Loss of pressurization prevention ATA 21

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

During operation of ground air supply, with the Outflow Valve closed, and with a fully Loss of pressurization events can occur due to incorrect control of the cabin pressure
closed cabin, there is risk of aircraft damage and injury to personnel in the event caused by erroneous sensed pressure values with no alarm displayed to flight crew. In
of an undetected build-up of cabin pressure. addition when the oxygen masks deploy in the cabin there is currently no indication on
the ECAM of the deployment.
Available enhancements
Introduction of new labels to give additional recommendations to minimize Available enhancements
the possibility of cabin residual pressure during ground air supply. The available enhancements consist of improvements to the cabin pressure control
and additional indication on the ECAM when the Oxygen Masks are deployed in the
This improves awareness to reduce risk of aircraft damage and/or injury to persons cabin.
during operation of the ground air supply.
1. Improvement to Cabin Pressurization and Control:
This is embodied by following SB: New Out Flow Valves (OFV) and Cabin Pressure Controllers (CPC) have been
developed, which introduce additional pressure sensors and detection robustness
-S
 B A320-11-1097: Install additional warning label LP/HP ground connection maint against erroneous cabin pressure measurement:
doors (Mod. 157025).
- SB A320-21-1203: Introduction of new OFV P/N 20790-20BA (Mod. 152530).
- SB A320-21-1204: Introduction of new CPC P/N 20791-13AD (Mod. 152531).
2.  Additional Flight Deck Indication
Display of ECAM MEMO “OXY PAX ON” to the flight crew as additional indication that
masks are deployed:
- SB  A320-35-1067: Adaptation pass info relay, relay socket and wirings for Gaseous
Oxygen System (GOS) (Mod. 150552).
- SB  A320-35-1068: Adaptation pass info relay, relay socket and wirings for chemical
oxygen system (Mod. 150551).
Subject to an Airbus monitored retrofit campaign: RIL: X35M14019491

Aircraft prerequisites
The alert introduction requires at least the following FWC standard or subsequent:
- SB  A320-31-1373: Introduction of FWC standard H2-F6 (Mod. 151269).
The activation of the system robustness requires the concurrent embodiment of both
- SB  A320-21-1203 and A320-21-1204.

Contacts
For more information on the monitored retrofit campaign please contact Retrofit
Operations at the following email address [email protected]
04 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 05

Introduction of new Avionics Equipment Ventilation Activation of the triple click Aural alert
Computer (PN-07) and PFD display enhancement
_
NEW _
Spurious Smoke Avionics Smoke Prevention No Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA)
Reduction of IFTB ATA 21 OEB enhancement ATA 22

A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Cases off Avionics Smoke have been reported, further to failures of electrical FMA Enhancement has been developed to introduce additional attention getters for the
components within the AEVC (Avionics Equipment Ventilation Computer). crew to identify any Automatic Flight System (AFS), and/or Flight Director (FD) mode
change not resulting from a crew action or, when a Vertical Speed or Flight Path Angle
(FPA) target is not held by the AFS.
Available enhancements
Improved components and software logic within the AEVC to prevent Avionics Smoke
have been introduced with AEVC standard-06: Available enhancements
- SB A320-21-1147: Avionics equipment ventilation - install THALES AEVC STD 06 Introduction of triple click aural alert and specific display on the PFD is activated. via
P/N 87292325V06. pin programming:
- SB  A320-22-1123  (Mod. 32600).
Further improvements of the AEVC software have been introduced with AEVC Std-07
- SB  A320-31-1068  (Mod. 24211).
to improve resilience to repetitive “VENT AVNCS SYS FAULT” ECAM warning:
- SB  A320-22-1091  (Mod. 31821).
- SB A320-21-1217: Avionics equipment ventilation - introduce new standard of AEVC
(PN -V07).
Aircraft prerequisites
This function requires at least the following FMS, DMC and FWC standards or subsequent:
Other references - SB  A320-22-1103:  Introduction of FMS2 (Mod. 32475).
-T  FU 21.26.00.019 “AEVC Overcurrent Protection Failures”. - SB  A320-22-1089:  Introduction of FMS2 (Mod. 31896, 34573).
- TFU 21.26.34.003 “VENT ANVCS SYS FAULT” ECAM Warning - AEVC V06 & - SB  A320-31-1127:  Introduction of DMC standard V40 (Mod. 28308).
System improvements”.
- SB  A320-31-1141:  Introduction of FWC standard H1P-E3P (Mod. 28580, 28916, 30644).

Note: Installation of FMGC FMS2 is covered by EASA AD 2016-0222 “Auto Flight –

Flight Management and Guidance Computer – Replacement”.
Refer also to section “AP/FD Logic Enhancements” (Page 10) for further
information on availability.
06 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 07

Introduction of FMS2 Release 1A Introduction of FMS2 Release 1A

Standard H2C (Honeywell) Standard S7A (Thales)
_ _
Cancel
Take off securing Cancel Full Take off securing Step 1
OEBs 14, 17,
Baro radio setting ATA 22 OEB 42 Non Precision Approach profile construction ATA 22
31, 41 and 46

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C fitted with Honeywell FMS2 All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C fitted with Thales FMS2
standard P1 Rev. 2+ standard S5 or FMS2 Release 1A standard S6 or below

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

The following safety enhancements have been developed and introduced in FMS2 The following safety enhancement has been developed and introduced in FMS2
Release 1A standard H2: Release 1A standard S7A:
Take Off Securing function (TOS1): Full Take Off Securing function step 1 (TOS1):
- To alert flight crew of incorrect takeoff parameters. - To alert flight crew of incorrect take off parameters
Baro radio setting: Improvement of Non Precision Approach profile construction.
- MDA/MDH field replaced by BARO on MCDU PERF APPR page Prevention of erroneous inputs of FMS QNH.
- DH field replaced by RADIO.
No profile invalidation at MDA -50ft: Available enhancements
- Allows to remain with AP engaged in case of missed approach below minimum. New Thales FMS2 Release 1A standard S7A:
- SB  A320-22-1544 (INSTALL FMGC S7A I15 THALES ON IAE A/C).
Available enhancements - SB  A320-22-1545 (INSTALL FMGC S7AC14 THALES ON CFM A/C).
Honeywell FMS2 Release 1A standard H2: - SB  A320-22-1476 (FMGC Std S7API12 on IAE engines, Mod. 156000).
- SB A320-22-1547 (INSTALL FMGC H2CI15 HONEYWELL ON IAE AND PW ENGINE). - SB  A320-22-1477 (FMGC Std S7APC13 on CFM engines, Mod. 156001).
- SB A320-22-1523 (INSTALL FMGC HONEYWELL H2CC14 ON CFM A/C). Subject to Airbus monitored retrofit campaign:
SB A320-22-1544 is subject to an Airbus monitored retrofit campaign: RIL SA22M16000534.
Subject to Airbus monitored retrofit campaign:
SB A320-22-1545 is subject to an Airbus monitored retrofit campaign: RIL SA22M16000533.
SB A320-22-1523 is subject to an Airbus monitored retrofit campaign: RIL SA22M16000532
SB A320-22-1547 is subject to an Airbus monitored retrofit campaign: RIL SA22M16000535 Note: Refer to section “AP/FD Logic Enhancements” (Page 10) for further information
on availability of latest FMGC standards.
Note: Refer to section “AP/FD Logic Enhancements” (Page 10) for further information on
availability.
Additional benefitss
OEB 42 is cancelled by FMS2 release 1A standard S7A.
Additional benefits Installation of standard S7A requires the previous installation of standard S6, which is
OEB 14, 17 and 31 are cancelled by FMS2 release 1A standard H2. including the following safety enhancements:
- Take off securing function step 1 (TOS1)
- Baro radio setting
Other references - No profile invalidation at MDA -50ft
- TFU 22.70.00.048
- OIT 999.0107/09
- ISI 22.83.00003 Other references
ISI 22.83.00003

