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G.R. No. 210554.  August 5, 2015. *
 
DAVID YU KIMTENG, MARY L. YU, WINNIE L. YU, VIVIAN
L. YU, ROSA GAN, LILIAN CHUA WOO YUKIMTENG,
SANTOS YU, MARCELO YU, and SIN CHIAO YU LIM,
petitioners, vs. ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG, ANASTACIO E.
REVILLA, JR., ATTY. JOVITO GAMBOL, and ATTY. DAN
REYNALD R. MAGAT, practicing law under the Firm name, Young
Revilla Gambol & Magat, and JUDGE OFELIA L. CALO,
Presiding Judge of Branch 211 of the Regional Trial Court,
Mandaluyong City, respondents.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Contempt; Words and Phrases;

The Supreme Court (SC) has defined contempt of court as: a willful
disregard or disobedience of a public authority.—This court has defined
contempt of court as: a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to,
the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its
proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so
near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such
a body. In its restricted

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*  SECOND DIVISION.

 
 

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and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the

authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is
generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.
(Emphasis in the original, citations omitted) In this case, respondents
committed acts that are considered indirect contempt under Section 3 of
Rule 71. In addition, respondents disregarded the Code of Professional
Responsibility when they retained the name of respondent Revilla in their
firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 states: Rule 3.02. In the choice of a firm
name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The continued
use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm
indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Firm Name; Maintaining a disbarred lawyer’s
name in the firm name is different from using a deceased partner’s name in
the firm name.—Maintaining a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name is
different from using a deceased partner’s name in the firm name. Canon 3,
Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased partner’s name as long as there is an
indication that the partner is deceased. This ensures that the public is not
misled. On the other hand, the retention of a disbarred lawyer’s name in the
firm name may mislead the public into believing that the lawyer is still
authorized to practice law. The use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm

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name was the issue in the consolidated cases Petition for Authority to
Continue Use of the Firm Name “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez &
Castillo” and In the matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of
the Firm Name “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, 92 SCRA 1
(1979).” Petitioners prayed that they be allowed to continue including Atty.
Alexander Sycip’s and Atty. Herminio Ozaeta’s names in their firm names.
This court denied the petitions, explaining that there is a possibility of
deception in the use of a deceased partner’s name. Also, Article 1815 of the
Civil Code shows that the partners in a partnership should be “living
persons who can be subjected to liability.” Further, the use of a deceased
partner’s name is not a custom in the Philippines. On the contrary, the local
custom shows that the firm name usually identifies the senior members or
partners of a law firm.
Same; Same; Same; Contempt of Court; The Supreme Court (SC) has
ruled that the use of the name of a person who is not authorized to practice
law constitutes contempt of court.—The use of a de-

 
 

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ceased partner’s name in a law firm’s name was allowed upon the
effectivity of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with the requirement
that “the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is
deceased.” On the other hand, this court has ruled that the use of the name
of a person who is not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of
court.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; The filing of a
Complaint for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
and the filing of this Petition for contempt under Rule 71 do not constitute
forum shopping.—As to the allegation of forum shopping, petitioners do not
deny that they filed a Complaint for disbarment. They argue, however, that
they did not mention the disbarment proceedings against respondents in
view of Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the Rules of Court, which states that
disbarment proceedings are private and confidential. In addition, a Petition
for contempt under Rule 71 and a Complaint for disbarment are different
from each other. The filing of a Complaint for disbarment before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the filing of this Petition for contempt
under Rule 71 do not constitute forum shopping. Forum shopping has been
defined as: when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other court. The elements of forum shopping are: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Contempt of

Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Balgos, Gumaru, Faller, Tan & Javier for petitioners.

