N O R T HW E S TE RN U N IV ER S IT Y

,Laoag
INC City, Ilocos Norte

MODULE 2: UNIT 1 – HUMAN ACTS AND MORAL AGENTS

I. MORALS

Morals are defined as standards for what behavior is considered right or wrong. It is important to note that
morals differ between individuals and cultures, and that an individual's morals change throughout their
life as they mature and their relationships with the environment and people around them change. The most
referenced model for this change is Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development;

Others have elaborated on the characteristics of the stages of moral development with special reference to
psychological needs, altruism and human relationships, and justice reasoning

II. MORAL AGENCY

Moral agency is the ability to make ethical decisions based on what is right or wrong. This capacity can be
found in individuals or collective entities like businesses or health care institutions. according to Christen
et al., moral agency encompasses three major concepts:

a. the moral competency of the person or organization in question

b. the normative framework on which ethical behaviour is based, and
c. the situational constraints that influence decision-making.

Moral competence refers to the capacity of an individual to "make decisions and judgments, which are
moral based on internal principles and to act according to them." Moral competencies include reasoning,
recognition, response, discernment, accountability, character, motivation, and leadership. With the
appropriate normative framework and a supportive situational environment, moral competency gives rise
to sound moral judgements.

In contrast to this, moral distress is said to occur when an individual makes a moral judgement, but is
unable to act upon it. Moral distress can result in emotional distress, frustration and anger.

III. WHAT ARE MORAL AGENTS?

A moral agent is any person or collective entity with the capacity to exercise moral agency. It is suggested
that rational thought and deliberation are prerequisite skills for any agent. In this way, moral agents can
discern between right and wrong and be held accountable for the consequences of their actions. Likewise,
moral agents have the responsibility to anticipate and avoid causing unjust harm.

Children and adults with certain intellectual or psychological disabilities may have little or no ability to
function as moral agents. In extreme cases, situational constraints, such as being held hostage, can
temporarily prevent adults with full mental capacity from acting as moral agents.

Moral agents are those agents expected to meet the demands of morality. Not all agents are moral agents.
Young children and animals, being capable of performing actions, may be agents in the way that stones,
plants and cars are not. But though they are agents they are not automatically considered moral agents.
For a moral agent must also be capable of conforming to at least some of the demands of morality.

This requirement can be interpreted in different ways. On the weakest interpretation it will suffice if the
agent has the capacity to conform to some of the external requirements of morality. So if certain agents
can obey moral laws such as ‘Murder is wrong’ or ‘Stealing is wrong’, then they are moral agents, even if
they respond only to prudential reasons such as fear of punishment and even if they are incapable of
acting for the sake of moral considerations. According to the strong version, the Kantian version, it is also
essential that the agents should have the capacity to rise above their feelings and passions and act for the
sake of the moral law. There is also a position in between which claims that it will suffice if the agent can
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perform the relevant act out of ,altruistic
I N C impulses. Other suggested conditions of moral agency are that
agents should have: an enduring self with free will and an inner life; understanding of the relevant facts as
well as moral understanding; and moral sentiments, such as capacity for remorse and concern for others.

Philosophers often disagree about which of these and other conditions are vital; the term moral agency is
used with different degrees of stringency depending upon what one regards as its qualifying conditions.
The Kantian sense is the most stringent. Since there are different senses of moral agency, answers to
questions like ‘Are collectives moral agents?’ depend upon which sense is being used. From the Kantian
standpoint, agents such as psychopaths, rational egoists, collectives and robots are at best only quasi-
moral, for they do not fulfil some of the essential conditions of moral agency.

IV. HUMAN ACTS

The term human act has a fixed technical meaning. It means an act (thought, word, deed, desire, omission)
performed by a human being when he is responsible; when he knows what he is doing and wills to do it.
An act is perfectly human when it is done with full knowledge and full consent of the will, and with full
and unhampered freedom of choice. If the act is hampered in any way, it is less perfectly human; if it is
done without knowledge or consent it is not a human act at all. An act done by a human being but without
knowledge and consent is called an act of a person but not a human act. In the terminology of classical
realistic philosophy, a human act is actus humanus; an act of a person is actus hominis.

The essential elements of a human act are three: knowledge, freedom, actual choice.

(1) Knowledge: A person is not responsible for an act done in ignorance, unless the ignorance is the
person's own fault, and is therefore willed (vincible ignorance), in which case he has knowledge that he is
in ignorance and ought to dispel it. Thus, in one way or another, knowledge is necessary for responsible
human activity.

(2) Freedom: A person is not responsible for an act over which he has no control, unless he deliberately
surrenders such control by running into conditions and circumstances which rob him of liberty. Thus, in
one way or another, freedom is necessary for every human act.

