Denver Law Review

Volume 76 Article 8
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Surveys

January 1999

Evidence: Attorney-Client Privilege & (and) Work Product Doctrine

Kenneth L. Rothenberg

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Recommended Citation
Kenneth L. Rothenberg, Evidence: Attorney-Client Privilege & (and) Work Product Doctrine, 76 Denv. U. L.
Rev. 825 (1999).

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 EVIDENCE: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & WORK
PRODUCT DOCTRINE

INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege of the common
law.' It provides protection to confidential communications between a
client and his attorney by prohibiting disclosure of communications re-
lating to legal advice or opinion.2 As the Supreme Court stated, this
privilege is necessary "to encourage full and frank communication be-
tween attorneys and their clients." The work-product doctrine affords
protection to materials prepared by an attorney in anticipation of trial."
Like the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine prevents
disclosure of information related to the client's case. The work product
doctrine encourages careful and thorough research by the attorney, with-
out fear an adversary will use their work.' It protects the attorney as he
finds facts and devises strategy, whereas the attorney-client privilege
protects the client. The liberal discovery rules of both civil procedure and

I. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
2. See Michael J. Chepiga, FederalAttorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine,
583 PLI LITIG. 473, 476 (1998) (discussing the federal courts' recent interpretation and application
of the attorney-client privilege); see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (articulating that the privilege
"exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the
giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice").
3. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. One aspect of the attorney-client privilege to receive a substan-
tial amount of attention over the last year concerns governmental attorney-client privilege. See
generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83
MINN. L. REV. 473, 475 (1998) (arguing the United States government controls the same type of
attorney-client privilege that exists for a corporation). The issue has arisen numerous times during
the Independent Counsel's investigation of President William Jefferson Clinton's administration. See
id. In a case of first impression, the District of Columbia Circuit held the Deputy White House
Counsel could not assert the attorney-client privilege to avoid responding to a grand jury if he pos-
sessed information relating to possible criminal violation. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1102
(D.C. Cir. 1998). In Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (1998), the Supreme Court
rejected the Independent Counsel's argument that the attorney-client privilege should not protect
confidential communications when the client has died and the communications relates to a criminal
proceeding. See Swindler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct. at 2084. The Supreme Court reaffirmed well over a
century of case law by stating the attorney-client privilege survives the death of a client. Cf.id. at
2087.
4. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). The Second Circuit recently expanded
the work product definition, Cf United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998). In Adlman,
the Second Circuit held the work product doctrine may protect a document prepared by a party if the
document is intended to help in making a business decision which turns on the party's appraisal of
the probable result of litigation expected to result from the transaction. See id. at 1197; cf Harvey
Kurzweil et al., Second Circuit Interprets and Potentially Expands Work Product Protection, 12
INSIGHTS, JULY 1998 at 27 (stating that the "practical effect of the Adlman decision is the work
product doctrine may protect certain advisory or opinion materials created by non-lawyers for the
purpose of advising whether to undertake contemplated business transactions").
5. See Emily Jones, Keeping Client Confidences:Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Prod-
uct Doctrine in Light of United States v. Adlman, 18 PACE L. REv. 419, 433 (1998) (describing the
policy considerations supporting the attorney-client privilege).
825
 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3

evidence conflict with both privileges.' Although the attorney-client

privilege may serve as a "roadblock to the truth," at least on an interme-
diate level, society has subordinated the search for truth to a preferred
value of full, confident, candid, confidential legal representation of a
client!
This survey examines how the United States Court of Appeals for
the.Tenth Circuit dealt with several important issues implicating the at-
torney-client privilege and work product doctrine during the survey pe-
riod.' Part I addresses the controversial areas of implied subject matter
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the effect of subsequent liti-
gation upon the work product doctrine. In Frontier Refining, Inc., v.
Gorman-Rupp Co.,9 the Tenth Circuit approved the Hearn" test to ana-
lyze issues of implied subject matter waiver" and decided that the work
product doctrine affords protection to subsequent litigation. 2
Part II of this survey analyzes a corporation's ability to assert attor-
ney-client privilege, as well as a corporate employee's ability to assert an
individual attorney-client privilege with corporate counsel. In Grand
Jury Subpoenas v. United States,3 the Tenth Circuit held a finite, indi-
vidual, attorney-client privilege existed between a corporate officer and
corporate counsel." In Grand Jury Proceedingsv. United States, a case
derived from the same activities as Grand Jury Subpoenas, the Tenth
Circuit held a corporate officer may assert an individual attorney-client
privilege for documents related to corporate activities when the officer's
personal rights are at issue.'5 Finally, in Sprague V.Thorn Americas,
Inc.," the court held the corporation's attorney-client privilege protected
documents prepared by in-house counsel for management.'7

6. See id. at 425.

7. T. Maxfield Bahner & Michael L. Gallion, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege Via Issue
Injection: A Callfor Uniformity, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 199, 199-200 (1998).
8. This survey period addresses cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
9. 136 F.3d 695 (10th Cir. 1998).
10. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
11. See Frontier,136 F.3d at 701.
12. See id. at 703-04.
13. 144 F.3d 653 (10th Cir. 1998)."
14. See GrandJury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 659.
15. See Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 156 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (10th Cir. 1998).
16. 129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 1997).
17. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1370.
 1999] EVIDENCE

