Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 149743             February 18, 2005

LEONARDO TAN, ROBERT UY and LAMBERTO TE, petitioners,

vs.
SOCORRO Y. PEREÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The resolution of the present petition effectively settles the question of how many
cockpits may be allowed to operate in a city or municipality.

There are two competing values of high order that come to fore in this case—the
traditional power of the national government to enact police power measures, on one
hand, and the vague principle of local autonomy now enshrined in the Constitution on
the other. The facts are simple, but may be best appreciated taking into account the
legal milieu which frames them.

In 1974, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law
of 1974, was enacted. Section 5(b) of the Decree provided for limits on the number of
cockpits that may be established in cities and municipalities in the following manner:

Section 5. Cockpits and Cockfighting in General. –

(b) Establishment of Cockpits. – Only one cockpit shall be allowed in each city or
municipality, except that in cities or municipalities with a population of over one hundred
thousand, two cockpits may be established, maintained and operated.

With the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, 1 the municipal sangguniang
bayan were empowered, "[a]ny law to the contrary notwithstanding," to "authorize and
license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate
cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks." 2

In 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Daanbantayan, 3 Cebu Province,

enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 6 (Ordinance No. 6), Series of 1993, which served as
the Revised Omnibus Ordinance prescribing and promulgating the rules and regulations
governing cockpit operations in Daanbantayan. 4 Section 5 thereof, relative to the
number of cockpits allowed in the municipality, stated:
Section 5. There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan,
Province of Cebu, not more than its equal number of cockpits based upon the
population provided for in PD 449, provided however, that this specific section can be
amended for purposes of establishing additional cockpits, if the Municipal population so
warrants.5

Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed an amendatory ordinance, Municipal

Ordinance No. 7 (Ordinance No. 7), Series of 1993, which amended the aforequoted
Section 5 to now read as follows:

Section 5. Establishment of Cockpit. There shall be allowed to operate in the

Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, not more than three (3) cockpits. 6

On 8 November 1995, petitioner Leonardo Tan (Tan) applied with the Municipal
Gamefowl Commission for the issuance of a permit/license to establish and operate a
cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, in Daanbantayan. At the time of his application, there
was already another cockpit in operation in Daanbantayan, operated by respondent
Socorro Y. Pereña (Pereña), who was the duly franchised and licensed cockpit operator
in the municipality since the 1970s. Pereña’s franchise, per records, was valid until
2002.7

The Municipal Gamefowl Commission favorably recommended to the mayor of

Daanbantayan, petitioner Lamberto Te (Te), that a permit be issued to Tan. On 20
January 1996, Te issued a mayor’s permit allowing Tan "to establish/operate/conduct"
the business of a cockpit in Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan, Cebu for the period from
20 January 1996 to 31 December 1996.8

This act of the mayor served as cause for Pereña to file a Complaint for damages with a
prayer for injunction against Tan, Te, and Roberto Uy, the latter allegedly an agent of
Tan.9 Pereña alleged that there was no lawful basis for the establishment of a second
cockpit. She claimed that Tan conducted his cockpit fights not in Combado, but in
Malingin, at a site less than five kilometers away from her own cockpit. She insisted that
the unlawful operation of Tan’s cockpit has caused injury to her own legitimate
business, and demanded damages of at least Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) per
month as actual damages, One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as moral
damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages. Pereña also
prayed that the permit issued by Te in favor of Tan be declared as null and void, and
that a permanent writ of injunction be issued against Te and Tan preventing Tan from
conducting cockfights within the municipality and Te from issuing any authority for Tan
to pursue such activity.10

The case was heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 11 Branch 61 of Bogo, Cebu,
which initially granted a writ of preliminary injunction. 12 During trial, herein petitioners
asserted that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the sangguniang bayan of
each municipality now had the power and authority to grant franchises and enact
ordinances authorizing the establishment, licensing, operation and maintenance of
cockpits.13 By virtue of such authority, the Sangguniang Bayan of Daanbantayan
promulgated Ordinance Nos. 6 and 7. On the other hand, Pereña claimed that the
amendment authorizing the operation of not more than three (3) cockpits in
Daanbantayan violated Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law of 1974, which allowed for
only one cockpit in a municipality with a population as Daanbantayan. 14

