Chapter 14

The practice of learning 20 I

The practice of learning Chaiklin and I initially proposed the following rationale?Theories of situated
everydar_ practice i~~-~~ that persons acting and the social World of activity
:an,!:ot be separated. This creates a dilemma: Research on everyday practice
Jean Lave typically focuses on the activities of persons acting, although there is agreement
that such pheno□:1e.na c_annot be analyzed in isolation from the socially material
world of that activity,l!'ut less attention has been given to the difficult task of Tiu
conceptualizing relations between persons acting and the social world. Nor has C1.m+ i:.,y. l_ (n
there been sufiicient attention to rethinking the "social world of activity" in 1:v,.), .51 r·r✓-
1 "'

re1at10na
· 1 terms. " "h
1-oget er,ht ese constitute the problem of context,l D ,,,
i"Vi"'.Al.!✓-V--,
The participants in the conference agreed to this set of priorities with the C
obvious proviso that relational concepts of the social world should not be
:xp.lore~ i?. isolation fro~ con~eptions . .<?fE.~£~~1::1-~-~~t_i_~g and interacting and
The American anthropologist Jean Lave is Profersor at the University of California, tfieiract1v1t1es. Th~t proviso gradually took on a more-Ceiitral meanmg and, is a
Berkeley. She has studied education and schooling in pre-industrial societies and, result, our concept10n of the common task crystallized into a double focus - on
through comparisons with the corresponding American conditions, she has become a strong context and, to our surprise, learning. A focus on one provided occasions on which
advocate of"practice learning." Most significantly this approach has been formulated in to consider the other. If context is viewed as a social world constituted in relation
thefanzous book Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation which she ~~th ~~ acting, 5oth co~text and ~~tivity seem inesaipably flexible arid
published together with Etienne Wenger in 1991. The following chapter is an extract '.'hangi~g. And thus characterized, changing participation and understanding@,
of Lavis introduction to the anthology Understanding Practice: Perspectives on rn practice- the problem oflearnrng - cannot help but become central as well.
Activity and Context, edited together with Seth Chaiklin and published in 1993 as
a kind ofprogrammatic update, reforniulation and overview ofthe learning approach of
It is difficult, when looking closely at everyday activity, to avoTd-
ihe
condus10.n that learning is ubiquitous in ongoing activity, though often
the Russian cultural-historical and activity theoretical school as developed in the 1930s unrecognized as such. Situated activity always involves changes in knowledge
by Lev Vygotsky and others. and action, and "changes in knowledge and action" are central to what we mean
by "learning,_'(his not the case that the world consists of newcomers who drop
\,J)'V.',-~ i, ,,.)~~
The problem with "context" unaccompanied rnto unpeopled problem spaces. People in activity are skillful c,.;)c< ,v..Ji''-"'"'°

Understanding Practice grew out of the work of a two-part conference in which

the participants came together to consider what we initially called "tl)e context
~t, and a~e more ~ften than not engaged in) helping each other to participate
rn changrng ways rn a changing world. So in describing and analyzing people's ~r::::;t:: ,
rnvolvement in practical action in the world, even those authors whose work
problem." All of us were involved in research on socially situated activity. generally would be least identified with educational foci (e.g. Suchman
We were concerned about conventional limitations on various approaches to and Trigg, 1993; Keller and Keller, 1993) are in effect analyzing peoples' , . ···
the stu<jy of activity. In particular, we wished to explore questions about the engagement in learning)We have come to the conclusion, as McDermott (1993)}, .,, '
Csocially constituted world_>- the context of socially situated activity - that suggem, :hat .there is no such thing as "learni~g" mi generis, but only changing ij,
our work often seemed merely to take for granted. r,art1opat10n 1ll the culturally designed settrngs of everyday life. Or, to put ~\',..,.~
1t the other way .•round, Pi'fEi_cipati?n in ev'.,ryday life may be thought of as a ~ _..;.
I had tried in previous research to understand how math activity in grocery
stores involved being "in" the "store," walking up and down "aisles," looking at P~~s ~f changmg understandmg !~·~5:£1ce, that 1s, as learning. ~
"shelves" full of cans, bottles, packages, and jars of food and other commodities. Learning became one focus of our work, even where unintended, partly
My analyses were about shoppers' activities, sometimes together, and about the becau~e of ou~ conce~n ':ith everyday activity as social and historical process'
relations between these activities and the distractingly material, historically and with the 1mprov1sat10nal, future-creating character of mundane practice;
constituted, subjectively selective character of space-time relations and their parrly, also, because those of us whose research has touched on educational
meaning. Both Seth Chaiklin and I knew that other people conceived of the questions have come to insist on denaturalizing the social processes that unfold
problem in quite different terms. We decided to hold a collective inquiry into within educational institutions by turning them into analytic objects. So
these old, but still perplexing questions.
1~~n .... ~.t..--~----1_J~ _,: •.•..•• -·----· _r_. 1
whether_ t~~ researchers have approached the problem of context through its
 ---------------------------'i,II

202 Jean Lave The practice of learning 203

The discussion of context suggests a problem, however: Conventional 1 Knowledge always undergoes construction and transformation in use.
r_;J, .
~,,
,rn~
J..
~ /4 theories of learning and schooling appeal to the decontextu.alized ~haracter of
some knowledge and forms of knowledge transmission, whereas 1_n a r_he?!J'
.of situated activity, "decontextualized learnin ~c:ivit ":is a _contrad1ct10n
in terms. ese two very different ways of conce1vmg of learning are a~ ly
compatible. Nonetheless, a belief that the world is divided into contextualized
and decontextualized phenomena is not merely an academic speculatrnn that
3
-~
2 Learning is an integral aspecr of activity in and with the world at all
times. That learning occurs is not problematic.
Whar is learned is always complexly problematic.
Acquisition of knowledge is not a simple matter of taking in know-
ledge; rather, things assumed to be natural categories, such as "bodies
ofk~o~ledge," "learners," and "cultural transmission," require reconcep- ~'
can be discarded when found theoretically inadequate or incomplete. tualtzat10n as cultural, social products.

