AGENCY AND COMMUNION IN

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

What are the ultimate motives that instigate individuals’ behavior? What are
the aims of social perception? How can an individual’s behavior be described
both from the perspective of the actor and from the perspective of an observer?
These are the basic questions that this book addresses using its proposed agency-
communion framework. Agency (competence, assertiveness) refers to existence of
an organism as an individual, to “getting ahead” and to individual goal-pursuit;
communion (warmth, morality) refers to participation of an individual in a larger
organism, to “getting along” and to forming bonds.
Each chapter is written by experts in the field and uses the agency-communion
framework to explore a wide variety of topics, such as stereotypes, self-esteem,
personality, power, and politics.
The reader will profit from the deep insights given by leading researchers.
The variety of theoretical approaches and empirical contributions shows that the
parsimonious and simple structure of two types of content in behavior, motives,
personality, self-concept, stereotypes, and more helps to build an overarching
frame to different phenomena studied in psychology.

Andrea E. Abele is a professor at Friedrich-Alexander University (Erlangen,

Germany). Her research interests are social cognition and the fundamental dimensions
of social judgment and behavior. She has published about 220 articles. She is a full
member of the Bavarian Academy of Science and a fellow of the Association for
Psychological Science and of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology.

Bogdan Wojciszke is a professor at SWPS University of Social Sciences and

Humanities (Sopot, Poland). His research interests are social cognition and moral
judgments and he has published 11 books and over 160 papers. He is a full member of
Polish Academy of Science and a fellow of the Association for Psychological Science.
Current Issues in Social Psychology
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AGENCY AND
COMMUNION IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Andrea E. Abele and Bogdan Wojciszke

First published 2019
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© 2019 selection and editorial matter, Abele Brehm and Bogdan
Wojciszke; individual chapters, the contributors
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authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual
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CONTENTS

List of contributors vii

1 Introduction: the Big Two of agency and communion as an

overarching framework in psychology 1
Andrea E. Abele and Bogdan Wojciszke

2 Connect and strive to survive and thrive: the evolutionary

meaning of communion and agency 13
Todd Chan, Iris Wang, and Oscar Ybarra

3 Agency and communion in social cognition 25

Bogdan Wojciszke and Andrea E. Abele

4 Warmth and competence are parallels to communion and

agency: Stereotype Content Model 39
Susan T. Fiske

5 Agency and communion in self-concept and in self-esteem 52

Andrea E. Abele and Nicole Hauke

6 Agentic and communal social motives 65

Kenneth D. Locke

7 The Big Two dimensions of desirability 79

Delroy L. Paulhus
vi Contents

8 Agency and communion in grandiose narcissism 90

Jochen E. Gebauer and Constantine Sedikides

9 Agency and communion: their implications for gender

stereotypes and gender identities 103
Sabine Sczesny, Christa Nater, and Alice H. Eagly

10 Dimensional comparison theory and the agency-communion

framework 117
Friederike Helm and Jens Möller

11 The dimensional compensation model: reality and

strategic constraints on warmth and competence
in intergroup perceptions 126
Vincent Yzerbyt

12 Power, self-focus, and the Big Two 142

Aleksandra Cislak and Aleksandra Cichocka

13 The “Big Two” in citizens’ perceptions of politicians 154

Susanne Bruckmüller and Nicole Methner

14 Rethinking the nature and relation of fundamental

dimensions of meaning 167
Alex Koch and Roland Imhoff

Index 181
CONTRIBUTORS

Andrea E. Abele, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany

Susanne Bruckmüller, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany

Todd Chan, University of Michigan, USA

Aleksandra Cichocka, University of Kent at Canterbury, UK

Aleksandra Cislak, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, Poland

Alice H. Eagly, Northwestern University, USA

Susan T. Fiske, Princeton University, USA

Jochen E. Gebauer, University of Mannheim, Germany

Nicole Hauke, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany

Friederike Helm, University of Kiel, Germany

Roland Imhoff, University of Mainz, Germany

Alex Koch, University of Cologne, Germany

Kenneth D. Locke, University of Idaho, USA

Nicole Methner, University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany

viii Contributors

Jens Möller, University of Kiel, Germany

Christa Nater, University of Bern, Switzerland

Delroy L. Paulhus, University of British Columbia, Canada

Sabine Sczesny University of Bern, Switzerland

Constantine Sedikides, University of Southampton, UK

Oscar Ybarra, University of Michigan, USA

Iris Wang, University of Michigan, USA

Bogdan Wojciszke, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Poland

Vincent Yzerbyt, Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium

1
INTRODUCTION
The Big Two of agency and communion as an
overarching framework in psychology

Andrea E. Abele and Bogdan Wojciszke

Which contents underlie human behavior and human

information processing?
What are the ultimate motives that instigate individuals’ behaviors? Is it the search
for grandiosity, excellence, wealth, influence, power? Is it the search for love, con-
nectedness, understanding, trust? Numerous philosophers and psychologists have
been concerned with these questions – some have focused more on the “power”
motive, some more on the “love” or “affiliation” motive.
Similarly: what are the aims of social perception? Does social perception spe-
cifically aim at recognizing likeable or lovable others who make us feel comfort-
able and who fulfill our desire for affiliation? Or does social perception aim at
detecting dangerous others who make us feel uncomfortable and insecure and
whom we want to avoid?
Furthermore, how can an individual’s behavior be described both from the
perspective of an outside observer (like, for instance, a personality researcher) and
from the perspective of the individual him/herself? Are power-striving versus
affiliation-striving adequate descriptions for individuals’ personalities? Do these
different themes also underlie individuals’ self-descriptions of their behavior and
their self-view? Moreover, how do these considerations apply to larger entities like
the perception and behaviors of different social groups?
These are very fundamental questions and modern psychology has differenti-
ated them into more narrow ones like, for instance, in motivation research, in
studies on person perception, or in studies on actor – observer differences in attri-
bution. More narrow-ranged research questions allow an empirical investigation
and, hence, more reliable answers. Scientific advantage, however, results from an
alteration between broad-scale theorizing and more specific hypotheses testing. It
is therefore useful to have constructs that are broad enough to cover a large range
2 Andrea E. Abele and Bogdan Wojciszke

of questions related to the questions outlined above, e.g., motivational forces of

behavior, functional meaning of social perception, interpretation of individuals’
behavior and personality from outside and from the person herself, and the under-
standing of cultures as associations of values.

The agency-communion conceptualization

We here argue that the constructs of “agency” and “communion” (and related
terms) have adopted the status of such overarching constructs. They are useful for
describing motivational forces of behavior, for analyzing the functional meaning
of social perception, and for researching the content dimensions of personality,
self-concept, and values.
Moreover, the compelling nature of the agency-communion framework has also
to do with the rediscovery of the role of content in psychology. Whereas previous
theorizing was much concerned with processes (e.g., information processing, self-
regulatory processes), it has now become clear that such processes are also dependent
on content.
Bakan introduced the constructs of agency and communion in1966 (although
they have already a long history in philosophy, see Markey, 2002) and described
them as the basic modalities of human existence.

I have adopted the terms “agency” and “communion” to characterize two

fundamental modalities in the existence of living forms, agency for the exis-
tence of an organism as an individual, and communion for the participation
of the individual in some larger organism of which the individual is part.
Agency manifests itself in the formation of separations; communion in the
lack of separation. Agency manifests itself in isolation, alienation, and alone-
ness; communion in contact, openness, and union. Agency manifests itself
in the urge to master; communion in non-contractual cooperation. Agency
manifests itself in the repression of thought, feeling, and impulse; commu-
nion in the lack and removal of repression.
(Bakan, 1966, pp. 14–15)

The present Chapter 2 (Chan, Wang, and Ybarra) will be specifically con-
cerned with the very basic evolutionary meaning of agency and communion.

The agency-communion conceptualization as an integrating

framework in different fields of psychology
Researchers in many areas of psychology have postulated these two kinds of content
under different names like agency vs. communion, intellectually vs. socially good-
bad, masculinity vs. femininity, instrumentality vs. expressiveness, competence vs.
morality, dominance vs. submissiveness, warmth vs. competence, and trust vs. auton-
omy (Abele et al., 2016; Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008; Erikson, 1950; Fiske,
 The Big Two as an Overarching Framework 3

Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Gebauer, Wagner, Sedikides, & Neberich, 2013; Hel-
geson & Fritz, 1999; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Paulhus &
John, 1998; Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008; Wiggins, 1979, 1991; Wojciszke, 2005;
Ybarra et al., 2008). Despite the different names, the constructs all share a common
core, which refers to agency and communion (see Abele & Wojciszke, 2014, for an
overview).
A look into the literature in motivation, personality, social, and cross-cultural
psychology shows that the agency-communion framework is indeed overarching.
The two themes of agency and communion have, for instance, been shown to
emerge in autobiographical narratives of both adults (Diehl, Owen, & Youngblade,
2004; Uchronski, 2008) and children (Ely, Melzi, Hadge, & McCabe, 1998). They
emerged in research on fundamental motives and values. For instance, McAdams
(1988) distinguished between the intimacy motive (affiliation, communion) and
the power motive (influence, uniqueness, agency); in a similar way, Hogan (1982)
framed his socio-analytic theory around agency and communion, labeling the
two primary human motives “getting ahead” (agency) and “getting along” (com-
munion). Horowitz and colleagues (2006) even used the terms “agentic motive”
(individual influence, control, or mastery) and “communal motive” (connection,
participation in a larger unit with other people). Values can also be distinguished
into these broad classes of content (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; Trapnell &
Paulhus, 2012): people have been shown to differ in the degree to which they
value motives of getting ahead (exemplified by power, expertise, success, etc.)
versus getting along (exemplified by relational obligations, “purpose” in life, and
sacrificing for others; Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012).
The agency-communion conceptualization has been shown to map onto
personality. In particular, work on the circumplex model (Wiggins, 1979, 1991)
showed that personality can be represented with the dimensions of dominance–
submissiveness (agency) and nurturance–cold-heartedness (communion). Paulhus
and colleagues (Paulhus & John, 1998; Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008) extended this
reasoning, using the agency-communion framework to distinguish between dif-
ferent self-presentational styles: an agentic self-presentational style tends to form a
“super-hero” impression (a person presenting him/herself as being able to master
every challenge), whereas a communal self-presentational style tends to form a
“saint” impression (a person presenting him/herself as always acting in moral ways).
In social psychology, the agency-communion conceptualization is prominent
in person perception (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Woj-
ciszke, 2005; Ybarra, Chan, & Park, 2001), group perception (Brambilla, Rusconi,
Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt,
2012; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007), self-perception (Gebauer et al., 2013;
Wojciszke, Baryla, Parzuchowski, Szymkow, & Abele, 2011), gender (Eagly, 1987)
and actor–observer differences in impression formation (Abele, Bruckmüller, & Woj-
ciszke, 2014; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). It is important in stereotype research ( Fiske
et al., 2002) and even in applied settings like power ( Cislak, 2013), organizations,
marketing, and brand perception (Kervyn, Chan, Malone, Korpusik, & Ybarra,
4 Andrea E. Abele and Bogdan Wojciszke

2014; Andrei, Zait, Vatamnescu, & Pinzaru, 2017). While the majority of this
work has been conducted with North American and Western European samples,
there is some evidence suggesting cultural universality of the Big Two (Abele
et al., 2016; Abele, Uchronski, Suitner, & Wojciszke, 2008; Saucier et al., 2014;
Wojciszke & Bialobrzeska, 2014; Ybarra et al., 2008).
The present Chapter 3 on social cognition (Wojciszke and Abele), Chapter 4 on
stereotypes (Fiske), Chapter 5 on self-concept and self-esteem (Abele and Hauke),
Chapter 6 on motives (Locke), Chapter 7 on social desirability (Paulhus), Chap-
ter 8 on grandiose narcissism (Gebauer and Sedikides), and Chapter 9 on gender
(Sczesny, Nater, and Eagly) elaborate these issues.

The “social life” of agency and communion

All this research has revealed that the questions posed at the beginning of this chap-
ter cannot be answered in an “either/or” way. People do not either strive for power
or for love; they do not perceive others either with respect to liking or with respect
to power; they do not describe their own behavior or their self-view by either
agency or communion; personality is also not described by either power or affili-
ation and cultures are not either individualistic or collectivistic, but value one of
these orientations more or less. Agency and communion belong together in form-
ing “human existence,” and there are several ways how the “social life” of agency
and communion (see Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Judd, & Nunes, 2009) functions both with
respect to the self and with respect to others. If, for instance, we receive informa-
tion on another person’s agency, but not communion, we will speculate about this
person’s communion in a specific way instigated by her degree of agency. Or if a
person only follows her agentic goals and does not consider close others’ needs, this
will impact not only the others, but also the actor’s efficiency. Agency not accom-
panied by communion (also called “unmitigated” agency; Helgeson & Fritz, 1999)
will not lead to a “good” human existence, and communion not accompanied by
agency (“unmitigated” communion; Helgeson & Fritz, 1999) will not, either.
Chapters 10 (Helm and Möller) and 11 (Yzerbyt) are representative for research
on the “social life” of agency and communion. These chapters nicely demonstrate
how research in different fields of psychology (educational psychology in case of
Helm and Möller; social psychology in case of Yzerbyt) may coincide in demon-
strating basic mechanisms of the “social life” of the Big Two dimensions.

Agency and communion in context

As has already been shown in research on actor–observer differences in relevance
of agency and communion (see Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, 2014), perspective and
context matter. Actors place more weight on agency than observers, and observers
place more weight on communion than actors. Further research has shown that
the actor–observer difference is moderated by the kind of relationship between the
two, for instance, the degree of interdependency or power differences (Abele &
 The Big Two as an Overarching Framework 5

Brack, 2013). Whereas persons with more power are driven in their actions and
perceptions by agentic rather than communal considerations, persons with less
power show the opposite pattern. The broader political and cultural context may
also matter in this respect. Researchers begin to study these questions, though
respective research is still scarce. The present chapters 12 (Cislak and Cichocka)
and 13 (Bruckmüller and Methner) deal with these issues (see also Chapter 2).

Are there alternatives to the agency-communion

conceptualization?
Recent research on Big Two also concerns (a) how exactly the Big Two should be
conceptualized and (b) the question whether in certain instances a conceptualiza-
tion with a third factor (forming a “Big Three” framework) might be preferable.
Abele et al. (2016) have, for instance, suggested and shown that agency and com-
munion have two facets each, competence and assertiveness in the case of agency,
and warmth and morality in the case of communion. The fruitfulness of both
holding on the Big Two conceptualization and widening it by facets is discussed in
several chapters, with respect to stereotypes (Chapter 4, Fiske), with respect to the
self-concept and to self-esteem (Chapter 5, Abele and Hauke), and with respect to
gender (Chapter 9, Sczesny, Nater, and Eagly).
Besides reasoning about sub-constructs of agency and communion, one might,
however, also think about contextual conditions that influence the number of
the “Big” content dimensions. A thought-provoking example of such research is
presented in Chapter 14 (Koch and Imhoff). These authors argue that an analysis
of group stereotypes can result in three dimensions. Possibly the method of assess-
ment and/or the fact that respondents have or have not a personal relationship to
these groups influences the number and kind or resulting dimensions.

Book contents
The present book describes the ubiquity of the agency-communion framework
in different fields of psychology. It integrates for the first time several approaches
building on the agency-communion conceptualization, which have been devel-
oped in different fields of psychology, more or less apart from each other. By
bringing together these different approaches we want to facilitate an overview of
the agency-communion framework in different settings; we want to demonstrate
the theoretical and empirical fruitfulness of the agency-communion framework;
we want to show connections between so far unrelated areas of research; and we
also want to suggest new directions of research, as outlined above.
In the second chapter, entitled “Connect and strive to survive and thrive: the
evolutionary meaning of communion and agency,” Chan, Wang, and Ybarra take
an evolutionary point of view and discuss that in order to survive, humans must
affiliate with cooperative others. To thrive, humans must pursue skills and goals.
The authors explore how evaluating other people on the dimensions of communion
6 Andrea E. Abele and Bogdan Wojciszke

and agency is adaptive in service of these two fundamental needs of surviving and
thriving. In particular, communion serves primarily to detect who poses a threat
to group life and should be avoided; agency serves primarily to detect who poses
an opportunity for goal pursuit and should be approached. The authors show how
knowing whether others are communal and agentic can help people acquire status
and assess whether others are suitable partners for long-term mating and parenting.
Chapter 3, entitled “Agency and communion in social cognition,” by Wojciszke
and Abele, gives an overview of these content dimensions, presents the dual per-
spective model of agency and communion and discusses its empirical support. This
model states that the Big Two are closely tied to the basic perspectives in social
interaction, the agent perspective vs. the recipient perspective. Because agents are
focused on goal completion and monitor efficiency of their actions, agentic catego-
ries dominate their perceptions. Recipients are focused on identification of action
goals/consequences and monitor the social value of the observed action (whether
the actor’s intentions are beneficial or detrimental for others), hence communal
categories dominate their perceptions. The agentic perspective is applied to own
actions and actions of close others as well as those on whom the perceiver is inter-
dependent. The recipient perspective is applied to actions of other people, especially
remote ones. The chapter also discusses further factors that affect inference and
processing of agency and communion and shows that the Big Two dimensions are
crucial in perception of organizations, commercial products, and brands.
In the fourth chapter, entitled “Warmth and competence are parallels to com-
munion and agency: Stereotype Content Model” Fiske summarizes 20 years of
research on her Stereotype Content Model (SCM). The SCM proposes that what
people want to know first about other individuals and groups is their intent for
good or ill – their warmth. People’s second information-seeking priority is whether
the others can enact their intent – that is, their competence. SCM data come from
varied methods, and the dimensions generalize across domains. Many researchers
followed this approach, suggesting its utility, but future challenges remain, as the
closing section illustrates.
In Chapter 5, “Agency and communion in self-concept and self-esteem,” Abele
and Hauke build on symbolic interactionism and show that in a similar vein as actor–
observer differences, the self-concept also contains an “actor” component (“how do
I see myself ”; called self-as-identity) and an “observer” component (“how do others
see me”; called self-as-reputation). By distinguishing these two components they can
reconcile a seeming contradiction in research on self-esteem: whereas several theories
on self-esteem suggest that it is dominated by communion, research rather shows
that it is dominated by agency. Abele and Hauke argue and show that the self-as-
identity component is dominated by agency, but the self-as-reputation component
is also saturated with communion. They further demonstrate the fruitfulness of dis-
tinguishing competence and assertiveness as facets of agency as well as warmth and
morality as facets of communion.
In Chapter 6, entitled “Agentic and communal motives,” Locke discusses that
motives to approach communion (e.g., form partnerships), avoid communion
 The Big Two as an Overarching Framework 7

(e.g., limit obligations), approach agency (e.g., enhance status), and avoid agency
(e.g., sidestep conflicts) are universals because each has reliably – under certain
circumstances – proven adaptive throughout human evolutionary history. Guided
by upward, connective, downward, and contrastive social comparisons, people
selectively invest in social goals that promise to be fulfilling (e.g., befriending like-
minded others) and divest from goals that threaten to be frustrating (e.g., attack-
ing stronger rivals). Individuals who can harness agency toward communal ends
tend to experience better psychological, physical, and social outcomes. However,
individuals differ in their inclinations towards agentic and communal motives due
to factors such as life history (e.g., unpredictable rearing environments), life stage
(e.g., parenthood), gender, and general sensitivities to costs/rewards. Variations in
social motives across persons and situations are partly mediated by variations in
oxytocin (which tends to amplify communal motives to protect and nurture close
others and social bonds) and testosterone (which tends to amplify agentic motives
to vigorously defend and enhance social rank).
In Chapter 7, “The Big Two dimensions of desirability,” Paulhus argues that
the concept of social desirability has been typically viewed as a single continuum
ranging from undesirable to desirable. However, that conception has led to confu-
sion because of restricting desirability to its social aspect. The author argues for
distinguishing two desirability factors corresponding to the evaluative aspects of
agency and communion. Key evidence comes from factor analyses of desirability
ratings: rather than one, up to 10 dimensions emerge. The predominance of agen-
tic and communal forms of desirability becomes evident when (a) factor extrac-
tion is limited to two factors or (b) responses are collected under stress or speeded
conditions. The bidimensional approach has at least two important implications:
(1) measures of desirable responding must be partitioned into agentic and commu-
nal positivity, and (2) desirability ratings of traits (and other self-descriptors) must
be scored separately for agentic and communal positivity. The two major factors of
social desirability scales – egoistic and moralistic enhancement – are underpinned
by agentic values and communal values, respectively.
In Chapter 8, “Agency and communion in grandiose narcissism,” Gebauer and
Sedikides argue that global self-evaluations (e.g., self-esteem, self-enhancement,
humility) have been typically characterized as saturated with both agentic and com-
munal content. An exception seemed to be grandiose narcissism, a self-evaluation
aspect long thought as inherently agentic to a degree that “communal narcissism”
was considered an oxymoron. Still, the authors summarize theoretical and empiri-
cal evidence that grandiose narcissism has also a communal aspect in addition to
the well-recognized agentic one. The chapter summarizes the agency-communion
model of grandiose narcissism both theoretically and for the evidence for the model’s
six validity criteria.
In Chapter 9, entitled “Agency and communion: their implications for gender
stereotypes and gender identities,” Sczesny, Nater, and Eagly show that agency and
communion are also essential to understanding the psychology of gender. Gen-
der stereotypes, in their descriptive and prescriptive forms, follow from a societal
8 Andrea E. Abele and Bogdan Wojciszke

division of labor whereby women tend to be concentrated in communally demand-

ing roles and men in agentically demanding roles. People’s inferences of communal
and agentic traits underlying the typical role behaviors of women and men yield
gender stereotypes. These stereotypes in turn can enhance or compromise the abil-
ity of women and men to occupy and succeed in social roles that demand agentic
or communal qualities. To the extent that people internalize stereotypes pertaining
to their gender, they gain gender identities by which women regard themselves as
especially communal and men as especially agentic. In addition, these identities and
related personal goals regulate the attraction of each sex to social roles that afford
opportunities to meet communal or agentic goals.
Helm and Möller in Chapter 10, “Dimensional comparison theory and the
agency-communion framework,” present a dimensional comparison theory (DCT).
DCT states that people conduct comparisons between different dimensions, e.g., their
achievements and attributes in different areas, in order to form their self-concepts in
these areas. Dimensional comparisons often lead to contrast effects, that is, higher
achievements or attributes in one area negatively affect self-concepts in other areas.
This contrast effect is also indicated by more positive correlations between the two
achievements or attributes than between the two self-concepts. Whereas previous
research on DCT was conducted in educational psychology and with respect to stu-
dents’ self-concepts in, for instance, mathematics and languages, recent research shows
that DCT also applies to self-concepts regarding agency and communion.
In Chapter 11, entitled “The dimensional compensation model: reality and stra-
tegic constraints on warmth and competence in intergroup perceptions,” Yzerbyt
brings together the work on the fundamental dimensions, i.e., warmth/communion
and competence/agency, and the research on intergroup relations. The author shows
that intergroup perception often leads to compensation between the two dimen-
sions. The first part of the chapter explains how the Stereotype Content Model
has proposed that two dimensions apply to the perception of groups in general and
stereotypes in particular. A closer examination of the model and the empirical work
it generated reveals that stereotypes are most often “mixed” in terms of the two
fundamental dimensions. The second part combines the insights of social perception
work and the intergroup relations literature and presents the dimensional compen-
sation model and its various empirical tests. The following three parts examine the
consequences of this dimensional compensation effect, some of its boundary condi-
tions, and new evidence regarding its underlying mechanisms.
Chapter 12 by Cislak and Cichocka, “Power, self-focus, and the Big Two,” inte-
grates the literature on social power and the Big Two by reviewing empirical work
on how power affects the agentic versus communal content of social perception,
evaluation, and behavior. It is argued and shown that people with high power have
a stronger self-focus than people with low power. Consequently, power promotes
an agentic mind-set. Power leads to higher attention to agency and propensity to
express agency. These effects are manifested in social information processing, social
judgments, values, and behavior. Power seems to reverse the usually observed pri-
macy effect of communion in person perception. The authors discuss implications
of this reasoning for the stability and change of social hierarchies.
 The Big Two as an Overarching Framework 9

In Chapter 13, “The ‘Big Two’ in citizens’ perceptions of politicians,” Bruck-

müller and Methner integrate research from political science with (social) psycho-
logical research. They address the question how different personal characteristics
that citizens ascribe to politicians shape the evaluation of politicians, political
communication, and voting behavior. On the one hand, decades of social psycho-
logical research into how people form impressions of others have suggested two
fundamental dimensions of social perception and judgment (Big Two). On the
other hand, several models have been developed in political science and political
psychology to conceptualize voters’ impressions of politicians as important predic-
tors of evaluation and vote choice. Bruckmüller and Methner point out parallels
between these models across disciplines. They illustrate how a Big Two framework
provides new insights into voters’ perceptions of politicians as well as into political
communication. They also exemplify how studying politicians and political com-
munication can enhance social psychologists’ understanding of basic processes of
person perception in general, and the Big Two in particular.
Chapter 14, entitled “Rethinking the nature and relation of fundamental
dimensions of meaning,” by Koch and Imhoff explores the meaning dimension(s)
that people prioritize to mentally organize and compare multiple targets. In addi-
tion to free choice of dimension(s), their study designs included free choice of
targets, too. The authors conclude that for social groups generated in such a way in
addition to agency and communion, a third prioritized dimension emerges. This
dimension is beliefs ranging from conservative to progressive. Perceiving others as
conservative-progressive serves the purpose to balance exploitation (routine, safe
choices) and exploration (alternative, risky choices). The authors’ data show that
communion increases with perceiver-target similarity in agency and beliefs. Thus,
the relation between targets’ agency and communion is negative, curvilinear, and
positive for perceivers’ low, average, and high in agency, respectively. Likewise,
the relation between targets’ progressiveness and communion is negative, curvi-
linear, and positive for perceivers conservative, neutral, and progressive in beliefs,
respectively. So, there is controversy on who is communal.
Summing up, this book brings together different research areas in the realm
of the agency-communion framework. The variety of theoretical approaches
and empirical contributions shows that the parsimonious and simple structure of
two types of content in behavior, motives, personality, self-concept, stereotypes,
and so on helps to build an overarching frame to different phenomena studied
in psychology. We are deeply convinced that the fruitfulness of this approach
has been demonstrated and will also be visible in future research questions both
with respect to more basic phenomena but also with respect to more applied
questions.

Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the authors of this volume for their inspiring contribu-
tions, their commitment to a really “joint” project and also for their straightfor-
ward cooperation and “communal” email contacts.
10 Andrea E. Abele and Bogdan Wojciszke

We are also thankful for the financial support we received during a long phase
of cooperation. Support came from the Alexander von Humboldt foundation to
both authors (Humboldt 3.4 Fokoop), by grants from the German Research Coun-
cil to Andrea E. Abele (DFG Ab 45/10–1, 10–2) and by 2012/04/A/HS6/00581
grant from Narodowe Centrum Nauki to Bogdan Wojciszke.

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2
CONNECT AND STRIVE TO
SURVIVE AND THRIVE
The evolutionary meaning of communion
and agency

Todd Chan, Iris Wang, and Oscar Ybarra

Humans have a universal drive to understand other people’s intentions and behav-
ior. From an evolutionary perspective, being perceptive about others in the social
world – especially strangers – comes with a host of benefits that promote survival
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Through evaluating others, people decide whether a per-
son poses a threat or an opportunity. People need these questions answered quickly
and accurately enough. Fortunately, humans have a well-developed, parsimonious
method for perceiving others, where individuals and situations that we encounter are
quickly evaluated under two dimensions, known as communion and agency.
In this chapter, we start by defining what these two fundamental dimensions
refer to in the context of person evaluation, and we provide evidence that people,
across culture and contexts, readily evaluate people with this communion-agency
lens. Then, we explain how these two dimensions provide functional benefits in
how effectively people can (a) connect with others and (b) reach their goals – two
core human motivations related to survival. Finally, we illustrate how knowing
how communal and agentic other people are can confer specific benefits for solv-
ing three recurring evolutionary challenges: acquiring status, long-term mating,
and reproducing.

The Big Two

Perceptual and cognitive systems evolved to address recurrent problems that humans
have faced throughout their evolutionary history. People in group life, across time
and culture, have needed to fulfill two broad motives: to navigate and leverage
social interactions and to pursue personal goals and distinctiveness, and in that order
(Ybarra et al., 2008). Social perception appears to be organized around these two
evolutionary motives of belonging and individual goal-pursuit. Consider when we
meet a new person: deciding whether someone is a friend or foe relies on knowing
14 Todd Chan, Iris Wang, and Oscar Ybarra

(a) what this person’s intentions are, and (b) how these intentions facilitate or hinder
our survival, belonging, and goal-pursuit. To answer these questions, people ben-
efit from knowing whether others are worthy of connecting (i.e., communal) and
whether they are competent (i.e., agentic).
Termed the “Big Two,”1 the dimensions of communion and agency account
in large measure for how people think about others (Bakan, 1966). Communion
refers to individuals’ pro-sociality, affiliative tendencies, and kindness. For exam-
ple, a highly communal individual may be described as someone who is fair,
good-natured, honest, loyal, selfless, sincere, and truthful (Wojciszke, Baryla, Par-
zuchowski, Szymkow, & Abele, 2011). Agency refers to individuals’ abilities, skills,
and ambitions. A highly agentic individual may likewise be described as someone
who is clever, competent, efficient, energetic, intelligent, knowledgeable, and logi-
cal (Wojciszke et al., 2011). Thus, communion refers to how well individuals connect
with other people, whereas agency refers to how well individuals can achieve goals.
These two dimensions are orthogonal but can interact to produce different
impressions (Kervyn, Yzerbyt, & Judd, 2010). This interaction is key from an
evolutionary perspective. For example, someone who is categorized as low on
communion may be perceived as untrustworthy, yet whether they are seen as a
threat to an individual or group depends on whether they are also perceived to
be sufficiently agentic (i.e., competent) to pursue any malicious intentions ( Fiske,
Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). As we will discuss, how someone is perceived and treated
often depends on the perception generated by the interaction of these dimensions
(i.e., opportunity or threat) and the goals of the perceiver.
Much research shows that when people generate descriptions and judgments of
themselves, other individuals, or groups, they rely on these dimensions of com-
munion and agency. For example, when people are asked to describe themselves
or other people in their own words, between 75% and 85% of their open responses
contain descriptions that fall under the dimensions of communion or agency
(Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011, 2013; Uchronski, 2008). Across cultures, whether
individuals or groups are concerned, impressions of their communion and agency
largely account for the variance in global perceptions of them ( Cuddy et al., 2009;
Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Demoulin, & Judd, 2008; Phalet & Poppe, 1997; Wojciszke,
Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). This innate preparedness to structure and see the
world through the lens of communion and agency suggests doing so helps meet
fundamental needs and was functional in solving recurring evolutionary chal-
lenges. We now turn to discussing how these dimensions of communion and
agency can respectively help people connect and strive.

Communion for connecting

To belong to a group and to be accepted by others is a fundamental human need.
From an evolutionary perspective, social exclusion meant lack of resources and no
protection from threats, and thus, inevitable death (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
Conversely, belonging to a group confers direct benefits for oneself in the way of
 Evolutionary Meaning of Communion and Agency 15

protection, reducing threats, and the sharing of skills and resources (West, Grif-
fin, & Gardner, 2007). Thus, people are acutely attuned to whether other people
show traits that signal that they are affiliative.
Selection likely favored affiliating with cooperative, agreeable people who con-
tribute to social groups, and avoiding freeloading, cheating people who deplete
from group life (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008). Thus, individuals need to be assured
that others are cooperative enough to provide these benefits (vs. confer harm or
threats to them), and that when they help others, others can be trusted to return the
favor (i.e., reciprocal altruism) (Trivers, 1971). Indeed, research shows that in social
dilemmas, socially agreeable individuals are more likely to change their individual
behaviors to favor what would be best for the group, suggesting there is a strong
basis to assume that highly communal people confer direct benefits for group life
(Koole, Jager, van den Berg, Vlek, & Hofstee, 2001).
How do communal evaluations inform these decisions about affiliation, trust,
and cooperation? First, communal traits reflect how affiliative others are. Second,
they signal whether a person is likely to violate the rules of group life. Third,
they provide cues of resource value, or the likelihood that a person will share a
resource, cooperate, and reciprocate ( Scholer & Higgins, 2008). Knowing some-
one is immoral, hostile, or disagreeable – negative communal qualities – are salient
threat cues that they will be unaffiliative, violate the rules of social life, and be of
low resource value. Conversely, positive communal evaluations (e.g., honest and
moral) reduce perceptions of threat, resulting in a more positive evaluation overall
(Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2011). Thus, communal traits
broadly inform whether an interaction will be a cooperative or threatening one.

Detect cooperation and amplify threat

Several features of communal evaluations support the notion that they serve the
purpose of detecting cooperation and amplifying threat. First, people are quite
adept at automatically judging how trustworthy, agreeable, cooperative, honest,
and extraverted others are from only facial cues ( Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; Todorov,
Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008; Zebrowitz, 2017).
Second, people are highly interested in ensuring others they interact with are
communal. For example, when people are asked to describe an ideal group mem-
ber, people tend to prioritize communal traits (e.g., trustworthiness) over agentic
traits (e.g., intelligence) regardless of group context (e.g., work or family member)
(Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007). Likewise, when individuals are asked what infor-
mation they would like to know about another person, they report being more
interested in learning about communal features of the person over agentic ones (De
Bruin & van Lange, 2000; Wojciszke et al., 1998). Even when toddlers are asked to
evaluate whether claims provided by two informants are true, they tend to trust the
knowledge of the “nicer” individual (Landrum, Mills, & Johnston, 2013).
Third, there is an asymmetrical sensitivity in communal evaluations towards
negative information, and negative information is strongly remembered. For
16 Todd Chan, Iris Wang, and Oscar Ybarra

example, although people are adept at detecting who to trust, people may be
even more sensitive at detecting those who violate the rules. After being exposed
to faces of individuals identified as cheaters or as trustworthy individuals, people
were more likely to remember the cheaters’ faces a week later (Mealey, Daood, &
Krage, 1996).
This sensitivity to negative communion evaluations may stem from evolution-
ary mechanisms designed to err on the side of caution when assessing and reducing
threats (i.e., error management theory) (Nesse, 2005). That is, the consequences
of misjudging someone as uncooperative (when they are cooperative) is likely to
be less costly, harmful, or lethal than the consequences of misjudging someone as
cooperative (when they are not). Thus, when cues like cooperation are difficult
to detect accurately, it is often better to err on the evaluation of less consequence
when choosing to enter social interactions. Consistent with this notion, when ini-
tial communal evaluations are negative, they are resistant to revision even in light
of future information or behavior (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Ybarra, Chan, & Park,
2001). For example, after being told someone is hostile, all future behavior from
that individual is likely to be filtered through this “hostile” label, coloring even
subsequently positive behavioral information. However, when initial communal
evaluations are positive, only one instance of negative information is necessary
to irreversibly update one’s global evaluation in a negative direction (Reeder &
Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Ybarra et al., 2001).
In sum, relative to other information obtained from evaluations, communal
information is primary, spontaneous, salient, and well-remembered. These features
serve the function of detecting who to affiliate with and who to avoid or treat with
caution. Knowing this information helps individuals avoid threats to survival, and
to select groups and others who can be relied on in order to meet their own goals.

Agency for striving

Communal evaluations help individuals judge whether others will connect or
cooperate in group life. But once the problem of positively connecting with others
is sufficiently solved, people must turn their attention to a second need: pursuing
individual distinction and personal goals (Ybarra et al., 2008). People who acquire
unique skills acquire more resources, mating partners, and status and respect from
the group ( Gebauer, Sedikides, Lüdtke, & Neberich, 2014; Schmitt & Buss, 1996).
Similarly, people’s social reputation is comprised of how similar they are to others
(i.e., being able to get along; communion) but also by how different they are from
others (i.e., being able to get ahead; agency) (Leary, 2007). Thus, people who do
not strive to get ahead get left behind.
However, pursuing goals and getting ahead nonetheless relies heavily on the con-
tributions of other people. Whether it be hunting, building, or using language, most
human practices are developed by learning, modeling, and assistance from other
people (Tomasello, 1998). How do we identify who to learn from? We now turn
 Evolutionary Meaning of Communion and Agency 17

our attention to the agency dimension, which helps answer this question (Peeters &
Czapinski, 1990). Of course, given that these evaluations still involve others, and con-
sistent with the preeminence and dominance of communion in people’s evaluations,
our discussion of agency is intertwined with the fact that agentic evaluations invari-
ably interact with communal evaluations to provide an informative impression.
Evaluating others on agency is concerned with assessing how others provide
value (or lack thereof) for one’s own goals. Specifically, being able to correctly
identify those to imitate, those who will share skills or knowledge, and those who
will provide favors or direct assistance, confers benefits when striving to get ahead.
Threats can not only arise from affiliating with those who are uncommunal, but
also those who are unagentic. For example, investing effort in imitating those who
are incompetent may lead to wasted time or stifled skill development.
Further, people need to identify those who will interfere with their goal pursuit
and identify those who are competitors when resources are limited or obtained
through competition. For example, if someone is evaluated relative to oneself as
highly agentic, they are likely to have increased influence over other people and
resources. Should this person also be highly communal, they may be seen as an
admired teacher that one should seek out for access, assistance, or modeling in order
to reach one’s own goals. In contrast, should this person not be very communal, they
may be seen as an unhelpful competitor one should avoid wasting time on when
seeking assistance but instead be vigilant of in competition (c.f. Cuddy, Glick, &
Beninger, 2011). In sum, knowing who is agentic can aid individuals’ goal pursuit.
Consistent with the notion that agency serves functions related to individual
goal pursuit, how interested people are in processing agentic information depends
on how relevant the situation is to their goal-pursuit (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014).
For example, whether meeting a stranger or a doctor, people should want to deal
with someone who is kind, polite, and caring. Thus, people are concerned with
communal evaluations as a default. However, relative to a stranger, people should
place more weight on evaluating their doctor on an agentic dimension, given
that a doctor is more important for one’s personal goals (i.e., maintaining health).
When it comes to evaluating others on agency, context plays more of a role in how
people approach and process information from this dimension.
Similarly, the goals and skills people concern themselves with will vary depend-
ing on environment and context. For example, individuals living in the tundra
require different skills than those living in the desert. Likewise, what is considered
to be a coveted goal, or what types of behaviors or traits confer respect with one’s
peers, are likely to vary among different cultures. Accordingly, whereas people
tend to highly agree on what traits and behaviors are communal, what constitutes
agentic traits, behaviors, and practices are more likely to vary depending on the
specific environment and culture individuals find themselves in and the opportu-
nities afforded to them (Ybarra et al., 2008).
Given the relevance of agency to goal pursuit, in contrast to communion, a
focus on processing and weighting positive over negative information is likely to
18 Todd Chan, Iris Wang, and Oscar Ybarra

confer advantages for individuals seeking assistance in meeting their goals. That
is, the costs of identifying someone as unagentic when they are agentic is likely to
be more costly than identifying someone as agentic when they are not. Misiden-
tifying someone as unagentic (when they are) may lead to missed opportunities
to learn or missing out on resources due to underestimating one’s competitors;
conversely, the costs of misidentifying someone as agentic (when they are not)
may be wasting time working with someone who turns out to be of little assis-
tance or needlessly exerting energy competing with someone who turns out not
to be a competitor. Further, because it is relatively difficult to “fake” competence,
instances of competence are more likely to be true indicators of positive agency. In
contrast, instances of failure can be attributed to various idiosyncratic reasons, and
without additional evidence, may lead to misidentifying someone as unagentic
when they in fact are ( Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). Thus, it is likely more costly
to prematurely dismiss someone as ineffective when they are not than to work
with someone who turns out to be so.
Indeed, research shows that agentic evaluations show an asymmetrical sensitiv-
ity, but in this case to positive information (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowron-
ski & Carlston, 1989). When people are in competitive contexts, for example, they
report wanting to know more about the positive strengths and qualities of their
opponent over their weaknesses, and remember this positive agentic information
better (Chan & Ybarra, 2002). Thus, in their overall evaluations of agency, people
are more likely to weight information that suggests another person is able and
competent over information that shows that they are failing or incompetent.

Solving specific challenges

We have discussed how leveraging information gleaned from evaluating others on
communion and agency provides benefits for connecting and striving. We now
turn to illustrating how evaluations of communion and agency, together, serve to
help people address three core evolutionary challenges: gaining status, long-term
mating, and parenting (Ackerman, Huang, & Bargh, 2012).

