THE FORDE REPORT

CONTENTS

Foreword 3

SECTION A
Introduction 9

SECTION B
The Commissioning and Drafting of the Leaked Report 14

SECTION C
The Most Significant Allegations within the Leaked Report 23

ALLEGATION 1 – Factionalism: HQ and LOTO 27

ALLEGATION 2 – Factionalism and the Disciplinary and Complaints System 37

ALLEGATION 3 – Factionalism and Other Party Operations 53

ALLEGATION 4 – Factionalism and the 2017 General Election 62

ALLEGATION 5 – Poor Staff Management 73

ALLEGATION 6 – Discriminatory Culture 81

SECTION D
Disciplinary Processes in The Party 91

SECTION E
The Culture, Structure and Practices of The Labour Party Organisation 100

SECTION F
Recommendations 115

APPENDIX
Glossary of Terms 136
 There is no getting away from the fact that this report
A Foreword from the Chair will make for difficult reading for the membership of the
Party, and its supporters. It is not intended to be a blanket
The beginning of the process criticism of the Party’s staff members who in general
worked with great skill and resolve, often for very long
When, in late April 2020, I was approached to chair
hours, in pursuit of the Party’s key aims and objectives.
this Inquiry I immediately accepted. My hope was that I
could help the Labour Party (the Party) and its members
understand the reasons for the NEC launching our Inquiry
and the wider structural and cultural issues that precipitated We make a series of clear and firm
an extremely difficult chapter in the life of the Party. I hoped
that our report would allow for mature reflection upon those
recommendations that are needed
issues that caused the Party to be so riven by factional issues if the Party is to be an effective
and go some way to preventing a risk of any repetition of Opposition and to establish itself again
them. It was obvious from the outset that the leaking of the
report on the handling of antisemitism complaints, entitled as a genuine government-in-waiting.
‘The work of the Labour Party’s Governance and Legal Unit
in relation to antisemitism, 2014-2019 (the Leaked Report),
and its contents, was evoking strong feelings within the
membership of the Party, causing speculation in the media Our approach
and particularly social media, as to the likely source of the
leak and the motivation of the authors, leading to calls for It became obvious to me, given the number and content
legal action, and causing real confusion as to what the of the emails I received, that we needed a formal Call for
objective facts were that led to this situation. Evidence, such was the strength of feeling expressed
on the establishment of this Inquiry. I wanted to ensure
Within minutes of the NEC confirming my appointment, that Party members had a chance to provide their input,
and before I was informed by the Party, journalists were and for it to be heard. This Call for Evidence was made
texting to congratulate me. I started to receive emails from in June 2020 and remained open until August 2020. We
some of those named in the Leaked Report, and lawyers’ received more than 1,100 submissions, which ran to many
letters threatening me and other Panel members with legal thousands of pages. Further important submissions were
action if we examined data referred to in it. However, I also sent after the Call for Evidence closed, when the Equalities
started to hear from Party members, chairs and officers and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) concluded its
of Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs), and former Party investigation of complaints of antisemitism in the Party,
employees, with disturbing allegations of unacceptable and published the report1 of its findings. We believed that
treatment, much of which was factionally-motivated. it was important to consider these later submissions too,
and have continued to engage with parties interested in
We want to thank those who sent us emails and submissions, our work throughout the Inquiry. We were clear from the
including Party members, affiliates and officers of CLPs, outset about the importance of hearing a wide range of
and various of the individuals named in the Leaked Report. views from across the Party, to help provide balance. At
We also wish to thank those who provided oral evidence to the same time, though, we were not asked in our Terms of
us, with in some cases, relevant documentation, as well as Reference to resolve individual cases. In any event, this
those who kindly participated in our roundtable discussion would have been a near impossible task.
about all aspects of organisational culture.
It quickly became clear to me, and to my Panel, that
we would need a Legal Secretariat to help manage and
Some of the evidence we received collate all the material and provide assistance in the
drafting of the report – something that we had indicated
was shocking and we believe that to the Party on our appointment.
the Party’s decision to act to tackle
the issues about which we heard and
read was both right and necessary.

1
EHRC Report – Investigation into antisemitism in the Labour Party October 2020

3 | THE FORDE REPORT | A Foreword from the Chair

We initially selected a Secretariat, who provided excellent
support in the early stages of our Inquiry. For reasons beyond
their control, and ours, they had to withdraw. We were then, We were clear from the outset about
however, without a Secretariat for several months before the importance of hearing a wide range
BDB Pitmans were appointed in late 2020. Unfortunately,
there have been significant periods – around half the time the of views from across the Party, to help
Inquiry has been working – when our Secretariats could not provide balance.
support us (again for reasons beyond their and our control)
which meant the Inquiry could not be progressed. This,
coupled with the Covid 19 pandemic – and an Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) investigation (about which I culture and practices of the …Party organisation). We
say more below) – has led to further delays in providing this were determined to deliver as comprehensive a report as
report, and I apologise for the time it has taken. possible in response to our Terms of Reference without
prejudicing the ICO inquiry.
I also want to thank my Panel for their hard work and
dedication. I know that it has often been a considerable We then had to make a decision about the propriety,
challenge to balance the many and varied demands which given the ICO’s work, of continuing to consider Term
are routinely placed on them as hard-working Peers, and of Reference 2 (the background and circumstances in
the significant calls on their time as a result of this Inquiry. which the Leaked Report was commissioned, written
and circulated) and in particular “the circumstances in
which the Report was put into the public domain”. The
The Information Commissioner’s Office
instruction to review these issues effectively charged us
with identifying, if possible, the individual or individuals
The ICO investigation continues at the time of writing
who were responsible for the unauthorised circulation
and, in answer to a Freedom of Information Act request in
of the Leaked Report. Continuing that part of the Inquiry
August 2021, some six months after I first became aware of
therefore clearly had the potential to prejudice the work
that investigation, the ICO stated it would neither “confirm
of the ICO, which as I have already highlighted, has the
nor deny” whether criminal proceedings were being
power to decide if a criminal investigation is required,
contemplated or when their enquiries would conclude.
and to conduct formal interviews under caution as a
The powers of the Information Commissioner are far consequence.
wider than those available to this Inquiry. For example, in
Accordingly our report does not reach conclusions on the
appropriate circumstances persons can be prosecuted by
questions posed in Term of Reference 2. We know this
the ICO and receive a criminal sanction. The Information
will disappoint the Party membership. We are satisfied,
Commissioner also has the ability to demand disclosure of
however, that the decision we reached is the right one.
relevant documents, whereas we were entirely dependent
upon voluntary cooperation. Neither are we a statutory or
It is important to emphasise that we did undertake
judicial Inquiry with powers to summon witnesses. For that
extensive work in response to Term of Reference 2 before
reason, certain important witnesses were able to decline
we were notified of the ICO’s investigation. For example,
our invitation to meet with us and give evidence. Having
we reviewed an expert digital forensic report, which
thought very carefully about this and reflecting upon
was commissioned originally by the Party, and I spoke
my practice when similar situations have arisen, in my
personally and at length, to one of their directors. Even
opinion, as I stated when I wrote to the General Secretary
after interviewing those involved in the Leaked Report’s
and the NEC on 11 February 2021, I could not take the
compilation, all of whom freely admitted that role, we
risk of prejudicing the ICO investigation.
could not identify the source of the leak. I recognise,
however, that our enquiries were incomplete as there
Initially, we considered that it might be difficult to conclude
were further interviews we wished to carry out and further
our Inquiry as I highlighted in my letter to the NEC. We
documentation which we wished to examine.
then anxiously considered the Terms of Reference and
ultimately concluded that we would continue to work on
The ICO, however, has statutory powers that are not
Term of Reference 1 (the truth or otherwise of the main
available to me.
allegations in the Leaked Report) and 3 (the structure,

4 | THE FORDE REPORT | A Foreword from the Chair

The continued multiple threats of legal action from various Whilst it is impossible to make an accurate quantitative
parties against the Panel, individuals and the Party, have led assessment of the extent to which such attitudes and
to our consequential decision not to name individuals other behaviours exist amongst the Party membership, many
than where their role is obvious, uncontentious and in the individuals supplied evidence of discrimination and a
public domain. The existence of the ICO investigation and perceived hierarchy of protected characteristics. To be
the risk of prejudicing it have also influenced that decision. clear, the evidence received pointed to a perception that
some protected characteristics were regarded, by the
The evidence Party, more highly than others. Equally, this meant that
some were less highly regarded.
The submissions we collated and evaluated in the early
months of the Inquiry made for challenging reading. Many One recurrent theme during witness interviews was a
of those who contacted us complained of discrimination professed commitment to combatting discrimination
across the whole range of protected characteristics2 towards those with protected characteristics. There was
as well as various kinds of bullying and harassment at near universal acceptance of the need for the Party to be
a local level. So overwhelming was the response, that a ‘broad church’.
we felt compelled to consider the issue of protected
characteristics not just in the context of the relationship However, many of the individuals laying claim to these worthy
between the elected leadership and senior staff but ambitions had a very strong, even unbending, view of what
across the whole of the Party – local and national. the Party should represent, who it should represent and how
it should fight elections effectively. It was concerning to me
Depressingly, we were provided with a wealth of that many failed to examine their own actions which were
evidence (both oral and written) regarding the perceived demonstrably unlikely to achieve that aim.
widespread existence of discriminatory behaviours,
based on religion, race, gender and sexual orientation.
Although we recognise that this evidence was provided
by a self-selecting group of people, who represent a small
We found little evidence of mutual
proportion of the overall membership of the Party, it was respect and a great deal of evidence
nevertheless both shocking and disappointing.
of factionalism, so deep-rooted
The Party prides itself on being diverse and inclusive. that the Party has found itself
Clause IV of the Party Rule Book makes this clear. Its dysfunctional.
aims and values state that it wants to create a community:

“where we live together freely, in a spirit of solidarity,

tolerance and respect”.
Key themes
From the evidence we received, it is clear that, across the
Party, these aims and values are not being fully respected In conducting this Inquiry, some key themes emerged.
and lived out.
Evidential difficulties
We found little evidence of mutual respect and a great
deal of evidence of factionalism, so deep rooted that the We were, in some cases, investigating events that took place
Party has found itself dysfunctional. It has been spending six years ago. Some crucial staff members had moved on,
more time occupied by factional differences, than and we had no powers of compulsion; and others had sought
working collaboratively to demonstrate that the Party is an legal advice as well as having provided statements to two
effective Opposition, with a view to forming an effective previous inquiries3. Some appeared well rehearsed in their
Government. The result is an undermining of the Party’s answers and all stated their complete commitment to the
effectiveness and ability to participate constructively in Party’s political success. Some promised further documents,
the nation’s democratic process. Again this is a failure to which were never supplied; some were accompanied by
live up to its aims and values. Clause IV provides in terms lawyers. It was concerningly difficult to gather vital minutes
that the Party “seeks the trust of the people to govern.” of meetings and to understand the rationale for decisions.
Key documents were unavailable, others were not supplied
and details of meetings were not recorded.

2
Protected characteristics as defined by the Equality Act 2010. Age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and
maternity, race, religion or belief, sex or sexual orientation.
3
To the EHRC and to the internal Party investigation of the events we were commissioned to review.

5 | THE FORDE REPORT | A Foreword from the Chair

 I understand that politics arouses passions but amplified by
the echo of social media, respectful debate was replaced
The Whatsapp messages we have by strident, often coarse, tribal, and binary views. Subtlety
seen reveal a real antipathy towards and nuance all but disappeared. Acknowledgement that
LOTO by Labour HQ staff after Jeremy there might be valid arguments and positions on both sides,
was stifled. People gravitated towards those with similar
Corbyn won the Party leadership: and, views and became polarized, with ill-founded speculation
according to the evidence we received, translated into fact and then social media propaganda.
Emboldened by the possibilities and protections of social
that feeling was mutual. media, there was often a rush to judgement and routinely an
oversimplification of the issues. This led to debilitating inertia,
factionalism and infighting which then distracted from what
all profess to be a common cause – electoral success.

More surprisingly, and deeply worrying, there was no

proper audit trail of emails. It became apparent that I understand that politics arouses
various WhatsApp groups were formed instead to manage
Party business both within LOTO (the Leader of the Ipassions but that
understand amplified byarouses
politics the echo of
Opposition’s team) and Labour HQ (HQ) – (we are social media,
passions respectfulby
but amplified debate was of
the echo
confident, though, that we received full copies of all the replaced
social by strident,
media, often
respectful coarse,
debate was
WhatsApp messages referred to in the Leaked Report).
tribal, and binary views. Subtlety
replaced by strident, often coarse, and
As a result, it has often been difficult or impossible to
understand the rationale for key decision making and nuanceand
tribal, all binary
but disappeared.
views. Subtlety and
establish accountability. This is hardly surprising when a
senior member of LOTO staff, questioned about the nuance all but disappeared.
complete absence of data on their Party issued laptop
(which had been forensically examined), told us that they
only utilized that device to send “five or six” different
versions of the same memo to selected others, to see We, as a Panel, hope that our recommendations for
“which version leaked”. Little or no other business was cultural growth will be helpful in addressing such issues
conducted using the laptop. because for us culture represents both the source of, and
solution to, many of the problems we have identified.
Culture
Denialism
The example above of a Party laptop being used as a
weapon to identify leaks is indicative of the toxicity on The evidence clearly demonstrated that a vociferous
both sides of the relationship between LOTO and HQ. faction in the Party sees any issues regarding antisemitism
The WhatsApp messages we have seen reveal a real as exaggerated by the Right to embarrass the Left.
antipathy towards LOTO by HQ staff after Jeremy Corbyn
won the Party leadership: and, according to the evidence The authors of the Leaked Report were supportive of
we received, that feeling was mutual, with online abuse, Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, enthusiastic and fully
segregation of the staff in each of the “camps” during committed. Nevertheless, in explaining, in the Leaked
campaigns and, in one instance, a deliberate go-slow by Report, the involvement of the EHRC they stated clearly:
certain members of staff designed to frustrate the efforts
of a colleague from an “opposing faction” to promote the This report thoroughly disproves any suggestion that
Party’s wider interests. antisemitism is not a problem in the Party, or that it is all a
“smear” or a “witch hunt.”
Of course, such an atmosphere is fuelled by factional
briefing to the media and on the internet. This promotes This represented a mature acknowledgment of the problem.
more mutual fear, and at times loathing, as well as huge
insecurity. Sadly, though, some still deny the existence and
seriousness of the problem, or the need to take action to
combat it, as the Party has now begun to do.

6 | THE FORDE REPORT | A Foreword from the Chair

It was of course also true that some opponents of level. It is also imperative that any complaints involving
Jeremy Corbyn saw the issue of antisemitism as a protected characteristics, which are made at local and
means of attacking him. Thus, rather than confront the CLP level, are referred swiftly to the centrally managed
paramount need to deal with the profoundly serious issue complaints system, for professional and independent
of antisemitism in the Party, both factions treated it as a investigation.
factional weapon.
We must commend the Party for its efforts more recently
That is not to say that “taking sides” is always wrong, to achieve a greater degree of independence in its
but rather that the taking of sides should be based upon system of regulation, with notable reforms approved at
reason, and should not be motivated by blind loyalty or the Party Conference in 2021. Further improvements are
irrational and entrenched opposition to a member, or still required, however.
leader, of a perceived tribe.
Independent members working within the disciplinary
process must have expertise in regulatory law and must
be selected for expertise in regulatory and disciplinary
Rather than confront the paramount
processes - not factional allegiance. We would also like
need to deal with the profoundly to see the involvement of independent Case Examiners
serious issue of antisemitism in the to screen complaints at the beginning of the process.
To facilitate the proper audit of the disciplinary system,
Party, both factions treated it as a it should ideally have indicative sanctions guidelines,
factional weapon. process guidance for Case Examiners and the members
of any panel charged with considering complaints, and
clear time limits at all relevant stages.

Disciplinary process Whilst we recognise and applaud many aspects of the

Party’s recent reforms of disciplinary procedures, we
We found a disciplinary process not fit for purpose during do have concerns that there appear to be no published
the period we investigated and therefore one that was procedures governing the use of administrative
potentially prone to factional interference. For example, there suspensions and that these appear to be operating
was a complete lack of any auditable database of cases, without clear criteria for their use being widely available.
which meant the Party could not, at any given moment, We are also concerned that the provisions which allow for
collate accurate information on the number of complaints individuals to have membership removed or denied on
which were then pending, or which had been disposed of, the grounds they have committed prohibited acts could
and the stage that the live matters had reached. Further, be exploited for factional purposes.
resourcing became completely inadequate to deal with the
dramatic increase in membership that the Party enjoyed. Data about the nature and outcomes of complaints,
and the speed of disposal of those cases, should also
The ever-greater use of social media, and the be published annually. If algorithms are to be used to
phenomenon of internet publications, caused an search for historical social media posts, they must be
explosion in complaints. At local level there seems to have professionally devised and data protection compliant.
been a lack of independence, training and transparency.
It is imperative that the Party ensures CLPs have officers We make a number of core recommendations that we
with the necessary skills and expertise to investigate and believe must be implemented, in addition to those already
determine in an impartial way, complaints made at local implemented by the Party. There are others which we
include for consideration, depending on the nature of the
case and the available resources.

We found a disciplinary process not

fit for purpose during the period we
investigated and therefore one that
was potentially prone to factional
interference.

7 | THE FORDE REPORT | A Foreword from the Chair

Next steps

The commissioning of this report is something for which There is a culture of intellectual
the Party is to be commended. It was always going to smugness which exists at the extremes
make for painful reading. Such reforms as have been
made to the disciplinary system are generally steps in of the political spectrum the Party
the right direction but more needs to be done to ensure represents. In the past this has led to
transparency, fairness and removal of factional abuse.
the dismissal of valid, albeit sometimes
We realise that some will complain about the outcome uncomfortable, views. It must now
of this Inquiry, but I would urge them to reflect and ask
come to an end.
themselves whether their reaction is merely a reflection
of their entrenched political position. Constructive
engagement with, and dialogue about, our findings will
be a key determinator of the Party’s future success. There
is a culture of intellectual smugness which exists at the
Finally, I would like to thank, once again, our two
extremes of the political spectrum the Party represents.
excellent Secretariats, Fieldfisher and BDB Pitmans, for
In the past this has led to the dismissal of valid, albeit
their dedication, expertise and unstinting support often
sometimes uncomfortable, views. It must now come to
provided at weekends and at unsocial hours, as well as
an end.
my fellow Panel members, Baroness Lister, Baroness
Wilcox and Lord Whitty for their invaluable input, their
expertise and their real-world political experience.

We must commend the Party for its

efforts more recently to achieve a greater
degree of independence in its system
of regulation, with notable reforms
approved at the Party Conference in
2021. Further improvements are still
required, however.

The Party’s leaders have consistently recognized that

the Party is a broad church or it is nothing. Consecutive
leaders have used the image of a broad church, often In the 21st Century a broad church
as a way of bringing together Left and Right. In the
21st Century, however, in my view, a broad church also
requires the Party to embrace, celebrate,
requires the Party to embrace, celebrate, encourage and encourage and enrich the lives of those
enrich the lives of those with protected characteristics,
with protected characteristics.
and to do so with equal determination and commitment
no matter what the nature of the protected characteristic
in question.

The Party has made considerable progress in addressing

some of the problems we identify in this report, but its
leaders, officers and members still have much to do
in returning to the Party’s founding and foundational
principles, so as to once again offer the country a viable
political alternative.

8 | THE FORDE REPORT | A Foreword from the Chair

A
SECTION A
Section A:
Introduction

A1 Background and establishment A1.4 Running to 860 pages, the Leaked Report
was unequivocal in alleging failings, factional
of the Inquiry
battles and conflicts of interest within the Party’s
A1.1 The Inquiry was established on 1 May 2020 by Governance and Legal Unit (GLU), including
the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the allegations that some Party staff worked
Party to investigate the contents of the Leaked against Jeremy Corbyn’s efforts to win the
Report and its subsequent unsanctioned release 2017 general election. Most controversially, the
to the media in April 2020. authors reproduced the transcripts of WhatsApp
messages which revealed shocking and wholly
A1.2 The Leaked Report was originally intended to inappropriate attitudes amongst very senior
be an annex to the Party’s proposed submission officials. The inclusion of these messages in
to the EHRC. The EHRC had first contacted the unredacted form undoubtedly gave the Leaked
Party following receipt of a number of complaints Report its sensational quality.
about antisemitism within the organisation. The
Party responded and, having considered that A1.5 On 9 April 2020 the Party was informed by a Sky
response carefully, the EHRC opened a formal News correspondent that he had obtained a
investigation in May 2019, using its powers under copy of the Leaked Report. It was subsequently
the Equality Act 2006. published by Sky on 12 April 2020. An earlier
version of the Leaked Report also began
A1.3 Although it started its life as an analysis of the circulating on social media platforms.
handling of specific antisemitism cases, the
Leaked Report quickly morphed into a wide-
ranging critique of the factional attitude of senior
professional Party staff in HQ to the Jeremy
Whilst the motivations behind the
Corbyn leadership and to the Left faction that
supported Jeremy Corbyn. unauthorised leak remain the subject of
much dispute, it is widely acknowledged
that the Leaked Report’s release into
the public domain caused significant
damage to the Party and laid bare
allegations of serious problems with its
structure, culture and practices.

10 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section A

A2 The Panel A4 Timeline

A2.1 Following the appointment of Martin Forde QC A4.1 The initial appointment of the Panel envisaged
as Chair, the Party appointed Baroness Lister of a six-week investigation with a focus on the
Burtersett, Baroness Wilcox of Newport and Lord following issues: (i) the truth of the allegations
Whitty to the Panel. within the Leaked Report; (ii) the circumstances
surrounding its commission, creation and
A3 The Scope of the Inquiry subsequent leaking; and (iii) the structure, culture
and practices within the Party (so far as the Panel
A3.1 The Inquiry’s Terms of Reference were as follows: consider relevant to the investigation). In order to
explore the questions posed to the Inquiry, the
“The Panel shall investigate and report on: Panel called for first-hand evidence from Party
members, staff and other interested parties.
The truth or otherwise of the main allegations The request was met with an overwhelming
response from the membership who provided
in the Report (the Panel shall determine
compelling testimony detailing their experiences
which are the most significant allegations of antisemitism (along with other forms of racism,
which require investigation but they shall sexism, homophobia and ‘denialism’) within
include the extent of racist, sexist and other the Party. The Panel received more than 1,100
discriminatory culture within Labour Party submissions. At that point it became clear that
workplaces, the attitudes and conduct of the the proposed timeframe would not be sufficient
to properly consider the evidence.
senior staff of the Labour Party, and their
relationships with the elected leadership of A4.2 Fieldfisher were initially appointed as the
the Labour Party); Secretariat to the Inquiry. However, with the
agreement of the Party, they ceased to act in that
The background and circumstances in which capacity and were replaced by BDB Pitmans in
the Report was commissioned, written and October 2020. At this time, it was suggested that
circulated within the Labour Party, with its the deadline for the Panel to report should be
extended to the end of 2020.
advisers and any other individuals external
to the Labour Party, including the question A4.3 Unfortunately, the task of securing access for
of the purpose for which the Report was the new Secretariat to the Inquiry’s document
commissioned and prepared, and the management system proved to be more
circumstances in which the Report was put complicated than was initially envisaged, and the
deadline for the Panel’s report was necessarily
into the public domain; and
extended again.

The structure, culture and practices of the

Labour Party organisation including the
relationship between senior party staff and
the elected leadership of the Labour Party,
as the Panel think appropriate having regard
to their investigation as a whole.

And the Panel shall make such

recommendations as it considers appropriate
concerning the organisation and structures
of the Labour Party, arising out of its
investigation, recognising that Labour Party
structures are covered in rule.”

11 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section A

A4.4 Thereafter, the Panel’s work was placed on A4.6 In contrast to the widespread response from the
pause during most of the period between membership, some key figures within the Party
February and July 2021, due to reasons that were notably silent. It is important to state that
were entirely out of the Panel’s control. These this investigation is not a Statutory Inquiry, and,
factors have contributed to the length of time that therefore, does not have the power to compel
it has taken for the Panel to report its findings. witness testimony or the production of documents
We would like to make clear at the outset that that would be available to an Inquiry established
any speculation that delays in our reporting under the Inquiries Act 2005. Regrettably, certain
resulted from pressures exerted by the Party – in prominent members of the Party (including those
an attempt either to influence our findings or to central to the factual matrix) either declined to
supress them altogether – is entirely unfounded. meet with the Panel or failed to respond to our
However we were inhibited in our work by the requests for evidence. Most notably, while he
ever present threats of litigation by lawyers acting was a signatory to a joint written submission,
on the part of different elements of the Party, and Jeremy Corbyn did not engage in our requests
different individuals. That has not changed our to interview him. Other senior figures provided
conclusions but, for example, we have, as far initial witness statements but thereafter denied us
as possible, not ascribed particular actions or the opportunity to explore their evidence through
comments to individuals largely because of the oral questioning. We were able to interview 14
regrettable tendency to invoke legal action. members of Party staff and former Party staff,
7 of which were past or present LOTO staff
A4.5 We are grateful to Party members and other and 7 of which were past or present HQ staff.
interested parties who responded to the Call Whilst we are grateful to these interviewees
for Evidence and provided submissions. The for their participation (and, for the most part,
evidence included submissions received some their candour) the failure of others to engage
time after the period specified in the Call for inevitably resulted in the Panel being presented
Evidence had closed, but were nonetheless with a partial picture of events.
considered by the Panel. Although much of this
testimony dealt with issues not strictly defined A4.7 Another issue we faced was the apparent lack
within the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference, it gave of contemporaneous documents such as emails,
a valuable insight into the impact of broader notes and minutes of meetings from the period
structural issues on the creation of political being examined. It was manifestly challenging
identities and discriminatory behaviour within the to reconstruct events from several years prior
Party. For this reason, some of our analysis strays without the benefit of a proper audit trail, and it is
into areas that, whilst seemingly outside the strict certainly the case that we were unduly reliant upon
scope of the Terms of Reference, we nonetheless individual recollections which were potentially self-
consider to be relevant to the Inquiry. serving, having been refined over time. Moreover,
our investigation was hampered by the apparent
failure of the Party to have kept adequate records
of disciplinary proceedings at key periods. Such
an absence of contemporaneous records seemed
to the Panel to be not only unfathomable but
completely unacceptable for an organisation of
the Party’s size.

