Operational Procedures - NPA25 - 070 ED04 110901
Operational Procedures - NPA25 - 070 ED04 110901
Please note that the information contained in these notes is for instructional use only. Every
effort has been made to ensure the content is valid, accurate and complete. No responsibility
is accepted for errors or discrepancies. The text is subject to regular change without notice.
These notes are designed for use during BCFT Modular ATPL (A) courses.
The notes are also suitable for distant learning with appropriate
Instructor guidance and worksheets.
The layout and order of the notes follows a logical learning sequence and is based upon the
structured JAR/EASA ATPL (A) learning objectives (Amnd Mar 2009)
7 The Aeroplane Flight Manual (AFM) and Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM) .. 1-15
4 Passengers...................................................................................................................... 3-7
5 Emergency contingencies within the North Atlantic MNPS Airspace .................. 6-18
1 Introduction
The ‘Operational Procedures’ syllabus is derived from several sources including EU-OPS
(Commercial Air Transportation), ICAO – International Standards and Recommended Practices
(Annexes 2, 6, 8, 14, 15, 17, 18) and various PANSOPS and NAT / MNPS documents. Much of
the information contained within these documents is cross-referenced encompassing common
subject matter, but the major component of source material is EU-OPS.
Therefore, these notes are formatted based on the Learning Objectives applicable to EU-OPS with
the other source material being inserted and referenced at an appropriate point within the subject
area. This allows particular subject areas to be studied as single blocks rather than scattered, and in
some cases, repeated.
Unfortunately, as material is taken from different sources, discrepancies have arisen (e.g.
definitions) where ICAO and JAR are in conflict. These discrepancies have been highlighted
within the notes.
1.1 Explain the applicability of ICAO Annex 6 (Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 2).
Annex 6 Part 1 contains details of the minimum Standards and Recommended Practices pertaining
to the operation of aeroplanes by operators authorised to conduct international commercial
air transport operations. They are subdivided into three parts as follows: -
Individual States are permitted to set their own rules on recommended standards and practices,
BUT they will never be less stringent than the minimum standards set down by ICAO.
In the case of the EASA, of which the UK is now an active member, the EU-OPS regulations are
based on the ICAO Annexes as a minimum standard. In practice, the rules in some cases are the
same, hence the applicability of Annex 6, but more often than not the EU-OPS rules are more
stringent.
“The purpose of Annex 6, Part I, is to contribute to the safety of international air navigation by
providing criteria of safe operating practice and to contribute to the efficiency and regularity of
international air navigation by encouraging States to facilitate the passage over their territories of
aeroplanes in international commercial air transport belonging to other States that operate in
conformity with such standards.”
EU-OPS applies to any civil aeroplane being used for COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT by an
operator with a principal place of business in a EASA Member State.
Definitions
Aircraft - Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air
other than the reactions of the air against the earth's surface.
Aeroplane - A power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft, deriving its lift in flight chiefly from
aerodynamic reactions on surfaces, which remain fixed under given conditions of flight.
Air Operator Certificate (AOC) - A certificate authorising an operator to carry out specified
commercial air transport operations.
Aerial Work - An aircraft operation in which an aircraft is used for specialised services such as
agriculture, construction, photography, surveying, observation and patrol, search and rescue, aerial
advertisement, etc.
General Aviation Operation - Aircraft operations other than a commercial air transport operation
or an aerial work operation.
State of the Operator - The State in which the operator's principal place of business is located or,
if there is no such place of business, the operator's permanent residence.
2.1 State the requirements and conditions to be satisfied for the issue or revalidation of
an Air Operator’s Certificate (Annex 6, Part 1, Chapter4 & EU-OPS).
In order to conduct commercial air transport operations, an operator must possess a valid Air
Operator Certificate (AOC) or equivalent document issued by the State of the Operator. The AOC
authorises the operator to conduct commercial air transport operations in accordance with any
conditions and limitations that may be specified.
However, the issue / revalidation of an AOC will be dependent upon the operator meeting certain
requirements, including the following: -
• The authority must approve the Operator’s Maintenance system be it ‘in house’ or sub-
contracted out. The maintenance standards used by the authority are called EASA-PART
145, which will be covered later in this section.
If the Authority is not satisfied that the requirements above have been met, the Authority may
require the conduct of one or more demonstration flights, operated as if they were commercial air
transport flights.
Obviously, the continued validity of an AOC shall depend upon the operator maintaining the
requirements above under the supervision of the State of the Operator (e.g. the CAA in the UK).
The Authority shall establish a system for both the certification and the continued surveillance of
the operator (e.g. CAA annual and random inspections) to ensure that the required standards of
operations are maintained.
• T – Training.
• O – Organisation.
• M – Maintenance.
• C – Quality Control.
• A – Airworthiness.
• T – Periodic Testing.
The AOC or equivalent document shall contain at least the following information: -
Definitions
Accountable Manager - The person acceptable to the Authority who has the corporate authority
for ensuring that all operations and maintenance activities can be financed and carried out to the
standard required by the Authority. The term ‘Accountable Manager’ is intended to mean the
Chief Executive / President / Managing Director etc of the Operator’s organisation.
• An applicant for an AOC must not hold an AOC issued by another Authority unless
specifically approved by the Authorities concerned.
• An applicant for an AOC must have his principal place of business and registered offices,
if any, located in the State responsible for issuing the AOC.
• An applicant for an AOC must have his aircraft registered in the same State in which his
AOC was issued and satisfy the Authority that he is able to conduct safe operations.
However, the State issuing the AOC can grant an Operator approval to register his aircraft
in another State.
• The operator must have 4 nominated post holders, acceptable to the Authority, who are
responsible for: -
o Maintenance.
o Training.
o Flight operations.
o Ground operations. Use the phrase: “My T**s Feel Great”
• The operator must arrange appropriate ground handling facilities to ensure the safe
handling of its flights.
• The operator must ensure that its aeroplanes are equipped and its crews are qualified, as
required for the area and type of operation.
• The operator must comply with the maintenance requirements (EASA-PART 145) for all
aircraft operated under the terms of its AOC.
• The operator must provide the Authority with a copy of the Operations Manual and all
amendments or revisions to it.
• The operator must maintain operational support facilities at the main operating base,
appropriate for the area and type of operation (e.g. hangarage, offices, ground equipment
etc).
Definition
Aerodrome - A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and
equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface
movement of aircraft. Note that the inclusion of “water” distinguishes it from “airfield”.
• An operator shall ensure that all employees when abroad know that they must comply with
the laws, regulations and procedures of those States in which operations are conducted.
• An operator shall ensure that all pilots are familiar with the laws, regulations and
procedures, pertinent to the performance of their duties, prescribed for the areas to be
traversed, the aerodromes to be used and the air navigation facilities relating thereto. The
operator shall ensure that other members of the flight crew are familiar with such of these
laws, regulations and procedures as are pertinent to the performance of their respective
duties in the operation of the aeroplane.
• Operators shall ensure that pilots-in-command have available on board the aeroplane all
the essential information concerning the search and rescue services in the area over which
the aeroplane will be flown. This information may be made available to the pilot by means
of the operations manual or such other means as is considered appropriate.
• An operator shall establish and maintain an accident prevention and flight safety
programme.
An operator shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that no person recklessly or negligently
acts or omits to act so as to endanger an aeroplane or person therein or so as to cause or permit an
aeroplane to endanger any person or property.
An operator shall ensure that any person authorised by the Authority is permitted at any time to
board and fly in any aeroplane operated in accordance with an AOC issued by that Authority and
to enter and remain on the flight deck provided that the commander may refuse access to the flight
deck if, in his opinion, the safety of the aeroplane would thereby be endangered.
Definition
Operational Control - The exercise of authority over the initiation, continuation, diversion or
termination of a flight in the interest of the safety of the aircraft and the regularity and efficiency
of the flight.
An operator shall exercise operational control and establish and maintain a method of supervision
of flight operations approved by the Authority.
An operator shall provide an Operations Manual for the use and guidance of operations personnel.
Details of the contents of the manual are covered later in this section. An operator must ensure that
all crew members can communicate in a common language and be able to understand the language
in which the Operations Manual is written. (EU-OPS)
An operator shall ensure that all personnel assigned to, or directly involved in, ground and flight
operations are properly instructed, have demonstrated their abilities in their particular duties and
are aware of their responsibilities and the relationship of such duties to the operation as a whole.
3.7 State the operator’s responsibilities concerning establishing ground and aircrew
standard procedures (EU-OPS).
Definition
Critical Phases of Flight - Critical phases of flight are the take-off run, the take-off flight path,
the final approach, the landing, including the landing roll, and other phases of flight at the
discretion of the Commander.
An operator shall establish procedures and instructions, for each aeroplane type, containing
ground staff and crewmembers' duties for all types of operation on the ground and in flight.
An operator shall establish a check-list system to be used by crew members for all phases of
operation of the aeroplane under normal, abnormal and emergency conditions as applicable, to
ensure that the operating procedures in the Operations Manual are followed.
An operator shall not require a crewmember to perform any activities during critical phases of the
flight other than those required for the safe operation of the aeroplane.
3.8 State the operator’s responsibilities concerning the use of air traffic services (EU-
OPS).
An operator shall ensure that Air Traffic Services are used for all flights whenever available.
3.9 State the operator’s responsibilities concerning the use of instrument departure and
approach procedures (EU-OPS).
An operator shall ensure that instrument departure and approach procedures established by the
State in which the aerodrome is located are used. A commander may accept an ATC clearance to
deviate from a published departure or arrival route, provided obstacle clearance criteria are
observed and full account is taken of the operating conditions. The final approach must be flown
visually or in accordance with the established instrument approach procedure.
An operator may only implement different procedures to those required, provided they have been
approved by the State in which the aerodrome is located, and accepted by the Authority.
An operator shall give any person authorised by the Authority access to any documents and
records, which are related to flight operations or maintenance, produce all such documents and
records, when requested to do so by the Authority, within a reasonable period of time.
The commander shall, within a reasonable time of being requested to do so by a person authorised
by an Authority, produce to that person the documentation required to be carried on board.
3.11 State the operator’s responsibility regarding the preservation of documentation and
recordings (EU-OPS).
An operator shall ensure that any original documentation and recordings, or copies thereof, that he
is required to preserve is preserved for the required retention period even if he ceases to be the
operator of the aeroplane and where a crew member, in respect of whom an operator has kept a
record, becomes a crew member for another operator, that record is made available to the new
operator. Flight and Cabin crew records must be kept for the following periods: -
Definitions (EU-OPS)
Approved by the Authority - Approved by the Authority means approved by the Authority
directly or in accordance with a procedure approved by the Authority.
Maintenance - Tasks required to ensure the continued airworthiness of an aircraft including any
one or combination of overhaul, repair, inspection, replacement, modification or defect
rectification.
Pre-Flight Inspection - Pre-flight inspection means the inspection carried out before flight to
ensure that the aeroplane is fit for the intended flight. It does not include defect rectification.
4.1 State the general requirements for the approval of a maintenance system (EU-
OPS).
If an operator wishes to carry out the maintenance of its own aeroplanes, then the approval of the
maintenance system, called EASA-PART 145, by the authority is required. In order to achieve
this, certain documents, in addition to the documents required for an AOC application, must be
made available to the authority. These are: -
Scrutiny of these documents will allow the authority to conduct an investigation into the
application to assess the volume of maintenance work necessary and the locations at which it will
be accomplished.
If the operator meets the requirements for the approval of the maintenance system then it will be
granted an AOC, with a EASA-PART 145 approval, to conduct its own aeroplane maintenance. If
not then the operator must arrange for its aeroplanes to be maintained by an outside agency (sub-
contractor) with EASA-PART 145 maintenance approval.
4.2 State the general requirements for ensuring that maintenance is carried out to an
appropriate standard (EU-OPS).
Either an operator has PART 145 maintenance approval or maintenance is contracted out to an
external EASA-PART 145 approved organisation, with the permission of the Authority.
In both cases, an operator must employ a person (or group) acceptable to the Authority to ensure
that all maintenance is carried out on time to an approved standard and provide suitable office
accommodation at appropriate locations for the task. The person, referred to above, is one of the
four nominated post holder, referred to earlier, in the AOC section.
The primary purpose of the quality system is to monitor compliance with approved procedures and
thereby ensure operational safety of the aeroplanes in terms of the airworthiness, and the
serviceability of operational and emergency equipment. This will include: -
• Pre-flight inspections.
• Defect rectification, taking into account the MMEL and MEL.
• Maintenance is carried out in accordance with the maintenance programme.
• Monitoring the effectiveness of the maintenance programme.
• Compliance with operational and authority directives.
• Embodiments of modifications.
• Monitoring that all contracted maintenance is carried out in accordance with the contract.
The Quality system must monitor the effectiveness of the maintenance programme and include a
feedback system to ensure that corrective actions are both identified and carried out in a timely
manner.
The purpose of the exposition is to set forth the procedures, means and methods of the
maintenance operation. Compliance with the exposition means compliance with the JAR
maintenance requirements.
The exposition itself is a manual that details the structure of the operator’s maintenance system.
For example: -
The Authority must approve an operator’s maintenance management exposition and any
subsequent amendments.
An operator must ensure that the aeroplane is maintained in accordance with the operator's
aeroplane maintenance programme. The programme must contain details, including frequency, of
all required maintenance. The programme will be required to include a reliability programme
when the Authority determines that such a reliability programme is necessary. The Authority must
approve an operator’s aeroplane maintenance programme and any subsequent amendment.
4.6 Describe the operator’s responsibility regarding the continued validity of the AOC
in respect of the maintenance system (EU-OPS).
An operator must comply with EU-OPS rules to ensure continued validity of the AOC in respect
of the maintenance system. If an AOC of an operator is suspended or terminated then the
approval, by the authority, to conduct aircraft maintenance under EASA-PART 145 is also
suspended or terminated.
4.7 Describe the procedure concerning the Equivalent Safety Case (EU-OPS).
An operator shall not introduce alternative maintenance procedures to those approved unless
needed and an equivalent safety case has first been approved by the Authority and supported by
other EASA member states. This will allow some flexibility to the Authority to grant operators
approval for alternative maintenance procedures, for example, where there have been
advancements in technology.
4.8 Detail the items to be checked in the servicing record, by the pilot-in-command,
before acceptance for flight. (Annex 6 Part I Chapter 8).
• The total time in service of the aeroplane and all life limited components.
• The current status of compliance with all mandatory continuing airworthiness information.
• Appropriate details of modifications and repairs to the aeroplane and its major
components.
• The time in service since the last overhaul of the aeroplane or its components subject to a
mandatory overhaul life.
• The current aeroplane status of compliance with the maintenance programme.
• The detailed maintenance records to show that all requirements for signing of maintenance
release have been met.
Definitions
Quality Assurance - All those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate
confidence that operational and maintenance practices satisfy given requirements.
Quality Manager - The manager, acceptable to the Authority, responsible for the management of
the Quality System, monitoring function and requesting corrective action.
An operator shall establish one Quality System and designate one Quality Manager to monitor
compliance with and the adequacy of, procedures required to ensure safe operational practices and
airworthy aeroplanes. Compliance monitoring must include a feedback system to the Accountable
Manager.
The Quality System must: -
• Be acceptable to the Authority.
• Include a Quality Assurance Programme.
• Be described in relevant documentation (Operations Manual).
The Quality Manager must: -
• Be acceptable to the Authority.
• Have direct access to the Accountable Manager.
• Not be one of the four nominated post-holders.
• Have access to all parts of the Operators organization and sub-contractors.
The Authority may accept the nomination of two Quality Managers, one for operations and one
for maintenance, provided that the operator has designated one Quality Management Unit to
ensure that the Quality System is applied uniformly throughout the entire operation. The following
is an example of a Quality organization where the AOC holder also has EASA-PART 145
maintenance approval -.
Accountable Manager
Quality Manager
An operator shall establish and maintain an accident prevention programme, which may be
integrated with the Quality System, including;
1. Programmes to achieve and maintain risk awareness by all persons involved in operations.
CRM and/or TEM courses are normally run on an annual basis to achieve this objective.
2. An occurrence reporting scheme to collate and assess relevant incident and accident
reports to identify adverse trends or to address deficiencies in the interests of flight safety.
3. A flight data monitoring scheme (FDM) for all aeroplanes above 27,000kgs. FDM is the
pro-active use of digital flight data from routine operations to improve air safety. The
programme shall be non-punitive and contain adequate safeguards to protect the source(s(
of the data.
4. The appointment of a person accountable for managing the programme.
Proposals for corrective action resulting from the programme shall be the responsibility of the
person responsible for managing the programme.
The effectiveness of changes resulting from those proposals shall be monitored by the Quality
Manager.(EU-OPS)
Definitions
Operations Manual - A manual containing procedures, instructions and guidance for use by
operational personnel in the execution of their duties.
Aircraft Operating Manual - A manual, acceptable to the State of the Operator, containing
normal, abnormal and emergency procedures, checklists, limitations, performance information,
details of the aircraft systems and other material relevant to the operation of the aircraft. The
aircraft-operating manual is part of the operations manual.
Flight Duty Period - The total time from the moment a flight crewmember commences duty,
immediately subsequent to a rest period and prior to making a flight or a series of flights, to the
moment the flight crewmember is relieved of all duties having completed such flight or series of
flights.
Rest Period - Any period of time on the ground where the operator relieves the flight
crewmember of all duties.
Human Factors Principles - Principles which apply to aeronautical design, certification, training,
operations and maintenance and which seek safe interface between the human and other system
components by proper consideration to human performance.
Human Performance - Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety
and efficiency of aeronautical operations.
6.1 List the contents of the operations manual (Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 6).
An operations manual, which may be issued in separate parts corresponding to specific aspects of
operations, provided it contains at least the following: -
• Fatigue And Flight Time Limitations - Rules limiting the flight time and flight duty
periods and providing for adequate rest periods for flight crewmembers and cabin
attendants.
• Flight Operations: -
o The flight crew required for each type of operation including the designation of the
succession of command.
o The in-flight and the emergency duties assigned to each crewmember.
o Specific instructions for the computation of the quantities of fuel and oil to be
carried, having regard to all circumstances of the operation including the possibility
of the failure of one or more power plants while en route.
o The conditions under which oxygen shall be used and the amount of oxygen to be
carried.
o Instructions for mass and balance calculations.
o Instructions for the conduct of ground de/anti-icing operations.
o The specifications for the operational flight plan.
o The normal, abnormal and emergency procedures to be used by the flight crew and
associated checklists.
o Standard operating procedures (SOP) for each phase of flight.
o Emergency evacuation procedures.
o Instructions on the maintenance of altitude awareness and the use of automated or
flight crew altitude call-out.
o Instructions on the use of autopilots and auto-throttles, especially in IMC.
o Instructions on the clarification and acceptance of ATC clearances, particularly
where terrain clearance is involved.
o The conduct of departure and approach briefings including route and destination
familiarisation.
o Stabilised approach procedure.
o Limitation on high rates of descent near the surface.
o Conditions required to commence or to continue an instrument approach.
o Instructions for the conduct of precision and non- precision instrument approach
procedures.
o Instructions and training requirements for the avoidance of controlled flight into
terrain and policy for the use of the ground proximity warning system (GPWS).
o Information and instructions relating to the interception of civil aircraft.
o Action to be taken in the event of exposure to solar cosmic radiation for aeroplanes
intended to be operated above 49,000 ft.
• Route Guides and Charts - a route guide to ensure that the flight crew will have, for each
flight, information relating to communication facilities, navigation aids, aerodromes, and
such other information as the operator may deem necessary for the proper conduct of flight
operations.
• Human Factors - Information on the operators' training programme for the development of
knowledge and skills related to human performance.
7 The Aeroplane Flight Manual (AFM) and Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM)
Definition
Flight Manual - A manual, associated with the certificate of airworthiness, containing limitations
within which the aircraft is to be considered airworthy, and instructions and information necessary
to the flight crewmembers for the safe operation of the aircraft.
The term ‘Aeroplane Flight Manual (AFM)’ applies to the publication, usually produced by the
manufacturer of the aeroplane, detailing the limitations, handling characteristics and
recommended safe operating instructions for the particular aeroplane type. The manual forms part
of the certificate of airworthiness and is provided to every operator who purchases that particular
aircraft type.
The ‘Aircraft Operating Manual’, is produced by the individual operator and, although based upon
the AFM, will provided detailed instructions to the flight crew on the method of operation, for the
particular aircraft type, in accordance with the operator’s standard operating practices (SOPs). The
manual forms part of the Operations Manual and will contain the same, or more stringent,
limitations found in the AFM.
It is not uncommon for some operators to use the manual provided by the manufacturer (AFM)
rather than write their own, whilst others will prefer to provide their own, which can differ
markedly from one operator to another. There is always more than one way to fly the same
aeroplane!
The operator shall provide operations staff and flight crew with an aircraft-operating manual, for
each aircraft type operated, containing the normal, abnormal and emergency procedures relating to
the operation of the aircraft.
7.2 List the contents of the aircraft-operating manual and the items to be included (CS
25.1581).
An aircraft-operating manual shall identify clearly the specific aeroplane or series of aeroplanes
with which it is related. The manual shall include details of the aircraft systems and of the
checklists to be used, and specifically: -
• Airspeed limitations.
• Power plant limitations.
• Weight and loading distribution.
• Flight crew required and type of operation.
• Ambient temperatures and operating altitudes.
• Additional operating limitations.
• Manoeuvring flight load factors.
• Systems and equipment limitations.
• A limitation on the maximum depth of contaminants for operations.
• Emergency procedures.
• Buffet onset envelopes.
• Fuel quantity system.
• Performance data.
Information or procedures not directly related to airworthiness or not under the control of the crew
must NOT be included.
If deviations from the requirements of States in the certification of aircraft were not permitted an
aircraft could not be flown unless all systems and equipment were operable. Experience has
proved that some unserviceability can be accepted in the short term when the remaining operative
systems and equipment provide for continued safe operations.
The State should indicate through approval of a minimum equipment list those systems and items
of equipment that may be inoperative for certain flight conditions with the intent that no flight can
be conducted with inoperative systems and equipment other than those specified.
A minimum equipment list, approved by the State of the Operator, is therefore necessary for each
aircraft, based on the master minimum equipment list (MMEL) established for the aircraft type by
the organisation responsible for the type design (manufacturer) in conjunction with the State of
Design.
The State of the Operator should require the operator to prepare a minimum equipment list
(MEL) designed to allow the operation of an aircraft with certain systems or equipment
inoperative provided an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
The minimum equipment list is not intended to provide for operation of the aircraft for an
indefinite period with inoperative systems or equipment. The basic purpose of the minimum
equipment list is to permit the safe operation of an aircraft with inoperative systems or equipment
within the framework of a controlled and sound programme of repairs and parts replacement.
Operators are to ensure that no flight is commenced with multiple minimum equipment list items
inoperative without determining that any interrelationship between inoperative systems or
components will not result in an unacceptable degradation in the level of safety and/or undue
increase in the flight crew workload.
The exposure to additional failures during continued operation with inoperative systems or
equipment must also be considered in determining that an acceptable level of safety is being
maintained. The minimum equipment list may not deviate from requirements of the flight manual
limitations section, emergency procedures or other airworthiness requirements of the State of
Registry or of the State of the Operator unless the appropriate airworthiness authority or the flight
manual provides otherwise.
Systems or equipment accepted as inoperative for a flight should have a placard attached / stuck
on where appropriate and all such items should be noted in the aircraft technical log to inform the
flight crew and maintenance personnel of the inoperative system or equipment.
For a particular system or item of equipment to be accepted as inoperative, it may be necessary to
establish a maintenance procedure, for completion prior to flight, to de-activate or isolate the
system or equipment. It may similarly be necessary to prepare an appropriate flight crew
operating procedure.
The list itself can be part of an Operations Manual or a separate stand-alone manual.
8.4 Identify the responsibilities of the Operator and the Authority with regard to the
MEL and MMEL (EU-OPS).
An operator shall establish, for each aeroplane, a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) approved by
the authority. This shall be based upon, but no less restrictive than, the relevant Master Minimum
Equipment List (MMEL) accepted by the authority.
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane other than in accordance with the MEL unless
permitted by the authority. Any such permission will in no circumstances permit operation outside
the constraints of the MMEL.
8.5 Define the function of the minimum equipment list (MEL) and the master minimum
equipment list (MMEL) (Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 6).
The operator shall include in the Operations Manual a Minimum Equipment List (MEL), approved
by the State of the Operator which will enable the pilot-in-command to determine whether a flight
may be commenced or continued from any intermediate stop should any instrument, equipment or
systems become inoperative.
8.6 State the responsibility of the commander with regard to MEL (EU-OPS).
The commander is responsible for checking the Minimum Equipment List, when necessary,
establishing that the aircraft is fit to fly within any limitations or operational constraints imposed
by the MEL. Using the example shown, a Boeing 737 aircraft, with an air conditioning pack
unserviceable, is allowed to fly with passengers providing that the aircraft is operated below
FL250. The commander, therefore, will have to plan the flight subject to the altitude restriction
imposed by the MEL. This may well affect en-route performance requirements and almost
certainly mean an increase in fuel requirements.
Definition
Configuration Deviation List (CDL) - A list established by the organisation responsible for the
type design with the approval of the State of Design which identifies any external parts of an
aircraft type which may be missing at the commencement of a flight, and which contains, where
necessary, any information on associated operating limitations and performance correction.
The Configuration Deviation List (CDL) is usually found at the back of the Minimum Equipment
List. The list identifies parts of an aircraft, such as aerodynamic fairings etc. that may be missing
but do not constitute part of an aircraft system, e.g. a hydraulic pump. However, their omission
may cause addition drag on the aircraft that may have an effect on take-off, cruise and landing
performance calculations and total fuel requirements.
An operator shall ensure that the following documents or copies thereof are carried on each flight:
-
• Certificate of Registration.
• Certificate of Airworthiness.
• Third party liability Insurance Certificate (English and Spanish).
• Noise Certificate (if applicable).
• Air Operator Certificate.
• Aircraft Radio Licence.
9.2 State the operator’s responsibility regarding manuals to be carried (EU-OPS &
Annex 6 Part I Chapter 6).
An operator shall ensure that the current parts of the Operations Manual relevant to the duties of
the crew are carried on each flight and those parts of the Operations Manual which are required for
the conduct of a flight are easily accessible to the crew on board the aeroplane. The current
Aeroplane Flight Manual must also be carried in the aeroplane unless the Authority has accepted
that the Operations Manual contains the relevant information for that aeroplane.
9.3 State the flight preparation forms to be completed before flight (Annex 6, Part I,
Chapter4).
A flight shall not be commenced until flight preparation forms have been completed certifying that
the pilot-in-command is satisfied that: -
• The aeroplane is airworthy (Technical Log). Completed logs must be kept for 2 years.
• The instruments and equipment for the particular type of operation to be undertaken are
installed and are sufficient for the flight (MEL).
• A maintenance release has been issued in respect of the aeroplane.
• The mass of the aeroplane and centre of gravity location are such that the flight can be
conducted safely, taking into account the flight conditions expected (Load Sheet).
Completed load sheets must be kept for 3 months.
• Any load carried is properly distributed and safely secured (NOTOC).
• A check has been completed indicating that the operating limitations can be complied with
for the flight to be undertaken (Performance).
• The standards of operational flight planning have been complied with.
• Completed flight preparation forms shall be kept by the operator for 3 months.
Definition
Operational Flight Plan - The operator's plan for the safe conduct of the flight based on
considerations of aeroplane performance, other operating limitations and relevant expected
conditions on the route to be followed and at the aerodromes concerned.
An operational flight plan shall be completed for every intended flight EXCEPT those intended to
take-off and land at the same aerodrome for such purposes as: -
• Air tests.
• Training.
• Local area pleasure flights under VFR.
9.5 Describe the commander’s responsibilities concerning the operational flight plan
(Annex6, Part I, Chapter 4).
The operational flight plan shall be approved and signed by the pilot-in-command and, where
applicable, signed by the flight operations officer/flight dispatcher, and a copy shall be filed with
the operator or a designated agent, or, if these procedures are not possible, it shall be left with the
aerodrome authority or on record in a suitable place at the point of departure.
9.6 List the details to be included in the operational flight plan (Annex6, Part I,
Chapter 4).
