Holy​ ​Apostles

The​ ​Object​ ​and​ ​Method​ ​of​ ​Metaphysics

By​ ​Nathan​ ​Hadsall

Dr.​ ​Timothy​ ​Smith

PHS​ ​621:​ ​Philosophy​ ​of​ ​Nature​ ​and​ ​Metaphysics

6th​ ​December​ ​2017

The​ ​investigation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​truth​ ​is​ ​in​ ​one​ ​way​ ​hard,​ ​in​ ​another​ ​easy.​ ​An​ ​indication​ ​of
this​ ​is​ ​found​ ​in​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​no​ ​one​ ​is​ ​able​ ​to​ ​attain​ ​the​ ​truth​ ​adequately,​ ​while,​ ​on
the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​we​ ​do​ ​not​ ​collectively​ ​fail,​ ​but​ ​every​ ​one​ ​says​ ​something​ ​true
about​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​things,​ ​and​ ​while​ ​individually​ ​we​ ​contribute​ ​little​ ​or​ ​nothing​ ​to
the​ ​truth,​ ​by​ ​the​ ​union​ ​of​ ​all​ ​a​ ​considerable​ ​amount​ ​is​ ​amassed.

Aristotle,​ ​Metaphysics​,​ ​α,​ ​1.

1
Table​ ​of​ ​Contents

Introduction:​ ​Why​ ​Study​ ​Object​ ​and​ ​Method? 3

1​ ​The​ ​Object​ ​of​ ​Metaphysics 4

1.1​ ​Metaphysics​ ​as​ ​Science 4

1.2​ ​A​ ​Problem​ ​of​ ​Semantics:​ ​Being​ ​and​ ​Beings 5

1.3​ ​The​ ​Unity​ ​of​ ​Metaphysics 7

2​ ​Analogy 8

2.1​ ​The​ ​Types​ ​of​ ​Analogy 9

2.2​ ​The​ ​Division​ ​of​ ​Analogy 9

2.3​ ​Analogy​ ​of​ ​Being 11

2.4​ ​Analogy​ ​of​ ​Abstraction 12

2.5​ ​Other​ ​Analogies​ ​in​ ​Metaphysics 13

3.​ ​The​ ​Method​ ​of​ ​Study 13

3.1​ ​A​ ​Few​ ​Methods​ ​Used​ ​by​ ​Aristotle 13

3.3​ ​Method​ ​According​ ​to​ ​St.​ ​Thomas 15

2
Introduction:​ ​Why​ ​Study​ ​Object​ ​and​ ​Method?

All​ ​of​ ​the​ ​courses​ ​I’ve​ ​taken​ ​on​ ​Metaphysics​ ​have​ ​started​ ​with​ ​an​ ​overview​ ​of​ ​the

speculative​ ​sciences,​ ​the​ ​object​ ​of​ ​Metaphysics,​ ​or​ ​an​ ​introduction​ ​to​ ​its​ ​Method.​ ​From​ ​a

theoretical​ ​perspective,​ ​the​ ​reason​ ​is​ ​clear:​ ​it​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​outline​ ​how​ ​a​ ​science​ ​will​ ​proceed

and​ ​show​ ​that​ ​a​ ​science​ ​such​ ​as​ ​metaphysics​ ​is​ ​even​ ​possible.

However,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​other​ ​considerations​ ​from​ ​a​ ​pedagogical​ ​perspective.​ ​New​ ​students

unfamiliar​ ​with​ ​the​ ​subject​ ​may​ ​not​ ​appreciate​ ​or​ ​even​ ​adequately​ ​understand​ ​an​ ​explanation​ ​of

its​ ​object​ ​and​ ​method.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​metaphysics,​ ​the​ ​conceptual​ ​framework​ ​required​ ​to

understand​ ​the​ ​method​ ​and​ ​object​ ​is​ ​often​ ​taught​ ​in​ ​the​ ​class​ ​itself.​ ​So,​ ​a​ ​practical​ ​conflict

appears​ ​between​ ​the​ ​theoretical​ ​requirements​ ​to​ ​establish​ ​the​ ​object​ ​and​ ​method​ ​and​ ​pedagogical

efficacy.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​main​ ​reasons​ ​that​ ​led​ ​me​ ​to​ ​select​ ​object​ ​and​ ​method​ ​as​ ​a​ ​topic​ ​for

this​ ​paper.​ ​I​ ​felt​ ​that​ ​a​ ​review​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​as​ ​a​ ​science​ ​at​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​course​ ​may​ ​provide

the​ ​additional​ ​clarity​ ​that​ ​hindsight​ ​often​ ​brings.

Secondly,​ ​many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​critiques​ ​against​ ​metaphysics​ ​have​ ​much​ ​to​ ​do​ ​with​ ​its​ ​method​ ​or

object.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​Hume,​ ​Kant,​ ​and​ ​some​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Vienna​ ​Circle​ ​all​ ​argue​ ​against

metaphysics​ ​as​ ​a​ ​science​ ​from​ ​an​ ​anthropological​ ​or​ ​epistemological​ ​perspective.​ ​Their

arguments​ ​are​ ​primarily​ ​against​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​as​ ​a​ ​science,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​human​ ​endeavor.

Is​ ​human​ ​reason​ ​capable​ ​of​ ​grasping​ ​and​ ​expressing​ ​metaphysical​ ​truths?​ ​Although​ ​it​ ​is​ ​well

beyond​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​this​ ​paper​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​a​ ​complete​ ​answer​ ​to​ ​any​ ​of​ ​these​ ​criticisms,​ ​I​ ​believe

that​ ​an​ ​adequate​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​object​ ​and​ ​method​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​are​ ​an​ ​important​ ​first

step.​ ​As​ ​St.​ ​John​ ​Paul​ ​II​ ​said,​ ​“If​ ​I​ ​insist​ ​so​ ​strongly​ ​on​ ​the​ ​metaphysical​ ​element,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​because​ ​I

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am​ ​convinced​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​the​ ​path​ ​to​ ​be​ ​taken​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​move​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​crisis​ ​pervading​ ​large

sectors​ ​of​ ​philosophy​ ​at​ ​the​ ​moment,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​to​ ​correct​ ​certain​ ​mistaken​ ​modes​ ​of​ ​behaviour

now​ ​widespread​ ​in​ ​our​ ​society.”1

In​ ​this​ ​paper​ ​I​ ​will​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​analogy​ ​is​ ​central​ ​to​ ​understanding​ ​metaphysics--both​ ​in

providing​ ​a​ ​unity​ ​to​ ​its​ ​object​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​being​ ​integral​ ​to​ ​the​ ​method​ ​of​ ​metaphysical​ ​inquiry.

