Maisonneuve & Larose

The End of the Mamlūk Sultanate: (Why did the Ottomans Spare the Mamlūks of Egypt and
Wipe out the Mamlūks of Syria?)
Author(s): David Ayalon
Source: Studia Islamica, No. 65 (1987), pp. 125-148
Published by: Maisonneuve & Larose
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 THE END OF THE MAMLUK
SULTANATE
(Why did the ottomans spare the mamliiks of
egypt and wipe out the mamluiksof syria?)

Remark
Introductory
It is quite a long time since I have startedstudying,offand
on, the historyof Egypt (and, to a lesserextent,that of Syria)
during the early Ottoman period. I intended,of course, to
utilizeas manyofthe available sourcesas I could. For various
reasons,the chances that I shall followup that researchare not
bright. I, therefore, decided to publishthat part of my study
which is based on the data containedin the two chroniclesof
Ibn Iyis (1) and Ibn Tiilin (2) about the fate of the Mamluk
militaryaristocracyin Egypt and in Syria duringthe firstyears
of the Ottomanoccupation.
I am well aware of the grave deficienciesof such a partial
research,for which I can offera partial justification:a) the
great richnessof these two chronicles(Ibn Iyis far surpassing
Ibn Thiltn)as comparedwiththe povertyofthe chronicleswhich
immediatelyfollowthem;(3) b) the fact that any kind of other
source materialcannot replace them;c) the factthat theywere
not studied sufficiently. Particularly inadequate is their
study against the backgroundof the previousMamlik regime.

(1) Ibn IyAs, Badd'i" al-Zuhir fi Waqd'i' al-Duhir, Istanbul, 1931, vol. V.
(2) Ibn Tilfin, Mufdkahat al-Khilldn fi HIawddith al-Zamdn, Cairo, 1964,
vols. I and II.
(3) See the Appendix.

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126 DAVID AYALON

I had to divide the study into two separate, but closely

connected and interdependentarticles: a) "Mamltik Military
Aristocracyduringthe First Years of the OttomanOccupation
of Egypt," to be published in the Bernard Lewis Festschrift;
b) the presentpaper. A minimaldegreeofoverlappingbetween
the two separatedpartsofthe same workwas unavoidable.

The Background
The Ottoman conquest of Egypt (1517) constitutedpart of
the greatestexpansion in the historyof that Empire into the
countriesof Islam, whichwas carriedout withinthe period of
less than threeyears(1514-1517). The two Muslimadversaries
ofthe Ottomansin theirbigpusheastwardsand southwardswere
the SunniteMamlik Empire(1250-1517),whichtheyannihilated
and the newlyfounded(1502) Shi'ite SafawidEmpireof Iran and
Iraq, to which they dealt a terribleblow, but which managed
to survive,recuperateand constituteforcenturiesa source of
constantdangerto the Ottomansalong theireasternborders.
As a resultof theirdriveinto Islamic territory the Ottomans
succeeded, in that very short period, in annexing to their
Empire Syria, Egypt and the Hejaz, Iraq, as well as parts of
Eastern Anatolia and North Western Iran. With additional
efforts theymanagedto establishtheirmasteryoverthe Red Sea
and the Persian Gulf. These conquests had also their share
in establishingthe Ottomans' various and varyingdegrees of
influenceand hegemonyover the countriesof NorthAfrica.
It is worthwhileto bear in mind in this connectionthat this
expansionwhichtransformed the map of the Islamic worldtook
place simultaneously(or almost so) with the transformation of
the wholeglobeby West European expansion,whichestablished
forcenturiesto come ChristianEurope's preponderanceoverthe
rest of the world (firstand foremostover the lands of Islam).
Thus the end of the European medievalperiodwitnessedat the
same time vast territorialchanges withinthe lands of Islam.
These two phenomena,which are by no means isolated from
each other,deserve an exhaustive examination.
To go back to the conquests of the Ottomans and to their
MamliIk policy. As already shown in the article for the
BernardLewis Festschrift, Sultan Selim made a quick and total
volte-face in his handling of the defeated Mamlfiks. After
havingattemptedto exterminatethemphysically,he decidedto

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 THE END OF THE MAMLOK SULTANATE 127

incorporatethemin the Ottomanarmy. The obvious question

whichposes itselfis: Why?
I believe that a combinationof reasonsmade him change his
mind so drasticallyand so quickly. The firstof these was:
The Ottomans' expansionwhichadded to theirEmpire,within
a fewyears,territories farwiderthan those conqueredby them
in Europe duringcenturies. The second one was theirfailure
to annihilate the Safawids. The third one was the circum-
navigationof the Cape of Good Hope by the Portuguese,which
took place so shortlybeforethe Ottomanconquestof Egypt and
the Fertile Crescent. The fourthreason was the Frankish
threat in the Eastern Mediterranean,includingthe command
of its most importantislands.
Even withoutthe existenceof an externalthreatto the newly
conqueredvast territories, the Ottomanswould have been faced
withthe formidabletask ofmanningthe administrativesystems
and the garrisonsof these territories. With the presence of
such mightyenemiesalongtheirborders,the drainon theirman-
power must have enormouslyincreased. Of all the military
elementswhich they subdued in their far flungdrive into the
Islamic countries,the Mamliiks were the most suitable for
incorporationin the Ottoman army, because of their warlike
ability,the commonoriginof the militaryslave systemsin the
two empiresand the Turkishdialect spoken by those Mamlfiks
(even when they were not Turkishborn). No wonder,there-
fore,that theywerethe firstto be includedin that army. The
quickness with which the Ottomans sent the rehabilitated
Mamlaiksto the Red Sea positions,to Alexandriaand, above all,
to the campaignagainstRhodes,is the best prooffortheircrying
need forthis kind of militarymanpower.
This policywas not, however,withoutits verygrave dangers.
The main problemwhichthe Ottomanshad to solve, and quite
quickly,was on whata scale and withinwhicharea theycan afford
to reinstatethe Mamliikswithoutendangeringtheir own hold
on that area. On the basis of the data furnishedby our two
sourcesthe bestway to followthe mannerin whichthe Ottomans
handled that problemis throughthe examinationof Ottoman-
Mamlfik-Safawid relations.

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128 DAVID AYALON

The Case oftheSafawids

The magnitudeof the difficultieswhichthe Ottomanshad to
tackle in and around the annexed areas, and which had their
directand indirectrepercussionson theirattitudetowardsthe
Mamliiks,is nowhere better reflectedthan in their relations
withthe Safawids,or moreprecisely,in the dangerousstalemate
created on their Safawid front.
Some of the main characteristicsof the Safawid dynastyand
the Shi'ite movementwhich it represented,were its immense
drive,the impactof whichwas feltfarbeyondthe bordersofits
realm;its uncompromising hatredofthe Sunna, and its amazing
resilienceand power of quick recoveryfrom even the most
shatteringblows. In this respect the informationfurnished
by our two sources is most revealing. From the momentof
theirinceptionas a state, the Safawids are consideredto be a
grave threatto the MamlfikSultanate. The earliestreference,
in a Mamlilksource,to theirexistenceis foundin Ibn Tfilfin's
chronicle. He tells us that in Jum~d II 907/December1501
"it became knownin Damascus that a man named Ism"I'l b.
al-Sifi (4) had conqueredthecountriesof Timurlankand
.Haydar
other countries,and he is now marchingagainst the countries
[of the MamlfikSultanate], and thereis no powerbutin God."(5)
This shortpassage is a mosttellingproofofthe dread caused by
the appearance of that new power. The associationwith the
unforgettabledevastation broughtabout by Timurlankin his
attack on both the Mamlfikand the Ottoman empires some
hundredyears earlierreflectsthe intensityof that dread.
Not until Safar 908/July1502 does Ibn Iyis mentionthe
Safawids forthe firsttime,but fromthe vast preparationsfor
a campaign to thwart their expected advance, (6) it is made
clear that the Mamltks had already been well acquainted with
what they consideredto be an ominousdangerfromthe north-
east. From now on, and up to the defeatof the Safawids by
the Ottomansin Rajab 920/August1514, the Mamltikslived in
a state of constantnervousnessand fear of a Safawid attack
(whichnever materialized),thus divertingtheirattentionfrom