Craftworl< learning and social production It should be said that the conceptions of craftwork in most of the chapters bear
little resemblance to the small-scale problem-solving tasks typical of cognitive
Traditionally, learning researchers have studied learnin if ir_were_a pro~ess learning research: Forging a cooking utensil or taking part in the work of a
contained in the min o t e earner and have ignored the lived-in world. national university examination committee are substantial, meaningful forms
This disjuncture, which ratifies a dichotomy of mind and body, sidetracks or of activity. In all cases the work described takes on meaning from its broader
derails the question of how to construct a theory that encompasse: ~ind and interconnections with(in) other activity systems.
lived-in world. It is not enough to say that some designated cognitive the~ry
of learning could be amended by adding a theory of "situation," for this raises
crucial questions about the compatibility of particular theories (cf._ Sov'.et Relations with theory past: Some paradoxes and silences of
cognitive theory
psychologists' discussion of the "match" between psychologies a~d- soc10logies
in the 1920s: Davydov and Radzhikovskii, 1985, p. 49). Nor '.sit sufficient Silences and paradoxes are generated in any theoretical problematic: questions
to pursue a principled account of situated activity armed only with a theory_of that cannot be asked and issues for which no principled resolution is possible.
.cognition and good intentions. Without a theoretical co~c~pt10n of th~ soc~al At least four such issues trouble traditional cognitive .theory. They concern

?~ IJ,JA: ,.., world one cannot analyze activity in sit~ .. A more ~ro~1srng alternative ~1es
~ ~ in ~_£~acing relations among person, _activity, and s1t1:1at1on, as t~ey are_ given
-i':'~~.JJ.(_in social practice, itself viewed as a smgle encompassrng theoretical ent~ty. It
the conventional divisions between learning and what is not(suppo_s~i:lto l,e)
l~_ar.Q...!Qg. Resolutions to these difficulties have been anticipated in the four
premises concerning kno~ledge and learning in practice mentioned earlier.
"''"::.J -? · is possible to detect such a trend in most if not all of the research trad1t10ns The problems include p.rs5i an assumed division between learning and other
A »-V represented in Understanding Practice- the chapters are working toward a ~~re kind~ of activity. S~9. . ~ both the invention and reinvention of knowledge
inclusive, intensive development of the socially situated character of act1v1ty are difficult problems for cognitive th~ory if learning is viewed as a matter
in theoretically consistent terms. . of acquiring existing knowledge. Thi1'.5U cognitive theory assumes universal
T ~ a£ sitnated activity do not .sepa~ate action, tho~ht, f~elmg, and processes of learning and the homogeneous characrer of knowledge and of
\ value and their collective, cultural-h1storical forms of located, i_nterested, learners (save in quantity or capacity). This makes it difficult to acrnyn.tfor
conflictual meaningful activity. Traditional cognitive theory is "distanced from the ri~hly varied participants and projects in any situation of learning. ( F ~
experience:, and divides the learning mind from the_world. This "release" from thei-e 1s a problem of reconceptualizing the meaning of erroneous, mistaken
the narrow confines of body and immediate experience 1s reiected on varied understanding in a heterogeneous world.
grounds in the chapters collected in Understanding Practice in favor of ':'ore Firs~ow is "learning" to be distinguished from human activity as such?
complex relations between person and world. The idea oflea~nmg as co~n1t1ve Within cognitive theories it has been assumed that learning and development
r, acquisition _ whether of facts, knowledge, proble.m-s?lvmg ~trateg1es, or are distinctive processes, not to be confused with the more general category of
metacognitive skills - seems to dissolve when learning 1s conceived of as :he human activity. This involves two theoretical claims that are in question here:
construction of present versions of past experience for several persons act.1ng One is that actors' relations with knowledge-in-activity are static and do not
together (e.g. Hutchins, 1993). And when scientific practice is_view~,d_as JUSt change excepr when subject to special periods of"learning" or "development."
another everyday practice (e.g. Lave, 1988), it is clear that rheones of situated The other is that institutional anangements for inculcating knowledge are the
activity" provide different perspectives on "learning" and its "contexts." . necessa1y, special circumstances for learning, separate from eve1yday practices.
_ . . . , r 1 -L- ~-L-1- -~ /:~•••• ..... ,,....-.,,.ac, 'T'L_ -1:_a_-_,__ 1 • •
 204 Jean Lave
The practice of learning 205

