Safety Fi RST: The Airbus Safety Magazine
Safety Fi RST: The Airbus Safety Magazine
#31
Safety
first
Safety first, #31 January, 2021. Safety first is
published by Airbus S.A.S. - 1, rond point Maurice
Bellonte - 31707 Blagnac Cedex/France.
Publisher and Editor: Yannick Malinge,
Chief Product Safety Officer.
Safety first
The Airbus magazine contributing to the enhancement
Concept Design by Airbus MultiMedia Studio
20210475. Reference: X00D16031905 Issue 31. of the safety of aircraft operations by increasing knowledge
Photos by Airbus, A. Tchaikovski, S. Ramadier, and communication on safety related topics.
M. Min Tun, H. Goussé, F. Lancelot, P. Masclet.
Computer rendergins by Fixion.
I hope that the new year finds you, your families, friends, and colleagues well. The entire
Airbus safety team and I pass on our best wishes for a brighter 2021. With the vaccine
solutions now becoming available, it gives us hope that we will begin to emerge from this
COVID-19 situation. However, we will still face some uncertainty, together with all of its
associated challenges.
Seeing so many grounded and parked aircraft in 2020 was disheartening for everyone,
especially in contrast to the normally dynamic operational environment of commercial
aviation. In this context, there is also the heightened risk of falling into the complacency
trap. It is why we must remain vigilant, and ensure we do everything that is required to safely
YANNICK MALINGE return to the skies.
SVP & Chief
In response to the evolving circumstances of 2020, aviation actors had to adapt and develop
Product Safety Officer
risk management strategies, in particular to avoid this complacency trap. At Airbus, we
launched our own task force, which included a dedicated focus on supporting Operators
with storage, parking, maintenance practices, and preparing aircraft for their return to service
including flight operations aspects. The significant work achieved by our colleagues in Airbus
Customer Services and Engineering teams is reflected in the Safety first articles published
throughout 2020.
These included Aircraft Parking and Storage (May), which was followed up by Preparing
for a Safe Return to the Skies (June), and with further updates provided in the Parking and
Storage / Return to Service Summary Letter. For flight crews who have recently flown much
less than usual, there are articles on Prevention of Unstable Approaches (October), A Focus
on the Landing Flare (September), and the latest article, A Focus on the Takeoff Rotation
(January). Each article provides operational best practices and the key safety elements for
pilots to recall during these critical flight phases.
Nevertheless, the aviation industry is not yet clear of the COVID-19 “wake vortex” effect.
Therefore, we need to remain focussed on fully applying a risk management mindset and to
implement all of the resulting risk mitigation strategies. It is why I strongly encourage every
one of us to keep going, and for you to make full use of the above-mentioned Airbus safety
information, which will support a safe return to flying.
Safety in aviation is a part of our professional DNA and our shared passion for aviation. It
is why we are pleased to see the readership of the Airbus Safety first articles continue to
grow, with over 500,000 visits to safetyfirst.airbus.com and the Safety first app in 2020. I
want to thank all of you for engaging with the safety information that we are sharing and for
continuing to connect your aviation colleagues with Airbus Safety first in 2021.
Visit us at safetyfirst.airbus.com
NEWS
Safety
first #31
OPERATIONS
P06
A Focus on the Landing Flare
P16
Prevention of Unstable Approaches
P36
Ground Operations
Maintenance
A Focus on the Takeoff Rotation
OPERATIONS
A Focus on the Landing Flare
A Focus on the
Landing Flare
There were several cases of aircraft touching down with their
nose landing gear first or hard landings reported to Airbus
over the last 2 years. This article will present some key points
coming from the analysis of two of these incidents and recall
the operational recommendations for performing the flare
phase that are key to ensuring a safe landing.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 007
Event Description
An A320 was on the final approach segment of its ILS approach, configured
for landing (CONF FULL).
The Pilot Flying (PF) disconnected the autopilot at 370 ft Radio Altitude (RA) and
kept autothrust ON. At 200 ft, tailwind variations caused the airspeed to drop
below approach speed (Vapp).
1 From 100 ft RA and below, high tailwind gradients maintained the airspeed
below Vapp -5 kt despite autothrust increase and reached a minimum of 119
kt (Vapp -20 kt) at 5 ft RA.
2 The PF performed the flare at 14 ft and at the same time started to slowly
push the thrust levers above CLB detent.
3 The aircraft touched down on its main landing gear and bounced. During the
bounce, a PITCH PITCH auto callout triggered.
4 The PF applied full nose down order and retarded the thrust levers to IDLE.
This triggered an extension of ground spoilers leading the aircraft to heavily impact
the runway, first with its nose landing gear and then its main landing gear.
5 The impact of the nose gear resulted in another sudden increase of the
aircraft’s pitch and the PITCH PITCH auto callout triggered for a second time.
The PF initiated a go-around by setting TOGA thrust and applying a full nose up
command. There was a tail strike as the aircraft lifted off from the runway at 133 kt.
The NLG wheels separated due to the impact of the NLG on the runway and
one wheel was sucked into Engine 1, causing this engine to stall. Other system
failures occurred due to the impact on the NLG and these caused the aircraft
to revert to alternate law. The flight crew diverted to a different airport and
eventually landed the aircraft.
OPERATIONS
A Focus on the Landing Flare
The FCOM SOP for landing requests a SPEED callout by the PM in the case
of speed deviation of 5 kt below the target speed. The PF should initiate a
go-around unless they consider that a stabilized condition can be recovered
by small corrections to the aircraft and within sufficient time prior to landing.
The FCTM states that the risk of tail strike is increased due to the high angle of
attack and high pitch attitude if the speed of the aircraft is allowed to decrease
too far below Vapp before the flare.