In a Decision dated 10 March 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The court
observed that Section 5 of Ordinance No. 6, prior to its amendment, was by specific
provision, an implementation of the Cockfighting Law. 15 Yet according to the RTC,
questions could be raised as to the efficacy of the subsequent amendment under
Ordinance No. 7, since under the old Section 5, an amendment allowing additional
cockpits could be had only "if the municipal population so warrants." 16 While the RTC
seemed to doubt whether this condition had actually been fulfilled, it nonetheless
declared that since the case was only for damages, "the [RTC] cannot grant more relief
than that prayed for."17 It ruled that there was no evidence, testimonial or documentary,
to show that plaintiff had actually suffered damages. Neither was there evidence that
Te, by issuing the permit to Tan, had acted in bad faith, since such issuance was
pursuant to municipal ordinances that nonetheless remained in force. 18 Finally, the RTC
noted that the assailed permit had expired on 31 December 1996, and there was no
showing that it had been renewed.19

Pereña filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated 24
February 1998. In this Order, the RTC categorically stated that Ordinance Nos. 6 and 7
were "valid and legal for all intents and purpose[s]." 20 The RTC also noted that the
Sangguniang Bayan had also promulgated Resolution No. 78-96, conferring on Tan a
franchise to operate a cockpit for a period of ten (10) years from February 1996 to
2006.21 This Resolution was likewise affirmed as valid by the RTC. The RTC noted that
while the ordinances seemed to be in conflict with the Cockfighting Law, any doubt in
interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grant of more power to the local
government unit, following the principles of devolution under the Local Government
Code.22

The Decision and Order of the RTC were assailed by Pereña on an appeal with the
Court of Appeals which on 21 May 2001, rendered the Decision now assailed.23 The
perspective from which the Court of Appeals viewed the issue was markedly different
from that adopted by the RTC. Its analysis of the Local Government Code, particularly
Section 447(a)(3)(V), was that the provision vesting unto the sangguniang bayan the
power to authorize and license the establishment of cockpits did not do away with the
Cockfighting Law, as these two laws are not necessarily inconsistent with each other.
What the provision of the Local Government Code did, according to the Court of
Appeals, was to transfer to the sangguniang bayan powers that were previously
conferred on the Municipal Gamefowl Commission. 24

Given these premises, the appellate court declared as follows:

Ordinance No. 7 should [be] held invalid for allowing, in unconditional terms, the
operation of "not more than three cockpits in Daan Bantayan" (sic), clearly dispensing
with the standard set forth in PD 449. However, this issue appears to have been mooted
by the expiration of the Mayor’s Permit granted to the defendant which has not been
renewed.25

As to the question of damages, the Court of Appeals agreed with the findings of the
RTC that Pereña was not entitled to damages. Thus, it affirmed the previous ruling
denying the claim for damages. However, the Court of Appeals modified the RTC’s
Decision in that it now ordered that Tan be enjoined from operating a cockpit and
conducting any cockfights within Daanbantayan.26

Thus, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioners present two legal questions for determination: whether the Local
Government Code has rendered inoperative the Cockfighting Law; and whether the
validity of a municipal ordinance may be determined in an action for damages which
does not even contain a prayer to declare the ordinance invalid. 27 As the denial of the
prayer for damages by the lower court is not put in issue before this Court, it shall not be
passed upon on review.

The first question raised is particularly interesting, and any definitive resolution on that
point would have obvious ramifications not only to Daanbantayan, but all other
municipalities and cities. However, we must first determine the proper scope of judicial
inquiry that we could engage in, given the nature of the initiatory complaint and the
rulings rendered thereupon, the exact point raised in the second question.

Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals, in declaring Ordinance No. 7 as invalid,
embarked on an unwarranted collateral attack on the validity of a municipal ordinance. 28
Pereña’s complaint, which was for damages with preliminary injunction, did not pray for
the nullity of Ordinance No. 7. The Municipality of Daanbantayan as a local government
unit was not made a party to the case, nor did any legal counsel on its behalf enter any
appearance. Neither was the Office of the Solicitor General given any notice of the
case.29

These concerns are not trivial.30 Yet, we must point out that the Court of Appeals did not
expressly nullify Ordinance No. 7, or any ordinance for that matter. What the appellate
court did was to say that Ordinance No. 7 "should therefore be held invalid" for being
in violation of the Cockfighting Law. 31 In the next breath though, the Court of Appeals
backtracked, saying that "this issue appears to have been mooted by the expiration of
the Mayor’s Permit granted" to Tan.32

But our curiosity is aroused by the dispositive portion of the assailed Decision, wherein
the Court of Appeals enjoined Tan "from operating a cockpit and conducting any
cockfights within" Daanbantayan.33 Absent the invalidity of Ordinance No. 7, there would
be no basis for this injunction. After all, any future operation of a cockpit by Tan in
Daanbantayan, assuming all other requisites are complied with, would be validly
authorized should Ordinance No. 7 subsist.

So it seems, for all intents and purposes, that the Court of Appeals did deem Ordinance
No. 7 a nullity. Through such resort, did the appellate court in effect allow a collateral
attack on the validity of an ordinance through an action for damages, as the petitioners
argue?

The initiatory Complaint filed by Pereña deserves close scrutiny. Immediately, it can be
seen that it is not only an action for damages, but also one for injunction. An action for
injunction will require judicial determination whether there exists a right in esse which is
to be protected, and if there is an act constituting a violation of such right against which
injunction is sought. At the same time, the mere fact of injury alone does not give rise to
a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a
right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the
plaintiff therefrom. In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act
causing damage, there must be damnum et injuria¾that act must be not only hurtful, but
wrongful.34

Indubitably, the determination of whether injunction or damages avail in this case

requires the ascertainment of whether a second cockpit may be legally allowed in
Daanbantayan. If this is permissible, Pereña would not be entitled either to injunctive
relief or damages.

Moreover, an examination of the specific allegations in the Complaint reveals that

Pereña therein puts into question the legal basis for allowing Tan to operate another
cockpit in Daanbantayan. She asserted that "there is no lawful basis for the
establishment of a second cockpit considering the small population of
[Daanbantayan],"35 a claim which alludes to Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law which
prohibits the establishment of a second cockpit in municipalities of less than ten
thousand (10,000) in population. Pereña likewise assails the validity of the permit issued
to Tan and prays for its annulment, and also seeks that Te be enjoined from issuing any
special permit not only to Tan, but also to "any other person outside of a duly licensed
cockpit in Daanbantayan, Cebu."36

It would have been preferable had Pereña expressly sought the annulment of
Ordinance No. 7. Yet it is apparent from her Complaint that she sufficiently alleges that
there is no legal basis for the establishment of a second cockpit. More importantly, the
petitioners themselves raised the valid effect of Ordinance No. 7 at the heart of their
defense against the complaint, as adverted to in their Answer.37 The averment in the
Answer that Ordinance No. 7 is valid can be considered as an affirmative defense, as it
is the allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material
allegations in the complaint, would nevertheless bar recovery. 38 Clearly then, the validity
of Ordinance No. 7 became a justiciable matter for the RTC, and indeed Pereña
squarely raised the argument during trial that said ordinance violated the Cockfighting
Law.391awphi1.nét
Moreover, the assailed rulings of the RTC, its Decision and subsequent Order denying
Pereña’s Motion for Reconsideration, both discuss the validity of Ordinance No. 7. In
the Decision, the RTC evaded making a categorical ruling on the ordinance’s validity
because the case was "only for damages, [thus the RTC could] not grant more relief
than that prayed for." This reasoning is unjustified, considering that Pereña also prayed
for an injunction, as well as for the annulment of Tan’s permit. The resolution of these
two questions could very well hinge on the validity of Ordinance No. 7.

