G.R. No. 198120. February 20, 2017.*

 
MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN, petitioner, vs.
FRANCISCO DOLOR (substituted by his heirs) and
HERMOGENA DOLOR, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of

Final Judgments; It is just as basic that a judgment can no
longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it becomes
final and executory; “nothing is more settled in law.”  Once a case
is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter
is laid to rest.—It is elementary that “[a]ppeal is not a matter of
right but a mere statutory privilege.” As such, one who wishes to
file an appeal “must comply with the requirements of the rules,
failing in which the right to appeal is lost.” It is just as basic that
a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as
soon as it becomes final and executory; “nothing is more settled
in law.”  Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is
settled and the matter is laid to rest.  Accordingly, [a final
judgment] may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering
it or by the highest court of the land.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a judgment becomes final,
the court or tribunal loses jurisdiction, and any modified
/
judgment that it issues, as well as all proceedings taken for this
purpose are null and void.—Once a judgment becomes final, the
court or tribunal

_______________

*  SECOND DIVISION.

 
 

101

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Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

loses jurisdiction, and any modified judgment that it issues,

as well as all proceedings taken for this purpose are null and
void. This elementary rule finds basis in “public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of
courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
final at some definite date fixed by law.”  Basic rationality
dictates that there must be an end to litigation. Any contrary
posturing renders justice inutile, reducing to futility the winning
party’s capacity to benefit from the resolution of a case. In
accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is timely filed,
the judgment or final order from which it arose shall become
final.
Same; Same; Same; Reckoning the date when a party is
deemed to have been given notice of the judgment or final order
subject of his or her Motion for Reconsideration depends on the
manner by which the judgment of final order was served upon the
party himself or herself.—Reckoning the date when a party is
deemed to have been given notice of the judgment or final order
subject of his or her Motion for Reconsideration depends on the
manner by which the judgment of final order was served upon
the party himself or herself. When, however, a party is
represented and has appeared by counsel, service shall, as a
rule, be made upon his or her counsel.
Same; Same; Same; Service of Judgments; Rule 13, Section 9
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three (3) modes
/
of service of judgments or final orders: first, personal service;
second, service by registered mail; and third, service by
publication.—Rule 13, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides for three (3) modes of service of judgments or
final orders: first, personal service; second, service by registered
mail; and third, service by publication. It reads: Section 9.
Service of Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions.—Judgments,
final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by
registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has
failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or
resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by
publication at the expense of the prevailing party. Rule 13,
Section 10 specifies when the first two (2) modes — personal
service and service by registered mail — are deemed completed,
and notice upon a party is deemed consummated: Section 10.
Completeness of Service.—Personal service is complete upon
actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the
expiration of ten (10) days after

 
 
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102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

mailing, unless the court otherwise provides.  Service by

registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee,
or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of
the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.
Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; Petitioner is
correct in saying that the fifteen (15)-day period must be reckoned
from the date when service was made at the updated address.—
Service, however, was also made at petitioner’s counsel’s
updated address. Petitioner herself acknowledges this. Precisely,
it is her contention that the 15-day period in which she may file
her Motion for Reconsideration must be reckoned from the date
when service at this updated address was made. This date, she
alleges, was June 1, 2006. Petitioner is correct in saying that the
15-day period must be reckoned from the date when service was
made at the updated address. To hold otherwise would be to
/
condone a glaring violation of her right to due process. It is to
say that she might as well not be given notice of the Decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court. In this respect, we sustain
petitioner.
Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; As basic as the previously-
discussed principles on appeal as a statutory privilege, finality of
judgments, and service of papers, is the principle that “a party
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.”—As basic as the
previously-discussed principles on appeal as a statutory
privilege, finality of judgments, and service of papers, is the
principle that “a party who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it.”  A mere allegation will never suffice: “a mere
allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of
proving the allegation with the requisite quantum of
evidence.”  Logically, a party who fails to discharge his or her
burden of proof will not be entitled to the relief prayed for.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Valdez, Domondon & Associates for petitioner.
   Maximo Jacob Rivera for respondents.