Looking at step 1 in the event described above, it shows the speed went below
Vapp -5 kt from 100 ft and below. If the PM had made a “SPEED” callout then
the PF may have noticed the speed decay and attempted to correct it or initiate
a go-around if it was not likely to stabilize in time.
Flare Height
The FCOM states that in a stabilized approach, the flare should be initiated at
30 ft for A320 family aircraft (the values for other Airbus aircraft are provided
later in this article).
The FCTM recommends initiating the flare earlier if there is a tailwind. This is
because a tailwind will contribute to a higher ground speed with an associated
increase in vertical speed to maintain the approach slope.
Initiating the flare earlier would have reduced the high vertical speed of the
aircraft in the event described above.
The A320 FCTM explains that the flight crew can rapidly retard all thrust levers to
IDLE either earlier or later than the 20 ft “RETARD” auto callout reminder depending
on the conditions. However, the thrust levers should be at IDLE by touchdown to
ensure that the ground spoilers will extend and keep the aircraft on the ground.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 009
In step 2 of the event, the PF pushed the thrust levers above the CLB detent
during flare. This increased thrust and inhibited the ground spoiler extension
during the initial touchdown, which contributed to the aircraft bounce.
Bounce Management
For a high bounce, as was the case in the incident described above, the FCTM
recommends maintaining the aircraft’s pitch attitude and performing a go-around.
The hard impact of the nose landing gear with the runway described in step 4
of the event was caused by extension of the ground spoilers when the thrust
levers were retarded to IDLE during the bounce combined with a full forward
stick input after the bounce.
In step 5 of the event, it was the full back stick input combined with the nose
landing gear bounce and thrust increase that contributed to the tail strike.
Event Description
The A321 performed an ILS approach in night conditions. The weather was fine
and there was a 10 kt headwind.
The flight crew switched OFF the autopilot at 940 ft RA and kept the FD ON.
The autothrust was ON and the speed was stabilized at approach speed.
2 The PF applied several pitch up inputs that maintained the nose up pitch
attitude and the aircraft subsequently floated above the runway for 4 seconds.
At around 20 ft RA, the PF retarded the thrust levers progressively to IDLE.
3 4 seconds later the aircraft was at around 10 ft and the PF applied a full
forward stick input. The nose landing gear heavily impacted the runway 660
m after the runway threshold, followed by the main landing gear.
Both nose landing gear wheels separated due to the severe impact and the
aircraft finally stopped on the runway centerline resting on its nose landing
gear axle.
OPERATIONS
A Focus on the Landing Flare
Flare Height
The FCOM recommends a flare manoeuvre at around 30ft for an A320 family
aircraft in a stabilized condition.
The flare described in the case study 2 was initiated too early at 110 ft RA and
autothrust was kept engaged. This Led to the aircraft crossing the runway
threshold with a vertical speed close to 0 ft/min.
The autothrust is active and targets the approach speed or selected speed as
long as thrust levers are not retarded to IDLE detent.
In this event, the aircraft descent rate was almost 0 ft/min at the runway threshold.
The A/THR was still active (thrust levers remained in CLB detent) and targeting
the approach speed. This led the aircraft to float above the runway for several
seconds until the PF retarded the thrust levers.
Pitch Control
The FCTM states that the PF must avoid using nose down inputs once flare is
initiated. The PF can release the back stick input slightly as required.
In step 3 of this event, the aircraft pitch down effect due to the full forward stick
input, combined with the aircraft's descent rate, resulted in a heavy impact of
the nose landing gear with the runway surface.
Go-Around Decision
In this event, the appropriate action would have been for the PF to initiate a
go-around when the aircraft was in a float condition above the runway.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 011
(fig.3)
Factors that may require an earlier flare
Flare correctly
On Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft
The PF must The PF should apply a progressive and gentle back stick order until touchdown.
avoid forward stick
The PF must avoid forward stick inputs once flare is initiated. The PF can
inputs once flare is gradually release the back stick input if needed. The PF must perform a
initiated. go-around If a normal touchdown point cannot be reached.
Any forward stick input after flare is initiated will increase the risk of landing on
NLG with hard impact.
(fig.4)
Flare technique on Airbus fly-by-wire
aircraft
Safety first #31 | January 2021 013
On A300/A310 aircraft:
The PF must start the flare with a positive and prompt back pressure on the
control column to break the descent rate. The PF must then maintain a constant
and positive back input on the control column until touchdown.
Retard!
A320/A330/A340/A350/A380 aircraft
The 20 ft “RETARD” auto callout is a reminder, not an order. The PF can retard
The PF must
the thrust levers earlier or later depending on the conditions. ensure that the
thrust levers are at
The PF must ensure that the thrust levers are at idle in any case, by touchdown
at the latest, to enable automatic extension of the ground spoilers. idle in any case, by
touchdown at the
Delaying the retard of the thrust levers may increase the landing distance because
the autothrust will target Vapp or the selected speed until it is disconnected by
latest, to enable
moving the levers to the IDLE detent. automatic
A220 aircraft
extension of the
ground spoilers.
The A220 is different from the rest of the Airbus family, because when the thrust
levers are engaged, they continuously respond to autothrust commands. The
A220 does not have any callout for retard. The Flight Mode Annunciator displays
the status of the autothrust (when it is armed and active) at the top of the PFD or
the HUD. When the autothrust RETARD function is activated, it will automatically
reduce the thrust levers to idle. When the autothrust RETARD function is armed,
it will be activated at 30 ft AGL(except in the case of an autoland, when it will
be activated between 20 and 15 ft AGL depending on the condition).