12 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section A

A4.8 An important issue to emerge from the testimony oppositional camps, and it is on occasion helpful
received by the Inquiry was the extent to which to use those labels, oversimplifications though
factional infighting within the Party distorted the they are.
perceptions and subsequent actions of Party
staff and members. This theme was expressed A4.10 What is clear from the evidence heard by the
time and again; the despair articulated by Panel is that factionalism within the Party has
members over the distraction that factional seen it fail its supporters and undermine the
infighting has caused, and continues to cause, Party’s contribution to the UK’s democratic
was palpable. The Panel has explored this issue process.
in detail given the number of times it was raised
in the evidence received. Equally troubling was A4.11 In addition to considering the themes arising
the frequent evidence of ‘denialism’ in relation out of the submissions received and evidence
to the seriousness of problems of antisemitism given to us, we have reviewed the report by
(not, for the avoidance of doubt, the complete Baroness Jan Royall entitled Allegations of Anti-
denial that antisemitism was an issue in the Semitism Oxford University Labour Club, May
Party whatsoever). This was principally amongst 2016 (the Royall Report), the Shami Chakrabati
some of Jeremy Corbyn’s supporters in relation Report, June 2016 (the Chakrabati Report), the
to antisemitism but was also evident more widely report of Lord Kerslake, entitled Independent
across all factions of the Party in relation to issues Organisational Review of the Labour Party:
of race and gender. Some anti-Corbyn elements Becoming a Well Run and Winning Organisation,
of the Party seized on antisemitism as a way to October 2020 (the Kerslake Review), Labour
attack Jeremy Corbyn, and his supporters saw Together’s 2019 Election Review (the Labour
it simply as an attack on the leader and his Together Report), and the action plan agreed
faction – with both ‘sides’ thus weaponizing the between the Party and the EHRC. Whilst we do
issue and failing to recognise the seriousness of not necessarily endorse all of the conclusions
antisemitism, its effect on Jewish communities and recommendations of these reports, they
and on the moral and political standing of the all do provide relevant insights that inform our
Party. conclusions and recommendations.

A4.12 This report is divided into sections, each dealing

with separate aspects of the Inquiry, as follows:
What is clear from the evidence heard
by the Panel is that factionalism • Section B deals with the commissioning and
drafting of the Leaked Report;
within the Party has seen it fail the
electorate and has undermined the • Section C deals with the six most significant
allegations in the Leaked Report;
UK’s democratic process.
• Section D deals with the disciplinary processes
in the Party;

A4.9 We occasionally refer to the “Left” faction of • Section E deals with the structure, culture and
the Party (which, during this period, coalesced practices of the Party; and
around Jeremy Corbyn) and the “Right” faction
(which included a substantial number of senior • Section F deals with recommendations.
staff in HQ, as well as a substantial number of
the politicians in the Parliamentary Labour Party  
(PLP)). Needless to say the “Left” and “Right”
labels are reductive; neither faction is a monolith
and the Party in reality has always contained a
complex spectrum of political beliefs. Our focus,
however, is on the extent to which HQ and
LOTO did, at least in this period, settle into two

13 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section A

B
SECTION B
14 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C
 Section B:
The Commissioning and
Drafting of the Leaked Report

The Leaked Report’s relatively young and

Summary and Conclusions inexperienced authors were left to compile the Leaked
Report with seemingly very little supervision from
The EHRC opened an investigation into the Party in
more senior staff. We received conflicting evidence
relation to antisemitism in May 2019. The Leaked
about the extent of any training or advice given to
Report started life as a dossier of material relating to
them about the data protection concerns to which this
the specific cases in which the EHRC had expressed
work gave rise. It is surprising, though, that neither
an interest, retrieved through searches of the Party’s
the authors or their managers appear to have been
computer systems.
alive to those concerns, or to have thought about the
The objective of the staff members who drafted need to seek guidance, for example from the ICO.
the report, which was shared by the senior staff
The final draft, of some 460 pages, was circulated to
overseeing their work, was to counter what appeared
senior staff too late to be comprehensively reviewed
to be a growing acceptance of the idea that delays
in advance of the EHRC deadline. On 22 March 2020,
in progressing antisemitism cases under Jeremy
the eve of the deadline, the Party’s external legal team
Corbyn’s leadership had been caused by interference
advised against submitting the Leaked Report to the
from Jeremy Corbyn himself, and his staff.
EHRC, and that advice was accepted.
The authors of the Leaked Report believed that the
Following that decision, senior staff authorised the
issues were in fact caused primarily by failings in the
authors to continue working on the Leaked Report
GLU, in particular a focus amongst senior staff on
so that it could be used for internal purposes. On
factional battles at the expense of disciplinary work.
29 March 2020, a penultimate 851-page version and
A tranche of WhatsApp messages from senior HQ then a final 860-page version were prepared.
staff, which the authors of the Leaked Report saw
On 12 April 2020, Sky News published an article about
as supporting that thesis, were discovered on Party
the Leaked Report, together with the 860-page version.
systems relatively late in the process; some of the
At around the same time, the 851-page version began
messages were incorporated into the Leaked Report,
circulating on social media. Following the appearance
transforming it into something rather more striking.
of the Leaked Report in the public domain, the
In our view the Leaked Report’s authors were Party quite properly alerted the ICO. The ICO then
not seeking to play down or obscure the scale of commenced its own investigations, which are ongoing.
antisemitism. The Leaked Report expressly rejects, on
The Party has carried out extensive internal
page 1 of the Executive Summary, the suggestion that
investigations into the unauthorised release of the
the problem of antisemitism in the Party was overstated
Leaked Report. Given the limited powers available to
and/or that allegations of antisemitism were all part of
us, and the fact that our investigation in this regard was
a smear campaign against the leadership, and indeed
cut short for reasons we have already explained, we
there is nothing in the Leaked Report (or elsewhere in
were unable to identify the person(s) concerned. This
the evidence we have seen) that would support such
was not, however, because of any interference by the
conclusions.
Party or others.

15 15
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| Section
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B C
B1 Scope B2 Our approach

B1.1 The second of the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference B2.1 The Party has itself carried out extensive
asks us to investigate and report on: investigations into the circumstances in which
the Leaked Report entered the public domain,
“The background and circumstances in which most significantly a digital forensic analysis, and
the [Leaked] Report was commissioned, an HR investigation report.
written and circulated within the Labour Party,
B2.2 We have endeavoured to avoid duplicating that
with its advisers and any other individuals investigative work and have had to defer to their
external to the Labour Party, including the expertise (e.g. the ability of the digital forensics
question of the purpose for which the Report experts to identify versions of the Leaked Report
was commissioned and prepared, and the on the dark web). Further, we are satisfied that
circumstances in which the Report was put both investigations were independent, and they
informed (a) the Party’s response to the ICO
into the public domain.”
regarding the leak (which we have also seen),
(b) disciplinary proceedings in relation to seven
B1.2 Our intention originally therefore was to deal with
members of staff, and (c) a review of the Party’s
the immediate questions to which the release of
internal data governance arrangements.
the Leaked Report into the public domain gave
rise: firstly, who commissioned and drafted it,
B2.3 The scope and purpose of our work was, however,
and for what purpose; and secondly, who leaked
different to that of the Party’s investigations; and
it, why, and how?
we have not considered ourselves bound by
them.
B1.3 Clearly, the answers to those questions are
important, both to the individuals named in
B2.2 In addition to the investigations mentioned above,
the Leaked Report and to the Party. They are,
we have received written and/or oral evidence
however, preliminary to the key focus of this
from the majority of the key individuals involved
Inquiry – namely, whether the main allegations
in the production of the Leaked Report as well as
within the Leaked Report were true and the extent
a substantial amount of underlying documentary
to which the fact of its being leaked reflected a
evidence, and have analysed it in the round.
deeper cultural malaise, and what steps might
However, the limited scope of our powers, and
be taken to remedy the issues we found. Those
the fact that our investigation of this issue had to
matters are addressed in subsequent sections.
be curtailed, meant that it was not possible for
us to identify the individual source of the leak or
B1.4 The Panel therefore considers that the only
leaks, nor to say how many hands the Leaked
aspects of the second of the Inquiry’s Terms of
Report passed through before entering the public
Reference on which it can report are:
domain. We had been promised documents from
various of those whom we interviewed, including
• the background and circumstances in which
the witness statements that they provided to the
the Leaked Report was commissioned and
EHRC in connection with its investigation, but
written; and
ceased all communications on this issue when
• the purpose for which the Leaked Report was we were notified of the ICO investigation.
commissioned and prepared.

16 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section B

B2.3 Below we set out a chronology of events with B3 Chronology of events
regard to the commissioning, and drafting of
the Leaked Report. Where matters are stated as B3.1 May – December 2019: the initial stages of the
fact, we consider that there is sufficient evidence EHRC investigation
to allow us to treat them as such, and where a
document is quoted we have seen it. Where there • On 28 May 2019 the EHRC launched
is a conflict of evidence in relation to a specific an investigation, under section 20 of the
issue and/or we are reporting something that we Equality Act 2006, into whether the Party had
have been told but in relation to which we have committed breaches of its duties under the
not seen documentary proof, that is indicated. Equality Act 2010 in relation to antisemitism.
The Party committed to full cooperation with
B2.4 We use the defined term “the Leaked Report” the EHRC, which issued the Party with a series
to refer to the Leaked Report in all stages of its of Requests for Further Information (RFIs).
evolution. That is, some references to “the Leaked
Report” are to the dossier of material collated in • Prior to the launch of the investigation,
the early stages of the Party’s work on the EHRC meetings took place between the Party and
response, while others are to the various final or the EHRC, including a meeting around March
near-final incarnations of the document. We aim 2019 attended by the General Secretary, the
to make it clear from the context which iteration Executive Director of Legal Affairs, and the
of the Leaked Report is referred to on each Party’s Data Protection Officer to discuss the
occasion. data protection strategy and the lawful basis
on which the Party could process data relating
to specific disciplinary complaints.

• A team in the Party’s GLU commenced work

on the Party’s EHRC response in May 2019,
overseen internally by the Executive Director
of Legal Affairs and then from July 2019, by
the Acting Director of GLU, in both cases
reporting to the General Secretary.

• The EHRC’s initial RFIs concerned the Party’s

policies and procedures, and were primarily
addressed through a witness statement from
the General Secretary. Subsequent RFIs
related to specific disciplinary cases; the
EHRC initially requested information pertaining
to 38 cases, which ultimately rose to 58, and
the Party offered information on an additional
12. In July 2019 the Party commenced a
substantial data gathering exercise in relation
to the case-specific RFIs.

17 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section B

 • There was at that point no single location on • By September 2019 information had been
the Party’s computer system where documents uncovered via the searches which was
relating to specific disciplinary cases, including perceived to be cohering into a narrative
those relating to antisemitism, were saved; to relevant to the EHRC’s broader questions about
capture all of the material relevant to a case, the Party’s disciplinary processes – namely that
the team agreed that searches of the system delays in progressing cases were caused by
would be required. The intention was to compile serious deficiencies in GLU rather than LOTO
chronologies setting out what had happened interventions. At around this time, those initial
(and what had gone wrong) in each of the cases. findings were presented to more senior staff
It was understood by the Party’s data protection and external counsel who were advising in
team that appropriate consideration had been relation to the Party’s EHRC response.
given to the lawful basis for the processing of
data that would inevitably be involved before the • The junior staff involved continued piecing
search was conducted. together that broader narrative by conducting
more general searches, alongside a
• The early searches returned insufficient compilation of case-specific chronologies.
results (due to an inconsistent approach to
saving documents by the GLU staff who had • By 25 September 2019, these findings had been
worked on the cases, coupled with a lack of written up into a skeleton narrative document of
institutional knowledge about specific cases some 6,000 words, titled “EHRC Narrative.”
as a result of staff turnover). A more powerful
search tool - used by the Party for responding • In October 2019, Prime Minister Boris Johnson
to subject access requests (the SAR tool) – was called a general election to be held on 12
utilised. The SAR tool allowed searches of the December 2019, and the Party shifted its
emails of all Party staff (held on Party devices) focus to campaigning.
as well as documents saved on Party drives.
Whilst the junior staff involved in conducting B3.2 January – February 2020
the searches had received generalised data
protection training, it does not appear that • In January 2020, work on the EHRC response
the relevant lawful basis/bases for processing resumed in earnest, and the EHRC agreed a
personal data, or the limitations which that deadline of 24 February 2020 for the Party’s
might place on the scope of the searches, was final submission. The submission to the EHRC
specifically brought to their attention. by the Jewish Labour Movement (JLM) had,
in the meantime, been published in redacted
• It is not clear that the correct procedure form. It was overwhelmingly critical of the
governing the authorisation of the use of the Party’s approach to antisemitism cases, in
SAR tool – which would have involved the particular LOTO’s alleged interference
human resources department – was followed. in them, echoing some of the allegations
The staff involved seem to have believed that made by former GLU staff in the July 2019
sufficient authorisation had been given for the Panorama programme “Is Labour Anti-
use of the SAR tool. Semitic?”. We were told by one witness that
the JLM submission was considered by the
• In relation to each case, the team carried team working on the Party’s EHRC response
out searches against the case number and to have shed additional light on the EHRC’s
respondent name, as well as the names of potential areas of focus/criticism, as did some
complainants and the key staff involved, in an of the later RFIs.
attempt to ensure that everything relevant was
captured. They reported their findings back to
more senior Party staff as they went along.

18 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section B

 • In late January 2020, a document described • O
 n 27 January 2020, the General Secretary
as a “comms plan” was produced; we were and the Acting Head of GLU held a conference
told that it was a written note of a telephone with the counsel team instructed by the Party to
conversation between a junior member of staff advise on the EHRC response; it was agreed
and the Executive Director for Strategy and that the Party should address the outstanding
Communications which was subsequently RFIs through a further witness statement,
circulated to the Acting Head of GLU and the the draft of which was to be prepared by the
General Secretary. The note explained that a legal team, which would either incorporate or
document was being produced for submission append the evidence being collated by junior
to the EHRC, adding that “the former staff who staff. On 30 January 2020, the counsel team
were interviewed by Panorama have made a reviewed a copy of the narrative document
submission to the EHRC, so this document is a and agreed it was helpful. The Acting Head of
very necessary and evidence-based rebuttal the GLU recalls seeing the EHRC Narrative at
to their claims”. It proposed that the document around this time too. It appears that this was
should be submitted to the EHRC and the the point at which the material started to come
NEC at the same time. together into a separate “report”.

• On 6 February 2020, concerns were raised B3.3 February – March 2020: the Leaked Report
with the General Secretary and other senior takes shape
staff about a potential disconnect between
the approach being taken by counsel and the • O
 n 4 February 2020 the EHRC agreed to extend
work being done on the narrative document; the Party’s deadline for its final submission from
it was noted by one staff member that “there 24 February 2020 to 2 March 2020.
appears to be a number of separate strands
of work happening which currently feel like • O
 n 7 February 2020 the counsel team
they will not tie together very easily.” The staff expressed concern regarding the length of
member noted that a comms plan had been the narrative document being prepared, which
produced which framed the EHRC response they considered might jeopardise compliance
as a public facing document, adding that this with the impending deadline. Clearly there
could provide an opportunity to reveal to the was a disconnect between the approach
public the “truth” about antisemitism in the being taken by the internal team and that of
Party and the willingness of those on the Left the external legal team, and this seems to
to deal with it. It was agreed by senior staff have been a missed opportunity to nail down
that “a wider narrative/account and comms the scope of the work in detail.
response is clearly necessary.”
• L
 OTO’s Chief of Staff stepped in to oversee
• W
 hat the comms plan shows is that those delivery of the EHRC response from mid-
involved in the preparation of the Leaked February, albeit she said her focus was on (a)
Report saw it from the outset as an opportunity overall compliance with deadlines, and (b) her
to influence the narrative around the individual submission as a named respondent
EHRC process. That is supported by other to the EHRC’s investigation, rather than on
documentary evidence, and has not been the main Party response. A WhatsApp group
disputed by the witnesses we have spoken was set up for the core EHRC team (the EHRC
to. However, as above, our finding here is a WhatsApp group), which included a number
relatively limited one: we do not consider that of senior LOTO staff.
the April 2020 leak/s and associated data
breach were, or could have been, planned as • W
 e were told that a meeting about the EHRC
at January 2020. response was held on 14 February 2020 at
Unite’s offices. It was proposed at that meeting
that a press conference could be held once
the Party’s response had been submitted to
the EHRC, in order to explain its submissions
in a public forum.

19 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section B

 • O
 n around 18 February 2020, the Acting Head for Party staff to use Unite’s offices as, in effect,
of GLU was removed from his role as instructing overspill space, usually during general elections.
solicitor in relation to the Party’s EHRC response. Shortly thereafter all staff began working from
On 25 February 2020, the Party appointed an home due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
external firm to act as counsel’s instructing
solicitors, and the Head of Complaints became • We found no evidence that the various
the Party’s internal lead. It appears that the Acting iterations of the Leaked Report or other
Head of GLU may not have appreciated at this material were transferred to or saved on Unite
point that he was effectively being removed from systems during this period. However, much
all work relating to the EHRC response. of the drafting took place using the cloud
platform Google Docs. We understand that
B3.4 February – April 2020: finalising the Leaked this was and is against Party policy, but was
Report and incorporating the SMT WhatsApp apparently relatively common amongst staff.
transcripts The implications of this are discussed below.

• The Leaked Report’s relatively young and • On around 14 March 2020, one of the junior
inexperienced authors were left to compile staff members assisting with the Leaked
the Leaked Report with seemingly very little Report uncovered the SMT WhatsApp
supervision from more senior staff. After, in transcripts. One of the group’s members had
particular, the removal of the Acting Head of GLU requested the transcripts from WhatsApp in
as lead on the EHRC response, there was a lack 2017, when they had been backing up their
of clarity as to who was overseeing the work at a correspondence as “due diligence” prior to
senior level and no clear reporting lines. leaving the Party’s employment; they had had
WhatsApp send the transcripts to their Party
rather than personal email address in error.
The Leaked Report’s relatively young The transcripts accordingly entered Party
and inexperienced authors were left systems and became discoverable through
searches using the SAR tool.
to compile the Leaked Report with
seemingly little supervision from more • The Leaked Report’s authors considered
that the SMT WhatsApp transcripts, like the
senior staff.
instant messages, were further evidence in
support of the narrative emerging from the
Leaked Report – namely that delays in dealing
• In mid-to-late February, the searches began with antisemitism cases in the period being
to draw in extracts from the Party’s internal investigated by the EHRC were caused not
messaging system (the instant messages) by LOTO, but by failings amongst GLU staff
which revealed substantial opposition to LOTO to progress those cases effectively because
from a number of HQ staff. One view of these (a) they were distracted from that work by
messages was that they went some way to factional battles, and (b) they were in some
explaining the delays and dysfunctions in the cases incentivised to encourage delays which
disciplinary system which had been uncovered. would be blamed on LOTO.

• On 2 March 2020 the EHRC agreed to extend its • A separate document was compiled which
deadline to 18 March 2020. We understand that set out the key extracts from the transcripts.
further meetings about the EHRC response were A shorter version was also prepared which
held on 5 and 10 March 2020. From 6 to 17 March highlighted the extracts by theme. Six of the
2020, a team of junior staff members worked highlighted themes in the latter document
together on the Leaked Report. They did so at related to misbehaviour by HQ staff (for example
Unite’s offices, because they were concerned “not wanting us to win elections” or “abuse
about working on such a sensitive document of other staff members”), while the seventh
in the crowded and leak-prone environment of covered “anything potentially damaging for
Southside, the Party’s HQ. We have heard from LOTO/left”. The extracts were incorporated into
multiple witnesses that it was relatively common the then current version of the Leaked Report

20 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section B

 to support the chapters in relation to certain developed there appears to have been a
disciplinary cases, as well as to pad out the degree of confirmation bias in the approach
sections about the LOTO/HQ dynamic. the authors took to the evidence. Extracts from
the internal messages and the SMT WhatsApp
• The apparently fortuitous discovery of the SMT transcripts were chosen because they
WhatsApp transcripts and their incorporation supported that narrative, and the individuals
into the Leaked Report transformed a involved were not given a right of reply; the
document that had been drafted carefully – version/s of the Leaked Report released
albeit repetitively and arguably with a clear without authorisation to the public domain was
factional bias – into a far more sensational accordingly heavily one-sided.
document. Once it contained extracts from
the messages – which detailed inappropriate B3.5 14 – 22 March 2020: decision not to provide
attitudes amongst very senior staff and the Leaked Report to the EHRC
possibly the misallocation of resources on
a factional basis during the 2017 general • Between 14 and 18 March 2020, the Head
election – its nature changed and its potential of Complaints sent various draft chapters of
interest to the media increased. the Leaked Report to the General Secretary
and the external legal team, possibly using
• For the avoidance of doubt, it is our view that the Dropbox; some sections were also shared
junior members of staff involved in the production in the EHRC WhatsApp group. This was the
of the Leaked Report sincerely considered this first time any of the wider team had seen
narrative to be true, and to a degree we agree draft sections of the Leaked Report. Both the
with them (as discussed later in this report). General Secretary and the Head of Complaints
Our view is that they recognised the severity of told us that they had not until this point realised
the problem of antisemitism in the Party (and in that the team’s work had resulted in a “report”
wider society) and were not trying to obscure as such, and that they were shocked by the
or excuse it. The Leaked Report expressly document’s length. In our view this speaks to
rejects any suggestion that the problem of the lack of structured supervision in place.
antisemitism in the Party was exaggerated; its
introduction states that it “thoroughly disproves • On 16 March 2020, the Acting Head of GLU
any suggestion that antisemitism is not a emailed the General Secretary to complain
problem in the Party or that it is all a “smear” or that he was not being provided with completed
a “witch-hunt”.” One of the authors emphasised sections of the Leaked Report or any drafts.
to us that some of the subsequent discussions
of the Leaked Report had “completely misused • On 19 March 2020 the legal team, having
[it] to say that antisemitism wasn’t an issue or reviewed the draft chapters, questioned whether
that it was just right wing staff members that the Leaked Report should be provided to the
held up some complaints to defame Corbyn or EHRC; the General Secretary remained keen to
something like that”. Indeed there is nothing in submit it if possible, saying that “the evidence
the Leaked Report (or elsewhere in the evidence that has been put together is in my view crucial
we have seen) to support the conclusion in demonstrating that the basis of the allegations
that the problem of antisemitism in the Party is a motivation to attack the political leadership
was overstated. of the party and the left in general.”

• In our view the Leaked Report’s primary author

was not firmly embedded in either “faction”,
and was far from unequivocally supportive There is nothing in the Leaked Report
of Jeremy Corbyn despite being on the Left (or elsewhere in the evidence we have
of the Party. We do not consider that any of
the Leaked Report’s authors embarked on the
seen) to support the conclusion that the
task with a preconceived narrative or reverse problem of antisemitism in the Party
engineered the evidence to fit it. There may
was overstated.
not have been a fully developed preconceived
narrative but we accept that as the narrative

21 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section B

 • The EHRC agreed to extend the deadline to have additional time to finalise it, and content
20 March 2020, and then again to 23 March that it would continue to serve a useful internal
2020. Work on the Leaked Report continued, purpose. The Leaked Report grew substantially
by all accounts at an urgent pace. The Head over the following days as work on it continued.
of Complaints circulated the first complete
draft (some 460 pages long) to the General B3.7 1 – 6 April 2020: production of summaries of
Secretary and the legal team on 21 March 2020 the Leaked Report
by email. The General Secretary responded
later that evening with comments on around • During this period summaries of the Leaked
a quarter of the Leaked Report, suggesting Report were produced which set out extracts
the removal of some criticisms of the Acting from the SMT WhatsApp transcripts, together
Head of GLU and of some sections which with commentary.
she considered to be unduly negative about
ongoing failings in the Party’s disciplinary • We were told that at least one of these
operations after her appointment as General summary documents was intended for use in
Secretary. The Head of Complaints agreed to relation to potential disciplinary proceedings
incorporate those changes into a further draft. in respect of some of the authors of the
WhatsApp messages. They could equally
• On 22 March 2020, however, the legal team have been intended for use as a media
advised emphatically that the Leaked Report briefing document.
should not be submitted to the EHRC. The
General Secretary accepted that advice and • Two further documents were created which
relayed it to the Head of Complaints who set out “packages” in relation to the Leaked
conveyed it to other members of staff working Report, summarising key points and proposed
on the Leaked Report. On 23 March 2020, the “hooks”. These packages included: (1)
General Secretary’s witness statement was evidence that LOTO’s office had sought
submitted to the EHRC without the Leaked to progress antisemitism cases while GLU
Report appended. staff had caused delays, and (2) evidence
of factionalism in the Party’s HQ, including
B3.6 23 – 29 March 2020: work on the Leaked Report extracts from the WhatsApp messages.
continues
• We received directly contradictory witness
• The General Secretary asked the team evidence about how these documents came
to continue work on the Leaked Report to be produced or what they were to be used
regardless, on the basis that is could be for – although it seems obvious that they
used for internal purposes (namely to inform were intended to form part of a selective and
potential disciplinary proceedings against controlled media release of all or parts of the
Party employees, and to assist in the Party’s subsequently Leaked Report.
defence to the defamation proceedings arising
from LOTO’s response to the BBC Panorama B3.8 12 April 2020: the publication of the Leaked
programme “Is Labour Anti-Semitic?” Report
(Panorama litigation)). To that end the General
Secretary envisaged the Leaked Report being • On 12 April 2020, Sky News published an
passed to the new Party leader, Keir Starmer, article about the Leaked Report, together with
after he took over on 4 April 2020. a 860-page version of the Leaked Report. At
around the same time, a 851-page version
• W
 e were told by the individuals who had began circulating on social media.
worked on the Leaked Report that they were
disappointed by the decision not to submit • Following the appearance of the Leaked
it to the EHRC, particularly, in one case, in Report in the public domain, the Party quite
light of concerns raised about the potential properly alerted the ICO. The ICO then
disconnect between the Leaked Report and commenced its own investigations into the
the work being done by the lawyers. We were publication of the Leaked Report, which are
also, however, told that they were relieved to ongoing.