Still, in the Order denying Pereña’s Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC felt less
inhibited and promptly declared as valid not only Ordinance No. 7, but also Resolution
No. 78-96 of the Sangguniang Bayan dated 23 February 1996, which conferred on Tan
a franchise to operate a cockpit from 1996 to 2006. 40 In the Order, the RTC ruled that
while Ordinance No. 7 was in apparent conflict with the Cockfighting Law, the ordinance
was justified under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code.

This express affirmation of the validity of Ordinance No. 7 by the RTC was the first
assigned error in Pereña’s appeal to the Court of Appeals. 41 In their Appellee’s Brief
before the appellate court, the petitioners likewise argued that Ordinance No. 7 was
valid and that the Cockfighting Law was repealed by the Local Government Code. 42 On
the basis of these arguments, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision,
including its ruling that the Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law remains in effect
notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code.

Indubitably, the question on the validity of Ordinance No. 7 in view of the continuing
efficacy of Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law is one that has been fully litigated in the
courts below. We are comfortable with reviewing that question in the case at bar and
make dispositions proceeding from that key legal question. This is militated by the
realization that in order to resolve the question whether injunction should be imposed
against the petitioners, there must be first a determination whether Tan may be allowed
to operate a second cockpit in Daanbantayan. Thus, the conflict between Section 5(b)
of the Cockfighting Law and Ordinance No. 7 now ripens for adjudication.

In arguing that Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law has been repealed, petitioners cite
the following provisions of Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code:

Section 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
shall:

....

(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant franchises, enact ordinances
authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, or enact ordinances levying taxes, fees
and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the
general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative
authority shall:

....

(v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting
and commercial breeding of gamecocks; Provided, that existing rights should not
be prejudiced;

For the petitioners, Section 447(a)(3)(v) sufficiently repeals Section 5(b) of the
Cockfighting Law, vesting as it does on LGUs the power and authority to issue
franchises and regulate the operation and establishment of cockpits in their respective
municipalities, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.

However, while the Local Government Code expressly repealed several laws, the
Cockfighting Law was not among them. Section 534(f) of the Local Government Code
declares that all general and special laws or decrees inconsistent with the Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly, but such clause is not an express repealing
clause because it fails to identify or designate the acts that are intended to be
repealed.43 It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are
disfavored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. 44
As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with knowledge of all existing
ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it is not intended to
interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as
a result of the language used, or unless the latter Act fully embraces the subject matter
of the earlier.45

Is the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule under the Cockfighting Law clearly and

convincingly irreconcilable with Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code?
The clear import of Section 447(a)(3)(v) is that it is the sangguniang bayan which is
empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks,
notwithstanding any law to the contrary. The necessity of the qualifying phrase "any law
to the contrary notwithstanding" can be discerned by examining the history of laws
pertaining to the authorization of cockpit operation in this country.

Cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our
culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation. When the newly-arrived
Americans proceeded to organize a governmental structure in the Philippines, they
recognized cockfighting as an activity that needed to be regulated, and it was deemed
that it was the local municipal council that was best suited to oversee such regulation.
Hence, under Section 40 of Act No. 82, the general act for the organization of municipal
governments promulgated in 1901, the municipal council was empowered "to license,
tax or close cockpits". This power of the municipal council to authorize or license
cockpits was repeatedly recognized even after the establishment of the present
Republic in 1946.46 Such authority granted unto the municipal councils to license the
operation of cockpits was generally unqualified by restrictions. 47 The Revised
Administrative Code did impose restrictions on what days cockfights could be held. 48

However, in the 1970s, the desire for stricter licensing requirements of cockpits started
to see legislative fruit. The Cockfighting Law of 1974 enacted several of these
restrictions. Apart from the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule, other restrictions were
imposed, such as the limitation of ownership of cockpits to Filipino citizens. 49 More
importantly, under Section 6 of the Cockfighting Law, it was the city or municipal mayor
who was authorized to issue licenses for the operation and maintenance of cockpits,
subject to the approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized representatives. 50
Thus, the sole discretion to authorize the operation of cockpits was removed from the
local government unit since the approval of the Chief of Constabulary was now required.