Gaining status
Increasing one’s status is one challenge humans continuously strive to solve. Essen-
tially, obtaining status is a relative goal, a goal to increase one’s standing, impor-
tance, and recognition in the social hierarchy ( Fiske, 2010). Increasing one’s status
brings a host of benefits, such as increased access to resources, favors, esteem from
others, and mates (de Waal & de Waal, 2007; van Vugt & Tybur, 2015). Status is
initially acquired by demonstrating physical dominance or that one has relatively
unique skills, resources, or information. Again, what skills and information are
valued in a social context depend on the ecology in which people live, which
dictate what skills are advantageous for problem solving. Nonetheless, given that
status is inherently imbued with agentic characteristics (being competent, unique,
 Evolutionary Meaning of Communion and Agency 19

influential, and powerful), people who want to attain status should demonstrate
agentic behaviors (cf. Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010).
For people seeking status, evaluations of agency and communion are critical.
First, given that increasing status inherently depends on others’ relative standing,
people first need to acquire accurate information about the social hierarchy, which
they appear very motivated to do (Moors & De Houwer, 2005). Given the tight
link between agency and status, having evaluations of others’ agency is necessary
to situate one’s own status among those who are higher and lower than oneself on
the hierarchy (de Waal, 1986). Second, after knowing the status hierarchy, people
can leverage this information to “get ahead” by identifying those on the hierarchy
whom they can affiliate with, model, or seek assistance from in developing skills
that can increase their own status. Individuals with high status receive benefits and
resources from transferring their knowledge to others (van Vugt & Tybur, 2015).
Of course, whether someone is an eager teacher will also depend on how commu-
nal that person is, or how willing that person is to share knowledge and resources,
consistent with the proposal that agentic traits usually interact with communal
ones ( Cuddy et al., 2011).
At the same time, people can use this information to identify who their com-
petitors are, and whether they should compete with these individuals or avoid
them ( Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). If the higher-status individual is one who is
competing for the same resource or pursuing the same goal, the person may pose a
threat that may be best dealt with by avoiding this individual; if this higher-status
person is pursuing a different goal, the person may be a potential mentor. Alterna-
tively, if it is known that a lower-status individual is the person who is competing
for the same resource, people may leverage this information to compete more
fiercely in order to protect their own status. In sum, deftly recognizing agency and
communion, with their links to striving and connecting, directly informs how
individuals may most adaptively navigate the challenge of increasing one’s status.

Long-term mating and reproduction

Beyond one’s own survival and growth, people strive to have offspring that live
long enough to reproduce themselves (Ackerman et al., 2012). In order to repro-
duce and nurture offspring, however, a recurring evolutionary challenge has been
to seek out and adequately evaluate other people for their suitability as a long-term
mate (Miller & Todd, 1998).
What constitutes suitability in a long-term mate? In searching for a long-term
mate, individuals are motivated to find someone who shows fidelity and invest-
ment in the relationship (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Li, Balley, Kenrick, & Linsen-
meier, 2002). However, simply being committed to the relationship is insufficient;
people, particularly females, are also motivated to seek out mates who are compe-
tent enough to acquire resources and nurture offspring. Thus, evaluating a person
for mating potential, especially in a long-term relationship, inherently requires
assessing their suitability both as a partner and as a parent.
20 Todd Chan, Iris Wang, and Oscar Ybarra

How can evaluations of communion and agency inform whether someone meets
these criteria? Communal attributes – being kind, gregarious, and sociable – are
associated with increased cooperation, loyalty, and fidelity in relationships, and as
such, individuals searching for long-term relationships tend to desire a partner who
is, first and foremost, highly communal (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Li et al., 2002;
Nettle & Clegg, 2008). These traits also help inform whether individuals will invest
in their dependent offspring. Communal traits signal that an individual possesses
the nurturing qualities that are critical for effective parenting. Women tend to be
viewed as more communal than agentic, perhaps reflective of the fact that they are
the sex that provides greater investment in the nurturing of children (L. B. Lueptow,
Garovich, & Lueptow, 1995; Williams & Best, 1982).
However, people also report a strong desire for an agentic partner. In fact, of the
Big Five, after agreeableness (i.e., communion), openness to experience, linked with
creativity and intelligence (Moutafi, Furnham, & Crump, 2006), is the most valued
factor in a mate (Botwin, Buss, & Shackelford, 1997). Both males and females report
desiring a partner that is open, curious, interesting, and intellectual, all agency-
related attributes, suggesting that these qualities signal fitness in a partner (Buss,
1989). For example, these traits show that an individual possesses the capability to
protect their offspring, acquire resources, and pass on skills and knowledge.
Although agentic information is valued by both sexes, it appears that females
are more likely to privilege evaluations on this dimension (e.g., of intelligence,
resources, status) in the context of long-term mating (Buss, 1989). Females put
forth greater investment in the bearing and rearing of a child (Trivers, 1972). As
such, they are oriented towards choosing a mate that can acquire and invest sus-
tained resources in themselves and their offspring (Buss, 1989).
At the same time, like status, males also need to know other males’ level of agency
to effectively pursue their goal of attracting and retaining a mate. Given that agentic,
high-status individuals (especially males) attract more mates, to effectively engage
and succeed (get ahead) at intra-sexual competition requires being aware of the rela-
tive success, status, and resources of one’s competitors (Cummins, 2005). In sum,
using agency to supplement evaluations of communion when evaluating individuals
as mating partners can provide a wealth of information that can facilitate the process
of finding and attracting a suitable long-term mate as well as partner in parenting.

Conclusion
Over human evolutionary history, humans have had two fundamental moti-
vations: connect with others and develop personal skills and goals. Neither of
these motivations can be accomplished alone, however, and those who succeed at
meeting these motivations know who to leverage for assistance and who to avoid
as a threat. Evaluating others on how communal and agentic they are serves to
parsimoniously inform this question. In particular, as illustrated in this chapter,
they can confer direct benefits for how people can efficiently acquire status and
 Evolutionary Meaning of Communion and Agency 21

evaluate people for their long-term potential as mates and as parents. Ultimately,
these two dimensions serve to guide how humans process information in the way
that is most adaptive to their surviving and thriving.

Note
1 Different lines of research have termed these dimensions differently (e.g., warmth and
competence; dominance and warmth) (see Abele & Wojciszke, 2014).

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3
AGENCY AND COMMUNION IN
SOCIAL COGNITION
Bogdan Wojciszke and Andrea E. Abele

Social cognition has been a thriving area of research for the last 40 years, becoming
a dominant approach to study human social behavior and its underlying processes.
The focus on cognitive and affective processes has been typically accompanied by
the implicit assumption that processes are content free, that all sorts of content are
processed in the same way. However, a large body of data accrued in the last 20 years
revealed two separate dimensions of content – agency and communion, the “funda-
mental dimensions” or “Big Two” (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick,
2007; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Peeters, 2008; Paulhus &
Trapnell, 2008) – universally present in the perception of the social environment
(persons, groups) and the self. This provokes the question why there are these two
types of content and whether they are processed in the same manner.
The present chapter gives an overview of these content dimensions; it presents
a model offering a theoretical explanation for the duality of content as well as dis-
cusses its empirical support. This model (the dual perspective model of agency and
communion; Abele & Wojciszke, 2014) states that the Big Two are closely tied to
the basic perspectives in social interaction, the agent perspective vs. the recipient
perspective. Agentic content is more salient in the agent perspective and commu-
nal content is more salient in the recipient perspective. We will also discuss further
factors that affect inference and processing of agency and communion. Finally,
we go beyond person perception and discuss how the two types of content shape
perceptions of organizations, commercial products, and brands.

Ubiquity of dual content formulations

Most of our knowledge on the Big Two has been gathered during the last two
decades. However, the idea that there are two basic types of content in human life
can be traced back to ancient philosophical thinking (Markey, 2002), and twofold
26 Bogdan Wojciszke and Andrea E. Abele

conceptualizations of content appeared in social and personality psychology already

in the mid-20th century and continued to reappear under different names and with
respect to different constructs like goals, motives, values, identities, perceptions, and
traits. Abele and Wojciszke (2014) identified about a dozen of such conceptual dis-
tinctions, like agency and communion, masculinity and femininity, competence and
morality, individualism and collectivism, independent and interdependent self, com-
petence and warmth, dominance and trustworthiness, and so on. Although these
distinctions are not all redundant, there is a substantial overlap between them. We
gathered names of 300 traits proposed as representative for five concept pairings (as
well as markers of the Big Five traits) and had them independently rated for how
much each trait reflected agency, communion, individualism, collectivism, masculin-
ity, femininity, competence, and morality, and how much it served self-interest and
other-interests (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). As can be seen in Table 3.1, principal
component analysis of these ratings revealed only two components that explained a
large proportion of variance. Whereas all communal dimensions of meaning loaded
highly on the first factor, all agentic dimensions loaded on the second factor.
Numerous studies conducted in different countries revealed these two types of
content in autobiographical memories, open-ended descriptions of persons (includ-
ing self-descriptions), perceptions of faces, perceptions of groups, trait ratings,
social comparisons, and so on (for reviews see Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; Fiske et al.,
2007; Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015). Reasons for the exis-
tence of this duality of meaning derive from both ontological and epistemic factors.
On the one hand, people universally face two core challenges of life: achieving
individual goals that require agency, competence, and status, as well as initiating
and maintaining supportive relations with others that require communion, mutual
trust, and cooperation (Ybarra et al., 2008; Chapter 2 in this book). On the other

TABLE 3.1 Factor loadings of 10 content dimensions for the 300 trait names (based on data
of Abele & Wojciszke, 2007)

Content dimension Factor 1 Factor 2

Eigenvalue 7.06 1.94

Percentage of item variance 70.06 19.42
Loadings
Communion .95 .27
Collectivism .93 .12
Morality .89 .24
Femininity .83 .28
Other-interest .82 .54
Agency .12 .96
Individualism .11 .92
Competence .39 .90
Masculinity .38 .86
Self-interest .50 .81
 Agency and Communion in Social Cognition 27

hand, social perception does not only reflect social reality but is also functional and
serves the perceiver’s goals. Regarding the self, this means identifying facilitating
and inhibiting conditions for own plans, evaluations, and goal pursuit (see also
Chapter 5, Abele & Hauke, in this book). Regarding others, this means adequate
identification of their intentions – whether they are beneficial or harmful (which
requires communal inference) for the self and probability of completion of these
intentions (which requires agentic inferences) (Fiske et al., 2007; Wojciszke, 1994).

The Big Two and their facets

These dual content constructs described so far can be summarized under the
names of agency (A) and communion (C), as was first proposed by Bakan (1966).
He used these terms to

characterize two fundamental modalities in the existence of living forms,

agency for the existence of an organism as an individual, and communion
for the participation of the individual in some larger organism of which the
individual is part. Agency manifests itself in the formation of separations;
communion in the lack of separation ... Agency manifests itself in the urge
to master; communion in non-contractual cooperation.
(Bakan, 1966, pp. 14–15)

As the above analysis shows, this A and C framework has seen broad usage. None-
theless, there are differences in the specific ways in which this framework is concep-
tualized in the various research traditions (see Abele et al., 2016; Abele & Wojciszke,
2014). It has therefore been recently suggested that A and C both are two-faceted.
In the case of A, these are the facets of assertiveness (agency-assertiveness; AA)
and competence (agency-competence; AC). Assertiveness reflects the motivational
and volitional component of A, and competence reflects its ability component.
In the case of C, the facets are warmth (communion-warmth; CW) and morality
(communion-morality; CM). While warmth pertains to being benevolent to people
in ways that facilitate affectionate, cooperative relations with them, morality refers
to being benevolent to people in ways that facilitate correct and principled relations
with them by the adherence to ethics and important social values. Both warmth-
and morality-related traits are intentional, and hence motivational, components.
Table 3.2 shows how these facets of A and C can be operationalized.
Whereas most of the theories and studies into the A/C framework have so far
been concerned with A/C, and not with their facets, research into the facets is
emerging and we will briefly cover it in the following sections (see also chapters 4,
5, and 9 in this book).

The dual perspective model of agency and communion

To account for the Big Two in social perception we developed a Dual Perspec-
tive Model of Agency and Communion (DPM, AC). It states that the two types
28 Bogdan Wojciszke and Andrea E. Abele

TABLE 3.2 Items measuring communion facets of morality and warmth, as well as agency
facets of assertiveness and competence (based on data of Abele et al., 2016)

Agency Communion
Assertiveness Competence Warmth Morality

Self-confident Intelligent Caring Reliable

Feels superior Competent Warm Trustworthy
Has leadership qualities Efficient Empathetic Considerate
Never gives up easily Capable Friendly Just
Stands up under pressure Clever Affectionate Fair

of content reflect the two perspectives taken when observing the social world
(Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, 2014; Wojciszke, Baryla, Parzuchowski, Szymkow, &
Abele, 2011): these are the perspectives of an actor or agent (person who performs
an action) and that of an observer or recipient (person who is on the receiving
end of the action). Agents are focused on goal completion and monitor efficiency
of their actions, hence agentic categories dominate their perceptions. Recipients
are focused on identification of action goals/consequences and monitor the social
value of the observed action (whether the actor’s intentions are beneficial or det-
rimental for others), hence communal categories dominate their perceptions.
The agentic perspective is applied to own actions and actions of close others as
well those on whom the perceiver is interdependent. The recipient perspective is
applied to actions of other people, especially remote ones. We review three main
hypotheses of the DPM and discuss their empirical support.

Primacy of communion
The first hypothesis states that communal categories are primary in social cognition.
This ensues from the fact that social cognition is mainly about inferring goals, inten-
tions (cf. Fiske, the present volume), and traits, with the latter being also heavily based
on intentions. Support for the general primacy of communal content comes from
studies showing its preferential processing. Communal traits are faster recognized in a
lexical decision task than agentic traits (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011, Study 1; Ybarra,
Chan, & Park, 2001), they are faster categorized as positive of negative, and commu-
nal traits are faster inferred from behavior than agentic traits (Abele & Bruckmüller,
2011, Studies 2 and 3). Also the valence of trait descriptors is much more dependent
on their saturation with communal than with agentic content, and this holds for
several European and Asian languages (Abele et al., 2016; Abele & Wojciszke, 2014).
Whereas perceived agentic qualities decide on significant matters such as hir-
ing, firing, and (sometimes) promotions, communal qualities decide on most vital
matters, such as identity and life-death rulings. A study with family members of
patients afflicted by neurodegenerative diseases showed that the former perceived
large changes in a patient’s identity when the patient’s moral faculty was injured
 Agency and Communion in Social Cognition 29

(especially in frontotemporal dementia), whereas patients’ purely cognitive impair-

ments (like Alzheimer’s disease) led to much smaller changes in perceived identity
(Strohminger & Nichols, 2015). Similarly, information on the morality of a person
(but not of his/her competence) makes people feel confident they know the person’s
true self. And conversely, confidence in knowing somebody’s true self results in per-
ceptions of high morality (Christy, Kim, Vess, Schlegel, & Hicks, 2017). As discussed
later, people are very fast in inferring trustworthiness (part of the morality facet of
communion) from faces; an analysis of over 700 convicted murderers in Florida
showed that these inferences predicted death vs. life sentences, with persons per-
ceived as less trustworthy being more frequently sentenced to death (Wilson & Rule,
2015). These latter findings nicely show that the hypothesis of a primacy of com-
munion becomes even stronger when the facets of C are distinguished: the morality
facet seems to have an even stronger weight than the warmth facet.

Dominance of communion in the perception of others

The second DPM, AC hypothesis states that the perception of others is dominated
by communal content. It derives from the fact that observers are mostly not unin-
volved, but rather recipients of others’ actions. Therefore they focus on the possible
benefits or losses of the agent’s behavior regarding the self, which can be predicted
from inferences on the agent’s communal traits and intentions. Numerous studies
found that communal categories have a higher weight than agentic ones when
thinking on others. Communal information is, for instance, sooner and more thor-
oughly searched when perceivers are forming their impressions (Abele & Bruck-
müller, 2011, Study 4; Abele & Bruckmüller, 2013; De Bruin & Van Lange, 2000;
Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Communal categories are also more easily
applied when interpreting others’ behavior. A study by Wojciszke (1994) showed
that identical acts were construed in a communal way (e.g., as moral vs. immoral)
when performed by others, but in an agentic way (as competent vs. incompetent)
when performed by the perceivers themselves. Moreover, information on others’
morality influences global impressions much stronger than information of any other
content, like competence or warmth (also called sociability) (Brambilla & Leach,
2014; Goodwin, Piazza, Rozin, 2014; Wojciszke et al., 1998), and this applies for the
perception of both individuals (review: Abele & Wojciszke, 2014) and social groups
(review: Ellemers, 2017). For example, 53% of the variance of global impressions
of real persons from a perceiver’s social milieu is predicted by their perceived com-
munal traits, while the perceived agentic traits explain merely 29% of impressions’
variance (Wojciszke et al., 1998). These authors asked their participants to form
impressions of fictitious strangers described with behaviors amenable to interpre-
tations in terms of both morality and competence, e.g., “Bob defended an absent
friend against groundless accusations, but he spoke in such an illogical and obscure
way that he could not persuade anybody” (showing positive morality but negative
competence). Varying the descriptions in a 2 (moral–immoral) x 2 (competent–
incompetent) design, the study showed strong non-additivity of the evaluative
30 Bogdan Wojciszke and Andrea E. Abele

influences coming from agency and communion. The positivity-negativity of

impressions depended on the information on morality, while the information on
competence influenced only the intensity of those impressions. Hence, immorality
could not be compensated by positive information on competence – an immoral
person was perceived in a negative way even if competent, while a moral person
was perceived in a positive way even when incompetent. To put it differently,
morality seems to always result in positive evaluation, immorality always in nega-
tive evaluation, but competence is evaluated positive only when accompanied by
morality (Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016). Interpreting these findings in terms of
the new facet approach to agency and communion, it again seems that the morality
facet carries more weight in assessing others than the warmth facet – however, most
of the last-mentioned studies did not explicitly consider the warmth facet (excep-
tions see Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Goodwin et al., 2014).
Some moderators have, however, to be considered when analyzing the domi-
nance of communion in the perception of others. One is the relationship the
other person has to the self: the general rule seems to be that persons who are
close, on whom the perceiver relies and on whom the perceiver is dependent (or is
interdependent with the other) are seen more in terms of agentic categories than
persons who are farther away and/or independent of the perceiver. One study
showed, for instance, that when subordinates did not depend on their supervi-
sor’s competence (as in bureaucratic organizations) their attitudes towards the boss
were significantly more associated with these persons’ perceived communion than
agency. However, when they depended on the supervisor’s efficiency (as in profit-
oriented business), attitudes were more related to the supervisor’s perceived agency
than communion (Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). A study by Abele and Brack (2013)
directly varied the closeness between two persons. Perceivers had to assess which
traits they would prefer in others who were either friends or supervisors. They
selected more communal than agentic traits for friends, but more agentic than
communal traits for supervisors.
A second moderator is power and status. In one study it was shown that people
in high-power positions were more interested in prospective subordinates’ agentic
qualities than communal qualities, and this spread to non-work situations (Cis-
lak, 2013; see also Chapter 12 in this book). In another study participants had
to estimate the number of dots on displays and were (randomly) informed that
they belonged to the better or worse performing perceptual style group (Guinote,
Cotzia, Sandhu, & Siwa, 2015). This information was sufficient to induce clear
differences in signaling agentic and communal qualities during a subsequent con-
versation with others of equal status. Whereas high-status persons (members of
the better performing group) signaled more agency (were rated as showing more
competence, capability, and knowledge) than communion (empathy, friendliness,
and supportiveness), low-status persons showed the opposite pattern. Even tempo-
rary increases in status, such as a won game of tennis, result in a heightened use of
agentic (as opposed communal) categories when deciding who is similar to whom
and when describing own current states (Baryla & Wojciszke, 2018).
 Agency and Communion in Social Cognition 31

Dominance of agency in self-perception

The third hypothesis of DPM is the dominance of agentic categories in self-
perception. It derives from the fact that people typically think of themselves as
agents who have a free will and who intentionally pursue their goals: success-
ful goal completion requires monitoring efficiency of own actions and that, in
turn, results on a focus on agentic qualities. This has far-reaching consequences.
One of them is the interpretation of ongoing behavior. Abele, Bruckmüller, and
Wojciszke (2014) analyzed the interpretation of interactions between two per-
sons. Previously unacquainted participants had a short conversation and after-
wards rated their own behavior (agent perspective) and their interaction partner’s
behavior (recipient perspective) in terms of agency and communion. Supporting
the prediction, recipients rated the agent’s behavior higher on communion than
on agency, and higher on communion than agents themselves did. Agents rated
their own behavior as more agentic than receivers did. Another consequence is a
higher dependence of self-esteem on self-ascribed agentic than communal traits
(Wojciszke et al., 2011), although communion-morality-related traits also corre-
late with self-esteem (see Abele and Hauke, Chapter 5 in this book).
A third consequence of this focus on own agency may be a neglect of own
communal behavior, especially if it is immoral. It seems that agents a priori assess
their own communion as high and positive rather than infer it a posteriori from
their own actions. People forget their own immoral behaviors much faster than
other types of action, both negative and positive (Kouchaki & Gino, 2016). This
is probably not only a defensive maneuver but an indication that people are not
concerned with their morality. They report thinking about their morality much
less frequently than thinking about the morality of others (and own competence)
and they show decreased memory of self-related moral information even if this is
positive (Baryla & Wojciszke, 2017). However, if one’s morality is attacked, like,
for instance, in negative gossip about the self, then it becomes a focus of rumina-
tion (see Abele & Hauke, this volume).

Processing of agentic and communal information

As already mentioned, communal qualities are basically inferred from intentions
and goals (whether these are benevolent or malicious), while agentic qualities
are inferred from the efficiency shown in goal completion. Still, goals seem to
be more important because high agency is inferred from a successful action only
when the action serves self-interests of the actor. When the identical action serves
interests of others, only communal – but not agentic – virtues are inferred ( Cis-
lak & Wojciszke, 2008). So, when a person fixes her own car, she is perceived as
inventive and clever, but when she fixes her neighbor’s car, people infer that she
is helpful and kind. In the same vein, persons choosing competitive strategies of
conflict resolution are perceived as more agentic and less communal than those
who opt for cooperation (Cislak, 2014). Moreover, as predicted and shown by the
32 Bogdan Wojciszke and Andrea E. Abele

DPM, AC, processing of agentic and communal information is dependent on per-

spective. Identical acts are more easily interpreted in terms of agency when looked
at from the actor/agent perspective and are more easily interpreted in terms of
communion when looked at from the observer/ recipient perspective, albeit the
relationship between perceiver and perceived person moderates these associations.
However, there are good reasons to believe that a large number of additional
factors influence judgments of both agentic and communal qualities, like, for
instance, embodied cues, stereotypes, and further context factors.
Regarding embodied cues, numerous studies showed that perceivers infer both
agentic qualities (competence, dominance) and especially communal ones (trust-
worthiness, extraversion) from faces in less than a quarter of a second, and extend-
ing the face exposure times increases the subjective confidence in these inferences
but not their content. A review of the relevant data (Todorov et al., 2015) con-
cludes that such intuitive inferences are based on a host of cues, from those that
are probably universal (e.g., inferences based on male vs. female appearance), to
those that are obviously idiosyncratic (e.g., resemblance to significant others). Ges-
tures also serve as cues for inferring agency or communion. For example, in some
countries, like Britain or Poland, the gesture of putting a hand on one’s heart is
associated with honesty; it was shown that persons performing this gesture are
perceived as more honest and trustworthy and also that performing the gesture
increases honesty in the performer’s own behavior (Parzuchowski & Wojciszke,
2014). Yet other gestures (such as “giving a finger”) lead to inferences of lack of
communion (hostility), even if performed inadvertently ( Chandler & Schwarz,
2009). Positive communion is inferred from the Duchenne (genuine) smile and
from nonverbal “immediacy cues,” such as leaning forward, orienting the body to
the other, and a relaxed posture (review: Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011). Wil-
liams and Bargh (2008) found that experiences of physical warmth (by keeping a
cup of hot coffee in hand) increase perceptions of “warm” (communal) personal-
ity traits in a stranger and lead to increased prosocial behavior. However, three
subsequent attempts at replication failed to reproduce this effect (Lynott et al.,
2014). The opposite effect – that priming of communal concepts results in higher
estimates of ambient temperature – fares better in empirical research ( Szymkow,
Chandler, IJzerman, Parzuchowski, & Wojciszke, 2013), although this effect is
constrained to objectively lower temperature ranges ( IJzerman, Szymkow, & Par-
zuchowski, 2016). High agency is inferred from nonverbal behaviors associated
with dominance and power, such as occupying central or elevated positions, phys-
ically expanding, and taking up more space, whereas low agency is inferred from
contracted and closed postures ( Cuddy, Wilmuth, & Carney, 2012). The “power
posing effect” (increase in agency after assuming an expansive posture), however,
remains a subject of an ongoing controversy, as it is not always replicated (Carney,
Cuddy, & Yap, 2015).
Stereotypes also serve as cues for inferring agency or communion. The well-
known Stereotype Content Model identifies agency (competence) and commu-
nion (warmth) as the two basic dimensions of stereotype content that serve to
 Agency and Communion in Social Cognition 33

legitimize the existing social order (see Fiske, chapter 4, this volume). Whereas
competence is attributed to high-status groups, thereby justifying their privileged
position, lack of communion is attributed to antagonistic groups, thereby justi-
fying the conflict. These stereotypes also influence the perception of individuals
belonging to the respective groups. Individuals belonging to high-status groups
are attributed more competence than low-status group members, and individu-
als from highly competing groups are perceived as less communal than individuals
from cooperating groups (Russell & Fiske, 2008). The reliance on stereotypes is
moderated by affective states of the perceiver, as, for instance, compared with
negative mood, positive mood leads to a stronger focus on agency in perceiving
of an unknown man, and a stronger focus on communion in perceiving of an
unknown woman ( Szymkow, 2014).
Finally, inferences of the Big Two are amenable to different aspects of social
context. For instance, ascribing agency or communion to others may also influ-
ence how these others perceive the self. In a recent study by Dufner, Leising, and
Gebauer (2016), it was shown that agency follows a “zero-sum principle.” Agency
is related to dominance and status, which can be attained only at the expense of
others. Hence, people who see others as high in agency are perceived as low in
agency themselves. In contrast, communion follows a “non-zero-sum principle”:
communion results in cooperative social relations and is typically reciprocated.
Therefore, people who see others as high in communion are perceived as high in
communion themselves.
A classical difference in processing information on the Big Two is an asym-
metrical diagnostic value of positive and negative information in the two domains.
Whereas in the agency (ability) domain positives weigh more than negatives, in the
communal (morality) domain negatives influence impressions much stronger than
positives. In effect, in the ability domain it is much easier to change impressions
from negative to positive than vice versa, while in the morality domain it is much
easier to change impressions from positive to negative than vice versa (Reeder,
1993; Reeder & Coovert, 1986). These asymmetries have been explained in vari-
ous ways, the most popular being the difference in implicit trait-behavior relations
on which lay perceivers rely (Reeder, Pryor, & Wojciszke, 1992). In the ability
domain, high results are strongly related to – and indicative of – high ability, while
low results can happen to anybody due to lack of motivation, strong impediments,
or exhaustion. In the morality domain, immoral behaviors are strongly related
to – and indicative of – immoral traits, while moral behavior may be shown by
anybody, because it is socially expected and enforced. However, recent research
suggests a more parsimonious explanation of these asymmetries as a result of dif-
ferential frequencies of positive and negative behaviors in the two domains. In
the morality domain, positive behaviors are much more frequent than negative
ones (because the latter are discouraged and punished) and therefore have a lower
diagnostic value. In contrast, in the ability domain, negative behaviors are more
frequent than positive ones, because the latter require rare abilities. These asym-
metries were empirically shown in a study that also revealed a direct link between
34 Bogdan Wojciszke and Andrea E. Abele

the consensual perceptions of frequency of positive and negative behaviors in the

two domains and updates of impressions from positive to negative and vice versa
(Mende-Siedlecki, Baron, & Todorov, 2013).

Beyond perceiving persons

The dimensions of agency and communion operate not only in person perception
but also in perceptions of social groups (see Fiske, chapter 4 this volume; Sczesny,
Nater, & Eagly, chapter 9 this volume), as well as social organizations and product
brands. For example, profit-oriented organizations are perceived as more agentic
(competent), but less communal (warm) than non-profits (Aaker, Vohs, & Mogil-
ner, 2010). Due to these perceptions of lower competence of non-profits, consum-
ers are less willing to buy their products. Only if the perceived competence of
a non-profit is boosted through subtle cues that connote credibility do the dis-
crepancies in willingness to buy disappear. To increase sales of their products and
secure consumers’ loyalty, firms generally strive to place themselves in “the golden
quadrant” of high communion and high agency, or at least are advised to create
a respective image by marketing researchers (Aaker, Garbinsky, & Vohs, 2012).
Several researchers assumed that people perceive brands and relate to them in
similar ways as they perceive and relate to other people. For example, Kervyn,
Fiske, and Malone (2012) transferred the dimensions of the Stereotype Content
Model to brand perceptions. These two dimensions were intentions (capturing
warmth) and ability (capturing competence). The authors identified four types
of brands that elicited distinct emotions: high warmth/ability eliciting pride
(for instance, Johnson & Johnson); low warmth/high ability eliciting envy (for
instance, Rolex); high warmth/low ability eliciting pity (for instance, public trans-
portation); and low warmth/ability eliciting contempt (for instance, BP). Both
dimensions predicted purchase intent and brand loyalty, although in some respects
the intention dimension proved more important.
In line with the previously discussed findings that communion is primary,
marketing communications stressing first communal and then agentic qualities of
brands are more persuasive than communications stressing agentic qualities first,
and perceptions of communion mediate word-of-mouth propensity (Andrei, Zait,
Vatamnescu, & Pinzaru, 2017). Organizations or brands involved in scandals, such
as environmental pollutions or corruption, suffer in their reputation, of course.
However, not all disasters are equal. Disasters based on lack of communion (e.g.,
neglect or ill intentions) lead to harsher condemnation of the involved organiza-
tions than disasters based on lack of ability, like failures in control of product qual-
ity (Kervyn, Chan, Malone, Korpusik, & Ybarra, 2014).

Conclusions
We have shown that the “Big Two” are in fact “Big Two” content dimensions that
dominate inferences of persons, the self, of groups, and even of organizations and
 Agency and Communion in Social Cognition 35

brands. The importance of these content dimensions of agency and communion is

rooted in both ontological reasoning (fundamental challenges of human existence)
and in epistemic factors (perceiving is for doing: inferring intentions and abilities
to perform them). From a social cognition point of view the epistemic perspective
is most important and we have shown that the interpretation of behaviors is closely
tied to the agent vs. recipient perspective in an interaction. Agents and recipients
do not only differ in their immediate visual field (agent perceives the situation;
recipient perceives the agent), but they also differ in the focus they pose on inter-
preting own and others’ behavior. Own behavior is interpreted with respect to
efficiency in goal completion (agency), while others’ behavior is interpreted with
respect to intentions (communion).

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4
WARMTH AND COMPETENCE
ARE PARALLELS TO
COMMUNION AND AGENCY
Stereotype Content Model

Susan T. Fiske

When strangers learn that I am a psychologist, I hasten to reassure them that I

don’t read minds. But actually, that’s a lie. All humans read minds, because we
know that other people’s behavior often follows from their intentions, and we
need to predict their behavior in order to plan our own. In this sense, we all are
lay psychologists who try to read minds (Heider, 1958). Nevertheless, I tell new
acquaintances that I don’t read minds, in order to communicate my benign intent,
namely, that I won’t use any supposed mindreading skills against them.
Intent and mindreading are central to social cognition, as a brief review will
show. Hence, my collaborators and I proposed that intent for good or ill is what peo-
ple want to know first about other individuals and groups. The second information-
seeking priority is whether the others can enact their intent. Our model calls these
two respective dimensions warmth and competence, defined and measured as
described later. Our data come from varied methods and generalize across domains.
Others have picked up this approach, suggesting its utility, but future challenges
remain, as the closing section illustrates.
In the context of this book collecting research programs relevant to agency and
communion (especially Abele & Wojciszke, 2014), this chapter concentrates on what
our Stereotype Content Model offers distinctively. As a parallel and independent inven-
tion (see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, 2018; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002;
Fiske & Durante, 2016 for intellectual history), its insights overlap other frameworks in
this volume; this confirms the growing scientific consensus about the Big Two.

Intent is distinctive to social cognition

Background on intent
As lay psychologists, we infer what other people are trying to and can do, Heider
(1958) proposed. The attribution of trying is essentially intent, which perceivers
40 Susan T. Fiske

base on cues to goal motivation, persistence, and satisfaction. In daily life, people
infer intent motivation based on the other person’s choices and attention (Fiske,
1989), as well as consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus (Kelley, 1972). The core
of mindreading is attributing a predisposition that is essentially the other person’s
intent (Jones & Davis, 1965). Perceivers often display a dispositional bias, and one
explanation is gaining a sense of control. Knowing the other’s intent helps people
adjust their own behavior, so a dispositional inference is pragmatic because it shapes
a perceiver’s own interaction goals: social thinking is for social doing ( Fiske, 1992).
If perceived intent matters, perceived negative intent matters even more. Nega-
tive outcomes get attributed to people, more than to random causes (Burger, 1981;
Malle, 2006; Shaver, 1985). This is especially true for worse events: the more
extremely bad, the more people seek human intent as a cause. Conversely, human
intent makes harm seem worse, even when it is not objectively worse (Ames &
Fiske, 2013a, 2015). Intent, called warmth in our model, is central to interpersonal
perception.
Moving up a level, dispositional (intent) attribution has some intergroup par-
allels to individual person perception, especially in perceivers’ strong reaction to
negative intent. People show dispositional biases to explain the negative behavior
of outgroups and the positive behavior of ingroups (Pettigrew, 1979). That is, out-
groups’ behavior supposedly results from consistently bad intentions, whereas the
ingroup has consistently good intentions.

Current work on intent

Recently, the heir to the attribution of intent, mindreading – mentalizing, perspective-
taking – takes the intergroup negativity bias one step farther. One recently empha-
sized intergroup mentalizing bias shows perceivers neglecting the outgroup mind,
in various dehumanizing perceptions (Haslam, 2006; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Leyens
et al., 2003; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Perceivers view outgroups as having less
inner experience and less sophisticated emotions – in short, less mind. Especially
when an outgroup is homogeneous and controls one’s outcomes, people feel they
cannot gain control by attributing dispositions, so they neglect the outgroup mind
(Dépret & Fiske, 1999). This work does not specifically identify intent (warmth) as
the ignored dimension, just mental states in general.
Objectified outgroups are specifically denied agency (assertiveness and ability
to enact intent: Cikara, Eberhardt, & Fiske, 2011; agency: Gray, Knobe, Sheskin,
Bloom, & Barrett, 2011) and overall competence (Heflick, Goldenberg, Cooper, &
Puvia, 2011). In particular, appearance-based objectification diminishes women’s
perceived competence, broadly defined.
Hence, warmth, or benign/malignant intent, had not yet been central in cur-
rent work on outgroup mindreading/mentalizing. The Stereotype Content Model
(SCM) fills that gap by including warmth as a primary dimension of stereotypes.
This seems reasonable because, first, intent demonstrably matters to individual
person perception, so it should also matter to intergroup perception. Second,
 Stereotype Content Model 41

perceivers’ focus on outgroup intent seems functionally plausible, for the same
reasons as it does for individual intent, noted earlier.

SCM and intent

The SCM views warmth as intent (“friend or foe?”) and competence as enacting
intent (“able or unable?”). As an introduction, SCM’s two fundamental dimensions
appear in Figure 4.1. The top half of the space shows groups viewed as having coop-
erative intent, including two quadrants: admired societal reference groups, such as
the middle class (high status/competence), and pitied groups, such as older people
(low status/competence). The bottom half of the space shows groups stereotyped as
having bad, competitive, or exploitative intent, also including two quadrants: con-
temptible societal outcasts, such as poor people (low status/competence), and envied
groups, such as rich people (high status/competence).
The next two sections describe each dimension, warmth and competence, in
more detail. Subsequent sections describe the varied evidence, then SCM exten-
sions and future directions.

children women
middle
5
gays Christians
elderly men
liberals blue
collar whites
Hispanics
4 Catholics Jews
young
WARMTH

blacks
teenagers white Asians
poor conservatives collar
3 rvativ
atheists
es
Muslims rich

1
1 2 3 4 5 6

COMPETENCE

FIGURE 4.1 Typical Stereotype Content Map, United States. Circles represent cluster
analysis results.
(Data from Kervyn, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2015)
42 Susan T. Fiske

Warmth is SCM’s code for intent

This volume collects variants on agency and communion. Although in theory the
SCM fits Abele et al.’s (2016) proposal that warmth/communion includes facets
of both friendliness and morality, in practice the SCM’s measures of warmth have
varied on including both facets of warmth. The first studies began with warmth as
both sociality and trustworthiness, drifted into just sociality, and recently returned
to include both facets (see Table 4.1 for illustrative studies).
An observer might wonder why the items varied over time. The explanation is
that the measurement model evolved, based on reliability and predictive validity
data. Our measures also benefited from kibitzing on colleagues’ work (Abele et
al., 2016; Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Ellemers & Van der Toorn,
2015; Willis & Todorov, 2016; Wojciszke et al., 1998); they revealed some gaps
between our own conceptual variables (e.g., warm intent) and our operationaliza-
tions (which neglected morality).
However measured, warmth is not mere evaluation, not the warmth of the
perceiver’s feelings toward the target, as in a feeling thermometer. Indeed, the
evaluation factor of the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957)
correlates with both SCM dimensions: it is good to be warm; it is good to be com-
petent (Kervyn, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2013).
SCM theory asserts that warmth is primary; this premise also benefited from
converging evidence (see Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007, for a review). In face per-
ception, split-second trustworthiness judgments (Willis & Todorov, 2006) con-
verge with thoughtful judgments of trustworthiness, and they do so more reliably
than judgments of competence, likability, or attractiveness. In person perception,
morality (an aspect of warmth) explains more variance than does agency (a com-
ponent of competence) (Wojciszke et al., 1998). People identify warmth-related
trait words faster than competence-related ones (Ybarra et al., 2001). Warmth is
detected faster, evaluated faster, inferred faster than competence, and reported
faster than competence (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011).
Our own open-ended data, participants’ responses to what they want to know
about strangers, indicate that warmth appears more frequently but more slowly
than competence (Nicolas, Bai, & Fiske, in preparation). Circumstances can pri-
oritize competence over warmth (Richetin, Durante, Mari, Perugini, & Volpato,
2012). And warmth matters more to observers (our focus here); competence mat-
ters more to self-concept (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Peeters, 1992; Wojciszke,
2005). Warmth and competence often trade off (compensate; see Chapter 11;
Kervyn, Yzerbyt, & Judd, 2010).
As an inference about intent, warmth judgments follow from perceived cooper-
ative interdependence (for a review, see Kervyn et al., 2015). Evidence is both cor-
relational (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002) and experimental (Caprariello, Cuddy, & Fiske,
2009) at the intergroup level, as well as experimental at the interpersonal level (Rus-
sell & Fiske, 2008). Measuring interdependence as both resource- and values-driven,
as well as measuring warmth to include both friendliness and morality, results in
 Stereotype Content Model 43

substantial effect sizes (Kervyn et al., 2015). The warmth of intent, measured as
both friendliness and trustworthiness, seems established as a primary dimension.

Competence is SCM’s code for potential impact

Theoretically, another group’s apparent competence determines whether they can
enact their intentions. Hence, competence codes the other’s potential impact on
self and ingroup.
Operationally, SCM research at first included both of Abele et al.’s (2016) fac-
ets of agency (see Table 4.1). In competence terms, SCM would call these abil-
ity (capability, skill, intelligence) and agency (confident, independent, assertive).
Unfortunately, for no good reason, the agency/assertiveness dimension fell away
in our subsequent operational definitions. To be fair, the reliability and predictive
validity of the extant competence measure has been exceptional ( Fiske & Durante,
2016). But for theoretical reasons, SCM competence should include both ability
and assertiveness (Abele et al., 2016).
Just as warmth does not reduce to mere valence, competence does not reduce
to Osgood et al.’s (1957) potency and activity. These latter two classic semantic-
differential dimensions combine, as in much person perception, and the combined
dimension runs between the two SCM dimensions, from high warmth and low
competence (weak, passive) to low warmth and high competence (strong, active)
(Kervyn et al., 2013).
The meaning of competence may differ by context: farmers, nurses, doctors,
and professors all appear highly competent ( Fiske & Dupree, 2014), but their com-
petences differ, some being more communal and others being more purely expert.
As Asch noted in the first-person perception studies (1946), the meaning of traits
depends on their context.
Perceived competence results robustly and reliably from perceived status at the
intergroup and interpersonal levels (e.g., Caprariello et al., 2009; Fiske et al., 2002;
Russell & Fiske, 2008; for review, see Fiske & Durante, 2016). Status can take vari-
ous forms, sometimes related to power and resource control, sometimes related to
other kinds of prestige (Mattan, Kubota, & Cloutier, 2017). Regardless, perceivers
apparently believe in meritocracy, that people get the status they deserve due to their
competence.