1​ ​The​ ​Object​ ​of​ ​Metaphysics

1.1​ ​Metaphysics​ ​as​ ​Science

Aristotle’s​ ​famous​ ​lines​ ​in​ ​Book​ ​Γ​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Metaphysics​ ​define​ ​what​ ​this​ ​study​ ​is:​ ​“There​ ​is

a​ ​science​ ​which​ ​investigates​ ​being​ ​as​ ​being​ ​and​ ​the​ ​attributes​ ​which​ ​belong​ ​to​ ​this​ ​in​ ​virtue​ ​of​ ​its

own​ ​nature.”2​ ​First,​ ​Aristotle​ ​is​ ​defining​ ​this​ ​field​ ​as​ ​a​ ​science.3​ ​Second,​ ​he​ ​outlines​ ​what​ ​it

studies.

If​ ​metaphysics​ ​is​ ​a​ ​science,​ ​then​ ​it​ ​has​ ​certain​ ​characteristic​ ​that​ ​belong​ ​to​ ​it​ ​as​ ​a​ ​science:

it​ ​is​ ​knowledge​ ​of​ ​causes,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​discursive​ ​going​ ​from​ ​what​ ​is​ ​known​ ​to​ ​what​ ​was​ ​previously

unknown,​ ​it​ ​produces​ ​knowledge​ ​that​ ​is​ ​necessary​ ​and​ ​universal,​ ​etc.4​ ​It​ ​also​ ​follows​ ​that

metaphysics​ ​has​ ​its​ ​own​ ​proper​ ​method,​ ​since​ ​each​ ​science​ ​must​ ​follow​ ​a​ ​method​ ​and​ ​use

instruments​ ​that​ ​are​ ​are​ ​in​ ​line​ ​with​ ​its​ ​object.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​physics​ ​and​ ​chemistry​ ​are​ ​both

positive​ ​sciences​ ​that​ ​study​ ​very​ ​similar​ ​objects,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​methods​ ​and​ ​instruments​ ​they​ ​utilize​ ​are

very​ ​different.​ ​Once​ ​the​ ​object​ ​of​ ​study​ ​is​ ​defined,​ ​then​ ​the​ ​proper​ ​method​ ​can​ ​be​ ​determined.

1
​ ​St.​ ​John​ ​Paul​ ​II,​ ​Fides​ ​et​ ​Ratio​,​ ​83.
2
​ ​Aristotle,​ ​Metaphysics​,​ ​Γ,​ ​1.
3
​ ​This​ ​is​ ​clearly​ ​science​ ​in​ ​the​ ​traditional​ ​sense,​ ​and​ ​not​ ​the​ ​restrictive​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​positive​ ​empirical​ ​science.
4
​ ​cf.​ ​Aristotle,​ ​Posterior​ ​Analytics​,​ ​bk​ ​1,​ ​n.​ ​6-8.
4
 In​ ​Aristotle's​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​a​ ​science,​ ​a​ ​study​ ​is​ ​defined​ ​by​ ​the​ ​material​ ​object​ ​(the

field​ ​or​ ​item​ ​being​ ​studied)​ ​and​ ​the​ ​formal​ ​object​ ​(the​ ​aspect​ ​that​ ​is​ ​being​ ​studied).5​ ​There​ ​are

several​ ​sciences​ ​that​ ​may​ ​study​ ​the​ ​same​ ​material​ ​object.​ ​However,​ ​these​ ​are​ ​distinguished​ ​by

the​ ​formal​ ​object​ ​under​ ​which​ ​the​ ​material​ ​object​ ​is​ ​studied.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​man​ ​is​ ​the​ ​material

object​ ​of​ ​both​ ​medicine​ ​and​ ​ethics.​ ​However,​ ​these​ ​sciences​ ​have​ ​a​ ​different​ ​formal​ ​object.

Medicine​ ​studies​ ​man​ ​as​ ​a​ ​living​ ​organism,​ ​while​ ​ethics​ ​studies​ ​man​ ​as​ ​a​ ​free​ ​moral​ ​agent.

According to Aristotle, metaphysics studies “being as being” (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν or ens​ ​in

quantum​ ​ens​).​ ​The​ ​material​ ​object​ ​of​ ​this​ ​science​ ​is​ ​“being.”​ ​Aristotle​ ​means​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that

metaphysics​ ​is​ ​not​ ​restricted​ ​to​ ​study​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​type​ ​of​ ​being;​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​just​ ​animals​ ​or​ ​mobile

entities,​ ​but​ ​anything​ ​that​ ​“is.”​ ​The​ ​formal​ ​object​ ​is​ ​“as​ ​being.”​ ​It​ ​does​ ​not​ ​study​ ​a​ ​being

inasmuch​ ​as​ ​it​ ​is​ ​mobile​ ​(as​ ​physics​ ​does),​ ​but​ ​only​ ​inasmuch​ ​as​ ​it​ ​is​ ​being.​ ​Just​ ​as​ ​medicine

does​ ​not​ ​take​ ​into​ ​account​ ​certain​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​man,​ ​but​ ​instead​ ​focuses​ ​on​ ​man​ ​as​ ​an​ ​organism,

metaphysics​ ​ignores​ ​the​ ​specific​ ​qualities​ ​of​ ​each​ ​particular​ ​type​ ​of​ ​being​ ​and​ ​only​ ​focuses​ ​on​ ​a

being​ ​as​ ​a​ ​being.​ ​Metaphysics​ ​studies​ ​all​ ​beings,​ ​but​ ​only​ ​under​ ​the​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​being.​ ​This​ ​is

different​ ​from​ ​all​ ​other​ ​sciences,​ ​"since​ ​none​ ​of​ ​the​ ​other​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​knowledge​ ​examines

universally​ ​what​ ​pertains​ ​to​ ​being​ ​as​ ​being."6

1.2​ ​A​ ​Problem​ ​of​ ​Semantics:​ ​Being​ ​and​ ​Beings

The​ ​meaning​ ​of​ ​“being​ ​qua​ ​being”​ ​is​ ​much​ ​clearer​ ​when​ ​expressed​ ​in​ ​Latin​ ​(​ens​ ​in

quantum​ ​ens)​ or Greek (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν) than in English. Neither of the classical languages carries the

ambiguity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​English​ ​word​ ​"being."​ ​ ​From​ ​a​ ​linguistic​ ​perspective,​ ​ens​ a​ nd ὂν are participles