I. WAIVER OF THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE EFFECTS OF

SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION UPON WORK PRODUCT

A. Background

1. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, which protects communications be-
tween attorneys and clients, can be defeated by two general categories of
waiver: (1) actual or expressed waiver and (2) implied subject matter
waiver.'" Actual or express waiver occurs when confidential communica-
tions are revealed to third parties, outside the attorney-client
relationship.'9 Implied waiver occurs when communications protected by
the attorney-client privilege are divulged or injected as part of a claim or
defense in litigation.' The concept of issue injection waiver seems rela-
tively straightforward; clients waive the privilege if they affirmatively,
plead a claim or defense that puts the privilege at issue.2' Yet, jurisdic-
tions have had tremendous difficulty applying a test in a uniform
manner.' Three main tests have emerged: (1) the automatic waiver rule,'
(2) the balancing test,24 and the (3) Hearn test.' The majority-accepted
Hearn test, a three-part conjunctive test, provides a waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege when
(i) assertion of the privilege is the result of some affimative act by
the asserting party, such as filing suit; (ii) through the affirmative ac-
tion, the asserting party has placed the protected information at issue
by making it relevant to the case; and (iii) application of the privilege
would deny the opposing party access to information vital to its de-
fense.26

18. See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 199-200.

19. See id. at 200. The requirement of confidentiality is an essential part of the privilege. Cf.
Leathers v. United States, 250 F.2d 159, 166 (9th Cir. 1957). A "corporation must show that the
allegedly privileged documents were available to corporate employees only on 'a fairly firm "need to
know" basis."' In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863, 870 (D. Minn. 1979).
20. See Balner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 200.
21. Seeid at201.
22. See id.
23. See id. (citing Independent Prods. Corp. v.Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y.
1958)). The automatic waiver rule holds a party who puts forth a claim, counterclaim, or affirmative
defense injecting an issue into the forefront of the litigation automatically, waives all corresponding
privileges. See Independent Prods., 22 F.R.D. at 276-77.
24. See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 202 (citing Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alli-
ance v. Public Serv. Co., 838 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1988)). The balancing test weighs the need for dis-
covery of the confidential information against the need to protect the confidentiality of the commu-
nication. See ClamshellAlliance, 838 F.2d at 20.
25. See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 202-03 (citing Heam v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581
(E.D. Wash. 1975)).
26. Id. (citing Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581).
 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3

A fourth approach, the anticipatory waiver test, has recently gained lim-
ited approval.
2. Work Product Doctrine
Since its beginning in the seminal case Hickman v. Taylor,28 an im-
mense body of judicially-created law has sprung from the work product
doctrine.' The work product doctrine was codified into Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Rule 26 states that a party may obtain
discovery of documents "prepared in anticipation of litigation" only upon
showing a substantial need for the materials and an inability to acquire the
materials from a different source without undue hardship.' The rule, how-
ever, is silent on the question of whether materials prepared in anticipa-
tion of one litigation are protected in subsequent litigation.32 Federal
common law governs subsequent litigation because of Rule 26's silence
on that issue.3 Federal circuits are split on application of the doctrine in
subsequent litigation. ' In 1983, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Federal Trade Commission v. Grolier, Inc." The Court held the work
product doctrine codified in the Freedom of Information Act' protects
attorney work product "from mandatory disclosure without regard to the
status of litigation for which it was prepared." 7
B. Tenth CircuitCase

1. FrontierRefining, Inc., v. Gorman-Rupp Co."

a. Facts
Frontier ran a refinery in Cheyenne, Wyoming.' In June 1992, four
of Frontier's contractors were severely burned when a fire erupted in the
slop system of the refinery where they were working. ' Gorman-Rupp

27. See id at 201 (citing Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863-64
(3d Cir. 1994)). This test provides that the privilege is waived when parties asserting claims or
defenses compel them "inevitably to draw upon a privileged communication at trial in order to
prevail." Id at 204 (quoting Smith v. Cavanaugh Pierson Talley, 513 So. 2d 1138, 1145 (La. 1987)).
28. 329 U.S. 496 (1947).
29. See John M. Palmeri & Thomas B. Quinn, Work Product in Subsequent Litigation: The
Tenth Circuit Enters the Fray, 27 CoLO.LAW. 79,79 (1998).
30. See id.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
32. See id
33. See Palmeri & Quinn, supranote 29, at 79.
34. See id,
35. 462 U.S. 19,22-23 (1983).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994).
37. See Grolier,462 U.S. at 28.
38. 136 F.3d 695 (10th Cir. 1998).
39. See Frontier,136 F.3d at 697.
40. See id.
1999] EVIDENCE

manufactured two of the centrifugal pumps used in Frontier's slop sys-

tem." Three of the injured contractors filed lawsuits against Frontier.'2
Frontier settled all three suits, while its insurance 'company settled the
claim brought by the fourth contractor.:3 Joe Teig, of Holland & Hart,
served as Frontier's counsel in defense of all four claims.' Following
settlement of the claims, Frontier hired new counsel and filed indemnifi-
cation lawsuits against Gorman-Rupp. ' During the discovery process,
Gorman-Rupp filed a discovery motion seeking production of Joe Teig's
files from his representation of Frontier in the underlying suits.' The
district court granted the motion and ordered production of Holland &
Hart's documents and a deposition of Joe Teig.' Joe Teig and Holland &
Hart unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the order on the first day of
trial.,8 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for Gor-
man-Rupp, and Frontier appealed. '9

b. Decision
Frontier argued that the lower court erred when it held that Frontier
had waived its attorney-client and work product privileges by bringing an
indemnity action against Gorman-Rupp: ° Wyoming law controlled the
outcome of this issue.' Because Wyoming lacked applicable law on
waiver of attorney-client privilege, the Tenth Circuit decided how it be-
lieved Wyoming would act. 2 The court held that Wyoming would apply
an intermediate approach regarding waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege based on the Hearn test.3 Three elements are necessary to establish
implied waiver under the Hearn test.' The third element requires a dem-
onstration that the privilege would deny the opposing party "vital" in-
formation relevant to its defense The court held, based on'the "avail-

