CITIZENSHIP

      Distinguished from nationality

      Modes of Acquiring citizenship

      Citizens of the Philippines

Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705
entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc. et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently
depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in this case thus:

FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February
1961.

In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to
take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping.

She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among
others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration
of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February
1962.

On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an
alleged Filipino citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an
action for injunction.

At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen
Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words.

She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the
names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
"In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of
Immigration, 'restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen
Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond,
upon her failure to do so.'

As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim
Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen.

HELD:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.

Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel
provision to Section 16.

Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat
them differently.

As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the
matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to
prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right
reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the
situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case.

Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.

Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to
Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

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"Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the instant
petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reasons set forth in the Order this Court, dated
March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:

'First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:

'"Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. - Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines."

The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held to mean
what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause 'who might herself be lawfully
naturalized' incontestably implies that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by
virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an
alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan' and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-
11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:

'"3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully naturalized as a
Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue of
her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under
the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines."

it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified,
does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because,
having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks,
at least, the requisite length of residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, See. 2, Case No.
2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).

'Were it the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by
virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law, it
would have been worded "and who herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."
'Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines,
after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff
only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident
that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending
compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be permitted.

'Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:

'"5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength
of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month
and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first
departing from the Philippines as she had promised." (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-
6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).

The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed, not only by the decided cases of
the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of Section 9, sub-
paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which reads:

'"An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain
permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and
procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by
the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admis-
sibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is added by Republic Act 503).'"
(Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).

'And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration of all laws
relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation to
alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial
function in determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R.
No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted with
abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.'

"It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and insufficiently talk in
broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write either language."

The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in the
resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the
government's brief, that "in the hearing ….., it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen
Yeung that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an
additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the
hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen
Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."

Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE 'WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY
NATURALIZED' (OF SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN
ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A
FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF
THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED
AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-
PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.

III

THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS
ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE
THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED
WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO
SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO
WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE
FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO

PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE
THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.

VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962.
(PAGES 3641, RECORD ON APPEAL)

We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above-decision upheld the two
main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:

"That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a
deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and
thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first
departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al., vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-
6017, Sept. 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);

"That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter
Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee
Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)"

It is obvious from the mature of these objections that their proper resolution would necessarily cover all
the points raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less,
on said objections.

I.

The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants' second and
fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seems
evident that the Solicitor General's pose that an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a
non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes
to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo.
Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said
petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would
have held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without having to depart as
required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law.

In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that that portion of Section 9 (g) of the
Immigration Act providing:
"An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain
permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and
procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by
the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act."

does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately
become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows
upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect
to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it
is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by aliens to con-
vert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure
prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the Court reiterating the ruling in Ong
Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 Phil. 785, said:

"x x x It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and
voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a
temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back on his representation and stay
permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve
him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of 'change' or
'correction', for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would,
as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien
so permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however
flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to
examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent
residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to
the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent
in such ruling are self-evident."

On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary
visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines
for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that
he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary
concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon
him. Consider, for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is
indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they
can be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed
to determine whether or not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and
hardships which such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a
rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice
Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
x x x (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of the
Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her
marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from would have
to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that 'in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen x x x of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the
bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative.'" (At. pp. 462-463)

In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor
as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of
citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of
authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and
express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the
Philippines. In the sense thus discussed, therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error
are well taken.

II.

Precisely, the second objection of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau
Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is
not denied did not have the effect of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized", it appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess all the
qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been
established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications
required by the law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent
as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for
naturalization.

To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court
since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G. R. No. L-11855 promulgated December 23, 1959,
106 Phil., 706, 713,[1] for it was only in Zita Ngo. Burca vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-24252 which was
promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this
Court held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for
naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove
in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required
thereby like any other applicant for naturalization,[2] albeit said decision is not yet part of our
jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are
in effect urging Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca
but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been
reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to So Im Ty.[3]

Actually the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473,
underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case,[4] one almost identical to the one at
bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay
was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956,
eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto
Lacasta. On March 9, 1956,her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and,
contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the
cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to
leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit
was filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no
obligation to leave because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned.
The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our
present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:

"The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino justified
or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before
March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a
Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it
would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence,
the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40 (c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613
provides that 'in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen x x x of the alien on whose behalf
the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the
depositor or his legal representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries
a male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.

"The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads:

'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen Philippines.'

"Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife,
unless she 'herself may be lawfully naturalized.' As correctly held in an opinion of the secretary of Justice
(Op. No. 52, series of 1950)# this limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by
marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:

'(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
'(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assas-
sination for the success and predominance of their ideas;

'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

'(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

'(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

'(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions,
and ideals of the Filipinos;

'(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the x x x Philippines are at war, during the period of such
war;

'(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.'

"In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall
under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite her failure
to depart from the Philippines within the period specified in the bond in question, there has been no
breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of political status, from alien
to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore, a case against the respondents-
appellants.

"Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the
parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may be lawfully naturalized,' and
this being a case of first impression in our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and
justice, the parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on
said issue." (At pp. 462-464.)

As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision as
regards the following propositions:
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of
an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";

2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Sec-
tion 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those
disqualified from being naturalized under Section 4 of the law quoted in the decision;

3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover
her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;

4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and

5. That in referring to the disqualifications enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the
impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications[5] specially considering that the decision
cited and footnoted several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the
Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:

"Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473),
provided that 'any woman who is now or hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.' A similar provision in
the naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not requiring the woman to have the
qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings,
but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7
Wall 496, 57, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No.
168 s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

"In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause 'who might herself be lawfully
naturalized', should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence,
good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the
race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)

"Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it results that
any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not
having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she possesses none of the disqualifications
mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband." (Op. No.
176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

"From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry is as to the
citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily
James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of
Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows:

'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.'

"The phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized', as contained in the above provision, means that
the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the disqualified classes
enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43 s. 1948; No.
95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does
not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the law.

"It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a Filipino
mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule
that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op.,
Sec. of Just., Nos. 5b, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura
must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473). (Op.
No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)

'Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a)
Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government; (b) persons defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of
their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the
period of such war.

'Section 3. Qualifications. - The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of this Act, in order
to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of
the hearing of their petition.

'The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition to being not less
than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each of the
following qualifications:

'First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five years, except as
provided in the next following section;
'Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period
of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which they are living;

'Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or have some known trade or profession; and

'Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.

'In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under oath his
intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state
or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.'

"We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an alien
woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this
case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino
citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in
any way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the
same being self-serving."

"SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. - Any woman, who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines.

"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof.

"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent,
shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his
minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he
will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as
a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where it he resides, and to take the
necessary oath of allegiance.

Is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man who
subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering
from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications
required by said law? If nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted
above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would be
inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for decision on January
21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before
Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable,
if not necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the
membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was
decided, two members, Justices Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according
to them, because they wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are
concerned.[12] Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with copious relevant
authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amicicurae[13] in
the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most
forceful manner, not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical
aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who stay so
long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially
or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the
administrative authorities in charge of the matter; as well as by the courts. Under these circumstances,
and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who took no part
in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter.
After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Sean Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second
(1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by
the first (1959) a Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this case
would seem to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration.

Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section 15,
aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American
counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American
provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.

The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American so-
vereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of
Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the
United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was
enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines
gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the
Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have
any perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently:

"SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United-States except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight."

This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by
adding a, provision as follows:

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."

The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially:

"SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of
the United States if residing therein."

For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of
marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code
provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the change of
sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the husband.
Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien upon the
citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one
who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus:

"SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. - In case a petitioner should die
before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the
proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are con-
cerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner."
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2927, that the
following provisions were added to the above Section 13:

"SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen and fourteen of
Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:

'SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands.

'SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being under the age of
twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine
Islands, be considered citizens thereof.

'SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippine Islands
after the naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.'"

When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above
Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen,
Section 13(a) above-quoted was re-enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this
Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any
other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions
of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.