Contacts
For more information on the monitored retrofit campaign please contact Retrofit Contacts
Operations at the following email address [email protected] For more information on the monitored retrofit campaign please contact Retrofit
Operations at the following email address [email protected]
08 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 09

Activation of the Automatic Nav engagement Introduction of speed protection package

at Go-around and FD disengagement to prevent potential speed
_ overshoot or undershoot
_
No Go-around enhancement No
OEB Decrease crew workload during Go-around ATA 22 OEB
Speed overshoot/undershoot prevention ATA 22

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C fitted with:

All A319/A320/A321 A/C
FMGC P1I11, S4I11 (IAE/PW) or FMGC P1C12, S4C12 (CFM)

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

The “NAV mode in Go-around” function has been developed to reduce the crew Speed overshoot or undershoot may occur when Automatic Flight System (AFS)
workload, and limit the potential deviations from the required flight path when experiences a perturbation (wind gradient, engine failure…).
performing a Go-around.
Available enhancements
Available enhancements Activation of the Speed protection package (AP/FD speed protection, AP/FD engagement
In case of Go-around, this enhancement enables the flight crew: /disengagement conditions) is performed via pin programming (Mod. 25879, 26497):
- To keep the NAV mode engaged, or - SB  A320-22-1072
- To automatically arm the NAV mode that avoids pilot action on the HDG/TRK selector
knob
This function may be activated via pin programming (Mod. 25612, 38399, 38670):
Aircraft prerequisites
This function requires at least the following FMGC and FCU standards:
- SB  A320-22-1296
- SB  A320-22-1063:  Introduction of FMGC B546BAM0206 (Mod. 26799).
- SB  A320-22-1064:  Introduction of FMGC B546CAM102 (Mod. 26968, 28283).
Note: Modification required as part of RNP AR package.
Refer to section “AP/FD Logic Enhancements” (Page 10) for further information - SB  A320-22-1297:  Introduction of FMGC B546BCM0205 (Mod. 26716).
on availability. - SB  A320-22-1068:  Introduction of FMGC B546CCM0104 (Mod. 26243, 26717, 27831).
- SB  A320-22-1047, A320-22-1048: Introduction of FCU standard M11 (Mod. 25345,
25346).
Aircraft prerequisites
This function requires at least the following FMGC standards: Note: Installation of FMGC FMS2 is covered by EASA AD 2016-0222 “Auto Flight –
- SB  A320-22-1244:  Introduction of FMGC standard P1I11 (Mod. 37311). Flight Management and Guidance Computer – Replacement”.
- SB  A320-22-1246:  Introduction of FMGC standard S4I11 (Mod. 37252). Refer also to to section “AP/FD Logic Enhancements” (Page 10) for further
- SB  A320-22-1247:  Introduction of FMGC standard S4C12 (Mod. 37935). information on availability.
- SB  A320-22-1248:  Introduction of FMGC standard P1C12 (Mod. 37934).

Other references
- ISI 22.83.00003
- Article in Safety First N°11
10 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 11

AP/FD LOGIC ENHANCEMENTS Tail strike indication on PFD

_ and “PITCH PITCH” call out at landing
_
No Enhancements of AP engagement logics No
OEB Enhancements of FD engagement logics ATA 22 OEB Tail strike prevention ATA 22

All A318/A320/A321 A/C All A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Enhancements to the engagement logic of the AP and FD engagement have been developed. Enhancement of pilot awareness to potential tail strike during landing by:
- A pitch limit indicator on the Primary Flight Display, which is displayed at landing
Available enhancements below 400 feet AGL.
The modifications introduce the following enhancements: - A “PITCH PITCH” call out, activated at landing when the pitch is greater than a
- In Alternate Law, introduce automatic Autopilot disengagement at VLS-10kts and certain threshold.
Vmo/Mmo +6kts
- AP & FD disengagement at STALL warning (Alternate Law and Direct Law)
Available enhancements
For A/C with EIS1, activation of call out only at landing via:
- FD will not re-engage automatically after an automatic disengagement
- SB A320-22-1259 (Mod. 37445).
Modification requires applicable Std of FAC AND FMGC as follows:
FMGC 2G: For IAE/PW engines H2CI15 (A320-22-1547) or S7AI15 (A320-22-1544) For aircraft with EIS2 activation of call out and Pitch Limit Indicator via pin programming:
FMGC 2G: For CFM engines - S7AC14 (A320-22-1545) or H2CC14 (A320-22-1523) - SB A320-22-1294 (Mod. 37444, 37445).
-OR-
FMGC 3G: F  or IAE/PW engines – H2CPI16; S7API16 Aircraft prerequisites
FMGC 3G: F  or CFM engines – H2CPC18; or S7APC18 Activation of call out function requires at least the following FWC and FAC standards
SB 22-1547 is subject to Airbus monitored retrofit campaign RIL SA22M16000534 or subsequent:
SB 22-1544 is subject to Airbus monitored retrofit campaign RIL SA22M16000535 - FWC standard H2F3 or H2F3P (Mod. 35220 or Mod. 38425)
SB 22-1545 is subject to Airbus monitored retrofit campaign RIL SA22M16000533 - SB A320-22-1226: Introduction of FAC standard BAM0619 (Mod. 36766)
SB 22-1523 is subject to Airbus monitored retrofit campaign RIL SA22M16000532
AND Tail strike indication on PFD requires at least the following EIS2, FAC and FMGC standards
FAC B624 – SB A320-22-1516 or A320-22-1553 or subsequent:
-OR- FAC C AA03 – SB A320- 22-1539 or A320-22-1554 - SB A320-31-1276 or SB A320-31-1271: Introduction of EIS2 standard S7
(Mod. 36725).
SB 22-1553 and 22-1554 are subject to an Airbus Monitored retrofit campaign: - SB A320-22-1226: Introduction of FAC standard BAM0619 (Mod. 36766).
RIL SA22M15020262
For IAE/PW Engines:
Aircraft prerequisites - SB A320-22-1244: Introduction of FMGC standard P1I11 (Mod. 37311).
- SB A320-22-1246: Introduction of FMGC standard S4I11 (Mod. 37252).
Installation of FMS2.
For CFM engines FMGC Standard
Additional benefits - SB A320-22-1247: Introduction of FMGC standard S4C12 (Mod. 37935).
- SB A320-22-1248: Introduction of FMGC standard P1C12 (Mod. 37934).
OEB 41 are cancelled by Honeywell FMS2 release 1A standard H2C.

