Arbitrary Detention

Padilla vs CA

G.R. No. 121917.  March 12, 1997

Facts: High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin
Padilla:

“(1)    One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;

“(2)    One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with
ammunitions;

“(3)    One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and

“(4)    Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.”

Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3. and a black bag containing two additional long magazines
and one short magazine.

PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office issued a Certification which
stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280,
a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla.  A second Certification stated that the three firearms were
not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla.

Issue:  Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in
the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule

Held: No.  There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that  per se did
not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal

Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:

“Sec. 5.  Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a)  When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b)  When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.

(c)  When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner’s vehicle
figured in a hit and run – an offense committed in the “presence” of Manarang, a private person, who
then sought to arrest petitioner.  It must be stressed at this point that “presence” does not only require
that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he “hears the disturbance created thereby
AND proceeds at once to the scene.”  As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires
followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and
thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its
driver.  After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan
bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near
the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who
actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run.  We beg to disagree.  That Manarang
decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run)
in effecting petitioner’s arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact
the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself,
inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a
suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an
untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life.  Moreover, it is a reality
that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private
citizens.  It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not
become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest
which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an
urgent need to render aid or take action.  The exigent circumstances of – hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a
moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime – all created a situation in which speed is
essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop
since they had more than mere “reasonable and articulable” suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle
has been engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an
unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner’s warrantless arrest
was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.

Besides, the policemen’s warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b)
as he had in fact just committed an offense.  There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of
time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.  Moreover, after having stationed themselves
at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang’s report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast
approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and
the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer’s personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner’s Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and
run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on
unreliable hearsay information.

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending

an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner’s belated challenge
thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by
presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by
applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.

We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, are
as follows:

1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence,
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view”, the elements of  which are:
(a).        a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b).        the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c).        the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d).        “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

 1. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity.
2. consented warrantless search, and
3. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court’s observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioner’s firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the
Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within “plain view” of
the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner’s waist and
back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero.  The same
justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the
policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the
driver’s seat. Thus it has been held that:

“(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers
should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded
from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of
the corpus delicti.”

“Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure
even without a warrant.”

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of
his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information
estopped him from assailing any purported defect.

Even assuming  that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless
can still be justified under a search  incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance).  Once the lawful arrest
was effected, the police may undertake a protective search  of the passenger compartment and
containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner’s grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the
offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle)
was within the arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous
with the arrest. The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary
rule.  Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance).  In connection therewith, a
warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a
law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle
are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

Case Digest: Astorga vs People

G.R. No. 154130, October 1, 2003

FACTS:

Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a number of his men were charged of Arbitrary
Detention for detaining DENR employees sent to the island of Daram to conduct intelligence
gathering and forest protection operations in line with the government’s campaign against illegal
logging. The complaint states that ten (10) men armed with M-16 and M14 rifles surrounded the team
with guns pointed at them, upon the order of Mayor Astorga. The team were then brought to a house
and were not allowed to leave until after nine (9) hours.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mayor Astorga was guilty of Arbitrary Detention

RULING:
Yes, Mayor Astorga is guilty of Arbitrary Detention.
RULING:

Yes, Mayor Astorga is guilty of Arbitrary Detention.

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person.

In this case, that the offender is a public officer is undeniably present. Also, the records are bereft of
any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred by some legal purpose. On the
contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his “instinct for self-preservation” and the
feeling that he was being “singled out.” The detention was thus without legal grounds.

What remains now is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained.

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim’s
liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and actuations of
the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the
extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the
wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and
the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This refusal was quickly followed by the
call for and arrival of almost a dozen “reinforcements,” all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. It was not
just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of
the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent
that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the
complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.

Note: COURT’S RESOLUTION ON ASTORGA’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, AUGUST 20, 2004

In August 20, 2004, the Special First Division of the Supreme Court issued a resolution on the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Mayor Astorga reversing its earlier ruling where it find the accused guilty
of the crime of arbitrary detention.

Here, the Court acquitted the accused based on reasonable doubt. The Court’s resolution was penned
in this wise:

The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear
in the minds of the private offended parties. The court fail to discern any element of fear from the
narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their
mission. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the
barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that
petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by
boat.

Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether
petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent.

Agbay vs. Hon. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military G. R. No. 134503 July 2, 1999
FACTS: On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested and detained
at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610 or the "Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.” Thereafter, a complaint was
filed against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th MCTC, Metro Cebu by Joan Gicaraya for and in
behalf of her daughter Gayle. The complaint states that the accused, did then and there, willfully,
feloniously and unlawfully, conspiring, confederating, helping with one another, while Agbay
manipulating to finger the vagina of Gayle Fatima Amigable Gicayara, his companion block the sight of
the victim’s mother, while on board a tricycle going their destinations. Upon initial investigation of the
Barangay Captain of Catarman, Jugalbot was released; and Agbay is presently detained. On
September 10, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the immediate
release of petitioner considering that the latter had "failed to deliver Agbay to the proper judicial
authority within 36 hours from September 7, 1997. Private respondents did not act on this letter and
continued to detain petitioner. On September 26, petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery
of detained persons against herein private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M.
Salomon and other unidentified police officers stationed at the Liloan Police Substation. Regarding the
complaint for violation of R.A. 7610, it is alleged by petitioner that on November 10, the 7th MCTC of
Liloan, Metro Cebu issued a resolution stating that there is probable cause for the crime in violation of
R.A. 7610. Thus, an information was filed against the two accused. On the other hand, the case for
delay in delivery filed by the petitioner against private respondents was forwarded to the
Ombudsman for the Military, thereby recommending its dismissal. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman for the Military gravely abused its discretion in not holding
the private respondents liable for violating Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. RULING:

No. The Court held that the private respondents should not be liable for not releasing the petitioners
as there was already a complaint filed by the mother of private complainant and there was no release
order from the court. Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting
from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on
bail. It also punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground
and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by
law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods
provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial
authorities. Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent
behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner
himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was
granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Art. 125 has been duly
served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. The petition is dismissed.