22 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section B

C
SECTION C
Section C:
The Most Significant Allegations
Within the Leaked Report

Scope Allegation 5:
The problems in the relevant period were
exacerbated by poor recruitment practices and
As well as investigating the circumstances in which it
inadequate staff management; and
was leaked, the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference ask us
to consider:
Allegation 6:
A racist, sexist and otherwise discriminatory culture
“The truth or otherwise of the main allegations in the
exists in Party workplaces.
Report (the Panel shall determine which are the most
significant allegations which require investigation but
The above are the “main allegations” from our perspective,
they shall include the extent of racist, sexist and other
not necessarily from the perspective of the Leaked
discriminatory culture within Labour Party workplaces,
Report’s authors - that is, they may not be the issues to
the attitudes and conduct of the senior staff of the
which the most space is devoted in the Leaked Report,
Labour Party, and their relationships with the elected
but they are the ones which we consider most significant
leadership of the Labour Party”.
in relation to our Terms of Reference.
We do so in this section, having identified the Leaked
We consider each of the main allegations identified
Report’s six main allegations as being that:
above in a separate chapter in this section of the
report. Before doing so, however, we need to make
Allegation 1:
clear our overall view of the content of the Leaked
There was an unusual intensity of factionalism
Report and, in particular, the content and implications
during the period 2015 – 2019 (the relevant
of the WhatsApp messages.
period), evidenced by the attitudes and conduct of
senior staff and their relationships with the elected
leadership;

Allegation 2:
Factionalism adversely impacted on the handling of
complaints by the Party in the relevant period;

Allegation 3:
Factionalism adversely impacted on other areas of
the Party’s work in the relevant period;

Allegation 4:
The Party’s results in the 2017 general election
were either (i) undermined by factionalism or (ii)
deliberately sabotaged by one faction;

24 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

The Genesis of the Leaked Report It has been put to us by a number of witnesses that the
extracts of the messages quoted in the Leaked Report
The Leaked Report as originally envisaged was were cherrypicked and selectively edited, such that
commissioned by the then General Secretary; it was the quotes that appear in the Leaked Report are both
intended to be an annex to the Party’s proposed unrepresentative and misleading.
submission to the EHRC. It was largely written by
relatively young and inexperienced staff members who Having reviewed the transcripts and considered evidence
were broadly on the Left, albeit the majority of them were, from many of those involved, we do not agree. We find that
at the time, working within the GLU rather than directly for the messages on the SMT WhatsApp reveal deplorably
LOTO. Their objective was clearly to rebut an emerging factional and insensitive, and at times discriminatory,
narrative that the problems with the Party’s handling of attitudes expressed by many of the Party’s most senior
antisemitism complaints in the relevant period were staff.
down to interference from the Left and LOTO by setting
out evidence that they were in fact caused primarily by We accept that the Leaked Report was itself a
failings in HQ. factional document with an agenda to advance, and
that the quoted messages were selected pursuant to
Regardless of its accuracy, which is discussed below, that agenda. Unsurprisingly, the majority of the SMT
the Leaked Report is unarguably a slanted document; WhatsApp transcripts (which run to some 1,200 pages)
it represents another front in the factional warfare which and the instant messages consist of perfectly acceptable
it describes and by its nature added nothing to the discussions about work or personal lives, and we accept
supposed “kindness in politics” that the party purported that the quoted messages appear more shocking when
to be moving towards. We have sought to analyse the read without the cushioning of that more anodyne
Leaked Report’s allegations in the round, looking in each material. Nevertheless, the substance of the quoted
case at the impacts of factionalism of all kinds rather than messages is concerning – and totally inappropriate from
solely through the Leaked Report’s framing. Nevertheless senior staff of a purportedly progressive political party –
we consider that the most important issue is not the and the selective editing does not equate to an overall
Leaked Report’s genesis but whether the allegations distortion of the quoted messages’ meaning; we do not
made are true; and if so whether and to what degree that consider that there was a conspiracy on the part of the
is harmful to the Party. Leaked Report’s authors to distort them.

Our use of the SMT WhatsApp transcripts

and instant messages
We find that the messages on the
The Leaked Report’s central thesis is that factionalism
under Jeremy Corbyn reached unprecedented levels and
SMT WhatsApp reveal deplorably
affected the Party’s ability to function as it should have. factional and insensitive, and at times
Indeed it was becoming so counter-productive that the discriminatory, attitudes expressed by
day to day functioning of HQ was severely affected by
a culture of conspiracy that permeated through the most many of the Party’s most senior staff.
basic of administrative tasks. That thesis is based largely
on extracts from (a) the SMT WhatsApp transcripts and
(b) the instant messages.

We have reviewed the SMT WhatsApp transcripts in full; We agree that, in a few cases, comments were presented
in relation to the instant messages we have reviewed the in a misleading way. To provide a much-publicised
full transcripts of a substantial sample of the chats cited example, the Leaked Report cites an 8 February 2017
in the Leaked Report, including any on which we have exchange in the “Forward Planning” WhatsApp group
placed weight in relation to our own findings and any in which a senior staff member claimed to have spotted
which individual witnesses have suggested were quoted Diane Abbott “crying in the loos” after Clive Lewis’
in a misleading way. resignation from the shadow cabinet. Some three hours

25 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

later, he claimed to have spotted Diane Abbott again in a Further, there are relatively few examples where we think
branch of Leon; a colleague replied “shall we tell michael the Leaked Report’s framing is substantially misleading
crick”, and he said “already have”. Read in context, that (the above being one). In the main, our view is that the
exchange picks up on running jokes about (a) “sightings” messages quoted in the Leaked Report fairly represent
of Diane Abbott which contradicted her justification for the tone and contents of the discussions about Jeremy
controversially missing a key Brexit vote on 2 February Corbyn, his staff, and the Party’s Left in the SMT WhatsApp
2017 through illness, and (b) the apparent omnipresence groups and across the selected instant message chats.
of Michael Crick, who had doorstepped the colleague in There are a significant number of comments in the
question that morning in Copeland, Cumbria, where he transcripts which were not quoted in the Leaked Report
was reporting on the upcoming by-election. but which demonstrate the same kind of hostility as those
that were.
The comments are unprofessional, unkind, and entirely
inappropriate, particularly when they relate to an MP Both the SMT WhatsApp transcripts and the instant
who is known to have been the subject of a very large messages represent discussions which the authors did not
number of abusive cyber comments, but in our view they expect to become public; as such we consider that they
are clearly not literal – that is, they do not relate to real amount to a contemporaneous record of their unguarded
sightings of Diane Abbott.4 The Leaked Report, however, views, albeit a partial one. Subject to the caveats above,
takes the comments literally, saying that “senior staff we accordingly consider that they represent a useful
discussed Abbott crying in the toilets and telling Michael source of evidence with regard to the Leaked Report’s
Crick, a Channel 4 reporter at the time, where she was”. allegations, which are serious; we do not consider that we
can accurately assess the veracity of those allegations
Some of the subsequent commentary has accepted that without referring to the messages, and we consider it
framing, with journalists speculating that Diane Abbott had to be a matter of public interest that our analysis is as
been crying in the toilets about racist abuse “as party staff complete as possible. We have, of course, considered the
mocked her and passed on her location to journalists.”5 messages in the round alongside a substantial amount of
other evidence, including both written and oral evidence
To a degree, it is possible that these comments were from many of the messages’ authors themselves.
misinterpreted in good faith, based on the framing in
the Leaked Report; but it is unfortunate that they have However, we do also accept that the messages’ authors
distracted from the less sensational but deeply serious were not given a right of reply before their messages were
allegations about racism in the Party more widely. included in the Leaked Report; that was a clear breach
of natural justice. Also we can only speculate if a similar
online group chat was used by the opposite faction where
they too could comment on the febrile workplace situation
However, we do also accept that the and perceived attitudes of staff towards them.
messages’ authors were not given a
 
right of reply before their messages
were included in the Leaked Report;
that was a clear breach of natural
justice.

4
Michael Crick has confirmed that he recalls no such discussions https://twitter.com/MichaelLCrick/status/1249663040729071616?s=20
5
https://twitter.com/michaeljswalker/status/1249440328349818883

26 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

Allegation 1
There was an abnormal intensity of factionalism during the period 2015 – 2019,
evidenced and/or exacerbated by the attitudes and conduct of senior staff and
their relationships to the elected leadership

Amongst senior HQ staff, communication via

Summary and Conclusions WhatsApp “echo chambers” amplified the hostility
and allowed the boundaries of acceptable conduct to
Historically factional tensions were played out
become blurred; this resulted in conduct on the part
amongst the Party’s elected representatives, amongst
of some senior staff which was wholly unacceptable
affiliated organisations and amongst the grassroots
(as discussed further in later sections of this report).
membership. Notionally the Party’s permanent staff
Some of the individuals concerned have been subject
were seen as playing a more or less neutral ‘civil
to disciplinary proceedings and some have expressed
service’ role . Though it has to be said that they were
remorse; we do not intend to reopen or second guess
often seen by the Left as being on the Right and
these cases.
arguably the identification of the staff with the leader
became more explicit in the Blair years. Jeremy
We endorse the conclusion in the Labour Together
Corbyn’s election marked the first time that the leader
Report that: “Labour has spent substantial periods of
was seen as so out of step with the predominant
the last five years in conflict with itself. We were not
political view of most of the permanent staff. This
speaking to the public but arguing amongst ourselves.
meant that the conflict reached a level of intensity not
Responsibility for this rests not wholly with one side
previously seen.
or part of our movement. Across our movement, we
should accept our part in these divisions and the
The toxic atmosphere within the Party in this period was
impact this had on our ability to come together and
compounded by the antagonistic relationship between
work together effectively.”
HQ and LOTO, exacerbated by the confusion and
entanglement of their respective roles, some of which
We believe there is a clear need for individuals to see and
predated the Corbyn era. The two should be clearly
treat each other better, regardless of their political views.
seen as having distinctive roles and different functions
and therefore different bases of staffing; they should
cooperate but not overlap. We recommend later a
much clearer differentiation. Although many individuals
(including senior managers) on both sides initially
sought to bridge the divide, the mistrust was mutually
“Labour has spent substantial
reinforcing, and even intermediaries eventually felt periods of the last five years in
compelled to “pick a side”. The result was a working
conflict with itself.”
environment which many found untenable.

27 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 C1.6 Party staff are, though, rarely apolitical, and
History of factionalism in the their position as gatekeepers of the Party rules
Party and amongst Party staff has always given them a degree of power to
advance a particular agenda. Throughout most
C1.1 Internal pluralism has always been a defining of the Party’s history – with the exception of the
feature of the Party, amplified by its network early Blair years – the majority of the ordinary
of affiliated organisations, democratic internal constituency membership has been to the Left of
arrangements, and divided central authority. the PLP, the Party leadership, and often the NEC.
The power of officials to enforce (and interpret)
C1.2 The “backroom” role and expected neutrality the Party’s rules and procedures often led to staff
of the Party’s permanent staff, including its – particularly in the regions – being seen by many
senior officials in HQ and the regional offices, on the Left as repressing attempts to bring about
has meant that their role in those conflicts has change and supporting the leadership/the Right.
tended to be secondary. Serving in effect as
the Party’s civil service, their job is to oversee C1.7 Some have argued that the extent of staff neutrality
the Party’s administrative functions in relation changed somewhat in the New Labour years, in
to the membership, compliance with the Party’s that Party staff, who were far more dependably
rules and elections: to build an election-winning sympathetic to Tony Blair’s objectives than were
vehicle which keeps moving in the right direction the PLP, became the vanguard of the “Blair
irrespective of the driver; and also to maintain the Project”.6 There was intense factionalism within
Party’s financial viability and legal standing. the elected elements of the Party in this period –
many MPs on the Left regarded the Blair Project
C1.3 Formally speaking, Party staff were supposed to as illegitimate (much as many on the Right later
be – and usually saw themselves as – neutral and viewed the Corbyn Project as illegitimate), and
not associated with any of the Party’s legitimate the Blair/Brown tensions always existed within
(that is, internal) factions, and focused instead New Labour itself. Factionalism also remained rife
on Party organisation and combatting external within the constituencies, where an influx of new
political opponents. members supportive of New Labour undermined
the Left’s dominance. At the same time, Party staff
C1.4 However, it must be recognised that there is a became more willing to overtly align themselves
degree to which those on the Left in the Party who with a particular faction.
are committed to change will inevitably clash with
permanent staff whose job is to enforce the rules C1.8 It certainly appears to us that, by 2015, the
as they are. Hence regional staff in particular majority of the Party’s senior staff did not see their
have often been seen as being on the Right by roles as requiring perfect neutrality, or even the
Left-leaning Party activists. And many staff have appearance of it. A practice of officials recruiting
often seen Left activists as a big problem for the in their own image (politically speaking) had,
Party. post-Blair, ensured that HQ’s broad political
alignment remained steadily on the Right of
C1.5 The Party has at times had to defend itself against the Party even as the elected leadership (and
infiltration from organisations to its Left seeking membership) moved to the Left. This led to the
to influence Party policy (the Communist Party creation of what one former employee described
and Communist Front Organisations in the 1950s, as a “mono culture” in HQ7.
and Militant in the 1980s). More generally, some
politicians and staff regard members’ involvement C1.9 Over the years there have also been structural
with Left groups outside the Party with suspicion, changes in the relationship between HQ and the
particularly (though not exclusively) those who leader’s office (dubbed “LOTO” only in recent
identify, or are labelled, rightly or wrongly, as years):
Trotskyites.

6
For example Lewis Minkin in ‘The Blair Supremacy: A Study in the politics of Labour’s party management’ [2014]: “In practice, they had always been
political organisers in the sense that their priority work was in development and assisting the organisation so that the party could win elections, and there
was often some mix of their neutral civil service role with the occasional political steering of internal decisions. But the crucial feature was that it was the ‘civil
service’ role that they affirmed as the legitimate role. Now under Blair the change in legitimacy was sharp and clear […] There was a positive responsibility
to intervene to manage and redirect the party with diminished inhibition […] Given that (like Blair) party employees tended to be to the right of members the
new role-definition and political alignment of the party officials had created the Leader’s vanguard organisation, and it stayed that way.”
7
This is expanded in Section E of this report

28 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 • Until 1983 the leader was only formally the • They all broadly came from the “mainstream”/
leader of the PLP, that is, they were elected Tribunite Left (or “soft Left”); Jeremy Corbyn
only by MPs. From 1983 the leader was elected came from the “far Left”/Campaign Group Left.
by an Electoral College, which represented
the Party’s various power bases – individual • In earlier cases of a leader from the Left
members in constituencies, MPs, and succeeding, there was a move to bring the
affiliated organisations (mainly trade unions). two sides together and consolidate across
With the creation of the Electoral College, the factional lines. Several leading opponents,
leader became leader of the whole Party, and however, declined to serve in Jeremy
hence arguably had a more legitimate role Corbyn’s Shadow Cabinet, and not much
in the direction of Party staff, although staff effort was made to persuade them – though
continued to be responsible to the NEC and a number of MPs who were in no sense his
General Secretary, rather than to the leader supporters did join the front bench team and
and his office. to some extent that continued to be the case
(despite increasing difficulties) throughout the
• In 2013 the Electoral College was abolished five years. On the whole, though, there was
and the choice of leader – subject to minimum deep hostility from the majority of the PLP to
support in the form of nominations within Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, and within a year
the PLP – became solely the decision of there was a vote of no confidence amongst
individual members (and registered individual MPs followed by a leadership challenge.
supporters). The ostensible aim was to reduce That deep animosity continued even after the
trade union influence, but it also eliminated unexpectedly good election result in 2017
PLP influence in the final vote and passed it to (though it was less overt for a period after that
an – normally overwhelmingly Left – individual election, with the PLP tending to adopt a more
membership. Jeremy Corbyn was the first positive tone towards the Party leadership).
leader elected under this system.
• In each earlier case there was a degree of
C1.10 Jeremy Corbyn was of course not the first leader policy accommodation to the Centre, which
to win that position from the Left; Harold Wilson, the Corbyn project showed few signs of
Michael Foot, Neil Kinnock, and Ed Miliband all undertaking.
did so, under whatever system of election then
prevailed. All of them faced some initial suspicion • The leader’s own office staff always largely
from established Party staff8. It is also true that reflect the leader’s views. There used,
some of those past leaders sought to replace the however, to be fewer than 10 members of
General Secretary and other officials at national the leader’s office staff when the Party was
and regional level. However, those leaders out of government, though the advent of (and
differed from Jeremy Corbyn in that: then increase in) “short money” for opposition
parties increased those levels somewhat.
Jeremy Corbyn’s office, however, rapidly
reached nearly 40 staff members, recruited
largely to reflect his politics. This shifted the
balance between LOTO and HQ and inevitably
led to duplication of roles and we were told by
several submissions that there was no policy
direction, no messaging and no coordination
in terms of day to day operations.

8
See Minkin: “[After Ed Miliband won the leadership, there] was initially a very poor relationship between some of the new Leader’s staff and ex-Blairite
senior managers who had actively supported the other brother. This was not simply a fit of pique over the defeat of a preference. It had been built into the
managerial obligations from 1995 that their primary loyalty was to [Blair] and his cause.”

29 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 • Affiliated trade unions represented on the NEC
had tended over decades, at least to start with,
Factional tensions between
to act as a “Praetorian Guard” to support the LOTO and HQ 2015 - 2019
elected leader on most issues, often irrespective
of their own union’s political position. Under C1.13 One of the few points on which the submissions
Jeremy Corbyn the unions were split, with we received were in broad agreement was that the
unions to the Right siding with the PLP majority problem of factional division in the Party got worse
in opposition to Jeremy Corbyn, and unions to following Jeremy Corbyn’s election as leader in
the Left being heavily supportive of the leader. September 2015. We have seen evidence that that
was the case within CLPs and the membership, as
C1.11 Factional opposition to the leader accordingly well as amongst staff; our focus is on the latter.
reached new heights in this period, with
unprecedented opposition within the PLP and C1.14 It is clear that some Party officials saw Jeremy
an escalation of conflict within the NEC. Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership – and the estimated 325,000
Corbyn’s election saw officials, many of whom new members who joined the Party between
had been employed in the Blair and post Blair May 2015 and July 2016 – as representing an
period, come into direct conflict with the Party’s existential threat to the Party and its institutions,
elected leadership for the first time; this gave rise akin to the threat posed by Militant entryists in
to a new type of conflict, in which each faction the 1980s.9 They were convinced that Jeremy
had its hands on at least some of the Party’s Corbyn was far to the Left of most voters and
operational levers of power. would steer the Party towards electoral decline
if not annihilation. It seems to us that a small
C1.12 One complicating factor was the decision made minority of HQ staff, including some senior staff,
in 2013 under Ed Miliband’s leadership – to were from the start unwilling to accommodate
designate two senior members of LOTO staff or proactively assist LOTO, which in their view
as Directors of the Party. This was intended to would have amounted to complicity with a regime
help coordination but in practice added to the which they believed would cause irreparable
confusion of lines of responsibility and jurisdiction harm to the Party. A few individuals saw their role
and eventually, in the Corbyn era, led to tension as being to keep the Party machinery running
and conflict. while allowing the Corbyn “project” to implode.

C1.15 Jeremy Corbyn’s campaign, meanwhile, had

made it clear that he wanted to democratise the
Party and move it to the Left. His victory was
The problem of factional division fuelled by a conviction in some quarters that,
in the Party got worse following to quote the Communication Workers Union
when it endorsed his candidacy, “the grip of the
Jeremy Corbyn’s election as leader in
Blairites […] must now be loosened once and for
September 2015. all. There is a virus within the Labour party, and
Jeremy Corbyn is the antidote.”10 Many officials
believed that they were seen by some of Jeremy
Corbyn’s allies as being part of the “virus”. It is
undoubtedly true that some senior individuals in
LOTO saw HQ staff as a part of the Party’s history
which they had been given a mandate to reject.

C1.16 The dynamic between LOTO and HQ immediately

following Jeremy Corbyn’s election was
accordingly characterised by, at best, intense
mutual mistrust at the highest levels. We have,
however, seen evidence that many individuals on
both sides (including some senior staff) did actively

9
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/explaining-the-pro-corbyn-surge-in-labours-membership/
10
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-hailed-antidote-labour-party-s-blairite-virus-union-10427220.html

30 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 seek to develop less hostile relationships across “we should’ve been working very closely
the divide. A very senior member of LOTO staff told together but […] instead it felt quite hostile.
us, for example, with reference to two senior HQ
And quite difficult […] obviously they called
members, that “I would say my relationship with
[…] and […] was good, as a working relationship
us Trots and thought that we were sort of
at a personal level […] they and particularly unhinged extremists […] but as they got to
[…] I would say became more cooperative and know us, as I got to work with them over
collaborative as time went on […] if you look at the time, I actually developed really positive
WhatsApp messages, […] – with the exception of relationships with everyone in that team. And
some particular, objectionable kind of material –
people in other teams who had previously
generally […] and […] are more circumspect about
the sort of factional hostility to the leadership.”
at first been quite hostile and maybe [had]
a kind of fear of the unknown. But once we
C1.17 It may be true that only a small number of started working together things improved.”
individuals on either side were implacably hostile
to the other from the outset, but it seems that C1.20 That did not, however, happen at scale. While
those individuals (particularly those in senior we have seen evidence that some constructive
roles) set the tone. working relationships were developed across the
HQ/LOTO divide, few witnesses we spoke to felt
C1.18 The problems were exacerbated by the fact that, that they had been able to opt out of the factional
unusually, the majority of the new leader’s hires tensions altogether.
were not individuals already in the “networks” of
HQ staff. That in itself might well have been a C1.21 Some HQ staff suggested that a lack of competence
good thing, but it did mean that concerted efforts in LOTO, combined with a reluctance to accept
should have been made for staff to get to know HQ involvement, had led them to conclude that
each other on a personal as well as a professional they would have to keep the Party machinery
basis, and we have seen no real evidence that running on their own in order to prevent it from
that happened. As one senior member of HQ breaking down altogether; that in turn increased
staff reflected in an interview with us: LOTO suspicions of a power grab.

“a lot of [LOTO hires] were staff who had C1.22 It certainly seems to us that Jeremy Corbyn and
his team, having in the main operated outside
come to the Labour Party from really outside
of the Party’s mainstream (and in some cases
organisations that had nothing to do with us,
outside of the Party), were not equipped to
and there was never any attempt on either understand and deal with the operation of the
side I don’t think to really enmesh […] these Party’s day to day mechanics. We have heard
two worlds and get people to know each from a number of staff who worked in LOTO in
other. And it created this level of distrust this period that the operation was unstructured
and at times chaotic, with a lack of clear
and this level of […] ambiguity about what
decision-making and reporting lines and, in
people’s roles were. And in some cases it
particular, a reluctance on the part of Jeremy
created real hostility.” Corbyn himself to make and communicate
unequivocal decisions. There is evidence that, in
C1.19 The initial mistrust could conceivably have been some respects, the position improved over time,
overcome had senior staff in both LOTO and HQ but it is clear that a significant degree of internal
made it a priority at the outset to clearly define dysfunction marked LOTO throughout Jeremy
the division of functions between LOTO and HQ, Corbyn’s tenure. In September 2019 a senior
foster personal relationships, recognise their member of Jeremy Corbyn’s staff quit, with his
differences in approach, and find a mutually subsequently leaked resignation letter referring
respectful way of working which accommodated to a “lack of professionalism, competence and
them. One junior member of staff from LOTO who human decency which I am no longer willing to
had to work fairly closely with HQ gave us an put up with daily”. Two key members of LOTO
example which we found instructive: staff told us:

31 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 “It was very, very chaotic in the leader’s office. “very few LOTO staff […] made a genuine
And that would apply across all areas of work. effort to bridge the gap […] Too many were
I think people in the press team and the policy happy to regard Southside as inevitably
team and all the different teams would say the hostile. Many of us at Southside were not
same thing. It was very, very chaotic.” hostile: we were sceptical, but keen to work
professionally with others. A climate of toxic
“of course it was a challenging period. You suspicion on both sides made that very
know, Jeremy had never been leader of difficult.”
the Labour Party, Jeremy had never run a
big organisation before. It was quite clear “healthy anxiety around a change of
the people around him were going to need Leadership in any organisation would be
support and it wasn’t forthcoming.” normal, and would usually dissipate with
the reassurance of the new senior team.
C1.23 Some HQ and regional staff, however, told us that
This reassurance never came […] staff
their attempts to offer such support were rebuffed by
felt they weren’t supported, there was no
a senior LOTO team which viewed them as “Blairites”
and wanted to consolidate a separate power base. political cover to take any difficult decisions,
Many felt that an exceptionally challenging work regions were disempowered, staff were
environment developed as a result: briefed against, the amount of hostility from
members increased with no recourse”
“working for the Labour Party […] was my
entire professional life, it was what I put all C1.24 Many HQ staff witnesses reported attempts to shift
my energies and time and effort into and all elements of their roles to their counterparts in LOTO,
or to restructure them out of existence altogether:
my love into. But post-2015, your value as
a member of staff was no longer about your
“there were anonymous accounts in the
professional abilities, your desire to achieve
newspapers all the time that Jeremy’s team
for the Labour Party, it was purely about […]
were going to wipe out the Blairites or the
judgements on you based on the length of
right wing from head office […] Jeremy
time you’d worked for the Labour Party […]
sent [a letter] to all the staff saying he had
if you’d worked for the Labour Party for a
absolutely no plans for any restructure in
long time you were evil because you were a
head office and no restructure would happen
Blairite and that was the definition. And that
without proper trade union consultation […]
was exceptionally challenging to work in.”
within a matter of weeks […] [LOTO] was
actually trying to implement a restructure
“the senior managers were under constant
[…] that was to severely reduce my role and
pressure from a factional and unrelenting
restructure me within the organisation.”
Leaders Office team (LOTO) who would
take no advice, did not respect people’s
“a ‘shadow’ press team was recruited in
roles or expertise, and who actively worked
LOTO […] it was never made clear to us
to remove people from their jobs or to side-
what the responsibilities of LOTO Comms
line people.”
were […] [they] would often be completely
unresponsive for hours when we attempted
to get press statements signed off and [HQ
comms] would then be blamed by Shadow
Ministers and the media for a slow response.”