41. See id.

42. See id.
43. See id. at 697-98. The claims were settled for respective amounts of $8.25 million, $6.75
million, $3.50 million and $750,000. See id.
44. See id. at 698.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 699.
50. See id. The Tenth Circuit noted it would not overrule the discovery ruling absent an abuse
of discretion; however, the court would review the "underlying factual determinations for clear error
and review de novo purely legal questions." Id.
51. See id. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, state law is determinative in
diversity cases concerning issues of privileges. See FED. R. EvID. 501.
52. See Frontier, 136 F.3d at 700.
53. See id. at 701.
54. See id.; cf supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing the Hearn test).
55. Frontier, 136 F.3d at70.
 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol, 76:3

ability of other sources for evidence[,]" the third element for waiver of
the privilege was not established. 6
For Frontier to win its indemnity claim against Gorman-Rupp,
Frontier had to show the underlying settlements with the injured con-
tractors were reasonably made in good faith." Frontier also had to prove
Gorman-Rupp was responsible for the fire."8 Gorman-Rupp contended
that they were permitted to see the privileged communications made by
Frontier's attorneys in the underlying claims to determine the motivation
and reasonableness of the settlements. 9
The Tenth Circuit decided Gorman-Rupp had other resources avail-
able for these questions without the use of Joe Teig's communications.'
For example, the testimony of two attorneys for the plaintiffs in the un-
derlying claim indicated that Mr. Teig admitted Frontier had no explana-
tion for its negligence claims.6 Also, Gorman-Rupp was free to interview
any employee of Frontier who could shed light on Frontier's reasoning
for settling.' Thus, the court decided that the privileged information Was
not vital and the trial court had abused its discretion in ruling to the con-
trary.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the work
product doctrine applied even though Frontier had prepared the pertinent
information in preparation of the underlying claims, and not in anticipa-
tion of the present suit." The Tenth Circuit decided the district court's
ruling, "which failed to extend the work product doctrine merely because
the relevant materials were prepared in anticipation of other, albeit re-
lated litigation, [was] against the great weight of well-reasoned author-
ity." In its decision, the court determined the appropriate starting point
for a decision on this issue was Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.'

56. Id.
57. See id.; cf Schneider Nat'), Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 579 (Wyo. 1992)
(describing circumstances under which indemnification is permitted). Under Wyoming law, the
party seeking indemnification must show the underlying settlement was reasonably "made in good
faith to discharge a potential or actual liability." Id.
58. See Frontier,136 F.3d at 701.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 701-02.
61. See id. at 702.
62. See id.; cf Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 415-16 (D. Del.
1992) (stating waiver is not justified simply to aid the adversary or to uncover the adversary's moti-
vations for acting).
63. See Frontier,136 F.3d at 702.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id Contrary to the attorney client privilege, "the work product privilege is governed,
even in diversity cases, by a uniform federal standard embodied in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)7' Id at
702 n.10. Rule 26(b)(3) states:
1999] EVIDENCE

The Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, in dicta, recog-
nized that Rule 26(b)(3) protects materials prepared for "any litigation or
trial as long as they were prepared by or for a party to the subsequent
litigation." 7 Additionally, every circuit to address the issue concluded, to
some extent, that the work product doctrine may survive in subsequent
litigation.'" For the reasons set out above, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the work product doctrine extends to subsequent litigation." Yet, the
court refused to decide whether subsequent litigation must be closely
related to the underlying litigation, because the indemnity action in
Frontier was "unquestionably 'closely related' to the underlying suit
between Frontier and the injured contractors."7"
Since the court held the work product doctrine extended to subsequent
litigation, relevant materials in the instant case were not discoverable by
Gorman-Rupp unless they could show a substantial need for the material
and an inability to obtain substantially equivalent material without undue
hardship.' Rule 26(b)(3) does not allow for discovery of an attorney's
work product unless the discovering party shows substantial need and un-
due hardship. As the court explained in its analysis of waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege, Gorman-Rupp failed to show both substantial need for
the work product materials and an undue burden if the materials were not
produced. 3 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
concluded the district court erred in compelling discovery of the Holland
& Hart materials and ordering Teig to submit to deposition.'

[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things ... prepared in antici-
pation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's repre-
sentative ... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In
ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
67. Frontier,136 F.3d at 703 (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 25
(1983)). The Tenth Circuit has recognized it considers itself bound to the Supreme Court's dicta
almost as fervently as to its outright holding if it "is recent and not enfeebled by later statements." Id
(quoting Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996)).
68. See id.
69. See id
70. Id.
71. See id. at 704.
72. Cf. id.
73. See id.
74. See id at 704-05. In an unpublished decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the attomey-client and work product protections were waived by selective dis-
closure of protected materials. See Quark, Inc. v. Harley, 1998 WL 161035, at *2-*3 (10th Cir.
1998). The Tenth Circuit's opinion correlates with most circuits' treatment of subject matter waiver
"as an all-or-nothing proposition." Chepiga, supra note 2, at 496. Under the subject matter waiver
theory, when an individual voluntarily discloses a portion of privileged communications, the privi-
lege is waived as to all privileged communication on that subject matter. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3

C. Other Circuits
Regarding implied subject matter waiver, the D.C. Circuit follows a
balancing test, weighing the need for the privileged information versus
the need for protection of the confidential information to analyze implied
waiver.' Both the Eighth and First Circuits apply some type of balancing
test as well.76 A majority of federal circuits, including the Second,'
Fifth, Seventh, 9 Ninth,' and Eleventh,8 favor the Hearntest. The Third
Circuit follows the anticipatory waiver test.'
Numerous circuits find an implicit waiver when a client relies on
attorney advice as a defense.83 In United States v. Workman," the Eight
Circuit held that the attorney-client privilege cannot be used "as both a
shield and a sword"-a defendant cannot rely on an attorney's advice as
a defense without allowing the prosecution to look at the essence of the
advice." In Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson,' the Third Circuit found
an implied waiver when a trust company asserted reliance on advice of
counsel as an affirmative defense to a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. In United States v. Bilzerian,' the Second Circuit held that a de-
fendant in a securities fraud case impliedly waived the attorney-client
privilege when he asserted reliance on advice of attorney as a defense.'
Every circuit that has addressed subsequent litigation has concluded,
at least to some extent, that the work product doctrine extends to subse-
quent litigation. The Third Circuit suggests the doctrine should apply
only to closely-related, subsequent litigation, although it has declined to
expressly so hold.' Meanwhile, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits extend the