Other references Other references

Article in Safety First magazine #6.
Presentation 20th and 22nd Flight Safety Conference.
Note: Refer to section “AP/FD Logic Enhancements” (Page 10) for further information
Contacts on availability of latest FAC and FMGC standards.
For more information on the monitored retrofit campaign please contact Retrofit
Operations at the following email address [email protected]
12 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 13

Modification of AMU power supply to prevent loss Upgrade to new Generator Control
of all audio communications in case of failure Unit standard 5.2
of the DC essential Bus _
_
No Total loss of radio and cockpit PA No
OEB communications prevention ATA 23 OEB Loss of AC1 BUS prevention ATA 24

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C fitted with GCU EM

A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C fitted with digital AMU
standard 5.1

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

In case of a DC essential Bus loss, the digital AMU is no longer powered. Following an event during which AC1 bus was lost leading to associated systems loss,
Consequently all radio and cockpit PA communications are lost. the recommendation was issued to improve the fault monitoring logic of GCU standard
5.1 to prevent the loss of AC1 bus.

Available enhancements
AMU power supply has been modified to keep communications means even in Available enhancements
case of DC essential Bus loss (Mod. 37782): Fault monitoring logic improved in New GCU standard 5.2 (Mod. 39670):
-  SB A320-23-1333. - SB A320-24-1124.

Aircraft prerequisites
Aircraft must be fitted with digital AMU:
- SB A320-23-1283 (Mod. 31296 and Mod. 34669).
- SB A320-23-1258 (Mod. 34669 and Mod. 34670).
- SB A320-23-1310 (Mod. 36518 and Mod. 36500).

Other references
OIT 999.0111/07
14 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 15

Spurious Smoke Warning Prevention Engine Fire extinguisher Pipe Installation

_ improvements
_
NEW

No No Reliability of Engine Fire Extinguishing

OEB Spurious Smoke Warning prevention ATA 26 OEB Operation ATA 26

A318/A319/A320/A321 Post Mod 33100 A319/A320/A321 < MSN 3375 Fitted with IAE Engines

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

On aircraft fitted with CIDS Smoke Detection functions (post mod 33100), spurious Several operators reported finding cracks on engine fire extinguishing pipes fitted on
smoke warnings can be caused in particular circumstances, which can lead to IFTB or Aircraft powered by IAE V2500 series engines.
diversion. Cracking of the fire extinguisher pipe can interfere with correct operation of the fire
extinguishing agent.
Investigations identified that high vibration in the area of the pipe is the most likely cause
Available enhancements of these fatigue cracks as the piping end is not sufficiently supported.
A new CIDS OBRM (P/N Z064H000034C) has been developed which introduces
enhancements to the smoke detection logic. This is introduced via Mod 158539
- SB A320- 23-1588. Available enhancements
Modification to the installation of the fire extinguisher pipe, by installing additional
clamps – SB A320-26-1072.
Other references
- TFU Ref 23.73.00.101.
- Airbus Cabin Electronics GmbH SB Z064H-23-010-R02. Aircraft prerequisites
Depending on the installed pipe Part Number, SB A320-26-1031 (Associated MOD
21457 and 21453) may be necessary.

Other references
EASA Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) 2016-07 “Airbus A319, A320 and A321
Aeroplanes – IAE Engine Fire Extinguisher Pipe Cracking”.
16 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 17

Upgrade of Spoiler Elevator Computer to improve Activation of visual and aural indications
ground spoiler/reverser availability and reduce hard in case of side stick dual inputs
landing during bounce _
_
No Hard landing and runway excursions No
OEB prevention ATA 27 OEB Dual side stick input prevention ATA 27

A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C fitted with SEC hardware B and B’ A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

The absence of ground spoiler extension or reverser extension contributes to increase Development of a visual and aural indication in case both pilots give simultaneous side
the stopping distance during landing. sticks orders.
The ground spoiler extension during bounce may contribute to a number of hard landings.
Available enhancements
Available enhancements The visual dual input indication (green CAPT/FO sidestick priority light is activated via
This new SEC software standard is developed in order: FCDC or SEC pin programming:
- To improve availability of ground spoiler in case of landing with abnormal engine - SB A320-27-1113 (FCDC pin programming, Mod. 25296).
throttle position - Or SB  A320-27-1104 (SEC pin programming, Mod. 25477).
- To reduce hard landing occurrence after a bounce The aural dual input indication is activated via FWC pin programming
- To improve reverse authorization - SB A320-31-1115 (Mod 26540).
- SB A320-27-1219 SEC 121 h/w B’ installation (Mod 160014 and Mod 150857). - SB A320-31-1264 (Mod 26540).
- SB A320-27-1230 SEC 123 h/w B installation (Mod 150471 and Mod 154866).
Aircraft prerequisites
Other references These functions requireat least the following FCDC, FWC standards (or subsequent)
- OIT 999.0101/10. and wiring provision:
- Article in Safety First n°9. - SB A320-27-1070:  Introduction of FCDC standard L53 (Mod. 24135).
- SB A320-31-1106:  Introduction of FWC standard E2 (Mod. 26017).
-S B A320-31-1094:  Wiring provision for pin program activation on FWC (Mod. 23960).

Other references
Article in Safety First N°3.
18 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 19

Introduction of a brush to prevent foreign objects Seal improvement on spoiler actuator servovalve
jamming pedal mechanism fitted in position 2 & 3
_ _
No Pedal jamming prevention No
OEB IFTB/Diversion prevention ATA 27 OEB Spoiler surface runaway prevention ATA 27

A319 before MSN 1344 /

A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C
A320 before MSN 1334 / A321 before MSN 1356

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Cockpit foreign objects (e.g. pens) may fall down through the cut-outs of the rudder/ Cases of in-service spoiler uncommanded deployment have been reported due
brake pedal assembly. It may lead to jam the pedal mechanism. to insufficient robustness of a spoiler servocontrol servovalve internal seal. This will lead
to increase the fuel consumption.
Available enhancements
A brush has been developed to prevent foreign objects jamming the pedal mechanism Available enhancements
(Mod. 28555): Introduction of improved seal on spoiler actuator fitted in position 2 & 3 is provided by:
- SB  A320-27-1131. - SB  A320-27-1216 (Mod 153342).

Other references Other references

- TFU 27.20.00.002. TFU 27.64.51.002
- OIT 999.0093/98.
- OIT 999.0161/99.
- Article in Safety First N°6.
20 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 21

Introduction of Flight Control Data Concentrator Replace Side Stick Unit Dampers on Captain
(FCDC) standard 58 and F/O Side
_ _
NEW

No Flight crew awareness

OEB Maintenance crew awareness ATA 27 Sidestick Operation improvements ATA 27

A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

In some cases, Reverser INOP may not be indicated to flight crew prior to selection. Cases of Side Stick Unit (SSU) with damping partially lost have been reported.
In addition, if an ADR is rejected by the ELAC flight control computer due to faulty air
data parameters, the associated failure message generated does not easily allow the This behaviour is linked to air ingress in the active part (chamber) of the damper, and has
identification of which air data parameter (angle of attack or speed) is faulty. been only observed on SSUs Part Number FE412000104 (Captain side, 100CE1) and
FE412000105 ( (F/O side, 100CE2) which are fitted with damper PN FE392050002.
Available enhancements
New logic has been introduced in FCDC standard 58: Available enhancements
- To add indication of additional cases of reverse system inoperative. SB A320-27-1258: Replace side stick unit damper on captain and F/O side.
- To distinguish between the failed Air data parameter, identifying an angle of attack This upgrades current SSU PN FE412000104 and PN FE412000105 into the new
probe failure by generating a specific maintenance message, and in conjunction with SSU PN FE412000106 and SSU PN FE412000107, electrically and mechanically
FWC from standard H2F5 and ELAC from standard L93/L84, the appropriate ECAM interchangeable.
alert. The modification consists in introduction of a new damper PN FE392050004 design.
This SB’s is subject to an Airbus Monitored retrofit campaign ref RIL SA27M16001724
Note: - H
 2F7 is a pre-requisite requirement for the STOP RUDDER INPUT warning R01 dated 01-Dec-2016.
(ref EASA AD 2016-0132).
-E LAC L97+ is mandated in accordance with EASA AD 2015-0088.
Contact
For more information on the monitored retrofit campaign please contact Retrofit
The modification consists of installation of FCDC standard 58:
Operations at the following email address [email protected]
- SB A320-27-1208: Introduce FCDC standard 58 (Mod. 151313).