(3) Actual choice or voluntariness: A person is not responsible for an act which he does not will, unless
he wills to give up his self-control (as a man does, for instance, in allowing himself to be hypnotized, or
by deliberately becoming intoxicated). Thus, in one way or another, voluntariness or actual choice enters
into every human act.

Now, a human act is a willed act. It proceeds from the will, following the knowledge and judgment of the
mind or intellect. Since what refers to the freewill is usually described as moral, a human act is a moral
act. Since the will is free, a human act is a free act.

A human act comes from the will directly or indirectly. When the act itself is the choice of the will, it
comes directly from the will and is said to be willed in se or in itself. When the act comes indirectly from
the will, inasmuch as the will chooses rather what causes or occasions the act than the act itself, it is said
to be willed in its cause or in causa. Thus a man who wills to become intoxicated, wills it directly or in se;
a man who does not wish to become intoxicated, but who seeks entertainment where, as experience tells
him, he is almost sure to become intoxicated, wills the intoxication indirectly or in causa. This distinction
of direct and indirect willing (or direct and indirect voluntariness) raises a notable issue, and we have here
two of the most important principles (that is, fundamental guiding truths) in all ethics.

These are:

(1) The Principle of Indirect Voluntariness: A person is responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly
willed when three conditions are met:

when he can readily foresee the evil effect, at least in a general way;

when he is free to refrain from doing what causes the evil effect; and

when he is bound to refrain from doing what causes the evil effect.
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But is the agent (that is, the doer of an act) not always bound to avoid what causes an evil effect? Is not
the fact that the effect is evil a sufficient reason for rendering the act which leads to it unlawful? Not
always, for sometimes the act has two effects, one good and one evil. In this case, the following principle
applies:

(2) The Principle of Twofold Effect: A person may lawfully perform an act which has two effects, one
good and one evil, when the following conditions are met:

when the act which has two effects is not in itself an evil act;

when the evil effect does not come before the good effect so as to be a means to it;

when there exists a reason, proportionately weighty, which calls for the good effect;

when the agent B (that is, the doer or performer of the act) intends the good effect exclusively, and merely
permits the evil effect as a regrettable side-issue.

Sound human reason vindicates the value and trustworthiness of these two leading ethical principles. The
basic law of morals, -- called the natural law, -- is summed up in this plain mandate of reason:

We must do good; we must avoid evil.

And, developing the second point, -- that is, the avoidance of evil, -- we have this basic rational principle:

We must never do what is evil, even though good may be looked for and intended as a result of it.

Human acts are modified, that is, affected, and made less perfectly human, by anything that hampers or
hinders any of the three essentials of human action: knowledge, freedom, voluntariness. Chief of the
modifiers of human acts are these:

(1) Ignorance. Ignorance that may be overcome by due diligence is called vincible ignorance or culpable
ignorance; ignorance that cannot be expelled by due diligence is called invincible ignorance or inculpable
ignorance. The reasoned ethical principle on this point is: Invincible ignorance destroys voluntariness and
relieves the agent of responsibility; vincible ignorance lessens but does not remove voluntariness and
responsibility.

(2) Concupiscence. By concupiscence we mean any of the g human impulses or tendencies technically
called the passions. These are: love, hatred, grief, desire, aversion, hope, despair, courage, fear, anger.
When concupiscence sweeps upon a person without his intending it, it is called antecedent concupiscence;
when a person wills it (as in the case of a man who nurses his injuries, or stirs himself to revenge, or who
allows a suddenly envisioned obscene image to remain in his mind or before his eyes) it is called
consequent concupiscence. The ethical principle here is: Antecedent concupiscence lessens voluntariness
and responsibility but does not take them away; consequent concupiscence does not lessen voluntariness
and responsibility.

Of all the types of concupiscence which influence human acts, fear has a peculiar significance, and we
have a special reasoned principle for it: An act done from a motive of fear is simply voluntary; the agent is
responsible for it, even though he would not do it were he not under the sway of fear. Of course, if the fear
is so great that it renders the agent insane at the moment of his act, he is incapable of a human act and is
not responsible. Civil law make provisions for the nullifying of contracts made under the stress of fear
(that is, of threat, or duress), for the common good requires that people be protected from the malice of
unscrupulous persons who would not hesitate to enforce harmful bargains by fearsome means.

(3) Violence. Coaction or violence is external force applied by a free cause (that is, by human beings) to
compel a person to do something contrary to his will. The ethical principle with respect to violence is: An
act owing to violence to which due resistance is made, is not voluntary, and the agent is not responsible
for it.