5
​ ​cf.​ ​Thomas​ ​Harper,​ ​S.J.,​ ​The​ ​Metaphysics​ ​of​ ​the​ ​School,​ ​ch.​ ​II.
6
​ ​Aristotle,​ ​Metaphysics​,​ ​Γ,​ ​1.
5
of​ ​esse​ and εἶναι respectively. However, in English “being” (ens​ ​and ὂν) can mean that which is

(​id​ ​quod​ ​est​)​ ​as​ ​in​ ​“a​ ​being”​ ​or​ ​“an​ ​entity.”​ ​It​ ​can​ ​also​ ​mean​ ​“the​ ​being”​ ​(​esse​ a​ nd εἶναι) as an

act,​ ​which​ ​we​ ​often​ ​render​ ​as​ ​"to​ ​be."​ ​As​ ​Boethius​ ​points​ ​out,​ ​“a​ ​being”​ ​and​ ​“the​ ​act​ ​of​ ​being”

are​ ​not​ ​the​ ​same​ ​thing.7 It is interesting that at times Joe Sachs translates this same ὂν ᾗ ὂν both

as​ ​"what​ ​is​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​it​ ​is"8​ ​and​ ​"being​ ​as​ ​being."9​ ​The​ ​former​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​better​ ​translation

than​ ​the​ ​latter,​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​it​ ​does​ ​not​ ​have​ ​the​ ​ambiguity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​English​ ​word​ ​“being”​ ​contained​ ​in

the​ ​latter​ ​translation.​ ​So,​ ​when​ ​Aristotle​ ​defines​ ​metaphysics​ ​it​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​from​ ​a​ ​semantic

perspective​ ​that​ ​he​ ​clearly​ ​is​ ​not​ ​talking​ ​about​ ​“to​ ​be”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​the​ ​act​ ​of​ ​being.

In​ ​reading​ ​through​ ​the​ ​contents​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Metaphysics,​ ​it’s​ ​also​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​Aristotle​ ​doesn't

reach​ ​the​ ​act​ ​of​ ​being​ ​itself​ ​(later​ ​the​ ​focus​ ​of​ ​Thomistic​ ​metaphysics).​ ​So,​ ​when​ ​Aristotle

discusses​ ​“being​ ​qua​ ​being,”​ ​he​ ​is​ ​expressing​ ​the​ ​object​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​and​ ​main​ ​question

driving​ ​the​ ​science​ ​as​ ​“what​ ​does​ ​it​ ​mean​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​being?”​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​“what​ ​is​ ​the​ ​meaning​ ​of​ ​‘to

be’?”​ ​This​ ​is​ ​also​ ​indicated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​answer​ ​he​ ​gives​ ​to​ ​this​ ​question:​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​being​ ​is​ ​to​ ​be

substance.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​why​ ​the​ ​heart​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Metaphysics​ ​(books​ ​Ζ,​ ​Η,​ ​and​ ​Θ)​ ​try​ ​to​ ​answer​ ​the

question​ ​of​ ​what​ ​it​ ​means​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​substance.​ ​This​ ​only​ ​makes​ ​sense​ ​if​ ​he​ ​is​ ​answering​ ​the

question​ ​of​ ​what​ ​it​ ​means​ ​“to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​being”​ ​and​ ​not​ ​what​ ​it​ ​means​ ​“to​ ​be.”​ ​So,​ ​any​ ​version​ ​of

"being"​ ​here​ ​should​ ​be​ ​understood​ ​to​ ​mean​ ​"a​ ​being"​ ​or​ ​“all​ ​beings,”​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​the​ ​act​ ​of​ ​being

(or​ ​esse​).10

7
​ ​cf.​ ​Boethius,​ ​De​ ​hebdomadibus​,​ ​Regula​ ​1.​ ​“Diversum​ ​est​ ​esse​ ​et​ ​id​ ​quod​ ​est.”
8
​ ​Aristotle,​ ​Metaphysics​,​ ​Γ,​ ​1.
9
​ ​Aristotle,​ ​Metaphysics​,​ ​Γ,​ ​1.
10
​ ​Some​ ​would​ ​even​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​the​ ​subject​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​is​ ​“being”​ ​understood​ ​as​ ​the​ ​most​ ​general​ ​and
abstract​ ​of​ ​terms.​ ​However,​ ​Aristotle​ ​had​ ​a​ ​very​ ​practical​ ​approach--as​ ​seen​ ​in​ ​his​ ​other​ ​writings.​ ​Besides
the​ ​theoretical​ ​arguments​ ​against​ ​this​ ​notion,​ ​it​ ​seems​ ​a​ ​Greek​ ​man​ ​of​ ​his​ ​times,​ ​with​ ​his​ ​feet​ ​so​ ​firmly
planted​ ​on​ ​the​ ​ground,​ ​would​ ​be​ ​speaking​ ​of​ ​concrete​ ​beings,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​vague​ ​abstractions.
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1.3​ ​The​ ​Unity​ ​of​ ​Metaphysics

The​ ​problem​ ​of​ ​the​ ​unity​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​can​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​two​ ​related​ ​questions.​ ​First,​ ​the​ ​text

itself​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​have​ ​many​ ​disconnected​ ​parts,​ ​repetitions,​ ​and​ ​possible​ ​contradictions.​ ​This

criticism​ ​is​ ​exemplified​ ​by​ ​historians​ ​such​ ​as​ ​Werner​ ​Jaeger,11​ ​and​ ​has​ ​been​ ​responded​ ​to​ ​at

length​ ​by​ ​Giovanni​ ​Reale.12​ ​The​ ​second​ ​question​ ​is​ ​intimately​ ​related​ ​to​ ​the​ ​first.​ ​If​ ​metaphysics

studies​ ​ens​ ​qua​ ​ens​,​ ​another​ ​problem​ ​quickly​ ​appears,​ ​since​ ​“being​ ​is​ ​said​ ​in​ ​many​ ​ways.”13​ ​How

can​ ​one​ ​science​ ​deal​ ​with​ ​different​ ​objects?​ ​How​ ​does​ ​the​ ​Metaphysics​ ​treat​ ​of​ ​both​ ​God​ ​and

substance?​ ​This​ ​second​ ​problem​ ​is​ ​actually​ ​part​ ​of​ ​why​ ​Jager​ ​proposes​ ​a​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​textual​ ​unity.​ ​He

states​ ​that​ ​Aristotle’s​ ​“original​ ​metaphysics​ ​was​ ​theology,​ ​the​ ​doctrine​ ​of​ ​the​ ​most​ ​perfect

being.”14

However,​ ​Aristotle​ ​himself​ ​provides​ ​the​ ​answer​ ​in​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​analogy.​ ​Just​ ​as

“healthy”​ ​is​ ​used​ ​in​ ​many​ ​ways​ ​(a​ ​food​ ​that​ ​causes​ ​health​ ​and​ ​a​ ​subject​ ​that​ ​is​ ​in​ ​good​ ​health),

but​ ​its​ ​various​ ​meanings​ ​all​ ​stem​ ​from​ ​one​ ​principal​ ​meaning;​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same​ ​way,​ ​the​ ​answer​ ​to​ ​the

unity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​ ​being​ ​is​ ​analogy.

