CIVIL LAW

PERSONS

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

Q: Patrick was the registered owner of a passenger jeepney which collided with
a train of the PNR, which resulted in the death of seven of his passengers. At the
time of the accident, Patrick was legally married to Alicia, but had been
cohabiting with Koreen. Jelaine, the wife of one of the passengers, filed a case
for damages against Patrick and Koreen. The trial court held Patrick and Koreen
jointly and severally liable to pay Jelaine. Koreen asked for the decision to be
reconsidered insofar as it requires her to be solidarily liable with Patrick. Is her
argument correct?

A: Yes, Koreen’s argument is correct. In the case of Juaniza v. Jose (G.R. No. L-
50127-28, March 30, 1979), the Court held that a woman living in a bigamous
relationship with a married man who was sought to be held liable for an accident
involving a vehicle driven by the bigamous husband under whose name the
vehicle was registered, the said woman cannot be held liable as co-owner of the
vehicle because the vehicle must be considered the conjugal property of the
bigamous husband and his legitimate spouse.

In the case at bar, since Patrick is legally married to Alicia, there is a legal
impediment for him to contract marriage with Koreen. She cannot be a co-owner
the jeepney and thus, Koreen cannot be held solidarily liable with Patrick.

LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

Q: Robin gave birth to a baby girl whom she named Lily. Ted, Robin’s husband,
was suffering from tuberculosis in such a condition that he could hardly move
and get up from his bed. Robin had sexual intercourse with Barney during the
first 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of the child. Ted
soon died. The child was born within 300 days from Ted’s death or the
dissolution of the marriage. Is Lily a legitimate child of Ted despite his illness and
Robin’s intercourse with Barney?

A: Yes, Lily is Ted’s legitimate child. In the case of Andal v. Macaraig (G.R. No.
L-2474, May 30, 1951), it was held that the fact that the husband was seriously
sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. The presumption
can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to
have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next
preceding the birth of the child. The fact that the wife had illicit intercourse with a
man other than her husband during the initial period, does not preclude
cohabitation between said husband and wife.
In this case, although Robin had sexual intercourse with Barney during the first
120 days of the 300 days next preceding Lily’s birth, there was no proof that it
was physically impossible for Ted to have had access to Robin during the same
period. Thus, Lily is to be considered as Ted’s legitimate child.

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Q: Dan and Serena got married on December 12, 2012. After three years,
Serena went to work in Saudi despite Dan’s objections. Serena promised Dan
that she will come home, but she did not. Dan went to Saudi and tried to locate
Serena, but he failed. When he came back to the Philippines, Dan filed a petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Serena’s psychological
incapacity. Will the suit prosper?

A: No, the suit will not prosper. In the case of Santos v. CA (G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995), it was held that psychological incapacity refers to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage. The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity and inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
In the case at bar, the fact of Serena’s abandonment of Dan cannot be
considered as constituting psychological incapacity, as it was not proven that
Serena abandoned Dan due to some psychological illness. Thus, their marriage
cannot be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

FILIPINO SPOUSE BECOMING AN ALIEN

Q: Flor and Mario were married to each other in Quezon City in 2005. In 2009,
Flor was offered a job as a nurse in Australia, which she accepted.
Subsequently, she applied for and was granted Australian citizenship. The
following year, she sued for divorce from Mario in an Australian court. After Mario
was served with summons, the Australian court tried the case and decreed the
divorce. Shortly thereafter, Flor married an Australian. Can Mario validly remarry
in the Philippines?

A: Yes, Mario can validly remarry in the Philippines. In the case of Republic v.
Orbecido III (G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005), the Court declared that Art. 26,
par. 2 of the Family Code should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. 

In the case at bar, Flor was a Filipino at the time of the marriage but she became
a naturalized Australian citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce decree in
her favor, thus allowing her to remarry. Applying the ruling in the aforementioned
case, Mario must therefore be allowed to validly remarry in the Philippines.

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH

Q: On January 10, 2015, Juan, an employee of ABC Shipping Lines was

sleeping on board the latter’s vessel when the same caught fire. Upon waking up,
he immediately jumped overboard. He has not been heard of since then. The
vessel was destroyed by fire and was washed ashore. Juan’s father, Jose filed a
notice of claim for death compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. An award was rendered in favor of Jose. ABC Shipping Lines
appealed the decision, claiming that there is no legal presumption of death upon
which to base any award for compensation and that Art. 391 of the Civil Code
should be applied in determining whether Juan should be considered dead. Is the
contention of ABC Shipping Lines tenable?

A: No, ABC Shipping Lines’ contention is not tenable. In the case of Victory
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission (G.R. No. L-9268,
November 28, 1959), it was held that Article 391 of the Civil Code relating to
presumption of death of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage
applies to cases wherein the vessel cannot be located nor accounted for, or
when its fate is unknown or there is no trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch as the
word "lost" used in referring to a vessel must be given the same meaning as
"missing" employed in connection with an aeroplane, the persons taking both
means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the same
sentence.
 In the instant case, none of the foregoing conditions appear to exist. The fate of
ABC's vessel is not unknown, since it had been definitely destroyed by fire and
washed ashore. Thus, the rule on presumption of death does not apply and
instead the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact of
death.