Undertaken at a time when European security is under stress,

Conventional Arms Control – A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking?

this study analyses the preconditions for a new conventional
arms control regime. To this end, the military-political interests of
Russia, the US and selected European countries are examined with
regard to three principal questions: What are the major security
policy goals for Russia, the US and European states? Which are
the prevailing military-political considerations in these countries’
pursuit of those goals? And how do the interests and policies of the
respective states dovetail with a renewed focus on conventional
arms control and confidence- and security-building measures?

There is an underlying tension between the diplomatic interest of

dialogue and negotiation on the one hand and the hard military
security interests of states on the other hand. At present, the
prospects for negotiations on a new conventional arms control
regime are slim. No changes are to be expected as long as the two
major players – Russia and the US – remain on the fringes of the

Gudrun Persson (ed.)

dialogue.

Conventional Arms Control

A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking?

Johan Engvall, Gudrun Persson (ed.), Robert Dalsjö,

Carolina Vendil Pallin and Mike Winnerstig

FOI-R--4586--SE

ISSN1650-1942 www.foi.se April 2018

Johan Engvall, Gudrun Persson (ed.), Robert
Dalsjö, Carolina Vendil Pallin and Mike Winnerstig

Conventional Arms Control

A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking?

FOI-R--4586--SE

Title Conventional Arms Control – A Way

Forward or Wishful Thinking?

Report no FOI-R--4586--SE
Month April
Year 2018

Pages 84
ISSN 1650-1942
Customer UD/Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Forskningsområde 8. Säkerhetspolitik

Project no B12515
Approved by Lars Höstbeck
Ansvarig avdelning Försvarsanalys

Cover: The OSCE works in conflict prevention and resolution, facilitating settlements of conflicts
and promoting peacebuilding and post-conflict rehabilitation. (Copyright: OSCE/Evgeny
Maloletka).

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This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729).
Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond
what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI.

2
 FOI-R--4586--SE

Sammanfattning
Finns förutsättningar för en ny rustningskontrollregim i ett europeiskt
säkerhetspolitiskt klimat präglat av misstro och konfrontation? För att bidra med
en samlad bild av läget analyserar denna studie de militärpolitiska intressena hos
Ryssland, USA och valda europeiska stater avseende tre övergripande frågor:
Vilka är de huvudsakliga säkerhetspolitiska målsättningarna för Ryssland, USA
och europeiska stater? Vilka militärpolitiska överväganden bestämmer hur
länderna söker främja dessa mål? Sammanfaller dessa intressen med ett förnyat
fokus på rustningskontroll och militärt förtroendeskapande?
Studiens huvudsakliga slutsatser kan sammanfattas i följande punkter:
 Ryssland anser att den allomfattande säkerhetsordningen favoriserar
euro-atlantiska organisationer. Ryssland verkar i stället för ett system
baserat på stormakters privilegierade intressesfärer, vilket i praktiken
betyder ett ryskt veto mot fortsatt Natoutvidgning.
 USA värnar rådande regelverk och överenskommelser och pekar på
Rysslands aggressiva beteende som grundproblemet för säkerheten i
Europa. Rustningskontroll är således enbart meningsfull som del av en
regelbaserad säkerhetsordning.
 Det finns en underliggande spänning mellan diplomatiska intressen av
dialog och förhandling och hårda militära säkerhetsintressen.
 En västlig linje betraktar de olösta territoriella konflikterna i Rysslands
närområde som kärnproblemet i den europeiska säkerhetskrisen.
 En andra västlig utrikespolitisk linje ser avspänning som möjlig om
diskussionerna kring rustningskontroll och militärt förtroendeskapande
separeras från de olösta territoriella konflikterna.
 Östersjöregionen framträder i ett militärstrategiskt perspektiv som ett
centralt område, en brännpunkt i konfrontationen mellan Ryssland och

3
FOI-R--4586--SE

Väst. Regionen har blivit en spelplan för de konkurrerande intressen

som önskar se antingen upprustning eller rustningskontroll som svar på
den ökande spänningen.
 Ryssland har två tydliga militärstrategiska prioriteringar i
Östersjöregionen: begränsa Natos möjligheter att tillföra stridskrafter
till regionen, samt säkra att icke-Natoländerna i regionen även fortsatt
står utanför alliansen.
 För de tongivande västmakterna är Östersjöregionen viktig för Natos
trovärdighet. 2016 års beslut om en förstärkt framskjuten närvaro (eFP)
är ett sätt att återförsäkra utsatta medlemmar om den samlade alliansens
stöd.
 De baltiska länderna och Polen, men även Finland, har som gemensamt
intresse att säkerheten kring Östersjön förblir förankrad i en
allmäneuropeisk säkerhetsordning.
 Intresset för förhandlingar om rustningskontroll är i rådande läge svalt
bland de flesta stater. Så länge de två nyckelaktörerna – Ryssland och
USA – ställer sig avvisande till diskussioner om rustningskontroll ter
sig utsikterna för att nå ett genombrott små.
Incitamenten i dagens Europa skiljer sig från när existerande avtal förhandlades
fram. Dagens juridiskt och politiskt bindande dokument är i fara, inte minst
eftersom Ryssland uppfattar dem som ståendes i motsättning till ryska
säkerhetsintressen.

Nyckelord: Rustningskontroll, förtroendeskapande åtgärder, CFE-avtalet, Open

Skies, Wiendokumentet, Nato, Ryssland, europeisk säkerhet.

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 FOI-R--4586--SE

Summary
Undertaken at a time when European security is under stress, this study analyses
the preconditions for a new conventional arms control regime. To this end, the
military-political interests of Russia, the US and selected European countries are
examined with regard to three principal questions: What are the major security
policy goals for Russia, the US and European states? Which are the prevailing
military-political considerations in these countries’ pursuit of those goals? And
how do the interests and policies of the respective states dovetail with a renewed
focus on conventional arms control (CAC) and confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs)?
The main conclusions can be summarised as follows:
 Russia perceives the comprehensive and cooperative security order as
rigged in favour of Euro-Atlantic organisations. It is actively seeking to
establish an alternative order that would grant Moscow a sphere of
privileged interests in its ‘near abroad’. In practice, this implies a
Russian veto on further NATO enlargement.
 The US wants to uphold existing rules and agreements, and identifies
Russia’s aggressive behaviour as the root cause of the European
security problem. Arms control is, thus, only meaningful as long as it is
embedded in a rules-based security order.
 There is an underlying tension between the diplomatic interest of
dialogue and negotiation on the one hand and the hard military security
interests of states on the other hand.
 One Western line of thought perceives the unresolved territorial
conflicts in Russia’s neighbourhood as the source of the current
European security crisis.

5
FOI-R--4586--SE

 Another Western line believes that tensions between Russia and the
West can be reduced if discussions on CAC and CSBMs are
disentangled from the unresolved conflicts.
 The Baltic Sea region has emerged as a geopolitical focal point in the
stand-off between Russia and the West. The region has become the
subject of conflicting interests wishing to see either a military build-up
or a special arms control regime as the way to address current security
concerns.
 Russia has two military-strategic priorities in the Baltic Sea region: to
constrain NATO deployment of additional military forces to the region,
and to preclude the non-NATO members in the region joining NATO.
 For the major Western powers, the Baltic Sea region is crucial for the
credibility of NATO.
 The Baltic countries and Poland, as well as non-NATO member
Finland, share a common interest in ensuring that the security
arrangements for the Baltic Sea region remain firmly attached to the
overall European security order.
 At present, the prospects for negotiations on a new CAC regime are
slim. No changes are to be expected as long as the two major players –
Russia and the US – remain on the fringes of the dialogue.
The incentives in contemporary Europe are not the same as they were when
existing agreements were negotiated and adopted. Today’s legally and politically
binding documents are in danger, not least because Russia perceives them as
anathema to its national security interests.

Keywords: Arms control, confidence building measures, CFE Treaty, Open Skies
Treaty, Vienna Document, Nato, Russia, European security.

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Preface
Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and military aggression in eastern
Ukraine a climate of political-military distrust has taken hold of Europe.
Deterrence has returned. In response to the unstable and unpredictable security
environment, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier in
2016 proposed to re-launch a dialogue on conventional arms control and
confidence- and security-building measures in the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for the purpose of rebuilding trust and
cooperation.
Against this background, this study analyses the prerequisites for creating new
conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in a
European security environment characterised by the return of geopolitics and
confrontation. It is the result of an assignment from the Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The task was to study arms control and confidence- and
security-building measures, including Russian, European, and American
interests.
We are indebted to Johan Tunberger for his review of the draft report, to Keir
Giles who provided useful comments on Chapter 3, and to Eve Johansson who
language-edited and copyedited the text.

Gudrun Persson, deputy research director, editor

Stockholm, March 2018

7
FOI-R--4586--SE

Acronyms and abbreviations

A2/AD anti-access/area denial

ABM anti-ballistic missile

ACV armoured combat vehicles

ATTU Atlantic to the Urals

BMD Ballistic Missile Defence

CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany)

CAC conventional arms control

CFE Treaty Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CSBMs Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

CSCE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization

eFP enhanced Forward Presence

EDI European Deterrence Initiative

ERI European Reassurance Initiative

EST European Security Treaty

EU European Union

GDP gross domestic product

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 FOI-R--4586--SE

HFA Helsinki Final Act

HNSA Host Nation Support Agreements

INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

JCG Joint Consultative Group

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OS Treaty Open Skies Treaty

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Paris Charter Charter of Paris for a New Europe

PEP Panel of Eminent Persons

PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation

PMDA Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement

SPD Social Democratic Party (Germany)

TLE treaty-limited equipment

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UK United Kingdom

US United States

Vienna Document Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building

Measures

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FOI-R--4586--SE

VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

WP Warsaw Pact

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Contents
Preface…... .. .……………………………………………………………………….7
Acronyms and abbreviations ........................................................................... 8

1 Introduction 13

2 Anatomy of existing OSCE instruments 17

2.1 The Steinmeier initiative .................................................................. 17
2.2 Comprehensive and cooperative security in the OSCE .................. 20
2.3 CAC and CSBMs in Europe ............................................................ 21
2.3.1 CFE Treaty .................................................................................. 22
2.3.2 Open Skies Treaty....................................................................... 24
2.3.3 Vienna Document ........................................................................ 25

3 Russian interests 28
3.1 Russian security goals .................................................................... 29
3.2 Russian military-strategic considerations ........................................ 32

4 US interests 39
4.1 US security priorities for Europe ..................................................... 40
4.2 US military interests in Europe ........................................................ 43
4.3 The US and the existing CAC and CSBM agreements ................... 45

5 European interests 49
5.1 Germany .......................................................................................... 49
5.2 France ............................................................................................. 52
5.3 The United Kingdom ........................................................................ 53
5.4 Poland ............................................................................................. 55
5.5 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania .......................................................... 57
5.6 Finland ............................................................................................. 59

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6 Conclusions 63
6.1 Security policy goals ....................................................................... 63
6.2 CAC and CSBMs in times of confrontation ..................................... 64
6.2.1 Territorial conflicts ....................................................................... 66
6.2.2 The Baltic Sea region .................................................................. 67
6.2.3 Way forward or wishful thinking? ................................................ 68

7 References 71

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1 Introduction

Johan Engvall, Gudrun Persson, Robert Dalsjö, Carolina Vendil Pallin and
Mike Winnerstig

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and military aggression in eastern Ukraine

have put European security in peril. In the place of cooperative security, a new
political-military climate filled with distrust has taken hold in Europe. Deterrence
has returned with states focusing on rebuilding their conventional military
capabilities and increasing spending on weapons, equipment, training and troops.
In response to the unstable and unpredictable security environment, German
Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2016 proposed to re-
launch a dialogue on conventional arms control (CAC) and confidence- and
security-building measures (CSBMs) in the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) for the purpose of rebuilding trust and cooperation.1
Since neither NATO member states nor OSCE participating states had been
consulted in advance, the proposal was rather cautiously received among the
OSCE’s 57 participating states. During the autumn of 2016, the proposal was
channelled into a broader compromise – the Hamburg Declaration – in which the
OSCE’s participating states “committed to launching a structured dialogue on
security and arms control”.2 Thus, the structured dialogue has emerged as a
compromise in a situation where existing multilateral agreements are struggling
to handle current security realities.3 In an additional German-led initiative,
several European states joined forces in establishing a group of like-minded
states – a parallel dialogue format devoted to supporting the re-launch of CAC in
Europe. In a joint declaration, the like-minded states highlighted “an urgent need

1
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “More security for everyone in Europe: A call for a re-launch of arms
control,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 August 2016,
http://www.osce.org/cio/261146?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).
2
The decision on launching a structured dialogue was taken at the OSCE Ministerial Council
meeting held in Hamburg on 8 and 9 December 2016. See OSCE, “From Lisbon to Hamburg:
Declaration on the twentieth anniversary of the OSCE framework for arms control,” 9 December
2016, http://www.osce.org/cio/289496?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).
3
European Leadership Network, “Making conventional arms control fit for the 21st century,” 8
September 2017, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/making-conventional-arms-control-
fit-for-the-21st-century_5080.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

13
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to re-establish strategic stability, restraint, predictability and verifiable

transparency and to reduce military risks”.4
The task at hand is to address both long-term and short-term challenges. In a
long-term perspective, the key challenge is to maintain a sustainable, robust and
predictable European security order. The more immediate concerns relate to how
to handle the escalating tensions between Russia and the West, manifested, for
example, by growing distrust and militarisation in certain geographical flashpoint
areas, including the Baltic Sea region.
The purpose of this study is to analyse the prerequisites for creating new CAC
and CSBMs in a European security environment characterised by the return of
geopolitics and confrontation. To this end, the bulk of the report is devoted to
mapping and analysing the interests and policies of Russia, the US, the three
major European powers – Germany, France and the UK – as well as five EU
member states bordering Russia in the Baltic Sea region – Poland, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania and Finland. Specifically, the study addresses the following
principal questions. What are the major security policy goals for Russia, the US
and European states? Which military-political considerations prevail in these
countries’ pursuit of those goals? And how do the interests and policies of the
respective states dovetail with a renewed focus on CAC and CSBMs?
The examination of the countries is delimited to aspects that have bearing on
European security in general and the potential role of CAC and CSBMs in
particular. From a time perspective, the study emphasises the evolution of
policies following the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014.
That said, in order to paint a clear picture and focus on the states’ main security
priorities, the authors occasionally take a longer post-Cold War perspective.
The study is based on open sources, primarily official government documents
and speeches. There are, however, variations among the national governments
examined, both in degree of openness and in level of detail, in their discussions
on European security, military priorities and CAC and CSBMs. Therefore,
complementary information on aspects not directly, or only summarily, treated in
official documents and speeches has been gathered from research reports, policy
papers and media reporting.
The study starts out by providing a review of CAC and CSBMs in Europe against
the backdrop of the Steinmeier proposal and the challenges confronting the
OSCE’s comprehensive and cooperative security order. The origins and basic
tenets of the three principal instruments in the field of CAC and CSBMs – the

4
“Ministerial declaration by the foreign ministers of the like-minded group supporting a relaunch of
conventional arms control in Europe,” Press release, 25 November 2016,
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/Newsroom/161125-erkl-freundesgruppe-konv-
ruestungskontrolle-europa/285610 (accessed 19 February 2018). Initially, the like-minded group
consisted of 14 European countries. As of early 2018, the group had expanded to 22 states

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 FOI-R--4586--SE

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Open Skies (OS)
Treaty and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures in Europe – are briefly described as well as the problems besetting
each of them. The second and major part of the study consists of three chapters
dealing with the security policy goals, military considerations and positions on
CAC and CSBMs of Russia, the US and selected European states. The
concluding chapter fleshes out the principal differences between and similarities
among the states, and discusses the implications for CAC and CSBMs.

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 FOI-R--4586--SE

2 Anatomy of existing OSCE

instruments

Johan Engvall

The current unpredictable security landscape of Europe contrasts with the post-
Cold War vision of a united, peaceful Europe built around democratic states
committed to specific cooperative principles enshrined in the major OSCE
documents. Equally striking is the divergence from the late Cold War period,
when existing CAC and CSBMs were negotiated, drafted, and signed. This
chapter provides an overview of the Steinmeier proposal and some concrete
suggestions that it spawned in the fields of CAC and CSBMs. It also traces the
evolution of the OSCE’s comprehensive and cooperative security order as the
framework for ordering relations among its participating states. Against this
backdrop, the chapter discusses the role of CAC and CSBMs in the post-Cold
War security architecture in Europe, with a particular emphasis on dissecting the
anatomy of these instruments.