 
 
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LEONEN,  J.:
 
A disbarred lawyer’s name cannot be part of a firm’s name. A
lawyer who appears under a firm name that contains a disbarred
lawyer’s name commits indirect contempt of court.
Through this Petition,1 petitioners ask that law firm, Young
Revilla Gambol & Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo (Judge Calo), be
cited in contempt of court under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.2
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (Revilla) was disbarred on December 2009 in
an En Banc Resolution of this court in A.C. No. 7054 entitled Que v.
Atty. Revilla, Jr.3
David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu, Vivian L. Yu,
Rosa Gan, Lilian Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu, and
Sin Chiao Yu Lim are the majority stockholders of Ruby Industrial
Corporation.4
In Majority Stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Lim,
et al.,5 this court ordered the liquidation of Ruby Industrial
Corporation and transferred the case to the appropriate Regional
Trial Court branch to supervise the liquidation.6
 
The liquidation was raffled to Branch 211 of the Regional Trial
Court in Mandaluyong City,7 presided by Judge Calo.8
Walter T. Young (Atty. Young), Jovito Gambol (Atty. Gambol),
and Dan Reynald Magat (Atty. Magat) are lawyers practicing under
the firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat.9 They

_______________

1  Rollo, pp. 3-16.

2  Id., at p. 13.
3  622 Phil. 1; 607 SCRA 1 (2009) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
4  Rollo, p. 3.
5  665 Phil. 600; 650 SCRA 461 (2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division].
6  Id., at p. 657; p. 523.
7  Rollo, p. 7.
8  Id., at p. 4.
9  Id.

 
 

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Kimteng vs. Young

entered their appearance in the liquidation proceedings as counsels

for the liquidator.10
An Opposition11 was filed against the appearance of Young
Revilla Gambol & Magat on the ground that Revilla was already
disbarred in 2009.12
Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed a Reply13 to the Opposition
stating that the firm opted to retain Revilla’s name in the firm name
even after he had been disbarred, with the retention serving as an act
of charity.14
Judge Calo overruled the opposition to the appearance of Young
Revilla Gambol & Magat and stated that Atty. Young could still
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appear for the liquidator as long as his appearance was under the
Young Law Firm and not under Young Revilla Gambol & Magat.15
Young Law Firm does not exist.
Thus, petitioners David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu,
Vivian L. Yu, Rosa Gan, Lilian Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu,
Marcelo Yu, and Sin Chiao Yu Lim filed this Petition under Rule 71
to cite respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,
Atty. Jovito Gambol, Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat, and Judge Ofelia
L. Calo in contempt.
This court required respondents to comment on the Petition.16
Respondent law firm Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed its
Comment17 on April 14, 2014, while respondent Atty. Gambol filed
a separate Comment.18

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10  Id., at p. 7.
11  Id., at pp. 22-26.
12  Id., at pp. 7 and 22.
13  Id., at pp. 27-33.
14  Id., at pp. 8 and 28.
15  Id., at pp. 8-9.
16  Id., at p. 56. The Resolution was dated February 24, 2014.
17  Id., at pp. 57-68.
18  Id., at pp. 70-84.

 
 

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On April 16, 2014, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File

Consolidated Reply.19 This was granted in the Resolution20 dated
June 18, 2014. In the same Resolution, this court denied petitioners’
Motion to Consider Case Submitted without Comment from [Judge
Calo]21 and ordered the parties to await Judge Calo’s comment.22
Counsel for petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation,23
informing this court that they have yet to receive a copy of Judge
Calo’s Comment.24 No Comment was filed by Judge Calo.
 
I
 
Petitioners cite San Luis v. Pineda25 and United States v. Ney, et
al.26 to support their argument that the use of a disbarred lawyer’s
name in the firm name is tantamount to contempt of court.27
Private Respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat counter that
they maintained Revilla’s name in the firm name for sentimental
reasons.28
Atty. Young and Atty. Magat explained that they did not intend to
deceive the public29 and that in any case, the retention of Revilla’s
name “does not give added value to the [law firm] nor does it
enhance the standing of the member lawyers thereof.”30

_______________

19  Id., at pp. 202-204.

20  Id., at p. 223.
21  Id., at pp. 217-220.
22  Id., at p. 223.
23  Id., at pp. 229-233.
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24  Id., at p. 229.
25  121 Phil. 419; 13 SCRA 441 (1965) [Per CJ. Bengzon, En Banc].
26  8 Phil. 146 (1907) [Per J. Tracey, En Banc].
27  Rollo, pp. 9-12.
28  Id., at p. 60.
29  Id., at pp. 59-60.
30  Id., at p. 59.