P.D. No. 1802 reestablished the Philippine Gamefowl Commission 51 and imposed
further structure in the regulation of cockfighting. Under Section 4 thereof, city and
municipal mayors with the concurrence of their respective sangguniang panglunsod or
sangguniang bayan, were given the authority to license and regulate cockfighting, under
the supervision of the City Mayor or the Provincial Governor. However, Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1802 was subsequently amended, removing the supervision exercised by the
mayor or governor and substituting in their stead the Philippine Gamefowl Commission.
The amended provision ordained:

Sec. 4. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective
"Sanggunians" shall have the authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting
pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its
review and supervision.

The Court, on a few occasions prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code in
1991, had opportunity to expound on Section 4 as amended. A discussion of these
cases will provide a better understanding of the qualifier "any law to the contrary
notwithstanding" provided in Section 447(a)(3)(v).

In Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court,52 the Court,

through Justice Cruz, asserted that the conferment of the power to license and regulate
municipal cockpits in municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy
embodied in the Constitution.53 The Court affirmed the annulment of a resolution of the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission which ordered the revocation of a permit issued by a
municipal mayor for the operation of a cockpit and the issuance of a new permit to a
different applicant. According to the Court, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission did not
possess the power to issue cockpit licenses, as this was vested by Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1802, as amended, to the municipal mayor with the concurrence of the sanggunian.
It emphasized that the Philippine Gamefowl Commission only had review and
supervision powers, as distinguished from control, over ordinary cockpits. 54 The Court
also noted that the regulation of cockpits was vested in municipal officials, subject only
to the guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. 55 The Court
conceded that "[if] at all, the power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it
does not carry the authority to substitute one’s own preferences for that chosen by the
subordinate in the exercise of its sound discretion."

The twin pronouncements that it is the municipal authorities who are empowered to
issue cockpit licenses and that the powers of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission
were limited to review and supervision were affirmed in Deang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,56 Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang Malolos Inc. 57 and Adlawan v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.58 But notably in Cootauco v. Court of Appeals,59 the Court
especially noted that Philippine Gamefowl Commission did indicate that the
Commission’s "power of review includes the power to disapprove." 60 Interestingly,
Justice Cruz, the writer of Philippine Gamefowl Commission, qualified his concurrence
in Cootauco "subject to the reservations made in [Philippine Gamefowl Commission]
regarding the review powers of the PGC over cockpit licenses issued by city and
municipal mayors."611awphi1.nét

These cases reiterate what has been the traditional prerogative of municipal officials to
control the issuances of licenses for the operation of cockpits. Nevertheless, the newly-
introduced role of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission vis-à-vis the operation of
cockpits had caused some degree of controversy, as shown by the cases above cited.

Then, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted. There is no more forceful
authority on this landmark legislation than Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., its principal
author. In his annotations to the Local Government Code, he makes the following
remarks relating to Section 447(a)(3)(v):

12. Licensing power. In connection with the power to grant licenses lodged with it, the
Sangguniang Bayan may now regulate not only businesses but also occupations,
professions or callings that do not require government examinations within its
jurisdiction.l^vvphi1.net It may also authorize and license the establishment, operation
and maintenance of cockpits, regulate cockfighting, and the commercial breeding of
gamecocks. Existing rights however, may not be prejudiced. The power to license
cockpits and permits for cockfighting has been removed completely from the
Gamefowl Commission.

