TITLE XIV : QUASI-OFFENSES

A. RPC, Art. 365 – Imprudence and Negligence

Reynaldo Valencia Vibar Vs. People of the Philippines

[ G.R. No. 235573, November 9, 2020 ]

LEONEN, J

FACTS:
Reynaldo Valencia was driving a passenger jeepney. While he was traversing
Sagumayon Bridge, the jeep suddenly shook and the passengers at the back of the
jeepney, namely Reymer Añonuevo (Añonuevo) and Richard Nicerio (Nicerio), heard a
loud thud, as if the jeep hit something solid. They stopped, and when Añonuevo and
Nicerio looked out towards the road, they saw a person lying face down. Valencia,
instead of helping, backed the Jeepney up, continued driving, and told his passengers
that he would tell the police about the incident. Añonuevo noted down the jeepney’s
plate number when he alighted and reported the incident to the police.
Valencia was arrested but posted bail. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. The RTC found him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
culpable felony of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN HOMICIDE defined and
penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code qualified by failing to lend on
the spot to the victim such help as may be in the hands of the accused to give.
Valencia appealed the judgment against him which was denied. In his Petition
for Review on Certiorari, petitioner maintains that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime
charged. He insists that none of the prosecution witnesses testified to seeing the jeepney
he was driving actually run over the victim and that their testimonies are circumstantial
at best.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding petitioner’s guilt for
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.

HELD: YES. Review of appeals filed before the Court is “not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion[.]’” Only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition
as this Court is not a trier of facts, and factual findings are “final, binding, or conclusive
on the parties and upon this court when supported by substantial evidence.”
However, exceptions to the general rule exist and the Court may pass upon the
findings of fact of the lower courts in the following instances:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial; (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record.
A careful review of the records convinces this Court that an exception to the
general rule exists in this case, particularly the first exception, or “[w]hen the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures.”
No one testified as to the manner by which petitioner was driving before he
supposedly hit Jaquilmo, or of personally witnessing the jeepney hit Jaquilmo. The
Regional Trial Court surmised that because of the early hour, petitioner was probably
not yet fully alert when he drove the jeepney; thus, he failed to notice Jaquilmo cross the
street. The Court of Appeals likewise concluded that petitioner must have been driving
“at a high speed” because prosecution witnesses felt the jeepney tilt and thud before
they spotted the victim lying on the road.
The prosecution was able to prove that Jaquilmo died on the bridge, but it failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner’s imprudence in driving the jeepney
was the proximate cause of his death. The prosecution must show the direct causal
connection between a motorist’s negligence and the injuries sustained to substantiate a
charge for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. Further, mere negligence will not
suffice because it is the motorist’s willful and wanton act done in utter disregard of the
consequence of his or her action, which criminalizes an imprudent or negligent act.
Here, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner’s
inexcusable lack of precaution in driving the jeepney was the proximate cause of
Jaquilmo’s death. In fact, the lower courts had diverging opinions on petitioner’s
imprudent act, with the Regional Trial Court stating that petitioner was probably sleepy
when he drove the jeepney, and the Court of Appeals concluding that petitioner was
driving the jeepney too fast.
Petition GRANTED AND REVERSED. Valencia is ACQUITTED.

Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr. and Dr. Marilou Bastan v. People

G.R. No.187926
Feb 15, 2012
MENDOZA, J.:

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Roy Alfonso Santiago (Roy Jr.) was hit by a taxicab; that he was rushed to the Manila
Doctors Hospital for an emergency medical treatment; that an X-ray of the victim’s
ankle was ordered; that the X-ray result showed no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia; that
Dr. Bastan entered the emergency room and, after conducting her own examination of
the victim, informed Mrs. Santiago that since it was only the ankle that was hit there
was no need to examine the upper leg; that 11days later, Roy developed fever, swelling
of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot; that Mrs. Santiago brought him back
to the hospital; and that the x-ray revealed a right mid-tibial fracture and a linear
hairline fracture in the shaft of the bone. A complaint for reckless imprudence resulting
physical injuries was filed against the petitioners for the alleged misconduct in the
handling of the illness of Roy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Belinda Santiago lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) against the petitioners, Dr. Emanuel Jarcia and Dr. Marilou Bastan, for their
alleged neglect of professional duty which caused her son, Roy Alfonso Santiago, to
suffer physical injuries. She then filed a criminal before the prosecutor for reckless
imprudence resulting physical injuries was filed against the petitioners for the alleged
misconduct in the handling of the illness of Roy. The RTC found Dr. Jarcia and Dr.
Bastan guilty of simple imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. The CA
affirmed the case in toto, not satisfied, hence this petiton
ISSUES:
 1.) Whether or not the petitioners failed to exercise the degree of care expected of
them as doctors and are liable for negligence to the private respondent.
2.) Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
HELD:
1.) YES, While the Supreme Court held that there was a lack of evidence with
regard to the criminal action. It is clear that the doctors are guilty of medical negligence.
Gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Tacata that a thorough examination was not
performed on Roy Jr. As residents on duty at the emergency room, Dr. Jarcia and Dr.
Bastan were expected to know the medical protocol in treating leg fractures and in
attending to victims of car accidents. In failing to perform an extensive medical
examination to determine the extent of Roy Jr.’s injuries, Dr.Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were
remiss of their duties as members of the medical profession. Assuming for the sake of
argument that they did not have the capacity to make such thorough evaluation at that
stage, they should have referred the patient to another doctor with sufficient training
and experience instead of assuring him and his mother that everything was all right.
2.) NO. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is unusual to the
law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The
doctrine, however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a
mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances
of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the
duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. The requisites for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:(1) The accident was of a kind which
does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) The instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge;
and (3) The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured. In this case, the circumstances that caused patient
Roy Jr.’s injury and the series of tests that were supposed to be undergone by him to
determine the extent of the injury suffered were not under the exclusive control of Drs.
Jarcia and Bastan. It was established that they are mere residents of the Manila Doctors
Hospital at that time who attended to the victim at the emergency room.
 Villareal v. People
G.R. No. 151258
February 1, 2012

