MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE':

TOP SECRET FILES ON KGB GLOBAL OPERATIONS,

1975-1985
 By Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky
KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from
Lenin to Gorbachev
(Hodder & Stoughton, 1990)

Instructions From The Centre:

Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations, 1975-1985
(Hodder & Stoughton, 1991)

By Christopher Andrew
Theophile Delcasse and the Making of the Entente Cordiale
(Macmillan, 1968)

The First World War: Causes and Consequences

(Volume 19 of the Hamlyn History of the World, 1970)

France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French

Imperial Expansion
With A.S. Kanya-Forstner
(Thames & Hudson, 1981)

The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence

Communities in the Twentieth Century
With David Dilks (Macmillan, 1984)

Secret Service: The Making of the British

Intelligence Community
(Heinemann, 1985)

Codebreaking and Signals Intelligence

(Frank Cass, 1986)

Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945

With Jeremy Noakes
(Exeter University Press, 1987)
 More
'Instructions from the Centre'

Top Secret Files on KGB

Global Operations
1975-1985

EDITED BY

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW
AND

OLEG GORDIEVSKY

FRANK CASS
 First published in 1992 in Great Britain by
FRANK CASS & CO. LTD.
2 Park Square, Milton Park,
Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

and in the United States of America by

FRANK CASS
270 Madison Ave,
New York NY 10016

Transferred to Digital Printing 2005

Copyright © 1992 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

More Instructions from the Centre:Top

Secret Files on KGB Global Operations,
1975-85
I. Andrew, Christopher M.
II. Gordievsky, Oleg
327.1247

ISBN 0-7146-3475-1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

More 'instructions from the centre' : top secret files on KGB global operations,
1975-1985/ edited by Christopher Andrew and Oleg
Gordievsky.
p. cm.
"First published as a special issue of the journal Intelligence and national
security, vol. 7, no. 1 Uanuary 1992)"-T.p. verso.
ISBN 0-7146-3475-1 :
1. Soviet Union. Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti-History.
2. Intelligence service-Soviet Union-History. I. Andrew,
Christopher M. II. Gordievsky, Otego III. Intelligence and
national security.
JN6529.I6M67 1992
327.1 '247'09--dc20 91-34825
CIP

All rights reserved. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior
permission of Frank Cass and Company Limited.

Typeset by Regent Typesetting, London

 Contents

Foreword vii

Abbreviations IX

KGB Codenames of Centre Officers and Residents Xl

Format of KGB Communications from the Centre to

Residencies xu

The United States: The 'Main Adversary' 1

Military Priorities 14

Residency Priorities: The Case of Denmark 25

The Federal Republic of Germany 37

Albania 41

The Vatican 46

The Arctic, the Antarctic and the World's Oceans 53

Africa 66

Asia 68

The Middle East 82

Zionism and Israel 89

Ciphers and Counter-intelligence 99

The Threat from the 'Main Adversary' 122

No~s 129
 Foreword

This volume contains a further selection of the highly classified KGB

documents copied or photocopied by Oleg Gordievsky while serving as
a PR line (political intelligence) officer in Copenhagen and London
during the decade that culminated in the rise to power of Mikhail
Sergeevich Gorbachev in 1985. The commentary has been written by
Christopher Andrew, based on joint analysis of the documents with
Oleg Gordievsky. We are very grateful to Dr Richard Popplewell for
help with the translation of the documents.
This is a companion volume to our books, KGB: The Inside Story of
its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (Hodder &
Stoughton, 1990) and Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files
on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (Hodder & Stoughton,
1991).
 Abbreviations

A Active Measures
ALP Albanian Labour [Communist] Party
ANC African National Congress
ARE Arab Republic of Egypt

Centre KGB Headquarters

CI Counter-Intelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency [USA]
CSCE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

DIA Defence Intelligence Agency [USA]

DLB Dead Letter-Box
DM Documentary Material [KGB]

EEC European Economic Community

FDC KGB First Chief [Foreign Intelligence] Directorate

FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FRG Federal Republic of Germany

GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters [UK]

GRU Soviet Military Intelligence

HVA East German foreign intelligence agency

ICMB Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile

K Directorate FDC Counter-Intelligence Directorate

KLine Operations against PRC in KGB Residencies
KGB Committee of State Security
KR Line Counter-Intelligence Department in KGB Residencies

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

N Line Illegal Support Department in KGB Residencies

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA National Security Agency [USA]

OT Operational-Technical [KGB]

PN Undeveloped Negative [KGB]

PR Line Political Intelligence Department in KGB Residencies
PRC People's Republic of China

RYAN Nuclear Missile Attack [KGB Operation]

S SpezlSpecial
S Directorate FDC Illegals Directorate
SIS Secret Intelligence Service (UK)
Sigint Intelligence derived from intercepting, decrypting and
analysing signals
Sotsintern Socialist International
SS Special Secretariat (FDC)
S&T Scientific and TechnicallTechnological Intelligence
SW Secret Writing
SWAPO South West Africa People's Organization

UNITA Union for the Total Liberation of Angola

UZTS Secure cipher room in Soviet mission

WJC World Jewish Congress

WZO World Zionist Organization

X Line S & T Department in KGB Residencies

Z apparatus Bugging and surveillance equipment [KGB]

 KGB Codenames of Centre
Officers and Residents

ALEKSEEV Viktor Fyodorovich GRUSHKO (as Deputy

Head, FCD)
ALYOSHIN Vladimir Aleksandrovich KR YUCHKOV
GORNOV Oleg Antonovich GORDIEVSKY
IRTYSHOV Yevgeni lzotovich SHISHKIN
KORIN Mikhail Petrovich LYUBIMOV
LAVROV Leonid Yefremovich NIKITENKO
LEONOV Leonid Yefremovich NIKITENKO
SEVEROV Viktor Fyodorovich GRUSHKO (as Head of FCD
Third Department)
SILIN Gennadi Fyodorovich TITOV
SVETLOV Nikolai Petrovich GRIBIN (not to be confused
with 'Svetlov' at London Residency)
SVIRIDOV Yuri Vladimirovich ANDROPOV
SVITOV unidentified
VADIMOV Vadim Vasilyevich KIRPICHENKO
VLADIMIROV Anatoli Tikhonovich KIREEV
YERMAKOV Arkadi Vasilyevich GUK

Notes: MS codenames written on documents by the Resident refer to

Residency officers on the circulation list.
 Format of KGB Communications
from the Centre to Residencies

vn l _12 Top Secret

No. 12343/PR 4 To Residents

We are sending you instructions on the work of sections of the Service

and organizations abroad in 1984.

Attachment: As indicated in text, no. 123SIPR5, Top Secret,

10 pages, PN 6
SILIN7

Manuscript notes: Comr[ ade] Gornov8

Comr[ade] Fred 8
Comr[ade] Brown 8
Yermakov9
14.12.83

KEY:
1 Initials of typist
2 Copy number (1 in this instance)
3 Number of despatch
4 Residency Line concerned (political intelligence in this instance)
5 Number and Line of enclosure
6 Format of enclosure (undeveloped film negative in this instance)
7 Codename of Centre officer signing despatch (G.F. Titov, head of
FCD Third Department)
8 Codenames of Residency officers chosen by Resident to read
despatch
9 Codename of Resident (A.V. Guk)
 The United States:
The 'Main Adversary'

From the end of the Second World War until the collapse of the
Soviet system in 1991, the United States was the chief target (in
KGB jargon 'The Main Adversary') of Soviet foreign intelligence.
During the early years of Ronald Reagan's presidency, the
Centre's fear of the Main Adversary was greater than at any time
since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In 1981 the KGB began
running jointly with the GRU its largest ever peacetime opera-
tion, codenamed RYAN, with the impossible objective of dis-
covering the (non-existent) preparations by the United States
and its NATO allies for a nuclear first strike against the Soviet
Union. 1
Though Operation RYAN wound down during 1984, the head
of the FCD, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov (later Chairman
of the KGB and one of the chief plotters in the abortive coup of
August 1991), continued to insist on 'the especial importance of
work on the USA in the present situation'. From 31 May 1984
Residencies around the world were ordered to send general
reports every six months on their operations against the Main
Adversary. Within the Centre these operations were co-or-
dinated by a section known as Group North, founded a decade
earlier. Each Residency possessed a 'Main Adversary Group'
consisting, typically, of one or two officers from the PR (political
intelligence) and KR (counter-intelligence) lines, and one from
Line X (scientific and technological intelligence) under a Line PR
chairman. 'Group North' officers from the Centre made
occasional visits to Residencies to inspect the work of Main Ad-
versary Groups.
Kryuchkov was dissatisfied with the results achieved. In June
1984 he informed Residencies that 'all the diverse intelligence
assignments against the USA' could not succeed unless there
was a 'radical improvement' in agent recruitment:
2 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

N.388
Top Secret
Copy No 1
[Ms notes:]
Comr Gornov
Brown
/I

Artyom
/I

and residency operational

staff
Lavrov [Nikitenko] 11.VII.84
No. 109SIPRJ57
21.6.84
[Ms.] Gordon 17.7 [Ms.] Astakhov 17.7

OPERATIONAL REPORTING ON THE USA

The deterioration in the international situation and the growing im-

mediate threat of war on the part of the United States mean that our
Service is confronted ever more urgently with the task of operating
against the USA as the main adversary. All the diverse intelligence
assignments against the USA with which our service is faced have one
factor in common: it is only possible to deal with them properly
according to present-day standards if we have an effective agent
organization operating in the principal American targets. Therefore
the main criterion of efficiency in our apparatus abroad working
against the USA must be its recruiting activity.
In recent years we have taken a number of steps designed to increase
efficiency in recruitment work against the USA. This has enabled
certain of our organizations abroad to achieve some solid results.
Nevertheless, the general situation in the recruitment of Americans
does not yet meet the requirements of our tasks and needs radical
improvement.
In view of the especial degree of importance of work on the USA in
the present situation, the new schedule for operational reporting which
came into operation wef 31 May 1984, lays down that all stations
abroad will report on their work on the USA twice a year (this
procedure was formerly in force only for certain stations). In this
context the requirements regarding the content of these reports acquire
a high degree of importance.
THE UNITED STATES: THE 'MAIN ADVERSARY' 3

The 'North' ['Sever'] group systematically analyses the reports from

stations abroad passed to Centre about work against the USA. The
information available provides evidence that the increased attention
devoted to the question of operational reporting has in some measure
been responsible for a number of stations abroad stepping up their
work on the USA, and for more energetic checking of this work in the
sections concerned in the Centre.
At the same time, operational reporting has not, up to now, become
an effective means of improving the efficiency of our recruitment work
against the USA. The majority of reports lack specific content, deal
with questions of secondary importance and do not provide a complete
picture of the activity of Residencies studying American targets. The
following are among the most widespread shortcomings:

a considerable amount of space is taken up in these reports by

description of the agent/operational situation which is as a rule
sufficiently well known to the section concerned in the Centre;
in a number of reports, information-gathering is promoted to first
place. This is typical of those Residencies where really systematic
work is not being done to create agent bases in American targets;
irrespective of the fact that the reports are supposed to be devoted
to work on the USA, many stations include in them information
about work on representatives of NATO countries and other
sectors;
many reports do not contain a critical analysis of the work done or
an assessment of the results, nor do they contain information about
implementation of the measures figuring in the Residency's work
plan; they do not show evidence of a specific contribution from
each officer;
among the shortcomings is the related fact that reports are com-
piled in an arbitrary fashion and do not have a precisely defined
structure. This makes it difficult to compare the results of the work
or assess the effectiveness of the action taken.
We should like to emphasize firmly that the Centre understands very
well the full complexity of the task of agent penetration of American
targets and the extremely difficult conditions in which, at times, it has
to be carried out. Therefore it is especially important that reporting
should not be just for show purposes or stress the secondary aspects or
formal side of the work, but should provide a genuine picture of how
the real issue is being dealt with - i.e. cultivating and recruiting
4 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

Americans, how the agent apparatus is being created and used for this
purpose, and what contribution each intelligence officer has made in
the matter.
In sending these recommendations on compiling reports on work
against the USA, we would draw the attention of heads of stations
abroad to the fact that they bear personal responsibility for organizing
work in this most important sector. We express a firm conviction that
the operational staff of Residencies thoroughly understand the tasks
arising out of the present complex international situation and will bend
all their efforts to carrying out their duty to the Party and the service.

Attachment: Recommendations for compiling reports, No 1096/PRI

57, three pages, secret, PN

ALYOSHIN
[KRYUCHKOV]
[Head of the FCD]

Secret
Copy No 1
Attachment to No. 1095/PRl57 of
21.06.84

Recommendations for compiling a report on work against the USA

A report on work directed against the USA must be presented as a
consolidated document about the work done by the station on agent
penetration into American targets. It should not be more than 3-4
pages in length and should set out in concise form the results of the
Residency's work in this sector during the period under review.
The report should contain information about progress in dealing
with the points in the plans for this part of the Residency's work and
any measures not included in the plan. It should clearly show for each
section and each individual, how far the set tasks have been carried out,
what results have been attained and in what direction it is proposed to
pursue the work.
Reference must be made to the numbers of the letters in which the
Centre has been informed about the progress of work on specific
persons (agent, confidential contacts and prospective cultivations). If
there is no information on some section of the report, then this should
be stated dearly and directly. Reference should not be made in the
THE UNITED STATES: THE 'MAIN ADVERSARY' 5

report to persons on whom operational information has not been sent

to the Centre.
In view of the fact that the report will be sent in by the PR Line, steps
should be taken to encode reference to the facilities of other lines which
are being used to process American targets, confining mention to the
source's (prospect's) pseudonym and line of work.
The following structure is recommended for an operational report:

I. Organization of work

formulation of the main task carried out by the Residency in its

work on the USA during the period under review.
a list of the principal and intermediate American targets being
studied by the Residency, giving the pseudonyms of the officers to
whom they are attached.
existence of a 'main adversary' group or officer responsible for this
section and distribution of responsibilities among officers.

II. Study of targets

the nature of fresh information about targets for penetration in the
period under review, and a list of informative and analytical
material and consolidated documents about the targets which have
been sent to the Centre.
information about the discovery of target officials and the search
for promising persons in relation to the cultivation of targets.

III. Recruitment work

results of studying and cultivating American citizens (pseudonym
of the study target, pseudonym of officer, operational facilities
used, discovery of a basis for recruitment, prospects for future
work),
results of study and cultivation of local nationals working in
American target installations (on the same pattern);
results of efforts to acquire and train recruiting agents and ancillary
agents with prospects for use against American targets (on the same
pattern).

IV Technical operations
operational yield and information obtained from existing technical
operations;
6 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

development of operational and technical prerequisites for carrying

out new technical operations, stage of implementation.

V. Infiltration of agents into the USA

agents, confidential contacts and other operational sources in-
filtrated into the USA. Information and operational yield from
operations carried out.

VI. Information and active measures [influence operations]

results of the Residency's efforts to obtain political information and
carry out active measures in the period under review (statistical
data, indicating pseudonyms, sources used and the channels for
implementing the active measures).

VII. Conclusions and proposals

overall assessment of results and the operational significance of
these in achieving the main task against the USA.
reasons for failure to carry out individual points in the plan and
steps to rectify the position;
assessment of the contribution by each officer of the Residency in
carrying out assignments against the USA.
proposals for improving and stepping up work on the USA.

No. 1096/PRl57
06.84

Though the KGB's main targets within the somewhat diffuse

American intelligence community were the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the National Security [Sigintj Agency (NSA),
its preoccupation during the early 1980s with alleged American
plans for a nuclear first strike and the militarization of space led it
to take an increasing interest in the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) which, it claimed, played 'an active part in working out and
preparing the practical steps for delivering a preemptive nuclear
strike'. Though much criticized and frequently reorganized since
its foundation in 1961, the D1A had an obvious interest for both
the KGB and the GRU. It takes part in preparing US National
Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Esti-
THE UNITED STATES: THE 'MAIN ADVERSARY' 7

mates on, inter alia, Soviet strategic forces and terrorism. The
D1A also produces the Target Data Inventory (TDl) which serves
as a data base for the U.S. National Strategic Target List and the
Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).2
The Centre's view of the DlA, however, was clouded by con-
spiracy theory. Its briefing to Residencies interpreted National
Security Decision Directive 138 of 2 April 1984, authorizing the
DIA to use agents to collect intelligence on terrorism, as a
sinister plot 'to use the terrorists in subversive action against the
USSR and the countries of the socialist community'.

[ms notes:]
Comr Gornov
Comr Yelin
Comr Brown
Comr Artyom
and all operational personnel of the residency

Lavrov, IlNII.84
[Nikitenko]
Yuk-l

N 395
Secret
Copy No 1
No. 12156/KR
4.7.84
To Representatives and Residents as listed

DESPATCH OF BRIEFING ON THE DIA AND ITS RESIDENCIES ABROAD

We are sending a briefing on 'Organizing agent penetration operations

against the American DIA and its Residencies abroad'.
Our residencies must regard recruitment of DIA officials and agent
penetration of elements of the United States military special services as
being among their prime tasks aimed at strengthening their position as
regards having agents in the American special services in order to
obtain in good time secret, including documentary, information in
advance about the USA's designs in strategy and military policy,
8 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

exposing the adversary's plans for preparing to launch a nuclear strike

against the USSR.
Please inform your operational staff about this briefing and take
additional measures to organize systematic and comprehensive study
of DIA targets in your country of residence.

Attachment: Briefing No. 121S7/KR, 7 pages, Secret, PN

VADIMOV
[v.v. KIRPICHENKO, First Deputy Head, FCD]
[Ms:]Gordon 17.7
Astakhov
17.7

Attachment to No. 121S6/KR Secret.

Copy No 1

'Organizing agent penetration of the United States DIA and its

Residencies abroad'
The Defense Intelligence Agency and its apparatus abroad continue to
occupy an important position in the American intelligence community.
It is in fact on the DIA and its Residencies operating abroad that the
task devolves of obtaining, disseminating and analysing intelligence
about military potential, defence measures adopted in other states,
and, above all, in the countries of the socialist community. The
American military special services play an active part in working out
and preparing the practical steps for delivering a preemptive nuclear
strike against the principal targets on the territory of the Soviet Union
and our allies.
Following the aggressive military policy and strategic plans of the US
administration, the DIA prepares directives for the priority tasks of all
military intelligence agencies, and consolidated documents for assess-
ing the plans and resources of the likely adversary. It is directly
involved in preparing relevant sections of the definitive intelligence
material compiled by the apparatus of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence of the USA. A centralized register of all intelligence tasks and
the information obtained by the intelligence services of the United
States Armed Forces is located at the DIA.
The main operational element of the D IA is the department in charge
THE UNITED STATES: THE 'MAIN ADVERSARY' 9

of the work of military attaches. This element consists of five geo-

graphical and five functional departments, each having its own com-
munications centre and administration service and head of depart-
ment's secretariat. Each of the geographical departments directs the
activity of military intelligence Residencies of the countries it covers.
The intelligence services of the United States arms of service occupy
an important position among the intelligence agencies of the American
military special services: ie the land forces intelligence and security
command, the air force intelligence service, the directorate of naval
intelligence. Co-ordination of activity and effective control of all these
is provided by the DIA.
According to the information which we have, elements of the
intelligence services of the various arms are actively engaged in
information-gathering through groups and detachments which form
part of the different army formations and naval and air force bases of
the United States deployed abroad.
As a rule, the DIA legal Residencies function through the military
attaches, groups of military advisers and the sections for scientific and
technical co-operation in the central military establishments of their
countries of residence.
Professional military intelligence officers, officers from technical
intelligence sub-units and those from operational tactical intelligence
carry out duties as part of their cover function in various military
installations of the United States located in third countries (military
bases, army HQ, the supreme command apparatus of the arms of
services in various parts of the world, communications centres, etc).
In a number of countries where the United States has no official
establishments, or where the diplomatic representation does not in-
clude military attaches, the DIA posts its representatives as officials of
mixed commercial companies, banks, shipping combines, etc.
The number of operational staff at a DIA Residency (excluding the
head of the organization and the technical staff) may vary from 1 to 25
or more, depending on the degree of importance attributed to the
country of residence in the military plans of the US administration, the
agent/operational situation and the prevailing counter-intelligence
system in the country.
American military special services personnel are drawn basically
from men serving in the various arms of service, including officers,
NCOs and ORs. In addition to the military personnel of the DIA, the
arms' special services and other special formations engaged in gather-
10 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

ing and processing military intelligence, some use is also made of

carefully vetted civilians, who, as a rule, form the auxiliary and
administrative apparatus of these special services.
Beginning in the 1980s, applications were also invited from final-
year students at civilian colleges and universities in the USA. The
number of civilian specialists working in the military special services is
increasing year by year. A special system of training is organized for
this category of personnel, based on the US military intelligence school
in Washington, the American Army's institute of foreign languages at
Monterey (California) and the US Army intelligence school at Fort
Huachuca (Arizona). The largest percentage of graduates from civilian
educational establishments employed in the DIA work in the analysis
and coding sections, and also in the investigation service and sub-units
engaged in scientific and technical intelligence.
Among the general requirements expected of members of the mili-
tary special services are such qualities as political and moral reliability,
an interest in intelligence work, the faculty of understanding and
influencing people, and sound physical health.
Members of the DIA are well looked after in the material sense.
(Their salaries range from 13 to 30 thousand dollars a year, not
counting increments for years of service, rank, etc.) Particular attention
is paid to political loyalty. Strict control is exercised over their conduct
and way of thinking. In accordance with the instructions from the
ministers for the US armed services, from 1982 onwards, all members
of military intelligence and counter-intelligence services, who have
access to secrets, must sign an undertaking not to divulge secrets. This
obligation was in fact in operation during the 1970s, applying even
after completion of service in the intelligence or counter-intelligence
service. Members of the military special services must report immedi-
ately all contacts with foreigners, especially those from socialist
countries, to the military counter-intelligence representative and to
their immediate superior. The requirement to report to counter-intel-
ligence extends also to contacts of DIA members with other foreigners
and even with American citizens whose conduct and actions may
prejudice the national security of the USA.
The chief task confronting the DIA and its Residencies consists in
obtaining advance information about possible military, economic and
political measures adopted in other countries, primarily in the USSR
and members of the Warsaw Pact, and also in areas 'vitally important
for the national security of the USA'.
THE UNITED STATES: THE 'MAIN ADVERSARY' 11

As part of the overall intelligence programme and the DIA directive

prepared on that basis, the 'list of key issues for military intelligence',
the Residencies are called upon to carry out a complete reconnaissance
of the most important economic, defence and industrial installations in
the territory of the Warsaw Pact member-states which have been
marked out as the main targets for a nuclear missile strike.
The following form part of the duties of DIA residencies: to produce
timely intelligence data about preparations for an attack on the United
States or its allies; about trends and prospects for expansion of the
armed forces of countries of the socialist community, and their opera-
tional and strategic resources; about plans for operational use of the
main groupings of armed forces of the potential adversary, their
strength, deployment and armament, counter-intelligence support for
the activity of the DIA's stations abroad, in close co-operation with
CIA Residencies; and exposure of members of the Soviet IS [intel-
ligence service] and their efforts in regard to the American armed
forces; they also carry out penetration operations with agents - in
association with the CIA - against Soviet intelligence personnel, using
American servicemen to plant on the Soviet intelligence service.
The DIA's instructions in recent years have directed the military
intelligence organization abroad to look for indications of increased
combat readiness in the groups of Soviet forces deployed in certain East
European countries, Afghanistan, and also in Cuban units located in
Angola and Ethiopia.
These instructions also apply to the activity of DIA Residencies
aimed at clarifying the question of Soviet co-operation with third-
world countries. At the same time the organizations abroad are also
given, as a long-term assignment, the task of obtaining information
about the legal position regarding existing agreements on military
matters, any extension of their scope and introduction of new forms of
co-operation in that field.
Under Directive No 138 of the President of the United States, which
came into operation in April this year, the DIA was invested for the first
time with powers to use agents of the military special services for
infiltration of terrorist and subversive groups and organizations
operating in third countries' territory. At the same time the DIA was
officially given the task of expanding the volume of intelligence
information obtained on terrorist elements operating immediately
around American military formations abroad. The facts, however,
indicate that the main, unacknowledged assignment in this context is
12 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS fROM THE CENTRE'

to use the terrorists in subversive action against the USSR and the
countries of the socialist community.
In addition to its intelligence activity abroad, the DIA has counter-
intelligence tasks aimed at uncovering Soviet intelligence personnel,
hampering their activity and ascertaining the designs of our intelligence
service in regard to United States' military installations. This work is
carried out in close collaboration with the CIA (in third countries) and
the FBI (in the USA).
In their daily activity the Pentagon's central intelligence apparatus
and its Residencies are guided by the directive on the 'Tasks of military
intelligence and the order of priority in carrying them out'. This
document is prepared every year at the DIA headquarters. These tasks
are set out in greater detail in the List of key issues for military
intelligence which is despatched periodically to all Residencies.
The material available in the Centre provides evidence that the chief
sources for obtaining information on the USSR of interest to the DIA
and its Residencies are agents, data obtained from space reconnais-
sance and instrumental means. At the same time the adversary has
succeeded in acquiring important information of a strategic nature on
aspects in which he is interested by processing overt documentary
material and questioning defectors, traitors and immigrants.
Study of the practical methods used in intelligence work by the DIA
components based at home and abroad, has shown that American
military intelligence makes use for information-gathering purposes of
its official and personal contacts with Soviet citizens and in the first
place, military attaches and their staff, officers and employees of the
Chief Military Advisor's organization, the GIU, GTU and GKES* in
third countries.
When present as observers at military exercises held on third
countries' territory, DIA officers try to make a wide range of contacts
among Soviet military personnel invited on these occassions, put a
great many questions to them about the combat characteristics of
Soviet-made weapons and military equipment and attempt to obtain
basic data on individual Soviet nationals and information on the
officers of military units, such as where they are serving and so on.
In the same way, American military intelligence personnel make use

* GIU: GRU General Engineering Department (deals with Soviet weapons exports)
GTU: General Technical Department (oversees Soviet military facilities and advisers over-
seas)
GKES: State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations
THE UNITED STATES: THE 'MAIN ADVERSARY' 13

of official formal occasions and private receptions organized by them

on a great variety of pretexts, receptions to which they invite, together
with the service diplomats, Soviet Embassy officials, journalists and
specialist personnel.
As one method of obtaining intelligence information on Soviet
matters, DIA officials and their agents made use of contacts with
service diplomats of non-aligned or neutral countries friendly to the
USSR, and countries receiving Soviet military equipment, where our
military specialists are to be found.
One of the operational methods most frequently used by the Ameri-
can military special services is to attempt to plant on the Soviet
intelligence service agents drawn from among American servicemen,
making approaches as alleged sympathizers and offering us their
services for a material reward. The actual utilization of information
obtained by the adversary in the course of such operations is as a rule
entrusted to the CIA or the FBI.
The other side naturally devotes a great deal of attention to improv-
ing 'plant' operations, trying to avoid stereotyped methods and even
going so far as to hand over to us, particularly in the first stages,
genuine secret, and sometimes even top secret, information of interest
to us.
In view of the role and position of the DIA in the American
intelligence community and the amount of important political,
strategic and operational information concentrated in United States
military intelligence installations, the need to penetrate the adversary's
military special services has acquired particular importance for
achieving the tasks confronting the intelligence service abroad.
No. 12157/KR
 Military Priorities

The Soviet General Staff regards both strategic and tactical

military intelligence as the primary responsibility of its Second
Chief (Intelligence) Directorate, the GRU (G/avnoye Raz-
vedyvate/noye Uprav/enie). The KGB also considered questions
of military strategy one of its main global priorities. Because of
the partial overlap in their operations, relations between the
KGB and the GRU have from time to time been fraught both in
Moscow and in foreign Residencies. 3 The KGB, however, was
larger, better funded and able to pull rank on what it called its
'military neighbours'. Though the GRU's interests are usually
defended by the Minister of Defence, none of its heads has ever
been even a candidate (non-voting) member of the Politburo. By
contrast, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, KGB Chairman from
1967 to 1982, became Party General Secretary from 1982 to
1984.4 Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov, Chairman from 1982 to
1988, became a full member of the Politburo in 1985 at a time
when the Minister of Defence was only a candidate member.
Kryuchkov, his successor as KGB Chairman, also became a full
Politburo member in 1989. (Though he left the Politburo after its
reorganization and downgrading in 1990, he became a member
of Gorbachev's short-lived Presidential Council; early in 1991 he
joined the newly created National Security Council.)
The KGB's main military concern during the early 1980s was
the threat of a nuclear first strike by the West: a fear which
produced its largest ever peacetime intelligence operation and
its first major collaboration with the GRU, Operation RYAN. But
it was also haunted by the strategic nightmare of the Soviet
Union's four main adversaries - the USA, Western Europe,
Japan and China - coming together to form 'a large-scale anti-
Soviet (anti-Communist) military coalition'.
MILITAR Y PRIORITIES 15

[ms notes:]
Comr Gornov, Shatov,
Brown, Artyom and
all operational staff of the
Residency for guidance in
our work
LAVROV [L.Y. NIKITENKO] 26.12.84
vn-1 Top Secret
No. 2106/PR Copy No 1
17.12.84 To Residents

MEASURES DESIGNED TO STEP UP WORK ON PROBLEMS OF MILITARY

STRATEGY

The dangerous development in the world situation at the present time

requires our Service to take additional measures to step up its work on
questions of military strategy to the maximum extent in all lines of
activity in the interests of providing reliable protection for state
security and strengthening our country's defence capability.
In this context, under Instruction No 8ss of 10.11.84 from the heads
of our Service, a list of priority strategic questions for the information
of our officers abroad has now come into effect, and requirements have
been formulated for stepping up efforts designed to discover in good
time the aims, scale and time limits envisaged in our main adversary's
preparation for war. The principal objective of this activity continues
to be timely discovery of any intentions of the USA, NATO or the PRC
to carry out a sudden nuclear missile attack on the Soviet Union and
other countries of the socialist community.
In planning and implementing the actual measures intended to deal
with this problem, residencies will concentrate their efforts on the
following:

obtaining reliable and, first of all, documentary information about

preparations by our main adversary to take political decisions and
adopt specific operational plans and measures directed to launch-
ing a nuclear or conventional war against the Soviet Union and the
other countries of the socialist community, or to intensifying
16 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

existing, or creating new critical situations which might lead to

war;
acquiring reliable data about any breakthrough achieved by the
main adversary in the scientific and technical fields which would
enable them to produce radically new types and systems of weapons
of mass destruction calculated to shift the strategic balance of forces
sharply in their favour;
preparing and implementing large-scale active measures to expose
enemy plans and designs for preparing for war.