(4) This is the usual distortionin the Mamlik sources of the name Safawi.
(5) Ibn Tlaon, I, p. 252, 11. 20-21.
(6) Ibn Iyis, V, p. 39, 11.7-21. The preparations were not confinedto Egypt,
but included Syria as well (Ibn Tfilfin,I, p. 261, 11. 19-21).

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 THE END OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE 129
a much more immediate threat, a fact which the Ottomans
exploited to their best advantage. One MamliIk expedition
afterthe other,all of themof a purelydefensivecharacter,was
sent to the northmainlyto Aleppo,(7) in orderto anticipatea
Safawid attack. (8)
The immensemightand prestigewhich the Safawid Empire
accumulated within very few years since its establishmentis
reflectedin our source in its defeateven more stronglythan in
the periodwhichprecededit. Ibn Iyis repeatedlystatesthatin
Chaldiran the Ottomans won the greatest victory in their
history,and that no victorywon by Selim's forefathers could
compare with it. He also gives quite numerousand detailed
versions of the battle, which is a quite unusual practice.(9)
Moresignificantofall, however,is the almostimmediaterecovery
of the Safawids from their crushing defeat, and their re-
appearance as a major power, challengingand menacingonce
again both the MamlRiks and the Ottomans. As earlyas Safar
922/March1516, i.e. barelya year and a half aftertheirdefeat,

(7) Aleppo was the key point in the Mamlak defensive system, both against
the Safawadis and against the Ottomans. See the referencesin the following
notes. It continued to be a bastion in the Ottoman defence of Syria against
the Safawids. See below.
(8) Ibn Tilon, I, pp. 316, 11. 11-17, 317, 11. 1-2, 318, 11. 7-9, 328, 11. 2-3, 362,
11.7-9. Ibn Iyis, IV, pp. 118, 11. 16-19, 121, 1. 20 - 122, 1. 8, 144, 1. 23 - 145, 1. 1,
258, 11.4-5, 257, 11.8-15, 262, 11. 1-6. No aggressive action on a large scale against
the Safawids was ever contemplated by the Mamliks. They refused to give
military assistance to the ruler of Bagdad when he was attacked and ousted by
them from his capital (ibid., IV, p. 146, 11. 13-6). A contributoryfactor to the
fear of the Safawids in the Mamlik Sultanate, was that that enemy threatened it
from the same direction as the Mongols (including Timurlank). A deep seated
dread of the Mongols lasted a long time after their danger had been completely
removed. See e.g. Ibn Tailon, I, p. 252, 11. 20-21; Ibn Iyis, IV, pp. 143, 1. 11 -
144, 1. 1, 227, 1. 17 - 228,1. 18. It should, however, be stressed here that in spite
of the anxiety and nervousness prevailing in the Mamlik Sultanate in the last
years of its existence therewas no feelingthat the Mamlfk regimeis doomed.
(9) On the evaluation of the victorysee Ibn Iyis, IV, pp. 401, 11.4-6, 403, 11.10-
19; V, pp. 100, 11. 8-11, 350, 11. 1-3. In the last two referencesthe victory over
the Mamliks is added to that over the Safawids. On the versions of the battle
see ibid., pp. 393, 11.3-11, 396, 11.4-9, 396, 11.4-9, 398, 11.2-16, 400, 1. 5 - 401, 1. 4,
402, 1. 6 - 404, 1. 5. Unlike the Mamlfiks,the Safawids were not wiped out of
existence, because, in addition to their freshnessand religious zeal, they were
greatly helped by the vastness of their country, its bad roads and mountainous
terrain, and also by its severe winter. In the actual battles they had no answer
to Ottoman firearms. Their zeal in battles of this kind could only increase their
casualties.

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130 DAVID AYALON

and several months before the Ottoman-Mamlrik showdown,

Ibn Iyis speaks in great detail of how the Safawid army had
been reorganized and replenished,and started a campaign
against the Ottomans,the firstfruitsof whichwerethe capture
ofAmid in NorthernMesopotamia,and howthiscomeback caused
greatconcernto the Mamlak Sultan and his advisers.(10)
The Ottoman occupation of the Mamlik Sultanate did not
halt the Safawid recoveryor ambitions. Their advance in
NorthernMesopotamia continued.(11) During Sultan Selim's
stay in Egypt, and particularlyduring his passage through
Syria on his way back to Istanbul,he was greatlyoccupiedwith
the Safawid threat,whichloomed large over both countries.(12)
In Syria this seems to have been the Sultan's major concern.
In Muharran924/January1518 he appoints a special governor
over the fringesof the District of Diyvr Bakr, on the Syro-
Mesopotamianborder,whose sole stated objectwas to watchthe
movements of the Safawids.(13) In the following month
(Safar/February), the firstand onlyinstructionwhich he gives
JRnbirdial-GhazMli, his newlyappointedViceroyover Southern
Syria, is, again, to watch the Safawids and collectinformation
about them.(14) In Rabi' I-Rabi' II/March-April of the same

(10) The informationabout this new revival of the Safawids and their army
and about theirnew conquests was furnishedto the Mamlak Sultan by the Viceroy
of Aleppo. How great was the belief in an imminentmajor clash between the
recoveringSafawids and the Ottomans, can be learnt from the fact that Sultan
Qdnsih al-Ghawri expressed the desire that he himself would go to Aleppo, and
await the outcome of the struggle,"for whichever of thetwowill defeathis adversary,
will inevitablymarch against our realm" (fa-inna kulla manintasara minhumd
'al& gharimihild budda an gazhaf 'al& bilddind) (ibid., V, pp. 20, 1. 18 - 21, 1. 17).
On the exchange of diplomatic envoys between the Safawids and the Mamlaks,
and the arrogance and haughtiness of the Safawids see: Ibn Iyhs, IV, pp. 123,
11. 14-18, 184, 11. 15-17, 207, 11. 18-23, 218, 1. 23-220, 1. 1, 220, 1. 17 - 221, 1. 20,265,
11.6-18, 266, 11.1-10,271, 11.7-14; V, p. 33, 11. 19-23; Ibn Tfilfin,I, pp. 354, 11.14-15,
257, 11.3-12, 18-19.
(11) That the advance of the Safawid army in NorthernMesopotamia was very
real, can be deduced from the fact that "numerous Ottomans", including the
Viceroys of Amid and al-Ruhd, togetherwith their retinues, arrived in Damascus
in Rabi' I 923/March1517, afterhaving fledfromthat army (Ibn Talfin, II, p. 58,
11. 17-20).
(12) For referencesto the anxiety caused by the Safawid threat in Egypt and
Syria during Sultan Selim's stay in the area, see: Ibn Iy&s, V, pp. 176, 11. 12-18,
182, 11.2-7; Ibn TTalin, II, pp. 74, 11. 14-18, 74, 1. 19 - 75, 1. 2.
(13) Ibid., p. 79, 11. 16-21.
(14) Ibid., p. 82, 11.8-11.