 
 

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They further argue that:

The non-deletion of [Anastacio E. Revilla’s] name in the Young Law

Firm’s name is no more misleading than including the names of dead or
retired partners in a law firm’s name. It is more for sentimental reasons. It is
a fraternal expression to a former brother in the profession that the Private
Respondents fully understand, his [referring to Revilla] principled albeit
quixotic advocacy.31

 
Private respondents point out that the Balgos Law Firm is
derailing the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation by filing this
Petition for contempt because the Balgos Law Firm resents that its
nominee was not elected as liquidator.32 Private respondents add that
petitioners have continuously blocked Ruby Industrial Corporation’s
unsecured creditors from obtaining relief, as shown by the number
of times that Ruby Industrial Corporation’s cases have reached this
court.33
Private respondents also raise the issue of forum shopping in
their Comment because petitioners allegedly filed a disbarment
Complaint against them before the Commission on Bar Discipline,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. One of the grounds for disbarment
cited by petitioners was the use of Revilla’s name in their firm
name.34
Private respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment,35
arguing that from the time Revilla was disbarred, he no longer
practiced law.36
Private respondent Atty. Gambol stated that he passed the 1990
Bar Examination but took his oath in July 2006.37 He is

_______________

31  Id., at p. 60.
32  Id., at p. 62.
33  Id.
34  Id., at p. 58.
35  Id., at pp. 70-84.
36  Id., at p. 72.
37  Id., at p. 73.

 
 

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a junior member of the Young Revilla Magat & Gambol law firm
and “has no power and/or authority [to decide] who should be
removed from the firm’s name[.]”38
Private respondent Atty. Gambol argues that in all the cases he
handled after Revilla’s disbarment, he omitted Revilla’s name from
the firm name in the pleadings that he signed. Such deletion was
through his own initiative.39
Petitioners filed their Reply,40 with petitioners addressing
respondents’ allegations that they remained silent on the disbarment
case they had filed by citing Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court,41 which provides that:

Rule  139-B.  Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

....
Section  18.  Confidentiality.—Proceedings against attorneys shall be
private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court
shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

 
Petitioners argue that liability for contempt is separate from
disciplinary action; hence, no forum shopping was committed.42
Petitioners did not address private respondents’ allegations
regarding the delay in the liquidation of Ruby Industrial
Corporation.
The issues in this case are:
First, whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty.
Jovito Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of
court when they continued to use respondent An-

_______________

38  Id.
39  Id., at pp. 73-74..
40  Id., at pp. 205-212.
41  Id., at p. 207.
42  Id.

 
 

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Kimteng vs. Young

astacio E. Revilla, Jr.’s name in their firm name even after his
disbarment;
Second, whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty.
Jovito Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of
court for deliberately allowing a disbarred lawyer to engage in the
practice of law;
Third, whether private respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is in
contempt of court for continuing to practice law even after
disbarment;
Fourth, whether public respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is in
contempt of court when she held that respondent Atty. Walter T.
Young can appear in court as long as it is under the Young Law
Firm, which is a nonexistent firm; and
Lastly, whether the filing of this Petition despite the pendency of
a disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
constitutes forum shopping.
 
II

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Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:

SEC.  3.  Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and

hearing.—After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
(a)  Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b)  Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after
being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment
or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts
or induces

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Kimteng vs. Young

another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c)  Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt
under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d)  Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e)  Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority;
(f)  Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g)  The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in
the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court
held by him. (Emphasis supplied)
This court has defined contempt of court as:
a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its
broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules
or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its
proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its
presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair
the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense,
contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity
of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within
its legal signification a variety of different acts.43 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)

 
In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered
indirect contempt under Section 3 of Rule 71. In addi-

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43  Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the

Philippines, 672 Phil. 1, 10; 656 SCRA 331, 342-343 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division].

 
 

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tion, respondents disregarded the Code of Professional

Responsibility when they retained the name of respondent Revilla in
their firm name.
Canon 3, Rule 3.02 states:

Rule  3.02.  In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or

assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased
partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased.

