U.S.

Department of Justice

United States Attorney

Eastern District of New York
CCC/CMM 610 Federal Plaza
F. #2015R02148 Central Islip, New York 11722

March 10, 2022

By ECF

The Honorable Joan M. Azrack

United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
100 Federal Plaza
Central Islip, New York 11722

Re: United States v. Edward Mangano

Criminal Docket No. 16-540 (S-2) (JMA)

Dear Judge Azrack:

The government respectfully submits this letter in advance of the sentencing of the
defendant Edward Mangano, which is scheduled for April 14, 2022.

I. Preliminary Statement1

From January 2010 to December 2017, the defendant was the Nassau County
Executive, the top elected official in Nassau County, where the Town of Oyster Bay (“TOB”) is
located. As the Nassau County Executive, the defendant swore an oath to serve the people of
Nassau County – the people whose taxes paid his salary – and outwardly purported to do so. But
throughout his term of office, he did just the opposite. From the moment he was sworn in, the
defendant engaged in a stunning abuse of power. He monetized his power and influence and
betrayed the people of Nassau County, most notably the residents of the TOB. The defendant put
his financial interests above the interests of those he was elected to serve. To make matters worse,
when he learned that the federal government was investigating his widespread corruption, he, his
wife and their long-time friend and coconspirator schemed to obstruct the federal grand jury’s

1
Because the Court presided over the instant case for more than five years, including two
trials, and has decided numerous substantive motions, the government will not repeat the facts
adduced at trial, and instead respectfully refers the Court to the factual statements set forth in the
Government’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant Edward Mangano’s Motions for
Reconsideration, Judgment of Acquittal and a New Trial, dated May 22, 2020, the Government’s
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendants’ Post-Trial Motions for a New Trial
Pursuant to Rule 33(b)(1), dated June 5, 2020, and the Court’s Memorandum and Order, dated
January 6, 2022 (“January 2022 Mem. & Order”). See ECF Dkt Nos. 425, 426 and 454.
investigation in order to conceal his corrupt behavior and maintain his power. The defendant,
quite frankly, led a culture of corruption that permeated his administration—unfortunately, an all
too frequent occurrence here on Long Island.

As proven in considerable detail during a more than seven-week trial before this
Court, the defendant sought bribes from Harendra Singh, a local businessman and restaurateur,
including, but not limited to, exotic vacations to Turks and Caicos and other destinations,
expensive chairs, hardwood flooring in his house, a luxury watch for his son and approximately
$450,000. In exchange for those bribes, the defendant used his official position to, among other
things, advise and pressure others within the TOB to execute amendments to the TOB’s concession
agreements with Singh, all of which served as indirect guarantees for over $20 million in loans
given to Singh and his business entities. Singh failed to repay those loans, causing Phoenix Life
Insurance Company—the company that insured the loans for TOB—to suffer more than $13
million in losses. Those loses would not have been sustained without the defendant’s corrupt
influence over the TOB.

But the defendant’s corrupt behavior did not end there. The defendant also steered
lucrative contracts to Singh (the “Nassau County Contracts”). Indeed, he used his power to have
the Nassau County Purchasing Department award a contract to Singh’s bakery to supply bread and
rolls to the Nassau County jail valued at nearly $200,000 (the “Bread and Rolls Contract”), rather
than the bakery that had been faithfully and proficiently supplying those products. As the Court
knows, Singh declined this contract after realizing that he did not have the capability to meet the
jail’s needs. The defendant also directed others to award Singh a contract to supply food to the
Office of Emergency Management in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy (the “OEM Emergency
Food Services Contract”)—a contract that paid Singh approximately $240,000 for 19 days of
services at a time when other Long Island restaurants struggled to stay afloat due to the devastation
caused by Hurricane Sandy.

On March 8, 2019, a jury found the defendant guilty with respect to the TOB Loan
Scheme of conspiracy to commit federal program bribery and honest services fraud and related
substantive counts, and conspiracy to commit obstruction of justice. For his crimes, the defendant
faces an advisory Guidelines range of life imprisonment.

All objective metrics—the scope of the defendant’s corruption, the value of the
bribes he received, the enormity of the losses he caused, the brazenness of his criminal behavior,
the pervasiveness of his corruption, his attempts to obstruct justice and the need to send a strong
deterrent message—all point to the imposition of a Guidelines sentence. Despite that the defendant
posits no legitimate, compelling arguments warranting a downward departure or variance from the
applicable Guidelines range (and the government cannot think of any), the government is not
asking the Court to impose a life sentence. Rather, after careful consideration of the Section
3553(a) factors and consultation with the U.S. Attorney’s management team, the government
respectfully recommends a sentence of imprisonment of no less than 210 months (i.e., 17.5 years).
This recommendation takes into consideration the resulting advisory Guidelines range if the Court
only considered the benefits received by the defendant as a result of his criminal activity. While
this conservative Guidelines range is not the applicable range—and should not be adopted by this
Court as the applicable range—the government submits that a sentence of at least the low end of
this conservative Guidelines range is necessary to serve the goals of § 3553(a).

2
 The defendant’s brazen use of a government position to enrich himself and obstruct
justice requires this sentence. As the Court is aware, the defendant’s trial exposed wrongdoing at
high levels of local government that is hardly aberrant. Recent prosecutions and trials in this
district and the Southern District of New York have laid bare the ugly truth that, too often, political
power and responsibility in New York leads to political corruption. This Court is well-positioned
to and should send a strong (and necessary) message to those who might consider following in this
disgraceful tradition. In an address to Congress, President Theodore Roosevelt insightfully
explained the seriousness of public corruption and the absolute need to hold public officials
accountable for betraying their oaths, stating:

There can be no crime more serious than bribery. Other offenses

violate one law while corruption strikes at the foundation of all law.
Under our form of Government all authority is vested in the people
and by them delegated to those who represent them in official
capacity. There can be no offense heavier than that of him in whom
such a sacred trust has been reposed, who sells it for his own gain
and enrichment; and no less heavy is the offense of the bribe giver.
He is worse than the thief, for the thief robs the individual, while the
corrupt official plunders an entire city or State. He is as wicked as
the murderer, for the murderer may only take one life against the
law, while the corrupt official and the man who corrupts the official
alike aim at the assassination of the commonwealth itself.
Government of the people, by the people, for the people will perish
from the face of the earth if bribery is tolerated. The givers and
takers of bribes stand on an evil pre-eminence of infamy. The
exposure and punishment of public corruption is an honor to a
nation, not a disgrace. The shame lies in toleration, not in
correction. . . . If we fail to do all that in us lies to stamp out
corruption we cannot escape our share of responsibility for the guilt.
The first requisite of successful self-government is unflinching
enforcement of the law and the cutting out of corruption.

Speech of President Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Address to Congress, December 7, 1903.
In this case, the Court is presented with a rare opportunity to reaffirm these ideals, restore the
public’s faith in government, and make clear that public corruption has no greater place in modern
society than it did nearly 100 years ago when President Roosevelt placed it among the most serious
criminal offenses. The Court should unreservedly seize upon that opportunity and impose the
recommended sentence.

II. The Presentence Investigation Report

A. The United States Sentencing Guidelines Calculation

On December 2, 2019, the United States Probation Department issued the PSR; and
on February 25, 2022, it issued an Addendum. Probation concluded that the defendant’s advisory
Guidelines offense level was 45, which is literally off the charts, and he was a criminal history

3
category I, resulting in a range of imprisonment of life. (PSR ¶ 122.) The offense level was
calculated as follows:

For Counts One, Two, Three and Four:

Base Offense Level (§ 2C1.1(a)(1)) 14

Plus: Offense Involved More than One Bribe (§ 2C1.1(b)(1)) +2

Plus: Loss Exceeded $9,500,000 (§§ 2C1.1(b)(2), 2B1.1(b)(1)(K)) +20

Plus: Offense Involved a Public Official (§ 2C1.1(b)(3)) +4

Plus: Manager or Supervisor (§ 3B1.1(b)) +3

Adjusted Offense Level: 43

For Count Seven:

Base Offense Level (§ 2J1.2(a)) 14

Plus: Substantial Interference with the

Administration of Justice (§ 2J1.2(b)(2)) +3

Adjusted Offense Level: 17

Multiple Count Analysis:

Base Offense Level (§ 3D1.2(c)) 43

Plus: Obstructing the Administration of Justice

(§§ 2J1.2, 3C1.1, 3D1.2, and their commentaries) +2

Total Adjusted Offense Level: 45

(PSR ¶¶ 53-58, 68-84.)