In planning and pursuing work on the problems of military strategy

you must be strictly guided by the attached list of priority strategic
questions.
Attachment: As indicated in text, top secret, 10 pages. No 8ss
SVETLOV
[N.P. GRIBIN]
[Head of Third Department, FCD]

Attachment to No 2106/PR

LIST OF PRIORITY QUESTIONS OF MILITARY STRATEGY ON WHICH

THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ABROAD IS REQUIRED TO THROW LIGHT

I. Strategic, economic and military fields

1.1 New features in both coalition and national military policy doc-
trines, military strategy and the strategic designs of the political and
military leadership of the United States, the NATO bloc, the principal
West European countries and Japan, and also the PRC, envisaging
stepping up long-term and immediate preparation for and possible
launching of a nuclear or conventional war against the USSR and other
countries of the socialist community:

- views entertained by the leadership on the possible scale and nature,

MILITARY PRIORITIES 17

targets and missions, and ways and means of preparation, launch-

ing and conduct of a war;
place, role and specific plans for preparing and carrying out a
sudden nuclear missile strike.
1.2 Estimates by senior political and military figures in the USA, the
NATO bloc, the main West European countries and Japan, and the
PRC analysing and forecasting any important changes in the world
military, political and strategic situation:
in the overall correlation of military forces between West and East;
in the correlation of military forces in areas bordering on the USSR;
in the correlation of military forces in areas distant from the USSR;
1.3 International political, economic and other circumstances and
situations in which the USA, the NATO bloc, the principal West
European countries and Japan, and also the PRC may reach the stage of
launching a nuclear or conventional war:
large-scale social, political and economic shifts anticipated in in-
dividual areas or countries which may transgress the limits (thres-
holds) they have set for qualitative changes in the military and
strategic situation;
1.4 Military policy decisions, designs, plans and measures of the United
States, NATO, principal West European and Japanese military policy
leaders to bring together a large-scale anti-Soviet (anti-communist)
military coalition, or to strengthen existing and create new military
blocs and associations of imperialist states:
expansion and intensification of military consultations as part of
multilateral conferences and summit meetings, bilateral talks and
agreements on mutual security and defence, strategic partnering
and co-operation;
attempts to create a 'global security system' involving the United
States, Western Europe and Japan;
expansion of the membership and areas of responsibility of NATO,
the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS), the regional security and defence system in the
Caribbean;
18 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

attempts to form a European Union (EU), a Pacific Treaty Or-

ganization (PA TO), a North-East Asia Treaty Organization
(NEATO), a Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), or a South
Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO).
1.5 Present position and prospects for a military policy and strategic
rapprochement between the USA, the NATO bloc, the principal West
European countries and Japan, and the PRC, on an anti-Soviet basis:
specific designs, plans and measures of the military and political
leadership of the USA and its allies aimed at drawing China into
military, political and economic relations with the West;
the contents of existing and possible new military agreements
between the USA and its allies and the PRC (assistance to China in
developing defence industry and nuclear power, and in acquiring
modern types of armaments and military equipment, and the
technology for producing them);
strategic provocation and incitement on the part of the PRC
leadership.

1.6 Directives, combined programmes, plans and measures to augment

the military and economic potential of the USA, the NATO bloc, the
main West European countries and Japan, and also the PRC for the
purpose of long-term and immediate preparation for the possibility of
launching and waging a nuclear or conventional war;
drawing up and implementing coalition and national policies for
appropriations and expenditure for military requirements, and
distribution of combined efforts to produce the basic types of
weapon and military equipment;
providing for maximum capacity in production facilities of military
branches of industry and creating fresh capacity, and switching a
number of civilian branches to production on military lines;
creating large-scale strategic reserves of military industrial equip-
ment, energy resources and raw materials in short supply, food-
stuffs, military stores and medical supplies;
expanding trade in armaments, granting loans and credits and
offering military economic, scientific and technical aid.

1.7 Any directives or instructions, drafts, plans or measures on the part

MILITARY PRIORITIES 19

of those directing military policy in the USA, the NATO bloc, the
principal West European countries and Japan, and also the PRe to
upgrade the structure of the main branches of the armed forces, or
provide them with up-to-date types of weapons and equipment;
reinforcing the organization and stepping up the numerical strength
and quality of the establishment of strategic nuclear and other
armed forces (ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, war-
ships and submarines, strategic bomber and fighter air forces,
artillery and armour);
reinforcing the presence of strategic armed forces on advanced
ocean and maritime positions in the most important areas and
countries (deployment close to the Soviet Union of American naval
and air forces, extended and medium-range nuclear missiles, cruise
missiles and other weapons, advance stock-piling of nuclear am-
munition and munitions, and preparation and modernization of
naval and air bases required for this purpose);
improving the strategic mobility of the main branches of the armed
forces (expansion of facilities for rapid movement of large airborne
formations and units, ammunition and logistical and technical
supplies, using ocean-going and sea-going shipping and military
transport aircraft);
stepping up the permanent operational readiness of the basic
complement of intercontinental ballistic missiles, extended and
medium-range ballistic missiles, warships and submarines,
strategic air force and early warning posts;
organizing and carrying out strategic command-post, naval, air,
army and specialist exercises with senior coalition and national
political and military command echelons, staff and command posts
taking part in preparing different variants of mobilization deploy-
ment of reserve components, operational deployment of the armed
forces and various arms, testing their battle readiness and capability
for delivery of nuclear and other strikes in possible theatres of war
and military action;
organizing and improving the work of central and local agencies for
providing for the survival of the administrative apparatus, the
economy and the civilian population in conditions of nuclear or
conventional war;
20 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

1.8 Directives, projects, plans and measures on the part of the USA,
NATO, the main West European countries and Japan and also the
PRC, associated with a possible switch to immediate preparation for
launching and conducting a nuclear or conventional war;

preparation, adoption and implementation of major political and

military decisions for eventually launching and waging a war;
(selection of specific ways, places and dates for going into action,
modification of combined and specialized operational plans for the
conduct of the war);
bringing the higher administrative and military command, control
and communications systems into a state of full combat readiness
(transferring the administrative and military leadership to wartime
command posts, and putting new control and communication
facilities into operation);
gradual or urgent switching of strategic nuclear and conventional
armed forces to a state of full combat readiness, according to the
prescribed alert system;
immediate preparation for carrying out a sudden nuclear attack
(definition of the main sectors and objectives of nuclear and other
operations in the initial period of the war).

1.9 Military strategy directives and aims, designs, plans and measures,
and political and military decisions of the military and political leader-
ship of the United States, the NATO bloc, the principal West European
countries, Japan, and also the PRC, relating to preparing, launching
and conducting limited regional and local wars and stirring up existing
and creating fresh foci of international tension, military conflicts and
crisis situations;

attempts to regain positions lost in the developing countries and

destabilize and change existing regimes;
improvement of combat capabilities and operational utilization of
the national armed forces of developing countries where pro-
American or pro-Chinese forces are in power;
creating, deploying and stepping up the combat capabilities of
rapid-deployment and special-purpose forces on foreign territory;
independent, combined or co-ordinated acts of direct and indirect
MILITARY PRIORITIES 21

aggression (armed intervention in the internal affairs of other

countries and organizing and infiltrating guerrilla formations).

1.10 Opposition of the political and military leadership of the United

States, the NATO bloc, the main West European countries and Japan,
and also the PRC to the peace initiatives of the USSR and the other
countries of the socialist community;

on the questions of preserving and promoting peace, ensuring

international security, political and military detente, full or partial
disarmament, and reducing and eliminating the threat of war;
on regional problems of preserving peace and security, settling
existing and preventing fresh armed conflicts and crisis situations;
on questions of normalizing bilateral relations.

II. Science, engineering and technology

2.1 Directives from the military policy leaders, programmes, plans and
activity of military, industrial and scientific research institutions in the
USA, the NATO bloc, the main countries of Western Europe, and
Japan, and also the PRC designed to increase military technology
potential, with a view to long-term and immediate preparation,
launching and conduct of a nuclear or conventional war.

stepping up fundamental, pure and applied scientific research and

development which might lead to considerable improvement in
existing types or to creating radically new types of strategic and
tactical nuclear and conventional weapons;
active utilization of important inventions and discoveries, and
designs and ideas for military technology, which would ensure that
a really new qualitative level was reached in the upgrading of
individual types of strategic and tactical nuclear and conventional
weapons.

2.2 Scientific, design and construction and technological documenta-

tion and samples from industrial firms, and scientific centres, revealing
results and prospects for utilizing research and development, their
tactical and technical characteristics, design features, production
technology and testing of existing nuclear weapons, and those in
22 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

process of development and also non-nuclear systems designed for

dealing with strategic problems;
land-based and naval strategic missile systems (MX, Midgetman,
'Trident-2', future developments);
strategic and tactical aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons
('B-1' bombers, ATV ('Stealth'), B-52H modifications, F-14, F-18,
Super-Mirage 4000, F-25 fighters, and future developments);
strategic and operational tactical, land, sea or air-based cruise
missiles and remote-piloted aircraft;
nuclear munitions;
anti-submarine defence facilities, including acoustic protection for
submarines, sonar search equipment and non-acoustic submarine
detection facilities;
anti-missile and anti-aircraft defence systems with ground-, air-,
and space-based elements (present position, prospects for develop-
ment and utilization);
control, communications and counter-intelligence systems (C3I) of
the armed forces;
chemical and biological weapons and protection devices against
weapons of mass destruction;
special high-power laser-based weaponry for anti-missile and anti-
space systems, naval and air force equipment and also pencil-beam
and rapid-fire weapons;
reusable space transport systems and long-term orbital stations
used for military purposes;
electronic warfare systems and weapons and also ECM [electronic
counter-measures 1for enemy detection and control systems;
high-energy fuels and explosives;
geophysical weapons (deliberate effects produced on weather and
climate and the ionosphere, and triggering off earthquakes and
tsunamis);
non-nuclear weapons systems designed for strategic purposes
(means of delivery and tactical control, systems for homing on a
target enhanced effect warhead charges);
programmes for introducing new technology and production
methods for military equipment;
present position and prospects for developing the main components
MILITARY PRIORITIES 23

of the PRC's nuclear potential; the PRC's nuclear, space-missile,

aviation and electronics industries.

III. Military strategy aspects of the intelligence and counter-

intelligence activities of the special services
3.1 Directives, orders and tasks of the military policy leadership of the
USA, the NATO bloc, the principal West European countries and
Japan, and also the PRe for providing intelligence and counter-
intelligence support for implementing military strategy and opera-
tional/tactical measures:
extent of information of the military policy leaders regarding major
changes in the military and strategic situation in the world, in the
most important regions and countries, and about military policy
decisions, plans and measures, economic and technical military
potential, the armed forces and armament of the USSR and the
Warsaw Pact Organization and individual socialist countries, and
their readiness and capabilities regarding reciprocal retaliatory
strategic operations in eventual theatres of war and military action;
the considerable increase in the activity of the adversary's military
strategic and operational/tactical intelligence service using agent
and technical penetration against important political, military and
economic targets in the USSR and the other countries of the socialist
community, in order to obtain reliable strategic information and
undermine military and economic potential and morale (reinforc-
ing existing sub-sections of strategic intelligence and creating new
ones for this purpose, improving their organization and establish-
ment, facilities and resources, and methods of operation);
specific plans and measures to acquire and infiltrate agents in the
territory of the USSR and that of countries of the socialist com-
munity, reactivating operations with agents put 'on ice', creating a
reserve agent apparatus, making arrangements for maintaining
reliable communications with them, and providing the necessary
electronic and technical equipment for this purpose;
expansion and active exploitation by hostile intelligence services of
space, air, sea and land observation posts for picking up and
intercepting information;
reinforcement of existing large-scale diversionary reconnaissance
24 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

and sabotage formations, detachments and groups, and creation of

new ones for eventual action in the rear of the armed forces of the
USSR and its allies;
imposing a stricter counter-intelligence system in the adversary's
higher political and military institutions, armed forces and arms of
service, headquarters and command posts, the military branches of
industry, large corporations and firms, and scientific research
centres;
material prepared and submitted by the adversary's intelligence and
counter-intelligence services, including analytical and forecasting
assessments, proposals and recommendations on strategic ques-
tions, providing assistance for working out, adopting and im-
plementing political and military decisions, designs and plans
involved in long-term and immediate preparation for, and eventual
launching and conduct of, a nuclear or conventional war.
No 8 ss
 Residency Priorities:
The Case of Denmark

Residencies around the world had two distinct responsibilities:

first, operations against American, NATO and Chinese targets;
secondly, operations against the host country. The Copenhagen
Residency, where Gordievsky was stationed as a Line N (illegal
support) officer from 1966 to 1970 and as a Line PR (political
intelligence) officer from 1973 to 1978, was a fairly typical case in
point. The three-year operational 'plan of work' drawn up in
1976 by the Resident, Mikhail Petrovich Lyubimov, for the pene-
tration of the Danish Foreign Ministry and Prime Minister's
Office, was intended to acquire intelligence on American and
NATO, as well as Danish. policy:

No 687/PR Top Secret

13 October 1976 Copy No.1
From Copenhagen To Moscow

PLAN OF WORK AGAINST THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AND THE

DANISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (OVER A 3-YEAR PERIOD)

The Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) are important targets in Denmark, the penetration of which
represents a permanent requirement for the work of the Residency.
The Prime Minister's Office is formally considered to be one of the
Danish ministries. It is located in the same building as the MFA (the
Christiansborg Castle); the majority of offices of both departments are
on one and the same floor of this building. The staff of the Prime
Minister's Office consists of 40 officials and roughly the same number
of technical assistants.
The hub of the Prime Minister's Office is the Secretariat through
which passes all kinds of information relating to external and internal
political affairs. Part of this information on external affairs is unique in
26 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

its way, as it reaches the office, bypassing the MFA, by virtue of direct
exchanges between the Heads of Government of the Western
countries.
The Danish MFA has at its disposal a variety of external political
information which is of essential interest to our Service, in particular
that which relates to such questions as NATO, the relations between
East and West, the relations with the USA, political co-operation
within the EEC, the fulfilment of the CSCE [Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe] resolutions. Communications and
reports are received here from Danish Embassies abroad, and there is
information which comes by way of exchanges between the countries
of NATO, the EEC and Northern Europe.
In organizing a deep study of the Danish MFA with the object of
devoting the Residency's efforts to the most important areas, we have
singled out those units of the Ministry where information of the
greatest interest to us is concentrated:
a) the Political Department of the MFA (which consists of three
sections);
b) the third section of the Administrative Department which is respon-
sible for questions of security, for communications and cipher
traffic;
c) the Political Economic Department;
d) the second section of the commercial department which is respon-
sible for economic relations with the Socialist countries and also
responsible for the control over the export of strategic goods.
We are planning the following steps in our intensive study of the
Prime Minister's Office and the Danish MFA:
1. To use the Residency's confidential contacts and operational con-
tacts ... * for gathering information about the activity of the Prime
Minister's Office and about the MFA; also to obtain leads to
officials within these establishments; ... *
2. Fundamental attention in our efforts to study these targets will be
assigned to acquiring agent recruiters. This task will be executed
within the framework of the Residency's overall work plan against
the Main Adversary [US] target (as set out in our 647/PR of 15
September of this year).
3. We shall collect official information about the activity of both

• see explanation on page 28

RESIDENCY PRIORITIES: THE CASE OF DENMARK 27

Ministries, their structure, their regulations concerning recruitmen-

tand so on through official contacts among officials of these
departments; ... *
4. In carrying out a study of the organization of the technical services
of the Prime Minister's Office and the MFA we shall pay particular
attention to the third section of the Administrative Department
which handles all kinds of communications including courier ser-
vice, the cipher services, protection, etc. We shall make efforts to
home in on cipher officials of the Danish MFA. A report will be
submitted about the activities of this section; ... *
5. Measures will be taken to acquire information about the training
and recruitment of officials of the most important elements of the
technical services of the MFA: cipher clerks, couriers, employees in
the photographic laboratories and printing sections, radio
operators, telephonists and others. We shall seek to clarify whether
a special school or courses exist for training cipher clerks for the
MFA and other Danish government institutions. A report will be
prepared on the above-mentioned questions;
6. We shall delve into the working conditions of the technical secre-
taries of the directing staff of the Prime Minister's Office and the
MFA and establish to what extent they have access to secret
documents;
We shall identify the training places and recruitment pro-
grammes for secretaries, typists, stenographers and female assis-
tants in the offices and for the archive assistants;
We shall prepare a report on these questions; ... *
7. We shall make a detailed study of the way in which the operational
staff acquire their jobs in the MFA. We shall clarify from which
training institutions (including from which faculties and from
which department within the various faculties) new officials are
recruited, how the transfer of staff between various government
departments is carried out. We shall take steps to get information
about the methods and depths of the checks which the personnel
section of the Administrative Department of the MFA carries out
on new entrants; ... *
8. After preliminary study we shall try to select from among the
technical personnel of the MFA a candidate for deep cultivation
and subsequent recruitment through Line N [illegal-support] as-
sets. We shall prepare an appropriate proposal; ... *

• see explanation on page 28.

28 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

9. We shall study the possibilities of carrying out a technical opera-

tiont in the MFA buildings or in the flats of its officials. We shall
consider the exploitation of possibilities by Line OT [operational-
technical] in connection with the construction which has already
begun of a new building for the Danish MFA at Christianshavn (an
area of Copenhagen) .... *
KORIN
[M P LYUBIMOV]
[Resident in Copenhagen]

• Pseudonyms of contacts and Residency officers, and target dates for submission of progress
reports, omitted.
tthe planting of bugging devices

During the later 1970s the Copenhagen Residency claimed to

be able to influence the Danish peace movement in anti-
American and pro-Soviet directions. as well as to launch
counter-attacks against American complaints at the abuse of
human rights in the Soviet Union. In 1977 FCD Service A. which
was responsible for 'active measures' (influence operations).
composed a number of letters which it wished to be sent to
Rosalynn Carter, wife of the US President, protesting against
American 'infringement of human rights'. The Copenhagen
Residency persuaded a well-known liberal politician to despatch
one of these letters to Mrs Carter, and sent a triumphant
telegram to the Centre announcing its success.
As usual, KGB active measures in Denmark were co-ordinated
with overt and semi-covert influence operations orchestrated by
the International Department. In October 1977 the International
Department took the initiative in arranging a hearing in Copen-
hagen sponsored by the main Soviet front organization, the
World Peace Concil, to denounce the West German Berufsver-
bot: a ban on various categories of left-wingers occupying
certain jobs. The Copenhagen Residency, meanwhile, was
covertly promoting allegations that 'militaristic and neo-fascist
forces were coming to the fore' in the Federal Republic. s
The Residency's PR Line (political intelligence) Work Plan for
1978 set out a highly ambitious programme both of intelligence
collection and of active measures:
RESIDENCY PRIORITIES: THE CASE OF DENMARK 29

No 907IPR Top Secret

8 December 1977 Copy No 1
Copenhagen To Moscow
To: Comrade Severov [Grushko]

THE COPENHAGEN RESIDENCY'S PR LINE WORK PLAN FOR 1978

The Residency sees the following requirements as its basic objectives

for 1978:
the penetration of Main Adversary targets, in the first instance by
the acquisition of support agents from among the local population;
similarly to aim for agent penetration of the main local institutions
of intelligence interest to us: the Danish MFA and the Prime
Minister's Office;
to carry on Line K work [against China] on the basis that agent
penetration of the Chinese People's Republic embassy in Denmark
is the most important requirement; and to continue the deep study
of the British and FRG embassies;
to proceed with the systematic collection of current political intel-
ligence, relating in the first place to the most important questions:
the policies of the USA, NATO and the EEC, and also questions
which directly affect the interests of the Soviet Union;
to mount active political measures designed to support USSR
foreign policy, with particular regard to their complexity and
international character.
In carrying out its intelligence work the Residency will be guided by
instructions from the leadership of the [Third] Department* and
Service [FCD] and, in particular, by the recommendations and com-
ments expressed in your letter No 2097/PR of 3.11.1977.

1. The Residency's PR Line requirements

a. Intelligence-gathering work
The primary efforts of the Residency's case officers during 1978 will be

• The FCD Third Department was responsible for KGB operations in Britain, Ireland,
Scandinavia, Australasia and Malta.
30 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

directed towards obtaining intelligence on the military-political and

subversive plans of the USA, NATO and China towards the USSR and
other countries of the socialist community, on United States policy
towards Western Europe and the situation on the northern flank of the
North Atlantic bloc. Residency officers will also be endeavouring to
obtain intelligence on the place and role of Denmark in NATO, on new
developments and trends in the policies of Denmark towards the Soviet
Union and the other socialist countries, on the plans for the gradual
transformation of the EEC into a military-political union and on
Danish policies within the framework of the Nine and Northern
Europe.
The Residency is planning to submit to the Centre on a regular basis
analyses on the political situation in the country and on the plans of the
Social Democrats to improve their position, the state of affairs in the
bourgeois parties, subversive activity on the part of the rightist forces
against the Communist Party and against links between the USSR and
Denmark.
Coverage and interpretation of important international conferences,
meetings and negotiations will continue, whether these are held in
Denmark or in other West European countries, including the final
stage of the Belgrade Conference, the meeting of Heads of State and
governments of the Nine in Copenhagen in April 1978, etc ...

b. Line A Work [Active Measures]

The main thrust of our active measures work will be as follows:

I. The exertion of influence on Danish political and social circles with

relation to the questions of detente, East - West relations, the
fulfilment of CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe] decisions and the decisions of the Belgrade Conference in a
way which benefits Soviet policies. The harnessing of support for
Soviet peace proposals, for the policy of disarmament, for the
conduct of the campaign against the Neutron bomb, Cruise missiles
and other new types of weaponry, in whose production the USA has
a stake ....
An important role will be played in this work by the Jutland
Committee for Peace and Security, which was formed with our
participation and also by the All Danish Co-ordinating Committee
for Peace, Security and Co-operation, in the leadership of which our
contacts are active. . ..
RESIDENCY PRIORITES: THE CASE OF DENMARK 31

11. The countering of US and NATO activity designed to increase

Denmark's dependence on the bloc; the exposure of US policies
which aim to heighten the degree of dependence of the Western
European countries.
The exposure of violation of human rights in the USA. The
publication of X's'~ book-album in the FRG and Sweden and
helping to secure its appearance in Britain. Assisting the activities of
X's'~ exhibition-show. The study of the feasibility of putting on the
exhibition in other Western countries.
The disclosure of the increase in the activities of militaristic and
neo-fascist forces in the FRG and the efforts of that country to play
a dominant role in the EEe. The exposure of the attempts of the
ruling circles in countries of Western Europe to transform the EEC
into a military-political union.
In order to perform these tasks we intend to make use of speeches
and broadcasts, based on our theses, by our agents and contacts in
Parliament, in the press and on television and to complete the
publication and distribution of a pamphlet which condemns the
opponents of detente ....
We aim to increase the efficiency of the channel through which
influence may be exerted on the Prime Minister....
iii. The broadening of ways of bringing influence to bear on public
opinion in the Western countries to our advantage. Efforts also to
make use of effective mass information media such as television, the
cinema and radio. With this in mind we must ensure the successful
implementation through 'X"~ of the [anti-US] operation and the
actions associated with it. We must also ensure that this operation
influences other countries of Northern Europe, in particular
Sweden and Norway ....
iv. The discrediting of the policies of the Chinese People's Republic,
which are aimed at supporting NATO and the EEC against the
Soviet Union, and at undermining the international and communist
movement.
Attention will be given, in 1978, to perfecting the various forms
of active measures, endowing them with a complex character, with
the aim of transcending national frameworks, and also so that new
operational possibilities can be provided and instigated.