In addressing the issue, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military in its 13 April 1998
Order, stated that the duty of filing the corresponding complaint in court was "fulfille by respondent
when the formal complaint was filed on September 8, 1997 with the 7th MCTC of Liloan-Compostela,
barely 20 hours after the arrest of herein complainant of September 7, 1997."26 The Solicitor General,
for his part, argues that while a municipal court judge may conduct preliminary investigations as an
exception to his normal judicial duties, he still retains the authority to issue an order of release or
commitment. As such, upon the filing of the complaint with the MCTC, there was already compliance
with the very purpose and intent of Art. 12527.

Soria v. Desierto. G.R. Nos. 153524-25, January 31, 2005.

Issue: Whether or not the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in
dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Facts: This was a criminal case where petitioners Edimar Bista and Rodolfo Soria were arrested on
May 13, 2001, Sunday and the day before the May 14 elections, without a warrant by respondents for
alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. In this case, one police identified Bista to have
a standing warrant of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6. From the time of Soria’s detention up to the
time of his release, 22 hours had already elapsed and Bista was detained for 26 days. The crimes for
which Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent,
hence, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within
18 hours of his arrest. The crimes which Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints
or information having filed with the proper judicial authorities.

Subsequently, the petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-
affidavit for violation of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents.
However, the office dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. But petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration which was then again denied for the same reason in the second assailed resolution.

Ruling: No. The respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing the case.

The respondents’ disposition of the petitioners’ complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly supported or
anchored by law and jurisprudence. It is important to remember that grave abuse of discretion is such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, the complaint of Sonia as based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election
day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law
for filing a complaint or information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a no-office day.
Therefore, there could be no violation of Article 125 of the RPC. In the same spectrum, the complaint
of Bista against the respondents for violation of the said article will not prosper because the running
of the 36-hour period for filing a complaint or information against him from the time of his arrest was
tolled by one day which was election day. Further, he had a standing warrant of arrest for violation of
BP Blg. 6 and he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring the
continuous detention.

6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was released upon the order of
Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and
continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Soria’s detention up to the time of
his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the
next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not prosper
because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from
the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation
of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order
of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his
continuous detention.

GEROCHE vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 179080
November 26, 2014

FACTS: On May 14,1989 at around 10:00pm at Sitio New Lantawan, Brgy.

Greenhills,
Province of Cotabato, Philippines, herein petitioners (barangay captain and
other
citizen armed forces geographical unit entered the house of one Roberto
Mallo by
forcibly breaking down the front door and searched the effects without
consent from the
owner and mauled one of the occupants of the house.
The prosecution’s version was that Baleriano at around 10:00pm that night
was
inside the house which he already bought from Mallo. They were already
sleeping when
they were awakened by such petitioners who without any warrant entered the
house

RULING:
1. YES, they are guilty of violation of domicile.
The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their
testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither
Geroche denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted
that they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are
considered
as public officers/employees.
2. NO, there was no double jeopardy.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question
including one not raised by the parties. When accused appeals from the
sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate. Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of
conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have
abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in
the assailed judgment. Petitioners could not have been placed twice in
jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of
Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of Less Serious
Physical Injuries.
DECISION: CA Ruling AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the

GALVANTE vs. CASIMIRO

G.R. No. 162808
April 22, 2008

FACTS: Private respondents SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido,

PO1 Eddie
Degran, PO1 Valentino Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot, confiscated from
petitionerGalvante
one pistol, a short magazine, and some ammunition. Consequently, an
Information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions was filed against Petitioner.
Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned criminal case (Criminal Case
5047), Petitioner filed an administrative case for grave misconduct, before the
DILG
Internal Affairs Service, and a criminal case against Respondents for
Arbitrary
Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman.
Petitioner alleges that he went to the house of a retired policeman, Percival
Plaza,
to inquire about the retirement procedure for policemen. Upon his arrival,
Private Respondents
blocked his way and pointed their long firearms, ready to fire at him. Petitioner
and his
companions raised their hands to show their waistline and to prove that they
had no firearm.
While their arms were raised, one of the Private Respondents (SPO4 Conde,
Jr.) went near
Petitioner’s owner jeep and conducted a search. He saw Petitioner’s
super .38 pistol under
the floor mat of the jeep and asked him of the MR (the full-text did not say
what an MR is…) of
the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed to them,
Petitioner gave the
asked document. Private Respondents left them alone, bringing with them the
firearm.
Petitioner left Percival Plaza’s house and went to Trento Police Station where
he saw a
person in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist. He then asked the
police officers,
including those who searched his jeep, to apprehend the civilian. Nobody
apprehended the
armed civilian person so he went to the office of Police Chief Rocacorba who
immediately called
the armed civilian to his office and when already inside his office, the
disarming was done. After
the disarming of the civilian, Petitioner was put to jail with the said person by
Police
Chief Rocacorba and was released only after posting a bail bond.
Subsequently, the RTC dismissed Criminal Case 5047 (the Illegal Possession of
Firearms case), after recommendation by the Prosecutor, on the ground that
“the action of the
policemen who conducted the warrantless search in spite of the absence of
any circumstances
justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of
his property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/ or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint of the
petitioner. (NO)

HELD:
There is no grave abuse of discretion. The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal
offense. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of
searches: Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained, and Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses.

Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies; rather, he accused private
respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This
situation, while lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.

The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, under Article
32, in relation to Article 2219 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code.

Ombudsman properly dismissed the complaint for illegal search, although the reason for dismissing
(valid warrantless arrest) the same is rather off the mark. The same should have been dismissed by
the reason that it is not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense.

SC 1st Division G.R. No. 220127 21 March 2018 Carlos Celdran People of the Philippines

Meaning of the elements of RPC 133. Offending Religious Feelings –  “Notoriously offensive” means
those acts which cause someone to fell resentful, upset, or annoyed and the acts are judged from the
point of view of the complainant NOT the offender.  “Feelings of the faithful” meant to refer to the
religious feelings of those inside the place devoted to religious worship or those engaged in religious
worship at the time of the commission of the act. Prepared by Gelo

FACTS:  During the celebration of the second anniversary of the May They Be One Campaign (MTBC)
and the launching of the Hand Written Bible which coincided with the feast of Saint Jerome, a throng
of people composed mainly of catholic church dignitaries intermixed with those of different religions
such as members of the military, police, media, non-catholics, students, representatives of various
religious organizations gathered around the Manila Cathedral in the afte1noon of September 30,
2010. The event was comprised of three (3) inseperable parts. The first part was the ecumenical
liturgical religious worship wherein the heads of the different protestant mainland churches and the
catholic church were present celebrating the words of God. It was followed by the Eucharistic
celebration - the holy mass. The last part was the handwritten unity bible.  While Brother Edgar J.
Tria Tirona was reading a passage from the Bible around 3:00 p.m., petitioner entered the Manila
Cathedral clad in a black suit and a hat. Petitioner went to the center of the aisle, in front of the altar
and suddenly brought out a placard emblazoned with the word "DAMASO." Commotion ensued when
petitioner started shouting while inside the church saying "Bishops, stop involving yourself (sic) in
politics," disrupting and showing disrespect to an otherwise solemn celebration.  The defense, on
the other hand, alleged that the incident did not happen during the celebration of the holy mass and
nothing happened that disturbed the proceedings.  The MeTC in its Decision dated December 14,
2012, found petitioner guilty of the crime Offending Religious Feelings.  RTC affirmed the MeTC.  CA
affirmed both MeTC and RTC. ISSUE– HELD – RATIO: (Related to the Topic) ISSUE WON Celdran is
guilty of Offending Religious Feelings 



HELD YES

The elements of Offending the Religious Feelings are: o That the acts complained of were performed
in a place devoted to religious worship, or during the celebration of any religious ceremony o That the
acts be notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful and the CA held that these elements are
present in the case at bar. First element was present because it was committed by the petitioner
while there was a religious ceremony insider the Manila Cathedral (which is a place of workshop). The
celebrations during that day were: the May They Be One Bible Campaign Anniversary and the feast
day of Saint Gerome. “Acts” as used in RPC 133 may come in the form of words, overt behavior,
deeds, or anything knowingly performed by a person – symbolic or otherwise. The petitioner is said to
have dressed in black suit and hat, walked through the middle aisle in the front of the Manila
Cathedral altar and displayed a placard with the word “DAMASO” and blurted out “Don’t meddle in
politics” while being dragged outside.

“Notoriously offensive” means those acts which cause someone to fell resentful, upset, or annoyed
and the acts are judged from the point of view of the complainant NOT the offender. “Feelings of the
faithful” meant to refer to the religious feelings of those inside the place devoted to religious worship
or those engaged in religious worship at the time of the commission of the act.

ISSUE WON RPC 133 is Unconstitutional 

HELD NO

As ruled by the CA, the attempts of Celdran to question the constitutionality cannot be condoned. The
Court presumes the law works with regularity, and thus assumes that RPC 133 is valid and
constitutional. There should be grave care and consideration caution in confronting the
constitutionality of a salute.

RULING: CA Decision affirmed. NOTE: In the appeal to the SC, Celdran raised a question of fact which
cannot be brought on appeal to the SC under Rule 45 for certiorari that only allows questions of law
to be raised. The question of whether petitioner offended the religious feelings of those who were
present during the celebration of the MTBC is a question of fact which will not be entertained in the
present petition.

GONZALES vs. ABAYA

G.R. No. 164007
August 10, 2006

FACTS:

Some armed members of the AFP had abandoned their designated places of assignment with an aim
to destabilize the government. Thereafter, they entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments in Makati City, led by Navy Lt. Triplanes, disarmed the security guards, and planted
explosive devices around the building.

DOJ filed with RTC of Makati City an Information for coup d’etat against those soldiers while
respondent General Abaya issued a Letter Order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to
determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War

The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those
charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for
violation of the Articles of War.

RTC then issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial against the accused…are
hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime
of coup d’etat."

In the meantime, the AFP approved the recommendation that those involved be prosecuted before a
general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of
the Articles of War. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer
to the charge but instead they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of
War maintaining that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order that the offense for
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of
coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not those charged with coup d’etat before RTC shall be charged before military tribunal
for violation of Articles of War. (YES)

HELD:

1) As to the jurisdiction of the court

GENERAL RULE: Members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law who commit crimes or
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court.

EXCEPTION: Where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-
connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: Where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice,
directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn
oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing
of their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-
connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same (under Art. 96 of Articles of
War) – dismissal from the service –imposable only by the military court.

