CASE ASSIGNMENTS

I. Introduction; Settlement of estates

Natcher vs. CA, G.R. No. 133000, Oct. 2, 2001

Patricia Natcher vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and the Heirs of Graciano del Rosario, Leticia
del Rosario, Emilia del Rosario-Manangan, Rosalinda Fuentes Llana, Rodolfo Fuentes,
Alberto Fuentes, Evelyn del Rosario, and Eduardo del Rosario
G.R. No. 133000, 2 October 2001, J. Buena

FACTS:
Sps. Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land
located in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children,
namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Graciana’s estate.

On 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an “Agreement of Consolidation-

Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights”. Graciano then donated to his children,
share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters
leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano’s name.

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold his land to his wife Patricia. On 07 October 1985, Graciano died leaving his second
wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

Private respondents filed a complaint alleged that upon Graciano’s death, petitioner Natcher,
through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, making it appear that
Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation and the issuance of title in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private
respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.

RTC ruled that the sale is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. Although the deed of
sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of
advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.”

CA reversed and set aside the lower court.

ISSUE:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly in questions as to advancement of
property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

RULING:
NO. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement
of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

Concomitantly, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is
devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the
real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch
55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case,
reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction
the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best
forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters
involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Montaner vs. Sharia District Court, G.R. No.174975, Jan. 20, 2009

Luisa Kho Montaner, Alejandro Montaner Jr., Lilibeth Montaner-Barrios and Rhodora
Elenor Montaner-Dalupan vs. Shari’a District Court, Fourth Shari’a Judicial District,
Marawi City, Liling Disangcopan, and Almahleen Liling S. Montaner
G.R. No. 174975, 20 January 2009, C.J. Puno

FACTS:
On 19 August 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and daughter Almahleen, both
Muslims, filed a complaint for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a
District Court. In said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations:
(1) In May 1995, Alejandro Montaner Sr. died;
(2) the late Alejandro Montaner Sr. is a Muslim;
(3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent;
(4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent;
(5) Almahleen Liling is the daughter of the decedent; and
(6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.

Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order (1) the partition of the
estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the
decedent.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) the Shari’a District Court has
no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaner Sr, because he was a
Roman Catholic; (2) private respondent failed to pay the required docket fees; and (3)
private respondents’ complaint is barred by prescription. Petitioners point to Disangcopn’s
petition which contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the
conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient.

The Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint on the basis of
Montaner Sr.’s religious denomination, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and
distribution of the estate of the deceased Muslims.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper docket fees were paid for the “complaint” for the judicial partition of
properties.

RULING:
YES. Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees
vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the party filing the case paid less
than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk
of court, the responsibility of making a deficiencyassessment lies with the same clerk of court. In
such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a
party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees. As every
citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties
knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party filing the case cannot be
penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment. However, the party concerned will be
required to pay the deficiency.

In the case at bar, petitioner children did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the
docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no
determination of whether Disangcopan correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of
court’s assessment.

JURISDICTION OVER SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF DECEASED MUSLIMS

All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims,
probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or
executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property shall be under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a District Courts (Article 143(b) of Presidential
Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines cited
in MONTAÑ ER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST
DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).

1.1. The Supreme Court held that the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts, Ijra-at-
al-Mahakim al Shari’a, proscribe “the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer
which would stop the running of the period to file an answer and cause undue delay”
Moreover, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners
raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court
has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which
requires an a prioridetermination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a
District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should
dismiss thbe case for lack of jurisdiction (MONTAÑ ER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO.
174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).

1.2. Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a
District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the
decedent.
It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim (Musa v. Moson, G.R. No. 95574, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 715, 719) such as the fact of
Alejandro Montañ er, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition
also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private
respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very
properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for
reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate
of the decedent (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). These include
the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer
for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate (MONTAÑ ER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT
COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).