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 THE END OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE 131

year, Selim stays in Aleppo and supervises personally the

strenghtening of its fortifications
(the town's wall, towersand
gates) to prepare it for what he believed to be an imminent
Safawid attack. (15) How imminentand how dangerous this
attack was consideredto have been, can be learntfromthe fact
that in Jumidd II/Juneof that year prayersand recitalsof the
entire Koran (khalamal) were performedby the graves of all
the importantMuslim saints in Cairo, and in the mosque of
al-Azhar,wishingSultan Selim victoryover Shah Ismn'll the
Safawid.(16) In the restof the periodunderstudyfear of the
Safawids did not, in any way, subside. (17)
Had the Safawid frontbeen the only one with which the
Ottomans had to cope, they would have had little reason for
real concern,for they had militaryand technicalsuperiority
which the Safawids never had a chance to context. But the
Ottomanshad otherenemiesas well, and the Safawids did not
content themselvesin being just another enemy, but ende-
avoured to establish contact and coordinatetheir operations
with the others,in spite of the fact that those others were
Christians. This tendency of cooperation with the Franks
against the Ottomans, which constituteda major feature of
Safawid policy for a long time, had its very early origins.
Already in the second half of the year 916/1510the Mamlik
Viceroy of al-Bira (today's Birejik) on the Euphrates caught
emissariesfromthe Safawidrulercarryinglettersto the Franks.
These letterswere addressedto the Frankishconsulsin Alexan-
dria, Damascus and Tripoli,who were asked by Shih Ismi'il to
writein his name to the Kingsofthe Franksand suggestto them
a common offensiveagainst the Mamliks and the Ottomans.
Accordingto his plan the Safawids would conduct the land
offensive,while the Franks would attack the two Empires by
sea. (18) A few monthsearlier Franks passing throughSyria
seem to have carriedin theircanes messagesfromthe Franks to

(15) Ibn Iyfs, V, pp. 243, 11. 1-20, 247, 11.21-23, 248, 1. 12 - 249, 1. 9. See also
Ibn Tilfn, II, p. 79, 11.2-4.
(16) Ibn Iyis, V, pp. 253, 11.5- 10, 253, 1. 24 - 254, 1. 6.
(17) Ibid., pp. 254, 1. 22-255, 1. 13, 258, 1. 20-259, 1. 2, 268, 11.9-13, 419, 11.15-
16, 452, 11. 5-8, 467, 1. 18 - 468, 1. 6, 470, 1. 22 - 471, 1. 4; Ibn Tailon, II, pp. 87,
11. 10-13, 102, 11.14-16.
(18) Ibn Iyfis,IV, pp. 191, 11.4-9, 205, 11.9-18.

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132 DAVID AYALON

the Safawids. (19) The way was thus paved, at such an early
date, for much biggerattemptsof cooperationin the future.
This shows that the Ottomanshad to face, as a resultof their
unprecedentedexpansion, not only internal difficultiesand
longerhostilefrontiers, but also alliances against thembetween
those frontiers. This could only speed up their decision to
reversetheir initial policy towards the Mamliks.
When the Ottomans decided to spare the Mamlaks, they
could eitherleave themin part of theirformerrealm or in the
wholeofit. They could eitherappoint OttomanViceroysover
the various provinces of the defunct MamlaikSultanate, or
Mamlfikones. What theydid was to leave the Mamlfiksin the
greatestpart of these provinces(Egypt and SouthernSyria; or,
moreprecisely,mostof the wholeof Syria),and to appointover
them two Mamlilk Viceroys. This was utter folly,and the
Ottomanssoon paid dearlyforit. When they came to realize
that revivingMamlilkpoweron such a largescale is too danger-
ous fortheirrule,theywereconfronted withthe need to choose
betweenEgypt and Syria. They chose Egypt, and rightlyso.
Allowingthe Mamliiks to survive in the whole or in the
greatestpart of theirformerrealmwould have led, as it really
did, to an attempton theirpart to overthrowthe Ottomansand
to restoretheirown old rule withinits old boundaries. As I
have already stated elsewhere:"In the course of its recorded
history,includingthe pre-Islamicperiod,Syria was neverruled
fromEgypt forso long,or, relativelyspeaking,withsuch firm-
ness as during the Mamlilk reign." (20) This was, indeed, an
exception in the of
long history Egypt, but what matteredwas
that forthe centuriesprecedingthe Ottoman conquest Egypt
and Syria were ruled as one unit,and that, therefore, it would
have been quite easy to restorethat unity shortly after the
separationof the two countries.

(19) Ibn TalOn, I, pp. 342, 1. 23 - 343, 1. 2. For Franco-Safawid contacts after
the Maml0k defeat see ibid., II, p. 120, 11. 12-18.
(20) Paper read in Hebrew on May 31, 1966, and published in English under the
title "The Muslim City and the Mamlik Military Aristocracy", Proceedingsof the
Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, vol. II, Jerusalem, 1967, p. 328.
I made the same statement,in more or less the same words, in an earlier paper I
read in the Colloquium on Medieval Islamic Cities in Oxfordin the summerof 1965.
See also my "Egypt as a Dominant Factor in Syria and Palestine", in Egypt and
Palestine, A Millenium of Association (868-1948), Jerusalem, 1984, pp. 33-37,
and especially, p. 33.

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 THE END OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE 133
Since preservingthe Mamlfk aristocracyboth in Egypt and
in Syriawas, froman Ottomanpointofview,out ofthe question,
therewereveryweightyreasonsforpreferring the firstover the
second. Egypt, being a flat and narrow country,(21) could be
easily dominatedfromthe sea and the sea-shoredeep inland,(22)
at least up to, and including,the capital, wherethe overwhelm-
ing majorityof the Mamliks resided. (23) In Syria, mastery
of the sea, or of great parts of the shore,would not have had
such a decisive effecton the hinterlandand on the big inland
cities. The mountainouscharacter of the country,together
withthe factthat,in additionto the bedouinsand semi-bedouins,
therewere in Syria the Turkmenand Kurdish tribesmen,who
were practically non-existentin the Egyptian countryside,
made the rule over that countryfar more difficultthan over
Egypt. The establishmentof the Safawid empireaggravated
the situationeven more:first,because of its physicalproximity
to Syria, and second, because of the strongTurkomanelement
in that country. There was a vast contiguousterritoryin-
habited by Turkomans,which stretcheddeeply into Eastern
Anatolia, North WesternIran and NorthernSyria.(24) Now,
Shah IsmicIl al-Saifi,thoughthe majorityof his adherentswere
Iranians,was of a Turkomanstock,and he directeda greatdeal
of his proselytizingpropaganda towards his fellow-tribesmen.
The Ottomans were particularlysensitiveto what was going
on in the regions of the Turkomans. There was also the
problemof where to concentratethe Mamltiks. In Egypt it
was quite simple, because Cairo, with the only citadel in the
country,dominated all or most of the land of the Nile. In

(21) It is obvious that only the inhabited, cultivated and cultivable land of
Egypt is intended in this statement.
(22) On the position of Egypt and Syria vis-d-visan external naval power, see
my "The Mamlfiksand Naval Power", Proceedingsof theAcademy of Sciences and
Humanities, vol. I, Jerusalem, 1965, pp. 10-11, and note 5 on p. 10. See also
"Egypt as a Dominant Factor, etc.", op. cit., pp. 35-36.
(23) During the Ottoman reign an important centre of power gradually came
into being in Upper Egypt, but this belongs to a later period (see "Egypt as a
Dominant Factor, etc.", pp. 40-41).
(24) In NorthernSyria the Turcomans must have constituted a decisive factor
over a very big region in the closing decades of the Mamlik reign. According
to an eyewitness evidence fromQA'itb&y's Sultanate the dominant language from
Latakia on the Mediterraneanshore to al-Bira on the Euphrates was not Arabic,
but Turkish (Abri al-Baq5' Ibn al-Ji'dn, al-Qawl al-Mustaraf ffSafar al-Malik
al-Ashraf,Torino, 1978, p. 17.