32 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 “Instead of being upfront about the need “what was clear was that there was an
for organizational change […] and opening attempt from elected politicians as well as
a redundancy scheme for people to leave, appointed staff and people elected onto the
they sought to hound people out of their jobs, NEC to undermine Jeremy’s leadership. And
create shadow structures, and brief against in fact remove him from office. And clearly
departments or individuals” all of that failed, but nonetheless, when it
becomes evident what people had done,
C1.25 LOTO staff and Jeremy Corbyn supporters in
it does lead to hostility and suspicion and
HQ, meanwhile, felt similarly besieged:
lack of respect and a very difficult working
“The continual stress of hostile leaks, the relationship going forward for staff who, you
hostile briefings to the press, and the go-slow know, are still in the same posts that they
on basic tasks, produced an atmosphere that were in before”.
was […] deeply disagreeable to work in.” C1.27 A senior member of regional staff described the
consequences of that breakdown of trust from
“Party staff were always polite on the face of their perspective, saying:
it. However, both I and members of my team
experienced a lot of passive-aggressive “there was a real break, to my mind, between
hostility from a number of staff.” LOTO and Southside, we weren’t working as
a team […] it genuinely was a really horrible
“General workplace chatter and social atmosphere. I never felt trusted, never felt that I
contact with GLU staff underlined how was part of a team. Always felt on the outside.”
many (but by no means all) members of
the unit regarded themselves as the ‘castle
keep’ holding out against not just specific
problematic individuals”
“LOTO and [HQ] … weren’t
working as a team”
C1.26 The discord was heightened by disagreements
about the Party’s position on Brexit, and culminated
(in June – September 2016) in a series of shadow
front bench resignations, a vote of no confidence
C1.28 The factions ended up in a cycle of attack and
in Jeremy Corbyn, and a leadership election in
counter-attack, with each side assuming that
which Jeremy Corbyn ultimately triumphed. The
the other was acting in bad faith (sometimes
perceived role of key HQ staff in the challenge to
justifiably, sometimes not) and responding in
Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, including allegations
kind. In our view those attitudes were modelled
of members being denied ballots on spurious
from the top; we have heard that those in the
grounds in the lead up to the vote, eroded much of
most senior positions on both sides failed to
the remaining spirit of cooperation. We have heard
treat healing the factional rift as a priority, and
some evidence that HQ staff attempted, in the
it appears that many junior and/or non-factional
aftermath of Jeremy Corbyn’s re-election as leader,
staff felt they had no choice but to “pick a team”
to “re-set” relations on a more positive footing, but
(or have one picked for them). For example:
the mistrust had by that point largely calcified. As
one senior member of LOTO staff put it:

33 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 • One temporary member of staff who worked in
LOTO but was based in HQ told us that “after
The attitudes of senior staff
the 2017 general election it became increasingly
C1.30 By the period covered in the SMT WhatsApp
clear that there were indeed two sides to an
transcripts (September 2016 – October 2017) it
increasingly bitter and factional rift in the Party
seems that a significant number of the senior HQ
which made my role as consensus seeker and
staff involved felt that they were on a defensive
bridge builder less and less tenable. In the end
footing. We think there was some justification
the chasm became too wide to bridge […] as
for their perception that many in LOTO were
was pointed out to me at Conference 2018 I
hostile to them, and we do not doubt that the
was seen as “too Corbyn” by one side and “not
intense pressure many of them have described
Corbyn enough” by the other.”
to us was genuinely felt. We consider, however,
that a “siege” narrative became amplified and
• A member of staff based in HQ from December
exaggerated through “echo chambers”, in
2017 – who prior to taking up the role had not
particular the SMT WhatsApp groups. In our
been a member of the Party, let alone a faction
view, that led some staff to lose perspective and
– told us that the “sects were very distinct […]
conclude that they were operating in a conflict
these two camps fuelled a culture of animosity
zone in which otherwise unacceptable conduct
towards the other, withholding information and
could be justified, and blinded them to their own
trying to damage each other’s reputation.”
contributions to the dysfunction. In that context,
some of them engaged in discussions about the
• One member of LOTO staff told us that the
leader’s staff and his supporters which were at
bulk of junior employees in HQ who were not
times shockingly disparaging and derogatory.
aligned with Jeremy Corbyn were nonetheless
happy when things seemed to be going well
C1.31 It is inevitable for there to be disagreements and
on the night of the 2017 general election, but
indeed sometimes personal animosity within any
were “swayed” by the negative attitudes of more
organisation, particularly a political party, but there
senior staff, adding that “it got to the stage where
have to be limits on how those disagreements
some of those who I was friends with would be
are expressed; in our view the discussions in the
cautious about being seen getting along with a
SMT WhatsApp groups frequently went beyond
leadership member of staff.”
those limits. There was clearly a range of attitudes
amongst the groups’ members, and some were
C1.29 We agree with the findings made in the Kerslake
far more vocal than others, but there are few if any
Review, and in particular the conclusion that: “It
examples of the more extreme comments being
is in the nature of a broad political party to have
challenged. The groups appear to have become
competing views and perspectives and this
echo chambers in which at times conspiratorially
has always been the case for the Party. What
hostile attitudes to the Party’s Left were at best
is different here is the way in which factionalism
tolerated, and at worst amplified – including by the
has become embedded in the way the Party itself
most senior staff, who in our view had a particular
operates creating distrust and division.”
duty to intervene.

C1.32 We have taken into account that many of the

comments were made in jest and were not intended
seriously or literally (contrary, on occasion, to the
Leaked Report’s framing of them); that does not
in our view negate all criticism of them. It is (or
should be) self-evident that saying that you hope
someone has been run over by a train, or that
someone deserves to die in a fire, is reprehensible
even if you are “joking”; for Party staff to consider
such “jokes” acceptable in relation to colleagues
or Party members suggests to us that they had
become detached from both professional and
personal norms.

34 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C1.33 We note the authors’ explanations that they were C1.36 There is a difference between a superficially
under intense pressure and used the WhatsApp polite relationship, and one of genuine mutual
groups as a kind of release valve. We accept endeavour. The latter requires a foundation of
that many of them now sincerely regret the respect, and such a foundation was lacking here.
messages they sent; as one put it to us, “when I Almost all of the members of LOTO staff who we
looked back at [the messages], I actually didn’t spoke to said that they were shocked when they
recognise myself. When I looked back at them, saw the vitriol of the comments quoted in the
I just felt really sad. I felt so sad.” Another told Leaked Report, which supports our conclusion
us that looking back at the comments “fills me that the HQ staff in question had been professional
with shame […] I regret it deeply and if I could (and in many cases friendly) in their face-to-face
change it I would […] I cannot express in strong dealings with LOTO colleagues. Those politically
enough terms how sorry I am”. aligned with Jeremy Corbyn, however, were not
entirely surprised by the messages:
C1.34 The conviction that the end of Jeremy Corbyn’s
leadership (be it brought about by PLP revolt or “[it] validated the feelings of being
electoral disaster) would be a good thing for the unwelcome that I and members of my team
Party underpinned, and was reinforced by, the
had experienced.”
WhatsApp discussions. We will consider in later
sections the specific consequences of allowing
that mindset to settle amongst a group of senior
“the sense that [HQ staff] regarded
Party staff. It seems to us indisputable that it themselves at a senior level […] as part of a
gave rise to a conflict of interests, although (as political opposition to the elected leadership,
explained in later sections) not to a degree which I mean that was something that had been
rendered the staff unable to do their jobs, and in totally clear from word go. And so seeing that
many cases do them well. However, the toxicity
played out in a private conversation wasn’t
of relationships did undermine good work done
by all Party staff.
surprising.”

C1.37 Indeed, even some that we spoke to who were

C1.35 It has been put to us that the SMT WhatsApp
not LOTO staff members told us they were not
transcripts and the instant messages, being
surprised:
private communications, do not reflect the actual
culture of the Party at the time. We accept that the
kind of hostility evident in the messages was not “On reading the leaked report very large
displayed by the staff involved in their day to day sections of it matched conversations I was
dealings with colleagues. In our view, though, the party to and that were going on around me at
messages (which are between colleagues, very the time – some of the messages published
often discussing work) are not straightforwardly
on WhatsApp being word for word transcripts
severable from the Party’s culture; they were
of conversations openly taking place in the
part of it. We do not accept that the discussions
were in effect vacuum sealed with no bearing on common areas, kitchenette and work areas
the way the staff involved saw or related to their of the Southside Office.”
colleagues in “real life”. We also do not accept
that messages sent to a WhatsApp group of C1.38 We emphasise again that we do not have an
24 people is an entirely private communication equivalent record of private communications
akin to a text with one friend or a phone call. We between LOTO staff. We have, though, heard from
note the recent cases of members of the police some HQ staff that they faced extreme hostility,
being sanctioned as a result of sharing material and in some cases bullying, from individuals in
in WhatsApp groups. LOTO. Some of the evidence we have received
from members of LOTO staff supports the
contention that HQ staff were viewed with mistrust
and in many cases dislike. We do not suggest that
the problem was one-sided.

35 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 C1.41 We understand the intensity of anger amongst
Consequences for the senior many of the membership at the contents of, in
staff involved in the messages particular, the WhatsApp messages cited in
the Leaked Report. Our focus, though, is on
C1.39 This is an appropriate point at which to note that, how such a toxic situation arose and (more
of the 24 members of the SMT WhatsApp groups, importantly) how it can be avoided in future. That
only four still work for the Party, and none of those endeavour will require empathy, a quality which
four were substantial contributors to the groups. was clearly lacking in some of the discussions
in the SMT WhatsApp groups; it has also been
C1.40 A number of the authors of the WhatsApp lacking in some of the responses to the Leaked
messages have been subject to disciplinary Report, which in some cases have been vicious
proceedings as Party members, which were and caused immense distress. It seems to us that
instigated shortly after the unsanctioned release a willingness to see the good in people even with
to the media of the Leaked Report, largely whom we disagree, and to believe in the potential
on the basis of the messages quoted within it. of people to learn and change, is foundational
The majority of those proceedings have now to all successful progressive movements. One of
concluded, with a range of sanctions applied the tragedies of this period for the Party is that so
by the NEC. Needless to say those proceedings many have lost sight of the humanity of those who
were wholly separate to this Inquiry and we are they see as being in an opposing faction, which
not performing a disciplinary function or second is perhaps easier than ever in an age where so
guessing the process. In other cases which we much of our communication takes place at arms-
considered, however, and which were dealt length through a screen.
with during the period we were commissioned
to review, we gained the impression that the  
strength of staff disciplinary outcomes – just like
disciplinary procedures regarding members
as discussed later in this report – reflected a
dependence on a narrow factional majority on
the NEC in one direction or the other. That prima
facie suggested a serious lack of objectivity and
fairness, and represented an unhealthy position
for the Party itself – and for its staff.

Many have lost sight of the humanity

of those who they see as being in an
opposing faction.

36 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

Allegation 2
Factionalism adversely impacted on the handling of
antisemitism complaints in the relevant period

As the EHRC identified, there was undue and

Summary and Conclusions improper involvement of LOTO in a limited number of
high profile disciplinary cases in which they should
HQ staff strongly asserted that their dealing with
have had no substantive involvement. That is rightly
antisemitism cases was systematically undermined by
to be deplored. We also understand that GLU staff felt
LOTO interference. This also formed the basis of the
that they were generally under political pressure from
Panorama narrative. The EHRC found that the Party
LOTO and their allies not to find certain individuals
operated a policy of LOTO intervening in antisemitism
guilty of antisemitism. However, we have not received
cases outside the process provided for in the Party’s
clear and convincing documentary evidence that
disciplinary policies and guidelines. Whilst it is true
there was a systematic attempt by the elected
that the EHRC findings tend to discount the legitimate
leadership or LOTO to interfere unbidden in the
political necessity of the leader and LOTO being made
disciplinary process in order to undermine the Party’s
aware of developments in such cases, we consider
response to allegations of antisemitism. In our view,
that there is enough evidence of direct intervention
the problem was principally a lack of clarity (on both
to support the conclusion that such interference, at
sides) about how involved LOTO should be; and this
times, went beyond what was the legitimate interest
was aggravated by the mutual antagonism between
of LOTO, most notably in relation to cases which
HQ staff and LOTO.
involved allies of Jeremy Corbyn.

During Spring 2018, the period on which much of the

We have also seen evidence of denialism about
reporting has focused, LOTO staff provided input into
antisemitism amongst some on the Left, who
specific cases after it was sought, sometimes
asserted that the issue was being exaggerated to
insistently, by HQ staff, who refused to proceed until
undermine the leader. To be clear, we have seen no
they had it. HQ staff say that they were forced into
evidence that claims of antisemitism were fabricated
making those requests by persistent “offline”
by complainants or improperly pursued by the
interference by LOTO which they wanted to bring into
complaints team (although we have seen evidence
the open; whatever HQ’s motives, however, we find
that many of the claims about antisemitism that were
that LOTO staff responded to the requests, for the
made public did not in fact concern members of the
most part, reasonably and in good faith. We note that
Party). The Leaked Report itself is emphatic in stating
their responses were subsequently used to form the
that it “thoroughly disproves any suggestion that
basis of wholly misleading media reports which
antisemitism is not a problem in the Party, or that it is
suggested that LOTO staff had aggressively imposed
all a “smear” or “witch-hunt”.”
themselves on the process against HQ’s wishes.

The problem was principally a lack

of clarity (on both sides) about how
involved LOTO should be.

37 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 seriously compounded by factionalism. In particular,
the ‘validation exercises’ which took place in the run
There were structural problems with up to the 2015 and 2016 leadership elections diverted
staff time and cemented a lack of trust between LOTO
the Party’s disciplinary system which
and HQ which further hampered the Party’s ability to
meant it was not fit for purpose. deal with antisemitism complaints effectively.

Whilst it is difficult to reach firm conclusions on the

extent of improper interference because of conflicting
evidence, we consider that both sides are open to
What we can firmly conclude on the basis of the criticism. It is our view that the fundamental reasons for
evidence we have seen is that there were structural the problems in the complaint-handling process were
problems with the Party’s disciplinary system which both structural and operational; but it is also clear that
meant it was not fit for purpose or able to cope with the the factional culture in which these structural problems
increase of complaints which followed the post-2015 arose seriously exacerbated those issues.
surge in membership. These systemic issues were

C2.3 The EHRC was concerned with whether the

Scope actions of the Party as a whole in relation to
those cases amounted to breaches of equality
C2.1 As has been set out above, the Leaked Report
law (for example because LOTO had had
was intended to form part of the Party’s evidence
substantive involvement in them). We are looking
to the EHRC in relation to its investigation into
at the broader issue of whether the actions of
whether the Party had breached its duties under
individuals and/or factions within the Party meant
the Equality Act 2010 in relation to antisemitism,
that complaints were not handled as effectively
by (amongst other things) failing to establish and
as they could have been.
maintain an adequate disciplinary system to deal
with complaints. One of the key allegations made in
C2.4 In general, we have not named individuals unless
the Leaked Report is that the failings in this period,
we consider it essential to do so, or unless matters
in particular in relation to antisemitism complaints,
have already been reported in the media. There
were caused not (as the Right had suggested) by
are occasions below where we discuss matters
LOTO, but rather by a combination of structural
which have been reported on inaccurately in the
failings, inaction or diversion onto other largely
media and in some of those cases we have taken
factional issues by the HQ staff responsible for
the view that individuals should be named in order
dealing with complaints, namely staff from the
to correct the record.
GLU. The alternative narrative – largely pursued
in the Panorama programme – is that GLU staff
were prevented from pursuing cases because of Structural problems with the
interference or fear of interference from LOTO or
the Left on the NEC.
disciplinary system during the
period 2015-2019
C2.2 The EHRC assessed concerns about the Party’s
handling of antisemitism complaints in the C2.5 It seems to be universally accepted, by
context of potential breaches of the Equality Act respondents to both the EHRC’s investigations
2010; we do not seek to rerun any of the EHRC’s and this Inquiry, that the Party’s disciplinary
findings and we have not sought to repeat the system was not fit for purpose nor designed
kind of analysis of selected individual cases to cope with the increase in complaints which
undertaken by the EHRC. The Party and the NEC followed the influx of new members in the relevant
have agreed a series of steps to prevent such period (with membership rising from 190,000 in
interference in future and address the problem May 2015 to over 500,000 in July 2016). As one
of antisemitism more generally. We are broadly senior member of GLU staff put it: “The Party
in support of those steps although we do have was dealing with a disciplinary system that was
some reservations which we set out later. designed for a small number of cases per year,

38 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 relying on the goodwill of voluntarily elected • Delays in the determination of cases by
party members to make themselves available the NCC: further bottlenecks arose when
for disciplinary hearings […] [the disciplinary cases were referred on by the NEC to the
process] was in many ways not fit for purpose for NCC, in part because it was difficult to find
a small number of cases, let alone the hundreds NCC members to sit on the panels that heard
of cases that the party faced in this time period.” cases, and in part because of respondents
requesting (and being granted) deferrals. In
C2.6 The Party’s disciplinary system is more fully May 2019, new guidelines were imposed to
explored in Section D of this report, but in encourage the swifter and fairer resolution
summary, the key systemic problems were: of cases by the NCC; in September 2019 the
NCC was expanded from 11 members to 25,
• An inadequate system for logging and meaning that it was able to convene panels
tracking complaints: this made it difficult if with greater ease.
not impossible for someone to identify what
stage a particular complaint had reached, • A lack of clear guidance: there was a lack of
or to see immediately how many disciplinary written guidance in relation to the framework
cases were active at a given time. In our for decision-making at every stage, namely
view this gave rise to inadequate oversight decisions by:
of how cases were being progressed, both
individually and as a whole. The “complaints - GLU (as to whether to investigate a
centre” introduced in 2017 – 2018 remedied complaint, whether to refer a matter
the position somewhat but not entirely. to the NEC, and whether to impose
an administrative suspension while an
• Inadequate staffing in GLU: this slowed down investigation proceeded);
the processing of incoming complaints, the
- the NEC (as to whether to take no further
investigation of complaints which were referred
action, issue a written warning, or refer a
by GLU to the NEC, and the preparation of
matter to the NCC); and
bundles/charge sheets for cases which the
NEC referred on to the National Constitutional - the NCC (as to sanction).
Committee (NCC). The position was improved
This led to inconsistent decision-making at
substantially in 2018 – 2019 through the hiring
every stage. Clearer guidance was introduced
of a number of governance officers.
in some areas (for example antisemitism
complaints) in 2019, but in our view the
• Delays in getting cases before the NEC: as
handling of all types of complaint must be held
at 2015, all cases referred by GLU to the NEC
to the same standard.
were heard by the full plenary NEC Disputes
Panel, which only met four times a year. Cases
• Inadequate processes at regional and
therefore often had to wait a long time to be
devolved levels: the process followed when
heard, and often got caught up in the NEC’s
complaints were handled locally by CLPs
broader factional currents once they got
and regional offices lacked clarity and was
there. This position was changed in 2017 in
often subject to complaints of bias from
relation to sexual misconduct cases, with the
respondents. In 2019, cases involving racism,
introduction of smaller sub-panels of three
discrimination and/or harassment based on a
to five members, sitting with an independent
protected characteristic were removed from
legal adviser. This “small panel” model was
the disciplinary powers of CLPs and now have
successful and was adopted in relation to
to be dealt with through GLU, which should
antisemitism cases in 2019.
substantially address the problem.

39 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C2.7 In short, there were fundamental problems with
the disciplinary system throughout this period
2015 – 2016 “validation”
which were not confined to antisemitism cases exercises
and were not addressed by management
nor the NEC; these problems inevitably led to C2.8 The allegation that the staff in GLU failed to deal
delays and inconsistencies which were not with antisemitism cases partly because they were
necessarily attributable to any individuals acting engaged in factionally based exercises against
in bad faith. The disagreement concerns whether the Left is a very serious accusation and one we
those structural problems were exacerbated by needed to assess in some detail.
individual members of staff from either faction. In
broad terms: C2.9 The Leaked Report repeats allegations that in
2015 – 2016 GLU staff were diverted into an
• The Right’s argument is that the problems exercise that trawled the social media accounts of
were exacerbated by improper interference a substantial number of applicants and members
from the Left – including some of the Party on the Left in search of problematic posts which
leader’s senior staff and his supporters in the would justify rejecting their application (or
PLP and the NEC – and that pressure was suspending their existing membership) in order
exerted on the complaints team to drop, delay, to deny them a vote in the leadership elections
or impose lesser sanctions in proceedings held in those years. It is alleged that this was
against members on the Left. This argument a factional exercise targeted at the Left, with a
has been made repeatedly in the media; it view to preventing Jeremy Corbyn from being re-
was also made by many of the witnesses we elected leader. The Leaked Report cites multiple
spoke to. More broadly, it has also been put instant messages (which we have seen) in which
to us that attempts to improve the disciplinary GLU staff described this process as “hunting out
system under Iain McNicol were resisted by 1,000s of trots”, “trot busting”, “trot spotting”,
LOTO and the Left on the NEC (even though “trot hunting” et cetera.
at that point the pro-Corbyn Left did not have
an NEC majority), which saw those efforts as a C2.10 No one has denied that a “validation” process of
hostile act by GLU. some kind took place in both 2015 and 2016. It
has been put to us by GLU staff that the 2015
• The Left rejects those allegations, and says that “validation” exercise was fairly ad hoc, while
the problems were in fact exacerbated by the the 2016 equivalent was more structured. In
inaction of GLU staff, who were overwhelmed both cases, we were told, the exercise was a
by the volume of work, and/or distracted from response to concerns that the lack of checks on
focusing on it by their engagement in factional members who had joined – particularly under
endeavours, and/or were content to allow the affiliated supporter system (which had been
cases to drag because any backlash tended enhanced by Ed Miliband) – could give rise to
to be against Jeremy Corbyn. This, broadly, hostile “entryism” from the Right and Left. Staff
was the thesis of the Leaked Report, and it told us:
was repeated to us by many witnesses.
“effectively the line was we don’t want to be
infiltrated by a load of Tories […] I don’t think
anyone ever envisaged you would have
hundreds of thousands of people joining, and
one of the learnings from 2015 was that some
sort of system was required to make sure
that there were not hundreds of thousands
of Tories joining the Labour party, who don’t
share the values, who would vote in some
way to do it harm – so there was a system
effectively to put cases on the basis of social
media entries to NEC panels who, rather

40 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 than adjudicating on disciplinary matters in C2.12 A list of “rejected members” circulated by GLU
the traditional form, could effectively remove staff on 21 August 2015 listed 238 applicants
who had been refused a ballot. Some were
someone’s ballot from the election”
Green or Conservative Party members who were
joining to vote for Jeremy Corbyn (with differing
“there’s a process where NEC members
motives), and we accept that those applications
could veto people […] joining as supporters were properly rejected. Others were rejected
or members in order to get a vote in those because they had indicated in the “reasons for
elections […] in [the 2015 leadership election] joining” section that they were joining only to
there were stories about, you know, journalists vote for Jeremy Corbyn and would leave if he
getting their llamas to have a vote, your cat did not become leader, which seems to us more
questionable as a ground for rejection. Others
signing up to have a vote and things”
were apparently rejected for reasons that were
wholly inadequate - for example: “Pattern of
“During the first leadership election, there retweeting Green Party material and expressing
[were] hundreds of thousands of applications support”; “Frequently submits images to the
to join the Labour Party from prospective socialist worker from SWP protests and events”;
new members. The Labour Party rulebook “green party supporter - likes on facebook”;
is very clear on the parameters in which “twitter follows and RT far left groups and
politicians”; “Retweeted Class War”; “likes a lotta
membership can be ruled out – largely for
greens on FB”.
members of other political parties and those
who don’t share Labour Party values. These C2.13 In 2016 the process was formalised somewhat.
included self-described Trotskyites and As before, applications were rejected, properly,
communists. Any communist is ineligible to from anyone who was shown on local authorities’
join the Labour Party and it was absolutely “statements of persons nominated” to have
nominated a candidate for another political party
within the roles and responsibilities of
within the last two years, or who admitted on their
Labour staff to ensure that their membership application form to being a member of another
applications were challenged.” party. GLU also, however, commissioned a tool
which matched applicants’ email addresses
C2.11 Many GLU staff accepted that the validation with Twitter and Facebook accounts and then
process – which in 2015 involved manual review searched for certain flagged words/phrases,
by Party staff of applicants’ social media pages which had been chosen by GLU staff:
– gave rise to some mistakes. It is certainly clear
that GLU staff recommended some applications “We sat down and we […] identified all of the
for rejection by the NEC on grounds which do
terms of abuse that sitting MPs and Peers had
not stand up to scrutiny. In an email sent on 12
August 2015, one NEC member agreed with come to us with […] And this only referred
the majority of a list of proposed suspensions, to the leadership election incidentally. This
but flagged several issues: “donating to the doesn’t refer to normal times, this is just
People’s Assembly is not an anti-Labour activity”; people trying to sign up as a supporter or
“we can’t block her for being just for being a member during the leadership election. So
journalist, unless there is any evidence she is
[…] terms of known abuse, which is where
anti-Labour we should let her through”; “we can’t
bar people because they say they are proud to you get all the ‘Blairite scum’, the ‘traitor’, the
be English”; “her Facebook likes are fine […] ‘rats’, those sorts of things […] a phrase like
we can’t block people just because they like the ‘I voted Green’, ‘I voted Tory’, those sorts of
people’s assembly and UK uncut”; “I wasn’t sure things. And hashtags from previous general
about this. All this Militant stuff is a bit before my elections and local elections and things. So
time. 1991 seems like a long time ago”.
there was a list of hundreds and hundreds
and hundreds of terms that became […] the
list that the social media was run against.”

41 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C2.14 Tweets containing the flagged phrases were • 15 abusive phrases which included the word
reviewed (usually by regional officers) and could “trot”; and
then form the basis of a recommendation that the
NEC reject someone’s application. A document • a number of abusive phrases containing the
setting out the “vetting process” was circulated names or twitter handles of specific MPs, almost
on 29 June 2016, together with a suggestion all of whom were on the centre or Right of the
that 10 casual staff be employed from Labour Party. Jeremy Corbyn himself was not included.
Students to review the results of the searches. All
applicants (and, later, some existing members) C2.18 Shortly afterwards, a list of just 294 “flagged
were run through the search tool. phrases” was sent by the same member of staff
to various NEC members (in response to the
C2.15 A “vetting criteria” document was also circulated, request mentioned above) with phrases relating
explaining that applicants would be referred to to specific MPs removed. The covering email
an NEC panel if the search results revealed that: explained that “[s]omething may also be flagged
“they have publicly stated that they supported to us if it appears in the same tweet as the name
a candidate in opposition to a Labour Party of an MP”, which in our view gives the inaccurate
candidate in 2015”; “there is good evidence impression that the names of all MPs (or at least
that they belong to an organisation whose aims all Party MPs) were included in the list.
and values are contrary to those of the Labour
Party. This includes other political parties and C2.19 According to a note circulated amongst the
organisations with contrary political aims”; “there GLU team on 22 November 2016 called “final
is strong evidence that they subscribe to the verification and validation numbers”:
aims of these opposing organisations, such
as recently attending their meetings or posting • Action was taken on the basis of the local
(more than once) on blogs or social media in authorities’ “statements of persons nominated”
support”; or “they publically [sic] state or send in relation to 250 new members, 160 existing
any abusive comments regarding any candidate members, and 24 registered supporters;
or any other Labour representative”.
• Applications were rejected from 990
C2.16 It appears (based on an instant messaging individuals who admitted membership of
discussion on 20 June 2016) that the intention was another party on their application form; and
for two senior members of GLU staff to have the
final sign off on which cases were sent to the NEC. • Action was taken by the NEC on other grounds
(including online comments flagged by the
C2.17 On 15 August 2016, following a request from search tool) in relation to 1,006 new members,
an NEC member for details of the search terms 1,403 existing members, and 131 supporters.
being used, a list of 1,959 “flagged phrases” was
forwarded by a member of GLU staff to two other C2.20 In an email chain between GLU staff on 22
senior members of the team. It included: November 2016, it was confirmed that there
had been just under 4,000 “total actions by the
• a range of phrases indicating support for other NEC which includes all Supporter Rejections,
political parties (“I voted Green”, “I voted Tory” Membership Rejections, Auto Exclusions and
et cetera); Administrative Suspensions”, and that 1,024
of those actions had been against existing
• 35 abusive phrases which included the word members, such that “the most appropriate course
“Blairite” or “Blair” (“Blairite scum” et cetera); of action was an administrative suspension
pending investigation.”
• 15 abusive phrases which included the
word “Corbynite” (but none which included C2.21 Various concerns about the process were
“Corbyn” or “Corbynista”); discussed at an 18 October 2016 meeting of the
NEC Disputes Panel, a note of which was sent
by one panel member to the GLU team. These
concerns included:

42 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 • whether existing members as well as new joiners
should have been put through all the validation
Reflections on the 2015 –
checks as part of the leadership contest; 2016 “validation” exercises
• whether checks to ensure that members were C2.23 It was understandable for Party staff to have
not breaking rules or breaching acceptable some concerns around undetected “entryism” in
standards should have been made separately this period. However the Party had not previously
from a specific internal election; conducted an equivalent validation exercise
on new members. The practice of conferring
• whether members who were suspended or “Provisional Membership” for a period of 8 weeks
excluded should have been allowed to vote does, to some extent, facilitate such validation,
(as they were in 2015) while their longer-term but it needs to be undertaken in future in a
status was clarified; properly non-factional manner.