1.3. THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION,

SETTLEMENT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, IS CONSIDERED A
SPECIAL PROCEEDING
The proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of
the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." The Supreme Court has applied the Rules,
particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim (Musa v. Moson, supra note 23, at 721-722). In a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of
death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which
would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). Here, the
respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañ er, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for
private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañ er to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is
the case in fact. x x x x x Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his
estate from being a party defendant in a civil action (Ventura v. Hon. Militante, 374 Phil. 562
(1999) applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is
misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no
definite adverse party. x x x As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate
of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities (Pacific Banking
Corporation Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals, 312 Phil. 578, 593 (1995) and to
distribute the residual to those entitled to the same (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402
Phil. 152, 161 (2001).

1.4. EXCEPTION TO THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE OF HEARING

The present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the
rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on
notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not
affected(Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291- 292).
The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process (Vlason
Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals,369 Phil. 269, 299 (1999) for the court to
determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any
period within which to file a reply or opposition (Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170,
May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291-292). In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not
the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be
heard" (De Borja, et al. v. Tan, et al., 93 Phil. 167, 171 (1953). x x x In the case at bar, as evident
from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a
copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an
opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same.
Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same
order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing.
Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing,
procedural process, was duly observed. x x x To deny the Shari’a District Court of an
opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the
estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to
control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation
simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of
justice. x x x x x In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to
recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding (Portugal v.
Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184, 198). The court, in its
capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent
(Uriarte v. Court of First Instance Negros Occidental, et al., 144 Phil. 205, 215-216 (1970). In the
case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to
the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the
decedent (MONTAÑ ER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009,
FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).

Alan Shecker vs. Estate of Shecker, G.R. No. 157912, Dec. 13, 2007

Alan Joseph A. Sheker vs. Estate of Alice O. Sheker, Victoria S. Medina-administratrix

G.R. No. 157912, 13 December 2007, J. Austria-Martirez

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent
is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the
filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having
money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims
to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate.

FACTS:
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and issued an order for all
the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. Petitioner Alan Sheker filed a
contingent claim for agent's commission due him in the event of the sale of certain parcels of
land belonging to the estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses
incurred in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The respondent executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker moved for the dismissal of said money
claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section
7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against nonforum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written
explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

The RTC dismissed the claim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the
payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim?

RULING:
YES. It must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings”.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the
Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as
practicable.

The word practicable is defined as possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in
ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it
categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings.

Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints
and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the
payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate
proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in
ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it
categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing,
and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct
probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's
contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his
motion a certification against non-forum shopping? The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was
initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all
persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and
the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred,
subject to certain exceptions.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors'
claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties
of the estate.
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the
decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a
separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim,
not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of
a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

Roberts vs. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-55509, April 27, 1984, 129 SCRA 33

Ethel Grimm Roberts vs. Judge Tomas R. Leonidas, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of
Manila; Maxine Tate-Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II and Linda Grimm
G.R. No. L-55509, 27 April 1984

FACTS:
Edward Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by his second
wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children by a first marriage
(Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce.

Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959. One will disposed of
his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second
will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented
for probate in Utah by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the
intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the two
wills and codicil to probate on April 1978 and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation
between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.

Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila,
entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.

As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by Ethel. On March 1978,
Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of
pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm’s will.
However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and the
motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record. The estate was partitioned.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (already probated in
Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of
administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for
the properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were
defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal and the
intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to the
decedent’s wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.

RULING:
NO. The Court held that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code; Sec.
1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died
testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should
be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and
answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient
for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with
copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.

Uriarte vs. CFI, G.R. No. L-21938-39, 29 May 1970

Testate Estate of the late Adriano Maloto: Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto,
Purificacion Miraflor, Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Asilo de Molo vs. Felino Maloto
and Felino Maloto
G.R. No. L-32328, 30 September 1977

FACTS:
One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence. Aldina
Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews,
respectively, of the late Adriana Maloto, in the belief that the decedent died intestate,
commenced on November 4, 1963 in CFI-Iloilo an intestate proceeding. In the course of said
intestate proceeding, Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo and Felino Maloto partitioned the properties of
Adriana among themselves, and said partition was approved by the court.