The operations manual must describe the content and use of the operational flight plan. The
following information is to be recorded: -
• Aeroplane type and variant and registration.
• Date of flight.
• Flight identification.
• Names and duty assignment of flight crewmembers.
• Time and place of departure (actual off-block time, take-off time).
• Place of arrival (planned and actual).
• Time of arrival (actual landing and on-block time).
• Type of operation (ETOPS, VFR, Ferry flight, etc.).
• Route and route segments with checkpoints; waypoints, distances, time and tracks.
• Planned cruising speed and flying times between checkpoints / waypoints.
• Estimated and actual times overhead.
• Safe altitudes and minimum levels and planned altitudes and flight levels.
• Fuel on board when starting engines, fuel calculations and in-flight fuel checks.
• Alternates – Take-off, en-route and destination.
• Initial ATS Flight Plan clearance and subsequent re-clearance.
• In-flight re-planning calculations and relevant meteorological information.
The intention of the operational flight plan is to enable any interested party (usually the Authority
during a random inspection) to ‘reconstruct’ the flight from the recorded information to ascertain
the safe operating procedures are maintained. Completed operational flight plans must be kept for
3 months.
An operator shall ensure that, in addition to the documents and manuals, the following information
and forms, relevant to the type and area of operation, are carried on each flight: -
• Operational Flight Plan (See note 1 below).
• Aeroplane Technical Log.
• Details of the filed ATS flight plan.
• Appropriate NOTAM / AIS briefing documentation.
• Appropriate meteorological information.
• Mass and balance documentation.
• Notification of special categories of passenger such as: -
o Security personnel.
o Handicapped persons.
o Inadmissible passengers.
o Deportees.
o Persons in custody.
• Notification of special loads including dangerous goods including written information to
the commander.
• Current maps, charts and associated documents.
• Any other documentation which may be required by the States concerned with this flight,
such as cargo manifest, passenger manifest etc; and forms to comply with the reporting
requirements of the Authority and the operator.
Note 1 - The Authority may permit the information on the Operational Flight Plan to be presented
in a form other than on printed-paper to an acceptable standard of accessibility, usability and
reliability.
9.8 List the contents of the journey logbook (Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 11).
The Aircraft Journey Logbook is usually prepared and kept by the Operator as a record of the
‘life’ of an aircraft. The pilot-in-command contributes to the ‘journey log’, either directly or
indirectly, by completing the technical log on completion of each flight. The Operator together
with additional information then transposes this data to the ‘journey log’. The aeroplane journey
logbook should contain the following items and the corresponding roman numerals.
• I – Aeroplane nationality and registration
• II – Date
• III – Names and crew members
• IV – Duty assignments of crew members
• V – Place of Departure
• VI – Place of Arrival
• VII – Time of Departure
• VIII– Time of Arrival
• IX – Hours of Flight
• X – Nature of flight (Private, aerial work, scheduled or non scheduled)
• XI – Incidents, observations if any
• XII – Signature of person in charge.
Completed journey logbook should be retained to provide a continuous record of the last 3 months
operations.
1-22 Operational Procedures (NPA25) - Edition 4 - 110901
©BCFT, a trading name of Bournemouth Flying ClubTM Ltd 2011
9.9 List the items of information to be retained on the ground by the operator (EU-
OPS).
An operator shall ensure that, for the duration of each flight or series of flights, information
relevant to the flight and appropriate for the type of operation is preserved on the ground and the
information is retained until it has been duplicated at the place at which it will be stored.
However, if this is impracticable because, for example, the ‘destination’ aerodrome’ has
inadequate facilities, the same information is carried in a fireproof container in the aeroplane on
the return leg.
10 Aeroplane Leasing
Definitions
Dry Lease - Is when the aeroplane is operated under the AOC of the lessee.
Wet Lease - Is when the aeroplane is operated under the AOC of the lessor.
Operators invariably have occasional requirements to lease aeroplanes. However, there are rules
associated with these leasing operations depending on whether the operator is the lessee, (the party
leasing-in the aircraft) or the lessor (the party leasing-out the aircraft). In addition, the regulatory
requirements will depend on the type of leasing (‘wet’ or ‘dry’) and whether both or only one of
the parties involved are EASA AOC holders. If both parties are non-EASA AOC holders then
knowledge of their arrangements are not required. The regulatory requirements are detailed below:
-
Wet lease-out - The lessor, providing an aeroplane and complete crew to the lessee, shall remain
the operator of the aeroplane, and retaining all the functions and responsibilities. The lessor
requires no approval.
Wet lease-in - The lessee must obtain prior approval for the operation from his respective
Authority. Any conditions, which are part of this approval, must be included in the lease
agreement. These conditions are considered a ‘variation’ of the AOC.
Dry lease-out - The lessor must obtain prior approval for the operation from his respective
Authority. Any conditions, which are part of this approval, must be included in the lease
agreement. These conditions are considered a ‘variation’ of the AOC.
Dry lease-in - The lessee must obtain prior approval for the operation from his respective
Authority. Any conditions, which are part of this approval, must be included in the lease
agreement. These conditions are considered a ‘variation’ of the AOC.
10.3 State the responsibility and requirements of each party between a EASA operator
and a non-EASA operator (e.g. an ICAO State) (EU-OPS).
Wet lease-out - The lessor (EASA) providing an aeroplane and complete crew to the lessee shall
remain the operator of the aeroplane, and retaining all the functions and responsibilities. The
lessor (EASA) requires no approval. (This is the same as ‘wet lease-out’ between EASA
operators).
Wet lease-in - A EASA operator, wet leasing-in an aeroplane from an entity other than a EASA
operator, must: -
Dry lease-out - The lessor (a EASA operator) may dry lease-out an aeroplane to a non-EASA
operator provided that the following conditions are met: -
Dry lease-in - The EASA operator shall not dry lease-in an aeroplane from a non-EASA operator
unless: -
• The lessor is an operator holding an AOC issued by a State that is a signatory to the
Chicago Convention.
• The lease-in period does not exceed 5 consecutive days.
• The Authority is immediately notified.
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane in which fuses are used unless there are spare fuses
available for use in flight equal to at least 10% of the number of fuses of each rating or three of
each rating whichever is the greater. Most modern aircraft are now equipped with circuit breakers
(CB) and this rule does not apply.
1.2 Specify the colours and markings used to indicate break-in points (Annex 6, Part I,
Chapter6).
If areas of the fuselage suitable for break-in by rescue crews in emergency are marked on an
aeroplane such areas shall be marked as shown below. The colour of the markings shall be RED
or YELLOW, and if necessary they shall be outlined in white to contrast with the background. If
the corner markings are more than 2 m apart, intermediate lines 9 cm x 3 cm shall be inserted so
that there is no more than 2 metres between adjacent markings. Please note that aeroplane break-
in areas are not mandatory, but if provided they must be marked as described.
Not over
2 metres
9 cm
3 cm
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane with a maximum certificated take-off mass of more
than 5,700 kg unless it is equipped at each pilot station with a windshield wiper or equivalent
means to maintain a clear portion of the windshield during precipitation.
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane unless the following equipment is installed: -
In an aeroplane, with a maximum approved passenger-seating configuration of more than 19, there
must be a door between the passenger compartment and the flight deck compartment with a
placard marked 'crew only'. The door must be lockable, from within the compartment only, and a
member of the cabin crew must hold a key in order to gain emergency access.
CREW ONLY
Since September 11 2001, this regulation is now under review. Current legislation from the Civil
Aviation Authorities requires that a strengthened door is fitted and is only lockable and unlockable
from within the cockpit and only. Therefore the provision for a key is no longer relevant.
There must be a means for opening each door that separates any passenger compartment, from
another compartment, which has emergency exit provisions. The means for opening must be
readily accessible and the door or curtain must have a means to secure it in the open position.
There must also be a placard on each internal door or adjacent to a curtain that is the means of
access to a passenger emergency exit, to indicate that it must be secured open during take off and
landing.
There must also be a means, for any member of the crew, to unlock any door that is normally
accessible to passengers, and that can be locked by passengers (e.g. the toilets).
1.5 State the requirements regarding the number of megaphones to be carried (EU-
OPS).
An operator must install on an aircraft sufficient megaphones for use by the crew in an evacuation
situation. The number required is as follows: -
Definition
Night - The hours between the end of evening civil twilight and the beginning of morning civil
twilight. Evening civil twilight starts at sunset and ends in the evening when the centre of the sun's
disc is 6° below the horizon. Morning civil twilight begins in the morning when the centre of the
sun's disc is 6° below the horizon and ends at sunrise.
• Red and Green lights projected 90° above and below the horizontal plane through an angle of
coverage from the aircraft forward centreline to 110° port and starboard respectively.
• A white light projected rearwards, 90° above and below the horizontal plane, through angle of
coverage 70° either side of the aircraft rearwards centreline.
White Light
140º
All to be ON between sunset and sunrise or any other period prescribed by the Authority. In
addition: -
• A RED rotating anti-collision light, to be on whenever the engines are running (DAY &
NIGHT).
• Two landing lights or a single landing light having two separately energised filaments
(NIGHT ONLY).
• Illumination for all instruments and equipment that is essential for the safe operation of the
aeroplane that is used by the flight crew.
• Lights in all passenger compartments.
• An electric torch for each crewmember station including the flight crew.
2.1 State the conditions that require the following equipment to be fitted (Annex 6, Part
I, Chapter 6).
The conditions that require the fitting of the additional equipment listed are as follows: -
Radiation Indicator
All aeroplanes operated above 49,000 ft shall carry equipment to measure and indicate
continuously the dose rate of total cosmic radiation being received and the cumulative dose on
each flight. The display unit of the equipment shall be readily visible to a flight crewmember.
All aeroplanes with speed limitations expressed in terms of Mach number, shall be equipped with
a Mach number indicator.
Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)
All turbine-engine aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 5,700 kg OR
authorised to carry more than 9 passengers MUST be equipped with a ground proximity warning
system.
Recommendation - All piston-engine aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in
excess of 5,700 kg OR authorised to carry more than 9 passengers SHOULD be equipped with a
ground proximity warning system.
A ground proximity warning system (GPWS) shall provide automatically a timely and distinctive
warning to the flight crew when the aeroplane is in potentially hazardous proximity to the earth's
surface under the following circumstances: -
• Excessive descent rate.
• Excessive terrain closure rate.
• Excessive altitude loss after take-off or go-around.
• Unsafe terrain clearance while not in landing configuration.
• Excessive descent below the instrument glide path.
• Approaching Minimum Descent Height or Decision Height.
• Windshear encounter close to the ground.
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS)
All turbine-engine aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 15,000 kg OR
authorised to carry more than 30 passengers, for which the individual certificate of airworthiness
is first issued on or after 1 January 2001, MUST be equipped with a ground proximity warning
system, which has a predictive terrain hazard warning function (EGPWS).
By 1 January 2003, all aircraft >15,000 Kg / 30 passenger seats MUST have EGPWS with a
recommendation that all aircraft > 5,700 Kg SHOULD have it fitted.
Definitions
Flight Recorder - Any type of recorder installed in the aircraft for the purpose of complementing
accident / incident investigation.
Flight Time - The total time from the moment an aircraft first moves under its own power for the
purpose of taking off until the moment it comes to rest at the end of the flight. Flight time as here
defined is synonymous with the term "block to block" time or "chock to chock" time in general
usage which is measured from the time an aircraft moves from the loading point until it stops at
the unloading point.
Operation: -
• The recorder is to record continuously during flight and MUST automatically begin
recording from when the aeroplane first moves under it’s own power until its ceases to
move under it’s own power.
• The recorder shall not be switched off during flight time.
• To preserve flight recorder data, flight recorders shall be de-activated upon completion of
flight time following an accident or incident.
Construction: -
JAR Requirements: -
These rules are complex and depend on when the aircraft was first registered, however modern
‘digital’ flight data recorders MUST be fitted to all aircraft registered after 1 April 1998 if: -
Note, aeroplanes with a maximum certified take-off mass less than 5,700 Kg may have a
COMBINED flight data / cockpit voice recorder.
A Type I flight data recorder shall record all 32 parameters, shown below, required to determine
accurately the aeroplane flight path, speed, attitude, engine power, ALL configuration changes and
operation.
Types II and IIA flight data recorders shall record the parameters required to determine accurately
the aeroplane flight path, speed, attitude, engine power and the configuration of lift and drag
devices. Only the first 15 parameters are required for a Type II FDR.
All flight data recorders shall be capable of retaining the information recorded during at least the
last 25 hours of their operation, except: -
• The Type IIA flight data recorder shall be capable of retaining the information recorded
during at least the last 30 minutes of its operation.
• Aeroplanes, with a maximum certified take-off mass less than 5,700 Kg need only retain
information recorded during at least the last 10 hours of their operation.
Following an incident, an operator must retain all recorded flight data for a period of 60 days
• It is not reasonably practical to repair the FDR before flight and the cockpit voice recorder
is serviceable.
• The aeroplane does not exceed 8 consecutive flights OR not more than 72 hours have
elapsed since it was found to be unserviceable.
The location and construction of the CVR is the same as the FDR. With regard to operation, like
the FDR, the CVR is to record continuously during flight. It must start recording automatically
before the aeroplane first moves under its own power and continue until it can no longer do so.
But, in addition, if electrical power is available, it MUST start recording as early as possible
during the cockpit checks BEFORE engine start until the end of cockpit checks immediately after
shutdown.
JAR Requirements: -
These rules, like the FDR, are complex and again depend on when the aircraft was first registered,
however in simple terms, turbine-engine aircraft registered after 1 April 1998 MUST be equipped
with a CVR if: -
• It is not reasonably practical to repair the CVR before flight and the flight data recorder
(FDR) is serviceable.
• The aeroplane does not exceed 8 consecutive flights OR not more than 72 hours have
elapsed since it was found to be unserviceable.
2.6 State the rules relative to the retention of data recorded by cockpit voice recorders
(Annex6, Chapter6, Attachment D & EU-OPS).
Aircraft registered BEFORE the 1 April 1998 must be capable of recording the last 30 minutes of
a flight on a continuous loop tape system.
Aircraft registered AFTER the 1 April 1998 must be capable of recording the last 2 hours of a
flight.
2.8 List the minimum equipment required for IFR flight (Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 6 &
EU-OPS).
Under Annex 6, the minimum equipment required for all aeroplanes when operated (i.e. VFR in
Controlled Airspace also), as IFR flights are as follows: -
• A magnetic compass.
• An accurate timepiece indicating the time in hours, minutes and seconds.
• Two sensitive pressure altimeters with counter drum-pointer or equivalent presentation.
• An airspeed indicating system with anti-icing protection.
• A turn and slip indicator.
• An attitude indicator / artificial horizon.
• A stabilised heading indicator (directional gyroscope).
• A means of indicating whether the power supply to the gyroscopic instrument is adequate.
• Outside air temperature (OAT) indicator calibrated in Celsius.
• A rate-of-climb and descent indicator (VSI).
• Additional instruments or equipment as prescribed by the appropriate authority.
However under JAR the following additional instruments are required: -
If an aeroplane is to be operated “Single Pilot IFR”, it must have an autopilot capable of at least
altitude and heading hold.
2.9 List the minimum equipment required for night VFR flight (Annex 6, Part I,
Chapter 6 & EU-OPS).
The requirement is exactly the same as above for IFR flight, BUT IN ADDITION; all the lighting
specified above at paragraph 1.5 above (internal and external lighting) must be included.
2.10 State the circumstances in which airborne weather radar equipment is compulsory
(EU-OPS).
Note: For propeller-driven pressurised aeroplanes having a maximum certificated take-off mass
less than 5,700 kg with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration less than 9 seats the
airborne weather radar equipment may be replaced by other equipment capable of detecting
thunderstorms and other potentially hazardous weather conditions, regarded as detectable with
airborne weather radar equipment, subject to approval by the Authority.
3 Navigation Equipment
3.1 State the minimum navigation equipment requirements for an aeroplane (Annex 6,
Part I, Chapter 7).
Definitions
The aeroplane shall be sufficiently provided with navigation equipment to ensure that, in the event
of the failure of one item of equipment at any stage of the flight, the remaining equipment will
enable the aeroplane to navigate properly.
On flights in which it is intended to land in IMC an aeroplane shall be provided with radio
equipment capable of receiving signals providing guidance to a point from which a visual landing
can be effected. This equipment shall be capable of providing such guidance at each aerodrome at
which it is intended to land in instrument meteorological conditions and at any designated
alternate aerodromes.
The equipment installation shall be such that the failure of any single unit required for either
communications or navigation purposes or both will not result in the failure of another unit
required for communications or navigation purposes.
3.2 List the requirements for navigation equipment when operating under IFR or under
VFR over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks (EU-OPS).
An operator shall ensure that navigation equipment comprises not less than: -
• One VOR receiving system, one ADF system, one DME.
• One ILS or MLS where ILS or MLS is required for approach navigation purposes.
4.1 State the requirements regarding the provision of an audio selector panel (EU-
OPS).
4.2 State the conditions under which a crewmember interphone system and public
address system are mandatory (EU-OPS).
Flight Crew Intercom - An operator shall not operate an aeroplane on which a flight crew of more
than one is required unless it is equipped with a flight crew interphone / intercom system,
including headsets and microphones, not of a handheld type, for use by all members of the flight
crew. Unfortunately, the flight crew intercom is sometimes referred to as the flight crew
interphone, which could be confused with the crewmember interphone discussed below, so take
care!
Crewmember Interphone - An operator shall not operate an aeroplane with a maximum take-off
mass exceeding 15,000 Kg OR having a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of
more than 19 unless it is equipped with a crewmember interphone system. The system must fulfil
the following criteria: -
• Operate independently of the PA system except for handsets / operating panel etc.
• Be accessible from each required cabin crew station close to each pair of emergency exits.
• Have a visual and/or aural alerting system and differentiating between normal and
emergency calls.
• Operate independently of the interphone system except for handsets / operating panel etc.
• Be accessible from each required cabin crew station close to each pair of emergency exits
within 10 seconds.
• Be audible and intelligible at all cabin crew seats, passenger seats and the toilets.
4.3 List the requirements for radio equipment when flying under VFR by reference to
visual landmarks (EU-OPS).
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane under VFR over routes that can be navigated by
reference to visual landmarks, unless it is equipped with the radio equipment (communication and
SSR transponder) necessary under normal operating conditions to fulfil the following: -
• Communicate with appropriate air traffic control facilities from any point in controlled
airspace within which flights are intended.
4.4 List the requirements for communications equipment when operating under IFR or
under VFR over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks (EU-OPS).
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane under IFR, or under VFR over routes that cannot be
navigated by reference to visual landmarks, unless the aeroplane is equipped with radio equipment
(communication and SSR transponder) and navigation equipment in accordance with the
requirements of air traffic services in the area(s) of operation.
An operator shall ensure that radio equipment comprises not less than: -
5.1 State the number of crash axes or crowbars to be onboard an aircraft (EU-OPS).
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane with a maximum certificated take off mass exceeding
5,700 kg OR having a maximum approved seating configuration of more than 9 passenger seats
unless it is equipped with at least one crash axe OR crowbar located on the flight deck.
If the maximum approved passenger-seating configuration is more than 200 then an additional
crash axe OR crowbar must be carried and located in or near the most rearward galley area. Crash
axes and crowbars located in the passenger compartment must not be visible to the passengers.
Definitions
Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) - A generic term describing equipment which broadcast
distinctive signals on designated frequencies and, depending on application, may either sense a
crash and operate automatically or be manually activated. An ELT may be any of the following: -
• Automatic portable ELT (AP) - An ELT that is rigidly attached to an aircraft but readily
removable from the aircraft after a crash.
• Automatically deployable ELT (AD) - An ELT that is rigidly attached to an aircraft and
deployed automatically in response to a crash. Manual deployment is also provided.
• Survival ELT (S) - An ELT that is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its
ready use in an emergency and activated by survivors. Automatic activation may apply.
6.1 State the maximum distance, from a suitable landing aerodrome, that an aircraft
may operate over water without the carriage of additional life saving equipment
(Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 6).
When flying over water and at a distance of more than 50 nautical miles away from the shore, or
when flying en-route over water beyond gliding distance from the shore, or when taking off or
landing at an aerodrome where, in the opinion of the State of the Operator, the take-off or
approach path is so disposed over water that in the event of a mishap there would be a likelihood
of a ditching. The aircraft must carry additional life saving equipment.
The equipment referred to above shall comprise one life jacket or equivalent individual floatation
device equipped with a means of electric illumination for the purpose of facilitating the location of
persons, for each person on board, stowed in a position easily accessible from the seat or berth of
the person for whose use it is provided.
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane with an approved passenger seating configuration of
more than 30 passengers on over-water flights at a distance from land suitable for making an
emergency landing, greater than 120 minutes at cruising speed, or 400 nautical miles, whichever
is the lesser, unless the aeroplane complies with the ditching requirements prescribed in the
applicable airworthiness code.
6.3 Specify the life saving and survival equipment to be carried on over water flights,
when necessary, and on flights over designated land areas.
Flights Over Designated Land Areas - Aeroplanes, when operated across land areas which have
been designated by the State concerned as areas in which search and rescue would be especially
difficult, shall be equipped with such signalling devices and life-saving equipment (including
means of sustaining life) as may be appropriate to the area over flown and shall be equipped with
at least one ELT (S). It is recommended that all aeroplanes should carry an automatically activated
ELT.
6.4 List the details of the on board safety and survival equipment, which in the event of
an emergency, are to be transmitted to the rescue co-ordination centre (Annex 6,
Part I, Chapter 11).
Operators shall at all times have available for immediate communication to rescue co-ordination
centres, lists containing information on the emergency and survival equipment carried on board
any of their aeroplanes engaged in international air navigation. The information shall include: -
• Pyrotechnics.
• Water supplies.
7.1 Detail the rules regarding the carriage and use of therapeutic / first-aid oxygen
(EU-OPS).
Any aeroplane operating at or above 25,000 feet and having a cabin crewmember on board must
carry a supply of undiluted oxygen for passengers, who for physiological reasons may require it
following a depressurisation and emergency descent.
The amount of oxygen carried must be sufficient for 2% of the passengers or at least ONE
passenger, whichever is the greater, and the number of dispensing units must not be less than
TWO.
7.2 Detail the rules regarding the carriage and use of supplemental oxygen (Annex 6,
Part I, Chapter4 & EU-OPS).
Definition
• Can be placed on the face from its stowed position within 5 seconds.
• After donning, enables immediate communication between fight crew and cabin crew via
the interphone.
Cabin Crew
All cabin crewmembers, when engaged in performing their duties shall use supplementary
breathing oxygen as follows: -
• Any period, in excess of 30 minutes, when the cabin altitude is between 10,000 and 13,000
feet.
The amount of supplementary breathing oxygen, required on board for use by the each cabin
crewmember, is 30 minutes.
• The entire flight time, for all passengers, when at pressure altitudes is in excess 13,000
feet.
• The entire flight time, in excess of 30 minutes, for 10% of passengers when the cabin
altitude is between 10,000 and 13,000 feet.
Operational Procedures (NPA25) - Edition 4 - 110901 2-19
©BCFT, a trading name of Bournemouth Flying ClubTM Ltd 2011
8 Safety Equipment (Fire)
8.1 Identify the different types of extinguishant, the type of fire on which each one may
be used and the precautions to be considered in the application of fire
extinguishant (AMC-OPS).
• Fuel – something that in the presence of heat will combine with oxygen, thereby
producing more heat and as a result will reduce itself into other chemical compounds.
• Heat – this can be considered as a catalyst, which accelerates the combination of the fuel
with the oxygen, which again results in even more heat being produced.
• Oxygen – an element that combines chemically with another substance (fuel) resulting in
the release of heat and light.
All three of these things are required for a fire to flourish and can be depicted by a ‘Fire Triangle’:
-
HEAT OXYGEN
FUEL
REMOVE ANY ONE OF THESE THINGS - AND THE FIRE GOES OUT
There are many different types of extinguishers commercially available and ALL are described
below. Note, however that not all the types of extinguisher described are used in an aircraft. It is
also important to realise that some extinguishers are not suitable for certain types of fire. The
types of extinguisher commonly found and the types of fire there are used for are as follows: -
Water
Water has its uses as an extinguishant but can only be used on ‘fires such as wood, fabric, cloth,
and paper etc. The water cools the fuel thereby removing the HEAT element of the Fire Triangle
and the fire goes out. Water extinguishers are used in aircraft for quickly dousing paper or fabric
fires that occur through people smoking or contact with other sources of heat. They are also useful
for damping down any material extinguished by other types of fire extinguisher that do not cool
the source of the fire (see BCF later) and thereby prevent re-ignition.
Water cannot be used on the three most common fires in aviation. It cannot be used on fluids or
oils etc as the reaction can be explosive and the water could spread the fire. It cannot be used on
electrical fires as it conducts the electricity to the fire fighter. It cannot be used on metal fires, as
metal fires are caused by the magnesium content of the metal alloy and the water can react
violently with magnesium to produce more heat thereby fuelling the fire.
Foam
Foam, which is soda acid mixed with water, is best used on flammable liquids or oils, fats and
spirits fires. The foam ‘blanket’ smoothers the fire preventing OXYGEN from getting to the fire
and thereby breaking the Fire Triangle. Foam must NOT be used on electrical fires because of the
water content in the foam. Foam fire extinguishers are not usually deployed on board aircraft but
foam is extensively used in great quantities by ground based fire services following an aircraft
incident on the ground.
BCF or Halon (Bromochlorodifluoromethane)
This extinguishant has many uses and is suitable for most types of fire and is therefore fitted in
flight decks. It is a colourless, non-corrosive gas that evaporates rapidly leaving no residue
whatsoever. It does not freeze or cause ‘cold burns’ to the user. The extinguishant acts rapidly on
fires by producing a heavy blanketing mist that interferes chemically by eliminating the OXYGEN
from the Fire Triangle and thereby extinguishing the fire. As the gas is heavier than air it will
‘seek out’ the source of the fire behind any panelling for example. The resultant fumes are mildly
toxic and after use the compartment should be ventilated. BCF does not ‘cool’ the material on fire;
therefore once the fire has been extinguished the material needs to be dampened down if possible
with water (see above).
Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
Carbon dioxide extinguishers like BCF work well on most fires as they deprive the fire of
OXYGEN breaking the Fire Triangle. They can be used on a wide range of fires but are not
recommended for use on brake fires as the rapid cooling effect of the carbon dioxide can cause the
tyre to explode. If used on a paper fire, care must be taken not to blow the paper over a large area
with the force of the carbon dioxide extinguisher adding to your problems. The operator must take
care, as the nozzle gets very cold.
There are several types of dry powder extinguishers on the market with different chemical
properties. The ‘multipurpose dry chemical (ABC)’ extinguisher is suitable for ALL types of fires.
The dry chemicals extinguish a fire by smothering it, cutting off the OXYGEN, thereby breaking
the Fire Triangle’. However, they should not be used on flight deck electrical fires because of the
adverse effect on vision and if non-conductive, interference with electrical contacts by chemical
residues. For this reason they are not usually deployed on board aircraft. Dry powders are used
extensively by ground based fire services and are particularly effective on metal fires. Application
is by a large extinguisher or scoop / shovel.
To summarise: -
Water Foam BCF CO2 Powder
Solid Material Note 1
Flammable
Liquids
Flammable Gases
Metals Note 2
Electrical Note 3
On an aircraft, where help from the fire brigade at 35,000 feet is difficult, survival often comes
from early detection of a fire. There a various compartments in an aircraft that contain fire
detectors linked to the flight deck. The areas where fire detectors are fitted are as follows: -
• Toilets.
• Cargo / Baggage holds.
• Engine compartments.
• APU compartment.
There is little point fitting fire detectors to the flight deck or the passenger cabin as these areas are
constantly monitored. There are many ways of detecting fire; early detection comes from detecting
the smoke. This can be achieved as follows: -
Smoke particle detector – These use an ionised chamber, the ions attach themselves to smoke
particles and the reduction in ionisation is used to set off the alarm.
Photoelectric smoke detector – Smoke disrupts light in a photoelectric chamber that sets off the
alarm
Not all cargo compartments are the same and are classified as follows: -
• Class A – A Class A cargo or baggage compartment is one in which the presence of a fire
can easily be discovered by a crewmember while at his station. Each part of the
compartment must be easily accessible in flight.
