blood residue

ï Forensic evidence including blood, saliva, hairs,

fibers, DNA, fingerprints, or other bodily fluids;
also surfaces or objects which may contain or
hold said items residue
ï Firearms and firearm indicia, including but not
limited to: long guns, hand guns, ammunition,
cartridge casings, holsters, gun cleaning kits, firearm
cases and manuals, receipts, photographs of
firearms and papers, notes or other documents
tending to show possession and/or ownership of
firearms
ï Electronic devices to include computers, cell
phones, cameras, and other devices capable of
recording and/or storing electronic data
ï Marijuana, and all other controlled substances
as defined in Minnesota Statues Chapter 152, as
well as, scales, drug paraphernalia, drug notes,
primary containers and other items used for
concealment, storage, manufacture, distribution
or consumption of controlled substances.
ï Receipts, paperwork, mail and/or other
documents that may be used to assist in
identification and tend to show the ownership or
occupancy of the residence.
ï US Currency
ï Fire Extinguishers.
ï Mercedes key fobs.

The following Clothing:

ï Person 1-

ï Person 2

3
 ï Person 3 -

ï Person 4 identified as

is or are at the premises described as:

1117 S. Marquette Avenue, apartment 701

Pre-Warrant Service

St. Paul PD SIU Operations Plan 2/2/2022 with an expiration of 2/7/2022

The type of activity was outlined in the plan was “Attempt to Locate/coordinate the
apprehension of St Paul Police murder suspect(s).”

The target locations included, 1117 Marquette Avenue South, apartments 701, 1402,
1403 (three distinct apartments at same complex and 2740 Minnehaha Avenue W in
Minneapolis.

The OPS plan had a caution statement that included the following information: “St Paul
Homicide Investigators have identified several suspects in the murder of Otis Elder Jr
near 502 Prior Avenue on January 10, 2022. They believe the suspects are also
responsible for multiple aggravated robberies/car-jackings in the Twin Cities area. They
are to be considered armed and dangerous. A Probable Cause Pick-up and Hold has
been issued for the primary suspect is as well as
All suspects
have been observed possessing multiple firearms in recent social media postings. The
weapons used in the murder have not been recovered.”

The “OVERALL OPERATION CONCEPT” detailed: “St Paul Homicide investigators

obtained non-night-capped Hennepin County search warrant with an unannounced entry
provision to search 1117 Marquette Avenue S (apartments #701, #1402, and #1403).
The primary suspect, , is known to live in apartment #1402.
lives in apartment #701, and he is known to spend a significant amount of time there.
Apartment #1403 is known as a ‘flop house/apartment’ where the primary suspect and
4
his associates convene. The primary mission is to apprehend and to search for
evidence related to the original crime. Two other suspects, and
, may be staying inside apartment #1403. They will be detained if observed
during the mission. See photographs below. Minneapolis Police SWAT will serve the
search warrant(s). They will determine the tactics employed to complete the warrant
execution, and the apprehension of the suspect(s). On January 31, 2022 SPPD SIU
conducted physical surveillance at each address, and confirmed via video surveillance,
the primary suspect stays at the address. SIU is in communication with MPD SWAT
Command and will continue to update them with pertinent information related to the
mission. SPPD investigators also obtained a Hennepin County night capped, knock and
announce warrant for 2740 Minnehaha Avenue in Minneapolis. This is the home of a
fourth suspect, who is currently in custody at the
Hennepin County Juvenile Detention Center.”

The plan noted that had not been charged in the homicide, was in custody of the
juvenile detention center, and could be released at any time.

It is noted that the OPS plan included contingency plans for if the target left the location
on foot or in a vehicle that are inapplicable to this review.

Officer Written Statement (Include Pre-Op and Operation Details)

Lieutenant Thomas Campbell

Campbell was the 1280 (SWAT) supervisor on 1/31/2022 when Sergeant Sysaath
forwarded an email to him from SPD seeking to have MPD SWAT execute knock and
announce search warrants in Minneapolis. Campbell reported that he agreed with
Sysaath that the search warrants at 1117 S. Marquette #1402, #1403, and #701 should
be no-knock warrants and that MPD SWAT would not use their team to execute knock
and announce warrants. Campbell relayed that if SPPD wanted the assistance of MPD
SWAT the warrants would have to be re-written as “no-knock” warrants.

Campbell noted that on the morning of 2/1//2022 he received a call from SPPD
Commander Flynn regarding the warrant execution denial. Campbell told Flynn that MPD
would not execute the warrants unless they were re-written as no-knock warrants.
Campbell reported that Flynn understood and agreed with Campbell’s reasoning but
would need permission from the Chief of St. Paul in order to re-write the warrants.

Campbell noted that a few hours later at 13:43 hours, Sgt. Zebro of SPPD emailed the
newly written and signed no-knock warrants for review.

Campbell outlined the reason SPPD requested SWAT to execute the no-knock warrants
for the three apartments at 1117 S. Marquette Ave. S. specifically:

• The target of the search warrant was a wanted person in connection to a recent
homicide.

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 • Homicide suspect lists apartment 1402 as his home address.
• Homicide suspect is associated with apartment 701 and has obtained a
key for the apartment from building management.
• Homicide suspect and associates are associated with apartment 1403 per
building management.
• The .223 firearm used during the homicide was not recovered.
• The target of the search warrant was recently seen on social media possessing
several firearms.
• The target addresses are occupied by an unknown number of associates, and
other homicide suspects have not been identified yet and could be inside.
• Several apartments in the same building are related to the homicide case, 1402,
1403, 701.
• Multiple no-knock search warrants are approved and signed by a judge for the
related apartments and will be served this morning.
• Two of the apartments are next door to each other. 1402 and 1403.
• The vehicle used by the suspect(s) during the homicide was later used for multiple
armed robberies.
• Lastly, the Officers and investigators did not have the proper safety equipment to
effectively serve the warrant themselves.

Campbell reported that he and Officer Sundberg observed the addresses to set up the
operations plans.

Campbell reported that on 2/2/2022 the team met with the affiant’s designee (St. Paul
Sgt) who briefed the team on the case and the search warrants.

Campbell said that he then briefed his team (1281) on the tactical plans for apartment
1402 while Sergeants Sysaath and Biederman briefed their team (1280) on the tactical
plans for apartment 1403. Campbell noted that the search warrants on these two
apartments would be served simultaneously. Campbell also stated that once the 1280
team cleared apartment 1403, the 1280 team would go to the 7 th floor and execute the
warrant on apartment 701.

Campbell noted that medical personnel were also part of the briefing.

Campbell reported that the teams then went to 1117 S. Marquette Avenue. Campbell
participated in the warrant execution of apartment 1402 and noted that apartment 1402
was unoccupied and a Code 4 (all clear) for 1402 was called at 0646 hours.

Campbell then headed to the 7th floor to assist the 1280 team with apartment 701,
however while on the elevator, Campbell heard Sergeant Biederman call for medical due
to someone being shot.

Campbell reported that when he arrived at 701, he spoke with Sergeant Carlson and
learned that an OIS had occurred and that Officer Hanneman was the shooter.

6
Sergeant Sysaath

Sysaath reported that on 1/31/2022 he was contacted by Sergeant Boerger of the SPPD
requesting MPD SWAT assist the SPPD in executing 3 search warrants in Minneapolis,
at 1117 S. Marquette Avenue, Apartments #701, #1402, and #1403.