2.1 The Steinmeier initiative

When Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, launched
his proposal for reviving CAC in August 2016, it represented an attempt to
reduce tensions and rebuild trust and cooperation between Russia and the West.
Since then, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has actively tried to put
forward several ideas in its bid to enhance the relevance of CAC and CSBMs for
European security. Much of this work goes back to five key areas identified in
Steinmeier’s initial proposal: regional limitations in militarily sensitive regions
such as the Baltic Sea region; new military capabilities and strategies; the
integration of new weapon systems, such as UAVs; flexible and independent
verification mechanisms; and applicability in disputed territories.5 Of these five
areas, re-tailoring CAC and CSBMs and designing special sub-regional measures
for the Baltic Sea region have received the most attention from German
policymakers and analysts, suggesting the need for closer examination of these
ideas.

5
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “More security for everyone in Europe: A call for a re-launch of arms
control,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 August 2016,
http://www.osce.org/cio/261146?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

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FOI-R--4586--SE

Several German analysts have introduced the concept of so-called status-neutral

security for areas troubled by unresolved conflicts. This notion was originally
developed in the context of the Georgian breakaway territories Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, but appears to be seen as applicable to the situation in Ukraine as
well. Since agreements on CAC and CSBMs are non-functioning in these
conflict regions, there is a high degree of uncertainty about the activities and
capacities of military forces stationed in these territories. The argument is,
therefore, that special CAC and CSBMs should be developed that are applicable
to conflict regions, irrespective of their political status.6 This position indicates
that local conflicts cannot be allowed to impede general progress on CAC and
CSBMs; in fact, according to this line of thinking, work on CAC and CSBMs
should be isolated from unresolved conflicts and even “refrain from prejudging
eventual political solutions”.7
Another idea casts arms control as increasingly important for crisis management.
This novelty, first raised in an edited volume based on a conference on CAC in
Berlin in 2015, entails an applicability of CAC and CSBMs that expands beyond
the traditional focus on military predictability, confidence-building and conflict
prevention to encompass conflict management as well. This idea stems in part
from the limited, but still continuing, inspections and monitoring flights
conducted in the early phase of the war in Ukraine under the Vienna Document
and the Open Skies Treaty.8 This is not just an academic exercise, for the 2016
White Paper on German Security Policy subsequently incorporated the idea of
arms control as an increasingly important instrument of crisis management.9
There are also suggestions that conflict regions could be linked to the concept of
third-party verification. The purpose of third-party verification mechanisms is to
permit “effective verification that is rapidly deployable, flexible and independent
in times of crisis (e.g. carried out by the OSCE)”.10 For example, a 2016 report
from the Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP) on European Security as a Common
Project – created by the OSCE to promote an inclusive and constructive security
dialogue across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions – identifies an
empowered “OSCE with a more authoritative and institutionalised neutral

6
For a recent policy report on the theme produced by the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), see
Sergi Kapanadze, Ulrich Kühn, Wolfgang Richter and Wolfgang Zellner, “Status-Neutral Security,
Confidence-Building and Arms Control Measures in the Georgian Context,” CORE Working
Paper 28, Hamburg, January 2017.
7
Wolfgang Richter, “Return to Security Cooperation in Europe: The Stabilizing Role of
Conventional Arms Control,” Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 11, September 2017, 13.
8
Wolfgang Zellner (ed), Conventional Arms Control in Europe: New Approaches in Challenging
Times, Hamburg: CORE Working Paper 26, September 2015.
9
Germany, Federal Government, White Paper 2016: On German Security Policy and the Future of
the Bundeswehr, 2016, 82.
10
Steinmeier, “More security for everyone in Europe.”

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verification capacity as a way of building trust”.11 A concept note to the OSCE

Security Days in October 2016 also noted approvingly the suggestion that “an
institutionalised mechanism for military inspections under the OSCE Secretariat”
be established.12 This initiative suggests that there is currently a problem with
verification, and that an impartial verification mechanism could improve the
effectiveness and legitimacy of military inspections. If it is implemented, a
supranational team of OSCE experts would thus take over military inspections
from national inspectors. In this light, initiatives along the lines of establishing
new types of impartial verification mechanisms, designed and implemented
under the auspices of the OSCE rather than the participating states, would
portend a controversial debate on supranational versus intergovernmental
approaches to CAC and CSBMs in the OSCE.
Steinmeier’s proposal devoted special attention to the need to “define regional
ceilings, minimum distances, and transparency measures (especially in militarily
sensitive regions such as the Baltic)”.13 Since then, several German analysts have
argued explicitly for introducing limits on military capabilities in the Baltic Sea
region.14 Overall, the idea of sub-regional arms control in the Baltic Sea region
has lacked conceptual clarity, leading some countries to fear that it essentially
implies a regionalisation of security, i.e. that the region would be detached from
the general European security framework. The positions of those countries
directly affected by such measures – the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland –
are detailed in chapter 5 which discusses European states. It suffices here to note
that the idea of the Baltic Sea region as a testing ground for alleviating tensions
between NATO and Russia would have far-reaching consequences for the
countries in the region.

11
OSCE, Panel of Eminent Persons, “Renewing Dialogue on European Security: A Way Forward.
Report on outreach events of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common
Project in 2016,” 23 November 2016, http://www.osce.org/networks/291001?download=true
(accessed 19 February 2018).
12
OSCE, Security Days, “Revitalising military confidence-building, risk reduction and arms control
in Europe,” 29 August 2016, http://www.osce.org/sg/261456?download=true (accessed 19
February 2018).
13
Steinmeier, “More security for everyone in Europe.”
14
See for example Volker Perthes and Oliver Meier, “A Baltic Test for European Arms Control,”
Project Syndicate, 15 February 2017, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nato-russia-
baltic-security-dialogue-by-volker-perthes-and-oliver-meier-2017-02?barrier=accessreg (accessed
19 February 2018); Wolfgang Richter, “Sub-regional arms control for the Baltics: What is
desirable? What is feasible?” Deep Cuts Working Paper, No. 8, July 2016.

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2.2 Comprehensive and cooperative security in

the OSCE
In the historical process of building comprehensive and cooperative security for
Europe, the first major codified step was the signing of the Helsinki Final Act
(HFA) of 1975. This founding document, signed by 32 nations, represented the
culmination of a decade of negotiations to contain the negative military and
geopolitical tensions of the Cold War. It came into existence during a period of
relative stability, when both the Eastern and the Western blocs had accepted the
status quo. The general security environment was thus antagonistic, but with a
lowest common denominator of avoiding the outbreak of war between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact (WP) and stabilising the status quo. While both sides
acknowledged that profound differences remained, particularly in the political
and military spheres, there were incentives for striking an agreement. In this
grand bargain, the West acknowledged continued Soviet supremacy in the East in
exchange for increased military and political transparency, as well as cooperation
in commercial, cultural and scientific fields. Consequently the overall
relationship was unbundled into three so-called “baskets”: military and political;
economic; and human rights. Since then the OSCE’s broad and comprehensive
approach to security has incorporated these three complementary and equally
important dimensions.15
An intermediate step forward occurred during the Stockholm Conference of
1984–1986, when participating states in the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) concluded negotiations on a set of CSBMs designed
to promote openness about and predictability of military activities in Europe.16
Again, the main purpose was to reduce the risk of armed conflict on the
European continent.
In 1990, the second major step was taken with the adoption of the Charter of
Paris for a New Europe (Paris Charter) as well as the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document 1990. Compared to the two
previous documents – negotiated within the framework of an antagonistic
division between East and West – the approach this time around was distinctly
positive. The aim was to dismantle the Cold War confrontational line of thinking
and establish a “Europe whole, free and at peace”. After the end of the Cold War,
the European security order has rested on the idea that: “Co-operation is
beneficial to all participating states while the insecurity in or of one participating

15
OSCE, “The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security: An Overview of
Major Milestones,” 17 June 2009, 1, http://www.osce.org/secretariat/37592?download=true
(accessed 19 February 2018).
16
Document of the Stockholm Conference, 1986, 19 September 1986,
http://www.osce.org/fsc/41238?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

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state can affect the well-being of all.”17 Thus, cooperative security presumes that
states would cooperate towards the common goal of security. In the OSCE
context, the crux of the matter is that security is indivisible: “the security of each
state of our region is inextricably linked with the security of every other state”.18
More than 25 years later, the comprehensive and cooperative security order can
no longer be taken for granted. Russia’s activities in Georgia and Ukraine
amount to a fundamental challenge to the acquis of European security. Instead of
cooperative security, Russia sees its own privileged right to a sphere of interests
that balances the West. In response to an increasingly unpredictable adversary,
the West is returning to a focus on strengthening collective defence. While the
OSCE responded to the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine by deploying a
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the overall antagonistic environment
raises the question of whether the role of the OSCE as a forum for building
common security remains as obvious as it once was.19 The attempt to re-launch
negotiations on CAC and CSBMs could be interpreted as a step in reviving the
OSCE’s role in European security. Challenges abound. The core matter in
dispute, however, is whether a dialogue on CAC and CSBMs, with an eye on
future negotiations, can be detached from fundamental disagreements on how to
organise relations between states.

2.3 CAC and CSBMs in Europe

Existing CAC and CSBM instruments originated as a response to the Cold War
military balance between East and West at a time when Europe was possibly the
most heavily militarised continent in the world. The massive concentration of
forces during this period raised fears of the risk of military invasion and a general
war in Central Europe. From a Western perspective, this was particularly
worrisome in the light of the inferiority of NATO’s conventional capabilities in
comparison to those of the WP, especially on the ground. In the interconnected
fields of CAC and CSBMs, three principal documents have been at the heart of
the European security order over the past quarter of a century: the CFE Treaty,
the OS Treaty and the Vienna Document. An examination of each of these
instruments is therefore in order.

17
OSCE, “The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security,” 1.
18
OSCE, “The Indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic Security,” Secretary General Marc Perrin de
Brichambaut. 18th Partnership for Peace Research Seminar, Vienna Diplomatic Academy, 4
February 2010, http://www.osce.org/sg/41452?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018). See
also OSCE, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris 19-21 November 1990, 5,
https://www.osce.org/mc/39516?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).
19
Stefan Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis,” Carnegie
Europe, September 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_249_Lehne_OSCE.pdf
(accessed 19 February 2018).

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2.3.1 CFE Treaty

Often referred to as the “cornerstone of European security”, the CFE Treaty was
negotiated during the final years of the Cold War, and was signed on 19
November 1990 by 22 countries included in the NATO and WP. Since both the
WP and the Soviet Union broke up shortly afterwards, 30 countries ratified the
treaty in 1992. The CFE Treaty regulates the possession and location of five
categories of heavy military equipment, so-called treaty-limited equipment
(TLE) – battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery pieces,
combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Geographically, the treaty covers a zone
from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU). The basic principle behind the CFE
Treaty was to limit the quantities and locations of weapons for the purpose of
reducing the risk of surprise attacks and concentration of forces. The regime set
equal ceilings for the two blocs and introduced geographical restrictions,
including flank zone ceilings to avoid the concentration of troops along the
borders of the two alliances.20 Compliance was assured through a comprehensive
set of intrusive verification measures emphasising on-site inspections. Taken
together, the central pillars of reductions, information exchanges and verification
made the CFE Treaty an integral part of shifting the European security
environment away from insecurity and distrust to cooperation and confidence-
building. The importance of the CFE Treaty in changing military security in
Europe can hardly be overestimated. It radically reduced tensions and dismantled
heavy military equipment. It also introduced a level of transparency that would
have been unimaginable at the height of the Cold War. By 2013, the CFE Treaty
had contributed to the elimination of more than 72,000 pieces of military
equipment, more than 5,500 intrusive on-site inspections and detailed exchange
of data.21
Following the break-up of the WP and the Soviet Union, it became clear that the
treaty needed adjustment to the post-bloc political reality in Europe. A new
Adapted CFE Treaty was subsequently negotiated and signed in Istanbul in 1999.
The adapted treaty replaced the bloc ceilings with specific national and regional
ceilings on military equipment, and raised expectations of the CFE Treaty
turning into a true pan-European regime. Such hopes, however, failed to
materialise as the agreement on adaptation never entered into force. Western
states rejected ratification on the ground that Russia had failed to adhere to the

20
James M. Acton, Low Numbers: A Practical Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2011, 42.
21
Jacek Durkalec, “Rethinking Conventional Arms Control in Europe: A Transparency-Centred
Approach,” Strategic File No. 7, September 2013, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1,
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/169601/PISM%20Strategic%20File%20no%207%20(34).pdf
(accessed 19 February 2018).

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so-called “Istanbul commitments” – politically binding pledges by Moscow to

withdraw its forces and equipment from the territories of Moldova and Georgia.22
Meanwhile, Russia became ever more critical in its appraisal of the fit between
the CFE regime and the political and strategic reality in Europe.23 Issues drawing
the ire of Moscow included NATO enlargement, the American plans for Ballistic
Missile Defence (BMD) systems in Eastern Europe and the independence of
Kosovo.24 Russia has also insisted on the need to renegotiate treaty limitations in
the flank zones, which it sees as undermining Russia’s security close to its
borders, especially in the south, but also along its northern flank. Those CFE
state parties directly affected by the elimination of such restrictions – primarily
Turkey, but also Norway – have rejected this demand. Russia further felt that the
value of the CFE Treaty was severely circumscribed by the facts both that
several European countries remain outside the treaty and that others, apart from
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, never ratified the Adapted CFE Treaty. In 2007,
Russia unilaterally suspended its application of the CFE Treaty. Ever since,
Moscow has refused to provide data and information, and has taken no part in the
treaty’s inspection regime. Moscow decided to suspend its participation despite
the fact that there was no clause in the treaty that would allow this. As a
countermeasure, NATO members ceased to implement certain CFE Treaty
obligations vis-à-vis Russia. In 2015, Russia also decided to withdraw its
participation from the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), the body in Vienna
dealing with questions relating to compliance with the CFE Treaty, leaving its
representation to Belarus while maintaining its veto as a state party.25 Despite the
unravelling of the CFE process, remaining state parties are implementing the
obligations stipulated in the treaty as a sign of good faith.26

22
Ulrich Kühn, “Conventional Arms Control 2.0,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26, no. 2
(2013), 191.
23
Zdzislaw Lachowski, “The CFE Treaty one year after its suspension: a forlorn treaty?” SIPRI
Policy Brief, January 2009, 4, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRIPB0901.pdf
(accessed 19 February 2018).
24
Jeffrey D. McCausland, “The Future of the CFE Treaty – Why It Still Matters,” EastWest
Institute, 2009, 4,
http://scholar.dickinson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1323&context=faculty_publications
(accessed 19 February 2018).
25
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Dogovor ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh
silakh v Evrope (DOVSE). Kontrol’ nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v Evrope,” 6 July 2017,
http://www.mid.ru/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola-nad-vooruzeniami/-
/asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/1137833 (accessed 19 February 2018).
26
U.S. Department of State, “2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” 14 April 2017,
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2017/270330.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).

23
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2.3.2 Open Skies Treaty

A group of 27 states created the OS Treaty – a decision to open their airspace to
unarmed flights to collect data on military forces and activities on the territories
of other signatories of the treaty – in March 1992. After a lengthy ratification
process, partly due to an initial inclination in some Russian political and military
circles to perceive the treaty as a potential tool of reconnaissance and espionage,
the OS Treaty entered into force on 1 January 2002.27 Shortly thereafter, eight
additional states joined as parties, among them Sweden, Finland and the Baltic
states. The geographical area of application of the OS Treaty extends beyond that
of the CFE Treaty by incorporating North America and Siberia. The stated
purpose of the OS Treaty is to employ “a regime to improve openness and
transparency, to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future
arms control agreements and to strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention
and crisis management in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe and in other relevant international institutions”.28 The OS
Treaty introduced unprecedented openness of territorial access, and facilitated
cooperation, since countries can conduct joint overflights and are obliged to
share information from the flights equally between observing nation and
observed nation, thereby preventing the monopolisation of information.29
According to calculations by the US State Department, as of mid-July 2017,
1,377 flights had been conducted under the agreement.30
For nearly a decade, implementation of the OS Treaty was generally not a
problem. However, the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, subsequently leading to
Russia formally recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states,
changed the situation. In 2010, Moscow began to deny observation flights over
Russian territories adjacent to the two breakaway regions. After 2014, the US in
particular has identified a number of compliance issues that affect the
implementation of the treaty. In a 2017 public report, the US criticised Russia for
expanding the restriction of areas where OS aircraft can conduct observations.
Besides the Russian borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, limits also apply
to some areas of south-west Russia, the Kaliningrad region and Moscow. In
addition, the US has raised compliance concerns in relation to the alleged
Russian habit of invoking the concept of force majeure (event beyond state

27
For an account of the negotiation and implementation of the OS Treaty, see Ernst Britting and
Hartwig Spitzer, “The Open Skies Treaty,” in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., Verification
Yearbook 2002 (London: Vertic, 2002), 223–238.
28
OSCE, Treaty on Open Skies, 1, http://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true (accessed 19
February 2018).
29
Pál Dunay, Márton Krasznai, Hartwig Spitzer, Rafael Wiemker and William Wynne, Open Skies.
A Cooperative Approach to Military Transparency and Confidence Building, Geneva: United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2004, xiii.
30
U.S. Department of State, “2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.”