THE CONSOLIDATED FACTS:

On February 1991, the neophytes of the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity) signified their intention to join the fraternity. On the first day of their
initiation rites February 8, 1991, they were briefed on what to expect during the
initiation, which included physical beatings and psychological torment, and were
informed that they could quit at any time. The neophytes chose to proceed and were
physically beaten by the Aquilans. They survived the first day. On the afternoon of
February 9, 1991, the initiation rites were revived and the neophytes were subjected the
same manner of hazing they survived on the first day. After the initiation ended for that
day, Fidelito Dizon and ArtemioVillareal demanded the reopening of the rites and
Nelson Victorino, the head of the initiation rites, allowed it. Leonard Lenny Villa died
as a consequence of the physical injuries inflicted during the rites.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans:

 26 of the accused were jointly tried (Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)).

 The trial of the remaining nine (Criminal Case No. C-38340) was held in
abeyance because some matters had to be resolved first.
On November 8, 1993, the 26 accused were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
On November 29, 1993, the trial of the remaining 9 commenced anew.
On January 10, 2002, the Court of Appeals set aside the finding of conspiracy by
the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of
the 25-surviving accused according to individual participation:
 19 (Victorino et al.) were acquitted since their guilt was not established by proof.
 4 of them, Tecson, Ama, Alemda, and Bantug (Tecson etal.) were found guilty of
slight physical injuries. They were sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor ordered
to jointly pay the heirs the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
 2 of them, Dizon and Villareal, were found guilty of homicide. They were
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years
of reclusion temporal and were ordered to jointly pay the heirs the sum of ₱
50,000 as indemnity and an addition ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
 On August 5, 2002, the trial court dismissed the charge against Concepcion on
the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. On October 2006, the CA also
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the same
ground.

Held:
No crime without a law punishing it
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the
core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not
simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing,
founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is
further proof of how the nature of hazing — unique as against typical crimes — cast a
cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or
mala in seat the time.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to
recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be
remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them
injury in the process. With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found
that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the
infliction of physical injuries
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had
the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would
have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment). Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died,
we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death.
 NORMAN A. GAID v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171636
April 7, 2009
TINGA, J

FACTS:
Petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the
Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis
Oriental. At the time several students were coming out of the school premises.
Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by
eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road.
From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down
petitioner’s jeepney which was traveling on the right lane of the road. However, neither
did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging
down the jeepney to ride at that point.
The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayatas feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the
jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney. Another
prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was also situated on the left side of the
street but directly in front of the school gate, heard a strong impact coming from the
jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an obstacle. Dayata
was then seen lying on the ground and caught in between the rear tires. Petitioner felt
that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side.
Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of
death. She testified that the head injuries of Dayata could have been caused by having
run over by the jeepney.
Issue:
WON petitioner is negligent
Held:
Yes, but Gaid is not liable. Presence or absence of negligence on the part of
petitioner is determined by the operative events leading to the death of Dayata which
actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged
down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and ended when he was
run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the span between the moment
immediately after the victim was runover and the point when petitioner put the jeepney
to a halt.
 During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent. Reckless
imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from
which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Petitioner was driving
slowly at the time of the accident, as testified to by two eyewitnesses. Prosecution
witness Actub affirmed this fact on cross-examination. Petitioner stated that he was
driving at no more than 15 kilometers per hour. It appears from the evidence Dayata
came from the left side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the
right lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near the
jeepney at the left side. Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In
Dayatas haste to board the jeep which was then running, his feet somehow got pinned
to the left rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a
strong impact coming from the jeep. With the foregoing facts, petitioner cannot be held
liable during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The proximate cause of the accident and the death of
the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving
jeepney to get a ride.
For the second stage, petitioner is negligent for failing to stop driving at the time
when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Negligence has been defined as the failure
to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of
precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused
is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. The standard test in determining
whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor
to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist. For one to be liable for negligence, it must be
shown that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is
defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation
of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a
substantial contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate
cause of an injury. The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved
to be the immediate cause of his death, as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His
skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately stopped the
jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered
were fatal. Petition Granted. Norman Gaid is acquitted.
 ENGADA VS. COURT OF APPEALS ROGELIO ENGADA, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Fourteenth Division, Manila, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 140698
June 20, 2003
Doctrine: The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last
clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
of the accident. But as already stated on this point, no convincing evidence was
adduced by petitioner to support his invocation of the above cited doctrine. Instead,
what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of
the emergency rule. Petitioner's act of swerving to the Tamaraw's lane at a distance of
30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the
Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was
no clear chance to speak of.