* an agent recruited by the Line PR officer, Nikolai Petrovich Gribin, later Resident in
Copenhagen from 1980 to 1984.
32 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

2. Operational Measures designed to fulfil the Residency's

Requirements
a) Basic targets for agent penetration Main Adversary work
The Main Adversary work will be conducted in accordance with the
Centre's instructions and the Residency's three-year forward plan (No
647/PR of 15.9.76). We propose to concentrate on the acquisition of
support agents (mainly agent-recruiters and talent-spotters) able to
fulfil our requirements, of which the most important is agent pene-
tration of American targets.
Specifically, the planning for 1978 includes the following:
to continue the study of Main Adversary targets, paying special
attention to the US Embassy as the prime target of interest to us. In
order to collect interesting information on it we shall continue the
practice of meetings with specifial American diplomats. In order to
widen contacts among embassy officials it is proposed to hold a
variety of meetings on an official basis (film shows, sporting
competitions, evening events etc) ....
to carry out a purposeful search for individuals among the technical
staff of the US Embassy and other Main Adversary targets to select
subjects for deep study. To endeavour to create conditions for
making use of Line N [illegal support] facilities in this work.
to continue observation of the living quarters of the technical staff.
Cafes, bars and discotheques where Americans in this category
spend their leisure time will be regularly visited. We shall try to
identify living quarters of the technical staff and their places of
leisure not previously known to the Residency ....
to step up the study of X'''s contacts, directing him to persons of
immediate interest from the point of view of work against the Main
Adversary and bearing in mind their possible future recruitment
under a 'false flag' by X* ....
to complete the recruitment of ... to utilize him as agent-recruiter
and talent spotter for Main Adversary work;
through operational contacts available to the Residency and using
other facilities, to search for a candidate for the role of penetration
agent into one of the Main Adversary targets (or an appropriate
department of the Danish MFA) in the capacity of a technical
employee. We shall increase the practice of utilizing case officers'
wives for this task ....
* see footnote on page 31
RESIDENCY PRIORITIES: THE CASE OF DENMARK 33

to continue the study of Americans (permanently or temporarily

resident in Denmark) from the ranks of businessmen, journalists,
teachers, students etc, ...

Prime Minister's Office (Pseudonym 'TEREM' - Dungeon)

In the work of studying this target for penetration by us in 1978, special
attention must be paid to the identification from among 'TEREM' staff
(especially from among the female technical staff) of those with whom
we may try to establish contact, with a view to their future deep study.
With the same object in view we shall also identify the procedures for
training and recruiting secretaries, shorthand typists and other female
staff of the 'TEREM'. In our study of 'TEREM', use will be made of
information obtained from people working there ... and various
official material. ...

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pseudonym 'SOBOR' -

Cathedral)
Considering that Residency officer have a significant number of official
contacts with this target it is proposed to concentrate our main efforts
in 1978 on a study of that part which presents the greatest interest from
the point of view of penetration and the acquisition of valuable
operational intelligence, namely the third office of the administrative
department which incorporates all aspects of communications includ-
ing couriers, the cipher service and also security protection etc. Work
will be initiated to obtain intelligence on the most important sub-units
of the 'SOBOR' technical services, the identity of couriers, photog-
raphy laboratory workers, secretaries and shorthand typists, together
with their access to secret documents ....
(The study ofthe 'SOBOR' [MFA] and the 'TEREM' [Prime Minister's
Office] as a whole will be effected with due regard to the three-year
plan, No 687/PR of 1976).

Institutions linked to the EEC

The work on the penetration of basic EEC targets in Denmark will be
continued in 1978 in accordance with our forward plan (No 677/PR of
30.9.76). Fundamental attention in this undertaking will be paid to the
Danish MFA where basic documents relating to the Ministry of
Commerce, the Information Offices of the EEC Commission and the
34 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

European Parliament are concentrated. In connection with Denmark's

Chairmanship of the Nine which takes effect from 1 January 1978 we
plan a further increase of our work on the EEC. ...

The KGB had a vested interest in exaggerating the impact of its

active measures. In Copenhagen, as in a number of other capi-
tals, the Residency sought to claim the credit for a whole series of
anti-war and anti-American activities which, in reality, it had
done little to promote. Gordievsky believes that active measures
during his years in Denmark had only a marginal impact. The
Centre, however, considered that 'a significant number' were so
strikingly successful that it reported them to the Politburo.
During 1977 it 'singled out for special mention' 'a complex of
operations' involving a book of unflattering photographs of life
in the United States.

No 3208/PRl55 Top Secret

16 January 1977 (sic, for 1978) Copy No 1
To Copenhagen: Comrade KORIN [LYUBIMOVj

We are sending you herewith an evaluation of the Residency's Active

Measures work in 1977 prepared by the appropriate sub-section of our
servIce:
A significant volume of work in the Active Measures field was
carried out by the Residency during 1977. Forty-five requirements
were placed on the Residency of which 15 were not fulfilled (these were
basically of a non-European nature) and a number of operations were
implemented through the Residency'S own initiative. Among the
operations carried out were:

21 conversations of influence
9 speeches in Parliament
20 public speeches
10 speeches on radio and television
46 publications
4 documentary operations'~
2 books published
• articles and forgeries produced by Service A.
RESIDENCY PRIORITIES: THE CASE OF DENMARK 35

6 meetings and demonstrations

2 exhibitions
7 items of material distributed and a number of other measures

A significant number of active measures implemented through the

Residency's own resources received favourable appraisal and were the
subjects of reports to the leadership of our department, of our service
and to higher authority. * The complex of operations involving the
publishing, distribution and publicizing of the book 'American Pic-
tures' should be singled out for special mention.
Active measures work was correctly organized by the Residency and
its resources were rightly channelled towards aiding the resolution of
the top priority foreign policy tasks facing the Soviet Union, such as
detente and the Belgrade Conference, disarmament, exposure of the
mendacious character of the human rights campaign unleashed by the
USA, the exposure of US and NATO plans to develop and deploy new
types of weapons etc. Some successful operations were also put into
effect against the adversary's subversive ideological centres and against
Western special services.
As a rule the Residency effectively carries out the requirements
received from the Centre, reports competently and fully on the work
done and shows initiative.
Side by side with the positive results which have been mentioned,
there have been some shortcomings in the Residency's performance,
the elimination of which would contribute to further perfecting its
techniques in the active measures field. In particular, cases were noted
of requirements not being spelled out clearly enough to sources; also
there were cases where a check on their performance was inadequate,
with the result that there was some slippage in the political texture of
the operations. Often one was aware of the lack of sound channels for
carrying out incisive operations against the northern flank of NATO
and the USA, for stepping up anti-NATO and anti-American feeling in
Denmark, for urging the Social-Democratic government to cut down
on the country's participation in the military preparations of the
[NATO] bloc, and for exposure of the activities of Western special
services, etc.
A number of measures were carried out by the Residency which were
designed to exert influence on the higher echelons of the Danish

• Instantsiya in Russian. In KGB documents, denotes the highest political leadership, specifi·
cally the Party Politburo
36 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

government concerning the most important international problems

and, judging from available information, successful results were
achieved in some cases. In our opinion these possibilities may also be
utilized in the future but the work must be undertaken in a more
purposeful manner, without losing the initiative. It is evident that the
Residency itself should do more to promote the discussion of topics
favourable to us, but with the Residency taking the lead and not the
target, as has sometimes been the case.
SEVEROV
[GRUSHKOj
[Head of Third Department, FeD]
 The Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG)

After the 'Main Adversary', the Centre's chief targets were the
United States' NATO allies. When NATO was founded in 1949,
KGB operations in Britain were still achieving some spectacular
successes. Kim Philby was about to be posted to Washington as
SIS head of station and liaison officer with the Americans.
Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess were supplying large amounts
of high-grade intelligence from the Foreign Office and diplo-
matic service. By the 1970s, however, the golden age of the
London Residency was past. After the mass expulsion of 105
KGB and GRU officers from London in 1971, the KGB found
operations in Britain more difficult to conduct than in almost any
other major Western State.
The Federal Republic of Germany had replaced Britain as the
most vulnerable of the major NATO members. The post-war
division of Germany and the flow of refugees from the East had
made the Federal Republic, which joined NATO in 1955, an
easier target for Soviet bloc intelligence penetration than any
other West European state. The KGB base at Karlshorst in the
Berlin suburbs was the biggest outside the Soviet Union. The
foreign intelligence agency of the East German Ministry of State
Security, the HVA, was even more successful than the KGB. Its
head for 33 years, General 'Mischa' Wolf, had a reputation as the
ablest, as well as the longest-serving, of the Soviet bloc intel-
ligence chiefs. Among the most remarkable of his several thou-
sand agents in the Federal Republic was Gunther Guillaume,
who for five years was the trusted secretary and personal com-
panion of the West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt. The shock
caused by Guillaume's arrest in 1974 led to Brandt's resignation. 6
From time to time the East German leader Erich Honecker
boasted openly about the HVA's successes. He said on television
in 1976:
38 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

We do not intend to publish the reports of our secret service

about the situation in the Federal Republic, the Bonn
government, the leadership of the CDU/CSU [the Christian
Democrats and their Bavarian allies], or the Federal
Defence Ministry. There can be no doubt, however, that we
are quite well informed. On that subject we rightly feel
optimistic/
As well as being kept informed by Mischa Wolf of most high-
grade HVA intelligence from the FRG, the KGB had a smaller but
important West German network of its own. In 1972 the Soviet
diplomat, Arkadi Nikolayevich Shevchenko (later to defect), was
shown a number of classified telegrams from the KGB Resident
in Bonn, Ivan lvanovich Zaitsev, which he found 'surprising in
the quality and quantity of their information'. He asked the
Foreign Ministry's German expert, Valentin Mikhailovich Falin
(later head of the International Department), 'how we could
obtain such inside intelligence'. Falin 'smiled mysteriously and
would say only, "We have quite a net in West Germany, you
know" '. Vladimir Mikhailovich Kazakov, then head of the FCD
American desk (later Main Resident in Washington from 1979 to
1985), called the FRG 'our door to the West'. 8
The Centre, however, was worried by the media exposure
which followed the arrest of Guillaume and other Soviet bloc
spies. 'The campaign of spy-mania and anti-Sovietism', it com-
plained, had made its work in West Germany 'considerably more
difficult'. In 1977 Kryuchkov issued a directive informing Resi-
dents that 'a pressing need has arisen to expand the spread of
intelligence work against the FRG, stepping up the cultivation
and study of West Germans in third countries for this purpose'.

gn 1 TOP SECRET
2412/PRl60 Copy No 1
26 July 1977 To Residents (according to the list)

Work against West Germany is assuming an increasingly greater

importance at the present time in connection with the growth of the
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 39

economic potential of the FRG and the increase in its influence in the
solution of important international issues.
The Federal Republic of Germany is both economically and mili-
tarily the leading West European capitalist country. It is the main
strategic bridgehead of NATO, where a significant concentration of
the adversary's military strength can be observed: the total numerical
strength of the forces of the Western allies (including the Bundeswehr)
reaches almost a million in the country. This situation distinguishes the
FRG from the other European capitalist states and makes it the most
important component of the military bloc. Within the FRG military
scientific-research studies in the fields of atomic energy, aviation,
rocket construction, electronics, chemistry and biology are being
intensively pursued.
Since the FRG has outstripped the other European countries both in
industrial production and in its scientific-technical development it has
succeeded in filling a leading position within the Common Market and
exerting a direct influence on the other members of the Community for
the solution of important political questions and for the formulation of
a common policy towards the socialist countries.
All this renders it necessary to conduct active intelligence work
against West Germany on all lines of intelligence activity.
At the same time the deterioration of agent operational circum-
stances, the sharp tightening-up of counter-intelligence conditions, the
intensive prophylactic operations conducted by the special services
against the missions of the socialist countries (and in the first place
against the USSR), and continuous fanning of the campaign of spy-
mania and anti-Sovietism have made the activity of our Residencies in
the country considerably more difficult.
With a view to overcoming these difficulties and to solving the
complex intelligence requirements within compressed time scales, a
pressing need has arisen to expand the spread of intelligence work
against the FRG, stepping up the cultivation and study of West
Germans in third countries for this purpose.
At the present time the FRG has roughly 400 official missions
abroad. A large number of West German journalists, advisers and
representatives of business circles are to be found in various countries
of the world. Over 4 million Germans are living in Western Europe at
the present time, while there are roughly 7 million living in the USA and
Canada. German colonies in the countries of Latin America, Africa and
Asia are expanding as a consequence of the growing penetration of
40 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

West German capital into the developing countries. All this creates
favourable pre-conditions for the conduct of intelligence work against
the FRG within the areas mentioned.
Following on from this particular attention should be paid to
planned and well-directed cultivations and studies of West Germans
from among the officials of West German missions and international
organizations who are in your country of residence, and of officials in
local establishments, organizations and firms; and also private persons
who have constant contacts with their corresponding counterparts in
West Germany. Also worthy of operational attention are colonies of
Germans who are permanently resident in the country but who have
business, family and other links with the FRG.
An analysis should be prepared of the possibilities open to the
Residency, selecting from among the Residency's agent-network suit-
able candidates from among local citizens who will be capable of
fulfilling effectively the role of talent-spotters, cultivators and re-
cruiters, for work against citizens of the FRG and against locally
engaged staff of West German institutions; also agents who will be able
to go for lengthy stays to the FRG or who can undertake periodic trips
to West Germany to collect intelligence of interest to us and to fulfil
other operational tasks.
The Annual Reports should contain a reflection of the work which is
being carried out against the West Germans.
Keep us informed about all the material which is of operational
interest concerning the study and cultivation of West Germans in your
country of residence.
ALYOSHIN.
[KRYUCHKOVl

Whatever difficulties the KGB encountered in the FRG were

more than compensated over the next decade by the continuing
success of Wolf's East German network which maintained a high
level of penetration until East Germany itself began to crumble
in 1989. Wolf, who had retired two years earlier, took refuge for
the next two years in Moscow, where he appears to have assisted
the KGB in taking over control of some of his former agents.9
 Albania

If West Germany was the European state outside the Soviet Bloc
on which the KGB was best informed, Albania was probably the
European country about which it knew least. In the immediate
aftermath of the Second World War and the Communist take-
over, according to an Albanian official history, 'The Albanian
Communist Party saw in the USSR a sincere, loyal ally and
resolute defender of the cause of the Albanian people'. It was
believed within the FCD that during the 1950s Soviet leaders had
even discussed building holiday villas in Albania. During the
Sino-Soviet quarrel, however, Enver Hoxha's neo-Stalinist
regime in Tirana sided with Beijing. In 1961 Khrushchev broke
off diplomatic relations with Albania, denounced its Party
leaders as 'imperialist agents', and urged the Albanian people to
overthrow them. Mao, by contrast, declared in 1966: 'Albania is
the shining beacon of Socialism in Europe'.
Within Europe, Albania appeared less like a beacon than an
international recluse, equally suspicious of contact with both
East and West. Hoxha expounded the doctrine of the 'dual
adversary', claiming that the Soviet Union and the United States
were both superpowers bent on world domination. The begin-
ning of a rapprochement between the United States and China in
1972 thus came as an unpleasant surprise in Tirana. After Mao's
death in September 1976, Hoxha eulogized him as 'a great
revolutionary' and ordered three days of official mourning. But
he remained deeply suspicious of the foreign policy of the new
Chinese leadership, warning the Seventh Albanian Party Con-
gress in November 1976: 'You can never lean on one imperialism
[the USA] in order to fight the other [the USSRI'.lO
The first major Centre briefing on Albania after the Seventh
Party Congress correctly pointed to signs of a 'a definite cooling
in Albanian/Chinese relations'. Remarkably, however, the brief-
ing drew on Western rather than Soviet sources for its analysis.
42 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

The breach in diplomatic relations 16 years before had left the

KGB without a legal Residency in Tirana and, apparently, with-
out a significant agent network.

No 969/PR/52 Top Secret

17 February 1977 Copy No 1
To Residents and Representatives
according to a list

THE WEST'S VIEWS ON VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNAL

POLITICAL SITUATION AND FOREIGN POLICY OF ALBANIA AFTER THE
7TH CONGRESS OF THE ALBANIAN LABOUR [COMMUNIST] PARTY

The development of affairs in Albania following the 7th Congress of

the Albanian Labour [Communist] Party (ALP) which took place in
November 1976 continue to attract the attention of Western political
circles. According to assessments by EEC experts the country's
economy is in a 'very serious' state and 'has no prospects of improving'
in the immediate years ahead.
In the same circles it is emphasized that Albania's state economic and
cultural development plan for 1971-75 was revised downwards more
than once, yet all the basic targets remained unfulfilled. The new 5-year
plan approved at the 7th Congress of the ALP envisages a further
slowing down in the tempo of development in the country's national
economy. The intention is over the period 1976-80 to increase indus-
trial output by 41-44 per cent (the 1971-75 plan envisaged 52 per
cent); investment is due to be increased by 33-38 per cent (compared
with the 1971-75 figures of 50 per cent); while turnover is due to
increase by 22-25 per cent (compared with the 1971-75 figures of 50
per cent).
These goals will hardly be achieved in the light of the severe shortage
of raw materials and modern equipment. According to available
information the Albanian government was forced as early as December
1976 to introduce a correction into the five-year plan which had only
just been adopted in order to reduce further a series of objectives.
The decisions taken at the ALP Congress and what has happened on
the basis of these in the succeeding period illustrates that the Albanians
are being guided as before by slogans such as, 'self-help', 'the inten-
ALBANIA 43

sification of the class struggle within the country', and 'the struggle
with the imperialist revisionist encirclement'. Among a significant part
of the population there continues to be dissatisfaction with their
situation and there is hidden displeasure with the political course
adopted by the leadership of the ALP. Despite the purges which took
place in 1973-76 critical statements about the internal and external
policies of the country's leadership are made within a narrow circle by
individual members of Albania's party and state apparatus.
As American experts on this subject have commented Hoxha
'realizes the force of the expressions of discontent' in the country and is
striving to promote into leading posts people who are devoted to him
personally. After the 7th Congress of the ALP Politburo members Isai
and Miska, and Mihali, who was a candidate member of the Politburo,
became Hoxha's pillars in the Albanian leadership.
In the view of the British Foreign Office new purges amongst the
country's leading party and State organs may be expected in the future
in Albania. These same conclusions were reached by the leaders of
some left-wing groups from West European states who recently visited
Albania.
The foreign policy direction of the ALP following the 7th Congress
remains anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese. The Albanian leaders assign the
basic place in their foreign policy to relations with China. At the same
time a definite cooling in Albanian/Chinese relations is observable. In
the speeches of the Albanian leaders at the session of the National
Assembly in December 1976 China and its new leadership were not
mentioned. The Albanian mass information media refrained from
giving information about latest events in the PRe. To those leaders
who in December 1976 were in Tirana representing a number of the so-
called 'Marxist-Leninist' parties, the ALP Central Committee
recommended that they should not express a point of view about the
events in China until such time as Albania had defined its own position
on the matter. The increased friction between Tirana and Peking was
also shown by the fact that at the end of December 1976 the two sides
were unable to sign a protocol relating to an exchange of goods for
1977.
The main questions that are the cause of discord between Albania
and China, in the view of the British Foreign Office, centre on the
attitude towards NATO, the 'Common Market' and the non-aligned
movement.
The leaders of Albania are not in agreement with the Chinese
44 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

pOSItIon on the above-mentioned problems, while the present-day

Chinese leadership is unhappy with the external political direction of
Albania and with the 'embarrassment' which the Albanians have felt in
recent times in connection with the alienation from power of Peking's
radicals.
However, neither China nor Albania is interested in a further
deepening of discord.
Italian diplomats have noted in this connection that China is the only
country from which Albania receives economic assistance. In their
opinion the Chinese are aware that in the event of an estrangement
with the Albanians, the influence of the USSR in the Balkans and in
Europe will be strengthened even more.
Following the 7th Congress, the Albanian leaders and the country's
mass communication media have been continuing to use any excuse for
anti-Soviet attacks.
This was shown particularly clearly at the last session of Albania's
National Assembly which confirmed the country's new constitution.
Speeches about this by Hoxha, Lleshi, Nase, Hasbiu and other
Albanian leaders were all of an anti-Soviet character.
Albania's policy towards the other countries of the Warsaw Pact will
also essentially not change in the near future, according to the assess-
ment of Western experts. At the same time they reckon that Albania is
showing 'a differentiated approach' individual socialist countries.
In Western political circles the comment has been made that after the
ALP Congress, at which Yugoslavia was subjected to serious attacks,
the anti-Yugoslavia campaign in Albania was curtailed. This was
brought about by the desire of the Albanian leadership to expand
somewhat its contacts with neighbouring states which 'are not part of
the zone of influence of the social-imperialists' [i.e. the Soviet Union]
Many Western experts point to the warming of Albania's relations
with some capitalist countries like Italy, France, Belgium, Norway and
Sweden. At the end of 1976 at a conference in the FRG Ministry of
Foreign Affairs a proposal was formulated 'to begin a dialogue with
Albania over its demands for reparations for the damage wrought on
the country by fascist Germany'. Within the FRG Ministry of Foreign
Affairs it is assumed that this 'will provide the opportunity to draw'
Albania into a dialogue with the FRG and NATO on other questions as
well. Greece is resolutely striving for the establishment of closer
contacts between Albania and the West. As the Greek Minister of
Foreign Affairs Bitsios recently declared, the aim of Greek policy is to
ALBANIA 45

convince Albania that she will gain by drawing closer to the other
Balkan countries and to the West.
If opportunities present themselves in the future please despatch to
the Centre any additional intelligence about the questions touched on
above.
IRTYSHOV.
[Y.A. SHISHKIN
Deputy Head, FCD]

The cooling of Sino-Albanian relations proceeded more rapidly

than the Centre had anticipated. In the summer of 1977 a series
of Tirana newspaper articles accused China of 'opportunism'
and 'flagrant departures from the teachings of Marxism-
Leninism'.l1 Albania now proclaimed itself in effect the only
genuine Marxist-Leninist state and the centre of world revolu-
tion. The Centre saw no alternative but to wait patiently for the
demise of Enver Hoxha and a change in Albanian leadership.
 The Vatican

Until the early 1970s the KGB was far more interested in the
Catholic Church within the Soviet Union than in the policy of the
Vatican. Those most active in operations against the Church
were provincial KGBs in the main Catholic areas - the Ukraine,
Byelorussia and Lithuania - who sent regular reports to the Fifth
Directorate in Moscow, founded in 1968 to monitor dissent and
'ideological subversion' in all its forms. During the 1970s the FCD
began to take a more active interest in the Vatican. Residencies
were asked, on a number of occasions, to supply intelligence on
what the Centre believed were the Papacy's increasingly subver-
sive contacts with Soviet Catholics. Their reports were passed on
to provincial KGBs.12
At the end of the decade the main focus of the Centre's
concern with Catholic 'subversion' moved to Poland. It was
severely shaken by the mushroom growth in 1980-81 of Polish
Solidarity, led by an unemployed electrician, Lech Walesa, who
began each day at Mass. Polish experts in the FCD traced the
origins of the Solidarity 'crisis' back to the election in October
1978 of the Polish Cardinal Carol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II.
The moral authority of Poland's Communist government was
visibly eclipsed by that of the Polish Pope. John Paul \l's
triumphal tour of Poland in 1979 witnessed an outpouring of
national and religious emotion unparalleled since the Second
World War. The Centre was better aware than most Western
experts that the military coup ably executed by General Woj-
cieck Jaruzelski in December 1981 with the blessing of the FCD
had achieved only a temporary halt in the onward march of
'ideological subversion'. When the Pope returned to Poland to
another hero's welcome in 1983, he urged those who opposed
the regime to turn to the Church for protection. In October 1984
the Polish Church gained a new martyr when the SB (the Polish
security service) abducted and murdered the pro-Solidarity
THE VATICAN 47

priest, Father Jerzy Popielusko. Walesa declared at his grave-

side: 'Solidarity is alive because you have given your life for it'.13
By now, the days were long past when any Soviet leader was
tempted to repeat Stalin's scornful question, 'How many divi-
sions has the Pope?' The FCD 'Plan of Work' for 1984 named the
Papacy as a priority target. The Vatican, claimed the Centre, was
out to subvert the Soviet Bloc in the belief that 'the action of the
Polish Church to strengthen its position in the state can be
extended to other socialist countries'. The Pope's next two
targets, it concluded, were Hungary and Yugoslavia. In Decem-
ber 1984 the Centre sent out a major directive calling for more
intelligence on the Vatican's 'subversive activity', and for 'large-
scale active measures' to discredit John PaulH personally, create
dissension within the Catholic Church, and weaken its authority.
For these operations to succeed, however, more agents were
required - 'above all, in the Vatican'.