Additional benefits
Installation of FCDC 58 will also improve:
-Flight data recording (increase recording rates of parameters, new parameters
recorded) to fulfil new FAA recording rules requirements.
22 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23

Wiring modification to provide adequate FUEL L (R) Introduction of fuel overflow

XFR VALVE FAULT or FUEL L (R) WING TK OVERFLOW monitoring function
ECAM procedure _
_
Fuel spillage prevention
Cancel IFTB/Diversion/Emergency descent prevention No
OEB 34 Dispatch/Reliability improvement ATA 28 OEB Flight crew awareness improvement ATA 28
Dispatch/Reliability improvement

All A321 A/C All A318/A319/A320 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Following fuel transfer valve failure, “FUEL L (R) XFR VALVE FAULT” procedure can be Fuel vent overboard has been reported by operators. Most of these occurrences
incompletely displayed on ECAM. happened on ground during taxi. Due to location, this is not observable from the flight
As a result, the flight crew may unduly apply the gravity fuel feeding procedure. deck.
This incomplete display also affects “FUEL L (R) WING TK OVERFLOW” ECAM procedure.
Available enhancements
Available enhancements Flight crew awareness can be improved by activation of the “FUEL OVERFLOW”
Correct ECAM procedures are ensured with installation of center tank low level signal caution:
wires between the 2 FLSCUs and the SDACs: - SB  A320-28-1216: (Mod. 154427)
Subject to an Airbus Monitored Retrofit campaign: RIL SA28M14014075.
- SB  A320-28-1178 (Mod. 39984).

Additional benefits Aircraft prerequisites

This function requires at least the following FWC standard or subsequent:
OEB 34 is cancelled by this wiring installation.
- SB  A320-31-1373: Introduction of FWC standard H2-F6 (Mod. 151269).

Contacts
For more information on the monitored retrofit campaign please contact RETROFIT
OPERATIONS at the following email address [email protected]
24 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 25

Introduction of fuel leak Introduction of fuel leak

detection function detection function
_ _
No Fuel leak detection No Fuel Leak Detection
OEB Dispatch/Reliability improvement ATA 28 OEB Dispatch/Reliability improvement ATA 28

All A318/A319/A320 A/C All A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

In case of incorrect identification of fuel leak, incorrect crew actions may lead to In case of incorrect identification of fuel leak, incorrect crew actions may lead to
undetected loss of fuel. undetected loss of fuel.

Available enhancements Available enhancements

The modification consists in the activation of the fuel leak detection function: The modification consists of installation of FQIC PN B539AAM0308 (Software Stage
- SB  A320-28-1214 (Mod. 154036). 8.0) and modification of the pin programming of the SDAC to allow better fuel detection:
- SB  A320-28-1169 :  Introduction of Stage 8.0 FQIC (Mod. 38634).
- SB  A320-28-1202 :  Introduction of fuel leak detection function (Mod. 39237, 25612).
Aircraft prerequisites
This  function  requires at  least  the following FWC, FQIC, DMC and SDAC standards
or subsequent: Aircraft prerequisites
- SB A320-28-1125: Install FQIC standard 13.10 (Mod. 33877). This function requires at least the following FWC, DMC and SDAC standards or
- SB A320-31-1334: Install FWC Standard H2F5 (Mod. 37871). subsequent:
- SB A320-31-1157, A320-31-1214: Introduction of DMC EIS1 V50 Standard - SB A320-31-1334: Install FWC Standard H2F5 (Mod. 37871).
(Mod. 31056). - SB A320-31-1157, A320-31-1214: Introduction of DMC EIS1 V50 Standard
- SB A320-31-1193 : Introduction of EIS2 Standard S4. (Mod. 31056).
- SB A320-31-1144, SB A320-31-1265, SB A320-31-1281: Installation of SDAC - SB A320-31-1193 : Introduction of EIS2 Standard S4.
Standard. - SB A320-31-1144, SB A320-31-1265, SB A320-31-1281: Installation of SDAC
H1D1 or H2D2 or H2D1 or H2E2 Standard.
- SB A320-31-1266: Activation of Hard Pin Programmed Functions. H1D1 or H2D2 or H2D1 or H2E2
- SB A320-31-1266: Activation of Hard Pin Programmed Functions.
Other references
- OIT 999.0080/13.
- TFU 28.42.00.043.
26 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 27

Activation of the PTU inhibition logic Activation of ATC/Transponder

to prevent potential loss of hydraulic systems monitoring function
_ _
Cancel Prevent Dual Hydraulic Loss No ATC/XPDR inadvertently switched OFF
OEB 47 Reduce crew workload ATA 29 OEB prevention ATA 31

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Loss of green (or yellow) hydraulic fluid may not be immediately indicated to flight crew, An investigation has identified cases of ATC/Transponder being inadvertently switched
depending on flight phase, due to ECAM warning and procedure inhibition. OFF leading to the loss of ATC/XPDR and TCAS functions.
Due to pressure decrease in the green (or yellow) hydraulic system, the PTU starts to A recommendation was issued to increase crew awareness of transponder (XPDR)
restore the pressure but as a consequence of no fluid in the green (or yellow) hydraulic being inadvertently switched off.
system this leads to overheat of the yellow (or green) hydraulic system resulting in
a dual hydraulic loss. To prevent the hydraulic system overheat, the PTU must be
switched off by the crew. Available enhancements
New ATC/XPDR monitoring function has been developed and is activated with SDAC
pin programming:
Available enhancements - SB  A320-31-1352 (Mod.151300, 25612).
An enhancement has been developed in order to automate the inhibition of the PTU - SB  A320-34-1459 (Mod. 150540).
under above scenario. PTU inhibition needs the following modifications depending
- SB  A320-31-1353 (Mod. 36398).
on your aircraft configuration.
Covering A/C with no wiring provision:
- SB  A320-29-1156:  Wiring  provision installation and activation (Mod. 153173). Aircraft prerequisites
Covering A/C with partial wiring provisions (Post Mod. 34236): This function requires at least the following SDAC and FWC standards or subsequent:
- SB  A320-29-1115 or SB  A320-29-1147: Diodes installation (Mod. 35879). - SB  A320-31-1281:  Introduction of SDAC standard H2E2 (Mod. 26726, 30365,
And 31496, 36811).
- SB  A320-29-1126 or SB A320-29-1145: Function activation (Mod.35938). - SB  A320-31-1334:  Introduction  of FWC standard H2F5 (Mod. 37871).
Covering A/C with full wiring provisions:
- SB  A320-29-1126 or SB A320-29-1145: Function activation (Mod.35938).
Activation is emphasized for aircraft on which Parker Hydraulic Electrical Motor pump
PN 51154-0X model are installed.