Sysaath wrote: “The warrants were a result of homicide that occurred in St. Paul on
1/10/2022 at 2133 hours. Facts from the warrants stated that a spent .223 caliber was
recovered from the scene of the homicide. The vehicle used to flee the scene, 2014 gray
Mercedes-Benz was involved in multiple incidents throughout the metro. Incidents
included auto theft, several armed robberies, and a vehicle pursuit from law enforcement.
There were suspects of the homicide mentioned were
and the other two were not identified. Through numerous investigation
techniques, the affiant determined the suspects were connected to the addresses listed
on the warrants.”

Sysaath indicated that Boerger of the SPPD completed an MPD Search Warrant and Risk
Assessment form for all three of the warrants.

Sysaath outlined the risk factors related to apartment #701 (and presumably all three
apartments) as follows:

Risk Factors associated with the search warrant location:

• Firearms/weapons: .223 rifle round left at murder scene
• Multiple units to be served: Apartments #701, #1402 and #1403
• History of Violence:

Suspect information:
• DOB
• Speed recently posted a rap video with multiple firearms with extended magazines
and a drum magazine. is the suspected shooter in the St. Paul Homicide.
Risk factors associated with the suspect(s)
• History of weapons use and/or possession:

• History of violence:

Sysaath reported that he forwarded the request from SPPD to Lt. Campbell and Sgt.
Biederman. Sysaath said that at 0635 hours on 2/1/2022 Sysaath, after consultation with
Campbell and Biederman, he informed SPPD Sergeant Boerger that the MPD would not
participate in knock and announce warrants.

Sysaath wrote that on 2/1/2022 at 0923 hours Sergeant Boerger called back and informed
Sysaath that the SPPD administration had now approved the search warrants as no-
knock warrants.

7
Sysaath indicated that after receiving keys to the warrant addresses, Sysaath conducted
reconnaissance of 1117 S. Marquette, Apt #701, #1402, and #1403 at approximately
1050 hours. Sysaath noted that the purpose of such recon was to get the most up to date
information on the locations and to gather information for tactical planning.

Sysaath detailed the pre-warrant briefing writing that SPPD Sergeant Boerger briefed the
1280, 1281 and HCMC Paramedics on facts and details of the warrants, while Sysaath
conducted the brief on the tactical plan.

Sysaath reported that upon arrival at 1117 Marquette Ave. S at 0637 hours officers of the
MPD Gun Investigation Unit were already on scene. Sysaath reported that the 1280 team
executed the search warrant on apartment #1403 at 0642 hours. Sysaath reported that
there was a male on the couch in apartment #1403 identified as Isaak Ibrahim Robe.

Sysaath described the execution of the warrant at apartment #701 as follows: “We made
our way to apartment #701. Officer A. Pearson used the provided key to unlock the door.
Once the door was opened, I was the initial team member of 1280 to enter and I
announced “Police search warrant” as I entered. Upon my entry, I “button hooked” to my
right and began to clear the kitchen area. I again announced, “Police search warrant”.
The kitchen had a pass-through which allowed me to see directly into the living room. I
saw a male, later identified as Amir Locke, quickly raised his head from behind the couch
and looked directly in the direction of our entry. It was apparent to me that Locke was
aware of our presence. While I was in the kitchen area, I lost sight of Locke’s head when
he quickly ducked behind the couch. I continued to advance towards the living room area
from the kitchen. I saw Locke coming out from under a blanket. His body and head were
now oriented towards my general direction. As he was coming out from under the blanket,
he had a tan colored firearm in his hand. Locke was holding the “grip” portion of the
firearm. Locke began to raise the firearm even after several announcements of “Police
search warrant” and “show me your hands” commands were given to him by other 1280
team members. The barrel of Locke’s firearm was pointed in the direction of Officer M.
Hanneman. Officer M. Hanneman was approximately three to four feet in front of the
firearm as it was being raised. Locke, acknowledging our presence, evasive movements
upon our entry, not complying with the verbal commands, controlling his firearm by the
‘grip’ and appearing as if he was attempting to get into a position to use the firearm in his
hand, made me believe Locke had the intentions of using his firearm to harm Officer M.
Hanneman and/or the 1280 team if given the opportunity. I saw Officer Hanneman fire
his duty firearm at Locke. I saw that Locke ended up on the living room floor. During
this time, I was unsure if Locke was still in the possession of his firearm. I later noticed
the firearm Locke had in his hand was now on the laying on the living room floor nearby.”

Sergeant Troy Carlson

Carlson reported that he is not assigned to 1280 but came in on 2/2/2022 because extra
personnel were needed. Carlson noted that he attended the briefing put on by Sergeant
Sysaath and the SPPD investigators. Carlson outlined the information from the briefing:
“In the morning briefing I learned that there had been a Homicide in St. Paul a few weeks

8
prior and that these warrants were in connection to that homicide where a man had been
shot and killed. SPPD also provided a SIU Operations Plan (SIU OPS PLAN) brief sheet
giving additional information that I also looked over. Between the briefing, SIU Operational
Plan and review of the search warrants themselves, I learned that SPPD believed the
main suspect lived in apartment #1402, lived in apartment #701
where spent significant time at and apartment #1403 was known as a “Flop
house/Apartment” where the primary suspect and associates convened at. I also learned
that and two additional suspects in the Homicide were named in the SIU Ops
Plan and had been observed possessing multiple firearms in recent social media posts.
The murder weapons, which I understood one to be a .223 rifle had not been recovered
by Homicide Investigators prior to the serving of the search warrants. Additionally, I
learned the suspects listed in the SIU Ops Plan were also responsible for multiple
aggravated robberies/car jackings in the Twin Cities area. According to the SIU Ops Plan
they were to be considered armed and dangerous. It should be noted there were two
HCMC Paramedics that attended the brief and were travel with us to the incident location
as a precautionary measure, this is standard procedure and commonly done.”

Carlson noted that he was assigned to the 1280 team. Carlson reported that he had not
reconned the apartments but was aware that Sysaath and other officers had reconned
the “addresses and saw them in person.”

Carlson noted that when the 1280 team was on the elevator from the 14 th floor to the 7th
floor, the elevator made two unscheduled stops based on what Carlson believed was
equipment accidentally hitting the elevator buttons.

Carlson indicated that he was stacked behind Sysaath when they went to the door of
#701. Carlson reported, “Once the door was unlocked, I saw Sysaath begin to move into
the apartment, just prior to him moving he clearly yelled ‘Police! Search Warrant!’ as he
moved. Due to his loud clear announcement I cannot remember if I also yelled search
warrant or not, but could hear additional Officers continuing to yell police, search warrant
several times. Once in the apartment we encountered a hallway with a closet to our left
and an opening to the kitchen on our right. Point officer, Sysaath went right into the kitchen
and I stayed in the hallway scanning for threat and moving forward into the apartment.
While moving forward, I immediately noticed the back of a couch in front of me that
appeared in a living room/open area and a sharp left corner that I could not see around.
I also immediately noticed that hands appeared on the back of the couch and a person
later identified as LOCKE pulled himself up from the couch to view over it. I saw him look
directly at me as I looked directly at him. I immediately began to shout at LOCKE to put
his hands up and show his hands. I thought if he put his hands up I could see them over
the barrier of the couch even if he laid back down. I also continued to move forward
towards LOCKE as I knew other officers would be coming around thru the kitchen and I
still had several officers behind me. After I began to yell at LOCKE about his hands and
to place them up, he immediately retreated under the blanket while staying on the couch
and began to vigorously move around. I continued to yell at him to show his hands, as I
was fearful he was reaching for a weapon due to all the movement under the blanket. At
no point as I approached could I see his hands. I continued to keep my focus on him as

9
I approached the sharp corner to my left, once there I scanned quickly for additional
threats to the left and saw a closed door. I was then immediately drawn back to LOCKE
on the couch still under a blanket as he continued to move vigorously. It was my belief
that at this time he was continuing to look for a weapon. It was at this point I reached out
with my right leg and kicked the back of the couch as hard as I could at the time. This
was done for two reasons, I hoped the kick would be strong enough to have him fall off
the couch and he would instinctively brace himself to hit the floor rendering him less of a
threat and secondly I hoped if he had a weapon in his hand the kick would be enough to
dislodge it from his hand until other officers could engage and detain him. Once I kicked
the couch, I immediately turned to the left and covered on the closed door for additional
threats as I saw Officers begin to engage LOCKE as they were coming around to my right
and from behind. While covering on the closed door, I heard what I thought was a physical
struggle and Officers continually yelling at LOCKE. At one point I heard the word gun
and I heard a shot. I never moved back to the altercation with LOCKE on the couch and
continued to cover on the closed door.”