Vn-1 No 733
No. 2182IPR Top Secret
19.12.84 Copy No 1
To RESIDENTS

WORK ON THE VATICAN

In recent years the Head of the Catholic Church and right-wing circles
in the Vatican have been stepping up subversive activity against the
socialist countries and the national liberation and anti-war move-
ments.
In view of this, the heads of our Department attach great importance
to more active efforts on the part of our organization abroad to
penetrate, using agents or other operational means, into the leading
Catholic centres of the West in order to obtain intelligence about
hostile operations in preparation by the Vatican, and also to carry out
large-scale active measures directed towards inciting prominent figures
in the Catholic Church to protest in defence of peace and limitation of
the arms race.
In consideration of the idea put forward by the Vatican for creating
under the banner of a so-called 'religious international', an inter-
48 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

national alliance to combat communist ideology, we think it expedient

to step up operational work with agents in the clerical circles of the
country where you are stationed, in order to deal with the tasks set by
the heads of our Department and Service for working against the
Vatican.
Attachment: Guidelines on measures to counteract the subversive
activity of the Vatican. Top Secret, Copy No 11,5 pages, No 12ss PN
SVETLOV
[GRIBIN]
[ms note]
Comrade GORNOV [GORDIEVSKY] and
PR Line operational staff
Lavrov 26.XII.84

Top Secret
Copy No II
Attachment to No 2182/PR
of 19 December 1984

Measures to counter the subversive activity of the Vatican

In recent times, as the ideological battle in the international arena has
been sharply intensified, the Vatican has pursued a policy of more
energetic subversive action by the Catholic Church in socialist
countries, converting a religious movement into a political opposition
force.
The anti-socialist bias of the Vatican's activity has become particu-
larly marked with the arrival on the papal throne of John Paul II, whose
hostility towards the countries of the socialist community is condi-
tioned both by his personal anti-communist and anti-Soviet convic-
tions and by the influence exerted on him by the most conservative
representatives of the Catholic clergy and reactionary political figures
of the West, especially those of the USA.
The views of the present Vatican hierarchy have found expression in
a document published recently with the Pope's approval, entitled
'Comments on some aspects of liberation theology', which contains
some sharp pronouncements about the socialist countries. Marxist
doctrine is declared to be incompatible with the Christian faith, and the
struggle of those nations fighting for their political, social and spiritual
liberation is regarded as inadmissible.
THE VATICAN 49

The Pope and his entourage are endeavouring by every possible

means to change the established relationship between church and state
in the socialist countries. In the light of the 'Polish experience', they are
trying in the first place to obtain actual complete independence of the
church from the state, strengthen the position of reactionary clergy in
the socialist countries and intensify anti-socialist feeling among the
Catholic clergy and faithful.
The Vatican is at present putting the main emphasis in its so-called
'Eastern policy' on practical steps to revive the activity of Catholic and
Uniate parishes, and on material and spiritual support for the most
reactionary priesthood, inspiring and propagating negative attitudes
among the faithful and setting up an organized 'religious opposition' to
pursue the aim of strengthening the church's influence on the social and
political processes in the socialist countries.
Steps are being taken by the Vatican to pursue this strategic line
using both legal and illegal forms of operation. These are reinforced by
widespread propaganda campaigns accusing the socialist countries of
violating the provisions of the 'Final Act' of the All-European Con-
ference, concerning 'religious freedom' and 'human rights'.
In leading circles in the Vatican, the Catholic Church is considered to
be the sole, well-organized, legal opposition institution capable of
exerting an influence on the broad masses, including workers and
young people, and they calculate that the tactics they have recently
adopted may lead to destabilization of the political situation in certain
states of the socialist community, or in some parts of the Soviet Union.
The Vatican also assumes that the action of the Polish Church to
strengthen its position in the state can be extended to other socialist
countries.
The Vatican is seen to be active, too, in strengthening the positions of
the Catholic Church in the Christian churches' ecumenical movement.
Many statements of heads of the Roman Curia contain appeals to
various religions and churches to 'forget past feuds and achieve mutual
understanding and co-operation in the fight against atheism'. In this
respect particular attention should be paid to the Vatican's efforts to
achieve an alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church and to establish
contacts with the Georgian Orthodox, the Armenian-Gregorian and
other churches, including Protestant ones, operating in socialist
countries. The Vatican has proclaimed the idea of creating a so-called
'religious international' (including not only Christians, but also Islam)
to combat communist ideology.
50 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

The Catholic Leadership is taking specific steps to create a 'cata-

comb' (illegal) church and ecumenical underground societies in
socialist countries 'under the flag of ecumenism', and attempts are
being made to erode the unity of individual churches, (for example the
Russian Orthodox Church) * by bringing in the idea of 'twinned
parishes' among different religious confessions of various countries
and cities.
The Vatican is endeavouring to establish diplomatic relations with
socialist states in order to secure wider opportunities for pursuing its
planned policy. In the Pope's opinion his speeches in defence of peace
and disarmament should arouse interest on the part of the governments
of these countries in developing contacts with the 'Holy See'. At the
same time the Vatican's principal interest is concentrated on the most
'promising' countries of Eastern Europe, from its point of view:
Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Vatican diplomacy attaches great
importance to organizing trips by the Pope to East European countries
and the Soviet Union, which in its estimation might help to further the
growth of religious feeling among the population of the countries he
visits. The Vatican is endeavouring to organize papal visits to Poland,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.
The Vatican also pursues a reactionary policy in relation to progres-
sive social and political forces. For instance, right-wing groups in the
Vatican have recently considerably expanded their subversive activity
against the national liberation movement, above all in Latin America.
Prominent reactionary Catholics, in active co-operation with the
leaders of the chief NATO countries, are endeavouring, with the Pope's
approval, to weaken the anti-war movement. John Paul II and his
supporters in the Vatican are trying to prevent Catholics and Catholic
organizations from being involved in this movement.
In view of what has been said, the efforts of the intelligence service
abroad must be directed to obtaining information on the following
main points:

the plans, forms and methods of subversive activity on the part of

the Vatican and churches and organizations under its control
against the countries of the socialist community and national
liberation and anti-war movements;
any action by the Roman Curia to strengthen the position of the

* RPT [Russkaya Pravoslavnaya TserkovJ in the original KGB text

THE VATICAN 51

Catholic Church in the states of the socialist community and turn it

into a political force to oppose the socialist system;
the attitude of the Pope and his immediate entourage in regard to
the following grave, topical, international questions: East-West
dialogue, political and military detente, the arms race, disarma-
ment, etc;
the Vatican's relations with the larger countries of the capitalist
world and the PRC; co-ordination of policy and co-operation,
especially with the United States and other NATO countries, in
undermining the position of socialism and the national liberation
and anti-war movements, including also co-operation with their
special services;
Vatican action to expand and strengthen the influence of Catholism
in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America;
the situation in the Roman Curia: the disposition of forces and the
struggle for influence between the various trends and groupings.
Work on active measures must be pursued in the following
directions:
discrediting specific manifestations of hostile activity on the part of
the Vatican against the socialist countries. Conveying to the leading
groups of the Roman Curia and to John Paul II personally, the
information that demands for expansion of the sphere of action of
the Catholic Church within the social and state system in socialist
countries is regarded by them as interference in their internal affairs
and may in consequence lead to deterioration of relations between
the state and the church, and also between the socialist countries
and the Vatican;
exploiting, in the interests of the socialist countries, the existence of
any internal dissensions in the Vatican, any dissatisfaction ascer-
tained on the part of influential cardinals with what is, in their
opinion, the 'excessive enthusiasm' of Pope John Paul II for his
'Eastern policy', to the detriment of other sectors of the Vatican's
activity. Emphasizing the fact that lack of concentration on the
problems of the Catholic Church and the broad mass of the faithful
in Western countries and many topical international questions
may, in the final account, affect the authority of the Vatican;
inspiring appeals from Catholic circles to John Paul and the Roman
Curia to make a contribution to the cause of strengthening peace
and international security, stopping the arms race, cutting down
52 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

military expenditure and using the resources thus released for the
fight against hunger and poverty, for solving the problem of
unemployment and providing aid for the developing countries, and
for other humanitarian purposes;
countering the expansion of contacts between the Vatican and the
Russian Orthodox, Georgian, Armenian-Gregorian and other
Christian churches, which are active in socialist countries, and its
efforts to make use of these contacts in its own interests;
exposing attempts by the Roman Curia to promote the anti-social
activity of reactionary elements in Catholic and Uniate circles in the
territory of socialist countries and plans to make use of the church
as a weapon for ideological sabotage of the socialist system in these
countries;
carrying out measures to counter the establishment of a world
organization of young Catholics;
reinforcing the negative view taken by senior Catholic personalities
regarding certain aspects of John Paul II's foreign policy and his
interpretation of Catholicism. In particular, making use of dissatis-
faction among Italian members of the Roman Curia with the Pope's
intention of strengthening his own position by promoting Poles,
West Germans and other non-Italians in the Catholic hierarchy;
taking steps to discredit John Paul II as the protege of the most
reactionary circles in the West, and exposing his anti-communist
and anti-Soviet aims. Undertaking measures to counteract his
attempts to push the Catholic Church into confrontation with the
countries of the socialist camp;
discrediting the policy of right-wing groups in the Vatican designed
to undermine the national liberation and anti-war movements;
uncovering and exposing co-operation between representatives of
the Vatican and organizations of the Catholic Church, and the CIA
and the special [intelligence1services of NATO countries;
In order to deal with these tasks, steps must be taken to make more
systematic use of existing agent resources and to create new ones in
Catholic centres and organizations and, above all, in the Vatican.
 The Arctic, the Antarctic and
the World's Oceans

In the mid-1970s the Arctic emerged for the first time as a major
KGB concern. The deployment of Delta Class submarines armed
with ICBMs in 1973 gave the Soviet Union the capacity for the
first time to launch a nuclear attack on the United States from
the Barents Sea. The Centre believed that growing Western
interest in the oil and natural gas deposits of Spitzbergen and the
rest of the Svalbard archipelago posed a major strategic threat.
Western oil-rigs, it feared, would be equipped to monitor the
movements of the submarines and surface ships of the Soviet
Northern Fleet. Moscow also saw the long drawn-out inter-
national negotiations on the Law of the Sea which began in 1974
as a potential threat to Soviet claims to the continental shelf
beneath the Barents Sea. These concerns led to the creation of
the winter of 1975-6 of a Soviet Interministerial Commission on
the Arctic chaired by N.A. Tikhonov, First Deputy Prime Mini-
ster, with Kryuchkov as one of its key members.
Intelligence collection on Norway and the Arctic was now
considered of such vital importance that it was personally su-
pervised by the Chairman of the KGB, Yuri Andropov. The
Centre's most important source was Arne Treholt, the Nor-
wegian under-secretary responsible for the Law of the Sea
negotiations. During Norwegian-Soviet negotiations in 1977 on
the delimitation of the Barents Sea, Treholt not only kept the
KGB fully informed of the Norwegian negotiating position but
also acted as a Soviet agent of influence. 14 In April 1978 the
Centre issued a major directive 'On the Activities of the West in
the Arctic'. 'At the present time', it told Residents, 'the military-
strategic, political and economic interests of the Soviet Union
demand the adoption of all-embracing measures to reinforce its
physical presence and juridical rights in the Arctic'. Though the
Centre disliked Norway's fisheries conservation policy, it hoped
54 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

that on other issues of Arctic policy it would be able to playoff

Norway against other Western powers. The April directive
ended by emphasizing the 'great importance' which the Polit-
buro as well as the Centre attached to intelligence on Western
plans in the Arctic region.

nm 6 Top Secret
No 21211PRlS2 Copy No 1
20 April 1978
To: Residents (according to list)

ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WEST IN THE ARCTIC

The ruling circles of the Imperialist Powers, especially the USA, have
recently been making persistent efforts to strengthen their political,
economic and military positions in those regions where previously no
sharp confrontation between East and West had been discernible.
Thus, the Arctic, by virtue of its growing economic and military-
strategic importance, has been steadily attracting the attention of the
West.
Prognoses concerning the presence in the Arctic regions of rich
deposits of oil and gas together with the exploitation of the deposits in
the North Sea have given powerful stimuli to the activities of various
countries keen to take control over this region. The Arctic is also rich in
foodstuffs which the West is beginning to regard as a strategic weapon
in its global policy. The Arctic has also always been considered, from
the military-strategic point of view, as a very important region since the
shortest airspace routes between the USA and the USSR pass over its
territories, and those seas of the Arctic Ocean which do not freeze over
provide the sole means of access for ships of the Soviet Northern Fleet
into the Atlantic Ocean. The Western Powers are actively opening up
this theatre of military operations. This is made significantly easier by
the fact that a broad-based infrastructure utilized by NATO already
exists in some of the Arctic regions (Iceland, Greenland and Northern
Norway).
In a preliminary report by a special EEC group, a zone between
Greenland and Norway was designated as being a source of energy
potential of the greatest future significance 'within the confines of the
THE ARCTIC, ANTARCTIC AND THE WORLD'S OCEANS 55

jurisdiction of the member states of the community'. The Western

Powers are persistently trying to obtain Norwegian agreement to
guarantee to the multinational companies access 'without discrimina-
tion' to the oil resources of the Norwegian continental shelf right up to
the border with the USSR. In a closed conference held in Oslo in 1976
on problems connected with oil exploration and processing in the
North, the US representative unequivocally stated that in the event of a
new Arab boycott the Americans would set in motion all means at their
disposal to guarantee maximum exploitation of the oil resources of the
North Sea and the Arctic.
The Western Powers closely link their plans for economic exploita-
tion of the Arctic with military-strategic considerations. In the sessions
of bi-partite working groups on problems of the Arctic, the representa-
tives of the Western Powers strive to convince the Norwegians that the
activities of oil companIes in the Barents Sea would make NATO more
interested in defending Norway in crisis situations and would
strengthen the position of that country in negotiations with the USSR.
The scientific research being carried out by the Western Powers also
has military application. Thus, in the report of the American com-
mittee concerned with the organization of an ice-breaking expedition
following Nansen's route which is planned for the spring of 1978, it
was explained that one of the aims of the expedition was the 'detection
of acoustic peculiarities which have to be taken into account for the
development of equipment essential for underwater operations in the
Arctic Ocean'. Apart from the Americans, the Swedes are also prepar-
ing for another expedition through the seas of the Arctic Ocean, in
which it is proposed to repeat the voyage undertaken in this region by
N orden scheid.
Attempts by NATO countries to expand their activities to the
Spitzbergen archipelago have been noticed; navigational stations have
already been constructed linked up with the US aero-space communi-
cations system; also an aerodrome capable of use by jet aircraft;
Spitzbergen is regularly visited by Norwegian warships and aircraft.
The NATO leaders, using the pretext of keeping a check on fishing in
the 200-mile economic zone off the Norwegian coastline and on the
200-mile fisheries conservation zone around Spitzbergen, have
demanded from the Norwegians the construction of a special patrol
fleet in order to keep track of Soviet warship and aircraft movements.
The absence of universally recognized, clear-cut statutes of inter-
national Marine Law determining the maritime boundaries of in-
56 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

dividual states creates favourable prerequisites for the Western Powers

to put forward the idea of the 'internationalization' of the Arctic; that
is to say, the acknowledgement of the total surface area of the seas
within the confines of the Soviet Arctic Sector as an 'open sea'. As is
evident from available data the Western Powers may put forward this
idea in case of a breakdown in the Soviet-Norwegian negotiations on
the demarcation of the continental shelf of the Barents Sea, and states
poor in energy resources together with developing countries may
support it. In the opinion of individual Western Powers the mere
formulation of such a proposition will be to the definite political
detriment of the Soviet Union.
In the course of their negotiations with the Soviet representatives the
Norwegians have stuck to the principle of the 'meridian line' (that is the
line of equal distance from basic points on the territories of contiguous
countries) on the issue of the demarcation of the continental shelf of the
Barents Sea, claiming thereby an area of more than 150,000 square
kilometres currently included in the Soviet Polar Sector. The
Norwegians have introduced a 200-mile fisheries conservation zone
around Spitzbergen, and this also includes a part of the Soviet Polar
Sector. These actions by the Norwegians are contrary to Soviet inter-
ests and, in fact, coincide with the general Western line on limiting the
Soviet Union's influence in the Arctic. At the same time the Norwegian
government is striving with all its powers to secure, physically and
juridically, extensive areas of the Polar regions, and this objectively
creates favourable conditions for bi-partite Soviet-Norwegian co-
operation, especially if account is taken of the fact that powerful
Western countries disagree with Norway on various aspects of its
policies in the Arctic. Apart from this the Norwegians are interested in
maintaining a 'traditionally low level of tension in Northern Europe'.
In its efforts against the advancement of the idea of 'internationaliza-
tion' of the Arctic, the Soviet Union can also, to a certain extent, count
on the support of Canada, which despite pressure from its allies still
favours points of view close to those of the USSR on the problems of the
Arctic. The Canadians have come out in favour of the sectoral principle
in the demarcation of the continental shelf, full national sovereignty
over its waters, navigable zones, straits and airspace, and Canadians
also favour strict conditions governing the exploration for, and pro-
cessing of, valuable minerals. They are ready to agree only to the
discussion of topics connected with the security of navigation and
protection of the environment, but at the same time they consider that
THE ARCTIC, ANTARCTIC AND THE WORLD'S OCEANS 57

only those countries with territories in the Arctic continental belt

should take part in such discussions.
At the present time the military-strategic, political and economic
interests of the Soviet Union demand the adoption of all-embracing
measures to reinforce its physical presence and juridical rights in the
Arctic. In this connection great importance is attached to the acquisi-
tion and submission to the Centre of up-to-date intelligence on the
problems of the Arctic which is essential for the preparation and
implementation of a complex of measures on the part of the Soviet
Union in this region. Special attention must, therefore, be centred on
obtaining reliable data on the plans and specific activities of the West in
the Arctic, with a view to throwing light on the following topics in
particular:
1. The discussion of military-political and economic questions con-
cerning the Arctic within the NATO and EEC institutions, and also
within the International Energy Agency. The positions of the
participants, especially the Americans, Canadians, West Germans,
Norwegians and Danes. Plans and possible steps adopted by the
NATO leadership with relation to the Arctic regions aimed at
undermining Soviet security. Intelligence on applied military
research and completion of the NATO infrastructure in the Arctic.
Divergencies in the positions of individual members of the bloc,
including where these are conditioned by their specific national
interests in the region.
2. Intelligence on the plans for the 'internationalization' of the Arctic
which are being worked out by Western NATO member-countries.
The juridical and political arguments supporting these intentions.
The attitudes of individual countries (primarily the Americans,
Norwegians, Danes and Canadians, but also the French and
Japanese) to these plans. Possible specific steps on the part of the
West towards officially launching these plans, with the aim of
undermining the political position of the USSR, measures aimed at
securing support on these issues on the part of neutral non-aligned
and developing countries.
3. Data on the work of the mixed bi-partite working groups on the
Arctic, composed of Norway and the USA, Britain, France and the
FRG. The presence of other groups of a similar kind with Western
countries participating. The basic topics discussed at sessions of
these groups, the points of view of the various sides, the decisions
and recommendations adopted and the results achieved (in the
58 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

opinion of those taking part). Information about the possibility of

the West adopting a common stance with regard to the UN
conference on the Law of the Sea.
4. Specific information on the direction, scope and future development
of economic activity in the Arctic by the leading Western Powers.
5. The studies being carried out by scientific research institutions and
by the ministries and departments responsible for them on prob-
lems connected with the exploitation of fuel-energy, mineral and
foodstuffs resources of the Arctic: the facilities allotted to scientific
research and experimental development work for this purpose.
Specific plans and steps taken by the USA and Sweden for the
implementation of projects to send maritime expeditions to the Arctic.
6. The attitudes of the principal Western Powers on Spitzbergen, their
views regarding Norwegian measures to strengthen Norway's
sovereignty over the archipelago and to the establishment of
'national' control in the zone surrounding it. The West's appraisal
of the functioning of the 1920 Paris treaty on Spitzbergen. Problems
of the Spitzbergen continental shelf and possible solutions, as
envisaged by the Western countries.
7. The progress and results of prospecting work undertaken by the
Norwegians in individual parts of Spitzbergen; intelligence on
participation by foreign specialists.
8. Concrete examples of pressure by the West on Norway with a view
to obtaining a tougher line vis-a-vis the Soviet Union with regard to
the problems of the Arctic regions, including the resolution of
problems which arise from the Soviet presence in Spitzbergen. The
evaluation by Western countries, principally the USA, of the cur-
rent policy of the Norwegian government towards these problems,
any evidence that these countries are co-ordinating their policy
towards Norway.
When organizing work on the problems of the Arctic, it is essential to
bear in mind the long-term nature of this requirements and the great
importance which the authorities* and also our department attach to
the acquisition of intelligence on the topics indicated.
SEVEROV
[V F GRUSHKOj
[Head of the Third Department, FCD]

* lnstantsiya in Russian. In KGB documents, this denotes the highest political leadership,
specifically the Party Politburo.
THE ARCTIC, ANTARCTIC AND THE WORLD'S OCEANS 59

There was no slackening over the next few years in the

Centre's interest in the Arctic. In 1981 General Titov, then head
of the Third Department which directed KGB operations in
Scandinavia, proposed the establishment of a new Residency
equipped with a sigint station at Barentsburg on Spitzbergen in
order to monitor Norwegian activity and Western naval move-
ments in the area. His proposal was approved in the winter of
1981-82. Simultaneously a new Arctic Section was founded in
FCD Service 1 (Reports), headed by A.P. Semyonov who had
previously been stationed at the KGB Residency in Stockholm.
The 'Plan for Work on the Problems of the World's Oceans, the
Arctic and the Antarctic, 1982-1985' distributed to Residencies
in December 1982 hCid comparatively little to say about intel-
ligence requirements in the Arctic, probably because these were
being so amply supplied by Treholt. Late in 1978 Treholt had
been posted to the Norwegian mission to the United Nations, for
part of his time in New York, Norway was a member of the
Security Council. In 1982-83 he was at the Norwegian Defence
College, cleared for NATO 'cosmic' top-secret material; the
prosecutor at his trial later likened Treholt's activities in the
college to those of a fox let loose on a chicken farm.15
The Centre felt much less well supplied with intelligence on
the Oceans and the Antarctic which were listed for the first time
in 1982 as KGB priority targets. Both the United States rap-
prochement with China and the Japanese economic miracle had
strengthened the Soviet sense of vulnerability in the Pacific. The
Centre's Work Plan identified three main specific anxieties: the
role of submarine-launched nuclear missiles in alleged US and
NATO plans for a first strike against the USSR; the implications
of American refusal to ratify the UN Law of the Sea Convention;
and United States schemes to exploit its superiority in deep-
water technology by pressing ahead with the extraction of
minerals from the seabed.
60 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

No 1967/PR Top Secret

15.11.82 Copy No 1
To Residents

PLAN FOR WORK ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD'S OCEANS, THE

ARCTIC AND THE ANTARCTIC, 1982-1985

The heads of our department have endorsed our service's plan for
working on the problems of the world's oceans, the Arctic and
Antarctic for 1982-1985. These issues have been listed as priorities for
your Residency. Work in this field must therefore be embodied in the
structure of the plan and the results shown in annual reports.
The world's oceans, the Arctic and the Antarctic are acquiring
continually increasing global importance among the range of issues
involved in inter-state relations.
The American and NATO doctrine on military strategy envisages
wide use of naval forces, primarily underwater-based, as one of the
major forms of offensive strategic armaments and weapons for a 'first
strike' directed against the USSR.
At the same time, ensuring permanent access to the mineral
resources of the sea bed is considered by the USA to be of vital
importance for the economy and defence of the country. The Ameri-
cans are preparing to expand their mastery of the oceans' resources,
reckoning on exploiting their leading position in this area as an
additional lever to exert influence on their allies and also on the
socialist and liberated countries.
The United States has refused to vote for adoption of the text of an
International Convention prepared by the third UN conference on the
Law of the Sea and has declared that it will not sign it. At the same time
it is confronting the socialist and developing countries with an
imperialist alternative solution for the matter, having concluded an
agreement in September this year with Britain, the FRG and France for
regulating temporarily the extraction of useful minerals in the open
sea. Our adversary is also maturing plans to implement practical
measures prejudicial to the interests of the USSR in the world's oceans,
the Arctic and the Antarctic.
At the same time the adoption of the International Convention does
not settle all questions. Problems such as the delimitation of territorial
THE ARCTIC, ANTARCTIC AND THE WORLD'S OCEANS 61

waters, maritime economic zones and the continental shelf between

contiguous countries continue to be of topical importance, as do also
problems of economic exploitation in international waters.
The USSR is interested in peaceful, rational exploitation of the
subsoil, seabed and expanse of the world's oceans and in arrangements
for equal co-operation with all countries for mutually advantageous
utilization of the mineral and organic resources of the sea.
Our service is also called upon to make its contribution towards
solving these grave problems, pursuing its activity in the following
principal directions:

1. Information-gathering and Analysis

Attention should be concentrated on obtaining covert information on
the following matters:

The military strategy of the USA and NATO in the world's oceans.
Plans and specific measures of the NATO political and military
leadership to strengthen its position in the most promising zones
and areas for operational deployment of a naval strike force and
underwater nuclear forces intended for attacking Soviet territory
and blockading Soviet naval forces, especially in the North Atlan-
tic, the Mediterranean basin and the northern waters of the Pacific
and Indian Oceans.
Intentions and the most important actions on the part of the USA,
other developed capitalist countries and also states belonging to
'Group 77' in regard to entry into force and practical implementa-
tion of the international convention on the Law of the Sea. At-
tempts by the USA to use the separate agreement with Great Britain,
the FRG and France to undermine the convention and inflict
damage on Soviet interests.
The growth of contradictions between the USA and the rest of the
world on the problems of the world's oceans. American measures to
increase their superiority in deep-water technology and control
over strategic resources in order to exercise political influence. Any
manoeuvres by large American companies to change their national
flag in order to register sectors with the International Sea Bed
Agency and the probable military and political consequences of
this. Approaches by the USA to third countries to conclude bilateral
and regional agreements on exploiting the continental shelf and
economic zones of these countries.
62 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

The national programmes for the world's oceans of Canada,

Australia, and individual European countries (especially Great
Britain, the FRG, France, Italy, Norway and the other Scandinavian
countries); in Asia (primarily Japan, India, Indonesia); in Latin
America (especially Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Peru),
and African countries. The prospects for co-operation between the
USSR and specific countries abroad in military and economic
spheres related to the world's oceans. Possible actions by the
adversary damaging to Soviet interests.
Any complications expected in the situation in individual areas in
connection with the process of demarcation of territorial waters,
the continental shelf and maritime economic zones. The competi-
tive struggle on the issues of economic activity in international
waters.
The military and political concepts of the USA, Canada, Norway
and Denmark in the Arctic and how they are implemented. The
policy of these countries in the matter of carrying out provisions of
the convention on the Law of the Sea on the jurisdiction of these
states in areas covered by ice. Specific operations designed to
'internationalize' the Arctic. The 'Arctic' programmes of Japan, the
FRG, Great Britain, France, and other Western countries and also
China.
Designs of individual countries, including members of 'Group 77'
to extend the operation of the convention on the Law of the Sea to
the Antarctic. Any plans designed to undermine the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty to the detriment of the Soviet Union's interests. Any opera-
tions planned to make use of the territorial division of the Antarctic.
American intentions regarding development of its natural
resources.
2. Active Measures
The main tasks of our intelligence service abroad in this field are
considered to be:
Exposure of the United States' and NATO plans and activity to
exploit the world's oceans for purposes of military strategy, and
especially to create and build up military bases in particular mari-
time zones and areas and to concentrate surface and underwater
nuclear forces with the intention of carrying out attacks on the
USSR.
Promotion of the signing and later on also the ratification of the
THE ARCTIC, ANTARCTIC AND THE WORLD'S OCEANS 63

international convention of the Law of the Sea, by the majority of

the States of the world.
Exposing the policy of the USA and its principal allies designed to
achieve unilateral advantages in opening up the world's oceans.
Discrediting any attempts by the USA and other NATO countries to
involve individual developing countries in exploiting specific
resources of the sea bed in international areas, circumventing the
international convention.
Helping to deepen existing contradictions and differences between
the USA and other countries of the world on questions related to the
world's oceans.
Exposing American ideas on politicizing the problems of the Arctic
and 'internationalizing' areas of the Arctic.
Helping to disrupt any plans designed to undermine the 1959
Antarctic Treaty to the detriment of the USSR's interests.
Creating suitable conditions for importing modern deep-water
equipment and technology into the USSR.
The following action must be taken to deal with the tasks men-
tioned:
Using the existing operational facilities, undertake action to
promote the protection of the Soviet Union's interests in the
matter of the world's oceans, and discredit United States' policy,
especially attempts to create obstacles to the entry into force of
the International Convention, and to 'internationalize' Arctic
issues, etc.
Special emphasis must be put on exposing American plans to exploit
the world's oceans for purposes of military strategy, especially in the
north-western and north-eastern parts of the Pacific Ocean, areas of
the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Panama Canal and the Malacca
Straits:
Work energetically to aggravate disagreements between the USA
and industrially developed, and also developing, countries on a
number of serious issues connected with the world's oceans.
Utilize especially, in the interests of the USSR, the disagreement
on the part of Canada and some other countries with the attitude
of the USA on Arctic questions and the dissatisfaction of the
liberated countries with American policy on exploiting the
resources of the sea.
64 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

3. Operational Work with Agents

In order to carry out the tasks mentioned above in the fields of
information and analysis, and of implementing influence operations,
steps must be taken to exploit existing agent facilities to good purpose
and to create new ones.
To this end:
Determine the main targets (state institutions, involved in formulat-
ing and implementing policy in regard to the world's oceans,
scientific research institutes and large firms connected with study of
these matters, and with designing and producing the requisite
equipment, and international organizations, etc) and organize
planned study of these. Step up work on targets which have already
been identified and persons of interest to us in these targets, in order
to obtain information and samples of equipment, and also carry out
influence operations.
Examine the intelligence access of agents, confidential contacts and
special unofficial contacts among foreign nationals and suggest
specific sectors for employing them.
Take steps to acquire new agents and confidential contacts among
foreigners, above all from among civil servants, representatives of
the business world, scientists, specialists, who have real prospects
of carrying out assignments connected with world ocean problems.
Select from among co-opted Soviet citizens persons who have
suitable access by virtue of the position they occupy in Soviet
institutions abroad, ministries and departments, scientific es-
tablishments or international organizations; supplement the range
of co-opted Soviet citizens with the necessary specialists and experts
on world ocean questions who are working in departments and
scientific institutions (IMEMO, ISKAN, IKIAN, * the State and
Law Institute, the Latin America Institute, etc). Pay particular
attention to Soviet specialists working in international organiza-
tions concerned with world Ocean matters.
Arrange for case officers, and also agents and persons of confiden-
tial status among Soviet citizens, to be sent to scientific centres and
institutions in Western countries which are concerned with