Other references
- FOT 999.0001/14.
- TFU 29.10.00.025.
- Article in Safety First N 04.
- Presentation during 19 Flight Safety Conference.
28 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 29

Activation of AVAIL indication Stall Warning awareness enhancement

on Engine Warning Display (EWD) _
NEW
_
No No
OEB
Engine condition awareness enhancement ATA 31 OEB
Flight Crew Awareness ATA 31

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

In some cases of engine auto shut down in flight, the pilot did not notice that the engine To improve awareness of STALL conditions Airbus has developed the following
restarted correctly and reinitiated the sequence. enhancements to the Stall Warnings:
- Red “STALL STALL” message will appear on the PFD in addition to Aural Stall
Warning to re-inforce Flight Crew Awareness
Available enhancements - STALL warning will remain active, even at low speeds.
The modification consists in activating the engine AVAIL display indication on Engine
Warning Display to inform the crew of successful engine start on ground or engine
relight in flight (Mod. 25612, 34665): Available enhancements
- SB A320-31-1331. The Red “STALL STALL” message on the PFD is activated with EIS2 standard S12 and
subsequent. It is also activated with HUD L5 for Aircraft with HUD capability.
- SB A320-31-1482: Indicating/recording system - DMC - introduce EIS2 S13-2
Aircraft prerequisites standard for CEO configuration.
This function requires at least the following DMC and ECU standards, or subsequent: - SB A320-31-1481: Introduce EIS2 S13-2 standard for NEO configuration.
- SB A320-31-1276:  Introduction  of  DMC standard EIS2 S7 (Mod. 34984, 36725). The Stall warning will be provided in flight when at stall warning threshold, whatever
- SB A320-31-1286:  Introduction  of  DMC standard EIS1 V60 (Mod. 31056, 37009). speed conditions further to installation of FWC H2F8 and subsequent.
- SB A320-73-1081:  Introduction  of  ECU standard 5AI (CFM56-5A) (Mod. 34156). - SB A320-31-1492: Install FWC H2-F9D for CEO aircraft.
- SB A320-73-1086:  Introduction  of  ECU standard 5BM (CFM56-5B) (Mod. 36462)
(Refer to page 45). Note: Installation of EIS2 S13 and FWC H2F9C provides capability for reversible
- SB A320-73-1082:  Introduction  of  EEC software SCN18 (IAE V2500-A5) (Mod. 34221). Back Up Speed Scale (BUSS) (refer to presentation at 22nd FSC).
SB A320-31-1492 is subject to an Airbus Monitored retrofit campaign ref RIL
SA31M16009125 R00 dated 08 Dec 2016.
SB A320-31-1481 is subject to an Airbus Monitored retrofit campaign ref RIL
D31M16008039 R00 dated 05 Dec 2016.

Aircraft prerequisites
For the Red “STALL STALL” message the aircraft must be fitted with EIS2.
For the Stall warning at low speed the aircraft must also be fitted with capable ADIRU standards
(Northrop Grumman, Honeywell Block II from standard AE21 and Honeywell Block III).

Other references
Presentation at 22nd Flight Safety Conference.
ISI 31.50.00065 - FWC Standard F8.
ISI 31.50.00066 - FWC Standard F9.
ISI 31.62.00007 - EIS2 Standard S12.

Contacts
For more information on the monitored retrofit campaign please contact Retrofit
Operations at the following email address [email protected]
30 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 31

Improved MLG Implementation of the heat shrink colour coding

door actuator hose on the landing gear tachometer harness
_ _
No No Cross connection tachometer harnesses
OEB Green hydraulic loss prevention ATA 32 OEB prevention ATA 32

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Several cases of Green hydraulic system loss due to hose breakage/leakage of the A number of cases have been reported where the tachometers were cross connected
Main Landing Gear (MLG) door actuator supply line have been reported. The hoses on the landing gear.
were found fractured by fatigue due to the stress applied during MLG door operation. The consequence is the loss of anti-skid on one wheel and loss of the braking pressure
on the adjacent one if anti-skid is active. This leads eventually to one wheel free and
one wheel blocked.
Available enhancements
A new hose design is available via
- SB  A320-32-1371 (Mod 150309) Available enhancements
A new heat shrink colour coding of the tachometer harnesses has been implemented in
order to enhance identification of the tachometer harness to prevent cross connection:
Other references - SB  A320-32-1395 (Mod 151416).
- TFU 32.31.35.003
- ISI 29.00.00013
Other references
- OIT 999.0133/07.
- Article in Safety first issued in Feb 2009.
32 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 33

Activation of the parking brake New landing gear

monitoring function selector valve
_ _
No Unexpected parking brake activation No
OEB prevention ATA 32 OEB
Nose landing gear collapse prevention ATA 32

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Unexpected parking brake application may occur: Uncommanded retraction of the nose landing gear can occur in certain conditions.
- Either if the parking brake has been inadvertently set in flight, Damage to the internal seal of the nose landing gear selector valve coupled with an
- Or upon failure conditions. LGCIU power interrupt can result in the uncommanded retraction of the NLG on the
ground.

Available enhancements
New parking brake monitoring logic was introduced in FWC standard H2F5 to enable
Available enhancements
detection of discrepancy between the parking brake handle position and the parking The modification consists in the introduction of a selector valve with improved seals:
brake Selector Valve and trigger appropriate ECAM warning. - SB A320-32-1348 (Mod. 38947).
In order to activate the parking brake monitoring function, an additional wiring is
needed, running from the SDAC to the parking brake handle:
Other references
- SB  A320-32-1381 (Mod. 151299, 25612, 39379).
TFU 32.31.00.009.
- SB  A320-31-1353 (Mod. 36398).

Aircraft prerequisites
This function requires at least the following SDAC and FWC standards or subsequent:
- SB  A320-31-1281:  Introduction of SDAC standard H2E2 (Mod. 26276, 30365,
31496, 36811)
- SB  A320-31-1334:  Introduction  of FWC standard H2F5 (Mod. 37871).

Other references
TFU 32.45.51.002
34 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 35

Introduction of BSCU standard L4.10 LG Door Bypass Valves

_ _

No Enhanced Awareness linked to Braking No

OEB and Steering ATA 32 OEB
Prevention of Inadvertent LG Door Closure ATA 32

A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C
All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C
(Except those fitted with Bogie Landing Gear)