Proceedings, 78 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting disclosure of some communications on a
subject matter waives privilege as to all communications on that subject matter).
75. See Bahner & Gallion, supranote 7, at 202 (citing Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d
1243, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
76. See id.; cf Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Public Serv. Co. 838 F.2d 13, 20
(Ist Cir. 1988); Sedco Int'l S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1982).
77. Cf. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991).
78. Cf. Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431,434 (5th Cir. 1989).
79. Cf. Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir. 1987).
80. Cf. Home Indem. Co. v. Lane, 43 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1995).
81. Cf. Cox v. United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1419 (11 th Cir. 1994).
82. Cf. Smith v. Kavanaugh, 513 So. 2d 1138, 1146 (La. 1987).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1263--64 (8th Cir. 1998); Glenmede
Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292
(2d Cir. 1991).
84. 138 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1998).
85. Workman, 138 F.3d at 1264.
86. 56 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 1995).
87. See Glenmede Trust Co., 56 F.3d at 478.
88. See Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292.
89. See id. at 1289.
90. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979).
19991 EVIDENCE

privilege to all subsequent litigation, related or not? Finally, at least

three circuits, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth, recognize that the work prod-
uct doctrine extends to subsequent litigation, but have either declined to
decide, or have failed to discuss, whether the doctrine extends only to
closely-related, subsequent litigation."

D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's analysis of implied subject matter waiver is not
reflective of federal law, but of a federal court interpreting what a Wyo-
ming state court would do. Being one of the more conservative circuits
throughout the years, it is not surprising the Tenth Circuit held the Hearn
test would apply. The Hearn test remains the majority approach, as it has
for more than two decades, and is recognized by critics as striking the
most equitable balance."3 Although the Tenth Circuit does not expressly
hold the Hearn test applicable in federal cases, based on Frontier," it
seems likely that it would.
Commentators note that determining the scope of a waiver can be
difficult due to varied interpretations by circuit courts regarding when an
implied waiver occurs." A strong argument is made that "[t]hese incon-
sistencies... serve as compelling justification for the Supreme Court to
assure litigants predictability and consistency by adopting a uniform
standard for determining the scope" of when the attorney-client privilege
is implicitly waived." Inherent in the attorney-client privilege is its goal
of promoting full and frank communication with a client and the need for
certainty and predictability in its application. '
The Tenth Circuit joins the majority of circuits by holding work
product remains protected in subsequent litigation. In Hickman v.

91. Cf, e.g., United States v. Pfizer, Inc., 560 F.2d 326, 335 (8th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp. v.
Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 484 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding the clear com-
mand of the second sentence of Rule 26(b)(3) directing courts to "protect opinion work products
against disclosure" was applicable to all work product materials referred to in the first sentence of
Rule 26(b)(3), and therefore no showing of substantial need or undue hardship could justify the
compelled disclosure of an attorney's opinion work product).
92. Cf, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing two
approaches and refusing to choose between the two); United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d
655, 660 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that were the work product doctrine an unpenetrable protection
against discovery, courts would be less willing to apply it to work produced in anticipation of other
litigation); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting the
existence of little authority restricting work-product protection "to materials prepared in connection
with the very litigation in which the discovery is sought).
93. See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 202-03.
94. Frontier Refining, Inc., v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695 (10th Cir. 1998).
95. Cf., e.g., Jennifer A. Hardgrove, Scope of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege: Articulat-
ing a Standard that Will Afford Guidance to Courts, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 643, 643 (1998) (propos-
ing a three-part test to guide the Supreme Court in articulating a uniform test).
96. Id.
97. Cf. Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 200.
 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3

Taylor,"8 the Supreme Court recognized attorneys should be able to liti-

gate without fear that adversaries might discover their work, 99 thus en-
couraging lawyers to prepare early and thoroughly for trial without the
threat that an opponent may discover their thoughts and impressions.
Protection of work product in subsequent litigation furthers this goal and
is consistent with Hickman. The Tenth Circuit, however, stopped short of
holding that work product remains protected in unrelated litigation.'"
In Frontier,the Tenth Circuit emphasized the underlying purpose of
the work product doctrine.' ' The purpose of the doctrine is to encourage
thorough and independent investigation by attorneys and is furthered by
protection of the work product in all subsequent litigation, related or not.
Thus, the Tenth Circuit would likely hold attorneys' work product should
remain protected even after resolution of the litigation for which it was
prepared.

HI. CORPORATE ArrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

A. Background
The attorney-client privilege is not limited to individuals; corpora-
tions can assert the privilege as well."2 Yet, applying the attorney-client
privilege to a fictional entity such as a corporation is not easy, because a
fictional entity is unable to interact with its attorney except through its
corporate personnel." The attorney-client privilege has become a hot
topic in corporate America today.'" This is due in part to the growth in
the number of corporations'" and the "vast and complicated array" of
federal regulations governing the businesses of corporations." The com-
bination causes disharmony. On the one hand, corporations are trying to
insulate confidential communications, and on the other, the government
is seeking disclosure through the use of a multitude of corporate rules
and regulations." 7 .

98. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

99. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-l1.
100. Cf Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 703 (10th Cir. 1998).
101. See Frontier,136 F.3d at 704.
102. Cf. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
103. See Brian M. Smith, Be Careful How You Use It or You May Lose It: A Modem Look at
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege and the Ease of Waiver in Various Circuits, 75 U. DaT. MERCY
L. REv. 389,394 (1998).
104. See id. at 389-90.
105. See id. at 390.
106. Id. at 389 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 499 U.S. 383, 392 (1981)).
107. See id. at 390.
1999] EVIDENCE

In Upjohn v. United States,'" the Supreme Court faced the question

as to whether employees of a corporation could assert the attorney-client
privilege on behalf of the corporation.'" The Upjohn Court refused to
draft a definitive set of rules to decide when the attorney-client privilege
applies in the corporate context and stated that courts should engage in a
case-by-case analysis to determine the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege."0 Yet, Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, set forth
a standard to provide guidance for the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate setting:
[Als a general rule, a communication is privileged at least
when... an employee or former employee speaks at the direction of
the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed con-
duct within the scope of employment. The attorney must be one
authorized by the management to inquire into the subject and must be
seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the fol-
lowing functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has
bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal conse-
quences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal
responses to actions that have been or may be taken by others with
regard to that conduct."'
Since the Supreme Court's historic decision in Upjohn, lower courts
have had difficulty in establishing when a corporate agent has standing to
assert the attorney-client privilege."2 This is due, in large part, to the lim-
ited guidance provided by the Upjohn decision."3 While the majority of
jurisdictions follow the requirements outlined in Upjohn, namely that all
corporate agents may fit the role of being a client, other jurisdictions are
unwilling to give credence to the test."" One reason for the inconsisten-
cies among jurisdictions is Rule 501 of the Federal Rule of Evidence,
which requires federal courts to apply state law when determining the
existence of the attorney-client privilege."' The following two related

108. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Supreme Court rejected the use of the "control group" test to
determine if an attorney-client privilege existed for a corporate employee. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at
397.
109. See id. at 386. The control group consisted of those in a position to control or take sub-
stantial part in a decision about the corporation may require the advice of an attorney. See id at 390.
110. See id. at 396.
111. ld at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
112. See Smith, supranote 103, at 395.
113. See id. The application of the attorney-client privilege can become even trickier to apply in
a limited liability company or a closely held corporation. See generally Roland J. Santoni, Applica-
tion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Disputes Between Owners and Managers of Closely-Held
Entities, 31 CREiGHToN L. REv. 849, 850-852 (1998) (noting that commentators have contended a
more "broad-based piercing of the privilege" should apply). In general, a lawyer for a corporation or
similar entity owes his loyalty to the entity and not to a director, officer, shareholder, representative,
or other individual associated with the entity. See H. Lowell Brown, The Dilemma of Corporate
Counsel Faced with Client Misconduct: Disclosure of Client Confidences or Constructive Dis-
charge, 44 BuFF.L.REv. 777, 779 (1996).
114. See Smith, supranote 103, at 395.
115. Cf id. at 396.
 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3

cases focus primarily on the separate issue of a corporate employee's

ability to assert a personal attorney-client privilege with corporate coun-
sel. The third case focuses on application of a corporation's asserting the
attorney-client privilege.

B. Tenth CircuitCases
6
1. GrandJury Subpoenas v. United States"

a. Facts
Several hospital doctors and the Intervenor"' were suspects in a con-
tinuing grand jury investigation." 8 During the relevant time period, the
Intervenor was employed as the Chief Executive Officer of the hospital."9
By responding to the grand jury hearing's subpoenas duces tecum, the
hospital implicated the use of attorneys John Doe and Jane Roe to carry
out alleged crimes.' During the period of the alleged crimes, attorneys
John Doe and Jane Roe provided legal counsel to the hospital.''
On January 21, 1997, the grand jury delivered subpoenas to the hos-
pital's counsel compelling their testimony.22 Five days earlier, Intervenor
moved to intervene and to quash the subpoenas by asserting the attorney-
client privilege on his own behalf, independent of the attorney's official
relationship with the hospital.' " On February 24, 1997, the court granted
Intervenor's motion to intervene, yet simultaneously refused to quash the
subpoenas because the court found the crime-fraud exception applied,
thereby vitiating the attorney client privilege. The court based this find-
ing on the government's establishment of a prima facie case of criminal
conduct between the hospital and its attorneys. 24
In March and April of 1997, Ms. Roe. and Mr. Doe both appeared
before the grand jury and both asserted the attorney-client privilege to
almost every question asked.'" The district court found the crime-fraud
exception applied and granted the government's motion to compel the

116. 144 F.3d 653 (10th Cir. 1998).

117. Since the appellant was the subject of a grand jury investigation, the court referred to him
as "Intervenor," and the two attorney's involved were referred to as "John Doe" and "Jane Roe." See
id. at 656 n.1.
118. See Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 656.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 657.
125. See id.
1999] EVIDENCE

testimony of Ms. Roe and Mr. Doe." The Intervenor then appealed the
district court's order.27

b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Intervenor had no
authority to assert the attorney-client privilege except for private com-
munications made to Ms. Roe and Mr. Doe in his personal capacity. In
formulating its decision, the Tenth Circuit adopted a five-part test used
by the Second and Third Circuits to determine whether a corporate offi-
cer may assert an individual privilege with corporate counsel." Under
this test, the corporate officer must show:
First ... they approached [counsel] for the purpose of seeking
legal advice. Second, they must demonstrate that when they ap-
proached [counsel] they made it clear that they were seeking legal
advice in their individual rather than in their representative capacities.
Third, they must demonstrate that the [lawyer] saw fit to communi-
cate with them in their individual capacities, knowing that a possible
conflict could arise. Fourth, they must prove that their conversations
with [counsel] were confidential. And, fifth, they must show that the
substance of their conversations with [counsel] did not concern mat-
ters within the company or the general affairs of the company.'"
Using this test, the Tenth Circuit held a limited privilege existed only to
those communications "in which Intervenor sought legal advice as to his
personal liability without regard to any corporate considerations. ''
The court next addressed whether the crime-fraud exception vitiated
the attorney-client privilege. "2 The court recognized that the privilege
does not apply when the client consults an attorney to further a crime or
fraud. "' The crime-fraud exception is applicable only when the party
opposing the privilege can establish a prima facie case of attorney par-
ticipation in the crime or fraud.'"0 The court found the government estab-
lished a showing of attorney involvement in the crime."5 Reviewing the

