Chro Reasonable Cause Finding 622022
Chro Reasonable Cause Finding 622022
VS.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
JUDICIAL BRANCH
RESPONDENT
PARTIES
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JURISDICTION
The investigator concludes that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to
☐ receive, investigate and issue a determination upon the merits of the complaint.
Therefore, this complaint is dismissed due to the lack of jurisdiction.
DRAFT COMMENTS
A draft finding was sent to the parties on May 6, 2022. Comments were to be received
on or before May 23, 2021.
No comments were received; thus no changes were made to the draft finding.
Comments were received within the comment period and were considered before
making this determination. Changes were made to the draft finding.
Comments were received within the comment period and were considered before
making this determination. No changes were made to the draft finding.
FINDINGS OF FACT
4. On November 26, 2018, Complainant was suspended from the practice of law in
the State of Connecticut for a one-year period. See DBD-CV17-6022075-S. She
1 CHRO No. 2110223 was dismissed after a Case Assessment Review and a release of
jurisdiction was issued. The allegations within CHRO No. 2110223 are restated here
only to the extent it is relevant to the background or history of the case.
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was required to apply for reinstatement after the expiration of that one-year period.
She was also required to: pay the Bar Examining Committee the application fee,
designate a court approved Trustee, agree to a one-year court approved
mentorship, provide written proof that she attended an approved continuing legal
education course in legal ethics and law office management (in person), and take
and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE).
6. After an application for reinstatement is filed, the Chief Court Administrator assigns
the matter to a panel of attorneys comprising the Standing Committee of the
Statewide Grievance Committee.2 Normally it is assigned to a Standing
Committee in a Judicial District outside of the Judicial District where applicant’s
office is located. Complainant’s case was assigned to the Hartford Judicial District
Standing Committee (hereinafter, “Hartford Standing Committee”) on or about
January 13, 2020.
7. A couple weeks later, Attorney for the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel (OCDC),
Elizabeth Rowe, contacted the Chairman of the Hartford Standing Committee,
Attorney Friedle, asking him to hold off on his proceedings as she had filed a
motion to dismiss the application for Complainant’s failure to take and pass the
MPRE. Complainant sought to waive that requirement, but ultimately took and
passed the MPRE on March 12, 2020. The motion was then withdrawn. Coinciding
with these reinstatement proceedings, the State of Connecticut closed various
offices and buildings due to the outbreak of COVID 19.
3 Attorney Friedle testified that he believed it was required and had always operated
under that belief in the 15 to 20 years he had been Chairman. The undersigned has no
reason to disbelieve this statement.
4
See e.g. Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. John Wang, HHD-CV14-6048385-S wherein
Standing Committee hearing scheduled for December 11, 2020 by notice dated October
30, 2020. OCDC report filed December 2, 2020 and Chief Disciplinary Counsel v.
Lawrence Dressler, NNH-CV14-6046179-S wherein Standing Committee hearing
scheduled for October 23, 2020 despite no report filed, but Statewide Grievance
Committee filed its report on October 20, 2020. Both of these matters involved a
Standing Committee in a different Judicial District (Fairfield County) than the
Complainant’s matter. Both of these matters are accessible to the public via the
Connecticut judicial case search.
5 It appears from the record that up until the filing of the CHRO complaint the delay was
she informed him that there were no in person hearings, except priority one matters (ie.
restraining orders), and therefore they would not likely be able to accommodate in
person hearings. She also informed him she needed to get permission to use judicial
resources (Teams) for any remote hearing. Permission was granted, and she believes it
was approved around the beginning of February 2021 when her colleague contacted
Attorney Friedle.
7 Attorney Friedle had a responsibility to ensure his Standing Committee proceeded with
the Complainant’s hearing. Therefore, while the Complainant did not definitively state
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10. Complainant filed her first complaint of discrimination with the Commission on
December 9, 2020 alleging Respondent’s failure to schedule a hearing, and
otherwise act on her application, was because of her race. She also filed a federal
lawsuit on January 11, 2021 against the Chief Court Administrator alleging
discrimination.
11. On February 8, 2021, Natalie Erickson of the Harford Judicial District contacted
Attorney Friedle about the use of the virtual courtroom for Complainant’s standing
committee hearing. Attorney Friedle responded stating he would be seeking advice
from the court regarding how to proceed after Complainant filed two cases against
Respondent and the Chief Court Administrator, and therefore, he wasn’t going to
schedule the hearing.
12. On February 9, 2021, Attorney Friedle sought advice from the Court on whether
Complainant’s CHRO complaint “constitute[d] a stay of the pending application
proceedings” and “how the [Hartford Standing] Committee should consider the
pending matters in its deliberations….” He indicated that the Hartford Standing
Committee had “never been asked to reinstate an Applicant who has two matters
pending against the Connecticut Judicial Department and a Senior Judge.” He
asserted that the Hartford Standing Committee had not been given permission to
schedule hearings yet, but that was clearly incorrect. Attorney Friedle later
corrected the assertion by a letter to the Court dated March 2, 2021. 8
13. On March 4, 2021, Attorney Friedle contacted Hartford Judicial District and
indicated his motion was on the short calendar for March 15, 2021, and sought
further information regarding in person hearings for April or May. Natalie Erickson
informed Attorney Friedle that no in-person hearings were happening and it was
unclear when those would resume, attached further information regarding remote
hearings and requested potential dates. Again, Attorney Friedle never followed up
with Complainant regarding how she wanted to proceed with the hearing.
her preference for hearing format, it would have been reasonable for the Chairman to
follow up, especially after the Hartford Judicial District contacted him.