Note that the A220 ground spoiler is activated if the thrust levers are at or near
the idle position.
A300/A310 aircraft
The FCTM recommends to maintain the pitch attitude and initiate a go-around in
the case of a high bounce . Maintaining the pitch attitude, and counteracting any
(fig.6) pitch-up tendency due to the thrust increase, enables the flight crew to avoid a
Management of a high bounce tail strike and ensure a softer secondary touchdown should this occur.
Be go-around minded
The PF can
The PF must perform a go-around if any parameter deviation becomes excessive,
abort the landing or if the aircraft is destabilized just prior to the flare.
and go-around at
any time until the If the aircraft floats above the runway, the flight crew must initiate a go-around
instead of attempting to recover the situation.
thrust reversers are
selected. However, The PF can abort the landing and go-around at any time until the thrust reversers
are selected. However, when the reversers are selected, the landing must be
when the reversers continued.
are selected, the
Avoid excessive rotation rate in a go-around close
landing must be to the ground
continued.
When the flight crew initiates a go-around close to the ground, they must avoid
an excessive rotation rate to limit the risk of tail strike.
The flight crew must wait until the aircraft is safely established in the go-around
before retracting the flaps by one step and the landing gear.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 015
Prevention of
Unstable Approaches
Unstable approach has been a problem since the very beginning
of commercial aviation. Even so, it is still one of the most
common contributing factors to many of the incidents and
accidents that occur on landing today.
Regardless of the changes or cycles our industry faces, this
article is a timeless reminder for the importance of efficient
preparation for approach including anticipation of late changes,
and the need for cooperation between flight crews and air traffic
controllers. The article also provides tips to detect a potential
unstable approach in advance so that it can be corrected long
before the stabilization height. Respecting stabilized approach
criteria is also highlighted as well as being go-around minded
in the case of late destabilization.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 017
MANAGING CHANGES
IN AVIATION
New challenges
A global pandemic, such as COVID-19, has several ramifications for the aviation
industry. This includes the challenge for pilots to maintain recency in the face of
an unprecedented drop in air traffic. Ongoing concerns about the effects of the
pandemic can also be distracting for flight crews. It is an important reminder for
crews to remain focused on their tasks throughout the flight. Especially during very
dynamic and variable phases such as arrival, approach, and landing.
In all cases, the flight crew must take advantage of the various tools and techniques
available to efficiently manage and monitor their energy.
OPERATIONS
Prevention of Unstable Approaches
PREPARATION FOR A
STABILIZED APPROACH
Energy Management
Good aircraft energy management from the top of descent is a prerequisite for
a stabilized approach. Aircraft energy management is a combination of tools,
anticipation, and a flexible flight crew action plan.
The use of the FMS during descent, approach, and landing provides efficient
assistance to the flight crew to manage the energy of the aircraft and reach the
final approach at the correct speed. The “Procedures - Normal Procedures -
Standard Operating Procedures - Descent” from the FCTM provides details on
how the FMS computes the descent profile and how the use of the managed
guidance modes enables the aircraft to stay near this ideal profile during
descent. This is also described in the “Control your speed during descent,
approach and landing” Safety first article published in July 2017.
Flight crews should alert ATC when they are unable to comply with any request
and should ask for additional track miles to manage the aircraft’s energy if
necessary.
However, Airbus recommends that the flight crews use an early stabilized
approachtechnique when:
The flight crew should enter Vapp as a speed constraint at the FDP, enabling
the FMS to calculate the adjusted vertical descent profile (not applicable to
A220 aircraft).
The “Control your speed during descent, approach and landing” Safety first
article, published in July 2017, illustrates the two approach speed techniques.
EARLY DETECTION OF AN
UNSTABLE APPROACH
In many cases, a potential unstable approach can be detected long before
the stabilization height. The flight crew should take advantage of the tools and
techniques available for early detection of an unstable approach. This will enable
them to take the time to recover the situation using trajectory modification in
cooperation with ATC. This will avoid the need for last-minute corrections by
the flight crew or a discontinued approach.
Situational awareness
Use of the FMS V/DEV indication during descent
The use of the FMS V/DEV indication available on the FMS PROG page (A320/
A330/A340), PERF DES page (A380/A350), or FMS DES page (A220) and its
indication on the PFD altitude scale (fig.1) and VSD (A220) provides the flight
crew with an indication of the aircraft position compared with the FMS descent
profile.
This indication is also useful when radar vectored and flying near the FMS route.
The flight crew needs to sequence the FMS flight plan if it is not done automatically
when in selected lateral modes during radar vectors. It enables the FMS to
compute an updated descent and approach trajectory and therefore to still
provide a useful reference to the crew. In addition, it allows the flight crew to (fig.1)
Example of a V/DEV indication on the PFD
switch back to managed guidance mode when cleared from ATC constraints. altitude scale of an A320
More information on the Flight Plan sequencing is available in “Procedures -
Normal Procedures - Standard Operating Procedures - Approach - Configuration
Management - Initial approach” in the FCTM.
OPERATIONS
Prevention of Unstable Approaches
(fig.2)
Computation principle of the energy circle
The ND will display the energy circle when the aircraft is in HDG or TRK lateral
guidance modes and within 180 NM of its destination. It provides a visual cue
of the minimum required distance to land, i.e. the distance required to descend
in a straight line from the current aircraft position at its current speed down to
the altitude of the destination airport at approach speed. The descent profile
used to compute the distance takes into account speed limits, the wind, a
deceleration level-off segment and a 3° final approach segment (fig.2). If the
airport is inside the energy circle, the flight crew should take action to adjust
the situation using speed or rate of descent adjustments or speedbrakes as
necessary or by requesting additional track miles from ATC.