(4) Habit. Habit is a readiness, born of repeated acts, for doing a certain thing. The ethical principle is:
Habit does not take away voluntariness; acts done from habit are voluntary, at least in cause, as long as
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the habit is permitted to continue.
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V. ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS

An end is a purpose or goal. It is that for which an act is performed. It is the final cause of an act.

An end intended for itself is an ultimate end; an end intended as a measure or means of gaining a further
end is an intermediate end. The first end (in order of attainment) is proximate; other ends are remote. An
ultimate end is ultimate in a certain series of ends, or it is the crowning end of all human activity. The
ultimate end of a series is called relatively ultimate; the crowning end of all human activity is called
absolutely ultimate.

A young man entering medical school has, as proximate and intermediate ends, the passing of his exams,
and the advance from the first to the second class; more remote ends are the exams and classes further on;
the ultimate end of the whole series of his studies and efforts is the status of a physician. But this end is
relatively ultimate, not absolutely so. Why does he wish to be a physician? Perhaps to do good and to
have an honorable means of livelihood. But why does he want this? For a full life, a rounded satisfaction
in his earthly existence? But why does he want these things? Inevitably, in view of a still further end. For
all human ends are directed, in last analysis, to an all-sufficing absolutely ultimate end. This is the
completely satisfying end or good; it is the Supreme and Infinite Good; it is the Summum Bonum; and,
for theists, it is God.

An end as a thing desired or intended is called objective. The satisfaction looked for in the attainment and
possession of the objective end, is the subjective end.

Man, in every human act, strives for the possession of good (for end and good are synonymous), and for
infinite good or God. This is the absolutely ultimate objective end of all human activity. And man strives
for the infinite good as that which will boundlessly satisfy; he looks for complete beatitude or complete
happiness in the attainment and possession of God. This is the absolutely ultimate subjective end of all
human activity.

Saint and sinner alike are striving towards God. The Saint is striving in the right direction, and the sinner
in the wrong direction. But it is the one Goal they are after, that is, the full, everlasting, satisfaction of all
desire. The good man in his good human acts and the evil man in his evil human acts are like two men
digging for diamonds; the one digs in a diamond mine, the other perversely digs in a filthy heap of
rubbish; the one works where diamonds are to be found, the other's work is hopeless of success. But it is
to find diamonds that both are working.

Man necessarily (and not freely) intends or wills the supreme and absolute end of all human acts. Man
freely (and not necessarily) chooses the means (that is, intermediate ends) by which he expects, wisely or
perversely, to attain that end.

VI. NORMS OF HUMAN ACTS

A norm is a rule; it is the measure of a thing. The norm of human acts is the rule which shows whether
they measure up to what they should be, and indicates the duty of bringing them up to full standard of
what they ought to be. The norms of human acts are law and conscience. More precisely, the one norm of
human acts is law applied by conscience.

Law is an ordinance of reason promulgated for the common good by one who has charge of society.

Fundamentally, law is an ordinance of Infinite Reason for all mankind and for every creature. In this
sense, law means the Eternal Law which is God's plan and providence for the universe. Inasmuch as this
law is knowable by a normal mind which reasons to it from the facts of experience, the Eternal Law is
called the natural law. For when a person ceases to be a baby and becomes responsible, this is owing to
the fact that he recognizes the following truth: "There is such a thing as good; there is such a thing as evil;
I have a duty to avoid evil and to do good."

A child of ten that knew no distinction between lies and truth, theft and honesty, obedience and
disobedience, would rightly be classed as an imbecile. Indeed, we say that a person "comes to the use of
reason" when he begins to have a practical grasp of three things: good, evil, duty. In other words, reason
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makes evident the basic prescriptions
, I NofCthe natural law.
The natural law is general. But man needs, in addition to general prescriptions for conduct, special
determinations of the law such as, for instance, the enactments of the State in civil and criminal laws.

Law is for the common good. Special regulations for individuals or groups are called precepts. A precept
is like a law inasmuch as it is a regulation or an ordering unto good. A precept is unlike a law inasmuch as
it is rather for private than for common good. In human laws and precepts, a further distinction is made. A
law is territorial; it binds in a certain place and not in other places; a precept is personal, and it binds the
person subject to it wherever he may be. Again, a law endures even though the actual persons who
formulated and promulgated it are dead and gone; a precept ends with the death (or removal from office)
of the preceptor.