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

In current BSCU L4.9B Standard: Landing Gear (LG) door bypass valves are designed to prevent movement of the Ground
- Failure of Landing Gear lever could lead to inhibition of pre-land test with no cockpit Door Opening Panel (GDOP) handle to the stowed position when the green hydraulic
effect. system is depressurized during maintenance operations. This avoids inadvertent
- Failure of Parking Brake selector valve can lead to Residual braking with closure of the doors when hydraulic pressure is restored.
no cockpit effect.
Residual hydraulic pressure present can lead to the possibility of the GDOP handle
being moved to the stowed position for a short period after switching off the green
Available enhancements hydraulic power. Which could lead to inadvertent closure of the doors on restoration of
With BSCU L4.10, there is additional cockpit awareness for these failure conditions. the hydraulic power, if process is not correctly followed.
- SB A320-32-1432 (mod 157591).
Subject to an Airbus Monitored Retrofit campaign: RIL SA32M16004200 R00 dated Available enhancements
20-APR-2016. The new door bypass valve (PN 114087010) increases the internal leakage and
decreases the time required for pressure to dissipate in the door close line once the
green hydraulic system has been de-pressurised.
Aircraft prerequisites
The improvement related to the detection of residual braking detection function requires This prevents the moving of the Landing gear Door Bypass valve handle to CLOSED,
at least the following SDAC and FWC standards or subsequent: and inadvertent closure of the landing gear doors if process is not correctly followed.
- SDAC Standard H2E3 (SB A320-31-1374, Mod 151314). - SB A320-32-1436 (mod 157235).
- FWC Standard H2F9 (Mod 161397).
Other references
Other references Triumph Actuation Systems VSB No. 114087-32-102.
For other improvements covered by this new BSCU standard refer to TFUs
- 32.42.34.053 - BRAKES RELEASED / AUTO BRK FAULT AT LANDING.
- 32.42.00.055 - Intermittent BRAKE SYS 1(2) FAULT ECAM warning -
Normal Brake Servovalve Faults.
- 32.51.00.027 - NWS fault due to spurious elec box failure.

Contacts
For more information on the monitored retrofit campaign please contact Retrofit
Operations at the following email address [email protected]
36 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 37

Decrease Inflation pressure of Yellow Park Brake Introduction of new Collins MMR to avoid cases of
Accumulator Localizer and/or Glideslope capture inoperative during
_ ILS approach
NEW
_
Cancel No Localizer/Glideslope capture in approach
Prevention of Loss of Emergency Braking ATA 32 OEB 28 Dispatch/Reliability improvement ATA 34

A319/A320/A321 aircraft pre mod 30079 A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C fitted with Rockwell Collins MMR
(A319 - MSN 1831, A320 - MSN 1896 and A321 - MSN 1836) PN 822-1152-121

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

On aircraft equipped with Rockwell Collins MMR it is possible that, due to an internal
In certain cases, internal leakage rate of alternate brake system can lead to brake MMR reset, there is no localizer (LOC) or Glide Slope (GS) capture during an ILS
accumulator pressure decrease and consequently to reduced availability of Emergency approach.
Braking in event of loss of Yellow and Green Hydraulic system.

Available enhancements
Available enhancements New Rockwell Collins MMR PN 822-1152-122 (Mod. 37356):
Installation of a label, and update of AMM task, which reduces the charging pressure of - SB  A320-34-1384.
the accumulator from 100 to 70 bar. AMM task is modified accordingly Subject to a Rockwell Collins monitored retrofit campaign: VSB GLU-920-34-502.
- SB A320-32-1215 DECREASE INFLATION PRESSURE OF YELLOW BRAKE
ACCUMULATOR.
Additional benefits
OEB 28 is cancelled by the installation of the MMR P/N 822-1152-122.
Other references Introduction of the modification will also correct nuisance faults and will improve
- ISI 32.44.00007 “Alternate Braking without Anti Skid - Brake accumulator charge the global system reliability.
pressure”.
- TFU 32.44.11.003 - Alternate Accumulator Pressure Check.
Other references
- TFU 34.36.00.023.
- OIT/FOT 999.0048/06.

Contacts
For the organisation of this retrofit please contact:
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP
COLLINS GENERAL AVIATION DIV
400 COLLINS RD NE
IA 52498-0001 CEDAR RAPIDS USA
38 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 39

Introduction of new Honeywell ADIRU Introduction of improved thermal insulation

with ADR monitoring enhancement on Honeywell ADM
on static pressure comparison _
_
No No
OEB
ADR monitoring enhancement ATA 34 OEB
ADR1 and ADR2 loss prevention ATA 34

All A318/A320/A321 A/C fitted with Honeywell

All A319/A320/A321 A/C
ADIRU pre P/N HG2030AE22

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

In case of pressure line disconnection between the static probe and the Air Data In case of extreme cold atmosphere Air Data Reference ADR1 and Air Data Reference
Module (ADM) the pressure measured by the ADM is incorrect. ADR2 values of static pressure may be affected.
In case of multiple pressure line disconnections, this may lead to multiple erroneous Note: The ADR3 is not subject to this fault mode.
displays in the cockpit (standby/Captain/First Officer) presenting similar but wrong
altitude and airspeed information.
Available enhancements
Introduction of polyethylene foam (insulation plate) between ADM and the structure:
Available enhancements - SB A320-34-1128 (Mod. 25882).
A new ADR monitoring is available from Honeywell ADIRU PN HG2030AE21 (Mod.
31105). If the difference between left and right static pressure is greater than 30mb, the
associated ADR FAULT warning message is triggered on ECAM: Other references
- SB  A320-34-1332:  Introduction of ADIRU PN HG2030AE22 (Mod. 31706). TFU 34.10.00.016
Note: All Northrop Grumman ADIRUs on the A320 family fleet have this new monitoring
(ADIRUs PN above 465050-0303-0314; Mod. 31070).

Other references
OIT 999.0032/08.
40 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 41

Introduction of Flight Path Angle Introduction of New Honeywell

display improvement software radio altimeter ALA52B-0232
_ _
No No
OEB
Flight crew awareness ATA 34 OEB
Erroneous radio altitude data prevention ATA 34

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C fitted with Honeywell ADIRU pre All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C fitted with Honeywell
P/N HG2030AE24 or P/N HG2030ADxx Radio Altimeters

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

This modification introduces an improvement of the Flight Path Angle (FPA) availability Direct radio signal coupling between receivers and transceivers antennas may cause
in the case of loss of airspeed. erroneous radio altitude data (-6ft) in approach.

Available enhancements Available enhancements

Introduction of Honeywell ADIRU standard PN HG2030AE24: Introduction of a new software on the Honeywell Radio Altimeter ALA52B-0232:
- SB  A320-34-1573 (Mod. 154721). (Mod 152435):
- SB  A320-34-1510.
Subject to an Airbus monitored retrofit campaign: RIL X34M12046720.
Other references
- Honeywell VSB HG2030AE-34-0011 converts ADxx and AExx to AE24.
- ISI 34.12.00003 “ADIRU MIXABILITY MATRICES”. Aircraft prerequisites
Accomplishment of SB A320-34-1510 requires the prior or simultaneous accomplishment
of the following Service Bulletins or the equivalent production modifications:
- SB  A320-34-1171:  Introduction of new RA Antennas (Allied Signal) (Mod. 24079, 27722).
- SB  A320-34-1394:  Introduction of new RA Antennas (Honeywell) (Mod. 37865).