24
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control) in a manner deemed disingenuous in 2014 and 2015.31 Russia has

refuted the compliance concerns, labelling them “stereotyped allegations”.32
Over time, the relative value of the technical component of retrieving data from
overflights has declined due to new technology enabling the collection of more
sophisticated data from satellite photos. Despite recent struggles, the OS Treaty
remains in place and fulfils a useful function primarily as a CSBM.33

2.3.3 Vienna Document

The Vienna Document on CSBMs was originally created in 1990, and since then
it has been revised in several rounds (1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011). The document
builds on the HFA first “basket” dealing with military relations as well as the
CSBMs developed in the Document of the Stockholm Conference 1986. It is the
essential OSCE document on CSBMs, and constitutes an integral part of the
organisation’s all-encompassing approach to security as first outlined in the HFA
and subsequently confirmed in the Paris Charter and the Istanbul Charter for
European Security. The overall spirit of the Vienna Document, as formulated in
Paragraph 2, emphasises “the duty of the participating states to refrain from the
threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international
relations in general”.34 Politically but not legally binding, the agreement’s most
significant contribution to European security lies in enhancing military
transparency among the 57 OSCE member states. Its provisions include
exchange of military information and details of defence policy and expenditure,35
and enabling inspection and observation of certain military activities, including
rules for notification of exercises and new deployments (at least 9,000 troops)
and rules for observation of certain military activities (exceeding 13,000
troops).36

31
U.S. Department of State, “2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.”
32
Lee Ferran, “How the US Says Russia Is Cheating in the ’Open Skies’, Code and Dagger, 16
August 2017, https://codeanddagger.com/news/2017/8/16/how-the-us-says-russia-is-cheating-in-
the-open-skies (accessed 19 February 2018).
33
U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “Open Skies Review Conference: Conventional Arms Control in
Europe in a Changing European Security Environment,” Closing remarks delivered by Under
Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller to the Open Skies Treaty
3rd Review Conference, Vienna, 10 June, 2015, https://osce.usmission.gov/closing-statement-by-
under-secretary-rose-gottemoeller/ (accessed 19 February 2018).
34
OSCE, Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 30 November
2011, https://www.osce.org/fsc/86597?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).
35
For an analysis of the Vienna Document’s use of military expenditure data as a CSBM, see Bent-
Göran Bergstrand, “Using Military Expenditure Data as a Confidence and Security Building
Measure: The UN and OSCE Experience,” Paper presented at the Third Nordic Military
Symposium 12–13 November 2013, Oslo.
36
OSCE, Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.

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Over the past decade, starting with the Russian aggression against Georgia in
2008, both the EU and the US have argued that Moscow has violated several
basic OSCE security principles, including sovereignty, inviolability of borders,
territorial integrity, non-use of force, non-interference, military transparency,
fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law and states’
freedom of choice of security arrangements. Regarding the obligations specified
in the Vienna Document, Russia continues to withhold information on its
military forces located in the separatist regions of Georgia, as well as on units in
Crimea. Its selective implementation of the provisions in the Vienna Document
also includes non-reporting of three specific types of military equipment
deployed in the zone covered by the document.37 Another worrying trend is
Russia’s routine use of no-notice large-scale snap exercises close to its borders
with other states; such snap exercises, without notification to the troops, are
exempted from the Vienna Document’s transparency requirements. Regarding
planned large-scale exercises, according to NATO officials, Russia has declared
every single military exercise since 1991 to be below the Vienna Document’s
numerical threshold of 13,000 troops, thus managing to avoid ever allowing
inspections or observation of an exercise.38 In order to reinvigorate the Vienna
Document, the EU and the US initiated a concerted modernisation effort in 2016,
which failed to materialise due to Russian opposition.39 Russian representatives
blame NATO countries for failing to adhere to existing CSBMs and insist that
the proposal to upgrade the Vienna Document does not make sense as long as
NATO increases its military deployments next to the Russian border. Moreover,
a modernised Vienna Document would only be of value if accompanied by
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty, Russia says.40
Among researchers and practitioners there is usually a consensus that strong
treaty regimes rest on three pillars: a consensus on the need to prohibit or limit
certain types of weapons or military activities; a legally binding document signed
by the parties concerned; and robust verification mechanisms. Thus, to
summarise this chapter, Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty, the growing

37
These are the BRM-1K armoured combat vehicle (ACV), the Su-30SM multi-role fighter and the
Ka-52 attack helicopter.
38
Teri Schultz, “Nato voices skepticism over size of Russia’s military exercise,” Deutsche Welle, 14
September 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/nato-voices-skepticism-over-size-of-russias-zapad-
military-exercise/a-39682346 (accessed 19 February 2018).
39
European Union, “EU Statement on reissuing the Vienna Document 2011”, OSCE Forum for
Security Co-operation, No. 834, Vienna, 9 November 2016,
http://www.osce.org/fsc/281371?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018); U.S. Mission to the
OSCE, “Reissuing the Vienna Document 2011,” 17 November 2016,
http://www.osce.org/fsc/282846?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).
40
See for example Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Statement by Anton
Mazur, Head of the Russian Delegation to the Vienna Negotiations on Military Security and Arms
Control, at the session of the annual OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, Vienna, 29 June
2016,” No 1272-05-07-2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2344591 (accessed 19 February 2018).

26
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number of compliance concerns regarding the OS Treaty and the failure of the
attempt to reissue the Vienna Document illustrate how all three instruments are
undermined in at least one of those components. Against this background, the
following chapters turn attention to how Russia and Western states view the role
of CAC and CSBMs in addressing European security problems.

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3 Russian interests

Carolina Vendil Pallin

In the early 1990s Russia nursed hopes that the OSCE would develop into a
substitute for NATO. As it became clear that these aspirations were unrealistic,
Russia became increasingly pessimistic about the OSCE as a forum for achieving
its security interests. Although Russia remains a signatory to the documents that
underpin the OSCE, it has increasingly sought to pursue a realist political-
military agenda while resisting the normative framework of the OSCE.41 That
Russia was dissatisfied with the post-Cold War European security order and with
the OSCE became clear with Vladimir Putin’s speech in Munich in February
2007. He called for a rethinking of the “architecture of global security” and
stated that: “People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument
designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries.”42
One of Russia’s geostrategic goals in Europe was clearly to prevent further
accessions to NATO.
Russia suspended its participation in the CFE in April the same year and in 2015
also suspended its participation in the Joint Consultative Group, claiming that it
did not live up to “present realities”,43 most importantly the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact. Russia’s proposal for a legally binding European Security Treaty
in 2008 was channelled into the OSCE Corfu Process (a step-by-step dialogue on
the future of European security) rather than being embraced by the EU member
states.44 Mounting Russian dissatisfaction with the OSCE thus perhaps explains

41
Elena Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki
Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23, no. 1 (2015),
6–24; Elena Kropatcheva, “Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A ‘Forum’ for
Dialogue or a ‘Battlefield’ of Interests,” European Security 21, no. 3 (2012), 370–94; Bobo Lo,
Russia and the New World Disorder, London: Chatham House, 2015, 74.
42
Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security
Policy,” 10 February 2007, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 (accessed 19
February 2018).
43
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Director of the Department for Non-
Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov’s interview with Interfax, 11 March 2015, No.
424-11-03-2015, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/obycnye-vooruzenia/-
/asset_publisher/MlJdOT56NKIk/content/id/1090147 (accessed 19 February 2018).
44
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Statement by Mr. Vladimir Voronkov,
Director of the Department of Pan-European Co-Operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Russia, at the Joint Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-Operation and the OSCE
Permanent Council,” OSCE, FSC-PC.DEL/28/09, 9 September 2015,
http://www.osce.org/fsc/38654 (accessed 19 February 2018).

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why Russia’s initial reaction to the Steinmeier initiative was less than
enthusiastic.45
In order to understand what Russia’s position is likely to be in talks on CAC as
well as its approach to CSBMs it is necessary, first, to examine Russia’s general
security policy goals; and, second, to take into account the military-strategic
considerations that prevail in Moscow.

3.1 Russian security goals

According to Russia, the world order is no longer one where the US dominates
the system. It has developed into a multipolar system where Russia is one of the
poles, with its own geopolitical sphere of interest. Thus, when Russia talks about
equality in international relations, it refers to equality among equals, among the
poles of the international system, a “global oligarchy”. It does not envisage an
order where small states have a say equal to that of the leading powers.46 Russia
wants to gain recognition for having a sphere of interest in its near
neighbourhood, including the final say in which security policy choices these
countries are allowed to make.
In spite of its waning power, the US remains the most important point of
reference for Russia – not least to shore up its own great-power status. It
measures itself against the US and it treasures each high-level bilateral meeting
as a way of demonstrating that Russia has regained its rightful position in the
world. Moscow is moreover convinced that Washington in particular is pursuing
a policy aimed at containing Russia and that Europe more or less follows the lead
of the US.47 Russia’s concerns when it comes to any arms control talks thus
begin and end with the country’s relationship with the US and with NATO. This
is also one of the reasons why Russia insists that the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) should be accepted as a counterpart to NATO, since it
would boost Russia’s status.

45
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii i
pechati MID Rossii v sviazi so statei Ministra inostrannykh del FRG F.-V. Shtainmaiera,
opublikovannoi v gazete ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zietung’ 26 avgusta 2016 goda,” No. 1533-05-
09-2016, 5 September 2016, http://www.mid.ru/obycnye-vooruzenia/-
/asset_publisher/MlJdOT56NKIk/content/id/2422300 (accessed 19 February 2018).
46
Lo. Russia and the New World Disorder, 180.
47
Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, Strategiia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 31 December 2016, §12,
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document133/ (accessed 19 February 2018); Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 30
November 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 (accessed 19 February 2018). See also
Vladimir Putin’s Valdai speech, “Zasedanie Mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba ‘Valdai’,”
19 October 2017, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882 (accessed 19 February 2018).

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When Russia discusses security in Europe, it will often refer to the NATO-
Russia Founding Act from 1997 and especially the paragraph that states that the
alliance commits itself to carry out its collective defence without “additional
permanent stationing of substantial combat forces”, and accuses NATO of
having violated this pledge. The caveat that the NATO commitment was made
“in the current and foreseeable security environment” is usually not mentioned
by Russia; nor is the final sentence, which states: “Russia will exercise similar
restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.”48 Thus, in its 2016
Foreign Policy Concept, Russia points to the “military restraint obligations in the
NATO-Russia Founding Act”, but also expresses its dismay at NATO expansion
as well as NATO’s “growing military activity in regions neighbouring Russia”.49
A Russian study has, moreover, pointed to the need to define what constitutes
“substantial combat forces” as a possible concrete measure to discuss in the
OSCE framework. It went on to state that the current rotation of NATO forces
comes in at over brigade strength (5,000), a ceiling for both sides proposed by
Russia in 2008 for the forces allowed to be deployed along each other’s (NATO-
Russia) borders.50 This would extend the NATO-Russia Founding Act pledge to
rotating forces as well as permanent ones, while not addressing pertinent issues
such as what would be “similar Russian constraint” or the geographical
parameters of “along the borders” for NATO and Russia respectively.
Increasing Russian displeasure with the EU’s growing influence in Russia’s near
neighbourhood as well was behind Russia’s bid for the legally binding European
Security Treaty (EST) in 2008. Among the main principles that Russia wanted
enshrined were non-interference in countries’ internal affairs and not allowing
“military alliances to evolve to the detriment of the security of other parties to the
Treaty”.51 Russia was signalling its discontent with the European security order
as it had evolved after the end of the Cold War. The EST was a demand for the
European security architecture to be revised to take Russia’s interests into
account in what it considered its exclusive sphere of interest. More specifically,
Russia wanted a veto against NATO accession for additional countries in
Russia’s near neighbourhood.52

48
NATO, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the
Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).
49
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2016), §70.
50
Viktor I. Mizin, “Budushchee kontrolia nad vooruzheniiami v Evrope,” in Alexei Arbatov and
Natalia Bubnova (eds), Bezopasnost i kontrol nad vooruzheniiami 2015–2016: Mezhdunarodnoe
vzaimodeistvie v borbe s globalnymi ugrozami, Moscow: IMEMO RAN; ROSSPEN, 2016, 137.
51
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Statement by Sergei Lavrov. The
Challenges of ‘Hard Security’ in the Euro-Atlantic Region. The Role of the OSCE in Establishing
a Stable and Effective Security System,” OSCE, PC.DEL/480/09, 23 June 2009,
http://www.osce.org/cio/37721?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).
52
Richard Sakwa, Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017, 142.

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On the heels of the war in Georgia in August 2008, then President Dmitrii
Medvedev thus spoke of Russia’s neighbouring states as regions where Moscow
considered itself to have privileged interests.53 Russia expected to have a say not
only in which alliances these states would be allowed to enter into, but also in
which economic and political international frameworks they adhered to –
preferably without having to bear the costs of empire.54 Therefore, any of these
states signing a deep free trade agreement with the European Union increasingly
became a red line. In Russia’s view, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine signing
association agreements with the EU diminished Russian influence and trade
opportunities. Perhaps even more importantly, it undermined the possibilities of
pushing these countries into Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Union, and in a longer-
term perspective, Russia considered closer cooperation with the European Union
as a step towards NATO accession.
There is little reason to expect Russia to change its position on Crimea or other
so-called “frozen conflicts” such as those in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Transnistria. The frozen conflicts offer useful leverage in the region and a
forward military presence while at the same time making NATO accession
unlikely. The political stand-off between Russia and the West on these conflicts
will therefore be protracted.55 It is furthermore important to understand that
Russia’s influence in its neighbouring countries constitutes an asset in domestic
politics. Putin’s statement that “Crimea shall unite Russia” still stands. It would
be difficult, not to say impossible, for Russia’s political leadership to back down
from its policy on the near neighbourhood in general and Crimea in particular
without undermining its political legitimacy at home.56
The need to build military strength has come to dominate over other policy areas
in Russia in recent years, and not only in budget terms. When it comes to
decision making on arms control the centre of gravity is most likely not the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Rather, arms control issues are coordinated and
hammered out between ministries and government agencies in the Security
Council, where the Ministry of Defence, including the General Staff, has the

53
Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, “Interviu Dmitriia Medvedeva rossiiskim
telekanalam,” 31 December 2008, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1276 (accessed 19
February 2018).
54
Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder, 102ff.
55
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Zaiavlenie rukovoditelia Delegatsii
Rossiiskoi Federatsii na peregovorakh v Vene po voprosam voennoi bezopasnosti i kontrolia nad
vooruzheniiami A. Iu. Mazura na plenarnom zasedanii Sovmestnoi konstultativnoi gruppy po
Dogovoru ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Evrope,” No. 414-10-03-2015, 10 March 2015,
http://www.mid.ru/obycnye-vooruzenia/-/asset_publisher/MlJdOT56NKIk/content/id/1089925
(accessed 19 February 2018). See also Russia’s official position on these conflicts in the Foreign
Policy Concept 2016, §§56–59.
56
Jakob Hedenskog, Gudrun Persson and Carolina Vendil Pallin, “Russian Security Policy,” in
Gudrun Persson (ed.), Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016, Swedish
Defence Research Agency 2016, FOI-R--4326--SE, 97–132.