• whether the Party should have engaged in C2.24 None of the GLU witnesses we spoke to accepted
active trawling of social media accounts that there was any particular focus on removing
and online postings of all members, and ballots from members on the Left (and indeed some
supporters, rather than responding to suggested that the focus had in fact been on Right
complaints; entryism): “there was absolutely no coordinated
attempt to ‘block’ Jeremy Corbyn supporters from
• the weight which should be given, when voting, unless their application failed to meet the
examining social media, to retweets/likes/shares, rules of the contest”. The fact is, however, that GLU
as opposed to original tweets and postings; staff had a substantial role in deciding how those
rules were interpreted, for example by choosing the
• which words were unacceptable in such social list of search terms in relation to abusive posts. The
media posts, and whether descriptions such list of flagged words should have been agreed by
as “hapless”, “useless” and “incompetent” GLU and the NEC, and published transparently. We
should have been treated as falling within the can see no legitimate non-factional reason why the
category of personal abuse, even if they were search tool was apparently designed only to catch
not actually obscene; abuse aimed at MPs on the centre and Right of the
Party, and to ignore the majority of abuse aimed
• whether NEC panel members, or the NEC as at MPs on the Left (including Jeremy Corbyn). The
a whole, should agree common standards names of all MPs could easily have been included.
for deciding whether evidence justifies Instead, it seems likely that problematic behaviour by
suspension or exclusion; individuals on the Right (for example, abusive tweets
at Jeremy Corbyn) were not investigated, because
• how much attention should be paid to comments they were not searched for. If the concern was about
or actions before a member joined the Party; Right entryism, that was a strange decision.

• whether suspended or excluded members C2.25 In our view the intention and effect of both
should be sent the evidence shown to the validation exercises was to remove ballots from
NEC panels with the letter notifying them, individuals who would otherwise have voted for
rather than having to request and receive this Jeremy Corbyn. It does not seem to us credible
as a separate exercise; and to suggest that the exercise (in particular the
social media component) was not targeted at
• whether more efforts should have been made applicants and members on the Left.
to hear appeals before the ballot closed.

C2.22 In our view those were all reasonable issues for

consideration and should have been resolved
transparently at the outset of the exercise, not
retrospectively.

43 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C2.26 It is clear from the extensive internal discussions C2.28 We accept that many of the membership
we have seen between staff engaged in “trot applications rejected as a result of this exercise
hunting” that they did not understand it to be a were rejected legitimately, but we have seen
factionally neutral task. It seems to us that many evidence that a material number were rejected on
concluded that a certain lack of transparency in problematic grounds. We also consider that the
relation to the exercise was acceptable because decision to extend the social media trawl to existing
it was, as one junior member of staff put it in an members, and to remove ballots from those who
instant message on 15 August 2015, “for the were administratively suspended as a result,
saving of the Labour Party!” In another exchange was improper. If the Party wishes its disciplinary
(on 11 July 2016), another junior employee system to have a proactive element (that is, one
suggested taking the twitter handles of people which involves searching for wrongdoing amongst
posting the pro-Corbyn hastag “#imwithjezza” existing members rather than simply responding
to run through the search tool “to see if they to complaints), that proactive element must
have posted abuse elsewhere”. We do not know operate within published guidelines, neutrally,
whether that happened, but it illustrates what and regularly (that is, not timed solely to coincide
some staff, at least, understood the objective of with a leadership election).
the task to be.
C2.29 The fact that the NEC made the final decisions
C2.27 One temporary member of staff who was based does not negate the lack of balance in the initial
in HQ at the time told us: exercise; the NEC could only deal with the cases
and evidence that were put before it, and panel
“Of particular concern for me as I commenced members did not (as explained above) seem to
work at Southside was the regular ringing of have full visibility on how searches were being
carried out. The NEC panel members were not
bells and cheering throughout the working
necessarily expected (or able) to interrogate the
day. On commenting that there seemed to cases closely. The “vetting process” document
be a lot of birthdays among colleagues I was said that the NEC would be sent a list of cases
advised that the bell ringing was conducted once a day and be expected to turn them
by the “compliance” unit and represented around within 24 hours. In an instant message
the successful suspension or expulsion discussion on 30 June 2016, a member of staff
who had been asked to assist in the validation
of a member – often surrounded by the
exercise asked a senior team member “what’s
description of such members as “trots”. your expectation or knowledge of - from last year
A large number of staff across most teams - how good the NEC are at listening to the kind of
were actively involved in trawling members, evidence we’ll produce?” and was told: “As long
post holders and potential candidates social as our team don’t take the piss - they’ll get used
media accounts seeking evidence that might to rubber stamping the recommendations.”
be used against them – although it was unclear
C2.30 It appears to us that only a handful of GLU
to me whether this was as volunteers or on a staff knew the full details of the infrastructure
specific request from the compliance unit.” surrounding the validation exercise – for example,
the words on the “flagged list”. It may well have
been the case that even the junior staff carrying
out the exercise believed that the initial searches
were targeting the Left and Right equally. We
also accept that even those who knew that the
system was targeting the Left believed that it
constituted a necessary “fight back” against
attempted hard Left infiltration and was in their
view justified (though none of the witnesses we
spoke to offered that explanation).

44 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C2.31 In our view, however, this was by and large a C2.34 The same GLU staff member told us that that
factionally slanted exercise, designed and carried had changed after 2015, when both the volume
out with a startling lack of transparency, which had of disciplinary cases and the level of LOTO
the goal of undermining Jeremy Corbyn’s chances interference increased dramatically:
in the leadership elections. It cemented mistrust of
the motives of HQ staff in LOTO. It also embedded “LOTO actively opposed or undermined
an extremely damaging conviction amongst parts decisions, while attempting to give the
of the membership that the Party’s disciplinary
appearance that decisions were made
system was rigged against them; this allowed the
false idea that complaints of antisemitism were
solely by officers of the party […] decisions
being fabricated as part of a “witch hunt” to take to suspend individual members or take
hold more easily than it otherwise would have, action at all were increasingly challenged or
and made the handling of complaints in the years questioned by members of staff in LOTO […]
ahead substantially harder. [GLU staff] felt increasingly pressurised and
unable to make our own decisions”
C2.32 Moreover the extent of this validation exercise (or
‘Trotspotting’ depending on your factional point
of view) was undoubtedly demanding on the
“It became a regular occurrence for GLU
time and priorities of several GLU staff. In that to receive emails from many staff in LOTO
sense it seems to us that at least to a degree it is or elsewhere asking about cases […] or
correct to assert that it did divert GLU staff from calling […] to intervene. I believe LOTO
a focus on complaints and disciplinary action on felt GLU should not be making decisions
antisemitism and other disciplinary cases.
on suspensions and cases without prior
agreement and sign off by the leader’s office”
Alleged interference by
Another member of GLU staff agreed:
LOTO staff and NEC members
in complaints “Labour staff were determined to stamp out
anti-Semitism across the Party but were
2015 - 2018 hindered from taking decisive action by
LOTO staff”
C2.33 Prior to the increase in disciplinary cases after
2015, we understand that LOTO generally had C2.35 One senior member of GLU staff told us that
no involvement in disciplinary cases (which were intervention by LOTO “or their supporters in the
relatively few in number) other than high profile media or online” happened in “many thousands”
ones, on which the leader was briefed. One long- of cases. Others told us that many of these
standing member of GLU staff told us that, under interventions took place at the regular meetings
previous leaders, LOTO involvement in such held between LOTO and HQ staff on Tuesdays
cases “was not a formal layer of ‘sign off’” but and Thursdays, and in subsequent telephone calls
a means of ensuring that “the Party was acting about the cases that had been discussed. We have
‘as one’ on any individual matter […] so that also been told that LOTO staff regularly requested
announcements or decisions could be made on copies of papers due to be sent to the NEC
a coordinated basis” in order to give “officers a Disputes Panel, and that the recommendations for
level of political cover for making hard decisions”. disciplinary action set out in those papers were then
challenged by LOTO staff outside of NEC meetings
(as well as within them). In most cases, these are
not the kind of interventions of which documentary
proof would exist.

45 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C2.36 A number of cases were flagged with us as C2.39 Members of GLU staff told us, however, that
examples of LOTO interference. As explained LOTO refused to have the second suspension
above, we have not reproduced the analysis put on the NEC’s agenda in March 2018, and that
conducted by the EHRC; we do not have the the General Secretary in the end had to impose
complete correspondence in relation to any the second suspension himself using delegated
individual case, and such an analysis is beyond powers. GLU staff we spoke to were convinced
the scope of this report in any event. We will, that LOTO had been trying to find a way to go easy
though, look at a key case illustrating the ways on Ken Livingstone, though there was a lack of
in which LOTO interference is said to have agreement about what LOTO’s precise objective
manifested itself in the period 2015 – 2018 (Ken had been. One senior member of GLU staff told
Livingstone) and 2018 - 2019 (Palestine Live). We us that “action on this case was delayed by LOTO
have chosen the examples in question because and it is my belief that they did so to protect Ken
they were mentioned to us frequently in evidence Livingstone and arrange an ‘easy way out’ via his
as examples of the adverse consequences of the agreed resignation from the Party some weeks
dysfunctional GLU/LOTO dynamic, and as such later.” Another told us that the suggestion that
illustrate (at the least) what each faction thought LOTO had sought to persuade Ken Livingstone
was happening. to resign (which was also made in the Leaked
Report) was “a lie”, saying that “[LOTO’s team]
weren’t trying to get Ken Livingstone to resign […]
Ken Livingstone They wanted Ken Livingstone back in the Labour
Party. That’s what they asked”.
C2.37 The NCC imposed a two year suspension on Ken
Livingstone in April 2017 after he made certain
C2.40 The matter was discussed in a WhatsApp
comments. After the NCC hearing, he reiterated
group of four senior LOTO/GLU staff. One of
the same comments, leading to calls for further
the LOTO members asked in February 2018 for
proceedings against him. Jeremy Corbyn issued
“lines to take” as to why the case had not been
a statement saying “It is deeply disappointing that,
progressed the previous year, and was told
despite his long record of standing up to racism,
that it had not been prioritised due to sexual
Ken has failed to acknowledge or apologise
harassment cases and the general election. On
for the hurt he has caused. Many people are
a couple of occasions in the chat, the LOTO staff
understandably upset that he has continued to
suggested moving the discussion to a telephone
make offensive remarks which could open him to
call, so it is hard to deduce from the transcripts
further disciplinary action.”
what their position was. One of the GLU members
of the group described to us a conference call in
C2.38 A senior member of GLU staff told us that they
which they were told, essentially, not to suspend
had investigated the further comments straight
Ken Livingstone unless they also disciplined
away, but decided to wait until the expiry of
an MP on the Right who had been accused of
Ken Livingstone’s first suspension (in April
misconduct in relation to a verbal confrontation
2018) before putting the new allegations to Ken
with Ken Livingstone. Another told us that, in a
Livingstone and imposing a fresh administrative
separate call:
suspension; that was because it was assumed that
the new suspension would immediately trigger a
letter before action (or possibly an application “essentially [the LOTO members] sounded
for an injunction) from Ken Livingstone, which me out and asked me about Iain [McNicol]
they thought it was better to defer. That view was simply removing Ken Livingstone’s
apparently shored up over the course of 2017 by suspension. Not doing the investigation
the need to deal with disciplinary cases arising
[…] they said – we have been to see him,
from the #MeToo movement, and then the general
we’ve been to his house, [we have] got an
election. The plan was to ask the NEC to consider
imposing the new suspension at its March 2018 agreement with him that he’s never going to
meeting. None of the GLU witnesses we spoke to talk about antisemitism again in the media.
denied that the decision to wait until 2018 before He’s very important to the left and to Jeremy.
taking further formal action was taken by GLU. And Jeremy wants him back in the Party.”

46 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C2.41 It seems that some junior LOTO staff, at least, C2.44 Some individuals on both sides emphatically
were keen for the second suspension to be and genuinely concluded that the other side was
progressed, in part due to concerns about bad trying to delay and/or undermine the proceedings
publicity were Ken Livingstone to be reinstated in relation to Ken Livingstone for factional reasons
in April 2018 (just before the local elections). (in LOTO’s case, because they saw him as an
One junior LOTO employee emailed a senior ally, or in GLU’s case, because they saw this as
member of GLU staff on 17 January 2018 an opportunity to damage Jeremy Corbyn).
expressing concern and asking whether a
second suspension had been imposed. She was
told that: “A second suspension was not applied,
2018 - 2019
so he will come back into membership in April.
C2.45 Most senior GLU staff who we spoke to accepted
The Party received a small number of complaints
that direct interference by LOTO staff happened
about his comments after the NCC hearing. We
only in a handful of cases, but said that the
haven’t formally opened a new investigation
interference was “part of a bigger picture which
yet, and that is a conversation we will have over
includes the NEC”, as well as pressure from
here.” The LOTO staffer then asked whether the
CLPs and members; they say that there was a
March 2018 NEC meeting could be used to “have
cumulative “chilling effect”. One told us that “the
his suspension lengthened”, and was told that:
combination of political pressure – or at the very
“Once the suspension ends he’s automatically
least a lack of political cover – on decisions,
back in. It would come again to Disputes if we
combined with outright political interference
opened a new investigation into him.”
from individual NEC members […] meant that
disciplinary processes reached a near impasse.”
C2.42 Those replies came from the same senior member
of GLU staff who told us that the investigation
C2.46 In March to April 2018, a practice arose whereby
had been commenced and “almost completed”
the views of LOTO staff were routinely sought on
in 2017, and that the plan was always to put the
disciplinary matters by email. It was agreed by the
new administrative suspension before the NEC in
witnesses we spoke to that this was a GLU initiative
early 2018. If that was the case, it is not clear to
and not one that LOTO requested. GLU staff told us
us why it was not explained in the email chain
that they adopted this approach because LOTO’s
in question. Irrespective of the motives on either
“offline” involvement in, in particular, antisemitism
side, this exchange undermines the suggestion
cases had by that point become established and
that GLU staff were battling to push forward with
routine. Many GLU staff considered that the old
the second suspension but meeting blanket
system – whereby LOTO informally signed off on
LOTO resistance.
decisions and provided political cover for them –
should have been emulated by Jeremy Corbyn’s
C2.43 All in all, it seems to us that there was a lack of
team. In their view, however, Jeremy Corbyn’s
clarity within each of GLU and LOTO as to what
team either refused to sign off on decisions they
was happening with regard to Ken Livingstone’s
did not like, or sought to change them. That, we
second suspension, and a range of views as
are told, led GLU to seek LOTO’s formal written
to what should happen. Individuals within each
agreement to GLU’s proposed course of action in
team were not always fully aware of things
each case, thereby forcing them to either sign on
their colleagues had said, and communication
to disciplinary outcomes in advance or put their
between the two teams was even poorer. It
objections to them on the record:
seems to us that (given the profile of the case) it
would have helped matters significantly had GLU
explained their proposed approach to LOTO at
the outset, including their intention to delay the “political pressure […] combined
second suspension until 2018 (albeit without with outright political interference
seeking substantive input) – not least because
LOTO was expected to provide political cover for from individual NEC members […]
that approach. meant that disciplinary processes
reached a near impasse”

47 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 “I was totally and utterly exhausted […] sick […] [GLU staff] had chased these emails about
of the Unit and myself making decisions that four or five times over about a fortnight […] I
then were overturned by the leader’s office was like, […] and […] aren’t responding […]
[…] [It was decided] to involve them […] and this looks terrible, it looks like the leader’s
formally in the decision-making. So have office are holding up disciplinary action, so
it in writing […] what they wanted us to do, then I actually inserted myself into the email
because we were sick of making decisions chain […] that whole process of checking
and then being shouted at for making them cases came to an end when […] really clocked
and then having to backtrack on them […] on about what was going on […] and said why
I wanted them to be accountable for the are we being consulted on these, let’s remove
decisions they were asking us to make ourselves from this process, and then it ended
behind closed doors.” at that point.”

“This kind of interference led to us involving “all of the individuals that the complaints
LOTO more and more in decisions that they were about, I had not the faintest idea who
previously would not have had a say in so any of them were. None of them were friends
that we had a level of agreement from them, of mine, as far as I knew none of them were
rather than being challenged or overturned associated to Jeremy Corbyn in any way
later on […] GLU staff were desperate to […] this picture was painted that we were
coordinate decisions with LOTO, but found protecting friends of Corbyn, but I didn’t
every attempt at doing that would descend know any of those people, I didn’t have any
into a fight, mutual distrust, questioning each loyalty to any of them in any way.”
others’ motives and very often an attempt
by LOTO or their allies to bypass the party’s Palestine Live
own rules to protect people who they felt
politically or personally close to.” C2.48 One matter which came up repeatedly in
evidence, and on which much of the reporting on
LOTO interference in disciplinary complaints has
“the formal communication from us to
focused, was the Palestine Live Facebook group,
establish a process to involve LOTO, that
which resulted in a number of suspensions from
wasn’t us taking initiative to set them up March 2018 (just as the GLU policy of effectively
[…] it was about formalising essentially a seeking LOTO sign-off came into effect).
process that existed anyway.”
C2.49 Various members were suspended from the Party
C2.47 This reasoning was not explained to LOTO’s team, over antisemitic posts made in the group, which
whose responses to requests made pursuant to were documented in a dossier presented to the
this strategy subsequently formed the basis of a Party in March 2018. A Jewish member on the
substantial amount of criticism. The requests for Left was one of those administratively suspended
comment on disciplinary cases made to senior (in early March 2018). His suspension caused
staff were initially ignored, and ended up finding some controversy, on the basis that it was
their way to a young and relatively inexperienced unclear whether his posts in the group had met
member of LOTO staff, who told us: the threshold for disciplinary action. Emails were
exchanged between members of GLU staff on
“[GLU staff] started emailing me and others 9 March 2018 saying they “just need the go-
these antisemitism complaints saying, what ahead from LOTO on this one in particular”;
subsequently, those requests were sent to LOTO
shall I do on this one, what shall I do on this
with a cover email which read “we would normally
one and, from my perspective, I just thought, if suspend with this. Views?”
we don’t respond or if I don’t respond, then we
will be accused of slowing down the process

48 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C2.50 A LOTO advisor was asked to comment on the
case following GLU’s requests for a steer on how
Other cases arising from
to proceed. The advisor stated that “I don’t know Palestine Live
him either but to accuse someone of anti-semitism
on these grounds doesn’t really stand up […] JC C2.54 A similar pattern played out in relation to other
interested in this one.” Following this advice, GLU cases arising from Palestine Live. Six further
was asked by LOTO to remove the suspension members involved in the group were highlighted
pending further consideration of the posts. by HQ for possible suspension. A series of emails
were sent to LOTO on the issue during the period
C2.51 On the same day, a LOTO staff member emailed 9 to 11 March 2018. One example read: “PLEASE
GLU asking for details of the suspension; she can we get a response to the below. The next thing
was told that details were with senior LOTO staff will be people saying we are soft on anti-semitism
members, who she then emailed saying “[i]s it or not acting” and “I know [a senior LOTO staff
OK for me to view the allegations against […]? member] and I talked about this yesterday, but
Jeremy has asked me to look into it urgently”. PLEASE can I get [an] agreement for these
suspensions. PLEEEEEEEEEASE”. On 19 March
C2.52 On 10 March 2018 LOTO provided its views 2018 GLU staff concluded that efforts to obtain
on the case to GLU. The email from a senior sign-off from LOTO had been unsuccessful. One
member of LOTO read: “I think to suspend this noted that they were “not getting anywhere with
guy for anti-Semitism is really problematic. None [two senior LOTO staff members] so I think we
of the posts can be identified as anti-Semitic in just suspend those in Palestinian [sic] Live which
the terms of the definition we have adopted as a we reckon have crossed the line”. It may be that
party or the guidance in the Chakrabarti report. GLU staff felt that they needed to double down
[…] if we’re more than very occasionally using on the policy of seeking sign off in advance, as
disciplinary action against Jewish members for one suspension had already been lifted on the
anti-Semitism, something’s going wrong, and advice of LOTO’s team.
we’re muddling up political disputes with racism.
Quite apart from this specific case, I think going C2.55 On 22 March 2018, an email chain regarding
forward we need to review where and how we’re the proposed suspensions was sent to a group
drawing the line if we’re going to have clear and which included members of LOTO and the
defensible processes”. Shortly afterwards, it was incoming General Secretary. The cover email
agreed that the suspension should be lifted. read: “Seeing as though we are on to suspending
some people – these are the rest of the problems
C2.53 In this instance GLU staff had asked for views in the Palestine Live Facebook group. Please can
from within LOTO on a particular case. Those we get a decision on these too?” When senior
views were given together with comments on LOTO staff did not acknowledge the email, a
the lack of clarity in the Party’s approach to young and relatively inexperienced member
antisemitism more broadly. This appears to us to of LOTO staff replied “Thanks very much for
be reasonable. Indeed, it does not appear that looping me in […] [we] will look at the information
GLU staff were themselves convinced of a cast- today and let you know what we think as soon as
iron case for suspension. possible.” We were told that this response was
motivated by a desire to remove any impression
that the leader’s office was deliberately holding
up disciplinary action.

C2.56 We understand, though we have not seen these

emails, that LOTO’s recommendation was to
immediately suspend three of the six individuals,
ask for more information about two, and take
no action against one. It was noted in regard to
one of the members that “…although her tweets
are drawing upon conspiracy theories, they
are just about Israel and no mention of Jews or
Jewishness”.

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C2.57 A member of GLU staff replied to LOTO’s C2.59 As the EHRC made clear, LOTO staff should
recommendations stating: “Thanks […] – we’ll not have been asked for their comments on
action this today”, then emailed again on 26 specific cases, nor should they have provided
March 2018 to say: “Thank you for your help them. Whilst LOTO will need to at least be
with agreeing recommendations for further aware of developments in politically sensitive
disciplinary action with the cases in recent weeks proceedings, and on the overall functioning
– it’s really helpful to have your input. With that of the complaints team, the EHRC found
in mind (and until the NEC working group on that “it is not legitimate for the leadership to
antisemitism concludes its report), I think it is influence, make recommendations, or make
worth me raising each case with you before we decisions on complaints outside of the formal
take further action on it.” A LOTO staff member complaints process.” But the EHRC did not,
replied to confirm that they would be happy to be as we understand it, find that there had been
consulted: “I think that sounds like a really good a systematic attempt by LOTO to slow down
way forward for the time being until the Working or dilute the Party’s response to antisemitism
Group is in force. Given the unfolding urgency of complaints, and we have seen no evidence of
getting this problem under control, it is helpful to that either. In our view the fundamental problems
have more people speeding the process along, were (a) a lack of clear guidance around how to
which I hope I can help with.” define antisemitism, what the threshold was for
suspension, et cetera, and (b) a lack of clarity
C2.58 The emails demonstrate that LOTO’s involvement (on both sides) around what LOTO’s role should
in disciplinary cases followed an enthusiastic have been in relation to disciplinary proceedings.
invitation from GLU. Whilst we accept that HQ
staff were apprehensive of LOTO interventions, C2.60 The level of allegations of antisemitism and the
we actually saw no documentary evidence of an concern of the Jewish communities and interest
organised and premeditated power grab by LOTO of the media should have led to a major move
- and in fact, there is some evidence that LOTO staff by the leadership, the NEC and all sections of
resisted invitations to expand their involvement. the Party to condemn and deal with signs of
On 27 March 2018, for example, when asked by antisemitism in the Party. Instead there appears
GLU to provide views on how to proceed with a to have been an assertion amongst supporters
complaint from a member of staff in the leader’s of Jeremy Corbyn, including on the NEC and
office, a LOTO staff member responded: “[We] amongst the membership, that the issue was
have been working with [GLU staff] to give a steer being exaggerated to undermine the leader.
on anti-Semitism complaints until the anti-Semitism Whilst there is some evidence that several
working group is up and running, and can make its complaints submitted did not involve members
own recommendations. However, we don’t want to of the Party and of some double counting, the
be involved in making a judgement on other sorts problem within parts of the Party was clearly of
of complaints which come in, and I’d not want to major significance.
get involved in something regarding someone
from our office, because of potential for conflict of C2.61 This denialism amongst some Jeremy Corbyn
interest etc. Please treat this as you would any other supporters may well have meant that GLU staff
complaint, and use your judgement and internal felt they could be pressurised by LOTO and that
processes to make the decision.” On 17 April 2018 all interventions from LOTO would be likely to be in
a request was made by LOTO that its staff were bad faith and trying to stop proper consideration
removed from emails regarding complaints. The of genuine antisemitism cases. Whilst it is our view
email noted “We think now that we are through the that this was not an entirely fair representation of
heavy influx of cases LOTO no longer needs to be LOTO’s position it is understandable that GLU
involved, except where politically sensitive or it’s to staff felt that pressure. The whole situation rapidly
do with an elected representative.” deteriorated as several on the Right did seize on
the issue as a way to attack Corbyn and several
on the Left adopted a position of denialism and
conspiracy theories. All of this led to further
misunderstanding, misrepresentation and
antagonism between LOTO and HQ, though it is
also true that conscientious staff on both sides
did try to keep lines open and constructive.

50 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 C2.65 We appreciate that the pressure GLU staff felt
Media criticism of LOTO themselves under rarely manifested itself in
involvement writing and it would be hard for us to comprehend
the cumulative effect of difficult NEC meetings,
C2.62 Some of the emails referred to above were telephone calls, in person confrontations and so
apparently leaked to the press, leading to stories on which have been described to us. We also
such as The Sun’s “Jeremy Corbyn’s cronies accept that the requests for formal written sign off
‘meddle in Labour anti-Semitism cases to stop made in March to April 2018 were seen by many
their friends getting kicked out of party’” on 5 GLU staff as a necessary means of pushing those
March 2019. There are other similar examples, invisible pressures into the open and forcing
such as an article published by Sky News on the LOTO to show their hand, but GLU staff should
same day and an article by the Times reported not have been making requests to LOTO for their
on 31 March 2019. input and there may have been mixed motives in
doing so.
C2.63 In July 2019, a member of GLU staff was
shown in the BBC Panorama programme “Is C2.66 Based on the evidence we have seen, however,
Labour Anti-Semitic?” saying that the 10 March we consider that the narrative put forward in
2018 email from a senior LOTO staff member relation to (in particular) the March to April 2018
quoted above in relation to a Jewish member emails was partial and misleading. The emails
on the Left had been interpreted in HQ as “the sent in that period of 2 months undoubtedly
leader’s office requesting to be involved directly demonstrate the kind of blurring of functions
in the disciplinary process. This is not a helpful which the EHRC found to be unlawful; GLU staff
suggestion, it is an instruction […] It’s all framed were wrong to seek LOTO staff’s substantive
as a suggestion, but this is not some junior staff at input into disciplinary cases, and LOTO staff
the leader’s office, this is [a senior LOTO member] were wrong to give it. The advice from two
part of Jeremy Corbyn’s inner circle […] when LOTO staff members which was subsequently
he says ‘I think we need to review this process criticised was, however, requested insistently
going forward’, that isn’t a suggestion. That’s him by GLU and in our view provided in good
instructing what he expects to happen.” faith; one LOTO staff member in particular was
thanked effusively by GLU for giving it. It is
C2.64 A Jewish Chronicle article from around the same proper to criticise the blurring of functions and/
time quoted a member of GLU staff suggesting or the substance of LOTO’s advice (about which
that LOTO’s office had “started involving we make no comment); in our view it is entirely
themselves in individual cases – whether it was misleading, however, to imply that these emails
with [a CLP member]or [a Jewish member on in themselves were evidence of those LOTO staff
the Left]. With both of those, the leader’s office members inserting themselves unbidden into the
directly intervened – very heavily […] I had taken disciplinary process for factional reasons.
decisions to suspend people such as [the Jewish
member on the Left] and [the CLP member] and
yet I was for the first time instructed that I had to
get it cleared by [a senior LOTO staff member’s]
The whole situation rapidly
office […] then came an email from [another
senior LOTO staff member] telling me that “JC” deteriorated as several on the
was “interested in this one”. Right did seize on the issue as a way
to attack Corbyn and several on the
Left adopted a position of denialism
and conspiracy theories.