as a process of internalizing them, versus a view of knowing and learning the_ possibilities that the materials at hand present." And "analyses of situated
as engagement in changing processes of human activity. In the latte~ case, ~ct10n: .. pomt to the contingencies of practical action on which logic in use,
"knowledge" becomes a complex and problematic concept, whereas in the ~ncludm'? the production and use of scenarios and formalisms, inevitably and
former it is ".learning" that is problematic. - rn every mstance relies."
A seconcl~related issue concerns the narrow focus of learning theories on Fuhrer (1993) '.'mphasizes the varying ~modonal effects of the improvisational
the transmission of existing knowledge, while remaining silent about the character o~~ct1v1ty. These effects are perhaps most inteflsely felt by newcomers, /
invention of new knowledge in practice. Engestrom (1987) argues that this ~u: he equa_tes newcomers' predicaments withthoseof learners in general. He
is a central lacuna in contemporary learning theory. Certainly, ~y simp_le msists that m addition to cognitive and environmental dimensions there is an
assumption that transmission or transfer or internalization are apt descri12tors emotional dimension to all learning. He argues that: '
for the circulation of knowledge in society faces the difficulty that they illlply
uni~iy of knowledg,,. They do not acknowledge the fundam~ntal imprint to some degree, all individual actions within everyday settings, especially
J( of interested parties, multiple activities, and different goals and orcumst~nces tho~e of newcomers, are somewhat discrepant from what is expected; the
on what constitutes "knowing" on a given occasion or across a multitude settings change continuously. Most emotions within social situations,
of interrelated events. These terms imply that humans engage first and such as embarrassment, audience anxiety, shyness, or shame, follow such
foremost in the reproduction of given knowledge rather than in the production discrepancies, just because these discrepancies produce visceral arousal.
of knowledgeability as a flexible process of engagement with the world. And _i: is the combination of that arnusal with an ongoing evaluative
Engestrom's conceptualization of how people learn to do things that have not cognit10n that produces the subjective experience of an emotion.
been done before elaborates the idea that zones of proximal developmen_i: are
,. J- •,s collective rather than individual, phenomena and that "the ne~" is a collective Given the~e co~,siderati?ns, Fu?rer raises the question of how people manage
\U' "~~-~·i,'. ._-_,: ,~ ~ i l l V ~ face of felt d!lemU?as and contradictions that impede ongomg and coordmate the various act10ns that arise from cognitive, social, and envi-
(,v' \ --.:," activity ancfimpel movement and change. . . . . . ronmental dema~d~ ?r '?oal~." Old-timers as well as newcomers try to carry
Fllr-ther, part of what it means to engage in learnmg act1v1ty is_ extend~ng out the usual act1v1t1es in given settings, but they are also trying to address
what one knows beyond the immediate situation, rather than 1nvolutrng ?1-any othe'r goals, ~mong which are impression management and "developing
one's understanding "metacognitively" by thinking about one's own cog- interpersonal relat10ns to other setting inhabitants ... Thus the newcomers
nitive processes. Critical psychologists of the Berlin school (e.g. Dreier, 1991; simultaneously pursue several goals and therefore they may simultaneously
Holzkamp, 1983) insist on the importanceofadistinction between expenenong perform different actions."
, tJ.j..,0~"' / or knowing the immediate ~irc:1mstances (" interpretive t~inking:," "re_stric~ed
':h_e t~ird is~u~he assumed homage!!~ of actors, goals, motives, and
o,,r(· v-..1;1::-;i-,·1 ( action") and processes of ~hmkmg bey~nd a~d a~ou~, t,~e immediate sit~m~10n act1v1ty melf, is challeng.ed in many chapters, replaced with quite different
I" :' i)- 1 in more general te_rms (_ comprehensive thmbng, extended, generalized assumptions that emphasize their heterogeneity. I believe this view is new to
(i~N action"). Together, ma dmlectJCal process by whJCh each helps to generate the discussions of l~arni~g_- It derives from an intense focus on the multiplicity of
· other, they produce new undersrandrng (see Wenger, 1991). actor_s engaged rn act1v1ty together and on the interdependencies, conflicts, and
Doing and knowing are inventive in another_ sense: They _are _open~ended relat10ns of power so produced. These views are elaborated in Understanding
processes of improvisation with the social, matenal and ex enential resources Practice by ~everal authors: Keller and Keller (1993) argue that "the goal of
at an . Keller and Keller's research illustrates this: The blacksmith's practices product10n 1s not monolithic but multifaceted ... based on considerations
as he creates a skimming spoon draw on rich resources of experience, his own and aesthetic, stylistic, functional, procedural, financial, and academic as well
that of other people, present and past. But his understanding of the skimmer as conceptions of self and other, and matedal conditions of work." Dreier
also emerges in the forging process. He does not know what it will be until it is (1993) proposes that "different artici ants' interpretations are based on
finished. At one point he spreads one section of the spoon handle for the second ~~fferent cont~xtual social positions with inherent differences in possi ilities,
time but goes too far and, in evaluating the work, finds it necessary to redu~e l~terests, an_9_Eerspectives on conflicts arISTflgFoffi"cfilferent locations.,,
the width of the handle again. "It is as though he has to cross a boundary m Suchman and Trigg (1993) describe artificial intelligence research as a socially
order to discover the appropriate limits of the design" (Keller and Keller, 1993). orgarnzed pro~ess of craftsmanship consisting of "the crafting together of a
The work of researchers in artificial intelligence appears to have the same complex machrnery made,. of .heterogeneous materials, mobilized in the service
1 'T<._: __ /1('\('\')\ _1 ___ •• :L_ '.L - - " - -L:11-..J :----~ •• :~~ .. :~~ ~C..J ____ 1_. ··-- , • .. -
 206 Jean Lave
The practice of learning 207
level of the classroom to the more inclusive level of inequities throughout
between immediate appearances and broader, deeper social forces or to
the political economy (preferably from both ends of the continuum at the
concrete interrelations within_ and across situations (e.g. Fuhrer, 1993; Levine,
same rime)." These statements refer to a wide variety of relations, but each
1993 ). Mehan explores the d1scoordination of voices in interactions between
challenges research on knowing and learning that depegds i_mplicitly on
school psych_ologist, teacher, and parent, who speak in different "languages"
a homogeneity of community, culture, participants, their motives, and the
- p_sychologica!, sociological, and historical - and between physicians and
meaning of events. . . . ,
patients. ~~ges~rOm (19~7) locates unproductive encounters between patients
The heterogeneous, multifocal character of situated activity implies that
and phystcians rn the mismatch among historically engendered discourses _
conflict is a ubiquitous aspect of human existence. ~his follows _if we,,ass.ume
thus, in practice, among the biomedical and psychosocial registers or voices the
1 that people in the same situation, people who are hel~rng ~o consr1:ure a situa- physician and patient use for communicating about medical issues.
i tion" together, know different things and speak with different rnterests and
Hutchins's analysis (1993) raises questions about the location of error- -
experience from different social locations. Suddenly assumpt10ns concerning
making in historical systems of activity and in relations among participants. He
the uniformity of opinion, knowledge, and belief become, on the ~ne ha~d,
desnibes what it is possible for novice navigators to learn in practice in terms ry-
matters of common historical tradition and complexly shared relations with
of task partitioning, instruments, lines of communication, and limitations
larger societal forces (whatevet these might mean- n?w an importa~t q~estion)
and openness of access for observing others, their interactions, and tools. He ~ ) ~
and on the other hand, matters of imposed conformity and symbolic v10lence.
argues th~t these define the portion of the task environment that is available i-o ~
""An~ysis focused on conflictual__pmctices of changing undetstanding in ac:i~ity
~s a ~earnrn contex: :o each task performer - this constitutes the performer's \Ma.8'~.
is not so likely to concentrate on the truth or error of some knowledge drum. _It
onzon of observabil!t . The density of error correction (which helps to make·,;..{," ......;. g
is mote likely to explore disagreements over what is relevant; wheth~r~ a~~J1ow 0
learning possible) depe_nds on the contours of this horizon. ,-~~ .
much, something is worth knowing and doing; what to make of amD1guous
In s_um, the assu~pt10ns proposed here amount to a preliminary account of
Circumstances; what is convenient for whomi what to do next when one ~oes
what is meant by sztttated learning. Knowledgeability is routinely in a state ofl
Ilot know what to expect; and who cares most about what. There are always
chan~e rather than stas~s,. in ~he me~ium of socially, culturally, and historically j }.
conflicts of power, so mislearning cannot be understood independentl.y of
ongorng systems of activity, rnvolvmg people who are related in multiple and i··,\","\?
someone imposing her or his view. There is, of course, and at the same time,
hete~o?~~eous wa_rs, whose social locations, interests, reasons 1 and subjective J,
much uniformity and agreement in the world. The petspectives represented
poss1b1l1t1es are different, and who improvise struggles in situated ways with
here differ about whether this is always, or only much of the time, a matter of
each other over the value of particular definitions of the situation in both
one party imposing assent, subtly ot otherwise, on others. .
!mmediate and comprehensive terms, and for whom the production ~f failure
Th&°ourth and final issue concerns "failure to learn." In marnstream
is as much a part of routine collective activity as the production of avemge,
theorizing about learning, this is commonly assumed to re~ult from ~he ordinary knowledgeability.
inability or refusal on the part of an individual to engage rn somethrng
called "learning." The alternative view explored earlier is that .not-learnmg
and "failure" identities are active normal social locations and pmcesses. The References
latter generates further questi~ns, however: If f~ilure i~ a soc~ally .arranged Davydov, V. _v. and Radzhikovskii, L.A. (1985). Vygotsky's theory and the activity-oriented
( identity, what is left to be said about the makrng of errors ? Given that
approa~h m psychology. In]. V. Wertsch (Ed.), Cttltltre, commtmication, and cognition: Vygotskia
11
s·evf!ral of the authors provide novel construals of failute to learn, quest10n perspecttves (pp. 35-65). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
the meaning of "consensus," and call attention to the defic!encies ~f claims Dreier, 0. (1991). Client interests and possibilities in psychotherapy. In C.W. Tolman and
that knowing unfolds without conflict and without engaging the mterests W. Maiers (Eds.), Critical psychology: Contrib11tions to a11 historical science of the mbject
of involved participants, does the term error still have meaning? The answer (pp. 196--211). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
depends on whose socially positioned point of view is adopted, and _on Dreier, 0. (1993). Re-searching psychotherapeutic practice. In S. Chaiklin and]. Lave (Eds.),
histoi'ically and socially situated conceptions of erroneous act10n and belief. Understanding practice: Perspectives on activity and co11te,'r;t, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Several of the chapters in Understanding Practice develop powerful ways of
conceptualizing socially1 historically situated nonlearning or misle~ning. They EngestrOm, Y, (1987). Leaming by expanding: An activity-theoretical approach to developmental
research. Helsinki: 0rienta~Konsultit.
. discuss nonlearning activities that occur when embarrassment is too great
✓ ( or that result from anxietv. from the social dele2:itimation of learnin2: or the Fuhrer, U. 0993). Behaviour setting analysis of situated learning: The case of newcomers.
fn S lhe1:J...-11n ,.,..,..-1 T T .... - t r , ' - , T, ,
 < ·y. I
1
Chapter 15
208 Jean Lave