 
 

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Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

LEONEN, J.:
 
When a party’s counsel serves a notice of change in
address upon a court, and the court acknowledges this
change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon
the counsel’s former address is ineffectual. Service is
deemed completed only when made at the updated
address. Proof, however, of ineffectual service at a
counsel’s former address is not necessarily proof of a
party’s claim of when service was made at the updated
address. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation
of when service was made is distinct from the burden of /
proving the allegation of where service was or was not
made. A party who fails to discharge his or her burden of
proof is not entitled to the relief prayed for.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying that
the assailed March 24, 2011 Decision2 and August 9, 2011
Resolution3  of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 88709 be reversed and set aside and
that the Court of Appeals be directed to resolve petitioner
Mercedes S. Gatmaytan’s (Gatmaytan) appeal on the
merits.
In its assailed March 24, 2011 Decision, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Gatmaytan’s appeal, noting that the
assailed March 27, 2006 Decision4  of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 223, had already attained
finality. In its as-

_______________

1  Rollo, pp. 3-37.

2  Id., at pp. 38-47. The Decision was promulgated on March 24, 2011,
and was penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino and concurred
in by Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
of the Sixth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3  Id., at pp. 49-50. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice
Florito S. Macalino, and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr., and Ramon M. Bato, Jr. of the Sixth Division, Court of
Appeals, Manila.
4  Id., at pp. 52-67. The Decision was penned by Judge Ramon A. Cruz
of Branch 223, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.

 
 
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104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

sailed August 9, 2011 Resolution, the Court of Appeals

denied Gatmaytan’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Regional Trial Court’s March 27, 2006 Decision
resolved an action for reconveyance against Gatmaytan /
and in favor of the plaintiff spouses, now respondents
Francisco and Hermogena Dolor (Dolor Spouses).
In a Complaint for Reconveyance of Property and
Damages filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court,
the Dolor Spouses alleged that on February 17, 1984,
they, as buyers, and Manuel Cammayo (Cammayo), as
seller, executed a Deed of Sale over a 300-square-meter
parcel of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City.5  This
300-square-meter parcel was to be segregated from a
larger landholding.6
The Deed of Sale stated that, of the total consideration
of P30,000.00, half (i.e., P15,000.00) would be paid upon
the execution of the Deed.7  The balance of P15,000.00
would be paid upon the release and delivery of the
registrable Deed of Sale and of the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) covering the segregated portion.8
Per a “Kasunduan”9 and based on a receipt dated May
18, 1984,10 the Dolor Spouses were able to pay the entire
consideration of P30,000.00 even before the TCT was
delivered to them.11  As such, on May 16, 1986, a second
Deed of Sale, in lieu of the first, was executed by
Cammayo in favor of Francisco Dolor.12  This Deed no
longer referenced the condition for payment of the
P15,000.00 balance but merely stated that the

_______________

5   Id., at p. 39.
6   Id.
7   Id.
8   Id.
9   Id.
10  Id., at p. 53.
11  Id.
12  Id., at p. 39.

 
 
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Gatmaytan vs. Dolor /
lot was being sold “for and in consideration of the sum of
THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS[.]13
The Dolor Spouses claimed that, on March 27, 1989,
they authorized Cecilio T. Manzanilla and his family to
occupy the lot and to construct a house on it.14
To the Dolor Spouses’ surprise, in October 1999,
petitioner Gatmaytan filed an ejectment suit against
Encarnacion Vda. de Manzanilla and her
15
family.   Gatmaytan anchored her ejectment suit on her
claim that she was the registered owner of the lot.16
In response, the Dolor Spouses filed against Gatmaytan
and Cammayo the Complaint for Reconveyance of
Property and Damages, which gave rise to the present
Petition.17
In her Answer, Gatmaytan claimed that the Deed of
Sale between the Dolor Spouses and Cammayo was never
registered.18 She explained that the lot was a portion of a
larger 5,001-square-meter parcel, which Cammayo had
earlier conveyed to her.19 She further averred that the
Dolor Spouses’ action was barred by prescription as they
failed to enforce their rights for 11 years.20
In his Answer, Cammayo acknowledged executing a
Deed of Sale in favor of the Dolor Spouses.21  He added
that he entered into an agreement with Gatmaytan for the
latter to defray the expenses for the payment of real
estate taxes, and the segregation of the title covering the
portion sold to the

_______________

13  Id., at p. 53.
14  Id., at p. 40.
15  Id.
16  Id.
17  Id.
18  Id.
19  Id.
20  Id.
21  Id.

 
 