Carlson reported that he went on to clear the room behind the closed door, the bedroom
where a male and female subject were located.

Sergeant John Biederman

Biederman reported that on 2/2/2022 he was assisting 1280 with three search warrants.
Biederman noted that in addition to seeking evidence of a homicide in St Paul, the
warrants also noted several robberies/car-jackings that were committed by the individuals
staying in or frequenting 1117 Marquette Avenue. Biederman was aware that there were
unrecovered firearms that included a firearm that fired a .223 rifle round.

Biederman reported that the briefing was conducted by SPPD Sergeant Darryl Boerger
and Sergeant Sysaath who provided background information on the case and search
warrant. Biederman reported that the tactical plan and assignments were provided. The
1280 team was assigned to serve the warrants at apartment 1403 and 701 while the 1281
team was assigned to serve the warrant at apartment 1402.

Biederman reported that after clearing apartment 1403, he made his way to the 7th floor
with the other officers of the 1280 team. Biederman wrote: “After the door was unlocked
with the key by Officer Pearson and (sic) announcement was made. Several other officers
entered the unit prior to me. As I was walking east in the entry way, I heard what appeared
to be gunshots.” Biederman offered no first-hand knowledge of the shooting itself other
than hearing the gunshots

Officer Aaron Pearson

Pearson reported that he was working 1280 and noted the 1280 team was briefed on a
High-Risk Search Warrant for 1117 Marquette Avenue S. #701. “The briefing provided
information of four people that were wanted in connection with a homicide investigation

10
for St. Paul police department. This warrant provided three different apartments within the
1117 Marquette Av building.”

Pearson noted that he was given a key to open the door at apartment 701 and after
completing his assignment on the 14th floor, rode the elevator with the 1280 team to the
7th floor.

Pearson described, “I then used the keys to the door of apartment #701 and pushed the
door open and yelled ‘police search warrant’ two times very loud and clear. I stepped
back allowing other officers to enter before me. I then entered in through the main door
after several other officers had entered. I had my duty handgun out at this point. As I
walked through the doorway, I could see a couch straight ahead in the main living room
area. I observed a lighter colored blanket aggressively flailing up and down as if someone
was underneath it moving around. I could hear commands being yelled for ‘hands, hands’
as I approached this person. At this point there was no hands being shown by this male.
As I was getting up to the back of the couch this male was lying on, I observed this males
head popping out of one end of the blanket but the rest of his body was covered in the
blanket. This male was coming off of the couch and I observed his head looking to the
right in the direction of my partners. Simultaneously I observed a handgun that he had in
his hand pop out and starting to be raised aiming in the direction of my partners to my
right. My duty handgun was aimed at this male at this point. I now perceived this as a
threat that would cause death or great bodily injury. I was, at this point, in fear for my
partners and I’s lives. As I was processing this, I began to aim more directly at this male
and was about to pull my trigger to stop the threat of death or great bodily harm. As I was
about to pull the trigger, I heard a gunshot. I then re-assessed the threat and continued
to re-assess the threat as I heard several shots. I decided not to pull my trigger, after re-
assessing, because I had observed the threat go down to the ground and the rounds that
were fired were effective in stopping the threat. The male was still mostly under the
blanket at this point.”

Officer Conan Hickey

Hickey reported that he was assigned to MPD 1280 team and in that capacity arrived at
1117 S. Marquette Avenue at approximately 0630 hours. Hickey reported that once the
team secured apartment 1403, they moved to apartment 701. Hickey reported that once
an officer in front of him opened the door to 701 with a key, Hickey shouted several times
that it was the police and they were executing a search warrant. Hickey indicated that as
he entered other officers were by the couch addressing a subject. Hickey said, “As I
started scanning the room, I heard several loud bangs come from the area of the couch
and I heard someone yell ‘gun’ several times. I noticed there was a closed bedroom door
to the left of where the couch was located. Due to there already being several other
Officers at the couch, I made my the decision to push towards the bedroom door to make
sure no one came out of it. As I approached the bedroom door, another Officer met me
at the same door. I later learned that this was Sgt. Carlson. We made entry into the
bedroom door and encountered a female and male in the room. We ordered both of them
to the ground and they complied. I placed both of them in zip ties to secure their hands.”

11
Officer Dominic Manelli

Manelli indicated that he was assigned to the 1280 team on 2/2/2022. Manelli indicated
that the team was assigned to execute a warrant at 1117 Marquette Ave. S at apartments
1402, 1403, and 701. Manelli said they were looking for and the
officers were informed that they were looking for homicide suspects and that a .223 shell
casing had been recovered from the scene of the homicide.

In describing what occurred at apartment #701 Manelli reported, “Upon arrival to the 7th
Floor, I followed behind Officer Hanneman was behind him in the entry to the apartment.
The door to apartment 701 was opened and I followed Officer Hanneman toward the open
door. Before entry into the apartment, Officer Pearson entered into the apartment before
me and I followed behind Officer Pearson. I entered the apartment yelling loud, verbal
commands of ‘Police Search Warrant’ and repeated these commands while in the
apartment. I entered the apartment and observed what appeared to be an unknown
person on the couch located who was moving under a tan blanket. It should be noted
that the unknown male was obstructed by the couch. I observed an open closet to the
left of the entrance of the apartment and I started to search the closet. While searching
the closet, I heard an officer yell ‘gun.’ It was this time I directed my attention away from
the closet and towards the sound of the officer that yelled ‘gun.’ I began to walk towards
the couch when I heard gun shots and observed muzzle flashes. I continued to travel
towards the couch when I heard an unknown supervisor yell that we had to continue to
search the apartment.”

Manelli reported that he then provided cover for Officer Hickey who had the male and
female in the bedroom. Manelli stated that he observed an identification card belonging
to Marlon Speed Jr. and confirmed that the male suspect being detained was Malon
Speed, the homicide suspect.

Officer Nathan Sundberg

Sundberg, whose assignment was with the Gun Investigation Unit, was filling in as a
member of the 1280 team and was assigned to assist in the execution of a High-Risk
Search warrant for the SPPD at 1117 Marquette Ave. S. in Minneapolis.

Sundberg reported that officers were informed that the warrant was in response to a
homicide in St. Paul and that officers would be looking for the suspects as well as
evidence related to the homicide. Sundberg also noted that the information included that
a .223 shell casing was recovered at the scene of the homicide and no weapons had
been recovered. Sundberg indicated that the teams arrived at 1117 Marquette Ave at
approximately 0620 hours. Sundberg noted that he was assigned to the fire extinguisher
and that he was wearing his normal police uniform with his heavy SWAT vest over the
uniform. Sundberg described that 1280 carried out the no knock warrant at apartment
1403 and the then regrouped to move to the 7th floor.