Contacts
For more information on the monitored retrofit campaign please contact Retrofit
Operations at the following email address [email protected]
42 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 43

Improved electrical installation Introduction of static pressure

of RA antennas monitoring on ground
_ _
No No
OEB
Prevention of loss of radio altitude ATA 34 OEB
ADR monitoring enhancement ATA 34

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Moisture ingress at radio altimeter connectors can affect radio altimeter operation, Non-detection of obstructed static pressure probes on ground in some specific cases.
and consequently lead to loss of radio altitude indication during approach/landing.
Available enhancements
Available enhancements Activation of on ground static pressure monitoring measured by the Air Data Reference
New electrical installation for RA antennas to improve the sealing of the radio altimeter (ADR) 1 and 2 with:
antennas connectors with: - SB A320-34-1563: Define static probe monitoring on ground function.
- SB A320-92-1030: Improve electrical installation for antennas.
Aircraft prerequisites
Aircraft prerequisites This function requires at least the following FWC standards:
It is recommended to perform SB A320-34-1476 (Install a new gasket between radio - SB A320-31-1373: Introduction of FWC standard H2F6 (or subsequent).
altimeter antenna and a/c skin) at the same time.
- SB A320-31-1374: Introduction of SDAC standard H2E3.

Other references
- TFU 34.42.00.017
- ISI 34.42.00007
- Article in FAST 49
- Article in Safety First N°11
44 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 45

Improved initialization function Improved TAT probes

during ADIRS alignment _
_
Simplification of ADIRU alignment
No No Improvement of Autopilot and
OEB
to prevent loss of flight plan ATA 34 OEB Auto Thrust availability ATA 34
and Navigation Data

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C pre mod 33240 All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Incorrect aircraft position entry during Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) Failure of the two heating sensing elements inside the Captain Total Air Temperature
alignment can lead to loss of flight plan, incorrect indication on the Navigation Display (TAT) probe can lead to loss of Flight Director, Autopilot and Autothrust.
and erroneous heading indication on takeoff.
Available enhancements
Available enhancements Replacement of the current TAT probe with an improved TAT probe, in order to improve
This enhancement introduces: robustness of the TAT two heating element sensing failures.
- Automatic position initialization Dependent on aircraft configuration there are three types of TAT that could be installed:
- Cross-check of manual initialization position with GPS position - SB A320-34-1331: Installation of AUXITROL “NON-ASPIRATED” TAT Probe PN RP350-00.
- Shortened alignment time - SB A320-34-1382: Introduction of UTAS “NON-ASPIRATED” TAT Probe PN 0102ME2GE.
- SB A320-34-1407: Introduction of UTAS “ASPIRATED” TAT Probe PN 0102LM2GE.
This enhancement is activated by modification of pin-programming of the ADIRU 1-3:
- SB A320-34-1550 (mod 33240): Activate Alignment Improvement Function on ADIRU
Other references
TFU 34.10.00.015 - DUAL BREAKDOWN OF TAT SENSING ELEMENTS
Aircraft prerequisites
The improved ADIRU alignment function requires the aircraft to be fitted with:
- HONEYWELL ADIRU PN HG2030AE21 (or subsequent PN) and Global Positioning Other data
System Sensor Unit (GPSSU) or Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR). - On A320 aircraft: Installation of FAC620 or later allows retention of AP2/FD2 and
- LITTON ADIRU PN 465020-0303-0314 (or subsequent PN) and MMR. ATHR in case of Captain TAT failure.
- On A318/A319/A321 aircraft: Installation of FG C13/I12 (or subsequent) allows
retention of FD2 and ATHR in case of Captain TAT failure.
- On A318/A319/A321 aircraft: Installation of FG C13/I12 (or subsequent) and FAC
620 (or equivalent) allows retention of AP2/FD2 and ATHR in case of Captain TAT
failure.

Note: Refer to section “AP/FD Logic Enhancements” (Page 10) for further information
on availability of latest FMGC and FAC standards.
46 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 47

Introduction of modification package (TCT, FAV, TLT) APU Bleed Air Contamination Prevention
to reduce dual bleed loss rate _
_
No Cabin depressurization prevention No Cabin Air Quality; Bleed Air Contamination
OEB IFTB/Diversion/Emergency descent prevention ATA 36 OEB prevention ATA 49

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Dual engine bleed loss can lead to an emergency descent due to loss of cabin APU Bleed Air Contamination can come from a variety of sources. Modifications have
pressurization. been developed which can prevent contamination of the APU bleed air.

Available enhancements Available enhancements

The following modification package will reduce dual bleed loss rate: The following modifications are available to address sources of APU bleed Air
- SB  A320-36-1061: Introduction of new TCT (7170HM) PN 342B050000 (Mod. 38788). Contamination:
- Liebherr VSB 6730F-36-01 or 6730-36-03: FAV (9HA) F01 standard or C01 standard - SB A320-49-1049 - Introduce Drain System And Sealing On R/L Access Doors.
modification. (effective in production from MSN 0618 and subsequent).
- Liebherr VSB 341-36-06: TLT (10HA) E standard modification. - SB A320-49-1050 - Introduce A Modified Intake Elbow Seal And Aircraft Intake Box
Seal.(effective in production from MSN 0724 and subsequent.
- SB A320-49-1106 - Seal Gap Between Air Intake Housing Cpl And Flange (effective
Additional benefits in production from MSN 5366 and subsequent).
Introduction of the modification package will improve the overall bleed reliability.
- SB A320-52-1152 - Introduce Additional Seals And Guttering To Prevent Water
Ingress.
Other references
- TFU 36.11.00.059.
- TFU 36.11.00.072.
- OIT 999.0061/08.
- ISI 36.11.00020.
- Article in Safety First N 7 and N 13 and
-P resentation during 16 and 19 Flight Safety Conference.
48 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 49

Introduction of new refuel Introduction of new Blue Hydraulic Service Panel Door
Panel Door (192MB) (197FB)
_ _
NEW

No No
OEB
Prevention of Parts Departing Aircraft ATA 53 OEB
Prevention of Parts Departing Aircraft ATA 53

All A319/A320/A321 A/C pre mod 32361P7541 fitted with refuel

All A318/A319/A320/A321 A/C pre mod 158401
panel door on fuselage

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Incorrect closing of the fuselage refuel panel door can lead to detachment in flight. Incorrect closing and latching of the access door 197FB can lead to detachment in
flight.
Available enhancements
Re-orientation of the refuel panel door, so that it opens in line with the airflow. Available enhancements
Consequently, if left unclosed the refuel panel door will close due to airflow. This Modification of the access door 197FB, such that it is less likely to come detached in
enhancement can be embodied by either: flight. The enhancements include:
- SB A320- 53-1164 (Mod 32734P7942) – serial solution - will provide the rework - Introduction of more solid hinges for the access door.
procedure of the existing panel 192LB and a kit including new door and fittings. - Replacement of hooks and latches for the access door – two instead of one.
- SB A320-53-1189 (Mod 35246P9046) – Simplified Solution. This Door 192MB will not
be interchangeable with serial solution. This enhancement can be embodied by application of:
- SB A320-53-1323 (Mod 158401 K18443) – “rear fuselage - redesign the connection
of the service door for 197FB”.