/
 106

106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

Dolor Spouses from the larger, 5,001-square-meter

parcel.22 Per this agreement, Gatmaytan was to have the
larger parcel titled in her name with the condition that
Gatmaytan would deliver to the Dolor Spouses the
segregated portion and TCT covering it.23
On March 27, 2006, the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court, Branch 223 rendered a Decision ordering
Gatmaytan to convey the lot to the Dolor Spouses.24
On June 16, 2006, Gatmaytan filed her Motion for
Reconsideration,25 which was denied by the trial court on
August 28, 2006.26
Gatmaytan then filed an Appeal with the Court of
Appeals.
In its assailed March 24, 2011 Decision,27 the Court of
Appeals, Sixth Division, dismissed Gatmaytan’s Appeal. It
ruled that the Regional Trial Court’s March 27, 2006
Decision had already attained finality as Gatmaytan filed
her Motion for Reconsideration beyond the requisite 15-
day period. This ruling was anchored on the following
factual observations:
First, the Regional Trial Court’s Decision was rendered
on March 27, 2006;28
Second, per the registry return receipt attached to the
back portion of the last page of the Regional Trial Court’s
Decision, Gatmaytan’s counsel, Atty. Raymond Palad
(Atty. Palad), received a copy of the same Decision on
April 14, 2006;29 and
Finally, Gatmaytan filed her Motion for
30
Reconsideration only on June 16, 2006.

_______________

22  Id., at p. 41.
23  Id.
24  Id., at pp. 52-67.
25  Id., at p. 42.
26  Id., at pp. 42-43.
/
 27  Id., at pp. 38-47.
28  Id., at p. 45.
29  Id., at pp. 45-46.
30  Id., at p. 45.

 
 
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Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

Gatmaytan then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.31

In its assailed August 9, 2011 Resolution,32 the Court of
Appeals denied Gatmaytan’s Motion for Reconsideration.
It emphasized that the Receipt at the back of the last page
of the Regional Trial Court’s Decision indicated that a
copy of the same Decision was received by a certain
Maricel Luis (Luis), for and on behalf of Atty. Palad, on
April 14, 2006.33  The Court of Appeals added that
previous orders of the Regional Trial Court were likewise
received by Luis, and that Luis’ authority to receive for
Atty. Palad had never been questioned.34
Gatmaytan filed the Present Petition.35
Gatmaytan insists that the Regional Trial Court’s
March 27, 2006 Decision has not attained finality as the
April 14, 2006 service was made to her counsel’s former
address (at No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City) as
opposed to the address (at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun
Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City) that her
counsel indicated in a June 8, 2004 Notice of Change of
Address36 filed with the Regional Trial Court. Gatmaytan
adds that the Regional Trial Court noted the change of
address in an Order37 of the same date, and directed that,
from then on, service of papers, pleadings, and processes
was to be made at her counsel’s updated address at Unit
602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue,
Quezon City.38
In support of the present Petition, Gatmaytan attached
a copy of the Regional Trial Court’s March 27, 2006 Deci-

/
_______________

31  Id., at pp. 131-138.

32  Id., at pp. 49-50.
33  Id.
34  Id., at p. 50.
35  Id., at pp. 3-37.
36  Id., at pp. 141-142.
37  Id., at p. 143.
38  Id., at p. 25.

 
 
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108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

sion.39  On its last page is a typewritten text, which

indicates that a copy of the same Decision was furnished
to:
 
Atty. Raymond Palad
Counsel for Gatmaytan
No. 117 West Ave., Quezon City40
 
The same last page of the copy of the Regional Trial
Court’s Decision indicates, in handwritten text:
 
Mailed also to
Atty. Raymond Palad at:
Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium
Timog Ave., Quezon City41
 
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Regional
Trial Court’s March 27, 2006 Decision has already
attained finality thus, precluding the filing of petitioner
Mercedes S. Gatmaytan’s appeal with the Court of
Appeals.
 
I
  /
 It is elementary that “[a]ppeal is not a matter of right
but a mere statutory privilege.”42 As such, one who wishes
to file an appeal “must comply with the requirements of
the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.”43
It is just as basic that a judgment can no longer be
disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it becomes final
and

_______________

39  Id., at pp. 52-67.

40  Id., at p. 67.
41  Id.
42  BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Pryce Gases, 668 Phil. 206, 215;
653 SCRA 42, 51 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
43   Id., citing  Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 513 Phil. 642, 653; 477 SCRA 516, 527 (2005)
[Per J. Garcia, Third Division].