• Class B – A Class B cargo or baggage compartment is one in which there is sufficient
access in flight to enable a crewmember to effectively reach any part of the compartment.
There must be a separate smoke detector and no fire retardant can get back into the
cockpit.
• Class C – A Class C compartment is one that does not meet the requirements of class A or
B but in which there is a separate smoke detector that gives a warning to the flight deck.
There is a built in fire retardant system controllable from the flight deck. There are means
to prevent smoke entering the cockpit or passenger compartment.
• Class E – A Class E compartment is one on aeroplanes used only for the carriage of cargo
and in which, there is a separate smoke detector and means to shut of ventilating airflow.
The required crew emergency exits are accessible under any cargo loading conditions.
8.4 Detail the number and type of fire extinguishers to be held onboard an aircraft
(EU-OPS.790).
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane unless hand held fire extinguishers are provided for use
in crew, passenger and, as applicable, cargo compartments and galleys in accordance with the
following -
• The type and quantity of extinguishing agent must be suitable for the kinds of fires likely
to occur in the compartment where the extinguisher is to be used.
• At least one hand held fire extinguisher, containing BCF or equivalent as the extinguishing
agent, conveniently located on the flight deck for use by the flight crew, suitable for both
flammable fluid and electrical equipment fires. EU-OPS does not mention toilets but
modern aircraft are fitted with automatic toilet extinguishers.
• At least one hand held fire extinguisher must be located in, or readily accessible for use in,
each galley not located on the main passenger deck.
9.1 Describe the recommended minimum medical kits (Annex 6, Part I, Attachment B).
An aeroplane shall be equipped with accessible and adequate medical supplies appropriate to the
number of passengers the aeroplane is authorised to carry.
• A medical kit, for the use of medical doctors, nurses or other qualified persons in treating
in-flight medical emergencies for aeroplanes authorised to carry more than 250 passengers
(JAR – 30 passenger seats more than 60 minutes cruise from suitable aerodrome).
First-Aid kits - The number of first-aid kits should be appropriate to the number of passengers,
which the aeroplane is authorised to carry: -
Location - It is essential that the required first-aid kits be distributed as evenly as practicable
throughout the passenger cabin. They should be readily accessible to cabin attendants, and, in
view of the possible use of medical supplies outside the aeroplane in an emergency situation, they
should be located near an exit. The medical kit, when carried, should be stored in an appropriate
secure location.
1 Flight Crew
Definition
Flight Crewmember - A licensed crewmember charged with duties essential to the operation of an
aircraft during flight time.
Pilot-in-Command - The pilot responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight
time.
1.1 Define the duties of the pilot-in-command (Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 4).
• The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the operation and safety of the aeroplane and
for the safety of all persons on board, during flight time.
• The pilot-in-command shall ensure that the checklists, provided by the operator are
complied with in detail.
• The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for notifying the nearest appropriate authority by
the quickest available means of any accident involving the aeroplane, resulting in serious
injury or death of any person or substantial damage to the aeroplane or property.
• The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for reporting all known or suspected defects of
the aeroplane, to the operator, at the termination of the flight.
• The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for completion of the technical / journey
logbook.
1.2 List the factors to be considered by the commander before commencing the flight
(EU-OPS).
If an emergency situation, which endangers the safety of the aeroplane or persons, necessitates the
taking of action, which involves a violation of local regulations or procedures, the pilot-in-
command shall notify the appropriate local authority without delay. If required by the State in
which the incident occurs, the pilot-in-command shall submit a report on any such violation to the
appropriate authority of such State; in that event, the pilot-in-command shall also submit a copy of
it to the State of the Operator. Such reports shall be submitted as soon as possible and normally
within ten days.
1.4 State the rules applicable to operating flight-crew members (Annex 6 Part 1 Chapter
4).
Take-off and landing - All flight crewmembers required to be on flight deck duty shall be at their
stations.
En route - All flight crew members required to be on flight deck duty shall remain at their stations
except when their absence is necessary for the performance of duties in connection with the
operation of the aeroplane or for physiological needs.
Seat belts - All flight crewmembers shall keep their seat belts fastened when at their stations.
Safety harness - Any flight crewmember occupying a pilot's seat shall keep the safety harness
fastened during the take-off and landing phases. All other flight crew members shall keep their
safety harnesses fastened during the take-off and landing phases unless the shoulder straps interfere
with the performance of their duties, in which case the shoulder straps may be unfastened but the
seat belt must remain fastened. Note - Safety harness includes shoulder straps and a seat belt that
may be used independently.
1.5 State the occasions on which a Flight Engineer/Flight Navigator must be included in
the crew (Annex 6 Part 1 Chapter 9).
Flight Engineer -When a separate flight engineer's station is incorporated in the design of an
aeroplane, the flight crew shall include at least one flight engineer especially assigned to that
station, unless the duties associated with that station can be satisfactorily performed by another
flight crew member, holding a flight engineer licence, without interference with regular duties.
Flight Navigator - The flight crew shall include at least one member, who holds a flight navigator’s
licence, for all operations where navigational skills necessary for the safe conduct of the flight,
cannot be adequately accomplished by the pilots from the pilot station.
Definitions
Synthetic Flight Trainer - Any one of the following three types of apparatus in which flight
conditions are simulated on the ground: -
• Flight Procedures Trainer - which provides a realistic flight deck environment, and which
simulates instrument responses, simple control functions of mechanical, electrical,
electronic, etc., aircraft systems, and the performance and flight characteristics of aircraft of
a particular class.
• Basic Instrument Flight Trainer - which is equipped with appropriate instruments, and
which simulates the flight deck environment of an aircraft in flight in instrument flight
conditions.
An operator shall not assign a pilot to act as pilot-in-command or co-pilot of an aeroplane unless,
on the same type of aeroplane within the preceding 90 days, that pilot has made at least THREE
take-offs and landings.on the same type of aeroplane or in a flight simulator approved for the
purpose.
1.7 Specify the knowledge and experience of a route or route segment, required by a
pilot, before assignment as pilot-in-command (Annex 6 Part 1 Chapter 9).
An operator shall not utilise a pilot as pilot-in-command of an aeroplane on a route or route segment
for which that pilot is not currently qualified until such pilot has complied with the provisions,
which follow: -
Each such pilot shall demonstrate to the operator an adequate knowledge of the route to be flown,
and the aerodromes, which are to be used. This shall include knowledge of: -
• The meteorological, communication and air traffic facilities, services and procedures.
• The navigational facilities and procedures, including any long-range navigation procedures,
associated with the route along which the flight is to take place.
Note - That portion of the demonstration relating to arrival, departure, holding and instrument
approach procedures may be accomplished in an appropriate training device, which is adequate for
this purpose.
A pilot-in-command shall have made an actual approach into each aerodrome of landing on the
route, accompanied by a pilot who is qualified for the aerodrome, as a member of the flight crew or
as an observer on the flight deck, unless: -
• The approach to the aerodrome is not over difficult terrain and the instrument approach
procedures and aids available are similar to those with which the pilot is familiar.
OR
• The descent from the initial approach altitude can be made by day in visual meteorological
conditions.
OR
• The operator qualifies the pilot-in-command to land at the aerodrome concerned by means
of an adequate pictorial presentation, usually in the form of an audio-visual airfield / route
brief.
OR
• The aerodrome concerned is adjacent to another aerodrome at which the pilot-in-command
is currently qualified to land.
The operator shall maintain a record, sufficient to satisfy the State of the Operator of the
qualification of the pilot and of the manner in which such qualification has been achieved.
An operator shall not continue to utilise a pilot as a pilot-in-command on a route unless, within the
preceding 12 months, the pilot has made at least one trip between the terminal points of that route as
a pilot member of the flight crew, or as a check pilot, or as an observer on the flight deck. In the
event that more than 12 months elapse in which a pilot has not made such a trip on a route in close
proximity and over similar terrain, prior to again serving as a pilot-in-command on that route, that
pilot must re-qualify.
1.8 State the requirements for proficiency checks on a pilot (Annex 6 Part 1 Chapter 9).
An operator shall ensure that piloting technique and the ability to execute emergency procedures is
checked in such a way as to demonstrate the pilot's competence. Where the operation may be
conducted under instrument flight rules, an operator shall ensure that the pilot's competence to
comply with such rules is demonstrated to either a check pilot of the operator or to a representative
of the State of the Operator. Such checks shall be performed twice within any period of one year.
Any two such checks which are similar and which occur within a period of four consecutive months
shall not alone satisfy this requirement. Flight simulators approved by the State of the Operator may
be used for those parts of the checks for which they are specifically approved.
Definition
A Cabin crew member is a person who is assigned by the operator to undertake tasks in the cabin
and shall be identifiable by virtue of an operator’s cabin crew uniform to passengers as a cabin crew
member.(EU-OPS.988)
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane with a maximum approved passenger seating
configuration of more than 19, when carrying one or more passengers, unless at least one cabin
crew member is included in the crew for the purpose of performing duties, specified in the
Operations Manual, in the interests of the safety of passengers.
When complying with the above, an operator shall ensure that the minimum number of cabin
crew is the greater of:
• one cabin crew member for every 50, or fraction of 50, passenger seats installed on the same
deck of the aeroplane;
• or
that number reduced by 1 for every whole multiple of 50 seats by which the maximum
approved seating configuration of that particular aeroplane falls below its certificated maximum
capacity.
Minimum requirements:
An operator shall nominate a senior cabin crew member whenever more than one is carried.
An operator shall ensure that each cabin crew member does not operate on more than three
aeroplane types without the approval of the authority.
An operator shall ensure that crew members who are not required flight or cabin crewmembers,
have also been trained in, and are proficient to perform, their assigned duties.
3.1 Define the duties of a flight operations officer (Annex 6 Part 1 Chapter 4).
A flight operations officer / flight dispatcher, when employed in conjunction with a method of flight
supervision in accordance the AOC, shall: -
• Assist the pilot-in-command in flight preparation and provide the relevant information
required.
• Assist the pilot-in-command in preparing the operational and ATS flight plans, sign when
applicable and file the ATS flight plan with the appropriate ATS unit.
• Furnish the pilot-in-command while in flight, by appropriate means, with information,
which may be necessary for the safe conduct of the flight.
• In the event of an emergency, initiate such procedures as may be outlined in the operations
manual.
3.2 State the essential qualifications necessary for a person to legally taxi aircraft
(Annex 6 Part 1 Chapter 4).
An aeroplane shall not be taxied on the movement area of an aerodrome unless the person at the
controls: -
• Has received instruction from a competent person in respect of aerodrome layout, routes,
signs, marking, lights, ATC signals and instructions, phraseology and procedures, and is
able to conform to the operational standards required for safe aeroplane movement at the
aerodrome.
4.1 State the regulations concerning the carriage of persons on an aeroplane (EU-OPS).
An operator shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that no person is in any part of an
aeroplane in flight which is not a part designed for the accommodation of persons unless temporary
access has been granted by the commander to any part of the aeroplane. This permission should
only be granted for the following conditions: -
• For the purpose of taking action necessary for the safety of the aeroplane or of any person,
animal or goods therein.
OR
• In which cargo or stores are carried, which is designed to enable a person to have access
thereto while the aeroplane is in flight.
4.2 State the operator’s and commander’s responsibilities regarding admission to the
flight deck and the carriage of unauthorised persons or cargo (EU-OPS).
An operator must ensure that no person, other than a flight crew member assigned to a flight, is
admitted to, or carried in, the flight deck unless that person is: -
The commander shall ensure that in the interests of safety, admission to the flight deck does not
cause distraction and/or interfere with the flight's operation and all persons carried on the flight
deck are made familiar with the relevant safety procedures. The final decision regarding the
admission to the flight deck shall be the responsibility of the commander.
In addition, an operator shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that no person secretes himself
or secretes cargo on board an aeroplane.
4.3 Detail the content of a passenger briefing in respect of emergency equipment and
exits.
An operator shall ensure that passengers are made familiar with the location and use of: -
• Seat belts.
• Emergency exits.
• Life jackets, if applicable.
• Oxygen dispensing equipment, if applicable.
• Passenger emergency briefing cards.
• Other emergency equipment provided for individual use.
The operator shall inform the passengers of the location and general manner of use of the principal
emergency equipment carried for collective use.
The operator shall ensure that during take-off and landing and whenever, by reason of turbulence or
any emergency occurring during flight, the precaution is considered necessary, all passengers on
board an aeroplane shall be secured in their seats by means of the seat belts or harnesses provided.
4.4 State the operator’s responsibility concerning portable electronic devices (EU-OPS).
An operator shall not permit any person to use, and take all reasonable measures to ensure that no
person does use, on board an aeroplane, a portable electronic device that can adversely affect the
performance of the aeroplane's systems and equipment.
4.5 State the requirements for carrying Persons with Reduced Mobility (PRMs) (EU-
OPS).
An operator shall establish procedures for the carriage of Persons with Reduced Mobility (PRMs).
The operator shall ensure that PRMs are not allocated, nor occupy, seats where their presence
could: -
In normal circumstances PRMs should not be seated adjacent to emergency exits and the number of
able-bodied persons capable of assisting in an evacuation of the aircraft must outnumber the number
of PRMs. The commander must be notified when PRMs are to be carried on board.
4.6 State the operator’s responsibilities for the carriage of inadmissible passengers,
deportees or persons in custody (EU-OPS).
An operator shall establish procedures for the transportation of inadmissible passengers, deportees
or persons in custody to ensure the safety of the aeroplane and its occupants. The commander must
be notified when the above-mentioned persons are to be carried on board.
4.7 State the requirements for the stowage of baggage and cargo in the passenger cabin
(EU-OPS).
An operator shall establish procedures to ensure that only such hand baggage is taken into the
passenger cabin as can be adequately and securely stowed. The operator shall establish procedures
to ensure that all baggage and cargo on board, which might cause injury or damage, or obstruct
aisles and exits if displaced, is placed in stowages designed to prevent movement.
An operator shall establish procedures to ensure that passengers are seated where, in the event that
an emergency evacuation is required, they may best assist and not hinder evacuation from the
aeroplane.
4.9 State the requirements for the securing of passenger cabin and galley(s) (EU-OPS).
An operator shall establish procedures to ensure that before taxiing, take-off and landing all exits
and escape paths are unobstructed. The commander shall ensure that before take-off and landing,
and whenever deemed necessary in the interest of safety, all equipment and baggage is properly
secured.
4.10 State the rules to be obeyed when refuelling with passengers on board (EU-OPS).
An operator must establish procedures for refuelling when passengers are embarking, on board or
disembarking and observe the following precautions: -
• A qualified person must remain at a specified location during refuelling operations. He / She
must be capable of handling emergency fire procedures and be ready to initiate and direct an
evacuation of the aeroplane by the most practical and expeditious means available.
• Crew, staff and passengers must be warned that refuelling is taking place and that smoking
is prohibited and seatbelts should be undone.
• Sufficient personnel must be on board prepared for an immediate evacuation. This usually
means that at least one cabin crew member is located at each pair of doors ready, if
necessary, to ‘ARM’ and open the doors thereby activating the emergency slides.
1 Performance - General
Definitions
Alternate Aerodrome - An aerodrome to which an aircraft may proceed when it becomes either
impossible or inadvisable to proceed to or to land at the aerodrome of intended landing.
Threshold Distance – The maximum allowable distance from an adequate and suitable alternate
aerodrome.
Take-Off Alternate - An alternate aerodrome at which an aircraft can land should this become
necessary shortly after take-off and it is not possible to use the aerodrome of departure.
En-Route Alternate - An aerodrome at which an aircraft would be able to land after experiencing
an abnormal or emergency condition while en route.
ETOPS (Extended Twin Ops) En-Route Alternate - A suitable and adequate alternate
aerodrome at which a twin-engine aeroplane would be able to land after experiencing an engine
shut-down or other abnormal or emergency condition while en route in an ETOPS operation.
Extended Range Operation (ETOPS / EROPS) – Any flight by an aeroplane with two power
units where the flight time at the one engine inoperative cruise speed from a point on the route to
an adequate alternate aerodrome, is greater than the threshold time approved by the State.
1.1 List the factors that may significantly affect the aeroplane performance (Annex 6,
Part I, Chapter 5).
1.3 State the limitations on take-off and landing mass (Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 5).
Definition
Take-Off - The mass of the aeroplane at the start of take-off shall be able, in the event of a critical
power unit failing at any point in the take off, either to discontinue the take off and stop within the
accelerate stop distance available, or to continue the take off and clear all obstacles along the flight
path by an adequate margin until the aeroplane is in a position to climb above the minimum flight
altitude.
The mass at the start of take-off must not exceed the maximum take-off mass specified in the
flight manual for the pressure-altitude appropriate to the elevation of the aerodrome and local
atmospheric conditions.
En-route - The aeroplane shall be able, in the event of the critical power-unit becoming
inoperative at any point along the route or to planned diversions, to continue the flight to an
aerodrome at which landing requirements can be met, without flying below the minimum flight
altitude at any point.
Landing - The estimated mass for the expected time of landing at the aerodrome of intended
landing and at any destination alternate aerodrome must not exceed the maximum landing mass
specified in the flight manual for the pressure-altitude appropriate to the elevation of those
aerodromes and local atmospheric conditions.
2.1 State the circumstances in which a take-off alternate must be selected (EU-OPS,
Annex 6, part I Chapter 4).
An operator must select and specify in the operational flight plan a take-off alternate if it would
not be possible to return to the aerodrome of departure for meteorological or performance reasons.
An operator shall only authorise use of aerodromes that are adequate for the type(s) of aeroplane
and operations concerned.
An operator shall not select an aerodrome as a planned take-off alternate aerodrome unless the
appropriate weather reports or forecasts or any combination thereof indicate that, during a period
commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome,
the weather conditions will be at or above the applicable landing minima required.
• The ground equipment shown on the respective chart required for the intended procedure
is operative.
• The aeroplane systems required for the type of approach are operative.
• The required aeroplane performance criteria are met.
• The crew is qualified accordingly.
The ceiling must be taken into account when the only approaches available are non-precision
and/or circling approaches and any limitation related to one engine inoperative operations must be
taken into account.
2.3 State the maximum flight distance (threshold distance) of a take-off alternate for a
two-engine non-ETOPS aeroplane (EU-OPS).
60 minutes flight time, at the one-engine inoperative cruising speed*, in still air standard
conditions, based on the actual take-off mass.
2.4 State the maximum flight distance (threshold distance) of a take-off alternate for an
ETOPS approved aeroplane (EU-OPS).
120 minutes OR the approved ETOPS diversion time, whichever is less, at the one-engine-
inoperative cruising speed*, in still air standard conditions for aeroplanes and crews authorised for
ETOPS.
2.5 State the maximum flight distance (threshold distance) of a take-off alternate for a
three or four engine aeroplane (EU-OPS).
120 minutes flight time at the one-engine inoperative cruising speed*, in still air standard
conditions, based on the actual take-off mass.
*If the AFM / AOM does not contain a one engine-inoperative cruising speed, the speed to be
used for calculation must be that which is achieved with the remaining engines set at maximum
continuous power.
Summary
3.1 Specify the correct cruising speed for the operational conditions pertaining;
calculate the effect of using a different speed.
The correct cruising speed depends on the type of aircraft flown. A modern Flight Management
Computer (FMC) will calculate the cruising speed dependant aeroplane weight, altitude, ambient
conditions and the cost efficiency index (Cost Index) selected. However, cost may not be the only
factor, the aircraft may be required to make an arrival time, in which case the cruising speed
selected will be based on ETA and not fuel efficiency. Many other aircraft will use tables that are
designed to take account of the aircraft’s weight and cruising altitude to give a speed, which if
flown, will give the most efficient fuel flow. The fuel used is a direct function of drag, the most
efficient speed being that which gives the best range. If the aircraft goes slower or faster than this
optimum speed, the fuel used to get to the destination will be more. One might need to get to the
destination quickly in which case fuel flow is not of great concern and the greater cost is accepted.
The JAR learning objectives do not specify any tables for this calculation, so either a table will be
provided in the exam or they may elect the CAP 697 (page 20) data used in flight planning. For
example – An MEP 1 aeroplane has a cruising altitude of 12,000 feet where the OAT is –12°C.
What is the optimum economy cruising speed?
Following the lines on the table above, the answer 178 knot is calculated.
The optimum cruising altitude is dependant on the aircraft type but as a general rule, without wind
consideration, the higher the better. However, when considering optimum cruising altitude it is
important to ensure that the minimum en-route and off-route altitudes are not forgotten. Like
cruising speeds the optimum altitude is calculated by the FMC, considering all the data available
to the system this is usually the best option. The only factors, which will vary the highest altitude
as being the optimum, are turbulence and wind velocity.
As before, the learning objectives do not specify any tables for this calculation, so either a table
will be provided in the exam or they may elect the CAP 697 (page 25) data used in flight planning.
For example – What is the optimum long-range cruising altitude of an MRJT 1 aeroplane,
weighing 56 tons?
Following the lines on the table above, the answer 34,000 or FL 340 is calculated.
What should be noted is that the further away from the optimum line then the greater the fuel
penalty. However, if FL340 is not available, only FL330 or FL350 due to semi-circular rules etc,
which one should be chosen? The answer is quite logical in that with the passing of time the
aircraft will burn fuel and so become lighter, therefore the altitude based on the ‘future’ weight
should be chosen (i.e. to the ‘right’ of the LRC line), provided, of course, this does not exceed the
maximum operating altitude for the current weight of the aircraft. As fuel is burnt the weight of
the aircraft will tend towards the optimum. So in this case FL350 is the optimum level
3.5 Describe the EU-OPS requirements relative to the establishment of minimum flight
altitude (AMC-OPS).
Definition
From the calculation of optimum cruising altitude in the previous section, it is evident that
aeroplanes are more efficient at higher altitudes. However, an operator will usually want to carry
the maximum amount of payload possible, so as the weight of the aircraft increases, the optimum
operating altitude decreases, as does the maximum permissible altitude (operating envelope). If
this maximum altitude available is lower than the terrain / safety altitude en-route then the
operator will have to either: -
• Choose another route = Longer distance / time =More fuel = Greater cost.
It’s a question of priorities. Modern turbo-jet aircraft have no problems attaining high altitudes,
clear of terrain, at maximum operating weight unless they are in the Himalayas! However, what
happens when one of the engines fail? The aircraft is unlikely to be able to maintain the original
cruising level even with ‘maximum continuous power’ set on the remaining engine(s). The aircraft
will ‘drift-down’ to a lower altitude while it diverts to a suitable aerodrome.
2000ft
1000ft
1000ft
Alternatively, the published minimum flight altitudes (Minimum En route Altitude, MEA, or
Minimum Off Route Altitude, MORA) may be used for determining whether one engine
inoperative level flight is feasible at the minimum flight altitude or if it is necessary to use the
published minimum flight altitudes as the basis for the drift-down construction. This procedure
avoids a detailed high terrain contour analysis but may be more penalising than taking the actual
terrain profile into account. So now a minimum cruise altitude can be calculated by the operator
and the payload adjusted accordingly.
3.6 List the factors considered when establishing minimum flight altitude (Annex 6,
Part I, Chapter4).
An operator shall be permitted to establish minimum flight altitudes for those routes flown for
which minimum flight altitudes have been established by the State flown over or the responsible
State, provided that they shall not be less than those established by that State.
An operator shall specify the method by which it is intended to determine minimum flight
altitudes for operations conducted over routes for which minimum flight altitudes have not been
established by the State flown over or the responsible State, and shall include this method in the
operations manual.
The State of the Operator should approve such method only after careful consideration of the
probable effects of the following factors on the safety of the operation in question: -
• The accuracy and reliability with which the position of the aeroplane can be determined.
• Airspace restrictions.
Following the failure of an engine, aeroplanes must be capable of a certain level of performance
whilst dealing with the engine failure, diverting to a suitable alternate, holding and eventually
landing. The performance required will depend on the performance category. The actual wording
of the performance criteria in EU-OPS is quite complicated.
* The term ‘level flight’ in the definitions below actually mean a rate of climb of 300 feet per
minute or more.
Twin-engine Performance A
Level flight* or better at least 1000 feet above the terrain OR a flight path to clear all terrain by at
least 2,000 feet during drift-down by 5nm either side of track to alternate. Taking into account: -
• Critical point.
• Wind.
• Fuel jettison.
• Suitability of alternate (weather & performance).
• Navigational performance (increase to 10nm either side of track if <95% containment).
When at the alternate, the aircraft must be capable of level flight* or better 1,500 feet above the
landing aerodrome.
Twin-engine Performance B
The aircraft must be capable of level flight* or better above the minimum safe altitude, to a point
1,000 feet above the landing aerodrome.
Single-engine Performance B
Capable of reaching a place at which a safe forced landing can be made (difficult to guarantee).
Twin-engine Performance C
Level flight* or better at least 1,000 feet above the terrain OR a flight path to clear all terrain by at
least 2,000 feet during drift-down by 5nm either side of track to alternate. Taking into account: -
• Fuel jettison.
When at the alternate, the aircraft must be capable of level flight or better 1,500 feet above the
landing aerodrome. Note that this is the same as twin-engine Performance A aeroplanes, except no
account is taken for the critical point, wind or suitability of the alternate aerodrome although
common sense would suggest otherwise!
The maximum distance (threshold distance) from an adequate en-route alternate for two-engine
aeroplanes is: -
Twin-engine Non-ETOPS approved aeroplanes: -
120 minutes
OR
Performance 300 nautical miles
Class B or C (whichever is the less)
The speed used for the calculation of the maximum distance to an adequate aerodrome for each
two-engine aeroplane type is based upon the true airspeed that the aeroplane can maintain with
one-engine-inoperative under the following conditions: -
The distance from an adequate aerodrome for an ETOPS aeroplane is type specific and dependent
on several factors related to the engine and equipment fit on that aircraft and more importantly
their reliability. The maximum distance allowed at present is 180 minutes (3 hours) at the one-
engine inoperative cruising speed. This equates to about 1,200 nm.
An operator must ensure that the following data, specific to each type or variant, is included in the
Operations Manual: -
Note that the Take-Off Alternate requirements and En-route alternate requirements are
different and potentially easily confused when answering exam questions!
3.9 Describe the limitations imposed by EU-OPS on extended range operations with
Performance A&C aeroplanes, with three or more engines, and two engines
inoperative (EU-OPS.585).
All three and four engines aeroplanes have no practical limit on the distance they can be from a
suitable alternate aerodrome. This assumes that if an engine fails the aeroplane will divert, or
continue to destination, with still two or more engines serviceable.
However, if certain performance criteria, based on a second engine failure are NOT met, then it
must remain within 90 minutes at the all-engine long-range cruising speed at standard temperature
in still air, away from a suitable aerodrome. These criteria are as follows: -
• The two-engines inoperative flight path shown must permit the aeroplane to continue the
flight, in the expected meteorological conditions, clearing all obstacles within 5 nm (10 nm
< 95% containment level) either side of the intended track by a vertical interval of at least
2000 ft, to an aerodrome at which the performance requirements applicable at the expected
landing mass are met.
• The two engines are assumed to fail at the most critical point.
• When at the alternate, the aircraft must be capable of level flight or better 1,500 feet above
the landing aerodrome and thereafter to fly level for 15 minutes.
Weather must be above the minimum from 1 hour before to 1 hour after ETA or time of passage.
Weather must be above the minima 1 hour before to 1 hour after ETA. Planning minima for a
destination aerodrome will be based on: -
4.2 State when a destination alternate need not be selected (EU-OPS & Annex 6, Part
I, Chapter 4).
For a flight to be conducted in accordance with the instrument flight rules, at least one destination
alternate aerodrome shall be selected and specified in the operational and ATS flight plans, unless:
-
• The duration of the planned flight from take-off to landing does not exceed 6 hours.
AND
• Two separate runways are available at the destination.
AND
• The meteorological conditions prevailing are such that, for the period from one hour before
until one hour after the expected time of arrival at destination, the approach from the
relevant minimum safe sector altitude and the landing can be made in VMC.
OR
• The destination is isolated and no adequate destination alternate exists.
• The appropriate weather reports or forecasts for the destination, or any combination
thereof, indicate that during a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after
the estimated time of arrival, the weather conditions will be below the applicable planning
minima.
OR
• No meteorological information is available.
* The distance is measured from the landing screen height of 50ft on a DRY runway.