Four years later, Aldina and Constancio, herein petitioners, went to the same court asking to re-
open the case alleging that Adriana actually left a will. They moved for the annulment of the
intestate proceeding and the allowance of the said will. Panfilo and Felino opposed the
motion. The court dismissed the motion on the ground that it was filed out of time.

Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus which
was later dismissed by the Court saying that the proper remedy was to file a separate
proceeding for the probate of the alleged will. Petitioners then filed with CFI Iloilo a petition
for probate of the said will but the court dismissed the same on the ground of res
adjudicata and that the earlier intestate proceeding had made a finding that the will of the
decedent was destroyed and revoked. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for probate was barred by the judgment of an earlier intestate
proceeding.

RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that the petition for probate of the alleged will was the proper remedy,
and should not have been dismissed. The earlier intestate proceeding is not a bar for the
petition for probate of the will as to constitute res adjudicata. The court also ruled that it was
not proper for the court in the intestate proceeding to make a finding that the discovered will
had been destroyed and revoked. The lower court was directed to proceed with the hearing
of the probate of the will.

In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a
bar to the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the
alleged will of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside and the lower court is directed to proceed
with the hearing of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against
the respondents.

Cuenco vs. CA, G.R. No. L-24742, Oct. 26, 1973

Rosa Cayetano Cuenco vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Third Division, Manuel
Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguerra, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo
Cuenco Reyes, and Teresita Cuenco Gonzalez
G.R. No. L-24742, 26 October 1973

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor
sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one
of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the
Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a
resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition
with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix.
Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance
resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the probate
proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal, CA
ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon City.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City court ordering
it to refrain from proceeding with the testate proceedings.
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in
pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate
over intestate proceedings.

RULING:
1. YES. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting
aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and
testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the
location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of
venue. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously
had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children ,
and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate
may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition
before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the
petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the
Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate
petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of
jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts.

Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the
question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in
Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by
respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of
the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would
make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its
territory and venue.

2. NO. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
deferring to the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu
court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction
to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed,
said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court undisputably had at least
equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed

jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City
court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court
their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due
notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted
without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.

DISPOSITION:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered
dismissed. No costs.

ADDITIONAL INFO:
Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should be by appeal
Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and
finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal
home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court —
could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case except when want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.

When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had
improper venue
The mischievous effect in the administration of justice of considering the question of residence
as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start
all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province
is too obvious to require comment. It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one
named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance
therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to
require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the
Cebu court every time she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate
court.

Hilado vs. CA, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009

Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation, First Farmers Holding Corporation vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, The Honorable Amor A. Reyes, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and Administratrix Julita Campos Benedicto
G.R. No. 164108, 8 May 2009

FACTS:

Quiazon vs. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Jenneth Quiazon and Maria Jennifer Quiazon vs. Ma. Lourdes
Belen, for and in behalf of Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
G.R. No. 189121, 31 July 2013, J. Perez

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

FACTS:
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise
Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñ as City. In her Petition,
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time
when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of
Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s
marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among
others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed
by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix
of her late father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñ as City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñ as City. In addition to
their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases
for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

In a Decision dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration
to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition
was properly laid in Las Piñ as City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners
that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.

ISSUE:
Whether the venue was properly laid.

RULING:
YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings
have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid
in Las Piñ as City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñ as City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a
decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on
the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in
1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial
partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground
that their marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his
marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that
Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather
than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous
appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

(9) Avelino vs. CA, G.R. No. 115181, March 31, 2000

Maria Socorro Avelino vs. Court of Appeals, Angelina Avelino, Antonio Avelino Jr.,
Tracy Avelino, Patrick Michael Avelino and Mark Anthony Avelino
G.R. No. 115181, 31 March 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino
Sr. and his first wife private respondent, Angelina Avelino. The other private respondents are
likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. and siblings of petitioner. The records reveal that
Socorro filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio
Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the
administrator of the estate.