The flight crew needs to keep in mind the computation logics of the energy circle
to better take advantage of the indications displayed on the ND.
The flight crew should consider inserting the landing threshold in the BRG/DIST
field of the FMS PROG page. This will provide the direct distance to the landing
threshold, and therefore, a very conservative estimation of the shortest possible
distance to land. To do a quick mental estimation of the vertical position vs.
distance, the flight crew can use the formula DELTA FL = DIST (nm) * 3 DEG.
The CDA function is standard on all A350 aircraft and is an option on A320
and A330 aircraft equipped with Release 2 FMS standard. The CDA function
computes a continuous descent profile that ensures the aircraft is configured
(fig.3) for landing and is at VAPP, at 1 000 ft AAL. The CDA function displays pseudo
CDA pseudo waypoints on the Navigation waypoints on the ND (fig.3) indicating to the flight crew the latest position to
Display extend the slats and flaps in order to follow the vertical profile of the approach.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 021
Cross-crew Communication
Efficient crew communication is essential during the entire flight, especially
during the whole dynamic approach phase that can include several changes in
speed and aircraft configuration in addition to the navigation and the guidance
toward the final segment. Flight crewmembers should express any concern
they may have about a parameter they are not comfortable with, even before
reaching the stabilization height. Such an exchange can bring the attention of
the other flight crewmember to a parameter that may not have been noticed.
This communication between the crewmembers will also prepare them for
a potential discontinued approach or go-around and will prevent a rushed
go-around maneuver at the last minute.
BE PREPARED TO INTERRUPT
THE APPROACH AT ANY TIME
The flight crew should be prepared to discontinue the approach or go-around
at any time, if it is not possible to reach or maintain a stabilized flight path.
Soft go-around
To limit the aircraft acceleration during go-around, especially when the aircraft
is light, the soft go-around can be used on aircraft equipped with the soft
go-around function. Refer to the “Introduction to the Soft Go-around Function”
Safety first article published in January 2017 for more information.
Operators should define and provide their flight crew with a clear definition of
their stabilization criteria and stabilization height based on the FCOM guidance,
their local regulations and experience.
OPERATIONS
Prevention of Unstable Approaches
Operators should encourage their flight crews to strictly respect the stabilization
gate and to perform a go-around if they cannot achieve the criteria or if they
do not feel comfortable with the stabilization of their aircraft. A non-punitive
policy regarding go-arounds combined with adequate go-around training using
various scenarios will increase flight crew confidence in their handling of the
maneuver and will improve their go-around decision making.
Stabilization criteria from the FCOM (fig.4) illustrated below provides guidance
(fig.4) to help Operators define their own stabilization policy. If one of the conditions is
FCOM stabilization criteria for not satisfied, the flight crew should initiate a go-around, unless they estimate that
an A320 aircraft only small corrections are required to recover stabilized approach conditions.
The PM must make a callout if any flight parameter deviates above the defined
thresholds. The PF must then either correct the deviating parameter, if possible,
or initiate a go-around if the correction cannot be made in a timely manner.
The “A focus on the Landing Flare” Safety first article, published in September
2020, provides an example of a late destabilization in final approach and the
associated recommendations for go-around near the ground.
Attention!
Crew at Stations!
An emergency evacuation is always a stressful situation for
passengers, cabin crews, and flight crews. Decisions have to be
made rapidly and if the communication between the cabin and
cockpit is not clear, or the evacuation is delayed by passengers
trying to take their personal belongings, these can have critical
consequences on the outcome.
From the preflight briefing until the safe evacuation of all aircraft
occupants, this article provides recommendations for both flight
crew and cabin crew to ensure a safe and efficient emergency
evacuation is performed.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 025
CASE STUDY 1
Event Description
An A319 was taxiing along the taxiway when the passengers and the cabin
crew detected smoke in the cabin. The purser used the interphone to notify
the flight crew and asked the captain’s permission to evacuate. The captain
set the parking brake to stop the aircraft on the taxiway, and called ATC to
report that they detected smoke in the cabin and that they would initiate an
emergency evacuation.
As the smoke became thicker in the cabin, the purser called again to the
cockpit, insisting that an evacuation was necessary and requested that the
captain urgently initiate the evacuation. The captain turned on the evacuation
alarm by pressing the COMMAND pushbutton-switch on the EVAC panel to
initiate the evacuation, but did not make an announcement to the cabin using
the Passenger Address (PA) system.
The cabin crew immediately began the evacuation but both engines were still
running.
The cabin crew at the rear doors of the aircraft had to hold up the passengers
ready to evacuate the aircraft for more than 30 seconds until the engines were
shut down. The flight crew saw the ECAM alert indicating that the doors were
open with engines running, and shut down the engines using the engine fire
pushbuttons instead of the master switches.
Event Analysis
Without the presence of any ECAM alerts and with pressure from the cabin
crew, the captain initiated the emergency evacuation. The QRH EMER EVAC
procedure, that specifically requests the flight crew to ensure that the engines
are shut down before initiating the evacuation, was not followed.
Because no announcement was made in the cabin for the evacuation, some
passengers mistook the evacuation alarm as a smoke alarm and they did
not immediately react, causing some delay to begin the evacuation. Other
passengers gathered their personal belongings, this resulted in some minor
injuries caused by people pushing past them or climbing over one another in
the aisle to reach the exits.
CASE STUDY 2
Event Description
The left engine of an A320 suffered a contained failure during the takeoff roll
at a ground speed of 31 knots. The captain immediately rejected the takeoff
and brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway. He announced “ATTENTION
CREW ON STATION” twice.
OPERATIONS
Attention! Crew at Stations!