When complying with the above the operator must take into account the following: -
As we will see later in the section dealing with ‘wet and contaminated runways’, if the runway is
wet then the landing distance available must be at least 115% of the landing distance required, as
calculated above for a dry runway.
For example - Within what distance must a turbo-jet aeroplane plan to stop on a runway that is
2000 metres long in dry and wet conditions?
5.1 State the fuel and oil requirements for flight, for propeller-driven aeroplanes or
turbo-jet aeroplanes, with and without a destination alternate nominated (Annex 6,
Part I, Chapter 4 EU-OPS).
The basic regulations for all aeroplanes for the carriage of fuel and oil supply is that a flight shall
not be commenced unless, taking into account both the meteorological conditions and any delays
that are expected in flight, the aeroplane carries sufficient fuel and oil to ensure that it can safely
complete the flight. In addition, a reserve (final reserve) shall be carried to provide for unforeseen
problems at the destination or alternate (if required). The total fuel and oil required is as follows: -
• Taxi Fuel.
• Alternate Fuel - Sufficient to carry out a missed approach at the destination and divert to
the planned alternate (if required). If two destination alternates are required then the
alternate fuel should be sufficient to proceed to the alternate that requires the greater
amount of fuel.
• Additional Fuel – Sufficient to allow the aeroplane to reach the en-route alternate,
following an aircraft malfunction, such as an engine failure or loss of pressurisation en-
route at a critical point (i.e. in the middle of the Atlantic), which would dramatically
increase the normal fuel consumption.
• Final Reserve -This is the amount of fuel the aircraft should have in its tanks on arrival
overhead the alternate in ISA at the estimated landing mass at the alternate. For
reciprocating-engine aeroplanes, this will be fuel to fly for 45 mins; for turbine-engine
aeroplanes, this will be fuel to fly for 30 mins at holding speed at 1500 ft. above
aerodrome elevation at the destination alternate aerodrome, or the destination aerodrome
when no destination alternate is required..
The calculation of the final reserve fuel requirement depend on several factors such as the type of
aeroplane operated and whether the destination aerodrome is isolated / alternate required etc.
5.2 State the considerations accounted for in the fuel and oil calculation (Annex 6, Part
I, Chapter 4).
In computing the fuel and oil required above, at least the following shall be considered: -
1 General Rules
Definitions
1.1 State the minimum visibility and separation from cloud for VFR in each class of
airspace (EU-OPS).
An operator shall ensure that VFR flights are conducted in accordance with the Visual Flight
Rules illustrated below: -
Note 1 - When the height of the transition altitude is lower than 3,050 m (10,000 ft) AMSL, Flight
Level 100 should be used in lieu of 10,000 feet.
Note 2 - Category A and B aeroplanes may be operated in flight visibilities down to 3,000 metres,
provided the appropriate ATS authority permits use of a flight visibility less than 5 km, and the
circumstances are such, that the probability of encounters with other traffic is low, and the IAS is
140 knots or less.
A flight to be conducted in accordance with the visual flight rules (VFR) shall not be commenced
unless current meteorological reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions
along the route to be flown under VFR will, at the appropriate time, be such as to render
compliance with these rules possible.
A flight to be conducted in accordance with instrument flight rules shall not be commenced unless
information is available which indicates that conditions at the aerodrome of intended landing or,
where a destination alternate is required, at least one destination alternate aerodrome will, at the
estimated time of arrival, be at or above the aerodrome operating minima.
Special VFR flights are not commenced when the visibility is less than 3 km and not otherwise
conducted when the visibility is less than 1.5 km.
Definition
• Take-off - expressed in terms of runway visual range and/ or visibility and, if necessary,
cloud conditions.
Runway Visual Range (RVR) - The range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centre line of
a runway can see the runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying
its centre line.
Obstacle Clearance Altitude (OCA) or Obstacle Clearance Height (OCH) - The lowest
altitude, or the lowest height above the elevation of the relevant runway threshold or the
aerodrome elevation as applicable, used in establishing compliance with appropriate obstacle
clearance criteria. Obstacle clearance altitude is referenced to mean sea level and obstacle
clearance height is referenced to the threshold elevation or in the case of non-precision approaches
to the aerodrome elevation or the threshold elevation if that is more than 7 feet below the
aerodrome elevation. An obstacle clearance height for a circling approach is referenced to the
aerodrome elevation. For convenience when both expressions are used they may be written in the
form "obstacle clearance altitudes height" and abbreviated "OCA / H".
An operator shall establish, for each aerodrome planned to be used, aerodrome-operating minima
that are not lower than the values given in EU-OPS. The method of determination of such minima
must be acceptable to the Authority. Such minima shall not be lower than any that may be
established for such aerodromes by the State in which the aerodrome is located, except when
specifically approved by that State.
In establishing the aerodrome operating minima, which will apply to any particular operation, an
operator must take full account of: -
• The adequacy and performance of the available visual and non-visual ground aids.
• The equipment available on the aeroplane for the purpose of navigation and / or control of
the flight path.
• The obstacles in the approach, missed approach and the climb-out areas required for the
execution of contingency procedures and necessary clearance.
• The obstacle clearance altitude / height for the instrument approach procedures.
1.6 State the rules for the compliance / non-compliance with aerodrome operating
minima (Annex 6 Part 1 Chapter 4).
A flight shall not be continued towards the aerodrome of intended landing, unless the latest
available information indicates that at the expected time of arrival, a landing can be effected at that
aerodrome or at least one destination alternate aerodrome, in compliance with the operating
minima established above.
An aeroplane shall not continue its approach to land at any aerodrome beyond a point at which the
limits of the operating minima specified for that aerodrome would be infringed, except in an
emergency.
The criteria taken into consideration for the classification of aeroplanes by categories is the
indicated airspeed at threshold (VAT), which is equal to either: -
• The stalling speed, VSRO in the landing configuration multiplied by 1.3 at the maximum
certificated landing mass.
OR
• VSI in the clean configuration multiplied by 1.23 at the maximum certificated landing
mass.
If both VSI and VSRO are available, the higher resulting VAT shall be used.
Definition
Low-Visibility Take-Off - A take-off where the Runway Visual Range (RVR) is less than 400
metres.
Low Visibility Procedures - Procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring safe
operations during Category II and III approaches and Low Visibility Take-Offs.
The take-off minima, established by the operator, must be expressed as Visibility or RVR limits,
taking into account the aerodrome facilities (lighting etc) and the aeroplane characteristics. Also,
where there is a specific need to see and avoid obstacles on departure and / or for a forced landing,
additional conditions (e.g. cloud ceiling) must be specified. The take-off minima must be selected
to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aeroplane in the event of both a discontinued take-off
in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure of the critical power unit.
* Category D aeroplanes.
RVR is usually reported for 3 sections along the runway – Threshold / Mid Point / Stop-end. The
minima required for take-off may be for some or all of the quoted RVR to be above the permitted
minima. For example, an operator (in the UK) may specify that, for a particular runway, the RVR
required for take-off must be above the relevant minima for the threshold and midpoint only.
For example, if the RVR required for take-off is 200 metres and the reported RVR is 350 / 200 /
150, is take-off permitted? - The answer depends on which ‘sections’ of the runway are required
to be above the take-off minima. If the Company Operations Manual states that the stop-end value
is not required then take-off may be permitted.
The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run (from the threshold
only) can be replaced by pilot assessment. This is usually done by counting the number of lights
visible on the runway prior to take-off. The spacing of runway lights is found in the aerodrome
booklet, commonly 15 metre spacing.
For example, if the RVR required for take-off is again 200 metres and the reported RVR is 150 /
200 / 200, is take-off permitted? – In this case the reported RVR at the threshold is below that
required for take-off, however, the Captain can assess the RVR himself, by counting the lights,
and if he / she determines that it is greater than the required 200 metres then he / she may take-off.
Of, course the reverse is also true in that if the threshold RVR is reported as 200+ metres but the
Captain determines visually that it is below the required minima, he /she may refuse to go!
The above example doesn’t mean that the mid-point and stop-end RVR can be ignored. For
example, if the RVR required for take-off is still 200 metres and the reported RVR is now 150 /
150 / 200, is take-off permitted? – The answer in this case is definitely NO because although the
threshold figure can be re-determined by the Captain visually, the mid-point cannot.
Operational Procedures (NPA25) - Edition 4 - 110901 5-5
©BCFT, a trading name of Bournemouth Flying ClubTM Ltd 2011
RVR Unavailable
When the RVR is not reported then the reported meteorological visibility, which is usually lower
than the RVR would have been, is used and assumed to represent all sections of the runway. So a
met visibility of say 300 metres means that the equivalent RVR is 300 / 300 / 300. The decision to
take-off or not is as determined as above. As we will see later there is a method of ‘factoring’ the
reported met visibility to determine the equivalent RVR depending on the runway lighting
available, however this ‘factoring’ is NOT PERMITTED for take-off calculations.
For example, if the RVR required for take-off is again 200 metres and the RVR and met visibility
is not reported is take-off permitted? – The Captain may determine the threshold value to be above
200 metres but if the mid-point or stop-end values are required how can he / she determine that
without taxiing down the runway and checking. Of course, when he / she gets back to the
threshold, it may have changed! It’s not worth risking your pension – go back to the terminal and
have a coffee.
Immediate Return
Finally, the commander shall not commence take-off unless the weather conditions at the
aerodrome of departure are equal to or better than applicable minima for landing at that same
aerodrome unless a suitable take-off alternate aerodrome is available.
For example, if the RVR required for take-off is again 200 metres and the reported RVR is 300 /
300 / 300, is take-off permitted? The obvious answer is YES and in theory take-off is permitted
BUT if the RVR / Met visibility required for an immediate return and landing from a particular
approach following a malfunction (single engine failure, for example) is, say, 600 metres, then
take-off is not permitted until either the RVR improves to 600 metres or a take-off alternate,
where the weather is suitable for landing, is nominated (remember Chapter 4).
From the first table, the lowest permitted minima for take-off was 150 / 200* metres. This can be
further reduced to 125 / 150* metres providing the following apply (* Category D aeroplanes): -
Reduction of the minima of 125 / 150* metres may be reduced even further to an absolute
minimum of 75 metres by the use of an approved on-board lateral guidance system, subject to the
approval of the Authority. (* Category D aeroplanes)
For multi-engine aeroplanes whose performance is such that they, in the event of a critical power
unit failure, may need to re-land straight ahead immediately (assuming the runway is long enough)
and to see and avoid obstacles in the take-off area, the following take-off minima apply: -
Runways are categorised into four different classes dependent upon the type of lighting and
markings. Obviously, the better the facilities of the runway, then the lower will be the RVR
minima that apply to that runway for the variety of precision and non precision approaches. The
categories re Full, Intermediate, Basic and Nil as follows: -
Full facilities: - Basic facilities: -
Runway markings. Runway markings.
720 metres or more of High Intensity (HI) or 420 metres or less of HI / MI approach
Medium Intensity (MI) approach lights. lights and any length of LI lights
Runway edge lights. Runway edge lights.
Threshold lights. Threshold lights.
Runway end lights. Runway end lights.
Intermediate facilities: - Nil facilities: -
Runway markings. Runway markings.
420 - 720 metres or more of HI / MI Runway edge lights.
approach lights. Threshold lights.
Runway edge lights. Runway end lights.
Threshold lights. OR
Runway end lights. No lights at all.
Note that for ALL approaches (precision and non-precision) only the THRESHOLD /
TOUCHDOWN zone RVR is required to be at or above the required minimum unless specified by
the operator.
Definition
Non-Precision Approach - An instrument approach and landing that does not utilise electronic
glide path guidance.
Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) or Minimum Descent Height (MDH) - A specified altitude
or height in a non-precision approach or circling approach below which descent must not be made
without the required visual reference. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) is referenced to mean sea
level and minimum descent height (MDH) is referenced to the aerodrome elevation or to the
threshold elevation if that is more than 7 ft below the aerodrome elevation. A minimum descent
height for a circling approach is referenced to the aerodrome elevation. For convenience when
both expressions are used they may be written in the form "minimum descent altitude height" and
abbreviated "MDA / H".
An operator must ensure that system minima for non-precision approach procedures, which are
based upon the use of ILS without glide path (LLZ only), VOR, NDB, SRA and VDF are not
lower than the absolute MDH values below: -
Obviously there are three more tables for the Intermediate, Basic and Nil runways, but the RVR
minima will all be higher values.
A pilot may not continue an approach below MDA / MDH unless at least one of the following
visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot: -
Rather than learn all these, think about what you would want to see in order to land
safely.
For night operations at least runway edge, threshold and runway end lights must be on.
Remember these lights form a BOX.
Definitions
Circling - The visual phase of an instrument approach to bring an aircraft into position for landing
on a runway, which is not suitably located for a straight-in approach. The lowest minima to be
used by an operator for circling are: -
Circling Minimum – The circling minimum is the minimum altitude or height required to give
obstacle clearance within a specified radius, and any specified sector. A circling approach will
always be based upon a defined radius from the airfield datum. The radius will be stated with the
circling approach minima.
Visual Approach - An approach when either part or all of an instrument approach procedure is
not completed and the approach is executed with visual reference to the terrain. An operator shall
not use an RVR of less than 800 metres for a visual approach.
Definition
Precision Approach - An instrument approach and landing using precision azimuth and glide
path guidance with minima as determined by the category of operation. Categories of precision
approach and landing operations are: -
• Category I (CAT 1) operation - A precision instrument approach and landing with a
decision height not lower than 200 feet and with either a visibility not less than 800 metres
or a runway visual range not less than 550 metres.
• Category II (CAT 2) operation - A precision instrument approach and landing with a
decision not lower than 100 feet, and a runway visual range not less than 300 metres .
• Category IIIA (CAT 3A) operation - A precision instrument approach and landing with a
decision height lower than 100 feet and a runway visual range not less than 200 metres.
• Category IIIB (CAT 3B) operation - A precision instrument approach and landing with: a
decision height lower than 50 feet or no decision height and a runway visual range not less
than 75 metres
• Category IIIC (CAT 3C) operation - A precision instrument approach and landing with
no decision height or runway visual range limitations.
Decision Altitude (DA) or Decision Height (DH) - A specified altitude or height in the precision
approach at which a missed approach must be initiated if the required visual reference to continue
the approach has not been established. Decision altitude (DA) is referenced to mean sea level and
decision height (DH) is referenced to the threshold elevation. For convenience where both
expressions are used they may be written in the form "decision altitudes height" and abbreviated
"DA/H".
A Category I ILS operation is a precision instrument approach and landing using an ILS with a
decision height not lower than 200 feet and with a runway visual range not less than 550 metres or
met visibility of 800 metres. As always, an operator will select the appropriate minima based upon
several factors, including runway lighting facilities mentioned earlier (remember - Full,
Intermediate, Basic and Nil), but the 200 feet / 550 / 800 metres is the absolute minimum allowed.
A pilot MUST NOT proceed beyond the OUTER MARKER during a precision approach unless
the reported RVR / met visibility is at or above the required minima. A pilot may not continue an
approach below the Category I decision height, unless at least one of the required visual references
for the intended runway is distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot. The required references
are the same as for the non-precision approach listed previously.
For single pilot operations, the minimum RVR for all approaches is not less than 800 metres
except when using a suitable autopilot coupled to an ILS, in which case normal minima apply. The
Decision Height applied must not be less than 1.25 x the minimum use height for the autopilot.
For example in a Citation II, the autopilot must be disengaged at 180 feet, therefore 1.25 X 180 =
225 feet. So the DH used will be a minimum of 225 feet.
A Category II operation is a precision instrument approach and landing using ILS a decision
height not lower than 100 feet and a runway visual range of not less than 300 metres .
Obviously, now that the decision height and RVR minimum is getting lower, the pilot will be
making use of the aeroplanes autopilot system (coupled approach) BUT still carrying out a manual
landing. If the autopilot is not being used then naturally the DH and RVR minima may / will be
higher.
A pilot may not continue an approach below the Category II decision height determined above
unless visual reference containing a segment of: -
• At least 3 consecutive lights being the centre line of the approach lights.
OR
• Touchdown zone lights.
OR
• Runway centre line lights.
OR
• Runway edge lights.
OR
• A combination of these is attained and can be maintained.
AND
• Must include a lateral element of the ground pattern, i.e. an approach lighting crossbar or
the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone lighting.
A Category IIIA operation is a precision instrument approach and landing using ILS with a
decision height lower than 100 feet and a runway visual range not less than 200 metres. A pilot
may not continue an approach below the decision height determined above unless a visual
reference containing a segment of: -
Category IIIB operations are subdivided into either with or without a decision height as follows: -
• A Category IIIB operation with a decision height is a precision instrument approach and
landing using ILS with a decision height lower than 50 feet and a runway visual range not
less than 75metres A pilot may not continue an approach below the Decision Height,
unless a visual reference containing at least one centreline light is attained and can be
maintained.
• For Category IIIB – No DH (No Decision Height) operations there is no requirement for
visual contact with the runway prior to touchdown. The RVR minimum of 75m still exists
because the pilot needs to see something at the end of the landing run in order to taxi!
A Category IIIC operation is a precision instrument approach and landing with no decision height
or runway visual range limitations. This is only theoretical at the moment as currently there is no
requirement for this type of operation and no aircraft are certified.
To summarise: -
ILS Lowest RVR Lowest DH Required Visual References
Category I 550m (800m Vis) 200 feet As per non-precision approach list
3 centreline lights + lateral
Category II 350m (JAR 300m) 100 feet
element
Category IIIA 200m <100 feet 3 centreline lights
Category IIIB + DH 50m (JAR 75m) <50 feet 1 centreline light
Category IIIB-No
50m (JAR 75m) No DH No visual reference
DH
Category IIIC 0 metres No DH No visual reference
If, and only if, RVR reports are not available, a pilot may calculate the RVR from the reported met
visibility. This is achieved by factoring the reported met visibility, dependent on the runway
lighting, using the table below: -
For example: - If the reported met visibility is 200 metres, at night, and the runway has HI lighting
then the calculated RVR is 200 X 2.0 = 400 metres.
Note: This factoring MUST NOT be used to calculate take-off minima or Category II and III
minima.
Definitions
Alert Height – The alert height is a specified radio height (typically 200 feet) below which the
pilot IS NOT warned about any failure of any part of the flight control system.
Fail-Passive (Fail-Soft) Flight Control System - A flight control system is fail-passive if, in the
event of a failure above the alert height the landing cannot be completed automatically. For a fail-
passive automatic flight control system the pilot assumes control of the aeroplane after a failure,
either manually of through the remaining autopilot (explained below).
Fail-Safe Autopilot – An autopilot is fail-safe if, in the event of a failure, there is no significant
out-of- trim condition or deviation of flight path or attitude and the pilot assumes manual control
of the aeroplane after a failure.
All Category III (and sometimes Category II) operations assume the use of a flight control system,
which by definition must incorporate an automatic landing system. Auto-land systems must
consist of at least TWO autopilots and more likely three. If, during an approach one of the three
autopilots failed, the pilot would be alerted to the malfunction, provided the aircraft is above the
alert height, but the remaining two autopilots could complete the auto-land. The RVR minima and
DH may change but the pilot does not need to intervene. This is a Fail-Operational (Fail-Active)
system. If any failure occurred BELOW the alert height (typically 200 feet), the pilot is NOT
alerted to the failure and the auto-land continues as normal.
If the aeroplane has only two autopilots, either by design, or is a three-autopilot aeroplane where
one has autopilot has already failed or is unserviceable, then the failure of an additional autopilot
would leave only one. The pilot would again be alerted, above the alert height, but the automatic
landing is now NOT possible (remember two autopilots are required for an auto-land above the
alert height) and the pilot will have to complete the landing manually, if permitted, or go-around
either manually or automatically by using the remaining autopilot. This is a Fail-Passive (Fail-
Soft) system.
If the remaining autopilot were to fail during the go-around (remember the auto-land is not
possible with only one autopilot) or indeed during at any stage in flight then it must fail-safe as
described above in the definitions.
Note, if a two-autopilot aircraft (fail passive) were conducting an auto-land and there were a
system failure BELOW the alert height then, as already stated, the pilot would not be alerted to the
malfunction but the auto-land is actually being completed by ONE autopilot. This is quite
acceptable because cockpit indications would not indicate the malfunction and the aircraft is only
ever being flown by one autopilot anyway regardless of the number fitted. The additional
autopilots are there to monitor the ‘master’ and take over if required.
Operational Procedures (NPA25) - Edition 4 - 110901 5-13
©BCFT, a trading name of Bournemouth Flying ClubTM Ltd 2011
6 Low Visibility Operations
6.1 State the general rules for low visibility operations (EU-OPS.& Appendix 1).
6.2 State the rules concerning the use of aerodromes for low visibility operations (EU-
OPS).
An operator shall not use an aerodrome for Category II or III operations unless the aerodrome is
approved for such operations by the State in which the aerodrome is located. An operator shall
verify that Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) have been established, and will be enforced, at those
aerodromes where low visibility operations are to be conducted.
6.3 State the qualification requirement for flight crew to conduct low visibility
operations (EU-OPS).
An operator shall ensure that, prior to conducting Low Visibility Take-Off, Category II and III
operations each flight crewmember is qualified in low visibility procedures having completed
simulator training in operating to the limiting values of RVR and Decision Height. The training
and checking is conducted in accordance with a detailed syllabus approved by the Authority and
included in the Operations Manual specific to the operation and the aeroplane type.
6.4 State the operating procedures for low visibility operations (EU-OPS).
An operator must establish procedures and instructions to be used for Low Visibility Take-Off and
Category II and III operations. These procedures must be included in the Operations Manual and
contain the duties of flight crew members during taxiing, take-off, approach, flare, landing, roll-
out and missed approach as appropriate. The commander shall satisfy himself that: -
• Low Visibility Procedures are in force.
• The status of the visual and non-visual facilities is sufficient.
• The flight crewmembers are properly qualified.
An operator must include in the Operations Manual the minimum equipment that has to be
serviceable at the commencement of a Low Visibility Take-off or a Category II or III approach in
accordance with the AFM / AOM. This is usually presented as a list of various approach aids and
equipment and the subsequent effect on the aeroplane’s approach / autoland capability and
minima, if unserviceable.
1 General Rules
1.1 Describe the operator’s responsibilities concerning routes and areas of operation
(EU-OPS & Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 4).
An operator shall ensure that operations are only conducted along such routes or within such areas,
for which: -
• Ground facilities and services, including meteorological services, are provided which are
adequate for the planned operation.
• The performance of the aeroplane is adequate to comply with minimum flight altitude
requirements.
• The equipment of the aeroplane meets the minimum requirements for the planned operation.
• Appropriate maps and charts are available.
• If two-engine aeroplanes are used, adequate aerodromes are available within the
time/distance limitations.
• If single-engine aeroplanes are used, surfaces are available which permit a safe forced
landing to be executed.
• Operations are conducted in accordance with any restriction on the routes or the areas of
operation, imposed by the Authority.
1.2 Specify appropriate cruising levels for normal long-range IFR flights and for those
operating on the North Atlantic Operational Track Structure.
The selection of the cruising altitude depends on many factors. The aircraft could be required to fly
the appropriate semi-circular cruising level or as directed by ATC to conform to the North Atlantic
Track Structure discussed later in this chapter. Within these constraints the crew will try and get as
high as possible where the TAS is higher and the engines more efficient.
• 000 to 179 M Odd flight levels, for example FL 290, 310, FL 300 FL 290
330 etc. FL 320 FL 310
FL 340 FL 330
• 180 to 359 M Even flight levels, for example FL 300, 320, Etc. Etc.
340 etc.
Definition
Flight Plan - Specified information provided to air traffic services units, relative to an intended
flight or portion of a flight of an aircraft.
Minimum Time Track – The MTT is literally the quickest way from A to B allowing for wind.
A Minimum Time Track is not necessarily the shortest route in terms of distance; the groundspeed
over a longer track may be significantly greater than a shorter track leading to a quicker flight time
and consequently less fuel usage. On some sectors, such as from the USA to Europe it is often
advantageous to go more than 500 miles off the shortest track to take advantage of the west to east
prevailing jet-stream. Equally when flying from Europe to the USA it is definitely advantageous to
avoid the jet-stream headwinds even though this may be significantly off the direct line.
1.4 State the normal time, in advance of departure, for filing an ATS flight plan on the
ground.
Unless otherwise prescribed by the appropriate ATS authority, a flight plan for a flight to be
provided with air traffic control service or air traffic advisory service shall be submitted at least
ONE HOUR before departure. However, international flights crossing state boundaries should file
flight plans at least TWO HOURS before departure to allow sufficient time for facilitation (customs
etc) arrangements to be made. Flights undertaken in any part of European airspace co-ordinated by
Brussels should file flight plans at least THREE HOURS before departure to allow sufficient time
for airspace allocation (Slots).
Operational instructions involving a change in the ATS flight plan shall, when practicable, are co-
ordinated with the appropriate ATS unit before transmission to the aeroplane. The ATS flight plan
request shall be submitted during the flight at a time, which will ensure its receipt by the appropriate
air traffic services unit at least TEN MINUTES before the aircraft is estimated to reach the intended
entry point to a controlled or advisory area or the airway crossing point or advisory route.
2.2 State the lateral dimensions (in general terms) of MNPS airspace (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Details of the North Atlantic MNPS airspace is contained with the document “Regional
Supplementary Procedures – Document 7030” The lateral dimensions include the following five
Control Areas are shown on the map above: -
• REYKJAVIK
• SHANWICK (NOT ‘Shannon’)
• GANDER
• SANTA MARIA
• NEW YORK
2.3 State the vertical limits of MNPS airspace (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
The vertical dimension of MNPS Airspace is between FL285 and FL420 (i.e. in terms of normally
used cruising levels, from FL290 to FL410 inclusive). RVSM is being applied throughout.
2.4 State the regulation concerning the Flight Rules to operate in the NAT region (NAT
Doc, Ed. 8).
Over the high seas, the NAT Region is Class A airspace (at and above FL55), in which Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR) apply at all times.
2.5 State the regulation concerning certification to operate in MNPS airspace (NAT
Doc, Ed. 8).
Approval for MNPS operations will require the checking by the State of Registry or State of the
Operator, of various aspects affecting navigation performance. These aspects include: -
• Navigation equipment used, together with its installation and maintenance procedures.
• Crew navigation procedures employed and the training requirements.
Approval to operate at RVSM levels within MNPS Airspace is subject to additional requirements: -
The North Atlantic MNPS airspace is a CTA like any other. Aircraft wishing to fly ‘random routes’
through it must file a flight plan like any other. Flights shall be planned along great circle tracks
joining successive significant points.
Flights operating between North America and Europe shall generally be considered as operating in
a predominantly east-west direction. Flights planned between the two continents via the North Pole
shall be considered as operating in a predominant north-south direction.
East-West Flights: -
For flights operating south of 70º N, the planned tracks shall normally be defined by significant
points formed by, the intersection of half or whole degrees of latitude with meridians spaced at
intervals of 10º. For example, when westbound significant points could be from 51ºN 020ºW to
52ºN 030ºW to 51ºN 040ºW.
For flights operating north of 70º N, where the meridians of longitude are ‘closer’ together, the
planned tracks shall normally be defined by significant points formed by the intersection of
parallels of latitude expressed in degrees and minutes with meridians normally spaced at
intervals of 20º. For example, when westbound significant points could be from 72ºN 020ºW to
73ºN 040ºW to 74ºN 060ºW.
The aim is to make the distance between successive points, as far as possible, NOT exceed one
hour's flight time.
North-South Flights: -
For flights whose flight paths are predominantly oriented in a north-South direction, the planned
tracks shall normally be defined by significant points formed by the intersection of whole
degrees of longitude with specified parallels of latitude which are spaced at 5 degrees. For
example, when northbound significant points could be from 55ºN 020ºW to 60ºN 022ºW to
65ºN 023ºW.
Again, the aim is to make the distance between successive points, as far as possible, NOT exceed
one hour's flight time.
2.8 Describe the Organised Track System (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
As a result of passenger demand, time zone differences and airport noise restrictions, much of the
North Atlantic (NAT) air traffic contributes to two major alternating flows, a westbound flow
departing Europe in the morning, and an eastbound flow departing North America in the evening.
The effect of these flows is to concentrate most of the traffic unidirectionally.