 
Respondents argue that the use of respondent Revilla’s name is
“no more misleading than including the names of dead or retired
partners in a law firm’s name.”44
 
III
 
Maintaining a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name is
different from using a deceased partner’s name in the firm name.
Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased partner’s name as
long as there is an indication that the partner is deceased. This
ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the retention
of a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name may mislead the
public into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice
law.
The use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm name was the
issue in the consolidated cases Petition for Authority to Continue
Use of the Firm Name “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez &
Castillo” and In the matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue
Use of the Firm Name “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes.”45 Petitioners prayed that they be allowed to continue
including Atty. Alexander Sycip’s and

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44  Rollo, p. 60.
45  180 Phil. 250; 92 SCRA 1 (1979) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].

 
 

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Atty. Herminio Ozaeta’s names in their firm names.46 This court

denied the petitions, explaining that there is a possibility of
deception in the use of a deceased partner’s name.47 Also, Article
1815 of the Civil Code48 shows that the partners in a partnership
should be “living persons who can be subjected to liability.”49
Further, the use of a deceased partner’s name is not a custom in the
Philippines.50 On the contrary, the local custom shows that the firm
name usually identifies the senior members or partners of a law
firm.51 Justice Aquino dissented, stating that:

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I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition
that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be)
that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead
or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the
names of their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had
customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to
benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and
esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was
followed before the war by the law firm

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46  Id., at pp. 253-254; p. 15.

47  Id., at pp. 261-263; p. 11.
48  Civil Code, Art. 1815 provides:
ARTICLE   1815.  Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may
or may not include the name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm
name, shall be subject to the liability of a partner.
49   Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name “Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo,” supra note 45 at p. 257; p. 7.
50  Id., at p. 260; p. 11.
51  Id.

 
 

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of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross, the

founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso,
his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the
year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the
name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.52
The use of a deceased partner’s name in a law firm’s name was
allowed upon the effectivity of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, with the requirement that “the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased.”53
On the other hand, this court has ruled that the use of the name of
a person who is not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt
of court.
In San Luis v. Pineda, this court has held that “[n]eedless to say,
[the] practice of law by one who is disbarred constitutes contempt of
court.”54 United States v. Ney, et al. involved J. Garcia Bosque who
was denied admission to the bar because he chose to remain a
Spanish subject during the cession of the Philippines under the
Treaty of Paris.55 Bosque entered into an arrangement with Ney, a
practicing attorney, and established “Ney & Bosque.”56 Bosque did
not personally appear in courts but the papers of their office were
signed “Ney and Bosque-C.W. Ney, Abogado.”57 The matter was
referred to the then Attorney-General, and contempt proceedings
were insti-

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52  J. Aquino, Dissenting Opinion in Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the
Firm Name “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo,” id., at pp. 264-265; p.

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16. Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, and Antonio joined the dissent of Associate
Justice Aquino.
53  Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 3, Rule 3.02.
54  San Luis v. Pineda, supra note 25 at p. 420; p. 442.
55  United States v. Ney, supra note 26, citing In re Bosque, 1 Phil. (1902) [Per CJ.
Arellano, En Banc].
56  Id., at pp. 146-147.
57  Id., at p. 147.

 
 

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tuted.58 At that time, Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure

defined contempt of court as:

1.  Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,

judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
2.  Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions.59

This court found that Atty. Ney was in contempt of court and
held that:

Under the second subdivision of [Section 232], Bosque is obviously not

answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other
hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is
liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it
did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner
Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was
chiefly and personally responsible.60

In Cambaliza v. Atty. Cristal-Tenorio,61 Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-

Tenorio used a letterhead indicating that Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr. was
a senior partner in the Cristal-Tenorio Law Office when, in fact, he
was not a lawyer.62 This court held that:

A lawyer who allows a nonmember of the Bar to misrepresent himself as

a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:

_______________

58  Id.
59  Id., at p. 148.
60  Id., at p. 149.
61  478 Phil. 378; 434 SCRA 288 (2004) [Per CJ. Davide, Jr., First Division].
62  Id., at pp. 384-385; p. 295.