31
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final say partly by virtue of its expertise in the area. It is unlikely that other
agendas, such as the need to reduce international tensions, would be allowed to
overshadow the military one in the near future.
Russia and the West are unlikely to find agreement on what constitutes
comprehensive security or to converge on what the OSCE’s normative agenda
should be. Russia would like to see less emphasis on the human rights dimension
of security enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. To Russia, democracy promotion
is another way to undermine Russia’s political system, an undue interference in
Russia’s internal affairs. Russian official texts and statements highlight the need
to prevent democratic revolutions (so-called colour revolutions) and the
establishment of regimes hostile to Russia in its neighbourhood.57 Democratic
revolutions are even framed as an integral part of contemporary warfare.58
Another area of domestic politics and debates that can have international
repercussions is the growing emphasis on sovereignty, and more specifically
Russia’s sovereignty vis-à-vis international treaties that it has ratified. In July
2015, Russia’s Constitutional Court ruled that it considered the Russian
Constitution “hierarchically superior” to the rulings of the European Court of
Human Rights.59 Article 15 in the Russian Constitution upholds the supremacy of
international law and so far it is only the interrelationship between Russia’s
constitution and rulings in Strasbourg that has been challenged. However, high-
ranking Russian officials have also suggested that the principle of supremacy of
international law should be reconsidered or modified more generally.60

3.2 Russian military-strategic considerations

Russia’s approach to the Steinmeier initiative is very much one of sitting back to
wait and see how Germany’s allies react to it – the very same allies “whose

57
See, for example, paragraph 43 in the 2015 National Security Strategy, Strategiia natsionalnoi
bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 31 December 2015, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/4039 (accessed
19 February 2018). See also Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Spheres of Interests, not Influence,” The
Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009), 12.
58
Gudrun Persson, “The War of the Future: A Conceptual Framework and Practical Conclusions
Essays on Strategic Thought,” Russian Studies, no. 3, NATO Defense College, 2017, 6ff,
http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1078 (accessed 19 February 2018).
59
Lauri Mälksoo, “Russia’s Consitutional Court Defies the European Court of Human Rights –
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Judgement of 14 July 2015, No. 21-П/2015,”
European Constitutional Law Review, no. 12 (2016), 386. See also Alexander Filippov, “National
Interest and International Law,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2 (2015),
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/National-Interest-and-International-Law--17548 (accessed 19
February 2018).
60
Mälksoo, “Russia’s Constitutional Court Defies the European Court of Human Rights”; Filippov,
“National Interest and International Law.”

32
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efforts brought the dialogue on conventional arms control to a standstill and froze
it” according to Russia.61
The 2016 Foreign Policy Concept states that Russia “strictly abides by its
international arms control obligations” and that it “participates, on the basis of
the principles of equal rights and indivisible security, in devising new arms
control agreements that serve Russia’s national interests and contribute to
strategic stability”.62 The emphasis is on nuclear arms control, but there is one
paragraph devoted specifically to CAC in Europe and it reiterates Russia’s
condition that “present realties” must be taken into account:
In the context of efforts to strengthen regional stability in Europe, the Russian Federation
seeks to bring the conventional arms control regime in Europe in line with present realities,
as well as ensure unconditional compliance by all States with the agreed confidence and
security-building measures.63

When it comes to both CAC and CSBMs, Russia repeatedly states that present
realities should be taken into account – referring not least to the fact that the CFE
Treaty was agreed upon before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (WP). Since
then, Russia argues, former members of the WP have joined NATO, thereby
radically changing Russia’s military-strategic position. In addition, the reference
to “present realities” has become Russian shorthand for arguing against further
accessions to NATO as well as against additional NATO military reinforcements
on the territory of the alliance members in Russia’s immediate neighbourhood.
While Russia would like to see restrictions on future alliance reinforcements, it
has not proved willing to discuss similar limitations for Russian forces on its own
national territory. Writing in 2018, Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Moscow
Carnegie Center, noted that “the Kremlin still regards NATO deployments close
to the Russian border as nonthreatening”, but also that geopolitical realities had
to be accepted and “serious military buildups” avoided. In addition, he
highlighted that Russia will not “accept limitations on its forces deployed on the
national territory”.64 This draws attention to one of the basic realities that any
future CAC agreement would have to take into account and spell out, namely
who the antagonists are, who are the parties to a future treaty. In the CFE Treaty,
there were two blocs. This is no longer the case, and certainly from a Russian
perspective the antagonist is NATO – an alliance. A treaty that would allow
Russia to move its forces on Russian territory but restrict movement of forces

61
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Kommentarii Departamenta
informatsii…”
62
Foreign Policy Concept (2016), §27:a, d.
63
Foreign Policy Concept (2016), §30. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, “Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii…”
64
Dmitri Trenin, “Avoiding U.S.-Russia Military Escalation During the Hybrid War,” U.S.-Russia
Insight, Moscow: Carnegie, January 2018, 5–7,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Trenin_Hybrid_War_web.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

33
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between NATO member states would be beneficial to Russia and limit NATO’s
range of manoeuvre considerably. Indeed, it would undermine the very idea of a
military alliance. Likewise, a treaty or even a gentlemen’s agreement not to allow
additional military build-ups would cement the present asymmetrical advantage
that Russia has vis-à-vis individual European countries along its borders.
Russia is convinced that a strong military is key to its national security. Since
2008, when it launched a military reform, it has increased its military capability
considerably. It more than doubled its military spending between 2005 and 2015
and allowed its military burden to increase, reaching 5.4 per cent in terms of
military spending as a share of GDP in 2015.65 The increase in military spending
was primarily geared towards modernising weapons and equipment, something
that has resulted in an overall increase in Russian military capability. Russia has
thus reached a position where it can use its military instrument to attain political
goals and it has proved itself ready to do so in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in
2014.
Russia’s military exercises tell us that Russia is preparing for a large
conventional war and for a war that could involve all of society. Russian military
exercises have grown in size and become more complex. In addition, the frequent
exercises and not least the large readiness exercises (often referred to as snap
exercises) have created a new “normal” – including in the Baltic Sea region. The
effect is that neighbouring states will have reduced warning time to prepare for a
possible military conflict.
All in all, Russia has strengthened its military position in Europe. It has
developed a military instrument that can be used for coercion without going into
battle through its superiority in numbers compared to any individual state in its
immediate neighbourhood. This is an asymmetry that Russia can exploit.66
Another asymmetry that Russia can exploit is what is usually referred to as
“hybrid warfare” in Western analyses. There is a wealth of terms for this
approach, as well as interpretations of what it encompasses. It typically refers to
an operational strategy that incorporates different elements of warfare – military
and non-military, special operations as well as nuclear rhetoric – in order to reach
the political goal at hand.67

65
Susanne Oxenstierna, “Russian Military Expenditure,” in Gudrun Persson (ed.), Russian Military
Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016. Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016,
FOI-R--4326--SE, 133–150.
66
Fredrik Westerlund and Johan Norberg, “The Fighting Power of Russia’s Armed Forces in 2016,”
in Gudrun Persson (ed.), Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016, Swedish
Defence Research Agency 2016, FOI-R--4326--SE, 67–96.
67
Tatiana Anichkina, Anna Péczeli and Nickolas Roth, “The Future of US-Russian Nuclear
Deterrence and Arms Control,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 4 (2017), 272.

34
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Russia is well aware that a full-scale open military confrontation with NATO
would have disastrous consequences. It would therefore probably be careful not
to use its military instrument to coerce at a level that makes it obvious that
Article 5 should be invoked within NATO. It could do so, for example, by using
tools that are more ambiguous than a clear-cut military invasion or by
establishing a new reality on the ground before NATO has been given the
necessary time to react. It could also test the willingness of the members of the
alliance to rally to the military defence of a small country on its geographical
outskirts.
The Russian grievances during the failed process to establish an adapted CFE
Treaty as well as official statements and security documents provide valuable
insights into what elements Russia would like to see included in a CAC treaty
and what constitutes “present realities” in its view.68 From a geostrategic
perspective, Russia wants to prevent further NATO enlargement or the Alliance
strengthening its position where it is already established. Russia’s Military
Doctrine lists a number of “military dangers”, most importantly that “military
infrastructure of the NATO member states” is coming ever closer to Russia’s
borders.69 In other words, CAC in Russia’s view would ideally be linked to it
having a veto on NATO enlargement, especially in its immediate neighbourhood,
and an embargo on additional US military bases, including US missile defence
(BMD). This is probably included in the reference to “military infrastructure”.
Achieving this would be de facto proof of Russia’s great-power role
internationally – something that in turn would also be hard currency in regime
survival domestically.
From a military-technological perspective, Russia has concerns when it comes to
US capabilities in the sphere of long-range high-precision conventional weapons.
Russia argues that these conventional weapons could come to undermine
strategic stability as Moscow defines it70 and has repeatedly voiced objections to
the US development of BMD as well as the Prompt Global Strike concept and
deployment of strategic conventional high-precision systems, all of which are

68
Anatolii Antonov and Rodion Aiumov, “Kontrol nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope –
konets rezhima ili istoriia s prodolzheniem?” Nauchnye zapiski Pir-tsentra, no. 1 (2012), Moscow:
Pir Center, 37–45.
69
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, §12. Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 25
December 2014. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/ (accessed 19 February
2018).
70
Persson, “The War of the Future,” 9–10. On the link between high-precision weapon systems and
nuclear strategic arms, see also Anichkina, Péczeli and Roth, “The Future of US-Russian Nuclear
Deterrence and Arms Control,” 275.

35
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designated main military dangers in Russia’s Military Doctrine.71 The Foreign

Policy Concept states that Russia is in favour of “constructive cooperation with
the US in arms control”, but also underlines that further strategic reductions “are
only possible when taking into account all factors affecting global strategic
stability” including BMD.72 At times Russia also points to other capabilities,
such as unmanned aerial vehicles and cyber warfare, and would also like to
include naval capabilities in CAC.73
Russia has established a strategic forward position through its bilateral military
collaboration with Belarus. This is also Russia’s only access by land to the
increasingly militarised Kaliningrad region, and even then only through a strictly
regulated approach over Lithuanian territory. To Russia, Kaliningrad is both a
military-strategic asset in the Baltic Sea region and a liability.74 Russia has
concentrated considerable capabilities for stand-off warfare in the region, but the
exclave could prove difficult to defend in a military conflict.
Russia does not, as a rule, talk of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), but its
military analysts are well aware of the existence of this Western concept.75
Building up a considerable ability to dispute access to the sea and air space in the
Baltic Sea and other strategic regions was a clearly stated goal when the Chief of
the General Staff, Valerii Gerasimov, spoke at an open collegium at the Ministry
of Defence in November 2017. According to Gerasimov, high-precision
weapons, such as ships with Kalibr cruise missiles and Bastion coastal missiles
as well as the S-400 air defence system, would be key to strengthening Russia in
strategically important regions such as the Baltic Sea, the Barents Sea, the Black

71
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, §12. Russia claims to have developed air defence
systems that can intercept hypersonic missiles (e.g. the S-500), but the consistent and strongly
voiced protests against US missile defence nevertheless suggest that this remains a main concern
for Russia. See, for example, RIA Novosti, “Voennyi ekspert rasskazal, chem RF otvetit na
narashchivanie sistemy PRO SShA,” 13 October 2017,
https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171013/1506749723.html (accessed 19 February 2018); RIA
Novosti, “Voennyi ekspert rasskazal o sposobe zashchity ot globalnogo udara SShA,” 13 October
2017, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171013/1506774540.html (accessed 19 February 2018).
72
Foreign Policy Concept (2016), §73.
73
Albert Zulkharneev and Evgenii Buzhinskii, “Kontrol nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope
ne dolzhen uviazyvatsia s politicheskimi voprosami,” Nasha Gazeta, 17 March 2014,
http://nashagazeta.ch/print/17336 (accessed 19 February 2018).
74
Fredrik Westerlund, “Russia’s Military Strategy and Force Structure in Kaliningrad,” RUFS
Briefing, no. 40, FOI Memo 6060, May 2017,
https://www.foi.se/download/18.bc6b81b15be852194d71d/1494413062692/RUFS%20Briefing%2
0No%2040%20Kaliningrad%20by%20Fredrik%20Westerlund.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).
75
Mizin, “Budushchee kontrolia nad vooruzheniiami v Evrope,” 129.

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Sea and the Mediterranean.76 To this should be added not only the deployment of
Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, but also increased capabilities for electronic
warfare.
In addition to the concerns present in the Military Doctrine, the importance that
Russia attaches to this was further emphasised in Putin’s annual address to
Parliament in March 2018, when the development of Russian weapons to counter
Western technologically advanced systems constituted a key message.77
Russia will remain sensitive to NATO strengthening its military force posture in
northern Poland (especially if it takes the form of US reinforcements), in the
Baltic Sea region as a whole, or in, for example, Romania in the Black Sea
region.78 Efforts to block an increased US presence and an overall NATO
military build-up as well would therefore ideally be part of a treaty on CAC from
a Russian perspective as well as guarantees that non-aligned states in Europe are
blocked from acceding to NATO. Consequently, Russian specialists have put
forward the idea of “additional [CAC] measures in sub-regions”,79 something
that could give Russia the advantage of arguing for specific ceilings to prevent
NATO from deploying additional forces to the Baltic Sea region, for example, if
political tensions quickly increased.
It is difficult to discern a coherent Russian agenda on CSBMs. Dangerous
incidents that could escalate into a military conflict between NATO and Russia
are not in Moscow’s interest. Viktor Mizin from the Russian Institute of World
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) has pointed to such risks as
especially potent in the Baltic and Black Sea regions and suggested using some
of the practices agreed upon along the contact line in Syria for these regions as
well.80 On an official level, the demand that CSBMs must reflect “present
realities” is again a frequent theme. This applies also to the Vienna Document,
which according to a former head of the Department for International
Cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Evgenii Buzhinski, should

76
Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, “Vystuplenie nachalnika Generalnogo shtaba
Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii – pervogo zamestitelia oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii
generala armii Valeriia Gerasimova na otkrytoi zasedanii Kollegii Minoborony Rossii 7 noiabria
2017 g.”,
https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12149743@egNews&_print=true
(accessed 19 February 2018).
77
Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Prezidenta
Federalnomu Sobraniiu,” 1 March 2018, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 (accessed
7 March 2018).
78
Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge,”
Survival 58, no. 2 (2016), 95–116.
79
PIR Center, “Perspektivy kontrolia nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope,” 5 May 2017,
http://pircenter.org/news/6914-perspektivy-kontrolya-nad-obychnymi-vooruzheniyami-v-evrope
(accessed 19 February 2018).
80
Mizin, “Budushchee kontrolia nad vooruzheniiami v Evrope,” 129, 139.

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undergo “thorough modification” and include naval forces.81 Russia has also
been active in pushing for CSBM measures on cyber security in a different track
inside the OSCE.82 It is also worth noting that in Dmitri Trenin’s analysis in
January 2018, Russia “can benefit from allowing some of its actions to be
ambiguous or unpredictable”.83
Political disagreements haunt talks on CSBMs as well. At the Moscow
Conference on International Security in 2016, Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated that the proposal from the West to modernise
CSBMs and increase transparency looked “strange” given that NATO was
talking about the need to contain Russia. As a necessary condition for talks on
CSBMs to be productive he said that the West must stop its “anti-Russian
course”.84 The statement underlines how technical matters quickly become
political in the current atmosphere of distrust that dominates Russian-Western
relations.

81
Zulkharneev and Buzhinskii, “Kontrol nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope ne dolzhen
uviazyvatsia s politicheskimi voprosami”. On the need for a modernisation of the Vienna
Document that takes “present realities” into account, see Mizin, “Budushchee kontrolia nad
vooruzheniiami v Evrope,” 139.
82
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Vystuplenie Zamestitelia Sekretaria
Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii O. V. Khramova na mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii
OBSE po kiberbezopasnosti, g. Vena, 3 noiabria 2017 goda,” 3 November 2017,
http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/rso/osce/-
/asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/2938933 (accessed 19 February 2018).
83
Trenin, “Avoiding U.S.-Russia Military Escalation”, 5.
84
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Vystuplenie Ministra inostrannykh del
Rossii S. V Lavrova na V Moskovskoi konferentsii po mezhdunarodnoi bezopasnosti, Moskva, 27
aprelia 2016 goda,” 27 April 2016, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2256120/pop_up?_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02B
w_viewMode=print&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_qrIndex=1 (accessed 19 February
2018).