12
Sundberg noted that because of his assignment he was positioned at the rear of the stack.
Sundberg described, “As the door opened I recall officers yelling ‘police search warrant.’
As I entered, officers were strategically making their way into the apartment. I recall a
space just inside the doorway that needed to be checked, and as one of the last members
in I checked/covered that area looking for individuals. Just moments later, I recall hearing
what sounded like multiple gun shots coming from the living room. I quickly moved toward
the living room and saw two team members who appeared to be dealing with a resistant
occupant (Locke) in their attempts to take him into custody. I recall hearing someone
mention a gun, and was concerned (despite seeing a two tone semi-automatic gun on the
floor above his head) that he was still armed. Because of this, I applied my body weight
on top of Officer Hanneman who was on top of Locke to further control Locke and pin him
to the floor in the event he possessed a firearm/weapon.”

Officer Ryan Carrero

Carrero reported that he was working the 1280 team on 2/2/2022. Carrero reported that
officers were executing a high-risk warrant on apartment 701 at the Bolero Flats
apartments and that a murder suspect wanted by the St Paul Police was believed to be
inside this unit. Carrero said that remarks at the briefing indicated that the suspect either
lived or spent time in this unit and it was believed that the suspect used a rifle during the
murder. Carrero noted that 1280 first executed a search warrant at apartment 1403 but
to his knowledge “we did not locate murder suspect. Officers left unit #1403 and used
elevator to reach Unit #701.”

Carrero described the entry as follows, “Upon arriving at Unit #701, officers used key fob
to gain entry into unit. Upon unlocking door and entering unit, officers simultaneously
yelled ‘police: search warrant’ multiple times, loudly and clearly. Upon walking into unit
and approaching kitchen/living room area, I heard what resembled approx.. THREE
gunshots, unclear who was firing them at the time. I immediately heard ‘He’s got a gun’
right after apparent gunshots. I swiftly entered living room area in an attempt to assist
and observed multiple officers on top of suspect, later identified as AMIR LOCKE.
LOCKE’s fists were clenched and he appeared to be pulling his hands up towards his
head while on his stomach. I observed a black/tan handgun above LOCKE’s head on the
living room floor. I told LOCKE to ‘stop fighting’ and ‘put your hands behind your back.’
During this time I moved a blue plastic container with TV on top of it in order to assist
officers. I was unable to get close enough to LOCKE to put my hands on him but
attempted to hand a ziptie cuff to officers. After a struggle with LOCKE, his hands were
eventually placed behind his back and he was handcuffed using ziptie cuff.”

Carrero described that when he turned Locke over he determined that Locke had wounds
to the front of his torso. Carrero indicated that team medics were called in from the
hallway and the medics immediately began life-saving measures.

13
Officer Carl Blad

Blad was assigned to team 1281. Blad noted that during the briefing, officers were
informed that the suspect being sought had used a long rifle in the homicide in St. Paul.
Blad was not a witness to the entry into apartment 701 or the shooting. Blad was assigned
to 1281 and was in the elevator when the shooting was called over the radio.

Officer S. Villegas

Villegas was assigned to the 1281 team on 2/2/2022. Villegas outlined the briefing with
SPPD and EMS as follows: “We were advised by St. Paul PD investigators that the
Homicide suspect had used a weapon that fired a rifle round and the gun had not been
recovered. Investigators stated the suspect was believed to be using key
card to get in and out of the apartment complex and was staying in several units, #1403,
#1402 or #701, We were advised that the judge had signed off on a no-knock warrant
given the circumstances.”

Villegas noted that the team arrived at 1117 Marquette Ave at 0636 hours. Villegas
reported that the team proceeded to the 14th Floor and that no persons were found in the
unit that 1281 was assigned to clear. Villegas noted that the 1281 team was getting into
the elevator to go down to #701 when he heard that shots had been fired and an
immediate EMS response was needed.

Officer Kyle Mader

Mader was assigned to the 1281 team on 2/2/2022. Mader reported that during the
briefing, officers were told that three apartments, two on the 14th floor and one on the 7th
floor would be searched. Mader said that there were four persons named in the warrant
wanted in connection to a shooting homicide in St. Paul. Mader believed that
investigators also said that an AR style rifle was involved or believed to be involved in the
homicide.

Mader was not a witness to the entry of shooting in 701 and reported that he heard the
call fro EMS for a shooting while still in the elevator.

Officer William Martin

On 2/2/2022 Martin was assigned to the 1281 team. Martin reported, “In the briefing we
were advised that multiple suspects were involved and multiple units in the building. We
were advised the suspected that were wanted in this were related to a homicide that had
occurred in St. Paul and weapons were involved.”

Martin did not witness the entry or the shooting in apartment #701 but reported that while
on the elevator, he heard an officer call for 1281 to respond to the 7th floor and also heard
a transmission asking for EMS for a gunshot wound.

14
Martin, a licensed EMT, assisted in providing emergency treatment to Amir Locke.

Officer Kristopher Dauble

Officer Dauble was assigned to 1281 team for the execution of the warrants at 1117
Marquette Ave. S. Dauble described that during the briefing officers were told that the
warrants were related to a homicide in St Paul and none of the suspects in the case had
been arrested. Dauble further reported being told that a .223 rifle had been used in the
homicide and had not been recovered. Dauble said that the officers were told by
investigators that the suspects were armed and dangerous. Dauble noted that he was
shown photos from social media posts after the homicide depicting the suspects in
possession of firearms.

Dauble was not a witness to the entry or shooting in apartment 702. Dauble reported that
as he was exiting the elevator on the 7th floor after completing his assignment on the 14th
floor, he heard 1280 announce the shots fired over the radio.

Officer Zach Seraphine

Seraphine reported that he was assigned to 1281 team on 2/2/2022. Seraphine stated
that during the briefing officers were told that the murder weapon used was a high caliber
.223/5.56 round which can penetrate body armor.

Seraphine did not witness the entry or the shooting in apartment #701 and like other
members of 1281 indicated that when the team was on the elevator headed to the 7 th
floor he heard radio traffic calling for EMS for someone that was shot.

Seraphine assisted in emergency aid to Amir Locke.

Officer Jason Andersen

Andersen was assigned to the 1281 team on 2/2/2022. Anderson wrote that the murder
consisted of an individual shooting another individual with a high powered rifle at close
range. Anderson noted that the 1281 team was assigned to apartment #1402 while the
1280 team would clear apartment #1403 and then go downstairs to the 7th floor, apartment
#701.

Anderson reported that the 1281 team cleared apartment #1402, finding no one present
and turned the apartment over to investigators. Anderson indicated that while on the
elevator to the 7th Floor, he heard the broadcast that medics were needed immediately.
Andersons reported that two members of the 1281 team, Will Martin and Zach Seraphine,
both of whom are medics were immediately sent to assist.

Officer Mark Hanneman

15
Officer Hanneman reported that on February 2, 2022, at around 6 a.m. he was assigned
to work 1280 which is the designation for the Minneapolis Police Department full-time
SWAT contingent. Hanneman reported that he attended a briefing at the Special
Operations Center (SOC) regarding a series of high-risk warrants they were going to be
executed related to an ongoing homicide investigation by the SPPD. Three separate
warrants were to be executed for three different apartments within 1117 Marquette Ave,
S. address.

Hanneman reported, “The warrants were also for the four separate suspects in the murder
investigation. These individuals were accused of firing a high powered rifle round into the
deceased. There was probable cause to believe that the four suspects were staying in
the three apartments we were to search. A Hennepin Judge had authorized the three no-
knock warrants.”