Angelina and the siblings of petitioner filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the
said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
The RTC granted the opposition and converted said judicial proceeding into judicial partition
of the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr.
Ma. Socorro filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the CA alleging
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in
granting private respondents’ motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Such petition was denied. Thus,
this petition before the Supreme Court submitting the following contentions: (1) no partition of
the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character
and extent of the decedent’s estate; and (2) petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not
provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for
judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and
should be struck down for lack of legal basis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conversion of a judicial proceeding of a motion for the issuance of letters of
administration to an action for judicial partition was proper.

RULING:
YES. When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by
the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78.  

The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74:

Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and
no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition.

Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. — Whenever the gross value of the estate
of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and
that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the
petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month
nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may
proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay,
to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally
entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment
of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own
right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed
and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of
the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may
be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in
the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if
it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office.

The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment
of the latter’s death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate
among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies
without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for
judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.
The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that
in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial
settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this
case. 

Where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the
majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings, and the court
may convert an heir’s action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition upon
motion of the heirs.

Thus, the trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of administration
into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error
may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in
order.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

(10) Spouses Benatiro vs. Heirs of Cuyos, G.R. No. 161220, July 30, 2008

Spouses Gorgonio Benatiro and Columba Cuyos-Benatiro, substituted by their heirs,

namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and Spouses
Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro vs. Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria
Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos
G.R. No. 161220, 30 July 2008

FACTS:

(11) Portugal vs. Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005

(12) Heirs of Ypon vs. Ricaforte, G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013

(13) Pacioles Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching, G.R. No. 127920, Aug. 9, 2005

(14) Aranas vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 156407, Jan. 12, 2014

(15) Neri vs. Heirs of Uy, G.R. No. 194366, Oct. 10, 2012

(16) Bautista vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 160556, Aug. 3, 2007

II. Probate of wills

(1) Felix Azuela vs. CA, G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006
 (2) Alonzo Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006

(3) Eng vs. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010

Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee

G.R. No. 176831, 15 January 2010, J. Nachura

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved
here— the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private
duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that
respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

FACTS:
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will,
which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, a
petition for mandamus with damages, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to
compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof
could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and
liquidate the patriarch's estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but
petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.

In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint and
posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of
action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner
denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent
and to his siblings.

The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent's evidence,
petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the
original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence
presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in
the petition—they did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for
the court to issue the writ of mandamus.

The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence, however, it granted the same on petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the
appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, granted
the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will
and the payment of attorney's fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by
testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the
main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence
used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of Mandamus was proper in this case?

RULING:
NO. The Court cannot sustain the CA's issuance of the writ. Mandamus is a command issuing
from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed
to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of
the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the
public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the
purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not
his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute
or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question
will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce
contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract
rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or
quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an
individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise,
justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the
government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a
private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee
because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let
it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the
original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his
possession or not.

(4) Alaban vs. CA, G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005

(5) Fluemer vs. Hix, G.R. No. L-32636, March 17, 1930

III. Executors/Administrators

(1) Fule vs. Pano, G.R. No. L-42670, November 29, 1976

(2) Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen, G.R No. 189121, July 31, 2013
 Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Jenneth Quiazon and Maria Jennifer Quiazon vs. Ma. Lourdes
Belen, for and in behalf of Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
G.R. No. 189121, 31 July 2013, J. Perez

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

FACTS:
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise
Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñ as City. In her Petition,
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time
when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of
Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s
marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among
others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed
by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix
of her late father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñ as City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñ as City. In addition to
their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases
for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

In a Decision dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration
to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition
was properly laid in Las Piñ as City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners
that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.
ISSUE:
Whether the venue was properly laid.