Pre Mod Post Mod Pre Mod Post Mod

Other references
Other references TFU 52.40.00.002 – “damage hinges/latches and loss of service doors (197FB,
- TFU 52.42.00.011 - FUEL PANEL DOOR 192MB / IN-FLIGHT LOSSES 197CB, 197EB)”.
- TFU 52.42.00.013 - IN-FLIGHT LOSS OF FUEL PANEL ACCESS DOOR 192MB
50 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 51

Introduction of Improved Oil Filler Door Latches on IAE Introduction of new Electronic Engine Control (EEC)
V2500 software SCN22/AB
_ _
No
OEB
Prevention of Parts Departing Aircraft ATA 71 Bleed Loss Prevention ATA 73

All A319/A320/A321 A/C pre mod 155785 fitted with IAE

All A319/A320/A321 Fitted with IAE Engines
Engines

Description of safety topic Description of safety topic

Incorrect closing of the Oil Refuel Panel door latches can lead to the refuel panel door New EEC software is introduced to:
to detach in flight due to scooping effect. -Reduce pressure peaks in engine air system at take-off which can cause bleed
overpressure.
- Incorporate various improvements for the basic V2500-A5 and/or the SelectOne engines.
Available enhancements
Installation of a new latch, Part Number HA2153-1, featuring an additional torsion spring
and increased latch poundage. This ensures it does not remain in an intermediate Available enhancements
position, whenever incorrectly latched, and allows better detection of incorrectly closed The new EEC software includes enhancements to:
Oil Filler Doors. This enhancement can be embodied by:
- Environmental Control System (ECS) bleed over pressure protection logic refinement
SB A320-71-1061 - Fan cowl doors - Introduce an improved oil filler door latch design (SelectOne only).
on IAE engine.
- ENG 1(2) REVERSE UNLOCKED triggering improvement.
- Improvement of the Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS) thrust reverser test in order
to detect the “stowed but unlocked” condition.
Note that this improvement is not active for the T/R Shut-off valve not installed
configuration.
- Flex Take Off securing package
- Introduces fuel burn improvement for the V2500-A5 SelectOne engines.

- SB: A320 -73-1104 - Introduce SCN22/AB EEC Software Standard For IAE V2500-A5
Engines.

Aircraft prerequisites
Damage caused by partial loss Pre-­mod showing Refuel Filler Door not - A320-73-1097 - introduce EEC software standard SCN21/AA for IAE V2500-A5
of Oil Filler Door fully closed leading to scooping effect (Modification No. 150848).
- For Flex Take Off Securing package improvements requirement for FWC H2F6 (SB
A320-31-1373 Mod. 151269)
Aircraft prerequisites
No pre-­requisites
Other references
- IAE V2500-ENG-73-0236 and V2500-ENG-73-0237
Other references - TFU 73.22.00.007
- TFU 71.13.00.059 - V2500 Fan Cowl Oil Filler Door Loss
- EASA SIB 2016-01 – “Improved Oil Filler Door Latches on IAE V2500 Engines”
52 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 53

Introduction of new ECU Software (FADEC 5BT)

_
UPDATED

Cancel Prevention of engine uncommanded rotation

OEB 35 Prevention of engine stall at Thrust reduction ATA 73

All A318/A319/A320/A321 fitted with CFM56-5B engines

Description of safety topic

New ECU logic is available that:
- improves behavior against stall at Thrust Reduction.
- Which can prevent engine uncommanded rotation at engine start.

Available enhancements
Modifications in the ECU software which:
- Enhances the starting logic, so that it requires to confirm the engine master lever
position.
- Improves robustness against engine stall.

ECU software 5BT:

- SB A320-73-1103 “FADEC SYSTEM - introduce ECU software “5BTF3” on CFM56-
5B ENGINES”

Additional benefits
For aircraft pre ECU software 5BR (Mod 39620), installation of 5BT cancels OEB35.

Other references
-T
 FU 80.00.00.017 A320 FAM - CFM56-5B - Uncommanded Engine Rotation.
-
ISI 73.20.00004 - A320 Fam CFM56-5B ENGINE – ECU/FADEC standard
combination - Intermix.
54 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 55

Abbreviations
_

ADM Air Data Module LGCIU Landing Gear Control and Interface Unit
ADR Air Data Reference LOC LOCalizer
ADIRS Air Data Inertial Reference System
ADIRU Air Data Inertial Reference Unit MLG Main Landing Gear
AFS Automatic Flight System MDA Minimum Descent Altitude
AMU Audio Management Unit MDH Minimum Descent Height
AOA Angle Of Attack MMR Multi Mode Receiver
A/P Autopilot
A/THR Autothrust OEB Operations Engineering Bulletin
ATC/XPDR Air Traffic Control Transponder OFV OutFlow Valve
OIT Operator Information Transmission
CPCS Cabin Pressure Control System
CPC Cabin Pressure Controller PA Passenger Address
PFD Primary Flight Display
DL Data Loading PN Part Number
DMC Display Management Computer PTU Power Transfer Unit

ECU Electronic Control Unit RFC/RMO Request For Change/Retrofit Modification Order
EEC Engine Electronic Computer RIL Retrofit Information Letter
EGT Exhaust Gas Temperature RNP Required Navigation Performance
EIS Electronic Instrument System
ELAC Elevator Aileron Computer SB Airbus Service Bulletin
EM2 Enhanced Manufacturing and Maintainability SDAC System Data Acquisition Concentrator
EWD Engine Warning Display SEC Spoiler Elevator Computer

FAV Fan Air Valve TAT Total Air Temperature

FCDC Flight Control Data Concentrator TCAS Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System
FCU Flight Control Unit TCT Temp Control Thermostat
FD Flight Director TFU Technical Follow Up
FLSCU Fuel Level Sensing Control Unit TLT Temp Limitation Thermostat
FMA Flight Mode Annunciator TOS Take-Off Securing
FMGC Flight Management and Guidance Computer
FMS Flight Management System VSB Vendor Service Bulletin
FOT Flight Operations Transmission
FPA Flight Path Angle XPDR Transponder
FQIC Fuel Quantity Indication Computer
FWC Flight Warning Computer

GCU Generator Control Unit

GPSSU Global Positioning Sensor System Unit
GS Glide Slope

HPC High Pressure Compressor

HSP High Speed Protection

IFTB In Flight Turn Back

IFSD In-Flight Shut Down
ILS Instrument Landing System
ISI In-Service Information
56 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 57

Prerequisite summary
_

This table shows the safety enhancements that can be implemented on the A320 fleet. The installation It is proposed as a quick reference guide. For further details refer to the individual page within this leaflet.
of the latest standard of computer could enable the implementation of several safety enhancements.

PAGE FG 2G std FMS2 FMS2 Thales FCU std M11 FWC H2F9 DMC EIS1 DMC EIS2 SDAC std FAC B624 SEC 121 or FCDC Std 58
C14 or I15 Honeywell Release 1A or higher V70 S13 H2E3 or CAA03 123
or FG 3G std Release1A S7A
PC18 or PI16 H2C
Cabin Oxygen mask indication
3
& improved cabin pressure control
Activation of the triple click Aural alert
5
and PFD display enhancement
6 / 7 Take-Off securing
Activation of the Automatic NAV
8
engagement at Go-around
Speed protection package
9
and FD disengagement
10 AP/FD Logic Enhancements
Tail Strike Prevention -
11
“Pitch Pitch” call out
11 Tail Strike Prevention - PFD Indication
16 Ground Spoiler activation enhancements

17 Dual Side Stick Indication

20 Improved Flight/maintenance awareness

Fuel overflow monitoring
23
function (All AC except A321)
24/25 Fuel leak detection
27 ATC/XPDR monitoring function
28 AVAIL indication on EWD
29 Stall Warning Awareness Enhancements
32 Parking brake monitoring
43 Static pressure monitoring
Improvement of AP and A/THR availability
45
in case of loss of TAT
ROPS Capable
58 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017 59

Notes Notes
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60 23 Flight Safety Conference - Santiago - March 2017

Notes
_