Hanneman noted that his team, 1280 was assigned to clear an apartment on the 14th floor
and then proceed to the 7th floor to execute a second warrant. Hanneman noted that the
1280 team made entry on the 14th floor and safely cleared the apartment before turning
it over to investigators. Hanneman noted that the nine-member 1280 team then entered
the elevator to go to the 7th Floor. Hanneman also noted that team members turned off
and then turned on their BWC cameras in order to create two video events, one for each
apartment.

Hanneman noted that the target apartment was 701 and then described what occurred,
reporting, “Our team lined up outside the door to the apartment. One of our members
had been given a key to the apartment, and when we ready to proceed, he opened the
door. I heard the team members in front of me loudly announcing ‘Police Department!
Search Warrant!’ I watched as they crossed the threshold into the apartment. I followed
suit and made my way inside. I was the third officer to enter. Once inside, I began to
walk forward. I observed a living room straight ahead of me. Within that living room was
a couch. The couch was positioned in a manner that its rear was facing toward me. I
was not initially able to clearly see the seating area of the couch, only what rose above
the back rest. I watched as Sergeant Troy Carlson moved forward and began to give
commands to show hands. I then saw a blanket rising and falling above the back rest of
the couch. It became clear to me that someone was on this couch, and they were not
listening to Sergeant Carlson’s command to show their hands. As Sergeant Carlson
moved forward toward the couch, I did so as well. I was to his right, and there came a
point where the hallway ended and I entered the living room itself. At this juncture, the
wall to my immediate right ended and I became able to position myself further to my right
which would begin to expose the seating area of the couch to my field of vision. I quickly
checked the corner where the hallway ended and the living room began to ensure no one
was hiding on the other side. Finding no one, I immediately returned my attention to the
couch. I watched as there continued to be considerable movement under the blanket,
but still not apparent effort to comply with the command to show hands. I steadily began
to gain visibility of the seating area of the couch. Sgt. Carlson kicked the couch and the
person underneath the blanket proceeded off the couch and onto the floor near the
ottoman. I then observed the end of the blanket rise, and underneath I saw an individual.

16
The individual was crouched and beginning to rise from behind the ottoman. As the
individual did so, I noticed that the individual had a handgun in their hand and was
brandishing it, and pointed at me. In this moment, I feared for my life and the lives of my
teammates. I was convinced that the individual was going to fire their handgun and that
I would suffer great bodily harm or death. I felt in this moment that if I did not use deadly
force myself, I would be killed. There was no opportunity for me to reposition myself or
retreat. There was no way for me to de-escalate this situation. The threat to my life and
the lives of my teammates was imminent and terrifying. I had my handgun drawn as we
were proceeding through the apartment. I had it in front of me pointing outward as I
encountered the individual on the couch and observed the individual rise with their
handgun. Upon recognizing this threat to my life, I pulled the trigger three times. I
watched as the individual quickly moved to his left and away from the couch and ottoman.
The individual now had their back to me, and continued to move around on the floor. I
jumped onto the individual’s back and struggled with the him, eventually tackling him to
the ground so that he was on his stomach. I laid on top of the male and used my arms to
hold down his arms. Looking up now, within our mutual reach I saw the handgun. It was
on the floor just above our heads. It was a semi-automatic pistol with an olive drab green
frame and black slide. I laid on top of the male and held him down so my partners could
move the handgun further away. Once the handgun was moved further away, I sat up
and assisted in securing the man’s hands behind his back.”

Civilian Statements

Marlon Speed

Marlon Speed was located in the bedroom of apartment #701 at the time of the shooting
of Amir Locke. Marlon Speed indicated that Amir Locke was his cousin. After being
asked what he remembered Marlon reported, “Shit, I rolled over, uh, shit I rolled over. All
I hear is gunshots. And then there was like police, police. They had shot my cousin in
the living room…Like I was sleep. I was knocked the fuck out. You know how you hear
some shit in your sleep, and then you go and just check it out. I sat up a little bit, next
thing I know gun shot. But I thought I was hearing shit, cause I heard the door open but
I was asleep so I thought I was hearin shit. So I just woke up, and that’s why I heard gun
shots. They police, police, police.”

Marlon Speed reported that he heard gun shots then he heard Police. Marlon described,
“I had just rolled over, just rolled over, probably was fittin to drink some water…all I hear
is boom. (making gun noises) then they said police. That’s exactly how it went. They
ain’t come in, they ain’t knock, they ain’t say police, or nothin. They just came through
the door and got to shootin. And said police.”

Marlon further reported, “They ain’t say shit, they just walked in, shoot their fuckin guns,
they damn near shot me and her. She jumped off the bed under the fucking blanket, had
to tell her she can’t do that shit. They woulda shot her ass, she came up from under the
blanket with nothin in her hands.”

17
Tatyana Henderson

Henderson reported that her address was 1117 Marquette Ave, Apartment #701.
Henderson indicated that she lives in apartment 701 by herself, but acknowledged that
her boyfriend Marlon Speed is at her apartment some of the time. Henderson stated
that Marlon Speed was with her in her apartment and that his cousin [Amir Locke] was
sleeping on the couch. Henderson reported that she had not seen Amir or anyone with
a weapon in her apartment, however she heard “them yelling it.”

Henderson described, “I was in my bedroom. So me and MARLON was in our

bedroom…And then his cousin was sleeping on the couch. And then we heard like yelling.
Like I don’t, I just thought somebody…like ran into my apartment or something. And then
like gunshots went off. And I’m like, on my God. So then we kinda like jumped on the
floor…Then that’s when we seen like officers running in...Like with guns and everything.
I’m like okay.” Henderson reported that the door to the bedroom was closed as this
incident was occurring. Henderson described that it sounded as if someone was breaking
in. Henderson said that the first time she realized it was the police was when officers
entered the bedroom.

Autopsy

According to the autopsy report, Amir Locke received three gunshot wounds all with a
front to back trajectory.

Body Worn Camera Video (BWC)

The body worn camera videos, which included audio of the entire entry as well as the use
of force by Officer Hanneman provides objective evidence of what occurred on 2/2/2022
at apartment #701.

Officer Pearson’s BWC depicts Pearson unlocking the door to apartment #701 with a key.

18
Sergeant Sysaath’s BWC clearly depicts the door being opened with a key and upon
opening an officer can be heard clearly yelling “Police, Search Warrant.” It is noted that
officers continued shouting “Police Search Warrant” as they moved into the apartment.
Sysaath’s BWC depicts that Sysaath turned right, going into the kitchen area, before
reaching the open area ahead (living room). As Sysaath moved toward the opposing
doorway of the kitchen that opened into the living area, an officer (presumably Sysaath)
can be heard directing Amir Locke to get on the ground. It is noted that Locke was the
only one in the living room at the time this directive was given.

The relative positions of the officers can be seen on Sysaath’s BWC as Sysaath is exiting
the kitchen

19
On Pearson’s BWC video Amir Locke can be seen rising from under the blanket, facing
in the general direction where Officer Hanneman was seen just before the shots were
fired on Sysaath’s BWC and it is clear that Locke is rising with a firearm in his right hand
faced Hanneman’s direction (see photos above and below)

20
After the three quick shots by Hanneman, Locke rolled counterclockwise and down to the
floor. Hanneman can be seen pinning Locke to the floor while officers are announcing
that Locke has the gun. An officer can be heard announcing, “gun; shots fired; drop the
fucking gun; he’s got the gun; drop the gun; drop the gun.”

DEADLY FORCE AUTHORIZATION/ANALYSIS

It should be noted at the outset that an analysis of any use of force event takes into
account, the Federal Constitutional Standard, the statutory standard set by the state, and
the policy standards set by the law enforcement agency itself. In developing policy and
training for a particular agency, law enforcement executives should also take into account
the community expectations for their particular community.