Facts of the case:

In this case, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney owned
by Sheila Seyan, the victim in this case. Sheila was also on board in her Tamaraw
jeepney driven by Edwin Iran. While on the road, the passengers allegedly saw from
the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up driven by Rogelio Engada, the
petitioner in this case. When Engada was just 30 meters away from Iran, Engada
flashed the right signal light of his truck, and swerved to its left encroaching the
lane of Iran and headed towards a head-on collision. As a result, Sheila was thrown
out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. In the hospital, the medical certificate
showed that she suffered a fracture on the right femur, she had lacerated wounds
and multiple contusions, and abrations, and lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the
right kidney.
Sheila filed a criminal complaint agains Iran and Engada for damage to property
through reckless imprudence with serious physical injuries. Probable cause was found
against Engada, while the complaint against Iran was dismissed. Consequently, an
information was filed against Engada for serious physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence. The lower court found Engada guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and ordered him to pay indemnification of the hospital and medical
bills of Sheila. When Engada appealed to the Court of Appeals, the CA dismissed the
appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of the lower court. Hence, this
petition. Engada contends that the CA erred when it found him negligent for occupying
the lane of the Tamaraw jeepney, and failing to return to his original lane at the safest
and earliest opportunity.
Issue of the case:
Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case, hence, Engada
should not be liable.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court did not apply the doctrine of last clear chance in this case,
instead, it applied the emergency rule. The Supreme Court stated that there is no
convincing evidence was adduced by Engada to support his invocation of the doctrine
of last clear chance. What is clearly applicable here is the emergency rule.
The rationale of this rule is that a person who is confronted with a sudden
emergency might have no time for thought, and he must make a prompt decision based
largely upon impulse or instinct. And in this case, when Engada swerved to Iran's lane
at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving at a fast speed as it approached the vehicle
of Iran, it denied Iran time and opportunity to reflect on the safest way to avoid the
accident. Hence, there was no clear chance to speak of in this case. And the emergency
rule was applied. So the petition for review of Engada was denied for lack of merit.
 PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL,
G.R. No. 172060,
September 13, 2010

Facts:
Respondent, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel, filed an action for frustrated parricide
against petitioner, Joselito R. Pimentel. The Information for Frustrated Parricide was
dated 30 August 2004 and was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004. The pre-
trial and trial was set on 14 February 2005. She also filed on 5 November 2004, a
petition, dated 4 November 2004, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section
36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City on 7 February 2005, for the pre-trial and trial of the Civil Case. He then
filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question asserting that the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case
would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon
City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
before it.
The Court of Appeals also denied the petition holding that the issue in the
criminal case for frustrated parricide differs from the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage. It ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide had already been committed. At the time of the commission of the crime, the
marriage is still subsisting.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide.

Ruling:
 The elements of a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action
and(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed, were not met.
Civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this
case, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would
warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the
victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage,
in case the petition in Civil Case is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that
was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIONISIO CALONGE
G.R. No. 182793
July 5, 2010

Facts:
Rosita A. Calonge was appellant’s legitimate wife, with whom he had three
children. On December 1, 2001 at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning, the Villaverde
Police Station received a radio call from the barangay captain of Cabuluan that a
massacre took place in their locality. Rosita’s bloodied body was found lying on the
ground about fifteen (15) meters away from their house. Her right hand was loosely
clasping a knife. Lying on his back near the stairs was appellant who was also
wounded but still conscious. Beside him were a bolo and a flashlight, both stained with
blood. While the windows of the house were locked with a piece of tie wire, the door
was already opened. Inside the two “bedrooms” of the house separated only by a
curtain, they found the lifeless bodies of the two young girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose.
The other child, Melody, was also bloodied but alive and conscious. They brought
Melody to the Veterans Regional Hospital where she was treated and confined for
seventeen days. Melody’s grandparents said they knew it was appellant because they
had heard Rosita shouting that appellant will kill them. On the other hand, when
appellant was asked what happened and who attacked him, he answered he does not
know. Appellant was charged with parricide and frustrated parricide.