Holzkamp, K. (1983). Gmndlegttng dc1· Psychologie [Foundations of psychology). Frankfurt a.M.: A social theory of learning
Campus. . . I S Ch "kl" d J Lave (Eds) Understanding
H h' E (1993) Learnrng to navigate. n . at m an . ·,
utc ms, · · _. b -·d UK c b ·id University Press. Etienne Wenger
practice: Pmpectives 011 act1v1ty and context. Cam II g_e, : ~ r ge > . _
K 11 C d K ller J.D. (1993). Thinking and acting with iron. In S. Chatkhn and J. ~ave
e er, . an e ' . . . d C b 'd UK· Cambridge
(Eds.), Undentanding practice: Perspecttves on acttvtty an • context. am n ge, ·
University Press. . j,£ C b "d
Lave, J. (1988). Cog11 ition ht practice: Mind, mathematics and c1tlt11re m eve,yday t1e, am rt ge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, _ ,. . _ ,
m E (1991) Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral partmpatwn. Cambridge,
Lave, J. an d w enger, . .
UK: Cambridge University Press. . . ldd
Levine, H.G. (1993). Context and scaffolding in developmental stu~ies of 1:1~the~-c '.
· d ds In s Chaiklin and J Lave (Eds.), Unde1'Jtandmg practtce. Pe1"Jpeet1ves
pro blemwSOIvmg ya . • ·. . ,
on activity and context. Cambridge, UK·. Cambndge Umvers1ty_Press; . . Cl 'kl'
American Etienne Wenger was born in the French-speaking part ofS,vitzerland and, as
R p (1993) The acquisition of a child by a learnrng chsab1l1ty. In S. 1a1 rn a young man, he lived in Hong Kong for three years. Later he studied computer science
M cD ermott, • • · . . . d . C b•'dge UK
and J. Lave (Eds.), Undema,1ding practice; Persptct1ws on ac11v1ty an context. am 11 , • in Switzerland ctnd the US, finishing by writing a dissertation on artificial intelligence.
Cambridge University Press. Cl "kl" For ten years he was then a researcher at the Institute for Research on Learning in Palo
cl T · RH (1993) Artificial intelligence as craftwork. In S. rn1 10 Alto, California, and it was by the end of this period that he, together with Jean Lave,
Suchman, L. A . an ngg, · · ·. . , . c, b 'cl UK:
and J. Lave (Eds.), Understa,iding practice: Pmpect1ves 011 acttvtty and context. am r1 ge, published the famous book Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation
Cambridge University Press. . . ,f h • 'b!e in 1991. This book also launched the concept of "communities of practice" as the
Wenger, E. (1991). Toward a the01y ofm/fllra! tramp~rcncy: ~!em~1ts ofa soc~al dt~cottrse_ o t e vtst environment of important learning, a term Wenger cemented in 1998 and elaborated
and the invisible. Unpublished doctoral dissertatton, University of Caltfornm, Irvme.
further in his book Communities of Practice: Learning, meaning, and identity.
The following chapter is mad, up of the more programmatic part of the introdt1<tion to
that book and a note in which Wenger gives an account of his tmderstanding of other
important approaches to learning.

Introduction
Our institutions, to the extent that they address issues of learning explicitly,
are largely based on the assumption that learning is an individual process,
that it has a beginning and an end, that it is best separated from the rest
of our activities, and that it is the result of teaching. Hence we arrange
classrooms where students - free from the distractions of their participation
in the outside world - can pay attention to a teacher or focus on exercises.
We design computer-based training programs that walk students through
individualized sessions covering reams of information and drill practice.
To assess learning, we use tests with which students struggle in one-on-
one combat, where knowledge must be demonstrated out of context, and
where collaborating is considered cheating. As a result, much of our
institutionalized teac~~:t:id training is perceiv.ed by would-be learners as
irrelevant, and most of us come out of this treatment feeling that learning
iS boring and ~rduous, ariCfiliaE-We are not really cut out for it.
So, what if we adopreai'Ccliflerent perspective, ·one that placed learning
;..., ... t..~ ---~---~ -r ', ' -
 210 Etienne Wenger A social theory of learning 21 I

or sleeping) that it is both life-sustaining and inevitable) and that - given a

chance - we are quite good at it? And what if, in addition, we assumed that learning as
learning is, in its essence) a fundamentally social phenomenon, reflecting our belonging
own deeply social nature as human beings capable of knowing? What kind
learning as
of understanding would such a perspective yield on how learning takes place community 0, .-s -h , ,. , ,
doing YV·( .\

and on what is required to support it? In this chapter, I will try to develop Sv_,__,,'t-.\ f~,,-+,•,:,;1t_-\-i',,r-
such a perspective.
practice