126. See id.

127. See id. at 656.
128. See id. at 658.
129. See id. at 659.
130. Id. (citing United States v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir.
1997)).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 661.
133. See id. at 660 (citing Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995)).
134. See Motley, 71 F.3d at 1551.
135. See Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 660-61. To assert the crime-fraud exception, the
opposing party has to establish a prima facie showing that attorney participation in the crime has
some factual foundation. See id. Even though the standard of proof required to make out a prima
facie showing has not been articulated by the Supreme Court, several circuits have articulated one.
See id.; cf. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563-64 n.7 (1989) (noting that the use of the phrase
"prima facie case" to describe the showing needed to defeat the privilege has caused some confu-
 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3

record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the evidence presented made a
prima facie case that the services of Mr. Doe and Ms. Roe were used in
furtherance of the crime or fraud."6 Thus, the crime-fraud exception nul-
lified the limited attorney-client privilege between Intervenor and corpo-
rate counsel.'37
2. GrandJury Proceedingsv. United States38

a. Facts
This case stems from the grand jury case just discussed. 9 In re-
sponse to the grand jury's subpoenas, the hospital agreed to produce
certain documents.' The Intervenor moved to quash the subpoenas and
bar production of particular documents based on the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine.' The district court denied the
Intervenor's motion and ordered production of the documents. 2 The
Intervenor appealed.

b. Decision
Affirming the lower court's decision, the Tenth Circuit used the five-
part test adopted by the court in GrandJury Subpoenas v. UnitedStates. 3
The court noted that the district court erred in interpreting the fifth prong

sion). cf., e.g., In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the government
satisfies its burden of proof if it offers evidence, if believed by the trier of fact, that would establish
the elements of an ongoing or imminent crime or fraud); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377,
381 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining that the court must find reasonable cause to believe that the attor-
ney was involved with fraud); United States v. Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995)
(suggesting that a party must demonstrate there is probable cause to believe some crime or fraud has
been attempted); United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing what the gov-
ernment must prove in order to trigger the crime-fraud exception); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
975 F.2d 81, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a party seeking discovery must present evidence that
would determine the elements of the crime-fraud exception had been satisfied); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (setting forth a two-prong test to determine
whether the crime-fraud exception applies to a communication between a lawyer and his client);
Koenig v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982) (defining a
"prima facie case" as evidence sufficient until "contradicted and overcome by other evidence"). The
Tenth Circuit decided it was not necessary to articulate a standard in this case because, under any of
these standards above, the government had established a prima facie showing. See Grand Jury
Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 660-61.
136. See GrandJury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 660-61.
137. See id. at 661.
138. 156 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 1998).
139. See Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d at 1039; see also discussion supra notes 116-37
and accompanying text.
140. See id. at 1040.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 1041 (citing Grand Jury Subpoenas v. United States, 144 F.3d 653, 659 (10th
Cir. 1998)); see also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
1999] EVIDENCE

of the test.'" Although the documents at issue related to corporate matters,

Intervenor was not barred from showing the application of an attorney-
client privilege.' However, the Intervenor did not satisfy the fifth prong
because he did not demonstrate that the documents at issue were primarily
limited to his individual legal rights.'" Nor was the fourth prong, confi-
dentiality, 7 satisfied, because Intervenor did not show the documents at
issue were confidential communications between himself "and the corpo-
rate attorneys acting in their capacity as his personal lawyer."'4 8
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, and held the
preponderance of documents pertained to corporate issues and had been
distributed not only to the Intervenor, but to third parties as well.' 9 The
court also held that the work product doctrine did not protect the docu-
ments" ° and that a joint-defense privilege did not apply to bar the pro-
duction of the documents.151

3. Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc."52

a. Facts
Ms. Sprague brought this lawsuit based on Title VII and the Kansas
Acts Against Discrimination, alleging sexual harassment and gender
discrimination." Ms. Sprague worked as a market analyst for Thorn
Americas, Inc. (Thorn) and in June 1992 received additional responsi-
bilities in the jewelry department under the supervision of Ed
Kowalski." Ms. Sprague left Thorn in September 1993." She informed
Thorn she would return only if Mr. Kowalski was no longer her manager
and the company upgraded her position." Thorn refused Sprague's de-
mands and deemed her terminated on November 1, 1993."5

144. See Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d at 1041. The fifth prong of the test states that the
corporate officer "must show that the substance of their conversations with [counsel] did not concern
matters within the general affairs of the company." Id.
145. See id. at 1042.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1041. The corporate officer must prove that "their conversations with [counsel]
were confidential." Id.
148, Id. at 1042.
149. See id.
150. See id The court concluded the corporate official failed to demonstrate the district court
clearly erred in fimding that the documents were not prepared in anticipation of litigation. See id.
151. See id. at 1043. The court held the Intervenor failed to establish a joint-defense privilege
because he "failed to produce any evidence ... of a joint-defense agreement with the Hospital." I.
152. 129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 1997).
153. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1359,
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1359-60.
157, See id.
 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3