True law is a liberating force, not an enslaving one. A true law may be compared to a true map. The map
does not enslave the traveler, but enables him to make his journey without hindrance or mishap. The man
who says he will not be enslaved by maps, is a prey to ignorance, and is thus truly enslaved; the man who
uses the map is liberated from the enslavement of ignorance and is freed to make the journey. For liberty
does not include in its essence the ability to do wrong. This ability is a sad condition of earthly human
existence; it is not a part of liberty itself. God can do no wrong, yet God is infinitely free. The souls in
heaven can no longer sin, and yet they have not lost freedom, but have used freedom and brought it to its
crowning perfection. Man's freedom is freedom of the choice of means to his ultimate end; when the end
is attained, means are no longer needed, and the freedom which won to success is forever crowned in full
perfection.

Law that is set down in recorded enactments is called positive law. The moral law as knowable to sound
human reason (that is, the Eternal Law as so knowable) is called, as we have seen, the natural law. A law
is called moral if it binds under guilt. It is called penal if it binds under penalty (such as a fine). It is called
mixed if it binds under both guilt and penalty. It is a debated question among ethicians whether there can
be a law that is entirely and exclusively penal.

All true laws have sanctions, that is, inducements (of reward or punishment prescribed) sufficient to make
those bound by them obedient to their prescriptions. Human positive law usually has the sanction of
penalty, not of special reward.

In individual human acts, law is applied by conscience.

Conscience is the practical judgment of human reason upon an act as good, and hence permissible or
obligatory, or as evil, and hence to be avoided.

Conscience is the reasoned judgment of the mind. It is no instinct, no sentiment, no prejudice born of
custom or what moderns call mores; it is no "still small voice"; it is no "little spark of celestial fire." It is
the pronouncement of reason, the reason with which we work out a problem in mathematics, -- only, to be
called conscience it must be the working out of a judgment or pronouncement in the domain of morals, of
duty.

When the judgment of conscience squares with facts, conscience is called correct or true. When the
conscience-judgment is out of line with facts, conscience is called false. When the conscience-judgment is
wholly assured and unhesitant, conscience is called certain. When the conscience judgment is hesitant,
and amounts to no more than opinion, conscience is called doubtful.

Doubt is speculative when it is a lack of certainty about what is true; it is practical when it is a lack of
certainty about what is to be done. A doubt is positive when the mind hesitates between two opposites
because there seems good reason for each; it is negative when the mind hesitates because there seems no
good reason on either side. A most important reasoned principle is the following: It is never lawful to act
while in a state of positive practical doubt. The doubt must be dispelled and replaced by at least moral
certitude.

To dispel positive practical doubt, a person must use the direct method of study, inquiry, finding all the
facts. If this method prove unsuccessful, or if it cannot be applied, then the indirect method (called the
appeal to the reflex principle) must be employed. This means that the person in doubt about the licitness
or illicitness of an act can make sure that he is not bound by applying the reflex principle: A law that is of
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doubtful application cannot beget , I aNcertain
C obligation. In this case, certitude is attained, not of the case
itself, but of the person's freedom from obligation: thus, it is an indirect certitude.

Out of the use of the reflex principle just mentioned, emerges the theory called Probabilism. It amounts to
this : If there exists a solidly probable opinion against the applicability of a law in a given case, that law is
of doubtful applicability. In other words, it is a doubtful law. But a doubtful law cannot beget a certain
obligation. Therefore, if there exists a solidly probable opinion against the applicability of a law in a given
case, there is no obligation.

The moral system of Probabilism is of value only when there is question of the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of an act; it has no place when the question is one of the validity or invalidity of contract.
Further, the phrase "a solidly probable opinion" does not mean a strong inclination or liking on the part of
the agent; it means a reasoned opinion, especially such as is defended by men of known learning and
prudence.

Probabilism, or the application of the reflex principle, a doubtful law does not bind, cannot be employed
except in the failure or the inapplicability of the direct method of solving a doubt. Nor can it be used when
there is question of a clear and definite end to be achieved.

VII. MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS

Morality is the relation of human acts to the norm or rule of what they ought to be. As we have seen, the
norm of human acts is law applied by conscience. And the basic law is the Eternal Law, especially as this
is knowable by sound human reason (it is then called the natural law). The squaring up of free and
responsible human conduct with law as applied by conscience is the morality of human acts; the lack of
such agreement of human acts with their norm is immorality. But, as we have indicated, morality is
generally used to signify the relation (whether of agreement or disagreement) of human acts to their norm
or rule. Thus we speak of morally good acts and of morally bad acts.