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C2.67 Numerous examples of LOTO pressure and
interference were cited by the respondents to this
Inquiry (and in the Panorama programme) which
do not (unlike the alleged March to April 2018
interferences) involve paper trails, and which are
as such harder to prove or disprove. We cannot
make any specific findings in relation to those;
any inquiry into their veracity would have been
mired in uncertainty and inevitably unproductive.
We accept, in broad terms, that there was a
cumulative build-up of pressure on GLU staff in
this period, not least from parts of the membership
falsely accusing them of a “witch hunt” in relation
to antisemitism, and that they were operating in
an extremely difficult environment. It is, however,
clear that in some cases wires were crossed,
interventions were misunderstood, and individuals
were unfairly maligned. 

52 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

Allegation 3
Factionalism adversely impacted on other areas of the
Party’s work in the relevant period

Summary and Conclusions “disunity, division and factionalism have seriously

hampered Labour’s electoral fortunes. Unless
Factionalism permeated relationships between the the Party goes through a process of collective
Party, HQ and LOTO, and compounded the complete internal healing and reflection, then the very
failure to recognise and respect their respective roles. difficult task of building a winning coalition will
This was the source of many of the problems which
fail. Every member, every part, every grouping
beset the operation of the Party. We concentrate
particularly on the issue of staffing and recruitment and every tradition within Labour has some
but the failure affected other areas too, such as media reflecting to do, and all parts of the party have
management and fundraising. It became endemic a contribution to make to the future. There is no
throughout the organisation. one part or view that has a monopoly on being
“correct”. Indeed, Labour’s founding principles
Staff in HQ and LOTO both genuinely believed that
are that, as a Party, we should reflect the country
the other side was trying to sabotage their work in this
period – sometimes with a degree of justification, and and the broad-based opinion across our wider
sometimes not. In simple terms, each faction believed movement.”
the other had “started it” when it came to obstructionist
behaviour, and that they were only responding in The leader and the leader’s office should be able
kind (which in turn strengthened the other faction’s to expect broad political support from the Party
conviction that they were under attack, and so on). bureaucracy; and the Party’s fulltime staff should
The mistrust within the Party was accordingly self- expect the leader and LOTO to respect their role as
perpetuating and prevented it from carrying out some the civil service of the Party and enforcers of Party
of its most basic functions effectively. rules. In the period we are considering neither of these
aspects of mutual respect appears to have operated.
It seems to us that many on both the Left and the Right
were (and in many cases still are) so firmly convinced
of being the wronged party that all evidence of failings
within their own faction was dismissed. The reality of
what happened in this period is much more nuanced;
many (though not all) of the issues came down to poor
communication and paranoia rather than bad faith
actors. Again, we wish to echo the Labour Together
Report:

53 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

Scope Lack of clarity around roles
C3.1 Having considered factionalism’s impact on the C3.4 As set out in our consideration of Allegation
antisemitism complaints process, in this section 1, many of Jeremy Corbyn’s staff from 2015
we will consider the extent to which it adversely onwards were recruited from outside the
affected the Party’s other work in the relevant traditional pool, resulting in a LOTO team that
period. Its impact on the Party’s campaign in was less familiar than its predecessors with the
the 2017 general election, which is the subject way the Party machinery worked, including the
of particular focus within the Leaked Report, is way in which functions and responsibilities were
considered in the next section. divided between LOTO and HQ.

C3.5 It is clear that recruitment became a key

Overall comments battleground in the Party’s broader power
struggle, resulting in attempts by both sides to
C3.2 The operations of HQ and of LOTO, whilst
block the other’s proposed hires. Strictly LOTO
separate, should be mutually reinforcing and
had no formal role in appointments to HQ – they
directed toward the same goals, including, in
are made by senior officials for junior posts and
particular, winning elections. However the roles
the NEC for senior posts. It is nevertheless the
of the two are very different and demand different
case that successive leaders have often had
approaches and hence also different balances of
strong views on who should occupy key positions
staff. The Leaked Report focuses on the extent
at HQ and at regional levels – and sometimes
to which the Party’s Right was distracted from
who should be removed – but these were
that goal by factional endeavours in the period
usually exerted via informal pressure or through
2015 – 2019. It seems to us, however, that both
NEC allies. The Corbyn office seems to have
the Left and the Right factions were substantially
considered it a key part of the Corbyn Project
focused on shoring up their own power within the
to change the balance and nature of permanent
Party in this period, with electoral success often
staff. Not surprisingly they faced resistance.
seemingly a secondary concern.
LOTO staff told us, for example, that “from the
very outset, any decisions that we wanted
C3.3 We outline below three of the main (interrelated)
implemented around staffing and resources,
issues which the factional tensions within the
[HQ staff were] very obstructive”, and that “all
Party gave rise to in this period (lack of clarity
discussion of further hires [in the digital team]
around roles; poor sharing of information and
was repeatedly kicked into the long grass.”
resources; and a culture of leaks), followed by an
analysis of the way in which those issues came
C3.6 This position was further complicated by the dual
to a head in relation to the proposed community
designation of senior LOTO staff as Directors of
organising programme.
the Party – a move that had been introduced in
2013 when Ed Miliband was leader - supposedly
to improve relations but it implied they had a role in
HQ and regional staff management and direction.
Towards the end of the Jeremy Corbyn period this
It seems to us that both the Left and
was aggravated by senior LOTO staff being given
the Right factions were substantially clear managerial functions in Southside. This had
focused on shoring up their own the effect of making HQ staff more uneasy about
their future deployment and employment.
power within the Party in this
period, with electoral success often
seemingly a secondary concern.

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C3.7 Similarly, HQ staff told us that their proposed hires
were frequently subject to LOTO interference and
A culture of leaks
blocked; for example, we heard that they were
C3.10 The problem of leaking and hostile briefing by
forced by LOTO to withdraw adverts for regional
one faction within the Party against another was
governance officers to assist with disciplinary
not a novel one in 2015. It did, however, reach
cases in the regions. The discussions in the
unprecedented levels in the uniquely toxic post-
SMT WhatsApp transcripts indicate that HQ staff
2015 atmosphere. Like so many of the problems
were willing, however, to try to force through
caused by factionalism, it was self-perpetuating,
hires without LOTO approval where they felt they
with each new affront triggering a response in kind.
had to. For example, in early 2017, a member of
the senior management team asked “on these C3.11 It is clear from the nature of the stories briefed in
[regional office] roles…are we going ahead even this period, and the outlets they appeared in, that
though Loto said last week to halt everything until both factions engaged in “friendly fire”, though
[community organisers] sorted out” and was told: none of the witnesses we spoke to admitted to
“Go ahead…They are now trying to stop digital. briefing against their colleagues.
Also go ahead with that.” At around the same
time another manager said “Job offers being C3.12 HQ staff told us about negative stories being
made this week…Just need to push through the briefed about them, saying that it was unheard
digital offers and then we’ve got everything. Can of for Party staff (as opposed to MPs) to be the
shut the gates then.” subject of those kind of attacks prior to 2015:
“despite […] being Party staff for a long time, I
C3.8 Senior LOTO staff concluded that the only way to think I managed to keep my name out of the press
progress Jeremy Corbyn’s agenda was through pretty much wholly for years and then suddenly,
direct hires to LOTO, leading to a dramatic you know, I was being named in articles by Paul
“insourcing” of functions previously based in Waugh and by other people […] that was a new
HQ and the unprecedented growth of the LOTO thing for us.”
team. This led to roles being duplicated across
almost all of the Party’s areas of work. The result C3.13 The leaking of negative stories was also utilised
was conflict between individuals performing heavily against LOTO, possibly because there
parallel roles, confusion over strategy, and a was greater mainstream press interest in
lack of clarity about where decision-making negative stories about Jeremy Corbyn and his
responsibility lay. All of this reinforced a defensive team than there was in negative stories about
tendency towards siloed working which in turn largely unknown HQ staff. Witnesses from LOTO/
made the problems worse. the Party’s Left told us:

C3.9 The expansion of the LOTO team was not

“very few people were aware I worked for
combined with an immediate reduction in HQ
staff, and indeed Jeremy Corbyn wrote to the Labour Party, until an announcement
staff representatives on 20 September 2016 that I was a “new starter” went out in a
to confirm that “I, and my senior management “staff bulletin” to Party staff in late August.
team, are not supportive of any compulsory Immediately following this, James Lyons
redundancies. At this stage, no changes to staff from The Sunday Times contacted me
have been proposed and nor would they ever be
asking about my employment.”
outside of the context of a properly structured
change management programme”. Many in HQ
felt, however, that that was LOTO’s longer-term
objective, even if it had to be achieved indirectly.

55 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 “On the day that [I left my former job to C3.15 It also had a significant impact on staff
start working for the Party], I was contacted wellbeing, and hindered the Party’s operational
effectiveness, since it inhibited colleagues’ ability
by [a journalist] then working at the Times
to communicate freely and frankly. The fear of
newspaper, who asked a number of leaks gave rise to (and/or was used to justify) the
questions about my political activities over a use of non-Party communication methods (such
decade ago. […]There are a limited number as the use of personal email addresses, or the
of places that news of my employment could widespread use of WhatsApp). Staff should be
have come from: plausibly, it can only have using internal Party communications systems
without fear of their communications being
been leaked by Labour Party staff. […] I was
improperly shared or otherwise misused. That
personally the victim of a fairly major leak was not the case in this period.
of email correspondence on at least one
occasion that I can recall […] The issue with
leaks is not necessarily what is leaked, but
Poor sharing of information
that the possibility of a leak gets in the way and resources
of a frank discussion amongst staff. The fear
C3.16 Both HQ and LOTO accuse the other of a failure
of leaking completely erodes the trust that is to share necessary information and resources
essential to a properly functioning political throughout this period. This seems to us to have
operation.” had a number of possible causes: (1) deliberate
withholding of information in the hope of
“I tried to avoid ever writing anything down undermining the ability of individuals on the other
which was remotely controversial or […] side to do their job; (2) deliberate withholding of
information due to a fear that it would be leaked/
informative beyond the most routine stuff
misused; and (3) accidental withholding of
because it ended up, often within days, in the information due to a lack of clarity around roles/
Times or Huff Post or Guido or something who needed to know what. It speaks to the levels
[…] the level of leaking was stratospheric.” of antagonism that most of the witnesses we
spoke to were quick to put such incidents down
“Overheard conversations among Jeremy to reason (1), though we suspect (on the basis of
Corbyn’s staff had been leaked to the the evidence as a whole) that reasons (2) and (3)
were equally if not more prevalent.
media so we were conscious we had to be
extremely quiet when having conversations C3.17 HQ witnesses told us:
about anything that we didn’t want leaked.”
“[LOTO] ignored requests for information
C3.14 Needless to say, this kind of briefing undermined
or guidance, they didn’t reply to emails […]
public perceptions of the Party, both because it
added to the stream of negative stories about the They didn’t turn up to meetings, or they
Party which were already being generated by simply held their own without inviting anyone
its external opponents, and because the stories from HQ.”
with an obviously internal source highlighted the
Party’s disunity. “I found working with senior LOTO figures
to be completely chaotic, accusatory
and demoralising […] [One senior LOTO
employee] would cut me out of email chains
“The level of leaking was [and] would try to write her own papers for
stratospheric.” NEC Committees and not tell the GLU (who
were responsible for drafting and circulating
papers), and therefore decisions and
recommendations were often disjointed.”

56 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 “Due to the distrustful culture, it was an C3.19 There is certainly some evidence of such
increasingly uphill struggle to get sign off obstruction in the SMT WhatsApp transcripts
(though we note that we do not have any equivalent
[from LOTO] on key planning decisions,
transcripts of unguarded conversations between
establish regular conference planning LOTO staff). In some cases, the obstructionism
meetings, and confront some difficult issues may have been triggered by LOTO making
around conference arrangements. It was requests that in themselves were outside of Party
unnecessarily exhausting.” norms and/or were seen as a “power grab.”

C3.18 LOTO staff reported a similar experience: C3.20 Certainly, the Leaked Report is on occasion too
simplistic in its framing of extracts from the SMT
“Within days it became apparent that many WhatsApp transcripts as evidence of attempts by
HQ staff were unhappy about the democratic HQ to sabotage LOTO. For example, following a
leak of Party polling in 2017, one senior manager
and overwhelming result of the leadership
suggested that the polling company should be
election […] Within weeks, it was clear asked not to disclose information about who
that resources were being withheld – both had had access to the Dropbox from which the
staffing budgets within LOTO and budgets leak had occurred; the Leaked Report suggests
for new computers.” that they did so “specifically to prevent LOTO
staff from discovering the source of the leak”.
“Scant staffing resources were made The explicit suggestion is that the manager was
deliberately trying to thwart the leak investigation,
available [to the social media team], well
and the implication (in our view) is that they were
below the level that had existed for much of doing so because they knew something about
the 2010-15 parliament.” the source of the leak. The full discussion in the
transcripts, however, indicates that the manager
“There was always the feeling that there was seeking to retain control of the inquiry
was an underlying game being played when into the leak, rather than to stop it – the next
dealing with Southside, although of course it (unquoted) lines are: “Clearly the next thing will
be who leaked it…And I want to get the names of
was always impossible to put your finger on
everyone ASAP”. The SMT WhatsApp transcripts
what was happening. While I often suspected also make it clear that none of the participants in
there was foul play, it was always very subtle the discussion appeared to have any idea about
and difficult to prove. It would take the form of the source of the leak (and indeed the manager
manipulation of agendas, bending the rules in question was in our view genuinely concerned
to allow certain people to speak in meetings about it).
while blocking others, calling meetings when
C3.21 It is true, however, that members of the SMT
they had a majority, and blocking meetings WhatsApp groups were focused on what they
when they did not.” saw as protecting the Party from Jeremy Corbyn
rather than helping him to advance his agenda.
Though staff did not generally seek to exacerbate
LOTO’s operational problems, which were seen
as self-inflicted, they often passively observed
or even welcomed them. Some comments do
appear to show straightforward attempts to
hinder LOTO’s work (in their view, for the Party’s
greater good).

57 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

Community organisers “I think [community organising] was resisted
for two reasons. One is a view about how
C3.22 LOTO’s proposed community organisers (COs) elections should be run […] there was a
programme involved hiring COs to work in the particular way of doing elections which had
regions. COs were to be based in the regions but become very entrenched under the Blair/
with a direct line to LOTO, being line managed
Brown period and so some people didn’t
jointly by the lead CO (based in LOTO) and the
relevant regional director. A senior member of like a different way of doing it. And the other
LOTO staff told us that they had tried to involve reason was much more factional. Which is
HQ and the regions at the outset: “I went to every that it was perceived that the creation of
regional director and explained what we wanted community organisers in regional offices
to do and […] I explained that I wanted to move was seen as a way of Jeremy’s supporters
towards a joint management of staff. I explained
getting a presence in those offices and
I wanted everybody in community organising to
attend staff meetings, to be based in offices, for creating a separate power base.”
the regional directors to know where they were at
C3.24 Some of the HQ and regional staff we spoke to
every moment of the day. To work jointly on plans
did not feel that LOTO’s attempts “to give them
that [regional directors] had started, you know;
the impression that they were working jointly with
if there was any embryonic work in community
us on it” were genuine, however, and concluded
organising we would build it. I told them to come
that meaningful compromise was not on the table.
and speak to me about resources. To give them
Some HQ witnesses we spoke to described their
the impression that they were working jointly with
firm convictions, borne of years of experience,
us on it.”
that the scheme would not be effective and
C3.23 There is little evidence of such collaboration, would lead to breaches of electoral law. It is
however. It is fair to say that many HQ and also clear that many in HQ saw the scheme as
regional staff had fundamental concerns an attempt by LOTO to shore up its power base
about the scheme which could only have been – indeed, a member of the senior management
addressed by its abandonment, and many took a team who had responsibility for campaigning
stance of implacable opposition from the outset. saw the proposed restructuring as amounting to
In a written submission to this Inquiry, Jeremy constructive dismissal – and opposed it at least
Corbyn told us: “From my election in 2015 I in part on that basis. Even staff in HQ and the
made it clear that Community Organising was a regions who supported community organising in
priority. It met with nothing but obstruction and principle were opposed to the parallel structure
delay from Head Office and most of the Regional LOTO was proposing – not just because of the
and national offices of the Party.” Other senior threat it posed to their roles, but because of the
members of LOTO staff told us: dysfunction and conflict which they believed
a dual structure would inevitably create. One
member of the senior management team, for
“of course you will hear lots of information
example, told us that they had been “one of the
about ‘it was outside the structure, it was few that really believe in community organising”,
probably illegal, it was definitely a risk to but were adamant that the lead CO should be
health and safety’ – that was a narrative based in HQ, not in LOTO (a matter on which
that was built up to block and frustrate the LOTO was not willing to compromise).
implementation of community organising
[…] it was not blocked as a concept, it
was blocked because we wanted to bring
somebody in who would not be accountable
to [HQ], therefore would not be told to do
things in the same old way that had been
done before.”

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C3.25 HQ staff told us: “[The community organising scheme] cost
over £1 million and it was not an effective use
“anyone who’d worked for the Labour Party of resources. LOTO could not explain what
for longer than five minutes thought having the objectives of the community organising
staff working in seats or in regions not unit were or why they would be a more
responsible to regional directors, whose job effective approach to winning local elections
was to run operations on the ground and than traditional organising […] There was
manage political relationships and achieve no proper evidence base to this new form
outcomes for the Labour Party, was A) a of organising and indeed when it was used
massive waste of resources and B) a system in 2019 we suffered one of our worst results
designed to create conflict and designed to since the 1930s.”
undermine the existing staffing structures in
the Labour Party. That’s why professional C3.26 Certainly, there does not seem to have been
staff who worked for the Labour Party for much meaningful engagement by LOTO with
the concerns raised by HQ and regional staff,
a long time argued against it […] when you
which were seen as obstructionism. When the
have an election it’s a regional director’s
Community Organising Unit was eventually
job to ensure that everything that happens launched in 2018, it was largely without the
for the Labour Party is properly and legally support of HQ and regional staff. One senior
accounted for. If they don’t know what’s LOTO staff member described being faced with
going on they can’t do that, and you risk “an absolute hard wall” from HQ, which meant that
compromise was impossible (“of course I tried to
volunteer agents or paid members of staff
go over [the wall], I tried to go round it. And only
accidentally breaking the law. So it was
when we got to the end of the line did we say,
resisted, I think exceptionally sensibly, for OK we’re now implementing this”). Similarly, a
a long period of time. And it then […] was senior member of regional staff told us that they
made to be a totemic issue from the leader’s felt that their concerns were simply ignored until
office; it became a bit of a power struggle.” “it became abundantly clear that it was going to
have to happen, because if it didn’t happen, we
“to have a parallel set of staff on the ground, couldn’t move on in the debate […] I said to the
regional directors, look, we don’t think this is going
that didn’t report to head office […] we had
to work, but bluntly a decision has been made to
legal advice that it was problematic from an do it.” It was clear from the outset that there was
electoral point of view, problematic in terms no meeting of minds on this proposal.
of controlling your electoral spend […] it
was problematic in a sense of being able C3.27 In the event, the scheme achieved some
successes, but it operated in parallel to the
to understand what your key seats are and
existing campaigns team, which limited its
allocating [resources] when actually you’ve
effectiveness and exacerbated factional
got two separate teams, two separate staff, tensions. We were told that, despite nominally
working in the same area with the same being line managed jointly by the lead CO (based
responsibilities, perhaps working to different in LOTO) and the relevant regional director, the
priorities” COs took instructions primarily from LOTO, and
some regional directors felt that information
was withheld from them by the COs; we also
heard that some regional staff treated the COs
with suspicion and referred to them as “Jennie
[Formby]’s spies”.

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C3.28 It is difficult to say to what extent the difficulties C3.29 We agree with that analysis and consider that
encountered by the Unit could have been eased some of the tensions discussed above were
had it had HQ’s full support, and to what extent inevitable. They could, however, have been
the difficulties simply vindicated HQ’s concerns. eased – and the scheme improved – had both
Clearly, the scheme drew out tensions between sides made genuine attempts at collaboration.
traditional election strategies and more modern
methods which both pre- and post- date the C3.30 To that end there could and should have been a
particular factional tensions of the Corbyn era. greater degree of buy-in from HQ and regional
As identified in the Labour Together Report: staff. The idea of the scheme did have some merits
and we do not accept that it was effectively a
“one of the biggest problems of the 2019 non-starter; regional staff in particular could have
campaign was a failure of integration made valuable contributions to the scheme’s
implementation had they engaged with it, albeit
and coordination between community
that would have involved ceding a degree of
organising and other campaign work […] operational control, and their support would have
the establishment of a new community added clarity to the internal messaging about
organising structure side-by-side with its objectives. However, that would also have
older, parallel and sometimes conflicting involved LOTO accepting that there should have
systems created its own problems of been a degree of regional director management
of the COs.
strategic coordination and integration. The
roles and responsibilities of the Community C3.31 LOTO must therefore take an equal part of
Organising Unit weren’t clearly understood the blame for failing to secure that buy-in. The
across the Party. […] Some Labour Party scheme was primarily an attempt to shift control
staff felt that the Community Organising of the Party’s campaigning operation to the
elected leadership and to uproot the traditional
Unit worked at odds with their efforts and
way of doing things. It was framed as revolution
consumed campaign resources at their
rather than evolution, such that the Party’s
expense, while others felt the Community campaigning experts were led to conclude that
Organising team was subject to a level of their input was neither needed nor welcomed,
pressure and scrutiny not applied to other and a valuable resource was as such wasted.
parts of the operation. Too often, the result It became a totemic issue in relation to which
neither side could be seen to compromise; again,
was unproductive interpersonal or inter-
it seems to us that designing a system that would
organisational tensions, where there should
achieve the best possible electoral outcome was
have been cooperation and synergy. As a secondary concern for both sides.
noted above, much of this is a symptomatic
consequence of the historic unresolved
tensions between community organising
models and traditional electioneering. In
this election, cultural and organisational
fault lines were reinforced by political and
“factional” divisions, but the basic clash of
philosophies and priorities has proved an
obstacle to the Party’s efforts to learn from
community organising in the past, including
the 2010 to 2015 period.”

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C3.32 The dispute about COs is in effect a mirror image
of the dispute about the proposal for regional
governance officers, which we refer to above.

• the proposal for regional governance officers

to help address the problems in the complaints
and disciplinary process appears to have
been opposed and eventually thwarted by
opposition from LOTO and the Left on the
NEC; and

• the proposal for COs to upgrade the

organising capability was opposed by HQ and
regional staff and the Right on the NEC; they
were appointed but opposed and eventually
abolished.

Both were in essence good ideas; with both there

were valid operational concerns about how they
would operate and fit in with the existing system.
But opposition and support were primarily on
crude factional grounds rather than any rational
discussion on how best to implement them.
They are both clear examples of operational
dysfunction due to factionalism.

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Allegation 4
The Party’s results in the 2017 general election were either
(i) undermined by factionalism or (ii) deliberately sabotaged by one faction

Summary and Conclusions (3) Did HQ staff stick to a defensive strategy in bad
faith, because they wanted to lose the election?
We find, in short, as follows:
No. We find that HQ staff genuinely considered that
a primarily defensive strategy would secure the best
(1) What was the disagreement over strategy
result for the Party, and we have not seen evidence
between LOTO and HQ?
to suggest that such a strategy was advanced in bad
From early in the campaign LOTO wished to pursue a faith. More broadly the evidence available to us did
more aggressive strategy, seeking to win significantly not support claims that HQ staff wanted the Party to
more new seats than HQ and the regions seemed to do badly in the 2017 general election (though many
be targeting (as well as retaining all existing Labour expected it to, and some had mixed feelings about
held ones). HQ staff believed that the polls, at the what the better than anticipated result would mean for
beginning of the campaign, required a more cautious the Party’s future and for their own roles).
defensive strategy; the polls improved through the
(4) Did HQ staff pursue the defensive strategy with
campaign but the main HQ strategy did not depart
sufficient transparency?
from that position until late in the campaign if at all.

We find that the decision to set up the Ergon House

(2) Did factionalism influence decisions about
operation covertly and divert money and personnel
strategy and resource allocation?
there without authority of the Campaign Committee,
Yes. There is some evidence that both sides improperly whilst not illegal, departed from the approved strategy;
based resourcing decisions on a combination of it was as such wrong.
electoral need and factional alignment, when only
(5) Did the diversion of funds and personnel into
electoral need should have been considered. We find
this Ergon House operation lose the Party the
that both HQ staff and LOTO staff wanted the Party
general election?
to win with as many of their favoured MPs in place
as possible, which prevented fully objective decision-
We were not in a position to commission any original
making; the two sides were trying to win in different
psephological analysis, but we consider it to be highly
ways.
unlikely.
Some senior HQ staff had the ability to implement
Nevertheless, the Ergon House operation was wrong.
resourcing decisions covertly. A handful of staff in
Ergon House created an additional fund for printing
costs under code GEL001 (spending some £135,000
in total on campaigns supportive of sitting largely anti-
Corbyn MPs and not on campaigns for pro-Corbyn
candidates in potentially Tory winnable seats).

62 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 • Did HQ staff stick to a defensive strategy in bad
Scope faith, because they wanted to lose the election?
C4.1 It is clear that factionalism detrimentally affected the
• Did HQ staff pursue the defensive strategy
Party’s performance in the 2017 general election
with sufficient transparency?
in a broad sense, with the issues described in
the previous section all impacting on the Party’s
• Did the diversion of funds and personnel into
operational effectiveness and the coherence of
this Ergon House operation lose the Party the
its messaging. In this section we consider the
general election?
consequences of the specific disagreement
between the factions in relation to election strategy.
(1) What was the
C4.2 One of the most striking allegations in the Leaked
Report is the suggestion that the defensive
disagreement over strategy
strategy pursued by HQ staff in the 2017 between LOTO and HQ?
campaign was responsible for the Party’s failure
to secure a majority, or at least for its failure to C4.6 On 18 April 2017, Theresa May announced that
secure enough seats to make a Labour-led she planned to call an early general election to
government feasible. take place on 8 June 2017.