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4 US interests

Mike Winnerstig

The United States and the Soviet Union dominated the European security sphere
for the entire Cold War period. For the United States, the Cold War endgame in
the late 1980s did not change this, as the US emerged as the only superpower and
thus became the major architect of post-Cold War-era security in Europe. The
US became a leading actor in all the peace and arms control treaties of the early
1990s, such as the 1990 CFE Treaty, that were the fruits of the end of the Cold
War. One aspect of this was the revamping of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe into the OSCE in 1995.
In parallel, the fate of Russia, the successor state of the Soviet Union, became a
US priority. Indeed, the US spent considerable energy on the so-called “Russia
First” policy of the administration of Bill Clinton (1993-2000), which aimed at
fostering a sense of friendship and partnership between the US and Russia.85
Even today, the Russian-US relationship is a major, and probably the most
important, dynamic in the field of European security. However, with the decision
to accept the applications for NATO membership of Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic in 1997, political-military relations between the Western allies –
including the US – and Russia started to deteriorate, as the Russian establishment
was firmly against NATO enlargement.
With the event of the George W. Bush administration in 2001, attempts were
made by both sides to improve the US-Russian relationship. After the terrorist
attacks on the US on 11 September that year, President Vladimir Putin expressed
strong support for the US and its actions against international terrorism. That also
changed, however, after the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty in 2002, as well as the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the
second major round of NATO enlargement in 2004. The latter entailed NATO
membership not only for former Warsaw Pact members but also for former
Soviet republics like the Baltic states, thus finally bringing them into the Western
fold which they had coveted for long. With the Russian invasion of Georgia in
2008, the US relations with Moscow got even worse.
However, the administration of Barack Obama (2009-2017) decided early on that
better relations with Russia were a major priority. Thus, the so-called “reset

85
This section is based on the discussion of the Russian-US relationship in Märta Carlsson and
Mike Winnerstig, Irreconcilable Differences: Analysing the Deteriorating Russian-US Relations,
Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016, FOI-R--427--SE.

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policy” with Russia was introduced in 2009, as was a number of changes to other
policies related to issues contested by Russian policymakers – such as the US
missile defence plans for Europe. This did not, however, help the overall US-
Russian relationship much, and after the Russian aggression against Ukraine and
the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 the Obama administration enforced
sanctions on Russia – in tandem with its European allies – and thus led the
bilateral relationship to even lower levels.
After having won the US presidential elections in 2016, Donald Trump set out on
a course explicitly directed at trying to make US-Russian relations better – in
ways not entirely dissimilar to the early Obama policies. This was also linked to
some election campaign statements by candidate Trump that were very
dismissive of NATO and the transatlantic relationship as a whole. All this caused
major concerns in Western Europe and rather high levels of optimism in the
Kremlin. In practice, however, the Trump administration policies related to
Europe, NATO and – in part – Russia have essentially been outsourced to the
secretaries of state and defence (at the time Rex Tillerson and James Mattis,
respectively) and to the White House National Security Council staff. These
actors seem to have a far more traditional view of the US role in European
security than the President. This entails clear support for NATO as an
indispensable alliance, because of the shared values between Europe and the
North American allies, and a very critical view of Russia.86
This means that at least so far into the Trump administration, the current US
policies toward Europe are remarkably similar to the earlier administrations’
policies. The US is essentially a status quo power in Europe, guarding the post-
Cold War security order and providing the means of protecting it, through NATO
and through an increasing American military posture on the continent.87 This has
meant that US-Russian relations so far, especially in the European and NATO
settings, have stayed fairly bad. This has not, however, affected issues of
strategic arms control such as the implementation of the New START Treaty of
2011. In conventional arms control, most aspects have been highly problematic
for years. This is not only due to state of the US-Russian relationship, but that
relationship plays a major role in it.

4.1 US security priorities for Europe

In the structured dialogue, the United States mission to the OSCE has repeatedly
communicated that there is nothing wrong with the acquis of the European

86
See Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, “The U.S. and Europe: Strengthening Western Alliances,”
remarks at the Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 28 November 2017,
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/11/276002.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).
87
See Fredrik Lindvall and Mike Winnerstig, Väpnad solidaritet: USA:s militära närvaro i Europa
fram till 2020, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2017, FOI-R--4428--SE.

40
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security order per se. According to the US, the most prominent principles of
European security – refraining from the threat or use of force, the territorial
integrity of states, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the equal rights and
self-determination of peoples – constitute what could be characterised as
inviolable principles, or the essence of the entire order. The problem is rather that
one particular state – Russia – is violating these principles. The following
statement from a US representative at the meeting in the structured dialogue in
September 2017 exemplifies the position:
The instability, uncertainty, and mistrust we see in Europe today is a direct result of the
assault on these core principles, principally by one participating State. Some say that
Europe’s security architecture is no longer valid; it’s outdated; it’s not relevant to the 21 st
century. We disagree. There is nothing wrong with European security structures and little
lacking in the OSCE’s principles and its acquis. The problem stems from the actions of a
select few that have disregarded these principles and enabled the resulting conflicts. We
need to hold those who undermine the OSCE’s principles accountable, not seek to rewrite
the core acquis of this Organization and the European security order. 88

On the road ahead, the US believes that it is crucial that the dialogue on current
and feature security threats should be open-ended, without preconditions,
preconceived conclusions or agendas driven by others than the participating
states.89 This could be interpreted as a firm US view on the structured dialogue as
an inter-state format. Possible attempts to take the process in a supranational
direction, under the auspices of for example the OSCE Secretariat, should
therefore be avoided.
The emphatic US endorsement of the comprehensive and cooperative European
security order means that the issues at stake go far beyond what can be addressed
by means of a new CAC or additional CSBMs. At a time when the basic
underlying principles of the European security order are threatened to the core,
CAC and CSBMs cannot be pursued in isolation from these broader security
ramifications. Putting it bluntly, arms control cannot deliver “respect for the
territorial integrity of neighbours; observance of the commitment not to use force
to resolve differences; or recognition that states have the right to choose their
futures and their alliances, and indeed whether to allow foreign forces on their

88
U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “U.S. Statement at Reinforced Meeting of the IWG on Structured
Dialogue. As delivered by Jorgan Andrews, Office of Eastern European Affairs,” 5 September
2017, https://osce.usmission.gov/u-s-statement-reinforced-meeting-of-the-informal-working-
group-on-structured-dialogue/ (accessed 19 February 2018).
89
U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “Developments of the Structured Dialogue. Remarks by Chargé
d’Affaires, a.i. Kate M. Byrnes to the Joint Meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation and the
Permanent Council,” Vienna, 5 July 2017,
https://osce.usmission.gov/structured_dialogue_development/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

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territory”.90 In short, CAC and CSBMs only fulfil a function in the context of a
rules-based order, in which key actors respect the basic rules of interaction.
Allowing CAC and CSBMs to take centre stage in the discussions would risk
diverting the dialogue from the major threat perceptions confronting European
security, according to US representatives. Such a scenario would also risk
duplicating or undermining work on these concrete issues already taking place in
the respective treaty implementation bodies. For example, modernising the
Vienna Document is a long-standing ambition of the US. To this end, the US
envisages a focused discussion in the Forum for Security Cooperation.91 As of
today, the most pressing problem in the field of CAC and CSBMs relates to the
sincerity of implementation. The US argues that Russia systematically
implements the treaties in a flexible manner that violates their intent. The US
message to the other OSCE participating states is clear: “It is not credible that an
exercise touted in the press as involving tens of thousands of troops was
conducted without prior notice to the troops involved. It is not credible that
activities involving complex military forces in the same time frame and the same
geographic space are not under a single operational command.”92
The perceptions communicated above naturally lead us into the issue of frozen
conflicts in Europe. The US laments Russia’s failure to fulfil its commitments
made at the 1999 Istanbul summit to withdraw its military forces from Georgia
and Moldova. Russia’s actions are in direct violation of the legal obligations of
the CFE Treaty, stipulating that there must be host state consent for the stationing
of foreign military forces. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggression in
eastern Ukraine further add to the list of instances of Russia’s lack of respect for
the sovereignty, integrity and freedom of choice of neighbouring states. In this
light “a new arms control negotiation will not help solve hardest security issues
we face in Europe today, notably in Ukraine. Rather, we need the political will to
insist that violations of basic principles – like military attack on a neighbour –
have consequences for the perpetrator”.93 In sum, the US emphasises the intimate
connection between the general security order and specific military questions
related to CAC and CSDMs. From this point of view, concerns in the arms
control field can not be treated as technical matters, for they must be pursued in
tandem with a frank discussion on violations of the rules-based security order.

90
U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “U.S. Remarks for 3rd IWG Structured Dialogue meeting. Session II:
Arms control arrangements under the aegis of the OSCE: Is there a better way to handle
compliance?” As delivered by Chargé d’Affaires, A.I. Harry Kamian, 5 September 2017,
https://osce.usmission.gov/u-s-remarks-3rd-iwg-structured-dialogue-meeting/ (accessed 19
February 2018).
91
U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “U.S. Remarks for 3rd IWG Structured Dialogue meeting…”
92
U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “U.S. Remarks for 3rd IWG Structured Dialogue meeting…”
93
U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “U.S. Statement at Reinforced Meeting of the IWG on Structured
Dialogue…”

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4.2 US military interests in Europe

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine led the US administration to reverse the
trend of a declining US military presence in Europe. In June 2014 President
Obama launched the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) in order to assure the
European NATO allies of the US’s continued commitment to the continent’s
security. The budget of the ERI has steadily expanded from $789 million in 2016
to $3.4 billion for fiscal year 2017. The Trump administration’s budget proposal
for fiscal year 2018 envisaged an increase of 40 per cent, which brought funding
close to $4.8 billion.94 In 2017, the Trump administration shifted the name to
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). In 2018, the Trump administration’s
budget request for the EDI for fiscal year 2019 went up again, to a total sum of
$6.5 billion. This does not entail funding for additional basing of US troops, but
does include funding for an increase in the pre-positioned sets of heavy army
equipment – including new main battle tanks – on the European continent.95
Since its inception, the EDI initiative has funded Operation Atlantic Resolve, a
practical demonstration of the US commitment to collective defence. The
operation includes: increased rotational presence of military units from the US in
Europe; increased bilateral and multilateral exercises with the US and its
European allies and partners; improved military infrastructure in Europe;
enhanced pre-positioning of US equipment across Europe; and intensified US
efforts to build partner capacity regarding interoperability and cooperation.96 The
multinational training and security cooperation led by the US military are taking
place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.97
Atlantic Resolve means a significantly enhanced American military capability in
Europe, particularly on the ground.
The US commitment to Europe was further underlined with the decision at the
NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016 to establish a stronger allied military presence
in Eastern Europe, the so-called Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). The purpose
of NATO’s eFP in Eastern Europe, its biggest collective defence reinforcement
in a generation, “is to protect and reassure NATO’s Eastern member states of
their security”. It is thus a deterrence posture with the intent of signalling the

94
The funds for fiscal year 2018 represented an increase of 40% over the previous fiscal year’s
budget of US$3.42 billion. See Department of Defense, “European Reassurance Initiative.”
Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2018, May 2017,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_ERI_J-Book.pdf
(accessed 19 February 2018).
95
See Jen Judson, “Funding to deter Russia reaches $6.5B in FY19 defense budget request,”
Defense News, 12 February 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/02/12/funding-to-
deter-russia-reaches-65b-in-fy19-defense-budget-request/ (accessed 8 March 2018).
96
U.S. EUCOM, “European Reassurance Initiative Fact Sheet,” 5 January 2017.
97
U.S. Army Europe, “What is Atlantic Resolve?” The Official Homepage of the United States
Army Europe, http://www.eur.army.mil/AtlanticResolve/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

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strength of the transatlantic link as well as deterring future Russian aggression in

the region, including incursions into Ukraine.98 The US Army leads the Battle
Group Poland, stationed in Orzysz in north-east Poland. The Battle Group
consists of more than 1200 soldiers, primarily from the US Army Europe’s 2nd
Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany. The Battle Group arrived in Poland in
April 2017 and two months later participated in the US-led military exercise
Saber Strike in the Baltic countries and Poland.99
In this context, the concept of “substantial combat forces”, introduced in 1997,
should be mentioned (see also 3.1 above for a discussion of the Russian
interpretation of this concept).100 In March 1997, the North Atlantic Council
made a unilateral pledge against additional permanent stationing of substantial
combat forces. In a more developed form, this was included in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act a few months later. This was a way of mitigating Russian reactions
against the decision to enlarge NATO with former WP countries – Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Poland – that the alliance was planning to take at the NATO
Madrid summit in July 1997. However, the concept of “substantial combat
forces” was never quantified, nor explicitly related to the new members of
NATO only. In the context of the history of the negotiations of the Adapted CFE
Treaty, some analysts have concluded that the permanent stationing of a brigade
– some 5,000 troops – in any NATO country would not exceed the informal
understanding of what constitutes “substantial combat forces”. If this
interpretation is correct, the current troop deployment of roughly 1,200 troops in
each of the Baltic countries, on what is in fact a rotational rather than a
permanent basis, is way below that limit.
In sum, despite early fears of US interest in NATO and Europe waning under
President Trump, the administration’s line, thus far, has been rather traditionalist.
However, under the Trump administration, US representatives have been
increasingly vocal in pointing out that NATO member states need to meet the
target of spending 2 per cent of their GDP on defence.101

98
U.S. Army, “Enhanced Forward Presence,” 25 September 2017,
https://www.army.mil/standto/2017-09-25 (accessed 19 February 2018).
99
U.S. Army, John Strickland, “U.S. Army-led NATO Battle Group on deterrence mission in
Poland,” 25 September 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/193970/ (accessed 19 February 2018).
100
This paragraph is based on William Alberque, “‘Substantial Combat Forces’ in the Context of
NATO-Russia Relations,” Nato Defence College Research Paper 131, June 2016.
101
Mike Winnerstig, “USA,” in Krister Pallin (ed.), Västlig militär förmåga. En analys av
Nordeuropa 2017, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2018, FOI-R--4563--SE, 162.

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4.3 The US and the existing CAC and CSBM

agreements
It is fair to say that for many years the US has used the OSCE as a vehicle for
arms control issues, although the emphasis on the humanitarian dimension has
also always been strong. In practice, this currently entails US efforts that focus
on the 1990 CFE Treaty, the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies (on aerial inspections),
and the 2011 Vienna Document (on confidence and security building measures).
The US reports annually on adherence to and compliance with all these and other
arms control treaties and commitments. “Adherence to” indicates a non-legally
binding political treaty, whereas “compliance with” indicates a treaty which is
legally binding under international agreements. In terms of the special report on
compliance with the CFE Treaty, the 2017 report very clearly singles out Russia
as the primary country of concern for the US.102 This report was published in
January 2017, which means that it was prepared by the Obama administration but
may have been authorised by the Trump administration.
The US indicates in the report that the Russian 2007 “suspension” (quotation
marks from the original text) is in itself a major compliance concern. Russia, in
the view of the US, continuously violates the CFE Treaty, does not participate in
the CFE Treaty review conferences, and has stated that it will not resume
implementation of the treaty. On top of this, the report states that Russia’s
stationing of its own military forces on the territories of Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine – all signatories to the CFE Treaty – without the consent of these
countries constitutes a clear violation of the treaty itself. This has been met by
the US and its NATO allies, the report notes, with both diplomatic “engagement
at the most senior levels” (i.e. strong political pressure) and the continuation of
US and allied non-implementation of CFE obligations vis-à-vis Russia. In
practice, this means that neither the US nor the allies even try to inspect Russia
and its armed forces as expected by the Treaty provisions. This policy has been
in place since 2011.
Summarising the problems related to Russia, the 2017 report does not mince
words:
Russia’s “suspension” of Treaty implementation has seriously eroded the Treaty’s
verifiability, diminished the exchange of data and notifications, decreased transparency, and
undermined the cooperative approach to security that have been core elements of the
NATO‑Russia relationship and European security for more than two decades.103

102
The following builds on Department of State, “Compliance With the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe Condition (5) (C) Report,” January 2017,
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2017/270369.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).
103
Department of State, “Compliance With the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe…”

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The report furthermore states that Russia’s stationing of forces on the territory of
other states without their consent “destabilizes regional security and has further
eroded confidence and stability throughout Europe”.104 Altogether, given these
very frank formulations, it is most obvious that the United States considers
Russian actions in the field of conventional arms control as a matter of extreme
concern.
This impression is reinforced by another 2017 State Department report on arms
control, non-proliferation and disarmament. This report, published in April 2017,
covers all the major arms control treaties that the US is a party to, such as the
Geneva Protocol, the biological and chemical weapons conventions, the INF
(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty of 1987 and several others.105 The
report contains a comprehensive analysis of a number of problems related to
these treaties. In the first place, the US considers itself as adhering to and being
in compliance with all treaties and commitments it is party to. In the second
place, the report points to a number of other countries which in the US view
clearly are not in compliance with, or adhering to, a number of these
international treaties and agreements.
As usual, Russia is not the only country that the US addresses, but Russia still
emerges as by far the biggest problem on the global level. Besides the treaties in
focus here, the US State Department finds that Russia is in violation of the INF
Treaty, considers the Russian suspension of the 2000 Plutonium Management
and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) “concerning”, and states that it remains
“unclear” whether Russia is actually fulfilling its obligations regarding the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention.106
The criticism regarding Russian violations of the CFE Treaty in the January 2017
State Department report – as discussed above – is reiterated. This means by
extension that the Trump administration has accepted and underwritten the
Obama administration’s findings and conclusions in this context. Furthermore,
the April 2017 report also raises considerable concerns about Russian
compliance with the 1992 Open Skies (OS) Treaty.107 Finally, the US considers
Russia not to be adhering to a substantial number of principles of the 2011
Vienna Document on CSBMs. Primarily, the report concludes, the Russian
“selective implementation” of the Vienna Document provisions, leading to a loss
of transparency, limits the effectiveness of the CSBM regime itself.108

104
Department of State, “Compliance With the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe…”
105
See Department of State, “2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,”14 April 2017,
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2017/270330.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).
106
Department of State, “2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control…”
107
Department of State, “2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control…”
108
Department of State, “2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control…”

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All this means that the US considers Russia as either violating or otherwise in
some way not complying with or adhering to six out of the 11 major arms control
treaties and agreements that the Department of State oversees in this context. The
only treaties that Russia in the US view is not violating are those that deal with
strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons (including the 1925 Geneva
Protocol). It goes without saying that this is hardly an optimal starting point for
new arms control initiatives.
This problem was reflected in a major 2016 speech at an OSCE-related
conference on conventional arms control. The speaker was one of the top US
arms control actors within the Department of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Bruce Turner at the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and
Compliance. Turner initially outlined all the good sides and strengths of OSCE-
oriented arms control on conventional weapons since the 1990s. Quickly,
however, his speech turned into a strong indirect attack on Russian actions, very
much in line with the official reports analysed above. His conclusion was that
any new arms control initiatives are difficult even to contemplate:
How can we begin to address this situation when one participating State has illegally
annexed part of the territory of another participating State and is currently directly involved
in destabilizing the east of the same country – or, in more abstract terms, is actively
ignoring or contravening the very principles that would need to provide the basis for any
new conventional arms control effort?109

Within the OSCE, this does not necessarily imply a US position that all the arms
control treaties and agreements under its auspices are dead letters. They still
provide Europe with considerable stability and transparency in important fields.
But the fact that they increasingly do not include one of the two most important
actors in the entire space of arms and arms control in Europe – that is, Russia –
does make them much less effective in many ways. This is something that most
likely not will change very soon.