 
 

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Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the

unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member
of the Bar in good standing.
The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding
oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one’s self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of
law. Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
....
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to
see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to
be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And the law makes it a misbehavior on
his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.63 (Citations omitted)

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63  Id., at pp. 387-389; pp. 295-296.

 
 

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From the time respondent Revilla was disbarred in 2009, it

appears that no efforts were exerted to remove his name from the
firm name. Thus, respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat are held
liable for contempt of court.
Rule 71, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
for the imposable penalties for indirect contempt:

SEC.  7.  Punishment for indirect contempt.—If the respondent is

adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine
not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a
lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt
consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order
or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to
the party injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount
as may be alleged and proved.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the
enforcement of a judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise
provides. (Emphasis supplied)

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In view of Rule 71, Section 7, a fine of P30,000.00 each is
imposed on respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat.
 
IV
 
Respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment, explaining
that he dropped respondent Revilla’s name from the firm name in the
pleadings that he filed in several courts. Respondent Atty. Gambol’s
explanation is supported by the allegations in the Comment filed by
respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat stating:
 
 

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Kimteng vs. Young

In fact, when co-Private Respondent Gambol, initially cowed perhaps, by

the same intimidation worked upon him by the Complainants’ counsel in
another case, asked permission to delete [Anastacio E. Revilla’s] name in
the Young Law Firm’s name in the pleadings that he (i.e., Private
Respondent Gambol) would subsequently file, Respondent Young allowed
him to do so.64

 
This court recognizes respondent Atty. Gambol’s effort to avoid
misleading the public by removing respondent Revilla’s name in the
pleadings he filed. Thus, the Complaint against him is dismissed.
Petitioners included Revilla as a respondent, but they did not
serve copies of the Petition and subsequent pleadings upon him.
Respondent Revilla also did not receive a copy of this court’s
Resolution requiring respondents to comment. Thus, this court shall
refrain from ruling upon respondent Revilla’s liability.
 
V
 
With regard to respondent Judge Calo, petitioners pray that she
be cited in contempt for allowing respondent Atty. Young’s
appearance as long as it was under the Young Law Firm. A
photocopy of the Order65 was attached to the Petition. A portion of
Judge Calo’s Order states:
Although this court grants the appearance of Atty. Walter Young
for the Liquidator, his appearance however shall be allowed only if
in the name of the Young Law Firm, managed by the said counsel,
and not under the name of the Law Firm of Young Revilla Gambol
and Ma-

_______________

64  Rollo, p. 60.
65  Id., at pp. 34-46. The Joint Order, dated December 5, 2013 and docketed as
SEC CASE No. MC 12-133 and MC 12-134, was entitled In re: Involuntary
Liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation.

 
 

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Kimteng vs. Young

gat. This is to avoid any misconception that a disbarred lawyer,

Revilla, continues to practice law.66
Petitioners argue that respondent Judge Calo’s Order is an
indirect violation of “the proscription against the participation of . . .
disbarred lawyer[s]”67 in court. Further, the Young Law Firm does
not exist.68
Respondent Judge Calo was required to file a Comment on the
Resolution69 dated February 24, 2014, but she did not comply.
From petitioners’ allegations, it appears that respondent Judge
Calo committed an error in judgment when she allowed respondent
Atty. Young’s appearance under the Young Law Firm. However, this
Petition to cite respondent Judge Calo in contempt is not the proper
remedy. Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese70 discussed the remedies available
to litigants as follows:

[T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or

irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which
may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission
of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive
law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after
rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal.
The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic
exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil
actions of certiorari,

_______________

67  Id., at p. 13.
68  Id.
69  Id., at p. 56.
70  529 Phil. 594; 497 SCRA 602 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

 
 

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Kimteng vs. Young

prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of

venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings
and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of,
nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as
the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are
prerequisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the
judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is
only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into
his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or
closed.71 (Citation omitted)

 
Whether petitioners availed themselves of judicial remedies was
not stated in their Petition. Nevertheless, this court cannot ignore the
possible effect of respondent Judge Calo’s Order. Thus, the
Complaint against respondent Judge Calo shall be re-docketed as an
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administrative matter. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

provides:

SECTION  11.  . . . The Supreme Court En Banc shall have the power
to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.