 
 
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Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

executory;44 “nothing is more settled in law.”45 Once a case

is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the
matter is laid to rest.46 Accordingly —
 
[a final judgment] may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court
of the land.47
 
Once a judgment becomes final, the court or tribunal
loses jurisdiction, and any modified judgment that it
issues, as well as all proceedings taken for this purpose
are null and void.48
/
 This elementary rule finds basis in “public policy and
sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the
judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by
law.”49  Basic rationality dictates that there must be an
end to litigation. Any contrary posturing renders justice
inutile, reducing to futility the winning party’s capacity to
benefit from the resolution of a case.50
In accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is
timely

_______________

44  Industrial Timber Corporation v. Ababon, 515 Phil. 805, 816; 480

SCRA 171, 180 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
45   Filipro, Inc. v. Permanent Savings & Loan Bank, 534 Phil. 551,
560; 503 SCRA 430, 438 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
46  Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 505 Phil. 265, 273;
468 SCRA 154, 161 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
47  Filipro, Inc. v. Permanent Savings & Loan Bank, supra.
48  Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., 387
Phil. 885, 895; 332 SCRA 139, 148 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
49  Filipro, Inc. v. Permanent Savings & Loan Bank, supra.
50  Id.

 
 

110

110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

filed, the judgment or final order from which it arose shall

become final:

Section 2. Entry of Judgments and Final Orders.—If no appeal

or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time
provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or final order
shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall /
contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final order and
shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such
judgment or final order has become final and executory.
(Emphasis supplied)

 
In turn, Rule 37, Section 1, in relation to Rule 41,
Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allows for
15 days from notice of a judgment or final order within
which a Motion for Reconsideration may be filed.
Rule 37, Section 1 reads:

Section 1. Grounds of and Period for Filing Motion for New

Trial or Reconsideration.—Within the period for taking an
appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside
the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more
of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights
of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by
reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been
impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered, and produced at the
trial, and which if presented would probably alter the
result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for
reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages awarded are
excessive, that the evidence is in-

 
 
111

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Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

sufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the

decision or final order is contrary to law. (Emphasis supplied)

 
For its part, Rule 41, Section 3 reads:
/
Section 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal.—The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from.  Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion
for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time
to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
(Emphasis supplied)

 
II
 
Reckoning the date when a party is deemed to have
been given notice of the judgment or final order subject of
his or her Motion for Reconsideration depends on the
manner by which the judgment of final order was served
upon the party himself or herself.
When, however, a party is represented and has
appeared by counsel, service shall, as a rule, be made
upon his or her counsel. As Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 2. Filing and Service, Defined.—

. . . .
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the
pleading or paper concerned.  If any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one
of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court.  Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall
only be entitled to one

 
 

112

112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.

(Emphasis supplied)
/
 
In Delos Santos v. Elizalde,51  this Court explained the
reason for equating service upon counsels with service
upon the parties themselves:

To reiterate, service upon the parties’ counsels of record is

tantamount to service upon the parties themselves, but service
upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their
lawyers. The reason is simple — the parties, generally, have no
formal education or knowledge of the rules of procedure,
specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal
remedies; thus, they may also be unaware of the rights and
duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a decision. More
importantly, it is best for the courts to deal only with one person
in the interest of orderly procedure — either the lawyer retained
by the party or the party him/herself if s/he does not intend to
hire a lawyer.52

 
Rule 13, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for three (3) modes of service of judgments or
final orders: first, personal service; second, service by
registered mail; and third, service by publication. It reads:

Section 9. Service of Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions.—

Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either
personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by
publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final
orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also
by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.

_______________

51   543 Phil. 12; 514 SCRA 14 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second
Division].
52  Id., at p. 26; p. 27.