A human act considered as such, as an act, as a deed performed, stands in agreement or out of agreement
with the norm of what it ought to be. Thus it has objective morality. Many mistaken people of our day,
especially those of university training, are fond of talking as though a human act took all its morality from
the intention of the agent, or from his viewpoint. They are full of expressions such as, "As I see it ... ," "To
my mind . . . ," "I don't look at it in that way . . . ," "It's all in the point of view . . ." etc. Now, there is an
immense field for human opinion. Where certitude cannot be had, opinion is the best man can achieve.
But in matters of essential morals, certitude can be had (as we have seen, by direct method, or, this failing,
by the reflex method). Hence the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act, -- its morality, in short, -- is never
a matter of opinion, viewpoint, prejudice, or preference. It is a matter of fact. It is an objective thing.
Human acts have objective morality.

A person blamelessly mistaken about the objective morality of an act is exempt (by reason of invincible
ignorance) from responsibility for such act. Thus, a person who is invincibly ignorant of the fact that a lie
is always unlawful, and who is convinced with full certitude that in certain circumstances a lie is
permissible, is not guilty of formal falsehood for telling such a lie. But this does not mean that the
objective morality of a lie is a fiction or an illusion; it does not mean that the morality of an act depends
on the agent's convictions. The lie is objectively evil and remains so. Only, in the case mentioned,
invincible ignorance excuses the agent from responsibility for it. And so much the worse for the agent, for
ignorance is always a blight and a burden.

Some acts have their objective morality in themselves by reason of their nature. Murder, lying, calumny,
injustice, are examples of acts intrinsically evil. Respect for life, truthfulness, charity, justice, are
examples of acts intrinsically good. Other human acts have their objective morality by reason of positive
law, which is an extrinsic determinant. Thus, hunting out of season, violating the speed laws, are acts
objectively but extrinsically evil. Obeying civil ordinances, performing the duty of true citizens as
expressed by law, are, in the main, acts objectively but extrinsically good. The basic virtue of being a
good citizen, however, is intrinsically good.

In the concrete, as a deed done, every human act has true objective morality. But when a human act is
considered in the abstract, in general, and not as a concrete deed performed, it is sometimes found to be
indifferent, and neither good nor bad. In other words, some human acts are not intrinsically good or
intrinsically evil in themselves as abstractly considered. But in their actual performing, they take on
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morality (and truly objective morality)
,INC from the circumstances.

For the determinants of morality are the act performed and the circumstances of the act performed.

The act performed is technically known as the object. Human acts that have intrinsic morality are good or
evil by reason of the object, that is the act itself. Such acts, if evil, are never permissible. If good, and if
circumstances do not vitiate them, they are lawful. Some of them are not capable of being vitiated by
circumstances, and these are always lawful, and also of obligation. Such, for example, is the duty of
professing the truth, of working justice to all men.

The circumstances of an act performed determine its morality when the object does not do so.
Circumstances are various, but the most important are those of person, of the intensity of the act, of place,
of time, of helping influences in the act, of manner, and of intention. The last named (that is intention of
the agent or doer) is the most notable circumstance.

Of circumstances in general, the ethical principles are these:

an indifferent act is made good or evil by circumstances;

a good act may be made evil by circumstances but an evil act cannot be made good by circumstances;
an act is made better or worse by circumstances;
a circumstance gravely evil ruins the morality of the whole act and makes it evil;
a circumstance slightly evil, which is not the entire motive of a good act, does not utterly destroy its
goodness.

Of intention in special, the ethical principles are these:

a good act done for a good intention has an added goodness from the intention, and a bad act for a bad
intention has an added evil from the intention;

a good act for a bad intention is wholly evil if the intention is gravely evil or if it is the whole motive of
the act;

a good intention cannot make a bad act good, but a bad intention vitiates a good act;

an indifferent act may be made good or evil by its intention.

For an act to be lawful, that is, morally right and good, it must square with all the requirements of object,
circumstances, intention. For an act to be evil, it must fail to square with any one of the requirements. The
axiom is:

An act to he good must be entirely good; it is vitiated (wholly or partially) by any defect.

VIII. PROPERTIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS

A property of an act is anything that belongs by natural necessity to the act. Now, a human act is a free
and deliberate act of a responsible being who is its author. It follows, that such an act is imputable to its
author, to his credit or discredit, that is, as a merit or a demerit. Thus, properties of human acts are
imputability, merit, demerit.

A human act once performed sets a precedent for the agent. It marks a path which he has traversed. It cuts
a groove, so to speak, for his action. And therefore he tends to act in the same way again. In a word,
human acts tend to follow patterns called habits. By habit in the present instance we mean an operative
habit, a habit of acting. Such a habit is an inclination, born of frequently repeated action, for acting in a
certain way.

An operative habit that is morally good is called a virtue. An operative habit that is morally bad is called a
vice. Virtues and vices are the consequences of human acts.