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134 DAVID AYALON

Syria such a centre did not exist. Besides Damascus there

were other important towns and numerous citadels. This
would lead unavoidablyto the establishmentof severalMamliik
centresthere,whichwould createa hostofinternaland external
difficulties. Fortunatelyforthe Ottomans,the MamlilkVice-
roy of Syria gave them the opportunityto put an end to their
Mamlilkexperimentin that country.

The Syrian Mamlaks

Now the ironyof the whole matterwas that it had been no
other but Sultan Selim-the man who originallyintended to
wipe out the Mamlfiks -who in actual factnot onlysparedthem,
but also made it possible for them to gather much strength
withinthe greatestpart of theirformerrealm,thus paving the
way fortheirattemptto overthrowthe Ottomans. It was his
son and successor, Suleyman the Magnificent(926-974/1520-
1566), who, althoughhe greatlyimprovedthe positionof the
Mamliiksof Egypt, at the same time he crushedtheirrevoltin
Syria(whichwas a directresultofhis father'spolicy),eradicated
them foreverin that country, and contained the Mamlfik
aristocracywithinthe boundariesof Egypt alone.
The restorationofthe Mamltiksby Sultan Selimwas made at
the verylast stage ofhis stay in the Mamlfikconqueredterrito-
ries. We have already discussed his changeof policy towards
the MamliIksof Egypt,(25) but thiswas by no means all that he
had done in this respect. When he decided to returnto his
capital, he had to appointviceroysin thoseterritories. On the
13th of Sha'ban 923/August31, 1517, i.e. only ten days before
his departurefromEgypt, he appoints amir Kh~yrbak, the
formerMamlilkviceroyof Aleppo, as the viceroy(nd'ib) of the
countryof the Nile. A significant featureofthat appointment
is, that he had alreadydecided to appoint an OttomanViceroy
(YiInus Bdshd),but at the verylast momentchangedhis mind,
and appointed a Mamlilkin his stead! (26)

(25) In the Bernard Lewis, Festschrift, cited above.

(26) Ibn Iyfs, V, pp. 198, 11. 6-8, 199, 11. 14-16, 202, 11. 5-7, 356, 11.20-21, 478,
11. 1-3; Ibn Tfilfin,II, p. 66, 11.5-6. Selim took with him a son of Khiyrbak as a
hostage. Information on the death of that son in Istanbul reached Cairo in
Dhf al-Qa'da 926/October1520 (Ibn Iyis, V, p. 357, 11. 19-20).

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 THE END OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE 135
Selim arrivedin Damascus on the 21st of RamadIn 923/early
October 1517,(27) where he stayed for about five months,
studyingthe situationand makingexcursionsinto the Syrian
capital's hinterland. His appointmentof a viceroywas made
only five days beforehis departure(5 Safar 924/February16,
1518), and once again his choice fell on a Mamltik,Jdnbirdi
al-GhazMli,who was Sultan Qdnsgihal-Ghawri's viceroy of
al-IHamdand Sultan Tiimdn bMy'sviceroyof Damascus. Of
particularsignificanceis the area upon which al-Ghazili was
givensway. Accordingto one ofour sources,he was appointed
over the originalMamltikprovinceof Damascus, as well as over
IHims,HIam5,Sidon, Beirut, Jerusalem,Ramla, Lydda, Kerak
"and otherdistrictsof Syria and Tripoli".(28) Accordingto the
other,he was givenauthorityover the territory stretchingfrom
al-Ma'arra(i.e. Ma'arrat al-Nu'man,to the south of Aleppo) to
al-'Arish and the Egyptian border. (29) This was a very great
and a very dangerousdeparturefromMamlfikpolicy towards
Syria. Under the Mamliks Syria was divided into seven
provinces(Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Tripoli,Safed, Gaza and
Kerak), each headed by a governoror viceroy (nd'ib), almost
invariably responsible to Cairo. (30) There might rise, from
amongthese governors,one who would overshadowall the rest,
and exertimmenseinfluenceand power;theremighttake place
boundarychangesbetweenthe variousprovinces;otherchanges
might also occur. But, on the whole, the patternwas kept
more or less intact, and greatlyfacilitatedthe perpetuationof
Egypt's rule over Syria. Now Sultan Selim, with complete
lack of knowledgeof the circumstancesin Syria, destroyedthis
well-triedpatternin one stroke,mergingsix ofthe old provinces
into one, thusleavingin Syria onlytwo provincesinsteadofthe
earlierseven, and handingover the by farbiggerofthetwoto a
Mamlik ! (the provinceofAleppo was ruledfromthe veryoutset
by an OttomanBMshi). On top ofall thathe put theCircassian

(27) Ibn Tfilfin,II, p. 67, 11. 19-21.

(28) Ibn Iyfs, V, p. 378, 11.20-26.
(29) Ibn Tfilfin,II, p. 82, 11. 4-7. Rumours about the appointment of al-
Ghaz5li as viceroy started circulatingabout a month before it actually took place
(ibid., p. 78, 1. 11). Sultan Selim left Damascus on the 10th of Safar/February21,
1518 (ibid., p. 82, 1. 17).
(30) "The Muslims City, etc.", pp. 328-329; "Egypt as a Dominant Factor",
pp. 34-35.

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136 DAVID AYALON

MamlGks,who still remainedin Syria, under the direct juris-

dictionofthe new MamlGkviceroy! amral-Jarakisa...
ilayhi).(31) There mightwell be another
(wa-ad.fa
yet factorwhichcould
tempt the new viceroyto raise the banner of rebellionagainst
the Ottomansat the firstopportunity. From the inadequate
informationat our disposal it would appear that Sultan Selim
did not leave behind in Damascus as stronga contingentof
Ottoman soldiersas he did in Cairo.(32) What mightcorro-
borate that suggestionis that even during the rebellionthe
existenceof such a contingentis not mentionedin the sources
used in thispaper. But onlyfurther studywillgive the correct
answerto this question.
Thus, withinless than a year since the completeconquestof
the Mamlik Sultanate, and as a directresultof Sultan Selim's
deliberate policy, almost the whole of that Sultanate was
governedby Mamlfikviceroys,withquite considerableMamliik
contingentsat their disposal. This could have only one
outcome.