11
​ ​Werner​ ​Jaeger,​ ​Aristotle:​ ​Fundamentals​ ​of​ ​the​ ​History​ ​of​ ​His​ ​Development​,​ ​pg​ ​170.​ ​“We​ ​must​ ​reject​ ​all
attempts​ ​to​ ​make​ ​a​ ​literary​ ​whole​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​remaining​ ​materials​ ​by​ ​rearranging​ ​or​ ​removing​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the
books,​ ​and​ ​we​ ​must​ ​condemn​ ​the​ ​assumption​ ​which​ ​overhastily​ ​postulates​ ​their​ ​philosophical​ ​unity​ ​at​ ​the
expense​ ​of​ ​their​ ​individual​ ​peculiarities.”
12
​ ​cf.​ ​Giovanni​ ​Reale,​​ ​Il​ ​concetto​ ​di​ ​filosofia​ ​prima​ ​e​ ​l'unità​ ​della​ ​metafisica​ ​di​ ​Aristotele.
13
​ ​Aristotle,​ ​Metaphysics​,​ ​Γ,​ ​2.
14
​ ​Werner​ ​Jaeger,​ ​Aristotle:​ ​Fundamentals​ ​of​ ​the​ ​History​ ​of​ ​His​ ​Development,​ ​pg​ ​216.
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2​ ​Analogy

2.1​ ​What​ ​is​ ​Analogy?

In​ ​Aristotelian​ ​and​ ​Thomistic​ ​logic,​ ​a​ ​spoken​ ​or​ ​written​ ​word​ ​signifies​ ​a​ ​concept​ ​(held​ ​in

the​ ​mind),​ ​which​ ​in​ ​turn​ ​signifies​ ​reality.15​ ​Logically​ ​speaking,​ ​we​ ​use​ ​words​ ​in​ ​a​ ​sentence​ ​to

express concepts and make assertions (ἀπόφανσις) about reality. We affirm or deny a predicate

of​ ​a​ ​subject.​ ​However,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​an​ ​ambiguity​ ​that​ ​exists​ ​within​ ​language.​ ​A​ ​word​ ​can​ ​be

predicated​ ​of​ ​another​ ​in​ ​three​ ​ways:​ ​it​ ​can​ ​be​ ​univocal,​ ​equivocal,​ ​or​ ​analogical.

A​ ​word​ ​is​ ​used​ ​univocally​ ​(​una​ ​vox​,​ ​one​ ​voice)​ ​when​ ​it​ ​has​ ​a​ ​single​ ​meaning.​ ​The

meaning​ ​of​ ​the​ ​word​ ​“elephant”​ ​is​ ​totally​ ​unambiguous.​ ​It​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​a​ ​single​ ​concept.​ ​A​ ​word​ ​is

equivocal​ ​(​aequus​ ​vox​,​ ​equal​ ​voice)​ ​when​ ​there​ ​are​ ​more​ ​than​ ​one​ ​unrelated​ ​meaning.​ ​A​ ​baseball

“bat”​ ​and​ ​a​ ​mammalian​ ​“bat”​ ​do​ ​not​ ​have​ ​anything​ ​in​ ​common​ ​conceptually.​ ​The​ ​word​ ​“bat”

applies​ ​equally​ ​to​ ​both​ ​concepts.​ ​The​ ​words​ ​are​ ​the​ ​same,​ ​but​ ​represent​ ​entirely​ ​different​ ​and

unrelated​ ​concepts.

However,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​predicating​ ​that​ ​falls​ ​between​ ​univocal​ ​and​ ​equivocal

language. There is predication in between pure diversity and absolute unity. Analogy (ἀναλογία)

in​ ​Greek​ ​initially​ ​referred​ ​to​ ​a​ ​mathematical​ ​proportion​ ​or​ ​a​ ​ratio.​ ​In​ ​Aristotelian​ ​and​ ​medieval

logic,​ ​analogy​ ​came​ ​to​ ​mean​ ​predication​ ​that​ ​is​ ​partly​ ​the​ ​same​ ​and​ ​partly​ ​different.​ ​Analogical

predication​ ​is​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​univocal​ ​predication​ ​in​ ​that​ ​the​ ​various​ ​meanings​ ​of​ ​the​ ​word​ ​have​ ​a

conceptual​ ​unity.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​different​ ​in​ ​that​ ​analogical​ ​predication​ ​does​ ​not​ ​have​ ​a​ ​single​ ​meaning.​ ​It

is​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​equivocal​ ​predication​ ​because​ ​each​ ​usage​ ​of​ ​the​ ​words​ ​is​ ​different,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is

​ ​Peter​ ​Kreeft,​ ​Socratic​ ​Logic​,​ ​pg.​ ​28.

15

8
distinguished​ ​from​ ​equivocal​ ​usage​ ​in​ ​that​ ​the​ ​meanings​ ​are​ ​not​ ​given​ ​equally16​ ​and​ ​are​ ​not

unrelated.

2.1​ ​The​ ​Types​ ​of​ ​Analogy

Analogy​ ​can​ ​be​ ​studied​ ​and​ ​understood​ ​from​ ​a​ ​linguistic​ ​perspective:​ ​How​ ​do​ ​words

come​ ​to​ ​possess​ ​or​ ​express​ ​different,​ ​but​ ​related​ ​meanings?​ ​It​ ​can​ ​also​ ​be​ ​seen​ ​from​ ​a​ ​logical

perspective:​ ​how​ ​do​ ​different​ ​but​ ​related​ ​concepts​ ​express​ ​something​ ​that​ ​is​ ​true;​ ​how​ ​do​ ​these

concepts​ ​relate​ ​to​ ​one​ ​another;​ ​and​ ​where​ ​is​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​source​ ​of​ ​meaning?