1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are
eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization
Law, was to remove the racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino
nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack of
exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the
whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads thus:

"SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. - Philippine citizenship may be acquired by: (a)
natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other
Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the
laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein."

and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of race or
color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said
provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-
Commonwealth American regime to the understandable limitations flowing from our status as a
territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely
approved pursuant to express authority, without which it could not have been done, granted by an
amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States
Congress of March 23,
"SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition
to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful
assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the
Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official
character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States."

and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of
Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American
law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to Provide for
a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout, the United States" contained no racial
disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among those
expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act a 2927 was enacted, subdivision (c) of its
Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back
to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above.[16] Thus, it
would seem that the rationalization in the quoted decisions predicated on the theory that the
elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the
abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis.[17]

3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the construction adopted
in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice
should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473
is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but
an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the, United States as it
stood before its repeal in 1922.[1]8 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable construction uniformly followed in all
courts of the United States that had had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be
considered as if it were written in the statute itself. It almost trite to say that when our legislators
enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in
adopting verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus
enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts as well as by the Attorney General of the
United States and all administrative authorities charged with the implementation of the naturalization
and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar,
92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U S 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [1935]; Helvering
v. Winmill, 305 U S 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S.
110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).

A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative au-
thorities is contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner
of Immigration, Appt., 285 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
"Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. § 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as
follows: 'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.'

"Section 1994 of the Revised Stat is said to originate in the Act of Congress, of February 10, 1855 (10
Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section provided 'that any woman, who might lawfully be
naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States,
shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen.'

"And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap.
66, § 16, 1844, which provided that 'any woman married, or who shall be married, to a natural-born
subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the
rights and privileges of a natural born subject.'

"The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. § 4358b, Fed.
Stat. Anna. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being 'An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married
Women,' in § 2, provides 'that any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage
of this Act, . . . shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage . . . .'

"Section 6 of the act also provides that 1994 of the Revised Statutes . . . are repealed.'

"Section 6 also provides that 'such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under
either of such sections, . . .' meaning §§ 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no appli-
cation to the facts of the present case, as the marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage. This
case, therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.

"In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed this pro-
vision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: 'The term, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws," only limits the application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization
Act, existing at the time, only required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white
person," and not an alien enemy.'

"This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the class or race
which might he lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the naturalization
laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of the provisions of the immigration laws relating to
the exclusion or deportation of aliens.

"In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the Act of 1855, de-
claring that 'any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.' He held that 'upon the authorities, and
the reason, if not the necessity, of the case, the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that an
alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and
who marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it should
appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle
her to naturalization.'
"In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in United States v.
Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and married here a
naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage
she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of the
provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: 'There can be no doubt of this,
in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed.
283.' The alien 'belonged to the class of persons' who might be lawfully naturalized.

"In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the United States
from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration authorities
took her into custody at the port of New York, with the view of deporting her. She applied for her
release under a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter she married a
naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit held, affirming the court
below that she was entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: 'The rule is well settled
that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged. The status
of the wife follows that of her husband, and by virtue of her marriage her husbands, . . . and domicil
became her domicil.'

"In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165 Fed. 980, had before it the
application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at that time his wife was
held by the immigration authorities at New York on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous
and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the husband's naturalization
would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined
to pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was
determined whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground
that the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the same time he expressed his opi-
nion that the husband's naturalization would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could
become lawfully naturalized. 'Her own capacity (to become naturalized),' the court stated, 'is a
prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot
confer it upon her.' Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the views expressed
therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something more than
that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge, unable to accept them.

"In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge Learned Hand held that
an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen while visiting Turkey,
and then came to the United States, could not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a
disease which under the immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she
had not had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was
affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however, at the time the relators married, they
might have been lawfully naturalized, and we said: 'Even if we assume the contention of the district
attorney to be correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under
our immigration laws, it does not affect these relators.'

"We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said to be
inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. The
distinction between that case and the one now before the court is that, in the former case, the marriage
took place before any order of exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated after
such an order was made. But such an order is a mere administrative provision, and has not the force of
a judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances
that existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order
being carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of exclusion should be based
on the ground that the alien was at the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made
satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the
disease, we think it plain that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the
making of the order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith
marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she thereby ac-
quired, under international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and
ceased to be an alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that
jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens.

"In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right of the officials to
deport a woman under the following circumstances: She entered this country in July, 1910, being an
alien and, having been born in Turkey. She was taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the
following September, and in October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to
the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her
deportation was that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her entry.
One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the
United States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself unable to
believe that a marriage under such circumstances 'is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the
facts shown.' He held that it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the
immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a naturalized alien not
otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by law from
admission to the United States does not come within the provisions of that section. The court relied
wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.

"In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and held that where,
pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was married to a
citizen of the United States, she thereby became a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her
citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her mar-
riage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and
preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an
action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A.
666, 219 Fed. 1022.

"It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute by the
Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act
of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United States for the period required by the
naturalization laws was not necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having
married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she never resided in the United States, she and
her husband having continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
"In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered
by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of age and a
native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to
reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she was taken before a United States commissioner by
way of instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat.
4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered this
country for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and
practicing the same within three years after landing. It appeared, however, that after she was taken
before the United States commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of
Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at
the time of her marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with her
husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but professed to
believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport her, the claim being
advanced that by her marriage she had become an American citizen and therefore could not be de-
ported. The Attorney General ruled against the right to deport her as she had become an American
citizen. He held that the words, 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized,' refer to a class or race who
might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws
was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.

"Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that Congress, in
enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, 'that the marriage to an American citizen
of a female of the sexually immoral classes .... shall not invest such female with United States citizenship
if the marriage of such alien female shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts
which make her liable to deportation under this act.'

"Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:

"(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class avoiding deportation
through the device of marrying an American citizen.

"(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman of any other of
the excluded classes, either before or after her detention, should not confer upon her American
citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its intention would have been expressed, and 19
would not have been confined solely to women of the immoral class."

Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We have found no
warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994
of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and
other treatises and other writings on the subject would seem to give such impression. The case of Kelly
v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of these decisions[19] simply held:

"As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens of the
United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress
provide. The terms 'married' or 'who shall be married,' do not refer, in our judgment, to the time when
the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a
woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his
citizenship existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she
becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act,
citizenship upon her. The construction which would restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the
time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the
Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband,
without the necessity of any application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there
is no reason for the restriction suggested.

"The terms, 'who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws,' only limit the application of the
law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time only required that the
person applying for its benefits should be 'a free white person,' and not an alien enemy. Act of April
14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.

"A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40
N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its provisions."

Note that while the court did say that "the terms, 'who might lawfully be naturalized under existing
laws' only limit the application to free white women"[20] it hastened to add that "the previous
Naturalization Act, existing at the time, x x x required that the person applying for its benefits should be
(not only) a 'free white person' (but also) x x x not an alien enemy." This is simply because under the
Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy
aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding
footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was
mentioned, the reason was that there was no other nonracial requirement or no more alien-enemy
disqualification at the time; and this is demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear
that under the previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is
important, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice Field,
(in Kelly v. Owen) the terms 'who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws' only limit the
application of the law to free white women, must be interpreted in the application to the special facts
and to the incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien
wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race and nothing more
necessarily, but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law in force at the time
of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband.

4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the
inference that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that
in place of the said eliminated section, particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or
not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is not only that she must not be
disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2,
such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the
Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate,
capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of
children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, said Section 2 has been purposely
intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises,
We have come to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.

To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already examined above of the
mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of the
legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15 is an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had already
a settled construction by American courts and administrative authorities.

Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above, there
can be no doubt that in the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of
the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in
the United States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence, good moral character,
adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the only eligibility to be
taken into account is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope of
which, We have just discussed.[21] In the very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice
Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus:

"The phrase, 'shall be deemed a citizen,' in section 1994, Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of 1855, supra,
'shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen,' while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has
not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent
court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account
practically any the less a citizen. The word 'deemed' is the equivalent of 'considered' or 'judged'; and,
therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be 'deemed' or 'taken' as true of any person or thing,
must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or
thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman
shall, under certain circumstances, be 'deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency
occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode
thereby prescribed."

Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a situation like
this wherein our legislature has copied an American statute word for word, it is understood that the
construction already given to such statute before its being copied constitute part of our own law, there
seems to be no reason how We can give a different connotation or meaning to the provision in question.
At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be based on
inaccurate factual premises related to the real legislative background of the framing of our
naturalization law in its present form.

Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with
the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view.
There is no question that Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as
Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with practically the same
provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase "who may be lawfully
naturalized" in Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial
requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how
could the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely,
according to the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was
approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their counter-part in the
corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account and that what should be
considered only are the requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1 together with the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?

Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15
could have been intended to convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American courts
and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from which
it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that time, Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States was no longer in force because it had been repealed expressly by the Act of
September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of American
citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more
liberal terms than those of other applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in
question, which, as already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans
had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be
naturalized judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the
approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled
construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring judicial
naturalization, and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative but to conclude
that our law still follows the old or previous American law on the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth
Act 473 was approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the American
Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old American law and make one of our own, or, at least,
follow the trend of the Act of the U. S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the
language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said
phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even
after the Americans had amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the
construction that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature
adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American courts had given it a construction
which was acquiesced to by those called upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a
construction here different from that of the Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our le-
gislature borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is more,
it appears that our legislators even ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in
maintaining the old phraseology. Under these circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the
principles of Statutory construction to say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation
and that it should be construed independently of the previous American posture because of the
difference of circumstances here and in VA the United States. It is always safe to say that in the
construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated
legislative point of view seems to indicate otherwise.

5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in effect, the
so-called racial requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been
considered as qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have always been considered as
disqualifications, in the sense that these who did not possess them were the ones who could not "be
lawfully naturalized", just as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section 2 of
Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically
identical to those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter.[22] Indeed, such
is the clear impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions
quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions
of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing 23 with approval the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice.[23] Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements were
always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the law, why
should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the disqua-
lifications? Why should such elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously
considered as irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the
holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the
same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding
the elimination of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making
the phrase in question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification
but to the qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927,
there were two groups of persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1
and those falling under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to
Section 1, could not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than
decreasing, the disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what
alchemy of logic such elimination could have converted qualifications into disqualifications, specially in
the light of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law distinctly
and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence,
qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining "who might be lawfully
naturalized", as such phrase is used in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American
citizens, and our law on the matter was merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.

6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions,
whether here or in the United States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the same
conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated
February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zits Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:

"Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove 'qualifications' -

"There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that Section 15 of the
law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the qualifications
prescribed under Section 2, before she may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an
alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The
unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:

"1. One of the qualifications required of an applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that
the applicant 'must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years.' If
this requirement is applied to an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of
ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her husband. If the wife happens to be
a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she automatically loses
her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a period of ten
years at least, she would be stateless. And even after having acquired continuous residence in the
Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition for naturalization will be granted, in
which case she would remain stateless for an indefinite period of time.

"2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he 'must own real estate
in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.' Considering the constitutional prohibition
against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of hereditary succession (Art. X111, Sec. 5,
Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband must have to prove that
she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income
requirement has been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the
said income. (Uy v. Republic, G.R. No. L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20605,
June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, G.R. No. L20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife
must prove that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other than her husband's trade,
profession or calling. It is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most
wives in the Philippines do not have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine Law,
recognizing the dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of
supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it is an
accepted concept that when a woman marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and
housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a lucrative
income of her own to qualify her for citizenship?

"3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization 'must have enrolled his minor children of
school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of the Private
Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as
part of the school curriculum during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.' If an alien woman has minor
children by a previous marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor children
had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her period of residence in the country, she cannot
qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of this Court. The reason behind the requirement
that children should be enrolled in recognized educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship
of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, G.R. No. L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil.
117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-4177, May 29,
1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, G.R. No. L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said minor children
by her first husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement
as applied to her does not exist. Cessanteratione legis cessat ipsa lex.

"4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by Section 2 'shall be
understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman.' It is absurd
that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should be required to reside only for five years in the Philip-
pines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino husband must reside for
ten years.

"Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife related by
marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. And yet,
it seems more than clear that the general purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to
accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to
other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No.
2927 (the old Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of
Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this situation that the
Philippine legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary of
Justice in 1941 is enlightening:

'It is true that under Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the nationality of the
husband; but the Department of state of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien
wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the leading case
of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being political
have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. Accordingly, the
stand taken by the Attorney-General prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448, was that marriage of alien
women to Philippine citizens did not make the former citizens of this country.' (Op. Atty. Gen, March 16,
1928)

'To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928 adding section 13(a) to Act No.
2927 which provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippine Islands.' (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours).

"If Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way
as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege
granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is submitted that such a construction, being contrary to
the manifested object of the statute, must, be rejected.
'A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is susceptible of
two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive
the former construction.' (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S.
338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910].

'x x x A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if pos-
sible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with the
decisions construing statutes, a construction which will result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences
will also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting
in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd consequences.'

'So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency in
legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility,
redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should adopt that cons-
truction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the
intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute
uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer
an illusory right. x x x' (82 C. J. S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632)."

7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the
construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But
the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature
contemplated to make it more difficult, if not practically impossible in some instances, for an alien
woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has
just been demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was
intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver
themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this
country, "for better or for worse". Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal
conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the
minority, as such cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it
is not farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family, the alien woman is somehow disposed to
assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and
associate, but surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be con-
sidered that in reality the extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as
for the husband. Indeed, We find the following observations anent the national policy rationalization in
Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:

"We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question. The avowed
policy of 'selective admission' more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is sought to be
acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the
national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to become citizens. There is here a choice
between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application in
cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to
accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings
that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a
citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is
a citizen of the Philippines, 'irrespective of his moral character; ideological beliefs, and identification
with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.' A minor child of a person naturalized under the law, who is
able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has
lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien wife of a
Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i. e., that
she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her
citizenship status as a fact.

"A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this regard, for it
explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in
extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other
objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson,
113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also 'Convention on the Nationality of Married Women:
Historical Background and Commentary.' UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to
acquit citizenship derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the Philippines where
tradition and law has placed the husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions
govern the life of the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity
of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation the State has a vital and enduring interest.
(See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country, there is a theoretic
identity of person and interest between husband and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the
home of one is that of the other. (See De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that
because of the theoretic identity of husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality
of the husband should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be the law upon the
other. For as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: 'The
status of the wife follows that of the husband, x x x and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile
became her domicile.' And the presumption under Philippine law being that the property relations of
husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one
is also that of the other.

"It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different
from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's interests in property and business
activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to
the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership,
acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused
recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances
where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law."
(Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned
that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and
construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized", found in the American statute from
which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative
authorities. There is merit, of course, in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the
light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws, We should
realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of
peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is
nationalistic almost in the extreme. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather
passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American
authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride
and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of
law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily
from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United
States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's
and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in
that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of September
22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without
undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of
August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, which, it is worth
reiterating, was consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to alien
women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and
without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral character,
adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they could show they did not suffer
from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now
hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows
the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that
she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances
where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake
and fictitious marriages or male fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because
of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably
by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be means of
discovering such undesirable practices and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.

III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in Burca,
supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may
herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as already noted, was submitted for
decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would
have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack of
qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any
naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain her claim that she is not disqualified under
Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide
is, may she be deemed a Filipina without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?

Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily be in the
affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because there is
still pending with Us a motion for its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of
serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this
opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.