The Revoltof al-Ghazall

The revoltofJdnbirdial-Ghazdlihad twomajorcharacteristics
of decisive importance:a) it was contemplatedand prepared
long beforeits actual outburst,so that it could take place at the
veryfirstopportunity;b) its aim was notjust to freeal-Ghzlli's
province from Ottoman yoke, but to restore Mamllk rule,
Mamlilkinstitutionsand Mamltikway of lifeover all the terri-
tories of the defeated and conquered Sultanate. At least
accordingto one source,he abolished,duringthe period of his
loyaltyto the Ottomans,many of theirinstitutionsand innov-
ations, in spite of the vehementoppositionof the ChiefQdlT
Ibn al-Farffir,(33) "for he [i.e. al-Ghazili] was inclined to

(31) Ibn Talfin, II, p. 85, 11.2-7. A reason for including the greatest part of
Syria under one governorshipmighthave been the great size of the Ottoman Em-
pire, which necessitated bigger administrativeunits than those of Mamlfk Syria.
However, this meant ignoringthe particular local conditions, especially within a
policy of appointing Mamlaks as viceroys of most of the area of the defunct
Sultanate and ofsparingthe Mamlik society.
(32) For the Ottoman contingentleft by Sultan Selim in Egypt, see my article
in the Bernard Lewis Festschrift.
(33) Ibn al-Farfilr,a Shrfi'iteunder the Mamliks, turned the madhhab
ofthe new rulers,immediatelyafterthe Ottoman conquest. .Hanafite,
This was undoubtedly
the reason forhis excessive pro-Ottomanzeal.

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 THE END OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE 137

leaving the old things as they were, whereas Ibn al-Farffir

wanted nothingbut the establishmentof the Ottoman order"
(fa innahukana yamil ild ibqa' al-qadim'ald qidamihi wa-kana
Ibn al-Farfar ya'ba illa qanan al-Arwam). Strangeas it may
seem, Sultan Selim sided, accordingto that source, with the
Viceroy,and gave him practicallya freehand. ("4) Both his
policy,his personalityand his good administrationgained him
great prestige and popularity within and without his
province,(35) a fact which could only encouragehim to revolt.
The local contemporary Arab sourcesare unanimousin their
claim that al-Ghazili revolted immediatelyafter learning of
Sultan Selim's death, but in none of them it is reflectedso
clearly and so convincinglyas in Ibn Tfilfin'snarrative. On
Wednesday the 12th of Dhil al-Qa'da/October24, 1520, two
emissaries arrived in Damascus with a letter informingthe
Viceroyof the death of Sultan Selim. The emissariescarrying
the letterweredispatchedto al-Ghazili,whowas at thatmoment
in Beirut, inspectingits fortifications. On Saturday nightof
the 15th (October 27) he returnedsuddenly(bahiatan) to his
capital, and declaredhis revolt. On Mondaythe 17th(October
29) he besieged the Damascus citadel, which was under the
commandof an Ottoman officer, and captured it on the same
day. As soon as he enteredthe citadel,he and his men put on
a Circassiandress,and abolishedthe Ottomandress (wa-azhara
libs al-Jarakisa min al-takhffadt wal-kalatatwa-abtala libs al-
Arwam min al-'ama'im (36) What is made so
wal-qaft.dndt).
clear in the above evidence of Ibn TUilfin
is, that had al-Ghazili
been in Damascus on the arrivalof the Ottomanemissaries,he
would have started his revolt on the very same day. This
evidence also proves how eager and how determinedhe was to
returnto the good old Mamlfikdays.
That al-Ghazili had always in mind the restorationof
Mamlilkrule over all the previousterritoriesof the Sultanate,
can be learnt fromthe fact that already on the 26th of Dhil

(34) Najm al-Din al-Ghazzi, al-Kawdkib al-Sd'ira bi-A'ydn al-Mi'a al-'Ashira,

Beirut, 1945, vol. I, p. 199, 11. 1-11. On al-Ghazili's outward obedience to Selim,
and his simultaneously secret preparations for revolt, see Ibn Iyis, V, p. 418,
11.3-4. Cp. also Ibn Tailon, II, p. 85, 11.14-18.
(35) Al-Ghazzi, I, p. 199, 1. 8; Ibn Iyis, V, p. 418, 1. 5.
(36) Ibn Tiliin, II, pp. 123, 1. 11 - 124, 1. 7. On the start of the revoltsee also
al-Ghazzi, I, p. 199, 11. 12-15; Ibn Iyis, V, pp. 362, 11. 11-21, 418, 11.4-6.

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138 DAVID AYALON

al-Qa'da/November7, namely, only eleven days after the

declarationof the revolt,his emissaryarrivedin Cairo,carrying
a letter from him to Kh~yrbak and other letters to other
Circassianamirs,in whichhe called themto join his revolt.(37)
The mood prevailingin the ex-Mamlilkterritories, the goal to
which al-Ghazili strove, and the unfoundedoptimismof the
insurgents,are well reflectedin the followingpassage.
"When al-Ghazili revolted,the people ofSyria (ahl al-Sham),
includingthe commanders,the army, the bedouins and the
semi-nomadsjoined him and said to him: 'get up and proclaim
yourselfSultan. For thereis none in frontof you whomyou
have to fear. As forus, we shall fightby your side to death'.
He was enticedby theirwords,and proclaimedhimselfSultan,
and he became lightheaded and thoughtless. And how many
a time haste was followedby regret! Thus he became Sultan
in Syria, giving himselfthe title al-Malik al-AshrafAbfi al-
["the fatherof Conquests" or "the Conqueror"].(38)
People kissed the groundin his presence,and his name was
Futih.t
mentionedin the Friday sermon (khufba) in the Umayyad
mosque and in the other pulpits of Damascus. When he
became Sultan people told him: 'Go to Egypt, fightKh5yrbak
and take possessionof Egypt', to whichhe answered:'Egypt is
in my grasp (fTqabdal yadS). I shall [first]go to Aleppo and
liberateit fromthe hands of the Ottomans,so that I shall not
have to worryabout myrear. Then I shallgo to Egypt'. Had
he marched on Egypt before having marched on Aleppo, it
would have been betterforhim,forthe armyof the Circassian
Mamlfiksand the people of Egypt (ahl Misr) and all the
bedouinswould have risen against Khayrbak and would have
joined him [i.e. al-Ghazfli], for he was liked by the people
(fa-innahukana muhabbabanlil-ra'iyya)."(39)
As faras Egypt was concerned,mostimportantof all was, of
course,the attitudeof the army,and particularlythat of the

(37) Ibid., p. 362, 11. 11-21. Al-Ghazdli suggested to Khdyrbak to proclaim

himselfSultan in Egypt, and thus divide between them the rule over the Mamlfk
Sultanate. He even threatened him that if he refused,he had others who would
readily accept his offer(ibid., p. 418, 11. 18-21). This was, of course,onlya tactical
offer. Had the revolt succeeded, one of the two would have, undoubtedly,ousted
the other, and established a unifiedSultanate, with its capital in Cairo.
(38) This patronymreflectscorrectlyal-GhazAli's great ambitions.
(39) Ibn Iyis, V, p. 418, 11.5-15. Al-Ghazili failed in his attempt to capture
Aleppo, and this was the beginningof his discomfiture.