C4.3 Some of the subsequent reporting has taken the C4.7 When the election was called, the Conservatives
Leaked Report’s thesis further, suggesting that HQ were polling on average some 20 points ahead,
staff followed a flawed strategy deliberately in order which put them on course for a landslide victory –
to protect their favoured MPs, not because they and the Party on course for what one HQ witness
necessarily thought it would secure the best result described as “electoral oblivion”. As at 26 April
overall. Some have gone further still, suggesting that 2017, Jeremy Corbyn’s net favourability rating was
HQ pursued a flawed strategy and/or failed to do at -4212 and some regional staff and volunteers felt
their jobs effectively because they knew it would cost that his leadership was an “enormous drag” on the
the Party seats – that is, that they took the approach Labour brand as the campaign got underway and
they did in order to secure a Conservative victory. initial decisions were made about strategy.

C4.4 We should note at the outset that the evidence C4.8 Broadly speaking, in a general election
we have seen does not lend itself to a definitive campaign, seats are identified by the Party as
conclusion as to which side was right about falling into one of the following categories:
strategy. Any attempt to set out a counterfactual
history – by modelling, for example, the vote • Labour-held seats which are secure enough
share that alternative seat targeting would have to be held with no national resourcing;
secured – would be purely speculative. We
will, however, consider the extent to which the • key seats to be provided with national resources
strategic thinking of both sides was clouded (including both seats which could be lost without
by factionalism rather than being data led, and national support, and seats held by other parties
whether strategies were pursued in bad faith. which are considered winnable); and

C4.5 The five questions we seek to address in this • opposition-held seats which are too distant a
section are: prospect to merit national funding.

• What was the disagreement over strategy

between LOTO and HQ (and how was HQ’s
preferred strategy pursued from Ergon House)?11

• Did factionalism influence decisions about

strategy and resource allocation?

11
an overspill office established in what had previously been the base for the Party’s London region.
12
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/04/26/corbyn-favourability-remains-rock-bottom-ahead-gen

63 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C4.9 HQ’s analysis at the outset was that the polling on 3 May 2017 (and Jeremy Corbyn started high
data demanded a strategy which focused on visibility campaigning) though even they could
shoring up seats currently held by the Party which not have predicted that the Conservatives would
were considered to be at risk, rather than on run such a poor campaign, which was of course
seeking to gain target seats held by other parties a major factor in the polls tightening.
(the defensive strategy) – that is, they considered
that the key seats list, at the margins, should tend C4.13 One witness pointed out that Jeremy Corbyn’s
towards drawing in seats which would otherwise ally Len McCluskey, General Secretary of Unite,
be in the first category, rather than seats which was arguing as late as 16 May 2017 that: “if
would otherwise be in the third category. Labour can hold on to 200 seats or so it will be
a successful campaign. It will mean that Theresa
C4.10 In our view the concerns of HQ staff at the outset May will have had an election, will have increased
of the campaign were both reasonable and her majority but not dramatically.”13
genuinely held, and indeed they were shared by
many on the Left. C4.14 LOTO sources told us that the Election Committee’s
plan was to adopt a graduated strategy, which
C4.11 LOTO accepted the logic of a defensive approach was to become increasingly offensive as resource
at the outset. We understand that, in a meeting availability and polling allowed: “(1) To defend
immediately after the election was called, a wholly all our existing seats (2) Deny the Tories and
defensive strategy was agreed; while no seats their allies a majority (3) Gain more seats than
were to be abandoned, some with very narrow the Tories (4) Win an overall majority”. From
majorities were to be treated as likely to be lost LOTO’s perspective, the polling improved almost
and given less support. The key seats list was not immediately after the election was called; many in
firm at this stage, but certain expenditure had to be LOTO accordingly became convinced of the case
incurred on the basis of this provisional list before for moving through the graduated stages relatively
the window in which national spending could be quickly and shifting to a strategy which focused
used to support local campaigning closed upon resources on trying to gain enough seats to win a
the dissolution of Parliament. majority (the offensive strategy / campaign to win).

C4.12 Some LOTO witnesses told us that they advocated C4.15 It is certainly true that the Party’s polling improved
a “campaign to win” from day one. However, one rapidly almost as soon as the election was called,
HQ source described such claims “as an attempt though the Conservatives’ ratings also initially
to rewrite history. There was nobody saying rose (largely, it appears, at the expense of UKIP).
we were going to win.” Many were, however, The shift in the polls across the campaign is
convinced that the Party’s polling would improve shown in the below findings by three different
once the broadcast impartiality rules kicked in kinds of opinion poll:13

Percentage Opinion Poll Gap Between the Conservatives

and Labour 2017 Citing Different Sorts of Polls
YOUGOV SURVATION IPSOS MORI

Late April 13% 11% 23%

Mid May 13% 9% 15%
Late May 14% 6% 5%
Late June 7% 1% 5%

This shows that the landslide implying Conservative lead when the election was called averaged 18% in late April, fell to
an average of 5% in the penultimate week and fell to a potentially hung parliament at an average of 4% in the last week.
Seeing those figures move should have convinced all factions of the need to rapidly shift the campaign focus.

13
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/16/success-for-labour-in-election-would-be-200-seats-says-mccluskey

64 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C4.16 We received contradictory evidence from HQ regional directors), all of whom can delegate that
and LOTO as to the extent to which a decisive function.14 There is no provision in statute for LOTO
break from the defensive strategy was proposed to demand that staff ignore the directions of the
by LOTO as the polling changed. We are told that General Secretary or other authorised individuals
a list of 268 seats to be provided with immediate regarding campaign spending. We agree with
support, including 32 offensive targets, was the witness who observed that “Parliament did
agreed shortly after the election was called; both not apparently foresee a circumstance in which
sides agree that, in late April 2017, the key seats the registered leader and registered treasurer of
list was expanded to include 326 seats (including a registered political party were fundamentally at
93 offensive targets). We were told repeatedly by loggerheads on the electoral strategy that party
supporters of Jeremy Corbyn that HQ staff were ought to pursue.”
too reluctant to implement the changing strategy
or to fully resource the offensive seats. C4.20 The Party’s own rules, however, are another matter.
The Rule Book says that: “The Leader shall in
C4.17 The gap between the two main parties only started conjunction with the NEC have overall responsibility
to narrow significantly when the Conservatives’ poll for all elections and shall appoint a Campaign Co-
numbers started to drop from mid/late May 2017, ordinator and a Campaign Committee to ensure
in part due to controversy around the proposed that all Party election campaigns report to the
“dementia tax” revealed in the Conservatives’ Leader and receive the support and assistance
manifesto on 18 May (in relation to which Theresa they need.”15 Whilst the General Secretary and
May was forced to announce a U-turn on 22 May, their delegates have the power to approve election
the same day as the Manchester Arena terrorist spending, it is assumed that they will do so in line with
attack). We accept that a degree of reticence the strategy agreed by the Campaign Committee
about changing tack was justified until the shift and the Campaign Co-ordinator appointed by the
was clearly established (not least because seats leader and report to that Campaign Committee.
with a high proportion of early postal voters can
remain, in reality, marginal even after the polls C4.21 It appears that HQ staff stayed on the right side of
have shifted in one side’s favour). the statutory requirements, and indeed designed
the Ergon House scheme (discussed below)
C4.18 We also accept that it is logistically difficult to in order to do so. A senior member of HQ staff
change strategy midway through a short election told us that the Campaign Committee would not
campaign, and that some LOTO staff were too make spending decisions and simply would not
quick to blame this on HQ reticence. Whilst we sign things off. The same senior staff member
agree with the LOTO witness who suggested that further explained that he did have some budgets
“the essential requirement of an election strategy is of which the Campaign Committee were unaware,
that it needs to be flexible”, it is also true that some and that were used to support some campaigns
campaign resources have a deployment time of around the country, but maintained that he was
weeks and cannot be diverted instantaneously. legally entitled to do so as a budget holder, and
One witness pointed out that many resources (such that everything he did was signed off by the
as blanket mailings booked weeks in advance, or General Secretary and reported appropriately
organisers on the ground) are hard to divert even to the Electoral Commission. Whilst the statutory
if priorities change, albeit others (such as digital position may have been in order it would have
spend) are not. As they put it, “Oiltankers are hard been customary for strategic Election Campaign
to turn round not because of the refractory attitudes budget allocations to be reported to the Campaign
regrettably common among the sorts of people who Committee and the Campaign Coordinator (and
captain them, but because they are oiltankers.” hence to LOTO). This was not only not done but
there was also deliberate concealment.
Where did final authority for election strategy lie?
C4.22 Like the legislation, the Party’s rules did not
C4.19 Under electoral law, control over campaign envisage a rupture of the kind we saw in this
spending is vested in the registered treasurer period. It seems that relations by 2017 were so
(which in the Party’s case is the General Secretary) difficult that both sides simply decided that a
and the deputy treasurers (which includes all compromise position was impossible.

14
s.76 (1) Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000
15
Clause VII 1.A.vii.

65 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 In an email sent on 29 May 2017, one of the staff members
The Ergon House Operation involved confirmed of GEL001 that “the budget for this
project has been increased from £75k to £175k which is
Ergon House was an overspill office established in what
why we’re able to do more sub-regional postage jobs”;
had previously been the base for the Party’s London
a spreadsheet was provided showing incurred printing
region. It is alleged that HQ staff operating out of Ergon
costs for “key seats” on GEL001 totalling £88,230 (the
House funneled funds away from the Left in winnable
GEL001 spreadsheet). The staff member in question told
seats, into safe seats held by MPs on the Right.
us that they had had no say in the seats that were chosen,
One witness who was aware of the Ergon House scheme adding that they were told “not to broadcast the fact that
at the time understood it to be: I was doing this because […] any spare money, [LOTO]
would have wanted to put it in to more Jeremy rallies or
Canterbury” (Canterbury being a marginal which in the
“a route to support seats which the leadership wanted
event the Party won by 187 votes).
to deresource, a means by which they could be
quietly supported, and seats saved, without picking The vast majority of the spending set out in the GEL001
a public fight or rowing back on existing protocols. spreadsheet – almost £75,000 – seems to relate to regions
[…] At the time those who knew about the Ergon rather than individual constituencies. Around £15,000
House operation were enjoined never to speak of relates to individual constituencies (only one of which was
on LOTO’s alleged list of seats to be defunded, which one
it, in the hope the leadership would never find out.
senior HQ witness told us the Ergon House spending was
I recollect observing to a colleague who also knew intended to redress).
about Ergon House that this was obviously ridiculous
as careful study of the various academic sites which A campaign budget circulated after the election
collect leaflets, or of the Party’s statutory return of (on 12 June 2017) records a total spend of just over
£92,000 under code GEL001, together with a committed
expenses, would inevitably lay bare its existence
spend of just over £42,000 (some £135,000 in total).
sooner or later.”
The maximum budget for the code is recorded as having
risen to just over £225,000, meaning that there was a
One senior member of HQ staff at the time put it to us
£90,000 underspend.
that “some [of my] former colleagues did like to play
games, so they thought they were getting one over on the
Just under £15,000 was apparently spent under this code
[other] side […] if they had been more politically aligned
in each of the weeks ending 30 April, 7 May and 14 May
to the leadership they would have got approval of what
2017, with the spend rising to over £50,000 in the week
they were doing, [but] they thought they knew best, they
ending 21 May, falling to £3,000 in the week ending 28
did not think LOTO would agree […] the distrust meant
May, and then rising to some £38,000 in the final 11 days
communication didn’t occur.”
of the campaign.

It is only the spending on code GEL001 which drew

It is not clear from the evidence we have seen what the
allegations of impropriety in the Leaked Report (though
rest of the spending (that is, the apparent £45,000 spend
it does not appear that that represented the entirety
not covered in the GEL001 spreadsheet) related to. The
of the work done from Ergon House). Based on the
Leaked Report cites other emails regarding printing for
emails we have seen, GEL001 (described as relating to
individual seats where the candidates were former anti-
“generic campaign materials”) was originally used for
Corbyn MPs with substantial majorities. It is not clear
miscellaneous printing and merchandise costs (as one
from those emails whether the printing for those MPs was
staff member put it in an instant messaging discussion,
arranged from Ergon House, nor which budget code it
“large scale labour TAT”), some of which was due to be
was recorded under, nor whether it was funded nationally
repaid from regional budgets. It appears, however, to
(as opposed to procured nationally and funded locally). It
have been adopted to record additional printing costs
would require a forensic accounting exercise beyond the
for constituencies in Ergon House’s own “key seats”
scope of this report to ascertain whether the rest of the
list (being used separately to the main budget code for
spend on code GEL001 related to spending on those MPs.
“defensive key seats”, which had a much higher total
spend than GEL001).

66 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

HQ’s pursuit of a defensive strategy from Ergon House C4.25 From mid-May 2017 onwards, Ergon House was
used to accommodate around 20 additional
C4.23 The Leaked Report alleges that HQ staff staff, including the design team (who oversaw
advanced the defensive strategy primarily by the production of leaflets and other campaign
funnelling funds of approximately £135,000 away materials). The Leaked Report quotes an email
from candidates from the Left in winnable seats, from one junior staff member (sent on 10 May)
into safe seats held by MPs on the Right. It is which said that “we are setting up an overflow
alleged that this covert activity took place from office at the London Region office at Ergon
Ergon House, using spending code GEL001. House for the design team and a few others to
The Leaked Report alleges that: “In this general camp out. This is to be kept relatively under the
election, Labour HQ assigned resources in a radar for now.” The Leaked Report also cites
factional manner, and hid this from LOTO. In May an instant messaging discussion on 17 May in
2017 Labour HQ assigned staff to a “secret key which one member of staff tells another “there is
seats team”, permanently based in a separate a secret key seats team arriving in [E]rgon house
building, Ergon House - “all secret to LOTO”.” permanently…lots of secret meetings going on
here…I think it’s all secret to loto. But think it’s a
C4.24 It appears to have been fairly widely understood by brand new team. Moving in on Sunday.”
HQ staff that the overspill team in Ergon House was
to facilitate, under the radar, activity which went C4.26 It seems that the budget for the “secret” work
against LOTO’s alleged demands to withdraw all done from Ergon House related primarily to
support from anti-Corbyn candidates (discussed the designing and printing of leaflets and other
further below, in particular at C4.33) and to shore materials for distribution in specific constituencies
up favoured MPs instead, irrespective of the key or regions; as one senior member of regional staff
seats list then in place. It is clear from the emails put it, “the work in Ergon House supplemented
we have seen that several junior HQ staff were our regional design production operation.” An
aware of the plan. It is not clear how many senior email sent to the West Midlands region on 17
HQ staff were involved; at least one told us that May 2017, which appears to relate to work being
only staff in the campaigns team knew the details, done from Ergon House, refers to “the Bespoke
though we were told that the project was agreed Print Service which is being offered to key seats.
in principle by the senior management team as a Just to give those of you who I haven’t spoken
whole: to a quick summary of what we’re able to offer
– basically, we can work with key seats, either
“in a meeting with other members of the adding to their existing print plan or giving it a
Party HQ senior management team I boost where extra support is needed.” We heard
that the materials printed under this code sought
reported back the events of the morning.
to remove Jeremy Corbyn from the campaign
The list [of MPs LOTO wanted to withdraw
literature, in order to appeal to voters who would
funding from] was purely factional and all the (it was believed) potentially vote for the Party in
MPs on it were well known for their views on spite of the leader rather than because of him.
Jeremy Corbyn. We agreed that we could not
simply pull support away from seats based C4.27 We understand that Party protocol requires
campaign materials relating to Great Britain as
on [LOTO’s] factional view. We agreed to
a whole, or to one of its constituent nations, to
continue to support seats on basis [sic] of be signed off by the relevant national leadership.
getting the most possible MPs elected. In Materials relating to a single region can be
order to do this, we had to move a number of approved solely by the relevant regional director.
staff and resources to Ergon House.” However, as above, all campaign activity – in
particular spending – needs to be reported
to the Campaign Committee. Please refer to
paragraphs C4.19 to C4.21 above for further
discussion on spending requirements.

67 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C4.28 We note that £135,000 is, in the context of the C4.31 One member of the senior management team
Party’s entire election budget, a very small sum. told us:
However, that is irrelevant to our analysis of the
propriety of the spending being incurred covertly “[…]we were in a bind. We felt it was pointless
(question 4). to try and discuss this sensibly with Jeremy’s
staff. Apart from the existing attempt to funnel
(2) Did factionalism influence money on a factional basis, Corbyn’s team
decisions about strategy were simply not prepared to take polling
information seriously. But we knew we
and resource allocation? couldn’t acquiesce in allowing these seats
C4.29 The above gives rise to the further question of to fall. We ensured these constituencies
whether HQ staff shaped their strategic approach continued to receive support.”
(including their decisions to offer support to the
constituencies on the GEL001 spreadsheet) on C4.32 The same submission went on to reject the
a purely objective basis, or whether MPs were allegation that its author had “funnelled money
chosen for support at least in part because into specific seats based on factionalism.
they were deemed by the staff in question to That is not the case. The opposite is true. We
be from the “correct” faction. It seems to us that made rational decisions based on evidence.”
the latter was the case, and that many HQ staff Nevertheless we find that some of the funding
took the same view as the senior manager who decisions made by staff in Ergon House were
had written on WhatsApp, after the Party’s poor factional – albeit the staff in question considered
local election performance on 4 May 2017, “The that they were merely levelling a playing field
landslide is on following these results…We can which LOTO had tilted for its own ends.
still save some decent MPs if we get it right”.
C4.33 Several HQ staff told us that they attempted
C4.30 In our view the individuals who (according to the to shore up MPs on the Right only in order to
GEL001 spreadsheet) were offered additional rebalance the factional pressures being exerted
support from Ergon House were not drawn from on resource allocation by LOTO. In particular,
a pool including every MP. In the main they are it has been alleged that on 19 May 2017 oral
to the Right (or centre Right) of the Party, and instructions were given by senior LOTO staff
none of them were supporters of Jeremy Corbyn (who deny the allegation) to withdraw funding
(though we accept that that was far from a from various MPs, irrespective of whether they
minority position amongst the PLP at the time). needed the support. We also heard that many
Polling data seemingly played some part in the seats were provided with additional support at
analysis too, but we think it is fair to surmise that LOTO’s request, including close allies of Jeremy
being opposed to Jeremy Corbyn was necessary Corbyn, despite their substantial majorities. We
(if not sufficient) for inclusion on the list. That is were however unable to establish the full truth
also borne out by the nature of the materials of these allegations. LOTO could not directly
GEL001 funded, which, based on the examples decree that expenditure, but LOTO pressure was
we have seen, sought to remove Jeremy Corbyn clearly felt amongst HQ staff; to what degree it
from the literature. (We do not, for the avoidance led to reallocation of priority resources is unclear.
of doubt, find that any of the MPs in question Some HQ staff felt that reshaping the Party in
knew that they were receiving support covertly the Left’s image – “the project” – was always the
on this basis.) main priority of Jeremy Corbyn and his allies.

68 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C4.34 Decisions about key seats and campaign C4.36 We hope it goes without saying that neither side
resourcing are always complex and multifaceted, should have sought to shape the key seats list to
but in 2017 they were particularly problematic, their own factional ends to begin with. The priority
given that (in our view) both sides were trying to should always have been to win the maximum
win the election in a way which shored up their number of seats. If the allegation that LOTO sought
preferred faction internally. It seems to us that to divert funding to supporters of Jeremy Corbyn is
the approach of both sides to resource allocation true, we are clear that such an attempt to change
was coloured by factional concerns; both sides funding arrangements on an ad-hoc, oral basis
believed the other to be acting factionally in its after the key seats list was agreed was wrong.
approach to campaign funding, and sought to
redress the balance (thus vindicating the other C4.37 By the same token, it was unequivocally wrong
side’s suspicions). As one HQ staff member put it: for HQ staff to pursue an alternative strategy
covertly. In our view HQ staff should not have
“I think it is a good example of that culture taken strategic decisions into their own hands
and lack of trust […] you effectively had a cold and sought to conceal their doing so from LOTO
and the Campaign Committee. We are absolutely
war. The reason [Ergon House] was kept a
clear that this should never have happened,
secret is because it was assumed [by HQ] and we consider that the anger amongst the
that if the campaign committee knew about membership regarding the issue is justified.
it they would stop it. The consequence would
be we would lose Ashfield and other seats”

C4.35 It is worth noting that, despite the Party’s long

history of factionalism, this is not a normal state
of affairs in relation to campaign resourcing. One
long-standing Party employee told us that they
had never previously seen factionalism dictate It seems to us that the approach
campaign funding decisions: of both sides to resource
“The fact that lack of internal support for allocation was coloured by
the leadership was regarded as a basis for factional concerns.
organizational resource allocation, and clearly
and explicitly taken into account by the team
around the leader of the Labour Party in 2017,
was something I found – and continue to
find – genuinely shocking. We are all Labour.
Once selected and nominated, in my view the
political positioning of Labour candidates ought
properly be immaterial. That was how the party
operated for each of the three general elections
in which I was involved before Jeremy Corbyn
became leader.”

69 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 pursuing no strategy at all and/or trying to
(3) Did HQ staff stick to a undermine the Party’s performance by failing
defensive strategy in bad to carry out their roles. We have no doubt that
HQ staff worked extremely hard throughout the
faith, because they wanted campaign; many spoke of staying away from
to lose the election? their families for prolonged periods, and of
working long hours, which the SMT WhatsApp
C4.38 We take the view that the defensive strategy transcripts themselves demonstrate. We do not
advocated by senior HQ staff in 2017 was consider that any of the staff we spoke to, many
objectively defensible, and we do not consider of whom had dedicated years of their lives to the
that it was followed in bad faith as an act of Party, ever wanted to see the Conservatives in
sabotage. HQ sources told us that, in their view, power.
the polls only began to justify a more offensive
approach after the disastrous launch of the C4.42 We found the senior HQ witnesses we spoke to
Conservative manifesto in late May. We accept very credible on this issue. One called allegations
that that was a genuine and reasonable view. of sabotage “bizarre and ludicrous”, adding that
“I have spent my entire adult life working for a
C4.39 Even the covert spending on code GEL001 was Labour government.” Another told us “I loved
in our view based on defensible views as to the working for the Party […] I worked weekends,
extent to which the seats in question needed bank holidays, evenings on by-elections for
additional support (though there were alternative weeks on end, and in four general election
strategies with equal merit). Of the defensive campaigns.” A senior member of regional staff
seats supported through GEL001, a couple of detailed the impact of the time away from home
the MPs on the list did, in the event, come close and excessive working hours demanded by the
to losing in 2017 (for example Gloria De Piero). 2017 general election, saying “I’ve made dubious
The fact that eight of the seats on the list were personal choices about my family, where I put
lost in 2019 – including two in which the Labour the Labour Party above them many times.”
MP had previously had a majority of over 10% -
further supports the view that it was reasonable C4.43 The allegations of deliberate sabotage are heavily
to consider such seats “losable” in 2017 and based on extracts quoted in the Leaked Report
suggests that there was merit in the defensive from the SMT WhatsApp transcripts, in particular
approach pushed by HQ. As we have noted those which seem to show HQ staff lamenting the
already, that does not mean that they were right Party’s success on election night. Some of the
to continue pursuing it covertly – there will always members of the SMT WhatsApp groups denied
be disagreements about strategy in a campaign that their messages expressed disappointment,
- but ultimately decisions have to be made and and said that they were unequivocally delighted
followed. However, it does, on analysis, militate by the result. Others admitted to having mixed
against suggestions of sabotage. feelings – for example because they knew that
it meant that Jeremy Corbyn would stay on as
C4.40 Accordingly, we do not find that that spending leader, which would in their view have damaging
amounted to sabotage as alleged in the Leaked consequences for the Party (and for their roles
Report. We do, as explained, find that it was within it) – which in the main we find more
nonetheless wrong. credible.

C4.41 We note that certain comments quoted in the C4.44 Many of the submissions we received struggled
Leaked Report have been taken as proof that HQ with the idea that individuals who responded with
staff adopted “go slow” tactics in the campaign to dismay to a positive result for the Party could have
undermine its success. We have seen evidence given their all to achieving it. We sympathise with
of HQ staff pushing back on LOTO’s preferred that. It is clear that the picture was a complex
strategy and pushing (or in some cases covertly one, with conflicting feelings at play.
pursuing) an alternative approach; we have
not, however, seen evidence of HQ staff simply

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C4.45 In our view many of the senior HQ staff in C4.47 We consider that this blinkered approach to
question (a) disliked Jeremy Corbyn’s politics, the Party’s prospects, hardened by the “echo
felt undermined and pressured by his team, chamber” effect of the SMT WhatsApp groups,
and feared that a positive result would provide may have made HQ too unwilling to compromise,
the necessary pretext for them to be fired, and too defensive about their approach, and (in some
(b) were committed to the Party, of which the cases) willing to operate behind LOTO’s back to
“Corbynite” faction was only one part, and protect favoured MPs. At the same time, we gained
worked to achieve the best result they could the impression that LOTO was too unwilling to
during the 2017 campaign. We accept that accept HQ staff’s expertise, too willing to ignore
those two realities are in tension with one the early polls, and similarly focused on shoring
another, and indeed many HQ staff seem to up Jeremy Corbyn’s power base and protecting
have felt that tension keenly themselves, but we favoured MPs. These conflicts and competing
do not consider them to be mutually exclusive. motivations did not make for an effective election
Human beings are complicated and not always machine, but nor do we consider that they led
consistent. As one witness put it: to deliberate sabotage as alleged. Whilst the
factions defined it differently, and were trying to
“a lack of belief in Jeremy’s fitness for office, get to it by different routes, they were both trying
and doubt that he would win, does not mean to reach the best possible outcome for the Party
in the 2017 election.
sabotage, or happiness in seeing Labour
defeated. There is and was immense loyalty C4.48 Overall, while we cannot reach a definitive view
to the elected leadership as there always is. about each and every allegation that has been
I worked long hours and long into the night, put to us, the whole episode that we have been
sometimes sleeping on the office floor, in commissioned to investigate, and its reporting,
every election between 2005 and 2019. Any exemplify how factionalism operated as a
prism through which those involved interpreted
Labour government is better than every Tory
what was happening at the time, and what
government. I have no hesitation in saying subsequently happened, with losses of credibility
that every one of my colleagues took the on both sides.
same view.”