RULING:
YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings
have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid
in Las Piñ as City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñ as City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a
decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on
the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in
1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial
partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground
that their marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his
marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that
Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather
than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous
appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

(3) Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching, G.R. No. 127920, August 9, 2005

(4) Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr., G.R. No. 166520, March 14, 2008

(5) Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, Oct. 10, 2012

(6) Estate of Hilario Ruiz vs. CA, G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996

The Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz, Edmond Ruiz, executor vs. The Court of Appeals (Former
Special Sixth Division), Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes, Maria Cathryn Ruiz, Candice Albertine
Ruiz, Maria Angeline Ruiz and the Presiding Judge of the Regionl Trial Court of Pasig
G.R. No. 118671, 29 January 1996, J. Puno

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not
extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error,
therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the
grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to
meet those obligations.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the
date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to
creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died
but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one
of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order
was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to
take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration.

FACTS:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters,
private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of
Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real
properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate
was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the
decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action
for the probate of his father's holographic will.

On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar
Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the
probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz, Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was
executed under undue influence.

On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva
Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine
and Maria Angeline — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.

On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed
an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments
deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and
concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of
Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent
payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the
testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in
accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.

On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but
granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered
the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three
granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent
Montes's motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider.

Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the
release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the
expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters
subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held
in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until
the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the probate court has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the
estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren.
2. Whether the probate court should order the release of the titles to certain heirs.
3. Whether the probate court should grant possession of all properties of the estate to the
executor of the will.

RULING
1. NO.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated
children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of
estate proceedings. He contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an
allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married
and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states "children" of the deceased
which excludes the latter's grandchildren.

It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the
"minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children,
regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support
from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support,
especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of
the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does
not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was
error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

2. NO.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed
properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to
creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:

Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings.

Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a
decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just,
permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be
distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule
90 of these Rules.

And Rule 90 provides that:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made.

When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration the allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the
court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate,
and after hearing upon notice shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the
same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons
may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to
who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed
by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or
any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the
date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to
creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he
died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax
is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the
rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the
order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months
after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the
intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy
may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.

The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the
probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his
motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. Therein, petitioner
assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will
included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his
mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the
decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and
decide the same as in ordinary cases.

3. NO.
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to
take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of
the debts and expenses of administration," Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court
explicitly provides:

Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer
estate not willed
An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real
as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses for administration.

When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had
been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance
expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But
petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously
cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the
necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion
of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its
succeeding rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.

Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is
merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he
is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he
is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally
assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of
the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their
veracity, propriety and justness.

(7) Ana Lim Kalaw vs. IAC, G.R. No. 74618, September 2, 1992

(8) Heirs of Sy Bang vs. Sy et al., G.R No. 114217, October 13, 2009

(9) Aranas vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014

IV. Claims against the estate

(1) Unionbank vs. Santibanez, G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005

Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Edmund Santibanez and Florence Santibanez Ariola
G.R. No. 149926, 23 February 2005, J. Callejo Sr.

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a
will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements
or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.

Included in the will of the decedent are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition
involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund
and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time
of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s
holographic will covering the said tractors.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.
As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of
course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner.

FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañ ez
entered into a loan agreement in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel
Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the
FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May
31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.

On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in
the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed
a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan dated December 13, 1980.

Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March
1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. On April 9, 1981, Edmund,
as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibañ ez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two
(2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by
them.

On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Demand
letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines
(UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5,
1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañ ez,
Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summons were issued against both, but
the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Accordingly, the
complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.

On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it
was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid.
2. Whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid.

RULING: 49
1. NO.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all
the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned
with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated:

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a
will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.

This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañ ez, left a holographic
will which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.

We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that
time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein
are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among
the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the
said tractors.

It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the
Court cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to
be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative,
and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs
of the decedent. In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint
agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will
was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the
decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto
themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible
heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.

2. NO.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the
heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use
the abovedescribed chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir
shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as
earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the
assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a
creditor of the late Efraim Santibañ ez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate
court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions.
All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.
Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he
has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein
provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered
the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the
court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at
their present value.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As
we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and
to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design
of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the
affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S.
Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence
presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañ ez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner
failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co
maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course,
subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter
further.