 
 
113

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Gatmaytan vs. Dolor
/
 Rule 13, Section 10 specifies when the first two (2)
modes — personal service and service by registered mail
— are deemed completed, and notice upon a party is
deemed consummated:

Section 10. Completeness of Service.—Personal service is

complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is
complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing,
unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is
complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5)
days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster,
whichever date is earlier. (Emphasis supplied)

 
III
 
While petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Regional Trial Court’s March 27, 2006
53
Decision,  there is a dispute as to the date from which the
15-day period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration must
be reckoned. That is, there is a dispute as to when
petitioner was given notice of the Decision. The Court of
Appeals refused to entertain petitioner’s appeal reasoning
that the judgment appealed from has attained
finality.54  This, according to it, is because petitioner
belatedly filed her Motion for Reconsideration on June 16,
2006 considering that her counsel supposedly received
notice of it on April 14, 2006.55 Petitioner insists that the
Motion was timely filed, her counsel having received
notice of it only on June 1, 2006.56
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals wrongly
reckoned service on April 14, 2006 as the service made on
this

_______________

53  Rollo, p. 42.
54  Id., at pp. 45-46.
55  Id., at p. 26.
56  Id.

 
 
/
 114

114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

date was upon her counsel’s former address.57  She adds

that service upon her counsel’s updated and correct
address was made only on June 1, 2006.58  Petitioner
points out that her counsel filed with the Regional Trial
Court a Notice of Change of Address. She further
emphasizes that the Regional Trial Court acknowledged
this change of address and issued an Order stating that,
from then on, service shall be made upon the updated
address.59
We sustain petitioner’s position that the service made
on her counsel’s former address was ineffectual. We find
however, that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of
proving the specific date — allegedly June 1, 2006 — in
which service upon her counsel’s updated address was
actually made. Having failed to establish the reckoning
point of the period for filing her Motion for
Reconsideration, we cannot sustain the conclusion that
petitioner insists on, and which is merely contingent on
this reckoning point: we cannot conclude that her Motion
for Reconsideration was timely filed. Having failed to
discharge her burden of proof, we are constrained to deny
her Petition.
 
IV
 
Indeed, petitioner’s counsel filed with the Regional
Trial Court a Notice of Change of Address dated June 8,
2004. She attached this Notice to her Petition as its Annex
“F.” This Notice states:

_______________

57  Id., at p. 27.
58  Id.
59  Id., at p. 25.

 
/
  
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Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS

 
THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT 
Regional Trial Court, Branch 223, Quezon City
 
GREETINGS:
 
Undersigned counsel hereby manifest (sic) that effective
June 8, 2004, their office address shall be at:
 
PALAD, LAURON & PALAD LAW FIRM 
UNIT 602, NO. 42 PRINCE JUN 
CONDOMINIUM, TIMOG AVENUE 
QUEZON CITY 
Quezon City for Manila, June 8, 2004
 
PALAD, LAURON &
PALAD LAW FIRM
 
By:
 
RAYMUND P. PALAD (sgd)
Counsel for Defendant Gatmaytan
PTR No. 52151545/02-17-04/QC
IBP No. 594509/01-10-04/Kal. City
Roll of Attorneys No. 39140/3-15-94 
Page No. 328, Book No. XVI60

 
Conformably, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order
of the same date, noting the change of address and stating
that service of paper, processes and pleadings shall, from
then on, be made on petitioner’s counsel’s updated
address:
/
_______________

60  Id., at p. 141.

 
 
116

116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

ORDER
 
The Notice of Change Address (sic) dated June 8, 2004, filed
by Atty. Raymund P. Palad, is  NOTED. Let therefore said
counsel be furnished with Orders and other papers coming from
this court at his new address at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun
Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City.
 
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, June 8, 2004.
RAMON A. CRUZ
Presiding Judge61

 
By its own Order, the Regional Trial Court bound itself
to make service at petitioner’s counsel’s updated address
at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog
Avenue, Quezon City. Thus, the service of its March 27,
2006 Decision at petitioner’s counsel’s former address at
No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City was ineffectual.
Service, however, was also made at petitioner’s
counsel’s updated address. Petitioner herself
acknowledges this. Precisely, it is her contention that the
15-day period in which she may file her Motion for
Reconsideration must be reckoned from the date when
service at this updated address was made. This date, she
alleges, was June 1, 2006.
Petitioner is correct in saying that the 15-day period
must be reckoned from the date when service was made at
the updated address. To hold otherwise would be to
condone a glaring violation of her right to due process. It
/
is to say that she might as well not be given notice of the
Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court. In this
respect, we sustain petitioner.
We, however, find ourselves unable to sustain her claim
that the 15-day period must be reckoned from June 1,
2006.