• the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, the United States and Canada
Institute, the Chinese Institute of the Academy of Sciences
THE ANTARCTIC AND WORLD'S OCEANS 65

oceanographic research, through scientific exchanges as members

of delegations, trainees and post-graduate students.
SILIN
[G FTITOVl
[Head of the Third Department, FeD]

Despite the growing importance of the Pacific in Soviet strategy

during the early 1980s, the KGB presence in Australasia re-
mained small: only seven legal officers in Australia and even
fewer in New Zealand. Jubilation in Moscow over the election of
David Lange's Labour government in New Zealand on an anti-
nuclear programme in 1984, however, led to plans to expand
KGB operations. The Centre told the London Residency that it
attached 'huge importance' to operations designed to organize
European support for Lange's anti-nuclear policies. KGB officers
were promised decorations if they succeeded in gaining in-
fluence over any anti-nuclear movement (Greenpeace excepted
because of its 'anti-Soviet' line on whaling).16
Greater KGB optimism in the Pacific was balanced by a major
setback in Arctic intelligence collection. On 20 January 1984
Arne Treholt was arrested in Oslo as he was about to board a
plane for a rendezvous in Vienna with Gennadi Titov, head of the
FCD Third Development. In his briefcase were 66 classified
documents from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.17 For mote
than a year (perhaps longer), the KGB Residency in London had
received no telegrams containing specific intelligence require-
ments on the Arctic. Following Treholt's arrest, it received five
such telegrams in six weeks. The fifth, signed by Kryuchkov
himself, quoted a recent analysis by the Centre of Arctic Intel-
ligence which concluded that insufficient information was now
being obtained, and exhorted the Residency to increase its
efforts.
 Africa

In the mid-1970s the Centre was full of optimism at the spread of

Soviet influence in sub-Saharan Africa. A vaguely Marxist mili-
tary junta, the Derg, seized power in Ethiopia in 1974. A year
later the Marxist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
(FRELlMO) also emerged victorious. In 1976 the Marxist Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), headed by
Samora Machel, was recognized by the Organization for African
Unity (OAU) as the legitimate government of Angola.
A decade later, the mood at the Centre had changed dramati-
cally. It was taken by surprise in March 1984 when FRELlMO
signed the Nkomati non-aggression agreement with South
Africa. 18 Soon afterwards N. V. Shishlin, foreign affairs consultant
to the International Department (and later to Gorbachev), told
the London Embassy and KGB Residency in a private briefing
that 'saving Mozambique' was beyond Moscow's power; its
economy had virtually collapsed and FRELlMO was riven with
internal rivalries. Shishlin considered Angola's economic prob-
lems as catastrophic, and its political leadership as divided and
incompetent, as those of Mozambique. He feared that the MPLA,
like FRELlMO, might be forced to come to terms with South
Africa. 19
Telegrams from the Centre expressed similar concerns,
usually in more guarded terms. Gordievsky noted (but did not
copy) one telegram on Southern Africa, received by the London
Residency shortly after Shishlin's briefing, which claimed that
South Africa had been able to exploit the very difficult economic
and political situation in various African states, particularly
Angola and Mozambique, to pressurize them into agreements
which were favourable to Pretoria. At the same time, the Centre
believed, South Africans had their own economic problems and
were finding it expensive to maintain garrisons in Southern
Angola and Namibia, as well as supporting UNITA (Union for the
AFRICA 67

Total Liberation of Angola) and the Mozambique counter-

revolutionaries. This gave them an added incentive to reach a
settlement. The telegram implied that these developments al-
ready posed a threat to Soviet influence in the area and that this
threat might become serious.
The London Residency was asked for information on the fol-
lowing points:
a. US plans to undermine the Soviet position in Southern Africa;
b. US activity to pressurize its allies not to give more economic
assistance to Angola and Mozambique;
c. South African attempts to emerge from isolation and to establish
diplomatic relations with African states;
d. Western pressure on African states to support Western policy with
regard to South Africa;
e. a possible move by Mozambique into the Western sphere of
influence and possible preparations for a Mozambique rejection of
military co-operation with the Soviet Union; the likelihood of
Mozambique mediation between UNITA and the MPLA; Machei's
position on the question of a Namibia settlement and the presence
of Cuban troops in Angola; possible changes in FRELIMO's ideo-
logical base;
f. disagreements within the Angolan and Mozambique leaderships on
possible reconciliation with their counter-revolutionary move-
ments; the normalization of relations with South Africa and the
USA as a means of neutralizing these movements; and the solution
of their financial and economic crises. Which personalities within
the leaderships were the main 'transmitters' of Western influence?
g. possible changes in the SWAPO position on a Namibian settlement
and their readiness to reach a compromise. Which political or-
ganizations might stand against SWAPO in elections held under
UN auspices?
h. the position of the African National Congress (ANC); Western
attempts to dissolve the ANC or weaken its Marxist base; how
serious were the statements by ANC representatives that they
would carryon the struggle from Mozambique in spite of the treaty
with South Africa?
 Asia

The KGB's main Asian target was the People's Republic of China
(PRC), which ranked immediately behind the United States and
its NATO allies in the order of KGB global priorities. 20 Because of
tight security within the PRC, however, Hong Kong became a
more important base than Beijing for Line K (anti-Chinese)
operations. Hong Kong contained, in addition to a number of
PRC official missions, a wide variety of Beijing-controlled Hong
Kong businesses and organizations, all of which were potential
targets. In April 1978 the Centre sent Residents a list of PRC-
controlled Hong Kong organizations, and other undertakings in
Hong Kong with contacts in mainland China. Additional targets
included foreign missions in Hong Kong, British and American
intelligence agencies, and scientific institutions whose students
were regarded as potential agents.
Some of the potential targets were shrewdly chosen. But there
were also some curious omissions. Among 'the best informed'
Hong Kong newspapers, the FCD made no mention of the Ming
Po, considered by some Western Sinologists to be the best
informed of all. The Centre's knowledge of Western intelligence
operations was also curiously patchy. It referred to 'the RAF
Radio Intercept Service' but made no mention of the important
GCHQ signals intelligence (sigint) operations. Nor did it include
in its long list of targets the Joint Services Intelligence Bureau
and the Ministry of Defence Language School.

vm.1 SECRET
No 1734/PRl62 Copy No 1
20 April 1978
To Residents

We are forwarding herewith a brief on 'Basic targets of interest to line

in Hong Kong' for your active consideration and possible operational
utilization.
ASIA 69

In our opinion this brief may be utilized in the organization of work

against line 'K' targets from within third countries, in particular, in the
implementation of operations designed to achieve the infiltration of
our agents into Hong Kong.

Chinese Peoples' Republic (PRC) targets in Hong Kong

Although it retains its formal status as a colony, Hong Kong is, at the
same time, fully within the sphere of Peking's* activities, both in the
area of active foreign policy and economics. The influence of China on
the internal life and external relations of Hong Kong is steadily
increasing. The bulk of the PRC's foreign trade transactions are
implemented through Hong Kong, so too is China's economic and
scientific-technical co-operation with the outside world Hong Kong
occupies an important place in the PRC's foreign tourism and also in
the field of its overseas cultural relations. In the political sphere Hong
Kong has been used, and continues to be used by the Chinese leader-
ship, for establishing relations with Western countries. Hong Kong
remains to this day the place where the Chinese prefer to contact their
foreign partners using various methods including secret ones. As
before, Hong Kong provides the connecting link between the PRC and
the Chinese emigre communities in South East Asia and other regions
of the world.
Because of all these factors there has been a marked increase in the
number of PRC official missions in Hong Kong over the past few years
and, equally, of various local organizations and undertakings which
are under the control of Peking. Thus, the PRC controls more than 40
Hong Kong banks, a large number of trading and industrial firms,
together with a number of local newspapers. Chinese influence is also
strong in the Hong Kong trades-unions. Among the most important
PRC official missions and local organizations controlled by Peking are
the following:

The Bank of China, 2A, Des Voeux Rd. C. Hong Kong; telephone
5-234191; telegraphic address Chun Kuo Hong Kong.
The China Travel Service H.K. Ltd, 3 Queen's Rd. C. Hong Kong;

• Russian transliteration from Chinese corresponds to the traditional English method rather
than the modern Pin-Yin (Peking, not Beijing).
70 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

telephone 5-224181-9; telegraphic address Travelbank Hong

Kong. This agency deals with all questions concerning travel to the
PRC by foreigners.
The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, 24 Conn aught Rd.
C. Hong Kong; telephone 5-2242555; telegraphic address
Chichacom, Hong Kong. The Chamber ensures contacts between
Peking and the representatives of overseas countries on various
matters, supplying the Chinese with information on the state of the
international markets.
The New China News Agency, 5 Sharp Street, Hong Kong; tele-
phone 5-720190; telegraphic address Hsinhua, Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Chinese Clerks' Association, 87 Lockhart Road,
Hong Kong; telephone 4-729459.
The Hong Kong Federation of Trades Unions.
The Publishers of the newspaper Ta Kung Pao, 342, Hennessy
Road, Hong Kong; Telephone H-728211.
The Publishers of the newspaper Wen Wei Pao, 4 Percival Street,
Hong Kong; telephone H-770923.
The China Resources Company, Bank of China Building 2A Des
Voeux Road, Hong Kong.

Business organizations in Hong Kong which maintain permanent

contact with China
Hong Kong is the large financial, commercial and industrial centre of
Asia. New firms are registered in Hong Kong at a rate of about 400
monthly. Bank investments there double themselves every five years.
More than a million people visit Hong Kong each year, of whom 30-40
per cent are businessmen.
Hong Kong continues to be the main market for Chinese goods. The
annual export of goods from the PRC to Hong Kong amounts to about
500 million US dollars. Hong Kong is one of the most important
sources of foreign exchange for the PRC - more than 25 per cent.
The growth of business activity in Hong Kong, and the expansion of
its ties with the PRC obliges local and foreign businessmen to devote
greater attention to the study of the state of the economic market in
China, and associated questions such as the situation in the PRC, the
internal and external policy of the Chinese leadership, etc. There are a
number of business organizations in Hong Kong, which concern
themselves with collecting up-to-date information on the above-men-
tioned questions. Frequently this information is of a confidential
ASIA 71

nature. The following are among the more notable organizations of

this type:
The Commerce and Industry Department, Fire Brigade Building,
Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong. This is a State organization
concerned with matters relating to the trade and industry of the
Colony. It is staffed by more than 1500 employees. In the Depart-
ment's information office there is an index of about 10,000 subjects
with information on various economic questions. This organiza-
tion is one of the best sources for information on the PRC, covering
a wide range of subjects.
The Federation of Hong Kong Industries, ELDEX Industrial Build-
ing, 21 Ma Ta Wei Road, Hunghom, Kowloon. Founded in 1960, it
aims at quality control and the observance of international stan-
dards for products manufactured in Hong Kong. The Federation
has a good technical library. It makes recommendations to the
government and private individuals on industrial matters and the
setting up of new companies.
The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, 901-907 Union
House, Chater Road, Hong Kong. Founded in 1861 - the first
Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce. It has good sources of infor-
mation on a variety of trade matters. There are more than two
thousand member-companies in the Chamber representing bank-
ing, insurance, maritime affairs and all aspects of commercial
activity. It has more than 75 employees including emigres from the
PRe. The Chamber of Commerce possesses one of the best com-
merciallibraries in Hong Kong. This Chamber represents the UN
office of EKADV* in Hong Kong and is a member of the British
National Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of British and
Commonwealth Chambers of Commerce. The office of the or-
ganization is to be found at Room 1128, Star House, Kowloon,
Hong Kong.
The Chinese Manufacturers' Association, CMA Building, 10th
Floor, 64-65 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong. Founded in
1934. More than 2,000 commercial firms are members. The
Association has a permanent exhibition centre for displaying the
products of member-companies. The organization may serve as a
good intermediary for commercial contacts in the PRe and Hong
Kong .
• This may be a garbled reference to the Bangkok-based ECAFE organization.
72 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

The American Chamber of Commerce, 322 Edinburgh House,

Hong Kong. Founded in 1969 for the development of trading
relations between Hong Kong and the USA. It has more than 525
companies on its books and most of these have been founded in
Hong Kong during the past few years. It has good trading contacts
with the PRC and publishes interesting statistical reports and
analytical material on trade with the PRC.lts permanent staff is not
large. It has a library.
The Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Queen's Road Central,
Hong Kong. Founded to foster business contacts between Japan
and Hong Kong. There are more than 4000 Japanese businessmen
in Hong Kong and the Chamber of Commerce maintains close
relations with most of these through its 120 member-companies.
Webb Associates Ltd, PO Box 757, A-3 Gardena Court, 2 Kennedy
Terrace, H.K. This is one of the best sources of information on the
financial position and credit worthiness of Hong Kong companies.
Apart from this, the firm specializes in the study of probable
investors and also in the preparation of surveys on industry and
trade.
The Hong Kong Exporters Association, Star House, 6th Floor,
Kowloon. It has 118 member-companies and files with information
on a large number of companies. It is concerned with questions
relating to the quality of goods produced in Hong Kong, and also
on marine freightage. Although the number of member-companies
is not large, they include some of the biggest in Hong Kong. The
Association's information may be of value in checking the reputa-
tions of dubious companies.
The Trade Development Council, Connaught Centre, Connaught
Road Central, Hong Kong. A government organization concerned
with the problems of export development and also economic and
trade research. It has offices in London, New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Amsterdam, Brussels, Frank-
furt, Vienna, Manchester, Stockholm and Hamburg. It publishes a
monthly journal, Hong Kong Enterprise, which is distributed gratis
among 45,000 businessmen the world over. It is the only organiza-
tion in Hong Kong which collects information on all business
matters in Hong Kong.
The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, 24-25 Connaught
Road Central, Hong Kong. Founded in 1900, it has 2000 member-
companies and is the largest Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong.
ASIA 73

It maintains a pro-Peking attitude and is concerned in the commer-

cial transactions between the PRC and foreign firms. It maintains
close contact with the Canton trade fair and also with State Trade
organizations in Peking and their representatives in Hong Kong.
The Kowloon Chamber of Commerce, 2 Liberty Avenue, Kowloon.
It has a membership of 40 companies and more than 3000 private
persons whose interests are closely linked with Taiwan.
The Indian Chamber of Commerce,S a Duddell Street, Hong Kong.
300 member-companies. This organization may be utilized for the
collection of information on the PRe.

Foreign Missions in Hong Kong

The foreign policy departments of the Western countries and those of
the majority of developing countries regard Hong Kong as a highly
advantageous point from which to observe events in China. There are
35 Consulates-General in Hong Kong working independently from
either their embassies in Britain or in the PRe. The collection and
analysis of intelligence on the PRC is the main function of their staffs of
whom a large number are Chinese speakers.
There is always a very significant number of foreign journalists in
Hong Kong. Practically all the large Western press-organs, together
with those of the developing countries, are represented by their own
staff in Hong Kong. There are likewise many China specialists among
these foreign newsmen.
The US Consulate-General is the largest of all these foreign missions
in Hong Kong - its staff consists of 150 Americans and 400 locally
engaged citizens. The number of China specialists alone amounts to
approximately 60. Some of these were, before the formation of the
PRC, working in China.
The Consulate-General monitors the Chinese Press and reports
emerging from the PRe. It maintains a unique card-index on state and
political figures, party officials, academics, military and other per-
sonalities in the PRC whose names have appeared in the Chinese Press
or in other material.
Of particular interest is the Consulate-General's Department of
Continental China whose staff is directly concerned with the problems
of the PRC, in particular with the collection and analysis of intelligence
on political, economic and military matters, and with forecasting
developments and events in the PRe. The Department participates
directly in preparing the bulletin issued by the US Information Service
74 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

in Hong Kong, 'Current Scene'. In the editorial articles appearing in

'Current Scene' (whose authors are, as a rule, members of the Depart-
ment) use is made of information on the PRC which has been obtained
from intelligence sources.
On the subject of foreign journalists in Hong Kong (in the context of
acquiring useful contacts and information on China) the following is
worthy of attention: The Foreign Correspondents Club of Hong Kong,
Sutherland Street; telephone 237734. Of the local Hong Kong news-
papers, the best informed on the Chinese scene are the South China
Morning Post and the Hong Kong Standard.

British Special {Intelligence] Service Sub-sections in Hong Kong

The Special Services of a number of Western countries are active in
Hong Kong. Their main function is to obtain by all possible means
intelligence on the situation in the CPR. The most active are the Special
Services of Britain and the USA which frequently co-ordinate their
activities on China. The British Special Services, being a part of the
administrative set-up in Hong Kong, also fulfil counter-intelligence
functions; they work in this connection partly from an official stand-
point, which to some extent makes it easier to study them.

Special Section of British Military Intelligence in Hong Kong. This

is a small group of officers attached to the Defence Department.
Among their tasks is the collection of intelligence of a military
nature on the PRC including that obtained by way of exchanges
with the Military Liaison Department of the American Consulate-
General.
The RAF radio intercept station in Saiwan. This is concerned with
intercepting communications of a military nature in Southern
China.
The RAF monitoring station in the Tui Mo Shan region, New
Territories.
Special Branch of the Hong Kong Police - SB; telephone H-
234011. This is the principal C.I organ of Hong Kong. This
Department collates all available data on foreigners and organizes
the work of studying them, paying particular attention to repre-
sentatives of the socialist countries. The immigration section for
checking bona fides, and the foreigners' registration section, are
subordinate to this Department. The foreigners' registration sec-
tion is responsible for refugees arriving in Hong Kong from China
ASIA 75

illegally, while the Immigration section deals with Chinese im-

migrants who have exit visas from the PRe. The Special Branch
maintains contact with, and assists local and foreign organizations;
it also aids private individuals. For example, at the request of the
American authorities it carries out a check of Chinese seeking entry
visas to the USA. It is known that the Special Branch fulfuls
individual assignments on behalf of the FBI and communicates
essential information to some of the better-known journalists.
The UK Regional Information Office for South-East Asia, 501,
Ridley House, 2 Upper Albert Road, Hong Kong; telephone H-
234830. The R. J. O. is an analytical department of the British
Foreign Office. It maintains contact with British Intelligence, and
makes use of such sources as the results of the BBC monitoring
service, the correspondence of British Diplomats in Peking, the
Hong Kong Police Special Branch reports on the results of inter-
rogations of Chinese refugees and British Foreign Office material.
The Weekly Bulletin of the R.I.O. - China News Summary - is
distributed in English and Chinese to all the Hong Kong news-
papers and to foreign Consulates-General, journalists and aca-
demics. In addition the R.I.O. distributes unofficially the publica-
tions of the Analysis Department of the British Foreign Office -
Asian Analyst, China Topics and China Notes.
The BBC Monitoring Service. This is a comparatively small group
handling the intercept of the broadcasts of 12 Chinese provincial
radio-stations. For technical reasons the BBC Hong Kong group is
limited to Central, Southern and Western China. (The intercepting
of broadcasts from Northern and North Eastern China is carried
out by CIA's information service on Okinawa.) The intercepted
information is made available on a commercial basis to journalists
in Hong Kong and is then placed in the publication Summary of
World Broadcasts which is issued daily by the Headquarters of the
BBC Monitoring Service at Reading (England), Information
obtained officially from the 'Hsinhua' agency is also included in this
publication. The Summary is one of the most important sources on
China for West European sinologues.

Hong Kong Scientific Institutions

From the operational point of view the most interesting Hong Kong
Scientific Institutions are those that carry out research on Chinese
subject matter and prepare students to become specialist scholars on
76 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

China. These have up-to-date information on China; and from among

their students may be found useful contacts including candidates for
deep study with future potential.
The Union Research Institute, 9 College Road, Kowloon. This
Institute was founded in 1951 and its Director is a Chinese - V. Sui,
who is a specialist on Culture and Education in China. It is
subsidized through the Asiatic Fund by the British government
together with certain US monopolies. Its basic task is to make up-
to-date information on China available to government, business
and scientific circles in the USA and Western Europe. Fifty Ameri-
cans, British and Chinese work in the Institute. There is a Secre-
tariat, library and a research department which analyses incoming
material. As sources of information it utilizes the press, television,
Chinese films from the People's Republic, the reports of diplomats,
businessmen, tourists and merchant seamen who visit China. The
Institute publishes China Weekly, China Monthly, Biographical
Service (biographical information on politicians and statesmen in
the PRC). In addition to this it also publishes reference material,
collections of documents on the history and economics of China, on
military and political matters, on the activities and speeches of
Chinese leaders etc.
The Universities Service Centre, 155 Argyle Street, Kowloon;
telephone K-640241. This forms part of the Union Research In-
stitute. Created in 1963 with funds from the Carnegie and Ford
foundations in order to assist Sinologues in the collection of
essential information. The Centre maintains links with the US
Consulate-General in Hong Kong and assists scholars from abroad
to find suitable contacts in Hong Kong academic circles. Scientific
workers and doctoral candidates, mainly Americans, come to the
Centre to complete their theses. The Centre ensures possibilities for
various categories of scientific-research work for young specialists
in Chinese studies.
The Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. Its director
is the American scholar, F. King, Professor of Economic History.
The Centre is concerned with the study of Chinese history, philo-
sophy and culture, together with the Chinese language and the
political and economic problems of contemporary China. In recent
years the Centre has regularly organized scientific conferences and
symposia on various Chinese and East Asian subjects. In addition to
this, permanent seminars are at work which survey such problems
ASIA 77

as the intra-Party and internal political struggle in China, the

'Cultural Revolution', Chinese emigration in different countries,
etc. The Centre issues the Journal of Oriental Studies in which
articles on the problems of contemporary China and the Far East
appear.
The Institute of Modern Asian Studies at the Hong Kong Univer-
sity. Founded in 1963, it works in close contact with the Centre of
Asian Studies. The well-known expert on the Chinese economy R.
Sya is its head. The institute conducts research into various aspects
of life in contemporary China and organizes seminars on the
problems of China and other Asiatic countries. The Institute pub-
lishes the weekly Mainland China Review and Contemporary
China Economic and Social Studies. Articles and documents are
published in these reviews which throw light on the contemporary
economic and political development of China together with the
international relations of the PRe.
The Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Chinese University of
Hong Kong. Founded in 1962, its Director Van Ho-chun is a
specialist in present-day Chinese politics and was educated in
England. The institute co-ordinates research carried out by differ-
ent departments of the Chinese University on Far Eastern problems,
works out new methods of studying China and organizes discus-
sions and conferences.
The Institute of Advanced Chinese Studies and Research at the
Chinese University has been in existence since 1953. Wu
Tsun-Chen is head of the Institute, which pursues reseach into the
history, philosophy and literature of China.
The Institute of Chinese Studies at the Chinese University. Opened
in 1967, it trains students to become experts on China and carries
out scientific research work on Chinese problems.
The Centre for the collection and analysis of information on the
situation within China. Created and owned by the Jesuit order. The
well-known Jesuit Sinologue Ladani is its director.
78 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

Taiwan and pro- Taiwanese organizations in Hong Kong

The Central News Agency, Bank of East Asia Building, 10 Des
Voeux Rd; telephone H-238522.
The Hong Kong Trade Union Council.
SEVEROV
[GRUSHKOj

All three of the countries where the Centre found intelligence

operations most difficult to conduct - Albania, China and North
Korea - were Communist states outside the Soviet bloc. Tight
security in Kim II Sung's neo-Stalinist police state made the work
of the KGB Residency in Pyongyang as difficult as in Beijing.
Moscow viewed with alarm Kim's growing flirtation with China
during the early 1970s. In 1973 the Soviet Union suspended arms
shipments, and the PRC became North Korea's main arms sup-
plier. Two years later during what the North Korean press
portrayed as a triumphal tour of foreign capitals, Kim II Sung
visited Beijing and Bucharest but missed out Moscow.
The KGB regarded Kim himself with feelings of both betrayal
and contempt. Kim posed as a wartime resistance hero who had
freed his country from the Japanese yoke in August 1945 after a
partisan campaign of unsurpassed brilliance. The Centre, how-
ever, was well aware that Kim had not even been in Korea in
August 1945. While Korea was being liberated by Soviet troops,
Kim had been serving in Russia as both a lieutenant in the Red
Army and an agent of the NKVD (the predecessor of the KGB).
Because of the difficulty of intelligence collection inside North
Korea, most KGB operations against it were conducted in foreign
capitals where Kim's regime had diplomatic missions-a strategy
similar to that employed against the PRe. North Korean em-
bassies, however, were thinner on the ground than those of
China. In the West the main centre for KGB operations was
Scandinavia, all four of whose capitals contained North Korean
embassies. (Elsewhere in Europe, only Austria and Portugal had
diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.) The most successful of
the Scandinavian Residencies was that of Copenhagen, which
ASIA 79

succeeded in obtaining intelligence on North Korea via sources

in both the Danish Socialist People's Party, a splinter group
which had broken away from the Communist Party, and the
Danish-North Korean Friendship Society, founded in the spring
of 1976. 21
The Centre was particularly pleased with a report obtained by
the Copenhagen Residency on a meeting in the summer of 1976
between Kim II Sung and a Socialist People's Party delegation.
According to the Residency's account of the meeting, Kim II
Sung had claimed that North Korea's lack of great-power status
gave it an advantage over both China and Soviet Union in
relations with developing countries. Kim admitted, however, to
grave concern at the possibility of another Korean War. He
thought China and the Soviet Union were likely to come to his
aid, but admitted that he was not certain that they would. Kim
then set out a plan for a world-wide solidarity movement involv-
ing Western socialists and social democrats, similar to that which
had opposed the United States in Vietnam, to support his plans
for Korean unification. 22
This report was highly praised by the Centre and circulated to
the Politburo. So were three more telegrams on North Korea
from the Copenhagen Residency during 1977. Kim's unrealistic
plan to win mass support from Western socialists led the Centre
to show unnecessary nervousness about the prospect of a rap-
prochement between North Korea and the Socialist Inter-
national. This was one of a number of topics on which it
instructed the Copenhagen Residency to obtain further intel-
ligence.