United States Constitutional Standard

It should be noted that the United States Constitutional standard sets the floor which every
agency in the United States must meet. At the same time, it should be recognized that a
state can be more restrictive on officer authority through legislation or through the
interpretation of the state’s constitution. For purposes of internal accountability, a law
enforcement agency can be more restrictive on officer use of force and deadly force than
either the United States Constitution or state law.

The analysis for use of force, and deadly force have in general terms been defined by two
United States Supreme Court Cases.

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In Tennessee v. Garner, the United States Supreme Court wrote: “Where the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either
to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by
using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is
probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to
prevent escape, and if, where [*12] feasible, some warning has been given.” Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

It should be noted that, as a factual matter, the Garner case was addressing the
circumstances under which an officer would be justified in using deadly force to prevent
escape.

In Graham v. Connor, the Court noted:

Because "[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application," however, its proper application requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S., at 8-9 (the
question is "whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of . . .
seizure"). (citation omitted).

The Court provided direction on how a particular use of force should be analyzed noting:

“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.

The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers
are often forced to make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.

As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an

excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without
regard to their underlying intent or motivation.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

Finally, in Scott v. Harris, the United States Supreme Court made clear that in any use
of force case, including deadly force, the United States Constitutional standard is one of
objective reasonableness based on Graham:

22
“Respondent's argument falters at its first step; Garner did not establish a magical on/off
switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute "deadly
force." Garner was simply an application of the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness"
test, Graham, supra, at 388, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, to the use of a particular
type of force in a particular situation. Garner held that it was unreasonable to kill a
"young, slight, and unarmed" burglary suspect, 471 U.S., at 21, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 1, by shooting him "in the back of the head" while he was running away on foot, id.,
at 4, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, and when the officer "could not reasonably have
believed that [the suspect] . . . posed any threat," and "never attempted to justify his
actions on any basis other than the need to prevent an escape," id., at 21, 105 S. Ct.
1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1. Whatever Garner said about the factors that might have justified
shooting the suspect in that case, such "preconditions" have scant applicability to this
case, which has vastly different facts. "Garner had nothing to do with one car striking
another or even with car chases in general A police car's bumping a fleeing car is,
in fact, not much like a policeman's shooting a gun so as to hit a person." Adams v. St.
Lucie County Sheriff's Dep't, 962 F.2d 1563, 1577 (CA11 1992) (Edmondson, J.,
dissenting), adopted by 998 F.2d 923 (CA11 1993) (en banc) (per curiam). Nor is the
threat posed by the flight on foot of an unarmed suspect even remotely comparable to the
extreme danger to human life posed by respondent in this case. Although respondent's
attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable,
in the end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of "reasonableness."
Whether or not Scott's actions constituted application of "deadly force," all that matters is
whether Scott's actions were reasonable.”

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382-83, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1777-78 (2007)

Minnesota Statute §609.066 Subd. 2 Use of deadly force:

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 609.06 or 609.065, the use of deadly
force by a peace officer in the line of duty is justified only if an objectively
reasonable officer would believe, based on the totality of circumstances known to
the officer at the time and without the benefit of hindsight, that such force is
necessary:
(1) To protect the peace officer or another from death or great bodily injury,
provided that the threat:
(i) Can be articulated with specificity [by the law enforcement
officer]; and
(ii) Is reasonably likely to occur absent action by the law enforcement
officer; and
(iii) Must be addressed through use of deadly force without
unreasonable delay; or
(2) To effect the arrest or capture, or prevent escape, of a person whom the
peace officer knows or has reasonable grounds to believe has
committed or attempted to commit a felony and the officer reasonably
believes that the person will cause death or great bodily harm to another

23
 person under the threat criteria in clause (1), items (i) to (iii) unless
immediately apprehended.
(b) A peace officer shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger
the person poses to self in an objectively reasonable officer would believe, based
on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time and without the
benefit of hindsight, that the person does not pose a threat of death or great bodily
harm to the peace officer or to another under the threat criteria in paragraph (a),
clause (1), items (i) to (iii).

NOTE: I have read the order entered by the Honorable Leonardo Castro from the
Minnesota District Court, Second Judicial District striking language as unconstitutional
from the statute, specifically the words “by the law enforcement officer” in 609.066 Subd2
(a) (1) (i).

Minneapolis Police Department Use of Force Policy #5-300

The policy lists “Force Guiding Principles” which includes United States constitutional
standards as well as statutory authority under Minnesota Statute section 609.066. It is
noted that the policy includes a verbatim recitation on 609.066 subd. 2 as outlined above.
The MPD policy goes on to direct that “Officers shall not use deadly force except in
accordance with MN Statute section 609.066, and even in those circumstances officers
shall first consider all reasonable alternatives including less lethal measures, before using
deadly force.

Analysis

General Observations Applicable to Constitutional Standards, Minnesota Law and

Minneapolis Police Department Policy

I would note that while this analysis discusses constitutional standards on use of force
and Minnesota law on use of force, it is not intended to be a legal analysis but instead
reflects the generally accepted policies, practices, and training provided to officers
throughout the United States for application of these principles in field operations. My
analysis is stated to a reasonable degree of professional certainty based upon my
specialized background, education, training, and experience as well as my continued
research, authoring, auditing, consulting, and training on law enforcement practices, to
include Use of Force and SWAT, nationwide.

At the outset it is noted that Officer Hanneman played no role in the murder investigation
for the murder of Otis Elder in the City of St. Paul. More importantly, Hanneman was an
operator on the 1280 team holding no supervisory authority, thus Hanneman made no
decisions with respect to planning, tactics, or decisions with respect to the manner of
execution of the search warrants.

24
It should also be noted that in accord with the objective video, Hanneman fired three shots
and when Locke spun away, Hanneman ceased shooting and then pinned Locke, who,
in accord with the audio from the BWC was still armed with a handgun or was in close
proximity to it. Thus, as the threat decreased by Locke’s movement to the floor on his
stomach, Hanneman’s force also decreased.

One of the concerns with officer involved shootings, particularly where multiple officers
are present is the concept of contagious fire. Contagious fire is where officers begin to
shoot in response to hearing shots. While the BWC video depict officers adjusting aim
toward Locke, no other officer fired.

Totality of Circumstances:

According to the St. Paul SIU Ops plan, the mission with respect to the execution of these
warrants was “Attempt to Locate/coordinate the apprehension of St Paul Police murder
suspect(s).” Thus, in addition to the evidence sought in the warrants, operators were
informed that they were looking for subjects involved in a violent murder and that a casing
from a high-powered bullet was found at the scene of the murder. Information also
indicated that the subjects involved in the murder, and specifically , had a
history of violence. The briefing also indicated that the SPPD had tracked numerous
social media posts that depicted all of the suspects with multiple firearms. Officers were
also made aware that the weapons from the homicide, and specifically a firearm that
shoots a .223 round had not been recovered. Officers were informed that multiple
suspects from the homicide may be located at the various apartments, 1402, 1403, and
701, at 1117 Marquette S. The officers were also made aware that these same subjects
were involved in other crimes in the Twin Cities to include aggravated robberies and car
jackings. The officers were also aware that a judge had signed a nighttime no-knock
search warrant.

In addition to the above facts and circumstances known to the officers based upon the
briefing and documented in the SPPD SIU plan, Hanneman also made observations on
the scene prior to discharging his firearm. These observations included the movement of
the blanket, numerous commands being given, and finally Amir Locke appearing with a
handgun, gripped in a manner consistent with being prepared to fire.