In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:

"We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this
country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Re-
vised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner
has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any
other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise - other than the judgment of a
competent court of justice - certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a
Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

"3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a 'petition for
citizenship'. This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts
were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for
naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner 'a citizen of the Philippines.'"

In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with
Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the
law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to
pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization, apparently from declaration of intention to oath-
taking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no
consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be the national of
the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality
with her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to
complete, the required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one
of the principal local languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or
engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of
intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible witnes-
ses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc. until a decision is rendered in her
favor, after which she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then, but not before she
takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines.
Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration.

Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a
cursory reading of the provision in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of
naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the
language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife is
intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take
a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have overlooked any
relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from that contained therein. It is undeniable
that the issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of
persons affected by the ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever
possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon them not contemplated
either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to enforce.

AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in the Bar
and well known for their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and
comprehensive resourcefulness, in research, truly evident in the quality of the memorandum they have
submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:

"The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case - that an alien
woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a citizen but can
acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization proceedings under the Revised
Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions 'certifying or declaring' such woman to be a
Philippine citizen are 'null and void' -has consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the present
case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The
newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens are affected by
this decision of the Court. These are women of many and diverse nationalities, including Chinese,
Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the
community, some of whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all exercised
rights and, privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens, They will have acquired, separately or in
conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they will, have sold and transferred
such property. Many of these women may be in professions membership in which is limited to citizens.
Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in companies engage in business activities
for which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these married women
are now faced with possible divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges
exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been accepted as
correct for more than two decades by the very agencies of government charged with the administration
of that law. We most respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such comprehensive
and far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and
re-examination."

To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G. R.
No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 - when Chief Justice Concepcion observed:

"The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases - although referring to
situations the equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at bar - may have con-
tributed materially to the irregularities committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced
the parties concerned to believe, although erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the
law.

"Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the Solicitor General was
required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state 'how many cases there are, like the one at
bar, in which certificates of naturalization have been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for
naturalization had been published in the Official Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January
28, 1950' (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) 'to May 29, 1957' (when the Ong
Son Cui was decided) 'and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965' (when the decision in the
present case was rendered).

"After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion for
reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained in the
later, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the
validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957."

Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the
prospective application of its construction of the law made in a previous decision[24] which had already
become final, to serve the ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far.
As already observed, the decision in Burca is still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suau Ay,
Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at the most become the law of the
case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to do now is to re-
examine the said rulings and clarify or modify them.

For ready reference, We requote Section 15:

"Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. - Any woman who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines.
"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof.

"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parents,
shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his
minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he
will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, Shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as
a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the
necessary oath of allegiance."

It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or
Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of
the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its
elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable persons
becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the consequence of the
naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the members of his immediate
family, his wife and children,[25] and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor
children who have been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor
children, if born outside the Philippines but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall
automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the Philippines, and not in the Philippines at
the time of such naturalization, are also "deemed citizens" of this country provided that they shall lose
said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all
such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "consi-
dered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the
Philippine (American) Consulate of the country where they reside and take the necessary oath of
allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized".[26]

No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor children,
falling within the conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision, are
vested with Philippine citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the
need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA.) Indeed, the language of the
provision is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same expression "shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not necessarily connote the
vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that
she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to
attach only after she has undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person
desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages
and intends legislative naturalization as to the minor children, the same section deliberately treats the
wife differently and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the Congress of
the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it
has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates,[27] hence there is no reason it
cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general conditions applicable to all of the members
of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized. The issue
before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature has done so in the disputed provisions of Section
15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respected authorities on
political law in the Philippines[28] observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is
often observed by some states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married
to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes who may apply
for naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498499 [10th ed. 1954];
emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and
Ricardo Cua, supra.)

More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United States
statutes from which our law has been copied,28-a the American courts have held that the alien wife
does not acquire American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the
words 'and taken' are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen
of the United States becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and
regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601,[1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P.
713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.)

We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of
Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that, in turn,
said paragraph was copied verbatim, from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
which by that time already had a long accepted construction among the courts and administrative
authorities in that country holding that under such provision an alien woman who married a citizen
became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the marriage
itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that it could be shown that at
the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To
repeat the discussion We already made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this
decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that
whereas in the United States, the American Congress, recognizing the uniform construction of Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such
construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit
to judicial naturalization, albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for citizenship,
on the other hand, the Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a requirement,
enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of
the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preference to adopt the latter law and its settled
construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the United
States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives
of her citizens to discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry without
passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it
seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing country, the
Philippines should adopt a similar policy, unfortunately; the manner in which our own legislature has
enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law along
the line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial
legislation which it is not constitutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this Court would be
going precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent.

There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied that
this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an
applicant for naturalization who dies during the proceedings do not have to submit themselves to
another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings involving the
husband. Section 16 provides:

"SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. - In case a petitioner should die
before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceed-
ings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned,
produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner."

In Tan Lin v. Republic, G. R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held:

"Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. 16,
the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not substituted for
the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not
those of the widow and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies
before or after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment becomes executory.

"There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said Section 16
contemplates the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of inquiry, for
the simple reason that it states that 'The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and
minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of
the petitioner.' This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the proceedings with the
deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to
consider the decision rendered, as far as it affected the widow and the minor children.

x x x x x
"The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not be bound to do
things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow
prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner
Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of
naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been
completed, not on behalf of the deceased, but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of
the benefits of his naturalization. I other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of
allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that 'any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who
have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.' (Section 15, Commonwealth Act
No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not show that
the petitioning widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition,
apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of
the Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex
A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature."

Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 13. If the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration in
Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel:

"It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be considered citizens of the
Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has the power not only to
prescribe the mode or manner under which foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power
of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898];
see 1 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]). The Constitution itself
recognizes as Philippine citizens 'Those who are naturalized in accordance with law' (Section 1[5], Article
IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who
are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those
who acquire citizenship by 'derivative naturalization' or by operation of law, as for example, the
'naturalization' of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien
woman to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, 22. op cit. supra, at 152, 172; Velayo, Philippine citizenship
and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of
International Law 3).

"The phrase 'shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines' found in Section 15 of the Revised Naturaliza-
tion Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.
S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994), American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that
upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully
as if she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. (U. S. v.
Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Ex rel. Sejnensky v. Tod, 225 F. 523, 26 A.L.R. 1316; see also Opinions of the US
Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 402], July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op.
508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 209] and Jan. 12, 1923 [33 Op. 398]).

'The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen", in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268)
or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapter 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and taken to be a
citizen", while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by the
ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application
and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a citizen.
The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged", and therefore, whatever an Act of
Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing must, in law, be considered
as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect
accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under, certain
circumstances, be "deemed" an American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent
to, her being naturalized directly by an Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.' (Van
Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-
147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).

"That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first paragraph of
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis of the entire statutory pro-
vision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:

(See supra)

The phrases 'shall be deemed,' 'shall be considered,' and 'shall automatically become,' as used in the
above provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the provision was to
confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence, of
their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines.
Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs with the fact of
citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect is for said persons to become 'ipso facto'
citizens of the Philippines. 'Ipso facto' as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor
children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also.
Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply
for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of
those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative
fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines
the point of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second paragraph of Section
15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso
facto a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of ci-
tizenship of his parent, and the time when the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time
that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may prove some 25 years after the
naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be 'considered' a
citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly,
an alien woman who married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her
marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship status became in
question), that she is one who 'might herself be lawfully naturalized.' It is not reasonable to conclude
that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she 'might herself be lawfully
naturalized.'

"The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the law, the
legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless
and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain
terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one 'who might herself be lawfully
naturalized.' The proviso that she must be one 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' is not a
condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact
necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i. e., as a fact established and proved in
evidence. The word 'might; as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to a
Philippine citizen, the alien woman 'had (the) power' to become such a citizen herself under the laws
then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 7 Wall 496, 19 L ed 283
[1869]). That she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her
marriage, she became a citizen.