(2) Metrobank vs. Absolute Mgmt. Corp., G.R. No. 170498, Jan. 9, 2013

(3) Bautista vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-28298, Nov. 25, 1983

(4) PNB vs. CA, G.R. No. 121597, June 29, 2001
 (5) Maglasang vs. Manila Bank, G.R. No. 171206, Sept. 23, 2013

(6) Rioferio vs. CA, G.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004

V. Sales, mortgages, escheats

Reyes vs. RTC, Makati, Br. 142, G.R. No. 165744, Aug. 11, 2008
Quasha vs. LCN Const. Corp., G.R. No. 174873, Aug. 26, 2008
Aldamiz vs. Judge, CFI Mindoro, G.R. No. L-2360, December 29, 1949
Pahomatang vs. PNB, G.R. No. 156403, March 31, 2005
Figuracion-Gerilla vs. Figuracion et al., G.R. No. 154322, August 22, 2006
Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002
Republic vs. Registry of Deeds of Roxas City, G.R. No. 158230, July 16, 2008
Tan vs. City of Davao, G.R. No. L-44347, Sept. 29, 1988

VI. Guardianship

Alamayri vs. Pabale, G.R. No. 151243, April 30, 2008

Vancil vs. Belmes, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001
Tonog vs. CA, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002
Caniza vs. CA, G.R No. 110427, February 24, 1997

VII. Adoption

In re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim, G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Castro vs. Gregorio, G.R. No. 188801, Oct. 15, 2014
Landingin vs. Republic, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006
In re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005
Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

VIII. Custody of Minors

Madrian vs. Madrian, G.R. No. 159374, July 12, 2007

Thornton vs. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004
Gualberto vs. CA, G.R. No. 156254, June 28, 2005
Dacasin vs. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010

IX. Habeas Corpus

Ampatuan vs. Macaraig, G.R. No. 182497, June 29, 2010

Moncupa vs. Enrile, et al., G.R. No. L-63345, January 30, 1986
Caballes vs. CA, G.R. No. 163108, February 23, 2005
Barredo vs. Vinarao, G.R. No. 168728, August 2, 2007
In re: petition for habeas corpus of Engr. Ashraf Kunting, G.R. No. 167193, April 19, 2006
Kiani vs. BID, G.R. No. 160922, February 27, 2006
In re: petition for habeas corpus of Eufemia Rodriguez, G.R. No. 169482, Jan. 29, 2008
Go vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009
Salientes et al. vs. Abanilla, G.R. No. 162734, August 29, 2006
 Andal vs. People, G.R. No. 138268, May 26, 1999
Evangelista vs. Sistoza, G.R. No. 143881, Aug. 9, 2001

X. Insane

Chin Ah Foo vs. Judge Concepcion, G.R. No. L-33281, March 31, 1930
People vs. Rafanan, Jr., G.R. No. L-54135, November 21, 1991

XI. Correction of Entries

Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

Republic vs. Labrador, G.R. No. 132980, March 25, 1999
Lee vs. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001
Corpus vs. Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Republic vs. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
Republic vs. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
Republic vs. Kho, G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007
Republic vs. Lim, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004
Dela Cruz vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

XII. Family Home; Absentees

Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990

Gapusan-Chua vs. CA, G.R. No. L-46746, March 15, 1990
Uyguangco vs. CA, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989
Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 163604, May 6, 2005
Reyes vs. Alejandro, G.R. No. L-32026, January 16, 1986
Valdez vs. Republic, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009
Santos vs. Santos, G.R. No. 1877061, October 8, 2014

XIII. Writ of amparo; habeas data

In re: Noriel Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, April 16, 2013
Rubrico vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010
Fr. Robert Reyes vs. CA, G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009
Daniel Masangkay Tapuz vs. Judge del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008
Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008
Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008
Caram vs. Segui, G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014
Spouses Pador vs. Barangay Captain Argayan, G.R. No. 183460, March 12, 2013
Aguilar vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013
Lozada vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012
In re: Saez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183533, August 31, 2010
Meralco vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, October 5, 2010
Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010
Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, Sept. 29, 2014

XIV. Appeals in Special Proceedings

Testate estate of Maria Manuel vda. De Biascan vs. Biascan, G.R. No. 138731, December
11, 2000