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 THE END OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE 139
CircassianMamlfiks. These receivedthe tidingsof the revolt
with great rejoicing, believing that their hour of salvation
(faraj) has arrived.(40) NumerousCircassianMamlfiksescaped
from Cairo secretly and joined the insurgents.(41) Among
themweresome of Khdyrbak'smosttrustedand mostfavoured
colleagues.(42) As forthe Ottoman units stationedin Egypt,
they showedno enthusiasmto fightal-Ghazll in Syria,in spite
of Kh5yrbak'sconstantproddingand urging. They declared
that theywould fighthimonlyif he attackedEgypt. (43) This
declarationnever had to be put to the test, because al-GhazMli
was not given the opportunityto attack the land of the Nile.
In any case, the constant squabbles between these Ottoman
units, and Khdyrbak'spolicy of discriminatingsome of them
against the others,completelyimmobilizedthem. The army
of Egypt played no part in quelling al-Ghazll's revolt.(44)
The potentialities inherent in that revolt-which were
obviously not negligible-were not given sufficienttime to
unfoldthemselves,forthe revoltwas veryshort-lived. It had
been crushedby a huge Ottomanarmyon the 22nd ofSafar927/
February 1st 1521, only three months after it had started.
The armyof the Ottomanswas composedof units stationedin
Eastern Anatolia,Aleppo and Rumelia, as well as of Turkoman
cavalry. Its commander-in-chief was B shMthe Third
Vizir. Other commanderswere the viceroyFarh.t of Aleppo, and,
very significantly, as we shall explain later, Ibn Siw~r, the
famous Turkomanchief,of the Dhti al-Qadr dynasty.(45)

(40) Ibn Iyfs, V, p. 374, 11.4-6.

(41) Ibid., p. 377, 11.17-22. See also ibid., pp. 434, 1. 14 - 435, 1. 5.
(42) Ibid., pp. 382, 1. 3 - 383, 1. 9. People were expecting and hoping for
al-Ghazili's conquest of Egypt.
(43) Ibid., pp. 368, 1. 13 - 369, 1. 1, 369, 1. 3 - 370, 1. 3.
(44) True, Sultan Suleyman wrote to Khiyrbak shortly before the decisive
battle against al-Ghazili that there is no need forthe participationof the Egyptian
army in quelling the rebellion (ibid., p. 371, 11. 20-21). This, however, does not
alter the fact that all Khiyrbak's attempts to induce the Ottoman units to march
against al-Ghazlli ended in failure. One consideration of Sultan Suleyman for
not using the Ottoman units stationed in Egypt against al-Ghazill, might have
been his fearthat denudingthat countryfromthose unitsmighttempttheCircassians
of Egypt to revolt. He certainlycould not rely on those Circassians in his plan to
crush al-Ghazlli.
(45) Ibn lyds, V, pp. 376, 1. 20 - 377, 1. 10. Al-Ghazzi, I, pp. 170, 1. 6 - 171,
1. 8. G. W. Stripling,The OttomanTurksand theArabs, 1511-1574,The University
of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1942, pp. 75-76. Al-Ghazzi gives a slightly

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140 DAVID AYALON

The swifnesswith which al-Ghaz1li had been overthrown,

put an end to his much expectedand not less publicizedmarch
on Egypt.(46) How the Circassian Mamlftks,the Ottoman
units, and the various elementsof the Egyptian population
would have reacted, in case such invasion would have taken
place, is, of course,a matterof conjecture. But that theredid
exist a great anti-Ottomanfeeling,and an extremelygreat and
widespreadsympathywith al-Ghazili's revolt,both in Egypt
and in Syria,about thisthe sourcesleave us in no doubtwhatso-
ever.
For the same reason the possible effects,at that time, of a
Syrian revolt on the Safawids, and vice versa, cannot be
ascertained. There is no indicationthat therehad ever been
any contactbetweenal-Ghazili and the Shi'ite Empire of Iran.
Our information in this respectdoes not go beyond a rumour,
whichprovedto be false,that al-Ghazili foundrefuge,afterhis
defeat,withthe Safawids.(47) Yet the potentialitiesof such a
revolt,fromthe point of view of the Safawids, had it lasted
longer,can be established indirectly.
In Rama<din 928/August1522 it became known that the
TurkomanIbn Siwlr, one of the main commandersof the army
whichdefeatedal-Ghazlli, was executedby the orderof Sultan
Suleyman. The reason forhis executionwas that the Sultan
learntthat Ibn Siwdrbecame the ally of the Safawidruler,and
correspondedwithhimwiththe intentof conductingsubversive
activities against the Ottomans. The Sultan dispatched to
Ibn Siw5r his Third Vizir B5shi, the above mentioned
commander-in-chief army,underthe pretextthat bothof
ofthatFarh.t
them must go to DiyZr Bakr, to watch the movementsof the
Safawids. When Ibn Siwlr entertainedhimin his camp, some
of Farh~it'sOttoman attendantspounced upon theirhost and
finishedhimoff. On the same occasionFarh1t Blsh5 executed
threeof Ibn Siwlr's sons and a group of his amirs.(48)
Now the Dhti al-Qadrs,and particularlyShah Siwir, and his
son who succeededhim,were staunchallies of the Ottomansfor

differentinformationfrom that of Ibn Iyis. Of all the commanders of the

Ottoman army Ibn Iyss mentionsby name only Ibn Siwir!
(46) In addition to earlier referenceson this subject in the present paper, see
Ibn Iyis, V, pp. 365, 11.8-11, 369, 1. 13 - 370, 1. 9.
(47) Ibid., p. 419, 11. 15-16.
(48) Ibid., pp. 467, 1. 19 - 468, 1. 6.

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 THE END OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE 141
a long time,servingas a bufferbetweenthemand the MamlGks.
In thelast decades ofthe Mamlfikreigntheyfoughtthe Mamltiks
with great valour, and whetherthey were victoriousor other-
wise theyalways inflictedheavy losses upon them. Later they
participated in Selim's campaign against the Mamliiks, and
lastly played a no minorrole in the defeatof al-Ghazili. Yet
all thiswas not sufficient to make themtrustworthy in the eyes
of the Ottomans, or to immune them from the contagious
influenceof the revived versionof Shi~ismofferedto them by
their fellow-Turkomans. The dangerous consequences of a
prolongedMamlGkrevolt on the thresholdof the Turkoman
area cannot, therefore,be over-estimated. This is clearly
demonstratedin the attitudeof Selim duringhis stay in Syria
on his homeward journey, described above. The Safawid
threatwas his chiefpreoccupation. His firstand onlyinstruc-
tion to Jdnbirdial-GhazMli,which the contemporaryArab
chroniclerdeems necessaryto bring to the knowledgeof the
reader,is to keep a watchfuleye on the Safawids. In Aleppo he
concentratedon strengthening the town's fortifications
against
the same enemy. Now if Syria was so importantto the
Ottomansas a bastion against the Safawids,the revoltin that
countryofthe verypersonwhomtheyappointedas theirwatch-
dog againstthe same enemy,could not have been overlookedby
the new Shi'ite power. It shouldalso be remembered, that the
firstobjectiveofal-Ghazdli,afterhavingsecuredDamascus, was
to captureAleppo,the verytownwhichSelim took such care to
fortifyagainst his major enemy in the East. Furthermore,
the conquest of the Aleppo provincewould have either esta-
blished a commonborderbetweenhim and the Safadis, or at
least would have greatlyshortenedthe distancebetweenthem.
That even relativelyremote Egypt, so much removed from
either Iran, Iraq, Shi'ism or the Turkomans,was not immune
fromthe Safawid impact, can be learnt fromthe famous un-
successfulrevoltof the viceroyof Egypt, Ahmed Pasha, in the
year 930/early1524. This man was a most trusted "Mam-
litk" (49) of Sultan Selim. When Suleymanbecame Sultan, this
Ahmed coveted the officeof Grand Vizir, to which the Sultan
appointed somebody else. In order to compensate him,

(49) Ibn Iyfs repeatedly calls the Ottoman military slaves by the name of
"Mamliks".

