NATO STRATEGIC DIRECTION SOUTH

November 2019

Geopolitical Dynamics in the Horn of Africa

and Mechanisms for Collaboration
between NATO and IGAD Countries

NSD-S Hub, Via Madonna del Pantano, Lago Patria - Italy 80014

www.TheSouthernHub.org
 Geopolitical Dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Mechanisms for 2019
Collaboration between NATO and IGAD Countries

The NSD-S HUB was established at Allied Joint Force Command, Naples in order to improve
NATO awareness and understanding of the opportunities and challenges from the South,
while contributing to the overall coordination of NATO activities and efforts. NSD-S HUB
products are mostly developed with open-source information from governmental and non-
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sourced and independently produced articles do not necessarily represent NATO opinions,
views or official positions.

This paper was written in collaboration with Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael from the Institute for Peace and
Security Studies (IPSS), Ethiopia.

Dr. Mesfin is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for Peace and Security
Studies (IPSS), Addis Ababa University (AAU) teaching advanced courses to
graduate and post graduate students. He is Director of the African Research
Universities Alliance (ARUA) Center of Excellence (CoE) for post- conflict
societies hosted by IPSS. He is also Editor-in-Chief of conflict analysis and
insight reports published by the African Peace and Security Program on the
IPSS website. His research interest focuses on governance, peace and
development studies of the Horn of Africa. He has extensively engaged in
researches related to the political practice and political economy of Ethiopia,
public enterprises and development in Ethiopia, federalism and conflict
management in Ethiopia, counter insurgency and counter financing of terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
Dr. Mesfin has over 12 years of executive level experience at the federal government of Ethiopia.

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 Geopolitical Dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Mechanisms for 2019
Collaboration between NATO and IGAD Countries

INTRODUCTION
This paper details the main findings of a study conducted during a two-week Joint Production Workshop
between IPSS and the HUB carried out for the first week in NSD-S Hub facilities in Naples and for the second
week in Addis Ababa.
The Horn of Africa is generally said to comprise the states of Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea.
However, South Sudan and the Sudan are also directly affected by the Horn’s politico-economic factors. The
security situation in this sub-region is highly complex due to several socio-economic, political and geo-
political factors which range from extreme poverty to maritime insecurity. The sub-region is also rich in
natural resources including potash and diamonds, and a significant portion of the world’s crude oil passes
through the Aden-Suez canal route, making the Horn of Africa one of the world’s most critical regions in
terms of security.
International relationships between the countries in the Horn of Africa have been significantly influenced by
the international and regional power relationships over the last two decades. At the end of the 20th century
the newly established State of Eritrea and Ethiopia, whose government was led by the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), attempted to create stability in the region. However, the war that
broke out between these two countries (1998-2008) and the expansion of terrorist groups and piracy in the
region brought about new security
threats which made the sub-region
volatile and susceptible to the influence
of international and regional powers.
In total 282 million people live in the
Horn of Africa: Sudan – 44m; Eritrea –
4m; Djibouti – 1m; Somalia – 12m;
Ethiopia – 113m; Kenya – 52m; South
Sudan – 11 m, and Uganda – 45m.
Therefore, the population of the Horn
of Africa accounts for approximately a
third of the entire African population.
The rapidly increasing population in the
Horn of Africa (growth rate of approx.
3% per annum, compared to the
continental growth rate of 2.3% p.a.)
puts great strain on health and
education services and employment
figures, and is creating huge challenges
for a sustainable economic growth.
Fig. 1 – Population figures for Africa

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 Geopolitical Dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Mechanisms for 2019
Collaboration between NATO and IGAD Countries

1. PEACE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

In this extremely complicated African region, most of the challenges are communal, including river and
water management, grazing land rights (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Kenya), poverty, authoritarian rule
and weak civil society organizations. The main threats are violent extremism motivated by extreme religious
beliefs, unemployment and marginalization as promoters of violent extremism and foreign terrorist
networks, and maritime insecurity (Bab al Mandab; piracy/terrorist networks) all of which have led to
increased intervention by regional and international powers.
The Horn is one of the regions in the world most affected by conflict. This has a direct impact on population,
thus the sub-region has the highest percentage of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). Among
the 12.6 million IDP in Africa in 2016, 8.6 million were from East Africa. By the end of 2016, more than a
quarter of South Sudan’s population was internally displaced due to intra-state conflict.
Poverty is a major problem in the Horn of Africa especially as it also fuels recruitment by terrorist groups.
Somalia has become a center of home-grown terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab. It has well-established
networks with Al Qaida and terrorist groups in Yemen. There is a spread of Yemen-based militants and arms,
along with financial flows into Somalia. Up to one million refugees from Somalia are based in Yemen. There
are parallel economic structures in the country which have facilitated regional trade in arms and the
smuggling of people and fuel.