SCM data are varied

The evidence for the SCM ranges from international comparisons to interpersonal
interaction to individual bio-behavioral responses.

Surveys
The SCM paradigms started with surveys (Fiske, 2018). Because the questions ask
participants to respond from society’s perspective, minimizing social desirability
44 Susan T. Fiske

and tapping into consensus, use of a representative versus a convenience sample has
not mattered much: everyone knows the societal stereotypes of common groups,
including their own, so ingroup favoritism is minimal and rarely contaminating.
The first step asks one sample to name groups in society, then identify their
own groups and the most negatively viewed groups (people often neglect these lat-
ter two types). Groups mentioned by at least 15% of the sample meet SCM criteria
to be in common discourse. The second step then asks a new sample to rate the
selected groups on warmth and competence traits (see Table 4.1), and sometimes

TABLE 4.1 Warmth and competence items from illustrative studies

Warmth-Social Warmth-Moral Competence- Competence-

Able Assertive

Fiske et al. (2002), warm, good sincere, competent, confident,

Study 1 natured tolerant intelligent independent,
competitive
Fiske et al. (2002), warm, good- sincere, well- competent, confident,
Study 2 natured, intentioned, intelligent, efficient
friendly trustworthy capable,
skillful
Fiske et al. (2002), warm sincere Competent confident
Study 3
Cuddy et al. (2007) warm, competent,
friendly capable
Cuddy et al. (2009) friendly, sincere competent, confident
warm, capable,
good-natured skillful
Durante et al. (2013) a warm well- competent,
intentioned capable
Kervyn et al. (2013) warm, competent,
friendly capable
Kervyn et al. (2015), warm, competent,
Study 1 friendly capable
Kervyn et al. (2015), warm sincere competent,
Study 2b capable
Durante et al. (2017) c warm, sincere, well- competent,
friendly intentioned, capable,
moral skilled
Note : The original studies always combined all warmth and all competence items into two separate
scales. Sorting of items into columns for the two facets each of warmth and competence is post hoc
and subjective, except for Kervyn et al. (2015), where the warmth scale construction was being
studied.
a
The Durante et al. (2013) items were most often as listed, except for several national samples that
differed, as described in the supplemental materials online.
b
Kervyn et al., Study 2, compared old warmth items (warm, friendly) and new ones (warm, sincere).
c
Two of the Durante et al. (2017) samples used slightly different items, as noted in the methods section.
 Stereotype Content Model 45

predictors (cooperative/competitive intent, status). Sometimes, also, a sample rates

groups on downstream effects of stereotypes: prejudiced emotions and discrimina-
tory tendencies (e.g., Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske et al., 2002).

Cultural comparisons
Surveys conducted in countries beyond the US (about 50 at this time) provide
cultural comparisons. Many groups appear in similar locations around the globe:
countries’ own citizens typically appear both warm and competent; undocu-
mented migrants stereotypically seem low on both. Rich people come across as
competent but cold, whereas older people are deemed warm but incompetent.
Cultural variants are informative in their idiosyncrasies, but also come in
regional and other systematic patterns ( Fiske & Durante, 2016). East Asian samples
do not self-promote their societal ingroups as much as Western samples do; East
Asian ingroups locate themselves in the modest middle of the space, but all their
outgroups land in the common quadrants anyway.
Another comparison depends on national economic indicators. Unequal countries
especially use the ambivalent (mixed) quadrants, lowering the warmth-competence
correlation (Durante et al., 2013). Equal countries (as indicated by the UN Gini
index of income inequality) show a simpler warmth x competence map, more of
a vector from low on both dimensions (migrants) to high on both (citizens and all
groups eligible for government support). In equal countries, competition is seen
as neither competent nor warm. Unequal countries, in contrast, tolerate competi-
tion (only natural under the circumstances). They separate deserving poor (elderly,
disabled, children) and undeserving poor (undocumented migrants, drug addicts,
homeless). Likewise, they distinguish the deserving rich (professionals, middle class)
and the undeserving rich (lawyers, politicians, CEOs). Unequal countries have more
explaining to do (Fiske, 2011; Durante & Fiske, 2017).
Another cultural dimension distinguishes nations’ use of the SCM space,
namely peace-conflict. The most peaceful countries behave as the most equal
ones do (and indeed they overlap, as in Scandinavia): peaceful countries identify
most societal groups as “us,” with a few outcasts (“them”), as noted. At the other
extreme, high-conflict countries also identify us versus them, where the adversar-
ies may be internal (civil war) or external (international war). Extremes of peace
and conflict correspond to simpler stereotype maps. Intermediate peace-conflict,
as in the US and the Americas generally, promotes the more complex maps with
heavy use of the ambivalent quadrants (Durante et al., 2017).

Archival data
SCM evidence generalizes over time, going back several decades in two more
open-ended datasets. A reanalysis of Katz and Braly’s (1933) 84-adjective checklist
data, as well as three subsequent replications roughly 20 years apart (Bergsieker,
Leslie, Constantine, & Fiske, 2012), readily codes into warmth and competence
46 Susan T. Fiske

dimensions, applied to 10 social groups. Each study maps the groups onto warmth
x competence dimensions. Another open-ended coding, this time of fascist maga-
zines’ depictions of social groups, also reproduces SCM dimensions (Durante, Vol-
pato, & Fiske, 2010).

Experiments
Besides surveys, experiments show that the hypothesized predictors (cooperative
or competitive interdependence and status) can respectively predict warmth and
competence at the intergroup level ( Caprariello et al., 2009) and the interpersonal
level (Russell & Fiske, 2008), as noted earlier. Interpersonal interactions trade off
warmth and competence as a function of impression formation goals, including
status divides (see Fiske, 2015, 2018). The point here is that people use the dimen-
sions when they are up close and personal, not just as abstract descriptions of
society on surveys.

Bio-behavioral data
People’s bio-behavioral responses also distinguish groups by warmth and compe-
tence, likewise suggesting that societal stereotypes have individual significance. In
one study, photographs of individuals ostensibly from the low-low, disgust quad-
rant (homeless people, drug addicts) decreased perspective-taking, attributions of
mind, and activation of brain regions associated with social cognition; this quadrant
also increased insula activation, consistent with disgust ratings (e.g., Harris & Fiske,
2006).
The envy quadrant contains high-competence, low-warmth groups such as
rich people and business people. When these groups encounter everyday adver-
sity (getting splashed by a cab), perceivers are unsympathetic, even pleased, as in
Schadenfreude (e.g., Cikara & Fiske, 2011). Facial electrodes record a tendency to
smile at their bad events, uniquely for this quadrant.
The pity quadrant – high-warmth, low-competence groups such as disabled
or older people – remains an ongoing project for SCM research. Clearly, blame
matters, with selective empathy only for misfortunes neither caused nor sustained
by the individual (Wu & Fiske, in press). Negative outcomes caused by fate do
elicit pity, but negative outcomes caused by intentional behavior not only seem
worse (Ames & Fiske, 2013a), they also elicit resentment ( Weiner, Perry, & Mag-
nusson, 1988).
The pride quadrant, though not studied as such from a bio-behavioral per-
spective, probably enhances mentalizing – reading the other’s mind and inten-
tions. Interdependence activates brain regions associated with in-depth social
cognition, specifically for unexpected information about an ally (that is, under
cooperative interdependence, as opposed to competitive independence; Ames &
Fiske, 2013b).
 Stereotype Content Model 47

Beyond the basic database

Extensions
The SCM extends to detailing stereotypes of specific groups, such as analyses of
the default older person as “doddering but dear” or the default female as nice but
not smart (see Fiske, 2015, for references). SCM also describes subtypes of ethnic
groups, sexual minorities, genders, disabilities, and mental illnesses ( Fiske, 2015).
The SCM applies to other entities that have intent, such as animals ( Sevillano &
Fiske, 2016) and corporate brands (Aaker, Garbinsky, & Vohs, 2012; Fournier &
Alvarez, 2012; Kervyn, Fiske, & Malone, 2012). Robots sometimes seem to have
intent, especially when they are more human-like or animal-like than machine-
like (Lee, Lau, & Hong, 2011).

Future directions
If SCM dimensions and the parallels within the agency-communion frameworks
are so fundamental, then they should appear implicitly as well as explicitly. Implicit
associations do indicate warmth and competence, measured separately, for two
contrasting outgroups (nursery school teachers and corporate lawyers) ( Carlsson &
Björklund, 2010). Sometimes, implicit and explicit SCM stereotypes may diverge,
perhaps due to social desirability concerns that encourage explicit reporting of
ambivalent stereotypes (something good about every group) but implicit associa-
tions being more uniformly negative (Rohmer & Louvet, 2012).
Besides implicit associations, research also is expanding stimulus modali-
ties beyond verbal indicators and photographs to perceiving outgroup individu-
als’ faces, a process that also appears to be encoded as warmth and competence
(Imhoff, Woelki, Hanke, & Dotsch, 2013). These dimensions fit other work show-
ing trustworthiness and competence in more general face perception (Willis &
Todorov, 2006).
Besides modality (implicit/explicit, visual/verbal) as a moderator, another
moderator appears to be global or local perspective, as reflected in Chapter 14
in this volume, which finds different dimensions when participants take a more
abstract viewpoint. Our adversarial collaboration finds SCM dimensions when
raters take a neighborhood or psychological approach, but the ABC dimensions
when raters take a more distant stance (Nicolas et al., unpublished).
As a result of such empirical encounters and other conceptual encounters, such
as this volume, theory and measurement will also develop as conceptual defini-
tions become more nuanced. That is, SCM work now returns to including both
sociality and morality as reflecting warm intent. Competence too needs to include
both ability and agency/assertiveness, all reflecting status. As unproblematic as
those may seem, the meanings of both warmth and competence may differ across
settings. For example, a doctor might be warm and competent in ways that differ
48 Susan T. Fiske

from a farmer’s warmth and competence, though both appear high in both dimen-
sions (Fiske & Dupree, 2014).

Conclusion
The SCM developed out of basic person perception research applied to intergroup
perceptions ( Fiske et al., 2002). In a range of theory and method developments,
SCM has benefited from broad international and local perspectives, and doubtless
this will continue in interdependent efforts like this volume.

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5
AGENCY AND COMMUNION
IN SELF-CONCEPT AND IN
SELF-ESTEEM
Andrea E. Abele and Nicole Hauke

The content dimensions of agency (A) and communion (C) are basic to many psy-
chological phenomena, among others to the self-concept and to its evaluative com-
ponent, self-esteem. A focuses on the individual person and the pursuit of personal
goals. Themes of A are self-realization, striving for power and status, and acting in
one’s own interest. Hogan (1982) summarized these themes under the label “getting
ahead.” C focuses on community and social integration. Themes of C are the for-
mation and maintenance of social relationships, striving for harmony, and acting in
the interest of others. Hogan (1982) summarized these themes under the label “get-
ting along.” These fundamental dimensions reflect the two recurring challenges of
human life: pursuing individual goals and belonging to social groups (Ybarra et al.,
2008; chapter 2 this volume).
The self-concept is what we think about the self. A person may think of the self
as being friendly and empathetic, smart, but a little indecisive; another person may
think of the self as being determined, competent, fair, but reserved. These descrip-
tions are communal (friendly, empathetic, fair, and – somewhat negative – reserved)
and agentic (smart, determined, competent, and – somewhat negative – indecisive).
A person may also think of own behavior in terms of A and C. As behaviors are open
to different interpretations, a person has some flexibility in using agentic versus com-
munal interpretations. Helping someone in need may be interpreted as “friendly” (“I
am a friendly person and this is why I am helping”), a communal characteristic; or it
may also be interpreted as “competent” (“I know what has to be done in this situa-
tion”), an agentic characteristic.
Whereas the self-concept relates to a person’s thinking about the self, self-esteem
reflects a person’s overall subjective evaluation of his or her own worth (Rosenberg,
1965). The current chapter discusses how a person’s self-concept regarding A and C
is related to his or her self-esteem. Put simply, is a more agentic or a more commu-
nal self-concept related to higher self-esteem? Is the self-esteem of individuals who
 Agency and Communion in Self-Concept 53

interpret own behavior more in terms of A higher (or lower) than the self-concept
of individuals who interpret own behavior more in terms of C?
The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section discusses dif-
ferent approaches to self-esteem and derives hypotheses how A and C are related
to a person’s self-esteem. The second section gives an overview of the empirical
evidence. The third section presents a novel framework for A, C, and self-esteem.
It will be shown that (a) looking at facets of the fundamental dimensions, asser-
tiveness and competence in case of A, warmth and morality in case of C, helps
to clarify how the fundamental dimensions and self-esteem relate to each other;
and (b) that the perception of the self can be distinguished into two perspectives,
the “actor” perspective, e.g., the person thinks about how he/she sees the own
person (we call it “self-as-identity”), and the “observer” perspective, e.g., the per-
son thinks about how others might see him/her (we call it “self-as-reputation”).
This distinction helps to understand why specific facets of A and C are related to
self-esteem. A, particularly agency-assertiveness, is of particular relevance in the
self-as-identity perspective, and communion-morality is of particular relevance in
the self-as-reputation perspective.

What is the basis of self-esteem?

A number of theories relate self-esteem to experiences of mastery: William James,
for instance, defined self-esteem as the ratio of successes and failures a person
experiences in subjectively important life domains (James, 1890). Note that it is
the subjective experience, and according to this view self-esteem is defined as an
average self-feeling independent of objective reasons. The theory of self-efficacy
similarly poses that self-efficacy, which is closely related to self-esteem, is the
generalized result of mastery experiences (Bandura, 1977). Barkow (1980) argues
that self-esteem is a means to achieve high status in a dominance hierarchy. High
status, in turn, facilitates reproductive behavior.
Other theories are less related to mastery experiences but more to interper-
sonal standing. They argue that self-esteem or a person’s feeling of own worth is
related to the perception of how others evaluate him/her. A prominent example
of such an approach is sociometer theory (Leary, 2012; Leary & Downs, 1995)
according to which individuals have a need to belong and self-esteem is part of a
psychological system (the “sociometer”) that monitors the social environment for
cues indicating low or declining relational evaluation (e.g., lack of interest, disap-
proval, and rejection). Hierometer theory (Mahadevan, Gregg, Sedikides, & de
Waal-Andrews, 2016) proposes that self-esteem (or self-regard) does not so much
track social acceptance or rejection, but rather social status to regulate behav-
ioral assertiveness. People with high status have a higher self-esteem than those
with low status and people with high self-esteem should be more able to afford
assertive and dominant behavior than people with lower self-esteem. Terror-
management theory ( Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) is also an inter-
personal approach to self-esteem (cf. MacDonald, Saltzman, & Leary, 2003). It
54 Andrea E. Abele and Nicole Hauke

claims that the purpose of self-esteem is to buffer the potentially paralyzing terror
that humans experience on contemplating death. Self-esteem is maintained by
fostering culturally shared world-views and values. As culturally shared values
are especially communal values (helping those in need, being fair and just, etc.;
Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), self-esteem should be related
to the expression of communal values.
A theory that somehow integrates mastery approaches and social monitoring
approaches to self-esteem is self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1995). It
states that high self-esteem should result from the fulfillment of the three basic
psychological needs, which are relatedness, competency, and autonomy. Relat-
edness, of course, has to do with how others perceive the self; competency and
autonomy have to do with mastery and with pursuing own goals.
The Dual Perspective Model of A and C (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, 2014; see
Chapter 3, this volume), finally, was developed to analyze the different mean-
ings A and C characteristics have in the perception of actors and observers in an
interaction. As a side aspect of this model, it was predicted that self-esteem should
be more related to A self-perception than to C self-perception because A charac-
teristics are more self-profitable than C characteristics (Peeters, 2008) and help to
“get ahead.”
What does this mean regarding the current questions? Except for the dual per-
spective model (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, 2014), the above theories are not explicit
about the association of a more or less agentic or communal self-perception with
self-esteem. The constructs discussed (dominance, status, relatedness, autonomy,
competency, cultural world-views) can be related to A and C, but they were
not conceptualized according to the fundamental dimensions. Also the aims of
the theories are in part different from the current questions. Nevertheless, they
more or less explicitly put different emphasis on the association between A vs. C
self-perception and self-esteem. Dominance theory ( Barkow, 1980), self-efficacy
theory (Bandura, 1977), hierometer theory (Mahadevan et al., 2016), and the dual
perspective model (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014) implicate that self-esteem is more
related to self-perception on A than on C. Sociometer theory (Leary, 2012) and
terror-management theory ( Solomon et al., 1991) implicate that self-esteem is
more related to self-perception on C than on A. Self-determination theory impli-
cates that both self-perception on A and on C are related to self-esteem. The next
section will give an overview of respective findings.

Empirical evidence
Research investigating the association of agentic and communal self-perceptions
with self-esteem was conducted with samples from different countries, different
educational backgrounds, and different ages. It also applied different methodologi-
cal approaches (overview see Table 5.1).
One approach was asking people to remember events that had influenced their
self-esteem in a positive or negative direction and later to categorize these events
TABLE 5.1 Studies investigating the association of agency, communion, and self-esteem

Study Sample Method Results

Abele and Wojciszke 61 Polish university students remember events that have participants reported more agentic than
(2007, Study 2) influenced SE communal events
Wojciszke and Abele 120 Polish college students remember events that have participants reported more agentic than
(2008, Study 1) influenced SE communal events
Wojciszke, Baryla, all samples: self-ratings of A/C
Parzuchowski, Szymkow,
and Abele (2011)
Study 1 62 pupils + Rosenberg SE (1965) A strong predictor of SE, C not significant
Study 2 (a) 170 students + self-liking/self-competence in all samples: A strong predictor of SE, C not
(Tafarodi & Milne, 2002) significant
(b) 88 students + name-letter-preference 
implicit SE (Koole, Govorun,
Cheng, & Gallucci, 2009)
(c) 90 employees + state SE (Heatherton & Polivy,
1991)
(d) 162 Polish employees of an + narcissistic personality inventory
international private company (Raskin & Hall, 1979)
(e) 53 state clerks + Rosenberg SE (1965)
Study 3 182 university students + Rosenberg SE (1965) even if importance of C higher than A: A
+ importance of A/C strong predictor of SE, C not significant
Wojciszke and 128 university students priming of positive/negative A vs. positive A priming  increase in SE,
Sobiczewska (2013) C behavior negative A priming  decrease in SE, C
priming  no influence on SE
Li, Tseng, Wu, and Chen 190 Taiwanese university students self-rating of A/C + Rosenberg SE A significantly correlates with SE, C not
(2007, Study 2) (1965)

(Continued)
TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

Study Sample Method Results

Bi, Ybarra, and Zhao self-rating of A/C + self-worth
(2013) questionnaire (Huang & Yu, 2002)
Study 1 213 Northern Chinese university A significant predictor of SE, C not
students significant
Study 2 139 Southern Chinese university both A and C significant predictors of SE
students
Gebauer, Wagner, 187.957 participants from 11 self-rating of A/C + e-Darling A is generally a stronger predictor of SE than
Sedikides, and Neberich European countries (Austria, trait SE scale ( Gebauer, Leary, & C, but four moderators: culture, gender,
(2013) France, Germany, Italy, Neberich, 2012) religiosity, age
Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, The Netherlands,
Turkey)
Abele et al. (2016) 1.803 participants from six self-rating of A/C + Rosenberg SE A is a strong predictor of SE in all of the
countries (Australia, China, (1965) samples, C is a weaker predictor of SE and
France, Germany, Poland, USA) only significant in some of the samples
Note : A = agency, C = communion, SE = self-esteem.
 Agency and Communion in Self-Concept 57

according to agentic vs. communal content (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Wojciszke &
Abele, 2008). Usually, events with agentic content (successes, failures), but not with
communal content were recalled. In other studies, participants’ self-perception
regarding A and C as well as their self-esteem were measured (Wojciszke et al.,
2011). Results showed that self-perception on agency significantly predicted self-
esteem, whereas self-perception of communion was no predictor. This pattern of
results was replicated in different samples ranging from young pupils through uni-
versity students and young competitive employees to older state clerks. In addition,
different measures of self-esteem were used and the agency-over-communion effect
was found throughout these samples and measures. Interestingly, even if partici-
pants reported that C would be more important for them personally than A, only
A was a significant predictor for self-esteem. A third methodological approach was
experimental priming of positive (successes) or negative (failures) information about
agentic behavior or positive (norm-maintenance) or negative (norm-breaking)
information about communal behavior and then to measures the participants’ self-
esteem. In line with the previous findings priming of successes led to an increase
in self-esteem and priming of failures led to a decrease in self-esteem. In contrast,
priming of norm-maintenance vs. norm-breaking had no influence on self-esteem
(Wojciszke & Sobiczewska, 2013).
The studies reviewed so far were all conducted with Polish participants. But the
stronger influence of agency than communion on self-esteem was not only found
in Poland but also in other European countries as well as in the USA, Australia,
China, and Taiwan (Abele et al., 2016; Bi et al., 2013, Study 1; Gebauer et al., 2013;
Li et al., 2007).
However, there are also findings showing that under specific conditions com-
munion may also be associated with self-esteem (Bi et al., 2013; Gebauer et al., 2013).
Bi et al. (2013, Study 2), for instance, showed that the well-established agency over
communion effect could be found in Northern China. In contrast, in Southern
China, where communal values are of particular importance, both agency and com-
munion were associated with self-esteem. Besides cultural norms, self-centrality of
traits also plays an important role as demonstrated in a large-scale study by Gebauer
and colleagues (2013). In a very large sample of participants from 11 European coun-
tries, agency generally was a stronger predictor of self-esteem than communion.
However, there were four moderators of the relative strength of these two predictors
of self-esteem. The influence of agency on self-esteem was particularly strong in
relatively agentic countries (high culture-level agency score), among non-religious
individuals, men, and younger adults. Conversely, there were also specific sub-
samples where the inverted effect could be found. Among older religious women in
Germany (a country with a relatively high culture-level communion; cf. Gebauer
et al., 2013), communion was a stronger predictor of self-esteem than agency.
In sum, there is empirical evidence that agency generally dominates self-esteem.
This finding is in accord with mastery approaches to self-esteem (dominance the-
ory, Barkow, 1980; self-efficacy theory, Bandura, 1977; hierometer theory, Mahade-
van et al., 2016), but less with social-monitoring approaches (sociometer theory,
58 Andrea E. Abele and Nicole Hauke

Leary, 2012; terror-management theory, Solomon et al., 1991). It is in line with the
dual perspective model (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014) and it does not contradict self-
determination theory.
However, as this overview of the empirical findings shows, communion can
also impact self-esteem, but to a lesser degree and under specific conditions only.
Hence, the question arises how these findings can be integrated into a cohesive
theoretical framework.

A novel framework for agency, communion, and self-esteem

As has been shown elsewhere (Abele et al., 2016), A and C can be distinguished into
two main facets each: in the case of A, these are assertiveness (agency-assertiveness;
AA) and competence (agency-competence; AC). Both are agentic characteristics,
but they differ slightly in their focus, and the distinction considers that success-
ful goal pursuit or “getting ahead” requires both ability and motivation/volition.
Competence (self-perception as competent, smart, etc.) reflects the former, and
assertiveness (self-perception as decisive, assertive, etc.) reflects the latter. In the case
of C, the facets of warmth (communion-warmth; CW) and morality (communion-
morality; CM) are differentiated. Again both are communal characteristics that
differ slightly in their focus: “getting along” needs behaviors that are on one hand
warm and friendly (CW) and on the other fair and reliable (CM). While warmth
pertains to being benevolent to people in ways that facilitate affectionate, coopera-
tive relations with them, morality refers to being benevolent to people in ways that
facilitate correct and principled relations with them by the adherence to ethics and
important social values.
These facets of A and C have been established across different cultures in America,
Asia, Australia, and Europe. Self-perceptions on AA, AC, CW, and CM are distinctly
related to personality, social values, and to self-construal (Abele et al., 2016). Research
on group perception as well as on person perception also supports the fruitfulness of
the distinction. For instance, the morality facet of C is more important for judgments
of groups than the warmth facet (see Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Brambilla, Rusconi,
Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013; Brambilla,
Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012; Kervyn, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2015; Leach,
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; summarizing: Ellemers, 2017). As another example, the
assertiveness facet of A is more important for judgments of a target’s status than the
competence facet (Carrier, Louvet, Chauvin, & Rohmer, 2014).
The fruitfulness of distinguishing these facets was also shown with respect to
self-esteem: Abele et al. (2016) studied not only the association between A and C
with self-esteem (see Table 5.1), but also the association between the facets of A and
C and self-esteem across six countries and with almost 2,000 participants. If self-
esteem was regressed towards these four facets (see Figure 5.1), then the AA facet
was the best predictor, followed by the AC facet and the CM facet which had about
the same weight. The CW facet had no impact at all. These findings help to recon-
cile the partly inconsistent findings reported in the previous section. Supporting a
 Agency and Communion in Self-Concept 59

dominance view of self-esteem (Barkow, 1980; Mahadevan et al., 2016) as well as the
dual perspective model (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, 2014), agency-assertiveness is most
closely related to self-esteem. Supporting a success/failure view of self-esteem (Ban-
dura, 1977; James, 1890), agency-competence is also related to self-esteem. How-
ever, supporting a sociometer view of self-esteem (Leary, 2012; Leary & Downs,
1995) as well as self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1995), communion is also
related to self-esteem, but it is only one facet: communion-warmth does not relate
to self-esteem, but only communion-morality. This is not exactly what sociometer
theory and self-determination theory might predict: “relatedness” (one of the basic
needs defined by Deci & Ryan, 1995) and “relational value” (Leary, 2012) should be
manifested in a positive association between self-perception on communion-warmth
and self-esteem. However, the higher weight of morality than warmth in self-esteem
nicely fits to the literature on group perception that also shows that morality, not
warmth (or sociability) is relevant in the evaluation of groups (Ellemers, 2017). In
sum, except of very specific circumstances (see Bi et al., 2013; Gebauer et al., 2013),
self-esteem seems to be more related to A, e.g., “getting ahead” than to C, e.g., “get-
ting along” (see also Gebauer et al., 2015). However, having a self-concept of a moral
person (the CM facet of C) also adds to a positive self-esteem, but seeing the self as
warm and friendly (the CW facet of C) has no effect at all.1
What do these findings mean and how could they be integrated into an agency-
communion model of self-perception and self-esteem? The dual perspective model
states that social behavior always implicates the perspective of either the actor
or the observer; actors are more focused on agentic qualities and observers are
more focused on communal qualities. We suggest to extend this model to the self

0.6
0.53
0.5

0.4
β coefficient

0.3

0.2
0.14 0.13
0.1
0.00
0
Agency Agency Communion Communion
Assertiveness Competence Morality Warmth

FIGURE 5.1 Self-esteem regressed on the facets of agency and communion across six
different countries (Australia, China, France, Germany, Poland, USA; N = 1.803; R2 = .43,
p < .001).
60 Andrea E. Abele and Nicole Hauke

that also implicates two perspectives. As has already been discussed by symbolic
interactionism, there are two kinds of self-concept, the “I” (personal self) and
the “me” (social self, “looking glass self,” Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934), that only
together constitute a person’s self. The huge literature on impression formation
also suggests that the self is constituted by an “internal” and an “external” (self-
presentation) part. More specifically, the “moral self” has been differentiated into
an “internal” vs. an “external” moral self, too (Aquino & Reed, 2002).
The extended Dual Perspective Model of the Self (Hauke & Abele, submitted)
also distinguishes between two perspectives of the self and considers the relative
importance of A and C from these two perspectives. In the “actor” perspective a
person concentrates on the self and his/her goals, plans, and self-view. This actor
perspective of the self is called self-as-identity. In the “observer” perspective a per-
son looks at the self from the outside (“looking glass”), monitors the social envi-
ronment for cues indicating low or declining relational evaluation and considers
how others may see and evaluate him/her. For instance, a person may think of the
self as “determined” (actor-self), but may at the same time be concerned if others
might interpret this behavior as “rude” (observer-self). This observer perspective
of the self is called self-as-reputation. The two perspectives on the self are inter-
twined, and the “actor” self develops in interaction with the “observer” self; how-
ever, for analytical reasons it is useful to distinguish them as separate constructs.
Analogous to the dual perspective model of social interaction, the extended Dual
Perspective Model of the Self predicts that A is more relevant in the actor perspec-
tive of the self, whereas C is more relevant in the observer perspective of the self. In
the above example (thinking of oneself as “determined,” but worrying if others may
see the behavior as “rude”), the characteristic “determined” (e.g., an agentic-assertive
trait) is profitable from the perspective of the “actor-self,” but may at the same time
be detrimental from the perspective of the observer-self. Hence, the actor-self should
monitor more his/her A traits and the observer-self should monitor more his/her C
traits. Moreover, considering the facet approach to A and C, the assertiveness facet
should be even more relevant for the actor-self than the competence facet of A, and
the morality facet of C should be even more relevant for the observer-self than the
warmth facet (cf. Pagliaro, Ellemers, Barreto, & Di Cesare, 2016). This is exactly
what we showed in a series of studies (Hauke & Abele, submitted). Participants were
provided with gossip stories and should imagine being the target of this gossip. The
gossip was either about lack of agency-assertiveness, lack of agency-competence, lack
of communion-warmth, or lack of communion-morality. Participants should report
the degree of identity threat and the degree of reputation threat they would experi-
ence in such a situation. In accord with our hypotheses, participants reported more
identity threat in the agency-assertiveness gossip condition than in the other three
conditions, and they reported more reputation threat in the communion-morality
condition than in the three other conditions.
In a further study, participants should recall events that had either led to a
high degree of identity threat or to a high degree of reputation threat. If asked
to recall an event in which they had experienced identity threat, participants
 Agency and Communion in Self-Concept 61

reported more situations with agentic content (both failures in competence and
failures in assertiveness) than situations with communal content. Conversely, if
asked to recall an event in which they had experienced reputation threat, they
reported more situations featuring communion-morality than situations featuring
communion-warmth or agency. These findings are again supporting our pre-
dictions that the actor-self considers more agency-related content (particularly
agency-assertiveness), whereas the observer-self considers more communion-
related (especially communion-morality-related) content.

Conclusions
The reviewed evidence suggests that agency and communion and their facets
are useful constructs in understanding the dynamics of self-esteem. Self-esteem
is strongly related to a person’s self-concept concerning agentic qualities. These
qualities help him/her to efficiently pursue goals, to establish and maintain status
in social hierarchies, and ultimately to have an evolutional advantage. However,
acting only in the sense of getting ahead with one’s own goals may not lead to
the desired ends because others would not like such a person and might oppose
him/her. Communal qualities are therefore also important to establish and main-
tain one’s status in a community and in social relationships more generally. The
C facet of warmth is important for bonding and relational issues, but respective
characteristics seem to be more or less taken as granted and self-perception regard-
ing CW is not much related to self-esteem. The C facet of morality is the one that
counts. Trustworthiness, reliability, and fairness are desired in others and they
are desired for the self, as well. They are relevant for reputational issues, and – as
self-evaluation is related to both the “actor” and the “observer” self – they are also
relevant for self-esteem.2 Only experiencing the self as both agentic and moral
establishes a high self-esteem.

Notes
1 It might be argued that the lacking effect of CW on self-esteem is due to a ceiling effect
and to low variability. People usually rate themselves high on CW and the standard devia-
tion of respective ratings is low. However, people also rate themselves high on CM and the
standard deviation of these ratings is also low. Hence, this is no reason why CW does not
impact self-esteem.
2 Interestingly, a recent theory of status attainment (Bai, 2017) discusses three routes to sta-
tus: dominance (here AA), competence (here AC), and virtue (here CM).

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6
AGENTIC AND COMMUNAL
SOCIAL MOTIVES
Kenneth D. Locke

Social motives – motives that energize and guide social life – can be organized
into two broad categories: agentic and communal (Horowitz et al., 2006; Wig-
gins, 1991; see also Abele & Wojciszke, this volume, and the other chapters in
this volume). Agentic social motives induce people to stand out and get ahead –
for example, by demonstrating or asserting superior skill, influence, achievement,
worth, or power (Hogan & Roberts, 2000). Communal social motives induce
people to fit in and get along – for example, by emphasizing their commonalities
or showing how they are kind, cooperative, trustworthy, and generous partners.
Agentic and communal motives are fundamental and universal elements of human
nature (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015; Baumeister & Leary, 1995), shap-
ing and being shaped by the opportunities and challenges of social life throughout
our evolutionary history (Chan, Wang, & Ybarra, this volume).
The current chapter shows that agency and communion function as cardinal
axes along which we chart the course of our social lives. The chapter’s first sec-
tion explores how any direction we take – approaching agency, approaching
communion, avoiding agency, and avoiding communion – can lead to good and
bad outcomes. Therefore, as explained in the chapter’s second section, we rely
on upward, connective, downward, and contrastive social comparisons to steer
us away from agentic and communal goals that are likely to be frustrating (e.g.,
competing with others whose assets decisively exceed our own) and towards
those that are likely to be fulfilling (e.g., partnering with others with whom
we share core attitudes and aims). The chapter’s third section describes how, in
addition, individuals differ in dispositions to incline in particular directions (e.g.,
towards agency, away from communion) due to factors such as life history, life
stage, gender, and general sensitivities to costs or rewards. Finally, the chapter’s
fourth section examines the regulation of agentic and communal motives by
testosterone and oxytocin.
66 Kenneth D. Locke

Costs and benefits of agency and communion

Generation after generation, the expression and regulation of agentic and commu-
nal motives has influenced individuals’ inclusive fitness. Agentic motives propelled
individuals to build skills, acquire resources, impress mates, intimidate rivals, and
secure social positions in which they were well-treated by others. Communal
motives compelled individuals to nurture and protect their offspring, and to join
together with others to share resources and build safe, functioning communities.
Moreover, individuals who more effectively demonstrated both agency and com-
munion were more likely to be invited by others to form cooperative (including
romantic) partnerships (Barclay, 2016). Unsurprisingly given these selection pres-
sures, humans are keenly sensitive and responsive to agency and communion, both
within and between groups.
Accordingly, acute as well as chronic threats to communion (e.g., being excluded
or rejected) or agency (e.g., being disrespected or defeated) can evoke powerful
physiological and emotional reactions that can undermine mental and physical
well-being (Anderson et al., 2015; Cundiff & Smith, 2017; MacDonald & Leary,
2005; Smith & Jordan, 2015). Conversely, expressing and satisfying agentic and
communal motives is associated with better mental, physical, and social function-
ing (Anderson et al., 2015; Crocker, Canevello, & Brown, 2017), and this is true
across diverse cultures (Church et al., 2013). Accordingly, individuals are generally
motivated to gain (or at least not lose) social rank – e.g., by augmenting and adver-
tising their abilities and achievements and avoiding situations where they might
get humiliated. Likewise, people are generally motivated to strengthen (or at least
not weaken) their social bonds – e.g., by being loyal to their ingroup and avoiding
actions that might get them excluded.
On the other hand, sometimes chasing agency and communion can yield more
costs than benefits, especially when agency is pursued without concern for com-
munion or communion is pursued without concern for agency (Helgeson & Fritz,
2000). Potential costs of agentic motives include pursuing vain or costly aspira-
tions and debilitating or humiliating competitions; being judged as excessively
agentic (e.g., presumptuous, pushy); and engendering malicious envy (Križan &
Smith, 2014; van de Ven et al., 2014). Potential costs of communal motives include
shouldering burdensome obligations to aide and protect others (Leary & Cottrell,
2013); moreover, if your beneficence is neither appreciated nor reciprocated, then
you may feel exploited, resentful, and alienated, which can have a corrosive effect
on your psychological and physical well-being (Crocker et al., 2017).
Agentic and communal goals are often risky because agency and communion
are limited resources. Agency is limited because in many situations there can
be only one “winner” who, for example, wins the prize, the princess, or the
promotion. Communion is likewise limited because each person can only offer
friendship, support, and intimacy to select individuals and not others. And there
are inevitably opportunity costs: whenever we are pursuing one agentic or com-
munal goal (e.g., to advance in a particular career or to connect with a particular
 Agentic and Communal Social Motives 67

person), we are simultaneously not pursuing other agentic or communal goals

(e.g., to advance in another career or connect with another person). In order to
adaptively invest in social goals that promise to be fulfilling and divest from those
that threaten to be frustrating, we must make social comparisons.

Social motives and social comparisons

Social comparisons are assessments of where we stand relative to others, and can
help us to estimate the likelihood of achieving specific agentic and communal goals
(Locke, in press). Horizontal comparisons (Locke, 2003) refer to connective compari-
sons that place you close to and contrastive comparisons that place you far from the
target other on dimensions such as attitudes (including communal attitudes towards
each other, such as affection and loyalty) and lifestyle preferences. Whereas connec-
tive comparisons (perceived similarities) suggest that the target is likely to satisfy
communal motives for a warm, supportive relationship, contrastive comparisons
(perceived dissimilarities) suggest that the target is apt to frustrate such motives.
A large literature confirms that connective comparisons tend to amplify commu-
nal motives towards others, while contrastive comparisons tend to dampen them
(Bahns, Crandall, Gillath, & Preacher, 2017; Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008).
Numerous studies suggest that the inverse is also true: communal motives pre-
dict noticing and accentuating similarities, while ignoring and minimizing dis-
similarities. When comparing with others with whom they feel connected or want
to feel connected (e.g., liked or admired persons or ingroup members), people make
more connective comparisons (sometimes referred to as showing more assumed
similarity or social projection), and this is more true of people with stronger commu-
nal motives (Locke, Craig, Baik, & Gohil, 2012; Morrison & Matthes, 2011). People
with stronger communal motives also tend to experience stronger positive feelings
upon discovering similarities between themselves and others (Locke, 2003). Finally,
people with stronger communal or collectivistic values tend to express culturally
normative attitudes and actions and describe members of their friendship groups as
having similar personalities, whereas people with stronger agentic or individualistic
values tend to express distinctive attitudes and actions and describe members of
their friendship groups as having personalities that differ from each other ( Gebauer,
Wagner, Sedikides, & Neberich, 2013; Locke, Zheng, & Smith, 2014).
Vertical comparisons (Locke, 2003) refer to upward comparisons that place the tar-
get above the self (e.g., “You ran faster”) and downward comparisons that place
the target below the self (e.g., “I ran faster”) along agentic dimensions (e.g., physi-
cal, material, intellectual, or social assets and achievements). People can use vertical
comparisons to assess their likelihood of success in particular domains, and adjust
their agentic aspirations accordingly. The impact of vertical comparisons on agentic
motives often hinges on further connective and contrastive comparisons with the
comparison targets. Connective comparisons with upward targets that suggest you
could eventually rise as high (and contrastive comparisons with downward targets
68 Kenneth D. Locke

that suggest you would never fall as low) excite agentic motives (Buunk & Ybema,
1997; Lockwood, Shaughnessy, Fortune, & Tong, 2012; Wheeler, Martin, & Suls,
1997). Conversely, contrastive comparisons with upward targets that suggest that
you can never rise as high (plus connective comparisons with downward targets that
suggest you might fall as low) dampen agentic motives. Upward contrastive com-
parisons can also undermine communal motives and even provoke hostile impulses
towards the superior target (Lam, Van der Vegt, Walter, & Huang, 2011; Tesser,
1988). Narcissistic individuals – who characteristically show stronger agentic than
communal motives (Locke, 2000; Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012) – appear especially
willing to denigrate or distance themselves from those who outperform them, thus
sacrificing relationships to protect their illusions of superiority (Morf & Rhodewalt,
1993; Nicholls & Stukas, 2011).
A shared consensus about who is superior can obviate potentially costly competi-
tions. Indeed, individuals may deliberately avoid competitions by portraying them-
selves as inferior and ineffectual (e.g., “I am too timid to take charge”). However,
assuming submissive, unagentic stances – if done chronically or excessively – can
contribute to depression (Taylor, Gooding, Wood, & Tarrier, 2011). Studies of psy-
chiatric patients found that depressed individuals gave disproportionate importance
to unagentic goals (e.g., to avoid being confronted, humiliated, or scorned), and,
during treatment, successfully calming these motives predicted reductions in dis-
tress (Locke et al., 2017; Thomas, Kirchmann, Suess, Bräutigam, & Strauss, 2012).