The flight crew completed the ECAM actions, shut down the left engine, and
contacted the Rescue and Fire Fighting Services to make sure that no fire was
visible outside the aircraft. The flight crew decided to taxi the aircraft off the
runway and were about to tell the cabin crew to resume normal operations, but
the purser had already initiated an emergency evacuation.
Event Analysis
The purser initiated the emergency evacuation and did not inform the flight crew
despite the “ATTENTION CREW ON STATION” announcement, which clearly
indicated that the flight crew was in control of the situation.
Fortunately, only some passengers suffered minor injuries, some of which were
caused by them being blown over by the jet exhaust coming from the right
engine that was still running. Many of the passengers gathered their personal
belongings and took these with them when they evacuated the aircraft.
Being prepared makes it easier to perform an emergency evacuation and will help
the crew in their capacity to make decisions and apply the Standard Operating
Maintaining Procedures in a stressful environment.
effective
communication and Aircraft Knowledge
ensuring compliance To ensure efficient evacuation, the cabin crew must have extensive knowledge
with the Standard of the aircraft systems. This includes the cabin communication system and the
aircraft configuration, especially the cabin layout that could impact visibility of the
Operating Procedures cabin and other cabin crew members or generate congested areas. Operating a
starts with the diverse fleet can imply various cabin configurations that have different numbers
of exits or positions of galleys and toilets. Cabin crew must be familiar with the
preflight briefing. cabin layout to ensure an efficient emergency evacuation.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 027
Crew Briefing
Maintaining effective communication and ensuring compliance with the Standard
Operating Procedures starts with the preflight briefing. T
his is when the flight
crew and cabin crew should define together any parameters that could affect
their decision-making if an emergency were to occur. It is also the opportunity
to review the emergency evacuation procedure with the associated standard
callouts, and discuss them in the context of the upcoming flight. The crew
should take into account any specific conditions such as airport equipment,
external conditions, and the application of MEL items.
BEST PRACTICE
Inform ATC
Once the aircraft is stopped, the flight crew should notify the ATC.
OPERATIONS
Attention! Crew at Stations!
When the ECAM actions (or ECL procedures) are completed, the first officer can
then assist the captain with the situation assessment.
The main factors that result in the crew initiating an emergency evacuation are
uncontrollable fire, thick smoke, and severe structural damage.
In most cases, the flight crew initiates the evacuation. However, in catastrophic
situations with immediate risks of life-threatening injuries or when the flight crew
is incapacitated, the cabin crew can decide to initiate the evacuation.
No evacuation required
If the situation does not require an evacuation, the captain should notify the
cabin crew and ATC, and should resume normal operations.
If the situation requires an evacuation, the captain calls for the EMER EVAC
procedure to be performed.
The captain initiates the evacuation with a short and clear announcement to
the cabin crew over the PA.
For aircraft equipped with the EVAC panel (optional for A300-600/A310/A320/
A330/A340/A350 aircraft, standard for A380 aircraft), the captain presses the
EVAC COMMAND guarded pushbutton-switch.
OPERATIONS
Attention! Crew at Stations!
For A220 aircraft, the captain presses the EVAC CMD guarded switch. This
ensures clear communication with the cabin crew and helps the flight crew to
focus on other actions in this high-workload situation.
(fig.2)
Example of EVAC panel
on A350 aircraft
NOTE
On A220, A330/A340 aircraft equipped with aircraft modification 49314 (CIDS
emergency power update), A340-500/600, A350, and A380 aircraft, the flight
crew must switch off the batteries. This is to make sure that after the aircraft
comes to a stop, power is still supplied to the CIDS for 10 minutes. This
is required by regulations in the case of emergency evacuation due to an
electrical emergency.
The cabin crew can initiate an emergency evacuation only in the case of a
catastrophic event or if the flight crew is incapacitated and normal disembarkation
is no longer possible. The cabin crew can use the EVAC command available on
the Flight Attendant Panel or as an option on any Additional Attendant Panel. They
can also use this command to request that the flight crew initiate an evacuation
if they are not authorized to do so directly.
KEYPOINT
Even if the cabin crew can initiate an emergency evacuation they must try to
contact the flight crew first to avoid any unnecessary evacuation.
(fig.3)
Example of Forward Attendant Panel (FAP)
lower section A320 aircraft
Safety first #31 | January 2021 031
EVACUATE, EVACUATE,
OPEN SEAT BELTS!
As a result, the crew must rapidly make decisions and adapt to changing
scenarios in a dynamic and stressful environment. This will ensure a constant
flow of passengers to each usable exit, and therefore, a quick evacuation.
Passenger Management
Multiple and unpredictable behaviors
Under stressful conditions, people can have varied reactions. Unlike cabin crew
who are trained, passengers are not. They can have unpredictable reactions that
can jeopardize their own safety and that of the other aircraft occupants. Panic
can lead to “frozen” passengers overwhelmed by the situation or passengers
trying to evacuate as soon as possible by aggressively pushing past other
passengers as referred to in Case Study 1.
Passengers that do not comply with cabin crew instructions can put the success
of an evacuation at risk. Baggage retrieval, use of phones, and not jumping
on the evacuation slides are the most common factors that slow down an
evacuation.
Be assertive!
Assertive management of passengers is key to dealing with the risks that could
impact the success of an evacuation. The cabin crew must use clear and
concise orders, and use a loud voice and assertive body language to ensure
that all passengers follow their instructions. The challenge for the cabin crew
is to switch from a nice and smiling cabin crew to an assertive one able to use
physical force, if necessary.
OPERATIONS
Attention! Crew at Stations!