2. INTERESTS OF EXTERNAL POWERS

As mentioned before, the Horn of Africa is currently one of the competition areas in which many global
powers compete to exploit resources, maintain their influence and guarantee trade routes, particularly
because it is next to one of the most important shipping corridors in the world (the Bab al Mandab Strait)
and to the oil rich Arabian Peninsula and South Sudan.
Some Middle Eastern countries besides having economic interests also have religious motivations.
The Blue Economy, including the development of trade corridors, is important for the Gulf States, so Dubai
World is a relevant player in the Horn of Africa. Dubai World is the Holding of Dubai, founded by Emir
Muhammad bin Rashid al Maktum in 2006. It covers domestic and foreign investments of the Emirate of
Dubai. Soon after its foundation it became prominent in the Horn of Africa. Among its activities were
numerous investments, especially in Djibouti and its harbor.
Finally, the Gulf States try to limit Iran’s influence, including confronting Iran’s intervention in the Civil War in
Yemen from the western side.
Iran aims to compete with Saudi Arabia through private activities (FDI) by investing in industrial parks in
Ethiopia and other East African countries. Networking with Lebanese Shia communities across Africa is
relevant. The diamond trade of African Lebanese communities plays a role in financing Hizb-Allah, and
probably Houthi rebels.
In the Sudan, South-Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia and Ethiopia, China exploits natural resources1 such as
crude oil and other raw materials (e.g. diamonds, lithium and potash) through Chinese mining companies
(fig. 2). It aims to connect African Hubs by way of the New Silk Road to mainland China (Lusaka-Dar es Salam

1
China’s exploitation of African resources extends well beyond the Horn of Africa, reaching as far south as Zimbabwe.

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 Geopolitical Dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Mechanisms for 2019
Collaboration between NATO and IGAD Countries

road and DRC-Djibouti/Kenya and Ethiopia roads). At the same time it is also becoming more involved in
peacekeeping missions and other humanitarian activities.

Fig. 2 - Source: NSD-S HUB Paper “Impact of China’s strategy on stability in Africa and the Middle East”

China supports infrastructural development and is an important debt holder in Africa, owning a total of 60
billion USD in debt. Djibouti has a decisive role due to its geographic location. The importance of this country
is elevated on account of its vicinity to the main marine route which passes from the Gulf of Aden through
Bab el Mandab to Europe.
Djibouti is the first foreign country where China has set up a military base. The purpose of China’s military
presence in Africa is to protect economic interests, since its trade amounts to 1 billion USD a day, a large
proportion of which passes through the Aden-Suez canal route. The rich natural resources such as oil
reserves in South Sudan and the Sudan have become attractive to countries such as China to maintain their
growing economies.
The US, on the other hand, with its allies, tries to limit China’s influence. Partnerships between US and
African companies have been created with an allocation of 60 billion USD to support the private sector.
In the wake of the attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US established Africa
Command whose primary focus is monitoring anti-terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa and Africa as a
whole. From an African perspective these developments were perceived as evidence of US intentions to
progress from the projection of soft power towards an active intervention approach to fight terrorism and
maintain the security of the Red Sea trade route, all of which eventually leading to Ethiopia becoming a main
ally.
The increasingly dominant presence of China in Djibouti has been interpreted by Africa as having forced the
US and others to explore alternatives. Since Eritrea is seen as the most likely choice, it was also thus
considered in the interests of the US to foster the peace process between Eritrea and its ally, Ethiopia.
European countries favor investments in the Horn of Africa in order to limit the migration flow to Europe,
working closely with the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development2 (IGAD)

2
IGAD is an organization of states in North-East Africa, covering the Horn of Africa states as well as Sudan, South Sudan,
Kenya and Uganda. It is based in Djibouti and was founded in 1996.

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Collaboration between NATO and IGAD Countries

focusing on governance, sustainable development, climate change and immigration. In this realm,
specifically EU countries believe better governance and sustainable development are important for resolving
the causes of conflicts, thereby causing a likely reduction in migration from Africa to Europe, particularly
because the containment of immigrants has become a major concern since 2015. To implement these
strategies the EU Commission is prioritizing collaborations between the regional entities such as IGAD and
AU, even though they are not fully-fledged international actors due to the varied interests of their members.
The relevance of Russia today cannot be compared with the Soviet Union’s influence in the region in
previous decades. Nonetheless, Russian projects involve infrastructure, such as ports in Eritrea and railroad
development in Ethiopia. Furthermore, most countries in the Horn of Africa rely on Russian arms systems.
Besides its interest in natural resources (gold, diamonds, and other minerals) India is relevant in agricultural
investments in Africa to guarantee its own food security. India also tries to penetrate African markets, mainly
for its textile products. Further Indian interests are Maritime Security and the search for African support for
its goals within the UN3.

3. CONCLUSIONS
The geographical location of the Horn of Africa makes it a competitive hotspot for various global powers.
Many regional powers are also involved, either in collaboration with global powers or separately, to
maintain their influence. Being a major trade route towards western countries, collaboration with the states
of the Horn of Africa is vital. Also, as the Horn of Africa is a network hub for religion-inspired violent
extremist groups from the Middle East and Africa, it is of primary security interest for all international actors,
including NATO, to closely monitor the global trade routes and regional security.
The Horn of Africa should focus its attention on regional integration, cultural diplomacy and the
implementation of peace deals between the countries in the sub-region. In this regard, ethnic groups could
help to achieve further integration, examples being the Afar in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea, the Tigrai in
Eritrea and Ethiopia and the Somali in Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. In 2018, the Horn of Africa was
the site of tremendous peace initiatives such as institutionalizing agreements involving sub-regional and
regional institutions like IGAD and AU to revitalize peace processes. Therefore, strengthening IGAD, so that it
can become more assertive and coordinate issues of regional integration, will be of paramount importance.
Maritime security from the Bab al Mandab Strait to the Suez Canal as well as tackling organized crime (anti-
piracy collaboration, human trafficking and anti-terrorism) is paramount and requires international
collaboration. For the states of the Horn of Africa as well as the Red Sea states, such collaboration with
NATO member states should be fostered in order to exploit local skills and experience to support capacity
development of the security institutions of the IGAD member states. IGAD itself might create closer
relationships with NATO and NATO members to institutionalize future collaboration.

3
For further information see NSD-S HUB paper “The Rationale behind India’s Shift to Africa”.

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