Sprague filed her original complaint one month later.' The district
court denied Sprague's motion to compel production of documents and
dismissed Sprague's claim on Thorn's motion for summary judgment.'"
At issue was a memorandum prepared by in-house counsel Doug
Westerhaus. Westerhaus refused to produce the memorandum based on
his assertion of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.'"
The memorandum prepared by Westerhaus for senior management alleg-
edly addressed issues of disparate treatment of women employees at
Thorn.'' Ms. Sprague's appeal focused on the district court's denial of
her motion to compel discovery of the memorandum. 62

b. Decision
In making its decision, the Tenth Circuit stated the "discovery issue
turns on the issue of attorney-client privilege and attorney work product
privilege."'63 Since Sprague asserted both federal and state claims, con-
sideration of both federal and Kansas law was required.' In state causes
of action, the Federal Rules of Evidence direct a federal court to use state
law to determine issues regarding privileges.'63 While difficulties may
arise if the privilege applies under state law but does not under federal
law,'" the court was persuaded that the attorney-client privilege was ap-
propriate, in this instance, under both federal and state law. 6 Since the
attorney-client privilege applied, the court decided it was unnecessary to
determine whether the work product doctrine applied.'"
The affidavit of Ms. Melanie Owens supported Ms. Sprague's mo-
tion to compel discovery. 69 Ms. Owens stated that she had a conversation
with Westerhaus in which Westerhaus informed her of his concern
"about the disparate treatment of women at Thorn."'7 0 According to the

158. See id.

159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1367-68.
162. See id. at 1368.
163. Id. Discovery issues are reviewed by an abuse of discretion standard. See id. (citing Go-
mez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995)).
164. See id.
165. See id.(citing Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995)). The
pertinent part of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "in civil actions and pro-
ceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rle of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be determined in accordance with State law." FED. R. Evi. 501.
166. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1369.
167. See id. Thus, the court did not need to formulate a remedy for conflicts in attorney-client
privilege roles. See id.
168. See id. at 1372.
169. See id. Ms. Owens worked for Thorn from January 1990 until September 1995 in the
Human Resources Department. See id. at 1369.
170. Id. Westerhaus was the staff attorney at Thorn for the Human Relations Department. See
1999] EVIDENCE

affidavit, Ms. Owens contended that Westerhaus told her he distributed a

memorandum relating to the issue of disparate treatment of women at
Thorn to the Vice President and the General Counsel."' Owens stated the
division she worked in at Thorn had been responsible for compiling sta-
tistical information used by Westerhaus in support of his memorandum.'
Westerhaus commented that based on the information he received, dispa-
rate treatment of women existed at Thorn.'"
The Tenth Circuit held that the attorney-client privilege protected
the memorandum because in-house counsel prepared it for higher man-
agement and it related to the giving of legal advice.'7" The court found a
broad rule prevailed in federal courts, protecting from disclosure any
communication regarding legal advice from an attorney to his client.'"
The court was also convinced that, under Kansas's statutory language,
the broad rule would apply to protect the memorandum. 6
Ms. Sprague argued the attorney-client privilege had been waived.'"
The court rejected this argument, stating that the corporation's ability to
waive the privilege rests with the corporation's management, specifically
with officers and directors." In this case, there was no express or implied
waiver of the privilege by either the directors or officers of Thorn in re-
lation to the memorandum as required by federal law.' The court also
held that there was no waiver under Kansas's statutory law.' 8°

171. See id.

172. See id.
173. See id. at 1369-70.
174. See id. at 1370. The court noted that "[ijegal advice.., from an attorney to his client,
individual or corporate, has consistently been held by the federal cous to be within the protection of
the attorney-client privilege." Id. (quoting United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986
(3d Cir. 1980)). The court also cited a Tenth Circuit case which held that "[t]he recognition that
privilege extends to statements of a lawyer to a client is necessary to prevent the use of the lawyer's
statements as admissions of the client." Id. (quoting Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686,692-93 (10th Cir.
1968)).
175. See id. It has been noted that the attorney-client privilege has been more difficult to apply
when it is asserted in the corporate setting as opposed to when it is asserted by outside counsel. See
Beverly W. Garofalo, Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to In-House Counsel, CORP.
COUNS. November, 1998, at 1. In general, the courts will hold that the attorney-client privilege
protects corporate communications only if legal advice, and not business advice, predominates. See
id. The courts, however, have been unable to establish a bright line test to determine what constitutes
legal advice as opposed to business advice. See id
176. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1370.
177. See id. at 1371.
178. See id. (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348-49
(1985)).
179. See id.
180. See id. Under Kansas's statutory law, the waiver of the privilege is limited to instances
when the judge may determine that the corporation (through an authorized individual) has waived
the privilege in accordance with Kansas's statutes. See id No such waiver was shown satisfying
such requirements. See id.
 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3

Ms. Sprague also contended that the attorney-client privilege did not
apply due to the crime-fraud exception.' Under both Kansas's statutory
law and federal law, the attorney-client privilege does not apply when the
client contacts an attorney to perpetuate a crime or fraud." The court dis-
missed Sprague's contention, noting that she provided no evidence to indi-
cate "Westerhaus' s advice was sought to perpetuate a crime" or fraud.'"