To prevent this situation from occurring, the cabin crew should gather the
passengers away from the aircraft and from any potential danger. They should
also count them and provide first aid, if necessary. For that, they have to
take any necessary equipment during the evacuation to help them with crowd
management on ground such as flash lights (if night conditions) or megaphones
if not at an airfield.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 033
The standard training focuses on exit and slide management, but the latest
publications from aviation authorities such as the EASA and the FAA, encourage
trainers to put more emphasis on passenger management, especially techniques INFORMATION
to discourage passengers from retrieving personal belongings or baggage
because it has a significant impact on the efficiency of any evacuation.
For more information on
managing emergency
CRM Training evacuation, you can
Given the importance of communication and crew coordination, Crew watch the “Evacuation
Resource Management (CRM) training is of utmost importance for both flight Management” video available on
crews and cabin crews. It should include stress management, decision- the Airbus Worldwide Instructor
making, leadership, human factors, including surprise and startle effect News (WIN) website.
management, and risk assessment.
OPERATIONS
Attention! Crew at Stations!
A Focus on the
Takeoff Rotation
An appropriate takeoff rotation maneuver is a balance between
good takeoff performance and sufficient margin versus tail strike,
stall speed, and minimum control speeds.
Applying the 3°/s rotation rate requested in the SOPs is the key to
ensure that the aircraft meets the expected takeoff performance.
Flight data monitoring shows that the rotation rate values in
service vary and a lower rotation rate is observed in some cases
with the associated degradation of takeoff performance. This
article describes both the takeoff rotation laws available on
Airbus Fly-by-Wire (FBW) aircraft and the recommended rotation
techniques that will enable flight crew to achieve consistent
takeoff rotations at the requested rotation rate.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 037
Event Description
A takeoff from a high altitude airport (8360 ft)
The aircraft reached V1 (128 kt) 54 s after brake release and TOGA thrust
application. 1 The Pilot Flying (PF) then initiated the rotation close to VR. The
nose landing gear lifted off the ground 1 s later and the pitch began to increase.
A late liftoff
2 V 2 (149 kt) was reached with the aircraft still on the ground. The main
landing gear was still compressed and the aircraft had a pitch of 4° up. 3 (fig.1)
Liftoff occurred 11 s after rotation initiation at 155 kt, and at only 140 m from Sequence of events from
the runway end with a recorded pitch of 9° up. V to liftoff
4 The aircraft flew over the runway end at 6 ft Radio Altitude (RA), and then 5
overflew the end of the clearway at 20 ft RA and avoided the LOC antennas by
only 12 ft. 6 The aircraft eventually reached 35 ft RA 550 m after the runway
end. The landing gear was selected up 3 s later at 135 ft RA with a vertical
speed of 1300 ft/min, pitch at 12°, and speed at 160 kt. The aircraft continued
its climb and completed its flight uneventfully.
Despite what seemed to be a standard takeoff roll, the aircraft lifted off the (fig.2)
runway very late, overflying the LOC antennas located at the end of the clearway Sequence of events from
with very little clearance. How did this happen? runway threshold to 35 ft RA
OPERATIONS
A Focus on the Takeoff Rotation
Event Analysis
A nominal aircraft acceleration performance until VR
The analysis of the DFDR data showed that the aircraft acceleration was in
accordance with the expected performance in the conditions of the day reported
as wet runway with 4 kt tailwind.
The sidestick inputs ordered by the PF during the rotation resulted in an average
rotation rate of 1°/sec. Airbus SOPs request a 3°/s rotation rate. This slow rotation
rate resulted in degraded takeoff performance leading to a significant increase in
the takeoff distance.
- the TOD computed with one engine failure happening just prior to reaching
V1 (TODN-1), or
- the TOD computed with all engines operative (TODN ) with an additional margin
of 15 %.
Twin-engine aircraft
On a twin-engine aircraft, the TOD is often provided by the TODN-1 because the
loss of half of its thrust strongly impacts the takeoff distance. This calculation
provides additional margin for a takeoff with both engines operative.
While the PF should perform the requested rotation rate of 3°/s in all conditions, (fig.4)
it is even more important in case of engine failure during takeoff, because there Example of a TOD computation
is no additional margin for the calculated TOD. for a twin-engine aircraft
OPERATIONS
A Focus on the Takeoff Rotation
Four-engine aircraft
On a four-engine aircraft, the TOD is often sized by the factored TODN because
the TODN-1 is often the shortest as it is computed with a loss of thrust limited to
a quarter of the total available thrust.
The takeoff rotation law helps the flight crew to perform the optimum takeoff
rotation. The takeoff rotation law consists of both the rotation law and tail strike
prevention functions.
There are different types of takeoff rotation law depending on the aircraft model.
There is a direct relationship between the sidestick deflection and the elevator
deflection on these aircraft models. The rotation rate obtained by a fixed sidestick
deflection value may vary noticeably with different operating conditions such
as aircraft weight, center of gravity position, slats/flaps configuration, engine
thrust, and takeoff speeds.
On these aircraft, the rotation law ensures that an equivalent and repeatable
rotation rate is achieved for a given sidestick deflection, and independent of the
variable operating conditions such as aircraft weight, center of gravity position,
slats/flaps configuration, engine thrust, and takeoff speeds.
A320, A321, A330neo, and A350 aircraft also have a tail strike pitch limit, but
it is only displayed on landing, because it is not necessary at takeoff. There is
no tail strike pitch limit indication on A318 and A319 aircraft, because these
aircraft have shorter length fuselage and less risk of tail strike.
The pitch rate limitation function on A330ceo aircraft, combined with its tail
strike margin is sufficient protection against the risk of tail strike.