The chief-virtues are prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These are called the cardinal virtues
(from the Latin cardo, -- stem cardin-, "a hinge") because all other virtues depend on them as a door
depends on its hinges.
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Vice, or habit of evil doing, is a habitual defect, a habitual failure to measure up to the norm of right
conduct and of the virtues. A single bad act is a sin, but not a vice. Vice is the habit of sin. It stands
opposed to virtue either by defect or by excess, but in either case it is a habitual failure (a negative thing)
to measure up to the standard of what a human act ought to be.

IX. THE STRUCTURE OF A MORAL EVENT – AQUINAS

The way that Aquinas presents his exposition of the structure of voluntary, human activity is already a
strong indication of how he thinks about the topic. For just as life itself is oriented toward a 'final end', so
is every opportunity for human activity something that prompts the person to 'move' oneself toward an
end or goal. The question is whether that end or goal is compatible with the end or goal of life, of living,
itself. Ultimately, Aquinas will write that if it is, then the activity one is performing is virtuous, while if it
is not, it is sinful.

After describing the final end of human life and reminding us that a human activity must be voluntary if it
is to be understood to be a moral activity, he turns his attention to those actions that proceed directly from
the will. He identifies three: the simple voluntary, the formation of an intention, and the experience of
enjoyment that one engages after the successful accomplishment of one's end or goal.

The simple voluntary refers to one's response toward what one apprehends as good or true. While it is the
sensitive appetite that awakens the possibility of attraction to what is apprehended as good, it is an act of
the will that signifies a 'willingness' to work toward that goal. The most common example Aquinas uses to
express this experience is the willingness to get or remain healthy. Note that it is also possible that one
decides not to will something good, such as health, because various circumstances warrant against it, e.g.
protecting my own health by taking nourishment may result in depriving others who are dying of
starvation.

At a given time, one might recognize an opportunity to protect or further one's health, such as taking
vitamin supplements or doing exercise. The will may then act in such a way as to formualte an intention
to realize that goal. This is the most important step in the entire moral event. It is also the first place to
look when it comes to evaluating human activity. Even though nothing has yet been physically done to
bring about the end in view, it is already possible to raise the question whether committing oneself to such
an end is beneficial to the person both here and now and in the longer term, pointing in the direction of
one's 'final end'.

As Aquinas frequently writes, the end (or goal to which one commits oneself) may be last in the order of
realization but it is first in the order of intention.*

The third activity that proceeds directly from the will takes place after one has actually achieved their
intended end or goal. It is the act of enjoyment, or more formally, 'fruition'. The 'fruits' of one's labor are
enjoyed because a goal has been successfully reached. This, of course, also depends upon the manner
which one chooses for reaching their goal.

X. CONSENT, CHOICE AND PERFORMACE

In what can be called the second phase of moral decision-making, the person goes in search of finding
ways to realize the goal being aimed at in their intention. Human intelligence gathers information, or
'takes counsel' as Aquinas writes, about various possibilities. But it is the will that acts to give consent to
the those possibilities. In some cases, there may be only one real possibility to which one can give
consent, in which case this becomes the object of choice (if acceptable). In other cases, the person must
still decide between different possibilities, considering as many relevant factors as one can, and choose
one of them.

The decision about which possibilities deserve consent and which choice may be the best depends upon
two factors: is the choice genuinely capable of attaining the intended goal, and does that choice exhibit a
due proportion (appropriateness) with respect to the goal being aimed at? Note that both of these
considerations refer back to the intention to achieve a goal. For without considering one's goal it would
not be possible to judge whether the activity chosen was a good one. Perhaps the best example to illustrate
this is that of deciding upon a manner in which to serve justice by punishing a criminal. The punishment
needs to 'fit the crime' (be appropriate or proportionate) in the sense that it should not be less or more
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severe than it needs to be. ,INC
XI. MORAL EVALUATION

The last section of this first 'chapter' in Aquinas' book about the fundamentals of moral activity addresses
the question of evaluating what is actually getting done in the entire moral event. Presenting that
evaluation after all the components have been accounted for is part of the systematic approach of
presenting the argument. It does not reflect the way things happen in real life because in reality an
evaluative process is taking place all along the way.

One needs to evaluate the various ends or goals to which one commits oneself through an act of intention.
Is this a virtuous end or does it work against the practice of virtue? Is what I am attempting to bring about
genuinely in the best interests of all concerned? Then, whether or not one gives consent to possible
courses of action (or omission) for achieving a goal will depend upon its efficiency as well as its
beneficence for all concerned. The same must be said about the choice of various possible courses of
action for achieving one's goal. Note that this does not mean that the action (omission) chosen is purely
'good' and does not involve some elements which may be injurious to persons. Amputating a limb would
obviously be disadvantageous for a person, leaving them in some way disabled; but it can appropriately be
chosen as a viable course of action when that limb is gangrenous.