Issue:
Is the accused guilty of the crime charged?

Ruling:
YES. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with
the victim. All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently proved by the
prosecution. Even granting arguendo that Melody did not see the actual stabbing
of her mother and two (2) sisters, the attendant circumstances point to no one else but
the appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the actual killing is not
indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently
establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial evidence is
adequate for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven and the combination of all circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can
be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given
case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
is the guilty person. In the killing of victims in this case, the trial court was
correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery
when the attack is so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either
to avert the attack or to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and
unexpected than when a father stabs to death his two young daughters while they were
sound asleep and totally defenseless.
 People v Jumawan | September 23, 1982 | GR L-50905 | Abad Santos, J.

SUMMARY:
Rodolfo Magnaye was murdered by his estranged wife (Presentacion Jumawan),
his brothers-in-law (Manuel and Cesario), and his father-in-law (Francisco Jumawan).
The crime was murder, instead of parricide, because his relationship to Presentacion
wasn’t alleged in the information. Presentacion likewise didn’t refer to Rodolfo as her
husband. Presentacion didn’t live with Rodolfo, and actually wanted him to sign
separation papers, which he didn’t. The Court ruled that their relationship can only be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

FACTS:

 1974: Presentacion Jumawan was married to Rodolfo Magnaye. But they were
separated in fact and did not live in the same conjugal home. Presentacion stayed
with her sister Sebastiana Jumawan.
 Rodolfo stayed with his mother Trinidad Alcantara.
 Several attempts were made to secure a separation so that Rodolfo and
Presentacion will be free to marry again. But Rodolfo persisted in refusing to
sign the document.
 When they went to the Provincial Constabulary Command to ask for the
assistance of Sgt. Mortilla, they were told that it cannot be legally done.
 January 19, 1976: Rodolfo was killed in Sairaya Quezon by: Presentacion (his
wife), Francisco (father of Presentacion), Manuel and Cesario (brothers of
Presentacion)
 Trinidad Alcantara:
 Mother of victim
 6:00 pm: Rodolfo left the house
 He told her that he was going to the public marked to fetch his wife and
that they were going to talk about their lives.
 Vicente Recepeda:
 67 years old, jobless, and a resident of Lucena who went to the Aglipayan
fiesta.
 9:30 pm: On his way home to Lucena, he heard shrieking of pigs in a
nearby slaughterhouse and wanted to inquire about prices.
 He got distracted when he heard then saw a person being attacked inside
a lighted store.
 Francisco holding the hands of Rodolfo
 Manuel behind Rodolfo with an arm around Rodolfo’s neck
  Cesario Jumawan in front of Rodolfo, left hand holding Rodolfo’s collar,
and right hand brandishing a small pointed bolo stabbed Rodolfo below
the right nipple.
 Policarpio Trinidad:
 Also came from the Aglipayan fiesta
 11:00 pm: He was waiting for a ride home at the gasoline station, when he
saw: Cesario and Manuel walking, with Rodolfo between them. Rodolfo’s
head was bowed in front. His two arms were on the shoulders of Cesario
and Manuel.
 Rodolfo was not walking.
 They were crossing the national highway towards the south and went on
walking after crossing the highway.
Patrolmen Marcial Baera and Albufera:
 11:45 pm: Presentacion reported that the store of Sebastiana is threatened
to berobbed by Rodolfo Magnaye.
 When asked why she knew Rodolfo, she denied their relation.
 They went to investigate the reported attempt.
 Saw one of the panels used to close the store was destroyed.
 But nothing appears to have been taken from the store.
 They said they will continue the investigation the next day
 Day of Discovery:
 Rodolfo didn’t return the evening prior, so Trinidad went to the market to
look for him.
 She met four children who told her that they saw a man near the water.
 They accompanied her to the place and she recognized the dead man as
her son.
 She then proceeded to the police headquarters to report the matter.
 Patrolmen Baera and Albufera went to the place and saw the dead man
without a shirt and wearing black pants with white shoes.
 They noticed a stab wound on the lower portion of the right breast
 In the afternoon of the same day Patrolman Loreto Galeon went to the
store of Sebastiana to follow up the investigation of the reported
attempted robbery.
 He found traces of blood in one of the wooden panels which are used to
close the store.
 The following day when he looked again, the wooden panels were
already planed ('kinatam') and the traces of blood could no longer be seen
ISSUES + RULING:
1. WON the evidence against the accused has overcome the presumption of
their innocence and overcome their alibis so as to create a certainty of their
guilt? (YES)
 The testimony of the witnesses must be linked to show rationally that the
four accused conspired and cooperated in the assassination of Rodolfo.
Trinidad Alcantara stated the purpose why Rodolfo left that night, which
was to discuss the fate of the marriage with Presentacion. Vicente
Recepeda testified as to the execution of the crime.
 Policarpio Trinidad identified a lifeless Rodolfo being transported away
from the scene of the crime.
 The purpose of Presentacion and Rodolfo’s rendezvous was actually
accomplished.
 Rodolfo’s death terminated their marriage.
 Presentacion testifies that she was at the store when she heard a person
who wanted to enter the store so she shouted 'magnanakaw'.
 In response to her shouts several people arrived and chased the person
who wanted to enter the store.
 Adjoining neighbor, a certain Mateo Diamante informed her that the
person being chased by several men was Rodolfo.
 She, however, did not talk with any of the person who chased her
husband nor does she know any of them.
 She didn’t even give the direction where her husband supposedly ran.
 Presentacion’s report that Rodolfo attempted to rob the store of Sebastiana
was a crude diversionary tactic. It was to enable Cesario and Manuel to
transfer the cadaver.
 None of those who allegedly chased her husband that evening was even
presented as a witness
 The alibis of Francisco, Cesario and Manuela are for naught, because the
places they mentioned were not far from the scene of the crime, so it was
not impossible for them to be there.
 Francisco says he was in the house of Sebastiana, not in her store.
 It was walking distance to the store.
 Cesario says he and his wife were in Barrio Sampaloc visiting his brother
Benigno. It was just three kilometres away.
 Manuel says he was sleeping in his house at Barrio Pili. It was just five
kilometres away.
 Manuel also says that he was suffering from an abnormality on the left
arm since childhood, so he cannot raise it in a normal way.
 The medical certificate by Dr. Concepcion dela Merced shows he suffers
from a deformity of the proximal and left humerous probably from a
 previous fracture but there is no showing that Manuel Jumawan is
incapable of raising his left arm around the neck of Rodolfo.
 Rodolfo’s actual height was not established by the evidence.
 Dr. dela Merced was not presented to testify on her findings