Due to the constraints of large horizontal separation criteria and a limited economical height band
(FL310–FL390) the airspace is congested at peak hours. In order to provide the best service to the
bulk of the traffic, a system of organised tracks is constructed to accommodate as many flights as
possible within the major flows on or close to their minimum time tracks and profiles.
Due to the energetic nature of the NAT weather patterns, including the presence of jet streams,
eastbound and westbound minimum time tracks are seldom identical. The creation of a different
organised track system is therefore necessary for each of the major flows. Separate Organised
Track Structures (OTS) are published each day for eastbound and westbound flows.
Westbound - The tracks are lettered A to H (8 tracks typically) for the westbound daytime OTS
with ‘A’ the most northerly and ‘H’ the most southerly.
Eastbound - The tracks are lettered S to Z (8 tracks typically) for the eastbound nighttime OTS with
‘S’ the most northerly and ‘Z’ the most southerly.
2.9 State the hours of validity of westbound and eastbound tracks (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
The hours of validity of the two Organised Track Systems (OTS) are based on the time the aircraft
would be at the mid point (30W) of the crossing and are normally as follows: -
So the daytime OTS actually starts at about 1000 UTC when the first aircraft reaches the start point
just west of the UK and would normally take about an hour and a half to reach 30W.
The use of OTS tracks is not mandatory. Currently about half of NAT flights utilise the OTS.
Aircraft may fly on random routes that remain clear of the OTS or may fly on any route that joins or
leaves an outer track of the OTS. There is also nothing to prevent an operator from planning a route
that crosses the OTS. However, in this case, operators must be aware that whilst ATC will make
every effort to clear random traffic across the OTS at published levels, re-routes or significant
changes in flight level from those planned are very likely to be necessary during most of the OTS
traffic periods.
2.10 Explain the purpose of the Preferred Route Message (PRM) and identify the latest
time of submission of a PRM for the daytime and night time OTS (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Operators intending to use the OTS are encouraged to contribute to the OTS planning process. This
enables oceanic planners to take into consideration operators' preferred routes in the construction of
the OTS. All NAT operators (both scheduled and non-scheduled) are urged to provide information
by AFTN message to the appropriate OCA regarding the optimum tracks of their intended flights
during the peak traffic periods. Such information should be provided, in the correct format, as far in
advance as possible, but not later than: -
The agreed OTS is promulgated by means of the NAT Track Message via the AFTN to all
interested addressees. The following is an example of a westbound NAT track message: -
NAT-I/2 TRACKS FLS 310/370 INCLUSIVE AUGUST 14/1130 UTC TO AUGUST 14/1800 UTC PART
ONE OF TWO PARTS-
A 57/10 59/20 59/30 58/40 56/50 SCROD VALIE EAST LVLS 310 320, WEST LVLS 340 350 370 EUR RTS
WEST 2 NAR NA212 NA214 NA218-
B 56/10 58/20 58/30 57/40 55/50 OYSTR STEAM EAST LVLS NIL WEST LVLS 310 320 330 340 350 360
370 EUR RTS WEST 2 NAR NA202 NA204 NA206-
C 55/10 57/20 57/30 56/40 54/50 CARPE REDBY EAST LVLS NIL WEST LVLS 310 320 330 340 350 360
370 380 EUR RTS WEST 2 NAR NA186 NA190 NA194-
D MASIT 56/20 56/30 55/40 53/50 YAY EAST LVLS NIL WEST LVLS 310 320 330 340 350 360 370 EUR
RTS WEST 2 VIA DEVOL NAR NA168 NA170 NA174-
E 54/15 55/20 55/30 54/40 52/50 DOTTY EAST LVLS NIL WEST LVLS 310 320 330 340 350 360 370 380
EUR RTS WEST 2 VIA BURAK NAR NA144 NA150-
F 53/15 54/20 54/30 53/40 51/50 CYMON EAST LVLS NIL WEST LVLS 310 330 350 370 EUR RTS WEST
2 VIA DOLIP NAR NA122 NA128-
G 52/15 53/20 53/30 52/40 50/50 YQX EAST LVLS NIL WEST LVLS 310 330 350 370 EUR RTS WEST 2
VIA GIPER NAR NA100 NA108-
2. Check routeing In this case, Track D, The start point is MASIT via the points shown
ending at YAY. Sometimes the start points or end points are a set of
coordinates (Track G starts at 52N O15W).
3. Check levels Track D has all levels from 310 to 370 available with only 1000 feet
spacing instead of the normal 2000 feet (RVSM). Notice there are no
easterly tracks available on D. However there are on Track A.
4. Check onward routeings NAR NA168 NA170 NA174 means after reaching YAY, the end
point, the onward routeing to the USA should be via NA168
(NA=North American).
5. Check Remarks Contact frequencies, Notices etc AND most importantly the Track
Message Identification (TMI). When an oceanic clearance is received,
the clearance will be via Track D at FL340 say. To make sure the
track message at Prestwick and on-board the aircraft are the same the
Identification number is stated. In this case, 182A.
2.13 State the procedure to be adopted by flights crossing 30° W when eastbound between
0930 and 1029 UTC and eastbound at 1030 UTC or later (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Eastbound traffic crossing 30° W between 0930 UTC and 1029 UTC in MNPS airspace should file
random flight plans at Eastbound Flight Levels (290, 330, 370). Where the flight will conflict with
the daytime (Westbound) OTS, the route should backtrack the daytime structure from 30°W.
However such traffic may plan to backtrack the outer track of the daytime structure from any point.
Flights against the Peak Flow Westbound traffic crossing 30°W at 1030 UTC or later should plan to
avoid the OTS completely.
2.14 State the procedure to be adopted by flights crossing 30° W when westbound
between 2300 and 2359 UTC and westbound at 0000 UTC or later (NAT Doc, Ed.
8).
Westbound traffic crossing 30°W between 2300 UTC and 2359 UTC in MNPS airspace should file
random flight plans at Westbound Flight Levels (310, 350, 390). Where the flight will conflict with
the nighttime (Eastbound) OTS the route should backtrack the nighttime structure from 30°W.
However such traffic may plan to backtrack the outer track of the nighttime structure from any
point. Flights against the Peak Flow Eastbound traffic crossing 30°W at 0000 UTC or later should
plan to avoid the OTS completely.
2.15 State the possible limitations of selecting random routes across the OTS (NAT Doc,
Ed. 8).
Nothing prevents operators from flight planning across the OTS. However they should be aware
that whilst ATC will make every effort to clear random traffic across the OTS at published levels,
re-routes or changes in flight level are likely to be necessary during most of the OTS traffic periods.
2.16 Define the procedure regarding the selection of cruising levels for flights wholly or
partly outside the OTS (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Flights planning to operate wholly or partially outside the NAT Organised Track System (OTS)
should flight plan levels appropriate to the direction of flight (Semi-circular Rule) except that
during the westbound OTS westbound aircraft may flight plan FL 330 and during the eastbound
OTS eastbound aircraft may flight plan FL 350, i.e. against the normal flow.
2.17 Define the procedure regarding the selection of cruising levels for flights outside the
hours of validity of the OTS (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Outside the hours of validity of the OTS and the changeover periods, operators are encouraged to
flight plan a random route at flight levels appropriate to the direction of flight (Semi-circular Rule).
If, and only if, the flight is planned to operate along the whole length of one of the organised tracks
as detailed in the North Atlantic Track Message, the intended organised track should be defined in
Item 15 of the flight plan using the abbreviation 'NAT' followed by the code letter assigned to the
track.
Flights wishing to join or leave an organised track at some intermediate point are considered to be
random route aircraft and full route details must be specified in the flight plan. The track letter
should not be used to abbreviate any portion of the route in these circumstances.
2.19 Identify what indication should be inserted on the ATC flight plan to show that the
flight is certified as being in compliance with MNPS (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
For all flights intending to operate within NAT MNPS airspace for any portion of their flight the
letter X should be inserted after the letter S in Item 10 of the flight plan indicating that the flight is
certified as being in compliance with the MNPS.
2.20 Describe how cruising speed for turbojet aircraft should be entered in the ATC flight
plan (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
For turbojet aircraft the Mach number planned to be used for each portion of the flight in the NAT
Region should be specified in Item 15 of the flight plan. Item 15 of the flight plan should reflect the
proposed speeds in the following sequence: -
3.1 State the components of separation within MNPS airspace (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Longitudinal Navigation
Longitudinal separations between subsequent aircraft following the same track (in-trail) is
expressed in terms of the differences in ATA / ETA at common waypoints. The longitudinal
separation minima currently used in the NAT MNPS Airspace are thus expressed in clock minutes
(typically 10 minutes separation). The maintenance of in-trail separations is aided by the application
of the Mach Number Technique (i.e. all aircraft on the same track will fly the same Mach No. in
order to maintain constant separation. However if the ‘lead’ aircraft is flying faster than a trailing
aircraft, there is no problem, as the longitudinal separation will be increasing. Obviously a faster
aircraft trailing a slower one is not permitted. However, aircraft clock errors resulting in waypoint
ATA report errors can lead to an erosion of actual longitudinal separations between aircraft. It is
thus vitally important that the time-keeping device used to indicate waypoint-passing times is
accurate, and is synchronised to an acceptable UTC time signal before commencing flight in MNPS
Airspace.
For unrestricted operation in the MNPS Airspace an aircraft must be equipped with TWO fully
serviceable Long Range Navigation Systems (LRNS). A LRNS may be one of the following: -
Each LRNS must be capable of providing to the flight crew a continuous indication of the aircraft
position relative to desired track. It is highly desirable that the navigation system employed for the
provision of steering guidance is capable of being coupled to the autopilot.
A number of special routes (“Blue Spruce Routes”) have been developed for aircraft equipped with
only one LRNS* and / or carrying only short-range navigation equipment (VOR, DME, ADF).
Vertical
Vertical separation is achieved by allocating flight levels to aircraft that are 2,000 feet apart.
Reduced separation criteria allow a vertical separation of 1,000 feet (RVSM). The minimum
equipment standard for RVSM flight operations is: -
A functioning Mode-C SSR Transponder is also required for flight through radar controlled RVSM
transition airspace and also for TCAS / ACAS protection, when outside radar coverage.
When checking altimeters (pre-flight or in-flight), confirmation is necessary that all altitude
indications are within the tolerances specified in the aircraft-operating manual. At least two primary
altimeters must at all times agree within +/-200 feet.
3.2 State what minimum lateral separation is used in MNPS (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
For aircraft flying at the same Mach No, the longitudinal separation is TEN MINUTES. However, if
the preceding aircraft is flying faster than the following aircraft the separation is reduced to: -
3.4 State what minimum change in ETA at the Oceanic entry must be reported to ATC
(NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
After obtaining and reading back the clearance, the pilot should monitor the forward estimate for
oceanic entry and if this changes by 3 minutes or more should pass a revised estimate to ATC.
3.5 Describe an “ATC system loop” error (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
An ATC system loop error is any error caused by a misunderstanding between the pilot, and the
controller regarding the assigned flight level, Mach number or route to be followed. Errors of this
nature, which are detected by ATC from pilot position reports, will normally be corrected.
However, timely ATC intervention cannot always be guaranteed, especially as it may depend on HF
communications.
3.6 Describe the procedures for step climbs (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Prior to the introduction of RVSM in the NAT MNPS Airspace there were few opportunities for
subsequent step climb re-clearances. With the increased number of available flight levels in RVSM
airspace there is now greater scope for en-route tactical re-clearances that afford the possibility of
step-climbs. Controllers will accommodate requests for step-climbs whenever possible. It is
important that pilots always report to ATC immediately on reaching any new cruising level.
3.7 State the procedure for changes of Mach number (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Pilots must adhere strictly to their assigned Mach Numbers unless a specific re-clearance is
obtained from the appropriate ATC unit. However, as the aircraft weight reduces it may be more
fuel efficient to adjust the Mach number. Since longitudinal separation between individual aircraft
are based on the ETA passed to or calculated by ATC, it is essential that ATC approval is requested
prior to effecting any change in cruise Mach number. Such approval will be given if traffic
conditions permit.
3.8 List the possible options to be considered by the pilot when one navigation system
fails before entering MNPS airspace (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
• Landing at a suitable aerodrome before the OCA boundary or returning to the aerodrome of
departure.
• Diverting via one of the special routes described previously.
• Obtaining a re-clearance above or below MNPS Airspace.
3.9 Describe the procedures to be adopted by the pilot when one navigation system fails
after entering MNPS airspace (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Once the aircraft has entered oceanic airspace, the pilot should normally continue to operate the
aircraft in accordance with the Oceanic Clearance already received, appreciating that the reliability
of the total navigation system has been significantly reduced. The pilot should however consider the
following: -
• Assess the prevailing circumstances (e.g. performance of the remaining system, remaining
portion of the flight in MNPS Airspace, etc).
• Prepare a proposal to ATC with respect to the prevailing circumstances (e.g. request
clearance above or below MNPS Airspace, turn back, obtain clearance to fly along one of
the special routes, etc).
• Advise and consult with ATC as to the most suitable action.
• Obtain appropriate re-clearance prior to any deviation from the last acknowledged Oceanic
Clearance.
When the flight continues in accordance with its original clearance (especially if the distance ahead
within MNPS Airspace is significant), the pilot should begin a careful monitoring programme.
The navigation systems fitted to MNPS approved aircraft are generally very accurate and very
reliable and gross navigational errors in NAT MNPS Airspace are rare. Nevertheless, the risks that
such errors pose can be significant and crews must employ rigorous procedures to ensure early
detection of any possible errors and hence mitigation of the ensuing risk.
Normally, navigation installations include comparator and / or warning devices, but it is still
necessary for the crew to make frequent comparison checks. When an aircraft is fitted with three
independent systems, the identification of a defective system should be straightforward. With only
two systems on board, identifying the defective unit can be difficult. If such a situation does arise in
oceanic airspace any or all of the following actions should be considered: -
If such assistance is not available, and as a last resort, the flight plan wind speed and direction for
the current DR position of the aircraft, can be compared with that from navigation system outputs.
3.11 Describe the type of procedure recommended in order to minimise the effect of a
total in flight navigation computer system failure (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Occasions may still arise when distance or across track differences develop between systems, but
the crew cannot determine which system is at fault. The majority of operators feel that the
procedure most likely to limit gross tracking errors under such circumstances is to fly the aircraft
half way between the across track differences as long as the uncertainty exists. In such instances,
ATC should be advised that the flight is experiencing navigation difficulties so that appropriate
separation can be effected if necessary. As a generalization, if there is a difference greater than 15
nm between two aircraft navigation systems (or between the three systems if it is not possible to
detect which are the most reliable) it is advisable to split the difference between the readings when
determining the aircraft's position. However, if the disparity exceeds 25 nm one or more of the
navigation systems should be regarded as having failed, in which case ATC should be notified.
4.1 State the primary method of air/ground communication in MNPS airspace (NAT
Doc, Ed. 8).
Most NAT air / ground communications are conducted on single side-band HF frequencies.
4.2 Describe the arrangements for passing messages through aeradio stations on HF
and VHF (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Pilots communicate with OCA via ‘aeradio’ stations staffed by communicators who have no
executive ATC authority. Messages are relayed, from the ground station to the relevant OCA for
action. Aeradio stations and OCA are not necessarily co-located. For example in the case of
Shanwick operations, the OCA is located at Prestwick in Scotland whilst the associated aeradio
station is at Ballygirreen in the Republic of Ireland.
4.3 State where position reports should be made (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Unless otherwise requested by Air Traffic Control, position reports from flights, on routes which
are not defined by designated reporting points, should be made at the significant points listed in the
flight plan.
4.4 Identify the methods of describing position (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Position should be expressed in terms of latitude and longitude except when flying over named
reporting points. For flights whose tracks are predominantly east or west, latitude should be
expressed in degrees and minutes, longitude in degrees only. For flights whose tracks are
predominantly north or south, latitude should be expressed in degrees only, longitude in degrees and
minutes. All times should be expressed in four digits giving both the hour and the minutes UTC.
4.5 State when position reports should be copied to adjacent OCA. (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Position reports should be made by aircraft operating within an OCA at a distance of 60 nm or less
from the common boundary with an adjacent OCA, including aircraft operating on tracks through
successive points on each boundary. In practice this only requires an addition to the address by
using the word “COPY”. E.g. "Shanwick copy Gander".
From among the aircraft intending to operate on the organised track system, OAC designate those
which will be required to report routine meteorological observations at, and midway between, each
prescribed reporting point. The designation is made by the OAC when issuing the Oceanic
Clearance using the phrase "SEND MET REPORTS", and is normally made so as to designate one
aircraft per track at approximately hourly intervals.
4.7 Describe the correct use of SELCAL within MNPS airspace (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
When using HF communications, pilots should maintain a listening watch on the assigned
frequency, unless SELCAL is fitted, in which case they should ensure the following sequence of
actions: -
4.8 Specify the frequency to be used for VHF air-to-air communication (NAT Doc, Ed.
8).
The VHF frequency for air-to-air communication is 123.45. This is not a chat frequency between
crews, and it is designed for message relay purposes from one aircraft out of range of a ground VHF
station to another aircraft that can relay the message.
4.9 Specify which additional frequency should be guarded in MNPS airspace (NAT Doc,
Ed. 8).
All aircraft in NATS airspace must monitor the International VHF Emergency frequency of 121.5
MHz.
4.10 Describe the initial procedure to be adopted by the pilot in command in the event of
HF failure en-route when out of range of VHF ground stations (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Each ‘aeradio’ station continuously listens out on its appropriate family of NAT HF frequencies. In
the event of failure of HF communications every effort should be made by the pilot to relay position
reports through other aircraft. An air-to-air VHF frequency for the Region has been agreed. When
out of range of VHF ground stations on the same or adjacent frequencies, 123.45 MHz may be used
to relay position reports. If necessary, initial contact for such relays can be established on 121.5
MHz.
4.12 Specify the agreed frequency for the relay of position reports.
123.45 MHz.
4.13 Specify what action should be adopted when communications failure occurs before
entry into MNPS airspace (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Due to the potential length of time in oceanic airspace, it is strongly recommended that a pilot
experiencing communications failure whilst still in domestic airspace does not enter the OCA but
adopts the procedure specified in the appropriate domestic AIP and lands at a suitable airport.
However, if the pilot elects to continue, then, to allow ATC to provide adequate separation, one of
the following procedures should be followed: -
• If operating with a received and acknowledged Oceanic Clearance, the pilot must enter
oceanic airspace at the cleared oceanic entry point, level and speed and proceed in
accordance with the received and acknowledged Oceanic Clearance.
• If operating without a received and acknowledged Oceanic Clearance, the pilot must enter
oceanic airspace at the first oceanic entry point, level and speed contained in the filed flight
plan and proceed via the filed flight plan route to landfall.
4.14 Specify what action should be adopted when communications failure occurs within
NAT MNPS airspace (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
If cleared on the filed flight plan route, the pilot must proceed in accordance with the last received
and acknowledged Oceanic Clearance, including level and speed, to the last specified oceanic route
point (normally landfall) then continue on the filed flight plan route.
If cleared on other than the filed flight plan route, the pilot must proceed in accordance with the last
received and acknowledged Oceanic Clearance, including level and speed, to the last specified
oceanic route point (normally landfall).
After passing the last specified oceanic route point, the flight should conform to the relevant State
procedures / regulations.
4.15 Identify what SSR transponder code is used and when this code is to be set on after
initial entry into NAT Oceanic airspace (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Set 2000 with mode C, unless otherwise directed by ATC. This should be set 30 minutes after entry
into NAT airspace. Until that time, the code given in domestic airspace is used.
5.1 Describe the initial actions for in-flight contingencies [ NORTH ATLANTIC MNPSA
OPS MANUAL: ED. 2008.]
The general concept of these Oceanic in-flight contingency procedures is, whenever operationally
feasible, to offset from the assigned route by 15 NM and climb or descend to a level which differs
from those normally used by 500 ft if below FL410 or by 1000ft if above FL410.
The aircraft should leave its assigned route or track by initially turning 45° to the right or left
whenever this is feasible. The direction of the turn should, where possible, be determined by the
position of the aircraft relative to any organised route or track system (e.g. whether the aircraft is
outside, at the edge of, or within the system).Other factors which may affect the direction of the turn
are: direction to an alternate airport, terrain clearance, levels allocated on adjacent routes or tracks
and any known off sets adopted by other nearby traffic.
5.2 Describe the subsequent actions for in-flight contingencies (NA OPS MAN Ed.
2008).
An aircraft that is able to maintain its assigned flight level, after deviating 10 NM (while continuing
toward an eventual off-set of 15 NM ) from its original cleared track centreline and therefore clear
of any potentially conflicting traffic above or below following the same track, should: -
• Climb or descend 1,000feet if above FL410.
• Climb or descend 500 feet when below FL410.
• Climb 1,000 feet or descend 500 feet if at FL410.
An aircraft that is unable to maintain its assigned flight level should, whenever possible, minimise
its rate of descent when leaving its original track centreline and then expedite descent to a feasible
flight level which differs from those normally used: by 500 feet if below FL410 or by 1000 feet if
above FL410.
5.3 Describe the action to be adopted in the event of en-route diversion across the
prevailing NAT traffic flow (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Before commencing any diversion across the flow of adjacent traffic, aircraft should, whilst
maintaining the 15 nm offset track, expedite climb above or descent below the vast majority of
NAT traffic (i.e. to a level above FL410 or below FL285), and then maintain a flight level which
differs from those normally used: by 1,000 feet if above FL410, or by 500 feet if below FL410.
However, if the pilot is unable or unwilling to carry out a major climb or descent, then any
diversion should be carried out at a level 500 feet different from those in use within MNPS
Airspace, until a new ATC clearance is obtained. If these contingency procedures are employed by
a twin engine aircraft as a result of the shutdown of a power unit or the failure of a primary aircraft
system, the pilot should advise ATC as soon as practicable of the situation, reminding ATC of the
type of aircraft involved and requesting expeditious handling. Of course, airmanship is important
under these circumstances, crews should: -
• Keep a good lookout.
• Display all available lighting.
• Transmit position on 121.5 and 123.45.
6.1 Explain why magnetic compasses become unreliable or useless in polar zones.
The magnetic field is divided into two components, the horizontal and the vertical. Beyond 70º N
the strength of the vertical field increases and the strength of the horizontal field decreases rapidly.
In the Polar Regions there is little horizontal field for the compass system to use. The CAA
considers a horizontal magnetic field strength of less than 6 microteslas insufficient to be used by a
detector unit.
6.2 State in which area VOR are referenced to true north (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
Compass unreliability - As discussed earlier there is very little horizontal magnetic flux and the
vertical flux causing dip is very strong. Gyro magnetic compasses work in direct gyro mode but
require updating due to real and apparent wander.
Large values of variation - Variation can be as much as 180° if you are on the line between true
north and magnetic north. The problem is not so much high variation values as these can be catered
for; it is the rate of change of variation.
Lack of short range ground based navigation aids - Land based navigation aids need positioning and
maintaining, clearly this is impossible in the hostile polar environment. The area lacks short-range
navigation aids, relying on long-range aids, INS and GPS.
Limited communications - It is natural for air traffic control centres to be located in areas of
habitation, VHF communication has a line of sight range limited to about 300 miles which means
aircraft over the polar regions are out of VHF range and limited to HF
Lack of adequate en-route alternate airfields - Polar regions are sparsely populated and equipped
with a limited number of airfields having adequate facilities for commercial transport aeroplanes,
Landing in the polar area is possible only with specialist equipment and ground support.
High rates of gyro earth rate correction - When using DG mode to give a heading reference the
wander is compensated for at a rate of 15.04 x Sine of the latitude / hour. At the pole the latitude is
90°, Sine 90° is 1 and therefore the gyro drifts at 15.05°/ hour giving the highest rate of gyro
correction.
6.4 Describe how grid navigation on a Polar Stereographic chart can be used in
conjunction with a Directional Gyro (DG) in polar areas to solve polar navigation
problems.
To navigate in the Polar Regions using a directional gyro only the instrument, in theory, would have
to be corrected for earth rate (apparent wander) and transportation wander both of which would be
large values as already described above. Even if the gyro could be compensated for and remained
referenced to true north, it would be of limited use to the pilot for the following reason: -
Note that the gyro still needs to be corrected for ‘earth rate’ but there is no longer any
transportation wander, as the ‘grid meridians’ are now parallel lines.
In the example above, ‘grid north’ is aligned with ‘true north’ at 80E. The ‘grid’ convergence at
80E is zero and will increase E and W when not positioned on the 80E meridian. The ‘grid track’ at
A, B and C is about 040°, i.e. a constant. This is now much easier to fly using a gyro with ‘earth
rate’ compensation only.
Assuming the free gyro was set accurately it will suffer real wander, transport wander and apparent
wander. Real wander can only be minimised by the quality of manufacture of the gyro instrument,
however real and transport wander can be compensated for.
If a pilot uses a ‘free gyro’ to follow a given course then it will suffer from apparent wander and the
pilot will follow a ‘curved course’ that changes by (15.04 x Sine latitude) degrees every hour. This
apparent wander is at a minimum at the equator (Sine of 0º = 0) and a maximum at the poles (Sine
90º = 1). For example, in the northern hemisphere, if the pilot were using a free gyro orientated to
true north in order to fly a heading of say 040º at latitude 30ºN, after one hour the gyro would have
‘shifted’ orientation by 15 x Sine 30º = 7.5º, which means that it now points to 007.5º and the pilot
would be progressively flying a curved course to the right if he maintains 040º as indicted on the
gyro.
This problem is further compounded by ‘transportation wander’ caused by the fact that as the
aircraft flies around the globe it will cross meridians that are NOT PARALLEL to each other.
Therefore the orientation of the gyro with respect to one meridian is not the same at any other
(except at the equator). The nature of the shift is again a function of the latitude. The transport
wander is expressed as: -
This again gives a zero value at the equator (Sine of 0º = 0) and a maximum value at the poles (Sine
90º = 1). The direction of the wander depends on whether the aircraft flies east or west as described
later. For a typical jet aircraft travelling at 500 knots groundspeed, the ‘change of longitude’
referred to above, is going to be significantly greater at the poles where the meridians are closer
together than in temperate climates.
6.6 Describe the effect of using a gyrocompass with hourly rate corrector unit to follow
a given course.
A gyrocompass can be corrected for apparent (earth rate) by using a weight, called a latitude nut
that precesses the gyro at (15 x Sine latitude) degrees per hour in the opposite direction to the
apparent wander due to the rotation of the earth. So now if the gyro is orientated to true north and
the pilot elects to fly a heading based upon the gyro reference then the aircraft will fly in a straight
line. However, the course flown is only ‘straight’ with respect to the meridian on which the gyro
was orientated to true north, therefore transportation wander still needs to be factored into the
calculations. However, at low latitudes and for relatively short journeys the use of the latitude
correction weight provides sufficient accuracy.
This objective is covered in detail in the navigation syllabus and best demonstrated by some
examples-
“What will the true, magnetic and compass headings when flying a grid heading of 040° if the
deviation is 7E, the variation 113W and the grid convergence 45E?”
1. Write out the table below and fill in the known data: -
Use the mnemonic “Cadbury’s Dairy Milk, Very Tasty Creamy & Good”
2. Next, calculate the unknown data by ‘adding east / subtracting west’ in the direction Compass to
True and vice versa the other way arriving at: -
The answers are easily extracted. This method is suitable for all types of this calculation.
Sometimes the values of grid convergence and variation are combined into ‘Grivation’. This is not a
problem, simple redraw the table as follows: -
Question
An aircraft navigates a great circle route from point ‘A’ (78ºN 056ºW) to point ‘B’ (78ºN 042ºE)
using a polar stereographic chart. The chart is overlaid with a grid orientated to the 20ºE meridian.
What are the true and grid track of the aircraft at point ‘A’ and the great circle distance A to B?
Solution
The first thing to do is draw a circle representing the 78ºN latitude, nominate the Greenwich 0º
meridian (line OG) and plot the two points A and B with the great circle track AB (a straight line)
between them. Secondly overlay the grid north references and calculate the angles using triangle
and compound angle technique as shown below: -
Finding the grid track from involves overlaying the grid north lines shown dotted. As the grid is
orientated to the 20ºE meridian then ^GOQ is 20º. As the grid is the same all over the chart then
^PAX (1) is also 20º. From the compound angle technique ^XAO is the same ^AOG which we all
ready know to be 56º (2). Finally, the angle ^BAO has just been calculated as 041º (3). Therefore,
the grid track from A to B is the sum of (1), (2) and (3) which is 20º + 56º + 41º = 118º.