The government agrees with that calculation.

B. The Defendant’s Objections to the PSR

By letter dated February 16, 2021 and again in his March 1, 2022 sentencing
submission, the defendant raised several objections to the PSR. Specifically, the defendant objects
to: (1) certain facts that are contained in the PSR (Def. Mem. at 2-15); (2) the two-level
enhancement, pursuant to § 2C1.1(b)(1) (id. at 15-18); (3) the three-level enhancement, pursuant
to § 3B1.1(b) (id. at 18); and (4) the 20-level enhancement, pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K) (id. at

4
18-23). 2 In the Addendum, with the exception of a small number of non-substantive facts,
Probation rejected the defendant’s objections. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant’s
objections are without merit and should be rejected. The government will address each in turn.

1. The Defendant’s Factual Objections Are Wholly Without Merit

The defendant attempts, in his sentencing memorandum and his voluminous

objections to the PSR, to relitigate the trial and to reframe the trial testimony as though the jury’s
verdict were something other than to convict the defendant for his participation in the bribery and
obstruction schemes. These objections amount to a total denial of the crimes for which he was
convicted—a position that the defendant unabashedly promotes. (See, e.g., Def. Mem. at 1 (“As
a matter of law, and fact, Edward Mangano is innocent.”), 29 (claiming he has lost “virtually
everything” “all because 12 years ago a phony friend of 25 years asked him to show up at a meeting
over which he had no ability to impact.”).) The jury already considered and rejected these specious
arguments. The Court did as well in its comprehensive order denying the defendant’s post-trial
motions. (See January 2022 Mem. & Order.) While the government will not address the
arguments that the Court rejected in its January 2022 Mem. & Order, it will discuss some of the
defendant’s other factual objections.

First, the defendant avers that certain information was omitted from the factual
statement. (See Def. Mem. at 1-15, Ex. A.) With respect to the defendant’s claim that certain
information was omitted from the factual statement, the defendant’s proposed “facts” are, largely,
unsupported, one-sided statements that are not relevant to any ultimate Guidelines calculation.
Thus, the defendant’s proposed factual statements should be rejected and should not be added to
the offense conduct.

Second, with respect to Paragraph 16, the defendant objects to the omission of a
description outlining the various differences in concession agreement amendments underlying the
various loans given to Singh. (Id., Ex. A at 4.) The Court considered this argument and deemed
it irrelevant, noting:

Mangano stresses various differences between the Madison

concession amendments and the NDH concession amendments in
both their terms and in the manner in which they were procured.
This is all ultimately irrelevant. It was foreseeable that Singh would
be seeking the TOB’s backing for one or more additional loans past
October 18, 2011. Whether or not the precise provisions of the 2011
NDH concession amendment or the amount of the 2011 NDH loan
were foreseeable is irrelevant. Mangano knew that he was
pressuring TOB officials to take action in the future and it was

2
The defendant does not object that the base offense level for Counts One through Four is
14. The defendant also does not object to the four-level enhancement for an offense involving a
public official, pursuant to § 2C1.1(b)(3), or the two-level enhancement for grouping Count 7,
pursuant to §§ 2J1.2, 3C1.1 and 3D1.2. (See Def. Mem. at 15.)

5
 certainly foreseeable that this could involve multiple loans for each
location and different terms.

See January 2022 Mem. & Order at 103.

Third, with respect to Paragraph 17, the defendant denies his involvement in
pressuring TOB officials to indirectly guarantee Singh’s loans, and in enlisting the services of
Savino and the Rivkin Radler law firm. (Def. Mem. at 5-8, Ex. A at 4-5.) Notably, despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the defendant continues to aver that GX 423 (Savino’s
handwritten notes) were not the product of a conversation with him but, rather, with Genova. The
Court – and the jury – already rejected this argument. As the Court noted:

[E]xtensive evidence – including phone records; an email from

Savino’s assistant; testimony from Savino and Genova, and the fact
that Savino’s notes referenced certain items that are only related to
Mangano and not to the TOB and Genova – showed that these notes
were, in fact, from a call with Mangano.

See January 2022 Mem. at Order at 15, n.6 (citing evidence).

Fourth, with respect to Paragraph 18, despite testimonial and documentary evidence
otherwise, the defendant continues to deny that he set up the April 28 Meeting. (Def. Mem. at 6,
8-9, Ex. A at 5.) The Court rejected this argument, holding:

Mangano contends that Singh lied at trial concerning the genesis of

this meeting. However, Singh’s testimony concerning Mangano’s
involvement was corroborated by Genova’s testimony as well as by
Singh’s April 26 and April 27 emails. Although the proffer notes
indicate that Singh told the government at an early proffer session
that he “most likely asked Porcelli to arrange for a meeting,” Singh’s
April 26 and April 27 emails to Mangano confirm that Singh asked
Mangano to arrange this meeting. Additionally, the involvement of
others in ultimately arranging this meeting are not inconsistent with
Mangano’s intervention with Venditto concerning the meeting,
about which both Genova and Singh testified.

See January 2022 Mem. at Order at 17, n.8 (citing evidence).

Fifth, with respect to Paragraph 37, the defendant astonishingly continues to claim
that Singh hired Linda Mangano solely in an effort to obtain Nassau County contracts. (Def. Mem.
at 8, Ex. A at 10-11.) As this Court held in its January 2022 Mem. & Order:

The notion that Singh hired Linda Mangano only because he

unilaterally hoped and expected to receive requirements contracts
for SGT and that her hiring had nothing to do with the TOB loan
guarantees was, frankly, always absurd. While Singh’s testimony
indicated that he was also hoping to obtain contracts with SGT, that
evidence does not diminish the overwhelming evidence that both

6
 Singh and Mangano understood that his intervention concerning the
TOB loan guarantees was at least one of the reasons why Singh gave
Linda Mangano a “no-show job” with a salary of $100,000 a year.

See January 2022 Mem. & Order at 69 (emphasis in original).

Sixth, with respect to Paragraph 39, the defendant continues to object to the Rule
404(b) evidence surrounding Anthony Gulino’s bribe to the defendant and baselessly asserts that
events post-trial undermine Gulino’s credibility. (Def. Mem., Ex. A at 11.) Contrary to the
defendant’s assertions, nothing in the post-PSR submissions undermine the credibility of Gulino’s
trial testimony. As the Court noted, “Gulino’s testimony concerning the cash payment to Mangano
was corroborated in multiple ways at trial.” See January 2022 Mem. & Order at 152; see also id.
at 152-54 (citing evidence). Moreover, even after learning about additional conduct by Gulino
subsequent to the trial, “Mangano has not identified any testimony by Gulino that has been shown
to be false.” Id. at 160.

Seventh, the defendant contends that the government did not prove the Bread and
Rolls Contract by a preponderance of evidence. (Def. Mem. at 8, 16-18, 22, Ex. A at 5-7, 12, 14.)
That contention is wholly inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial. Nassau County offered
contracts for food services at county locations, including the Nassau County Correctional Center
(“NCCC”) via a sealed bid process, wherein bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that
each vendor is unaware of the amount of competing bids. (PSR ¶ 22.)

In 2012, the NCCC’s bread and rolls contract was put up for bid. In April 2012,
public bids were accepted, for a contract that would begin on July 1, 2012. Two bids were
received: one from Rockland Bakery; and the other from Singh’s bakery (San Remo). (PSR ¶ 23;
see also TT. 478-669, 1501-09.) For approximately ten years, Rockland Bakery had been the
contract vendor supplying these items to the count. (PSR ¶ 22.) Although officials in the Nassau
County Purchasing Department recommended awarding the contract to the incumbent Rockland
Bakery (PSR ¶ 24; see TT. 488-500, 526-27, 592-93; GXs 302), Rob Walker—the defendant’s
second-in-command—intervened in extraordinary fashion with the Purchasing Department to
have the contract awarded to Singh’s Bakery. (PSR ¶ 25; see also TT. 478-669; GX 1196.) For
example, Walker visited the Purchasing Department and met with the individual who had prepared
the recommendation regarding the bids. (TT. 500-502, 598; GX 1198.) Walker had never before
visited the Purchasing Department regarding the award of any contract. (PSR ¶ 25; TT. 500-502.)
Shortly thereafter, in response to Walker’s visit, there was a series of emails between Walker and
others discussing the contract. (See, e.g., TT. 502-24, 598-614; GXs 1196-1199, 1207, 1209, 1214,
1221.) At one point, in response to the pressure to award the contract to Singh’s bakery, a
supervisor in the Purchasing Department referenced wanting to avoid availing himself of inmate
“shirts and trousers,” referencing his fear of going to jail for the conduct. (PSR ¶ 25; see also TT.
605-11; GX 1207.)