Individual differences in agentic and communal motives

While social comparisons help individuals to align their social motives with their
specific circumstances, individuals simultaneously show some stability in their
social motives across situations. Individual differences in agentic and communal
motives can be assessed using various implicit and self-report measures (Locke,
2011; Ojanen, Grönroos, & Salmivalli, 2005; Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012; Schul-
theiss & Brunstein, 2010; Trucco, Wright, & Colder, 2013). Although implicit
and self-report measures only weakly correlate with each other (Locke, 2000) and
each has strengths and weaknesses (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989),
research supports the construct validity of both approaches. For example, stronger
self-reported communal motives have been found to predict volunteering to be
crisis counselors (Rek & Dinger, 2016), feeling more satisfied with dyadic interac-
tions (Locke & Sadler, 2007), and judging more harshly those who transgress com-
munal norms (Kammrath & Scholer, 2011). Likewise, stronger implicit communal
motives have been found to predict making self-disclosures (McAdams, 1992),
attending to friendly faces ( Schultheiss & Hale, 2007), and preferring interac-
tive activities (Weinberger, Cotler, & Fishman, 2010). People also show enduring
agentic and communal motives on behalf of groups with which they identify; for
example, Locke (2014) found that US citizens who wanted the US to be generally
more agentic and less communal when interacting with other countries typically
favored the more politically conservative candidate in their presidential election.
 Agentic and Communal Social Motives 69

Many factors contribute to individual differences in social motives. Below, I

briefly consider the potential influence of life stage, life history, biological sex, and
general approach/avoidance dispositions.

Approach/avoidance
Individual differences in general propensities to approach rewards or avoid costs
may help explain individual differences in propensities to approach/avoid agency
and communion. Supporting this hypothesis, agentic and communal motives are
positively associated with extraversion (a trait linked to reward sensitivity and
approach motives) and negatively associated with neuroticism (a trait linked to
punishment sensitivity and avoidance motives) (Corr, DeYoung, & McNaughton,
2013; Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2003; Locke & Heller, 2017). A specific avoidance goal
that may specifically moderate communal motives is disease avoidance. People
who are chronically prone or situationally primed to feel repulsed by communi-
cable pathogens tend to report lower levels of communion (e.g., friendliness, trust)
toward strangers and foreigners, and instead may emphasize ingroup and family
communion ( Fincher & Thornhill, 2012; Murray & Schaller, 2016).

Life stage and life history

Lifespan psychosocial models (e.g., Erikson, 1950) articulate a normative pathway to
developing sturdy, synergistic communal and agentic motives that benefit the indi-
vidual and society. Infants experience powerful communal motives to remain close
to familiar caregivers and uncommunal motives to be wary of unfamiliar adults,
presumably because such motives reliably improved survival (Bowlby, 1969). Secure
attachments build a foundation of trust and optimism that support agentic motives to
experiment, explore, express preferences, and develop skills (Bowlby, 1988). As ado-
lescents solidify an identity, they grow less preoccupied with unagentic and uncom-
munal motives (e.g., avoiding humiliation) (Trucco, Wright, & Colder, 2014).
From puberty onward, mating motives may evoke from some males extrava-
gant expressions of risk-taking, non-conformity, generosity, and formidability,
presumably because they advertise one’s agency and rank, and – at least in ances-
tral environments – were effective in luring mates and deterring rivals ( Griskevi-
cius, Haselton, & Ackerman, 2015; Roney & von Hippel, 2010; Schaller, Kenrick,
Neel, & Neuberg, 2017). As adulthood proceeds, though, people may generally
place less importance on agentic motives and more on communal motives ( Rob-
inson, 2013), perhaps because adult occupational and family roles typically involve
directing one’s agency (mental, physical, material, and social resources) to help
others. For example, parenthood entails employing one’s agency to care for chil-
dren lacking in agency to care for themselves. Indeed, our mammalian family tree
suggests that communal motives may have been originally selected specifically for
protecting and nurturing vulnerable offspring. In humans, though, the potential
focus of communal concerns has greatly expanded, and can encompass sundry kith
70 Kenneth D. Locke

and kin, strangers, and even other species (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010 ;
Preston, 2013; Tomasello, 2014). Harnessing agency towards genuinely communal
ends is the essence of the adult developmental task of generativity (Erikson, 1950)
and normative conceptions of heroism (Frimer, Walker, Lee, Riches, & Dunlop,
2012; Kinsella, Ritchie, & Igou, 2015).
Alas, most people are not heroes. Communal motives, though expansive in prin-
ciple (Singer, 1981), are often disconcertingly narrow in reality. For example, parents
tend nurture their own children more than others’ children and their biological chil-
dren more than their stepchildren, and fathers may better nurture their children who
resemble them more (Del Giudice & Belsky, 2010). Moreover, many people experi-
ence tensions rather than synergies between their agentic and communal motives.
Such tensions can arise between agentic motives to acquire new sexual partners or
produce more children and communal motives to invest in and nurture the children
and partner one already has (Durante, Eastwick, Finkel, Gangestad, & Simpson, 2016;
Fletcher, Simpson, Campbell, & Overall, 2015). Perhaps because of such tensions,
men with stronger agentic power motives or weaker communal affiliation motives
feel more constrained by fatherhood (Ruppen, Waldvogel, & Ehlert, 2016).
Life history theory suggests that a key moderator of communal motives to invest
in relationships, children, and society is social/environmental unpredictability, espe-
cially during childhood (Del Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015; Ellis, Figueredo,
Brumbach, & Schlomer, 2009). From the perspective of natural selection, if chil-
dren’s life spans are unpredictable, there may be little benefit in investing in nurtur-
ing a particular child; if others’ fidelity is unpredictable, there may be little benefit
in investing in a long-term relationship; and if the wider world is unpredictable,
there may be little benefit in investing in improving your society. Indeed, exposure
to unpredictable environments predicts more aggression, relationship instability, and
narcissistic, Machiavellian, and antisocial personality traits (e.g., Ellis et al.; Jonason,
Icho, & Ireland, 2016) – i.e., traits reflecting diminished communal (but undimin-
ished agentic) motives (Locke, 2000; Locke & Christensen, 2007).

Sex differences
Because of constraints imposed by gestation, lactation, and menopause, males can
potentially have a greater number of children, while females are required to make
a greater minimum physiological investment in each child. Consequently, females
tend to be choosier regarding with whom they will mate, obligating mate-seeking
males to engage in intra- and inter-sexual competition (Buss, 1995). Generations of
differential selection pressures favoring males pursuing rank and females providing
care could lead to sex-linked differences in social motives; and indeed, compared to
men, women typically place more importance on communion and less importance
on agency (Locke & Heller, 2017; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005; see also chapter 9).
Sex differences in social motives may help explain sex differences in preferences for
power versus status (Hays, 2013). Whereas power/dominance entails demonstrating
you can and will use force or resources to punish and reward others, status/prestige
 Agentic and Communal Social Motives 71

entails demonstrating you can and will use your skills or assets to benefit others
(Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).
Locke and Heller (2017) found that in the workplace people with stronger agentic
motives were more likely to want power, have power, and have their job satisfaction
depend on their having power; in contrast, people with stronger communal motives
were more likely to have status and to prefer status to power. Moreover, women’s
tendency to have stronger communal motives and weaker agentic motives than men
partly explained women’s stronger preference to have status rather than power.

Social chemistry
Hormones and neuropeptides – most notably testosterone and oxytocin – help
regulate agentic and communal motives, thus potentially contributing to the indi-
vidual differences described above. Testosterone appears to amplify agentic motives
to enhance and defend one’s social rank. Oxytocin appears to amplify communal
motives to nurture and protect one’s social bonds and significant others.

Oxytocin
Oxytocin levels – whether measured or manipulated – are positively associated
with engaged, nurturing, protective parental behavior ( Feldman & Bakermans-
Kranenburg, 2017; Bakermans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 2017). Oxytocin
levels increase after birth for both mothers and fathers, and involved fathers who
interact with their infants show oxytocin levels comparable to that of mothers.
During our evolutionary history the role of oxytocin has progressively expanded
from facilitating parenting to facilitating other attachments, including romantic
relationships (Fletcher et al., 2015; Griskevicius et al., 2015). For example, men in
committed relationships who received oxytocin experienced their partner as more
attractive ( Scheele et al., 2013). However, among individuals prone to feeling inse-
cure or vulnerable in relationships, elevating oxytocin may amplify those feelings
and thus activate self-protective rather than communal behavior (Bartz, 2016).
More broadly, oxytocin heightens social concerns and facilitates bonding and
benevolence among ingroup members, especially very close others (MacDonald &
MacDonald, 2010). Simultaneously, oxytocin may sharpen ingroup-outgroup
boundaries, and intensify wary, competitive, or hostile behavior toward poten-
tially threatening outgroup members ( Shalvi & De Dreu, 2014). Tellingly, priming
the parental care motive produces similar effects, heightening aversion to poten-
tially threatening others, such as strangers and distrusted outgroups (Eibach &
Mock, 2011; Gilead & Lieberman, 2014).

Testosterone
Testosterone levels are positively correlated with self-report, observational, and
implicit measures of agentic motivation (Knight & Mehta, 2014; Turan, Guo,
72 Kenneth D. Locke

Boggiano, & Bedgood, 2014). Individuals with higher testosterone levels are more
prone to desire an elevated social position and pursue assertive, competitive, or
aggressive actions in order to attain and retain social rank (Mehta & Josephs,
2011). Testosterone also activates sexual and mating motives (Muller, 2017), but
may inhibit bonding and nurturing (van Anders, Goldey, & Kuo, 2011; Roney &
Gettler, 2015). For example, higher testosterone levels predict being less committed
to one’s current partner and more interested in alternative partners (Wardecker,
Smith, Edelstein, & Loving, 2015), being more averse to intimate conversa-
tions following sexual activity (Denes, Afifi, & Granger, 2017), and among men
responding less sympathetically to infant cries (Fleming, Corter, Stallings, &
Steiner, 2002).
More generally, testosterone may stimulate agentic motives while suppressing
communal motives. For example, men with higher testosterone levels tend to be
more egocentric and antisocial (Johnson, Leedom, & Muhtadie, 2012; Wright
et al., 2012) and express weaker communal motives (Turan et al., 2014). Interest-
ingly, men’s testosterone levels decline when they transition from mate-seeking to
committing to a romantic partner or becoming a resident father – i.e., life circum-
stances in which rebalancing social motives away from agency (competing for new
mating opportunities) and toward communion (caring for one’s existing relation-
ship and offspring) would generally have been adaptive (Roney & Gettler, 2015).

Conclusions and future directions

Agency and communion are capacious concepts. Agentic motives encompass
various specific motives (e.g., achieving, outcompeting, mating), which them-
selves encompass innumerable narrower goals (e.g., overcoming this obstacle,
routing this rival, dazzling your dinner date). Communal motives likewise
include various specific motives (e.g., connecting, nurturing, protecting), which
themselves encompass innumerable narrower goals (e.g., calling your friend,
comforting your baby, defending your spouse). Different agentic motives and
goals have unique features, but also share features in common, and the same is
true of different communal motives and goals. For example, if a variable such
as upward comparisons, gender, or testosterone has an effect on one agentic
motive, then it tends to have similar effects on other agentic motives. Likewise,
if a variable such as connective comparisons, unpredictable childhood environ-
ments, or oxytocin has an effect on one communal motive, then it tends to have
similar effects on other communal motives. Collectively, the evidence reviewed
in this chapter suggests that agency and communion define fundamental catego-
ries of social motives and a productive framework for integrating insights from
different fields, stimulating novel hypotheses, and arriving at a deeper under-
standing of human sociality.
Looking to the future, our world is increasingly populated and shaped by arti-
ficial intelligences (AIs). They are embedded in innumerable devices (e.g., cars,
phones, “virtual assistants,” medical instruments, security systems) and every year
 Agentic and Communal Social Motives 73

play a greater role in operating our homes and businesses as well as our financial,
power, and communication systems. While AIs are motivated to achieve specific
aims, they must also accept the limits of their agency (e.g., not try to exceed speed
limits or pass faster vehicles). Furthermore, they should want to avoid connections
with untrustworthy human or non-human agents (e.g., potential security threats),
while also wanting to form and maintain mutually beneficial connections with
agents whose goals align with theirs (e.g., with whom they can share pertinent
information), which requires demonstrating their own trustworthiness. In other
words, the more powerful and autonomous the AI, the more it should be regulated
by a mixture of agentic, unagentic, communal, and uncommunal motives that
can be flexibly applied to complex and novel situations. Thus, our understanding
of the two fundamental social motives may help us not only to enhance human
relating, but also to successfully weave AIs into the fabric of society.

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7
THE BIG TWO DIMENSIONS
OF DESIRABILITY
Delroy L. Paulhus

Introduction
The varied papers in this volume are testament to the breadth of application of the
two meta-dimensions, agency and communion. I will use the term desirability as
synonymous with positive evaluation and argue that the broad influence of the agency-
communion distinction can be traced to two distinct ways in which people evaluate
themselves, other people, and questionnaire items. Whereas it has long been assumed
that evaluation is unidimensional – that is, every stimulus can be rated on one dimen-
sion from bad to good – I will argue that evaluation is bidimensional. This dual evalu-
ation emanates from the fact that both agency and communion are desirable qualities.

The multidimensionality of desirability

A problem overlooked throughout the long history of social desirability research is
the bias created by attaching the word social: That qualifier biases judgments toward
communally positive criteria (nice, cooperative, honest) to the detriment of agenti-
cally positive aspects (productive, creative, intelligent). Thus it is no surprise that
comprehensive trait ratings place likable, helpful, and honest at the top of desir-
ability ratings (Alicke, 1985; Bochner & Van Zyl, 1985).1 When the adjective social
is removed, then traits such as intelligent and conscientious become just as highly
rated (Hampson, Goldberg, & John, 1987; John & Robins, 1993). One goal of this
chapter is to persuade readers that research on desirability should not be restricted
to its communal aspects.
In principle, the dimensionality of desirability is infinite; that is, there are
endless ways that a person or trait can be seen as desirable, depending on the
rating context and the perceiver. Desirability in friends, workers, and romantic
partners all have different connotations. And perceptions of the same individual
80 Delroy L. Paulhus

by a Pollyanna, a cynic, a family member, and a competitor are likely to differ

substantially.
Yet everyday observers, as well as most psychologists, persist in viewing desirabil-
ity as unidimensional. That traditional view, clearly articulated by Edwards (1957), as
well as Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957), is that there exists an absolute dimen-
sion of evaluation (goodness, desirability) upon which we can map all personality
traits. Based on this assumption, we often ask our subjects to rate traits according
to their desirability scale values (DSVs). These values have been compiled in tables
to be used for various purposes (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Edwards, 1957; Bochner & Van
Zyl, 1985; Schönbach, 1972), including the equating of desirability in forced choice
methods.
A number of personality researchers have claimed to extract a pure evaluative
factor that is independent of content (Peabody & Goldberg, 1989; Leising et al.,
2013). But the claim for unidimensionality loses credibility when confronted with
the fact that the putative evaluation factor is inconsistent across domains. In the
Big Five domain, it runs through Agreeableness (Peabody & Goldberg, 1989). In
MMPI research, it runs through Neuroticism (Edwards, 1957). In multidimensional
scaling work by Rosenberg and Sedlak (1972), the evaluative factor is Intellectual
Positivity. Although one can run an evaluative factor through any dataset, there is
no guarantee that it will generalize to other datasets (e.g., Irwing, Booth, Nyborg, &
Rushton, 2012).

Apples and oranges

To illustrate the weakness in the unidimensionality assumption, I ask readers to
consider the following exercise. Examine these four items (panda, university, rose,
cypress tree) and order them (from low to high) with respect to desirability. Read-
ers may find this difficult. Try the same exercise with these three groups of people
(saints, supermen, and children).2 Surely it makes little sense to evaluate incom-
mensurate, qualitatively different objects (i.e., apples and oranges). Nonetheless,
research psychologists have no qualms about asking subjects to rate such discrep-
ant traits as honest, wise, and friendly on the same continuum. It seems that we’re
asking our subjects to do the impossible. As noted below, however, they seldom
complain!
So far, my approach has been to ask readers to experience the difficulty of com-
paring apples and oranges. But there are more empirical and objective sources of
evidence. Together they build a strong case for the multidimensional nature of
evaluation.

Factoring item desirabilities

One direct approach is to examine the structure of desirability ratings – as opposed
to the structure of self-ratings, the standard approach to factoring personality. The
two most prominent factor analyses of desirability ratings are those conducted
 The Big Two Dimensions of Desirability 81

by Sam Messick (1960) and Nancy Wiggins (1966). Messick came up with nine
factors; the first two corresponded to agentic and communal desirability, respec-
tively. Similarly, Wiggins came up with six, including separate factors for agentic
and communal desirability.
When limited to two factors, factor analyses of desirability ratings yield a clear
result: agentic and communal evaluation – with comparable sizes (Carey & Paulhus,
2008). That result supports the claim that agency and communion predominate in
evaluations as well as in self-ratings (Caruana, Lefeuvre, & Mollaret, 2014; Bruce &
Paulhus, 1990).

Rater differences
Many traits are judged positively by some people and negatively by other people.
If so, desirability scale values may show moderate means but bimodal distributions
(Abbott, 1975). For example, the trait “conservative” is evaluated positively by half
the people and negatively by the other half. Also, psychopaths often show evalu-
ations that are the reverse of most raters. For example, psychopaths view “nasty”
and “aggressive” as highly desirable (Buckels & Paulhus, 2017). Finally, there are
individual differences in people’s motivation to evaluate at all (Jarvis & Petty, 1996).
Such rater differences add further evidence against the notion that desirability is
unidimensional.

Context differences
Other research has established that evaluation of the same behavior can differ dra-
matically depending on the context in which it is rated (Ferris et al., 2010). One
paradigm that illustrates this inconsistency is the simulation of job applications.
Subjects are asked how they would promote themselves if applying for diverse jobs
(Holden et al., 2003; Bruce & Paulhus, 1990). Traits that were rated as desirable for
the social worker position (e.g., empathy, nurturance) were not rated as desirable
for a position as a military drill instructor.
Note that all subjects in this research were asked to answer as if they were “fak-
ing good.” So apparently the word “good” changes meaning quite fluidly across
contexts. By limiting the context to job applications, this paradigm permits con-
trol over extraneous factors that would apply when desirability is compared across
work vs. home or relationship contexts (e.g., Block, 1961).
Another classic example is the way in which desirability changes meaning with
the gender of the target being rated. Sandra Bem (1974) collected desirability rat-
ings of traits (a) when applied to men and (b) when applied to women. The differ-
ences in these desirability ratings – sometimes drastic – were used to develop Bem’s
theory of psychological androgyny. Individuals who rated both kinds of traits as
desirable were gifted with the label androgynous. Interestingly, these two clusters
of traits were later demonstrated to tap agency and communion (Wiggins & Hol-
zmuller, 1981).
82 Delroy L. Paulhus

The dynamics of desirability

The flexibility of human cognition allows people to move easily from simplicity
to complexity ( Suedfeld, 1992). Simple decisions favor speed and a comfortable
world-view. Although people trend to simplicity under high load conditions, they
can distinguish multiple desirability factors when given time and encouragement
to do so (Paulhus, Graf, & Van Selst, 1989).
But if evaluation is so complex, why don’t raters complain? It appears that
judges automatically incorporate context into their decisions (Ferris et al., 2010);
that is, all evaluations are contextualized, but people are unaware of this process
and fail to notice when they change criteria for evaluation. In short, evaluation is
an implicit, automatic process ( Chen & Bargh, 1999; Jarvis & Petty, 1996).
Nonetheless, the bidimensional evaluative pattern emerges over and over. One
reason is the bidimensional nature of human values that trigger the bidimensional
evaluation. The other is context associated with agency (e.g., competition and
achievement) or communion (e.g., cooperation and nurturance). I will consider
both in detail below.

Fundamental values
The predominance of agency and communion in analyses of evaluation springs
from the two underlying values (Locke, 2000; Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012). The
Locke measures are scored according to dyadic interactions, whereas the Trapnell
and Paulhus measures are more global in nature.3 In the analysis by Paulhus and
John (1998), the triggering of values is the first step in a cascade that causes a bias
in favor of agentic or communal evaluations and eventual behavior.

Priming by context
Agentic and communal values can also be primed by context. The ease with
which judges can alter the weighting of dimension is exemplified by Sherman,
Mackie, and Driscoll (1990 ). Before evaluating political candidates, subjects
were primed with an agentic dimension (forging foreign policy) or a commu-
nal one (taking care of home citizens). Depending on which dimension was
primed, the evaluation of candidates was reversed. In short, evaluation is a very
pliable factor.
Hence, it is not surprising that the relative impact of agentic and communal
values also varies across applications. In terms of categorization speed, communion
takes precedence (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011). In terms of impact on self-esteem,
agency takes precedence (Wojciszke, Baryla, Parzuchowski, Szymkow, & Abele,
2011; but see also Abele & Hauke, this volume). Although human judgment can
operate at varying degrees of complexity, it may be that the two-factor level of
agency-communion is the optimal level for everyday cognition (Rosch & Mervis,
1975).
 The Big Two Dimensions of Desirability 83

Self-enhancement
Whether the trigger is fundamental values or context, individual differences in
self-enhancement emerge in both agentic and communal contexts. However, the
nature of enhancement differs qualitatively (Paulhus & John, 1998). In agentic
contexts, the enhancement has an egoistic flavor with an exaggerated sense of intel-
ligence, creativity, and overall competence. In communal contexts, the enhance-
ment has a moralistic flavor with an exaggerated sense of moral superiority (see
Gebauer & Sedikides, this volume).

The big picture

In summary of my model of agency-communion dynamics, I have argued in a
series of reports for a specific developmental sequence (Paulhus, 2002; Paulhus &
John, 1998; Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012). It begins with the differential socialization
of two fundamental values, triggering two forms of self-enhancement, and culmi-
nates in two identities that play out in observable behavior. Whether the identity is
agentic or communal, it necessarily includes some reality and some enhancement
(Hogan, 1983).
Given all this evidence for duality, why is desirability so often assumed to be
unidimensional? One reason is that people overlook its subjectivity (e.g., “I heard
it was a good movie”) and rely on pluralistic ignorance ( Prentice & Miller, 1996).
By ignoring alternative viewpoints, people avoid the challenges of dealing with
complexity (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).
This pressure toward simplicity in trait perception is clearly exemplified in
the so-called halo effect (Thorndike, 1920): information that a target individual
is positive on one characteristic tends to increase the likelihood that he/she will
be rated positively on other characteristics. As a result, a constellation of complex
acquaintances can more easily be arrayed from good to bad. The cognitive econ-
omy of collapsing multiple dimensions to facilitate approach-avoidance decisions
is nothing less than critical for human survival (Emler, 1990; Pinker, 2005).

Two important implications

The most important implications of this chapter are that agentic and communal
desirability be distinguished in (1) the measurement of desirable responding, and
(2) the systematic scaling of attribute desirabilities.

1. Measures of desirable responding

The first implication concerns so-called social desirability scales, which have a
long history in psychological assessment (for the most recent review, see Holden &
Passey, 2009). These instruments were designed to capture individual differences
in the tendency to give desirable responses on self-reports. Because they refer to
84 Delroy L. Paulhus

individual differences in response styles, not to desirable characteristics, the term

socially desirable responding (SDR) or simply desirable responding (DR) is preferable
(Paulhus, 2017).
A variety of such measures have appeared in the assessment literature (for a
detailed review of individual scales, see Paulhus, 1984). Although serious measure-
ment began with the MMPI validity scales (Hathaway & McKinley, 1951), the
development of such measures accelerated during the 1950s and 1960s. Although tar-
geting the same concept, the item selection methods varied dramatically. Edwards’s
(1957) SD scale comprised the set of items receiving the highest desirability ratings
in large surveys. Items on Wiggins’s (1959) Sd scale were those showing the great-
est change in claim rates between faking and honest conditions. The Marlowe-
Crowne scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) consisted of items that were (a) highly
desirable, but rare, or (b) undesirable, but common. When compared empirically,
the striking result was a lack of convergence among these scales. Clearly, desirable
responding is not a unitary tendency (Holden & Fekken, 1989).
That singular lack of convergence motivated my early work on determining
how many factors would emerge in a comprehensive comparison of all the promi-
nent scales (Paulhus, 1984). Two clear factors emerged. The first was marked by
such scales as the Edwards scale and Jackson’s SD scale; the factor was labeled Self-
Deceptive Enhancement to refer to an exaggerated self-positivity that the respondent
actually believed. The second factor was marked by the Marlowe-Crowne scale and
Eysenck’s lie scale; it was labeled Impression Management to refer to self-positivity
triggered by an audience. Other researchers have come to similar conclusions about
the duality of desirability: Holden and Fekken (1989) used the labels Sense of General
Capability and Interpersonal Sensitivity. For Dubois (2000), the corresponding labels
were Social Desirability and Social Utility. Leising and colleagues (2013) preferred
the labels Positive Self Regard and Claim to Leadership. Nonetheless, the similarity in
labels is unmistakable.
This divergence in the two major factors culminated in my development of the
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) (Paulhus, 1991). Consisting of
two 20-item subscales, this measure is now the most widely used measure of desir-
able responding (Holden & Passey, 2009). Although its two subscales have received
empirical support, they have also been critiqued for the difficulty of distinguishing
desirable responding (i.e., response styles) from actual personality traits (i.e., content).
In other words, some respondents claiming the desirable options on the BIDR may
actually possess those two desirable traits. If so, the BIDR subscales may be measuring
two personality traits (de Vries, Zettler, & Hilbig, 2014; McCrae & Costa, 1983).4
The fatal flaw with this content argument is that these two traits only appear in
studies of social desirability, self-enhancement, or bias; they never appear as factors
of personality.
Nonetheless, in 2002, I reconsidered the issue of content vs. style in SDR scales
(Paulhus, 2002). To understand the distinctive behavior of personality factors and
SDR factors, I turned (with Oliver John) to the meta-factors of agency and com-
munion (Paulhus & John, 1998). We argued that these meta-factors were more
 The Big Two Dimensions of Desirability 85

environmental in origin and tended to increase correlations among the Big Five
factors. Our reasoning followed Hogan (1983) in recognizing that children are
socialized to seek two broad goals in life: “getting along” (communion) and “get-
ting ahead” (agency). Whenever activated, these motives can simplify the usual
five-dimensional personality structure to appear more bidimensional.
As a result, two second-order factors often emerge when factoring the cor-
relations among the Big Five traits (e.g., DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2002;
Digman, 1997). Although the latter researchers use different labels, the correspon-
dence with agency and communion is hard to ignore. As noted earlier, the bidi-
mensionality also becomes apparent when self-reports are collected under speeded
or stressful conditions (Paulhus et al., 1989).

2. Desirability scale values

Because they do not take into account the multidimensionality of SD, all tabled
desirability scale values are misleading, if not meaningless (Messick, 1960). Some
receive high ratings because they emphasize agentic positivity (e.g., intelligent,
conscientious, creative). Others receive high ratings because they emphasize com-
munal positivity (e.g., warm, helpful, dependable). Therefore, a tabled value may
reflect its agentic desirability, its communal desirability, or some combination of
both. A colleague and I are now collecting both desirability ratings on the same
sample (Ziegler & Paulhus, 2017).
One common use of such ratings is to equate the desirability of matched pairs
in forced choice formatting (Jackson et al., 2000; Nederhof, 1985). The goal of this
procedure is to control social desirability so that respondents will not simply be
using that criterion to choose an answer. To obtain a match, however, it is likely
that one choice is agentic and the other communal. Therefore, item content is
being introduced by the back door. For example, assessors would balk at assessing
self-reported intelligence by forcing a choice between “smart” and “dumb” –
because of a clear desirability confound. Instead, “smart” might be compared with
“kind,” a trait with equally high desirability but communal instead of agentic. Of
course, the problem is avoided when the two options are relatively neutral to begin
with: For example, “I love big parties” vs. “I avoid big parties.”
Although it doesn’t always guarantee control over desirable responding, the
forced choice procedure was put to good use in assembling the Narcissistic Per-
sonality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988). Respondents were forced to choose
between “I would make a great world leader” and “In most ways, I am an average
person.” This was a clever way to determine if respondents would choose agentic
desirability over communal desirability – the fundamental dynamic of narcissism.

Conclusions
Desirability doesn’t lie in the trait. It’s not an inherent property. Instead, it’s the
result of a process of considering the implications of personal qualities within an
86 Delroy L. Paulhus

interpersonal context. In principle, there is an infinite number of contexts, so the

same trait can be evaluated as desirable, undesirable, or neutral depending on the
context and the judge.
Nonetheless, given the fact that two fundamental human values are especially
prominent, evaluations tend to center on agency and communion. Each situation
tends to trigger one or the other (with some cross-talk).5 Despite the complexity of
human interactions, agency and communion represent the two largest clusters of
traits, motives, and behavior (Wiggins, 1991). As a result, people tend to generalize
their responses to one of those two implicit contexts.
Any appearance of a global desirability factor in multivariate research neces-
sarily summarizes some unspecified combination of goals, contexts, and group
differences. Although adaptive for lay cognition, it appears that this evaluative over-
simplification may have had a detrimental effect on the history of psychometrics.

Notes
1 Some rating instructions use labels that are explicitly communal. For example, Anderson
(1968) asked respondents to rate the “likableness” of 555 personality trait words (also
Schönbach, 1972).
2 See Brown (1986) for other examples.
3 Note that the popular Schwartz value model forces agency and communion to be in
opposition by ipsatizing the value ratings (Schwartz, 1992).
4 Nonetheless, to avoid such critiques, alternative approaches that are more objective in nature
have been developed and validated (see Paulhus & Holden, 2010).
5 Cross-dimensional influence of agency and communion is discussed in detail by Yzerbyt
(this volume) as well as by Judd and colleagues (2005).

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8
AGENCY AND COMMUNION IN
GRANDIOSE NARCISSISM
Jochen E. Gebauer and Constantine Sedikides

The year is 50 BC. Gaul is entirely occupied by the Romans. Well, not entirely ...
One small village of indomitable Gauls still holds out against the invaders.
– Asterix the Gaul ( Goscinny & Uderzo, 1969)

The Romans had occupied Gaul, just as the Big Two (agency and communion)
currently “occupy” self-evaluation (Abele & Hauke, this volume; Paulhus, this
volume). And just as Gaul, self-evaluation is not entirely occupied by the Big Two.
To date, hardly any self-evaluative concept receives more scientific attention than
grandiose narcissism – a global self-evaluation characterized by excessively exalted
self-importance, entitlement, and social power – and that concept still holds out
against the Big Two “invaders.” The classic view of grandiose narcissism considers
grandiose narcissism inherently agentic and, thus, rejects a communal form of this
construct. Here, we summarize theoretical reasons and empirical evidence for the
applicability of the Big Two to grandiose narcissism.
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part reviews the classic view
of grandiose narcissism. The next part reviews evidence that the Big Two pervade
global self-evaluations, resulting in a simple – but consequential – argument: if the
Big Two are generally applicable to global self-evaluations, the Big Two should also
apply to grandiose narcissism. The third part describes a theoretical model that is
based on that argument, the agency-communion model of grandiose narcissism
(ACM; Gebauer, Sedikides, Verplanken, & Maio, 2012) in its revised, minimalist
version (minimalist-ACM; Gebauer et al., 2018). The final part reviews empirical
evidence for the minimalist-ACM.

Classic view of grandiose narcissism

The emergence of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry,
1988) paved the way for social-personality psychologists’ immense interest in
 Agency and Communion in Grandiose Narcissism 91

grandiose narcissism. The NPI, implemented in over three-quarters of narcissism

studies (Cain, Pincus, & Ansell, 2008), has resulted in “NPI-narcissism” often
being used interchangeably with grandiose narcissism (Miller & Campbell, 2008).
Example items of the NPI are “I will be a success,” “I rarely depend on anyone
else to get things done,” and “I am more capable than other people.” Research-
ers theorized that grandiose narcissists possessed particularly inflated self-views
in virtually all domains of life, and such broad and sweeping self-enhancement
fed off their excessively exalted self-importance, entitlement, and social power
(Emmons, 1987; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991a, 1991b). In support of those
claims, John and Robins (1994) provided empirical evidence that NPI-narcissists
unduly self-enhance in a managerial performance task, while Gabriel, Critelli, and
Ee (1994) provided empirical evidence that NPI-narcissists unduly self-enhance
their intelligence and physical attractiveness.
Paulhus and John (1994; cited in Paulhus & John, 1998) challenged the view
that grandiose narcissists uphold their excessively exalted sense of self-importance,
entitlement, and social power by self-enhancement in virtually all domains of life.
Paulhus and John (1994) provided empirical evidence that NPI-narcissists unduly self-
enhance on agentic traits (dominance, extraversion, intellect, openness, neuroticism,
ambition), but not on communal traits (agreeableness, nurturance, and dutifulness) –
a replicable pattern (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Carlson, Naumann, &
Vazire, 2011; Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011). Two theoretical explanations
appear plausible. One states that grandiose narcissism is inherently agentic, and so
grandiose narcissists buttress their global self-evaluations (highly exalted sense of self-
importance, entitlement, and social power) by unduly overstating their agentic, but
not communal, attributes. The other explanation states that NPI-narcissism does not
capture grandiose narcissism in its entirety, but captures only one side of it (agentic
narcissism) and neglects the other side (communal narcissism).
The field endorsed the former explanation without considering the latter one.
Grandiose narcissists’ selective self-enhancement (agency: yes; communion: no)
became a theoretical cornerstone. The alpha-gamma model (Paulhus & John,
1998), for example, describes grandiose narcissism as an alpha/agentic bias. The
minimalist model (Paulhus, 2001) links grandiose narcissism to an extreme form
of agentic, at the expense of communal, self-perception. The impulsivity model
(Vazire & Funder, 2006, p. 161) defines unmitigated agency as “overly positive
self-views on agentic traits” and equates unmitigated agency with narcissism. The
agency model (Campbell & Foster, 2007) describes agentic self-enhancement as the
signature of grandiose narcissism. And the energy clash model (Sedikides & Camp-
bell, 2017) is built on the premise that narcissistic leaders enhance their agentic, not
their communal, attributes.
Why did the field endorse the view that grandiose narcissism is inherently
agentic? First, the origins of grandiose narcissism can be traced to Timothy Leary’s
(1957) book on the “Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality.” He theorized that
narcissism is located in the middle between the high-agency and low-communion
axes. This idea, albeit not upheld empirically, has been influential. Second, due
to the construct’s strong psychoanalytic heritage, scholars think of it in more
92 Jochen E. Gebauer and Constantine Sedikides

dynamic, self-regulatory terms compared to other self-evaluations (Back et al.,

2013; Campbell & Foster, 2007; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Thinking of grandi-
ose narcissism in self-regulatory terms implicates typical self-regulatory processes,
including goal alignment (Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2011). Accord-
ing to the goal-alignment process, goals and their means are typically aligned
content-wise: narcissists possess an agentic goal (to maintain an excessively exalted
sense of self-importance, entitlement, and social power) and, thus, should employ
agentic means (agentic self-enhancement) to reach that goal. Third, the literature
has conceptualized communion in two ways: as the degree of interpersonal ori-
entation (other-focus vs. self-focus; Clark & Mills, 1979) and as the behavioral
content within interpersonal interaction (warm-agreeableness vs. cold-hearted;
Wiggins, 1991). The former conceptualization is antithetical to communal narcis-
sism, because an exaggerated self-focus is essential to all forms of grandiose nar-
cissism, although this conceptualization has waned in recent years in favor of its
alternative (Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008). Fourth, experimentally expos-
ing NPI-narcissists to communal primes reduces their narcissistic relationship style
(Finkel, Campbell, Buffardi, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2009) and their level of nar-
cissism ( Giacomin & Jordan, 2014). These findings were taken as evidence that
communion is antithetical to grandiose narcissism. Finally, the NPI has been so
vital to grandiose narcissism research that it may have appeared inappropriate,
even irreverent, to question its construct validity.

The Big Two in self-evaluation

The previous section described the classic view of grandiose narcissism. In contrast
to that classic – and still predominant – view, research has shown that global self-
evaluations typically fall into two factors, an agentic and a communal one. The
origins of the Big Two in self-evaluation can be traced back to Shavelson, Hubner,
and Stanton (1976), who proposed that global self-esteem can be broken down
into academic aspects (aka agency) and social aspects (aka communion).1 Fleming
and Watts (1980) tested this proposal. A factor analysis of the Janis-Field Feelings
of Inadequacy Scale (Janis & Field, 1959) revealed two factors: school abilities
(aka agency) and social confidence (aka communion).2 Heatherton and Polivy
(1991), in validating their State Self-Esteem Scale, uncovered two psychological
factors: performance (aka agency) and social (aka communion).3,4 Tafarodi and
Milne (2002), in their examination of the factorial structure of Rosenberg’s (1965)
Self-Esteem Scale, also uncovered two factors: self-competence (aka agency) and
self-liking (aka communion). (For related discussions, see Abele & Hauke, this
volume; Paulhus, this volume.)
Self-esteem is not the only self-evaluation that comprises agentic and communal
factors. Self-enhancement (i.e., an overly positive self-evaluation) is another. In their
“Muhammad Ali effect,” Allison, Messick, and Goethals (1989) showed that intelli-
gence self-enhancement (aka agency self-enhancement) and morality self-enhance-
ment (aka communion self-enhancement) are two conceptually distinct forms of
 Agency and Communion in Grandiose Narcissism 93

unrealistically positive self-evaluation. Moreover, Paulhus and John (1994) factor-

analyzed nine self-enhancement indices corresponding to nine traits (dominance,
extraversion, intellect, openness, neuroticism, ambition, agreeableness, nurturance,
and dutifulness). Although those traits spanned the personality spectrum, the fac-
tor analyses did not reveal a five-factor self-enhancement structure. Instead, a Big
Two structure emerged. These results have been replicated directly or conceptually
and cross-culturally (Campbell et al., 2002; Gebauer, Sedikides, & Schrade, 2017;
Paulhus & John, 1998; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003).
Humility is also relevant to the discussion. Hill and Laney (2017, p. 243) define
humility as a “phenomenon that involves a nondefensive willingness to see one-
self accurately by acknowledging one’s personal limitations, combined with an
appreciation for the strengths and contributions of other people from which one
can learn.” In short, humility can be located at the very low end of a global
self-enhancement dimension or perhaps at the low end of the grandiose narcis-
sism dimension (Miller, Price, Gentile, Lynam, & Campbell, 2012). Indeed, the
literature distinguishes two humility factors: intellectual humility (aka agentic
humility) and relational humility (aka communal humility) (Davis et al., 2011;
Roberts & Wood, 2003).

Agency-communion model of grandiose narcissism

and its revised, minimalist version
The previous section summarized extensive evidence that the Big Two are integral
to self-evaluation, including positive self-evaluation (self-esteem), overly positive
self-evaluation (self-enhancement), and the absence of overly positive self-evaluation
(humility). From this vantage point, it appears highly likely that the Big Two are
also integral to narcissistic self-evaluation. This logic constitutes the foundation of
the ACM (Gebauer et al., 2012) and the minimalist-ACM (Gebauer et al., 2018).
The original ACM extended the dynamic self-regulatory processing model
(Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001) and the agency model (Campbell & Foster, 2007) of
narcissism. To begin, the ACM challenged the content validity of the NPI, arguing
that it assesses agentic, not grandiose, narcissism. According to the ACM, agentic
narcissists continually seek to validate their self-importance, entitlement, and social
power by unduly enhancing their agentic, but not communal, attributes. Cru-
cially, the ACM introduced the construct of communal narcissism. According to
the ACM, communal narcissists continually seek to validate their self-importance,
entitlement, and social power by unduly enhancing their communal, but not agen-
tic, attributes. The ACM regarded agentic and communal narcissism as dynamic,
self-regulatory concepts, engrossed in continually validating the global self-evaluation
of grandeur.
The minimalist-ACM is a revised version of the ACM. The key difference is that
the minimalist-ACM does not think of agentic and communal narcissism as par-
ticularly dynamic, self-regulatory constructs but rather as “plain” traits. This refor-
mulation owes to advances in narcissism research. First, there is growing consensus
94 Jochen E. Gebauer and Constantine Sedikides

that grandiose narcissism is best defined as a global self-evaluation signified by an

excessively exalted sense of self-importance, entitlement, and social power (Brown,
Budzek, & Tamborski, 2009; Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman,
2004; Krizan & Herlache, 2018; Sedikides & Campbell, 2017). Second, other global
self-evaluations (self-esteem, self-enhancement, humility) comprise agentic and
communal factors, which are not conceptualized as particularly dynamic and self-
regulatory (Hill & Laney, 2017; Paulhus & John, 1998; Tafarodi & Milne, 2002).
Third, there is little evidence that grandiose narcissism has dynamic, self-regulatory
properties (Gebauer et al., 2018), making the case for Occam’s razor. For example,
there is no sufficient evidence that grandiose narcissists’ excessively exalted sense of
self-importance, entitlement, and social power is a defensive self-regulation strategy
to ward off lingering feelings of inadequacy (Bosson et al., 2008). Finally, the heri-
tability of narcissism is relatively high (Vernon, Villani, Vickers, & Harris, 2008),
and agentic narcissism’s genetic variance is largely unshared with communal narcis-
sism’s genetic variance (Luo, Cai, Sedikides, & Song, 2014).