Also, Rule 4, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme

Court72 provides that the administrative functions of this court
include “disciplinary and administrative matters involving justices,
judges, and court personnel[.]”

_______________

71  Id., at pp. 598-599; pp. 606-607.

72  A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, as amended by the Resolution dated August 3, 2010.

 
 

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Kimteng vs. Young

VI
 
As to the allegation of forum shopping, petitioners do not deny
that they filed a Complaint for disbarment. They argue, however,
that they did not mention the disbarment proceedings against
respondents in view of Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court, which states that disbarment proceedings are private and
confidential.73 In addition, a Petition for contempt under Rule 71 and
a Complaint for disbarment are different from each other.
The filing of a Complaint for disbarment before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the filing of this Petition for contempt
under Rule 71 do not constitute forum shopping. Forum shopping
has been defined as:

when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different

courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court.74

 
The elements of forum shopping are:

(a)  identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same

interests in both actions;
(b)  identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and
(c)  the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, re-

_______________

73  Rollo, p. 207.
74  Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, January
21, 2015, 746 SCRA 378, 431 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Heirs of
Marcelo Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, February 17, 2014, 716 SCRA 175, 178
[Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

 
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430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Kimteng vs. Young

gardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action

under consideration.75

 
This court has explained that disbarment proceedings are sui
generis, and are not akin to civil or criminal cases.76 A disbarment
proceeding “is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession
of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts.”77
Also, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ findings are
recommendatory, and the power to sanction erring members of the
bar lies with this court.78
As discussed by this court in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan:79

The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is

broader [than] the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be
committed both by lawyers and nonlawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also
constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however,
the Supreme Court’s disciplinary authority over lawyers

_______________

75  Id., citing Goodland Company, Inc. v. Asia United Bank, 684 Phil. 391, 409;
668 SCRA 366, 383-384 (2012) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
76  In re Almacen, No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 600-601 [Per
J. Castro, En Banc]. See also Gonzalez v. Alcaraz, 534 Phil. 471, 482; 503 SCRA
355, 364 (2006) [Per CJ. Panganiban, First Division]; Que v. Revilla, Jr., supra note 3
at pp. 22-23; p. 19; Ylaya v. Gacott, A.C. No. 6475, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA
452, 467-468 [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; and Dizon v. De Taza, A.C. No. 7676,
June 10, 2014, 726 SCRA 70, 78-79 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
77  Cristobal v. Renta, A.C. No. 9925, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 247, 249
[Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division].
78  Bernardino v. Santos, A.C. No. 10583, February 18, 2015, 750 SCRA 637, 656
[Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
79  248 Phil. 542; 166 SCRA 316 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

 
 

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may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the
respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power
to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of
disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to
the Court’s exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic]
is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as
such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his

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part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade

the administration of justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him and contumacious conduct warranting application of the
contempt power.80 (Citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty.
Dan Reynald R. Magat are found in contempt of court for using a
disbarred lawyer’s name in their firm name and are meted a fine of
P30,000.00 each.
The Complaint against Atty. Jovito Gambol is DISMISSED.
This is without prejudice to any disciplinary liabilities of
respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat,
and Judge Ofelia L. Calo.
The counsels are ordered to make the necessary amendments in
relation to the use of the disbarred lawyer’s name including changes
in their signage, notice of appearances, stationeries, and like material
within a period of five (5) days from receipt.
The Complaint against respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is also
ordered re-docketed as an administrative matter.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to private respondents’ personal records
as attorneys, to the Integrated Bar of the Phil

_______________

80  Id., at pp. 555-556; pp. 331-332.

 
 

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Kimteng vs. Young

ippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for their

information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.

Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat meted with
P30,000.00 fine each for contempt of court, complaint against Atty.
Jovito Gambol dismissed. This is without prejudice to any
disciplinary liabilities of respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty.
Dan Reynald R. Magat and Judge Ofelia L. Calo.

Notes.—Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the

Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity.
(City Government of Baguio vs. Masweng, 717 SCRA 95 [2014])
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to
the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court,
and consequently, to the due administration of justice. (Id.)
 
 
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