2. WON the crime is parricide? (NO)

 Presentacion did not reveal to the investigating policemen that he was her
husband, even when she was asked why she knew his name.
 Relationship is inherent in parricide but Presentacion’s relationship to the
deceased was not alleged in the information.
 She stood convicted of (just) murder, as qualified by abuse of strength
 Although not alleged in information, aggravating circumstance can be
appreciated.
 Relationship, then becomes and aggravating circumstance as to the others,
the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law.
 The penalty for murder with an aggravating circumstance is death.
However, for lack of necessary votes, penalty is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby affirmed in toto. No
costs.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-
appellants.

G.R. No. L-74324

November 17, 1988

FACTS:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year-old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. On
one evening, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza. There were different kinds
of ride and one was a ferris wheel. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and
noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him.
They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
The accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris
wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do
so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused
Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The accused Pugay admitted that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing
that the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on
fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay
pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants Pugay and Samson criminally liable?

HELD:
Yes. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he
must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia,
that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped
his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured
on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not
have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the
benefit of doubt, it can be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended
to set the deceased’s clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind
of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code.
Therefore, the SC agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying
circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and
penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
 People v Paterno
G.R. No. L-2665
March 6, 1950
TUASON, J.
CASE: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI Davao
Defendants: Florentino Paterno, Cerbesa Malimbasao, Arades Lagbawan, Sarmiento
Panganay, Enrique Lemente, Mangapa Talbin
FACTS:
Florentino Paterno, Ignacio Vicente, Tranqui Manapos, Cerbesa Malimbasao, Arades
Lagbawan and Sarmiento Panganay, Enrique Lemente, Mangapa Talbinwere members
of an underground org called volunteer guards.
Feb 8,1943, the group was attacked by a Japanese patrol guided by Primo Jurolan and
Demenciano Chavez.
Feb 12, 1943, Florentino et al marched to Jurolan's barrio. Finding Jurolan and his wife
Delfina Gatillo, defendants tied the spouses' hands behind their back and took them
into their house. The couple were then killed with daggers. Mangapa Talbin then
burned the house with Jurolan's 3-day-old live infant inside.
The accused though took Jurolan's two elder children out of the house before burning
it. CFI found the defendants guilty of murder: (1)For the death of Delfina Castillo:
Sentence: an indeterminate penalty 10y1d to 17y4m1d of RT; indemnity: P2k. (2) For the
death of the child (no reference to the arson was made): Sentence: RP and to pay an
indemnity of P2k to its heirs.The accused were also condemned to pay proportionate
shares of the costs.(3)For the murder of Primo Jurolan: the defendants were pronounced
entitled to the benefits of amnesty Proc. No. 8 for the reason that Jurolan was a Japanese
spy.
ISSUE:
WON the defendants are guilty of murder.
Held:
No. They are guilty of arson. The appellants have been correctly found guilty of murder
with reference to the slaying of Delfina Gatillo, but they had the same degree of
participation in the crime and all should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua for setting
fire to the house with the resulting death of the child.
Murder or homicide is absorbed in arson as defined in this article.
Murder or homicide is absorbed in a juridical sense would exist if the killing were the
objective of the malefactor and the burning of a building were resorted to only a means
of accomplishing his purpose.
The rule is otherwise when arson, as in this case, is itself the end and death is a mere
consequence. Ds' plea: they acted in obedience to direct orders and threats of one
Anselmo Onofre. They committed the crimes from fear of that man, fear of being
themselves slain if they refused to comply. Onofre was the recognized overall
commander of the organization and that he was the only one who had a firearm, a .45
caliber pistol, the defendants being provided with no more weapons than bolos. Ignacio
Vicente and Tranqui Manapos, who were used by the prosecution as witnesses,
substantiated this plea.
SC: This testimony not true.
•These witnesses turned hostile to the prosecution and testified virtually in favor of the
appellants.
•Both swore on direct examination that Paterno was the leader of the band and ordered
the killing and the arson. Only on cross-examination, the two declared that Anselmo
Onofre was the supreme commander and the mastermind of the act.
•These two witnesses' affidavits, sworn to before the justice of the peace, and in their
testimony before the provincial fiscal, not even a hint was made of Anselmo Onofre.
• Vicente's and Manapos' explanation for not naming Onofre that is they were afraid of
him, is unconvincing:
•Onofre was not around when they made their statements
•they were already in the custody and under the protection of peace officers.
•the affidavits were made in June, 1946, when the war was over, complete peace and
order had been restored and civil government reestablished.
•The defendants themselves made written and sworn confessions before the same
justice of the peace, and none of them, except Paterno and Lemente, implicated Onofre.
•These confessions were produced by the accused before the Amnesty Commission as
the sole evidence on which they relied for their petition for discharge under the
amnesty. It is unthinkable that evidence of vital importance to their defense, so vital as
to be the sole point stressed by them in the court below and in this instance, should
have been forgotten or withheld by all the accused, except two, for no other reason than