Empirical evidence for the minimalist-ACM

Gebauer et al. (2018; for a summary, see Gebauer & Sedikides, in press) compiled
an extensive review of studies testing the minimalist-ACM. The review assessed the
evidence according to six criteria. In this section, we describe those six criteria and
summarize the evidence for them. Before doing so, however, we briefly note how
agentic and communal narcissism is measured in the context of the minimalist-
ACM: Agentic narcissism is measured with the NPI (described above), whereas
communal narcissism is measured with the 16-item Communal Narcissism Inven-
tory (CNI; Gebauer et al., 2012). Example-items are “I am the most caring per-
son in my social surrounding,” “I will be well-known for the good deeds I will
have done,” and “I greatly enrich others’ lives.” The CNI’s psychometric properties
are satisfactory (Gebauer et al., 2012; Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Czarna, Piotrowski,
Baran, & Maltby, 2016).

Criterion #1: distinctiveness of agentic and communal narcissism

To qualify as distinct forms of grandiose narcissism, agentic and communal narcis-
sism must be positively, but non-perfectly, interrelated. In most other self-evaluations,
the size of the relation between the agentic and communal factors ranges between
moderate and large4 (self-esteem: Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; self-enhancement:
Paulhus & John, 1998; humility: Hill & Laney, 2017). It makes theoretical sense
to expect a similarly-sized relation between agentic and communal narcissism. Of
course, that size may differ somewhat between countries, due to divergent socio-
cultural norms and habits (Gebauer et al., 2015), but the relation must be positive
and non-perfect in each culture. Several studies support this moderate size correla-
tion. Fatfouta, Zeigler-Hill, and Schröder-Abé (2017) found a positive interrelation
of moderate size in a German sample. Gebauer et al. (2018) meta-analyzed this
 Agency and Communion in Grandiose Narcissism 95

relation within 20+ samples largely from the US, the UK, and Germany, also find-
ing a positive relation of moderate size. In addition, these authors probed for cross-
cultural differences in a large study from 50+ countries. They obtained a positive,
non-perfect relation between agentic and communal narcissism in all countries,
ranging in size between moderate and large.

Criterion #2: selective self-enhancement

To qualify as agentic narcissism, agentic (i.e., NPI) narcissists must unduly enhance
their agentic, but not communal, attributes. Grijalva and Zhang (2016) provided
relevant evidence for agentic narcissism. They meta-analyzed agentic narcissists’
tendency to self-enhance on agentic and communal attributes. Agentic narcissists
enhanced their agentic attributes more than their non-narcissistic counterparts.
Agentic narcissists did not differ from their counterparts in enhancing their com-
munal attributes.
Communal narcissists, by contrast, must unduly enhance their communal,
but not agentic, attributes. Gebauer et al. (2012) reported preliminary evidence
that communal narcissists unduly enhance their communal attributes. Specifi-
cally, communal narcissists unduly overclaimed their communal knowledge (e.g.,
knowledge of international health charities), but not their agentic knowledge (e.g.,
knowledge of chemistry and physics). Gebauer et al. (2018) reported a large-scale
replication of the just-described results. Additionally, Nehrlich, Gebauer, Sedikides,
and Schoel (in press) found in two larger studies that communal narcissists see
themselves as particularly prosocial, but they do not actually behave any more pro-
socially than their non-narcissistic counterparts. The results remained unchanged
when agentic narcissism was controlled for. In sum, the empirical evidence meets
criterion #2.

Criterion #3: common grandiose self-evaluations

at the global level
To qualify as forms of grandiose narcissism, agentic and communal narcissism must
predict particularly high levels of grandiose self-evaluations at the global level.
A large number of studies found positive relations between agentic narcis-
sism and self-importance (aka grandiosity), entitlement, and social power (for a
review see Gebauer et al., 2018). Moreover, those relations remain intact when
communal narcissism is statistically controlled for (Gebauer et al., 2012, 2018).
Likewise, Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, and Maltby (2015) reported a posi-
tive relation between agentic narcissism and entitlement, despite controlling for
communal narcissism (grandiosity and social power were not assessed). Finally,
Gebauer et al. (2018) replicated the latter findings in their cross-cultural study
in 50+ countries.
Communal narcissism, too, is positively related to self-importance (aka gran-
diosity), entitlement, and social power. Gebauer et al. (2012) provided initial
96 Jochen E. Gebauer and Constantine Sedikides

evidence for this, whereas Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al. (2015) reported a positive

relation between communal narcissism and entitlement. Giacomin and Jordan
(2015) showed that communal narcissists’ communal self-perceptions serve to
uphold social power. Lastly, Gebauer et al. (2018) replicated Gebauer et al.’s (2012)
results in a large US sample, and further obtained positive relations between com-
munal narcissism and entitlement in 50+ countries even after controlling for
agentic narcissism (with the exception of one country). The empirical evidence
meets criterion #3, too.

Criterion #4: psychological adjustment

To qualify as grandiose narcissists, agentic and communal narcissists must be at
least as psychologically adjusted as their non-narcissistic counterparts. Put differ-
ently, agentic and communal narcissists must not be psychologically maladjusted,
because maladjustment is a conceptual feature of vulnerable narcissists, not grandi-
ose narcissists (Barry & Malkin, 2010; Campbell, 2001; Dickinson & Pincus, 2003;
Miller et al., 2011; Wink, 1991).
Supporting this reasoning, Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, and Rus-
bult (2004), for example, found positive relations between agentic narcissism
and self-esteem, subjective well-being, and couple well-being in UK and US
samples. Sedikides et al. (2004) also found negative relations between agentic
narcissism and anxiety, depression, sadness, and loneliness (see also Cain et al.,
2008; Miller & Campbell, 2008). Gebauer et al. (2018) examined the relation
between agentic narcissism and psychological adjustment (self-esteem, life sat-
isfaction) in 50+ countries. The size of this relation varied considerably across
countries but it was never significantly negative; on average, it was moder-
ately positive. Moreover, controlling for communal narcissism did not change
the result pattern regarding agentic narcissism and psychological adjustment
( Gebauer et al., 2012, 2018).
Communal narcissists, too, are psychologically adjusted, at least as adjusted as
non-narcissists. Gebauer et al. (2012) found positive relations between commu-
nal narcissism and higher self-esteem in two UK samples. Likewise, Żemojtel-
Piotrowska, Clinton, and Piotrowski (2014) found positive relations between
communal narcissism and higher self-esteem, more positive affect, higher life
satisfaction, and better social well-being in a Polish sample. Gebauer et al. (2018)
reported positive relations between communal narcissism and more positive affect,
higher life satisfaction, less negative affect, and lower depression in a large US
sample. Gebauer et al. (2018) also examined the relation between communal nar-
cissism and psychological adjustment (self-esteem, life satisfaction) in 50+ coun-
tries. The size of this relation varied considerably across countries, but it was never
significantly negative; on average, it was moderately positive. Moreover, control-
ling for agentic narcissism did not change the result pattern regarding communal
narcissism and psychological adjustment ( Gebauer et al., 2012, 2018). The empiri-
cal evidence, thus, meets criterion #4.
 Agency and Communion in Grandiose Narcissism 97

Criterion #5: distinctiveness from vulnerable forms of narcissism

To qualify as forms of grandiose narcissism, agentic narcissism and communal nar-
cissism must be empirically distinct from vulnerable forms of narcissism ( Camp-
bell, 2001; Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Miller et al., 2011; Wink, 1991).
Agentic narcissism is empirically distinct from vulnerable forms of narcissism,
including hypersensitive narcissism (Hendin & Cheek, 1997; Miller et al., 2011),
pathological narcissism (Maxwell, Donnellan, Hopwood, & Ackerman, 2011; Pin-
cus et al., 2009), and narcissistic personality disorder (Maxwell et al., 2011; Miller &
Campbell, 2008).
Communal narcissism, too, is empirically distinct from vulnerable forms of nar-
cissism, including hypersensitive narcissism, pathological narcissism, and narcissis-
tic personality disorder (Gebauer et al., 2012, 2018). One must assure the empirical
distinctiveness of communal narcissism from the self-sacrificing self-enhancement
facet of pathological narcissism (SSSE; Pincus et al., 2009), because SSSE can be
conceptualized as the communal form of pathological narcissism. However, even
SSSE is empirically distinct from communal narcissism. Specifically, Gebauer et al.
(2018) found a moderate-to-large relation between communal narcissism and SSSE
across two large US samples. At the same time, those two forms of narcissism
evinced different nomological networks. Controlling for SSSE, communal nar-
cissism was positively related to agentic narcissism and psychological adjustment
(more positive affect, higher life satisfaction, less negative affect, lower anxiety,
lower depression, and lower neuroticism). Controlling for communal narcissism,
SSSE was hardly related to agentic narcissism at all and negatively related to psycho-
logical adjustment (less positive affect, more negative affect, higher anxiety, higher
depression, and more neuroticism). The empirical evidence also meets criterion #5.

Criterion #6: distinctiveness from Big Two self-perceptions

To qualify as a form of grandiose narcissism, agentic narcissism must be positively,
but non-perfectly, related to agentic self-perceptions. Similarly, to qualify as a form
of grandiose narcissism, communal narcissism must be positively, but non-perfectly,
related to communal self-perceptions.
Agentic narcissism is positively related to agentic self-perceptions. The size of
that relation ranges between moderate and large, but it is not perfect (Brown, Freis,
Carroll, & Arkin, 2016; Campbell et al., 2002; Gebauer et al., 2012; Miller et al.,
2012; Paulhus, 2001). Agentic narcissism and agentic self-perceptions are positively
associated, but distinct, constructs.
Communal narcissism is positively related to communal self-perceptions. The
size of this relation ranges from moderate to large, but is not perfect ( Gebauer
et al., 2012, 2018). The relation between communal narcissism and prosociality
self-perceptions is also relevant, because prosociality is a key aspect of commu-
nion (Gebauer, Sedikides, Lüdtke, & Neberich, 2014). As described above, Neh-
rlich et al. (in press) obtained moderately positive relations between communal
98 Jochen E. Gebauer and Constantine Sedikides

narcissism and prosociality self-perceptions. Finally, the link between communal

narcissism and agreeableness self-perceptions is relevant, as agreeableness is also a
key aspect of communion (Paulhus & John, 1998). Gebauer et al. (2018) exam-
ined this link in their study from 50+ countries. They obtained positive relations,
with over 70% of them ranging from small to moderate. Communal narcissism
and communal self-perceptions are positively linked, but distinct, constructs. The
empirical evidence meets the final criterion, too.

Concluding remarks
The Big Two have figured prominently in the self-evaluation literature. Yet, the
classic view in the narcissism literature maintains that they are inapplicable to
grandiose narcissism. In contrast, we summarized theoretical reasons and empiri-
cal evidence for an agency-communion model of grandiose narcissism (Gebauer
et al., 2012) in its minimalist version (Gebauer et al., 2018). According to this
model, the Big Two apply to grandiose narcissism, just as they apply to other
global self-evaluations: grandiose narcissism comprises an agentic factor (agen-
tic narcissism) and a communal factor (communal narcissism). The evidence we
reviewed satisfies six key validity criteria of the minimalist-ACM. We conclude,
rather boldly, by returning to our opening quote: To consider grandiose narcissism
inapplicable to the Big Two is as inaccurate as to consider Asterix’s village part of
Gaul’s actual history.

Notes
1 Shavelson et al. (1976) also proposed two additional self-esteem facets. One facet (physi-
cal self-esteem), however, is not psychological. The other facet (emotional self-esteem) is
psychological, but does not tap into psychological content.
2 Fleming and Watts (1980) found a third factor, which they interpreted as global, content-
free self-esteem.
3 Heatherton and Polivy (1991) reported a third dimension (appearance), but that dimen-
sion is physical, not psychological.
4 We use the following terms to describe effect sizes (Cohen, 1988). Small: .10  r < .20,
small-to-moderate: .20  r < .30, moderate: .30  r < .40, moderate-to-large: .40  r < .50,
large: r > .50.

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9
AGENCY AND COMMUNION
Their implications for gender stereotypes
and gender identities

Sabine Sczesny, Christa Nater, and Alice H. Eagly

Agency and communion represent the two fundamental modalities of human nature.
These dimensions, the so-called Big Two, represent self- versus other-orientation.
As stated by Abele and Wojciszke (2014, p. 196), “Agentic content refers to goal-
achievement and task functioning (competence, assertiveness, decisiveness), whereas
communal content refers to the maintenance of relationships and social function-
ing (benevolence, trustworthiness, morality).” These dimensions constitute meta-
concepts of human values, motives, traits, and behaviors. As we explain in this
chapter, agency and communion are essential to the analysis of gender stereotypes
and identities and their consequences.

Gender stereotypes: descriptive and prescriptive

Gender stereotypes are broadly defined as people’s consensual beliefs about the
attributes of women and men. These stereotypes are culturally shared beliefs and
can be descriptive, pertaining to the characteristics of women and men, and prescrip-
tive, pertaining to the characteristics that women and men should or should not
have (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). These stereotypes take the form of cognitive
schemas, or sets of beliefs about each sex.
To assess gender stereotypes, researchers often have asked participants to rate
a typical woman or man, or women and men in general, on a variety of traits,
including agentic (e.g., ambitious, assertive) and communal (e.g., caring, sensitive)
attributes. Although these direct, or explicit, measures are common, implicit mea-
sures have produced similar findings (e.g., Rudman & Goodwin, 2004).
Results of such studies have shown that women are perceived as more com-
munal and less agentic than men (Williams & Best, 1982). Men are and should be
assertive and competitive but not weak, whereas women are and should be socially
sensitive and compassionate but not dominant. Although these gender stereotypes
104 Sabine Sczesny et al.

are present in most cultures, an exception is the greater communion ascribed to

men in some East Asian cultures ( Cuddy et al., 2015; Steinmetz, Bosak, Sczesny, &
Eagly, 2014). Also, as generally less salient themes, gender stereotypes include
beliefs about the cognitive abilities, role behaviors, occupations, and physical attri-
butes of men and women (e.g., Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Diekman & Eagly, 2000).
Another aspect of gender stereotypes is their relation to the societal status of
men and women. Specifically, agentic traits associated with men are linked with
high status, and communal traits associated with women are linked with low
status (e.g., Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996;). Finally, although the lower
societal status of women might suggest that the female stereotype is more negative
than the male stereotype, the female stereotype is the more evaluatively positive
stereotype, mainly due to the very positive value placed on communal qualities
such as kindness and consideration (Eagly & Mladinic, 1994).

Sources of gender stereotypes

In general, gender stereotypes arise from life experiences in a given cultural con-
text. Because the sorting of women and men into different social roles produces
differences in their everyday behaviors, role behavior is a key source of what
people observe and thus represent in their beliefs about the sexes. Consistent with
the correspondent inference principle ( Gilbert & Malone, 1995), people infer the
traits of men and women from observations of their behavior and generally do so
spontaneously. Because most behaviors are performed to enact social roles, the dis-
tribution of women and men into roles underlies gender stereotypes. For example,
observations of mainly women caring for children contribute to the beliefs that
women are compassionate and kind.
The specific activities that comprise a division of labor derive in part from male
and female biology – that is, their evolved physical attributes, especially women’s
reproductive activities and men’s size and strength, which can allow some activi-
ties to be more efficiently performed by one sex or the other, depending on the
socioeconomic and ecological context. Human biology thus interacts with the
environment to produce a division of labor. Within societies, the division of labor
is perpetuated and legitimized through the formation of gender stereotypes that
make the contemporaneous division of labor seem natural and inevitable.
Although preindustrial societies offered various divisions of labor, a male bread-
winner and female homemaker arrangement emerged along with industrialization
and urbanization in Europe and North America (Janssens, 1997). In contemporary
industrialized and postindustrial societies, given low birthrates and shortened or
optional lactation, women’s reproductive activities are a much weaker constraint
on their activities. Therefore, both women and men typically engage in paid labor.
However, in an arrangement that might be called a neotraditional division of labor,
men generally have longer employment hours, and women continue to spend more
time than men on unpaid domestic work (Cohn, 2017). Also, despite a decrease
over time in the sex segregation of occupations in many industrialized nations (e.g.,
 Implications for Gender 105

Lippa, Preston, & Penner, 2014), men still dominate most blue-collar jobs, many
of which have strength-intensive components. Yet, men’s greater size and strength
are much less influential overall because most occupations now favor brains over
brawn, and technology lessens the strength demands of most kinds of physical
work.
Despite these changes, occupations have remained profoundly sex-segregated.
Women are overrepresented in occupations that especially reward social skills (e.g.,
nursing, teaching children) and underrepresented in things-oriented occupations
(most STEM fields and mechanical and construction trades; Lippa et al., 2014).
The proportion of women is also low in occupations that especially reward agency
(e.g., top leadership roles; European Commission, 2017). Sociologists thus refer to
horizontal gender segregation, by which women and men have occupations favoring
different traits and abilities, and vertical segregation, by which men are concentrated
in occupations that yield greater status and power (Levanon & Grusky, 2016).
Social role theory proposes that everyday observations of the differing roles of
women and men provide information from which people derive gender stereotypes
(Eagly, 1987; Wood & Eagly, 2012). The resulting beliefs that women and men dif-
fer in agency and communion reflect essentialism, or the tendency to infer that dif-
ferent human essences underlie differences in behavior (Prentice & Miller, 2006).
People may assume that such essences follow from social or biological causes ( Ran-
gel & Keller, 2011). These stereotypic beliefs have considerable accuracy at group
level, that is, pertaining to women and men in general, due to their grounding in
observations of group members’ behaviors in their typical social roles (Koenig &
Eagly, 2014). In this sense, stereotypes reflect social reality (Jussim, 2012). How-
ever, they are of course not accurate for individuals who are atypical of their sex.
The perception of both sexes is influenced by their memberships in social groups
in addition to gender (intersectionality; Shields, 2008). Hence, studying gender along
with groupings by sexual orientation, ethnicity, age, and social class reflects the
complexity of people’s lives. Intersectional stereotypes can contain distinct elements
beyond gender stereotypes. For instance, gender stereotypes are closest to those of
Whites, whereas stereotypes about Black women are somewhat different from ste-
reotypes about women in general and Blacks in general (Ghavami & Peplau, 2013).
Gender stereotypes continue to receive support from contemporary occupa-
tional and domestic role segregation (Levanon & Grusky, 2016). Thus, a com-
parison of gender-stereotypical beliefs in the United States at earlier and recent
time points has revealed approximately the same agentic and communal beliefs
(e.g., Haines, Deaux, & Lofaro, 2016). However, studies have failed to identify
women’s gain in stereotypical competence, which presumably has occurred because
of their shift to paid employment and their greatly increased higher education. For
example, US survey research by the Pew Research Center (2015) found that respon-
dents believed that women were higher than men on competence traits such as
organized, innovative, and intelligent, yet lower on agentic traits such as ambitious
and decisive. Also, research on so-called dynamic stereotypes has shown a narrative
of change whereby people believe that women have become and are continuing
106 Sabine Sczesny et al.

to become more agentic, whereas men are more constant in their attributes (Diek-
man & Eagly, 2000). In reality, women appear to have gained stereotypical com-
petence but much less agency given their slow rise into roles demanding qualities
such as dominance and competitiveness.

Consequences of gender stereotypes for occupants of

agentic and communal roles
Over the last decades, researchers have made substantial advances in under-
standing the consequences of gender stereotypes for women in agentically
demanding roles, especially in leadership roles. According to the lack of fit model
( Heilman, 1983, 2012 ) and the role congruity theory of prejudice toward female
leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002 ), leadership roles are thought to require mainly
agentic qualities. Stereotypes of leaders and managers are thus more similar
to the characterization of men than women and portray leaders as higher in
agentic than communal traits (see meta-analysis by Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, &
Ristikari, 2011). Women thus suffer from a mismatch between the leader role
and their female gender role.
Expectations triggered by this perceived mismatch can have far-reaching conse-
quences for women in leadership contexts. Their overriding challenge is to reconcile
the leader role’s demand for agency and the female role’s demand for communion,
creating a double bind. One consequence is that, as many experiments have demon-
strated, women are censored for violating the proscription against women engaging
in clearly dominant behavior (see meta-analysis by Williams & Tiedens, 2016), even
though such behavior is generally appropriate to leader roles. In general, women
who occupy leadership positions are seen as less legitimate than their male coun-
terparts, triggering consequences such as challenges to their authority and reduced
cooperation (see review by Vial, Napier, & Brescoll, 2016).
As a result of these conf licting demands, female leaders can face a double
standard, such that for comparable levels of performance, they are evaluated
less favorably than male leaders, especially in male-dominated settings (see
meta-analysis by Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992). For example, in studies
of managers ( Heilman, Block, & Martell, 1995), men received higher evalua-
tions than women who performed equally well. Except in feminine settings,
women generally must display greater evidence of skill than men to be con-
sidered equally competent ( Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997). Also, as candidates
for male-dominated jobs, women were less likely to receive positive evalua-
tions than equivalent men when evaluated by men (see meta-analysis by Koch,
D’Mello, & Sackett, 2015).
The situation of men in female-dominated communal roles has received less
attention (Croft, Schmader, & Block, 2015). One disadvantage that such men
experience is a lack of same-sex role models, a deficit that women also experi-
ence in male-dominated roles. In addition, the incongruity and lack of fit the-
ories outlined above could be extended to consider the mismatch between the
 Implications for Gender 107

male stereotype and communal demands of female-typed occupations. Men are

often penalized when they enact communal behavior or are successful in femi-
nine domains and thereby violate male gender norms (Rudman, Moss-Racusin,
Phelan, & Nauts, 2012).
Men’s occupancy of caring roles in the home and workplace can produce dou-
ble standards and double binds that mirror those that women experience in male-
dominated roles. For instance, men who were successful as employee relations
counselors (a female-dominated position) were perceived as less effective and were
granted less respect than successful women in the same job (Heilman & Wallen,
2010). Also, an experiment found that male applicants for an elementary teaching
position were perceived as more likely to be gay and less likeable (but not less hire-
able) than female applicants with similar qualifications (Moss-Racusin & Johnson,
2016). In fact, men working in childcare can be viewed as a safety threat because
some believe that they might abuse children physically or sexually (Nentwich,
Poppen, Schälin, & Vogt, 2013).
Despite these and other studies suggesting male disadvantage in female-dominated
jobs, recent experimental evidence suggests that men may sometimes be favored
over women for such positions, although more by female than male evaluators (see
meta-analysis by Koch et al., 2015). Perhaps such data reflect a concern, especially
on the part of women, for integrating jobs in the female ghetto.
Other evidence also suggests that, contrary to the double standard, persons
from the underrepresented sex are sometimes affirmatively hired over equally
qualified persons from the overrepresented sex. For instance, in a field experi-
ment, excellent fictitious female applicants for tenure-track assistant professorships
in STEM disciplines were preferred with a ratio of 2:1 over equally qualified male
applicants by faculty members at numerous US universities (Williams & Ceci,
2015). Moreover, data from actual hiring at 89 US research-intensive institutions
showed that in the sciences in general, women who applied for academic posi-
tions had a better chance of being interviewed and receiving offers than did male
job candidates (National Research Council, 2010). Furthermore, an organization’s
commitment to diversity goals can favor those women who appear to have the
abilities necessary for reaching the upper echelons of organizations. Such women
received higher pay than high-potential men (in field studies and experiments;
Leslie, Manchester, & Dahm, 2017). In addition, male vanguards in female-typed
professions can profit from structural advantages that tend to promote them into
leadership positions (the glass escalator; Williams, 2013).
Intersectional stereotypes based on memberships in multiple groups can have
complex implications in differing contexts, as revealed in experiments varying
such attributes. For instance, Black female leaders were evaluated more negatively
for organizational failure than White women and Black and White men (Rosette &
Livingston, 2012). However, Black female leaders behaving dominantly did not
suffer from the same agency penalty that White female leaders experienced, prob-
ably because Black women’s stereotype typically includes agentic attributes (Liv-
ingston, Rosette, & Washington, 2012).
108 Sabine Sczesny et al.

Gender identity
Gender identity is individuals’ self-definition as female or male, which is based
on their biological sex as interpreted within their culture (Wood & Eagly, 2015).
When people describe who they are, most indicate that being a man or woman or
boy or girl is important to their identity and ascribe at least some gender-stereo-
typical traits to themselves.
The most basic aspect of gender identity is an existential sense of oneself as
female or male, which ordinarily corresponds to one’s biological sex. Psycholo-
gists have invented various direct and indirect methods for assessing this basic or
existential categorization of oneself as male or female. The most popular measure
adapts Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) collective self-esteem scale with items such
as “Being a woman [man] is an important reflection of who I am.”
At an early age, children typically learn that there are two sexes and that they
belong to one of these groupings (Martin & Ruble, 2010). Awareness of self and
others as male or female, which emerges by around 18 months of age, further
develops as children learn what this classification means in their culture. Observa-
tions of other boys and girls motivate children to act similarly by, for example,
playing with gender-typical toys.
As children mature, their personal experiences and observations of others
shape their ideas about the sexes into gender stereotypes, which form one basis
for their identities as they incorporate the cultural meanings of gender into their
own psyches. To the extent that people value their female or male group member-
ship, they tend to self-stereotype by ascribing culturally feminine or masculine
attributes to themselves. The link between self-categorization in a social group
and the application of the group stereotype to oneself is a key principle of social
identity theory (Abrams, Thomas, & Hogg, 1990). For example, among those
who value belonging to their male or female social category, women may regard
themselves as caring and compassionate and men regarded themselves as strong
and competitive.
To assess this self-stereotyping aspect of gender identity, psychologists typi-
cally obtain self-reports from women and men of their agentic and communal
personality traits by having them respond on rating scales (Bem, 1974; Spence &
Helmreich, 1980). These dimensions of personality thus match gender stereotypes,
and, in fact, were derived from earlier research demonstrating these stereotypes
(Rosenkrantz, Vogel, Bee, Broverman, & Broverman, 1968). Implicit measures
have also been adapted to assess this trait aspect of gender identity (e.g., Green-
wald & Farnham, 2000).
People act on their gender identities through self-regulatory processes, by
which they control their behavior to conform to their identity (Wood, Chris-
tensen, Hebl, & Rothgerber, 1997). Persons who value their identity as a woman
or a man experience positive affect when acting consistently with their personal
gender standards and negative affect when acting in ways that depart from these
standards. These emotions then guide their future actions.
 Implications for Gender 109

People incorporate more complex forms of gender into intersectional identities

(Remedios & Snyder, 2015). In addition, not everyone is strongly gender-identified,
and instead some people completely reject gender distinctions ( genderqueer). Fur-
thermore, even though gender identity usually matches biological sex (cisgender),
variations exist, with some people transitioning to the other sex (transgender) and
sometimes modifying their biological sexual characteristics (transsexual ). Other
people resist internalizing aspects of their gender’s stereotype, as some women may
embrace high, not low, agency.

Gender identity related to behavior

Gender identity works together with stereotyping to influence behavior. To the
extent that women ascribe low agency to themselves or are aware of the stereo-
type that women lack agency, they can engage in self-limiting behavior such as
making less ambitious career choices (Heilman, 2012). Mere awareness of others’
stereotype-based expectations can produce stereotype threat that impairs their
performance (see review by Hoyt & Murphy, 2016). Many studies have shown that
individuals whose identities are threatened in a particular evaluative context can
suffer from impaired performance. Being especially identified with one’s gender
increases vulnerability to such performance effects because the pertinent stereo-
type is personally relevant (e.g., Schmader, 2002).
Women can experience stereotype threat when attempting leadership. In an
experimental demonstration, students viewed television commercials featuring
female-stereotypic (vs. neutral) content (Davies, Spencer, & Steele, 2005). Women,
but not men, exposed to the female-stereotypic portrayals subsequently expressed
less preference for a leadership role than a no-leadership role. Chronic threats of
this type can have profound implications for women’s identities in male-dominated
contexts (Pronin, Steele, & Ross, 2004). In such situations, women may engage
in identity bifurcation, by which they prioritize their identity in the domain being
evaluated (e.g., leadership, mathematics) and reject aspects of typical feminine iden-
tity that could threaten their domain competence (e.g., planning to have children).
This reaction seems to be a high price to pay for maintaining a sense of domain
competence. Also, female leaders’ worry that others think that women have trouble
exerting authority can cause them to falter, lose confidence, and even to withdraw
(Hoyt & Murphy, 2016).
Experimental research has related gender identities to various outcomes.
Women perceived themselves as less suitable for an advertised leadership position
than men, but the candidates’ agentic gender identity related more strongly to
their self-ascribed fit with the leadership position than their sex (Bosak & Sczesny,
2008). Furthermore, women working in collaboration with men were unwilling
to take an equal amount of credit for successful joint outcomes (Haynes & Heil-
man, 2013), presumably because of their less self-assertive identities as well as oth-
ers’ beliefs that women should be modest.
110 Sabine Sczesny et al.

Gender stereotypes and gender identities can complicate men’s performances

as well. Stereotype threat can undermine men in communal roles, given, for
example, the stereotype that men are deficient in social skills. In an experiment
in which male participants learned that a test measured social sensitivity and that
women generally scored better on this test, these men performed worse than men
who had not been alerted to this female-favoring stereotype (Koenig & Eagly,
2005). Women, in contrast, were less affected by this information, performing
non-significantly better when exposed to the female superiority message. In
fact, men may be especially vulnerable to threat in such situations according to
the argument that male gender identity, or manhood, is a precarious social status
that is difficult to achieve and needs to be confirmed through visible actions
(Vandello & Bosson, 2013). Therefore, as experiments have shown, men may be
more anxious than women to guard and confirm their gender identity, moti-
vating agentic behaviors and restraining communal behaviors. The enhancement
of agentic behavior occurred when threats to men’s masculinity increased their
aggression (Bosson, Vandello, Burnaford, Weaver, & Arzu Wasti, 2009) and the
harassment of women (Maass, Cadinu, Guarnieri, & Grasselli, 2003). Specifically,
threats to men’s masculinity increased their aggression and harassing behavior
toward women. Threatening men by informing them that they had low (vs. high)
testosterone caused them to express more traditional attitudes toward parenting
and less support for gender equality and collective egalitarian action (Kosakowska-
Berezecka et al., 2016).
Other research has tested predictions about gender identity in natural settings.
In general, agentic identity predicted self-assertive outcomes such as career suc-
cess (e.g., Abele, 2003; Evers & Sieverding, 2014). Communal identity predicted
relational outcomes such as involvement in family roles (e.g., Abele, 2003) and
satisfaction in close relationships (e.g., Steiner-Pappalardo & Gurung, 2002). In
longitudinal research, such outcomes manifested even 10 years after the initial
assessment of gender identity (Abele & Spurk, 2011).
Despite societal changes in recent years, apparently the communal and agen-
tic gender identities of women and men have converged only a small amount
between 1974 and 2012, mainly by women viewing themselves as slightly more
agentic than in earlier years (see meta-analysis by Donnelly & Twenge, 2017).
An initial tendency for women’s agency to increase sharply during this period
then faded, to produce only a small increase overall. Given little overall change
in men’s agency or men’s or women’s communion, sex differences in agentic
and communal gender identities have remained substantial: d = 0.72 for greater
communion in women and d = 0.55 for greater agency in men. This phenom-
enon should not be surprising, given the persistence of agentic and communal
stereotypes that we noted earlier and the striking segregation of occupational and
domestic roles that continues to fuel these stereotypes. Such findings suggest that
gender, understood in terms of agency and communion, has so far not yielded
much in response to changes in women’s roles or to the ongoing challenges to
the gender binary.
 Implications for Gender 111

Conclusion
The Big Two – agency and communion – are overriding themes in psychological
gender research. Social scientists, especially psychologists, have widely adopted
these concepts to describe gender stereotypes and gender identity and their con-
sequences for behavior. Reflecting psychologists’ idea that masculine stereotypes
have served largely as negative forces slowing women’s attainment of gender
equality, it seemed that change in women’s roles would boost their agency. Indeed,
women more often complete higher education, have taken up paid work and
entered many higher status occupational roles. What many scholars of gender have
missed is the preservation of the agency-communion divide in social roles, despite
these changes. Women remain concentrated primarily in communally demanding
occupations. In addition, women’s entry into agentically demanding occupations
such as management and law has triggered internal resegregation. Women are
underrepresented in the subareas of these professions regarded as more agenti-
cally demanding (e.g., top leadership roles in corporations and government) and
overrepresented in the subareas regarded as more communally demanding (e.g.,
human resources management; Levanon & Grusky, 2016). In addition, men have
shown little movement into female-dominated roles, either in the workplace or
in families ( Croft et al., 2015). This neotraditional division of labor perpetuates
gender-stereotypical beliefs about agency and communion as well as matching sex
differences in gender identity.
Understanding of these phenomena could be furthered by information from a
broader range of cultures. Although some researchers have incorporated data from
many nations (e.g., Williams & Best, 1982), the majority of studies come mainly from
Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic cultures (Henrich, Heine, &
Norenzayan, 2010), with the United States being decidedly overrepresented.
As another limitation, theoretical and empirical work on agency and com-
munion has often been restricted to a binary view that neglects the intersections
of gender with other group memberships. Also neglected are increasing trends
toward gender and sexual fluidity. Future research should expand these themes to
enlarge the understanding of gender in its varied, contemporary manifestations.
Another emerging theme is that the Big Two sometimes decompose into three
or four components. For example, agency sometimes has two components, asser-
tiveness and competence, and communion also can have two components, warmth/
sociability and morality (see Abele et al., 2016). The assertiveness/competence dif-
ferentiation is important to gender stereotypes because, as we have suggested,
contemporary stereotypes portray women as less assertive than men but not neces-
sarily less competent.
In conclusion, psychologists have made remarkable progress in understanding
the phenomena of gender. Nevertheless, in addition to remedying deficits we
noted in cultural breadth, intersectionality, and subcomponents of agency and
communion, psychologists of gender should reach beyond disciplinary bound-
aries to take into account the important research conducted by sociologists and
112 Sabine Sczesny et al.

economists as well as by neuroscientists and other biologically-oriented research-

ers. Current knowledge, enhanced by the new directions that we recommend,
should favor the development of policies and interventions that advance equal
opportunities for women and men.

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10
DIMENSIONAL COMPARISON
THEORY AND THE AGENCY-
COMMUNION FRAMEWORK
Friederike Helm and Jens Möller

The present chapter is concerned with the formation of agentic and communal self-
concepts. Agentic and communal terms are central to self-perception (e.g., Abele &
Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, &
Kashima, 2005; Wojciszke, 2005). For instance, Diehl, Owen, and Youngblade
(2004) showed that 99% of adults’ self-descriptions could be categorized as agentic
or communal terms. Uchronski (2008) similarly found that 74% of the partici-
pants’ self-descriptions could be categorized as communal or agentic (the remain-
ing referred to affective states). The most frequently stated term in the communion
area was “helpful,” and in the agency area was “ambitious.” Herzog and Markus
(1999) presented their participants with a list of 44 attributes gathered from free
self-descriptions, and found that certain attributes were considered important by
a majority of their participants: these were agentic (e.g., “to be independent”) and
communal characteristics (e.g., “to be a good friend”).
Whereas agency and communion are positively associated in the perception of
others (Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Wojciszke, Abele, & Baryla, 2009), they are more
or less uncorrelated in the perception of the self (Abele, 2003; Abele & Spurk, 2011;
Uchronski, 2008).
What is the reason for these different relations of agency and communion in self-
perception versus the perception of others? Dimensional comparison theory (DCT;
Möller & Marsh, 2013) might provide an answer. After introducing DCT and respec-
tive findings we will apply this theory to the agency/communion area. Finally, we
will outline some ideas for further research on the application of assumptions of the
DCT to the formation of agentic and communal self-perceptions.

Dimensional comparison theory

DCT provides a framework for describing the formation of self-perceptions in a
variety of domains. This began with research on the internal/external frame of
118 Friederike Helm and Jens Möller

reference model (I/E model; e.g., Marsh, 1986; Möller & Köller, 2001), examining
the formation of academic ability self-perceptions. The I/E model describes the
joint operation of social and dimensional comparison processes in the formation
of verbal and mathematical self-concepts. Social comparisons are conducted in an
external frame of reference when students compare their achievement with the
achievements of their classmates. For example, if a student’s math achievement is
better than that of his/her classmates, this student’s math self-concept is also likely
to be higher. Dimensional comparisons are conducted in an internal frame of ref-
erence when students compare their achievement in a given subject with that in
another subject. For example, a student might compare his/her verbal versus math
achievement. If the verbal achievement is better than the math, verbal self-concept
will increase and math self-concept will decrease, as a result of dimensional com-
parison. In the process of making dimensional comparisons between the verbal
and the math domains, students seem to emphasize their achievement differences.
It follows that the self-concept in both domains is less closely associated than is the
achievement in both domains.
Möller, Pohlmann, Köller, and Marsh (2009), in a meta-analysis of 69 studies,
have confirmed the assumptions of the I/E model: positive effects of achievement
on the self-concept in the corresponding domain as a result of social comparisons,
and negative effects of achievement on non-corresponding self-concept as a result of
dimensional comparisons (see Figure 10.1). The average correlation between math
and verbal achievements was positive and strong (r = .67), and much higher than
the average correlation between math and verbal self-concepts (r = .10). The two
horizontal paths relating math achievement to math self-concept (.61) and verbal
achievement to verbal self-concept (.49) were substantial and positive – a result of
social comparison processes. The two cross paths leading from verbal achievement
to math self-concept (− .27) and mathematics achievement to verbal self-concept
(− .21) were negative – a result of dimensional comparison processes. Moderator

.61
MAch MSelf

7
-.2
.67 .10
-.2
1

VAch VSelf
.49

FIGURE 10.1 The I/E model: results of a meta-analytic path analysis of the relations
between math and verbal achievement and math and verbal self-concept (from Möller
et al., 2009). MAch = math achievement; MSelf = math self-concept; VAch = verbal
achievement; VSelf = verbal self-concept.
 Dimensional Comparison Theory 119

analyses showed that the effects of dimensional comparisons as described in the

classic I/E model are not restricted to a particular achievement or self-concept mea-
sure, nor to specific age groups, gender groups, or countries (Möller et al., 2009).
Longitudinal studies measuring math and verbal achievements and math and
verbal self-concepts on multiple occasions have further substantiated these find-
ings (e.g., Marsh & Köller, 2004; Marsh, Kong, & Hau, 2001; Möller, Retelsdorf,
Köller, & Marsh, 2011). Former achievement indicators impact positively on subse-
quent corresponding self-concept and negatively on subsequent non-corresponding
self-concept. Former self-concepts impact positively on corresponding subsequent
achievements and negatively on subsequent non-corresponding achievements.
However, the strongest support for the supposition that people evaluate their abil-
ity in one domain by comparing it with their ability in another domain comes
from experimental studies (Möller & Köller, 2001; Möller & Savyon, 2003; Strick-
houser & Zell, 2015). Möller and Köller (2001), for example, set participants to
work on tasks related to math ability and then tested how manipulated feedback
on their math achievement in these tasks affected verbal self-concept. Verbal self-
concept was lower when the feedback on their achievement on the math-related
tasks was high, and it was higher when the feedback was low.
In recent years, initial steps have been taken to acknowledge dimensional
comparisons as being vital to the formation of self-perceptions in non-academic
areas as well (e.g., Möller & Husemann, 2006; Möller & Savyon, 2003; for an
extensive outline see Möller, Müller-Kalthoff, Helm, Nagy, & Marsh, 2016). For
example, two introspective studies (Möller & Husemann, 2006) have confirmed
that students spontaneously carry out dimensional comparisons in their everyday
lives, not only regarding academic matters, but also concerning a variety of other
domains – specifically, personal relationships and characteristics (like agency and
communion).
In light of the above-mentioned findings indicating that agency and commu-
nion are central dimensions of self-description (e.g., Diehl et al., 2004; Uchronski,
2008) that are only loosely correlated ( Spence et al., 1974; Abele, 2003; Abele &
Spurk, 2011; Uchronski, 2008; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Wojciszke et al., 2009),
it appears possible that the formation of agentic and communal self-perceptions
can also be explained by DCT: contrastive dimensional comparison processes
might explain why the correlation between agency and communion is lower in
self-perception than in other-perception.