XII. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

A. EARLY LIFE

Thomas was born in 1225 at Roccasecca, a hilltop castle from which the great Benedictine abbey of
Montecassino is not quite visible, midway between Rome and Naples. At the age of five, he was entered
at Montecassino where his studies began. When the monastery became a battle site—not for the last time
—Thomas was transferred by his family to the University of Naples. It was here that he came into contact
with the “new” Aristotle and with the Order of Preachers or Dominicans, a recently founded mendicant
order. He became a Dominican over the protests of his family and eventually went north to study, perhaps
first briefly at Paris, then at Cologne with Albert the Great, whose interest in Aristotle strengthened
Thomas's own predilections. Returned to Paris, he completed his studies, became a Master and for three
years occupied one of the Dominican chairs in the Faculty of Theology. The next ten years were spent in
various places in Italy, with the mobile papal court, at various Dominican houses, and eventually in
Rome. From there he was called back to Paris to confront the controversy variously called Latin
Averroism and Heterodox Aristotelianism. After this second three year stint, he was assigned to Naples.
In 1274, on his way to the Council of Lyon, he fell ill and died on March 7 in the Cistercian abbey at
Fossanova, which is perhaps twenty kilometers from Roccasecca.

B. EDUCATION

Little is known of Thomas's studies at Montecassino, but much is known of the shape that the monastic
schools had taken. They were one of the principal conduits of the liberal arts tradition which stretches
back to Cassiodorus Senator in the 6th century. The arts of the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, logic) and those
of the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy) were fragments preserved against the
ruinous loss of classical knowledge. They constituted the secular education that complemented sacred
doctrine as learned from the Bible. When Thomas transferred to Naples, his education in the arts
continued. Here it would have been impressed upon him that the liberal arts were no longer adequate
categories of secular learning: the new translations of Aristotle spelled the end of the liberal arts tradition,
although the universities effected a transition rather than a breach.
Taking Thomas's alma mater Paris as reference point, the Faculty of Arts provided the point of entry to
teen-aged boys. With the attainment of the Master of Arts at about the age of 20, one could go on to study
in a higher faculty, law, medicine or theology. The theological program Thomas entered in Paris was a
grueling one, with the master's typically attained in the early thirties. Extensive and progressively more
intensive study of the scriptures, Old and New Testament, and of the summary of Christian doctrine called
the Sentences which was compiled by the twelfth century Bishop of Paris, Peter Lombard. These close
textual studies were complemented by public disputations and the even more unruly quodlibetal
questions. With the faculty modeled more or less on the guilds, the student served a long apprenticeship,
established his competence in stages, and eventually after a public examination was named a master and
then gave his inaugural lecture.

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,INC
C. WORK

Thomas's writings by and large show their provenance in his teaching duties. His commentary on
the Sentences put the seal on his student days and many of his very early commentaries on Scripture have
come down to us. But from the very beginning Thomas produces writings which would not have emerged
from the usual tasks of the theological master. On Being and Essence and The Principles of Nature (the
latter a very useful summary for students of the principles that Aristotle develops in his Physics) date from
his first stay at Paris, and unlike his commentaries on Boethius' On the Trinity and De hebdomadibus, are
quite obviously philosophical works. Some of his disputed questions date from his first stint as regius
master at Paris. When he returned to Italy his productivity increased. He finished the  Summa contra
gentiles, wrote various disputed questions and began the Summa theologiae. In 1268, at Rome, he began
the work of commenting on Aristotle with On the Soul, and during the next five or six years commented
on eleven more Aristotelian works (not all of these are complete). During this time he was caught up in
magisterial duties of unusual scope and was writing such polemical works as On the Eternity of the
World and On There Being Only One Intellect.
At Naples, he was given the task of elevating the status of the Dominican House of Studies. His writing
continued until he had a mystical experience which made him think of all he had done as “mere straw.” At
the time of his death in 1274 he was under a cloud in Paris. 219 propositions were condemned in 1277 by
a commission appointed by the Bishop of Paris, among them some tenets of Thomas. This was soon
lifted, he was canonized and eventually was given the title of Common Doctor of the Church. But the
subtle and delicate assimilation of Aristotle that characterized his work in both philosophy and theology
did not survive his death, except in the Dominican Order, and has experienced ups and downs ever since.