The RTC, in making the declaration that Art 96 of Articles of War as “not sevice-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furthenance of the crime of coup d’etat”, practically amended the law which
expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." It is
only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over
the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC
constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore,
void.

2) As to the Doctrine of Absorption of Crimes

Moreover, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to
crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the
doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offences. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055
deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles
of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

OCAMPO V. ABANDO G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014

FACTS:

A mass graveyard was found at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte by the43rd
Infantry Brigade containing 67 skeletal remains of those believed to be victims of “Operation Venereal
Disease (VD)” by the Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People’s Army/National Democratic
Front (CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the Philippines. This was done to purge their ranks of suspected military
informers.

Members of the Scene of the Crime Operation team conducted forensic crime analysis to identify the
bodies by way of DNA sample. The initial report of the PNP Crime Laboratory on their identities
remained inconclusive, but, in a Special Report, the Case Secretariat of the Regional and National
Inter-Agency Legal Action Group came up with ten names of possible victims after comparing the
testimonies of relatives and witnesses.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu sent undated
letters to Pros. Vivero, requesting for legal action on the twelve attached complaint affidavits. These
were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD who all swore that their relatives had been
abducted or last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.

Charging them with murder, the affidavits were directed to 71 named members of the group,
including the petitioners. Namely, the petitioners were Ocampo, Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad who
were all pointed out to be members of the Central Committee that ordered the campaign to be
carried out in 1985.
On this basis, Pros. Vivero issued a subpoena requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and
Ocampo complied. However, Echanis and Baylosis did not do so because allegedly they were not
served the copy of a subpoena. As for Ladlad, though his counsel made formal appearance during the
preliminary investigation, he also did not submit for the same reason as the two.

Pros. Vivero, in a resolution, directed the filing of information for 15 counts of multiple murder
against the 54 named members, including the petitioners. He also caused some respondents to be
used as state witnesses for their testimony is vital to the prosecution. Said information was filed
before RTC Hilongos, Leyte branch 18 presided by Judge Abando.

Prior to receiving the resolution, Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Hearing. Judge Obando found probable cause and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them with no recommended bail.

Ocampo went to the Supreme Court by way of special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 and asked for the abovementioned order and the prosecutor’s resolution to be annulled. He
said that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others was then already pending before RTC Makati
and so, the crime of murder was absorbed by the rebellion in line with the political offense doctrine.

The Court ordered the Solicitor General to comment on the issue and also ordered the parties to
submit their memoranda. From the oral arguments, the Court found that the single Information
charging them all of 15 counts of murder was defective. The prosecution moved to admit amended
and new information, but Judge Abando suspended the proceedings during the pendency of the case
before the Court.

Meanwhile, Echanis was arrested and he, along with Baylosis, filed a Motion for Judicial
Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and
Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant, but it was dismissed by Judge Abando.
Around this time, Ladlad filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with the RTC Manila.

Echanis and Baylosis moved to reconsider but it was not acted because, as per request of the DOJ
Secretary to change the venue of the trial, the records were transmitted to RTC Manila. Echanis and
Baylosis continued to seek relief from the Supreme Court in response to Judge Abando’s orders.
Echanis also prayed for his release.

Both Ocampo and Echanis were granted provisional release by the Supreme Court under cash bonds.

As to Ladlad’s Motion to Quash, it was denied by respondent judge and the same happened to his
Motion for Reconsideration. Ladlad sought to annul the latter’s orders by way of special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65.

As to their bail, Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail whereas Baylosis filed a Motion to Allow
Petitioner to Post Bail which were granted, with no opposition from the OSG (bec. they’re consultants
of the NDFP negotiating team, then having talks with the GRP peace panel).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners’ right to due process was violated.

HELD:

NO. Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.

A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary
investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a
component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to
be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard
to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and
defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent
who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.

"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of
one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been
afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis that they were denied due process, we quote the
pertinent portion of Prosecutor Vivero’s Resolution, which states:

In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[,] the
respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit
their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be
found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo
Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However,
Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
appearance by their respective counsels.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based
on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded
attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.In this case, the Resolution stated that
efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known
addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be
found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the
attached documents or evidence.

Moreover, Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the
preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.

We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case."106 Having opted to remain passive
during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of
due process, since their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own doing.

As to Ocampo’s claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal
the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must
be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of
Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of
the resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:

People vs. Pitulan

GR 226486
22 January 2020
This Court resolves the Notice of Appeal  assailing the Decision  of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Regional
1 2

Trial Court Decision  finding Glecerio Pitulan y Briones (Pitulan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime
3