A conceptual perspective: theory and practice . Learning identity

There are many different kinds of learning theory. Each emphasizes different learning as
aspects of learning, and each is therefore useful for different purposes. To becoming
some extent these differences in emphasis reflect a deliberate focus on a slice meaning
of the multidimensional problem of learning, and to some extent they reflect
more fundamental differences in assumptions about the nature of knowledge, learning as
knowing, and knowers) and consequently about what matters in learning. (For experience
those who are interested, a number of such theories with a brief description of
their focus are listed in a note at the end of this chapter.)
The kind of social theory oflearning I propose is not a replacement for other
Figure I 5.1 Components of a social theory of learning: an initial inventory.
theories of learning that address different aspects of the problem. But it does . ,j-;u-v-"
have its own set of assumptions and its own focus. Within this context, it does :p,..,~<-'i ,d "'71
constitute a coherent level of analysis; it does yield a conceptual framework from a kind of action and a form of belonging. Such participation shapes not on! / ~
which to derive a consistent set of general principles and recommendations for what we do, but also who we are and how we_ interpret what we do. ' ~ ... ,f,.).,lµ;
understanding and enabling learning. A social t~eory o~learni~g _mu~t therefore integrate the co~ponents necessary fa{'1"""- (
My assumptions as to what matters about learning and as to the nature of to characterize social part1opat10n as a process of learning and of knowing.
knowledge) knowing, and knowers can be succinctly summarized as follows. These components, shown in Figure 15.1, include the following:
I start with four premises:
• meaning: ~ a b o u j ; l o u r (changing) ability - individually and
We are social beings. Far from being trivially true, this fact is a central _,-.v-::,,., collectively - to ex erience our life and the world as meaningful;
aspect of learning. ,,,,~·;',-)-u~ • practice: 'a way of talking a ~ h e shared historical and social resources,
Knowleclge_ is a mart~r of competence with respect to valued enterpri~es fra~eworks, and perspectives that can sustain mutual engagement in
----;~ch ·;s singing in tune, discovering scientific facts, fixing machio/:s, act10n; . ~ - · - - - ~ .
writing poetry, being convivial, growing up as a boy or a girl, and so forth. • community: a way of talk1ng)about the social con.figurations in which
Knowing is a matter of participating in the pursuit of such enterprises, our enterptises are defined as worth pursuing and our participatiori is
that is, of active engagement in the_w..utld. [ reco~;,:::ab!_~li-~l1e,Petence;
• Jy[ea~ -:::_2~r ability to experience the world and our engagement with • lfway of talking)lbout how learning changes who we are and creates
ita'.silleaning~~_!~mately what learning is to produce. personal histories of becoming in the context of our communities.

As a reflection of these assumptions, the primary focus of this theory is on Clearly, thes_e elemems are deeply interconnected and mutually defining.
learning as social participation.~here refers not just to local In fact, lookrng at Figure 15.1, you could switch any of the four peripheral
events of engagement in certain activities with certain people, but to a more components with learning) place it in the center as the primary focus, and the
(J.c-t\"V ~ti1--f.i(, encompassing___££~cess of being acti~~~~~ticl£,~n,"ts in the practic~~:. qf..~ocia) figure would still make sense.
n. ,Jrit..1 ~Y· ~ rnnlmnnitif's- an~ rnnstructing- identities in l'f'latinn to these communities. Therefnrf'_ whPn T rhP rAnr<>hf- ,....c«,;::::,_..._._~ .. -'~-- _£. ··-::---
Jl(.:p
212 Etienne Wenger
A social theory of learning 213

of which it is a constitutiye element. The analytical power of the conce_p_~_~es the experience is not. Most communities of practice do not have a name and
precisely in that it integrates th~7om onents of Fi ure 15.1 while referring do not issue membership cards. Yet, if we care to consider our own life from
to a fami iar experience.
--- . ---- that perspective for a moment, we can all construct a fairly good picture of the
communities of practice we belong to now, those we belonged to in the past,
Communities of practice are everywhere ~nd those we would like to belong to in the future. We also have a fairly good
idea of who belongs to our communities of practice and why, even though
We all belong to communities of practice. At home, at work, at school, in our membership is rarely made explicit on a roster or a checklist of qualifying
hobbies~ we belong to several communities of practice at any given time. And criteria. Furthermore, we can probably distinguish a few communities of
the communities of practice to which we belong change over the course of our practice in which we are core members from a larger number of communities
lives. In fact, communities of practice are everywhere. in which we have a more peripheral kind of membership.
Families struggle to establish an habitable way of life. They develop their In a~l th~se ways, the concept of community of practice is not unfamiliar. By
own practices, routines, rituals, artifacts, symbols, conventions, stories, and exploring it more systematically, I mean only to sharpen it, to make it more
histories. Family members hate each other and they love each other; they agree useful as a thinking tool. Toward this end, its familiarity will serve me well.
and they disagree. They do what it takes to keep going. Even when families Articulating a familiar phenomenon is a chance to push our intuitions: to
fall apart, members create ways of dealing with each other. Surviving together deepen and expand them, to examine and rethink them. The perspective that
is an important enterprise, whether surviving consists of the search for food results is not foreign, yet it can shed new light on our world. In this sense, the
and shelter or of the quest for a viable identity. conc~pt of community of practice is neither new nor old. It has both the eye-
Workers organize their lives with their immediate colleagues and customers openrng character of novelty and the forgotten familiarity of obviousness- but
to get their jobs clone. In doing so, they develop or preserve_ a sense of perhaps that is the mark of our most useful insights.
themselves they can live with, have some fun, and fulfill the requirements of
their employers and clients. No matter what their official job description may
be, they create a practice to do what needs to be done. Although workers may be
Rethinking learning
contractually employed by a large institution, in day-to-day practJCe they :"ork Placing the focus on participation has broad implications for what it takes to
with - and, in a sense, for - a much smaller set of people and commun1t1es. understand and support learning: ·
Students go to school and, as they come together to deal in their own fa'.hion
with the agenda of the imposing institution and the unsettlrng mysteries of • For individuals, it means that learning is an issue of engaging in and
youth, communities of practice sprout everywhere - i~ the _classroom. as well contributing to the practices of their communities,
as on the playground, officially or in the cracks. And rn spite of cumculum, • For communities, it means that learning is an issue of refining their practice
discipline, and exhortation, the learning that is most personally transform~t1.ve and ensuring new generations of members.
turns out to be the learning that involves membership in these commun1t1es • ~or organizations, it means that learning is an issue of sustaining the
of practice. mterconnected communities of practice through which an organization
In garages, bands rehearse the same songs for yet another wedding gig. knows what it knows and thus becomes effective and valuable as an
In attics, ham radio enthusiasts become part of worldwide clusters of com- organization.
municators. In the back rooms of churches, recovering alcoholics go to their
weekly meetings to find the courage to remain sober. In laboratori~s, _scie~t~sts Learning in this_ sense is not a separate activity._ It is not something we do
correspond with colleagues, near and far, in order to advance their 1nqu1nes. ~~fl,w<eclo_nothing else or stop doing when we do something else. There are
Across a worldwide web of computers, people congregate in virtual spaces and ~i!l1es_ it101:r li~es J','hen_,,Iearni~~ 1~~~ified: when situations shake our sense
develop shared ways of pursuing their common interests. In offices, computer of familiarity, when we are challenged beyond our ability to respond, when
users count on each other to cope with the intricacies of obscure systems. In we wish to engage in new practices and seek to join new communities. There
neighborhoods, youths gang together to configure their life on the street and
are also fA~~-s ~~~~2cie.~.Y.._<:.~1?lic}f!y p~a(:eS us_ in si_t°:atiqn~. where _the issue
their sense of themselves.
Communities of practice are an integral part of our daily lives. They are so
9~i~Ii{~~-:
of le_~~_!!g__"~-~cg~e~-1?.!'.91?_1~.1!?_a~~~~!:iLfi.~T£.~i~ ·;~~tt~~Icfa';;-es,
memorize, take exams, and receive a diploma. And there are times when
:.-.C~,......,nJ n.-.....J ,..~ ...._~,.un,..:-.,-,,. t-h ... t- t-han <•n<•aJ., ,,_~ma;..., .. ,.,, ,,...,.-,....J:,..; .. f,-,,,...,,c, hnt- fnt'
 214 Etienne Wenger A social theory of learning 2l 5