"(This Court has held) that 'an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the
Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized' (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under
this view, the 'acquisition' of citizenship by the alien wife depends on her having proven her
qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may herself
be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law that the proviso does not mean that she
must first prove that she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' before she shall be deemed (by
Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the 'uniform' decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to
support its holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her
qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was that the alien wives in those cases failed
to prove their qualifications and therefore they failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly
Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [1957] the case was remanded to the lower court for determination of
whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the Go-
vernment, 'might herself be lawfully naturalized,' for the purpose 'of proving her alleged change of
political status from alien to citizen' (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who
was being deported, claimed that she was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court
finding that there was no proof that she was not disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, ruled that: 'No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of
Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable.' (at 523) It will be
observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives 'might
(themselves) be lawfully naturalized' did not necessarily imply that they did not become, in truth and in
fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was that these wives
failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven fact.

"In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when citizenship is
conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact.
Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any
proceeding, would be required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in
order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.# His citizenship status commences from the time of
birth, although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien
woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her
marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by
showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a
statutory declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such
citizen from a declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino is a citizen of the Philippines
provided she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the
former becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.

"It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized, it
cannot be said that she has established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it be said that on
that account, she did not become a citizen of the Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned
in any legal proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a case,
the presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to be. (U. S. v. Roxas, S Phil. 375 [1905];
Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a representation shown to have been
made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321)."

The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is
there for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of
her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it
everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved
only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such, question is that as the laws of our country, both substantive
and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship
under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as
the case may be, for the truth is that the same situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Every-
time the citizenship of A person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding Court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. This, as we view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in
Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently in-
quiring into the matter May make the effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying
somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these are not really binding.

It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that the
most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion No.
38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus C. Barrera, may be considered as the most
appropriate initial step by the interested parties:

"Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of he alien certificate of registration alleging,
among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from
acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Common wealth Act No. 473, as amended.
Upon the filing of said petition which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB
Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition."

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will probably
be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on
the substance and vigor of the opposition.

Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not touched by
the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers the matter be settled once and
for all now.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for
injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized
representative is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of
the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from
and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.

Djumantan v. Domingo, Jan. 30, 1995

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; POWER OF THE PRESIDENT; RIGHT TO EXPEL OR DEPORT ALIENS; RATIONALE. —
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the
public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission
into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the
part of the government to permit them to stay. The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into
or allowed to continue to reside in the country, is protected only so far as Congress may choose to
protect it.

2. ID.; IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940; SEC. 9 THEREOF; ENTRY OF ALIENS INTO THE COUNTRY, NOT A
MATTER OF RIGHT. — There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be
admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The fact of marriage by an
alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the
admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto
make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the
expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not
mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country,
the alien has no right to an indefinite stay.

3. ID.; ID.; DEPORTATION OF ALIENS; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BENCH. —

Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country. The right of
public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed. Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into
the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and misleading statements in her application
and in the other supporting documents submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez
first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner was admitted into the
country and asked for her deportation. After the EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID
requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint. Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980,
when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than
five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.

Facts

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.He then embraced
and was converted to Islam.

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the Philippines.
Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez. The latter made it
appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability
extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for
his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her
children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true
relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”, however,
subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. Banez’
eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at
the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she
was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to
respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked
the visa previously granted to her.

Issue
Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from temporary to
permanent resident legal.

Ruling :

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the country and
the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges
were obtained through misinterpretation.Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the
public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission
into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the
part of the government to permit them to stay.

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not
withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of
aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her
extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a
visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. an alien
allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and “may be admitted” as a permanent
resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a
Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter
of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with preliminary injunction, to
reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID), ordering the deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991,
denying the motion for reconsideration.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in
accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.

On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-month
old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a
friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his
stay in Indonesia.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13,
1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.

Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia, that:

"That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs. Djumantan, 42 years old, and her two
minor children, MARINA, 2 years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian citizens, who are
coming as temporary visitors.

That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the hospitality they have accorded
me during the few years that I have stayed in Indonesia in connection with my employment thereat.

That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior while they are in the
Philippines; I also guaranty their support and that they will not become a public charge.

That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the authorized stay granted them by
the Government" (Rollo, p. 41).

As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.

Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of
the Immigration Act of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a
complaint for "concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two.
This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of
permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an
alien certificate of registration.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman,
who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained
at the CID detention cell. She later released pending the deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400)
after posting a cash bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed
to depart voluntarily from the Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10).
However, she had a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground
that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen (Rollo, pp. 11-12).

In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public respondents, disposed as follows

"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Commissioners finds the second marriage of
Bernardo Banez to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her" (Rollo, p. 23).

Public respondents denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in their Resolution dated January 29,
1991 (Rollo, pp. 31-33).

Hence, this petition.

We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease and desist from
executing or implementing the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated January 29,
1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-36).

On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August 14, 1994 and that
he and his mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent resident visa to
petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-175).chanrobles law library

II
Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim
Code, which recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise, she argues that
under Articles 109 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the
Muslim Code, the husband and wife are obliged to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the husband is given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She claims that public
respondents have no right to order the couple to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).

When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that the CID could not
order petitioner’s deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the
Immigration Act of 1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).

III

We need not resolve the validity of petitioner’s marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly
deport petitioner as an ‘undesirable alien’ regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to
be first resolved is the question on petitioner’s immigration status, particularly the legality of her
admission into the country and the change of her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident.
Upon a finding that she was not lawfully admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire
permanent residency, the next question is whether the power to deport her has prescribed.

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the country and
the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges
were obtained through misrepresentation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her
applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.

The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence
the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would
be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino
citizen, who is married to another woman (Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the
public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the
nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which
creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).

The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country, is
protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy
180 F. 2d. 489).

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the Philippines.

The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the
immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L.
Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino
husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to
depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33
SCRA 362 [1970]).

Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who
applies for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay.
Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and
"may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent
residency is the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry
of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are
legally married to Filipino citizens.

IV

We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public respondents to deport
petitioner has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

Said Section 37(b) provides:

"Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of this section at any
time after entry, but shall not be effected under any clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3
and 4 shall not be effected if the court, or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to
the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported" (As amended by Rep. Act No.
503).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry.

"2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry;

"3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for a
term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his
entry to the Philippines, or who, at any time after such entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than
once;

"4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs;

"5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected with
the management of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;

"6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not affirmatively
shown to have arisen subsequent to entry;

"7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he
was admitted a non-immigrant;

"8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the
Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed
to organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public
officials because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of
property, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching
such doctrines, or who on any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the
dissemination of such doctrines;

"9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act,
independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the case of an alien
who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and deportation, said alien
shall first serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided, however,
That the imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of the
Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may
fix and approved by the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as
the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);

"10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of violating the
provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and fifty-three, otherwise
known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now Republic Act No. 562), or who, at any time
after entry, shall have been convicted more than once of violating the provisions of the same Act;

"11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of any criminal
action which may be brought against him;

"12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act Numbered Four
hundred and seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or
any law relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;

"13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties, to prevent them from
being attached or executed."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act
by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is
subject to deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be
effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause
for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country (Costanzo v.
Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR
1282).

In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we held that under Section 37(b) of
the Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years after
the cause of deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement
of the law as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year limitation is applicable only
where deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11
and 12; that where deportation or exclusion is sought to be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
Section 37(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that to the contrary, deportation or exclusion
may be effected ‘at any time after entry.’"

Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false
and misleading statements in her application and in the other supporting documents submitted to the
immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about
the manner petitioner was admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78).
After the EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-
complaint (Rollo, p. 78).

Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of
the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of
the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation
of an alien and claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the
revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).

The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order
for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the
country. When public respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in
effect, ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order issued on June 4, 1991 is
MADE PERMANENT.

The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the
permanent resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.

ELECTION OF THE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

 In re: Vicente Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

FACTS :

Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in
Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examination.

The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following documents as
proof of his Philippine Citizenship:

1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;

2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his place; and

3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union

On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.

Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.

He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.

The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the Philippine
Bar.

In his report:

1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of
majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265
"an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person
whose mother is a Filipino citizen"

2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already be
beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:

Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:

No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. The
reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from "upon reaching the age of majority",
which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the
court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.

The Court holds that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed
from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is
clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover,
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when
convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As
such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
Therefore, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED ELECTION

 Co v. HRET, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

FACTS:

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd district of Northern Samar. His
adversaries, which include petitioners Co et al., filed election protests against him averring that he is not a natural-
born citizen of the Phils. and that he is not a resident of the 2nd district of Northern Samar and therefore he did not
satisfy the qualification for representatives mandated in Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution. It is argued that Ong does
not even have real properties in that district. Respondent HRET found for Ong, hence his petition for certiori. Ong
was born of a natural-born citizen mother and a Chinese father who was later naturalized while Ong was a minor.
Ong was born in the said district of Samar and grew up there. Their house was twice burned and, in both times, they
rebuilt their residence in the same place. After elementary, he pursued his studies in Mla. and practiced his
profession as CPA in the Central Bank of the Phils. Later, he engaged himself in the management of the family
business in Mla. He married a Filipina. In between, he made periodical journeys back to his home province. However,
Ong does not have property in the district.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers.

HELD:

1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar. The respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of
his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a
Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent
Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a
foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father
which he could possibly have chosen.

2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born
citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa
convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent,
was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies

Issues:

(1) Is Ong a naturally-born Filipino citizen?

(2) Is Ong a resident of the 2nd district of Northern Samar?

Held:

(1) Yes. When Ong’s father was naturalized, Sec 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to
him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Thus, it was the law itself which elected Philippine citizenship to
him when he was only 9. Election through a sworn statement when he turned 21 (age of majority) would have been
an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who is already a Filipino citizen. Moreover, formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos, when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding and, in this case, Ong’s establishment of his life here
are themselves formal manifestations of choice.

(2) Yes. The domicile of origin of Ong, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar (in the
district). Although no merit was found in the petitioners’ argument that Ong does not even have property in the
district, the Court nonetheless held, for the sake of argument, that did it is not required that a person should have a
house in order to establish his residence and domicile because that would tantamount to a property qualification. It is
enough that he should live in the municipality. Although he studied in Manila and practiced his profession therein, the
periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.

-------------xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx---------------------------xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx----------------------xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that members of the House of
Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the Philippines." The voting majority of the present Court says,
"Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even aliens
will do as well."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of Representatives,
Congress of the Philippines

Natural Born Citizens

Bengson v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,
however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act
Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of
the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for
reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was
not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.

HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD:

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A.
No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,

2. by repatriation, and

3. by direct act of Congress.

**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;

3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,

4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and

5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the
Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry
of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship

----xxxxx--------------x------------xxxx-----------x------xxxxxxxxx---------xxxxxxxxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxxxx--------xxxxxxxxxxxx

YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To
be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under
this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications
and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the
Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political
economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry
of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.

Tecson v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

Facts:

Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly
misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen
despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen.
Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic
issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or
vice-presidency before the elections are held.
“Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of the
Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of “candidates” for President or Vice-President
before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided that among the
citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was
identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the
age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of
residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan—respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen
by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship
did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and
the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship
in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation
to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Dual citizenship & dual allegiance

Mercado v. Manzano, GR 135083, May 26, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed.
Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered
himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result
of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which
they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully
complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our
courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law
may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated
his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the
ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be
taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does
some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP

BY NATURALIZATION IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY

 Labo v. Comelec, 176 SCRA 1

Facts:

Ramon Labo Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His Rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto
against labo as Lardizabal asserts that labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an
Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an
Australian ‘ that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian
when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later
declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of baguio who voted for him
by a vast majority.

Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an elective official must be a citizen of
the Philippines.

From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were not possessed by the petitioner
during elections. He was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as
such.

Issue: WON private respondent, having garnered the 2nd highest number of votes, can replace the petitioner as
mayor.

Held: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.

Note:

Dual citizenship is not a bar in running for elections, dual allegiance is.

Mere repatriation is not enough to run for elections.

A written certification of an oath of allegiance to the Philippines must be attached together with the COC.

- WON, Labo can retain his public office

- - No, Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an
Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of
subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute
that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an
immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual Allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealth with by law. He lost his Filipino Citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost hid Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To
restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or be declared as a Filipino through an act of
Congress- NONE OF THIS HAPPENED.

Labo being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome
the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of baguio could not have even, unanimously, changed
the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner
(curiously would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian) the electorate had no power
to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual
owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor if their city. Only
citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen

xxxx- Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert , through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be
declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest
number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionality guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority of plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through
their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound, Policy dictates the public elective officers are filed by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea
in all republican forms.

By express renunciation or expatriation

Yu. Vs, Santiago

Facts:

Petitioner Willie Yu is a Portuguese National who acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization on

February 10,1978. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued a renewed Portuguese Passport
by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on July 20, 1986. Being a naturalized Filipino, he signed commercial
documents stating his citizenship as Portuguese without the authentication of an appropriate Philippine
consul. He was then detained by the CID for obtaining a foreign passport while having a Filipino citizenship.
Yu then filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to
the Court en Banc. The Court en Banc denied the petition. He then filed a motion for reconsideration with
prayer for restraining order but it was denied. After denial, he filed a motion for clarification with prayer for
restraining order. On December 7,1988, the temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was issued. The
respondent filed a motion to lift the said TRO, contending that Yu was in full knowledge and Legal capacity
when he applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization he consequently recognizes, identifies and
agrees to the oath taken which states to renounce “absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty” and pledged to maintain true faith and allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Hence, petitioner then knows the limitations or restrictions once solemnizing
said oath and its succeeding consequences should they be violated.

Issue:
Was the petitioner’s act constituted a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship?

Ruling:
Yes, considering the facts stated, the court ruled that the Petitioner’s acts constitute an express renunciation
of his Philippine citizenship through naturalization. Express naturalization means renunciation made known
distinctly and explicitly, and not that which is implied. After acquiring Philippine citizenship, with full
knowledge, he resumed his prior status as a Portuguese citizen by applying for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport and representing himself as a Portuguese in official and commercial documents. The court found
that such acts are grossly inconsistent with the maintenance of his Philippine citizenship.

Reacquisition of citizenship, RA 8171

Retroactivity of Repatriation

Frivaldo vs. Comelec (1996)

July 08, 2013
Frivaldo vs. Comelec
GR No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727

FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January
22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo

In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged
but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect
himself against President Marcos

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on
Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His
motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this
Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that
they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a
temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time
required comments from the respondents.

ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,
1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to
this basic question.
HELD : YES! The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all
public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of
the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born"
citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows,
however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from
the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado
P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials
and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in
Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen
of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born"
citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows,
however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from
the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado
P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner
should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization,
or by repatriation.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is
hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not
that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was
that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is
not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge
his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office
are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his
title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and
by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the
challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight
months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing
exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not
excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of
this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
 Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to
any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution
and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it
is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its
difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome
back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express
and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.

HELD:

The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of Presidential
Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for governor.

The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are:

(1) filing the application;

(2) action by the committee; and

(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved.

It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship.

If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should
not have explicitly provided otherwise.

He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

- Yes. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship
unlike that for residence and age. Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of Qualifications of
Elective Officials not of candidates.’

The SC ruled that citizenship is required only during the time when an official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions. Thus it starts upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of
office to begin. Since Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the very day the term of office
of governor (and other elective officials) began—he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold
such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.

Suffrage

Akbayan Youth v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001

There is no obligation to do impossible things

FACTS:
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the
registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December
27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth then sued COMELEC for
alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4
million youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of
Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular
election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in
the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of preelection acts including voters
registration if the original period is not observed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the
voters registration.

RULING:
No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189
which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election.
The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere
statutory requirement.

Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. The law
obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible.