of direct assault with murder. Three (3) Informations were filed against Pitulan for direct assault with murder of police
Officer 1 Aldy Monteroso (PO1 Monteroso), direct assault with attempted murder of police Officer 1 Alberto Cirilo
Dionisio (PO1 Dionisio), and direct assault with frustrated murder of PO1 Benito De Vera (PO1 De Vera). 
For its part, the prosecution presented PO1 De Vera, PO1 Dionisio, and police Officer 3 Eric Cortez (PO3 Cortez) as
witnesses
From their testimonies, the prosecution alleged that on April 20, 2003, the group of PO1 De Vera, PO1 Dionisio, and
PO1 Monteroso responded to a report that of a group of armed men aboard a Hyundai van was acting suspiciously
along General Avenue, Barangay Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City. Thus, the officers, in complete uniform, rode
their police mobile patrol to the reported location. On their way to General Avenue, the officers saw a van, with plate
no. PVY-701, matching the description of the vehicle they were looking for. They ordered the van to halt, but it gave
chase instead, until the officers overtook and blocked its path along Road 20 The officers ordered the riders to step
out of the vehicle. When all but the driver complied, PO1 Monteroso opened the door opposite the driver's side to
check on him. However, as soon as he did so, the driver-who was later identified as Pitulan-shot him thrice on the
chest. Pitulan then attempted to escape, but on his way, he encountered PO3 Cortez and his team who was
responding to a radio message of the gun battle. PO3 Cortez's team ordered the van to stop and attempted to
approach the van. However, its driver, whom he later identified as Pitulan, opened fire at their patrol car. The officers
fired back and, in the shootout that ensued, hit the van's left tire. The van hit an island at the intersection of Visayas
Avenue and Congressional Avenue
Pitulan solely testified for the defense. He alleged that on April 20, 2003, he was with his four (4) brothers on a Besta
van driven by a certain Rudy Pagador. Pitulan fell asleep on the road, only to be awakened later on by successive
gunfire, from which he sustained wounds that caused him to fall unconscious on the floor of the van. He later woke
up in a hospital, where he was told that his brothers were all dead.
As for the other charges, the trial court found no conspiracy among the van's passengers who were involved in the
shootout. Hence, it acquitted Pitulan of direct assault with attempted murder and direct assault with frustrated murder
against PO1 Dionisio and PO1 De Vera, respectively. 2

The issues for this Court's resolution are as follows:

First, whether or not the prosecution's failure to conduct paraffin and ballistic testing was fatal in proving the guilt of
accused-appellant Glecerio Pitulan y Briones; and

Second, whether or not accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the complex crime of direct assault with
murder.

This Court sustains accused-appellant's conviction only for the complex crime of direct assault with homicide.

The determination of witnesses' credibility is left to the trial courts, which have the unique opportunity to observe their
conduct in court. The trial courts' findings are generally binding on this Court and will not be overturned without a
showing of any fact or circumstance that was overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, which may change the
results of a case. If these findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, then all the more will this Court be stringent
in applying the rule. 44

Moreover, denial is an inherently weak defense. Absent any clear and convincing evidence, bare denial will not
outweigh an affirmative testimony from a credible witness.  Without "any showing of ill motive on the part of the
45

eyewitness testifying on the matter, a categorical, consistent and positive identification of the accused prevails over
denial and alibi."
46

In this case, accused-appellant assailed his conviction allegedly based on compelling doubt that he was the
assailant. However, based on PO1 De Vera's testimony, both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
found that of the van's passengers, only accused-appellant did not alight when ordered to do so. As he was the only
one in the van, no other person could have shot PO1 Monteroso from inside

As the trial court aptly noted, there is no dispute as to where accusedappellant was at the time of the incident. He
categorically admitted during trial that he was inside the van when the shootout happened:

There is no dispute that there was a gun battle between the group of the police officers-complainants and the group
of the accused. The accused himself admitted this, in addition to the fact that he and his companions (his four
brothers and one Rudy Pagador and Augusto Torres) were on board a blue Hyundai Besta/Grace Van, qualifying his
statement only by asserting that he was not driving the said van and he was asleep when he woke up to the sound of
gunfire, but he never shot at anybody and he lost consciousness, waking up much later already confined in a
hospital.
49

To this, accused-appellant only denied his involvement in the shooting and claimed that he was knocked
unconscious from the wounds he allegedly sustained. This bare denial, without substantial evidence, cannot
controvert the clear and positive identification of PO1 De Vera that he saw accused-appellant shoot PO1 Monteroso.

Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation
for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack,
employ force or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a
weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a
fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

Direct assault may be carried out in two (2) modes: (1) through committing an act equivalent to rebellion or sedition,
but without public uprising; and (2) through employing force and resisting any person in authority while engaged in
the performance of duties. The elements of the second mode of direct assault are as follows:

Appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are: 1) that there must be an attack, use of
force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; 2) the assault was made when the
said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and 3) the accused knew that the
victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or
assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.  (Citation omitted)
61

In this case, accused-appellant was identified as the driver of the van and the shooter who attacked and killed PO1
Monteroso. When the shooting happened, PO1 Monteroso and his team were responding to a report of a suspicious
group of men aboard a van. He was also in complete uniform and aboard a police mobile.  When accused-appellant
62

shot PO1 Monteroso, he knew that he was a person of authority in the exercise of official duties. Thus, all the
elements of direct assault are present.

In People v. Vibal,  this Court held that when the assault leads to the death of an agent or a person in authority, the
63

resulting offense is the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.

The lower courts convicted accused-appellant of direct assault with murder. This Court modifies the conviction to the
complex crime of direct assault with homicide, there being no treachery which qualified the killing of PO1 Monteroso
to murder.

The essence of treachery is "in the suddenness of the attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving
the latter of any chance to defend himself [or herself] and thereby ensuring the commission of the offense without risk
to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make." 64

For treachery to qualify the killing to murder, the following elements must be proven: "(1) that at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself [or herself], and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by him [or her]." 65

The prosecution was not able to establish the existence of treachery here. After the chase, PO1 De Vera's team
ordered the van's passengers to alight and raise their hands. Because the driver, accused-appellant, refused to heed
the order, PO1 Monteroso approached the vehicle to accost him. PO1 Monteroso was a fully armed and trained
police officer; his training and police work would have prepared him for the possible hostilities that· a person
impending arrest may commit. The previous car chase and accused-appellant's refusal to heed police order should
have warned him of a possible violent behavior to evade arrest.