However,​ ​analogy​ ​can​ ​also​ ​be​ ​understood​ ​from​ ​an​ ​ontological​ ​perspective.​ ​A​ ​food​ ​or

medicine​ ​that​ ​is​ ​“healthy”​ ​really​ ​does​ ​cause​ ​a​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​be​ ​“healthy.”​ ​There​ ​is​ ​a​ ​true​ ​causal

relationship​ ​between​ ​the​ ​object​ ​that​ ​is​ ​healthy​ ​in​ ​a​ ​secondary​ ​sense​ ​(the​ ​medicine)​ ​and​ ​the

subject​ ​that​ ​has​ ​health​ ​primarily.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​an​ ​analogy​ ​of​ ​being​ ​in​ ​father​ ​and​ ​son,​ ​because​ ​of​ ​the

causal​ ​relationship.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​an​ ​ontological​ ​analogy​ ​on​ ​the​ ​level​ ​of​ ​being,​ ​when​ ​we​ ​look​ ​at​ ​a

things​ ​nature.

2.2​ ​The​ ​Division​ ​of​ ​Analogy

Starting​ ​with​ ​Cajetan’s​ ​De​ ​Nominum​ ​Analogia​,​ ​analogy​ ​was​ ​divided​ ​into​ ​two​ ​main​ ​types:

analogies​ ​of​ ​proportionality​ ​and​ ​analogies​ ​of​ ​attribution​ ​(or​ ​simple​ ​proportion).

With​ ​the​ ​analogy​ ​of​ ​attribution​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​resemblance​ ​between​ ​terms,​ ​which​ ​has​ ​its

source in a relation πρός ἓν or ad​ ​unum​.​ ​This​ ​can​ ​be​ ​both​ ​extrinsic​ ​and​ ​intrinsic.​ ​Extrinsically,

there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​real​ ​similarity.​ ​Only​ ​one​ ​term​ ​possesses​ ​the​ ​characteristic​ ​found​ ​in​ ​the​ ​analogy.​ ​Then,

all​ ​the​ ​others​ ​are​ ​called​ ​by​ ​that​ ​term​ ​because​ ​of​ ​their​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​the​ ​first.​ ​The​ ​example​ ​given​ ​by

​ ​As​ ​we​ ​will​ ​discuss​ ​later​ ​on,​ ​analogical​ ​meanings​ ​often​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​a​ ​primary​ ​single​ ​meaning.
16

9
Aristotle​ ​and​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​is​ ​health,17​ ​since​ ​health​ ​is​ ​only​ ​in​ ​the​ ​subject​ ​that​ ​is​ ​healthy.​ ​An

intrinsic​ ​analogy​ ​of​ ​attribution​ ​would​ ​be​ ​a​ ​cause​ ​that​ ​makes​ ​a​ ​similar​ ​effect​ ​(ex.​ ​Father,​ ​son;

God,​ ​creation).​ ​This​ ​is​ ​also​ ​called​ ​an​ ​analogy​ ​of​ ​participation.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​God​ ​and​ ​creation,

being​ ​is​ ​really​ ​in​ ​both​ ​God​ ​and​ ​His​ ​creation,​ ​but​ ​in​ ​analogous​ ​ways.

In​ ​an​ ​analogy​ ​of​ ​proportionality,​ ​A​ ​is​ ​to​ ​B​ ​as​ ​C​ ​is​ ​to​ ​D.​ ​Ex.​ ​puppies​ ​are​ ​to​ ​dogs​ ​as​ ​kittens

are​ ​to​ ​cats.​ ​The​ ​analogy​ ​of​ ​proportionality​ ​can​ ​be​ ​either​ ​improper​ ​(extrinsic)​ ​or​ ​proper​ ​(intrinsic).

With​ ​improper​ ​proportionality,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​real​ ​basis​ ​for​ ​similarity.​ ​The​ ​analogy​ ​is​ ​only​ ​founded

on​ ​a​ ​similarity​ ​discovered​ ​by​ ​the​ ​knower.​ ​Improper​ ​proportionality​ ​is​ ​also​ ​called​ ​metaphoric

proportionality,​ ​since​ ​this​ ​type​ ​of​ ​analogy​ ​includes​ ​similes​ ​and​ ​metaphors.18

The​ ​second​ ​analogy​ ​of​ ​proportionality​ ​is​ ​proper​ ​(or​ ​intrinsic)​ ​proportionality,​ ​where​ ​there

is​ ​a​ ​real​ ​causal​ ​relationship​ ​between​ ​between​ ​the​ ​two​ ​terms.​ ​The​ ​often​ ​used​ ​example​ ​is​ ​the

faculty​ ​of​ ​seeing​ ​(which​ ​is​ ​intrinsic​ ​to​ ​the​ ​eye)​ ​and​ ​faculty​ ​of​ ​understanding​ ​(which​ ​is​ ​intrinsic​ ​to

the​ ​mind).​ ​In​ ​each​ ​of​ ​these​ ​cases​ ​we​ ​are​ ​talking​ ​about​ ​a​ ​really​ ​possessed​ ​faculty.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​proper,

because​ ​the​ ​attribute​ ​is​ ​really​ ​connected​ ​with​ ​the​ ​subjects​ ​(or​ ​intrinsic​ ​to​ ​them).

17
​ ​It’s​ ​interesting​ ​that​ ​this​ ​example​ ​is​ ​used​ ​by​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​to​ ​illustrate​ ​both​ ​multa​ ​ad​ ​unum​ ​and​ ​unum​ ​ad
alterum​:​ ​“multa​ ​habent​ ​proportionem​ ​ad​ ​unum,​ ​sicut​ ​sanum​ ​dicitur​ ​de​ ​medicina​ ​et​ ​urina,​ ​inquantum
utrumque​ ​habet​ ​ordinem​ ​et​ ​proportionem​ ​ad​ ​sanitatem​ ​animalis,​ ​cuius​ ​hoc​ ​quidem​ ​signum​ ​est,​ ​illud​ ​vero
causa;​ ​vel​ ​ex​ ​eo​ ​quod​ ​unum​ ​habet​ ​proportionem​ ​ad​ ​alterum,​ ​sicut​ ​sanum​ ​dicitur​ ​de​ ​medicina​ ​et​ ​animali,
inquantum​ ​medicina​ ​est​ ​causa​ ​sanitatis​ ​quae​ ​est​ ​in​ ​animali.”​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​Aquinas,​ ​Summa​ ​Theologiae​,​ ​I,
q.​ ​13​ ​a.​ ​5.
18
​ ​Cajetan,​ ​De​ ​Nominum​ ​Analogia​,​ ​n.​ ​25.​ ​“Fit​ ​autem​ ​duobus​ ​modis​ ​analogia​ ​haec:​ ​scilicet​ ​metaphorice​ ​et
proprie.​ ​Metaphorice​ ​quidem,​ ​quando​ ​nomen​ ​illud​ ​commune​ ​absolute​ ​unam​ ​habet​ ​rationem​ ​formalem,
quae​ ​in​ ​uno​ ​analogatorum​ ​salvatur,​ ​et​ ​per​ ​metaphoram​ ​de​ ​alio​ ​dicitur.”
10
Types​ ​of​ ​predication:

1. Univocal
2. Equivocal
3. Analogy
a. Attribution
i. Extrinsic
ii. Intrinsic​ ​(participation)
b. Proportionality
i. Proper​ ​(intrinsic)
ii. Improper​ ​or​ ​metaphoric​ ​(extrinsic)

2.3​ ​Analogy​ ​of​ ​Being

Being​ ​can​ ​be​ ​predicated​ ​analogously​ ​in​ ​two​ ​ways:​ ​foundationally​ ​being​ ​is​ ​an​ ​analogy​ ​of

intrinsic​ ​attribution,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​also​ ​proper​ ​proportionality.