In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est.

Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the
time, be legally, coincidentally, it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation
or application of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible.

The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed
from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA
8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition.

Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.

Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings
that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the
additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of
voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then
they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it – by that time, the May
14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special
registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters
are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYANYouth’s pleading was attached any actual
complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters
registration has ended on December 27, 2001.

Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed
to register on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights.
 Makalintal v. Comelec, GR 157013, July 10, 2003

ISSUE: Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional?

FACTS: A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the
Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has
actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public
funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a
taxpayer and as a lawyer. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in
Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card
holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence
in the Philippines.

DECISION: Partly granted.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution,
Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with
the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of
absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines
abroad” is not physically present in the country. The petition was partly granted, Sections 17(a),
18(b), 19(c), 20(d) are declared void for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
Pursuant to Section 30 of RA No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in
full force and effect.

PART III- GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Nature of Philippine State: 

Meaning of democratic and republican state: Art II, Sec. 1 Const.
also see Cruz, Philippine Political law;

Doctrine of  Incorporation -   Art II, Sec.2 Const.

Definition; Concept
 Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, March 26, 1949

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and

Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period
covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and
failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities
and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese
Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to
establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin
and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the
prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit
respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not E.O. 68 is Constitutional
2) Whether or not the Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947
3) Whether or not Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution United State
not being a party in interest in the case.

Held:

1) The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commander in chief of all our armed forces. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the
adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to
seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or
impede our military effort have violated the law of war. The President as Commander in Chief is
fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment
of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68

2) It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form,
part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. Even if
the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of
rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may
have been or shall be a signatory

3) Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the
Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. The appointment of the two American
attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States,
which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a
tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. It is of
common knowledge that the United State and its people have been equally if not more greatly
aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It
can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication
of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.

Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155

Facts:

RA 1180 – An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was enacted to nationalize the retail trade
business in the Philippines. The law prohibits persons not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade and other prohibitions and regulations.

Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. SolGen content
that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival.

Issue:

Whether or not the Act is unconstitutional because it denies alien residents the equal protection of
the laws.

Held:

No.

Ratio:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and
as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to
declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act
transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
 Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230

FACTS;

During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam
and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the
National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive
Secretary Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment
of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association
assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.

HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in
the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of
laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the
very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is
latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also,
insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.

As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.

Doctrine of Transformation- 

Civilian Supremacy: read also R.A. 7055; Art. VII Sec. 18 Constitution; Sec. 5 (1), Art. XVI
Constitution;
Meaning and its concept:

IBP V.ZAMORA

FACTS:
The President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime
prevention and suppression. On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed the instant petition to declare the
deployment of Philippines Marines unconstitutional thus null and void alleging that no emergency situation
would justify the employment of soldiers for law enforcement work and that the same is in derogation of
Article II Section 3 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint visibility patrols violate the Constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military

HELD:
The calling of the Marines, in this case, constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian enforcement
and that it does not contravene Section 3, Article II of the Constitution. The limited participation of the
Marines is evident in the LOI itself which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’
authority. The deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution and not
with the military. What is in here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and the civilian
authorities, not a derogation of civilian supremacy. Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed.

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in
verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise
of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling
of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing,
it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to
shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing,
President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing
Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005
for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service. After
investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on
willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be
quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or
orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified
before the Senate.

Issue:

1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?

2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President
desires otherwise?

3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October 2005?

Held:

1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief,
and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Our
ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the
prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed
forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the
President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate
that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost
respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court
will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes
that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress
is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since
petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the
military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality
which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the
courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a
wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is
considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and
respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is
only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The
judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the
legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to
originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by
the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the
jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the
termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is
terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of
and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005.

Gonzales vs. Gen. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, Aug. 10, 2006

Facts:

Only July 27, 2003 at around 1:00am, more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men
of the AFP entered the premises of Oakwood Apartments in Makati. They then announced their grievances
against the Arroyo Administration, corruption in the Military; illegal sale of arms and ammunitions to the
enemies; they demanded for the resignation of the President, the Cabinet and AFP and PNP top brass. The
President issued G.O. No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion. Negotiates were sent to the place and the soldiers
finally laid their arms. After investigation, they were charged with coup d’ etat penalized under Article 134-A,
RPC. They were likewise charged under the Articles of War, specifically Article 96 for conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman. They filed a motion with the RTC where the coup d’etat case was pending to
take over jurisdiction over all the cases pending with the military tribunal following the doctrine of absorption.
The RTC ruled that the cases before the military tribunal were not service-connected but rather absorbed in
furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat. When they were charged under Art. 96 of the Articles of War, they
filed a petition for prohibition praying that the respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War. They maintained that Article 96 is not service connected, hence,
absorbed by coup d’etat, thus, within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The OSG contended that under RA 7055,
violation of Art. 96 is service-connected, hence, within the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. They further
contended that the offense has already prescribed since they were not arraigned within 2 years from the
date of the commission of the offense.

Q – Are they entitled to the writ of prohibition? Explain.

Answer: No. RA 7055 identifies the service-connected crimes including violation of Article 96 of the Articles
of War. It is triable by the court martial. The charge against the accused concerns the alleged violation of
their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation
caused dishonor and discredit to the military profession. The charge has a bearing on the professional
conduct and behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of the offense is
the penalty prescribed by the same, that is, dismissal from the service, imposable only by the military court.
Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of
misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
Q – Are the crimes defined by the Articles of War, like that of Article 96 absorbed by the crime of coup
d’etat? Explain?

Answer: No. RA 7055, Sec. 1, specifically specifies what are considered as service-connected offenses or
crimes, and vests upon the military courts jurisdiction. In fact, it mandates that they be tried by court-martial.
(Navales v. Abaya, G.R. Nos. 162318 and 162341, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 393).

Q – When is the doctrine of absorption of crimes applicable?

Answer: The doctrine applies to crimes punished by the same statute, not where the crimes are punishable
by different statutes. It applies also if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Sec. 1, RA 7055
deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of
War.

J. Callejo’s Opinion.

Service-connected acts defined and penalized by the Articles of War are sui generis offenses not absorbed
by rebellion perpetrated by the officers and enlisted personnel of the AFP or coup d’etat. This is so because
such acts or omissions are merely violations of military discipline, designed to secure a higher efficiency in
the military service.

Common crimes committed in furtherance of a political crime, such as rebellion, are absorbed.
A political crime is one directly aimed against the political establishments.
(People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956). Such common offenses assume the political complexion of the
main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same to justify the imposition of the graver penalty. (People v.
Hernandez, supra.)
XXX-----------XXXX-

On July 27, 2003, 321 heavily-armed soldiers led by Antonio Trillanes IV, with an intention to destabilize the
government, took over the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They
disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building. They voiced their
grievances against the then administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo for the alleged graft and
corruption in the military and the government, and declared their withdrawal of support to their Commander-
in-Chief. After hours of negotiation, the petitioners surrendered to authorities.

After the investigation of the NBI, the DOJ filed before the Makati RTC an Information for coup d’etat against
the petitioners. Meanwhile, respondent General Naciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest
and detention of the petitioners and created a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel, tasked to determine the
propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended
by R.A. 7055.

The panel recommended in its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report that following the “doctrine of absorption,”
those charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for
violation of the Articles of War.
The RTC then issued an Order stating that “all charges before the court martial against the accused are
hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup
d’etat.

After reviewing the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel, Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO)
OIC Julius Magno recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including
petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners
to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed in the Supreme Court the instant
Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of
Article 96 of the Articles of War. They invoked the RTC’s determination of the offense as not service-
connected. They maintained that the crime of coup d’etat absorbed the said offenses and that the military
tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

ISSUES
Whether or not those charged with coup d’etat before RTC shall be charged before military tribunal for
violation of Articles of War, as amended.
Whether or not the doctrine of absorption of crimes be made applicable to the case at bar.

RULING
On the first issue.