Thus, it is not possible that PO1 Monteroso was in no position to defend himself at the time of the attack. This Court
has held that when a police officer had been forewarned of brewing violence, he or she could not have been
completely taken by surprise by the attack. In such instance, therefore, treachery could not have attended the killing. 66

Here, without the first element of treachery, the killing of PO1 Monteroso cannot be qualified to murder. Accused-
appellant is, therefore, guilty of the complex crime of direct assault with homicide.
People vs. Recto
G.R. No.129069, October 17, 2001

Facts:
On April 18, 1994, early afternoon, while SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male were leaving the premises, the
group of appellant Julio Recto arrived. Barangay Captain Orbe advised them not to create trouble, but
Dante Regis pulled a piece of wood and threw it towards them. Thereafter, appellant Recto, while
holding a balisong or fan knife, approached Barangay Captain Orbe. The latter responded by telling
the former to surrender the balisong. Appellant stepped backward, opened his jacket and pulled out a
gun. Upon seeing the gun, Barangay Captain Orbe retreated, while Barangay Kagawad Antonio
Macalipay stepped forward with both arms raised and uttered the words: 'Do not do it. We'll just
settle this.' Julio Recto, however, immediately pulled the trigger, hitting Barangay Kagawad Macalipay,
causing him to fall down on the ground. Then Cornelio Regis, Jr. approached the fallen Macalipay and
flipped his bolo at the latter who rolled and fell into the rice paddy. Melchor Recto saw the shooting
from his hiding place behind a concrete pillar. He then ran inside the old dilapidated bathroom of the
bodega. Barangay Captain Orbe also followed. Inside the bathroom, Melchor Recto peeped through
the window and saw appellant Recto fire his gun at Emilio Santos. Santos also fired his revolver at
appellant and later, turned around and crawled. While crawling, Santos fired another shot towards
Regis, Jr., but the latter was able to reach and hack the former with a bolo. When Melchor could no
longer see Julio Recto, he jumped out of the bathroom window and ran. While running, Julio Recto
shot him hitting the latter's thigh. Barangay Captain Orbe also got out of the bathroom through the
top and landed onto the ricefield. Before he could take a step, he was also shot by appellant Julio
Recto at his right elbow, but was still able to continue running and cross the southern portion of the
ricefield. He caught up with the wounded Melchor Recto and both went their separate ways. On the
other hand, both Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano 'Renato' Santos died due to
multiple wounds inflicted on them by herein appellant.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of direct assault in
Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1972 which accordingly resulted in his being convicted of complex crimes
in those cases

Held:
Yes. First, in Criminal Case No. 1970. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in
two ways. One of which is by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall attack,
employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.” One way to
aggravate this mode is when the offender lays a hand upon a person in authority. In this case,
Melchor Recto was clearly an agent of a person in authority. Unquestionably, he was a barangay chief
tanod; however, at the crime scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not acting and had
no occasion to act in the performance of his official duties that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him did
not amount to direct assault. Thus, appellant's liability amounted only to attempted, not frustrated,
homicide. Appellant shall be convicted of attempted homicide. Second, in Criminal Case No. 1972. The
court erred in finding the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Evidently, the victim
had all the opportunity to escape or defend himself from the aggression that was to ensue, yet chose
not to grab the opportunity and instead placed himself in a position more open to attack. Equally
important, his vulnerable position had not been deliberately sought by appellant. It was thrust on the
latter by the former himself. In short, appellant did not deliberately choose the mode of attack to kill
the victim with impunity and without risk to himself. Absent treachery, the killing is homicide, not
murder. Appellant shall be convicted of qualified direct assault with homicide aggravated by the use
of a weapon.

ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005

Facts: On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information for direct
assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or about the 20th day of
March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO,
knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter
grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter
was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted petitioner of
the crime of direct assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by
the trial court.

Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person
or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any
of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties,
or on occasion of such performance. Unquestionably, petitioner’s case falls under the second mode,
which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with
a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand
upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality
that it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude while testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or
oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court
and will not to be disturbed on appeal.

Mallari vs. People

GR 224679
12 February 2020
That on or about the Twelfth (12th) day of January 2007, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while being pacified by PO2 Richard F. Navarro who
was a duly qualified and appointed police officer of Olongapo City and while the latter was in the actual performance
of his official duties, that is, maintaining peace and order in the said locality, and the said accused well knowing
before and during the assault that PO2 Richard F. Navarro who was a duly appointed police officer, as such, an
agent of a person in authority, did then and there willfull, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, kick and slap said
police officer.

The incident transpired on the early morning of January 12, 2007. According to the prosecution, at around 6:45 a.m.,
the Olongapo Police Station 3 received a report of an altercation on the ground floor of GenX Billiard Hall on Gordon
Avenue. At this, PO2 Navarro and SPO3 Merza, who were both in uniform, went to the scene. There, they found two
(2) groups of women fighting and pulling each other's hair out, among them a visibly drunk Mallari. The officers
rushed to stop the fight.
10

Once the squabble was over, the officers asked the women to go to the police station to file proper complaints.
However, the intoxicated Mallari shouted at them, "Wala kayo pakialam sa akin, hindi aka sasama sa inyo."  She 11

then grabbed PO2 Navarro by the collar, slapped his cheek, and kicked his legs several times. To restrain her, PO2
Navarro held her by the shoulders and brought her to the back of the patrol car. SPO3 Merza was about to pacify the
other women, but they eventually agreed to go to the police station. The incident was entered in the blotter and
Mallari was detained for direct assault.12

PO2 Navarro was treated at the James Gordon Memorial Hospital for the minor injuries he got from Mallari.  Dr. Ortiz13

issued him a medical certificate stating that he had sustained swelling on the zygomatic area, or the cheekbone. 14