As a result of the continued instance that San Remo be considered for the contract
(see PSR ¶¶ 25-26; TT. 502-24; GXs. 1196-1199, 1207, 1209, 1214, 1221), and Rockland Bakery
declining a partial award, on June 15, 2012, the Purchasing Department prepared a Staff Summary
decision, authorizing San Remo to receive the entire contract, valued at $193,824. (PSR ¶ 27; see
TT. 526-27; GX 303.) However, on June 20, 2012, San Remo Bakery withdrew their bid for the

7
contract, citing an inability to provide the products at the process reflected on the bid. The contract,
in its entirety, was thereafter awarded to Rockland Bakery. (Id.; see also TT. 526-30, 1509-10;
GX 1214.) Accordingly, the trial evidence plainly established that the defendant took official
action to steer the Bread and Rolls Contracts to Singh.

Eighth, the defendant’s argument that the government did not prove that he took
official action to secure the OEM Emergency Food Services Contract for Singh (Def. Mem. at 9,
16-17, Ex. A at 7-8, 12) is similarly meritless. In November 2012, following Hurricane Sandy,
Singh obtained an emergency food services contract to supply food to OEM in order to feed the
influx in emergency workers who remained in the area in the weeks following the hurricane to
restore public services. (PSR ¶¶ 28-29.)

As established at trial, following the discovery of unsanitary conditions involving

the prior food supplier, Nassau County needed to award an emergency food services contract to
feed the hundreds of emergency and rescue workers working at OEM. The emergency contract
was slated to be awarded to Dover Catering, a tried and true Nassau County registered vendor who
was reading, willing and able to provide food to all the emergency workers at OEM. Indeed, the
chef from Dover had already been on scene to assess the conditions and began putting together a
menu of food options. (See TT. 763-77, 921-37, 944-52.) Yet, the evidence at trial, including
testimony from the defendant’s former assistant, Singh and others, established that the defendant
intervened and directed that Singh be awarded this contract, not Dover. (See, e.g., TT. 835-40,
848-49, 909, 917-20, GX 333; see also TT. 718 (“county exec has a favorite vendor he uses for
this sort of things and that would be what would happen”).) Singh’s business was paid
approximately $240,000 by Nassau County for providing 19 days of food to the OEM Emergency
Management Center. (TT. 1050, 1646, 1734.) Again, the trial evidence established that the
defendant took official action to secure the OEM Emergency Food Services Contract for Singh.

In sum, the facts in the PSR are rooted in the trial record, and largely accepted by
the Court in its January 2022 Mem. & Order.

2. The Two-Level Enhancement Pursuant to § 2C1.1(b)(1) Is Appropriate

In his sentencing submission, the defendant objects—without citation to any legal

authority—to the two-level multiple bribe enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(1). (See
Def. Mem. at 15-18.) In support of his objection, and in direct contravention of the jury’s verdict
and the Court’s January 2022 Mem. & Order, the defendant claims that the only bribe that can be
remotely attributed to him is a single bribe – Linda Mangano’s employment, “which began in April
2010 – in exchange for Mangano’s purported assistance in the TOB that same year.” (Id. at 16).
The defendant denies any of the other bribes and contends that because the jury acquitted him of
the charges related to the Bread and Rolls Contract and the OEM Emergency Food Services
Contract the multiple bribe enhancement is inapplicable. (Id. at 16-18). The defendant is wrong
on all accounts.

Section 2C1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines provides for a two-level enhancement “[i]f

the offense involved more than one bribe.” Application Note 2 explains that “[r]elated payments
that, in essence, constitute a single incident of bribery or extortion (e.g., a number of installment
payments for a single action) are to be treated as a single bribe or extortion, even if charged in

8
separate counts.” Here, as established at trial, Singh bribed the defendant on multiple occasions.
These bribes included, but were not limited to, multiple vacations, a massage chair, an ergonomic
office chair, hardwood flooring, a watch, free food and a no-show job for the defendant’s wife.
(See PSR ¶¶ 31-40; see also TT. 1429-34, 1450-55, 1510-13, 1522-27, 1655-61, 1665-90; GXs 1,
2, 27, 140-144, 147-149, 150-157, 162-163, 213, 233, 237, 239, 408, 417, 470, 470-A, 700-E, 700-
F, 700-P, 700-R, 718, 721, 727, 729-730, 737, 754-755, 757, 764, 766, 769-771, 784-785, 798,
857, 919-922, 1301, 1302, 1315, 1445-48.)

Moreover, to the extent the Court ignored those other bribes and only considered
the defendant’s wife’s no-show job, the sham job is sufficient to support the applicability of the
enhancement under § 2C1.1(b)(1). Linda Mangano’s no-show job was not a “single” bribe in
exchange for a $1.5 million line of credit, as feebly argued by the defendant. Quite to the contrary,
the no-show job bribe led to multiple loans for multiple locations, all indirectly guaranteed by the
TOB. As the Second Circuit has held, “[c]ourts confronted with similar situations have uniformly
held that multiple payments meant to influence more than one action should not be merged together
for purposes of § 2C1.1 merely because they share a single overall goal or are part of a larger
conspiracy.” United States v. Arshad, 239 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 2001).

Furthermore, the no-show job paychecks should not be considered “installments,”

as there was no agreed upon final amount and no agreed upon end date. See id. (“[T]he pattern
and amount of payments [do not] bear the hallmarks of installment payments, such as a regular
schedule of payments over a finite period of time toward a fixed final sum.”) (emphasis added);
see also United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1152 (10th Cir. 1996) (where defendant paid
monthly bribes in exchange for ongoing patient referrals, the Circuit affirmed district court
decision finding that the agreement was not for a final fixed sum paid in regular installments in
return for a single action); United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1994) (three separate
work applications under the umbrella of a larger conspiracy were not installment payments for a
single action); United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1993) (many payments in
exchange for helping a particular taxpayer evade taxes were not considered a single bribe).

Also, the defendant cannot claim that his wife’s paychecks were a single bribe for
purposes of § 2C1.1(b)(1) because they were all connected by an overarching purpose: the TOB
Loan Scheme. Under such a theory, the two-point enhancement under § 2C1.1(b)(1) would rarely
apply, since it is frequently the case that multiple bribe payments can be attributed to a single
overall purpose. Separate bribe payments, not made as installments of a single bribe, which are
paid over a period of time, for different actions and for different purposes, are properly considered
to be separate bribes, not a single bribe.

Lastly, with respect to the Nassau County Contracts, as set forth above, the
government established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant engaged in honest
services wire fraud and extortion as it related to the Bread and Rolls Contract and the OEM
Emergency Food Services Contract. Thus, this conduct further places the defendant well within
the purview of the multiple bribe enhancement.

Accordingly, the two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(1) should

be applied.

9
 3. The Three-Level Enhancement Pursuant to § 3B1.1(b) Is Appropriate

Next, the defendant objects—again, without citation to any legal authority—to the
three-level role enhancement for supervising five or more participants, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(b). (See Def. Mem. at 18.) With respect to the TOB Loan Scheme, the defendant claims
that he supervised no one and had no authority over anyone in the TOB government. (Id.) With
respect to the Nassau County Contracts, the defendant asserts that he was acquitted of such conduct
and that the government did not establish this relevant conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Id.) Again, the defendant is wrong.