member of a community. But situations that bring learning into focus are flot learning and to their effects on the ways we design for learning. By proposing
necessarily those in which we learn most, or most deeply. I he events of leai'riiflg a fr~ework that considers learning in social terms, I hope to contribute
we can point to are perhaps more like volcanic eruptions whose )itry bursts to this urgent need for reflection and rethinking.
, reveal for one dramatic moment the ongoing labor of the!,earth. ~arning is
\10.-1'~{y.j.,\ something we can assume - whether we ~ee i~ or not, whether we like the w~y The practicality of theory
1,«-- i _ ,.- it goes or not, whether what we are learning is to repeat the past or to shake 1t
\ v.-,i-~ off. Even failing to learn what is expected in a given situation usually involves A perspective is not a recipe; it does not tell you just what to do. Rather, it
learning something else instead] acts as a guide about what to pay attention to, what difficulties to expect, and
For many of us, the concept of learning immediately conjures up images of how to approach problems.
classrooms, training sessions, teachers, textbooks, homework, and exercises. Yet
in our experience, learning is an integral part of our eve1yda live It is part of • If we believe, for instance, that knowledge consists of pieces of information
our participation in our commun1t1es an organizations.LThe problem is.not ~xplicitl_r s~ored in the brain, then it makes sense to package this
that we do not know this, but rather that we do not have very s stematic ways m~o~matwn 1~ w~ll-designed units, to assemble prospective recipients of
of tal ing about this familiar experience. Even though the topic of Communities this 1nformat10n ma classroom where they are perfectly still and isolated
of Practice cove;s mostly things that everybody knows in some ways, having from a~y distraction, a~d to deliver this information to them as succinctly
a systematic vocabulary to talk about it does make a difference. An adequate and articulately as possible. From that perspective, what has come to stand
vocabulary is important because the concepts we use to make sense of the for the ep_itome of a learning event makes sense: a teacher lecturing a class,
world direct both our perception and our actions. We pay attention to what whether m a s_c,4ool, in a corporate training center, or in the back room
we expect to see, we hear what we can place in our understanding, and we act of a library/fF~if we believe that information stored in explicit ways is
according to our woddviews. only a small part of knowing, and that knowing involves primarily active
Although learning can be assumed to take place, modern societies have come participation in social communities, then the traditional format does
to see it as a topic of concern - in all sorts of ways and for a host of different not look so productive. What does look promising are inventive wa~f
reasons. We develop national curriculums, ambitious corporate training engaging students in meani~_g_f~ practices, of providing access to resources
programs, complex schooling systems. We wish to cause learning, to take t~~-t_ ~?.~~~ce their participation, of opening their hotlzons so they call put
charge of it, direct it, accelerate it, demand it, or even simply stop getting in themselves on learning trajectories they can iaentify with, and of involVing
,the way of it. In any case, we want to do something about it. Therefore, our th~f!l in .fl..~.~ions, discussions, and reflections that make a difference tO the
,,.,.,,,9 \' 'perspectives on learning matteb ~hat we think about learning influences wh~Je COfl!~.1:1:nities that they value.
,,J'1-")C' J}'c,j •