Mallari testified that at around 6:00 a.m. that day, she and her co-workers were singing at a karaoke bar in GenX
Billiard Hall when they got into a heated argument with another group of women, which then escalated to a physical
fight. The ruckus prompted the bar owner to send the women downstairs, but their fighting only continued. 16

Later, Mallari added, the police arrived and ordered them to board the patrol car. Mallari initially obeyed, but after
noticing that her companions did not, she alighted from the vehicle. PO2 Navarro pushed her back in by holding her
stomach and the collar of her blouse. When she still attempted to alight, PO2 Navarro grabbed her by the ankles,
spreading her legs open in the process. When he pulled her down, she hit her head and neck on the vehicle's floor,
her buttocks hitting the ground.17

After composing herself from the embarrassment, Mallari boarded the car and went with the officers to the police
station. There, she was surprised that PO2 Navarro claimed that she had slapped him several times. She then called
her mother and went to the hospital for a medical examination

However, petitioner should not be held guilty of direct assault, but rather, of the crime of resistance or disobedience
under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes direct assault:

ARTICLE 148. Direct assaults. — Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or
shall attack, employ force or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged
in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is
committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon
a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of  prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

Direct assault may be committed in two (2) ways:

[F]irst, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment
of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.  (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
41

In this case, petitioner is charged with the second mode of assault. Its elements are the following:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious
resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of
official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his
duties.

5. That there is no public uprising. 42

A police officer is an agent of a person in authority.  An agent of a person in authority is one who, "by direct provision
43

of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader,
and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority[.]"  Being a police officer, PO2 Navarro is an agent of a
44

person in authority.

Petitioner was also aware that PO2 Navarro was a police officer. He introduced himself as one and was in his police
uniform.  He was performing his official duties as a police officer when he was pacifying the melee, and right when
1a₩phi1

petitioner attacked him. Thus, the second, third, fourth, and fifth elements of direct assault are present in this case.

However, the first element of the offense is not present.

To be considered as direct assault, the laying of hands or the use of physical force against the agent of a person in
authority must be serious.

The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in authority when not serious in nature
constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151, and not direct assault under Article 148 of the RPC. This is
because the gravity of the disobedience to an order of a person in authority or his agent is measured by the
circumstances surrounding the act, the motives prompting it and the real importance of the transgression, rather than
the source of the order disobeyed. The pushing of IO1 Mangili is not of such serious defiance to be considered direct
assault, but is resistance nonetheless.  (Citations omitted)
52
Resistance or disobedience is punished under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

ARTICLE 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. — The penalty of
arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in the
provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such
person, while engaged in the performance of official duties.

When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto menor or
a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed upon the offender.

For this crime to be proven, the two (2) key elements must be shown: "(1) That a person in authority or his agent is
engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or
seriously disobeys such person or his agent." 53

EDMUNDO SIONZON V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 202692, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 ISSUE: Whether petitioner
violated Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code when he resisted the officer placing him under arrest.
FACTS:
A checkpoint was established along Roxas Boulevard in Malate on June 11, 2006. P/Insp. Aguilar et.
al., where manning the checkpoint when they saw a red Ford Ranger with plate number XAE 988
driven by petitioner Sydeco. They then proceeded to flagged the swerving pick up and asked the
petitioner to alight from the vehicle. Petitioner, who the police claimed was smelling liquor, denied of
being drunk, shouted and talked rudely to the Policemen. Petitioner blurted out “Putang Ina Mo, bakit
mo ako hinuhuli.” Respondents, proceed to subdue the petitioner and was arrested and brought to
Manila Hospital to be examined for liquor. Petitioner on the other hand, claimed to be a victim of
physical injuries, robbery and arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar. The MTC and the RTC,
rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of violation of RA 4136 and violation of Article 151 of the
Revised Penal Code of resisting arrest. HELD: No. Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent
behavior as defined in Sec. 48 of RA 4136 – No person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway
recklessly or without reasonable caution or so as to endanger the property or the safety or rights of
any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway. Nothing in the
records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone." Moreover, the swerving
incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving
vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third persons is minimal. The
men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period material appeared not to have
performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the norm expected of peace officers.
They spotted the petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he
obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the driver’s license or issue any ticket or similar
citation paper for traffic violation as required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136,
which specifically provides: SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. – Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any
violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations
x x x confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the
Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not
exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. There can be no quibble
that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or agents of a person in
authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against
unreasonable searches to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to
disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often
been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy
lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever
they are ignored or worse infringed. Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized
the checkpoint manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle
for a vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of
the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action.