Yes. Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, the nature of the offense is “service-connected” and the penalty
prescribed for the same (Art. 96 of Articles of War)—dismissal from the service— is imposable only by the
military court.

The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial
the jurisdiction over “service-connected crimes or offenses.” Evidently, such declaration by the RTC
constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

Callejo, Sr. (concurring opinion)

Officers and enlisted personnel committing punitive acts under the Articles of War may be prosecuted and
convicted if found guilty of such acts independently of, and separately from, any charges filed in the civilian
courts for the same or similar acts which are penalized under the Revised Penal Code, under special penal
laws or ordinances, and prescinding from the outcome thereof.

Tinga (concurring opinion)

My position hinges on the peculiar nature of Article 96 of the Articles of War, the violation of which
petitioners stand accused of before the court-martial. Not only does Article 96 embody a rule uniquely
military in nature, it also prescribes a penalty wholly administrative in character which the civilian courts are
incapable of rendering. For that reason alone, I agree that petitioners may stand civilian trial for coup d’etat
and court-martial for violation of Article 96.

On the second issue.

No. The doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes
punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. The doctrine applies only if
the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of
jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of
absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

Callejo, Sr. (concurring opinion)

Case law has it that common crimes committed in furtherance of a political crime, such as rebellion, are
therein absorbed. A political crime is one directly aimed against the political order as well as such common
crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. Coup d’etat is a political crime because the
purpose of the plotters is to seize or diminish State power.

Separation of Church and State: Art. II, Sec. 6 of Constitution

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.: 119673; July 26, 1996

FACTS:

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo
(INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures
and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly

“offended and constituted an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of
petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of the respondent Board. The RTC ordered the
respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the
respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction
and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with
grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the
subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA
decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUEs:

Does the respondent Board have the power to review the petitioner’s TV program?

Assuming it has the power, did the respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the
airing of the petitioner’s religious program?

RULING:

YES, the respondent Board has the power to review the petitioner’s TV program.
Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board
has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which
guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.”The Court, however, rejected the petitioner’s
postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal
belief. Television is a medium

that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent i.e. serious detriment to the more overriding
interest of public health, public moral, or public welfare. The Court shall continue to subject any act pinching
the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny, but we shall not leave its rational exercise
to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should stand still.

YES, respondent Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of the petitioner’s religious
program.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board X-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” other religions,
especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence will show that the so-called “attacks” are
mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not
viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public
viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom of speech and
interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.

Under our constitution, it is not the task of the State to favour any religion by protecting it against an attack
by another religion. The freedom of religion is the freedom of thought. The embers of truth will be fanned in
the heat of colliding ideas.The respondents failed also to apply the CLEAR and PRESENT DANGER RULE.
In this case, it was not present. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring
about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

The principle of absorption of common crimes by the political crimes applies to crimes defined and penalized
by special laws, such as PD No. 1829, otherwise known as Obstruction of Justice. (Enrile v. Amin, G.R. No.
93335, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 573). However, in Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., G.R. No. 95136, October
3, 1991, 202 SCRA 405, it was held that the rulings in People v. Hernandez; Enrile v. Amin; Enrile v.
Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217, do not apply to crimes which, by statutory fact, are
sui generis.

Service-connected punitive acts defined and penalized under the Articles of War are sui generis offenses
not absorbed by rebellion perpetrated by officers of the AFP.

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.
Facts:
Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,
especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal certifications to qualified
products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also
due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee
its implementation. In this petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO
violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by
the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt,
classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and
Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court
found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner,
of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos
can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.
Issue:
Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State.

Held:
No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred
status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without
doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from
the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal,
Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to
interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself
the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation
of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court
found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner,
of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos
can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy
of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like
ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling
justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right
to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively
protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and
promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to
by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human
consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom
of Muslims

--XXX
By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious
freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products
are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State
has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only
the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the
threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours,
the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise
reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no compelling justification for the government
to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal,
even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to
health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with
ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe.
Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies
given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived
danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal certifications
issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food
product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID.
What is Non-Establishment Clause? 
Local Autonomy; Art. II, Sec. 25 of Constitution Art. 10 Sec. 2

G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP -
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of
the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3
Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial
or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation
of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government
units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3.
Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for
judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art
2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective
exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive
the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by
law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest
order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and
for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial
or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond
anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition
of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria
of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory,
the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD
on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of
a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in
the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the
MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
 submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation
of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as
traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands.
The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom
of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro
homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of
the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the
free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the
statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein.
The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory
to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of
a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and
the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies
that the same is on its way to independence.

Decentralization of Administration vs. decentralization of Power

Limbona vs. Mangelin

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the

Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam,
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in
November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position.
Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and
be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue
that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some
members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved
within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit
that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the

autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government
given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or

decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At
the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category

[CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the
organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former
class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government
acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If
the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter
sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps
the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines
are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very
Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the
second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place,
mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision
and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And
if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with
more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We

have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized

power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales
must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987
sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except
by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in
accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in
question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a
settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the
invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought.
Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear
that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is
that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an
apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side.
For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith

BASCO v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649 (Digested Case)

G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO

SANCHEZ,petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR),
respondent.

Re: Principle of Local Autonomy

FACTS: The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp. was created by PD 1067-A and granted a franchise under
PD 1067-B. Subsequently, under PD 1869, the Government enabled it to regulate and centralize all games
of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under declared policy. But the petitioners
think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter — PD
1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because of the following
issues:

ISSUES:
(1) WON it waived the Manila City gov't's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law.

(2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to impose local taxes and license fees, and thus contrary to the
principle of local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.

(3) WON it violates the equal protection clause as it allows some gambling acts but also prohibits other
gaming acts.

(4) WON it violates the Cory gov't's policy of being away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward
free enterprise and privatization.

HELD:
(1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its charter, is exempt from paying tax of any kind is not violative of the
principle of local autonomy. LGUs' have no inherent right to impose taxes. LGUs' power to tax must always
yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed by the state itself which has the inherent
power to tax. The charter of LGUs is subject to control by Congress as they are mere creatures of Congress.
Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGUs. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

(2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on "gambling", has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the
power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was
withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Furthermore, LGUs'
have no power to tax instrumentalities of the gov't such as PAGCOR which exercises governmental
functions of regulating gambling activities.

(3) No. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in
equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though
they were the same.

(4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what
the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. On the issue of
monopoly, the same is not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether
public interest demands that monopolies be "regulated" or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the
Legislature to decide. The judiciary can only intervene when there are violations of the statutes passed by
Congress regulating or prohibiting monopolies.

Political Dynasty/Equal Access of opportunities for public service-

Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections

GR No. 161872 April 13, 2004

FACTS:

When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Presidency, the
Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its due course. Pamatong requested a
case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied his request. The COMELEC declared
Pamatong, along with 35 other people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC noted that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are either not
nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered political party with national constituency.”
Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service,” citing
Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in
this manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the “most qualified among all the presidential candidates” and
supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage national and international
campaigns, and his government platform.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along with the
grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public service.

RULING:
NO

The Court noted that the provisions under Article II are generally considered not-self executing. As such, the
provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the article, does not convey any judicially enforceable
rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action” by presenting
ideals/standards through the policies presented. Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public
office, one that is subject to limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without
discrimination, then the equal access clause is not violated. The Court justified the COMELEC’s need for
limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of ensuring rational, objective, and orderly elections. In
the absence of any limitations, the election process becomes a “mockery” if anyone, including those who are
clearly unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to run. Note: Pamatong presented other
evidence that he claims makes him eligible for candidacy. The Court however stated that it is not within their
power to make such assessments.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.

The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of
Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,
and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the
rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the
provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much
to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as
operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly
written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.
Words and phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public service” are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to
inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may
be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate
of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the
burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest
to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes
into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of
time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates
standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run
a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which
are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant
minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these
nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine
the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong’s contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more
qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article
VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2)
registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5)
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.