No 4774IND Top Secret

5 December 1977 Copy No 1

COPENHAGEN

To: The Resident

During 1977 the Residency turned its attention to the elucidation of
questions concerning Korea. In the main the data received from you are
80 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

of interest and supplement intelligence which we have on individual

aspects of the situation in the Korean peninsula, the internal situation
and the foreign policy of both the Korean People's Democratic
Republic and South Korea. Out of fourteen telegraphed reports
received from you in the course of this year, three were submitted to the
Authorities* one was utilized in the compilation of an analytical
report, your report No 952 was submitted to the leadership of our
department and the remainder were filed for information.
In its foreign policy, the leadership of the Korean People's Demo-
cratic Republic is paying considerable attention at the present time to
developing relations with the Scandinavian countries including Den-
mark and striving thereby to 'erase' the consequences of the notorious
narcotics scandal. Notwithstanding their heavy indebtedness to some
developed capitalist countries amounting to some 1.5 billions of
dollars, the North Koreans are endeavouring to maintain their indus-
trial~conomic links with the West at the previous level, and, where
possible, to increase them. Thus, for example, in June-July of this year,
a large party of Danish specialists visited the Korean People's Demo-
cratic Republic to pass on experience of operating of the Sunchkhon
cement factory which has been constructed there with the assistance of
Japan, Denmark, Austria and other capitalist countries.
The existing data, and in particular your report No 952, confirm the
interest of the Korean Labour Party in developing relations with the
Socialist and Social-Democratic Parties of Western Europe, in particu-
lar with those in the Scandinavian countries on whose support the
North Koreans will rely this December in Tokyo at the meeting of the
Social-Democratic Party leaders within the framework of the Sotsin-
tern [Socialist International].
We are, therefore, interested in obtaining specific information on the
development of relations between the Korean People's Democratic
Republic and Denmark in various spheres and, in particular, infor-
mation on how the Danes are reacting to North Korean feelers
regarding an increase in the links. Of particular interest would be data
on the hidden meaning behind the efforts of the Korean Labour
[Communist] Party to activate contacts with parties belonging to the
Sotsintern.
Inasmuch as there is information indicating that the ruling parties of
the Scandinavian countries co-ordinate their policies with regard to the

* Instantsiya
ASIA 81

Korean People's Democratic Republic and concert their steps towards

the development of links with the Korean Labour Party, the possibility
cannot be ruled out that you may receive information on the Korean
People's Democratic Republic's contacts with other countries of Nor-
thern Europe and also with the USA and the People's Republic of
China. We should be extremely interested to receive any such infor-
mation.
The foreign-policy stand of the Korean People's Democratic
Republic and of South Korea is characterized by the endeavours of
these countries to achieve the maximum consolidation of their posi-
tions in this or that region to the exclusion of their rival. We would
welcome information on the respective positions of North and South
Korea in the countries of your region, particularly Denmark, and
information on which circles support which country.
We request you, as far as possible, in preparing intelligence reports
for the Centre, not to confine yourself to evaluations emanating only
from Korean representatives but to supplement these with appraisals
and statements from responsible representatives of your country of
residence.
SEVEROV
[v. F. GRUSHKOj
[Head of Third Department FCD]

By the end of the decade the Centre's anxieties about North

Korea had somewhat diminished. Pyongyang was put out by
both the Sino-American rapprochement and the Chinese inva-
sion of Vietnam in 1979. Thereafter Soviet arms supplies to
North Korea resumed. The Centre agreed to a request from
North Korean intelligence for a variety of intelligence equip-
ment. While the Chinese boycotted Red Army Day in February
1980, Pyongyang celebrated once again the 'militant friendship'
between Soviet and North Korean forces. 23 Intelligence on North
Korea subsequently became a less urgent priority. It was not
mentioned by name in either the review of foreign operations in
1982-83 or the FCD Plan of Work for 1984.24
 The Middle East
At the end of the 1960s Egypt seemed to offer a secure base for
Soviet influence in the Middle East. In addition to the more than
20,000 Soviet advisers in Egypt, the KGB had penetrated the
Egyptian bureaucracy on an impressive scale. Its agents included
President Gamal Abdel Nasser's intelligence chief, Sami Sharaf.
There were numerous jokes within the Centre about the 'Soviet
Egyptian Republic'. But after Nasser's sudden death in Septem-
ber 1970, the vast edifice of Soviet influence crumbled rapidly
away. Within two years Sharaf had been arrested, the Soviet
advisers had been sent packing and many of the agents recruited
under Nasser had broken contact. Because of heavy surveillance
by Egyptian security, meetings with the agents who remained
usually took place outside Egypt in locations such as Cyprus and
Beirut. Nasser's successor, Anwar el-Sadat, was denounced in
the Centre as a traitor. His Director of Intelligence, General
Ahmed Ismail, was known to be in contact with the CIA.25
Sadat's unilateral denunciation of the Soviet- Egyptian friend-
ship treaty in March 1976 caused little surprise in the FCD. In
November 1976 the Centre circulated a memorandum (zapiska)
to Residencies, accurately predicting that Sadat would continue
to strengthen his ties with the West, especially the United
States:

TOP SECRET
4923/52 Copy No 1
3 November 1976 To Residents
(according to list)

ON THE SUBJECT OF EGYPTIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR

AND THE USA

An analysis of the available information shows that the leadership of

THE MIDDLE EAST 83

the ARE [Arab Republic of Egypt], headed by Sadat, is continuing its

policy of widening its contacts with the West, primarily with the USA.
Sadat's policy of developing all-round co-operation with the West
has not so far brought any perceptible benefits to the ARE. According
to well-informed Arab diplomatic circles in Cairo, there appears to be
growing disappointment on the part of the Egyptians that American
economic assistance has been much less than is required in order to
stabilize the ARE economy. According to available information, the
Americans do not intend to help Egypt in the future to the extent
required by Sadat. The US deputy Minister of Finance, Parsky, con-
siders 'that the main course of economic co-operation between the
ARE and the USA lies through the increase of private American capital
investment, while assistance given through government channels must
only serve as of the Egyptian economy for the assimilation of the
former'. American private business is, however, approaching eco-
nomic co-operation with Egypt with great caution. According to an
assessment by the leadership of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, private investors are frightened by the
internal political instability and by the inability of the present ARE
administration effectively to manage the economy.
At the same time Sadat is not prepared to take measures to improve
relations with the Soviet Union. The Egyptian leadership is planning
very shortly to reduce to a minimum the number of Soviet military and
technical specialists in the ARE and to decrease the size of Egyptian
missions in the USSR. The training of Egyptian military personnel in
Soviet military training establishments is being interrupted and the
number of Egyptian students going to the USSR is being reduced.
According to information from Egyptian business circles, the curtail-
ment of relations with the USSR is creating dissatisfaction in a con-
siderable section of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, particularly among the
representatives of firms specializing in the production and sale of those
goods whose main buyer is the Soviet Union. The State sector of
Egyptian industry remains dependent on deliveries of Soviet equip-
ment, spare parts and raw materials. According to the view of the
Counsellor of the Prime Minister, Rahman, it is more advantageous for
Egypt to obtain spare parts from the USSR than to switch over to home
production based on the use of Western technology and equipment.
The greatest dissatisfaction with the present foreign policy exists in
army circles. It is considered in these circles that with the slowing down
of the process of reaching a Middle East settlement, the danger of a
84 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

renewed military conflict with Israel is increasing. Notwithstanding

Sadat's efforts to diversify his sources of arms, the West has not so far
given Egypt any real military help. The US Ford administration con-
siders it expedient to start deliveries to the ARE of certain types of
military equipment, but cannot overcome the resistance of the pro-
Israel lobby in Congress. At the same time the cessation of deliveries of
Soviet military equipment and the recall of Soviet military specialists
has a bad effect on the battle-readiness of the ARE army. According to
information from Egyptian military circles, more than half of their
aviation equipment and a large part of their rocket, armoured and
other equipment requires overhaul or replacement. According to the
assessment of the American Special Services, if the United States is
unable in some way to fill the vacuum which has been caused by the end
of Soviet-Egyptian military co-operation, then the situation in the
Egyptian army will become explosive, and the 'Army generals could
decide to mount a coup' .... *
In an effort to lessen the dissatisfaction in the country with its biased
policy towards the West, the Egyptian leadership is taking certain
steps, which are intended to give the impression that it is interested in
the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. Egyptian officials
make statements about the ARE's desire 'to build bridges with the
USSR'. This theme features in a number of Sadat's latest speeches, and
the same was said by Foreign Minister Fahmi in a conversation with a
Soviet representative. The President of the National Assembly, Mare,
has spoken about the possibility of arranging a visit by him to the USSR
by him unofficially but with Sadat's knowledge. The tone of anti-Soviet
propaganda has been somewhat softened, and Egyptian representa-
tives abroad have been instructed by the Egyptian Foreign Office to
abstain from anti-Soviet actions. However, in the words of the former
ARE Prime Minister, Sidki, 'the readiness of SADAT to seek a recon-
ciliation with the USSR is a mere manoeuvre, based on expediency'.
Sadat is convinced as before that merely by showing outward signs
of friendship he will be able to succeed in obtaining military-economic
help from the USSR without damaging American-Egyptian relations.
The ARE Ambassador in the FRG emphasized in a private conversa-
tion that 'in conducting his policy, Sadat proceeds on the basis that the
strategic interests of the USSR in the Middle East will in the long run
force the Soviet side to agree with the conditions laid down by Egypt'.

* Passage omitted.
THE MIDDLE EAST 85

Judging from reports received, the Egyptian government will con-

tinue to pursue the all-round development of American-Egyptian
relations.
SVITOV

Despite Soviet anger at Sadat's 'betrayal', the oil crisis which

followed the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War in 1973 encouraged
the Centre's hopes for a revival of Soviet influence in the Middle
East. Arab oil producers first cut off oil exports to the West, then
joined other OPEC countries in enforcing an enormous rise in oil
prices. For the first time, a part of the Third World had success-
fully brought economic pressure on the West. Moscow was
taken aback by the role played by the region's leading oil
producer, Saudi Arabia, which it had previously regarded as
under the thumb of the United States. The Centre nurtured
illusory hopes of weakening the American ties of the oil-rich
Shah of Iran. (It was slow to foresee his overthrow in 1978.) The
FCD also persuaded itself that political instability in Turkey
might bring to power a left-wing government.
At the annual FCD Party Conference on 26 November 1975,
General Kryuchkov announced that Iran and Turkey had been
designated priority targets, second in importance only to the
USA, NATO and the PRe. Heavy security in both countries,
however, made intelligence operations 'extremely difficult'.
When the later defector Vladimir Kuzichkin joined Directorate S
(illegals) in 1976,26 he discovered that there was not a single
illegal working in Turkey.27 The KGB's most important agent in
Iran, the 56-year-old General Ahmed Mogharabi, recruited 30
years before, was arrested in September 1977 and later
executed. There followed what Kuzichkin, then stationed in
Teheran, considered 'an intelligence vacuum' in the Residency.28
The other major state in the Middle East where operating
conditions were most difficult was Saudi Arabia. Because of the
absence of Soviet-Saudi diplomatic relations, the KGB lacked a
legal Residency in Riyadh.
The head of Directorate S, Vladimir Kirpichenko, a Middle
Eastern expert whose past successes included the recruitment of
86 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

Sami Sharaf, won Kryuchkov's support for a plan to recruit

iranian, Turkish and Saudi students and expatriates in Europe as
illegal agents for use in their home countries.

Outgoing No 20302IN Top Secret

30 December 1977 Copy No 1
To Residents
(According to distribution list)

On account of the extremely complicated agent-operational conditions

in Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia which make the conduct of intel-
ligence work particularly difficult in these countries, and in accordance
with forward plans approved by Comrade Sviridov [Andropov], it is
intended in the near future to mount a complex of measures to step up
work in the above-mentioned countries on an illegal basis. To this end,
and in conjunction with the resources of the Centre and of legal
Residencies in countries of the Near and Middle East, it is envisaged
that the active use of the resources of a number of Residencies in
European countries will also be required.
In view of the fact that a relatively large number of young students
and expatriates from Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are in Europe at
the present time it is essential to start work on selecting from among
this category of person candidates whose services we may be able to
utilize for Line N purposes in the very near future.
In the light of the directives of Comrade Alyoshin [Kryuchkov], No
3994IN of 28.3.75 and No 7059 of 17.6.76 with which you are
familiar, we request you to outline ways and means of stepping up the
work of selection, study and deep study of candidates for subsequent
use for illegal intelligence purposes in the above mentioned countries.
This will mean:
a thorough analysis of the agent resources and other assets of the
Residency to identify persons who may be of use in the plan already
mentioned; in this connection it is also desirable to analyse avail-
able material on agents and confidential contacts who have lost
their potential in Europe;
the organization of work in order to select and study candidates
from among Iranian, Turkish and Saudi Arabian citizens who
possess real possibilities for carrying out intelligence work as
special [illegal] agents or as agent-employers;
THE MIDDLE EAST 87

the identification of candidates from among the citizens of other

countries of the Near and Middle East who have opportunities to
travel to Iran, Turkey or Saudi Arabia for extended periods;
bearing in mind the large number of technical specialists who travel
from the European countries to take up employment in Iran,
Turkey and Saudi Arabia, a purposeful effort should be undertaken
to make a deep study of candidates from this category of persons
with a view to their subsequent despatch to the countries already
mentioned.
Suggestions on the foregoing to reach this office by 1 March 1978.
VADIMOV
[KIRPICHENKO]
[Head of Directorate S, FeD]

Though the Centre did not foresee the Islamic Revolution which
brought the Ayatollah Khomeini to power in Iran in early 1979, it
was cautiously optimistic about its consequences, hoping that
the Marxist Tudeh party and other left-wing groups would be
able to play an influential role in the new regime. Social change,
it believed, would make Iran more progressive and better dis-
posed to the Soviet Union.
In May 1979 the high-flying Leonid Vladimirovich Shebarshin
(later to succeed Kryuchkov as head of the FCD) was posted as
Resident in Teheran with personal instructions from Andropov
to rebuild an Iranian agent network within two years. He did not
succeed. In 1980 13 Soviet intelligence officers and diplomats
were ordered to leave. A year later, the two leading KGB illegals
in Iran were arrested in Switzerland. 29 At the end of 1981 KGB
Residencies in Teheran and elsewhere were instructed to draw
up four-year plans for increasing Soviet influence in Iran. The
plans proved hopelessly optimistic. In 1982, while serving as a
Line N officer in Teheran, Kuzichkin defected to SIS. In 1983 the
Tudeh Party was dissolved; 18 Soviet intelligence officers (in-
cluding Shebarshin), diplomats and their families were expelled.
During the later 1970s Moscow's closest major ally in the
Middle East was Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In 1977 the Centre
informed Residencies that, by decision of the Party Central
88 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

Committee, in view of the close relations established between

Iraq and the Soviet Union, all intelligence operations against Iraq
were to cease forthwith. Existing Iraqi agents and 'confidential
contacts' were to be downgraded to 'official contacts'. No other
state outside the Soviet bloc benefited from such a self-denying
ordinance on the part of the Soviet intelligence community.
When Saddam Hussein began imprisoning large numbers of
Iraqi Communists in April 1979, the ordinance was lifted.
Soviet-Iraqi relations were further complicated when Saddam
began the Gulf War with Iran in September 1980. Moscow
eventually decided to give secret backing to Iraq but remained
deeply suspicious of Saddam himself.30 Shortly before Gordiev-
sky's recall to Moscow in May 1985, the London Residency
received an urgent request for all possible intelligence on Iraqi
preparations for chemical and biological warfare and on assis-
tance for these preparations from abroad. 31
 Zionism and Israel

'Zionist subversion' was one of the KGB's most enduring con-

spiracy theories. The Stalinist era bequeathed to the KGB a
tradition of antisemitism masquerading as anti-Zionism still
clearly visible even in the mid-1980s. In 1948, however, the
Soviet Union had been the first to recognize the state of Israel,
seeing its creation as a blow to British imperialism inflicted by
progressive Jews of Russian and Polish origin. Alarm at the
enthusiasm shown by Soviet Jews for the new state, combined
with evidence of Israel's growing links with the United States,
produced a rapid volte-face in Soviet policy. Henceforth, Zionism
was officially condemned as part of an imperialist plot to subvert
the Soviet Union.
The campaign against imaginary Zionist conspirators spread
throughout the Soviet bloc. The 1952 trial of the 'Leadership of
the Anti-State Conspiratorial Centre led by Rudolf Siansky' in
Czechoslovakia identified 11 of the 14 defendants, including
Siansky himself, as 'of Jewish origin'. The simultaneous purge of
Jews from the Soviet nomenklatura was nowhere more ener-
getically pursued than at the Centre. By early 1953 all Jews had
been removed from the MGB (predecessor of the KGB), save for a
small number of 'hidden Jews': people of partly Jewish origin
who were registered as members of other ethnic groups. In the
winter of 1952-53 the MGB crushed a non-existent 'Jewish
doctors' plot' against Stalin and the Soviet leadership, unmask-
ing a group of innocent doctors as 'monsters and murderers'
working for a 'corrupt Jewish bourgeois nationalist organiza-
tion' in the service of Anglo-American intelligence. 32
Though the level of anti-Zionist and antisemitic paranoia
dropped sharply after Stalin's death in March 1953, it did not
disappear. None of the Jews sacked from the MGB at the height
of the antisemitic witch-hunt was reinstated. Over 40 years
later, at the beginning of the Gorbachev era, Jews were still
90 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

excluded (along with a number of other national minorities)

from the KGB. The only exceptions were a handful of recruits
with Jewish mothers and non-Jewish fathers, registered as
members of other ethnic groups. Even the Central Committee of
the Communist Party was slightly less rigid than the KGB in
rejecting applicants with Jewish blood.
In the mid-1980s bizarre conspiracy theories about Jewish and
Zionist plots continued to surface at the Centre. L.P. Zamoysky,
deputy head of the FCD Directorate of Intelligence Information,
an officer with a reputation for high intelligence and good
judgement, solemnly assured the London KGB Residency in
January 1985, in Gordievsky's presence, that Zionism had be-
hind it not merely Jewish big business and finance but also the
occult power of Freemasonry whose rites, he alleged, were of
Jewish origin. It was, he insisted, a 'fact' that Freemasons were
an integral part of the Zionist conspiracy. Many KGB officers
believed that the US 'military-industrial complex', which they
saw as the Soviet bloc's most dangerous opponent, was manipu-
lated by the 'Jewish lobby'. The Fifth Directorate of the KGB,
founded in 1968 to monitor and suppress domestic dissidence in
all its forms, regarded Zionism as the main channel for Western
'ideological subversion' in the Soviet Union. 33
In 1968-69 Soviet Jews began a letter-writing campaign to
Western journalists and the samizdat press, protesting at the
violation of their human rights. After a mass Jewish sit-in at the
Supreme Soviet building early in 1971, there was a dramatic
increase in the number of exit visas granted for emigration to
Israel. The Politburo's decision seems to have been intended
both as a concession to Western opinion at a time when it was
pursuing East-West detente, and as a means of pacifying dissi-
dents who, it may have calculated, would not jeopardize their
prospects of emigration by continued agitation. Over a quarter
of a million Jews were allowed to emigrate during the 1970s
before detente gave way to renewed confrontation with the
United States. Yuri Andropov, the KGB Chairman, is believed to
have concluded that the emigration policy had failed. It had not
produced the trade and credit concessions which, it was claimed,
ZIONISM AND ISRAEL 91

the United States had promised as a quid pro quo. Nor had it
pacified the Jewish 'refuseniks', who were supported by a
vociferous campaign of international protest. In 1978 one of the
best-known refuseniks, Anatoli Shcharansky, was sentenced to
ten years in a labour camp, plus three further years' imprison-
ment, on a trumped-up charge of 'treasonable' links with the
CIA. 34
By the beginning of the 1980s the KGB, and in particular its
Fifth Directorate, was concerned by other nationality problems
as well as the Jewish refuseniks: among them Tartars deported
by Stalin who wanted to return; Baltic nationalists who were
demanding greater independence; and Armenians and Volga
Germans who wanted to emigrate. The Centre also feared that
the surge of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East might
spread across Soviet borders. The FCD conference held to review
foreign operations during 1982-83 was told of 'a marked in-
crease' in 'the subversive activity of emigre, nationalist and
Zionist organizations and associations abroad'. Zionism, how-
ever, still retained pride of place among the subversive forces
which the Centre believed were in league with Western intel-
ligence agencies. The FCD 'Plan of Work' for 1984 listed first in
its counter-intelligence priority targets:

Plans for subversion action or secret operations by the ad-

versary's special services, and by centre for ideological
diversion and nationalists, especially Zionists and other
anti-Soviet organizations, against the USSR and other
countries of the socialist community.35

In the summer of 1982 Residents were sent a detailed four-

year 'Plan for Work against Zionism in 1982-1986', which had
been under preparation for some time. 36 The Centre warned that
the Soviet bloc was threatened by 'all kinds of subversive opera-
tions' organized by Zionists in league with Israel and Western
intelligence services. These had to be countered by a major
increase in intelligence collection and agent recruitment, as well
as by a wide range of active measures designed to weaken and
divide the Zionist movement.
92 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

No 1214/PR TOP SECRET

02.07.82 Copy No.1
To: Residents
according to the list

We are sending you an extract from the prospective plan for work
against Zionism in 1982-1986, for your information and for use in
your work.
Information and analysis, influence operations and recruitment and
agent-operational measures in this line must be included in the pre-
scribed form in Residencies' annual plans and reports.
Attachment. Extract No 471IPRl54 Top Secret, Copy No 1 of 9 pages,
PN.
SILIN
[G F TITOVl
[Head of the Third Department, FCD]

Attachment to No 1214/PR Top Secret

No 4711PRl54 Copy No 1
02.07.82

EXTRACT FROM THE PROSPECTIVE PLAN OF WORK AGAINST ZIONISM

IN 1982-86

I. Work on information and analysis

1. Step up information-gathering on the following questions through
KGB foreign intelligence channels:
plans, forms and methods of international Zionist subversion (The
World Zionist Organization (WZO), the 'Jewish Agency', the
World Jewish Congress, (WJc), the Zionist Israeli Leadership, the
Israeli special services and also the numerous Zionist organizations
active throughout the world, chiefly in the principal capitalist
countries); co-operation between the Israeli special services and
international Zionist centres and imperialist intelligence services,
and in the first place, the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA.
ZIONISM AND ISRAEL 93

preparation by the Israeli special services and Zionist centres

(possibly in contact with the intelligence services of the leading
capitalist states), of specific ideological sabotage and all kinds of
subversive operations against the USSR, other countries of the
socialist community and the international communist and workers'
movement;
alignment of forces in international Zionism: the relative impor-
tance of the leftist-liberal wing, which, in contrast to the rightist-
extremist wing, advocates the establishment of normal mutual
relations between West and East;
disagreements in the Zionist leadership over organizing and con-
ducting subversion; the attitude of individual leaders of inter-
national Zionism to the question of Jewish emigration to Israel,
especially from the USSR, and to the problem of settling Near East
affairs; possible clashes in the Zionist leadership over the careerist
ambitions of certain prominent Zionist figures, struggle between
American and Israeli Zionists for the leading role in the Zionist
movement, and conflicts between them due to the tension develop-
ing from time to time in American-Israeli relations;
mutual relations between Zionist centres and organizations and the
government of the countries where they are located, Zionist lobbies
in the government and parliaments of these countries and the
degree of influence they exercise on their domestic and foreign
policy; conflict between the policy of Israel and the Zionist centres
and the interests of Jewish business circles in the principal capitalist
countries, and in particular, individual aspects of Israeli policy in
the Near East, which do not suit the United States' military-
industrial complex and the representatives of Israeli big business
connected with it;
any persons of Jewish origin who hold anti-Zionist views in
governmental, parliamentary or political circles, in the mass media,
in the business world or in the scientific or technical fields in the
principal capitalist countries; information about representatives of
Jewish business circles who are in favour of developing commercial
and economic relations and scientific and technical co-operation
with the USSR;
political trends in Jewish communities abroad; are there any strata
or individuals in them holding views close to ours on this or that
subject?
development of anti-Zionist processes and tendencies in Jewish
94 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

communities and appearance of new anti-Zionist organisations (of

the type of the 'Breir' organization founded in 1972 to unite
prominent figures of Jewish communities in the USA against Israeli
righ-wing extremist policy and, in particular, putting forward a
programme for settlement in the Near East corresponding largely to
our own position on this matter);
the attitude and mood among Jews who left the USSR after 1967
and, where possible, factual information about the number of
persons desirous of returning to the USSR; possible attempts on
their part to form organizations and societies for contacts with the
homeland, and efforts to establish contacts with progressive Rus-
sian organizations.
Time limit: throughout the period

II. Active Measures

Work on active measures must be conducted on the following principal
lines:
1. Bringing disorganization and division into the Zionist leadership by
intensifying existing disagreements and conflicts:

a) between the Zionist government of Israel and the WJC leaders who,
like Israel, lay claim to the role of unique representative of the so-
called 'world-wide Jewish community';
b) between the liberal wing of the WJC and right-wing extremist
forces in international Zionism (the WZO, the Israeli government)
regarding methods of carrying on subversion against the USSR and
other socialist countries and the question of Jewish immigration to
Israel;
c) between Israeli and American Zionists for the leading position in
the Zionist 'movement';
d) between Israeli Zionists and certain Zionist circles in the USA,
whose slogan is 'independence of the Diaspora from Israel';
e) between Israeli and the United States which is obliged to manoeuvre
in its relations with Israel because of its dependence on oil-produc-
ing Arab countries;
f) between the Reagan administration and the WJC, which is opposed
to the present US administration, etc.