I would note, that the BWC videos depict the movements of the officers, the blanket, the
commands, and finally, the brandishing of the weapon.

Constitutional Standards:

The Force used by Officer Hanneman was consistent with constitutional standards
trained to officers throughout the United States based upon generally accepted
policies, practices, and training provided to officers for application in field
operations.

25
The Minneapolis Police Department Use of Force Policy cites to both the United States
constitutional standards as well as the Minnesota statute on Use of Force/Deadly Force.

There are several basic concepts trained to officers and embodied in policy and practice
that must be applied to any use of force analysis.
First, all uses of force are judged from the perspective of the officer. Additionally, the
officers are judged based on what the officer knew at the time without the benefit of 20/20
hindsight. Thus, Amir Locke’s intentions or the fact that we know after the fact that he is
not one of the suspects in the homicide, is not relevant to the use of force review.

Officers throughout the United States are trained with respect to use of force decision-
making and justification. The foundation of this analysis a three-part test that parallels
the mandates announced by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor.1
The training directs officers to consider the seriousness of offense; whether or not the
subject poses an immediate physical threat to the officer or anyone else; and finally,
whether the subject is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

It is recognized that when considering the seriousness of the offense, that such
consideration includes the offense the officer suspects at the time the control tactic is
used and not just the original offense or other justification which led the officer to contact
the individual at the outset.

It is noted that the time that passed from the moment the door was unlocked until the third
shot was fired by Hanneman was approximately 10.08 seconds. If one takes the timing
from the point where Hanneman first reaches the couch until the third shot the time frame
closes down to approximately 2.15 seconds. I would note that a reasonable and well-
trained officer, who had heard loud announcements of “police, search warrant” as well as
other directives toward a subject covered by a blanket, who suddenly appeared
brandishing a firearm, would not have time to determine if the subject was one of the
subjects wanted for the St. Paul homicide. Additionally, any reasonable and well-trained
officer, who while in uniform, and following loud announcements of “police search
warrant” who observed a subject producing a firearm from under a blanket and gripping
the firearm by the grip, would conclude that the serious offense of an assault with a firearm
upon an officer was occurring.

Based on the same split-second timing and facts known to Hanneman, an objectively
reasonable and well-trained officer would conclude that they were facing an immediate
physical threat of serious bodily harm or death. Law enforcement had entered an
apartment on a court-authorized no-knock warrant but had made loud, verbal
announcements upon opening the door as depicted by the BWC videos. These
announcements were continued as the officers moved into the apartment. A subject,
concealed under a blanket is clearly depicted moving while under the blanket, and specific

1
This formula is derived from Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) and can be found in law enforcement
training lesson plans as well as Use of Force policies throughout the United States. See e.g. International
Association of Chiefs of Police, Use of Force Model Policy 2005, IACP Model Policy Center, Virginia 2005.

26
orders are shouted to that individual. The individual, as depicted by the video, then came
partially out from under the blanket gripping a handgun and raising the gun from under
the blanket. Any reasonable and well-trained officer would have concluded that the
subject posed an immediate physical threat of serious bodily harm or death to the officers
as well as any other person in the area.

I would note that in common training, officers are trained that in some circumstances, an
officer is justified in responding with deadly force based on a reasonable belief that the
subject is about to pull out a firearm and use it against the officer even though the officer
has not yet seen a firearm. This type of training has its foundation in various cases
decided by our federal courts that recognize that where the officer has probable cause
of a deadly threat, the officer need not wait before responding with deadly force. 2

Under the facts presented by the provided materials and as depicted by the objective
video, Officer Hanneman not only saw the glint of steel, but actually saw the handgun
prior to firing. As previously outlined, Hanneman also knew that the warrants related to
a violent homicide with firearms being used and the fact that a judge had signed warrants
to search these apartments related to the homicide.

I would note that when a subject responds to law enforcement directives by producing a
handgun, any reasonable and well-trained officer would conclude that the subject was
actively resisting arrest.

The use of deadly force by Officer Hanneman was consistent with the Minnesota
Statute section 609.066 in accord with principles trained to officers throughout the
United States based upon generally accepted policies, practices, and training
provided to officers for application in field operations.

The statute, in language similar to Constitutional standards directs: “Notwithstanding the

provisions of section 609.06 or 609.065, the use of deadly force by a peace officer in the
line of duty is justified only if an objectively reasonable officer would believe, based on
the totality of circumstances known to the officer at the time and without the benefit of
hindsight, that such force is necessary:” Thus, the officer’s actions are judged by a totality
of circumstances and without the benefit of hindsight.

2 See e.g. White v. City of Topeka, 489 F. Supp. 3d 1209, 1224 (D. Kan. 2020) In cases
involving deadly force, officers' use of deadly force "is justified under the Fourth Amendment if
a reasonable officer in [the defendant officers'] position would have had probable cause to
believe that there was a threat of serious physical harm to themselves or to others." Estate of
Larsen, 511 F.3d at 1260 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An officer's reasonable,
but mistaken, belief that a suspect was likely to use force against the officer renders the use of
force objectively reasonable because, as our Circuit has explained, "[a] reasonable officer need
not await the glint of steel before taking self-protective action; by then, it is often too late to take
safety precautions." (emphasis added).

27
While the totality of circumstances is detailed above, it is noted that Hanneman’s totality
of circumstances included the fact that there had been a violent murder by shooting in St.
Paul; that an investigation had been done by the SPPD which had identified suspects
who were staying at or associated with apartments where no-knock warrants signed by a
judge would be served; that the firearms used in the homicide had not been recovered
and likely included a firearm capable of firing a .223 round. It was also briefed that the
SPPD investigation had uncovered social media postings in which the suspects were
depicted with multiple firearms. Thus, even before entering the apartment, an objectively
reasonable officer, in accord with generally accepted law enforcement policies, practices,
and training would recognize that he or she may be confronted by individuals who were
armed and dangerous. As previously noted, Hanneman’s totality of circumstances prior
to discharging his firearm went even further when, consistent with the objective video,
Hanneman observed a subject come out from under the blanket with a handgun gripped
in his hand and raising the gun.

While a reasonable and well-trained officer would conclude that there was an immediate
threat upon seeing the subject holding a firearm, particularly in light of all the other facts
that had been briefed to the officers, the manner in which the gun was held by Locke and
the manner in which the gun was moving, only enhanced the threat. The fact that Locke
was not one of the suspects and may not have had any bad intentions is not relevant to
what an objectively reasonable officer would believe in the circumstances faced by
Hanneman. Even if it turned out that Locke had no improper intentions, this would not
impact the officer’s actions under the statute since, like the Constitutional standard and
all law enforcement policy and training, the benefit of hindsight does not impact whether
an officer’s use of deadly force was justified.

Under the Minnesota Statute, 609.066 use of deadly force must be necessary “To protect
the peace officer or another from death or great bodily injury, provided that the threat:

(i) Can be articulated with specificity [by the law enforcement officer]; and
(ii) Is reasonably likely to occur absent action by the law enforcement officer; and
(iii) Must be addressed through use of deadly force without unreasonable delay”

Officer Hanneman knew officers were serving a no-knock warrant for evidence and
apprehension of subjects for a violent homicide involving firearms. Hanneman was
suddenly confronted with a subject rising from under a blanket following multiple loud
announcements of “Police, Search Warrant”, coupled with directives to the subject who
was moving under the blanket. Hanneman additionally made visual observations that the
subject was armed with a handgun and was raising the gun from under the blanket. Any
reasonable and well-trained officer, based on universal law enforcement training and
generally accepted practices would recognize that the use of deadly force was necessary
to protect Hanneman as well as the other officers who were serving a judicially signed
search warrant. Additionally, a reasonable and well-trained officer would recognize that
a subject opening fire in an apartment building would also pose a threat to anyone else
in adjoining rooms or apartments.