fear of an absent, or dead, man. Although Paterno's affidavit (Exhibit D) incriminates
Onofre, yet it does not speak of compulsion or duress brought to bear on him or any of
his fellow-defendants. So even if we should assume, for the sake of argument, that the
crimes at bar were perpetrated by Onofre's order, such order would not serve to justify
or excuse appellants' deed. Lemente stated in his affidavit that Onofre commanded him
at the point of a pistol to kill Jurolan's wife. But no credence can be given to this part of
Lemente's statement. There was absolutely no need for Onofre, granting that he was
present, to force an unwilling tool to take the life of a defenseless woman when to do
the killing himself would require less effort on his part than to threaten and intimidate
a comrade. DECSISION: RP; indemnity to wife and baby: P6k; costs of the appeal
charged against the appellants in equal share.
 People v Cagoco
GR No. L-38511
10/6/1933
Justice Vickers
Facts of the Case:
On July 24, 1932, Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped total on the sidewalk.
While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice,
and when Yu Yee was about to leave his father, the man that had been passing back
and forth (Francisco Cagoco) approached Yu Lon from behind and suddenly and
without warning struck Yu Lon with his fist on the back part of the head. Cagoco
immediately ran away. Yu Yee and two other witnesses pursued him and then lost
sight of him. The blow caused Yu Lon to fall on the ground. As a consequence of which
he suffered a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital
region which were necessarily mortal and caused his immediate death. The next day,
Yu Yee promptly reported the incident to the police. Cagoco was later apprehended
and identified by Yu Yee as his father‘s assailant.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
As to the contention that the deceased would have fallen on his face if he had been
struck on the back of the head, the expert testimony shows that in such a case, a person
instinctively makes an effort to regain his balance. As a result, the deceased may have
fallen downwards. Further, the sidewalks almost invariably slop towards the pavement
so that when the deceased straightened up, he naturally tended to fall backwards. The
accused struck the deceased on the back of the head because it would have been
necessary for him to go between the deceased and Yu Yee who were then conversing.
There is treachery when the offender commits a crime employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tends directly to ensure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order that
a person may be criminally liable for felony different from that which he proposed to
commit, these two requisites should be present: 1. that a felony was committed, 2.
That the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime
committed by the offender. 3.In the case at bar, there is nothing to indicate that Yu Lon
‘s death was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of the
accused ‘s felonious act and the fact that he did not intend to cause so great an injury
does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a
mitigating circumstance. Since the accused committed the felony with treachery, he is
guilty of murder.
 US v Burns
G.R. No. L-16648
March 5, 1921
STREET, J.
CASE: Appeal from a judgment of CFI Samar.
FACTS:
Frank E Burns who have an automobile for hire business traveled to Laoag to pick
Major Newman. He stopped at the municipality of Pambujan to spend the night there
(Sep 5, 1918).
Burns asked his employee Casimiro Breva to search for the automobile of one Pedro de
la Cruz, saying that he wanted to burn it. Casimiro was unsuccessful in his search,
however, Burns told him that later that night he needed Casimiro to go with him to
burn Pedro's automobile. As a lookout, he will pay him P200.
That night, the two went to the house of Pedro. Casimiro stood guard in the street, and
Burns entered the basement where the car was and burned it. (time about 11pm).
The fire spread and consumed not only the house of Pedro but also of his 10 neighbors.
One servant of Pedro named Cipriano Jazmin was burned to death.
April 27, 1920: CFI Province of Samar found Frank E. Burns guilty of the crime of arson
and sentenced to 20y of cadena temporal, with the accessories prescribed by law, and
adjudged to pay the costs. Hence this appeal.
Prosecution witnesses: Casimiro Breva Primitivo Balanquit, the municipal president of
Pambujan: witnessed the two on Calle San Juan a short distance from the burning
house. Eugenio Esplana, keeper of the house where Burns stayed with Tomasa: after
being awakened by the ringing of the bells, she lighted a lamp and found Tomasa Surio
lying on the petate, but the accused was not there.
Burns' Defense: He was with Tomasa Surio who woke him up around midnight,
informing him of the happening fire. He ran outside, passed in front of the house of
Pedro where he met Casamiro. Tomasa corroborated his story.
Burns' alibi is false.
•first (one of the two) of all the numerous population to arrive at the scene, even before
the inmates of the burning house had been aroused.
•Tomasa's testimony that Burns, after going out, returned immediately
•conversation with Pedro on the morning after the fire where he made a statement
which assumed the fire to be of incendiary origin.
Testimony of Casimiro is truthful. It was delivered in a straightforward, natural style — an
earmark of sincerity — without stumbling, and that, notwithstanding extensive cross-
examination by the three attorneys for the defense, it had been in no material part
falsified or disproved.
Motive:
•Burns entertained resentment on account of the fact that Pedro de la Cruz was
competing to some extent with the former by using his automobile for the carriage of
passengers for hire. 1st car bought by Burns; heard Pedro will buy a new car,
remonstrated and advise him not to.
•there had been a misunderstanding between the parties in connection with a loan, or
sale, of gasoline which Pedro de la Cruz had made to the accused upon a certain
occasion when gasoline was scarce and high.
Burns committed a complex crime - arson and homicide, and ff A89 (now A77) the
penalty for the more serious crime will be imposed in its maximum degree. Hence, ACs
of nocturnity and evident premeditation are unimportant. Now, arson under A549 is a
graver crime than homicide under A404, inasmuch as the penalty for the former ranges
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua, whereas the penalty for the latter is fixed
within the limit of recollection temporal. Sentenced therefore must be cadena perpetua.
DECISION: sentence: cadena temproal; indemnity P40k to Pedro; P500 to Sergio
Socorro
 PEOPLE v. MARCIANO GONZALES
G.R. No. L-46310
October 31, 1939