2. Freezing the initiative of the reactionary rightist-extremist wing of

international Zionism by:
ZIONISM AND ISRAEL 95

a) wide-ranging exposure of Zionism as a close associate of the most

reactionary imperialist circles operating against peace-loving
forces;
b) running operational ploys with leaders of the World Jewish Con-
gress utilizing their fears that intensification of the 'cold' war may
lead to isolation of the WJC from Jewish populations in the socialist
countries;
c) disruption of Zionist-sponsored congresses and other anti-Soviet
gatherings and also various kinds of ideological sabotage and
various other subversive operations;

3. Weakening the influence of international Zionism, promoting the

development of positive anti-Zionist tendencies and processes in
Jewish communities overseas and stepping up the activity of progres-
sive forces within them by:
a) conveying to broad strata of the Jewish population in capitalist
countries information showing that the political policy of Zionist
centres is directed towards undermining detente and worsening
relations between East and West, and is against their vital interests;
b) compromising the most active Zionist leaders who are the initiators
of various kinds of anti-Soviet operations in the international
arena;
c) exposing the falsity and bankruptcy of Zionist ideology, which is
serving the mercenary interest of the Jewish grande bourgeoisie;
d) disseminating information to refute the slanderous inventions of
Zionists about state antisemitism allegedly existing in the USSR;
e) exerting purposeful influence through existing agent facilities and
confidential contacts, especially agents of influence (not only
among persons of Jewish extraction) on neutral vacillating, left-
wing liberal and also former progressive groups of the Jewish
population to reorientate them politically and weaken the influence
of Zionism on them;
f) establishing contacts through Soviet institutions abroad, for utiliza-
tion in our interests, with prominent figures in Jewish circles
overseas who are in favour of developing political relations and
economic or scientific, technological and cultural co-operation
with the USSR; introducing the practice of inviting them to recep-
tions at Soviet institutions abroad, helping them in suitable cases to
arrange trips to the Soviet Union and to publish objective material
in the Western press about the position of Jews in the USSR;
96 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

g) making open or 'covert' use of leaders of Jewish organizations who

for one reason or another are against Zionism, inter alia by
approaching them through progressive (emigre or local) Jewish
organization or groups, including:
pacifist Jewish organizations, condemning the aggressive political
line of the right-wing extremist leadership and the present Israeli
government aimed at disrupting detente and whipping up inter-
national tension;
left-wing liberal Jewish organizations, comprising realistically
thinking representatives of the Jewish intelligentsia and lower and
middle business circles and also the rabbis who favour a just
settlement in the Near East, maintaining the inalienable rights of
the Arab people of Palestine;
Jewish religious organizations representing Orthodox Judaism (not
acknowledging the Jewish state of Israel, set up in violation of
Judaic religious dogma and infringing by its actions a number of
Talmudic canons);
Jewish organizations rejecting the Zionist concept of a 'world-wide
Jewish nation' with its centre in Israel and also the idea of emigra-
tion of all Jews to Israel, etc; also persons who are associated with
publication of newspapers or other periodicals (including non-
Jewish ones) promoting anti-Zionist ideas of one kind or another.
Time limit - throughout the period

h) encouraging various groups of Jews who are forbidden to return to

the USSR to form compatriot organizations and societies for cul-
tural relations with, the homeland, providing them with moral
support through the Rodina [homeland] Society, and help with
suitable propaganda material, converting them by this means into
centres of anti-Zionism overseas.
Persons who come forward on their own initiative in favour of
uniting Jews who came from the USSR in progressive organizations
must be carefully checked and proposals suggested for working
with them;
i) fostering the existing attraction which some Jews who were former-
ly in the USSR feel towards Russian progressive organizations
abroad, where such tendencies can be exploited to discredit
Zionism.
Prepare proposals for specific action on this point:
j) facilitating the return to the homeland of some Jews who have left
ZIONISM AND ISRAEL 97

the USSR and making use of them for anti-Zionist propaganda

measures; co-opting for involvement in such operations 'blown'
agents, those who have lost their access or some who have been
specially trained for this purpose;
Time limit - December 1982
h} implementing measures designed to step up the activity of progres-
sive organizations and also of the surviving sound stratum in
formerly left-wing organizations whose leaders after the 1967
Arab-Israeli conflict in the main went over to the Zionist camp;
strengthening and improving the soundness of such organizations
by replenishing them with people originally from the USSR who
hold anti-Zionist views, penetrating them with our agents or
confidential informants who are able by their personal qualities and
organizing capacity to activate the resources mentioned and involve
them in anti-Zionist activity. If an opportunity is found for carrying
out such an operation, please put forward proposals.
Time limit - throughout the period

III. Agent-operational support

In order to deal with the tasks mentioned above in the area of our work
on information and analysis and on active measures, steps must be
taken to make more effective use of the existing agent access to
Zionism and create fresh access.
1. a} Step up penetration by agents and technical operations into our
main targets in Zionism:

the World Zionist Organization - WZO (General council, execu-

tive committee and its 12 departments);
the 'Jewish Agency' (management council, executive committee);
the World Jewish Congress - WJC (general council management
council, executive committee and WJC branches in 69 countries);
the Israeli state apparatus (the President's Office Council of Mini-
sters, Foreign Ministry, the Ministry for Absorption, the Israeli
special services - Mossad, Shinbet, Sherut-medein);
b} Acquiring fresh access and widening existing access to the Jewish
press and other periodicals in order to make use of them for active
measures against Zionism.
Time limit - throughout the period
2. In view of international Zionism's efforts to draw moderate Jewish
groups into its sphere of influence, steps must be taken to organize
98 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

work and acquire agents in that stratum of Jewish communities with a

view to subsequently moving them into Zionist centres.
3. Recruitment work must be carried out among Jews who have gone
abroad and who as a result of disenchantment with life in the West feel
an inclination to re-emigrate, but who for a number of reasons
(including fears of revenge on the part of Zionist terrorist organiza-
tions) do not apply to Soviet consulate and conceal their views from
those around them. Organize a search for and cultivation of such
persons in residencies of countries where there is a Jewish colony of
people who emigrated from the USSR after 1967.
Time limit - throughout the period
4. In view of the fact that some persons of Jewish origin with ethnic
connections with the USSR, who live in capitalist countries, are in
many cases by virtue of their position and type of occupation in
possession of intelligence information (on politics, science and techno-
logy or military strategy), the search for and recruitment of such agents
should not be confined to work against Zionism, and attention should
be directed also to acquiring agents who have access to any secret
information of interest to the USSR, and who present opportunities for
carrying out large-scale influence operations. The work of recruitment
must be stepped up among persons of Jewish origin who visit the USSR
as part of various types of delegation.
Time limit - throughout the period
5. When carrying out subsidiary tasks in our work against Zionism
(keeping a check on the activity of the Zionist lobby in capitalist
countries, obtaining leads, studying candidates for recruitment etc)
wide use must be made of agents of non-Jewish origin who because of
their type of activity have constant contact with this or that group of
the Jewish population in the country.
Time limit - throughout the period
 Ciphers and Counter-Intelligence

All Soviet missions in the West can expect surveillance by local

security services. The Centre, however, had an apparently in-
curable tendency to exaggerate both its scale and intensity.
Before leaving for foreign postings, all KGB officers went
through a training course designed to prepare them for all
manner of 'provocations' by Western intelligence agencies. The
training, however, was based on a frequently false analogy with
the huge KGB surveillance operations conducted within the
Soviet Union.
In Gordievsky's experience at London and Copenhagen, new
arrivals began by suspecting even local shopkeepers and gar-
deners in nearby parks of being part of an elaborate network
designed to keep them under constant surveillance. Most even-
tually grasped the fact that Western security services are tiny by
Soviet standards and have to choose their targets far more
selectively than the KGB. Directorate K at the Centre, however,
continued to issue sometimes fanciful warnings about new
forms of surveillance being devised in the West, and to interpret
misfortunes suffered by Soviet citizens abroad as possible - or
probable - provocations by local security services.
Among those who the Centre feared were the main targets
for Western provocation were Soviet cipher personnel. The
Centre's fears were largely a reflection of its own successes in
this field. Most major codebreaking successes on which evidence
is available have been assisted in varying degrees by intelligence
on foreign code and cipher systems obtained by espionage.
Western intelligence agencies, however, did not make such
intelligence a major priority until the Second World War. Russia
already did so at the beginning of the century. The British
ambassador to St. Petersburg, Sir Charles Hardinge, complained
in 1906 that the Tsarist Okhrana had offered his head Chancery
100 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

servant the then enormous sum of £1,000 to steal one of the

British diplomatic ciphers. 37 Between the wars Soviet intel-
ligence revived and expanded Tsarist techniques for obtaining
Western cipher materials and diplomatic documents to assist its
codebreakers. Its first major success in penetrating Whitehall
was to recruit two Foreign Office code clerks, Ernest Oldham in
1930 and John King in 1935. 38
A generation later, the passing of the age of the brilliantly
talented ideological mole in both Britain and the United States
increased still further the relative importance of agents such as
Oldham and King. The vast Anglo-American communications
and sigint (signals intelligence) network contained thousands of
comparatively junior employees with access to high-grade intel-
ligence. By the 1970s the KGB's most important moles in the
United States and Britain were no longer high fliers like Kim
Philby and Alger Hiss, but two cunning though not especially
talented petty criminals. Chief Warrant Officer John Walker, a
communications watch officer on the staff of the Commander of
US Submarine Forces in the Atlantic, had joined the navy as a
teenage high school dropout in order to escape imprisonment
after committing four serious burglaries, and later tried to force
his wife into prostitution. Corporal Geoffrey Prime of the Royal
Air Force and, later, the British sigint agency GCHQ was a social
and sexual misfit who graduated from making obscene tele-
phone calls to molesting little girls. Both Walker and Prime
occupied comparatively low-level jobs which gave them - and
the KGB - access to some of the most important cipher and sigint
secrets of the Atlantic Alliance.
The almost simultaneous recruitment of Walker and Prime in
January 1968 helped to prompt a major reorganization of KGB
sigint. Hitherto the Eighth Directorate had handled sigint as well
as KGB ciphers and communications security. In 1969 a new
Sixteenth Directorate was established to specialize exclusively in
sigint. The new directorate worked closely with the Sixteenth
Department of the First Chief Directorate which henceforth had
exclusive control of all FCD operations to acquire foreign code
and cipher systems, and to penetrate sigint agencies. Its officers
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 101

in Residencies abroad handled only one case each which they

kept entirely separate from other Residency operations. 39
The Centre was haunted by the fear that Western intelligence
agencies might discover Walkers and Primes within the Soviet
cipher and sigint organization. These fears were sometimes
taken to remarkable lengths. Even dry cleaning shops, Direc-
torate K believed, might be used to target Soviet cipher clerks. In
March 1985 the Centre began two elaborate operations, code-
named Blesna 6 and Blesna 7, designed to detect this and other,
mostly improbable, Western traps.

Comr YAN No 161

[Ms.:] Top Secret
Lavrov, 21 March 85 Copy No 1
LONDON
To Comrade LAVROV [NIKITENKO]
(personal)
No 312/KR
13 March 1985

IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES 'BLESNA-6 AND 7'

In compliance with the instructions from the heads of our Department
for stepping up security in Soviet institutions and their secret cipher
offices abroad, the Centre has been studying the question of applying
special measures (codename 'Blesna-6 and 7') with the aim of uncover-
ing any possible attempts by the adversary's special services to intro-
duce devices and markers into the personal effects of cipher staff while
local consumer services firms have access to these articles.
Application of the measures will, in addition, be designed to obtain
specimens of new equipment used by the adversary's technical intel-
ligence services to obtain information processed in UZTS'f in Soviet
missions abroad.
'Blesna-6' envisages setting up a suitable situation for the enemy to
step up operations for technical processing of personal articles belong-
ing to one of our cipher clerks, which have been given in for repair, dry
cleaning or other services.

* secure cipher rooms

102 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

'Blesna-7' is applied when a cipher clerk purchases some personal

article in local shops or from a commercial firm, after previously
selecting or ordering it, so that the article remains outside our control
for a certain length of time.
Ways of arousing the interest of the adversary's special services will
be devised by the Residency with reference to the operational situation
in the country and local customs. At the same time, it is essential in the
first place to concentrate on commercial firms, stores, studios, cleaners
etc, where the adversary would (or could) carry out operations against
Soviet nationals, and to analyse any incidents involving members of the
Soviet community which may have taken place there.
It is also evident that a single visit to a selected objective will scarcely
lead to the desired result. When planning these measures, therefore,
one must envisage several calls, having regard to the usual pattern of
visits by Soviet nationals to these places and the availability of goods on
the local market.
In order to carry out these measures it is considered advisable that an
operational team should be formed, consisting of a cipher clerk, or an
engineer (if there is one) for the security of the UZTS, and a member of
the Residency who speaks the local language. In our view one should
involve in this operation any operational personnel who have been to
some extent 'blown' to the adversary and whose repeated visits to the
'consumer establishment' must therefore come within the range of
vision of the adversary's special services. We also assume that, from
knowledge of the functional duties and general behaviour of Referen-
tura [Cipher section] officials, the adversary is able to distinguish a
cipher clerk from other Soviet nationals visiting shops or consumer
services. Cipher clerks could be used at the time when it is planned to
replace them and this will enable us to provide a cover story for our
operation, resulting from the need to purchase articles for personal use.
The following articles could be used for operations 'Blesna-6 and 7':
shoes with heels
electronic wristwatch with alarm
jacket (suit)
fountain pen (with a built-in electronic watch)
lighter
wallet and notebook (with hard covers) etc
The decision about the form of delivery of the goods (whether by
those carrying out the operation or through a firm) will be taken
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 103

locally. The expenses of the operation will be put down to the Centre's
account.
All articles obtained in the course of the operation or processed by
consumer services must be despatched to the Centre for expert
examination (this is not done locally).
Please assess your facilities, in the light of the above, for carrying out
operations 'Blesna-6 and 7', examine the variants for mounting the
operation, designate candidates for carrying it out, for submission to
the corresponding subsections in the Centre for approval, and also
inform us of the proposed expenditure.
Please exercise personal control over preparation for these set tasks;
and inform only your 'KR' deputy of the nature of the assignment.
Please send your proposals by diplomatic bag addressed to Comrade
Krylov and marked 'Personal'.
VLADIMIROV
[A.T. KIREEVj
[Head of Directorate K, FCD]

Each Soviet diplomatic mIssIon abroad had a secure cipher

section known as the Referentura divided into separate depart-
ments handling diplomatic. KGB. GRU and other communica-
tions. Life for Referentura staff was more strictly regulated than
for any other Soviet officials living abroad. When moving about
the capitals in which they were stationed they had at all times to
be accompanied by embassy staff. Unsurprisingly. alcoholism
within Referenturas was a recurrent problem. A study by the
Centre early in 1985 revealed that this and other problems were
worst among those cipher staff who had spent most time abroad.
General Kryuchkov. himself teetotal. was so concerned by the
security risks involved that in March 1985 he sent personal
directives to all Residents to insist on 'standards and rules of
conduct by cipher service personnel'.
104 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

No 5482/PR No 201
23.3.1985 Secret
Copy No 1
To residents and KGB representatives
(according to list)
Personal

WORK WITH EMPLOYEES OF SECRET CIPHER SERVICES ABROAD

Cases of breaches of rules and regulations for conduct abroad on the

part of members of secret cipher services have recently become more
frequent and in 1984 alone made it necessary to send 12 employees in
this category home to the Soviet Union before their time.
Analysis of the reasons for these dismissals has shown that as a rule
the basic cause is misconduct due to abuse of alcohol, abnormal family
relations, lack of discipline and slackness at work, and that it is most
frequent of all among employees who have had three or more postings
abroad.
For instance, in March 1984, a senior Referentura Officer at the
USSR's commercial mission in Mexico was sent home early from his
posting abroad because during his period of residence in the country
(since March 1983) he had consistently indulged in alcohol abuse,
which was the reason for the unhappy situation in his family. In spite of
educational work done with him, he did not draw the necessary
conclusions for himself, but continued to drink heavily. Late in 1983 he
went home during working hours, drank himself into a condition in
which he was no longer responsible, and in consequence, was in-
capable of carrying out his duties.
In August 1984 a Referentura officer of the Soviet MFA was sent
home early from Cameroon as a result of an abnormal family situation.
His wife accused him of conjugal infidelity and declared her intention
of dissolving the marriage, which gave rise to a serious scandal in the
family, and on this account it proved impossible for the couple to
remain abroad.
It is a disturbing fact that those who commit serious offences in
Soviet communities are often the heads of Referenturas, i.e. the very
persons who have to exercise control to see that cipher service officers
observe the rules of conduct abroad, look after their training and be an
example of behaviour for their subordinates.
Another instance occurred in August 1984, when the head of the
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 105

Referentura at the Soviet Embassy in Mali committed suicide at night

in his flat with a pistol taken from the Referentura.
Before this incident, he had several times indulged in alcohol abuse
and been found in a state of intoxication and he was not always in
control of his actions. For several days before his suicide, he had stayed
away from his duties and in view of this it was decided that he should be
sent home early.
In October 1984, the acting head of the Referentura at the Soviet
mission in Kampuchea was sent home early to the USSR for systematic
alcohol abuse and for striking a courier from the special protection
service in the face.
This sort of situation is evidence of the fact that less attention is being
given to this category of employee of Soviet establishments by those in
charge of Soviet missions abroad, residences and especially security
officers, and inadequate educational work is being done for them.
In view of this we think the following action must be taken:
improve the standard of counter-intelligence work in the Referen-
tura of missions abroad. Endeavour, jointly with the heads of Soviet
establishments and Party officials, to step up educational work
among employees of the cipher service and pay more attention to
the way of life and leisure occupations of this category of personnel.
Be well aware of relations within their families. Exercise a positive
influence on the situation among Referentura staff;
see that there is a prompt reaction to any circumstances providing
evidence of infringement of rules of conduct abroad on the part of
members of the cipher service, or of alcohol abuse;
step up checks on observance by cipher service personnel of the
arrangements laid down for going into town, to see that they fulfil
the requirement that they should be constantly (inseparably) ac-
companied by Embassy officials on visits to town.
At the same time, having regard to the specific character of this
category of employee, such action should be undertaken with great
care, endeavouring to involve the administration and Party organiza-
tions in it to a greater extent. There must be strict regard for secrecy in
any operational measures undertaken.
The Centre must be informed immediately of any incident of in-
fringement of standards and rules of conduct by cipher service person-
nel.
ALYOSHIN
[KRYUCHKOVj
106 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

The Centre was also continually fearful that its agent network
included 'plants' by Western intelligence services. It insisted on
enormously detailed and time-consuming checks on the relia-
bility of both actual and prospective agents:

gzh-1 Top Secret

No 66311X Copy No 1
24 May 1978

COPENHAGEN
To: Comrade KORIN [LYUBIMOVj

We are forwarding herewith a report entitled 'Basic methods for

conducting checks on agents, and deep study targets among foreigners
abroad', which has been prepared by the appropriate sub-section of
our service for possible use when planning checking measures on the
existing agent network, future targets of deep study and operational
contacts.
Attachment on 16 pages, Secret No 15112-6650 OM.
[Ms note]
Please inform all members of the operational staff. This material must
be used when drafting the relevant proposals.
KORIN [L YUBIMOVj
6.6.78

SECRET
Copy No 1
Attachment to No 66311X

BASIC METHODS FOR CHECKING AGENTS AND DEEP STUDY TARGETS

AMONG FOREIGNERS ABROAD

The following are the basic and essential requirements by which

Residencies must be guided in their daily operational practice in order
to guarantee security in their work with foreign agents:
1. The checking of an agent apparatus must be a continuous process,
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 107

irrespective of the basis on which the agent was recruited, the

degree of confidence we have in him or the length of time he has
been collaborating with us;
2. Well thought-out agent checks must be carried out not more than
once a year and, should any doubts regarding reliability crop up, a
complex of special checks using operational-technical methods
must be implemented;
3. The above-mentioned checks must pursue strictly defined aims,
conform to the specific circumstances and realistic possibilities, as
well as being based on the results of an analysis of all available
material and an assessment of previous work with the agent.
The basic aim of these checks must be the acquisition of reliable data
enabling conclusions to be drawn concerning the following problems:
whether the person being checked has links with hostile special
services and is acting on their behalf (check for plants);
whether the person being checked is a deep study target for hostile
Special Services (check for loss of cover);
whether he is sincerely co-operating with us and making active use
of his intelligence potential (check on sincerity);
In practical operational work the methods listed below for studying
and carrying out checks on agents may be used.

I. Methods of conducting checks without the use ofagents

1. The studying and checking of an agent in the course of personal
contact between him and a case officer.
By accumulating biographical and character data on the agent and
by rechecking this periodically;
By regularly highlighting any changes in the agent's political or
ideological views as well as changes in his work - or social
circumstances; a realistic appraisal of the reasons for his collaborat-
ing with us and his intelligence potential;
By determining his reactions to tasks of an operational and test
nature, to discussions on his personal life, his sources of infor-
mation etc;
By collecting data on the agent's close contacts and the subsequent
checking of these through existing means;
Any changes in the agent's family circumstances, inter-relation-
ships within the family; his lifestyle;
108 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

By his observance of security measures in performing intelligence

tasks, the clandestinity of his behaviour;
By periodical checks as to how the agent is observing the conditions
for contacting and cover-stories concerning his intelligence activity.

2. The checking of an agent through official means

Various kinds of official sources of information comprising institu-
tional and biographical information on governmental, political and
commercial personalities may be used:

telephone directories;
parliamentary, party and company directories;
newspapers and journals;
official archives and libraries;
Police Department bulletins;
the facilities offered by Chambers of Commerce, banks, companies
and brokers;
electoral registers;
population census material;
professional directories.

3. Checking a target of study through his connections and contacts

The case officer or illegal makes unconscious use of his neutral

cover connections and contacts to collect information and cross-
check individual facts or biographical data about the target of
study;
the carrying out of analogous work using agents and co-opted
collaborators of Soviet nationality, and also in isolated cases case
officers' wives. The specific task and methods of carrying it out
must have been carefully planned beforehand for these people.

In all cases where connections and contacts are used for checking it is
essential to be extremely careful and to have a well thought-out cover-
story for the conversations in order to conceal the real reasons for our
interest in the target of study.

4. Checks in which only Residency officials or illegals take part

By instigating checks at places of work and residencies of the object

of study by means of personal visits or with the aid of the telephone;
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 109

Arranging for surveillance to be placed on the object of study to

check his pattern of work; to identify the places he visits, discover
his contacts etc. The implementation of such measures in relation to
agents must inevitably be combined with tasks which have been
specially worked out for them and which will permit the monitor-
ing of their actions;
The mounting of counter-surveillance on the object of study on
previously stipulated routes or routes we know he uses, with the
object of discovering any signs that he is under surveillance by
hostile special services;
The use of various operational-technical aids to check agents (will
be treated below).

5. Checks through an analysis of the intelligence received

The following considerations must be taken into account when arrang-
ing and implementing such checks:

It is essential to analyse not only the contents of the material but

also the nature of the documents - whether originals or copies. First
and foremost, measures must be taken to amplify and cross-check
data about the sources, the times and circumstances of the acquisi-
tion of the intelligence; also a comparison of the material may be
made alongside past and other original documents from the cor-
responding institution, checking typewriter prints etc;
Side by side with a regular evaluation of the importance and
authenticity of individual items of intelligence it is essential to assess
the subject's intelligence work as a whole over a specific period of
time (a quarter, half-year, full year etc), as this will enable a survey
to be made of the overall value of the information and its trends,
and will also establish more accurately which of the material from
the source is not corroborated by the further course of events.

6. Checking an agent by the imposition of special tasks

The following variants may be considered as examples of the diversity

of checks which are possible under this heading:

Setting the agent the task of collecting basic information and

character data on a number of people about whom we already have
sufficiently full and reliable knowledge;
The checking or collection of information on events, facts and
110 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

personalities, partly or completely fictitious (if there is no suspicion

of possible links between the agent and hostile special services);
The obtaining of information (documentary or de visu), already
well known to the Centre from other sources;
Preparing for the agent a task which it is outside his competence to
fulfil without recourse to specialists or to counter-intelligence (if he
is in contact with it). For example:
a) To visit restricted areas and collect data on such targets as can
only be correctly described by someone having specialist
knowledge and practical skills;
b) To send him to a country which has difficult operating con-
ditions to meet a 'valuable agent' within a tight time limit,
provided that local conditions make this practically impossible
to accomplish without the help of special organs;
The imposition of a test assignment which forces the adversary to
perform specific actions thereby exposing himself to monitoring
from our side, for example:
a) To carry out a check on a specific person in order to collect
information about him (places of work and residence, hours of
work, the routes he follows, places he frequents etc), an
analysis of which must lead the adversary to suspect that we
intend to re-establish a lost contact with him and subsequently
to organize surveillance in case of a possible change in the
status of this person;
b) To ensure the departure by air of an undercover agent from the
country in possession of valuable material (possibility of
supplementary checks on the aircraft flight in question or
delaying the aircraft);

the imposition of tasks whose fulfilment would involve matters of

principle which the agent would not be able to decide by himself
without consultations with hostile special services (assuming he is
in contact with them) and this would show itself in his conduct and
reaction to such assignments.

An indispensable condition for the successful use of this method of

checking is that the tasks should appear natural, realistic, well thought-
out, and should flow from the whole course of previous work with the
agent.
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 111

II. Checking with the help ofagents

When using agents for preparing and carrying out checks on targets of
study, the following basic requirements must be rigorously observed:
1. Do not allow one agent to be aware of others;
2. The target under scrutiny must not discover the measures being
taken by the Residency for checking him;
3. The agent to whom the checking is entrusted must be reliable.
The following are possible options in the use of agents for checking
purposes:
Collecting information about the target of study about his life,
business and social activity, contacts, political views, personal and
business qualities, intelligence potential etc and also for cross-
checking individual facts or events from his life and activities;
Acquiring specific information from parallel agents enabling
material obtained from the person under study to be cross-checked;
Setting a reliable and experienced agent to study and check the
person under scrutiny;
Organizing surveillance or counter-surveillance on the person un-
der scrutiny;
Carrying out a secret search of his quarters;
'Recruiting' the target of study into another intelligence service
with the help of the checking agent;
Obtaining reliable data on the target of study by means of agents
working in hostile Intelligence or Counter-Intelligence Services;
The utilization of agent facilities to mount the operational-techni-
cal measures listed below.

III. Checking with the help of operational-technical methods

1. Checking by means of postal correspondence
By sending to the address of the person under study a series of letters
(a minimum of 5 or 6) from third countries and also from other
cities in the country of residence;
By putting test-letters directly into the post-box in the person's
quarters or place of work with all the necessary stamps provided by
the Centre together with various characteristics for detecting if it
has been opened, including a chemical substance to detect the
appearance of fingerprints on the enclosure;
The object of study forwards his reports using test SW [secret
112 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

writing] copying paper (pseudo copy) treated specially for checking

against a possible [hostile] chemical analysis with the object of
establishing the composition of the SW including attempts to cut off
small strips for such an analysis.
It is essential to adhere to the following operational-technical re-
quirements in preparing test-letters:
The form of the letter must exactly conform to the usage of the
country in question (envelope, paper, style of address, quantity,
type and value of postage stamps, correct lay-out etc);
The open text must correspond to the operational cover story for
the correspondence and the distinguishing marks on the envelope;
it must be written and spelt correctly in whatever language is used.
When doing the text of the letter, avoid the use of registered
typewriters;
in selecting an address for reply, it is more suitable to use actual and
existing addresses where it is difficult to find the sender (institutes,
schools, communal dwelling-houses, pensions, tourist centres etc);
test-letters must not be kept longer than the period agreed with the
14th Department of the First Chief Directorate as in excess of this
time the characteristics incorporated to detect unsealing will make
it impossible to conduct a qualitative analysis.
2. Checking by means of test containers and packets
This can be done by sending the person under study to the area for
which a cover story has been prepared in order to receive or despatch
test containers simulating the arrival (or despatch) of important intel-
ligence material from or to a 'valuable source', using different left-
luggage lockers (at airports, railway stations, bus stations etc).
In this case the operation itself may be carried out as follows:
a) the container is placed by a case officer, trusted agent or illegal and
a receipt (or key) subsequently forwarded to the address of the
person under examination so that the latter may withdraw the
container and forward it to the case officer;
b) the container is placed by the case officer, trusted agent or illegal
and the receipt (key) transmitted to the person being checked by
means of DLB or by personal contact with the case officer (without
previously notifying him of the location of the DLB or of the left-
luggage locker);
c) the object of study is entrusted with a container to be placed by him
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 113

in a left-luggage locker and the receipt (key) in a DLB which will

subsequently be emptied by the object of study himself or by the
case officer under the pretext of a 'hitch' in the operation involving
the arrival of a 'valuable agent' to effect the despatch.
Another method of checking is the use of the residence (dacha,
garage, office, etc) belonging to the person under examination for
'storing' test containers (packets) for fixed periods for supposed
despatch to 'a valuable agent' who will come to collect the packet
under previously arranged conditions of contact. The operation per-
mits of two variants:
a) the object of study returns the packet to the case officer on the
expiry of the stipulated period on the instructions of the latter;
b) the packet is collected by another case officer or co-opted person in
the guise of a foreigner with due regard for essential security
measures ensuring that the checking operation is not blown if the
person under study is in contact with hostile special services.
The residence (dacha, place of work) of the object of study may be
used for the 'reception' of test containers (packets) from 'a valuable
agent' in accordance with agreed contacting conditions and their
subsequent despatch to a case officer. The delivery of the container is
carried out by another case officer or co-opted person adopting the
necessary security measures to avoid blowing the checking operation
and to avoid the launching of provocation measures against us in the
event that the object of study is in contact with hostile special services.
The object of study can be despatched to an area (airports, railway
stations, seaports, restricted areas, other countries etc) for which a
cover story has been prepared for a meeting with 'a valuable agent' in
order to 'receive or despatch' test containers (packets) as outlined
below:
a) the person under study goes for a meeting which is 'aborted' for
'objective' reasons, with the subsequent return of the container to
the case officer;
b) a meeting is arranged between the object of study and another case
officer or co-opted person in the guise of a foreigner; the necessary
security precautions are observed in order to exclude the possibility
of blowing the fact that it is a checking operation in case the object
of study is in contact with hostile special services.
The object of study can be despatched to a cover area for which a
114 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

cover-story has been prepared for the reception or despatch of test

containers by means of a DLB as outlined below:

a) The DLBs are filled by a case officer, trusted agent or illegal and
cleared by the person under study at a pre-arranged signal (without
his being informed in advance about the position of the DLB);
b) The DLB is filled by the object of study but then the operation is
subsequently cancelled due to the non-arrival of a 'valuable agent',
with the container then being collected by the target himself or the
case officer.