28
Based on the totality of circumstances detailed throughout this analysis and the objective
video, the necessity to use deadly force to protect the officers and others can be
articulated with specificity. In accord with the statute, Constitutional standards, and all
law enforcement training as well as generally accepted practices, an objectively
reasonable officer would conclude that death or great bodily injury was reasonably
likely to occur absent action by Hanneman. The statute, like the Constitutional standard
and generally accepted practices does not take into account the benefit of hindsight.
Thus, the fact that Locke was not one of the suspects is not part of the analysis with
respect to the Hanneman’s decision to use deadly force. While Locke’s intentions or
decisions with respect to the firearm are unknown, even if Locke’s intentions could be
determined, this would also be the benefit of hindsight which is outside the scope of the
Constitutional standard, the Minnesota statute which expressly excludes the benefit of
hindsight, and all generally accepted practices in law enforcement with respect to deadly
force decision-making and deadly force analysis.

Deadly force in accord with Minnesota Statute, 609.066 also directs that for deadly force
to be consistent with the law, an officer must conclude that the threat posed “Must be
addressed through use of deadly force without unreasonable delay.”

All officers are trained that they will be confronted with events where they will be forced
to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly
evolving, about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. It is noted
that split-second decision making includes the decisions that must be made as the ground
situation changes during a pre-planned event such as a high-risk entry.

Law enforcement has recognized that human reaction to a perceived threat is 0.75 to 0.8
of a second.3 I note that in my own experience in conducting stimulus related shooting
drills, whether to threat versus non-threat targets, or simply pre-identified stimulus i.e.
whistle to commence and whistle to cease firing, the physical lag time at both ends of the
shooting cycle was consistent with the reported findings. Former Chief Division Counsel
of the F.B.I. Boston Division noted in his book, Deadly Force, Constitutional Standards,
Federal Policy Guidelines, and Officer Survival, wrote: “The Concept of action/reaction
makes the pursuit of armed fleeing suspects extremely dangerous for police officers. A
fleeing suspect with a gun in hand can turn and fire at least two shots at a pursuing officer
before the officer can respond.”4 Callahan noted that the suspect could fire even more
than two shots before an officer could respond if the officer takes the time to stop and
steady him or herself before returning fire. Callahan went on to point out: “The FBI has
interpreted the new DOJ uniform policy on deadly force to permit the use of deadly force
against a fleeing suspect who is running for cover with a pistol in hand. The FBI believes
that this suspect poses an imminent danger to agents in the immediate vicinity and
believes further that there is no safe alternative to the use of deadly force in this situation.

3
“Physical Lag Times and Their Impact on Deadly Force,” The Tactical Edge Magazine, Spring 1995, Lieutenant
Michael Hillman (LAPD), P. 28. Hillman noted that the sum total of physical lag time ( perception time plus brain
lag plus reaction time) is generally between 0.75 and 1.0 seconds.
4
Deadly Force, Constitutional Standards, Federal Policy Guidelines, and Officer Survival, John Michael Callahan,
Jr. Looseleaf Publications, Flushing, New York 2001. P. 30
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As long as the suspect remains within gunshot range of the Agents, he can turn and fire
before they can effectively respond (action/reaction). Attempting to pursue can only
increase the risk because the suspect can hide and ambush the agents pursuing him.” 5
Although this was not a foot pursuit, the concept of some reactionary gap is relevant to
any law enforcement use of deadly force, particularly when the subject is presenting a
firearm.

A fundamental principle of officer survival and use of force is the fact that action beats
reaction every time.6 While some researchers and law enforcement specialists go to
extremes with this principle, common human experience recognizes the fact that one
must perceive a threat, process the information, and then react. Common defensive
tactics programs offered to law enforcement as well as law enforcement related texts
indicate that even a subject running from an officer can turn and fire two shots before the
officer would be able to react.7 It is well known in law enforcement that the physical lag
time between an officer’s perception of a threat and the response to the threat in many
cases will put the suspect in a different position or give the subject time to carry out the
thrreat. The concept is well known in law enforcement and is consistent the Military’s
OODA Loop training which reflects that a person must first Observe the threat, then Orient
to the threat, then Decide what action to take, and finally must Act.8 It is well recognized
that a threat can be carried out or positions will be changed during the time it takes an
officer to cycle through this process. I would note that the OODA loop is an integral part
of use of force training that I provide throughout the United States. As noted in footnote
2 above, even courts have recognized the danger in a delayed response by an officer:
"[a] reasonable officer need not await the glint of steel before taking self-protective
action; by then, it is often too late to take safety precautions." (emphasis added).

Officers are well aware through training and experience that during any delay when
confronted with a subject raising a gun, will provide the opportunity for the subject to begin
shooting, particularly if the officer(s) are not in a position of cover. Under the facts
presented during the serving of this search warrant, officers moving through the living
room, in accord with the objective video were not in positions of cover. At least one officer,
who was moving toward the left side of the apartment was not looking at the subject on
the couch. As such, an officer would recognize that any delay in addressing the threat
could result in great bodily harm or death to Hanneman, other officers, and any person in
the adjoining rooms or adjoining apartments.

Based on generally accepted law enforcement training and practice, the threat of great
bodily harm or death had to be addressed through the use of deadly force without
unreasonable delay.

5
Deadly Force, Constitutional Standards, Federal Policy Guidelines, and Officer Survival, John Michael Callahan,
Jr. Looseleaf Publications, Flushing, New York 2001. P. 30-31.
6
See e.g. Deadly Force Constitutional Standards, Federal Policy Guidelines, and Officer Survival, John Michael
Callahan, Jr. Looseleaf Publications, Flushing, N.Y. 2001
7
See e.g. Deadly Force Constitutional Standards, Federal Policy Guidelines, and Officer Survival, John Michael
Callahan, Jr. Looseleaf Publications, Flushing, N.Y. 2001
8
OODA Loop Model was first developed by Colonel John Boyd USAF during the Korean war.
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Minneapolis Policy

The use of deadly force by Officer Hanneman was consistent with the Minneapolis
Police Department when considered in conjunction with generally accepted
practices and training in law enforcement.

It should be noted that law enforcement agencies are free to be more restrictive on officer
authority than the legal standards for purposes of internal accountability. Likewise, the
agency is free to strictly interpret these internal policy provisions.

The Minneapolis Police Department policy has a provision that is more restrictive than
Constitutional Standards or the Minnesota statutory provisions on deadly force. The
policy notes: “Officers shall not use deadly force except in accordance with MN Statute
section 609.066, and even in those circumstances officers shall first consider all
reasonable alternatives including less lethal measures, before using deadly force.

Thus, under the Minneapolis Police Department policy, even when in compliance with
state law officers shall first consider all reasonable alternatives including less lethal
measures, before using deadly force. It is important to recognize that this provision does
not direct officers that they must try other measures, rather, they shall consider all
reasonable alternatives including less lethal measures before using deadly force.

Based on all of the details outlined in this report to include the rapidly evolving split-second
decision-making that had to occur, a reasonable and well-trained officer would recognize
that there was no time to transition from a firearm to a less lethal option. Additionally,
even when less lethal options are available, the fact that less lethal options often fail,
leads to training throughout the United States that when faced with a subject presenting
a firearm, who the officer reasonably perceives is about to fire, the only reasonable and
tactically sound response is lethal force.

s/John J. Ryan
John J. Ryan

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