D. PHILOSOPHY

Many contemporary philosophers are unsure how to read Thomas. He was in his primary and official
profession a theologian. Nonetheless, we find among his writings works anyone would recognize as
philosophical and the dozen commentaries on Aristotle increasingly enjoy the respect and interest of
Aristotelian scholars. Even within theological works as such there are extended discussions that are easily
read as possessing a philosophical character. So his best known work, the Summa theologiae, is often
cited by philosophers when Thomas's position on this or that issue is sought. How can a theological work
provide grist for philosophical mills? How did Thomas distinguish between philosophy and theology?
Sometimes Thomas puts the difference this way: “… the believer and the philosopher consider creatures
differently. The philosopher considers what belongs to their proper natures, while the believer considers
only what is true of creatures insofar as they are related to God, for example, that they are created by God
and are subject to him, and the like.” (Summa contra gentiles, bk II, chap. 4) Since the philosopher too,
according to Thomas, considers things as they relate to God, this statement does not put the difference in a
formal light.
The first and major formal difference between philosophy and theology is found in their principles, that is,
starting points. The presuppositions of the philosopher, that to which his discussions and arguments are
ultimately driven back, are in the public domain, as it were. They are things that everyone in principle can
know upon reflection; they are where disagreement between us must come to an end. These principles are
not themselves the products of deductive proof—which does not of course mean that they are immune to
rational analysis and inquiry—and thus they are said to be known by themselves (per se, as opposed
to per alia). This is proportionately true of each of the sciences, where the most common principles just
alluded to are in the background and the proper principles or starting points of the particular science
function regionally as the common principles do across the whole terrain of thought and being. The fact
that they are known per se does not imply that they are easily known to just anyone who considers them.
A good deal of experience of the world and inquiry, not to mention native intelligence, and the ability to
avoid intellectual distraction, may be required for anyone in particular to actually apprehend their truth.
By contrast, the discourse of the theologian is ultimately driven back to starting points or principles that
are held to be true on the basis of faith, that is, the truths that are authoritatively conveyed by Revelation
as revealed by God. Some believers reflect on these truths and see other truths implied by them, spell out
their interrelations and defend them against the accusation of being nonsense. Theological discourse and
inquiry look like any other and is, needless to say, governed by the common principles of thought and
being; but it is characterized formally by the fact that its arguments and analyses are taken to be truth-
bearing only for one who accepts Scriptural revelation as true.
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This provides a formal test for deciding
, I N Cwhether a piece of discourse is philosophical or theological. If it
relies only on truths anyone can be expected upon sufficient reflection to know about the world, and if it
offers to lead to new truths on the basis of such truths, and only on that basis, then it is philosophical
discourse. On the other hand, discourse whose cogency—not formal, but substantive—depends upon our
accepting as true such claims as that there are three persons in one divine nature, that our salvation was
effected by the sacrifice of Jesus, that Jesus is one person but two natures, one human, one divine, and the
like, is theological discourse. Any appeal to an authoritative scriptural source as the necessary nexus in an
argument is thereby other than philosophical discourse.
More will be said of this contrast later, but this is the essential difference Thomas recognizes between
philosophy and theology. To conclude, consider a passage in which Thomas summarizes his position. He
is confronting an objection to there being any need for theological discourse. Whatever can be the object
of inquiry will qualify as a being of one sort or another; but the philosophical disciplines seem to cover
every kind of being, indeed there is even a part of it which Aristotle calls theology. So what need is there
for discourse beyond philosophical discourse?
… it should be noted that different ways of knowing (ratio cognoscibilis) give us different sciences. The
astronomer and the natural philosopher both conclude that the earth is round, but the astronomer does this
through a mathematical middle that is abstracted from matter, whereas the natural philosopher considers a
middle lodged in matter. Thus there is nothing to prevent another science from treating in the light of
divine revelation what the philosophical disciplines treat as knowable in the light of human reason.
(Summa theologiae, Ia.1.1 ad 2)
For Thomas theological discourse begins with what God has revealed about Himself and His action in
creating and redeeming the world. The world is understood in that light. Philosophical discourse begins
with knowledge of the world. If it speaks of God what it says is conditioned by what is known of the
world. But even given the distinction between the two, Aquinas suggests here that there are in fact
elements of what God has revealed that are formally speaking philosophical and subject to philosophical
discussion—though revealed they can be known and investigated without the precondition of faith. In
other words, even something that is as a matter of fact revealed is subject to philosophical analysis, if
religious faith is not necessary to know it and accept it as true. So it may happen that concerning certain
subjects, as for example the nature of God, the nature of the human person, what is necessary for a human
being to be good and to fulfill his or her destiny, and so on, there can be both a theological and a
philosophical discussion of those subjects, providing for a fruitful engagement between the theological
and the philosophical. For this reason, Thomas' theological works are very often paradigms of that
engagement between theological and philosophical reflection, and provide some of his very best
philosophical reflection.

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