109
Bruce I. Turner, “Revitalizing Military Confidence-Building, Risk Reduction, and Arms Control
in Europe, Remarks at the OSCE Security Days: Roundtable on Re-launching Conventional Arms
Control in the OSCE Context,” Vienna, 3 October 2016.

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5 European interests

Johan Engvall

The changing security landscape in Europe has led the continent’s states to
formulate both common and individual policies to meet the new realities. On the
one hand, in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea, the EU has managed to
unite around sanctions on Russia and maintain them for more than three years.
On the other hand, the attempt to revive CAC and CSBMs to address the current
crisis has been differently received across European capitals. While some states
see dialogue and confidence-building as a potential way to re-establish trust and
cooperation, others perceive their interests as threatened by a policy of détente
and possible agreements with Russia at this point in time. This chapter maps the
general security policy goals and military-strategic interests of Germany, France,
the UK, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland in relation to CAC and
CSBMs.

5.1 Germany
The Steinmeier arms control initiative emerged in response to the question of
how to handle the crisis between Russia and the West. Within the German
political establishment there is, however, no consensus on whether this approach
is the preferred one. Divisions ran deep inside the 2013-2017 coalition
government, in particular between the Social Democratic Party (SPD)’s stance as
the party of peace and dialogue and the harder line represented by the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU).110 The Defence Ministry, led by the CDU, has
committed the German armed forces to NATO’s deployment of forces in the
Baltic states. For example, from 2017, as part of the NATO enhanced Forward
Presence (eFP) in the form of four multinational battalion-sized battle groups in
the Baltic countries and Poland, Germany has led the battle group in Lithuania.111
In contrast, the SPD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have led the dialogue
line towards Russia. In the words of Steinmeier, “security cannot be established

110
Justyna Gotkowska, “The German initiative for arms control: time for dialogue with Russia,”
OSW, 9 September 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-09-09/german-
initiative-arms-control-time-dialogue-russia (accessed 19 February 2018). These divisions are set
to continue since the same parties after lengthy negotiations agreed to form a new coalition
government following the German federal elections in September 2017.
111
NATO, “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” Fact sheet, May 2017,
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf (accessed
19 February 2018).

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by working against each other”, and in times of difficult relations with Russia
“we need more not less dialogue”.112 In short, there is a dividing line, or perhaps
a division of labour, between the Federal Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry,
resulting in a Russia policy that combines deterrence with dialogue.
The White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr,
released in July 2016, represents an attempt to reconcile deterrence with dialogue
in defining Germany’s security policy interests in the wake of Russia’s
annexation of Crimea. This document confirms the dual nature of German
security policy by explicitly calling for a strategy that combines credible
deterrence against Russia with dialogue.113 Germany’s search for balance also
falls back on the delicate cohabitation between military build-up and diplomacy.
On the one hand, Germany has signalled a tentative commitment to the goal of
NATO members spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence by 2024, although this
remains to be seen given that its military spending in 2016 stood at 1.2 per cent
of GDP.114 On the other hand, there is a firmly established German view that
diplomacy and cooperative security, of which CAC and CSBMs are
cornerstones, should guide international relations. In this light, the Steinmeier
initiative, aiming at change through rapprochement rather than deterrence,
connects to key traditional principles of German foreign policy – military
restraint, the primacy of diplomacy and multilateralism.115
Regarding its NATO commitments, Germany has given priority to measures to
enhance the alliance’s readiness and force posture to meet the new security
challenges. Since 2014, the Bundeswehr has been one of the largest contributors
to NATO military deployments along the eastern flank. Its military cooperation
with the US has intensified and the White Paper confirms the increasing
importance of collective defence. Thus, irrespective of inter-party divisions,
Germany is an emerging military player in the Baltic Sea region, supporting
measures to increase NATO readiness and adjustments of its force structure to

112
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, “Relaunching conventional arms control in Europe,” 25
November 2016, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/abruestung/161125-
ruestungskontrolle/285652 (accessed 19 February 2018).
113
Federal Government of Germany, White Paper 2016: On German Security Policy and the Future
of the Bundeswehr, 2016, 66. See also Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “More security for everyone in
Europe: A call for a re-launch of arms control,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 August 2016.
114
There are internal divisions on defence spending as well, exemplified by Foreign Minister
Sigmar Gabriel arguing that the 2 per cent target is “entirely unrealistic” and “completely
unnecessary” for Germany. He further said that “it would be disastrous if Germany wanted to lead
Europe not only economically and politically, but also militarily.” See Hanno Kautz, “What is the
biggest threat for us? Interview with German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel,” Bild, 27 January
2017, https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/bild-international/interview-foreign-minister-sigmar-
gabriel-54307246.bild.html (accessed 19 February 2018).
115
Johan Eellend, “Germany – A Long Farewell to Ostpolitik,” in Johan Eellend, Niklas H.
Rossbach and Anna Sundberg, The Russian wake-up call to Europe: French, German and British
security priorities, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016, FOI-R--4270--SE, 56–57.

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meet the demands of the new security policy realities.116 That said, Germany
resists the establishment of permanent military bases in Eastern and Central
Europe, arguing that this would violate the agreements of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act of 1997.117 This clearly indicates the combined policy of
deterrence and dialogue.
To safeguard a rules-based international order underpinned by norms and values,
the German strategic priority is to strengthen global and regional organisations.
Germany values the OSCE highly. It emphasises the OSCE’s indispensability for
the future of comprehensive and cooperative European security as well as
Germany’s leading role in strengthening the organisation’s vital functions, such
as its instruments for conflict resolution. Germany links a modernisation of CAC
and CSBMs to these objectives.118 Although Germany acknowledges the
uniqueness of the current security landscape, there are nevertheless references to
the historical experience of combining dialogue and deterrence during times of
greatest pressure, with the Cold War serving as prime example.119 In sum, the
German commitment to CAC and CSBMs has deep roots in the country’s foreign
policy culture and is therefore likely to remain on the table in some form or the
other. What is less clear is whether the German position in the OSCE dialogue
represents a coordination of the diplomatic interests of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the military interests of the Ministry of Defence, or whether the
former has carved out CAC and CSBMs as its exclusive diplomatic right.

116
Eva Hagström Frisell, “Tyskland,” in Krister Pallin (ed.), Västlig militär förmåga. En analys av
Nordeuropa 2017, Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2018, FOI-R--4563--SE, 121.
117
See Andrew Rettman, “US and Germany say No to Poland on NATO base,” Euobserver, 16
April 2016, https://euobserver.com/foreign/133084 (accessed 19 February 2018). Among the
leading German proponents of CAC, the main worry is that NATO military deployments along its
eastern flank will jeopardise the long-term goal of a strategic partnership between NATO and
Russia that Germany long has nurtured and invested in. Not least feared is the collapse of the
NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council.
118
Federal Government of Germany, White Paper 2016, 77–78.
119
This goes back to the so-called Ostpolitik associated with Social Democratic Chancellor Willy
Brandt. Formulated in 1969, it was designed to promote “change through rapprochement” (Wandel
durch Annäherung). The intellectual father of the idea was however Egon Bahr, who served as
Secretary of the Chancellor’s office under Brandt 1969–72, but had already formulated this line of
thinking in 1963. See Egon Bahr, “Wandel durch Annäherung,” Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing,
15 July 1963, https://www.fes.de/archiv/adsd_neu/inhalt/stichwort/tutzinger_rede.pdf (accessed 19
February 2018). Ostpolitik also drew inspiration from the NATO Harmel report in 1967, which
like the current German policy, grappled with similar issues relating to NATO’s dual approach of
pursuing détente and deterrence towards the Soviet-led communist bloc. See NATO, Ministerial
Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, “The Harmel Report: full reports by the rapporteurs on the
future tasks of the Alliance,” Brussels 13–14 December 1967, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/nato-
strategy/Harmel_Report_complete.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

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5.2 France
Although less active, France’s approach to Russia after Crimea resembles
Germany’s with a combined focus on dialogue and deterrence. That said, it must
be kept in mind that France, in comparison with Germany, takes a different
approach to international security. As a permanent nuclear-armed member of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), France nurtures its identity as a
leading international actor with a particular strategic autonomy.120 France is the
European country with the strongest international military commitment. In late
2015 around 20,000 French soldiers were deployed outside Europe with the fight
against terrorism. The country’s threat perception pays comparatively less
attention to Russia and the east, looking instead primarily southwards – to Africa
(North Africa and the Sahel) and the Middle East. The White Paper on Defence
and National Security of 2013, initiated under François Hollande’s presidential
tenure, clearly spelt out this geostrategic priority.121
Since 2014, France has repeatedly condemned the illegal annexation of Crimea
and voiced its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Together with Germany,
Russia and Ukraine, France participated in the negotiations leading to the Minsk
2 ceasefire agreement for eastern Ukraine. Following the election of President
Emmanuel Macron, a Strategic Review of Defence and National Security was
published in October 2017. The review notes that Russia seeks to weaken the
transatlantic link and divide the EU. By the use of intimidating measures, Russia
is actively trying to expand its sphere of influence in several directions.122 That
said, when Macron presented his initiative for a sovereign, united and democratic
Europe in September 2017, the external outlook focused on the terrorist threat
and the migration challenge. As a result, what Europe needs is “an external
policy focused on a few priorities: firstly, the Mediterranean and Africa”.123
Thus, compared to Germany, the eastern vector is not so pronounced in France’s
security policy calculations.
Relations between France and the US have improved in the past decade, aided
not least by finding common ground in the fight against terrorism. France has
been fully reintegrated into the NATO command structure since 2009. At the
same time, it stands outside the alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group. In its
ambition for an ever-closer European Union, France continues to harbour visions
of a European defence. A partial French victory was won at the end of 2017

120
Anna Sundberg, “France – Between North and South, and Everywhere,” in Eellend, Rossbach
and Sundberg, The Russian wake-up call to Europe, 17–54.
121
Présidence de la Republique, The French White Paper on defence and national security – 2013.
122
République Française, Revue strátegique de defense et de sécurité nationale 2017, 42.
123
“President Macron’s Initiative for Europe: A sovereign, united, democratic Europe,” 26
September 2017, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/european-
union/events/article/president-macron-s-initiative-for-europe-a-sovereign-united-democratic-
europe (accessed 19 February 2018).

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when 25 EU member states agreed to the Franco-German proposal to launch the

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defence.124 Its
embrace of European defence notwithstanding, NATO is France’s security
guarantee. The French view on NATO is that the alliance is about solidarity and
shared responsibilities. French representatives have carefully emphasised that the
country is strongly against a regionalisation of the alliance in the sense of a
division of responsibilities for different regions among the members.125
Consequently, France contributes 300 soldiers to the UK-led battle group in
Estonia.126
Notwithstanding significant differences in geographical and thematic priorities,
France supports the discussions on CAC and CSBMs within the OSCE’s
structured dialogue. In the words of France’s Permanent Representative to the
UN: “There can be no strategic stability without a set of common rules to frame
military competition.” In order to move towards such stability, discussions on
arms control, confidence-building, transparency and risk-reduction measures
within the OSCE are considered important tools.127 However, while France
supports CAC in Europe on principle, it does not see a strong link between it and
its own primary national security interests. The security risks posed by Russia’s
behaviour are subordinated to terrorism and migration with a geographical
orientation to Africa and the Middle East.

5.3 The United Kingdom

In the past year, UK foreign and security policy has been overshadowed by
Brexit and the subsequent management of the pending separation from the EU.
Amidst the domestic upheavals following Brexit, international defence and
security matters are less urgent policy priorities.128 On the international arena, the
UK’s status as well as its ultimate guarantee against potential adversaries rests on

124
Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, “Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a
Process Toward EU Defense?” Policy Brief, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 6
October 2017, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/can-france-and-germany-make-pesco-work-
process-toward-eu-defense (accessed 19 February 2018). PESCO represents a binding
commitment among the 25 member states to improve their defence cooperation.
125
Sundberg, “France – Between North and South, and Everywhere,” 42.
126
NATO, “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.”
127
“The OSCE is essential for security in Europe,” Briefing in the presence of the Austrian OSCE
Presidency – Statement by Mr François Delattre, Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations Security Council, 22 February 2017, https://onu.delegfrance.org/The-OSCE-is-
essential-for-security-in-Europe (accessed 19 February 2018).
128
Malcolm Chalmers, “UK Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit,” RUSI Briefing Paper,
January 2017, 3,
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_bp_uk_foreign_and_security_policy_after_brexit_v4.pdf
(accessed 19 February 2018).

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the nuclear deterrent.129 The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence
and Security Review adopted in 2015 highlights the need to strengthen the UK
military posture, which includes increasing defence spending to continue to meet
the NATO target of 2 per cent of GDP and investing in capable and flexible
armed forces.130 From a military-strategic point of view, the UK aspires to
increase its NATO commitments, in particular its relations with the US and
France.131 Strong cooperation with allies is also required in order to respond in a
robust manner to state-based threats.
Regarding the resurgence of state-based threats, these are primarily associated
with Russian behaviour in Ukraine, which has led to the unravelling of the rules-
based international order.132 In the National Security Strategy, Russia is
described as increasingly “aggressive, authoritarian and nationalistic”. In the
context of Russian aggression, the government is mindful of the British
commitments made when leading the 2014 Wales NATO summit, including the
common defence investment pledge, the institution of a Readiness Action Plan,
the establishment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), and the
UK’s contributions to the NATO Air Policing Mission in the Baltic countries.133
Since then, as part of the decision in 2016 to deploy the NATO eFP battalions to
the Baltic states and Poland, the UK has taken the leading role in NATO’s eFP in
Estonia.134 For the UK, the Baltic Sea region is important in a military-strategic
perspective, not least as a transport route for receiving and providing military
assistance.135 In the context of the NATO promise to support allies in times of
crises, Russia’s deployment of long-range missiles in Kaliningrad and St
Petersburg, amongst other places, raises concerns for UK and other allies’
abilities to operate in the area.

129
United Kingdom. National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A
Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, November 2015, 11,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478936/52309_Cm
_9161_NSS_SD_Review_PRINT_only.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).
130
It should be noted, however, that according to SIPRI figures UK defence spending in 2015 and
2016 amounted to 1.9 per cent of GDP, while NATO data reported 2.1 per cent and 2.2 per cent
for respective years. The explanation for this discrepancy goes back to an approved change of
calculation method for NATO reporting that included war pensions, contributions to UN peace
supporting operations, pensions for the Ministry of Defence’s civilian staff and certain revenues
from the Ministry of Defence. See Juuko Alozius, “Försvarsekonomi I focus: Storbritannien,” FOI
Memo 6118, Swedish Defence Research Agency, September 2017.
131
National Security Strategy, 10–11.
132
National Security Strategy, 15.
133
National Security Strategy, 18, 20.
134
“British troops arrive in Estonia to deter Russian aggression in one of the biggest deployments to
the region in decades,” The Telegraph, 18 March 2017,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/18/british-troops-arrive-estonia-deter-russian-
aggression-one-biggest/ (accessed 19 February 2018).
135
Niklas H. Rossbach, “Storbritannien,” in Pallin (ed.), 151.