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142 DAVID AYALON

Suleymangave himthe Viceroyaltyof Egypt,to whichcountry

he arrived in Sha'bdn 929/July1523. Ahmed, originallya
ChristianGreek,soon decided to revolt,mobilizingmany of the
Mamlks and other elementsin the country. But he sought
allies as well beyondthe boundariesof Egypt. To the Franks
he offeredthe surrenderof newlyconqueredRhodes. He also
triedto establishcontactswith the Safawid ruler. According
to our Arab sourcehe became,underthe influenceof an Iranian
religiousman, named QId1 Zldeh al-Ardawili,a very devout
Shi'ite, and a great believer in and propagandist for Shah
Isma'Il and his teachings. His persecutionand extortionof
the Muslim population of Egypt is attributed,by the same
source,to his hatred of the Sunnites.(50)
In the early part of the sixteenthcenturythe chances of a
Mamlilkor otherrevoltin Egypt and Syria against the mighty
Ottoman Empire were not very great,even if it had been led
by less rash men than al-Ghazili and AhmedPasha, and even if
a real coordinationcould be achieved betweenthe insurgents,
the Safawids and a Frankishpower. Yet the possibilitythat
such combinationswould materializein the future,and cons-
titutea greatdanger,could not be ruledout. In any way, the
revival of Mamlilkaristocracyboth in Egypt and in Syria has
alreadycaused sufficient troublein itself,even withoutthe pros-
pect of wider implications. The Ottomanslearnt theirlesson,
and it was Suleymanwho correctedhisfather'smistake. There
was also no guaranteethat in any futureMamlfikrevoltin Syria
the MamlfIks ofEgyptwouldremainneutral. He, therefore, not
only contained the MamliIks within the boundaries of Egypt
alone, but also decided to stop the nominationof Mamliiksas
viceroysof that country. This tendencyof Suleymanbecame
evidentevenin thelifetimeofKhiyrbak. Thoughhe confirmed
his Viceroyalty,he neversent him"the robe ofthe continuation
of office"(khil'at al-istimrdr),a fact which greatly worried
Khiyrbak. Worsestill,it could not be kept secret,and people
started speculatingabout the possibilityof his dismissal.(51)
Yet he was not dismissed. His early death (14 Dhfi al-Qa'da
928/earlyOctober 1522), however,which,by all appearances,

(50) Al-Ghazzi, I, pp. 156, 1. 13 - 159, 1. 23, and particularly pp. 156, 11. 13-18,
158,11.5-9, 158, 1. 27 - 159, 1. 1. See also StanfordJ. Shaw, op. cit.,p. 4 and index.
(51) Ibn Iyis, pp. 370, 11.3-6, 376, 11.1-11, 478, 11. 1-4.

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 THE END OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE 143
had been a naturalone, solved Suleyman'sproblem. This time
he appointedas Viceroyof Egypt no lesserpersonthan Musta-
phd Pasha, his Grand Vizir and brother-in-law.
(52)
In the shortperiod under study no Mamlfikcontingentwas
sent from Egypt against the Safawids. But the existence
there of a strongMamlilk element,as well as other military
regiments,gave the Ottomansconsiderableflexibilityin deploy-
ing their armed forces. (53)

Conclusions
The reinstatementof the Mamlfks so quickly after their
defeat over the greatestpart of theirformerrealm is the best
prooffor the urgencyof the Ottomans' need forthat kind of
manpower. In my view that urgencywas createdto no small
extent(thoughby no means exclusively)by the Safawidthreat,
whichlooms so large in the accountsof both Ibn Iyis and Ibn
Tfilfn. It constitutedthe mostpressing,as well as thenearest,
geographical threat to the Ottomans. The danger of the
Safawidswas so great,because of the high motivationof their
movement, and because of that movement's great appeal,
especially to the inhabitantson the other side of the border
within the Ottoman and the ex-Mamlik Empires (above all,
the Turkomans). The factthat it could not be brokeneven by
the absolutesuperiority of Ottomanfirearms could onlyincrease
the fear fromthat danger.
That fear,however,seemsto have blindedthe Ottomans,and
particularlySultan Selim, to the perilous implicationsof the
revival of the Mamltks on such a large scale, and so shortly
aftertheirdefeat. Curiouslyenough,the same Safawids,who
werea maincause in thatrevivalon thatscale, seem also to have
been a great factorin reducingit to a much smallersize. The
hatredand fearof the Safawidsduringthe previousreignmight
have misledthe new rulersto believe that the Mamltikscould
be reliedon in the struggleagainstthe Shi'ite enemy,or at least
that theywould not be a liabilityin that struggle. The revolt
musthave openedtheireyes to the dangerof a Mamlflkuprising

(52) Ibid., pp. 485, 11.20-22 487 11. 16-17. Khdyrbak's appointment, on his
death-bed, of Sindn Bak, the Ottoman, as his successor, was completely ignoredby
Sultan Suleyman.
(53) See also Shaw, op. cit., p. 194.

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144 DAVID AYALON

on the thresholdof the Safawid realm,which mightspread to

Egypt as well. Therefore,the Mamlfiksof Syria must be
eliminated. On the otherhand, leaving a low-profileMamlilk
aristocracyonly in the land of the Nile, which is relatively
remotefromthe Shiite territory,withtasks confinedto internal
securityand to dealingwiththe Frankishenemyon two fronts,
was certainlya much saferand much more manageable thing
froman Ottomanpointof view. Even so the Mamliikscaused
much headache to their masters in the early period of the
occupation.

APPENDIX A
A Note on
The Ottoman Conquest and Mamlilk Historiography

The Ottoman conquest, which dealt a death blow to the

Mamlik Sultanate,dealt, at the same time,almosta death blow
to historiographyin Egypt. As is well known, hardly any
otherIslamic periodor regionin the MiddleAges producedsuch
an abundant and variegated amount of historiographical and
relatedmaterial,as did the Mamlfk Sultanate. Furthermore,
the importanceof that materialgrealyexceeds the boundaries
of that Sultanate. Mamlilk historical and similar writings
are a mine of preciousinformation on many otherparts of the
"Abode of Islam" and on the "Abode of War", as well as on the
relationsbetweenthe two "Abodes". It goes withoutsaying
that these writingsare the richest,as far as the historyof
Islamic Egypt is concerned. In OttomanEgypt, by contrast,
historiography is the poorest duringthe greatestpart of that
reign. I rather doubt whether such an abrupt decline of
historiography evertakenplace in any otherimportantpart
had
of the Muslimworld.
What werethe causes ofthatunique decline? At thepresent
state of our knowledgeI believe that only a partial answercan
be given to that question.
The most importantcause is the most obvious one. Egypt
(and its capital Cairo), which constituted,up to the conquest,
the focal part of an Empire, became just a provincein a far