SUMALINOG, JAZ ANN T. 101915 Case No. 27 VYTIACO VS. CA G.R. No. L-20244-48, 24 Apr 1967
Zaldivar, J.;
Facts: Appellant Jorge Vytiaco was charged before CFI of Palawan in three criminal cases for: (1) Grave
Threats; (2) Assault Upon in Agent of a Person in Authority; and (3) Disobedience to a Person in
Authority. On 12 Mar 1959, a commotion arouse between the appellant and Rosalino Jagmis.
Appellant was passing by the private market of Jagmis’ brother-in-law when he heard the Jagmis
talking madly. Appellant tried to calm him down but he failed, and instead, they started to grab each
other. A PC soldier, Esteban Gapilango, saw the two and separated them. Appellant went away but
told Jagmis to wait and he would get his gun. Apparently, someone already had relayed about the
commotion so appellant met his brother-in-law, Ramon Ramos, on his way carrying 2 guns. When
Ramos was about to give the gun, Gapilango approached to demand the surrender of the guns but he
failed after Ramos ran away. He was then held by the appellant and the latter was able to snatch from
him his pistol. Appellant then ordered Gapilango and Jagmis to raise their hands and threatened
them. Gapilango asked the appellant to return his pistol identifying himself as a PC soldier. Appellant
refused and went home without returning the pistol. Gapilango reported it to the PC detachment
officer and they went to appellant’s house to get the pistol and promised the appelant to amicably
settle the case but still the appellant refused. The pistol was only given to the PC assistant provicial
commander by the Vice Mayor of Aborlan to whom the appellant surrendered the pistol. CFI found
the appellant guilty in all three cases. On appeal, CA acquitted the appellant on the 1st and 3rd case
but found him guilty of resistance and serious disobedience instead of direct assault (2nd case).
Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether the appellant is guilty of resistance and serious disobedience.
Ruling: No. To be held guilty of resistance or disobedience to a person in authority or the agent of
such person, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that the person he
disobeyed or resisted is a person in authority or the agent of such person who is actually engaged in
the performance of his official duties. What is punished as an act of resistance or serious disobedience
under the RPC is not the resistance or disobedience against a person in authority or an agent of such
person in his capacity as a private individual but in his official capacity as an authority under law, or as
an agent of law, while engaged in the performance of his official duties. In this case, there is a doubt
as to whether the appellant had the intention to resist or disobey a peace officer who was in the
performance of his official duty and such doubt must be resolved in favor of the appellant. The Court
considered the refusal of the appellant to 53

return the gun to Gapilango as series of acts on his part to protect himself. The fact that Gapilango
was in civilian clothes and did not exhibit a badge and just simply identified himself verbally after the
appellant wrested his gun from him showed that there was no assurance on the part of the appellant
that Gapilango was really a peace officer. Thus, the CA erred when it found the appellant guilty of
resistance and serious disobedience.

Alberto vs. Dela Cruz

GR L-31839
30 June 1980
That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio of Taculod, municipality of Canaman, province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a
member of the Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur and specially charged with the duty of keeping under custody and
vigilance detention prisoner Pablo Denaque, did then and there with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence
leave the latter unguarded while in said barrio, thereby giving him the opportunity to run away and escape, as in fact
said detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away and escape from the custody of the said accused
during the cross-examination of prosecution witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur,
the defense brought forht and confronted the witness with a note, marked as exhibit, purportedly written by Gov.
Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house at
Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur, then leased by the province and used as an official guest house. Jose
Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who ahnded the note for him; that he was not sure as to
genuineness of the signature appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was made and signed
by Gov. Cledera.   Beleiving that the escape of Pablo Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to
2

Jose Esmeralda and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which tha accused Eligio Orbita
had been charged, the defense cousel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of the information so as to
include Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants therein
In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the reinvestigation of the case for December 19, 1969. Summonses
were issued to Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda, Lorenzo Padua, the provincial warden, and the accused Eligio Orbita
to be present thereat.   Dr. went thereat But, on the date set for the reinvestigation of the case, only Gov. Cledera
6

Jose Esmeralda and Lorenzo Padua appeared. The accused Eligio Orbita did not appear. Neither was the note
(Exhibit 2) produced. Since no additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on January 2, 1970
that "after conducting a reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and intelligent analysis of the facts and law
involved, no prima facie case against Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be charged.  7

The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment;
and (2) by helping such a person to escape. To remove means to take away a person from the place of his
confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person released To help in the escape of a Person
confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished that person with the material means such as a file, ladder,
rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape.   The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider
15

who removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who has
custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article
223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province,    and Jose Esmeralda
16

is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of
the Revised Penal Code. There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under Article 223 of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads, as follows:

ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any Public officer who shall consent to the escape of a
prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished

1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary disqualification in its minimum period to
perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.

2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not
have been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or municipal
ordinance.

In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the Penal Code, it is necessary that the public officer had
consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a
prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness
in the custody of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the
fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime.    For sure no connivance in the escape of
17

Pablo Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose
Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes does not mention the names of
the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to
compose the work party.

Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda under Article 224 of the Revised
Penal Code. This article punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of
his negligence resulting in evasion is definite amounting to deliberate non- performance of duty.   In the constant
18

case, the respondent Judge said:

We cannot, for the present be reconciled with the Idea that the escape. of Denaque was facilitated by the Governor's
or . his assistants negligence. According to law, if there is any negligence committed it must be the officer who is
charged with the custody and guarding of the ...  19

We find no reason to set aside such findings.

Pangan v. Gatbalite Digest

Facts:

1. On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to
serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on
October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Petitioner never got to serve his sentence
and hid for about nine years.

2. Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat
Detention Cell. Four days thereafter, he filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the RTC of
Angeles City, impleading respondent (Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga). Petitioner
contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that, a) the straight penalty of
two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,Article 93 [of the]
Revised Penal Code, and (b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost
nine years, his criminalliability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code.

3. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there was no evasion of the service of the
sentence. Evasion presupposes escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of
liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty already prescribed

HELD: NO.

The period of prescription of penalties – the succeeding Article 93 provides – "shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Article 157 of the RPC
discussed how evasion of service of sentence was perfected. It is provided therein that,

"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any
convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment. To consider properly the meaning of evasion service of sentence, its
elements must be present these are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving
his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades
"service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment."

That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the second sentence of
Article 157. It provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means
of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks,
false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the
term "jail breaking."

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and
157 of the RPC means the unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one
who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the record would show, even before the
execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. He now begs for the
compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to
appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a
fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven
beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not
to be rewarded therefor.