_______________

61  Id., at p. 143.

 
 

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V
 
As basic as the previously-discussed principles on
appeal as a statutory privilege, finality of judgments, and
service of papers, is the principle that “a party who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it.”62  A mere allegation
will never suffice: “a mere allegation is not evidence, and
he who alleges has the burden of proving the allegation
with the requisite quantum of evidence.”63  Logically, a
party who fails to discharge his or her burden of proof will
not be entitled to the relief prayed for.
This court’s grant of relief to petitioner is contingent on
her ability to prove two (2) points: first, that the Regional
Trial Court was bound to make service at her counsel’s
updated address; and second, that service at this address
was made on June 1, 2006, and not on an earlier date.
While petitioner has successfully shown that service to
her counsel’s former address was ineffectual, she failed to
prove that service on her counsel’s updated address was
made only on June 1, 2006.
Petitioner attached the following annexes in support of
the Petition she filed with this court:
a. Annex “A” – a certified true copy of the Court of
Appeals’ assailed March 24, 2011 Decision;64 /
 b. Annex “B” – a certified true copy of the Court of
Appeals’ assailed August 9, 2011 Resolution;65
c. Annex “C” – a photocopy of the Regional Trial Court’s
March 27, 2006 Decision;66

_______________

62   Dela Llana v. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013, 711

SCRA 522, 534 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
63   Clado-Reyes v. Limpe, 579 Phil. 669, 677; 557 SCRA 400, 408
(2008) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
64  Rollo, pp. 38-48.
65  Id., at pp. 49-51.
66  Id., at pp. 52-67.

 
 
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Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

d. Annex “D” – a copy of the Brief she filed before the

Court of Appeals;67
e. Annex “E” – a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration
she filed before the Court of Appeals;68
f. Annex “F” – a copy of the Notice of Change of Address
filed with the Regional Trial Court by her counsel;69
g. Annex “G” – a photocopy of the Regional Trial Court’s
June 8, 2004 Order;70
h. Annex “H” – a copy of the respondents’
Comment/Opposition to her Formal Offer of Evidence
filed with the Regional Trial Court;71
i. Annex “I” – a copy of respondents’ Memorandum filed
with the Regional Trial Court.72
 
Annexes “C,” “F,” “G,” “H,” and “I” are crucial to
petitioner’s claim that service of the March 27, 2006
Decision to her counsel’s former address was ineffectual.
In addition to what we previously discussed was the
importance of the Notice of Change of Address and the
ensuing Order of the Regional Trial Court. Annexes “H” /
and “I” indicate that the respondents themselves started
serving copies of their submissions and pleadings with
petitioner’s counsel’s updated address, in conformity with
the Regional Trial Court’s June 8, 2004 Order.
None, however, of the documents that petitioner
adduced before this Court attests to the truth of her
allegation that service to her counsel’s new and correct
address was made only on June 1, 2006.

_______________

67  Id., at pp. 68-130.

68  Id., at pp. 131-140.
69  Id., at pp. 141-142.
70  Id., at p. 143.
71  Id., at pp. 144-146.
72  Id., at pp. 147-158.

 
 

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In her Petition, petitioner alluded to a ‘“[r]eceipt’

attached at the back of the [Regional Trial Court’s March
27, 2006] decision.”73 No copy of this receipt, however, was
produced by petitioner. In all of the 16 pages of the
Regional Trial Court’s Decision that petitioner submitted
as Annex “C” of her Petition, the only references made to
the mailing of the Decision to her counsel are: first, the
previously mentioned typewritten and handwritten texts
indicating mailing to both her counsel’s former address
and updated address; and second, a stamped notation that
stated:

RELEASED BY REGISTERED MAIL DATE

3/31/06 By: [signature appears]74

/
 Neither of these attests to June 1, 2006 as the date of
delivery to her counsel.
In Cortes v. Valdellon,75 this Court noted the following
as acceptable proofs of mailing and service by a court to a
party: (1) certifications from the official Post Office record
book and/or delivery book; (2) the actual page of the postal
delivery book showing the acknowledgment of receipt; (3)
registry receipt; and (4) return card.76