DCT and the formation of agentic and communal self-concepts

There is already some research testing the predictions of DCT with respect to self-
perception in agency and communion. Helm, Abele, Müller-Kalthoff, and Möller
(2017) in a field study regressed students’ agentic and communal self-perceptions
on teacher- and peer-ratings of the students’ agentic and communal characteris-
tics. In line with the assumptions, positive correlations of agentic and communal
other-ratings were evident for peers (r = .23, p < 0.01) and for teachers (r = .25;
120 Friederike Helm and Jens Möller

p < .01). As well, these correlations for other-ratings of agency and communion
were significantly higher than correlations for self-ratings (r = 0.10, p < .05; peer/
self: z = 2.03, p < .05; teacher/self: z = 2.26, p = .01).
Using structural equation modeling, testing the assumptions of the DCT model
for agency and communion, positive paths emerged from peer- and teacher-ratings
to corresponding self-ratings (see Figure 10.2), indicating social comparison effects:
a student perceiving that his/her peers ascribe a higher level of agency/communion
to him or her will develop a more positive self-concept in the agentic/communal
area. Most importantly for the application of DCT to agency and communion,
negative paths from peer- and teacher-ratings of agency/communion to self-ratings
of communion/agency were shown, indicating dimensional comparison effects.
More positive other-perceptions of a student’s agency/communion resulted in less
positive student self-perception of communion/agency. Thus, students on the one
hand seem to make inferences from peer- and teacher-perceptions of their agentic
and communal characteristics to their self-perception in the agentic and communal
area, e.g., social comparisons. On the other hand, there are also hints on the pres-
ence of contrastive dimensional comparisons, as there were negative associations
between other-ratings and self-ratings in the non-corresponding domain. Accord-
ingly, contrastive dimensional comparisons might be one reason for the lower
agency/communion correlation in self-perception than in other-perception.
In a second field study, Helm and Möller (in prep.) assessed agentic and com-
munal self-assessments and teacher-ratings at two times during a school year
(beginning of the school year [t1]) and mid-term [t2]) and regressed self- and
other-ratings at t2 on self- and other-ratings at t1. In line with the assumptions,
there were positive effects of self-perception at t1 on self-perception at t2 and of
other-ratings at t1 on other-ratings at t2 (see Figure 10.3), indicating a certain sta-
bility of self- and other-perception. Secondly, there was a positive effect of agen-
tic other-perception at t1 on agentic self-perception at t2. The positive effect of

.42**/.45**
Peer/Teacher: Self:
Agency Agency

–.14*/–.13* –.21**/–.07

Peer/Teacher: Self:
Communion Communion
.34/.24**

FIGURE 10.2 Path model for the relationships between peer-ratings (before the slash)
and teacher-ratings (after the slash) of students’ agentic and communal traits and
students’ self-ratings; *p < .05; **p < .01.
 Dimensional Comparison Theory 121

.22**
Teacher: Agency t1 Self: Agency t2
.49**
–.10*
.40** .45**
.76**
.34** Self: Agency t1 Teacher: Agency t2 .17**

.12** .12*
–.19**

Teacher: Communion t1 .09+ Self: Communion t2

.32** .40**
.59**
.23** .21**
.57**

Self: Communion t1 Teacher: Communion t2

FIGURE 10.3 Path model for the relationships between teacher-ratings of students’
agentic and communal traits and students’ self-ratings at t1 and t2; non-significant
paths are shown in gray, dashed lines. +p < .06; *p < .05; **p < .01.

communal other-perception at t1 on communal self-perception at t2 was of only

marginal significance. Moreover, neither the effect of agentic other-perception at
t1 on communal self-perception at t2, nor the effect of communal other-perception
at t1 on agentic self-perception at t2 reached statistical significance. These non-
existing effects speak against dimensional comparison between other-perceptions.
However, the effect of agentic self-perception at t1 on communal self-perception
at t2, and the effect of communal self-perception at t1 on agentic self-perception
at t2 was significant and negative, indicating contrastive dimensional comparisons
between self-perceptions at t1 to be affecting self-perceptions at t2.
To sum up, these field studies support our reasoning that contrastive dimen-
sional comparisons between agentic and communal feedback (Helm et al., 2017)
and between former self-concepts (Helm & Möller, in prep.) have an effect on
(subsequent) self-concepts in the two domains.
Besides these field studies, several experimental studies revealed findings that
can be interpreted as dimensional comparisons between own agentic and commu-
nal characteristics. Brown and Smart (1991) showed that a failure at an intellectual
task would lead to an emphasis of one’s own interpersonal qualities, particularly in
participants with high self-esteem. In their first study, participants rated their self-
esteem, worked on cognitive tasks and received the feedback that they had scored
in the top 15% or in the bottom 30% of all students tested at their university.
Subsequently, they rated their interpersonal qualities (e.g., sincere, loyal, kind) and
their intellectual qualities (e.g., intelligent, smart, competent). Results showed that
participants with high self-esteem emphasized their interpersonal qualities more
after a failure feedback than after a success feedback. Participants with low self-
esteem, however, showed the opposite effect: They depreciated their interpersonal
qualities after failure feedback.
In the second study, high self-esteem participants who had received failure
feedback were more willing to help another student with his/her master’s thesis
122 Friederike Helm and Jens Möller

and complete more tests. Low self-esteem participants showed the opposite effect.
Hence, Brown and Smart’s (1991) studies suggest contrastive dimensional com-
parisons between agency and communion, but only for high self-esteem partici-
pants. The authors interpret this finding with the assumption that people with a
high self-esteem protect their general positive self-image after failure feedback by
emphasizing other positive qualities. In another experimental study, Möller and
Savyon (2003) showed dimensional comparison effects of feedback about intel-
ligence on honesty self-perception. Participants received feedback on anagram
tasks, indicating that they had solved a low or a high percentage of these tasks.
As expected, participants in the failure condition rated themselves as being more
honest than did students who received positive feedback on the anagram tasks.
Helm et al. (2017) conducted additional experimental studies demonstrating
the effects of agency feedback on communal self-perception. In one study, these
authors showed that communal self-perception was lower in the group with high
agency feedback than in the group with low agency feedback. In the other study,
feedback on communal tasks was given and the effect on the agentic self-concept
was measured. Agentic self-perception was lower in the group with high com-
munion feedback than in the group with low communion feedback. All these
experiments support the conclusion drawn from the field studies, that contrastive
dimensional comparisons between feedback in these two areas may be at work
when self-perception in agency and communion is assessed.1

Conclusion
The present chapter showed that DCT is a promising theoretical approach not only
in the field of educational psychology and the formation of academic self-concepts,
but also in the field of social psychology and the formation of self-concepts on
the Big Two of agency and communion. Dimensional comparisons might be the
mechanism that explains why agency and communion are uncorrelated in indi-
viduals’ self-ratings, whereas they are correlated in the ratings of other persons.
Besides emphasizing the general importance of dimensional comparisons in
forming one’s agency- and communion-related self-concept, the present findings
also suggest that individuals (shown here for students) develop their agentic and
communal self-perceptions partly as a result of the feedback they get from peers
and teachers. Positive feedback in one domain might have negative consequences
for self-perception in the other domain instigated by dimensional comparison.
Moreover, self-perceptions in the two areas might have consequences for sub-
sequent self-perceptions in the non-corresponding area, leading to the cement-
ing of already existing over-accentuated differences in agentic and communal
self-perceptions.
The question of why and under what circumstances contrastive dimensional
comparisons between agency and communion take place in the formation of self-
concepts in the two areas is worthwhile to pursue further. Such research questions
could be answered by introspective studies like the diary studies by Möller and
 Dimensional Comparison Theory 123

Husemann (2006). These authors asked their participants to record the dimensional
comparisons that they carried out in everyday life and the situations in which these
comparisons were carried out. Furthermore, motivations for dimensional compari-
sons between agency and communion might be examined in experimental studies
manipulating participants’ motivation and then giving them the opportunity to
conduct different kinds of comparisons between different areas.
Longitudinal studies could analyze the development of the relation between
agentic and communal self-perceptions over the life span. DCT suggests that one
main motivation for dimensional comparisons is the self-differentiation moti-
vation, that is, the motivation to establish a differentiated picture of one’s own
strengths and weaknesses. This motivation can be assumed to be especially strong
in adolescence, as a central task in this life stage is the preparation of important life
decisions, for example, which career path to follow. A differentiated self-concept
about one’s own relative strengths and weaknesses can be assumed to be helpful
for such decisions. Agency and communion, as outlined above, might be of crucial
psychological significance in this stage as well, as they capture two central recur-
ring challenges of human life: pursuing individual goals and belonging to social
groups (Ybarra et al., 2008). Hence, a differentiated self-concept in these two
personality areas is likely to be of high importance for the management of central
life tasks, and contrastive dimensional comparisons between the two areas might
be especially pronounced in adolescence. Yet, as Abele and Wojciszke (2014) state:
“The two life tasks or challenges are, of course, not independent. It is important
for agency to be mitigated by communion and vice versa” (p. 9). Accordingly,
later in life, a central task might be the integration of both self-concept domains.
Research on the association between agentic and communal self-perception in dif-
ferent age groups could answer the question if an over-accentuation of differences
in one’s own agentic and communal qualities is more pronounced in certain life
stages than in others.
Another question regarding dimensional comparisons between agency and
communion is whether this comparison type only occurs in the formation of
self-perceptions, or whether the formation of other-perceptions is influenced by
dimensional comparisons as well. The DCT, as outlined, on the one hand assumes
that dimensional comparisons are motivated by the need to form a picture of one’s
own strengths and difficulties, in order to facilitate decision making. This moti-
vation seems to be relevant to the formation of self-concepts rather than to the
formation of impressions of others. Yet, DCT moreover assumes that dimensional
comparisons under certain conditions are carried out when people evaluate the
warmth and competence of groups or other people, an assumption supported by
various studies (see Yzerbyt, this volume). Yet, for evaluations of other people, dif-
ferent motivations guiding the comparison processes leading to these evaluations
can be assumed than for self-evaluations. Comparison processes in the formation
of self- and other-evaluations in the agentic and the communal area and possibly
diverging conditions under which these comparisons are carried out should be
examined further.
124 Friederike Helm and Jens Möller

Note
1 There is only one study that does not fit this pattern: Abele, Rupprecht, and Wojciszke
(2008) gave positive or negative feedback on anagram tasks and measured self-perception
of agency and communion both before and after task completion. These authors found
that agency became lower after failure feedback, but communion remained unchanged.

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11
THE DIMENSIONAL
COMPENSATION MODEL
Reality and strategic constraints on warmth
and competence in intergroup perceptions

Vincent Yzerbyt

Social perceivers rely on two fundamental content dimensions to describe them-

selves and others, i.e., warmth/communion and competence/agency (Fiske, 2015).
These two dimensions reflect core challenges of human life, namely “getting along”
and “getting ahead,” and epistemic motives, that is, understanding intentions and
assessing resources. If people navigate the world as individuals and rely on interper-
sonal social cognition to orient interpersonal behavior, they also belong to larger
social entities. As members of groups, people build upon intergroup perception to
shape their intergroup behavior (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). The present chapter
brings together the work on fundamental dimensions and the research on intergroup
relations and shows that intergroup perception often leads to compensation between
both dimensions (Yzerbyt, 2016). The first part of the chapter explains how the
Stereotype Content Model has proposed that two dimensions apply to the percep-
tion of groups in general and stereotypes in particular. A closer examination of the
model and the empirical work it generated reveals that stereotypes are most often
“mixed” in terms of the two fundamental dimensions. The second part combines
the insights of social perception work and the intergroup relations literature and
presents the dimensional compensation model and its various empirical tests. The
following three parts examine the consequences of this dimensional compensation
effect, some of its boundary conditions, and new evidence regarding its underlying
mechanisms. The final part concludes with a series of directions for future research.

The two fundamental dimensions of stereotyping

and intergroup stereotypes
Within the field of social perception, the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) ( Fiske,
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; for a review, see Fiske, 2015; see also Fiske, this vol-
ume) builds upon a long tradition of research (e.g., Katz & Braly, 1935) as well
 The Dimensional Compensation Model 127

as more recent contributions (Phalet & Poppe, 1997) on the issue of attitudes and
stereotypes. This model offers a rich account of the antecedents and consequences
of the specific views that social perceivers form about the people and groups that
comprise their social world. Indeed, a central tenet is that two structural dimen-
sions characterize social relations. First, people and groups differ in the extent to
which they possess status, power, and resources. Second, people and groups also
cooperate or compete with each other. These two unmistakable features of social
interactions constrain the way perceivers form their impressions of groups and
group members. In turn, the latter shape people’s affective reactions and orient
their behaviors ( Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008).
Clearly, the two structural aspects of competition/cooperation and resources
orchestrate people’s views at the psychological level. On the one hand, the assumed
intentions of the target (do the members of this group mean well, does this social
target harbor positive goals?) translate into judgments of warmth/communion.
On the other, the power and resources believed to characterize the target (is this
group in a position to make its intentions come true, given the goals of this social
target, are the necessary means available?) convert into judgments of competence/
agency. Importantly, whereas earlier work on social perception stressed the impor-
tance of evaluative consistency, with judgments falling by and large on a single
dimension ranging from bad to good, SCM researchers expected and repeatedly
found that these two dimensions are orthogonal and form a bidimensional space
crossing low to high competence and low to high warmth.
In spite of the wide acclaim of the SCM and the impressive amount of support-
ive evidence (Fiske, 2015; Fiske, this volume), even SCM researchers note that a
substantial number of the groups tend to fall in the ambivalent quadrants, i.e., the
high-competence-low-warmth quadrant and the low-competence-high-warmth
one (Durante et al., 2013, 2017). Moreover, experimental work by SCM scholars
on such specific groups as career women (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004) and old
people ( Cuddy, Norton, & Fiske, 2005) suggest that ambivalence is often the pair
of glasses through which perceivers appraise particular group members. Finally,
the related work on ambivalent sexism conducted by Glick and Fiske (1996) reveals
that hostile and benevolent sexism largely portray women in terms that correspond
to these two quadrants. Hostile sexism has it that women are skilled, yet sly and
ill-intentioned creatures, globally tempting and using men to take advantage of
them. In contrast, benevolent sexism conceives of women as adorable yet fragile
people, worthy of love but not quite able to navigate the social world. In sum, the
orthogonality of the fundamental dimensions of warmth and competence may
well apply as a rule, but a negative relation tends to emerge between the two fun-
damental dimensions whenever one focuses on perceptions of particular pairs of
groups in the context of actual social interactions.
Turning to the intergroup literature, a seemingly different account emerges
with respect to the origins and functions of stereotypes. According to Social Iden-
tity Theory (SIT; Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), stereotypes serve
to explain, rationalize, and justify the social world as well as intergroup behavior.
128 Vincent Yzerbyt

That is, stereotypes not only account for the nature of people and their relations,
but they also serve a series of motives (Yzerbyt & Corneille, 2005). This is because
people derive their sense of worth from their membership into social groups. In
other words, social perceivers’ needs in terms of self-regard are satisfied to the
extent that they belong to groups that come across as valuable, preferably better
than other groups. This search for positive distinctiveness is believed to account for
many of the biases that materialize in stereotypes, prejudice, and discriminatory
behaviors in the real world (for a review, see Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010).
To be sure, people’s love for their group does not necessarily mean that they
will consider their ingroup superior to other groups on all counts. Doing so would
not only be delusional, but probably counterproductive as well. In fact, reflecting
on the specific measurement tools mobilized by the social identity researchers,
Mummendey and Schreiber (1983) conjectured that ingroup bias may seem to
emerge inevitably because group members face only one judgment dimension on
which they can differentiate between the ingroup and the outgroup. After all, this
methodological option mimics the realistic conflict theory setting imagined by
Sherif (1966) and it is thus hardly surprising that groups are bound to compete, if
only symbolically, in order to secure a dominant position in such a situation. Inter-
estingly, these authors show that, when a more varied set of dimensions is available
for evaluation purposes, group members mobilize only a subset of characteristics
to affirm their superiority. Establishing ingroup bias on some selected dimension
would seem to give the possibility to bear with outgroup bias on other, less crucial,
dimensions. Upon scrutiny, the criteria chosen to materialize the dominant posi-
tion of one’s group are far from being indifferent. To be sure, reality constraints
are entering the picture and group members on both sides of the fence are likely to
consider them, but the real question is how these checks translate into judgments.
Are there lawful connections between “objective” aspects of the intergroup situa-
tion and the more subjective understanding of the groups and people in presence?
And what are the factors that modulate the resulting picture? SIT remains mostly
silent about these questions. As the next section shows, this is where the work on
the Stereotype Content Model (SCM: Fiske et al., 2002) comes in handy.

The compensation in intergroup stereotypes: initial

demonstrations
In most real-life situations, multiple dimensions are available for group evalua-
tion. It thus seems possible to combine insights from SIT in the intergroup rela-
tions domain, whereby group members search for positive distinctiveness with the
SCM findings regarding the role and importance of the two fundamental dimen-
sions of social perception. One important lesson from the SIT tradition is that the
comparative context imposes itself in any situation involving two groups. So, if
it is indeed the case that perceivers appraise social targets in terms of competence
and warmth, group members would compare groups in terms of aspects that boil
down to these two trait domains. On the one hand, people would evaluate groups
 The Dimensional Compensation Model 129

on a global dimension of competence that would readily translate the concrete

relative positions of the groups with respect to status, power, and resources. On the
other, group members could rate groups in terms of social features that convey the
nature of their collaboration. In light of the long tradition in intergroup contact
and conflict, we focused on situations in which perceivers rarely take more than
two groups into consideration, most often the ingroup and the outgroup, but also
sometimes two target groups that are evaluated from an observer’s perspective.
Drawing on the lessons from Mummendey and Schreiber (1983), we reasoned
that one group is likely to end up higher on competence than the other but that,
at the same time, the other group should be rated more favorably on warmth. As
such, this negative relation between judgments on the two dimensions in social
situations, which we called compensation (Yzerbyt, Provost, & Corneille, 2005),
should provide group members with a means to secure positive distinctiveness
while avoiding the unrealistic and indeed socially sanctioned move of affirming
superiority on every aspect. This prediction of compensation is fully in line with
the notion of social creativity (Lemaine, 1974): each group finds a way to shine on
some dimension of comparison.
In the first empirical test of compensation (Yzerbyt et al., 2005), we relied on
a full-crossed design. French-speaking Belgian and French participants evaluated
both French-speaking Belgians and French on traits related to warmth and com-
petence. France enjoys higher prestige in terms of language and culture and is
politically and economically more important than Belgium. Given these structural
differences, we hypothesized that citizens of these two countries would rate French
higher than Belgians in terms of competence. We also expected participants to
see Belgians as warmer than French. Crucially, we hoped participants from both
groups to agree on the relative standing of the groups on these two dimensions.
The data fully corroborated our predictions (see Figure 11.1). Additionally, both
groups seemed keen to exacerbate (minimize) the difference between the two
groups on their preferred (less preferred) dimension.
Although such data illustrate the real-life relevance of the compensatory rela-
tion between these two dimensions in intergroup evaluations, one limitation is
that the observed compensation rests on existing knowledge. In a more strin-
gent test of compensation using an experimental approach (Judd, James-Hawkins,
Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005, Expt. 1a and 1b), we manipulated the information
given to participants on one of the two dimensions and examined their judgments
on both dimensions. Any difference on the non-manipulated dimension would
show that perceivers make inferences beyond the information given. A pattern
known as halo would result if this difference parallels the one on the manipulated
dimension. Compensation would materialize instead if the difference goes in the
opposite direction. We predicted the latter.
Concretely, participants learned that they were to form an impression of two
social groups. First, they read a series of 32 behaviors, half of which were allegedly
performed by a member of one group (Blue) and half by a member of the other
group (Green). For each group, half of the behaviors (8) concerned one dimension,
7.00
Competence
Warmth

6.00

5.00

4.00
French judging French judging Belgians judging Belgians judging
French Belgians French Belgians

FIGURE 11.1 Competence and warmth of French and Belgians targets for French and
Belgian judges.

6.00
Competence
5.00
Warmth
4.00

3.00

2.00

1.00

0.00

–1.00
High judging high High judging low Low judging high Low judging low
–2.00

FIGURE 11.2 Competence and warmth rating of high and low targets for high and
low judges.
 The Dimensional Compensation Model 131

e.g., competence. Whereas the majority of these (6) were positive for one of the
two groups, they were negative for the other. As for the remaining behaviors, they
were either neutral on both dimensions (4) or pertained to the other dimension,
half of them (2) being positive and half (2) negative. Next, participants sorted
the cards according to groups, read all sorted behaviors again and, to encourage
impression formation, wrote a short text about each group. Finally, they rated
both groups on four scales that measured competence (capable, skilled, lazy, dis-
organized) and four that tapped warmth (sociable, caring, insensitive, unfriendly).
As expected, participants noticed the built-in difference between the two
groups, whether competence or warmth was manipulated. More importantly, they
compensated on the other dimension. Thus, even when perceivers contemplate
unknown groups, their judgments reveal a negative relation between competence
and warmth. Compensation even showed up in negative correlations between
the group differences on the two dimensions, that is, the larger the perceived dif-
ference between the groups on the manipulated dimension, the larger the perceived
difference between them on the other dimension in the opposite direction. Along
with several others (Judd et al., 2005; Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Judd, & Nunes, 2009;
Yzerbyt, Kervyn, & Judd, 2008), this experiment clearly demonstrates perceivers’
propensity to imbue a group that is more competent (warm) than another with
comparatively less warmth (competence).
Contrary to Yzerbyt et al.’s (2005) initial study, the above participants did not
belong to either the Blue or the Green group. A follow-up experiment (Judd et al.,
2005, Expt. 5) examined this issue using a minimal group paradigm. Participants
learned that their profile on an initial perceptual task made them members of
the high- or the low-competence group before receiving the group information.
Compensation emerged but remarkably, and replicating Yzerbyt et al.’s earlier
findings, participants of each group enhanced the positive regard in which they
held their own group relative to their regard for the other group (see Figure 11.2).
That is, compared to the members of the low-competence group, the members
of the high-competence group saw more of a difference in competence between
the two groups and less of a difference in warmth. Still, even they were unable to
deny the compensation as they acknowledged that their own group might be less
warm than the other group. These judgments emerge even though the objective
information provided to participants indicates that both groups are comparable on
the second dimension.

Consequences of compensation
Compensation emerges in surprisingly diverse settings, sometimes with non-trivial
and even counterintuitive consequences (for reviews, see Kervyn, Yzerbyt, &
Judd, 2010; Yzerbyt, 2016). One illustration of the startling impact of compensa-
tory judgments is how they guide information-gathering strategies (Kervyn et al.,
2009). Indeed, a most striking phenomenon in social perception concerns percep-
tual and behavioral confirmation ( Snyder, 1984): perceivers are particularly adept at
132 Vincent Yzerbyt

verifying their prior views of others. In particular, they shape other people’s behav-
ior and have them support their favored conclusions ( Snyder, 1984), a phenomenon
known as self-fulfilling prophecy. Interestingly, research has always stressed that
perceivers notice information and generate hypotheses of a similar valence, leading
to a halo confirmation effect.
We wanted to see whether compensation instead could materialize in the judg-
ments and behaviors of the target people. In a first experiment (Kervyn et al.,
2009, Expt. 1), participants underwent the Judd et al. (2005) manipulation with
one additional twist. Specifically, participants received a list of questions and had
to select those they found most useful in gaining further information. For the
questions pertaining to the manipulated dimension, participants selected the ones
implying the high (low) end of the dimension to be asked to the high (low) group.
More interestingly, they also selected questions manifesting a compensatory pat-
tern on the unmanipulated dimension. A second experiment (Kervyn et al., 2009,
Expt. 2) looked at the bias in the answers made available as a result. Pretest par-
ticipants answered the questions selected in Experiment 1 and experimental par-
ticipants received their answers. Some read the answers to 10 questions most often
selected for the high-competence group and the answers to the 10 questions most
often selected for the low-competence group. Others read the answers to the ques-
tions posed to the high and the low warmth groups. In both cases, the group
impressions formed by experimental participants revealed compensation on the
other dimension.
In a final experiment (Kervyn et al., 2009, Expt. 3), we tested the viability
of this behavioral confirmation process in actual interactions. We invited three
participants at a time to the lab for an interview scenario. Two of the participants,
the interviewees, were made to believe that they were each member of one of two
groups while the third, the interviewer, asked a series of 20 questions. The 10 ques-
tions selected most often for the high-competence (warmth) group were posed to
the corresponding group member and the 10 questions selected most often for the
low-competence (warmth) group were asked to the other interviewee. Participants
then rated the two interviewees and their groups. For interviewers, compensation
emerged whether the judgments concerned the interviewees or their groups. For
the interviewees, compensation materialized in the ratings of the groups and of
the other interviewee (only when the manipulation concerned competence). Only
self-ratings failed to show compensation. In sum, compensation not only shapes
social perception but it also constrains behaviors, even shaping the views of the
group members about the groups in presence. Clearly, thus, compensation affects
people’s judgments in a wide variety of ways (for a review, see Kervyn et al., 2010).

Compensation in an intergroup context: boundary conditions

The initial studies that investigated compensation all involved some form of
comparison between a few targets, ideally two. This may suggest that the com-
pensatory logic may be less likely to apply whenever a social target is appraised
 The Dimensional Compensation Model 133

in isolation or when more than two targets are considered. We tested this idea
by having participants evaluate only one group, either the high-competence or
the low-competence group, and rate the group on both competence and warmth
(Judd et al., 2005, Expt. 4). Interestingly, the high-competence group ended up
being judged slightly warmer than the low-competence group. There was thus no
evidence of compensation and even a tendency for a halo effect. These data not-
withstanding, it is often difficult to avoid comparison in the social domain. The
above pattern emerged in a study where respondents learned about a new group in
a rather decontextualized setting. As the abundant literature on social comparison
stresses, social perceivers are prone to compare any social target with others, in
particular when they are themselves members of one of the groups. In short, halo
is hard to obtain when comparison concerns intrude the situation.
Another remarkable feature of the situations examined in early compensation
work has to do with the gap between the groups on one of the two dimensions as
well as the absence of conflict. We decided to investigate the impact of these two
factors more systematically in a series of studies (Cambon, Yzerbyt, & Yakimova,
2015; Cambon & Yzerbyt, 2016). Using a minimal group paradigm ( Cambon
et al., 2015, Expt. 1), we had groups of four to six participants fill in a bogus
personality test measuring either their competence or their warmth. In the asym-
metrical conditions, one-half of the group members received high scores and the
remaining ones low scores on the manipulated dimension and were then assigned
to two different subgroups on the basis of this score. In the symmetrical condi-
tions, all participants received either a high or a low score on the manipulated
dimension and joined the two groups on a random basis. Subgroups then went to
separate rooms and filled in some questionnaire. The topic of this questionnaire
allowed manipulating the level of symbolic conflict by telling the subgroup mem-
bers that the other subgroup in the session had either the same or a different view
on the topic. Participants then rated their subgroup and the other subgroup on
both dimensions. Depending on conditions, the manipulated dimension was thus
the ingroup’s preferred dimension, i.e., the ingroup allegedly scoring high on this
dimension, or the outgroup’s preferred dimension, i.e., the ingroup allegedly scor-
ing low on this dimension. As predicted, compensation emerged only when there
was a clear difference on the manipulated dimension between the two groups and
conflict was absent (see Figure 11.3, left panel). At the other extreme, the lack of
initial difference and the presence of conflict led participants to express strong
ingroup bias on both dimensions (see Figure 11.3, right panel).
A second experiment ( Cambon et al., 2015, Expt. 1) turned to existing groups
and had psychology students evaluate their ingroup as well as a very superior
(medical students), a superior (economy students), an equal (sociology students),
an inferior (special education students), or a very inferior (auxiliary nurses) out-
group. We also manipulated the level of conflict. Rather than a symbolic conflict,
we relied on realistic threat. The outgroup department was or was not likely to
move and occupy the psychology building, one of the nicest buildings on campus.
In line with predictions (see Figure 11.4), compensation emerged more strongly
134 Vincent Yzerbyt

7
Ingroup
6
Outgroup
5

1
Ingroup preferred Outgroup preferred Ingroup preferred Outgroup preferred
No Conflict and Difference Conflict and No Difference

FIGURE 11.3 Ratings of ingroup and outgroup on ingroup and outgroup preferred
dimension as a function of conflict and intergroup difference.

5
Low conflict
4
High conflict
3
2
1
0
–1
–2
–3
–4
–5
Very superior Superior Equal Inferior Very inferior

FIGURE 11.4 Compensation (computed as ingroup bias on competence minus ingroup

bias on warmth) as a function of status of the outgroup and level of conflict.

in low-conflict situations that involved a different status between the groups.

Whereas the initial status difference readily translated into competence and led to
clear compensation on warmth with a low level of conflict, ingroup bias emerged
on both fundamental dimensions when the participants thought the outgroup
posed a threat. Interestingly, conflict led participants to exacerbate the difference
on the ingroup’s preferred dimension, i.e., competence and warmth for the (very)
inferior outgroup and the (very) superior outgroup conditions, respectively.
 The Dimensional Compensation Model 135

Clearly, thus, conflict disrupts the emergence of compensation. These results

also underscore the importance of existing group differences for compensa-
tory judgments to emerge. When groups enjoy a comparable status, participants
acknowledge the similarity in competence and prove reluctant to make a distinc-
tion on warmth, again as long as there is no conflict. This impact of group differ-
ences for compensation also showed in a study with natural groups judging each
other, using a variety of hierarchical levels within two organizations (Cambon &
Yzerbyt, 2016). Here too, in the absence of conflict, compensation emerged more
strongly when the groups were further apart in terms of status. In fact, Cambon
et al. (2015, Expt. 2) found that status difference materialized in a preference for
compensation over ingroup bias only to the extent that group members see the
intergroup gap as legitimate and stable.
A most intriguing lesson from the above studies is also that group stereotypes
are fluid and context-based (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Oakes, Haslam, &
Turner, 1994; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). That is, groups may be seen as more
competent than warm in a given comparison context and warmer than competent
in another. A series of studies using countries as the target groups (Kervyn, Yzer-
byt, Demoulin, & Judd, 2008) illustrates this point. In a first experiment (Kervyn
et al., 2008; Expt. 1), participants rated Canada on competence and warmth in one
of three different conditions. In the control condition, Canada came out as mod-
erately competent and warm. When participants evaluated Brazil before Canada,
the latter country came across as more competent than warm. In contrast, when
they first evaluated Japan, Canada was now less competent than warm. A second
experiment (Kervyn et al., 2008, Expt. 2) showed that this fluidity also affected
participants’ own group. Compared to a control condition in which Belgian par-
ticipants evaluated their country, Belgium appeared less competent and warmer
when participants first contemplated Germany and the other way around when
they initially rated Italy. In sum, even though compensatory judgments are law-
ful, they are not necessarily referring to inherent properties of the social targets.
Rather, they constitute evaluations that are highly responsive to the salient struc-
tural aspects of the social setting.

The routes to intergroup compensation

Although our research program stresses the robustness of the compensation in
social perception and accumulated impressive evidence that compensation mat-
ters in social interactions, the reasons underlying its emergence remain largely
unknown. As mentioned above, the prime concern is likely to be the group’s rela-
tive standing in the comparative context. At a very basic level, if group members
were unable to assert their superiority on one of the two fundamental dimensions,
would they grant the outgroup superiority on the other dimension? And does this
depend on being able to shine on the one dimension that they deem important for
themselves in the situation? In all likelihood, the search for positive distinctiveness
surely remains a key factor in the emergence of compensation.
136 Vincent Yzerbyt

We tested this idea in two experiments using a deceptively simple stratagem

to confront people with the possibility of conceding superiority to the outgroup
(Yzerbyt & Cambon, 2017). We started from the realization that research on com-
pensation always presented participants with an opportunity to rate each one of
the two groups on both dimensions. We decided to prevent this and instead to
present group members with only one dimension (at least initially). We were espe-
cially interested in those cases where the dimension was not the one that group
members would spontaneously associate with their group. When group members
appraise groups in terms of the dimensions that are spontaneously associated with
their group, i.e., competence for the high-status groups and warmth for the low-
status groups, things should be easy. We therefore predicted compensation in all
these “comfortable” situations. A much more challenging situation arises when
people fail to meet initially with their preferred dimension and instead have to
consider the other dimension. In these “uncomfortable” situations, we expected
no compensation. The findings fully confirmed our predictions (Yzerbyt & Cam-
bon, 2017).
As it turns out, the data also revealed a somewhat different pattern depending
on the status of the groups. High-status group members did not hesitate to indi-
cate their superiority on warmth, a judgment we had never observed when both
dimensions were available. In contrast, low-status group members were less will-
ing to assert superiority on competence and indeed failed to do so when the status
difference was greatest. We would argue that these different reactions emphasize
the reality constraints attached to the two fundamental dimensions in that self-
ascription of warmth seems more subjective, more “negotiable,” than claims of
competence (Tausch, Kenworthy, & Hewstone, 2007). In our opinion, if a “the
winner takes it all” posture fails to emerge in most real-life situations it is because
of the possible social sanctions attached to it (Plant & Devine, 2001). Normative
pressures are likely to play a role in the judgments of high-status groups about low-
status groups ( Owuamalam, Wong, & Rubin, 2016). In line with this reasoning,
we also measured the perceived norms on non-discrimination and, as predicted,
the more high-status group members proved sensitive to such norms, the more
they compensated (Yzerbyt & Cambon, 2017, Expt. 2).
In a recent study ( Cambon & Yzerbyt, 2018), we tested this “normative”
account using a “testing-process-by-interaction” strategy (Jacoby & Sassenberg,
2011). Specifically, we manipulated the pressures towards non-discrimination by
activating either a non-discrimination or a non-censorship norm. We hypoth-
esized that the activation of the non-discrimination norm would make high-
status participants aware of the pressures toward non-discrimination and lead to
compensation. In contrast, activating a norm that questioned political correctness
and censorship and promoted “honesty” should attenuate the awareness of non-
discrimination pressures and make high-status groups less reluctant to express
their “unrestrained” views of the groups on both fundamental dimensions. As
predicted, these effects only occurred for high-status group members, because
their advantageous position in the experimental setting (they received positive
 The Dimensional Compensation Model 137

feedback regarding their status) makes them more sensitive to the norms toward
(non-)discrimination. Such data go a long way to confirm that sensitivity to ambi-
ent norms may come as a viable reason for high-status group members to compen-
sate, a pattern known as “noblesse oblige” (Vanbeselaere, Boen, Van Avermaet, &
Buelens, 2006).
What about the low-status group members? In all likelihood, the key here is
again the search for positive distinctiveness. However, their outgroup bias on com-
petence can hardly rests on magnanimity. In contrast, it is their ingroup bias on
warmth that ought to be seen as a direct response to their predicament. Given the
social hierarchy in terms of prestige, status, and resources, promoting one’s group
on warmth is the safest way to ensure a comparative edge to the members of the
low-status group. Building upon several lines of research (Abrams & Hogg, 1988;
Lemyre & Smith, 1985), we would argue that self-esteem is at the heart of the pro-
cess for low-status groups. Interestingly, if the dividends of compensation reside
in the ability to secure positive self-esteem, then it should be possible to reassure
people via alternative means. This rationale is consistent with several strands of
work (Becker, 2012; Derks, van Laar, & Ellemers, 2007; Fein & Spencer, 1997)
and holds that compensation serves an affirmation function. In our experiment,
we did or did not give participants the possibility to self-affirm before describ-
ing both groups (Cambon & Yzerbyt, 2018). We predicted that only participants
given the opportunity to self-affirm would not need to compensate, because the
affirmation manipulation would have boosted their self-esteem. We predicted that
these effects would take place only among low-status group members for two
reasons. First, the status feedback should not threaten high-status group members’
self-esteem, so the latter should not experience any need to restore it. Second,
high-status group members’ self-esteem is likely to be high, and there is evidence
that self-affirmation fails to affect high self-esteem participants. Our data fully
confirmed these predictions.
To sum up, the search for positive distinctiveness is a key aspect underlying
compensation in group members’ judgments. However, this search materializes in
very different ways for members of the high-status and of the low-status groups
essentially because of higher reality constraints for competence than for warmth.
Although high-status groups are tempted to favor the ingroup on all counts, they
are at least sensitive to social norms of non-discrimination. The story for low-
status group members is entirely different as they depend on favorable warmth
ratings to restore their threatened self-esteem.

Conclusions
When people evaluate their ingroup and some outgroup, they often avoid favoring
their ingroup on all counts. Instead of derogating the outgroup across the board,
group members are keen to select only certain aspects to secure their positive dis-
tinctiveness while conceding some value to the outgroup on other aspects. In the
present chapter, we relied on these two dimensions of warmth and competence
138 Vincent Yzerbyt

evidence by the SCM ( Fiske et al., 2002) to examine the way group members
appraise intergroup comparisons (Yzerbyt, 2016). Our research shows that the two
fundamental dimensions offer the perfect ground for this compromising posture
as members of real but also of minimal groups manifest a so-called compensation
pattern along competence and warmth. In other words, when a group is judged to
be better on the competence dimension than the other group, it also tends to be
rated as less warm. This robust pattern shapes group members’ judgments as well
as their behaviors (for a review, see Kervyn et al., 2010).
A very important message of our research is that the standing of the groups
cannot be interpreted as pointing to some kind of inherent characteristics. Rather,
group members modulate their stereotypes as a function of the specific com-
parison context, i.e., the status/power and the cooperation/competition relations
characterizing the groups in presence. Even more striking, our data show that
the presence of intergroup conflict and the illegitimacy of the relative status dif-
ference both disrupt compensation ( Cambon & Yzerbyt, 2016). In line with the
justification role of stereotypes stressed by Tajfel (1981), this finding doves nicely
with the idea that compensation is a form of intergroup perception that signals and
contributes to the status quo of the social hierarchy. Several recent efforts suggests
that ambivalence on the two dimensions emerges in the context of unequal social
systems (for a review, see Durante & Fiske, 2017) and is observed more in countries
characterized by moderate levels of conflict than in countries with very high or
very low levels of conflict (Durante et al., 2017). By directly manipulating conflict
levels and status differentials, our own work thus contributes to this literature by
offering unique insights with respect to causality.
Importantly, while group members’ goal in ingroup and outgroup seems to be
one of securing positive distinctiveness, the specific compensation pattern typi-
cally results from additional and indeed different concerns depending on whether
people belong to the high-status or the low-status group in the given context.
At the very least, normative pressures condemning discrimination are one set of
considerations leading the dominant groups to give up superiority on warmth. In
contrast, given the reality constraints of the status difference and the resulting dif-
ferentiation on competence, dominated groups find themselves tempted to claim
greater warmth in an attempt to enhance their self-esteem.
As it turns out, the dynamics of intergroup comparison whereby group members
may feel more or less constrained by their relative position on competence or warmth
is reminiscent of social comparison work in the interpersonal domain. In line with
the logic underlying our dimensional compensation model in intergroup contexts, a
compensation pattern would also be expected to emerge when individuals compare
themselves with each other. The confrontation with another person who is decid-
edly more competent or warmer is likely to have non-trivial consequences on how
people want to see themselves on the other dimension (see Chapter 10).
Although the dynamics of intergroup stereotyping are a complex matter, this
chapter shows that substantial progress is possible by bringing together such various
research traditions as social perception on the one hand and intergroup relations
 The Dimensional Compensation Model 139

on the other. At the same time, several questions remain unanswered. For instance,
and in light of contemporary efforts stressing a series of nuances within each of
the fundamental dimensions (Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008; Abele et al.,
2016), future research may want to consider whether compensation equally applies
to the sub-dimensions of competence/agency, i.e., skills and assertiveness, and
the sub-dimensions of warmth/communion, i.e., sociability and morality. Also,
the specific role of compensation in ongoing interactions between groups and
group members and its underlying mechanisms remain important topics for future
endeavors. Indeed, giving up warmth on the part of high-status groups does not
seem to derive solely from compliance with anti-discrimination norms but may
likely serve other purposes, in relation to the justification function of stereotypes.
In our view, a thorough understanding of the motives and contexts that prevail
in the formation of intergroup stereotypes constitutes a captivating item on the
research agenda.