Principles: HUSBAND WHO DID NOT SURPRISE HIS WIFE IN THE VERY ACT OF
ADULTERY, BUT THEREAFTER; PARRICIDE. — Even if the accused caught his wife
rising up and is already standing and buttoning his drawers, the accused cannot invoke
the privilege of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, because he did not surprise the
supposed offenders in the very act of committing adultery, but thereafter, if the
respective positions of the woman and the man were suffIcient to warrant the
conclusion that they had committed the carnal act. (3 Viada, Penal Code, p. 96; People
VS. Marquez, 53 Phil., 260.)
Facts:
Appellant testified that at midday on June 2, 1938, on returning to his house from the
woods, he surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act of
adultery, the latter having escaped by jumping through the door of the house. He
scolded his wife for such act, told her that the man was the very one who used to ask
rice and food from them, and counseled her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His
wife, promised him not to do the act again.
Thereafter — the accused continued testifying — he left the house and went towards
the South to see his carabaos. Upon returning to his house at about five o’clock in the
afternoon, and not finding his wife there, he looked for her and found her with Isabelo
near the toilet of his house in a place covered with under bush. When he saw them, his
wife was rising up, while Isabelo, who was standing and buttoning his drawers,
immediately took to his heels. The accused went after him, but unable to overtake him,
he returned to where his wife was and, completely obfuscated, attacked her with a
knife without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead
body to his house.
The appellant contends that, having surprised his wife, in the afternoon of the date in
question, under circumstances indicative that she had carnal intercourse with Isabelo,
he was entitled to the privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised Penal Code