Deactivation of the tail strike pitch limit indication for takeoff will be performed
at the opportunity of a next A330/A340 Flight Management Guidance and
Enveloppe Computer (FMGEC) or A380 Flight Control and Guidance Computer
(FCGC) update.
The Pitch Target Marker (PTM) on the PFD provides the initial pitch for the flight
crew to target during the takeoff rotation until FD guidance is available.
(fig.10)
Pitch Target Marker (PTM)
on the PFD of an A220 aircraft
Tail strike prevention: Pitch rate reduction
A limitation function will reduce the pitch-up command sent to the elevators in
case of excessive pitch rate, and will reduce the risk of tail strike. T
he flight
crew should be aware that this pitch rate limitation is not protection
against tail strike: A tail strike event can still occur if a nose-up input is
maintained on the sidestick.
A tail strike symbol is displayed on the Head-Up Display (HUD) during rotation
when the PTM is not displayed and the aircraft pitch angle approaches the
tail strike angle by less than 3 degrees or when the pitch rate is excessive.
Safety first #31 | January 2021 043
Step 2: Use outside visual references to achieve & maintain rotation rate
After the PF initiates the rotation, they should 2 use outside visual
references to achieve and maintain the rotation rate.
With a suitable rotation rate, the aircraft typically lifts off approximately 4 to 5 s
after the PF initiates the rotation and when the pitch reaches approximately 10°.
Step 3: Target initial pitch attitude after liftoff then follow FD guidance
When the aircraft is airborne, the PF should 3 adjust the pitch toward
the initial pitch target provided in the FCOM (e.g. 15° or 12.5° if one
engine failed on A320 aircraft). On A220 aircraft, the Pitch Target Marker
(PTM) provides a visual indication of the initial target pitch. The PF should (fig.11)
then 4 follow the FD guidance. Recommended rotation technique
OPERATIONS
A Focus on the Takeoff Rotation
INFORMATION
The “What about rotation technique?” video is available on
the Worldwide Instructor News (WIN) website and provides a
step-by-step review of a full takeoff sequence performed in an
A380 simulator.
NOTE
Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE)
for A340 family aircraft
An EASA Safety Information Bulletin (SIB 2017/20) was published in 2017
following the incident described in this article. In 2018, a Training Areas of
Special Emphasis (TASE) was included in the A340 Operational Suitability Data
(OSD) for flight crew in response to the SIB. The TASE emphasizes the need to
ensure flight crews know how to perform the correct takeoff rotation technique
during initial and recurrent training. This includes:
Flight data monitoring shows that the takeoff rotation rates recorded
CONTRIBUTORS:
in service vary and that a lower rotation rate is observed in some
Sebastien BALZER cases, with the associated degradation of takeoff performance.
Aircraft Performance
Engineer Achieving an appropriate rotation rate is essential to ensure takeoff
Design Office performance, while maintaining a sufficient margin with tail strike, stall
speed, and minimum control speeds.
Philippe CASTAIGNS
Experimental Test pilot Airbus aircraft are designed, tested, and certified to achieve the
Flight Tests
necessary rotation rate, while having sufficient margins against the
Stéphane DELANNOY tail strike. Flight control laws include features that reduce the risk of
Aircraft Stability & tail strike.
Control Engineer
Design Office The flight crew should apply the FCOM procedures and FCTM
techniques to achieve the requested rotation rate:
Thomas LEPAGNOT
Accident/Incident After the rotation is initiated with a positive nose-up input, the flight
investigator crew should use outside visual references to achieve and maintain
Product Safety
the rotation. The flight crew should fly the rotation, and make any
Xavier LESCEU necessary adjustments to achieve and maintain the required rotation
A220 Chief Pilot rate. When the aircraft is airborne, the PF adjusts the pitch toward
Test Pilot - TRI/TRE the initial FCOM pitch target and then follows the FD guidance.
Customer Services
Daniel LOPEZ-FERNANDEZ
Director Product Safety
Enhancement
Product Safety
Patrick SALLIER
Aircraft Performance
Senior Expert
Design Office
Gilbert SAVARY
Head of Operational
& Training Policy
Flight Operations
& Training Support
ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN PREVIOUS
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Available in the Safety first app and website: safetyfirst.airbus.com
Issue 30 Issue 25
• Avoiding fuel spills on A320 family aircraft-source files • Are You Properly Seated?
• Safe aircraft refuelling • A Recall of the Correct Use of the MEL
• Aircraft parking and storage • Protecting Aircraft and Passengers from Cargo Fire
• Preparing for a safe return to the skies
• Mind the oebs Issue 24
July 2017
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• Control your Speed... During Descent, Approach and Landing
January, 2020 • Troubleshooting Airframe Vibrations
• GNSS Interference • Preventing Falls from Height
• Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions • Progress to Pinpoint anAircraft’s Position
• Managing Severe Turbulence
• Safe Aircraft Parking
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Issue 28 January 2017
July, 2019 • Safely Flying Non-Precision Instrument Approaches
• Overspeed Event with Crew • Introduction to the Soft Go-Around Function
Take-over and OEB49 Application • Preparing Flight Crews to Face Unexpected Events
• Management of Overspeed Event in Cruise • Safety, Our Shared Destination
• The Adverse Effects of Unrealistic Simulator Scenarios
• Preventing Fan Cowl Door Loss Issue 22
• Correct Escape Slides Maintenance for
Successful Slides Deployment
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• Pitot Probe Performance Covered
Issue 27 On the Ground
• 180° turns on runway
January, 2019 • Optimum use of weather radar
• Engine Thrust Management - Thrust Setting at Takeoff
• Prenventing Inadvertent Slide Deployments Issue 21
• Preventing Violent Door Opening due to
Residual Cabin Pressure
January 2016
• Lessons Learned About the Teach-In Function • Control your speed... in cruise
• Lithium batteries: safe to fly?