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 THE END OF THE MAMLOKSULTANATE 145
bigger Empire. But puttingit this way would reflectonly
part of the transformation which Egypt underwentas a result
of its conquest,forthe followingreason. The MamlflkSultan-
ate was considered,sinceits inception,to be the major powerin
the Muslimworld,and it has notreallyrelinquishedthatposition
up to its extermination, in spite of all the vicissitudesand the
declinewhichit experienced. The unexpectednesswithwhich
that Sultanate was wiped out and the fact that up to its last
years it was consideredto be the Islamic powerpar excellence,
must have come as a terribleshock. Few, however,could be
shocked and paralyzed more than the historianswho were
writingthe annals of that great Empire, which so suddenly
ceased to exist. The incentivefor writinghistoryunder the
new circumstancesmust have disappeared. Some of the old
guardmightcarryon theirwritingintothe periodofoccupation,
by the forceof habit. But what prospectcould historiography
offerto a newcomer?
An additionalimportantcause was the disappearance,under
the Ottomans,ofthe offspring ofthe Mamltiksas a verydistinct
social group,forreasonswhichI discusselsewhere.(54) A very
great proportionof the historiansof the MamltikSultanate
came fromthat group(the awlddal-nds). Theirextinctionwas
a particularlyheavy loss to Egyptianhistoriography, because of
their scholarlytrainingon the one hand, and their intimate
knowledgeof Mamltiksocietyon the other.
Anothercause was thatin the latterpartofthe Circassianrule
(whichcoveredthe period784-922/1382-1517), Mamlfikhistorio-
graphy had alreadypassed the peak of its vitality,creativeness,
diversificationand output, although it still remained very
powerful. To what a degreethe economicdecay ofthe Mamlilk
realm caused the weakening,is a moot question. A reviewof
the historiography of the whole Mamlik period does not show
that its ups and downs necessarilycorrespondedto the fluctu-
ations of the Sultanate's economy.
Yet another cause must have been the mass transferof
historicalworksfromCairo to Istanbul,many of whichare still
found there. In view of the fact that such works,unlike so

(54) See my "Notes on the Transformationof MamlfikSociety in Egypt under

the Ottomans", JESHO, vol. III (1960), pp. 148-174, 275-325, and "Mamlfik
Aristocracy,etc." in the Bernard Lewis, Festschrift.

10

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146 DAVID AYALON

manyworksofa religiouscharacter,are usuallyavailable onlyin

a verylimitednumberofcopies,the veryharmfuleffectsoftheir
mass transferare obvious.(66)
Whateverthe causes mightbe, the studentofOttomanEgypt
is faced with the situationthat he has at his disposal only one
really importantlocal source forthe study of the beginningof
the Ottomanoccupationof that country,namely,the chronicle
of the Mamltk historianIbn Iyis (852-930/1448-1524), which
covers its firstsix years (922-928/1516-1522). Its value can
hardlybe overestimated,not only because it is a most detailed
and a most reliablesource(especiallyas far as the narrativeof
facts is concerned),but also because it is the best and most
authoritativehistoryof the last decades of Mamltk rule, and
because the last yearswhichit covers,namely, the years of the
Ottomanrule,are the mostdetailedones in the wholechronicle.
Few othersix years in Mamlfikhistoryare dealt with in such
detail by a singlehistorian. It is, therefore,invaluableforthe
study of Egypt's transitionperiod fromMamltk into Ottoman
rule,whichis a decisiveperiod,whenold institutions are abolish-
ed, and new ones replace them or start taking shape (on Ibn
Tallin for Syria see below).
It should be emphasizedin this connectionthat nothingcan
replace the local good chronicle. Neither other kinds of
historicalworks,nor the narrativesof travellersand visitors
(be theyEuropean or Ottoman),noreven the Ottomanarchives.
All these have, undoubtedly,their specific extremelygreat
meritsand importance. They will certainlyinformus about
many essential subjects, upon which a local chronicleusually
passes in silence. They will help us as well in supplementing,
clarifyingand correctingmuch of the information furnishedby
the local chronicle. Yet they can never serve as a real sub-
stitute to it.
The part of Ibn Iyis's chroniclededicatedto OttomanEgypt
had been citedquite oftenin the past, and, withthe growingand
commendableinterestin that countryand that periodin recent
years,is being moreand moreutilized. Yet a systematicand
exhaustiveuse of that part has stillto be made. It has to be

(55) See also my "The Historian al-Jabarti and his Background", BSOAS,
vol. XXIII (1960), pp. 217-218, and notes.

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 THE END OF THE MAMLUK SULTANATE 147
carriedout withparticularstresson comparisonwiththe history
and institutionsof the MamlfikSultanate.
The harvestthat can be gatheredfromthe chronicleof Ibn
Talin (830-953/1476-1546)is much smaller than that of Ibn
Iyas, forvarious reasons. First of all, because our knowledge
of MamltikSyria, although quite impressivein itself,is very
meagerwhen comparedwith our knowledgeof MamltikEgypt.
Secondly,Ibn Tiilin's chronicleis not verydetailed,and it deals
not withthe whole of Syria,but mainlywith Damascus and its
province. Thirdly,it covers a period whichis morethan two
years shorterthan the period covered by Ibn Iyas (it ends in
Dhti al-Qa'da 926/endof October 1520). However,it begins
well beforethe Ottomanconquest,and the information it does
containis of a highquality. In combinationwiththe account
of Ibn Iy~s, which oftentranscendsthe boundariesof Egypt,
we can learnfromit a lot about OttomanSyria,and about more
general aspects of the Ottoman conquest and occupation.
In the articles I mentionedin the introductoryremark I
confinedmyselfto the study of the policy of the Ottomans
towards the Mamlik aristocracyas reflectedin the two chro-
niclesunderdiscussion. Needlessto say, othersubjectscan be
reconstructedwith a similardegreeof detail and reliabilityon
the basis of these two sources.

APPENDIX B
Of all the militaryduties and operationsin whichthe Mam-
Iiks participatedas partofthe Ottomanarmyduringthe period
underdiscussionby farthe mostimportantone was theirshare
in the conquest of Rhodes, forseveral reasons: a) it was their
firstfighting underthe Ottomans;b) theyestablisheda personal
contact with the Ottoman Sultan, and foughtunder his direct
command,a fact which greatlyenhanced the process of their
restoration in Egypt;(56) c) theyprovedhowbadlythe Ottomans

(56) In addition to earlier references about Sultan Suleyman's favourable

attitude towards the Mamliks of Egypt (especially in the article in the Bernard
Lewis, Festschrift),it should be added that the Viceroy Mustaff Pasha, brought
with him a special order (marsi2m) fromthat Sultan, in which he demanded good
treatmentof the Mamliks (Ibn Iyfs, V, p. 486, 1. 22).

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148 DAVID AYALON

were in need of a militaryelementof their kind, for,though

ultimatelyvictorious,the besiegingarmy sufferedmost heavy
casualties,in whichthe Egyptiancontingenthad its fullshare.
From an officialletter received in Cairo it was learnt that
"the numberof dead amongthe Ottomanand Egyptianarmies,
fromthe handgunsand artillerywhichfiredon themdaily,from
the fortressof Rhodes, was immeasurable. Any part of the
wall whichthe besiegersdestroyedby day, was repairedby the
Franks under the cover of nightwith a special kind of stone
(al-hajar al-fass). The besiegerswere sapped and exhausted
by the fortitude(ba's) of the Franks. The names of the dead
from among the Circassian amirs and Mamltikswere kept
secret." (57)
David AYALON
(Jerusalem)
(57) Ibid., p. 483, 11. 8-15.

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