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12
POWER, SELF-FOCUS, AND
THE BIG TWO
Aleksandra Cislak and Aleksandra Cichocka

Overview
Agency and communion are the “Big Two” in social cognition (Abele & Wojciszke,
2014). Agentic versus communal behavior and agentic versus communal social
cognition are closely tied to perspective: agency corresponds to the perspective of
the actor and reflects self-interest, while communion corresponds to the perspec-
tive of the observer and reflects other-interest (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; Cislak &
Wojciszke, 2008). Social power is also closely tied to perspective (Galinsky, Magee,
Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008): the power-
ful have a different focus than the powerless. The present chapter integrates the
literature on social power and the Big Two, reviewing empirical work on how the
power perspective affects agentic and communal contents of perception, evaluation,
and behavior. Specifically, we make the theoretical argument that due to self-focus,
power promotes an agentic mind-set. People behave in a most agentic fashion when
they have power, and in a least agentic fashion when they lack power (Moskowitz,
Suh, & Desaulniers, 1994). Even more importantly, people in a position of power
tend to interpret others’ behavior in terms of agency rather than communion (Cislak,
2013), and base their overall evaluation of powerless individuals on the assessment
of their agency (Cislak, 2014). Thus, power reverses the usually observed primacy
of communion (Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011) towards the
primacy of agency.
In this chapter, we will first shortly discuss the Big Two and the concept of
power, including its positive and negative consequences, such as goal-directed agen-
tic behavior and objectification. We will then show that power leads to self-focus.
We will argue that the focus on the self is the psychological mechanism that stands
behind the positive and negative aspects of agency stemming from holding high-
power positions.
 Power, Self-Focus, and the Big Two 143

The Big Two and self versus others

Agency and communion are underlain by a vital distinction between the self and
others (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014). Early formulations of this distinction can be
traced back to the ancient philosopher Empedocles who claimed that strife (repre-
senting separation) and love (representing union) are two underlying forces orga-
nizing the universe. In modern psychology, these concepts refer to distinct ways
individuals relate to the social world. In his seminal work, Bakan (1966) described
agency and communion as two modalities of human existence and considered
both of them to be fundamental prerequisites of maturity and well-being.
In the field of social perception, agency and communion have been called the Big
Two of social cognition (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011). Numerous studies show that
these two dimensions underlie interpersonal impressions and explain the variation
in self- and others’ evaluations (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014). Peeters (1992) postulated,
and empirical evidence confirmed (Wojciszke, 1994), that agency-related traits are
self-profitable, while communion-related traits are other-profitable. Thus, commu-
nion corresponds to others’ interests, and agency corresponds to self-interest. When
the behavior leads to positive or negative outcomes for others, it is interpreted in
terms of communal traits (positive or negative respectively). But when the very same
action leads to either beneficial or harmful consequences for the self, it is interpreted
in terms of agency (Cislak & Wojciszke, 2008). Thus, the essence of communion is
the focus on others, while the essence of agency is the focus on self.

Social power
The vast literature on social dimensions coincides with recent findings from the
field of the effects of social power. Social power is defined as asymmetric control
over valued resources in a social relationship (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Impor-
tantly, power is by nature a relational concept: it concerns relations between indi-
viduals, rather than individuals themselves (Emerson, 1962). As we will describe
in more detail in the next sections of this chapter, this type of social asymmetry
has been consistently shown to undermine social relations and result in corrup-
tion. But power and some of its less desired effects should neither be equated
with merely holding a high position within a social or organizational hierarchy,
nor with being a leader. In fact, the psychological effects of power often stand in
contrast to the leadership demands (Maner & Mead, 2010), that is, pursuing col-
lective good and focusing on others. Although power may stem from holding a
high position, its effects are qualified by the effects of other sphere of control also
increasing with position, namely personal control. While exploitation and aggres-
sion are positively related to power, they are negatively related to personal control
(Cislak, Cichocka, Wojcik, & Frankowska, 2018).
In this chapter we focus on the psychological effects of power as a type of asym-
metric social relation involving control over others. We attempt to develop an
agentic model of power. To do so, we begin by analyzing how power influences
144 Aleksandra Cislak and Aleksandra Cichocka

perceptual focus, resulting in a self-centered perspective. Subsequently, we argue

that self-focus stands behind the agentic mind-set of the powerful. We then review
studies lending empirical support to the increased agency-focus of the powerful
across different domains: in the way they perceive others and their behavior, in
their own behavior, and in what they value. Finally, we will discuss how social
hierarchies may be perpetuated by the agency-focus of the powerful.

Power and perceptual focus

Recent psychological literature on social power depicts it as a strong stimulant.
Power advances people toward their goals by activating the behavioral approach
system (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), thus promoting action (Galinsky,
Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003) and goal-directed behavior (Guinote, 2007a). Accord-
ing to the situated model of power, it affects goal orientation by stimulating readi-
ness to engage in goal-directed behavior, reducing procrastination, and enhancing
flexibility in goal-directed actions (Guinote, 2007b). In a similar vein, lacking
power disrupts effective goal attainment by reducing executive control manifested
in impaired planning, updating, and inhibiting ( Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van
Dijk, 2008). Thus, power promotes agentic behavior – powerful people tend to be
more focused on their goals and more fit to attain them.
Unfortunately, because powerful people tend to ignore and disregard others,
only too often these goals are egocentric and selfish. Power promotes egocentrism
by reducing spontaneous perspective taking, which usually leads to a more accu-
rate perception of others’ interests (Galinsky et al., 2006). These effects are mani-
fested on the very basic level of brain activity as power affects neural responses
to others’ actions. For example, power decreases mirroring measured as a motor
resonance during a task involving observation of others’ actions (Hogeveen, Inzli-
cht, & Obhi, 2014). In line with these findings, having a high social position is
associated with less regard for others’ feelings (Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010) and
lowered compassion towards others (van Kleef et al., 2008). Consequently, power
leads to actions focused on benefits for the self, rather than for others (Maner &
Mead, 2010). This involves monopolizing resources and using them for one’s own
goals (Rucker, Dubois, & Galinsky, 2011), withholding information from others
(Maner & Mead, 2010), and cheating on others (yet keeping high moral standards
in evaluating them; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010).
Thus, power increases unethical behavior, especially when this behavior is
self-beneficial ( Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015). Furthermore, power magni-
fies self-confidence ( See, Wolfe Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011) and motivates
those who hold it to compete with expert advisors ( Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012),
which in turn reduces taking advice from others and harms decision-making
processes. Finally, as an utmost example of self-focus, powerful people tend to
get more inspiration from themselves rather than from others (van Kleef, Oveis,
Homan, van der Löwe, & Keltner, 2015). Thus, power promotes resistance to
social signals.
 Power, Self-Focus, and the Big Two 145

At the same time, power seems to make people more authentic. It promotes
self-driven, situationally unconstrained behavior (Keltner et al., 2003). Power-
induced asymmetries affect conformity and creativity, resulting in powerful peo-
ple being more self-reliant and more independent from situational pressures and
others’ opinions (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). In
a similar vein, power increases self-reliance both on the inner states and traits. For
example, power increases reliance on bodily information and as a result powerful
(but not powerless) individuals eat more when hungry and eat more appetizing
than non-appetizing food ( Guinote, 2010). Powerful people tend to also rely more
on their own preferences, for example on preferred styles of information process-
ing (Kossowska, Guinote, & Strojny, 2016). But power also promotes authenticity
by intensifying the effects of individuals’ initial predispositions on their percep-
tion and behavior. Power reinforces the effects of both exchange and prosocial
orientation, thus making prosocially-oriented individuals even more prosocial
( Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001) and more accurate in assessing emotional states
of others ( Côté et al., 2011). Thus, power may sometimes increase prosociality and
stimulate communal mind-set but only by means of reinforcing the initial proso-
cial orientation, that is, through enhancing focus on self.
Taken together, empirical evidence from various research fields such as social
neuroscience, cognitive, organizational, and social psychology converges in show-
ing that power promotes self-focus, which may stand behind the far-reaching
effects of power. As powerful people are focused on the self, they should also pay
more attention to the agency dimension, because it brings them closer to goal-
focus and is also more self-profitable. Here, we claim that by promoting self-focus,
power leads to an agentic mind-set manifested in a wide range of effects across
different domains.

Power and the agentic mind-set

Empirical research linked power to agency in a broad sense, implying that power-
ful people feel that they are the ones who are putting things into action. Obhi,
Swiderski, and Brubacher (2012) showed that induced power decreases the per-
ceived time interval between an action and its consequences. This may be inter-
preted as increased sense of agency of powerful persons who are more prone to
perceive a direct connection between the self and the outcome. Thus, as we argue
in the following sections, power promotes an agentic mind-set that is manifested
in perceptions of own and others’ actions, as well as behavior, life narratives, and
even in more stable personal characteristics (such as personality and values). First,
the more powerful people feel, the more they value factors conducive to their
own goals and targets. In fact, agency dominates autobiographical memories of
those who value power (McAdams, Hoffman, Day, & Mansfield, 1996). Second,
because by definition the powerful have the ability to influence others and with-
stand their influence ( Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003), they control relationships.
Therefore, the powerful do not need to pay attention to the intentions of their
146 Aleksandra Cislak and Aleksandra Cichocka

subordinates and thus can ignore the communal aspect of perception. Those who
occupy higher organizational positions tend to perceive others in an instrumental
way, especially their own employees (Gruenfeld et al., 2008).

Power and person perception

Consequently, we argue that power can enhance focus on the agentic, rather than
communal, traits of others. This prediction was tested in three experiments ( Cis-
lak, 2013). In the first study, power was manipulated by means of a role-playing
task. Participants were asked to imagine being a team leader or a team member
and then to assess how interested they would be in the traits of a new person join-
ing their team. Overall, team leaders were more interested in the agentic traits of
their employees than subordinates were, and they were more interested in agentic
than communal traits. In the second study, power was manipulated with a mem-
ory task ( Galinsky et al., 2003), thus eliminating a possible confound between
the perceiver’s perspective and the object of perception (powerful vs. powerless).
Participants were then asked to read a list of sentences describing behaviors of
unknown others and to interpret them in terms of traits implied by these behav-
iors. In the high-power condition, participants interpreted behaviors of unknown
others using traits that were more agentic than traits inferred by participants in the
low-power condition. At the same time, they interpreted these behaviors as more
agentic than communal. Likewise, powerful communicators used more agency-
related attributes when attempting to persuade others (Dubois, Rucker, & Galin-
sky, 2016). Notably, they were also more persuaded by the agentic content, thus
revealing their perceptual focus.
Why do the powerful focus on others’ agency? We believe that the key to this
question lies in the perception of others as instruments to achieve (or barriers that
may hinder) goal attainment. Hence, the focus on others’ agency should be the
higher, the more these others can serve (or hinder) their own goals. In the final
study, replicating the results of the first two experiments, power led to preference
for agentic over communal traits of others, and this effect indeed was shown to be
mediated by enhanced task orientation.
These findings are complemented by the results of studies on the role of power
motivation in social information processing (Woike, 1994). This line of studies
showed that power-motivated individuals engage in more differentiation rela-
tive to integration than those who are intimacy motivated. Integration involves
making connections and perceiving similarities, thus representing a connected
way of thinking typical for communal concerns. Differentiation, on the other
hand, involves comparisons and contrasts, representing a separate way of thinking,
thereby promoting distance and individualistic orientation. Thus, individuals who
are power motivated represent social information in the way that is more typical
for agency concerns.
Subsequently, it may be further hypothesized that agency concerns are associated
with employees’ desirability, while communion concerns are associated with bosses’
 Power, Self-Focus, and the Big Two 147

desirability. These predictions were tested in an experiment set in an organizational

conflict (Cislak, 2014). Participants were employees who were first asked to read a
short description of a person involved in an organizational conflict and behaving
either in a cooperative or a confrontational way. Participants were then asked to
evaluate agency, communion, and the desirability of this person as their boss or as
their employee. In line with previous results, perceived agency predicted evaluation
of someone as an employee, while perceived communion predicted evaluation of
someone as a boss, but not the other way around (Cislak, 2014). A similar pattern
was observed in the political domain. For example, communion but not agency
concerns underlie support for politicians and voting decisions (Cislak & Wojciszke,
2006).
In summary, the results of these studies converged in showing that agency
dominates the way the powerful perceive social reality. Induced power resulted
in higher interest in agentic qualities of potential employees, preference for their
agentic over communal traits, preference for the agentic versus communal con-
tent of persuasive messages, and readiness to interpret others’ behavior in terms
of agency. Finally, agency (but not communion) concerns prevail when people
consider desired traits of potential employees.

Power and agentic values

The agentic mind-set of people who have power can also be observed in what
they value. Drawing on structural theories (Kohn & Słomczyński, 1990 ), we
predicted that a high organizational position is positively associated with self-
enhancement values (such as achievement) and with openness to change val-
ues (such as self-direction). However, it should be negatively associated with
conservation values (such as conformity) and self-transcendence values (such as
benevolence; Cislak & Wojcik, 2017). Drawing on socio-psychological theories
of social power, we further hypothesized that these effects would be mediated
by power experienced by those holding managerial positions. We tested these
predictions using cross-cultural data from the European Social Survey (wave
2012) conducted in 29 countries with ISCO88 codes as indicators of organiza-
tional position, the McArthur ladder as a measure of subjective power, and the
Schwartz Value Survey as a measure of the values pursued by participants. Across
the various countries, we found that for individuals holding powerful posi-
tions agentic values such as achievement and self-direction were relatively more
important standards guiding their behavior, decisions, and attitudes. Communal
values such as benevolence were less important for them than for those occupy-
ing non-managerial positions. All of these effects were mediated by subjective
power.
Values refer to trans-situational goals and serve as criteria for a broad spectrum
of socially relevant decisions and choices. Power is associated with a tendency to
use standards guiding these decisions that reflect focus on self ( Schwartz, 2012)
and thereby agency concerns in social life.
148 Aleksandra Cislak and Aleksandra Cichocka

Interpersonal behavior
Social role theory (Eagly, 1987) posits that some social roles require and are expected
to be associated with more agentic behaviors, while other social roles require and are
expected to be associated with more communal behaviors. These role requirements
stand behind perceived and expected differences in behavior. In their refinement of
the social role theory Moskowitz et al. (1994) hypothesized that the factor control-
ling the relationship between roles/occupations and agency is power. Individuals in
roles associated with holding a higher power position reveal more agency-related
interpersonal behaviors than individuals holding lower power positions. In an analy-
sis set in natural settings and actual power differences, Moskowitz et al. (1994) found
that the same people revealed more agentic behaviors in the interactions in which
they played the role of the supervisors than in interactions in which they had been
supervised (regardless of their gender). Thus, power was shown to be associated with
agency also on the behavioral level. In contrast, no power differences were found for
communal behaviors.
Such differences were, however, observed in subsequent work. Individuals holding
relatively low positions within the group hierarchy showed more communal and pro-
social behavior (Guinote, Cotzia, Sandhu, & Siwa, 2015). The agentic-communal dis-
tinction is also well-illustrated by research in the field of consumer behavior (Rucker
et al., 2011; Rucker, Galinsky, & Dubois, 2012). Rucker et al. (2011) found that low-
power participants bought three times more than high-power participants when
purchasing for others, but at the same time they acquired only half of high-power
individuals’ purchases when buying for themselves. This is in line with work showing
that social class and experienced power promotes selfishness, rather than unethical-
ity per se (Dubois et al., 2015). Thus, the behavior of the powerful is intended to be
agentic (see Cislak & Wojciszke, 2008) rather than immoral. These results speak to
the agentic mind-set framework developed in this chapter.

Theoretical and social implications

Across different domains we found a consistent pattern of results showing that
power is related to agency in (1) social perception, (2) autobiographical memories,
(3) personal values, and (4) interpersonal behavior. Thus, power reverses the usu-
ally observed primacy effects of communion (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; Abele &
Bruckmüller, 2011). Integrating classic agency and communion theorizing with
recent power literature, we argue that this is due to the fact that power promotes
self-focus. Agency is underlain by self-considerations, hence it is prominent in
lives of the powerful or those striving for power.
Our theorizing assumes that the self-focus associated with power fosters
agency. However, the causal relations between these variables are still not well-
understood. Is it self-focus that promotes the agentic mind-set of the powerful or
is it the agentic mind-set that promotes self-focus? Rucker et al. (2012) presented a
similar rationale to Cislak (2013) for the relationship between power and agency in
 Power, Self-Focus, and the Big Two 149

order to predict consumer behavior. However, they proposed a reversed relation-

ship between agency and self-focus. In their agentic-communal model of power,
they argued that self-focus is the consequence of agency concerns rather than the
other way round. In fact, past work indicates that the relationship between self
and agency might work both ways: self-concerns lead to focus on agency (Abele &
Wojciszke, 2007) and priming agency promotes closeness to self (Piotrowski &
Wojciszke, 2015). However, in light of current psychological literature on the
effects of power it seems plausible that self-focus is the more proximal conse-
quence of power. Specifically, results showing the enhanced prosociality of the
powerful who were initially more prosocial can be well-explained within the self-
focus model of power as one could argue that the self-focus promotes authenticity
(Wicklund, 1975). At the same time, these results are not as easy to integrate with
the agentic-communal model of power. Therefore, we argue that both the authen-
ticity and agentic mind-set of the powerful can be understood as consequences of
the self-focus promoted by power. Thus, psychological processes associated with
power might show both positive and negative social aspects.
A common thread in the discussion on theories of the two dimensions is to
what extent power and agency actually form one dimension, and whether “getting
ahead” necessarily involves “moving up.” Power is a relational concept (Emer-
son, 1962) as reflected by the psychological definitions of power highlighting the
interpersonal asymmetry. Thus, the presence of others is a necessary prerequisite of
experiencing power. Agency is a manner of behavior of individuals or an interpre-
tation of their behavior. Agency encompasses two facets: competence and assertive-
ness (Abele et al., 2016). Arguably, the former should be less related to power than
the latter. Empirical evidence also suggests that their functions are different. For
instance, power (though not agency) concerns stand behind the backlash against
women (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). Therefore, we claim that
power and agency are positively related to each other, though not close enough
to unify them under one dimension. Both the theoretical considerations and the
empirical evidence allow for a more nuanced understanding of these concepts.
Finally, in a broader theoretical perspective, the findings reviewed here are in
line with theories of how system-level considerations affect social relations ( Sida-
nius & Pratto, 1999). Marxist theories based on the arguments of John Stuart Mill
predict that under a capitalist system other people are mediators between an indi-
vidual and a product (Marx, 1992/1844). Employees are valued to the extent they
contribute to the value of the product, and therefore their merits such as skills and
productivity are more appreciated than their virtues, such as morality or kindness.
Power promotes personal efficiency, also in the field of human resources manage-
ment by making the powerful more attentive to the task-related traits of their
employees. But at the same time it also instrumentalizes social relations. Likewise,
the personalities and values of the powerful reflect their self-focus and to some
extent also their exploitative tendencies. Social perception, decisions, values, and
behavior of the powerful that are dominated by agency concerns thus support
existing social hierarchies.
150 Aleksandra Cislak and Aleksandra Cichocka

This has important social implications. The results reviewed here shed light
on the long-standing discussion regarding the corruptive effects of power. Power,
rather than directly corrupting people, simply leads to self-focus. This can explain
the increased preference for self-focus values such as self-enhancement and open-
ness to change and the decreased preference for other-focus values, i.e., self-
transcendence and conservation. In turn, the self-focus is manifested in a wide
range of social effects, from egocentric perspective and selfishness, through agency-
focus, to increased authenticity in the expression of one’s values and orientations.
The agentic focus promotes action and attainment of goals, which can be, though
are not necessarily, also the goals of the persons over whom the powerful have
control. Thus, power enables people to get what they aim for. But power also pro-
motes instrumental perceptions of others that may disrupt workplace social rela-
tions. Therefore, it creates a tension with the demands of leadership, which involves
focus on group goals and others (Maner & Mead, 2010). Therefore, the agentic
mind-set of the powerful may increase organizational performance, but it may also
be harmful for those organizations, in which productivity depends on the infor-
mational and social benefits of concentrating on others (such as companies with a
primary strategic focus on innovation; see Dezsö & Ross, 2012). In the long run,
a diminished communal mind-set may undermine social responsibility concerns
resulting both in unethical and suboptimal decisions.
Importantly however, the otherwise lower agentic focus of the powerless may
be enhanced by demonstrating the illegitimacy of the power relationship. When a
power relationship is not perceived as justified and legitimate, those at the bottom
gain action orientation and agency-focus typical for those at the top (Lammers,
Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008). Thus, power and agency-focus remain in the
dynamic interplay shaping social hierarchies.

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13
THE “BIG TWO” IN CITIZENS’
PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIANS
Susanne Bruckmüller and Nicole Methner

A key aspect of politics in present-day Western democracies is a personalization

of politics. That is, in addition to political issues and party identification (see
Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960), an important way in which voters
make sense of complex political information is by anchoring it around individual
politicians and their personal attributes (Holtz-Bacha, Lessinger, & Hettesheimer,
1998; see also Adam & Maier, 2010). Accordingly, voters’ political decisions to
some extent also depend on their impressions of individual politicians and their
personalities (Catellani & Alberici, 2012; Kinder, 1986; Mondak, 1995). Political
campaigns and media reporting often center on individual politicians (e.g., Holtz-
Bacha, 2006), politicians themselves engage in strategic impression management
(e.g., Jacobs & Shapiro, 1994), and researchers in political science, political psy-
chology, and in communication studies have a great interest in how citizens form,
maintain, and change impressions of politicians as well as in how politicians try
to convey particular personal attributes to voters (e.g., Caprara, Barbaranelli, &
Zimbardo, 1997, 2002; Catellani & Alberici, 2012; Funk, 1999; Jacobs & Shapiro,
1994; McGraw, 2003).
At the same time, the question of how people generally form impressions of oth-
ers is a core topic in social psychology, social cognition in particular. One realiza-
tion, based on decades of research on person perception and impression formation,
is that how people perceive and judge others can be meaningfully characterized by
drawing on two fundamental content dimensions (e.g., Abele & Wojciszke, 2014;
Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005),
often labeled as Communion and Agency (Bakan, 1966), or the Big Two (Paulhus &
Trapnell, 2008). In the present chapter, we argue for bringing this research together
with research on citizens’ impressions of politicians in political science, political
psychology, and political communication. We hope (a) to show how applying a
Big Two framework to voters’ impressions of politicians can lead to new research
 The “Big Two” in Perceptions of Politicians 155

questions and new insights into voters’ perceptions of politicians, and (b) to illus-
trate how this may also enhance social psychologists’ understanding of the Big Two.

Voters’ perceptions of politicians

What do we know about how voters perceive politicians? While political scientists
have always considered the role of individual politicians’ public images, the ques-
tion how voters perceive individual politicians’ personalities and how this may
affect voting behavior became a prominent research topic in the 1980s and 1990s
and since then has been considered by many to be key for understanding modern
politics (see Adam & Maier, 2010; Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). A first question
was to what extent voters’ general positive or negative impressions of individual
politicians mattered and how they were integrated into election choices (e.g., Lau,
1982; Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh, 1989; Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk, 1986).
However, the question soon turned to the specific content of voters’ impressions
of politicians’ personalities and the question of whether it was useful to distin-
guish between different types of content (e.g., Funk, 1999; Caprara et al., 1997).
While the specific number of content dimensions and the labels for these dimen-
sions differ between scholars, most distinctions comprise comparable traits (see
McGraw, 2003). A popular distinction, applied for example, by Kinder (1986) in
the National Election Studies in the US, is between competence (e.g., “intelligent”),
leadership (e.g., “provides strong leadership”), integrity (e.g., “honest”), and empathy
(e.g., “cares about people like me”). Other authors have suggested similar content
dimensions under different labels, for instance, dominance, charisma, likability, or
trustworthiness (e.g., Chen, Jing, & Lee, 2014; Funk, 1999; Pancer, Brown, & Barr,
1999). Empirical evidence suggests that appraisals of politicians’ competence and
integrity in particular (more so than leadership and empathy) are central for voters’
evaluation of politicians and for their vote choice (e.g., Kinder, 1986; Lodge et al.,
1989; Miller et al., 1986; Mondak, 1995). For example, Mondak (1995) inspected
the Almanac of American Politics (a reference book published biannually that gives
in-depth profiles of high-ranking politicians in the US) to obtain a list of terms
that had been used to describe various politicians in the US House of Representa-
tives (incumbent between 1969 and 1981). He then asked student participants to
rate these terms with regard to the competence or integrity they expressed; based
on these ratings he then created competence and integrity scores for each politi-
cian. Representatives who were still in office in 1981 had substantially higher
ratings with regard to both competence and integrity than those who had left the
House because they had been defeated in an election.
In another line of work, psychologists ( Caprara et al., 1997, 2002) started from
the Big Five model of personality, prominent in personality psychology (McCrae &
Costa, 1987). According to this well-established model, five different factors can be
distinguished in people’s descriptions of their own and other individuals’ personali-
ties. Yet for the perception of politicians, Caprara and colleagues found that only
two dimensions emerge as the primary anchors of evaluation, namely extraversion
156 Susanne Bruckmüller and Nicole Methner

(referred to as energy by these authors) and conscientiousness (referred to as friend-

liness). Remarkably, this held true for politicians in Italy as well as in the US, for
politicians from different sides of the political spectrum, during election campaigns
as well as at other times, and for presidential candidates as well as for lower-ranking
politicians (for an overview, see Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004).
How can these different approaches, conceptualizations, and labels for the dimen-
sions that characterize voters’ impressions of politicians be reconciled with one another?
We suggest that many of them can be brought together under the umbrella of the two
fundamental content dimensions uncovered by decades of psychological research on
person perception (i.e., the Big Two framework). Some psychologists have already
applied this framework to the perception of politicians (see e.g., Bertolotti, Catellani,
Douglas, & Sutton, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Cislak & Wojciszke, 2008; Wojciszke &
Klusek, 1996) and even political parties (Ehrke, Bruckmüller, & Steffens, 2016, 2017).
However, this approach has – to the best of our knowledge – not really been picked
up by political science and political communication research, for example into the
personalization of politics.1 Yet, as we show below, a Big Two conceptualization can
provide insights into questions such as, why is it these trait dimensions that matter
most for the perception of politicians and not others? And what are the implications
for political campaigns, politicians’ impression management, and for voting behavior?

The Big Two of social perception and judgment

How people form impressions of others is a core topic of social psychology. An
important distinction in this context is between process, that is, questions on how peo-
ple form, maintain, and change impressions of others, and content, that is, questions
on which kinds of characteristics and attributes matter most for person perception,
when, and why. Regarding the content question, decades of research have essentially
yielded two fundamental content dimensions (see Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, 2014;
Fiske et al., 2007; Judd et al., 2005). These dimensions have been labeled differently
by different authors (see Abele & Wojciszke, 2014, for an overview). We will here
refer to them as communion and agency, following Bakan’s (1966) terminology.

The Big Two of social perception and judgment

In essence, communion describes characteristics that pertain to cooperation, moral
integrity, and the attributes needed to “get along” (Hogan, 1983) with others. This
comprises traits such as warm, friendly, honest, and fair. Agency describes characteris-
tics that pertain to self-assertion, goal pursuit, and the abilities needed to “get ahead”
(Hogan, 1983) as an individual, comprising traits such as competent, determined, asser-
tive, and clever (see also Wojciszke & Abele, this volume). While these dimensions
are relatively broad, within each dimension two related but separable sub-facets
can be distinguished, namely morality and warmth (or sociability) within the com-
munion dimension, and assertiveness and competence within the agency dimension
(Abele et al., 2016; Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Carrier, Louvet, Chauvin, & Rohmer,
 The “Big Two” in Perceptions of Politicians 157

2014; see also Abele & Hauke, this volume; Fiske, this volume; and Sczesny, Nater,
& Eagly, this volume). Whether it is important and meaningful to distinguish
between these sub-facets or not depends on the research question at hand.

The Big Two in voters’ impressions of politicians

Comparing these two dimensions – and their sub-facets – to the various models
on impressions of politicians’ personalities, the parallels in content should be read-
ily apparent. Integrity, trustworthiness, empathy, likability, and friendliness are
all comprised within the communion (“get along”) dimension, and competence,
leadership, charisma, dominance, and energy are comprised within the agency
(“get ahead”) dimension – although the different conceptualizations may cap-
ture different sub-facets of communion and agency (see Table 13.1). Sometimes,
the terms used to measure the respective traits are identical as well (e.g., “hon-
est,” “moral,” “compassionate,” or “intelligent”). Moreover, remember that Cap-
rara, Zimbardo, and others ( Caprara et al., 1997, 2002) who proposed energy and
friendliness as the key dimensions for the perception of politicians had started
from the Big Five personality model (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Yet, not only do
their two factors closely resemble communion and agency, other researchers as
well have noted that there are two super-factors akin to communion and agency
that meaningfully comprise the Big Five (Digman, 1997; Wiggins, 1979).
In sum, psychologists studying the content dimensions of social perception and
judgment have proposed a range of different two-dimensional models of how peo-
ple perceive themselves and others. All these models share a common core in con-
tent (the Big Two). The content dimensions that have been proposed to underlie
voters’ impression of politicians’ personalities – and that have been found to predict
both overall favorability ratings and vote choice – very nicely parallel these two core
content dimensions.
Such considerable overlap between research traditions in different disciplines
suggests that the two could mutually benefit from each other, for example, by
integrating insights gained in one research tradition into the respective other tra-
dition. In the remainder of this chapter, we will illustrate some examples for what
both research traditions could gain from such integration. Needless to say, these
are just a few examples, but hopefully they will encourage readers interested in
this intersection of politics and psychology to see many more points of connec-
tion, to develop fruitful research questions, and to gain new insights.

What can a Big Two framework add?

What can a Big Two framework add to research on

impressions of politicians?
In general, a Big Two framework may be helpful to conceptualize a core challenge
for politicians. On the one hand, politicians are expected to lead (an agentic task);
TABLE 13.1 Conceptual parallels between (exemplary) research on voters’ perception of politicians and the Big Two framework

Big Two framework Bertolotti Caprara et al. Chen et al. Funk (1999) Kinder Pancer et al. Wojciszke and
(Abele et al., 2016) et al. (2013) (1997, 2002) (2014) (1986) (1999) Klusek (1996)

Communion
Morality Morality Trustworthiness Integrity Integrity Integrity Morality
Warmth Friendliness Likability Empathy Empathy Charisma Likability
Agency
Competence Leadership Competence Leadership Competence Competence Competence
Assertiveness Energy Dominance Effectiveness Leadership
Note: The grouping of concepts into the Big Two framework is based on their respective operationalizations.
 The “Big Two” in Perceptions of Politicians 159

at the same time, they need to be responsive to the needs and desires of the popu-
lace (a communal task; McGraw, 2002). Understanding agency and communion
as two separate dimensions may help researchers and political strategists to realize
that to be responsive to public opinion and therefore to be communal does not
necessarily reduce politicians’ agency, a criticism sometimes leveled at politicians
who appear too responsive to public opinion (see Jacobs & Shapiro, 1994). Relat-
edly, a Big Two framework might also shed some light on the question why it is
precisely these two dimensions that matter for the perception of politicians.
The underlying theory to explain why agency and communion are the primary
dimensions of social perception and judgment is that person perception fulfills the
goal to facilitate (safe and beneficial) interactions with others (Gibson, 1979). For
this end, perceivers first and foremost need to know whether another person is
a friend or a foe, that is, whether they have benevolent or malevolent intentions
towards the perceiver ( Fiske et al., 2007; Wojciszke & Abele, this volume; Ybarra,
this volume). Communion is a key indicator of such benevolence/malevolence.
Perceivers also need to know whether the other person is able and likely to act
on their benevolent or malevolent intentions (i.e., their agency, Fiske et al., 2007).
This explains why in most contexts, communion is the primary dimension for
person perception (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). It also
explains why high assertiveness and competence do not always lead to a more
favorable evaluation, as the meaning of agency for the perceiver depends on the
perceived person’s communion (see Paulhus, this volume). A competent benevo-
lent person is great; a competent villain is all the more dangerous (see Fiske et al.,
2007). Thus, a Big Two framework not only provides insights into why morality
(the primary sub-facet of communion, Brambilla & Leach, 2014) and competence
(a sub-facet of agency) are central for the evaluation of politicians and for voters’
election choices ( Chen et al., 2014; Kinder, 1986; Lodge et al., 1989; Miller et al.,
1986; Mondak, 1995). It also points to situations when crafting a campaign around
a candidate’s competence is promising and when it may backfire.
Another realization of Big Two research is that this general primacy of commu-
nion is moderated by the type of relationship between the perceiver and the perceived
person. In situations in which the perceiver’s outcomes depend on the actions of
another person, agency gains importance, as this other person’s agency will be key for
obtaining own desired outcomes. For example, one would prefer one’s lawyer to be
friendly and moral, but one would care at least as much whether they are competent
and assertive (Abele & Brack, 2013; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Cislak & Cichocka,
this volume; Wojciszke & Abele, this volume). Arguably, this is the case with politi-
cians as well, at least with those that hold public office or run for one. One may even
predict that the relative importance of agency and communion in politicians varies
depending on whether a politician holds office or not; for the importance of a candi-
date’s perceived agency, it may even matter whether or not voters perceive a realistic
chance for this candidate to actually take office after the election.
However, a Big Two framework may not only be useful on such a broad
conceptual level. A more specific example that we will illustrate in more detail
160 Susanne Bruckmüller and Nicole Methner

concerns politicians’ impression management in their responses to criticism. Since

citizens often cannot know whether a criticized politician is truly blamable or not,
one option is to declare allegations as untrue (e.g., Armstrong-Taylor, 2012), and
indeed, politicians frequently use denials to counter criticism ( Craig, Rippere, &
Grayson, 2014). Further possibilities to reject allegations include excuses, justifica-
tions (see McGraw, 2002), and counterattacks to divert attention away from the
initial criticism ( Craig et al., 2014). For example, in two studies, participants from
Italy and Britain read an alleged newspaper column describing shortcomings in
the budget management of a fictitious politician (Bertolotti et al., 2013). In a sec-
ond text, the politician either justified (“If I had [...], the resulting expenses would
have been even larger,” p. 120) or took responsibility for the poor budget manage-
ment (e.g., “If I had [...], the resulting expenses would have been avoided,” p. 120).
Both responses increased the perceived morality of the politician compared to the
evaluation after the attack, but justifications were more effective in restoring the
perceived leadership of the politician than acknowledging responsibility was.
However, other studies found an advantage for denials over justifications ( Craig
et al., 2014) and negative effects of counterattacks compared with simply ignoring
attacks ( Carraro et al., 2012). In short, research into the effectiveness of differ-
ent defense strategies provides no consensus on which strategy works best, and
no matter which defense is used, citizens still tend to evaluate politicians more
negatively than before an attack ( Craig et al., 2014). This raises the questions why
politicians still use such defenses and whether there might be more effective ways
to deal with criticism.
A Big Two framework can lead to new insights here. According to the dual
perspective model (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, 2014; Wojciszke & Abele, this vol-
ume), the importance of agency and communion differs between self-perception
and the perception of other people. In the perception of others, communion is the
primary dimension, as people first and foremost want to know whether others
are benevolent or malevolent (see above). In self-perception, on the other hand,
people tend to focus on the achievement of own goals and therefore, on agency
(Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, 2014; Wojciszke & Abele, this volume). Accordingly,
politicians themselves may aim to demonstrate their agency, for example, by deny-
ing or justifying mistakes (thereby defending their competence) or by counterat-
tacking opponents (demonstrating assertiveness). At the same time, these defenses
may not be effective in restoring a positive image because voters may be much
more skeptical about politicians’ communion than about their agency – because
the stereotype of politicians is that they are generally immoral (Birch & Allen,
2010; Hatier, 2012). Thus, denials, excuses, justifications, and counterattacks may
even be counterproductive if they are perceived as rather superficial attempts at
impression management. And, as intimated above, presenting oneself as particu-
larly assertive and competent may backfire if a politician’s morality is impugned
(“competent villain,” see above). Accordingly, impression management strategies
that focus on increasing a politician’s moral reputation, that is, their communion,
may be more effective.
 The “Big Two” in Perceptions of Politicians 161

We therefore recently suggested a response to criticism that focuses on politi-

cians’ communion, namely, openly accepting valid criticism (Methner, Bruckmül-
ler, & Steffens, 2017). By agreeing with a critic and acknowledging problems or
imperfect decisions, politicians can counter voters’ expectations of self-interested
and dishonest behavior and thus provide a strong signal of honesty (i.e., morality/
integrity). In two experiments, we examined whether citizens perceived politi-
cians who accepted criticism as more moral and warmer (i.e., more communal)
than politicians who denied criticism or counterattacked the critic. In Experi-
ment 1, participants read a scenario about a fictitious politician in the ministry of
health who either accepted or denied criticism leveled against his ministry con-
cerning the data security of medical records. Indeed, accepting criticism increased
the perceived communion of, trust in, and intentions to vote for the respective
politician (Experiment 1). For a real politician we also found that accepting criti-
cism increased ascriptions of communion and trust, but only if the politician’s
political affiliation matched the participant’s political orientation (Experiment 2).
Interestingly, the politicians’ perceived assertiveness was not affected (in either
experiment), and in Experiment 1, the agreeing politician was even rated as more
competent than his criticism-denying counterpart.
This example illustrates what a Big Two framework can add to research on
political communication. The dual perspective model provided new insights why
politicians pursue defenses and counterattacks as impression management strate-
gies, and why these strategies can fail to restore a positive impression. Moreover,
drawing on established findings on the primacy of communion, we were able to
suggest a different strategy for politicians when dealing with criticism and found
initial support for its higher effectiveness than typical defenses.

What can research on impressions of politicians add

to Big Two research?
Where a closer look at the literature on voters’ perceptions of politicians may be
informative for psychologists interested in the Big Two is with regard to modera-
tors and boundary conditions of established effects. For example, political psychol-
ogists have found some interesting interactions between voters’ political choice
and their own and politicians’ traits. Voters with communal values such as univer-
salism and benevolence, for instance, prefer liberal/left-wing coalitions, while voters
with agentic values such as power and achievement prefer conservative/right-wing
coalitions (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006). More-
over, voters favor politicians that (seem to) match their own personality ( Caprara,
Barbaranelli, Consiglio, Picconi, & Zimbardo, 2003). Within the Big Two litera-
ture there is little evidence for a systematic moderating influence of participants’
own agency and communion (for an exception see Gebauer, Wagner, Sedikides, &
Neberich, 2013). However, this could be because perceivers’ own traits matter in
some contexts but not so much in others. For example, our own values, attitudes,
and personality may matter – or matter more – when we choose leaders that will
162 Susanne Bruckmüller and Nicole Methner

represent us, but not so much in other contexts of person perception. This is, of
course, an empirical question.
Similarly, research on the perception of politicians might inspire hypotheses
on moderating factors and boundary conditions for the primacy of communion
over agency. Above we already hypothesized that the relative importance of a
politician’s perceived communion and agency may depend on whether this politi-
cian currently holds office or not. Another important moderator may be party
affiliation or, more generally, group membership. Despite communion being the
primary dimension of person perception, and even though the general stereotype
of politicians is that they are immoral (e.g., Birch & Allen, 2010; Hatier, 2012),
party supporters evaluating their respective party leader rely first and foremost on
a leader’s competence ( Capelos, van den Akker, & van der Eijk, 2007). One may
speculate that the association between a party leader and the self, as well as related
social identity processes (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) cause party supporters to simply
take party leaders’ communion for granted and to thus focus on leaders’ agency
instead. A similar process (taking own communion for granted; see Bi, Ybarra, &
Zhao, 2013) has been suggested as explanation for the dominance of agency over
communion in self-perception (Wojciszke, Baryla, Parzuchowski, Szymkow, &
Abele, 2011; but see also Abele & Hauke, this volume).2
As a further example, research on voters’ perceptions of politicians suggests
a possible boundary condition for the asymmetry observed in the diagnostic-
ity of positive versus negative agentic versus communal information in impres-
sion formation ( Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). In impression formation, one
immoral act influences overall morality judgments much more than one moral act
(that is, negative morality-related behavior is more diagnostic). At the same time,
one competent act is more influential than one incompetent act (that is, positive
competence-related behavior is more diagnostic; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).
However, a particularly strong cue in impression formation is expectancy viola-
tion (Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987), and citizens in Europe and North America
generally perceive politicians as immoral and not trustworthy (e.g., Birch & Allen,
2010; Hatier, 2012). Hence, politicians might be a case where positive morality-
related information is more diagnostic than negative information, because it is
unexpected. In our experiments summarized above (Methner et al., 2017), we
found some initial support for this hypothesis, as expectancy violation played an
important role for the influence of accepting criticism on trust in politicians.
Finally, within social cognition the realization that the Big Two can be mean-
ingfully conceptualized as containing two sub-facets each (namely, morality and
warmth for communion and competence and assertiveness for agency) is relatively
recent (e.g., Abele et al., 2016; Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Carrier et al., 2014). Yet,
while political scientists have used a variety of different content dimensions to
study the perception of politicians, one early and particularly prominent concep-
tualization has four dimensions that exactly match these sub-facets (namely integ-
rity, empathy, competence, and leadership; Kinder, 1986). An earlier look into the
respective literature could have saved psychologists quite a bit of time. We hope
 The “Big Two” in Perceptions of Politicians 163

that the parallels we have pointed out in this chapter will help researchers across
disciplines to save time on some future key insights.