Issue:
WON the appellant is qualified for the privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code?
Ruling:
The Court do not believe that the accused can avail himself of the aforesaid article,
because the privilege there granted is conditioned on the requirement that the spouse
surprise the husband or the wife in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person, the accused did not surprise his wife in the very act of carnal
intercourse, but after the act, if any such there was, because from the fact that she was
rising up and the man was buttoning his drawers, it does not necessarily follow that a
man and a woman had committed the carnal act.
US v. EUFRASIO ALANO Y AGBUYA, GR No. 11021, 1915-12-01

Facts:
Defendant Eufrasio Alano and his wife Teresa Marcelo amused themselves at the card
game of "black jack." About half past seven that evening the defendant, feeling tired,
went to bed, while his wife remained at the window looking out and a little while
afterward told her husband that she would go down for a moment to the Chinese store
nearby, which she did.
As Teresa Marcelo was slow in returning and her sick child was crying, Eufrasio Alano
left the house to look for her in the Chinese store and, not finding her there, went to
look for her in another Chinese store nearby with the same result.
He therefore started to return home through an alley where he tripped on a wire lying
across the way. He then observed as he stopped that among some grass near a clump of
thick bamboo a man was lying upon a woman in a position to hold sexual intercourse...
with her, but they both hurriedly arose from the ground, startled by the noise made by
the defendant in stumbling.
Alano at once recognized the woman as his wife, for whom he was looking, and the
man as Martin Gonzalez, who immediately started to run. He was wearing an...
undershirt and a pair of drawers, which lower garment he held and pulled up as he
ran. Enraged by what he had seen, the defendant drew a fan-knife he had in his pocket
and pursued Martin Gonzalez, although he did not succeed in overtaking him, and, not
knowing where he had fled, returned to the house, where he found his wife Teresa in
the act of climbing the stairs.
He then reprimanded her for her disgraceful conduct and immediately stabbed her
several times.

Issues:
WON the appellant is qualified for the privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code?

Ruling:
From the record it appears, then, to have been fully proven that, because the defendant
caught his wife, Teresa Marcelo, in the act of committing adultery with Martin
Gonzalez, after he had unsuccessfully pursued the latter, who succeeding in escaping
and hiding himself, he assaulted the adulteress and inflicted upon her twenty-four
wounds which produced her death a few moments afterwards. This crime is provided
for in article 423 of the Penal Code, and no valid objection to his finding lies in the
circumstances that the unfaithful wife was not killed in the very place where she was
caught, for the reason that the wronged husband preferred first to attack the despoiler
of his honor and afterwards the adulterous wife who succeeded in getting away from
the place where she was caught with her paramour. The assault upon the woman must
be understood to' be a continuation of the act of the wronged husband's pursuit of her
paramour, who had the good fortune to escape and immediately get away from the
place of the crime. Consequently, although the deceased did not fall dead in the place
where she was caught, but in another place nearby, logically it must be understood that
the case at bar comes within the provisions of the said article 423 of the Penal Code.
For the proper imposition of the penalty prescribed by law, account must be taken of
the extenuating circumstance that the defendant acted upon an impulse of passion and
obfuscation, and also of the special circumstance provided in article 11 of the Code, as
amended by Act No. 2142; and, as there is no aggravating circumstance to offset these
extenuating ones, the penalty of destierro (banishment) should be imposed upon him in
the minimum degree.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is reversed and Eufrasio Alano
y Agbuya should be sentenced, as he is hereby, to the penalty of six months and one
day of banishment ( destierro) from the district of Malate, and he shall not reside or
enter within a radius of twenty-five kilometers from the church of the said district
during the period of this sentence. The costs of both instances shall, furthermore, be
charged against him, without prejudice to his being furnished a certified copy of this
decision and placed at the disposal of the Court of First Instance, so that he may be
released from custody in order to serve out the said sentence of banishment ( destierro).
So ordered.

Principles:
"When the defendant's confession is accepted to find him guilty, without setting forth
other grounds, it must be admitted in its entirety, as well in respect to what is
prejudicial to him as to what is beneficial; and if it unquestionably appears therefrom
that the crime was attended by the extenuating circumstance of prior and immediate
provocation by the injured party, this circumstance must be taken into consideration"