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Overall, the UK appears to take a sceptical position on the German CAC

initiative. It belongs to the group of NATO countries, in the first instance
together with the US and Poland, that question the timing of re-launching arms
control when Russia is breaching several of the principles and treaties
underpinning European security.

5.4 Poland
Polish security essentially rests on three basic pillars: a national defence
capability, the collective defence of NATO, and regional cooperation. Taken
together, the three pillars have produced a security policy aimed at strengthening
NATO’s military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. The alliance’s
decision at the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016 to establish a stronger
military presence in the Baltic countries and Poland was therefore seen as the
most significant military-political success for Poland since it achieved NATO
membership in 1999.136
Domestic politics in Poland has taken a highly polarised turn after the change of
government in 2015. Even though security and defence policy has remained less
affected by the antagonistic political climate than other policy fields, the
governing Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc) party has nonetheless spent
considerable energy on trying to distance itself from its predecessor in this
field.137 In 2016, the Ministry of Defence undertook a strategic review leading to
a new defence concept in May 2017. The concept specifies that Poland must
adjust its defence policy to acquire stronger national defence capabilities and
intensify cooperation with allies at a time of increasingly severe security
threats.138
There is no doubt that the aggressive policy of Russia, which aims “to create a
new international order based on the so called ‘concert of powers’”, is perceived
as the main threat to Poland’s national security.139 If anything, since the change
of government, Poland has consolidated its standing as perhaps the most vocal
European voice warning of the threat Russia poses to European security. Its
primary security goal is, therefore, to deter Russian aggression through strong
national defence and ever-stronger support from NATO allies. Poland is one of
the few NATO members currently spending 2 per cent of GDP on its defence.

136
Ministry of National Defence, “The Warsaw NATO Summit and Its Implications for the Polish-
American Bilateral Relationship,” 22 July 2016, http://en.mon.gov.pl/news/article/latest-news/the-
warsaw-nato-summit-and-its-implications-for-the-polish-american-bilateral-relationship-u2016-
07-25/ (accessed 19 February 2018).
137
Anna Sundberg, “Polen,” in Pallin (ed.), 101.
138
Ministry of National Defence, The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland, May 2017.
139
Ministry of National Defence, The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland, 23.

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Thus, in present circumstances, security is assured through stronger military

presence rather than dialogue.
For the Polish government, it is of paramount importance that the Baltic Sea
region remains firmly attached to the US and NATO as a whole, ruling out any
option of regionalising security. To this end, it is putting substantial efforts into
developing a special relationship with the US, including providing a facility for
missile defence on its territory and expanding the US presence in the country
through headquarters, battle groups, an air presence and the deployment of
military hardware. Thus, Poland is purposefully building up its capability to offer
host nation support for NATO troops.140 Cooperation is also intensifying with
countries identified as “like-minded” in their perception of the Russian threat, i.e.
the Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria. A particular source of concern for
Poland is Russia’s militarisation of the neighbouring Kaliningrad region,
including the deployment of nuclear-capable Iskander missiles and the latest S-
400 Triumph air defence system.141
Explicitly addressing the existing CAC and CSBMs, the Polish National Security
Strategy, approved in November 2014, noted that those instruments have
weakened in Europe. It adds, moreover, that existing CAC and CSBMs are used
in an instrumental manner, i.e. “for the purpose of legitimising often intense
military activities”. An equally pessimistic stance is taken on the ability of the
OSCE to utilise its potential for conflict resolution in the coming years, given
that its “actual effectiveness depends on the commitments of participating
countries”.142 Given the investments in domestic military modernisation
mentioned above, as well as in facilitating access for allied reinforcements, from
Poland’s point of view the major security concerns will not be not resolved by a
new CAC or additional CSBMs. In plain language, the kind of restrictions on
military capabilities that would be the objective of a new CAC regime are far
from compatible with the government’s military-strategic priorities.

140
Laura Smith-Spark and Atika Shubert, “Poland welcomes thousands of US troops in NATO
show of force,” CNN, 14 January 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/14/europe/poland-us-
troops-nato-welcome/index.html (accessed 19 February 2018).
141
Katie Forster, “How a tiny pocket of Russian land next to Poland could soon become the most
dangerous place in Europe,” The Independent, 28 October 2016,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/russia-military-base-europe-putin-build-up-tensions-west-uk-
kaliningrad-a7384571.html (accessed 19 February 2018); Alexandra Sims, “Poland ‘highly
concerned’ after Russia moves nuclear-capable missiles into Kaliningrad,” The Independent, 8
October 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-highly-concerned-after-
russia-moves-nuclear-capable-missiles-into-kaliningrad-a7352151.html (accessed 19 February
2018).
142
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2014, Warsaw 2014, 22,
https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/NSS_RP.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

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5.5 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

While the Baltic countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are historically,
culturally and politically very different, they all share the geopolitical fate of
being small neighbours of Russia.143 They all perceive Russia’s aggressive
foreign policy, most notably its military modernisation and increasing military
activities, including snap exercises in the vicinity of the Baltic Sea, as a real
threat to their sovereignty.144 Among the eastern NATO members, the Baltic
countries are militarily, politically and economically most vulnerable to Russian
pressure.145 The military aggression Russia is conducting in Ukraine is seen as
particularly threatening from the Baltic perspective. As an insurance against
possible Russian intentions and capabilities, the three states have united in their
request for an enhanced NATO military presence in the region.146 This appeal
was partially approved at the Warsaw summit in 2016 when NATO committed to
an eFP in the Baltic states and Poland.147 The Baltic countries have also worked
diligently to promote a united EU and NATO line against Russia in order to
secure a multinational commitment to NATO’s Article 5, the collective defence
clause that states that an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all.
Against this backdrop, the Baltic countries are especially afraid of any kind of
regional arrangements that would potentially restrict NATO’s freedom of
movement and collective defence of the region. For Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, the NATO umbrella is absolutely vital, and any agreement or
understanding that would risk removing this umbrella is therefore an absolute red
line.148 Their security policy rationale is to avoid military attack by virtue of
being members of NATO. A study commissioned by the Estonian Parliament,
back in 2012, noted the Baltic countries’ concern over the growing imbalance of
forces between Russia and NATO in the region, as well as the obstacles to the
alliance sending reinforcements to the region posed by Russia’s deployment of
advanced military equipment along the borders.149 Russia placing state-of-the-art

143
Robert Dalsjö, “Baltikum,” in Pallin (ed.), Västlig militär förmåga, 79.
144
See the official security policy documents of respective state. Riigikogu, National Security
Concept of Estonia 2010; Saeima, The National Defence Concept (of Latvia, 2016); and Lietuvos
Respublikos Seimas, “Seimas approved the National Security Strategy,” Press release of the
Lithuanian Parliament, 17 January 2017.
145
Robert Dalsjö, Brännpunkt Baltikum, Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2016,
FOI-R--4278--SE, 11.
146
Benjamin Oreskes, “Exposed Baltics seek NATO help to combat Russia threat,” Politico, 26
February 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/exposed-baltics-seek-nato-help-to-combat-russia-
threat/ (accessed 19 February 2018); Dalsjö, Brännpunkt Baltikum.
147
See Paragraph 40 in NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communique,” 9 July 2016,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).
148
For the Baltic countries’ military dependence on NATO, see Dalsjö, Brännpunkt Baltikum.
149
Riina Kaljurand, Karlis Neretnieks, Bo Ljung and Julian Tupay, “Developments in the Security
Environment of the Baltic Sea Region up to 2020,” International Centre for Defence Studies,
September 2012, 63.

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missiles in Kaliningrad and St Petersburg may create a so-called anti-access/area

denial (A2/AD) bubble, challenging the Western ability to establish air
supremacy in the Baltic Sea region, and to reinforce and resupply the Baltic
countries in the event of an emergency.150 Freezing the current military
imbalance in a special regional agreement, in which the Baltic Sea region runs
the risk of being decoupled from the hard security guarantees of the transatlantic
link, would therefore be a nightmare scenario. As for their own military
capabilities, these are restricted to delaying a potential aggressor until military
assistance from allies could be provided. The Baltic countries have become
among the world leaders in growth of military spending, with all countries’
defence expenditures estimated to reach at least 2 per cent of GDP in 2018.151
Unlike Germany, France, the UK and Poland, the Baltic states are not parties to
the CFE Treaty, only the OS Treaty and the Vienna Document. They were
formally removed from the CFE Treaty in October 1991 amid fears that their
participation in the bloc-based treaty would give Russia continued military and
political influence in the region.152 While remaining outside the CFE Treaty,
Estonia and Lithuania, but not Latvia, concluded bilateral CSBMs with Russia in
1998 and 2001, respectively.153 In 2006, Russia decided not to prolong the
bilateral arrangement with Estonia, which had allowed for one additional
evaluation visit per year and exchange of additional information according to
CFE Treaty requirements.154 The agreement between Lithuania and Russia
provided for the exchange of information on conventional armed forces of
Lithuania and Russia’s Kaliningrad region as well as one additional inspection
visit each year on the basis of the Vienna Document. However, information
exchange stopped after Russia suspended the CFE Treaty in 2007, and the
additional evaluation was renounced by Russia in 2014, to the regret of the
Lithuanian Foreign Ministry.155

150
Ian Williams, “The Russia-NATO A2AD Environment,” Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense
Project, 3 January 2017, https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-nato-a2ad-environment/ (accessed 19
February 2018).
151
For example, in the last five years Lithuania’s defence spending has increased more than three-
fold, taking its share of GDP from less than 1 per cent in 2013 to slightly more than 2 per cent for
2018.
152
Zdzislaw Lachowski, The Adapted CFE Treaty and the Admission of the Baltic States to NATO,
Stockholm: SIPRI, December 2002, 21.
153
Zdzislaw Lachowski, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the New Europe, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004, 142.
154
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Estonia to the OSCE, “Information exchange of the code
of conduct on politico-military aspects of security,” April 2017, 20, http://www.osce.org/forum-
for-security-cooperation/319436?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).
155
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, “Lithuania regrets Russia’s decision
which reduces transparency,” 5 May 2014, http://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuania-regrets-russias-
decision-which-reduces-transparency (accessed 19 February 2018).

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Suspicious of Russian intentions and from a position of military inferiority and

geographical exposure, the Baltic governments, fearing any restrictions on their
ability to receive outside military support in the event of crisis, responded with
caution to Germany’s CAC initiative. There were, however, differences of
opinions among the respective foreign ministries. For example, Lithuania’s
Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius responded with scepticism, noting that
Russia’s poor record in complying with international norms and principles
should serve as a warning of the dangers of not being consistent in not rewarding
Russian non-compliance. In contrast, Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs
expressed greater understanding for Steinmeier’s initiative, arguing that it is
important to find a balance between reinforcing European security and defence,
and having a dialogue with Russia.156

5.6 Finland
The government report on Finnish foreign and security policy from 2016 notes
that the cooperative security regime, “based on the principles of shared security
as well as arms reduction treaties and confidence-building measures”, has been
challenged and destabilised by Russia.157 These changes, particularly in
Finland’s vicinity, mean that “[t]he use or threat of military force against Finland
cannot be excluded.”158 Finland’s security policy primarily addresses the
interlinked factors of the crumbling cooperative security order in Europe, the
deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea region and Russia’s
demonstrated willingness and capability to employ military force to establish a
security regime based on spheres of interest.159 To counter these challenges,
Finland’s regional security policy emphasises two aspects. First, the OSCE’s
broad concept of security must be maintained as the baseline for continued
cooperative security.160 Second, while remaining militarily non-aligned, Finland
pursues ever deeper military cooperation with the US and NATO, exemplified by
the signing of Host Nation Support Agreements (HNSAs) during the 2014
NATO summit in Wales. The agreements enable Finland, like Sweden, to benefit
from NATO’s support in crisis situations.161 Securing a special status in its
relationship with the US is critical for Finland’s military security. Thus, its non-

156
Latvian Public Broadcasting, “Germany’s Steinmeier: NATO needs Russia dialogue,” 13
September 2016, http://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/germanys-steinmeier-nato-needs-russia-
dialogue.a200602/ (accessed 19 February 2018).
157
Prime Minister’s Office, Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, 9/2016, 11.
158
Prime Minister’s Office, Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, 11.
159
Prime Minister’s Office, Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, 22.
160
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Review on Finland’s Security Cooperation, 2015.
161
Tobias Etzold and Christian Opitz, “Between Military Non-Alignment and Integration,” Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP Comments 25, April 2015, 3, https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C25_etz_opt.pdf (accessed 19 February
2018).

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aligned status notwithstanding, Finland does not differ from the Baltic nations or
Poland in the sense that a strong transatlantic link is profoundly important for
maintaining security in the Baltic Sea region.162 The special priority given to
bilateral cooperation with Sweden is firmly anchored to this reality.
As a militarily non-aligned country, Finland has never been a state party to the
CFE Treaty. From the Finnish perspective, the CFE Treaty’s comprehensive
exchange of military information and verification measures were non-compatible
with the basic elements of the nation’s defence system, based on compulsory
military service and mobilisation. Opening weapon and equipment stores for
verification would increase the risk of a potential enemy carrying out a strategic
strike against those targets.163 As stated clearly in the Foreign Ministry’s Review
on Finland’s security cooperation: “Because of the special features of the defence
system, in-depth verification methods included in conventional arms control
regimes are challenging for Finland.”164 In the OSCE work on CSBMs, however,
Finland takes an active role, within the framework of both the Vienna Document
and the OS Treaty. With regard to Russia, there exist two bilateral arrangements
between Finland and Russia.165 For Finland, increased military activity in the
Baltic Sea region raises fears of unintentional escalation stemming from lack of
communication or accidents.166 To avoid such a scenario, Finland stresses the
need to reinforce dialogue and confidence building with Russia, while
condemning its actions in Ukraine. Finnish President Sauli Niinistö has proposed
that one step to increase trust in the region would be for aircraft to use
transponders over the Baltic Sea as a confidence-building measure.167
Regarding the dialogue on renewing conventional arms control in Europe, the
Finnish position holds that it is primarily the responsibility of the OSCE
participating states to find the way forward.168 This point of view could be

162
Regeringskansliet, Nationell säkerhetsstrategi, January 2017, 15; Government Report of Finnish
Foreign and Security Policy, 12.
163
Pentti Olin, “A Finnish perspective of the CFE Treaty,” Baltic Defence Review, No. 4 (2000): 69.
164
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Review on Finland’s Security Cooperation, 35.
165
The first agreement, operational since 2000, allows for one additional annual evaluation visit on
the basis of the Vienna Document. It should be noted that the Finnish visit only applies to the
Leningrad Military District. The second agreement, concluded in 2002, includes biannual
exchange of naval visits to Finnish bases at Upinniemi or Pansio and Russian bases at Kaliningrad
or Kronstadt (Lachowski, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the New Europe, 144).
166
Timo Soini, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “The Sea of Change,” The Security Times,
17 February 2017,
https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/MSC_/2017/Sonstiges/ST_Feb2017_double_page.pd
f (accessed 19 February 2018).
167
Yle, “Putin agrees to Finnish proposal on aircraft transponders,” 1 July 2016,
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/putin_agrees_to_finnish_proposal_on_aircraft_transponders/8999
141 (accessed 19 February 2018).
168
Timo Kantola, “Possible New Negotiations on Conventional Arms Control – A Finnish View,” in
Wolfgang Zellner (ed.), Conventional Arms Control in Europe: New Approaches in Challenging
Times, Hamburg: CORE Working Paper 26, September 2015, 29-30.

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interpreted as a signal that it is not in Finland’s interest to see the initiative being
taken in a supranational direction under the leadership of, for example, the OSCE
Secretariat. While Finland has declared a willingness to take part in the process,
it is careful not to link its potential involvement to any commitment to acceding
to a final agreement. This represents a logical application of the Finnish middle
way of balancing “the need to protect the special features of the defence system
with the exchange of critical military information within the security
environment of Finland”.169 Recalling Finland’s maintained focus on defence of
its territory, compulsory military service and mobilisation, the country’s
reluctance to subordinate its military forces to a possible future CAC regime with
intrusive inspections appears to remain as valid today as it was 25 years ago.