The great circle distance A to B is solved using the trigonometry formula below: -
a2 = b2 + c2 – 2bc cosine A
6.8 Define and calculate transport wander and earth rate (astronomic) wander.
Again this subject is covered in greater detail in the navigation syllabus, however as a brief
overview, the total wander of a gyro is made up of the following: -
• Real Wander (Drift & Topple) - depends on the quality of the gyro, modern gyros drift very
little and laser ring gyros hardly wander at all.
• Apparent Wander (Drift & Topple) - due to the Earth’s rotation (Earth Rate) and Transport
Wander, which is an apparent wander depending upon the speed / displacement an aeroplane
in the east / west direction.
6.9 Describe the use of INS information to solve polar navigation problems.
The INS or (IRS) can be used to solve polar navigation problems as it does not use the earth’s
magnetic flux as a reference. The IRS controller shown below is fitted to the Boeing 737; the
selector can be rotated to give a variety of navigation information in the two windows. The system
is integrated into the autopilot that can fly the required track. The IRS should be used every 15
minutes to plot the aircraft’s position on the chart.
6.10 Describe what precautions can be taken when operating in the area of compass
unreliability as a contingency against INS failure.
A characteristic of the navigation computer system is that the computer element might fail, and thus
deprive the aircraft of steering guidance and an indication of position relative to cleared track, but
the basic outputs of the IRS (LAT/LONG, Drift and Groundspeed) are left unimpaired. A typical
drill to minimise the effects of a total navigation computer system failure is suggested below. It
requires the carriage of a suitable plotting chart.
• Draw the cleared route on a chart and extract mean true tracks between waypoints.
• Use the basic IRS outputs to adjust heading to maintain mean track and to calculate ETAs.
• Plot position at 15 minutes intervals on the chart and adjust heading to regain track.
A Polar Track Structure (PTS) has been established, consisting of 10 fixed tracks in Reykjavik CTA
and 5 fixed tracks through Bodo OCA. Although NOT mandatory, operators proposing to fly on the
Europe-Alaska axis from FL310 to FL390 inclusive are recommended to submit flight plans in
accordance with one of the promulgated PTS tracks.
7.1 Describe how the desired route must be specified in the air traffic control flight plan,
when the aircraft is planned to operate along the whole length of the PTS track or
when joining or leaving a PTS track at some intermediate point (NAT Doc, Ed. 8).
If, and only if, the flight is planned to operate along the whole length of one of the Polar tracks, the
intended track should be defined in Item 15 of the flight plan using the abbreviation 'PTS' followed
by the track code. Flights wishing to join or leave a polar track at some intermediate point are
considered to be following a random route and full track details must be specified in the flight plan.
The track code must not be used to abbreviate any portion of the route in these circumstances. Note
there are NO RVSM levels used in the polar track structure. Estimated times over significant points
must be specified in Item 18 of the flight plan. Each point at which a Mach number or flight level
change is planned must be specified as geographical co-ordinates in latitude and longitude followed
in each case by the abbreviation 'PTS' and the track code.
1 Fuel Jettisoning
Fuel jettisoning can be dangerous for both the jettisoning aircraft, following aircraft and the
environment so certain rules do apply. Jettisoning should be considered an emergency procedure
and only carried out when there is an urgent requirement to reduce weight to enable the aircraft to
perform correctly and eventually land safely.
• The fuel jettisoning system must be capable of jettisoning the required amount of fuel to
meet the aircraft performance requirements within 15 MINUTES
• The fuel jettisoning system and operation are free from fire hazard
• The jettisoning operation does not adversely affect the controllability of the aircraft.
Air Traffic Control must be informed of your intentions to enable either the jettisoning aircraft to be
vectored away from following traffic or following traffic to be vectored away from the jettisoning
aircraft. Jet engines prefer air down their intakes and not fuel.
A fuel jettisoning system must not be allowed to jettison all the fuel if the system is left on
inadvertently. It must be designed so that at least some fuel is left in the tanks. There could be no
conceivable requirement to jettison fuel on the ground so the system should be automatically
deactivated using squat switches on the undercarriage.
“Nothing shall be dropped or sprayed from an aircraft in flight except under conditions prescribed
by the appropriate authority and as indicated by relevant information, advice and / or clearance from
the appropriate air traffic services unit.”
This means that nothing can be jettisoned or sprayed from an aircraft unless the aircraft has
clearance and approval from air traffic control. This does not necessarily include a commander’s
decision to jettison fuel to save his aircraft.
Fuel when jettisoned spreads in a form of fine droplets and vapour, making it very volatile and
easily ignited. The safety considerations when jettisoning fuel are as follows: -
• Drills - The jettison must be in accordance with the drills appropriate to the particular
aircraft.
• Smoking - Smoking in the aircraft should be stopped and the no smoking signs illuminated.
• HF Radio - The HF radio uses a lot of energy, large amounts of current pass through the HF
wire, there is a possibility that HF transmissions could ignite the fuel being jettisoned.
• Electrics – Like turning on or off light switches with a domestic gas leak, unnecessary use of
switches could cause problems. This is not particularly likely as the inside of the aircraft is
more likely to be under positive pressure compared to external atmospheric pressure
ensuring no fuel fumes can enter the aircraft.
• Flight Pattern – It may sound simple but if fuel is jettisoned in a hold the aircraft could fly
through the vapour / fuel the next time around. Fuel vapour down the intake of an engine in
place of air will have startling results. Fuel jettisoned in an airway may give an unpleasant
surprise to a following aircraft.
• High lift devices – The process of jettisoning fuel is likely to be certificated with the wing
clean. High lift devices have a significant effect on the airflow pattern and attitude of the
aircraft. The jettison outflow is likely to be from a wing and the use of high lift devices
could cause unexpected problems.
• Weather conditions – Lightning could clearly ignite the fuel and there are certain weather
conditions that lead to a large build up of static electricity. Called ‘St Elmo’s Fire’, this large
build up of static electricity again could ignite jettisoning fuel.
The reason for jettisoning fuel is to reduce aircraft weight, following an on-board emergency, in
order to land. If the Commander has decided that an overweight landing is not required but the
aircraft cannot continue on to its destination, landing weight will have to be achieved as soon as
possible. The steps to consider are as follows: -
• Air Traffic Control – ATC must be informed so that the aircraft can be directed away from
other aircraft to a safe area to jettison fuel. This is likely to be away from protected airspace
so air traffic assistance is required to provide a radar service to provide a proper level of
collision protection.
• Altitude and Area – If fuel is jettisoned at sufficient altitude (typically 6,000 feet but as low
as 4,000 feet in the summer) most if not all the fuel becomes vapour prior to reaching the
earth’s surface. If possible, the area selected for fuel jettison should be away from major
habitation, for example, over the sea.
• Drill Cards - The process is started and stopped using drill cards. However, this does not
cater for just how much fuel is jettisoned. The crew determines the quantity of fuel
jettisoned, as it would be potentially disastrous if, whilst distracted, more fuel were
jettisoned than intended. In practice the fuel is jettisoned down to a predetermined level, it is
the responsibility of the crew not to get distracted and take great care in monitoring the fuel
levels as fuel is jettisoned.
2.1 Identify the atmospheric conditions resulting in ice, snow, slush or frost formation on
aircraft surfaces whilst on the ground.
This subject is covered in depth in Meteorology; however, a basic understanding of the atmospheric
conditions that lead to the formation ice etc on the ground is required.
Ice – Pure ice can form on the aircraft if water impinges the airframe that is supercooled. The term
‘supercooled’ means that the water is below freezing (0°C) and still in a liquid state. When it
impinges the aircraft the water freezes and forms Ice. Several atmospheric conditions can lead to
this, freezing rain being the most severe form. Clear Ice forms in the temperature range 0ºC to –
10ºC whilst Rime Ice forms in the temperature range 0ºC to –40ºC.
If rain falls from a warm front cloud above 0°C it is possible for the rain to fall into an area below
0°C where it becomes supercooled and causes severe ice problems (Clear Ice). The rate of accretion
is very high, the ice is hard and strong and potentially very dangerous to aircraft. If fog has formed
and the temperature is below 0°C and a gentle breeze passes over the aircraft, then again ice can
form on the airframe (Rime Ice). This requires a cold night, moisture and a slack pressure gradient.
Snow – Snow in atmospheric terms is precipitation in an ice crystal state. The conditions that lead
to rain clouds can lead to snow if the temperatures are low enough. It is possible to have snow
falling with the surface temperature above 0°C.
Slush – Slush is a term used to describe a mix of ice and water. Slush will occur from prolonged
sleet, which is precipitation falling as a mix of ice and water or melting snow. The greater problem
is snow melting forming pools of water, which drains badly due to the build-up of ice. Sleet forms
where the temperature is near 0°C and slush forms during the melting process when the temperature
is above freezing.
Frost – Frost can form on an aircraft in exactly the same way it does on a car. The air in contact
with the aircraft is cooled to below 0°C, water condenses or sublimates and frost is formed. Frost
though thin and light is very granular and can easily cause significant problems with visibility from
the flight deck, if not cleared prior to take-off. Most large aeroplanes are fitted with heated
windscreens.
In simple terms de-icing is the removing of ice from the airframe after it has formed. Anti-icing is
the prevention of ice forming in the first place. When an aircraft is airborne the demarcation
between de-ice and anti-ice can get blurred. For example a propeller anti-icing system will cycle
between blades allowing a small amount of ice to form on each blade prior to the heating element
getting its turn of the current. The propeller blade is being de-iced as well as the system being an ice
prevention system (anti ice). The system is in fact anti-ice; indeed nearly all aircraft systems are
anti-ice with de-icing occurring mostly on the ground.
Whilst the aircraft is doing nothing ice formation is not a problem. However, ice must be removed
from the aircraft prior to flight, whilst still on the ground (more on this later). Other problem areas
are as follows: -
The engines can be damaged significantly by ice ingestion. The ice can be ingested from the ground
or where previously formed in the intake. Damage from ice on the ground is minimised by airport
clearing operations, whilst damage from ice in the intake is avoided by using the anti–icing devices
fitted to the engine.
The range of temperatures that can cause engine icing on the ground is different to the airframe. The
intake accelerates the air towards the first stage compressor, which reduces the pressure and
temperature of the air. This temperature reduction can be as much as 10°C. If the air is moist, damp
or raining in the temperature range less than +10°C, then engine icing is possible and the anti-icing
devices should be ON to provide protection.
Every aircraft is different in the level of icing it can sustain in the air, therefore knowledge of the
aircraft’s icing limitations is essential. All aircraft should take off fully de-iced, however once
airborne, airframe anti-ice problems are dependant on the severity of the icing.
In light and moderate airframe icing, the anti-ice systems cope easily and ice is removed as soon as
it forms. However, if the ice is severe and the protection systems cannot remove the ice quicker
than it forms, ice will build up and despite the anti-icing systems the aircraft will have to vacate that
environment. It is recommended that hot air wing anti-icing systems be cycled at of two minutes
intervals.
There is very little difference to the engine once it has started, whether in the air or on the ground.
The major consideration is the amount of bleed air used and engine power. Most airliners will use
engine bleed air for anti-icing purposes in addition to that already being used for air conditioning
and pressurisation.
In the descent with the throttles at idle there may not be enough hot bleed air for effective anti-icing
and a minimum power may be required to maintain air pressure for anti-icing. This increase in
power, together with the igniters being continuously energised (‘clicking’), is usually automatic
whenever the engine anti-icing is selected on.
In turbine engine aircraft, engine power can be measured by ‘Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR)’. EPR is
the ratio of POUT / PIN. If the intake EPR probe (PIN) becomes blocked then the EPR gauge can over
read! This was the cause of the fatal air crash into the Potomac River, Washington where the pilot
neglected to turn on the engine anti-icing system prior to take-off in freezing conditions.
In piston engine aircraft, carburettor icing can occur at surprisingly high outside air temperatures
and carburettor heating should be used especially in the descent.
2.4 State the operator’s responsibility with regard to ground and flight icing.
An operator shall establish procedures to be followed when ground de-icing and anti-icing and
related inspections of the aeroplanes are necessary, and shall not operate an aeroplane in expected
or known icing conditions, unless the aeroplane is certificated and equipped to operate in such
conditions.
An operator shall not operate an aeroplane in expected or actual icing conditions at night unless it is
equipped with a means to illuminate or detect the formation of ice. Any illumination that is used
must be of the type that will not cause glare or reflection that would handicap a crewmember.
2.5 State the commander’s responsibility with regard to ground and flight icing.
The commander shall not commence take-off unless the external surfaces are clear of any deposit
that might adversely affect the performance and / or controllability of the aeroplane except as
allowed in the Aircraft Operating Manual or Aeroplane Flight Manual.
A commander shall not commence a flight in known or expected icing conditions unless the
aeroplane is certificated and equipped to cope with such conditions.
2.6 State where information on De-icing and Anti-icing procedures must be located.
The Operations Manual must contain specific details of de-icing and anti-icing procedures.
There are a variety of de-icing / anti-icing measures, the general methods available as follows: -
• Fluids – Fluid is the most common method as it can both de-ice and anti-ice. As will be
discussed later there are a variety of fluids of differing strengths to give different protection
and holdover times. With most fluids it is the temperature that de-ices and the fluid’s glycol
content that anti-ices.
• Taxi Through – This is the up-market side of de-icing in that the aircraft taxis through an
area where the de-icing and anti-icing fluids are applied from specially constructed rigs
located near to the departure runway. This method reduces holdover time (discussed later) to
a minimum and is suitable for severe icing. The system is environmentally friendly as the
glycol fluids are recovered and recycled. Pilots must turn off the engine / APU air bleeds
that supply the air conditioning packs as burnt anti icing fluid is noxious if it enters the
aircraft air system.
2.8 Define and describe the different stages of a De-icing / Anti-icing procedure.
De-icing – This is a procedure by which ice, snow or frost is removed from the aircraft by applying
hot water or a mixture of hot water and anti-icing fluid (glycol). The fluid is applied as close as
possible to the surface to minimise heat loss and simply melts any frozen deposits, whilst the
‘glycol’ reduces the freezing point of the melting residues to below the ambient temperature, which
prevents re-freezing. The hydraulic force of the fluid spray assists in flushing off the residues from
the surface of the aircraft.
Anti-icing – This procedure consists of the application of an anti-icing fluid or a mixture of anti-
icing fluid and water at ambient temperature to the aircraft to protect against the accumulation and
adhesion of ice, snow or frost to aircraft surfaces before icing takes place. This protection only lasts
for a limited period (holdover time). For effective anti-icing an even film of undiluted ‘anti-icing’
fluid is applied to prescribed surfaces, lowering the freezing point of any deposits, effectively
melting them.
One-Step De-icing – This is the application of a HOT mixture proportionate to the ambient
temperature to remove minor accumulations of precipitation or frost, leaving a coating of fluid to
provide holdover protection. This method is applicable only if very minor accumulation has
occurred and when the expected take-off time is soon after the de-icing process. One-step de-icing
is not advisable under conditions of heavy precipitation.
Two-Step De-icing – This is the application of HOT water or a diluted mixture to remove the
accumulation of contaminant (de-icing), followed immediately (within three minutes) by an
application of an undiluted or strong mixture of anti-icing fluid at AMBIENT temperature
proportionate to the ambient temperature and type of precipitation present (anti-icing).
The effective protection time (known as the holdover time) is measured from when the second stage
or anti-icing fluid (Step 2) is first applied.
The exact procedure to follow will be defined in the Operations Manual for each particular operator.
However, the general principles followed by operators are to impose procedures as follows: -
If 15 minutes have elapsed since de-ice / anti-ice then a visual check should be carried out to check
that the wing surfaces are still clear. If any doubt exists return to the stand to be de-iced / anti-iced
again. If the laid down holdover time for the fluid used and weather experienced is exceeded again
the safe option is to return to the stand to repeat the procedure. Ultimate responsibility rests with the
commander who is not allowed to exceed holdover times and commence a take-off. As already
stated “If there is any doubt then there is NO doubt – return to stand”.
All currently available de-icing fluids are categorised worldwide according to a type classification
as follows: -
• Type I – Unthickened fluids, intended for de-icing use. These fluids can be used undiluted
or mixed with water (aqueous solutions), applied heated or cold. Type I fluids have a very
limited ability to prevent additional freezing and holdover times with them are short.
Type I, II or IV fluid can be used for de-icing. Type II and IV is the most commonly used fluid in
Europe and is the preferred type due to its considerably greater holdover times.
It is usually applied in aqueous solution, with the mixture ratio stated as the glycol content first,
then the percentage of water. The mixing proportion between the fluid and water is strictly a
function of the ambient weather conditions. For Type II fluid application the ratios are normally
limited to 100/0, 75/25, 60/40 and 50/50, with each ratio being applicable to a range of
temperatures. The table illustrated below details the correct ratio for each range of ambient
temperatures. Heating greatly increases the effectiveness of any fluid when used for de-icing. All
fluids have been formulated to withstand normal heating temperatures of 71°C - 82°C.
The aircraft must be free from anti-icing fluid as it accelerates to take-off speed. It is desirable that
the wings are aerodynamically clean. There is little point stopping ice from affecting the
performance of a wing if the fluid used to de-ice / anti-ice affects the performance of the wing in the
same way.
The table below is an example of an operator’s holdover table. Any table provided in the exam may
be of a different format. For example, The OAT is minus 7°C and it is snowing steadily.
What is the holdover time using 75 / 25 Type II fluid?
* 1.5 50 m 45 m
ZERO TO 1
-7 * 45 m 30 m 20 m 15 m
* 20 m 10 m 5m 3m
* 8 5 4
-8 to
* 1.5 1 50 m
-10
* 45 m 30 m 20 m
* 8 5
-11 to
* 1.5 1
-14
* 45 m 30 m
* 8
-15 to
* 1.5
-25
* 45 m
Interpretation of the table above, shown in bold, gives the answer of One Hour.
Fluid Type and Mix - Using a weaker mix of a Type II / IV fluid will reduce holdover times.
Contaminant - A study of the table above illustrates that the lower the temperature and the severity
of the contaminant combine together to reduce the holdover time.
Wind - Wind increases the water impingement, increasing the level of icing and in addition the
airflow blows the glycol anti-icing off the aircraft. These two aspects could lead to a situation where
an aircraft attempts to take-off within the holdover time but without adequate ice protection. The
fluids are in fact designed to blow off the aircraft as it accelerates to take-off speed and therefore
will also blow off in strong winds.
Jet Wash - When positioned at a runway holding area with a number of other aircraft, the jet wash
from an engine even at idle will remove the glycol protection from an aircraft sat behind it. It is
wise not to get to close the aircraft in front especially if holdover times are critical.
3.1 List the sources of information on bird strike hazards (Annex 14 Chapter 9).
ICAO has set up a Bird Strike Information System (IBIS), designed to collect and disseminate
information on bird strikes to aircraft. Information on the system is contained in the IBIS Manual.
Aeronautical charts will illustrate areas of bird concentration where the risks are considered
significant enough to include on the aeronautical chart. Bird sanctuaries have been established with
published avoidance criteria, the sanctuary may well be seasonal depending on breeding seasons.
Appropriate ATS will warn of bird concentrations by a message on ATIS or a specific caution to
departing and arriving aircraft. “NOTAMs” are occasionally issued in areas or aerodromes where
significant bird strike risk exists. Finally, aircraft taking off or landing ahead may also report bird
activity which could assist flight crews.
3.2 State the commander’s responsibilities regarding the reporting of bird hazards and
strikes.
When a bird strike has been established it is the commanders responsibility to report the occurrence.
The commander may report the incident to the appropriate ATS unit but must complete and action
the Bird Strike Occurrence form on completion of the flight.
Classification
It is difficult to establish whether a particular species of bird is a hazard to aircraft. In general terms
species inhabiting open landscape are a greater hazard to aviation than those living in woodland
areas. Any bird, even a small one has the potential to damage an aeroplane. The larger the bird the
greater the damage is expected from a single strike. There is also a greater likelihood of a strike if
there is a large number of birds of the same species (migrating flocks etc). Birds that fly at high
altitudes are still a threat since their point of arrival or departure may be near an airport site. In
summary, the birds that pose the greatest threat are large birds and flocking birds, the latter being
the greatest threat.
The greatest risk of damage due to bird strike occurs below 1,500 feet during take-off and landing
and at slow manoeuvre speeds.
In a larger proportion of bird strike reports there is usually no mention of the species. If a strike has
occurred the birds are usually categorised as follows: -
• Small (sparrow).
• Medium (gull).
• Large (goose).
Birds occur on airport sites for a variety of reasons, however, they are usually attracted by the
essentials of life such as: -
• Food.
• Water.
• Shelter.
• Mates.
Food – It is difficult to remove food sources, grass is the common vegetation on airports. Mowing
or haymaking may attract birds because of the disturbance of the soil. Birds are attracted to airport
land to feed on mice, moles, earthworms, insects and spiders. Chemicals may be used, within the
national environment laws to control the amount of foods available to the birds.
Agriculture – Airport land is sometime leased for agriculture. However, at some stage in the life
cycle of the crop, birds will be attracted to it. Cultivation will always attract birds.
Refuse Dumps – Dumps provide a rich source of food unless they consist of building waste only.
There is legislation in place to prevent new dumps being sited close to airports with a recommended
minimum distance of 13 Km from airport property. Very few scaring methods will keep birds away
from dumps, the only reliable method being wire or bird proof netting.
Water – Surface water attracts ducks etc. Ponds and lagoons on airport property should be avoided
or covered with netting etc. Drainage ditches clog up with vegetation providing a habitat for insects
etc, which in turn attract the birds.
Shelter – Birds will seek shelter on high vantage points on airport property giving a clear view of
their surroundings.
Vegetation – Trees provide food, shelter and nesting. Trees should be cut back to 150 metres from
the runway and taxiway centreline.
Ground Cover – The height of the grass determines what species of bird will use it for cover. Most
birds dangerous to aircraft prefer short grass where they can see an approaching danger and where
feeding is easier. Allowing the grass to grow to over 20cm or more will discourage feeding birds.
Dispersal Methods
Continual harassment of birds has been found to reduce the population. Scare tactics include
pyrotechnics, gas cannons, light and sound, chemicals, trapping and falconry.
• Gas Cannons.
• Pyrotechnics.
• Distress Calls.
• Alarm Calls.
• Calls of Predators.
• Scarecrows.
• Flags and Streamers
• Lights
• Predator Models
• Hawk Kites
• Gull Models
Generally, visual deterrents are regarded as less effective than auditory deterrents on their own.
They should be combined with sound for maximum effectiveness.
Birds will first detect an aircraft by sight. This then will be supported by sound and vibration. An
aeroplane is viewed as a predator and the bird will invariably ‘break’ down in front of the aeroplane
towards the nearest cover immediately. A pilot can anticipate and expect this reaction. If a bird is
relatively high to the aircraft, it will still ‘break’ down the pilot should not attempt to ‘duck under’
because the bird will follow.
An operator shall establish procedures for noise abatement during instrument flight operations in
compliance with ICAO regulations. Take-off climb procedures for noise abatement specified by an
operator for any particular aeroplane type should be the same for all aerodromes.
Runways should not normally be selected for preferential use unless they are equipped with suitable
glide path guidance, e.g. ILS or visual approach slope indicator system for operations in VMC
conditions.
4.3 State the runway conditions that preclude the use of a noise preferential runway.
The conditions that preclude the use of a noise preferential runway are as follows: -
4.4 State the minimum height for turns and obstacle clearance on noise preferential
routes.
Departure
There are two noise abatement procedures identified as ‘NADP1’ and ‘NADP2’. One of these two
procedures should be applied routinely for all take-offs. Procedure 1 results in noise relief close to
the aerodrome, whereas procedure 2 provides relief distant from the aerodrome.
3,000 feet
Flap retraction
and acceleration
Speed maintained at
V2+10 – V2+20
800 feet
Reduce Thrust
Take-Off Thrust
V2+10 min
Runway
Note that take-off power is reduced at 800 feet but the flaps are not retracted until 3,000 feet.
Therefore the aircraft climbs at a high rate and angle, but slow forward speed (V2 +10 to V2 + 20)
minimising the noise in the vicinity of the airfield. At 3000 ft. it transitions to normal en-route
climb speed.
Procedure 2
This procedure is used to reduce noise levels distant from the airfield.
3,000 feet
Flap retraction
and acceleration
800 feet
Reduce Thrust
Take-Off Thrust
V2+10 min
Runway
Note that power reduction again takes place at 800 feet. However, the aircraft now accelerates and
retracts flaps maintaining a positive rate of climb and minimum clean speed to 3000 ft. then
transitions to normal en-route climb speed.
• The initial climb-out speed is V2 + 10 to 20 knots or that prescribed in the aeroplane flight
manual or aircraft operating manual.
• Observance of the minimum steady climb out speed shall not be required if this causes the
maximum acceptable body angle (pitch attitude) to be exceeded.
o The aeroplane has reached a height of at least 800 feet above the aerodrome
elevation.
o A standard power setting is used which is sufficient for the aeroplane to maintain, at
the maximum certificated take-off mass, a steady gradient of climb not less than 4%
at the speed specified above.
o The take-off flight path, with all engines operating and after making due allowance
for the possibility of engine failure and for the period required to obtain full power
from the remaining engine(s), ensures clearance of all obstacles under the flight path
by an adequate margin.
Approach
4.6 State the minimum range from the threshold from which final landing configuration
takes precedence over noise abatement.
The aeroplane shall not be required to be in any configuration other than the final landing
configuration at any point after passing the outer marker OR 5 nautical miles from the threshold of
the runway of intended landing, whichever is earlier.
Visual Approach - The pilot should not be required to complete a turn on to final approach at
distances less than would, permit an adequate period of stabilised flight on final approach before
crossing the runway threshold.
Instrument Approach - The pilot should not be required to complete a turn on to final approach at
distances less than would, permit the aircraft to be established on final approach prior to
interception of the glide path.
The objective of reduced power / reduced drag approaches is to achieve uninterrupted descents at
reduced power and reduced drag (continuous descents) by delaying the extension of wing flaps and
landing gear until the final stages of approach.
The speeds employed during the application of these techniques tend, accordingly, to be higher than
would be appropriate for descent and approach with the flaps and gear extended throughout. Also as
the descent is continuous there should be no ‘levelling off’ therefore engine power and hence noise
is reduced.
Compliance with published noise abatement approach procedures should not be required in adverse
operating conditions already detailed above in paragraph 4.3.
Landing
• Noise abatement procedures shall NOT contain a prohibition of use of reverse thrust during
landing.
• The practice of using a displaced threshold as a noise abatement measure shall not be
employed unless aircraft noise is significantly reduced by such use and the runway length
remaining is safe and sufficient for all operational requirements.
Definitions
Contaminated Runway – A runway is considered to be contaminated when more than 25% of the
runway surface area within the required length and width being used is covered by the following: -
• Compacted snow.
• Ice.
Damp Runway – A runway is considered damp when the surface is not dry, but when the moisture
on it does not give it a shiny appearance.
Wet Runway – A runway is considered wet when the runway surface is covered with less than
3mm of water, or equivalent, or when there is sufficient moisture on the runway surface to cause it
to appear reflective, but without significant areas of standing water.
Dry Runway – A dry runway is one which is neither wet nor contaminated, and includes those
paved runways which have been specially prepared with grooves or porous pavement and
maintained to retain ‘effectively dry’ braking action even when moisture is present.
5.1 Describe the types of contamination, stating the minimum depth to be considered
contaminated and the maximum depth that will preclude operations.
The presence of water on a runway will be reported to the pilot using the following descriptions: -
• Wet – The surface is soaked but no significant patches of standing water are visible.
• Water Patches – Significant patches of standing water are visible (i.e. more than 25% of the
runway surface area to be used).
Aquaplaning is caused by a layer of water beneath a tyre. The layer of water can build up into a
wedge in front of the tyre and lift the tyre away from contact with the runway. This negates any
braking effects, as the tyre is not in contact with the runway. It can occur in as little water as 2mm
and is dependant on: -
• Aircraft speed
• Tyre pressure
• Tread pattern depth.