l
we reco?nize lear~ing, a~ w~ll.as what we do wh~n. we decide that ':e__ ~ust ~o Similarly, if we believe that productive people in organizations are the
:~~ __ \ somethrng about 1t - as rnd1v1Guals, as commun1t1es, and as organizat10ns. diligent implementers of organizational processes and that the key to
~~~:~,~ If we proceed without reflecting on our fundamental assumptions about the organizational performance is therefore the definition of increasingly more
td<'¥""' .,i;-,~J,:~-r:') nature of learni~g, w: run an increasing ris_k that o~r conceptions ~ill have efficient and detailed processes by which people's actions are prescribed,
wPf \e misleading ramificat10ns. In a world that 1s changrng and becomrng more then It makes sense to engineer an,d re-enginee~· thes;;,....,P-r~cesses in abstract
\v complexly interconnected at an accelerating pace, concerns about learning are ways and then roU them out for 1mplementat10n. I)uy1f we believe that
certainly justified. But J:~1,'lo;e than learning itself, it is;:ouf concepti!}JL..j -feople. rn or~amzat~ons contribute to organizational goals by participating
zV""t?.f__l~~~1!ing that needs urgent attent10n when we choose to meddle with 1t ,on mvent1vely m practices that can never be fully captured by institutionalized
1-r"r,· r-- the scale on which we do today, Indeed, the more we concern ourselves with processes, then we will minimize prescription, suspecting that too much
0
i-\ ki-~ ~:anfk{O.d-Of.desig~~ the more profound are the. effects of our di~c?~rses on of it discourages the very inventiveness that makes practices effective. We
/"i;(.l,..,.,.,.-•"tv/t,,?!I the topic we want to address. Th~ ~arth~r you aim, the mor~ an in1t~al error will have to make sure that our organizations are contexts within which
: _,W' J' . r-1' ',. matters. As we become more amb1t10us rn attempts to orgamze our lives and the communities that develop these practices may prosper. We will have
\',-t.,__,.-·-\;.b:.;;:-,_}.._v-<< 'our environment, the implications of our perspectives, theories, and beliefs to value the work of community building and make sure that participants
G''·"'\ --.~,~-~,,\ extend further. As we take more responsibility for our future on larger and have access to the resources necessary to learn what they need to learn
~::~~t. _ l.''
, •
larger scales, it becomes more imperative that we reflect on the perspecti:es
r -·~--- A L--- :-~1! __ ,.: __ _ c _,,_ .... ............ ,.,. ,.,.... ,.,, .. ,...,.,.--.,'7.o
~ ~
in order to take actions and make decisions that fully engage their own
L--nnu,l.orl n.o,::,J--,; I ;h,
 l
I

216 Etienne Wenger A social theory of learning 217

If all this seems like common sense, then we must ask ourselves why our and_ adaptive resp~ns~. Because they completely ignore issues of meaning,
institutions so often seem not merely to fail to bring about these outcomes ~heir us~fulnes~ lies 1n, cases where addressing issues of social meaning
but to work against them with a relentless zeal. Of course, some of rhe blame 1s made 1mposs1ble or 1s not relevant, such as automatisms, severe social
can justifiably be attributed to conflicts of interest, power struggles, a~d dysfuncrionality, or animal training (Skinner 1974).
even human wickedness. But that is too simple an answer and unnecessarily • Cognitive the?ries focus on internal cognitive structures and view learning as
pessimistic. We must also rem~~in.s.titutlQ_n~ are d~~P-~.n_d that transformations in these cognitive structures. Their pedagogical focus is on
our designs are hostage to our understand1n&_p~£..~fl.~.c;r1~~§_,..,J!.~..theru.ie_s. In the processing and transmission of information through communication,
diis·~s·ense our theories are very practical because they frame not JUSt the ways explanation, recombination, contrast, inference, and problem solving.
we act, b~t also - and perhaps most importantly when design involves social They are useful for designing sequences of conceptual material that build
systems _ the ways we justify our actions to ~urselv~s a~d each orhe~. In ~n :o npon existing information structures. (Anderson 1983; Wenger 1987·
Hutchins 1995). '
institutional context, it is difficult to act without 1ust1fy1ng your act10ns 1n
the discourse of the institution. • Constru,tivist theories focus on the processes by which learners build their
. A social theory oflearning is therefore not exclusiv~ly_an ac~de~ic en~e1yrise. own mental structures when interacting with an environment. Their
r
\V,,.,... While its perspective can indeed inform our academic 1nvest1gat10ns, lt lS also pedagogical focus is task-oriented. They favor hands-on, self-directed
~) ,;a\
· ~ \,\t.--~\;y-"t relevant to our daily actions, o_ur policies, .. h'al ..
and the tee rnc , orgarnza~10~a ,
I
activities oriented towards design and discovery. They are useful for
,1 ~Y.C\ and educational systems we design. A new conceptual framework for thinking structuring learning environments, such as simulated worlds, so as to afford
\ .t."✓""
11
u ' about learning is thus of value not only to theorists but to a II of us - teac h ers,
, , ~\ "._.\'-"' the construction of certain conceptual structures through engagement in
0,u\· \,.. students, parents, youths, ~~ouses, health _rractitioners, patients, managers, self-directed tasks (Piaget 1954; Papert 1980).
workers, policy makers, citizens - who in one way or anoth~r m~st take • Social learning theories take social interactions into account, but still from
steps to foster learning (our own and that of others) in our r~l~t10nsh1ps,_ 01:r a primarily psychological perspective. They place rhe emphasis on in-
communities, and our organizations. In this spirit, Commumttes of Practice 1s terpersonal relations involving imitation and modeling, and thus focus
written with both the theoretician and the practitioner in mind. on the study of cognitive processes by which observation can become
a source of learning. They are useful for understanding the detailed
information-processing mechanisms by which social interactions affect
Note behavior (Bandura 1977).
I am not claiming that a social perspective of the sort proposed here says
everything rhere is to say about learning. It takes for granted the b10logical, Some _rheori:s are moving away from an exclusively psychological approach,
neurophysiological, cultural, linguistic, and historical developm~nts t~at but with a different focus from mine.
have made our human experience possible. Nor do I make any sweeping claim
that the assumptions that underlie my approach are incompatible ':ith those • A~'tivity the?~ies focu.s on the structure of activities as historically con-
of other theories. There is no room here to go into very much detail, but for Sfltured entities. Theu pedagogical focus is on bridging the gap between
contrast it is useful to mention the themes and pedagogical focus of some other the historical state of an activity and the developmental stage of a person
theories in order to sketch the landscape in which this perspective is situated. with respect to that activity-· for instance, the gap between the current