Acknowledgments
We thank Julia Dupont, University of Koblenz-Landau, for valuable comments on
an earlier version of this chapter.

Notes
1 Caprara and Zimbardo (2004) do mention in passing that their dimensions of energy and
friendliness bear resemblance to the dimensions outlined by Bakan (1966).
2 For the evaluation of one’s ingroup as a whole, morality appears to be the most important
dimension (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). However, this does not preclude a motiva-
tion to take for granted the morality of (the leader of) a group one highly identifies with.

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14
RETHINKING THE NATURE AND
RELATION OF FUNDAMENTAL
DIMENSIONS OF MEANING
Alex Koch and Roland Imhoff

This research was supported by a University of Cologne Advanced PostDoc Grant

to Roland Imhoff.
Agency and communion matter because people can use these Big Two dimen-
sions to mentally organize all sorts of social entities varying from macro to micro,
including countries, groups ( Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, this volume),
individuals (Abele & Wojciszke, this volume), and the self (Abele & Hauke, this
volume). More importantly, the Big Two matter because thinking, feeling, and
acting in agentic and communal ways is goal-relevant and functional in the short
and long run (Locke, this volume; Ybarra, this volume). Thus, people want to
be and present the self as agentic and communal (Abele & Hauke, this volume;
Paulhus, this volume) – sometimes to an excessive extent (Gebauer & Sedikides,
this volume) – and they try to balance agency and communion, a task not always
easy to perform (Yzerbyt, this volume; Helm & Möller, this volume). Consistent
with the desirability of the Big Two, agency and communion information weighs
heavily, influencing emotions, behaviors (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007), and
well-being (Locke, this volume). In sum, the Big Two indeed appear to be the two
fundamental dimensions that people prioritize over other dimensions of meaning
(Abele & Wojciszke, 2014). Despite the persuasiveness of this conclusion, in this
chapter we invite rethinking the nature and relation of prioritized dimensions.

Why and how to reexamine fundamental dimensions

in a data-driven way
The priority that agency and communion enjoy has often been inferred from studies
that restricted the range of candidate meaning dimensions to exactly these two. For
example, self-esteem, evaluation of others, and social comparison were predicted
from agency and communion (Wojciszke, Baryla, Parzuchowski, Szymkow, &
168 Alex Koch and Roland Imhoff

Abele, 2011). People rated politicians, women, men, the self, traits, grandiose self-
thoughts, and experienced events on agency and communion (Abele & Wojciszke,
2007; Cislak & Wojciszke, 2008; Gebauer, Sedikides, Verplanken, & Maio, 2012;
Sczesny, 2003), categorized cultural practices as agentic and/or communal (Ybarra
et al., 2008), rated groups on status, competence, warmth, and competition with
other groups (Fiske et al., 2002), and inferred agency and communion from behav-
iors (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011, Study 3). There are, however, some studies that
test the priority of the Big Two by allowing people to employ other meaning
dimensions.
For example, Abele and Bruckmüller (2011, Study 4) asked people to provide
up to six descriptions of an acquaintance and found that 79% of all open responses
could be reliably categorized as relating to agency or communion. Uchronski (2008)
showed that 74% of up to 12 open self-descriptions (up to six and six descriptions
of the self at home and at work, respectively) related to agency or communion.
In a study by Wojciszke, Bazinska, and Jaworski (1998), all 10 personality traits
listed by >20% of participants as most important in others related to competence
(2) or morality (8). While it is possible that many of the both categorized (i.e., as
relating to agency or communion) and uncategorized descriptions (also) relate to
one or a few meaning dimensions other than the Big Two, these and other mostly
data-driven studies (see Abele & Wojciszke, 2014) clearly showed that agency/
communion is a satisfying (but not necessarily the optimal) model of how people
make sense of the generic individual, specific others, and the self.
Following the data-driven research cited in the previous paragraph, we also
sought to provide an impartial look at the nature of prioritized dimensions by
examining the dimension(s) that people spontaneously focus on to make sense
of their social environment (Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves, 2016).
In contrast to previous approaches construing social environment in the sense of
a single person, we were interested in how participants spontaneously compare
multiple groups. Importantly, the population of relevant social groups was unclear.
According to Brunswik’s (1955) notion of representative design, free choice of
dimension(s) is necessary but not sufficient to study prioritized meaning in an
ambiguous population. In addition, the population must be clarified and perceiv-
ers must respond to samples that represent the now unambiguous population –
otherwise generalizing results beyond the lab is out of reach. For example, if
perceivers respond to targets theoretically constrained to differ in agency but
not communion, they will not prioritize communion because it is uninforma-
tive (Tversky, 1977). Importantly, in many studies on fundamental meaning (e.g.,
Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011, Study 3), perceivers responded to targets that by
design differed greatly on the Big Two but no other dimension. If targets in the
population of social groups also differ greatly on other dimensions, however, such
studies may overlook fundamental meaning regardless of perceivers’ free choice of
dimension(s). To avoid this, besides designing free choice of dimension(s), in our
data-driven studies perceivers responded to target distributions that represented
the population of social groups well.
 Rethinking Fundamental Dimensions of Meaning 169

We reasoned people know best which targets represent the population of social
groups well. Thus, we gave perceivers free choice of targets, too (Koch, Imhoff, et al.,
2016). That is, initial samples of perceivers listed social group-representative targets,
and we gave subsequent samples of perceivers free choice to relate the most fre-
quently named targets to any desired dimension(s). Following previous data-driven
research, we instructed perceivers to judge targets’ similarity. Similarity needed to
be interpreted before it could be judged. For example, the similarity of doctors and
bankers needed to be interpreted with respect to agency, communion, or something
else before it could be judged. If agency, the two targets would be judged as similar.
If communion, they would be judged as different. Crucially, perceivers were free to
prioritize any desired dimension(s) to interpret and judge targets’ similarity.

Conservative-progressive beliefs: an overlooked

fundamental dimension
In a first series of data-driven studies (Koch, Imhoff, et al., 2016), we instructed
people to list groups that well-represent their social world. Aiming to disambigu-
ate this population in an impartial way, we made an effort not to prime groups
(“[...] what various types of people do you think today’s society categorizes into
groups?”; see Fiske et al., 2002, p. 883). People listed between 3 and 30 groups.
We compiled a social world-representative sample including all 42 groups listed
by at least 10% of all people (e.g., Blacks, women, rich people, alcoholics, punks,
and Muslims, see Figure 14.1). Next, another sample of people used the spatial
arrangement method (Koch, Alves, Krüger, & Unkelbach, 2016; Lammers, Koch,
Conway, & Brandt, in press) to judge the groups’ similarity. The groups appeared
in labels in the middle of a blank screen, and people’s task was to spatially rear-
range (i.e., drag-and-drop) them in such a way that more similar groups were
placed closer together and more different groups were further apart. Once fin-
ished, we recorded the spatially arranged proximity between each group and each
other group as the judged similarity of the respective unique pair of groups. This
method was highly efficient because rearranging a group readjusted the proximity
(i.e., similarity) between that and all other 41 groups on the screen.
We averaged spatially arranged similarity separately for each unique pair of groups,
and we subjected these mean pairwise similarity indices to multidimensional scaling
(MDS; Hout, Papesh, & Goldinger, 2013) to compute people’s mean similarity map
(see Figure 14.1 minus the two content dimensions). This solution was interpreted
by other people who listed dimensions that might explain the groups’ configuration
in the map. Next, another sample of people categorized >90% of all repeatedly listed
dimensions as relating to one of the three candidates shown in Table 14.1: agency/
socioeconomic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and communion.
Other people rated the groups on A, B, or C to assess the suitability of A, B,
and C for explaining the groups’ configuration in the map (i.e., for explaining the
dimensions that people had spontaneously used to interpret and judge the groups’
similarity).
 High
agency (A)
Rich
Politicians
Celebrities Upper class
Conservatives
Republicans

White collar

Christians
Athletes Religious
Jocks
Democrats Whites
Jews
Liberals Men
Parents Elderly Conservative
beliefs (B)
Women
Progressive Middle class Asians
beliefs (B) Nerds Students Muslims
Lesbians Hipsters Teenagers
Homosexuals Goths
Hippies Hispanic Blue collar
Transgender Working class
Blacks
Immigrants

Lower class
Poor
Homeless
Drug addicts

Low
agency (A)

FIGURE 14.1 People’s mean similarity map of social groups according to the ABC model.

TABLE 14.1 The ABC of stereotypes about social groups

A (agency/socioeconomic success) B (conservative-progressive beliefs) C (communion)

Powerless – Powerful Traditional – Modern Untrustworthy –

Low status – High status Religious – Science-oriented Trustworthy
Dominated – Dominant Conventional – Alternative Dishonest – Sincere
Poor – Wealthy Conservative – Liberal Cold – Warm
Unconfident – Confident Threatening –
Unassertive – Assertive Benevolent
Repellent – Likable
Egoistic – Altruistic
 Rethinking Fundamental Dimensions of Meaning 171

Figure 14.1 plots A and B where they best explained the groups’ configuration
in the similarity map. C could not be modeled as a dimension spanning the map.
Thus, inconsistent with the Big Two ( Fiske et al., 2002), results showed that people
had freely chosen agency (A) and beliefs (B) but not communion (C) to interpret
and judge the similarity of the groups, suggesting that the dimensions that people
spontaneously use to make sense of their social world are A and B but not C. In six
studies, this AB model of fundamental meaning replicated across ~4,000 people,
two national contexts, four group sets compiled in different ways, three similar-
ity measures, and three similarity judgment instructions (global, character, and
personal encounter similarity; Koch, Imhoff, et al., 2016).
As outlined above, people can use the Big Two to differentiate all sorts of social
entities varying from countries to brands. Thus, evidence that people spontane-
ously use AB to differentiate entities other than social groups would further vali-
date the AB model. There were only a few job groups among the social groups we
had examined (Koch, Imhoff, et al., 2016, see Tables 1, 5, and 6). We thus took job
groups as a separate entity domain. We used the same design and analysis as out-
lined above (two studies, N ~1,800, two national contexts), except that people did
not list job groups at first. Instead, we examined all 150 basic, distinct job groups
listed by the US Department of Labor (i.e., the entire entity domain). The first
two dimensions that people spontaneously used to spatially arrange the job groups
were agency/competence (i.e., A) and progressiveness (i.e., B; designers, artists,
etc. were high scorers, whereas morticians, firefighters, etc. were low scorers).
Next, we replicated spontaneous differentiation on A and B with all 84 basic, dis-
tinct job groups listed by the International Standard Classification of Occupations
( Imhoff, Koch, & Flade, 2017). Next, we generalized the AB model from social
and job groups to the 48 US mainland states (two studies, N ~1,800, two similar-
ity measures; Koch, Kervyn, Kervyn, & Imhoff, in press). Taken together, these
lines of data-driven research provided support for a third fundamental dimension
of meaning overlooked in theory-driven research on the Big Two: B as in beliefs
ranging from conservative to progressive.
In fact, B became known decades before our work, namely as tight-loose in
Peabody’s person perception and group stereotypes models (1985; see Peeters,
2008), as backward-modern in Jones and Ashmore’s (1973) group stereotypes
model, as conservation-openness to change in Schwartz and Bilsky’s (1987) human
values model, as conventional-alternative in Pattyn and colleagues’ (2013) person
perception model, etc. These likewise data-driven research lines further support B
as a fundamental dimension of meaning.
The Big Two model is supported by effects of AC information on social cog-
nition. Thus, for B to be seriously considered as a fundamental dimension, B
information should influence social cognition, too. First, we showed effects of
B information on social inference. People inferred that members of social groups
more similar in stereotypic B are more likely to be in the same place at the same
time, and are more likely to like one another (Koch, Imhoff, et al., 2016, see
Study 7). People also inferred that citizens of US states more similar in stereotypic
172 Alex Koch and Roland Imhoff

B are more likely to like one another (Koch et al., in press, see Study 3). Next,
we showed effects of B information on source memory. People read statements
by members of stereotypically conservative and progressive job groups and later
guessed who had said what. They confused members of different conservative
(progressive) groups more often than conservatives with progressives and vice
versa ( Imhoff et al., 2017, see Study 3). We also showed effects of B information on
attitude generalization. People recalled positive or negative police officer behav-
iors and then evaluated all 150 basic, distinct job groups listed by the US Depart-
ment of Labor. Job groups more similar to police officers in stereotypic B were
evaluated more positively after recall of positive compared to negative police offi-
cer behavior ( Imhoff et al., 2017, see Study 4). In sum, B information influenced
social inference, source memory, and attitude generalization (N ~1,000), further
raising our confidence that B is a fundamental dimension of meaning.

Minding conservative-progressive beliefs is important for

balancing exploitation and exploration
The Big Two are deemed fundamental dimensions not least because empirically
well-supported theories (e.g., Wojciszke & Abele, Chapter 3 this volume; Fiske,
this volume; Locke, this volume; Chan, Wang, & Ybarra, this volume; Yzerbyt,
this volume) clarify the goal-relevance and functionality of agency and commu-
nion. Thus, for B to match up to A and C, an empirically supported theory should
clarify the purpose and benefit of differentiating social entities as more conserva-
tive versus more progressive.
So, why mind B? Is this useful? Conservatives seek and provide feelings of
stability, predictability, control, safety, comfort, and belonging. Thus, they advo-
cate religion, traditions, conventions, and uniformity. Broadly speaking, they
favor routine, safe choices/available rewards of certain quality and quantity (i.e.,
resource exploitation). Progressives seek and provide feelings of curiosity, stimula-
tion, expansion, entertainment, and distinctiveness. Thus, they advocate science,
innovations, autonomy, and diversity. Broadly speaking, they favor alternative,
risky choices/uncertain rewards of unknown but possibly high quality and quan-
tity (i.e., resource exploration; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014; Jost, Federico, &
Napier, 2009). Thus, conservatives inspire, and provide opportunities and support
for, exploitation, whereas progressives inspire, and provide opportunities and sup-
port for, exploration. Accordingly, the purpose and benefit of minding B could be
guidance in solving the trade-off between exploitation and exploration.
Solving this trade-off between available resources of certain quality and quan-
tity and uncertain resources of unknown but possibly high quality and quantity
is, and throughout evolution and cultivation has always been, tough but important
for successful self-regulation. For example, people and, in fact, all living beings,
have always had to choose between their routine and alternative habitats, shel-
ters, occupations, tasks, strategies/tactics, groups, partners, foods, etc., and getting
these choices right has always been tough but important to survive and thrive. To
 Rethinking Fundamental Dimensions of Meaning 173

further illustrate by reference to psychological science in 2017: should we replicate

more old or discover more new findings? Should we stay with p < .05 or go with
p < .005? Fisher or Bayes statistics? Should we keep publishing in journals or move
on to posting our papers online? As these examples show, sometimes exploitation
is better, while at other times exploration is better.
Back to B: Our argument is that minding others’ B informs the self about
where to find reasons and opportunities for collaborative exploitation (conserva-
tives) versus exploration (progressives). In other words, the purpose and benefit of
minding B could be guidance in adaptively balancing exploitation and explora-
tion. To show this, our participants first played one of two games (Koch, Imhoff,
Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves, 2017). The first game – the Balloon Analogue Risk
Task (Lejuez et al., 2002) – is a process-pure measure of choosing safe versus risky
options. People earned a point each time they further inflated a balloon. The
balloon burst at some point, however. If people stopped inflating before it burst,
they kept their points. If it burst, they lost all points. In the exploitation condi-
tion, people learned that the balloon bursts early such that it is best to play it safe
(i.e., exploitation). In the exploration condition, they learned that the balloon
bursts late such that it is advisable to take some risk (i.e., exploration). The second
game – a modification of the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, Dama-
sio, & Anderson, 1994) – is a process-pure measure of choosing routine versus
alternative options. People drew 10 cards (points or blanks) from a routine deck
and then drew 40 cards from either the routine deck or four alternative decks. In
the exploitation condition, people learned that the routine deck has the highest
probability of earning a point (i.e., exploitation was superior). In the exploration
condition, they learned that the most rewarding deck is among the four alterna-
tives (i.e., exploration was required).
After playing the balloon or card game, people indicated their willingness to
delegate earning points in the game to members of stereotypically conservative
(e.g., elderly person) and progressive (e.g., environmentalist) groups (see Koch,
Imhoff, et al., 2016, Tables 1, 5, and 6). As predicted, when people had learned
that exploitation (exploration) is the best game strategy, they preferred to delegate
to members of stereotypically conservative (progressive) groups. Next, we repli-
cated this interaction of requirement (exploitation vs. exploration) and opportu-
nity (conservative vs. progressive B) with individuals as targets. After playing the
balloon or card game, people inspected the profile of other players one at a time.
Each profile showed self-rated sex, age, and A, B, and C on 0–100 scales. For each
profile, people either pocketed points or chose to bet these points on the respective
player’s game performance (below vs. above median; there was no feedback) for
twice as many points. As predicted, having learned that exploitation is required
people bet that conservative and progressive players had performed above and
below median, respectively. When exploration was required, however, they bet
the reverse. That is, despite the availability of four other often relevant cues (sex,
age, and the Big Two; the five cues did not correlate with one another) people
spontaneously relied on players’ B to bet whether they would succeed or fail in
174 Alex Koch and Roland Imhoff

situations that require pure exploitation or pure exploration. We replicated this

effect with people betting real money instead of points. Interestingly, more con-
servative and progressive people actually performed better in the exploitation and
exploration condition of both games, respectively, suggesting that B is a valid cue
for behavioral exploitation-exploration. In sum, 12 studies (N > 1,000) showed
that one purpose and benefit of minding B is guidance in solving the trade-off
between exploitation and exploration (Koch, Imhoff, et al., 2017). This clarifica-
tion of the goal-relevance and functionality of B information further supported
that B qualifies as a third fundamental content dimension.

Communion increases with perceiver-target similarity

in agency and beliefs
As outlined above, we found evidence that people spontaneously use A and B
but not C/warmth/morality for differentiating social groups, job groups, and US
states. This was highly unexpected, as C has been argued to have higher processing
priority than A (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011), for example because evaluating oth-
ers’ intentions (good vs. bad, i.e., C/warmth) is more important than estimating
the likelihood that they realize them (i.e., A/competence; see Fiske, this volume).
We reconsidered C by modeling it as centrality (i.e., not as a dimension) in our
similarity maps best described by A and B (e.g., Figure 14.1). In all studies reported
by Koch, Imhoff, and colleagues (2016), social groups’ mean C predicted groups’
proximity to the center of their similarity map. This suggested that while people
do not spontaneously use C to differentiate groups, C follows, and thus people
infer it, from A and B in a curvilinear fashion. According to this curvilinear rela-
tion, social entities perceived as more average in A and B are inferred to be more
communal (higher in C), whereas perceived extremeness in A and/or B leads to
inferences of low C, resulting in a two-dimensional ABC model of fundamental
meaning. C peaking at average AB was reminiscent of the more general cur-
vilinear relation between content and evaluation (on every evaluatively relevant
dimension, an intermediate range of positive quantities is flanked by the two
negative ranges of insufficiency and excess; see Grant & Schwartz, 2011). Further,
C peaking at average AB was consistent with that people seen as more likable
(~higher in C) are seen as more similar to one another (Alves, Koch, & Unkelbach,
2016; Koch, Alves, et al., 2016), and with that people seen as more similar to one
another are seen as more likable (Alves, Koch, & Unkelbach, 2017a). This higher
similarity of positive compared to negative social entities is consequential because
similarity influences many levels of processing (Alves, Koch, & Unkelbach, 2017b)
including categorization, generalization, and recognition (Alves et al., 2015).
Assuming that most people see the self as average in A, Imhoff and Koch (2017)
theorized that groups and persons seen as more average in A possibly receive higher
mean ratings in C because they are seen as more similar to the self by most people.
This “similarity breeds trust/liking” explanation has important implications. If C
increases with perceiver-target similarity in A, perceivers who see the self as low,
 Rethinking Fundamental Dimensions of Meaning 175

average, and high in A should disagree on targets’ C, and the relation between
targets’ A and C should actually not be curvilinear for everybody but negative
and positive for perceivers who see the self as low and high in A, respectively. So,
inconsistent with the original ABC model of fundamental meaning, the relation
between targets’ A and C might depend on perceivers’ A, but Koch, Imhoff, and
colleagues (2016) overlooked this controversy because they had analyzed mean
rather than individual A and C ratings. The same might have been the case for the
relation between targets’ B and C. We tested this next.
In four studies (N ~1,000) conducted in the US, Germany, India, and South
Africa, people rated psychologically relevant groups on A, B, or C twice, allowing
to decompose the total A, B, and C variance into three distinct shares: differences
between groups that people agreed on (consensus), group-unspecific differences
between people (controversy #1), and group-specific differences between people
(controversy #2). As predicted, people disagreed on groups’ C but not so much on
A and B. In four additional studies (N ~1,000), US Americans rated psychologically
prevalent US groups on A, B, and C. We explained groups’ C by groups’ A and
B, people’s self-rated A and B, and the interactions target A*perceiver A and target
B*perceiver B. The two interaction terms were significant, sizable, and supported
our updated theorizing that targets’ C increases with perceiver-target similarity in
A and B. As predicted, for perceivers low (high) in A the relation between targets’
A and C was negative (positive). Likewise, for perceivers conservative (progressive)
in B the relation between targets’ progressiveness and C was negative (positive).
In sum, reexamining the nature and relation of prioritized dimensions, we
took a data-driven approach, focused on social groups as targets, and advanced
our knowledge in three steps. First, we rediscovered B and found that A and B
are orthogonal dimensions. Second, we found that across perceivers of all kinds,
targets’ C increased with their averageness in A and B, respectively (Koch, Imhoff,
et al., 2016). And third, impressions of C turned out to increase with perceiver-
target similarity in A and B. Thus, C peaking for targets average in A and B only
applied for perceivers who themselves were average in A and B. For perceivers
extreme in A and/or B, C instead peaked for targets extreme in A and/or B in the
same way as the respective perceiver (e.g., perceivers conservative in B trusted the
most in targets also conservative in B; see Figure 14.2). We revised the ABC model
accordingly, concluding that there is controversy on C (Koch, Nicolas, et al., 2017).

People spontaneously use A, B, and C to make sense

of the social world
Our second and so far most recent revision of the ABC model concerns the spon-
taneous usage of C for mentally organizing social entities. At first (see Figure 14.1),
we did not find evidence that people spontaneously use C to spatially arrange
social groups etc. based on their similarity ( Imhoff et al., 2017; Koch, Imhoff,
et al., 2016; Koch et al., in press). This, however, turned out to be an artifact of
analyzing mean rather than individual data.
176 Alex Koch and Roland Imhoff

Peak C
(high A) Rich
Politicians
Celebrities Upper class
Conservatives
Republicans

White collar

Christians
Athletes Religious
Jocks
Democrats Whites
Jews
Liberals Women Men
Parents Elderly Peak C
Peak C (cons B)
(average
Middle class Asians
AB)
Peak C
Muslims
(prog B) Nerds Students
Lesbians Hipsters Teenagers
Homosexuals Goths Hispanic Blue collar
Transgender Hippies Working class
Blacks
Immigrants

Lower class
Poor
Homeless
Drug addicts
Peak C
(low A)

FIGURE 14.2 Communion depends on people’s own positon in the groups’ mean
similarity map.

Koch, Imhoff, and colleagues (2016), for example, predicted social groups’
mean C ratings from the groups’ coordinates in people’s mean similarity map
(i.e., people’s mean spatial arrangement solution). However, people disagree on
groups’ C (Koch, Nicolas, et al., 2017). Thus, aggregating C ratings across people
separately for each group leveled out a lot of within-person variance in groups’
C (e.g., person 1 trusts Democrats but not Republicans, whereas person 2 trusts
Republicans but not Democrats; aggregating C ratings across persons 1 and 2, the
two groups will appear equally trusted), possibly obscuring people’s spontaneous
usage of C (i.e., little variance in groups’ mean C ratings, little covariance with
the groups’ coordinates in people’s mean similarity map). Aggregating spatially
arranged similarity across people separately for each unique pair of groups possibly
 Rethinking Fundamental Dimensions of Meaning 177

also leveled out a lot of within-person variance in groups’ C. For example, three
persons spontaneously use C to judge three groups’ similarity. Person 1 trusts ath-
letes and gamers (distrusts politicians) and thus drags them to one end (the other
end) of the screen, person 2 trusts athletes and politicians (distrusts gamers) and
thus drags them to one end (the other end) of the screen, and person 3 trusts gam-
ers and politicians (distrusts athletes) and thus drags them to one end (the other
end) of the screen. Aggregated across persons 1–3, the three unique pairs of groups
that can be formed with the groups will appear equally similar, again obscuring
people’s spontaneous usage of C (i.e., little variance in groups’ mean pairwise simi-
larity, little covariance with the groups’ mean C ratings).
To test whether aggregating C ratings and spatial similarity arrangement across
people obscured their spontaneous usage of C, in two new studies (N ~400) we
circumnavigated aggregation by predicting groups’ (A, B, and) C as rated by single
individuals by the groups’ coordinates in the same single individuals’ spatial simi-
larity arrangement map. Results confirmed that people spontaneously used A, B,
as well as C to spatially arrange the groups, a major step towards reconciling the
ABC model (Koch, Imhoff, et al., 2016) with the Big Two model (e.g., Fiske et al.,
2002; Fiske, this volume) claiming that people prioritize A and C to make sense of
the social world. As we found that different people used different combinations of
dimensions, one important avenue for future research is to clarify when and why
people use A, B, and/or C to differentiate social groups, job groups, etc.

Conclusion
The data-driven research presented in this chapter explored the meaning dimension(s)
that people prioritize to mentally organize and compare multiple targets in
ambiguous populations (e.g., social groups). To this end, in addition to free
choice of dimension(s) our study designs included free choice of targets, too. For
the population of social (and job) groups, we conclude four points: (1) In addi-
tion to agency and communion, a third prioritized dimension is beliefs ranging
from conservative to progressive. (2) Perceiving others as conservative-progressive
serves the purpose to balance exploitation (routine, safe choices) and explora-
tion (alternative, risky choices). (3) Communion increases with perceiver-target
similarity in agency and beliefs. Thus, the relation between targets’ agency and
communion is negative, curvilinear, and positive for perceivers low, average, and
high in agency, respectively. Likewise, the relation between targets’ progressiveness
and communion is negative, curvilinear, and positive for perceivers conservative,
neutral, and progressive in beliefs, respectively. As a result, there is controversy on
who is communal. (4) People spontaneously use A, B, and C to mentally organize
and compare targets.
Points 3 and 4 resulted from a collaboration with Susan Fiske’s lab at Princeton
University and Vincent Yzerbyt’s lab at the Catholic University Louvain-la-Neuve.
We are thankful for their input and look forward to further reexaminations of the
nature and relation of prioritized meaning.
178 Alex Koch and Roland Imhoff

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INDEX

Note: Page numbers in italics indicate figures and in bold indicate tables on the corresponding
pages.

ABC model see fundamental dimensions of Bakan, D. 2, 27, 143, 156

meaning Balanced Inventory of Desirable
Abele, Andrea E. 5, 26, 30, 31, 42, 58, 103, Responding (BIDR) 84
119, 168 Bargh, J. A. 32
agency: dominance in self-perception 31; Barkow, J. 53
influence on self-esteem 57–58; novel Bazinska, R. 168
framework for communion, self-esteem Bem, Sandra 81
and 58– 61, 59; for striving 16–18; Big Five personality traits 20, 80, 85
see also Big Two (agency-communion) Big Two (agency-communion) 2, 13–14,
agency-competence 59 25, 90, 142; alternatives to 5; in citizens’
agentic and communal information, perceptions of politicians 154–163;
processing of 31–34 conceptualization of 2–5; in context
agentic and communal narcissism: 4–5; costs and benefits of 66– 67;
distinctiveness from Big Two self- defined 14; in desirability 79–86; as
perceptions 97–98; distinctiveness from dimensions of desirability 79–86;
vulnerable forms of narcissism 97; dual perspective model of agency and
distinctiveness of 94–95; psychological communion 27–31, 28; fundamental
adjustment in 96; selective self- dimensions of meaning and (see
enhancement in 95 fundamental dimensions of meaning);
agentic mind-set 145–146 for gaining status 18–19; gender
agentic motive 3 stereotypes and identity and 103–112;
agentic motives see social motives in grandiose narcissism 93–98;
agentic values and power 147 inferences in social context 33; long-
Allison, S. T. 92 term mating and reproduction and
Almanac of American Politics 155 19–20; power and 143–150; research
approach/avoidance 69 on impressions of politicians and
archival data 45–46 157–163, 158; in self-concept and
artificial intelligences (AIs) 72–73 self-esteem 52– 61; in self-evaluation
Asch, S. E. 43 92–93; self-perceptions vs. narcissism
assumed similarity 67 97–98; self versus others and 143;
182 Index

in social cognition 25–35; “social 83–85; introduction to 79–81; measures

life” of 4; of social perception and of desirable responding and 83–85;
judgment 156–157; and their facets in multidimensionality of 79–80; rater
social cognitions 27; ubiquity of dual differences 81; scale values of 85
content formulations and 25–27, 26; desirable responding (DR) 84
underlying human behavior and human Diehl, M. 117
information processing 1–2; see also dimensional comparison theory (DCT)
agency; communion 117–119, 118; conclusion on 122–123;
bio-behavioral data 46 formation of agentic and communal
boundary conditions in intergroup self-concepts and 119–122, 120 –121
context 132–135, 134 dominance theory 54
Braly, K. W. 45 Driscoll, D. M. 82
Brown, J. D. 121–122 Dual Perspective Model of A and C 54, 60
Brubacher, S. P. 145–146 dual perspective model of agency and
Bruckmüller, S. 31, 168 communion 27–31, 28
Dubois, N. 84
Caprara, G. V. 155, 157 Dufner, M. 33
chemistry, social 71–72 dynamics of desirability 82–83
Cislak, A. 148–149 dynamic stereotypes 105–106
Claim to Leadership 84
communal motives see social motives Edwards, A. L. 80
communion: for connecting 14–16; essentialism 105
dominance in perception of others evolutionary meaning of agency and
29–30 ; increases with perceiver- communion: agency for striving in
target similarity in agency and beliefs 16–18; Big Two and 13–14; communion
174–175; novel framework for agency, for connecting in 14–16; conclusion on
self-esteem and 58– 61, 59 ; primacy 20–21; gaining status and 18–19; long-
of 28–29; see also Big Two (agency- term mating and reproduction and 19–20
communion) experiments 46
compensation: consequences of 131–132; extension, Stereotype Content Model 47
in intergroup context 132–135, 134 ; in
intergroup stereotypes 128–131, 130, Fatfouta, R. 94
137–139; routes to intergroup 135–137 Fekken, G. C. 84
competence: cultural comparisons 45; self- Fiske, S. T. 34, 127, 177
esteem and 59; as Stereotype Content Fleming, J. S. 92
Model’s code for potential impact 43; fundamental dimensions of meaning:
survey data 43–45, 44 communion increases with perceiver-
conceptualization, agency-communion target similarity in agency and beliefs
2; alternatives to 5; as integrating and 174–175; conclusion on 177;
framework in different fields of conservative-progressive beliefs as
psychology 2–4 overlooked 169–172, 170, 170 ; minding
conservative-progressive beliefs 169–172, conservative-progressive beliefs as
170, 170 ; importance in balancing important for balancing exploitation
exploitation and exploration 172–174 and exploration in 172–174; people
cooperation, detecting 15–16 spontaneously using ABC model to
costs and benefits of agency and make sense of the social world 175–177,
communion 66– 67 176 ; when and how to reexamine
cultural comparisons 45 167–169

data, Stereotype Content Model 43–46 gaining status 18–19

descriptive gender stereotypes 103–104 Gebauer, J. E. 33, 57, 94, 95–96, 98
desirability: conclusions on 85–86; gender identity 108–109, 111–112; related
context differences 81; dynamics of to behavior 109–110
82–83; factoring item 80 –81; important gender stereotypes 111–112; consequences
implications of agentic and communal for occupants of agentic and communal
 Index 183

roles 106–107; descriptive and Kinder, D. R. 155

prescriptive 103–104; sources of 104–106 Koch, A. 174–176
Giacomin, M. 96 Köller, O. 118
Glick, P. 127 Kumashiro, M. 96
Goethals, G. R. 92
Goscinny, R. 90 Laney, E. K. 93
grandiose narcissism: agency-communion Leary, Timothy 91
model of 93–98; Big Two in self- Leising, D. 33, 84
evaluation and 92–93; classic view of life stage and life history 69–70
90 –92 Locke, K. D. 68, 71
Gregg, A. P. 96 long-term mating and reproduction 19–20,
Grijalva, E. 95 69–70

halo effect 83 Mackie, D. M. 82

Heatherton, T. F. 92 male gender identity 110
Heider, F. 39 Malone, C. 34
Heller, S. 71 Maltby, J. 95–96
Helm, F. 119, 120, 122 manhood 110
heroism 70 Markus, H. R. 117
Herzog, A. R. 117 Marlowe-Crowne scale 84
hierometer theory 53, 57 Marsh, H. W. 118
Hill, P. C. 93 mating, long-term 19–20, 69–70
Hogan, R. 52, 85 Messick, D. M. 92
Holden, R. R. 84 Messick, Sam 81
horizontal comparisons 67 Mill, John Stuart 149
horizontal gender segregation 105 Milne, A. B. 92
Horowitz, L. M. 3 mind-set, agentic 145–146
Hubner, J. J. 92 minimalist-ACM 93–94
human behavior, agency and communion Möller, J. 118, 119, 120, 122–123
underlying 1–2, 13–14 Mondak, J. J. 155
human information processing, agency Moskowitz, D. S. 148
and communion underlying 1–2, 31–34 Müller-Kalthoff, H. 119
humility 93 multidimensionality of desirability 79–80
Husemann, N. 122–123 Mummendey, A. 128, 129

identity bifurcation 109 narcissism 68; grandiose 90 –98

I/E model 118, 118–119 Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI)
Imhoff, Roland 167, 174–176 85, 90 –92
impression management 84 negative communal qualities 15
intent: background on 39–40; current Nehrlich, A. D. 95, 97–98
work on 40 –41; Stereotype Content neotraditional division of labor 104
Model and 41, 41–43
interpersonal behavior 148 Obhi, S. S. 145–146
“Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality” 91 Osgood, C. E. 43, 80
Interpersonal Sensitivity 84 Owen, S. 117
intersectionality 105 oxytocin 71

James, William 53 Paulhus, D. L. 91, 93

Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale 92 perception of persons and social groups 34;
John, O. P. 91, 93 power and 146–147
Jordan, C. H. 96 perceptual focus and power 144–145
Judd, C. M. 132 personalization of politics 154
person perception 34; power and 146–147
Katz, D. 45 Pew Research Center 105
Kervyn, N. 34 Piotrowski, J. 95–96
184 Index

Pohlmann, B. 118 self-sacrificing self-enhancement (SSSE) 97

politicians 154–155; Big Two framework self versus others 143
and research on impressions of 157–163, Sense of General Capability 84
158; Big Two in voters’ impressions of sex differences in social motives 70 –71
157; voters’ perceptions of 155–156 Shavelson, R. J. 92
Polivy, J. 92 Sherif, M. 128
positive communal qualities 15 Sherman, S. J. 82
Positive Self Regard 84 Smart, S. 121–122
potential impact, competence as code for 43 social chemistry 71–72
power: agentic mind-set and 145–146; social cognition 25; beyond perceiving
agentic values and 147; interpersonal persons 34; Big Two and their facets
behavior and 148; perceptual focus in 27; conclusions on 34–35; dual
and 144–145; person perception and perspective model of agency and
146–147; social 143–144; theoretical and communion in 27–31, 28; intent as
social implications of 148–150 distinctive to 39–41; processing of
prescriptive gender stereotypes 103–104 agentic and communal information
primacy of communion 28–29 31–34; ubiquity of dual content
priming by context 82 formulations and 25–27, 26
social comparisons and social motives
reproduction 19–20 67– 68
Robins, R. W. 91 Social Desirability 84
Rosenberg, S. 80, 92 social groups, perception of 34
Rucker, D. D. 148 Social Identity Theory (SIT) 127–128;
Rudich, E. A. 96 compensation in intergroup stereotypes
Rusbult, C. 96 and 128–131, 130
“social life” of agency and communion 4
Savyon, K. 122 socially desirable responding (SDR) 84
Schoel, C. 95 social motives 3, 65; approach/avoidance
Schreiber, H.-J. 128, 129 69; conclusions and future directions
Schröder-Abé, M. 94 72–73; costs and benefits of agency
Sedikides, C. 95, 96 and communion and 66–67; individual
Sedlak, A. 80, 92 differences in agentic and communal
selective self-enhancement 95 68–71; life stage and life history 69–70;
self-concept 52, 59– 60; DCT and sex differences in 70–71; social chemistry
formation of agentic and communal and 71–72; social comparisons and 67–68
119–122, 120 –121 social perception and judgment, Big Two
Self-Deceptive Enhancement 84 of 156–157
self-determination theory 54 social power 143–144
self-enhancement 83, 91, 92–93; social projection 67
selective 95 social role theory 105, 148
self-esteem 52–53; basis of 53–54; Social Utility 84
conclusions on 61; empirical evidence sociometer theory 53, 54
on 54–58, 55–56; novel framework for Stanton, G. C. 92
agency, communion, and 58– 61, 59; State Self-Esteem Scale 92
self-enhancement and 92–93 status, gaining of 18–19
self-evaluation: Big Two in 92–93; at Stereotype Content Model (SCM) 32–33,
global level, common grandiose 95–96 39–41; beyond the basic database 47–48;
self-focus 148–150 compensation in intergroup stereotypes
self-perception: dimensional comparison and 128–131, 130, 137–139; competence
theory (DCT) and (see dimensional as code for potential impact in 43;
comparison theory (DCT)); dominance intent and 41, 41–43; two fundamental
of agency in 31; in Dual Perspective dimensions of stereotyping and intergroup
Model of A and C 54; empirical stereotypes in 126–128; varied data with
evidence on 54–58, 55–56 43–46; warmth as code for intent in 42–43
 Index 185

striving, agency for 16–18 warmth: cultural comparisons 45; intent

Suci, G. J. 80 and 40 –41; as Stereotype Content
surveys 43–45, 44 Model's code for intent 42–43; survey
Swiderski, K. M. 145–146 data 43–45, 44
Watts, W. A. 92
Tafarodi, R. W. 92 Wiggins, Nancy 81, 84
Tannenbaum, P. H. 80 Williams, L. E. 32
terror-management theory 53, 58 Wojciszke, Bogdan 26, 29, 31, 103, 168
testosterone 71–72
threat, amplifying of 15–16 Youngblade, L. 117
Yzerbyt, Vincent 131, 177
Uchronski, M. 117
Uderzo, A. 90 Zeigler-Hill, V. 94
Żemojtel-Piotrowska, M. 95–96
vertical comparisons 67– 68 zero-sum principle 33
vertical gender segregation 105 Zhang, L. 95
voters’ perceptions of politicians 155–156 Zimbardo, P. 157