Section 3B1.1(b) provides for a three-level enhancement if “the defendant was a

manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or
more participants or was otherwise extensive.” This enhancement is appropriate where the
defendant “played a crucial role in the planning, coordination, and implementation of a criminal
scheme.” See United States v. Paccione, 202 F.3d 662, 624 (2d Cir. 2000). A defendant may be
considered a manager or supervisor if he exercised some degree of control over others involved in
the commission of the offense or played a significant role in the decision to recruit or to supervise
lower-level participants. See United States v. Al-Sadawi, 432 F.3d 419, 426 (2d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Blount, 291 F.3d 201, 217 (2d Cir. 2002). Under § 3B1.1(b), a defendant need only
manage or supervise one other person, so long as the criminal activity itself involved at least five
participants. See United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1212 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreover, in
determining whether there are five participants in a criminal activity, the defendant may be
included as one of the five. See United States v. Norman, 776 F.3d 67, 82 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing
Paccione, 202 F.3d at 625).

Here, with respect to the TOB Loan Scheme, it is indisputable that the criminal
activity involved five or more participants, including but not limited to the defendant, Singh,
Venditto, Genova, and Mei. The defendant was certainly a “manager” or “supervisor” under the
meaning of § 3B1.1(b). The defendant was the highest-elected official in the County and, as such,
wielded considerable power – both in the County and within his political party. He directed a
course of action, spoke to and, essentially hired, attorneys to find a way to get the loan guarantees
done, set up a meeting of the participants and acted as the go between amongst the parties. Without
the defendant’s pressure, direction and intervention, and his enlistment of the services of the
Rivkin Radler lawyers, the indirect loan guarantees would never have been done. He was,
indisputably a pivotal figure in the successful execution of the TOB Loan Scheme.

In addition, as set forth above, the trial record contains ample evidence,
considerably exceeding the required preponderance, of the defendant’s role in depriving the
residents of Nassau County of his honest services in relation to the Bread and Rolls Contract and
the OEM Emergency Food Services Contract. As the Nassau County Executive, the defendant
unquestionably supervised and managed Rob Walker. Even if the Court were to limit the role
enhancements under § 3B1.1 by scheme, and not group them together, the defendant’s conduct, as
it relates to the Nassau County Contracts, places him within the two-level role enhancement
pursuant to § 3B1.1(c). While the Court should find the three-level role enhancement applicable
here, even if the Court were to use the lower, two-level enhancement, the defendant’s adjusted
offense level would be 44, instead of 45, and his Guidelines range would still be unchanged (i.e.,
it would still be life imprisonment).

10
 Accordingly, the three-level role enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) is
appropriate and should be applied.

4. The 20-Level Enhancement Pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K) Is Appropriate

Finally, the defendant contends that the 20-level enhancement should not apply.
(Def. Mem. at 18-23.) For the reasons detailed below, the 20-level enhancement is appropriate
and should be used in calculating the defendant’s applicable Guidelines.

Where, as here, the greater of “the value of the payment” or “the benefit received
or to be received in return for the payment” exceeds $6,500, Section 2C1.1(b)(2) requires the
increase in offense level to be based on the loss table contained in Section 2B1.1. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2C1.1(b)(2). Here, the payment to the defendant is approximately $530,000 in bribes while,
conservatively speaking, the benefit received or to be received by Singh in return for the payment
is more than $11,000,000. That latter figure is calculated by adding the total dollar value of the
loans Singh received from the Lender only ($13,873,010.74) minus the loan repayments made by
Singh ($2,082,686.28) resulting in a net benefit to Singh of approximately $11,790,324.46.3

At trial, the government introduced extensive, irrefutable evidence about the value
of these loans, i.e. the benefit to Singh. Specifically: (i) the first loan, which closed on June 9,
2010, was a $1,500,000 line of credit (“LOC”) from the Bank (“Loan #1”) (GX 536); (ii) the
second loan, which closed on May 25, 2011, was a $3,400,000 loan from the Bank (“Loan #2)
(GX 541); (iii) the third loan, which closed on November 19, 2011, was a $7,843,138 loan from
the Lender (“Loan #3) (GX 542); and (iv) the fourth loan, which closed on June 22, 2012, was a
$12,273,748 loan from the Lender (“Loan #4) (GX 543). 4 Thus, there is more than ample
evidence—documentary and testimonial—to support a finding, well beyond a preponderance of
the evidence, that the net benefit received by Singh on the two Lender loans was over $11 million,
which squarely falls within § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K).

Probation calculated a loss of approximately $20,956,824. (PSR ¶ 70.) Probation’s

estimate is based upon (i) the $20,000,000 in loans that Singh would have been otherwise unable
to obtain; (ii) the Bread and Rolls Contract, valued at $193,824; (iii) the OEM Emergency Food
Services Contract, valued at $233,000; and (iv) the $530,000 in bribes. (Id.) Because the bribe
payments are separate and distinct from the benefit received or to be received by the bribe payer,
and § 2C1.1(b)(2) requires the use of the “net benefit” to the bribe payer, the total benefit received

3
The loans from the Bank were, ultimately, paid off. As noted above, the closing
documents show that Phoenix Life Insurance Company funded a total of $13,873,010.74 at the
closing table for the two Lender loans. Phoenix Life Insurance Company records indicate that
Singh paid Phoenix a total of $3,242,993.91 across the two loans: $2,082,686.28 was applied to
the principal balances, and $1,160,307.63 was applied to interest. Even if this Court were to apply
the total amount paid to Phoenix, including the debt service/interest portion of Singh’s payments,
the net benefit to Singh would still exceed $9.5 million. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K).
4
The loan documents from the Lender (i.e. the two NDH loans backed by Phoenix Life
Insurance Company) included the principal plus interest figures on the face of the document.

11
or expected to be received in return for the payment is approximately $11 million plus the net
benefit that Singh received from the Nassau County Contracts. Even if the government added the
net benefit of those contracts, it would not impact the applicable Guidelines enhancement. Indeed,
the benefit Singh received would still fall within the more than $9,500,000 and less than
$25,000,000 range set forth in § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K). Therefore, the Court can limit the net benefit to
the $11 million in loans, resulting in a 20-level enhancement.

The defendant raises several objections to this calculation. 5 In particular, the

defendant argues that the benefit to Singh was not the loans themselves but the amendments to the
concession agreements, and since the value of this “option” cannot be identified, the only way to
calculate loss at is relates to the Madison loans is the payment received by the defendant. (Def.
Mem. at 20.) The defendant further denies any involvement in the two NDH loans and, predicably,
lays blame for these loans with Singh and various TOB officials. (Id. at 20-22.) All of these
arguments are without merit.

The evidence adduced at trial overwhelming established that the defendant

accepted a multitude of bribe payments from Singh in exchange for the defendant’s pressure and
influence in obtaining the TOB’s indirect guarantees for loans paid to Singh and Singh’s
companies, as well as various Nassau County contracts. With respect to the loans themselves, as
set forth above, Singh received a net benefit of over $11 million in the form of the unpaid Lender
loans; money he would not have otherwise received without the defendant’s pressure and
influence. As proven at trial, and as the Court held in the January 2022 Mem. & Order, the
defendant’s criminal conduct did not end at the April 28, 2010 meeting, and the resulting loans—
which were a benefit received by Singh and which net benefit totaled over $11 million—were
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant as a result of his criminal conduct. See, e.g., January 2022
Mem. & Order at 99 (“. . . the NDH concession amendments were reasonably foreseeable acts in
furtherance of the quid pro quo scheme/conspiracy” as a result of the defendant’s pressure on
Venditto), 103 (it was foreseeable that Singh would be seeking the TOB’s backing for additional
loans).

The defendant’s attempt to reduce Singh’s benefit to a mere piece of paper (i.e., the
concession agreement amendments) that cannot be valued is utterly absurd. The evidence at trial
made clear that no lender would issue loans to Singh or his businesses without the TOB’s backing,
indirectly or otherwise. Without the amendments to the concession agreements, Singh would
never have received the millions in loans. The amendments were specifically entered into to
facilitate the loan process, and without them no loans would ever have been issued. Thus, the net
benefit to Singh is certainly the more than $11 million in unpaid Lender loans – loans he would
never have received without making bribe payments to the defendant. Indeed, Singh’s businesses

5
The defendant objects to Probation’s calculation, which combines the amount of the bribe
payments with the amount of the benefits received by Singh. (See Def. Mem. at 19; PSR ¶ 70 and
PSR Addendum.) As set forth above, the government agrees that these amounts should not be
combined. However, as set forth herein and in contrast to the defendant, the government submits
that the total amount of benefits received by Singh in exchange for the bribe payments is
approximately $11 million; thus, there is no difference in the Guidelines calculation, as
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(K) still applies.