169
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Review on Finland’s Security Cooperation, 35.

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6 Conclusions

Johan Engvall, Gudrun Persson, Robert Dalsjö, Carolina Vendil Pallin and
Mike Winnerstig

6.1 Security policy goals

Russia perceives the current European security order as rigged in favour of Euro-
Atlantic organisations. In its place, Russia is actively seeking to establish an
alternative order that would grant Moscow a sphere of privileged interests in its
near abroad. As part of this objective, Russia would like to have a future veto on
further NATO enlargement. In other words, Russia would like to redefine the
OSCE concept of indivisible security to mean that no alliance should be allowed
to increase its security at the expense of another alliance.
The Russian vision for the OSCE concept of comprehensive security is also
distinctly different. From Russia’s point of view, the OSCE should be designed
as an organisation focusing on hard security, while the normative agenda should
be either downplayed or reformed to better mirror Russian interests. For
Moscow, the third dimension of the OSCE’s comprehensive security concept –
dealing with promotion of democracy and human rights – represents one way in
which the West seeks to undermine Russia. A manifestation of this view was the
ruling of the Russian Constitutional Court in July 2015 that the Russian
Constitution is superior to the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg.
The United States, on the other hand, wants to defend and uphold the post-Cold
War European security order. While the Trump administration, in power for less
than a year, has still to produce a formal policy in the field of European arms
control issues, it would be surprising if the eventual Trump policies deviate
greatly from the general thrust of earlier administrations’ efforts.170 The US
must, also under the Trump administration, be considered a status quo power in
the field of European security. This means that the policies of the US are directed
towards the safeguarding of the general peace and arms control efforts of post-
Cold War Europe, efforts that were constructed essentially under US leadership

170
An example of this might be the new National Security Strategy, scheduled for launch in late
December 2017. According to press reports, this strategy will underline the importance of allies
and will be critical toward Russian actions and policies. See e.g. Caroline Houck, “Allies Are Key,
Says Trump’s National Security Strategy”, Defense One, 13 December 2017,
http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2017/12/allies-are-key-says-trumps-national-security-
strategy/144508/?oref=search_mcmaster (accessed 19 February 2018).

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more than 25 years ago. This means that US support for NATO, the OSCE, and
the arms control treaties related to these organisations is unwavering.
This posture today also entails a clearly negative view of Russia and Russian
actions in the arms control field and elsewhere. The fact that US-Russian
strategic nuclear arms control cooperation continues to work relatively well does
not translate into a fertile ground for US-Russian, or anyone else’s, initiatives on
the CAC arena in Europe and/or under OSCE auspices. It could be argued quite
to the contrary that the strong US endorsement of the comprehensive and
cooperative European security order means that CAC and CSBMs cannot be
pursued in isolation from these broader security ramifications.
Turning to Europe, Germany, through the efforts of the SPD and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, is the initiator and driving force in the dialogue on CAC and
CSBMs in Europe. CAC is emphasised as a cornerstone in Germany’s attempt to
strengthen cooperative security even in times of greatest pressure. The lingering
question is whether the German proponents of CAC will aspire to a new treaty on
CAC or if they are content with keeping an open dialogue with Russia. There
may even be intra-ministry differences related to whether this is a result-driven
or process-driven initiative. On the general level of German policy, the
outstanding uncertainty is the extent to which the Foreign Ministry’s initiative on
arms control and dialogue is anchored within the German armed forces. Amongst
the other European countries examined here, the smaller states in the Baltic Sea
region – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and to a certain extent Finland –
communicate security perceptions similar to that of the US in relation to Russia’s
behaviour. They have all formulated national policies seeking to strengthen their
military capabilities as well as pushing for regional cooperation and an active
NATO. They also share a sceptical view of the prospects for a new CAC regime
in a situation where Russia has violated existing agreements. Within Europe, this
position dovetails particularly closely with the policies of the UK and Poland.

6.2 CAC and CSBMs in times of confrontation

Regarding talks on arms control, including CAC and CSBMs, the US remains
Russia’s main point of reference. In this great-power perspective, other
participating states are generally reduced to useful tools for either the US or
Russia. Moscow is primarily interested in restricting additional military
reinforcements by NATO to the alliance members in Russia’s immediate
neighbourhood. Considering the military modernisation programme undertaken
by Russia since 2008, a preferable outcome for Russia would be to freeze the
military build-up in NATO member states, thereby maintaining the numerical
advantage acquired in recent years. At the same time, Russia would like to
include in the discussion emergent as well as complementary capabilities,
including high-precision weapons systems and naval forces – something NATO

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members in all likelihood will not even be prepared to open discussions on.
However, it should be recalled that Russia’s policy to a certain degree thrives on
ambiguity and unpredictability in the military domain, leaving the kind of
transparency and oversight measures associated with CAC and CSBMs of
limited value.
The policies of the US aim to safeguard the arms control efforts and the post-
Cold War European security order. Its priorities therefore remain to support
NATO, the OSCE and the arms control treaties associated with these
organisations. In the current political-military situation, the US takes a clear
position on the prospects for negotiations with Russia on CAC and CSBMs:
Russia’s violation of existing principles and treaties cannot be taken as point of
departure for any future negotiations. Accordingly, CAC and CSBMs only fulfil
a function in the context of a rules-based order, in which key actors respect the
basic rules of interaction.
There is no European line on CAC and CSBMs: there are divisions within
NATO as well as the EU. Germany, through the work of the SPD and certain
parts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the key driver of the process. The
country is responsible not only for formulating the initiative in the first place, but
also for providing most of the input to the process. Under German direction
conferences are organised and policy papers written to generate new ideas on the
relevance of CAC. The main German allies in the endeavour seem to be Austria
– with an active role in 2017 as the Chair in Office (CiO) of the OSCE – and
Switzerland. At the same time, there is no consensus on the German policy.
Through the CDU and the Federal Chancellery, Germany has endorsed NATO’s
deterring military presence in the Baltic Sea region.
Positioned at the opposite end of the spectrum are the UK, Poland and the Baltic
countries. They all share the assessment of the US that Russia’s behaviour is
likely to preclude negotiations on arms control for the foreseeable future. Instead
of seeking détente, they first of all pursue a policy line of deterrence, with
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland pushing NATO to commit to an enhanced
forward presence in the Baltic Sea region, in which the UK took a leading
European role for 2017. In between these two positions fall France and Finland.
They both support the Steinmeier initiative in principle, while concomitantly
taking a less active approach to the process. This can be explained by the fact
that both countries’ security policy priorities and military-strategic considerations
are only weakly linked to CAC. In the case of France, it falls back on threat
perceptions, such as terrorism and migration, originating south of the EU rather
than to its east. Finland’s interest is tempered by hard military considerations.
The special features of its national defence system are difficult to match with the
kind of intrusive verification inspections connected to arms control agreements.

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6.2.1 Territorial conflicts

The emergence and consolidation of contested territories outside state control in
the former Soviet space is a thorn in the flesh for security in the OSCE area. On
the road ahead, it seems implausible that CAC negotiations can be divorced from
political disagreements inside the OSCE on how to draw the borders in the
regions of unresolved conflicts. Russia is intent on keeping these unresolved
conflicts as its own pawns. Moscow has actively supported and acknowledged
the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia as well as supported
separatist movements in the Transnistrian region of Moldova. The annexation of
Crimea and military aggression in the Donbas region of Ukraine have extended
these territorial conflicts further in Europe. Russia has clearly stated its refusal to
discuss ending its military presence in these regions. For military-strategic
reasons as well as because of domestic political dynamics, it must be considered
highly unlikely that Moscow will change its policy on this issue. On the face of
it, Russia would prefer the frozen conflicts to be treated as technical rather than
political obstacles.
At the same time, a so-called status-neutral depoliticisation of the frozen
conflicts would ignore the root of the problem. A deep geopolitical and
normative confrontation underscores the military agenda of all OSCE
participating states. The revisiting of CAC and CSBMs in Europe was prompted
by Russia’s annexation of Crimea, an act that exposed the gulf between Russia
and the absolute majority of participating states. Nonetheless, a closer look inside
the Western group reveals that two opposing perceptions of reality arguably
stand against each other in relation to the unresolved conflicts in Georgia and
Ukraine.
The group led by Germany’s Foreign Ministry sees the escalating political-
military tensions, possibly leading to large-scale military conflict, between
Russia and the West as the major problem. It would therefore seem that a
normalisation of the relationship is the main priority. A dialogue on CAC and
CSBMs could be a potential icebreaker, particularly if it is depoliticised and
disentangled from the territorial conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. The idea of
approaching these conflicts from a status-neutral perspective represents one way
of separating discussions on arms control from the infected issue of how to
resolve these conflicts.
The other group, mainly led by the US, the UK, Poland and the Baltic states, sees
Russia’s acts of aggression and its violations of the rules of interaction between
states as the core problem. Russia’s behaviour has triggered a systemic crisis, at
the heart of which are the illegal annexation of Crimea, the military instigation of
rebellion in Donbas, the occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and the issue of the Transnistria region in Moldova. Discussions
on European security in general and CAC and CSBMs in particular cannot be
allowed to directly or indirectly legitimise Russia’s violations of neighbouring

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countries’ sovereign rights to territorial integrity and their right to make their
own security policy choices freely. Unless Russia is held accountable for its
actions, comprehensive and cooperative European security is jeopardised.
To summarise, reducing territorial conflicts to technicalities handled during
negotiations would represent a gain for Russia. At the same time, it would be
delusional to believe that Moscow would reciprocate such a move by accepting
the OSCE’s normative agenda and the comprehensive and cooperative security
concept. Rather, in Russia’s eyes, it would vindicate its demand for an exclusive
sphere of interests in its neighbourhood as well as its view of the international
system as a whole as one where small states are expected to yield to the demands
of more powerful neighbours.

6.2.2 The Baltic Sea region

The Baltic Sea region has emerged as a geopolitical focal point in the stand-off
between Russia and the West. To de-escalate mounting tensions, there are
proposals for certain sub-regional CAC arrangements on the Baltic Sea region. In
search of positive experiences, proponents within the OSCE have mentioned the
Dayton Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina as a potential model for the
Baltic Sea region. However, it must be stressed that the Dayton Agreement was
adopted in a radically different environment, characterised by parties with a
thoroughly documented inability to handle regional security without a solution
being imposed on the region from the outside. In the Baltic Sea region, on the
other hand, there exists a cooperative culture based on broader peace-supporting
principles of free exchanges in the realms of politics, economics and security.
Moreover, unlike the Dayton Agreement, no outside parties could impose a sub-
regional order around the Baltic Sea. Indeed, Germany, Russia and the US are all
major players in the region.
From Russia’s point of view, a regional solution for the Baltic Sea should include
constraints on NATO deployment of additional military forces to the region, not
least naval forces. For Russia, an ideal solution would be to preclude the region’s
non-aligned nations joining NATO. In contrast, the Baltic countries are firmly
against any kind of regional arrangements that would potentially restrict NATO’s
freedom of movement in the Baltic Sea region or in any way undermine the
credibility of NATO’s Article 5.
The same resistance to the idea of special CAC arrangements for the Baltic Sea
region is found in Poland and Finland. The latter remains outside NATO but, just
like Sweden, pursues ever-deeper military cooperation with the US and the
alliance, exemplified by the signing of Host Nation Support Agreements
(HNSAs) during the 2014 NATO summit in Wales. The agreements enable
Finland and Sweden to benefit from NATO’s support in crises. Thus, even non-
NATO Finland and Sweden do not differ from the Baltic nations or Poland in the

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sense that a strong transatlantic link is crucial for security in the Baltic Sea
region.
For the US, the UK and France, the Baltic Sea region is crucial for the credibility
of NATO as an organisation. The decision at the 2016 Warsaw NATO summit
on an eFP along the eastern flank of the alliance expressed NATO solidarity and
continued commitment to Eastern Europe. For the EU members in the Baltic Sea
region, uncertainties regarding Russia’s A2/AD capabilities – and their
implications for Western reinforcements in the region – further underline the
importance of a united NATO and of the US remaining committed to Europe.

6.2.3 Way forward or wishful thinking?

A multifaceted set of developments has contributed to the erosion of existing
CAC and CSBM arrangements. First, and foremost, the Soviet Union no longer
exists, nor does the WP. Instead, the former WP member countries are now part
of an enlarged NATO closer to Russia’s borders. Even though there are no longer
two blocs, the reality is that there is a current confrontation between Russia and
the West. The two sides differ on the sources and nature of the challenges to
European security. Russia and the West also have different visions for the
European security order. Russia strives for the creation of a balance of power
reminiscent of the historical experience of the Concert of Europe. The Western
priority, on the other hand, albeit with different Western states advocating
somewhat different strategies and tactics, is to defend the comprehensive and
cooperative security order of the post-Cold War era. The US position is
particularly clear in arguing that specific treaties in the field of arms control are
only meaningful if embedded in a rules-based security order. Taken together,
these major differences, in threat perceptions and security policy responses,
undermine the prospects for talks on CAC and CSBMs.
In a historical perspective, the incentive structures in present-day Europe differ
from those of the early 1970s and the negotiations that eventually resulted in the
HFA of 1975 or, for that matter, from those existing at the time of the adoption
of the Paris Charter, the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document amid the
collapsing communist bloc in Eastern Europe in 1990. In 1975, there was a
mutual interest in a grand bargain whereby the West acknowledged Soviet
superiority in the east in exchange for transparency. In 1990, the idea of a
European continent whole, free and at peace enabled comprehensive and
cooperative security to blossom. Today, the problem is of a different nature in
the sense that agreements exist, but Russia is actively choosing not to implement
some of them on the grounds that they do not support Russian security interests.
It is thus difficult to imagine any breakthroughs as long as Russia wants to have a
security order that is fundamentally at odds with the principal documents
regulating European security.

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What would it take for all parties to respect a new CAC regime or additional
CSBMs? In general, the prospects are constrained by the sheer variety of states
participating in the dialogue. Indeed, what are technical issues for some states
will be existential ones for others, depending on size, geography, historical
experiences and domestic politics. Moreover, as long as the two principal actors
– Russia and the US – sit on the sidelines discussions on CAC will not move
beyond discussions among the converted. The two most powerful Western
sceptics – the US and the UK – argue that, since Russia has demonstrated that it
is prepared to violate existing treaties, the fundamental question relates to how it
can be guaranteed that new regimes would not meet a similar fate. In other
words, as long as Russia plays by its own rules, inventing a new set of common
rules is pointless. Thus, a conclusion from this study is that the preconditions for
initiating negotiations on arms control in the OSCE are not in place at this
particular point in time.
The conclusions reached in this study raise a few questions that merit further
examination. One is the German question. As the driving force behind re-
launching a dialogue on CAC and CSBMs, a future study should look more
closely at the positions of different parts of the German political establishment.
This could include the extent to which the Ministry of Defence and the armed
forces are consulted in Berlin’s diplomatic efforts in the field of CAC and
CSBMs. This point is not restricted to Germany alone. Overall, there is a
potential friction between the diplomatic interest of dialogue and negotiation on
the one hand and the hard military security interests of states on the other hand.
There is surely research to be done on how different states handle this dilemma
and to what degree they integrate military representatives in the diplomatic work,
for example within the structured dialogue. Finally, this study has incorporated
NATO in the analysis in an indirect manner, noting how selected members of the
alliance pursue their interests either through the alliance or in relation to it.
However, NATO’s position, as an organisation, on the OSCE dialogue on current
and future security threats in Europe could be an interesting subject for study as
the process moves on.

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Undertaken at a time when European security is under stress,

Conventional Arms Control – A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking?

this study analyses the preconditions for a new conventional
arms control regime. To this end, the military-political interests of
Russia, the US and selected European countries are examined with
regard to three principal questions: What are the major security
policy goals for Russia, the US and European states? Which are
the prevailing military-political considerations in these countries’
pursuit of those goals? And how do the interests and policies of the
respective states dovetail with a renewed focus on conventional
arms control and confidence- and security-building measures?

There is an underlying tension between the diplomatic interest of

dialogue and negotiation on the one hand and the hard military
security interests of states on the other hand. At present, the
prospects for negotiations on a new conventional arms control
regime are slim. No changes are to be expected as long as the two
major players – Russia and the US – remain on the fringes of the

Gudrun Persson (ed.)

dialogue.

Conventional Arms Control

A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking?

Johan Engvall, Gudrun Persson (ed.), Robert Dalsjö,

Carolina Vendil Pallin and Mike Winnerstig

FOI-R--4586--SE

ISSN1650-1942 www.foi.se April 2018