ti}, \'- ", "';~\., Learning is a natural concern for students of neurological functions. state ofa language and a child's ability to speak that language. The purpose
1
is to define a "zone of proximal development" in which learners who

0
,,,,;~),~~:1~
. Neurophysiological theories focus on th~ biological .mechanisms of receive help can perform an activity they would not be able to perform by
\ ;;••"'' )::"_)" learning. They are informati:'e about phys10logical limits and rhythms themselves (Vygotsky 1934; Wertsch 1985; Engestrom 1987).
u\ .JY.4:
r"~' ·"""",.;- ,vVand about issues of stimulat10n and opt1m1zat10n of memory processes • Socialization theories focus on the acquisition of membership by newcomers
\~',,Jv •';:.~,)CV
"" , ,:;,.~J ' (Edelman 1993; Sylwester 1995). within a functionalist framework where acquiring membership is defined as
i!!JEE_alizing the norms ofa social group (Parsons 1962). As I argue, there is a
c:, ,~".,. "//Learning has traditionally been the province of psychological theories. s~~Ele difference between imitation or the internalization of norms by i~di-
c,S".'.:',/ \ :!.:!~a1.s and the construction of identities within communities of t1mrtirP
\\r T.ln/n_A,;n,.;e,. ,-)...,.,.,,.;,..,, ,t:',...,...,.,, ,.....-. h,,.J..,,.,.,.;,...,. m,.,,..J;.i:;,.,,...,_:,.,...,, T,;,.. ,,,_;....,,,.J,.,, ,.,,.,,,-.,.,.,.,,..a
 - - - - - - - - - - - - ·----•!!!!J<L~-:~ -
1
Chapter 16
218 Etienne Wenger

can be said to learn as organizations. ~h~ir pedag~gi~al ~ocus is on Transitional learning and
or anizational systems, structures, and politics and on rnstttut1onal forms
g (A ' and Schon 1978· Senge 1990; Brown 1991; Brown and reflexive facilitation
of memory rgyns ' N k nd Takeuchi
Duguid 1991; Hock 1995; Leonard-Barton 199 5; ona a a
The case of learning for work
1995; Snyder 1996).

Danny Wildemeersch and Veerle Stroobants

References
"cl MA Harvard University
The Architect11re of Cognition, Camb ri ge, :
. . (1983 ) •
An clerson, JR
Press. . . A Th 1...,, o,f Action Perspective.
. cl S h'' DA (1978). Organizattonal Leanung; eo J
Argyns, C. an c on, , ·
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. . . .
7) Social Learning The01y. Englewood Cltffs, NJ: Prentice-Ha 11 . Danny Wildemeersch, Professor at the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium), is a
Bandura, A. (197 · . h t' n Harvard Btt.riness Review,]an.-Feb., well-known .rcholar in European youth and adult education research. He has a special
Brown,J.S. (1991). Research that rernvents t e corpora IO •
interest in educational and learning activities in grassroots movements initiatives and
1
pp. 102-11. .d p 1991) Organizational learning and communities-of-practice:
Brown, J.S. and Dug~1 ' , ( k', l . , nd innovation. Organization Science, 2(1):
organisations dealing with social exclusion, participation, sustainable development,
Toward a unified view of wor mg, earnrng, a etc. For ten years, from 1993 to 2003, he worked closely together with two younger
pp, 40-57. . .. Britliant Fire· On the Matter of the Mi11d. New York: Basic Books.
researchers Veerle Stroobants and Marc Jans among others, in a cross-national EU
1 1

Edelman, G. (1993). Bnght A_11, d" .. A Aa. ·1y-Theoretical App,'Oach to Developmental research project, investigating the situation and possibilities ofsocially vulnerable youth
..
E ngestrom, .
y (1987)·. Learnmg by Expan . mg. ,1 ivt
in six European countries. The research resulted in various contributions inclttding
1

Research. Helsinki: Orienta-Kocl~ult1t. , . The rise of enabling organizations. Governors the book Unemployed Youth and Social Exclusion in Europe: Learning for
k D W (1995) !he chaor 1C century. .
Hoc ' . : . . . d lh South Metropolitan College/University Consortmm, Inclusion? (Weil, Wildenzeersch andJansen, 2005 ). The following chapter is written
State University Consortnun an e
by Wildenzeersch and Stroobants and presents a framework on transitional learning,
University Park, IL. Il p
h" E (1995) Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: M ress. building on Stroobants' dissertation (200 I) and on findings from the European research.
Hutc ms, • · . ,f K . 1 d , Building and Smtaining the Sottrces Some ofthese insights were presented earlier in a 200 I article 'Making sense of learning
Leonard-Barton, D. (1995), Wellsprmg.r o now e ge.
, /,·on Boston· Harvard Business School Press. . for work: Towards a framework of transitional learning' by Stroobants, Jans and
o,flnno,a cl."" k h.. H (1995). The Knowledge-Creating Company: How japa11ese Cmnpames Wildemeersch in the International Journal of Lifelong Education.
Nonaka I an 1a euc 1, • .
Crea:e the Dynamics o/l11novatio11. New Yo1·k_: Oxford University Press.
P apert, S. (l 9 S0). Mind.storms. New York: Basic Books.
, A ' N 'Yi k Free Press Introduction
p ons r. (1962). TheStr11ctt1reofSocta! ct1on. ew or . , .

~::~::~~-9~;;90).
:'s , The Construction of Reality in the Child. New York: Basic Books. . .
The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Lear,Jing Organ1zatto11.
In this contribution we look back at some ten years of research in which we
have tried to interpret the processes of transitional learning taking place in
New York: Doubleday, the context of various education, training and guidance practices, mostly in
Skinner, B.F. (1974). About Behaviorism. ~cw Y~rk: I~nopf. . An exploration of the linkages
d W (1996) Organization learnmg an per ormance. . support of people who have difficulty in finding or in keeping a job. One
Soy er, . . . . . k' 1 d , cl performance. Doctoral dissertation, University of the outcomes of this research is a framework that helps to interpret the
between organtzanon learnmg, now e ge, an
of Southern California, Los Angeles. . Brain Alexandria,
changing conditions of individual learning processes and educational practices
R (1995) A Celebration ofNe1trow: A11 Ed11cator's G11tde to the HNman . against the background of transformations in present-day society. Various
SyIwester, . · .
VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Deve1opment.' observers describe the changes in society today in terms of individualisation.
(1934) Thought and Language. Cambridge, MA: Mlf Press. . . Individuals are said to be at the same time free, obliged and responsible to make
~::t:Y•:·~~987). Artificial Intelligence and T11toring ~y.rtems: Comp11-tatio11al and Cog111t1ve adequate choices and decisions regarding their own private and professional
g ' . . ,fK l d S· Francisco· Morgan Kaufmann.
AMroachestotheCommttmcattono now.e ge. an .' di' • C bridge MA· lives. Such processes of individualisation increase the need for individual and
1'1' . . ,f p • . L . · ,g Meamng an . uenttty. am , ·
Wengel', E. (1998). Com1mm1t1es o racttce. eam11 ' , social reflexivity. Consequently, individualisation processes go toe:ether with
, <
Harvard University Press, . . r"mhrirfo-p MA'. Harvard
~~~h T 11 ClQ<; 'I 11.,,,,.,,b
Wfa .. 01 ,,,,,J t/1,, f:,,r;,,/ Pn1w,,,,,,,., nf Mind