12
obtained the four loans only because of the TOB’s indirect loan guarantees provided for in the
concession amendments; loan guarantees that the TOB agreed to do only after the defendant’s
pressure and intervention. “[T]he punishment should fit the crime, and the measure of the crime
is the greater of the benefit to the payer or the recipient.” United States v. Gillam, 167 F.3d 1273,
1279 (9th Cir. 1999).

Further, in reality, the defendant asks this Court, in short, effectively to declare that
he is innocent. But this Court already denied the defendant’s post-trial motions for acquittal, and
rightly so. And the jury concluded, the defendant was guilty. The defendant’s continued attempt
to disclaim any responsibility for the TOB Loan Scheme, including the NDH loans, should not be
entertained.

Accordingly, the 20-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K) is

appropriate and should be applied.6

***

In sum, the defendant’s adjusted offense level is 45, resulting in a Guidelines

range of imprisonment of life.

III. Argument

The Court’s “starting point and the initial benchmark” when determining the
defendant’s sentence is the advisory Guidelines range of life imprisonment. Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007). The Court is required to consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) in determining the defendant’s sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 S.Ct. 586, 596
(2007). That section directs a court to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary” to comply with the need for the sentence imposed:

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect

for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;

and

6
If you consider the gain (i.e. the approximately $530,000 bribes paid to the defendant),
as opposed to the benefit received by Singh in exchange for the bribes—which the Court should
not, as the value of the benefit is readily available—the defendant would be subject to a 12-level
enhancement pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G), resulting in a total adjusted offense level of 37 and an
advisory Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment.

13
 (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

Careful consideration of all of those factors demands a substantial term of

imprisonment. Accordingly, the government recommends (i) the statutory maximum sentence of
five years’ imprisonment on Count One, (ii) the statutory maximum sentence of ten years’
imprisonment on Count Two, and (iii) no less than 210 months’ imprisonment on Counts Three,
Four and Seven, concurrent on each count.

A. The Seriousness of the Offense Mandates a Significant Sentence

Section 3553(a) requires the Court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the
offense” and to impose a sentence that “reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. §§
3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A). As described below, the nature and seriousness of the offense mandates
a significant sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A).

First, the severity of the defendant’s conduct in this case cannot be overstated:
while serving as the highest elected, and most powerful official in Nassau County, the defendant
accepted a multitude of bribes from a local businessman in exchange for official action, and then
conspired to obstruct a federal grand jury investigation to cover up his criminal conduct. Like all
public officials, the defendant took an oath swearing to provide the people of Nassau County with
honest services – to subordinate his own personal interests to the public’s needs. For more than
five years, he defiled that oath. In total, he accepted bribes valued at more than $530,000. And in
exchange, he influenced the TOB to indirectly guarantee loans, and he steered contracts to his
long-time friend and coconspirator, circumventing the otherwise independent sealed bidding
process and the Nassau County registered vendor list. Such behavior evidences a total disregard
for the law and a complete betrayal of his public office.

Second, the financial harm that the defendant caused was significant. Motivated
by greed and a sense of entitlement, the defendant sold the power and influence of his office and,
in the process, caused Phoenix Life Insurance Company to lose over $11 million. His criminality
also cost the TOB taxpayers more than $4 million in legal fees.

Third, the length of the defendant’s criminal conduct also warrants a substantial
term of incarceration. Indeed, the defendant did not engage in some arbitrary, aberrant behavior.
Far from a one-time mistake, the defendant’s criminal conduct began the moment he was elected
as Nassau County Executive and continued for years, stopping only when the FBI executed a
search warrant on Singh’s business, causing Singh to stop paying Linda Mangano for her sham
job. The defendant took deliberate and willful steps that deprived his constituents of his honest
services, and profitted from that conduct. Every day that the defendant had his wife on Singh’s
payroll for doing nothing, he was compromised. Every day—from the moment he took office until
the FBI searched Singh’s business—the defendant put his wallet ahead of the taxpayers.

14
 Fourth, the breadth and pervasiveness of corruption further supports the
recommended sentence. As adduced at trial, the defendant abused his position in a variety of ways
on a variety of occasions. He used personnel to pressure long-time civil servants into awarding
contracts to his friend, Singh. He accepted bribes from others and used Singh to launder the money
so that the bribe money would not be traceable to him. And he used his position to obtain zoning
approvals that no one within the TOB would ever receive, so that he could sell property for his
own personal benefit. The scope of the defendant’s arrogance and the breadth of his criminal
conduct is staggering. The defendant led a culture of corruption that permeated throughout his
administration: it rotted from the top down. Rather than inspiring his inner circle to serve the
public, he set a powerful and distressing example for how to monetize one’s official position. One
need only look to Rob Walker, the defendant’s second-in-command, who was recently sentenced
for his role in obstructing a federal investigation into Walker’s receipt of a bribe from Anthony
Gulino, the same contractor who made a bribe payment to the defendant.

Fifth, the tactics employed by the defendant to conceal his criminal conduct from
regulators and law enforcement further supports the recommended sentence. Before law
enforcement initiated its investigation, the defendant took steps to conceal the bribes he received
from Singh. For example, to hide that his wife was being paid for a sham job, the defendant
arranged for Singh to pay his wife through a Queens-based company, as opposed to a Nassau
County company or a company associated with Singh, so that he could list her salary on his
financial disclosure form without arousing any suspicions and thus thumbing his nose at the
transparency and conflict of interest rules designed to prevent such corrupt schemes.

Even more troubling is the defendant’s conduct after learning of the federal
government’s investigation. After the FBI visited the defendants’ home and interviewed Linda
Mangano about her no show job, the defendant, his wife and Singh met and devised a plan to
obstruct the investigation. They attempted to fabricate work that Linda Mangano supposedly did
for Singh to make it appear that she actually provided work for Singh in exchange for her salary
in an effort to mask the true nature of those payments. The defendant’s actions were intentional
and show what he understood those payments to be: those payments were bribes, the defendant
knew it, and he took measures to ensure that the government would not be able to prove it. This
conduct, by an elected public official, who is also a lawyer, is particularly egregious and offensive.
His obstructive conduct alone undermines the very underpinnings of our criminal justice system.
For an elected official to engage in such conduct is inexplicable and inexcusable.

And last but certainly not least, the defendant did not simply cause financial harm,
he also caused intangible consequences that are far less obvious but even more corrosive. An
essential principle of our country that separates us from despotic regimes is that no citizen is above
the law regardless of their station in life. The defendant blatantly disregard that principle. When
Nassau County residents entrusted the defendant to be the County Executive, they had the right to
expect honesty and integrity. What they actually got was widespread corruption and dishonesty.
His conduct eroded the public’s faith in our government. As a Connecticut district court astutely
observed:

Government corruption breeds cynicism and mistrust of elected

officials. It causes the public to disengage from the democratic
process because . . . the public begins to think of politics as “only

15
 for the insiders.” Thus, corruption has the potential to shred the
delicate fabric of democracy by making the average citizen lose
respect and trust in elected officials and give up any hope of
participating in government through legitimate channels.

United States v. Ganim, No. 01-CR-263, 2006 WL 1210984 at *1, 5 (D. Conn. 2006). These
intangible consequences are unfortunate and further demonstrate just how serious the instant
crimes were.

In sum, corrupt schemes by public officials, such as the ones perpetrated by the
defendant here, undermine the trust that is essential to the proper functioning of our government.
As Probation aptly noted “the damage to the trust that the public has in their elected government
is tremendous, and perhaps, can take longer to repair than the financial losses.” (PSR
Recommendation at 2.) The defendant’s crime – depriving citizens of the honest services of their
elected officials and obstructing justice – are among the most serious crimes that this Court is
called upon to consider. Accordingly, the nature and circumstances of the offense calls for a
significant sentence, one of no less than 210 months.