_______________

73  Id., at p. 23.
74  Id., at p. 67.
75   162 Phil. 745; 70 SCRA 556 (1976) [Per J. Teehankee, First
Division].
76  Id., at pp. 751-753; p. 560.
Said the court:
The certifications from the official record book and delivery book of the
Post Office together with the very page of the delivery book showing the
acknowledgment of receipt on January 27, 1972 of the registered mail
matter as per signature of respondents’ counsel’s authorized clerk are
the direct and primary evidence of completion of service, even more so
than the registry receipt and return card which the Rule accepts as such
proof of service for practical purposes (since it would be too cumbersome
to require similar detailed certifications and ex-

 
 
 

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Petitioner could have produced any of these documents

or other similar proof to establish her claim. She did not.
All she has relied on is her bare allegation that delivery
was made on June 1, 2006. It is as though belief in this
allegation necessarily follows from believing her initial
claim that service to her counsel’s former address was
ineffectual.
/
 Petitioner’s own, voluntary reference to a “‘[r]eceipt’
attached at the back of the [Regional Trial Court’s March
27, 2006] decision”77 suggests that she herself had access
to this receipt and could have presented a copy of it to this
Court. The fact that she did not present it implies
negligence, or worse, calls into operation the presumption
“[t]hat evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced.”78  Regardless, it remains that she failed to
prove what she claimed.
Petitioner similarly alludes to the Regional Trial
Court’s supposed realization of its error and subsequent
action to correct its mistake:

On account of this mistake and realizing that Atty. Raymond

Palad only received a copy of the decision on 01 June 2006 (see
Affidavit of Atty. Raymond Palad, attached to Motion for
Reconsideration, Annex “E”, hereof), the court a quo resolved the
motion for reconsideration on the merits and gave due course to
Gatmaytan’s Notice of Appeal. The Hon. Court of Appeals —
Sixth Division should have done the same thing.79 (Emphasis in
the original)

 
As with the “receipt” she had earlier adverted to,
petitioner could just as easily have presented to this Court
a copy of the Regional Trial Court’s Resolution, which
supposedly resolved

_______________

hibits as those presented by petitioner as proof of service for each of the

tens if not hundreds of thousands of registered mail matter involved in
court proceedings).
77  Id., at p. 23.
78  RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3(e).
79  Rollo, p. 26.

 
 

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her Motion for Reconsideration on the merits as opposed,
presumably, to denying it on the technical ground that it
was filed beyond the 15-day period. This would supposedly
reveal that the Regional Trial Court realized its mistake
and corrected it. She did not present this.
Instead of producing the Regional Trial Court’s
Resolution, petitioner adduced a copy of a Motion for
Reconsideration. Even then, what she annexed was not a
copy of the Motion for Reconsideration she filed with
the Regional Trial Court  but a copy of the Motion for
Reconsideration dated April 12, 2011, which she filed with
the Court of Appeals. This was a Motion for
Reconsideration she filed in response to the presently
assailed March 24, 2011 Court of Appeals’ Decision, not to
the Regional Trial Court’s March 27, 2006 Decision.
Again, petitioner’s failure to attach the correct annexes
to her Petition could be attributed to mere inadvertence or
negligence. We shudder to think however, that this could
just as possibly be an indication of how petitioner makes
an allegation but willfully refuses to produce proof —
indeed, suppresses proof — of what she alleges. Worse,
her explicit reference to a Motion for Reconsideration filed
with the Regional Trial Court, only to present something
entirely different, could indicate an attempt to mislead
this Court into blindly accepting her allegations.
As with the missing receipt however, regardless of
whether petitioner failed to attach it deliberately or out of
mere inadvertence, what remains is that petitioner failed
to prove what she claimed.
Lacking evidentiary basis, petitioner’s contention that
service upon her counsel’s updated and correct address
was made only on June 1, 2006 cannot be sustained. As
her plea for relief hinges on this singular detail, we are
constrained to deny such. Bereft of any avenue for
revisiting the Regional Trial Court’s March 27, 2006
Decision, its findings and ruling must stand.
 
 
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122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

/
 Gatmaytan vs. Dolor

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari

is  DENIED, the assailed March 24, 2011 Decision and
August 9, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Sixth
Division, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 88709 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza

and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.—The well-settled principle of immutability of

final judgments demands that once a judgment has
become final, the winning party should not, through a
mere subterfuge, be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
(Remington Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Maricalum
Mining Corporation, 759 SCRA 649 [2015])
 
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