Thus, that part of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipality of
Malolos v. Libangang Malolos, Inc. et al., which held that "…the regulation of
cockpits is vested in the municipal councils guidelines laid down by the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission" is no longer controlling. Under [Section 447(a)
(3)(v)], the power of the Sanggunian concerned is no longer subject to the
supervision of the Gamefowl Commission. 62

The above observations may be faulted somewhat in the sense that they fail to
acknowledge the Court’s consistent position that the licensing power over cockpits
belongs exclusively to the municipal authorities and not the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission. Yet these views of Senator Pimentel evince the apparent confusion
regarding the role of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission as indicated in the cases
previously cited, and accordingly bring the phrase Section 447(a)(3)(v) used in "any law
to the contrary notwithstanding" into its proper light. The qualifier serves notice, in case
it was still doubtful, that it is the sanggunian bayan concerned alone which has the
power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks within its
territorial jurisdiction.

Given the historical perspective, it becomes evident why the legislature found the need
to use the phrase "any law to the contrary notwithstanding" in Section 447(a)(3)(v).
However, does the phrase similarly allow the Sangguniang Bayan to authorize more
cockpits than allowed under Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law? Certainly, applying
the test of implied repeal, these two provisions can stand together. While the
sanggunian retains the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation,
and maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize more
than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have a
population of over one hundred thousand, in which case two cockpits may be
established. Considering that Section 447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially of the identity of
the wielder of the power of control and supervision over cockpit operation, it is not
inconsistent with previous enactments that impose restrictions on how such power may
be exercised. In short, there is no dichotomy between affirming the power and
subjecting it to limitations at the same time.

Perhaps more essential than the fact that the two controverted provisions are not
inconsistent when put together, the Court recognizes that Section 5(d) of the
Cockfighting Law arises from a valid exercise of police power by the national
government. Of course, local governments are similarly empowered under Section 16 of
the Local Government Code.l^vvphi1.net The national government ought to be attuned
to the sensitivities of devolution and strive to be sparing in usurping the prerogatives of
local governments to regulate the general welfare of their constituents.

We do not doubt, however, the ability of the national government to implement police
power measures that affect the subjects of municipal government, especially if the
subject of regulation is a condition of universal character irrespective of territorial
jurisdictions. Cockfighting is one such condition. It is a traditionally regulated activity,
due to the attendant gambling involved 63 or maybe even the fact that it essentially
consists of two birds killing each other for public amusement. Laws have been enacted
restricting the days when cockfights could be held,64 and legislation has even been
emphatic that cockfights could not be held on holidays celebrating national honor such
as Independence Day65 and Rizal Day.66

The Whereas clauses of the Cockfighting Law emphasize that cockfighting "should
neither be exploited as an object of commercialism or business enterprise, nor made a
tool of uncontrolled gambling, but more as a vehicle for the preservation and
perpetuation of native Filipino heritage and thereby enhance our national identity." 67 The
obvious thrust of our laws designating when cockfights could be held is to limit
cockfighting and imposing the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule is in line with that aim.
Cockfighting is a valid matter of police power regulation, as it is a form of gambling
essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and self-
reliance.68 Limitation on the number of cockpits in a given municipality is a reasonably
necessary means for the accomplishment of the purpose of controlling cockfighting, for
clearly more cockpits equals more cockfights.

If we construe Section 447(a)(3)(v) as vesting an unlimited discretion to the sanggunian

to control all aspects of cockpits and cockfighting in their respective jurisdiction, this
could lead to the prospect of daily cockfights in municipalities, a certain distraction in the
daily routine of life in a municipality. This certainly goes against the grain of the
legislation earlier discussed. If the arguments of the petitioners were adopted, the
national government would be effectively barred from imposing any future regulatory
enactments pertaining to cockpits and cockfighting unless it were to repeal Section
447(a)(3)(v).

A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it
is void.69 Ordinance No. 7 unmistakably contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing
three cockpits in Daanbantayan. Thus, no rights can be asserted by the petitioners
arising from the Ordinance. We find the grant of injunction as ordered by the appellate
court to be well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., CJ., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario
and Garcia, JJ., concur.