B. The Defendant’s Failure to Accept Responsibility Warrants a Significant Sentence

The next factor that the Court must consider is the “history and characteristics of
the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). For the reasons set forth below, this factor also weighs
in favor of the imposition of a significant term of imprisonment, even though the defendant, like
virtually every other corrupt politician that appears for sentencing, has no criminal history.

The fact that the defendant utterly refuses, still, to accept any responsibility for any
aspect of his criminal conduct is germane and warrants a substantial sentence. In determining an
appropriate sentence in this case, the Court should consider the defendant’s lack of remorse and
unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions. See United States v. Kaziu, 559 F. App’x
32, 39 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming district’s reliance on defendant’s lack of remorse as a factor
evincing future dangerousness); United States v. Sejdaris, 534 F. App’x 23, 25 (2d Cir. 2013)
(affirming district court’s reliance on “protestations of innocence to be an indication of likely
recidivism”); United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 295 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding defendant’s
“lack of remorse for, or even appreciation of, the seriousness of the totality of his conduct . . .
further expand[s] the range of substantively reasonable sentences to allow the district court to
afford adequate specific deterrence and protection of the public”); United States v. Martinucci,
561 F.3d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming above-Guidelines sentence where district court
considered, among other things, the defendant’s lack of remorse); United States v. Li, 115 F.3d
125, 135 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s upward variance based on the defendant’s
“manipulative conduct and unwillingness to accept responsibility—which persisted throughout her
criminal proceedings and were viewed as having been exhibited once again during her comments
at sentencing”); see generally United States v. Keskes, 703 F.3d 1078, 1090-91 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“A lack of remorse is a proper sentencing consideration ‘because it speaks to traditional
penological interests such as rehabilitation (an indifferent criminal isn’t ready to reform . . . ).’”
(citation omitted)); United States v. Watkins, 667 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding a district
court’s “high range sentence” based upon, among other things, the defendant’s “lack of remorse”);
United States v. Kwong, 877 F. Supp. 96, 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Dearie, J.) (imposition of

16
maximum term of imprisonment allowable under Guidelines range was justified by defendant’s
lack of remorse and by gravity of offense).

Here, more than three years after the jury’s verdict, the defendant is unrepentant
and shamelessly blames everyone but himself for his crimes. Indeed, his February 2022 sentencing
submission amounts to a total denial of the crimes for which he was convicted, seeks to minimize
the power he yielded as the highest elected official in Nassau County, and lacks any indicia of
remorse as to the impact his crimes have had on others, including the residents of Nassau County,
the very people who elected him to that office. Nowhere in the defendant’s sprawling 30-page
memorandum does he express remorse, regret or sympathy for his victims. His lack of remorse
warrants a stiff sentence.

Moreover, the circumstances of the defendant’s upbringing, family structure, and

lack of criminal history, should certainly be considered, but they must also be balanced against the
nature and gravity of the instant offense. In fact, the defendant’s age at the time he committed the
instant offenses, his educational background, prior employment as a lawyer, and ability to
influence others through his political position make his crimes all the more appalling. Unlike
many other offenders who appear before the Court, the defendant had the benefit of a stable family
and support system: he was raised by two loving parents in a home devoid of physical or verbal
abuse. The defendant did not suffer from mental health or substance abuse problems that led him
to commit the charged crimes. He was not forced into a criminal life due to the circumstances
surrounding his upbringing or some financial duress. Nor was it a youthful indiscretion. Rather
than being borne out of necessity or adverse circumstances, the defendant’s criminality was driven
by one motive: pure greed. And for that, he should be punished accordingly.

It is also worth emphasizing that the defendant’s lack of criminal history should not
justify a downward departure of variance. The applicable Guidelines range already reflects the
defendant’s lack of a criminal history, placing him in the lowest possible criminal history category.
As such, his lack of criminal history does not merit an additional variance.

Nor does the defendant’s history of public service warrant a reduced sentence. In
his sentencing submission, the defendant describes at length his accomplishments as Nassau
County Executive, including “innovative programs in the areas of, Community Policing to combat
the heroin epidemic; reducing costs through public private partnerships; job creation, and
environmental conservation.” (See Def. Mem. at 24.) He also cites to numerous awards and
recognition he and his administration received locally, state-wide and nationally, including “well
deserved national recognition” during Hurricane Sandy, id., as well as letters of support he
received from members of his community. (Id. at 15). However, while he has dedicated much of
his life to public service, it was when he was at the height of his power and influence that he chose
to take advantage of his position and in engage in significant bribery schemes.

Additionally, those good works were what he was expected to do in exchange for
his public salary, and not a reason to reward him when he corruptly used that same position for his
own private gain. It was the defendant’s job as an elected public official to serve his constituents
and help improve their lives. He should not receive any special credit for simply doing the job for
which he was elected and generously compensated. See United States v. Serafini, 223 F.3d 758,
773 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[I]f a public servant performs civic and charitable work as part of his daily

17
functions, these should not be considered in his sentencing because we expect such work from our
public servants.”); see also United States v. Morgan, 635 F. App’x 423m 449-50 (10th Cir. 2015)
(finding that sentencing judge erred in sentencing the former President Pro Tem of the Oklahoma
State Senate to probation for accepting a $12,000 bribe, in part, by giving undue weight to letters
of support: “The number of letters was certainly impressive but not surprising. As the Government
aptly points out: ‘One does not become President Pro Tem without the confidence of many
supporters, some quite influential.’ The letters must be viewed in that light.”); United States v.
Vrdolyak, 593 F.3d 676, 683 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a district court erred in giving weight to
letters attesting to defendant alderman’s good deeds in part because “[p]oliticians are in the
business of dispensing favors; and while gratitude like charity is a virtue, expressions of gratitude
by beneficiaries of politicians’ largesse should not weigh in sentencing”); U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11
(public service “not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted”).

In Ganim, the district court imposed a 108 month sentence on the former mayor of
Bridgeport, Connecticut following his convictions for racketeering, bribery and other offenses
relating to his acceptance of hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash payments and gifts. 2006
WL 1210984 at *4. In fashioning the defendant’s sentence, the sentencing court considered the
defendant’s accomplishments as mayor but stated that “it should be given a lesser weight in the
context of a top elected municipal official who criminally and shamelessly flout[ed] his lawful
authority and the public trust.” Id. at *3. The court further stated:

As an elected official, [the defendant] had a duty to serve the public.

In the sentencing equation, he is entitled to no special credit for his
work on behalf of the city, because that is what he was elected and
paid to do. This is not a situation where the defendant’s service to
the community is entirely separate from his position and therefore
could be considered exemplary—for example, an embezzling
corporate CEO who feeds the elderly at a nursing home or
volunteers at the public library. Rather, [the defendant’s] service to
the community of Bridgeport was exactly what was expected of him
as mayor, and when being sentenced for corrupting that office it is
of less import whether the city under his administration made
progress towards civil goals.

Id. The Ganim Court’s rational applies to this case as well. The Nassau County taxpayers paid
the defendant a generous salary of more than $180,000 to serve them and to put their interests
above his own. But that was not enough for the defendant.

Further, while the defendant may have used his official position to help certain
members of the community, he also used his position for his own personal benefit in ways other
than the TOB Loan and the Nassau County Contracts Schemes. The defendant used his position
to violate zoning laws applicable to his property at 329 Broadway in Bethpage, laws that the
defendant knowingly circumvented in order to proceed with the sale. The events surrounding 329
Broadway was a stunning example of corruption, dishonesty and unfairness and the evidence
presented to the jury was a crystalized example of how those in power (the defendant) exerted
influence over others (TOB officials) to take action. (See TT. 3036-42.)

18
 Finally, the defendant’s claim that he “has lost virtually everything,” including his
“political career and boundless future,” his law license, his assets and “his good name,” and that
the “enormity of the real life punishment already inflicted upon [him]” warrants substantial
leniency is without merit. (See Def. Mem. at 29). Congress, through the Guidelines, has addressed
and rejected arguments from privileged defendants, like the defendant, who lament the collateral
consequences of conviction as applied to them. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (“The Commission shall
assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to . . . socioeconomic status
of offenders.”); U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10 (socioeconomic status not relevant); see also U.S.S.G. § 5H1.2
(vocational skills and education not ordinarily relevant); U.S.S.G. § 5H1.5 (employment record
not ordinarily relevant); U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 (family ties and responsibilities not ordinarily relevant).
Courts have agreed. See, e.g., United States v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 47 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is
impermissible for a court to impose a lighter sentence on white-collar defendants than on blue-
collar defendants because it reasons that white collar offenders suffer greater reputation harm or
have more to lose by conviction.”); United States v. Musgrave, 761 F.3d 602, 608-09 (6th Cir.
2014) (impermissible for the district court to rely heavily on the fact that the defendant had already
“been punished extraordinarily” through years of legal process, the loss of his CPA license and his
felony conviction).