First,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​beings​ ​in​ ​Γ2,​ ​Aristotle​ ​is​ ​referring​ ​to​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​beings​ ​as​ ​an

analogy​ ​of​ ​intrinsic​ ​attribution.​ ​“There​ ​are​ ​many​ ​senses​ ​in​ ​which​ ​a​ ​thing​ ​is​ ​said​ ​to​ ​be,​ ​but​ ​all

refer​ ​to​ ​one​ ​starting-point.”19​ ​According​ ​to​ ​Aristotle,​ ​being​ ​refers​ ​first​ ​to​ ​substance​ ​and​ ​second​ ​to

accidents.​ ​However,​ ​God​ ​for​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​as​ ​ipsum​ ​esse​ ​subsistens​ ​would​ ​also​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​the

primary​ ​meaning​ ​of​ ​“being”​ ​according​ ​to​ ​res​ ​significata​.​ ​Second,​ ​each​ ​being​ ​(​ens​)​ ​participates​ ​in

being​ ​(​esse​)​ ​to​ ​a​ ​different​ ​degree​ ​according​ ​to​ ​its​ ​essence.​ ​This​ ​participation​ ​is​ ​an​ ​ontological

analogy​ ​of​ ​proper​ ​proportionality.

So,​ ​analogy​ ​provides​ ​an​ ​answer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​the​ ​unity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​object​ ​of​ ​metaphysics.

The​ ​object​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​is​ ​being​ ​(​ens​)​ ​as​ ​it​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​substance​ ​and​ ​inasmuch​ ​as​ ​it​ ​possesses

being​ ​(​esse​)​ ​through​ ​participation.​ ​The​ ​princeps​ ​analogatum​ ​is​ ​both​ ​substance​ ​and​ ​esse​ ​per

essentia​,​ ​God.

​ ​Aristotle,​ ​Metaphysics​,​ ​Γ,​ ​2.

19

11
2.4​ ​Analogy​ ​of​ ​Abstraction

St.​ ​Thomas​ ​does​ ​not​ ​see​ ​the​ ​object​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​as​ ​something​ ​abstractly​ ​unreal.​ ​On​ ​the

contrary,​ ​he​ ​sees​ ​the​ ​object​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​as​ ​necessarily​ ​more​ ​real​ ​than​ ​the​ ​objects​ ​of​ ​either

math​ ​or​ ​physics.​ ​Its​ ​object​ ​is​ ​not​ ​like​ ​the​ ​others--an​ ​abstraction​ ​formed​ ​by​ ​simple​ ​apprehension.

The​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​being​ ​is​ ​instead​ ​formed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​second​ ​operation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​intellect,​ ​judgment.​ ​St.

Thomas​ ​sees​ ​the​ ​first​ ​operation​ ​(simple​ ​apprehension)​ ​as​ ​corresponding​ ​to​ ​a​ ​thing’s​ ​nature​ ​and

the​ ​second​ ​operation​ ​(separatio)​ ​as​ ​corresponding​ ​to​ ​a​ ​thing’s​ ​being​ ​(esse).​ ​By​ ​its​ ​very​ ​nature,

judgment​ ​must​ ​correspond​ ​to​ ​being.

We​ ​conclude​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​three​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​distinction​ ​in​ ​the​ ​operation​ ​of​ ​the
intellect.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​one​ ​through​ ​the​ ​operation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​intellect​ ​joining​ ​and​ ​dividing
which​ ​is​ ​properly​ ​called​ ​separation;​ ​and​ ​this​ ​belongs​ ​to​ ​divine​ ​science​ ​or
metaphysics.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​another​ ​through​ ​the​ ​operation​ ​by​ ​which​ ​the​ ​quiddities​ ​of
things​ ​are​ ​conceived​ ​which​ ​is​ ​the​ ​abstraction​ ​of​ ​form​ ​from​ ​sensible​ ​matter;​ ​and
this​ ​belongs​ ​to​ ​mathematics.​ ​And​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​third​ ​through​ ​the​ ​same​ ​operation
which​ ​is​ ​the​ ​abstraction​ ​of​ ​a​ ​universal​ ​from​ ​a​ ​particular;​ ​and​ ​this​ ​belongs​ ​to
physics​ ​and​ ​to​ ​all​ ​the​ ​sciences​ ​in​ ​general,​ ​because​ ​science​ ​disregards​ ​accidental
features​ ​and​ ​treats​ ​of​ ​necessary​ ​matters.20

The​ ​difference​ ​between​ ​abstraction​ ​and​ ​separatio​ ​is​ ​crucial​ ​to​ ​understanding​ ​Thomistic

metaphysics.​ ​Simple​ ​apprehension​ ​can​ ​consider​ ​one​ ​thing​ ​as​ ​separate​ ​from​ ​another​ ​without​ ​it

being​ ​so​ ​in​ ​reality.​ ​However,​ ​for​ ​separatio​ ​to​ ​be​ ​truthful​ ​(conforming​ ​to​ ​reality),​ ​it​ ​must​ ​not

separate​ ​in​ ​the​ ​mind​ ​what​ ​exists​ ​in​ ​reality​ ​united.​ ​So​ ​for​ ​St.​ ​Thomas,​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​substance​ ​apart

from​ ​its​ ​accidents​ ​is​ ​a​ ​matter​ ​of​ ​separatio​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​abstraction,​ ​since​ ​he​ ​views​ ​them​ ​as​ ​really

distinct--not​ ​inter​ ​res​,​ ​but​ ​in​ ​re​.​ ​He​ ​says,​ ​“the​ ​consideration​ ​of​ ​substance​ ​without​ ​quantity

belongs​ ​to​ ​the​ ​order​ ​of​ ​separation​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​to​ ​that​ ​of​ ​abstraction.”21