In the latter case it is essential to provide the person under study with
a convincing cover-story to avoid revealing to him the fact that it is a
test operation (in case of possible links between him and hostile special
services).
When arranging verification measures using test containers (pack-
ets) one must bear in mind that these may be carried out with the help
of a great diversity of special aids, chemical, photographic and
mechanical, which permit a high degree of reliability in establishing
whether a container has been opened, whether there has been contact
with the contents, whether separate elements have been moved, checks
made for SW, or enclosures substituted, whether there are fingerprints
or the container and contents have been exposed to X-rays. As regards
the last-named it must be borne in mind that special services are now
equipped with special X-ray devices (to obtain an image by means of
individual impulses) which do not involve exposing any films packed in
the container or erasing any magnetically recorded messages.
Additionally when drawing up plans for, and putting into effect, this
type of test operation the following operational requirements must be
observed:

The cover-story, the nature and choice of place where the check
takes place must flow in a logical sequence from work previously
undertaken with the target so as to convince him of the continuity
of the proposed operational ploy;
The containers used must, both with regard to their contents and
the camouflage employed, fit into the cover-story;
The verification operation itself must relate closely to agent-opera-
tional conditions and specific events, so as to convince the target of
study and the special services (in a double-agent case) that the
operation is a genuine operational one;
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 115

The duration of the check must be planned in such a way that the
special services (taking into account the technical and operational
facilities at their disposal), would be able without undue haste to
unseal the container, study the contents and return it to its original
condition;
In order to obtain positive results in checking the target of study by
means of this type of operation it is essential to think in terms of
carrying out more than one (a minimum of five or six).

3. Checks with covert code-letter devices

This involves all the checking in the section on 'Checks by means of test
containers and packets', with only this difference, that within the latter
one or other of the 'Z' devices [recording apparatus or concealed
microphone] is camouflaged.

The object of study is despatched to an area with a suitable cover-

story to fulfil an 'assignment' in maintaining a non-personal con-
tact with a 'valuable agent' (the receipt or despatch of intelligence;
giving a pre-arranged radio signal etc) with simultaneous monitor-
ing of his actions from the moment that he is provided with the
technical equipment for the operation;
The installation, with the help of a case-officer or of a trusted agent,
or 'Z' equipment [recording apparatus or microphone] in the
target's flat or at his place of work or at the place where he is due to
meet a person of interest to Soviet intelligence (for the purpose of
handing over of a 'souvenir', the transmission of an object for
temporary use or for retention, or for a secret identification, etc.);
The person under examination may be utilized for surveillance or
counter-surveillance operations, with simultaneous monitoring of
his actions with the help of operational-technical equipment pro-
vided for him supposedly so as to transmit previously agreed signals
while fulfilling his assignment;
Or he can be provided with operational equipment for 'recording'
conversations of interest to us (at a meeting with a specific person or
when visitors call on a colleague, etc.), with simultaneous monitor-
ing of his actions the whole time the checking measure continues;
The object of study can also be sent to an area with a suitable cover
story to fulfil a 'mission' to take air samples to establish the level of
radiation, with simultaneous monitoring of his actions from the
moment he takes over the equipment;
Use can be made of operational technical equipment permanently
116 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

available to agents (signalling apparatus, devices for the reception

or transmission of intelligence, long-distance radio contact etc), or
they can be supplied to the target so that checks can be conducted in
the course of their exchange under appropriate pretexts (repair,
servicing, new model etc) for new items which open the way to
necessary monitoring or disclosure of interest in them on the part of
the person under examination or on the part of hostile special
serVlces.
In selecting this or that method of checking with the help of 'Z'
equipment, the following must be borne in mind:
1. The options outlined above are far from exhausting the possible
uses of operational technical equipment in checking out targets;
2. When carrying out test measures using 'Z' equipment, all the basic
rules for checking objects of study through test containers and
packets (precautionary measures and operational requirements for
mounting checking operations) remain equally in force;
3. Every checking measure mounted with the assistance of 'Z' equip-
ment requires certain additional preparatory work:
Preliminary operational-technical reconnaissance with the object
of working out a detailed operational plan (the selection and
checking of the scenes of the operations, case officer's meeting with
the person under study, counter-surveillance and control point, the
routes to be taken by all participants etc);
Certain operational-technical factors affecting the correct choice of
the 'Z' equipment must be considered (the timing and duration of
the operation, the effects of climatic conditions and other limiting
factors, the monitoring of the ether, architectural peculiarities, etc).
The task of preparing the equipment must also be studied;
The serviceability of the equipment and its suitability for the job in
hand should be checked and tested in the residency.
4. Checking with the help of other operational-technical means
This can be done by:
Fingerprint analysis of personal reports from the object of study, -
either handed to the case officer in the course of meetings or in
reports transmitted by post in the form of secret writing;
The use of special chemical methods for testing the object of study's
meeting place with a 'valuable agent' or the DLB (the contents
themselves are not treated), the case officer being able subsequently
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 117

to establish (at a meeting after the operation) by means of certain

devices whether the object of study actually visited the area (assum-
ing that surveillance or counter-surveillance was not possible);
Sending to the agent, who maintains long-distance one-way radio
contact with the Centre, a partially garbled cipher telegram con-
taining a specific task (to go to a rendezvous, or a meeting with a
'valuable agent', to clear a DLB etc) with subsequent monitoring of
the object of study's performance, the aim being to establish any
possible involvement of hostile special services ('providing' help in
the deciphering);
The use of search techniques for checking the target's car (it is taken
from the latter under the pretext of carrying out a meeting with a
'valuable agent') in order to detect any eavesdropping devices, any
special fluorescent marks for surveillance of the car by ultra-violet
rays, any radio-active marking or radio beacons (checking for
plants);
The use of the facilities of operational points for intercepting the
radio communications of the surveillance service to carry out
checking measures on agents and illegals in order to detect any signs
of the possibility of their being under study by hostile special
services (movements on specific routes with strict adherence to
time-schedules; going to controlled meeting-places and rendezvous
points; clearing false DLBs, etc).

IV. Checking by means ofagent-combinations

An agent-combination for checking an object of study is a complex of
interrelated agent-operational measures, brought together as a single
operational concept designed to achieve an effective test of the object of
study.
Agent-combinations may be implemented in a great variety of ways
using all the methods of verification outlined above and any combina-
tion of these methods depending on the requirements related to the
verification of the target, the facilities of the Residency, the character-
istics of the specific case, the conditions prevailing for agent-opera-
tional assignments in the particular country and certain other factors.
In this connection we do not consider it appropriate to give specific
examples of possible agent-combination options in the present instruc-
tional resume.
118 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

The Centre was also seriously concerned by the danger of

Western intelligence operations against the growing number of
Soviet trucks and lorries travelling to the West. Much of its fear
of 'provocation operations' against Soviet lorry-drivers simply
reflected the KGB's exaggerated suspicions of the West. It was
easy for conspiracy theorists within the Centre to interpret
'suspicious contacts' and various mishaps on Western roads as
part of an organized plot.
The Centre also had, however, one more substantial reason for
fearing interest in Soviet vehicles by Western security services. A
small but significant percentage of lorries from the Soviet bloc
contained sophisticated surveillance equipment. In 1986 a
Soviet semi-trailer parked on a minor road near defence installa-
tions in Southern Sweden was spotted by local lorry-drivers who
devised a method for 'accidentally' removing its tarpaulin cover.
Inside they discovered five men and extensive electronic moni-
toring equipment. Soviet trucks were also regularly observed
monitoring tests at the US White Sands Missile Range in New
Mexico close to the Mexican border. According to Major-
General J.M. Bunyard, project director for the Patriot air-
defence missile: 'Every time there is a missile test at White
Sands, the vans with telemetry intercept equipment roll right up
to the border'. 40

No 332
Top Secret
Copy No 1
No 8285/KR
30.04.85
Representatives and Residents
(as listed)

MEASURES TO IMPROVE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE WORK IN ROAD

TRANSPORT ESTABLISHMENTS

Road transport is playing an ever-increasing part in promoting the

country's social and economic development and improving the defence
capability of the Soviet state.
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 119

It carries a great volume of internal and international transport of

freight and passengers and in certain parts of the country, it is the main
link in the transport system. Road transport is widely used for carrying
military freight, raw materials and special products of the defence
branches of industry. Information about the location and the nature of
production of important defence and military installations and
material relating to mobilization matters are concentrated in road
transport combines, directorates and enterprises.
The volume of freight transported by 'Sovtransavto' vehicles in West
European countries and some states in the Near East has increased in
recent years and movement of transport by road has been initiated
between the USSR and the PRe.
The special services of the imperialist states and of the PRe display
considerable interest in road transport facilities and are stepping up
their efforts to gather data which reveal the function and capabilities of
the country's vehicle fleet at a time of emergency.
The activity of foreign intelligence services in regard to international
road communications has increased. The procedure relating to the time
spent by 'Sovtransavto' employees abroad has been tightened up and
instances of hostile treatment and recruitment attempts, as well as
various kinds of provocation operations have become more frequent.
The adversary is exploiting for subversive purposes the particular
conditions of 'Sovtransavto' drivers' periods spent abroad, their
repeated visits to the same country, and lack of communication with
Soviet institutions abroad, and their constant contacts with foreigners,
including police, customs and frontier service officers and representa-
tives of firms.
In view of this, the heads of our department are giving serious
consideration to the question of ensuring the security of road trans-
port.
One of the latest instructions on this point notes, in particular, that
in spite of the measures taken lately to step up counter-intelligence
work on road transport, there are still serious shortcomings and
omissions in organizing and implementing it.
The steps taken to expose hostile agents have been ineffective
and executed without due regard for the specific direction of the
adversary's efforts and the forms and methods of subversive
activity.
Inadequate use is made of means of preventing the occurence of
exceptional incidents and when these are investigated, thorough
120 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

research is not carried out in all cases where there is possible involve-
ment of agents of the adversary's special services and hostile ele-
ments.
According to the instructions from the leadership of the Department,
the following steps must be taken:
step up work on obtaining information about the designs and
subversive activity of the special services, anti-Soviet centres and
organizations abroad in relation to road transport facilities;
prepare and carry out measures to plant agents from among the
drivers and other employees of 'Sovtransavto' on hostile intel-
ligence services with the aim of initiating double-agent ploys and
drawing away their efforts into channels which are controlled by
our department;
take the necessary steps to expose and prevent hostile operations by
an adversary conducting subversive activity through international
road transport. Ensure that an efficient watch is kept on the
operational situation to see how it develops on autoroutes abroad
and at points where loading operations are carried out, and other
places frequented by drivers abroad, and react promptly to any
change in the situation by organizing intelligence counter-measures
in this direction;
prepare and carry out measures to compromise the special services
and their agents engaged in hostile cultivation of Soviet drivers,
inducing them to betray the Motherland, creating opportunities for
recruitment and mounting provocation operations;
carry out more thorough processing of foreigners who establish
suspicious contacts with members of Soviet vehicle crews, in order
to find out if they are involved with foreign special services;
arrange for systematic exchange of information with the friends
[other Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services] on the organization of
counter-intelligence work on international road transport, and also
about the discovery of the adversary's efforts, directed against
international road transport and recruitment approaches to drivers
from the USSR and other socialist countries. Plan and execute
measures to study foreign road transport firms belonging to
capitalist states, through which the hostile intelligence services are
operating, and anti-Soviet centres and organizations abroad, and
take steps to put a stop to their subversive operations.
Please keep us regularly informed about what action the Residency
CIPHERS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 121

takes to improve intelligence and counter-intelligence activity in inter-

national motor transport.
In particular, please examine the Residency's agent and other
resources for dealing with these tasks and include the necessary action
in the year's plan for the lines concerned.
Please report not less than once a year on the adversary's hostile
activity against road transport targets, as part of the report on the
operational situation in international road communications, as en-
visaged by guideline No 2314/KR of 23.2.84.
VADIMOV
[V.V. KIRPICHENKO]
[First Deputy Head, FeD]
 The Threat from the 'Main
Adversary'

The main strategic priority of FCD counter-intelligence during

the decade before Gorbachev came to power remained 'the
struggle against the subversive intelligence activities of the
American special services'. The plan for 'intensifying' counter-
intelligence against the Main Adversary in the period 1983-87
gave 'a particular emphasis' to 'measures to combat enemy
ideological sabotage'. The Centre interpreted Zionist support for
Jewish refuseniks, nationalist agitation in the Baltic Republics,
'ideological warfare' against the Soviet Union and plans 'to
undermine the Soviet economy' as part of a subversive master-
plan co-ordinated by American Intelligence.

[ms notes: Incoming 27

Comrade Gornov, Yeiin, Brown
and operational staff of the Copy No 1
Residency
Leonov
26.1.84
Yermakov [A.Y. Guk]
No 84/KR To Residents (personally)
06.01.84 as listed

PLAN FOR BASIC MEASURES TO STEP UP STILL FURTHER THE EFFORT TO

COMBAT THE SUBVERSIVE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES
SPECIAL [INTELLIGENCE] SERVICES

In circumstances where the United States special services are con-

tinually increasing their subversive intelligence activities against the
USSR and expanding the scale on which hostile methods are used to
undermine the military and economic potential, defence capability and
preparedness for mobilization of our country, it is essential, in the
THE THREAT FROM THE MAIN ADVERSARY 123

interests of safeguarding state security, that the counter-intelligence

service abroad should take steps to increase its counter-measures
against the adversary to a substantial extent, and improve still further
the level and effectiveness of our action against American intelligence
in all sectors of the struggle.
In October 1983, the heads of our Department accordingly put into
operation a 'Plan of basic counter-intelligence measures for intensify-
ing to a greater degree the struggle against the subversive intelligence
activities of the American special services in the period 1983-1987'.
The following tasks have been set for Residencies in accordance with
this Plan:
gathering information about the aggressive plans and designs of
ruling circles in the USA and its special services, with all available
help provided by our resources, in order to implement Soviet
foreign and domestic policies;
uncovering and preventing American special services' intelligence
activity, particularly when using agents, against the USSR, reliable
protection for Soviet state, military and other secrets, and defence
of the Soviet economy from adversary wrecking and sabotage;
putting a decisive stop to acts of ideological sabotage on the part of
subversive centres and organizations abroad operating under the
control of the American special services, and ensuring the security
of Soviet institutions and citizens abroad ...

[ms notes:] Astakhov 16.2.84

James 9.02
Fedin
Gordon 8.11
Artyom 9.2.84
Evans [illeg name] 9.2.84

One of the main sections of the Plan envisages making the maximum
use of existing agent and operational facilities in Residencies in order to
obtain intelligence on the following items:
signs of preparation by the ruling circles in the USA for a nuclear
attack on the USSR, and any measures they take designed to
weaken our country's defence capability, or to create focal points of
tension in various parts of the world;
124 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

specific plans of the American special services for agent penetration

of Soviet state and military secrets and eventual training and
infiltration of agents into our country in order to carry out
diversionary sabotage operations;
the adversary plans and actions to undermine the Soviet economy,
or commercial and economic, scientific and technical co-operation
between the USSR and other countries;
operations planned by the American special services and centres of
ideological sabotage associated with them and designed to step up
psychological warfare' against the USSR, with the aim of discredit-
ing our foreign and domestic policy and undermining the Soviet
state and social system.
In order to extend existing operational facilities for obtaining reli-
able data on the efforts, and forms and methods used in agent activity
by the American special services, and for taking steps to uncover this
promptly and put a stop to it, Residencies must complete the recruiting
action already approved in regard to members of the American special
services and proceed to organize fresh targets to process for recruit-
ment.
The Plan has in view a series of additional measures aimed at
penetrating the American intelligence service's agent network from
third countries' territory.
A particular place in the Plan is occupied by measures to combat the
adversary ideological sabotage. In response to the tasks confronting
our Service in this important sector of counter-intelligence work,
Residencies must take specific steps to pursue more energetic study of
centres belonging to anti-Soviet emigre and Zionist organizations
abroad, which are utilized by hostile special services for subversive
operations against the USSR and Soviet citizens abroad.
The Plan also envisages suitable additional measures to be taken to
reinforce physical security and technical protection of Soviet institu-
tions in the USA, and in a number of countries where there is a difficult
counter-intelligence regime and an unstable operational situation. In
order to counteract attempts at recruitment and other hostile activities
by the adversary against Soviet citizens serving in posts abroad,
Residencies must continually improve their counter-intelligence
methods for working in the Soviet colony and its environs, making the
fullest possible use for this purpose of agents and other operational
assets in the special services and state institutions of the USA and third
countries, and also official contacts of security officers with repre-
THE THREAT FROM THE MAIN ADVERSARY 125

sentatives of local authorities. At the same time, Residencies must take

care to improve the standard of preventive work carried out among
groups of Soviet citizens abroad.
Progress in carrying out the measures envisaged by the Plan must
appear in the Residencies' annual reports on the work of the counter-
intelligence service abroad. *
You and your deputy for 'KR' [counter-intelligence] matters must
personally familiarize yourselves with the Plan in the Centre (Comrade
Vladimirov's subsection), utilizing for this purpose a visit during your
next leave.
ALEKSEEV
[GRUSHKOj

[next page]
For Comrade Gornov [Gordievsky]
Lavrov [Nikitenko] 22.V1.84

Though The Centre's conspiracy theories about American sub-

version became somewhat less extravagant during the later
1980s, they did not disappear. In the nine months before the
abortive coup of August 1991, the KGB leadership voiced public
fears of Western plots to infect Soviet grain imports and des-
tabilize both the Soviet Union and the Soviet economy.41 In June
1991, the First Deputy Head of the FCD, General Vadim Vasilye-
vich Kirpichenko, (whose codename 'Vadimov' appears on a
number of documents in this volume) complained publicly that
'the recent outburst of glasnost' and 'transformations in the
USSR' were assisting an intensified 'CIA offensive against the
Soviet Union'. Despite Kirpichenko's disclaimer, it was clear that
the United States remained the KGB's 'Main Adversary'.

VADIM KIRPICHENKO ON AMERICAN ESPIONAGE (Novosti Press

Release,S June 1991)
'It is harder for Soviet secret agents to operate in the United States than

• This paragraph is underlined and sidelined, with 'Yermakov' written in the margin
126 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

for their American counterparts to work here', asserted Lieutenant-

General Vadim Kirpichenko, First Deputy Head of the KGB's Foreign
Political Intelligence Department [FCD], in an interview with
Novosti's Vladimir Ostrovsky.
General Kirpichenko referred to the greater openness of Soviet
society, its profound democratization and the recent outburst of
glasnost, and to new factors which are making the tasks of foreign
secret agents easier to fulfil. The intelligence officer believes that the
transformations in the USSR have in particular created conditions that
make it easier for Western secret agents to establish contacts with
Soviet citizens.
The General also thinks that such radical changes have not occurred
in American society. Consequently Soviet secret agents find it just as
hard to operate now in the USA as they did in the past.
As before quite influential circles and specialist bodies systematically
create spy hysteria campaigns for domestic opinion. The American
press constantly publishes material about the work of the KGB, its
intelligence service, etc. Kirpichenko noted that such a campaign
clearly maintains the heightened sense of concern the American public
feels about national security.
Referring to the work of the CIA, the General drew attention to the
way employees of this agency go flat out to obtain information from
those Soviet citizens who have access to state secrets. He went on: 'We
notice that Soviet citizens abroad are approached by CIA agents and
other special services. Many of them are simply offered the chance of
staying in the USA or working for the CIA. At times such proposals are
made at random to strangers on the street.'
Kirpichenko called this a CIA offensive against the Soviet Union. He
believes that such a campaign has two aims: on the one hand to obtain
secret information cheaply and on the other to reduce the activity of
Soviet secret agents by intimidating them through encroachments on
Soviet citizens.
The General singled out the following assessment from a recent (16
May 1991) report of the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) to
Congress's Joint Committee on Economics: 'Despite the political,
economic and ethnic crises, the USSR remains a single country, capable
of delivering a mortal blow to the USA.'
The General considers the publication in the American press of such
information to be planned with the sole aim of putting pressure on the
Soviet leadership. This conclusion is supported by certain indirect
THE THREAT FROM THE MAIN ADVERSARY 127

evidence: a year ago in London a secret group of experts - intelligence

section heads - was founded and had a single aim: 'to regularly devise
assessments, which will pressurize the Soviet leadership into doing
something' .
Kirpichenko continued:
We could take as one example of the activity of the secret services
their attempts to influence public opinion on the problem of
Soviet-Japanese relations. They also disseminated misinforma-
tion about our alleged readiness to cede the islands in exchange
for a large provision of credit from Japan, and other rumours.
At the same time, foreign intelligence services' interest in
gathering data on the Soviet defence and science and technologi-
cal potential, our reserves of strategic raw materials, foodstuffs,
hard currency and gold has also increased perceptibly.
We are well aware that American secret service agents have
increased quite significantly over the past few years the number of
trips they make to the Soviet Union. This activity would seem to
confirm the axiom that on-site reconnaissance remains as vital as
before.
However, electronic intelligence has provided the major part of
information for the US through numerous tracking stations,
surveillance of Soviet telephone communications and satellite
interception of radio messages.
The Soviet General emphasized that the degree of technical sophisti-
cation of special services is being constantly upgraded, in particular,
CIA's liaison techniques which are highly advanced. According to
Kirpichenko, US intelligence is invariably perfecting its techniques and
forms of activity. Almost every year, Soviet state security bodies come
across new methods of activity conducted by foreign intelligence
serVICes.
Speaking about Robert Gates' appointment,'~ the Soviet General
recalled the words of this newly nominated US expert on Soviet affairs:
'Discrediting the KGB's past and present activity may seriously affect
its prestige, undermine its personnel's morale, and thus serve to expand
the sphere of activity of US intelligence in the Soviet Union.'
It should be mentioned in this connection, Kirpichenko observed,
that on more than one occasion the Soviet leaders stated that the USSR

• the nomination of Robert Gates to succeed William Webster as Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI).
128 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

does not regard the United States as its adversary, while the US
administration has not made a similar statement to this effect. This
circumstance is of special importance now, and, regrettably, it serves to
fuel hostile stereotypes of the Soviet Union among Americans.

In the aftermath of the failed coup of August 1991, the

traditional KGB assessment of the threat from the 'Main Adver-
sary' was publicly ridiculed even by some KGB officers. The FCD
was accused by one of its officers of having 'profaned the
essence of intelligence work'. 'We served mainly Party interests',
he told Izvestia. 'To please our bosses, we passed on doctored
and slanted information, in accordance with the slogan "Pin
everything on the Americans, and everything will be OK". That's
not intelligence, it's self-deception.'42
Ironically, soon after the August coup, the newly appointed
head of the KGB Analytical Directorate, Vladimir Arsentyevich
Rubanov, pOinted to the United States intelligence community
as the main model for the reorganization of the KGB.43In October
1991 the First Chief Directorate was hived off from the restruc-
tured KGB to become an independent foreign intelligence
agency, and given a name curiously similar to that of its tradi-
tional main opponent: the Central Intelligence Service.
 Notes

Abbreviations:
KGB Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign
Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990).
Instructions from the Centre: Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions
from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (Lon-
don: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991).
Unless otherwise stated, the source for information on the KGB and its foreign operations is
Oleg Gordievsky.

1. KGB, pp. 487-507. Instructions from The Centre, Ch. 4.

2. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger,
1985), pp. 35-41. Desmond Ball, The Development of the SlOP, 1960-1983', in
Desmond Ball and Jeffrey T. Richelson (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1986).
3. The expansion of S & T (scientific and technological intelligence) collection increased
the overlap between KGB and GRU operations. There also appears to be an enormous
duplication of effort in sigint between the two agencies. KGB, pp. 510-11.
4. Vitali Vasilyevich Fedorchuk, KGB Chairman from May to December 1982, was not a
Politburo member.
5. Gordievsky
6. KGB, pp. 372-3.
7. Erich Honecker, Zur aktuellen Fragen unserer Innen- und Aussenpolitik nach dem IX.
Parteitag (Berlin, 1976), pp. 13-14. We are grateful to Professor Jefferson Adams for
this reference.
8. Arkadi N. Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985),
pp.224-5.
9. Friedrich Thelen, 'Post-Cold War Spies: Cloak and Stagger?', European Affairs,
May-June, 1991.
10. Peter R. Prifti, Socialist Albania since 1944; Domestic and Foreign Developments
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), Ch. 12.
11. Ibid., pp. 253-5.
12. Gordievsky
13. KGB, pp. 484-7,536-7.
14. KGB, pp. 473-5.
15. KGB, pp. 475-8.
16. KGB, pp. 512-13.
17. KGB, pp. 477-8.
18. KGB, pp. 463-5.
19. Gordievsky
20. Instructions from The Centre, Ch. 9.
21. KGB, pp. 461-2.
22. Gordievsky
23. KGB, p. 463. Gerald Segal, 'The Soviet Union and Korea', in Gerald Segal (ed.), The
Soviet Union in East Asia (London: Heinemann, 1983).
24. Instructions from The Centre, Ch. 1.
25. KGB, pp. 411-17.
130 MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE'

26. Kuzichkin was posted to the section of the Second Department which prepared docu-
mentation and 'legends' for iIIegals in Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
27. Vladimir Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB (London: Andre Deutsch, 1990), p. 105.
28. Two less important, long-serving KGB agents, Ali Naghi Rabbani, a senior official in the
Ministry of Education, and the retired General Darahshani were also caught in 1977-78.
Ibid., pp. 147-8, 197-9, 222.
29. Ibid., pp. 298-303, 365.
30. KGB, pp. 458-9.
31. Gordievsky. Forfurther discussion of KGB operations in the Middle East, see KGB, pp.
455-61, 530-1.
32. KGB, pp. 342-8.
33. Gordievsky. The anti-Masonic dimension of Zamoisky's conspiracy theory is elaborated
in L. Zamoysky [sic], Behind the Facade of the Masonic Temple (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1989). The antisemitic dimension was considered unsuitable for publication.
34. Geoffrey Hosking, A History of the Soviet Union (London: Fontana, 1985), pp. 438-9.
35. Instructions from The Centre, Ch. 1.
36. Gordievsky was clear that the Plan was not simply, or mainly, a response to Israel's
intervention in Lebanon in June 1982.
37. KGB, pp. 10-12.
38. KGB, pp. 142-4.
39. On the vast KGB and GRU sigint operations since the 1960s see KGB, pp. 437-42,
510-12, and Desmond Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (Sigint), Canberra Papers on
Strategy and Defence, no. 47 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1989).
40. Desmond Ball, 'Soviet Signals Intelligence: Vehicular Systems and Operations', Intel-
ligence and National Security, Vol. 4, No.1 (1989).
41. Instructions from The Centre, Ch. 10.
42. Izvestia, 25 Sept. 1991.
43. Izvestia, 18 Sept. 1991.