As the Seventh Circuit has observed:

[N]o “middle class” sentencing discounts are authorized. Business

criminals are not to be treated more leniently than members of the
“criminal class” just by virtue of being regularly employed or
otherwise productively engaged in lawful economic activity. It is
natural for judges, drawn as they (as we) are from the middle or
upper-middle class, to sympathize with criminals drawn from the
same class. But in this instance we must fight our nature. Criminals
who have the education and training that enables people to make a
decent living without resorting to crime are more rather than less
culpable than their desperately poor and deprived brethren in crime.

United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). The suggestion
that the defendant or any person from a privileged background should receive a lesser sentence
than others due to “reputational harm,” “professional harm” or “lost business opportunities” is
simply wrong and this Court should reject it.

C. The Need for General Deterrence Is High

Section 3553(a)(2)(B) further requires the Court to consider “the need for the
sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” Id. This factor has two
components: general and specific deterrence. Because the instant offense involved “rational, cool,
and calculated” decision making, rather than “sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, [it is a]
prime candidate for general deterrence.” United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation omitted).

Sadly, New York State has experienced numerous highly publicized corruption
scandals in the last several years. This type of criminal conduct erodes the public’s trust and

19
confidence in its government, particularly on Long Island, where corruption in local government
is endemic and is a harm that cannot easily be measured. Because of this, and because of the
pervasiveness of corruption in New York (and on Long Island, in particular), the Court has a
responsibility to send a clear, unambiguous message to the defendant, to current and future public
officials, and to the community: violations of the public trust, in particular when committed by a
high-level official like the defendant, will not be tolerated and will be met with a significant
sentence. Indeed, the Second Circuit has specifically endorsed the sentencing court taking into
account local deterrence under Section 3553(a). See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 195
(2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (affirming sentence based, in part, on need for local deterrence of crime);
see also United States v. Pabey, No. 10-CR-17, 2011 WL 3163523 (N.D. Ind. May 5, 2011
Sentencing Order) (recounting recent public corruption convictions in the region and stating that
the sentence for the former Mayor of East Chicago should send the “necessary message that
corruption by elected public officials will not be tolerated and the epidemic of political corruption
that has existed in this region of our state for at least the past three decades has got to stop”). A
significant sentence is necessary to demonstrate that no one, not even the Nassau County
Executive, is above the law.

A sentence of at least 210 months will send that important deterrent message
because white collar criminals, such as corrupt politicians, are among the most responsive to the
general deterrence of a significant sentence. Unlike many of the criminals who pass through this
Court, corrupt politicians, or those considering committing these crimes, are generally well-
educated, have access to and are more acutely aware of information about sentences imposed on
high-profile public officials. Those potential wrongdoers will conclude that the potential cost of
spending more than 17 years in prison far outweighs the potential financial gain from betraying
one’s official position. See, e.g., Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240 (“Defendants in white collar crimes
often calculate the financial gain and risk of loss, and white collar crime therefore can be affected
and reduced with serious punishment”); Drago Francesco, Roberto Galbiati & Pietro Vertova, The
Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence From a Natural Experiment, 117 J. of Political Econ. 257,
278 (2009) (“Our findings provide credible evidence that a one-month increase in expected
punishment lowers the probability of committing a crime. This corroborates the theory of general
deterrence.”). As one district court noted:

We need not resign ourselves to the fact that corruption exists in

government. Unlike some criminal justice issues, the crime of
public corruption can be deterred by significant penalties that hold
all offenders properly accountable. The only way to protect the
public from the ongoing problem of public corruption and to
promote respect for the rule of law is to impose strict penalties on
all defendants who engage in such conduct, many of whom have
specialized legal training or experiences. Public corruption
demoralizes and unfairly stigmatizes the dedicated work of honest
public servants. It undermines the essential confidence in our
democracy and must be deterred if our country and district is ever
to achieve the point where the rule of law applies to all—not only to
the average citizen, but to all elected and appointed officials.

20
United States v. Spano, 411 F. Supp.2d 923, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 477 F.3d 417 (7th Cir.
2006).

Given the substantial amount of money lavished on the defendant, those who are
given the opportunity to participate in corruption where they will receive more than half a million
dollars will not be deterred if the defendant is not punished severely. That is particularly so
because corruption is, by its very nature, opaque to regulators and law enforcement, and thus
exceptionally difficult to detect and prosecute. Here, it took the unwavering dedication of the FBI,
IRS and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, who literally spent thousands of hours reviewing millions of
pages of documents and conducting hundreds of interviews, to uncover sufficient evidence to
prosecute and convict the defendant. In fact, it took years to arrest and convict the defendant,
demonstrating just how difficult the defendant’s crimes were to investigate—made even more
difficult by his obstructive conduct. Thus, a significant sentence that serves as general deterrence
of crimes that are complex and difficult to investigate is warranted here. See, e.g., United States
v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Considerations of (general) deterrence argue
for punishing more heavily those offenses that either are lucrative or are difficult to detect and
punish, since both attributes go to increase the expected benefits of a crime and hence the
punishment required to deter it.”); United States v. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006)
(deterrence of white-collar crime is “of central concern to Congress”).

In sum, to afford the defendant “substantial leniency,” as requested in his

sentencing memorandum, would actually embolden those who wish to accept bribes in exchange
for official action and take affirmative steps to obstruct law enforcement and grand jury
investigations into that corruption. It would signal to similarly situated-individuals that the
potential benefit for such criminal conduct is high while the cost is relatively low, especially when
considering the difficulty in investigating and prosecuting these types of crimes. Thus, absent a
substantial sentence in this case, the defendant’s conduct would provide a blueprint to those who
would engage in and solicit similar honest services fraud schemes and obstructive conduct.
Accordingly, “substantial leniency” would encourage, rather than deter, similar behavior in the
future, which would have a disastrous effect upon our Long Island community. To avoid that, the
Court should impose a sentence of at least 210 months.

D. The Need for Just Punishment and to Promote Respect for the Law
Demands a Substantial Sentence

The next factor that the Court must consider is “the need for the sentence imposed
to promote respect for the law, and to provide for just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2)(A). A “substantial[ly] lenien[t]” sentence will not promote respect for the law or
provide just punishment. In fact, it will do the opposite. Cases of this scale require significant
custodial sentences. These sentences are among the best ways in which to communicate to the
public that they will be protected and that the guilty will be punished. Similarly, for a defendant
to commit a crime of this magnitude and receive a reduced-sentence would serve to erode respect
for the law. Cases do not get much more significant and crimes do not get more brazen than the
defendant’s crimes. If the defendant receives “substantial leniency,” an unfortunate message
would be sent that these crimes are unworthy of significant punishment.

21
 Corrupt public officials have the power to cause severe social harm, diminishing
the public’s trust in its elected officials. The crimes that the defendant committed compromise the
baseline integrity of our government, which depend upon the public’s trust that its elected officials
will take official action to further the public’s, rather than their own, interests. The defendant
torched that trust for his own enrichment. A crime this serious, touching upon such fundamental
societal issues, must be punished accordingly. See 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A).

E. The Sentencing Range and Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities

Warrants a Sentence of At Least 210 Months

The final factors the Court must consider are the kinds of sentences available
(§ 3553(a)(3)), the applicable Guidelines range (§ 3553 (a)(4)), and any pertinent policy statements
from the Sentencing Commission (§ 3553(a)(5)). The Court is fully aware of all of the available
sentencing options. It is no accident that the Guidelines counsel toward such a high sentence.
Those Guidelines serve as the reservoir for the collective sentencing wisdom of the entire nation
of federal jurists. That wisdom, looking at the enormous scope of the instant crimes, counsels
toward a life sentence. Ultimately, each sentence must be imposed according to the law and the
individual conscience of the judge. However, these factors also suggest that the Court should
consider the sentences that other judges would impose under similar facts. Since every sentence
must begin with the Guidelines, it is safe to assume that the sentences in other courts would often
adhere to the advisory Guidelines. After all, those Guidelines are designed for the typical, or
“heartland,” case in mind.