Issue 26 • Wake vortices
• A320 Family Aircraft configuration
July 2018
• Look out for Ice Ridges on the Lower Nose Fuselage Issue 20
• High Load Event Reporting
• Using Aircraft as a Sensor on Contaminated Runways
July 2015
• Thrust Reverser Deployment in Fight • Control your speed... during climb
• Lateral runway excursions upon landing
• Fuel monitoring on A320 Family aircraft
• Hight-altitude manual flying
Safety first #31 | January 2021 047
Issue 19 Issue 14
January 2015 July 2012
• Tidy cockpit for safe flight • Thrust Reverser Selection means Full-Stop
• Landing on contaminated runways • Transient Loss of Communication due to
• Understanding weight & balance Jammed Push-To-Talk A320 and A330/A340 Families
• Wind shear: an invisible enemy to pilots? • A380: Development of the Flight Controls - Part 2
• Preventing Fan Cowl Door Loss
• Do not forget that you are not alone in Maintenance
Issue 18
July 2014
Issue 13
• Control your speed... at take-off January 2012
• Safe operations with composite aircraft
• Learning from the evidence • A320 Family / A330 Prevention and Handling
• A320 Family cargo Containers/ pallets movement of Dual Bleed Loss
• Parts Departing from Aircraft (PDA) • The Fuel Penalty Factor
• The Airbus TCAS Alert Prevention (TCAP)
• A380: Development of the Flight Controls - Part 1
Issue 17
• Facing the Reality of everyday Maintenance Operations
January 2014
• Airbus Brake Testing Issue 12
• Hard Landing, a Case Study for Crews July 2011
and Maintenance Personnel
• Aircraft Protection during Washing and Painting • Airbus New Operational Landing Distances
• Flight Data Analysis (FDA), a Predictive Tool for Safety • The Go Around Procedure
Management System (SMS) • The Circling Approach
• Flying a Go-Around, Managing Energy • VMU Tests on A380
• Automatic Landings in Daily Operation
Issue 16
Issue 11
July 2013
January 2011
• Performance Based Navigation:
RNP and RNP AR Approaches • What is Stall? How a Pilot Should React
• Atlantic Airways: Introduction of RNP AR 0.1 Operations in Front of a Stall Situation
• Flight Crews and De-Icing Personnel – Working together in • Minimum Control Speed Tests on A380
Temporary Teamwork for safe Skies • Radio Altimeter Erroneous Values
• Low Speed Rejected Take-Off upon Engine Failure • Automatic NAV Engagement at Go Around
• Late Changes before Departure
Issue 10
Issue 15
August 2010
January 2013
• A380: Flutter Tests
• The Golden Rules for Pilots moving from PNF to PM • Operational Landing Distances: A New Standard for
• Airbus Crosswind Development and Certification In-flight Landing Distance Assessment
• The SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE Procedure • Go Around Handling
• Post-Maintenance Foreign Objects Damage (FOD) Prevention • A320: Landing Gear Downlock
• Corrosion: A Potential Safety Issue • Situation Awareness and Decision Making
ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN PREVIOUS
‘SAFETY FIRST’ ISSUES
Available in the Safety first app and website: safetyfirst.airbus.com
Issue 9 Issue 4
February 2010 June 2007
• A320 Family: Evolution of Ground Spoiler Logic • Operations Engineering Bulletin Reminder Function
• Incorrect Pitch Trim Setting at Take-Off • Avoiding High Speed Rejected Take-Offs Due to
• Technical Flight Familiarization EGT Limit Exceedance
• Oxygen Safety • Do you Know your ATC/TCAS Panel?
• Managing Hailstorms
• Introducing the Maintenance Briefing Notes
Issue 8
• A320: Dual hydraulic Loss
July 2009 • Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems Operations
Based on GPS Data
• The Runway Overrun Prevention System
• The Take-Off Securing Function
• Computer Mixability: An Important Function Issue 3
• Fuel Spills During Refueling Operations December 2006
• Dual Side Stick Inputs
Issue 7
• Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Damage
February 2009 • Pitot Probes Obstruction on Ground
• A340: Thrust Reverser Unlocked
• Airbus AP/FD TCAS Mode: A New Step • Residual Cabin Pressure
Towards Safety Improvement • Cabin Operations Briefing Notes
• Braking System Cross Connections • Hypoxia: An Invisible Enemy
• Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2
• Fuel Pumps Left in OFF Position
• A320: Avoiding Dual Bleed Loss Issue 2
September 2005
Issue 6
• Tailpipe or Engine Fire
July 2008 • Managing Severe Turbulence
• Airbus Pilot Transition (ATP)
• A320: Runway Overrun • Runway Excursions at Take-Off
• FCTL Check after EFCS Reset on Ground
• A320: Possible Consequence of V /M Exceedance
• A320: Prevention of Tailstrikes Issue 1
• Low Fuel Situation Awareness January 2005
• Rudder Pedal Jam
• Why do Certain AMM Tasks Require Equipment Resets? • Go Arounds in Addis-Ababa due to VOR Reception Problems
• Slide/raft Improvement • The Importance of the Pre-flight Flight Control Check
• Cabin Attendant Falling through the Avionics Bay • A320: In-flight Thrust Reverser Deployment
Access Panel in Cockpit • Airbus Flight Safety Manager Handbook
• Flight Operations Briefing Notes
Issue 5
December 2007
• New CFIT Event During Non Precision Approach
• A320: Tail Strike at Take-Off?
• Unreliable Speed
• Compliance to Operational Procedures
• The Future Air Navigation System FANS B