8 Attorney Friedle’s memory of the proceedings is not entirely accurate. For instance, he
repeatedly testified Hartford Judicial District never contacted him on February 8, 2021
about the scheduling of a remote hearing, and that he learned they would be able to
schedule a hearing on February 8th or 9th in November, 2020. However, emails provided
by Respondent clearly show he was contacted about scheduling on February 8, 2021
and indicated his intent to file a motion for advice.
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14. On March 9, 2021, the subject complaint (CHRO No. 2110331) was filed as an
amendment to CHRO No. 2110223. It was at this point, the Hartford Standing
Committee sought to transfer Complainant’s application to another standing
committee.
15. On April 8, 2021, the Court (Pavia, J.) refused to provide advice to the Hartford
Standing Committee and granted the motion to transfer May 6, 2021. The
Middlesex Judicial District Standing Committee (Middlesex Standing Committee)
scheduled the hearing for September 1, 2021. Complainant then had a hearing
before the three-judge panel on January 12, 2022.
16. It is clear Complainant’s CHRO complaint filed on December 9, 2020 impacted the
Hartford Standing Committee’s scheduling and processing of the reinstatement
application. For instance, when Attorney Friedle was asked why he didn’t schedule
the hearing for February when he had received notice of availability in November,
he testified that he was waiting to hear back from Complainant about how she
wanted to proceed. He then continues, “and then within a very short period of time
from the 18th of November to December 9th she files the CHRO complaint. So
could I be guilty of holding it up a couple of weeks. Yea, I could be.”9 Therefore,
Respondent’s attempt to blame Complainant for failing to indicate her preference
for remote or an in-person hearing is without merit.
17. Attorney Friedle’s concerns after Complainant filed the CHRO complaint was
compounded by the January federal lawsuit filing.10 The Hartford Standing
Committee at that time voted to seek the advice of the court. When Complainant
filed her second complaint, CHRO No. 2110331, alleging retaliation, Attorney
Friedle took it as a personal attack. Attorney Friedle testified, “once she suggested
I was a racist, my impartiality was gone.” He sought to transfer it on March 30,
2021.
18. It is not clear why Attorney Friedle did not move to transfer Complainant’s
reinstatement application to another standing committee prior to March 30, 2021.
Attorney Friedle testified he did not feel the Hartford Standing Committee’s
impartiality was impacted until March 9, 2021 when she added the standing
19. Respondent also argues that it was not responsible for any delay as Complainant’s
application was incomplete until just before the Standing Committee hearing.
However, Attorney Friedle never testified, nor had he communicated with
Complainant, that her application was incomplete and the Standing Committee
could not schedule the hearing as a result. Rather, he testified repeatedly
Complainant’s filings were the cause of the delay.12 Respondent’s attempts to
blame COVID 19 for the delay is also not supported by the record, as there had
been communications about scheduling a remote hearing in November pending
approval.
20. While Attorney Friedle may not have had the intention of retaliating against the
Complainant, the undersigned does not need to make such a finding. Rather, the
undersigned must determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe
Respondent took an adverse action against Complainant for engaging in a
protected activity, specifically the filing of a CHRO complaint. To be adverse
sufficient for a retaliation case, an action must be sufficient to dissuade a
reasonable person from making or supporting a discrimination complaint. Based
on the credible evidence before me, including Attorney Friedle’s own admissions,
Respondent’s delay and attempt to stay the proceedings was because the
Complainant filed a CHRO complaint. This delay and attempt to stay proceedings
could otherwise have dissuaded a reasonable person from filing a CHRO
complaint, if they knew that would be the consequence for filing said complaint.
DETERMINATION
11 First, the amended complaint, which was treated as a new complaint never amended
the Respondent, the Judicial Branch. Second, CHRO No. 2110223 alleged race
discrimination by the standing committee for its failure to schedule a hearing, while
CHRO No. 2110331 alleged retaliation by the standing committee after the Complainant
filed her complaint. Third, while Attorney Friedle asserts “nowhere did I suggest the
case should not go forward”, his motion for advice suggests otherwise. While he may
not have directly sought permission to stay the proceedings, he requested the Court
advise him whether the CHRO/Federal filings constituted a stay of the proceedings.
Such is a suggestion to the Court not to proceed.
12 Respondent, in its comments, again blames Complainant and her filing discrimination
complaints and lawsuits for the delay. Such admission is direct evidence of retaliation
as Complainant’s CHRO filings were engaging in a protected activity for which
Respondent then used to justify a delay in the proceedings.
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After reviewing all of the evidence in the Commission’s file, the investigator
☒ concludes there is reasonable cause for believing that a discriminatory practice
has been or is being committed as alleged in the complaint.
After reviewing all of the evidence in the Commission’s file, the investigator
☐ concludes that there is no reasonable cause for believing that a discriminatory
practice has been or is being committed as alleged in the complaint.
Anna-Marie Puryear
Human Rights Attorney II/Investigator
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