In order to determine what a fair and just sentence is in the instant case, the
government examined the sentences of public officials convicted of federal corruption offenses
since 2010. It compiled a list of more than 80 public officials who were convicted of federal
corruption offenses. What the government learned from this exercise was that since 2010, New
York federal district courts imposed sentences that were approximately 83% of the low-end of the
advisory Guidelines in these types of cases. See Exhibit A.

Even more revealing was that when the government expanded the scope of this
exercise to the rest of the country, the result was nearly identical. Indeed, since 2010, district
courts around the country imposed sentences that were approximately 82% of the low-end of the
advisory Guidelines for public officials convicted of federal corruption offenses. See Exhibit B.

The government parsed this data further and reached a similar conclusion.
Specifically, the government compared sentences of convicted public officials that held positions
similar to the defendant’s, such as other County Executives and Mayors, and found that in those
dozen cases, the federal district courts imposed sentences that were approximately 91% of the low-
end of the applicable Guidelines range. See Exhibit C. What all of these objective data points
demonstrate is that the defendant’s sentence should be at least 80% of the low-end of the
Guidelines of life, in order to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Section 3553(a)(6) “is
concerned with national disparities among the many defendants with similar criminal backgrounds
convicted of similar criminal conduct.” United States v. Benson, 591 F.3d 491, 505 (6th Cir.
2010). Careful review of the applicable Guidelines range “necessarily [gives] significant weight
and consideration to the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 54. One of the
“central reasons” for adopting the Guidelines “was to ensure stiffer penalties for white-collar

22
crimes and to eliminate disparities between white-collar sentences and sentences for other crimes.”
United States v. Peppel, 707 F.3d 627, 638-39 (6th Cir. 2013).

Another interesting takeaway from the government’s examination of national

federal public corruption cases is that the defendant presents a nearly unique case. Of the more
than 80 convicted defendants, only two other corrupt public officials faced a Guidelines range of
life. And significantly, each received substantial sentences: George Grace, the former Mayor of
St. Gabriel, Louisiana, was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment while Donald Hill, a former
City of Dallas Councilman, was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment. See Exhibit B.

Not surprisingly, all of these objective metrics support the government’s sentencing
recommendation and are consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements
regarding public corruption offenses. The Sentencing Commission has made it clear that public
corruption offenses should be punished significantly. In recent years, while there has been a shift
towards reducing federal sentencing guidelines (e.g., Guidelines amendments reducing the offense
level for crack offenses and increasing the dollar elements in the § 2B1,1 loss table in order to
reduce the applicable loss enhancement), public corruption is one type of crime that the Sentencing
Commission has done the reverse. Indeed, in 2004, the Sentencing Commission increased the
offense levels applicable to bribery and extortion offenses. See U.S.S.G. Manual app. C
(Amendment 666). In doing so, the Commission stated, in relevant part:

This amendment increases punishment for bribery, gratuity, and

“honest services” cases while providing additional enhancements to
address previously unrecognized aggravating factors inherent in
some of these offenses. The amendment reflects the Commission’s
conclusion that, in general, public corruption offenses previously
did not receive punishment commensurate with the gravity of such
offenses. . . . The higher alternative base offense levels for public
officials reflect the Commission’s view that offenders who abuse
their positions of public trust are inherently more culpable than those
who seek to corrupt them, and their offenses present a somewhat
greater threat to the integrity of governmental processes.

Id. The significant Guidelines range reflects the considered judgment of the Sentencing
Commission, and is the product of the Commission’s stated belief that lenient sentences for public
corruption defendants do not adequately reflect the “gravity of such offenses.” Id. Accordingly,
the Court should give the Guidelines range careful consideration as “the starting point and the
initial benchmark” for the appropriate sentence in this case. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49.

IV. The Defendant Owes Restitution and Forfeiture

It is well established that restitution and forfeiture are separate, mandatory

obligations of a defendant at sentencing. See United States v. Torres, 703 F.3d 194, 203 (2d Cir.
2012) (upholding an order for forfeiture and restitution because each serves a different purpose:
forfeiture is meant to interfere with criminal activity and provide an economic deterrence to crime,
while restitution is meant to compensate victims); United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 169 (2d

23
Cir. 2010) (there was “no infirmity in the District Court’s imposition of both a forfeiture and
remedy and a restitution remedy. These remedies are authorized by separate statutes, and their
simultaneous imposition offends no constitutional provision.”). The defendant is liable for both
obligations as a result of his crimes.

A. The Court Should Order Restitution

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”) provides for mandatory

restitution to victims of certain crimes, including conspiracy to commit federal program bribery
and honest services wire fraud and related substantive counts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c). “The
primary and overarching goal of the MVRA is to make victims of crime whole, to fully compensate
thee victims for their losses and to report these victims to their original state of well-being.” United
States v. Quarshi, 634 F.3d 699, 703 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
see also United States v. Pescatore, 637 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2011) (full amount of restitution
must be ordered without regard to defendant’s economic circumstances).

To that end, the MVRA requires defendants convicted of covered offenses to

“reimburse the victim for lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses
incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at
proceedings related to the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4). A victim’s attorneys’ fees are
among the types of “other expenses” that may be included in such a restitution order where they
are “necessary” and “incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense
or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.” United States v. Amato, 540 F.3d 153, 161
(2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4)). The statutory terms “investigation,”
“prosecution, and “proceedings” refer to government investigations and criminal proceedings (not
private investigations victims may choose to conduct on their own). See Lagos v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (2018).

“Generally, this Circuit takes a broad view of what expenses are ‘necessary.’”
United States v. Maynard, 743 F.3d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 2014). A district court has “broad discretion
to determine restitution” and must make a “reasonable estimate” of the actual loss “based on the
evidence before it.” United States v. Milstein, 481 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007).

Here, Phoenix Life Insurance Company is the victim of the defendant’s bribery
scheme and is owed restitution. Following years of litigation, some of which is ongoing, Phoenix
Life Insurance Company is the victim of the defaulted loans and suffered losses in excess of
$11,000,000. (See PSR ¶ 62.) Counsel for Phoenix Life Insurance has been provided with an
Affidavit of Loss and will return a completed, sworn affidavit detailing its losses, to the Court in
advance of sentencing.

B. The Court Should Order Forfeiture

In accordance with Rule 32.2, the government previously provided notice to the
defendant of its intent to seek forfeiture in the event of his conviction. Fed. R. 32.2(a); ECF Dkt
Nos. 1, 92, 309. In this regard, the applicable statutory provision mandates the forfeiture of all
property constituting or derived from proceeds traceable to the crimes of conviction. 18 U.S.C.

24
§ 981(a)(1)(C). Moreover, under established Second Circuit precedent, the forfeiture may take the
form of a money judgment. See United States v. Awad, 598 F.3d 76, 69 (2d Cir. 2010).

By motion, dated April 4, 2019, the government moved for forfeiture of (1) one
Black and Silver Panerai Brand Luminor 44mm watch, and (2) the entry of a forfeiture money
judgment in the amount of $526,606.95. See ECF Dkt. Entry No. 409. This motion was
unopposed.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the government’s April 2019 application,
this Court should enter the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture provided to the Court concurrent with
that application.

V. Conclusion

For all the reasons set forth herein, the government recommends a sentence of (i)
the statutory maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment on Count One, (ii) the statutory
maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment on Count Two, and (iii) no less than 210 months’
imprisonment on Counts Three, Four and Seven, concurrent on each count. In addition, the Court
should impose restitution in the full amount of the victim’s losses, forfeiture of the Panerai Brand
Luminor 44mm watch, and a forfeiture money judgment in the amount of $526,606.95. Such a
sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of sentencing. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

Respectfully submitted,

BREON PEACE
United States Attorney

By: /s/
Catherine M. Mirabile
Christopher C. Caffarone
Lara Treinis Gatz
Assistant U.S. Attorneys
631-715-7850

25