C. Other Circuits
In In re Perrigo Co.,' ' a shareholder derivative action was brought
against officers, directors, securities underwriters and controlling share-
holders based on their actions during a public offering. The Sixth Cir-
cuit articulated the general parameters of the corporation's attorney-
client privilege as set forth in Upjohn as the appropriate statement of the
law.' In particular, the Sixth Circuit held that the corporate attorney-
client privilege may apply to any communication by a corporate em-
ployee acting within his corporate duties when he is aware that the in-
formation provided to the attorney is required to help corporate counsel
give legal advice to the corporation.' 7
One of the more recent developments of the corporate attorney-
client privilege, recognized by the Third Circuit, occurs when a corporate
employee asserts a personal privilege for communications made with
corporate counsel.' In United States v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,'" the Second Circuit adopted the Third Circuit's require-
ments, set forth in In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management
Corp., for an individual to assert a personal attorney-client privilege
between a corporate employee and a corporate attorney.'9 ' The Second
Circuit held that the five-part test" described above was not satisfied
because the individual seeking to assert the privilege had "neither sought

181. See id.

182. See id. at 1371-72; cf.Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547,1551 (10th Cir. 1995));
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 167 F.R.D. 134, 140--41 (D. Kan. 1996).
183. Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1369.
184. 128 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 1997).
185. See In re PerrigoCo., 128 F.3d at 430.
186. See id. at 437.
187. See id. (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)).
188. See Chepiga, supra note 2, at 484 (citing In re Bevill, Brester & Schulman Asset Mgmt.
Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1986)) (noting that the Second Circuit adopted the requirements,
set out in Bevill, for a corporate employee to assert the privilege after communicating with corporate
counsel).
189. 119 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
190. 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986). Note that in this case the Third Circuit held that corporate
officers could not assert individual attorney-client privilege to prevent disclosure of corporate com-
munications with corporate counsel after a corporation's privilege was waived. See In re Bevill,
Bresler& Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d at 124-25.
191. Cf Chepiga, supra note 2, at 484.
192. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
1999] EVIDENCE

nor received legal advice in his individual capacity during conversations"

with corporate counsel.'""
The Sixth Circuit, though not relying on the formulation set out in
the Second Circuit, nevertheless has required an employee to make it
clear to corporate counsel that he sought legal advice on personal matters
in order to assert a privilege over ensuing communications with corpo-
rate counsel.'" The Eighth Circuit has also recognized that an individual
corporate officer may have a personal claim or attorney-client privilege
9
with regard to communications with corporate counsel.' '
D. Analysis
In Sprague, the Tenth Circuit recognized a contradiction of treatment
of the attorney-client privilege in several cases.'" Under the narrower
approach, the corporate attorney-client privilege does not protect confi-
dential communications between an attorney and his client unless it re-
lates to legal advice pertaining to client confidences.'"' Under the broader
approach, the corporate attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure
any communication from a corporate attorney to his client in which the
communication relates to giving legal advice." The court was persuaded
by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Natta v. Hogan,'" which was repre-
sentative of the broader approach.' The Tenth Circuit followed the
broader rule-a rule which the majority of circuits follow.
Meanwhile the Tenth Circuit adopted the five-part test used by the
Second and Third Circuit. As other circuits consider the issue of whether
a corporate employee can assert an individual attorney-client privilege
with corporate counsel, it is reasonable to expect that the test used by the
Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits will be adopted.

CONCLUSION
The work product doctrine is alive and well in the Tenth Circuit.
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit in Frontier followed the
trend of other circuits in affording attorneys work product protection in
subsequent litigation. Unlike other circuits, the Tenth Circuit stopped
short of determining whether an attorney's work product is protected in
unrelated subsequent litigation. The Tenth Circuit's decision is appropri-
ate to further the goal of the work product doctrine, namely to encourage

193. InternationalBd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d at 217.

194. Cf.In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978).
195. Cf.Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
196. See Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997). For a discus-
sion of the two general approaches, see Loftis v. Arnica Mutual Ins. Co., 175 F.R.D. 5 (D.Conn.
1997).
197. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1370 (citing Loftis, 175 F.R.D. at 9-10).
198. See id. (citing In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 602 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
199. 392 F.2d 686, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1968).
200. See Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1370.
 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3

complete and thorough preparation for litigation. Due to the conflicting

standards used by circuit courts to determine the applicability of the
work product doctrine in subsequent litigation, it would be appropriate
for the Supreme Court to establish a uniform standard.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Frontieronly suggestively adopted
the Hearn test to determine whether clients waive the attorney-client
privilege when they affirmatively plead a claim or defense that puts the
privilege at issue. This decision followed the majority thinking of other
circuits. However, the discrepancies among the circuit courts when im-
plied subject matter waiver is in question does implicate the need for a
uniform standard. To allow the attorney-client privilege to achieve its
goals of open and complete communication between a client and an at-
torney, like other areas of the law, uniformity and predictability are re-
quired.
The Tenth Circuit in Grand Jury Subpoenas, further developed a
personal corporate attorney-client privilege when it adopted a five-part
test to determine whether a corporate employee may assert an individual
privilege with corporate counsel. This decision gives corporate attorney's
and corporate employee's important guidance surrounding when an indi-
vidual assertion of the attorney-client privilege exists between a corpo-
rate employee and corporate counsel. Although only the Second and
Third Circuits use the test adopted by the Tenth Circuit, the other circuits
have established similar standards regarding personal attorney-client
privilege with corporate counsel.
Finally, in Sprague, the Tenth Circuit applied a straightforward
analysis of a corporation's ability to assert the attorney-client privilege.
Following the general parameters of a corporation's attorney-client
privilege established in Upjohn, the court held a memorandum prepared
by in-house counsel for higher management and related to the giving of
legal advice was privileged. Although there is no definitive, uniform
standard the circuit courts apply to establish applicability of a corpora-
tion's attorney-client privilege, the circuits generally adhere to the
framework established by the Supreme Court in Upjohn. To assert the
privilege, the confidential communication must fall within the em-
ployee's scope of duty and must relate to corporate legal advice not oth-
erwise available from upper management."'

Kenneth L. Rothenberg*

201. Cf. Gregory J. Wallace & Jay W. Waks, Internal Investigation of Suspected Wrongdoing
by CorporateEmployees, 1057 PLI CORP. 515,524 (1998).
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Denver College of Law.