​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​Aquinas,​ ​In​ ​librum​ ​Boethii​ ​De​ ​Trinitate​,​ ​q.​ ​5,​ ​a.​ ​3.
20

21
​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​Aquinas,​ ​In​ ​librum​ ​Boethii​ ​De​ ​Trinitate​,​ ​q.​ ​5,​ ​a.​ ​3.
12
 It​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​even​ ​in​ ​the​ ​operations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​intellect​ ​that​ ​form​ ​the​ ​objects​ ​of​ ​the​ ​three

speculative​ ​sciences,​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​sees​ ​an​ ​analogy​ ​of​ ​abstraction.22​ ​“In​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​the​ ​term

‘abstraction’​ ​does​ ​not​ ​have​ ​a​ ​univocal​ ​meaning.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​analogical,​ ​signifying​ ​activities​ ​of​ ​the

intellect​ ​which​ ​are​ ​essentially​ ​diverse​ ​from​ ​each​ ​other,​ ​although​ ​proportionately​ ​the​ ​same.”23

2.5​ ​Other​ ​Analogies​ ​in​ ​Metaphysics

Another​ ​important​ ​analogy​ ​used​ ​by​ ​Aristotle​ ​and​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​is​ ​act​ ​and​ ​potency.​ ​First,

Aristotle​ ​says​ ​that​ ​act​ ​is​ ​not​ ​defined,​ ​but​ ​only​ ​known​ ​by​ ​induction​ ​and​ ​grasped​ ​by​ ​analogy.24

Then,​ ​this​ ​pairing​ ​of​ ​act​ ​and​ ​potency​ ​is​ ​used​ ​by​ ​Aristotle​ ​in​ ​two​ ​different​ ​ways:​ ​as​ ​accidents​ ​and

substance,​ ​and​ ​then​ ​form​ ​and​ ​material.​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​will​ ​also​ ​use​ ​act​ ​and​ ​potency​ ​when​ ​explaining

the​ ​relationship​ ​of​ ​esse​ ​and​ ​essentia​.​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​will​ ​also​ ​thoroughly​ ​make​ ​use​ ​of​ ​analogy​ ​when

speaking​ ​of​ ​the​ ​divine​ ​names.25

3.​ ​The​ ​Method​ ​of​ ​Study

3.1​ ​A​ ​Few​ ​Methods​ ​Used​ ​by​ ​Aristotle

As​ ​with​ ​many​ ​of​ ​Aristotle’s​ ​works,​ ​he​ ​begins​ ​by​ ​discussing​ ​what​ ​others​ ​have​ ​thought.​ ​In

some​ ​cases,​ ​he​ ​takes​ ​these​ ​opinions​ ​as​ ​a​ ​starting​ ​point.​ ​In​ ​other​ ​cases,​ ​he​ ​identifies​ ​what​ ​is​ ​wrong

in​ ​their​ ​thinking.​ ​Aristotle​ ​calls​ ​this​ ​approach​ ​dialectic​ ​(διαλεκτική).​ ​While​ ​truth​ ​is​ ​not​ ​found​ ​in

the​ ​opinion​ ​(δόξα)​ ​of​ ​others,​ ​it​ ​can​ ​provide​ ​an​ ​orientation​ ​to​ ​begin​ ​the​ ​study.

22
​ ​Despite​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​does​ ​use​ ​the​ ​term​ ​“abstraction”​ ​to​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​separatio​ ​I​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​side​ ​more
with​ ​Fabro​ ​in​ ​rejecting​ ​Cajetan’s​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​the​ ​three​ ​degrees​ ​of​ ​abstraction.
23
​ ​Maurer,​ ​Armand,​ ​The​ ​Division​ ​and​ ​Methods​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Sciences​,​ ​Introduction,​ ​XXIII.
24
​ ​Aristotle,​ ​Metaphysics​,​ ​bk.​ ​Θ,​ ​n.​ ​6.​ ​“Our​ ​meaning​ ​can​ ​be​ ​seen​ ​in​ ​the​ ​particular​ ​cases​ ​by​ ​induction,​ ​and
we​ ​must​ ​not​ ​seek​ ​a​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​everything​ ​but​ ​be​ ​content​ ​to​ ​grasp​ ​the​ ​analogy.”
25
​ ​St.​ ​Thomas,​ ​Summa​,​ ​ ​Prima​ ​Pars,​ ​Question​ ​13.
13
 Part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Metaphysics​ ​moves​ ​along​ ​by​ ​deduction--a​ ​demonstration​ ​starting​ ​with​ ​true

premises​ ​and​ ​first​ ​principles​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​a​ ​necessary​ ​conclusion.​ ​However,​ ​the​ ​sources​ ​of​ ​these

premises​ ​and​ ​first​ ​principles​ ​is​ ​often​ ​induction--the​ ​inference​ ​of​ ​general​ ​truth​ ​from​ ​particulars.

There​ ​is​ ​a​ ​difficulty​ ​in​ ​using​ ​deduction​ ​when​ ​dealing​ ​with​ ​metaphysics,​ ​because​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the

subject​ ​is​ ​related​ ​to​ ​first​ ​principles​ ​themselves.​ ​As​ ​Aristotle​ ​points​ ​out,​ ​there​ ​must​ ​be​ ​some​ ​first

principles​ ​which​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​demonstrated.​ ​Without​ ​certain​ ​axioms​ ​to​ ​begin,​ ​logical​ ​discourse

would​ ​run​ ​in​ ​an​ ​eternal​ ​circle.

One​ ​specific​ ​axiom​ ​Aristotle​ ​addresses​ ​is​ ​the​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​noncontradiction.​ ​Since​ ​it​ ​is​ ​the

very​ ​first​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​thought,​ ​it​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​demonstrated.​ ​However,​ ​although​ ​it​ ​cannot​ ​be

demonstrated​ ​syllogisticly,​ ​Aristotle​ ​shows​ ​that​ ​the​ ​truth​ ​of​ ​the​ ​principle​ ​can​ ​be​ ​seen​ ​by​ ​the

process of refutation (ἔλεγχος). This is the method primarily used by Socrates, also known as

reductio​ ​ad​ ​absurdum​.​ ​Elenchos​ ​(or​ ​refutation)​ ​is​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​using​ ​a​ ​syllogism​ ​to​ ​make

evident​ ​the​ ​falsity​ ​of​ ​an​ ​opposing​ ​position​ ​by​ ​showing​ ​the​ ​resulting​ ​contradictions​ ​when​ ​the

position​ ​is​ ​brought​ ​to​ ​its​ ​conclusion.​ ​Much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Metaphysics​ ​uses​ ​elenchos​ ​because​ ​it​ ​deals

primarily​ ​with​ ​first​ ​principles,​ ​which​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​demonstrated,​ ​only​ ​defended.