Ultimately its effect is to prevent braking effectiveness, increase landing distances and allow
aeroplanes to slew from differential forces from reverse thrust.
A simple formula has been derived that gives an approximation of the minimum speed for initiation
of hydroplaning. The formula is: -
Thus for a tyre pressure of 200 lb/in2 the aquaplaning speed is 9 x √ 200 = 127 knots. The tyre
pressure may be given in ‘bar’ in which case 1 bar = 14.5 psi.
Note that the weight of the aeroplane does not affect the hydroplaning speed. This is because there
is a direct proportional relationship between the aircraft weight and the size of the tyre ‘footprint’.
The footprint is the area of the tyre in contact with the ground.
Therefore, if a tyre is inflated to a certain pressure then the weight of the aeroplane, which it
supports, will cause the tyre to ‘squash’ creating a flat spot (footprint) of a certain area. If the
weight of the aeroplane is increased by say 50% then it could be argued that the tyre would ‘dig’
into any water present and create a better contact with the runway and therefore better braking.
However, the additional aircraft weight causes the tyre to ‘squash’ even more creating a ‘footprint’
50% bigger and consequently the contact pressure between tyre and runway surface remains
constant.
Tyre tread depth does have a positive effect on the hydroplaning speed. This is because the water
that is between the tyre flat spot and runway surface is under pressure. If there is a channel (tread)
through which the pressurised water can escape then the amount of water between the tyre and the
runway surface is reduced allowing the tyre better direct contact with the runway, which provides
better braking performance and a higher hydroplaning speed for a given tyre pressure. However,
once the depth of water on a runway is equal to the depth of the tyre tread, then the benefits of the
tread pattern are negated.
Dynamic – This is due to the standing water as described above where the water lifts the aircraft off
the runway. The water supports the tyre entirely.
Viscous – This occurs when the runway is damp and provides a very thin film of water which
cannot be penetrated by the tyre. This principle is how oil prevents metal parts in an engine rubbing
together causing damage by wear and heat. Viscous hydroplaning can occur at much lower speeds
than dynamic hydroplaning and can occur for longer. This is particularly associated with smooth
surfaces such as the touchdown zone of the runway that is smoothed by rubber deposits.
Reverted rubber – When reverted rubber aquaplaning occurs the affected tyres become tacky and
take on an appearance of uncured rubber. This is normally due to a long skid occurring on a wet
runway, during which the heat generated by friction between the tyre and the wet surface literally
boils the water and reverts the rubber. The tyre is unable to disperse the water and the resulting
steam prevents the tyre from making contact with the runway surface.
5.5 Define braking coefficient of friction and state that which is considered normal for a
wet runway.
The braking coefficient is a measure of the braking efficiency, due to the surface friction of a
runway, expressed as a two-digit figure. For example, 0.28 as a friction coefficient represents 28%
braking efficiency.
A wet runway is defined as having a friction coefficient of approximately HALF of that of a dry
runway but with ‘Good’ braking action. The reported braking actions are as follows: -
5.6 List and describe the methods used to communicate braking action.
A SNOWTAM, which is valid for 24 hours, always includes a braking action measured for each
third of total runway length. It includes a ‘friction coefficient’ or estimated braking action.
5.7 Interpret from a SNOWTAM the contamination and braking action on a runway.
EGTE 11070730 06 5/5/6 8/9/7 34/33/37TAP 24/3/LR YESLR TOTAL 0900 NO 11070930
CLEARANCE IN PROGRESS
As you can see it is a quite long and complicated message and not all items have to be transmitted.
The decode can be found in your Jepperson Manual. The first requirement is to separate the items: -
As can be seen above, item ‘H’ describes the braking action either as a braking coefficient as shown
or as braking action using the same code as a METAR, i.e. 91 = Poor etc but without the ‘9’.
Item ‘F’ describes the type of contaminant as follows: -
• 1 - Damp.
• 2 - Wet or Water Patches.
• 3 - Rime or Frost.
• 4 - Dry Snow.
• 5 - Wet Snow
• 6 - Slush.
• 7 - Ice.
• 8 - Compacted Snow.
• 9 - Frozen Ruts or Ridges.
5.8 Describe the effect that contamination and / or a low coefficient of friction have on
performance calculations.
The effects of a contaminated surface are to impair the aircraft’s acceleration capability, through the
additional drag / retardation effect on the wheels and spray impingement drag. This will result in an
increase in the required take-off run due to the slower acceleration to take-off speed.
Also, if the take off is abandoned, the contamination affects the braking action, thereby increasing
the stopping distance required. These two factors combined will have a significant effect on the
performance calculations and could be severely limiting, particularly on shorter runways.
Other possible effects are power loss / system malfunction from spray ingestion, directional control
problems and possible structural damage. The effects of a very slippery surface are negligible on
acceleration but profound in relation to braking effectiveness if the take off is abandoned, and can
produce directional control difficulties.
Most performance manuals show that an aircraft can safely take off in contaminated conditions with
all engines operating but make no guarantee about an ability to stop or go in the event of an engine
failure. A recommended stop speed can also be calculated and up to this speed (V1) it should be
possible to abandon the take off safely. A recommended go speed can be calculated above which
the aircraft should get airborne safely in the event of an engine failure (VR). This creates a possible
large gap between the two speeds (a V1/VR split).
An operator shall ensure that when the appropriate weather reports or forecasts, or combination
indicate that the runway at the estimated time of arrival may be wet, the landing distance available
is at least 115% of the required landing distance.
An operator must also ensure that if the weather reports indicate a contaminated runway the
landing distance must be the greater of the distance determined above or 115% of the landing
distance determined in accordance with the approved contaminated landing distance data.
It is acceptable to use a shorter distance than required above providing the Aeroplane Flight Manual
/ Aircraft Operating Manual includes specific additional information about landing distances on a
wet and contaminated runways.
Heavy rain implies that the runway surface will be contaminated, i.e. the water depth will be greater
than 3 mm. Runways are designed to drain very quickly. It may be more prudent to allow the
runway to drain to the point where it is considered wet and not contaminated. If a landing has to be
made then the following are worthwhile precautions: -
• Land firmly without bouncing, this helps the wheels spin up without hydroplaning, which is
essential for anti skid braking effectiveness.
• On touchdown lower the nose, this transfers a lot of the weight to the main wheels and it is
also important so that the squat switches are made to enable the lift dumpers / spoilers to
deploy.
• Standard reverse thrust should be selected but if the aircraft slews due to differential thrust
be prepared to cancel reverse.
• The engine igniters should be switched on to prevent engine flame out on the runway due to
water ingestion. These are normally selected ON automatically whenever the flaps are
extended.
• Excess approach speed is normally a factor in every over-run, so fly normal approach
speeds. DO NOT fly slower than the normal approach speeds and aim for the normal
touchdown point and NOT the threshold.
• The nose wheel usually has rudder fine steering; forward pressure on the control column
may help the steering. This will be annotated in the flying manual, if recommended.
Definition
Dangerous Goods - Articles or substances that are capable of posing significant risk to health,
safety or property when transported by air.
6.1 State the requirement for aircraft operators to comply with the International
Standards and Recommended Practices governing the safe transport of dangerous
goods by air.
Rules pertaining to the transport of dangerous goods by air are set out in ICAO Annex 18. The
United Kingdom is a signatory to this Annex and operators are required to comply with the
standards and recommended practices of this document. Explosive, corrosive, flammable, toxic and
radioactive goods are regularly transported by air cargo. To ensure such cargo can be carried safely,
Annex 18 has been adopted by Contracting States together with the associated document "Technical
Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air" (The Technical Instructions). Each
Contracting State shall take the necessary measures to achieve compliance with the detailed
provisions contained in the Technical Instructions. However, a lot of airlines use a publication
called “IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR)”, this document complies fully with the ICAO
technical instructions and describes practical guidance in order to comply with ICAO technical
instructions.
Articles and Substances normally classified as Dangerous Goods but which are carried on aircraft as
part of the airworthiness requirements are exempt from the provisions of Annex 18. However, spare
or replacement items of those operationally necessary items must be carried in accordance with
Annex 18 and Technical Instructions.
6.2 List the definitions and define the terminology associated with the transport of
dangerous goods.
Acceptance Check List - A document used to assist in carrying out a check on the external
appearance of packages of dangerous goods and their associated documents to determine that all
appropriate requirements have been met.
Cargo Aircraft - Any aircraft that is carrying goods or property but not passengers.
Dangerous Goods Accident - An occurrence associated with and related to the transport of
dangerous goods that results in fatal or serious injury to a person or major property.
Dangerous Goods Incident - An occurrence, other than a dangerous goods accident, associated
with and related to the transport of dangerous goods, not necessarily occurring on board an aircraft,
which results in injury to a person, property damage, fire, breakage, spillage, leakage of fluid or
radiation or other evidence that the integrity of the packaging has not been maintained. Any
occurrence relating to the transport of dangerous goods, which seriously jeopardises the aircraft or
its occupants, is also deemed to constitute a dangerous goods incident.
Handling Agent - An agency which performs on behalf of the operator some or all of the latter's
functions including receiving, loading, unloading, transferring or other processing of passengers or
cargo.
Over-pack - An enclosure used by a single shipper to contain one or more packages and to form
one handling unit for convenience of handling and stowage.
Package - The complete product of the packing operation consisting of the packaging and its
contents prepared for transport.
Packaging - Receptacles and any other components or materials necessary for the receptacle to
perform its containment function and to ensure compliance with the packing requirements.
Proper Shipping Name - The name to be used to describe a particular article or substance in all
shipping documents and notifications and, where appropriate, on packaging.
• Requires hospitalisation for more than 48 hours, commencing within seven days from the
date the injury was received.
• Results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes or nose).
• Involves lacerations that cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle or tendon damage.
• Involves injury to any internal organ.
• Involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5% of the body
surface.
• Involves verified exposure to infectious substances or injurious radiation.
State of Origin - The Authority in whose territory the dangerous goods were first loaded on an
aircraft.
Technical Instructions - The latest effective edition of the Technical Instructions for the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, approved and published by ICAO.
UN Number - The four-digit number assigned by the United Nations Committee of Experts on the
Transport of Dangerous Goods to identify a substance or a particular group of substances.
Unit Load Device - Any type of aircraft container, aircraft pallet with a net, or aircraft pallet with a
net over an igloo.
An operator shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that dangerous goods are packed as
specified in the Technical Instructions. They should be packed in good quality leak-proof materials
suitable for the contents. Packages containing liquids shall be pressure tested and secured or
cushioned with materials that will not react dangerously with the liquid. Packages, over-packs and
freight containers must be labelled and marked as specified in the Technical Instructions. Where
dangerous goods are carried on a flight that takes place wholly or partly outside the territory of a
State, labelling and marking must be in the English language in addition to any other language
requirements.
6.4 Identify the technical instructions and their applicability to the classification and
safe transport of dangerous goods.
An operator shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that articles and substances are classified
as dangerous goods as specified in the Technical Instructions. The classification of an article or
substance identifies the potential risks associated with their transportation by air. There are nine
main hazard classes, determined by the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transportation
of Dangerous Goods. The hazard classes, used for all modes of transport are as follows: -
Class 1 – Explosives.
The function of the checklist is to enable dangerous goods to be passed from the sender to the
operator to the receiver in a manner conducive to safe and efficient operations. An operator shall
not accept dangerous goods for transport until the package; over-pack or freight container has been
inspected in accordance with the acceptance procedures in the Technical Instructions.
An operator or his handling agent shall use an acceptance checklist. The acceptance check list shall
allow for all relevant details to be checked and shall be in such form as will allow for the recording
of the results of the acceptance check by manual, mechanical or computerised means.
Normally, only those dangerous goods identified in the Technical Instructions may be transported
by air. Certain other articles, including infected live animals, which are normally forbidden, may be
granted a specific exemption whilst other articles listed in the Technical Instructions are forbidden
for transport by air under any circumstances. An operator shall take all reasonable measures to
ensure that articles and substances that are specifically identified by name or generic description in
the Technical Instructions as being forbidden for transport under any circumstances are not carried
on any aeroplane.
An operator shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that articles and substances or other goods
that are identified in the Technical Instructions as being forbidden for transport in normal
circumstances are only transported when: -
• They are exempted by the State concerned under the provisions of the Technical Instructions
OR
• The Technical Instructions indicate they may be transported under an approval issued by the
State of Origin.
6.7 Identify the items that would otherwise be classed as dangerous goods but which are
excluded from the requirements and state the provisions relating to these exclusions.
Dangerous goods required to be on board an aeroplane in accordance with the relevant regulations
or for operating reasons are those which are for: -
Medical Aid for a Patient - Gas cylinders, drugs, medicines, other medical material, such as
sterilising wipes and wet cell or lithium batteries are the dangerous goods that are normally
provided for use in flight as medical aid for a patient. However, what is carried may depend on the
needs of the patient. These dangerous goods may also be carried on a flight made by the same
aeroplane to collect a patient or after that patient has been delivered when it is impracticable to load
or unload the goods at the time of the flight on which the patient is carried.
Hand Hold On
ITEMS
Baggage Baggage Person
Alcoholic Beverages not exceeding 70% by volume, when
YES YES -
packed in containers of less than 5 litres.
Non-Radioactive Medicinal or Toilet Articles including
aerosols, when the total quantity of all such articles carried by
YES YES YES
each crew member or passenger does not exceed 2 Kg or 2 litres
and the net quantity of each article does not exceed 0.5 kg/litres.
Hair Curlers containing hydrocarbon gas. No more than one
person. Safety covers must be fitted. Not to be used on board any YES YES NO
time.
Gas Refills for above. NO NO NO
Dry Ice (CO2, solid) 2 Kg per passenger when used to pack
YES YES -
perishables.
Safety Matches or Lighter intended for use by an individual. NO NO YES
Lighters containing unabsorbed liquid fuel, Lighter Fuel and
NO NO NO
Lighter Refills.
Small C02 Gas Cylinders worn for the operation of mechanical
limbs and spare cylinders of similar size if required to ensure an YES YES YES
adequate supply for the duration of the journey.
Radio Isotopic Cardiac Pacemakers or other devices (including
those powered by lithium batteries) implanted in a person, or
NO NO YES
radio-pharmaceuticals contained within the body of a person as a
result of medical treatment;
Small Gaseous Oxygen or Air Cylinders for medical use. YES YES -
Securely Boxed Cartridges for sporting purposes, subject to
NO YES NO
limitations.
Wheelchairs or other Battery-Powered Mobility Aids with non-
NO YES -
spillable batteries, subject to restrictions.
Mercury Barometer or Thermometer carried by representative
YES NO -
of a Government weather bureau. (Captain must be informed)
One Small CO2 Cylinder fitted into a self-inflating life jacket
YES YES YES
plus one spare cylinder.
Heat Producing Articles such as under-water torches and
YES NO NO
soldering equipment.
Small Oxygen Generator for personal use. NO YES NO
Small Medical or Clinical Thermometer containing mercury for
YES YES YES
personal use, in protective case.
An operator shall ensure that, except when otherwise specified in the Technical Instructions,
dangerous goods are accompanied by a dangerous goods transport document and where dangerous
goods are carried on a flight which takes place wholly or partly outside the territory of a State, the
English language must be used for the dangerous goods transport document in addition to any other
language requirements. The shipper is responsible for completion of the document however the
operator usually provides this as a service for a fee naturally.
An operator shall ensure that dangerous goods are not carried in an aeroplane cabin occupied by
passengers or on the flight deck, unless otherwise specified in the Technical Instructions.
An operator shall ensure that dangerous goods are loaded, segregated, stowed and secured on an
aeroplane as specified in the Technical Instructions.
An operator shall ensure that packages of dangerous goods bearing the 'Cargo Aircraft Only' label
are carried on a cargo aircraft only and loaded as specified in the Technical Instructions.
• Warning notices or placards sufficient in number and prominently displayed, at each of the
places at an airport where tickets are issued and passengers checked in and aeroplane
boarding areas.
• A warning must be issued with the passenger ticket. This may be printed on the ticket or on
a ticket wallet or on a leaflet. The information to passengers may include reference to those
dangerous goods that may be carried.
Other Persons – Information to persons offering cargo for transport by air should be promulgated in
such a manner that those persons are warned as to the need to properly identify and declare
dangerous goods. As a minimum this information should consist of warning notices or placards in
sufficient number and prominently displayed at any location where cargo is accepted.
Information is provided to enable ground staff to carry out their duties with regard to the transport
of dangerous goods. Where applicable this information should also be provided to the handling
agent.
The written information given to the commander as specified in the Technical Instructions contains
the information required by the aerodrome authorities. Approval to carry dangerous goods comes
from the aviation authorities and the aerodrome interest remains with safety. In the event of a
precautionary or emergency landing the aerodrome authority and safety services need to be aware
of the following: -
• Proper shipping name.
• UN number, if assigned.
• Class.
• Subsidiary risks.
6.12 Describe the information to be provided by the operator in the event of an aircraft
accident or incident.
The operator of an aeroplane, which is involved in an aeroplane incident, shall, on request, provide
any information required to minimise the hazards created by any dangerous goods carried.
The operator of an aeroplane, which is involved in an aeroplane accident, shall, as soon as possible,
inform the appropriate authority of the state in which the aeroplane accident occurred of any
dangerous goods carried.
An operator shall establish and maintain staff training programmes, as required by the Technical
Instructions, which the authority must approve. If an operator does not hold a permanent approval
to carry dangerous goods the operator must ensure that all persons involved in the handling and
transport of dangerous goods are adequately trained.
An operator shall report dangerous goods incidents and accidents to the authority. An initial report
shall be despatched within 72 hours of the event unless exceptional circumstances prevent this. The
information to be provided is as above at paragraph 6.11.
Definitions
Crash Landing - A crash landing is a landing on a runway or at an off airport location, but not
water, from which the aircraft is expected to come to rest with some part of the fuselage and wings
in contact with the ground. Structural damage is likely to occur.
Ditching -Ditching is a crash landing on water, or a failure of the aircraft to stop on the runway,
which could result in the aircraft coming to rest in the water.
Because variety of circumstances that would require an aeroplane to ditch, common sense must
prevail. It is unlikely that a formal (checklist) drill is able to cover every eventuality. For example if
the emergency occurs with the gear down and a ditching is imminent the landing gear must be
raised. The following is an extract from a company’s operation manual that encapsulates aspects to
be consider prior to and during a ditching: -
• Inform ATC immediately (MAYDAY) and, if necessary, squawk transponder code ‘7700’.
This will alert the emergency services to your situation and they could be en-route to your
location even before the aircraft has actually ditched or ATC may vector your aircraft
towards rescue services in your area. ATC will also pass the latest QNH for your area.
• The cabin crew must be notified at the earliest opportunity in order to prepare the cabin for
ditching and perhaps more importantly brief the passengers. Some operators use pre-
recorded emergency announcements and sometimes ‘videos’. These take a finite time to run
but have the advantage of releasing the cabin crew for more important cabin preparation
duties. The briefing is designed to gain their attention and obtain their assistance in
preparation for the ditching. It covers such aspects as extinguishing cigarettes, stowing loose
articles and donning life jackets. It is important to remind the passengers not to inflate the
life jacket inside the aircraft. This brief should also cover the brace position to adopt on
command.
• Prior to ditching the cabin should be depressurised, so the doors will open easily once on the
surface. Air conditioning should be switched off and the outflow / spill valve closed, this
may aid aircraft buoyancy for a few vital seconds. Cabin lights should be dimmed to the
lowest possible setting to allow the eyes to get used to the ambient lighting conditions, even
though emergency lights should illuminate once on the surface, they may fail.
• Contact the water at the minimum forward speed and sink rate, closing the throttles
immediately prior to contact, assuming a power on ditching. For night ditching use normal
landing lights.
• After ditching, the passengers and crew should abandon the aircraft and, if possible, assist
with the use of the escape slides / rafts. Passengers waiting to disembark should be kept
evenly distributed about the cabin to maintain aircraft equilibrium on the water and prevent
early capsize, but in the ensuing panic this would be very hard to achieve. Lifejackets
MUST NOT be inflated until outside the aircraft and in the water. The crew are normally
the last to leave the aeroplane
Water Conditions
The two main factors that create disturbances of the sea are waves and swells: -
Waves - Wave or chop is the condition of the surface caused by local winds. They move in the same
direction as the wind and exist only so long as the wind is blowing. As waves leave the area of
generations their energy and height are dissipated.
Swells - Swell is the condition of the surface that has been caused by a distant disturbance. Usually
there is a primary swell 3 or 4 feet high and about 500 to 1,000 feet from crest to crest. In addition
there is usually a secondary swell coming from 5 to 60 degrees apart. Swells are nearly always
present in the local sea whether there is a wind blowing or not. There is no relationship between the
direction of the swell and the local wind conditions. Sometimes the swell and wave systems will be
‘in phase’ where the height of the swell will the sum of the two systems. Where the two systems are
‘out of phase’ the crest of one system will fill the trough of the other producing a relatively calm
area. Obviously the later would be a preferred area for touchdown. The primary swell is best
observed at a height of 2,000 feet whilst the secondary swell is best observed just above the surface.
Wind Direction - The wind speed and direction can be ascertained from the appearance of the
whitecaps, foam and wind streaks. Whitecaps fall forward with the wind but are overtaken by the
waves to produce an illusion that the foam is sliding backwards.
This is a landing following an in-flight incident (either technical or otherwise) which the
commander expects to be normal, yet there is an increased risk of something untoward happening.
The cabin crew should mentally prepare for an evacuation, but no special passenger briefing is
required as this may cause unnecessary alarm.
Performance ‘A’ aircraft are defined as aircraft that should never be in a position where the loss of a
critical engine would result in a forced landing or ditching. Clearly, if all the power units fail the
aircraft will have to do an emergency landing or ditching. Unlawful interference, fuel starvation /
contamination and fire / smoke on-board have in the past been responsible for the emergency
landing of aircraft. There are numerous causes for a possible emergency landing, for example any
undercarriage malfunction will resulting an emergency landing.
It is not possible to cover every eventuality, suffice to understand that emergencies do occur and
that teamwork, standard operating procedures, emergency drills, training and understanding of your
aircraft all play their part in a successful outcome.
7.4 List the factors to be considered when deciding to make a precautionary / emergency
landing or ditching.
The first consideration is the safety of the crew and passengers. In order to achieve this goal the
aircraft will need looking after also. It is highly likely that if the aircraft is damaged passengers or
crew will be injured. Commercial pressures and logistics, though considered must take second place
to the safety of the passengers and crew. If an event or emergency occuring then the aircraft
commander, with advice from his crew, must decide on a precautionary landing, emergency landing
or ditching. If the occurrence is a threat to life then preparations for a possible emergency landing or
ditching must be made. The decision is not taken lightly as it will undoubtedly cause considerable
stress to the passengers. For an aircraft commander it is better to be safe than sorry in the end. A
precautionary landing is easier to define as an event / situation that is not life threatening, but could
develop into one if precautionary action is not taken.
• The performance of the aircraft should more problems of a similar nature occur, i.e. a
second engine failure, the loss of a second hydraulic system or the loss of another generator.
• Air traffic congestion and / or any known deficiencies in air traffic control.
Cabin crew will brief the passengers in English, spoken clearly and then if time permits cabin crew
will follow up with other languages if applicable. Unless ordered by the commander it is not
normally required to brief the passengers on a precautionary landing and thereby cause unnecessary
alarm. The briefing should contain the following elements: -
• Gain the passengers attention by specifically asking for it, include the instruction for anyone
sat next to a person sleeping or using headphones to be alerted to the information about to be
presented.
• State that the aircraft is forced to make an emergency landing at an airport or ditching on
water in about XX minutes.
• The passengers’ co-operation is essential and requires passengers to take the following
precautions: -
o All cigarettes must be extinguished and clothing loosened.
o Remove all sharp objects from the person including high heels, spectacles, dentures
and watches.
o If ditching, instruct passengers to don life jackets reminding them not to inflate them
inside the aircraft and reminding them on the proper donning procedure.
o All seats must be in an upright position, sit well back and fasten the seatbelt tightly.
o Instruct the passengers which exits to use.
o Instruct the passengers on the brace position and when to adopt the brace position.
Throughout the approach, landing and evacuation, standard calls are made which are normally
detailed in the emergency checklist, a typical series of calls, made over the public address, are as
follows: -
• At about 1,000 feet agl on the approach: “CABIN CREW, TAKE YOUR SEATS FOR
LANDING”.
The order to evacuate is normally made by the flight deck, with the accompanying evacuation
alarm. This order will only be made once the flight crew have shut down all the engines / APU.
Passengers and running engines don’t mix well!
Some operators advise their cabin crew that in the event of a “catastrophic event”, defined as where
the aircraft has come to rest in an unusual attitude, then they should exercise their own initiative and
commence the evacuation themselves. This allows for the unfortunate possibility of the flight-crew
not surviving the impact.
All flight deck crew should have a clear understanding of the duties of the cabin crew in an
evacuation, together with an appreciation of the techniques of crowd control as follows: -
• Assert your authority firmly at the outset.
• Give short, clear, positive commands and use physical force where necessary.
• Stand to the side of an exit; you do not want to get swept out of the exit until ready to leave.
• The aim is to evacuate passengers at the rate of one per second through each exit but
evacuating everyone within 90 seconds with half the exits blocked (CS-25 requirement)
Once the aircraft engines, APU and electrical supplies are secured, the flight deck crew should also
evacuate the aircraft. The crew are still responsible for the passengers and should aim to guide them
away from the aircraft, tyres, engines or fires. The passengers should be gathered at a safe distance
upwind. Cabin crew have available ‘Day-Glo’ hats and megaphones. Crowds respond to and obey
uniformed personnel wearing headgear. It is often seen as an emblem of authority and useful as a
gathering point for passengers.
The actions to be taken in general for a carburettor fire, which occurs on starting, are as follows: -
• Deny the engine of fuel by selecting the fuel off, both selector and pumps.
• Continue to let air into the engine compartment by keeping the throttle open and the engine
rotating.
• Call the tower or ground radio for assistance.
• If the fire continues, vacate the aircraft taking with you the aircraft’s fire extinguisher,
aiming the extinguisher at the base of any fire.
• If you suspect a start-up fire, you should get the aircraft checked prior to flight. Some inlet
filters are beneath the carburettor and are prone to damage, after a fire they need changing.
Engine Fire
Any fire in turbo-jet, turbo-prop and aspirated engine is usually detected by fire detection systems
(fire-wire) and are generally dealt with in the same way as follows: -
• Deny the engine of fuel by selecting the FUEL OFF using both the selector and pumps.
• Shut down the engine using the appropriate drills for the aircraft type.
• Arm and, if necessary discharge the engine fire extinguishers, if fitted only AFTER the fuel
is switched off.
However, in turbo-jet and turbo-prop engines a fire may occur within the jet-pipe or combustion
chamber of the engine, usually during engine start when the airflow within the engine is at its most
erratic. There are no fire detection systems within this area, any fire being detected by a high
exhaust gas temperature (EGT, JPT, T4 etc) or by the ground crew. The actions for this type of fire
are as follows: -
• Deny the engine of fuel by selecting the FUEL OFF using the selector.
• Continue to ‘motor’ (called Dry Motor or Vent Run) the engine to clear any remaining fuel
vapour.
• Attempt a further start or abort the starting cycle if the EGT exceeded prescribed limits.
It is worth noting that any fire extinguishers fitted to an engine will be useless in extinguishing a
fire in the jet-pipe or combustion chamber. The extinguishers are designed to counter any fire on the
outside of the engine caused, for example, by a broken fuel line or break in the casing.
If an engine fire occurs during the take-off run then the take-off is abandoned if below V1. During
the deceleration, consideration should be given to the wind direction and the aircraft positioned with
the engine on fire downwind. This will prevent any flames from the fire impinging the fuselage
during any evacuation. The wind relative to the aeroplane fuselage was one of the contributory
causes to 50+ deaths at the Manchester B737 fire disaster.
Should smoke occur associated with a fire then the fire drills take priority. If oxygen masks and
smoke goggles are available these should be activated and donned. The oxygen masks have a
‘Normal’ and ‘100%’ setting available. In the ‘Normal’ position the masks provide 100% oxygen
when above 32,000 feet pressure altitude. Below this height the oxygen is ‘diluted’ with cabin air
through a filter. The smoke will stop when the fire stops but it will be necessary to vent the aircraft.
The procedure to follow to vent the aircraft will depend on the aircraft type. If smoke occurs
without obvious signs of fire the solution lies in isolating all the electrical supplies, clearing the
smoke then re-introducing the supplies one at a time in order to isolate the problem. One important
point is that one pilot should do the drills and the other pilot should fly the aircraft and monitor the
progress of the drills.
The responsibility to fight these fires lies with the cabin crew. Many people are nervous of flying
and smoke or flames inside the aircraft will cause panic. The cabin crew must use their training to
control the passengers so that they are not allowed to hinder the fire fighting process. The toilets are
particularly susceptible as people tamper with the smoke detectors. Toilets are now regularly
checked by the cabin crew as there is no limit to a person’s imagination if they get desperate to
smoke a cigarette.
A problem for the flight deck is that they are immediately informed of the fire and then have to wait
for an update. The flight deck must consider all their available options to be prepared for diversion /
ditching if necessary.
If smoke persists in the cabin then the passengers should be instructed to keep low down and be
redistributed to areas of the cabin where the smoke density is the least. Most operators discourage
the deployment of passenger supplementary oxygen under smoke conditions. Where there is smoke
there is usually fire and the supplementary oxygen, which cannot be turned off once activated, will
add fuel to the fire. Furthermore, the oxygen masks used to provide supplementary oxygen to
passengers are designed for use during decompression and NOT smokey conditions. Consequently
the oxygen fed to the masks is mixed with cabin air to dilute the dose.
Smoke in the cockpit or cabin is probably caused by a fire somewhere else and is a very serious
situation. If the source of the smoke / fire cannot be determined and the fire extinguished then
statistics suggest that the crew have a maximum of 14 minutes to get the aircraft on the ground to
ensure the survival of the persons on board!!
There are problems associated with very hot brakes. The following are some of the considerations: -
• Fire – The most immediate problem is the potential for fire, if the brakes do catch fire the
aircraft commander needs to make a decision on whether to evacuate the aircraft or conduct
a rapid disembarkation.
• Welded Brakes – After an abandoned take off the peak temperature will occur about 15
minutes after the aircraft has stopped, if the parking brake is on the brakes could weld on
making it very difficult to remove the aircraft from the runway or taxiway.
• Tyre Explosion – The heat dissipates through the tyre and undercarriage assembly. If heat
makes the tyre pressure excessive the tyre could potentially explode. Thermal plugs are
supposed to expand and deflate the tyre automatically to prevent this.
If attempting to fight a brake / wheel fire, always approach the wheel from the fore / aft direction
but NOT from the side. Aeroplane wheels are usually constructed as ‘split hubs’. If there is damage
then the pressure created in the tyre might shear the bolts holding the two halves of the wheel
together resulting in a large mass of metal travelling at considerable velocity in a lateral direction!
The best type of extinguisher for wheel fires is a thick ‘dry powder’ which effectively blankets the
whole wheel. CO2 and water extinguishers are not recommended.
The safety precautions rely on common sense and depend on specific circumstances. An
unnecessary evacuation could cause unnecessary injury. It is usual to have some time to prepare for
this possibility so the following are worthwhile considerations: -
• The tower needs to be advised of the situation and emergency services requested.
• Contact the attending fire services either by intercom or R/T (usually 121.60 MHz) to assess
the extent of undercarriage damage / fire risk.
• Spoilers and flaps should be set to the recommended settings for the possibility of
passengers evacuating the aeroplane via the over-wing exits.
• The aircraft should, if possible, be taxied off the active runway and parked with the brakes
OFF, unless there are any signs of fire in which case the aircraft should be evacuated
without delay.
• It is essential to make sure the cabin crew are at their stations prior to ordering an evacuation
or disembarkation.
9.1 State the difference between slow and rapid or explosive decompression.
A rapid or explosive decompression is a violent occurrence. The following will occur with an
explosive / rapid decompression: -
• Cabin altitude alarm will be sounding with associated red lights and ‘attention getters’.
• Most people will suffer ear damage and the attendant pain, including the flight deck crew.
• Dependent on the height, the survival time without oxygen can be measured from 20
seconds to a few minutes. It is imperative that the initial action is to get onto oxygen.
During a slow decompression, the pressure in the aircraft is leaking at a greater rate than the air is
being supplied by the air conditioning packs. The cabin altitude will be slowly rising, even though
the dump valve / outflow valve will indicate fully shut, and the cabin differential will be falling
slowly. The altitude alert will sound at 10,000ft and the oxygen will normally automatically deploy
at 14,000ft. Importantly the crew have much more time to bring the problem under control without
the pain and panic of an explosive decompression. It is worth remembering that an explosive
decompression is a life-threatening situation, once the immediate problems are solved the question
about structural integrity must be asked and the aircraft landed as soon as possible.
Aeroplane pressurisation is maintained by regulating the outflow of air. In normal circumstances the
indicator valve will show partially open. If cabin air is leaking then this valve should indicate fully
shut. If, however, the controlling valve itself is the problem it will probably indicate an open or
partially open position, it should therefore be selected to an alternative system or manually closed.
The cabin altitude will be slowly climbing which means the cabin rate of climb / descent indicator
will be showing a climb. The differential between the cabin pressure and the outside pressure will
be reducing as the cabin climbs. It is also worth remembering that the inner ear is sensitive to
pressure changes and may well be the first clue to a developing problem. If the crew fail to detect
the decompression the altitude alert will sound when the cabin reaches 10,000ft.
9.3 Describe the effects on aircraft occupants of a slow and rapid decompression.
Slow Decompression
The passengers may detect a slight pressure change with no ill effects felt until passing 10,000ft. If
the cabin continues to rise some people may get breathless especially smokers. At 14,000ft the
automatic oxygen system will deploy the oxygen masks and even though the occupants can breathe,
they are now extremely nervous. This very reasonable fear can bring on panic attacks, asthma and
cardiac problems.
The explosive decompression will disorientate the occupants, they will find breathing very difficult
and be in extreme pain from ear damage. Many will be incapable of donning oxygen masks and
could perish without assistance from cabin crew or fellow passengers. They will not understand the
requirement of the crew to fly the aircraft rapidly down to 10,000ft ,or MSA if higher, and associate
the decompression with the rapid descent and assume the aircraft is about to crash. As a general
principle when the aircraft is under control the cabin crew will have an immense task administering
the problem. The pilot’s job is to get the aircraft down and medical assistance as soon as possible.
The ‘time of useful consciousness’ if a function of altitude as shown below: -
9.4 Describe the actions required following a slow and rapid decompression.
Slow decompression
You have time to contact ATC and commence a controlled descent whilst the problem is addressed
using the emergency checklist. The checklist drills should enable the problem to be solved and the
system taken over manually. If it is likely that oxygen is required the crew will have the time to
prepare the occupants and brief them that they are not in any danger. It is likely that the checklist
will require the crew to don oxygen masks immediately.
Rapid decompression
The priority here is OXYGEN. All flight crew should don their oxygen masks immediately and
establish communications. Next check that the passenger oxygen supply has automatically
deployed, if necessary manually deploying the masks. The establishment of oxygen and crew
communication should be carried out prior to any descent. Pilots often confuse the term ‘RAPID
decompression’ as implying a ‘rapid descent’ - this is NOT the case. A few extra seconds getting set
up correctly prior to the descent will mean that the aircraft is controlled correctly. Flying into a
mountain WILL kill you!
The aircraft should be turned out of the airway and an expeditious descent commenced as follows: -
Note, if an explosion has caused the depressurisation and the structural integrity of the aircraft is in
doubt then the descent should be conducted at the current aircraft speed and not accelerated.
Definitions
Windshear – Variations in vector wind along the aircraft flight path of a pattern, intensity and
duration to displace an aircraft abruptly from its intended flight path such that substantial control
action is required.
Low-Altitude Windshear – Windshear along the final approach path or along the runway and
along the take-off and initial climb out path.
Vertical Windshear – This is the change of horizontal wind vector with height as might be
determined by two or more anemometers at different heights.
Horizontal Windshear – The change of horizontal wind vector with horizontal distance as might
be determined by two or more anemometers at different locations.
Updraught / Downdraught – Changes in the vertical component of wind with horizontal distance.
10.1 Identify the meteorological phenomena associated with windshear and the most
likely locations for windshear encounters.
Windshear can be extremely dangerous and without specific equipment the best avoidance is from
understanding the meteorological features that cause, or help identify windshear. These features are
as follows: -
Thunderstorms – Mature thunderstorms and large cumulonimbus pose a myriad of problems to the
aviator. However with regard to windshear there are two features which merit separate descriptions
as follows: -
Frontal Passage – Fronts, whether warm, cold or occluded vary in strength. It is only well
developed active fronts, with narrow surface frontal zones and with marked temperature inversions
between the two air masses that are likely to carry the risk of windshear. Warning signs to look out
for include sharp changes in wind direction indicated on the weather chart by an acute angle of the
isobars as they cross the front. Equally, a temperature difference of 5°C or more across the frontal
zone and the speed of movement of the front, especially if 30 knots or more should alert to possible
marked windshear.
Marked Temperature Inversion – Vertical windshear is nearly always present in the boundary layer,
normally involving a gradual change in the wind. However a hazard can exist when an
unexpectedly strong vertical shear develops either due to a low-level jet or inversion from stagnant
surface air.
Topographical Windshear – Natural or man-made features can affect the steady state wind and
cause windshear of varying severity dependent on the wind strength and direction relative to the
feature.
Storm Movement
Inflow
Gust Front
Microburst - This is a highly concentrated powerful downdraught of air typically less than 3
nautical miles across, lasting from 1 to 5 minutes. These produce vertical downdraughts as high as
60 knots which splay out in all directions at heights as low as 300 feet with wind speed differences
at the surface as high as 90 knots. Microbursts can either be ‘wet’ or ‘dry’ which again pose a
possible problem in detection. Several microbursts in succession have in the past been responsible
for bringing even very large aircraft down. The components used to detect a microburst are as
follows: -
• Divergent winds near the surface taken directly from the base velocity.
30 knots
I.A.S. is 110 knots
Groundspeed is 100 knots
I.A.S. is 130 knots Therefore, loss of lift and
Groundspeed is 100 knots height loss.
10 knots
Shear Line
The pilot sets the approach power for a speed of 130 knots giving a groundspeed of 100 knots. On
passing through the shear line, the loss of airspeed will be sudden, but the inertia of the aircraft will,
at first, keep its original groundspeed of 100 knots and power will be needed to accelerate the
aeroplane back to its original IAS of 130 knots giving a groundspeed now of 120 knots. This will
take a finite time to achieve, meanwhile the aircraft, having lost 20 knots of airspeed, will be
sinking faster due to loss of lift. The headwind was a form of energy and when it dropped 20 knots
an equivalent amount of energy loss occurred. To counter this loss the pilot must increase engine
power to compensate and recover to arrest the rate of decent and regain the target approach speed of
130 knots IAS.
Tailwinds - The example above describes a sheer where the headwind suddenly decreases. Of
course, there may have been a tail wind in which case an increasing tail wind is the same as a
decreasing head wind and vice versa: -
The opposite effect to above can occur when an aeroplane takes off along a runway with say a 10-
knot headwind rapidly becoming 30 knots at say 200 feet.
Assuming a target climb speed of 120 knots, the effect of a sudden transition through the shear line,
into a 20 knot increase of headwind will increase the IAS by the same amount until the momentum
of the ground speed is lost. This is the case of temporary energy gain, lift will be added and the
aircraft will climb more rapidly. This example shows windshear as a positive benefit, enhancing
aircraft performance due to ‘energy gains’.
10.4 Describe the effects and actions required following entry into a strong downdraught.
To visualise the effect of downdraught it is necessary to envisage an aeroplane flying suddenly from
a horizontal airflow into air with a vertical component either due to turbulence or downdraughts
from thunderstorms and microbursts.
Downdraught
Resultant Airflow
WING Vertical
Airflow
Shear Line
Horizontal Airflow
Having described the basic effects, the combination of all these effects needs to be considered, as in
the sequence of events described below which might be encountered within a microburst on the
approach.
At A there is a rapid increase in the headwind component (energy gain), the airspeed will increase
and the aircraft will go high on the glide path. The likely reaction is to reduce power to increase the
rate of descent back to the glide path and reduce airspeed back to the target approach speed. Then
comes the downdraught at B, the rate of descent will increase rapidly with the aeroplane, still with a
nose high attitude from the attempt to reduce airspeed at A, passing through and below the glide
path. Power is then reapplied, but the engine takes time to ‘spool up’, meanwhile the aeroplane
passes from the downdraught into increasing tailwind at C (energy loss), which means a further loss
of airspeed and lift!
To avoid this potential catastrophe, the pilot should accept the increase in speed at A and maintain
the glide path and engine power. At B, he can use the extra speed gained at A to counter the
downdraught, and maintain the glide path whilst anticipating the requirement for an increase in
power at C subject to the strength of the tail wind. However, a better decision would be to avoid
this situation altogether by ‘going around’ early or not even starting the approach in the first place.
Clues from aircraft ahead may be invaluable if you monitor the R/T.
Operational Procedures (NPA25) - Edition 4 - 110901 7-43
©BCFT, a trading name of Bournemouth Flying ClubTM Ltd 2011
11 Wake Turbulence
Definitions
Large aeroplane - An aeroplane of a maximum certificated take-off mass of over 5,700 kg.
Note that these definitions have NOTHING to do with the wake turbulence categories described
later in this section.
The term “ Wake Turbulence” is used to describe the effect of rotating air masses generated behind
the wing tips of large jet aircraft. The term is preferred to Wake Vortex, which describes the nature
of air mass.
Wake turbulence is created as the airflow from the top of the wing and the airflow from the bottom
of the wing meet. The streamlines are flowing at slightly different angles and a rotation to the
vortex is imparted, as shown below: -
Tip vortices are a rotating mass of air around a low-pressure core. Both the vortices rotate inwards
and expand as they rotate. This expansion is effectively a dilution of the energy contained in the
vortices. The greater the induced drag the larger the vortices. When an aircraft is landing or taking
off the induced drag is high and the vortices are powerful as shown below: -
The vortices are a function of developing lift. They start as soon as the wing develops lift but the
more powerful wake turbulence vortices develop when the aircraft rotates, angle of attack is
increased and the lift generated is greater than weight to lift the aircraft of the ground. The vortices
remain until such time as the aircraft wing is not developing lift, this occurs on touchdown when the
lift dump and spoilers are deployed as shown below: -
During take-off and landing, the vortices sink towards the ground and move laterally away from the
runway when the wind is calm. A 3 to 5 knot crosswind will tend to keep the upwind vortex in the
runway area and may cause the downwind vortex to drift towards another runway. If the wind is
stronger both the vortices will move downwind and could cross another runway.
11.6 State the three main factors that combine to give the strongest vortices.
• Aircraft Speed.
Heavy aircraft, flying Slowly, in a Clean Configuration, produces the Strongest Vortices. For
example, a large or heavy aircraft that must reduce its speed to less than 250 knots below 10,000
feet and is flying in a clean configuration while descending, produces very strong wake. The size of
the vortex is proportional to span of the aircraft that generates it, for instance a B747 with a span of
65 metres trails a vortex from both wingtips each with a diameter of around 65 metres. At low
altitudes vortices generally last for about 80 seconds, but in very light or calm winds, they can last
for up to 2½ minutes.
Clearly a strong wind disperses the vortices by breaking the vortices up and moving them away
from the critical area, where aircraft are arriving and departing. Calm conditions allow the vortices
to roll naturally away from the runway. They are dangerous in calm wind conditions but the worst is
a wind strength and direction that holds one of the vortices on or near the runway. This is about a 3-
5 knot crosswind component to the vortex as mentioned earlier.
Helicopters also produce wake turbulence. Helicopter wakes may be of significantly greater
strength than those from a fixed wing aircraft of the same weight. The actual vortex from the blades
will vary depending on the disc loading. This loading is effectively the amount of weight the disc
area has to support. The strongest wake occurs when the helicopter is operating at lower speeds (20
- 50 knots). Some mid-size or executive class helicopters produce wake turbulence as strong as that
of heavier helicopters. This is because two-bladed main rotor systems, typical of lighter helicopters,
produce stronger wake turbulence than rotor systems with more blades.
11.9 List the ICAO wake turbulence categories according to maximum certificated take of
mass.
The wake turbulence separation minima is based on a grouping of aircraft types into three
categories according to the maximum certificated take-off mass as follows: -
• Medium (M) - All aircraft types of more than 7,000 kg but less than 136,000 kg.
The wake turbulence separation minima for arrival and departure are as follows: -
ARRIVALS
During the intermediate approach, ‘Medium’ and ‘Light’ category aeroplanes will be separated
from ‘Heavy’ category aeroplane by a distance of FIVE Nautical Miles.
The minimum separation for final approach and landing are as follows: -
These minima are also applied when an aircraft is operating directly behind another aircraft and
when crossing behind at the same altitude or 1,000 feet below.
DEPARTURES
The minimum separation for take-off is calculated as a time interval based upon the time the leading
aeroplane “rotates”, i.e. starts creating a vortex. The required intervals are as follows: -
NO LIMIT for an aeroplane following another aeroplane within the same or lighter category. For
example a ‘Medium’ following another ‘Medium’ or a ‘Heavy’ following a ‘Medium’.
A TWO MINUTE minimum separation for an aeroplane following an aircraft within a higher
category, for example a ‘Medium’ following a ‘Heavy’ or a ‘Light’ following a ‘Medium’, applied
to aeroplanes departing from the same take-off position on the same runway.
A THREE MINUTE minimum separation for an aeroplane following an aircraft within a higher
category, for example a ‘Medium’ following a ‘Heavy’ or a ‘Light’ following a ‘Medium’, applied
to aeroplanes departing from an intermediate take-off position on the same runway.
Parallel runways separated by less than 760 metres are considered to be a single runway for ‘wake
turbulence’ reasons with the separation minima described above applicable.
CROSSING RUNWAYS
The Final Approach and Landing minima described in the table above will apply to aeroplanes
departing from a crossing runway, if the projected flight path of the second aircraft will cross the
projected flight path of the first aircraft at the same altitude or less than 1,000 feet below.
When operating on a runway with a displaced threshold, a separation minimum of TWO MINUTES
shall be applied between the following: -
A separation minimum of TWO MINUTES shall be applied between a lighter category and a
heavier category aircraft when the heavier aircraft is making a low or missed approach and the
lighter aircraft is: -
• Landing on a parallel runway, separated by less than 760 metres, in the opposite direction.
An operator shall ensure that all appropriate personnel are familiar, and comply, with the relevant
requirements of the national security programmes of the State of the Operator.
Training Programmes – An operator shall establish, maintain and conduct approved training
programmes, which enable the operator's personnel to take appropriate action to prevent acts of
unlawful interference such as sabotage or unlawful seizure of aeroplanes and to minimise the
consequences of such events should they occur.
Aeroplane Search Procedure Checklist - An operator shall ensure that all aeroplanes carry a
checklist of the procedures to be followed for that type in searching for concealed weapons,
explosives, or other dangerous devices.
As above, following an act of unlawful interference on board an aeroplane the commander or, in his
absence, the operator shall submit, without delay, a report of such an act to the designated local
authority and the Authority in the State of the Operator.
The PRIMARY consideration under these circumstances is the safety of the crew and passengers.
Initially comply with the hijackers demands. Once the situation has calmed down explain what is
and what is not possible. Hijackers are likely to be tense, nervous and possibly mentally unstable.
Use tact and avoid any conversation that might cause irritation. Be co-operative and try to develop a
relationship, avoiding any sudden movements the assailant may regard as hostile.
Notify the appropriate ATS unit - An aircraft, which is being subjected to unlawful interference,
should endeavour to notify the appropriate ATS unit of this fact and any significant associated
circumstances. Any deviation from the current flight plan necessitated by the circumstances should
be transmitted, if possible, to enable the ATS unit to give priority to the aircraft and to minimise
conflict with other aircraft. The commander should select Mode A / 7500 (unlawful interference).
The commander is expected to confirm the code, but if this is not possible the commander shall not
reply at all.
Cabin Crew should make every effort to ensure that the passengers remain calm and do not resort to
action that may jeopardise the safety of the aircraft. It is unlikely that Steven Segal or Bruce Willis
are on board to save the day! Alcoholic drinks should not be served and seat belts should be
fastened.
Once on the ground, the captain should keep the authorities advised of the situation and attempt to
gain the release of passengers and crew. The Captain should expect the security services to take
control of the situation and is duty bound to comply with their instructions. During the negotiations
make the hijacker do his own thinking, the negotiators are trained to entice him or her into a course
of action they want.
Hygiene will become an important consideration in the long term. Galleys and toilets need to be
kept clean. Food, water, medical supplies and power need to be provided. As a rule the transfer to
ground power should be made as soon as possible. This is something the security services can turn-
off prior to a possible raid.
12.4 List the different measures to be taken by the State in which the unlawful interference
occurs.
Each Contracting State shall take adequate measures for the safety of passengers and crew of an
aircraft that is subjected to an act of unlawful interference until their journey can be continued.
Each Contracting State responsible for providing air traffic services for an aircraft which is the
subject of an act of unlawful interference shall collect all pertinent information on the flight of that
aircraft and transmit that information to all other States responsible for the Air Traffic Services
units concerned, including those at the airport of known or presumed destination, so that timely and
appropriate safeguarding action may be taken en route and at the aircraft's known, likely or possible
destination.
Each Contracting State shall provide such assistance to an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful
seizure, including the provision of navigation aids, air traffic services and permission to land as may
be necessitated by the circumstances.
Operational Procedures (NPA25) - Edition 4 - 110901 7-51
©BCFT, a trading name of Bournemouth Flying ClubTM Ltd 2011
Each Contracting State shall take measures, as it may find practicable, to ensure that an aircraft
subjected to an act of unlawful seizure, which has landed in its territory, is detained on the ground
unless its departure is necessitated by the overriding duty to protect human life, recognising the
importance of consultations, wherever practicable, between the State where that aircraft has landed
and the State of the operator of the aircraft, and notification by the State where the aircraft has
landed to the States of assumed or stated destination.
The authority of the State in which the aeroplane subject to interference lands, if different from the
State of Registry, must notify the State of Registry by the most expeditious means and also the
States of those citizens that: -
12.5 Describe the requirements of the flight deck door of a transport passenger aeroplane
(Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13).
In all aeroplanes that are equipped with a flight crew compartment door, this door shall be capable
of being locked. It shall be lockable from within the compartment only, and a member of the cabin
crew must hold a key. This requirement is likely to change following the events of September 11
2001 whereby the door is ONLY capable of being locked and unlocked from within the cockpit and
are designed to minimise the penetration from small arms fire and grenade shrapnel.
12.6 Describe the permission required to carry weapons onboard an aircraft and the
circumstances.
The carriage of weapons onboard an aircraft by law enforcement officers and other authorised
persons, acting in the performance of their duties, requires special authorisation in accordance with
the laws of the State involved. Contracting States should ensure that the carriage of weapons in
other cases is allowed only when an authorised and duly qualified person has determined that they
are not loaded, and then only if stored in a place inaccessible to any person during flight time.
12.7 Describe the procedure to be followed in the case of a bomb on board an aircraft.
Most operators will have received bomb threats of one sort or another. The airlines usually adopt a
method of classifying any possible threat based on the intelligence information available from
‘Threat Assessment’ agencies. Typically, the assessment is as follows: -
• AMBER – A warning that could be related to one or more targets and where there is doubt
about its credibility.
In practice, the aircraft commander would only be notified of a ‘RED’ threat or equivalent.
Obviously if a ‘RED’ bomb threat is received prior to boarding then the boarding is delayed until
the aircraft has been searched and cleared by security personal. However, if the threat is received
during taxiing then the commander should obtain details of remote parking area and the immediate
availability of steps. The airfield will need to be advised of the need to remove all passengers from
the aeroplane to at least 200 metres upwind of the aircraft. The aeroplane should be disembarked
using the steps making sure that ALL hand baggage is taken with them. If steps are not available
then consideration should be given to the use of the slides in which case normal evacuation
procedures should be followed.
• Passenger must be disembarked with ALL hand baggage by steps or slides, if necessary.
Carry out the ‘Bomb Threat’ emergency checklist procedures relating to the type flown. Actions in
the checklist should contain the following advice: -
• Stop the cabin altitude from rising any further. Any device may have a pressure sensitive
detonation switch.
• Confirm the threat with company operations.
• Balance the need for a rapid landing as required in the checklist with the risk from undue
haste. A bomb may kill you, flying into a mountain definitely will!
• Declare an emergency and divert to the nearest suitable and adequate airfield.
• Keep ATC and Company informed requesting the ground services (steps etc) discussed
above.
• Brief the cabin crew to conduct a search of all areas without alarming passengers.
• Brief the cabin crew for a possible emergency landing.
• Prepare for the possible use of passenger / crew oxygen and smoke hoods.
• If possible reduce the cabin differential pressure to zero by descending the aeroplane to the
current cabin altitude but as already stated above DO NOT RAISE the cabin altitude. The
possible damage inflicted on aeroplane by an explosive device is greatly INCREASED if the
cabin is pressurised.
• Minimise manoeuvres and avoid turbulence.
• If fuel considerations and aeroplane performance permit, establish the landing configuration
as soon as possible. If a device explodes then it may damage the control runs for flap and
gear selection. If they are already in the correct configuration for landing then it won’t
matter. During a large sea transit, however, consider leaving the gear up for a possible
ditching.
• Once on the ground then proceed as above ‘Bomb Threat (Aeroplane on Ground)’.
Bomb Found (Aeroplane in Flight)
This is probably the worst-case scenario but in addition to the actions mentioned above, the
following actions should be carried out: -
• Do not disturb the bomb / device.
• Move passengers, portable oxygen bottles, alcohol and first aid kits away from the area.
• Fire extinguishers should be readily available.
• Obtain expert advice through operations, using a drawing of the device or even better a
digital camera picture in order to describe the device to the ‘experts’.
• Mark the position of the device with something distinctive and conduct a search. Just
because one bomb has been found it does not mean there will not be others.
• Utilise any material to minimise blast / fire damage but keep the device itself DRY.
• Consider moving the device to an area where it would cause the least damage. Most
aeroplanes have a ‘Least Risk Bomb Location’ specific to type but usually in the window
recess of one of the rear doors.
DEFINITION LOCATION
Acceptance Check List Chapter 7, Page 7-22
Accountable Manager Chapter 1, Page 1-3
Adequate Aerodrome Chapter 4, Page 4-1
Aerial Work Chapter 1, Page 1-2
Aerodrome Chapter 1, Page 1-5
Aerodrome Operating Minima Chapter 5, Page 5-2
Aeroplane Chapter 1, Page 1-2
Aircraft Chapter 1, Page 1-2
Aircraft Operating Manual Chapter 1, Page 1-13
Air Operator Certificate (AOC) Chapter 1, Page 1-2
Alternate Aerodrome Chapter 4, Page 4-1
Approved by the Authority Chapter 1, Page 1-8
Approved Standard Chapter 1, Page 1-8
Basic Instrument Flight Trainer Chapter 3, Page 3-3
Cabin Crew Member Chapter 3, Page 3-5
Cargo Aircraft Chapter 7, Page 7-22
Circling / Circling Minima Chapter 5, Page 5-9
Circling Minimum Chapter 5, Page 5-9
Commercial Air Transport Operation Chapter 1, Page 1-2
Configuration Deviation List (CDL) Chapter 1, Page 1-19
Consignment Chapter 7, Page 7-22
Contaminated Runway Chapter 7, Page 7-16
Crash Landing Chapter 7, Page 7-29
Crewmember Chapter 3, Page 3-1
Critical Phases of Flight Chapter 1, Page 1-6
Cruising Level Chapter 4, Page 4-6
Damp Runway Chapter 7, Page 7-16
Dangerous Goods Chapter 7, Page 7-22
Dangerous Goods Accident Chapter 7, Page 7-22
Dangerous Goods Incident Chapter 7, Page 7-22
Dangerous Goods Transport Document. Chapter 7, Page 7-23
Decision Altitude (DA) or Decision Height (DH) Chapter 5, Page 5-10
Destination Alternate Chapter 4, Page 4-1
Ditching Chapter 7, Page 7-29
Downdraught Chapter 7, Page 7-39
END OF NOTES