Finally, the whole of book B uses the method of aporia (ἀπορία), which poses a problem

in​ ​their​ ​most​ ​radical​ ​form.​ ​The​ ​aporia​ ​develop​ ​each​ ​problem​ ​to​ ​a​ ​seemingly​ ​impassable​ ​point.

This​ ​method​ ​is​ ​useful,​ ​because​ ​it​ ​helps​ ​to​ ​show​ ​the​ ​difficulties​ ​and​ ​apparent​ ​contradictions​ ​in

greater​ ​clarity.

14
3.3​ ​Method​ ​According​ ​to​ ​St.​ ​Thomas

Since​ ​most​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​deals​ ​with​ ​first​ ​principles​ ​and​ ​what​ ​is​ ​not​ ​directly​ ​sensible,​ ​it

requires​ ​a​ ​special​ ​method​ ​appropriate​ ​to​ ​dealing​ ​with​ ​these​ ​truths.​ ​As​ ​mentioned​ ​previously,​ ​St.

Thomas​ ​starts​ ​with​ ​separatio​ ​as​ ​the​ ​“distinction-separation​ ​proper​ ​to​ ​metaphysical​ ​reflection​ ​(for

example,​ ​distinguishing​ ​esse​ ​from​ ​essence​ ​in​ ​creatures​ ​or​ ​God​ ​from​ ​creatures).”26​ ​However,​ ​it​ ​is

the​ ​resolutio​ ​(or​ ​analysis)​ ​that​ ​is​ ​the​ ​method​ ​of​ ​metaphysics​ ​outlined​ ​by​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​in​ ​De

Trinitate​.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​a​ ​movement​ ​from​ ​effect​ ​to​ ​cause​ ​or​ ​from​ ​particulars​ ​to​ ​universals.27​ ​It​ ​is​ ​the

opposite​ ​of​ ​composition,​ ​or​ ​compositio​,​ ​which​ ​goes​ ​from​ ​universals​ ​to​ ​particulars.

The​ ​resolutio​ ​and​ ​compositio​ ​can​ ​be​ ​accomplished​ ​in​ ​two​ ​ways:​ ​by​ ​intrinsic​ ​causes

(​secundum​ ​rationem​)​ ​or​ ​extrinsic​ ​causes​ ​(​secundum​ ​rem​).​ ​The​ ​result​ ​of​ ​resolutio​ ​secundum

rationem​ ​is​ ​knowledge​ ​of​ ​ens​ ​commune​ ​and​ ​the​ ​transcendentals​ ​(the​ ​properties​ ​of​ ​being​ ​as

being).​ ​The​ ​result​ ​of​ ​resolutio​ ​secundum​ ​rem​ ​is​ ​knowledge​ ​of​ ​the​ ​ultimate​ ​cause​ ​of​ ​all​ ​beings.

The​ ​resolutio​ ​secundum​ ​rem​ ​is​ ​a​ ​movement​ ​from​ ​one​ ​thing​ ​to​ ​another,​ ​from​ ​the​ ​finite​ ​to​ ​the

infinite,​ ​from​ ​effect​ ​to​ ​the​ ​efficient,​ ​exemplary,​ ​and​ ​final​ ​cause.28​ ​The​ ​resolutio​ ​secundum

rationem​,​ ​however,​ ​finds​ ​the​ ​constitutive​ ​parts​ ​(substance,​ ​form,​ ​essence,​ ​etc)​ ​and​ ​the

transcendentals​ ​(​res​,​ ​unum​,​ ​bonum,​ ​etc)​ ​present​ ​in​ ​all​ ​beings.29

26
​ ​Mitchell,​ ​Jason,​ ​Being​ ​and​ ​Participation,​ ​The​ ​Method​ ​and​ ​Structure​ ​of​ ​Metaphysical​ ​Reflection
according​ ​to​ ​Cornelio​ ​Fabro​,​ ​pg.​ ​665.
27
​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​Aquinas,​ ​In​ ​librum​ ​Boethii​ ​De​ ​Trinitate​,​ ​q.​ ​6,​ ​a.​ ​1.​ ​“secundum​ ​viam​ ​resolutionis,​ ​in
quantum​ ​ratio​ ​ex​ ​multis​ ​colligit​ ​unam​ ​et​ ​simplicem​ ​veritatem.”
28
​ ​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​Aquinas,​ ​In​ ​librum​ ​Boethii​ ​De​ ​Trinitate​,​ ​q.​ ​6,​ ​a.​ ​1.​ ​“Ultimus​ ​ergo​ ​terminus​ ​resolutionis​ ​in
hac​ ​via​ ​est,​ ​cum​ ​pervenitur​ ​ad​ ​causas​ ​supremas​ ​maxime​ ​simplices,​ ​quae​ ​sunt​ ​substantiae​ ​separatae.”
29
​ ​St.​ ​Thomas​ ​Aquinas,​ ​In​ ​librum​ ​Boethii​ ​De​ ​Trinitate​,​ ​q.​ ​6,​ ​a.​ ​1.​ ​“Quandoque​ ​vero​ ​procedit​ ​de​ ​uno​ ​in
aliud​ ​secundum​ ​rationem,​ ​ut​ ​quando​ ​est​ ​processus​ ​secundum​ ​causas​ ​intrinsecas.”
15
 However,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​note​ ​that​ ​although​ ​resolutio​ ​secundum​ ​rationem​ ​does​ ​not

proceed​ ​from​ ​one​ ​thing​ ​to​ ​another,​ ​that​ ​does​ ​not​ ​mean​ ​that​ ​the​ ​intrinsic​ ​causes​ ​are​ ​not​ ​distinct​ ​or

are​ ​just​ ​a​ ​logical​ ​distinction.​ ​While​ ​all​ ​the​ ​transcendentals​ ​are​ ​by​ ​definition​ ​convertible​ ​with​ ​ens

(and​ ​therefore​ ​logical​ ​distinctions),​ ​the​ ​intrinsic​ ​causes​ ​are​ ​not,​ ​as​ ​both​ ​Aristotle​ ​and​ ​St.​ ​Thomas

point​ ​out.​ ​The​ ​resolutio​ ​secundum​ ​rationem​ ​is​ ​a​ ​logical​ ​analysis​ ​to​ ​arrive​ ​at​ ​the​ ​real​ ​distinction​ ​of

esse​ ​et​ ​essentia.

16