C4.46 Significantly, many of the staff in question

(4) Did HQ staff pursue the
believed that a victory under Jeremy Corbyn defensive strategy with
was impossible – they had long considered
themselves to be “watching a slow motion car
sufficient transparency?
crash that you can do nothing to stop” or an
C4.49 We do not consider that the staff involved in
“awful limp to certain death”. It seems that most
Ergon House spending under code GEL001
of them did not consider that Jeremy Corbyn had
implemented it in bad faith. However, we do find
any prospect of becoming Prime Minister – they
that the staff involved – which appears to have
saw themselves as working instead to minimise
been only a handful, albeit many were aware
the Party’s losses, shore up good MPs, and
of the scheme in high level terms – deliberately
ensure that the blame for the inevitable loss was
sought to obscure the nature of the spending from
carried by Jeremy Corbyn (having felt themselves
LOTO, knowing that it went against the agreed
unfairly blamed for the result of, in particular, the
strategy. Emails we have seen clearly indicate
December 2016 Sleaford by-election). In short,
that the spending on GEL001 was intended to go
they considered that a bad result was inevitable,
“under the radar”. For example, one of the key
deeply regrettable, and would be the start of a
staff members involved, asking for an update on
period of rebuilding. When the polls began to
a budget meeting on 24 May 2017, said “did they
tighten and it became apparent that some of their
run through GEL001? Because they probably
assumptions had been wrong, many reacted with
don’t know what’s been spent on that”.
incredulity and deflation.

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C4.50 In relation to at least £15,000 worth of spending
under code GEL001, secrecy seems to have
(5) Did the diversion of
been desired primarily because the money was funds and personnel into
being provided to individual candidates who
were not supportive of Jeremy Corbyn and who
this Ergon House operation
were not on the approved key seats list. As one lose the Party the general
LOTO source put it: “Given the protracted and
intense debate about strategy and LOTO’s desire
election
to expand targeting into Tory and SNP held
C4.53 Had the relatively modest level of resources
marginals … it is inconceivable that we would
at Ergon House been allocated instead to
have agreed to extra resources being given to
supporting additional target seats it would have
seats that were not at risk”.
had to have been impossibly cost effective and
so extraordinarily precisely targeted to make
C4.51 As discussed above, the GEL001 spreadsheet
any significant difference to individual results let
seems to show some £75,000 being spent
alone the overall result of the general election.
across entire regions (or multiple regions),
which presumably contained both offensive
C4.54 Whilst we were not in a position to commission
and defensive seats. It could be that part of the
any original psephological analysis, we consider
motivation for keeping this spending secret was
it to be highly unlikely that the diversion of funds
the fact that the materials in question advanced
and personnel into the Ergon House operation
a strategy of removing Jeremy Corbyn from
lost the Party the general election. Nevertheless,
the literature – which obviously LOTO did not
the Ergon House operation was wrong.
endorse.

C4.52 In our view this was all done based on a genuine

belief that LOTO’s strategy was wrong, and
that the spending in question was necessary.
Many of the witnesses we spoke to from HQ
believed that the Party’s success in 2017 was at
least partly down to HQ staff pushing back on We consider it to be highly
LOTO’s offensive strategy, though that cannot
unlikely that the diversion of
be proved. As above, we cannot possibly assess
which approach was “right” in terms of eventual funds and personnel into the
electoral outcomes. However, even if it were Ergon House operation lost
correct that the Ergon House spending did in fact
contribute to the Party’s relative success, it does the Party the general election.
not change the fact that the operation was simply Nevertheless, the Ergon House
wrong, and arguably in our view in breach of an
implied duty of good faith.
operation was wrong.

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Allegation 5
The problems in the relevant period were exacerbated by
poor recruitment practices and inadequate staff management

It is clear that the Party has historically not sufficiently

Summary and Conclusions prioritised staff training, development, and welfare.
In many cases this seems to have been because
We find that recruitment processes in the Party have
they were seen (at least by individual managers) as
long been too informal and insufficiently transparent,
luxuries compared to the more urgent “big picture”
and as such open to factional manipulation. That led
battles, be they winning the Party’s internal war or
to a lack of diversity (including ideological diversity)
winning elections. This is a false economy. The Party’s
in HQ, and contributed to the creation of a “mono-
staff (and its volunteers) are its greatest asset.
culture”, as explored in Section E, which laid the
foundations for a destructive clash with LOTO under
As explained above, our impression from the evidence
Jeremy Corbyn. It is to be expected that, at any
is that these are long-standing problems which will
given time, some of the Party’s staff will disagree
take time to resolve. We note that steps to improve
with the politics of the elected leader; however, it is
the Party’s HR and staff management practices have
disastrous for almost all of them to do so, especially
been underway since 2016, including a significant
in circumstances where the leader in question enjoys
expansion of the HR department, and are continuing;
widespread support amongst the membership.
we hope that the recommendations in the final section
of this report will usefully inform that progress.
Recruitment practices were weaponised by both HQ
and LOTO in the relevant period, in particular by (in
LOTO’s case) duplicating roles traditionally performed
by HQ staff in order to shore up a separate power
base. Appointments in which HQ and LOTO were both
Recruitment practices were
involved, for example in the regions, often became
caught up in a factional tug of war. weaponised by both HQ and
LOTO in the relevant period.
The effect was to entrench and exacerbate the
divisions between the two camps. It also meant that
people deemed factionally appropriate were routinely
hired or promoted (by both sides) to roles for which
they were not an ideal fit in terms of experience, with
an obvious cost to the Party’s operational effectiveness
(and in many cases a cost to those individuals). It is clear that the Party has
Talented people have been passed over or had their
historically not prioritised staff
talents wasted.
training, development and welfare.

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 LOTO staff under Jeremy Corbyn, combined with
Scope the increased duplication of roles between LOTO
and HQ, meant that the practice intensified in
C5.1 Many of the witnesses we spoke to told us that,
this period. We also heard that LOTO became
in the relevant period, factionalism exacerbated
involved in recruitment processes, for example
(and was exacerbated by) poor recruitment
in the regions, which would usually have been
and staff management practices. We heard that
overseen solely by HQ and the NEC. Whilst
these problems were present in both the Party’s
leadership interest in such appointment was
HQ and in LOTO under Jeremy Corbyn. We will
not new, it is true to say that, in the past, the
consider the accuracy of those allegations in this
formalities were normally observed and the NEC
section; in the next, we will consider the related
with senior staff made the final decision. In the
allegations of discrimination in Party workplaces.
Corbyn period it appeared to HQ staff that LOTO
C5.2 We note at the outset that it is beyond the scope considered that they should have a final say. In
of this Inquiry to undertake a comprehensive short, it seems that recruitment was used by both
analysis of how the Party approached recruitment factions as a means of shoring up internal power.
in this period, or prior to it (and of course no such However those previous practices of recruitment
analysis was undertaken in the Leaked Report, and employment were not exempt from distortion
which features allegations based on a handful and factionalism. Indeed we heard evidence that
of comments made in the SMT WhatsApp the process lacked objectivity and transparency.
transcripts and staff emails). The submissions
C5.6 The Labour staff branch of GMB, the largest
we received supported the view that those
recognised union for Party staff, made a
examples were, however, indicative of a broader
submission to this Inquiry which attached the
organisational problem. Whilst noting that we are
results of a staff survey carried out in June 2020.
dealing only with anecdotal evidence, then, we
It concluded that:
have sought to outline in this section how staff felt
that the problem manifested itself.
“A prominent theme is with regards to hiring
C5.3 We understand that the Party is already taking practices. Many staff are reporting issues
steps towards improving its recruitment and staff of lack of transparency, inconsistency,
support processes. What follows emphasises the nepotism, and factionalism taking
importance of that work being maintained and
precedence over knowledge, ability and
monitored.
experience. Some staff have even reported
this latter point has resulted in them training
Factional recruitment in HQ up people who have been hired to be their
and the regions manager or more senior to them in a team
[…] It is clear that hiring practices over the
C5.4 We heard repeatedly in submissions from current
last few years have been a major issue for
and former staff that the Party’s recruitment
practices were driven by factionalism, with senior many employees with complaints regarding
staff recruiting in their own image - often backed inconsistent and factional practices.”
by the dominant faction on the NEC - rather
than based on qualification. Some witnesses C5.7 The submissions we received echoed those
suggested that this approach has quietly findings. We heard that entry-level staff in HQ
prevailed amongst the Party’s permanent staff were often recruited from particular pools, such
for decades, leading to the HQ “mono culture”, as Labour Students, the Party’s student wing.
which we explore in more detail in Section E. Many former staff were unsurprised to see
that the Leaked Report quoted HQ managers
C5.5 Appointments made by the elected leadership encouraging factional recruitment – for example,
to their own office staff, and of special advisers saying that all of the applicants for a vacancy
(SPADs) appointed to Shadow Cabinet members, had been “trots”, so “if I can get away with it, I
have always (for obvious reasons) tended to won’t employ anyone”. Former staff from HQ and
focus more overtly on political and personal the regions told us that:
allegiance, but we heard that the expansion of

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 “people […] backed up their own positions C5.8 Senior LOTO staff told us that they had been
by keeping people that they trusted.” frustrated with the way HQ operated:

“analysing why the Party organisation was so

factional, I would put it down to a lot of the senior
“[The Party] has a culture of people having come into the organisation in a
people being very reluctant to trust particular period […] basically the late Blair
outsiders or people they don’t know. leadership period. Often coming from the
student movement, as with quite a few MPs.
From an equalities perspective this is
And then recruiting people in their own image,
clearly a disaster waiting to happen.” with their own likeminded people.”

“you recruit people who you know or […] I

don’t know whether they tap people on the
“it was clear that nepotism played a role in shoulder and say, you know, that person’s
promotions and also progression. Currently, a good person, but you’d have people who
I am one of the members of staff that has were students and they’d maybe then go
been in [my team] the longest, however an and work as a SpAd or do some kind of
individual less senior […] is currently acting organising or whatever. They’d get a little bit
in as Head […] This was done without any of CV where they can say, you know, I can
process or knowledge of a process” give you this that and the other person as
a reference, and then they’d be appointed.”
“nepotistic networks among staff that heavily
C5.9 We heard that roles were often advertised
influence selection for appointment and
internally only. This could be justified if, for
promotion [were] reinforced by a rigidly example, they were part of a team restructuring
hierarchical culture of power, supported by rather than an expansion. However, internal
exclusionary outside workplace staff social advertising inevitably adds to the tendency to
networks.” monoculture, both ideologically and socially –
and, crucially, racially. Senior HQ and regional
“part of the problem within Party HQ is staff told us:
that people are often hired on their political
“the two reasons – as far as I am aware – [for]
connections and affiliations. Certainly, in my
internal appointments is to give progression
time, I saw many hires being made based
for staff, and as an attempt to manage the
on these grounds, and not on merit. This is
increase in costs in increasing headcount.”
a systemic organisation wide issue, which
carries on to this day – which further fuels a
“sometimes the Labour Party advertised
toxic culture – that cannot be undone.”
posts internally only because bluntly they
only had the money to fund the posts if there
was a vacancy elsewhere […] Sometimes
it’s internal only for speed […] when there is
time and there is a desire for fresh blood there
is a deliberately long process with a […] very
deliberate external process where people are
approached and there is a lot of advertising.
It depends on the needs of the organisation
at the time. But, in my experience, people
were appointed on merit.”

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C5.10 Whilst internal appointments will in some cases
be appropriate, an habitual failure to advertise
Long-term impact
externally runs the risk of exacerbating the “mono
C5.13 The first problem with a largely internal or
culture” effect.
insider-known approach to recruitment is that it
prevents HQ from being, like the membership,
C5.11 Even where roles were advertised externally, we
a broad church encompassing a diversity of
heard that adverts were often placed on websites
views. We agree with the member of LOTO who
such as “w4mp” (for people wishing to work in
suggested that the consequence of senior HQ
politics), and as such attracted highly politically
staff recruiting in their own image and promoting
engaged people whose primary interest was
their allies is that it creates, at the top of the Party,
working for the Party. Some witnesses we spoke
“a sort of insider, unrepresentative group. Both
to felt that, for anything other than campaigning
unrepresentative politically of the Labour Party
roles, that was the wrong approach, and that
but also unrepresentative of the wider society, or
roles in (for example) HR or finance should be
Labour voters, or the people that we’re seeking to
filled through searches specific to those sectors,
represent.”
with strong political affiliations inessential or even
undesirable. One senior manager told us:
C5.14 An exclusionary approach to recruitment means
that the Party has inevitably missed out on talent,
“I think we have an issue in terms of how we both by failing to promote capable individuals
recruit, and it’s not in terms of who we are and, more broadly, by creating an atmosphere
trying to attract but where we advertise. We in which many individuals feel excluded and
would frequently advertise on a site called unable to reach their full potential (and in some
[w4mp]; I would refuse to use it looking for cases leave as a result). It has led to what
many of the witnesses we spoke to considered
someone to work in [my team] because
to be a concerning lack of diversity amongst
I don’t think I will get a good candidate from senior staff in particular (as discussed in the
there. We want someone who wants to work next section), including a lack of ideological
in […] regardless of the organisation.” diversity. As HQ became relatively politically
homogenous, particularly at the senior level, a
C5.12 Once recruited, we heard that many staff degree of “groupthink” appears to have taken
progressed through the Party’s ranks in hold (demonstrated, for example, in the SMT
a relatively informal way, through internal WhatsApp transcripts).
promotions in which relationships often mattered
more than qualifications. Some (though by no
means all) HQ staff and former staff recognised
this in their own career histories. One former staff As HQ became relatively
member, for example, recalled promotion to a politically homogenous,
senior role some 15 years earlier: “I don’t think
it was competitive in that there were two of us [in particularly at the senior level,
the relevant team] and I got it. I don’t remember a degree of ‘groupthink’ appears
a formal interview process for it to be honest
with you.” Another admitted that “I did feel out
to have taken hold.
of my depth […] I make no bones about it that
I was promoted more quickly than I wish I had
been.” In comments cited in the Leaked Report,
some senior managers seemed to acknowledge C5.15 In our view, that ideological homogeneity
that these norms existed; one wrote in 2015 that prevented HQ from collectively fulfilling a neutral
not many people were being interviewed for the “civil service” role, and set the stage for a clash
role he had applied for because it was a “bit with the first elected leader wholly at odds with
of a […] stitch up”, for example, while another the prevailing political alignment of the Party’s
joked that he had “seemed to accumulate jobs permanent staff. We do not think the problems
by accident”. which arose in 2015 – 2019 would have been
as severe had HQ been populated by a more
diverse cohort of staff.

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Particular problems 2015 – 2019 “I know people had been offered inappropriate
jobs. I heard a story about somebody being
Factional recruitment in LOTO offered a job in LOTO because they were
related to somebody who was friends with
C5.16 In some ways it is less problematic for individuals
the Chief of Staff and, you know, people
directly hired by the elected leadership to
being offered jobs that didn’t exist, for which
have overt political beliefs and alignments.
The leader’s staff often come and then go with there was no budget.”
that leader, and they are not required to fulfil
the kind of politically neutral role that HQ staff C5.19 Again, these are speculative allegations, but our
should, since they are involved in advancing the interviews with junior staff hired to (and promoted
leader’s political agenda rather than keeping within) Jeremy Corbyn’s team indicated that they
the Party machinery running. Proper processes had the ring of truth:
should, however, be followed in relation to all
other hires and promotions, not least for the “I didn’t have a job interview, I was drafted
sake of the staff involved. The recruitment net in after the 2017 election because they
should be cast sufficiently wide to ensure that needed people and, you know, I don’t think
qualified individuals are not being excluded from that’s right; and that’s also been the case
consideration, and the process for promotion
with many people far more senior than me,
should be sufficiently rigorous that individuals do
not end up out of their depth. where there’s either no advertisement or
sometimes only an internal ad, where the
C5.17 As one senior member of LOTO put to us frankly, person’s been handpicked beforehand.”
this was seen as a difficult line to tread in LOTO
in the period in question: “[My manager] asked me to apply for [a
promotion] and I really, really, really did not
“Of course I wanted people committed to want it, and in hindsight I sort of wish I had
socialism. But I did recognise that […] it’s never taken it. But, he was quite persistent
illegal to say ‘I’m picking you because of and so I said that I would consider it […] I
these politics’, but it’s in your mind and I was just sort of abandoned there.”
might as well be honest with you on that.”
C5.20 There was also the complicating problem that
C5.18 It seems to us that the intensity of the factional the various different strands and grouplets that
battles in this period increased the sense in LOTO constituted ‘the Left’ were competing to get
that it was essential to recruit allies; the relatively their adherents to work in the office of a leader
chaotic and inexperienced LOTO operation as that they saw as the first ‘truly Left’ leader of the
referred to in our consideration of Allegation Party. This meant that LOTO appears to have
1, was also, in our view, a factor in proper felt it had to accommodate different groups
recruitment processes being abbreviated. Senior which led to a degree of duplication within LOTO
staff in HQ told us that they took a dim view of itself, an overexpansion of LOTO staff and, on
LOTO’s approach, saying: occasion, contradictory messages from LOTO
to HQ. This additional dysfunction compounded
“in my experience, appointments, or whether the difficulties between LOTO and the more
people got promoted within the organisation monolithic regime at Southside.
[…] was all based on essentially one of two
reasons. First one being: are you an avid
supporter of Jeremy Corbyn, and have you
either been involved in his campaigns or
worked on them […]? And number two, are
you on the left?”

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Duplication of roles “[there was] the most astonishing level of
recruitment of positions that never used to
C5.21 Many witnesses alluded to the related problem,
exist in the leader’s office, to duplicate the work
predating Jeremy Corbyn’s tenure but intensified
during it, of LOTO hiring people to duplicate roles
that was happening in the Party. So almost
already being done in HQ, in order to accumulate everyone in the Party felt they had a shadow
more operational power to LOTO. One senior ally in the leader’s office. Having meetings with
of Jeremy Corbyn reflected that: the same people doing the same things but
coming to different decisions, and there was
“when Michael Foot was leader of the no joined up working […] when this became
Labour Party […] there was a handful of staff intolerable for people [at HQ], they resigned
working for him in Parliament […] As time’s and they would be replaced by the person in
gone on, because of Short money and LOTO who had been performing that role on
other factors, you’ve built up effectively […] a shadow basis.”
a parallel administration in Parliament with
substantial employment, and overlapping C5.23 Similar concerns were reported in relation to
roles. And so quite apart from the politics […] regional appointments, with staff telling us that
they were excluded from hiring processes that
there’s an inherent structural problem there,
they would usually have been involved in so that
I would say, which may be what Ed [Miliband]
(in their view) supporters of Jeremy Corbyn could
was trying to resolve with the creation of the be installed:
Executive Directors structure.”
“effectively, post-2015 what was valued was
C5.22 A number of HQ witnesses perceived that the
whether or not somebody looked like they
ultimate goal of this role duplication was to force
out HQ staff (without actually firing them), after
supported Jeremy Corbyn, whether they
which their function would be performed solely voted for him, and whether they said publicly
by their LOTO “shadow”. One HQ employee felt about it. Only people in that position were who
that “we could see ourselves being replaced they really wanted to recruit […] It would’ve
before our very eyes.” Two senior HQ managers been common for myself or [another regional
told us:
director] to be on the selection panel for the
West Midlands and London RD posts, which
“you’ve also got a suspicious LOTO who
were the only posts that became vacant after
are prepared to take full advantage of the
Jennie [Formby] became General Secretary.
blurring of the roles […] to try and get their
We were no longer part of those processes.”
people in to kind of repopulate HQ over time.
And of course you’ve got your experienced
“Regional appointments (both senior and
staff with corporate memory, some might be
more junior) were made on the basis of
resistant to change or a different way of doing
politics, rather than ability. For several
things. But they’re feeling unappreciated and
positions in our office former staff with
it must be incredibly exasperating”
organising experience were overlooked in
favour of applicants with no experience but
who simply happened to be members of
Momentum.”

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C5.24 The result has been a continuous re-entrenchment C5.26 Many witnesses considered these issues to be
of the factional divisions. The conviction that their caused in part by the structure introduced in
counterparts had been hired based on ideology 2012 whereby Executive Directors were given
rather than ability led to a growing sense on both responsibility for all staff in a given department,
sides that attempts at collaborative working were with some of the Executive Directors reporting to
pointless. There was a growing sense of alienation the General Secretary and others to LOTO. One
amongst HQ and regional staff, who were in many told us that this “was a backwards step. It blurred
cases made to feel that they were competing for their what should be a key distinction between the role
own jobs with LOTO “shadows”: “I never felt trusted, of the Leader’s Office in specifically supporting
never felt that I was part of a team. Always felt on the Leader and the role of the party as the civil
the outside [… ] not being trusted to do the job that service of the whole organisation. It also […]
I was employed to do.” Many staff hired by LOTO, confused lines of management which for Labour
including some in “shadow” roles, also felt those Party head office staff should unequivocally lead
tensions keenly: “From the moment we entered to the General Secretary.”
Southside, it was made abundantly clear that for a
large number of the people I would be working with, C5.27 Staff hired during this period across the
I was viewed with suspicion, as an enemy […] what organisation, including in LOTO, were shocked
really broke me […] was how it affected my ability to by the extent to which staff development and
do good work in my job. One of the most frustrating support appeared to be an afterthought:
things was how patronising people were to us […] I
was talked to like I was a naïve ‘Corbynista’, if I was “I would say it was not especially organised
talked to or included at all.” and the management culture in general in
Labour…performance review is very far from
Poor staff support
what they do […] I think most people are sort
C5.25 We heard repeatedly that the Party’s willingness of left to ‘get on with the job’ and there is
to circumvent proper procedures in its hiring not really much of a culture of performance
processes was coupled with a failure to provide management.”
proper support for staff once they were installed,
in terms of both career development and “I was a political advisor […] I was in
pastoral care. This long-standing issue seems
Parliament and [my line manager] was in
to us to have been heightened in this period,
when opportunities for career development
Southside, and he was also expected to
were felt by staff to be particularly dependent line manage something ridiculous like 20
on political alliances, and HR functions operated or so political advisors. So for the year that
at least partly through a factional prism. Whilst I did that job, I never ever heard from him
some teams/departments were certainly worse […] I worked in the public sector before the
than others, there was a feeling amongst
Labour Party where we had very by the book
many witnesses that the wellbeing of staff was
deprioritised across the board, with the handling
probation reviews and performance reviews
of the unauthorised release to the media of the and stuff so it was quite weird to me working
Leaked Report cited by individuals in both LOTO for the Labour Party because there was just
and HQ as an example. nothing at all.”

“None of the staff [in my region] had targets

and objectives and there have never been
any appraisals and 1-2-1s […] [there
were] unclear lines of communication and
delegation and work allocation was erratic
and unclear.”

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C5.28 Many reported feeling that they had no place “if 20 individuals made a complaint about
to turn when issues arose, particularly since an individual bullying them […] What sort
complaints were sometimes dismissed in this
of organisation wouldn’t go, ‘actually, there
period as factionally-motivated attacks:
might be something here to have a look at’?
“HR staff do not act as honest brokers. The Labour Party seeks to cover up this sort
Instead of taking an objective and of stuff where it involves senior politicians
independent stance and following agreed and senior staff.”
policies and procedures, they simply carry
“I certainly didn’t feel cared for and I felt
out the instructions of senior management.
unable to protect the staff I was responsible
Staff had no confidence in the grievance
for and to continue to look after them. That’s
procedure and that was well founded […]
again part of the reason I felt I had to go.”
Politicians were seen as out-of-bounds and
no action was taken no matter how extreme
the behaviour”
 
“my biggest concern about the leaked
report is that it appears that comments were
made about me in a [WhatsApp] group that
included both my line manager at the time
[…] and the Head of HR […] These are the
two staff members to whom I would have
directed any complaints of bullying at work.”

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Allegation 6
A racist, sexist and otherwise discriminatory
culture exists in Party workplaces

Some progress has been made in relation to sexism,

Summary and Conclusions though there is more to be done. The Party clearly
needs to continue its work to root out sexual harassment
Three dimensions of our Inquiry lead us to conclude
and misogyny in its workplaces, and impressive work
that there are serious problems of discrimination in the
has been done on that front already, but it also needs
operations of the Party:
to be alive to the subtler ways in which even senior
• The undoubted overt and underlying racism and women can feel excluded and undermined.
sexism apparent in some of the content of the
It seems to us that less progress has been made
WhatsApp messages between the Party’s most
when it comes to racism. Racism in the Party is
senior staff.
not experienced by individuals solely through
• A significant number of replies to our Call for Evidence acts of aggression or microaggression towards
– mainly from ordinary Party members – spelling them personally – it is experienced through seeing
out their experience of discrimination – racism, colleagues being passed over for promotion; being
islamophobia and sexism – in constituency parties the only person from an ethnic minority background
and in Party processes; whilst it is not our intention to around a meeting table; being managed by a near-
examine cases in CLPs, often the complaints were in exclusively white senior team; and hearing the
part about the failure of Party officials at regional and particular disdain which colleagues reserve for
national level to take such problems seriously. (for example) ethnic minority MPs, councillors and
CLP members. Many respondents felt they were
• Submissions from current and former members of confronted with a less welcoming atmosphere in which
staff describing their experience of discrimination many respondents felt they were forced to immerse
and of lack of sensitivity to issues of racism and themselves daily, and this amounts to a constant drain
sexism displayed by senior management. on the attention and energies of talented people who
would prefer to be focused on their work.
Other themes included concerns that the attention to
the surge of cases relating to antisemitism and the In many cases, the recruitment practices described in
importance they appeared to play in the interfactional the previous section were seen as creating additional
conflict meant that the Party was in effect operating barriers for (in particular) Black and ethnic minority
a hierarchy of racism or of discrimination with other staff, with senior staff recruiting from their own networks
forms of racism and discrimination being ignored. and/or in their own image, often without following an
For a Party which seeks to be a standard bearer of open recruitment process. Whilst we do not suggest
progressive politics, equality, and workers’ rights, this that those practices are anywhere near universal in
is an untenable situation. The Party must live by its the Party, a staff member only has to see it happening
values and lead by example. once to perceive that the Party is not a professional
environment in which they can contribute and progress
to the maximum of their potential.

81 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

 Many staff felt that specific problems were only dealt within the membership. This is the least we could
with when it was politically expedient and/or essential expect from a party committed to anti-discrimination.
to do so, and that the Party’s more recent steps to
address the problems with antisemitism, for example, Whilst we received very few responses which specifically
have not been matched by a commitment to tackle detailed homophobia or discrimination against people
other forms of racism, nor by a full-scale effort to with disabilities and we did not receive reports of
get its house in order as an employer. Moreover, transphobia, we strongly suggest that the Party also
the persistence of racist attitudes amongst some addresses these types of workplace discrimination. In
staff, and the failure to prioritise a suitably robust short, it is essential that the Party takes steps to become
response to those attitudes, meant that complaints an environment in which everybody can contribute and
were not treated with the urgency and sensitivity they thrive; it must model the kind of workplace environment
deserved. The outrage rightly directed in recent years which it would wish to see across the country were it
at the scourge of antisemitism should be matched in power.
by equally strong measures against all forms of
discrimination, within Party workplaces as well as

C6.4 Our focus is on discrimination in Party workplaces,

Scope not amongst the membership as a whole or within
individual CLPs. Those are separate, serious issues,
C6.1 Much of the commentary on the Leaked Report
on which we received a significant volume of evidence,
has focused on comments it quotes from senior
but which fall outside the scope of this report.
staff which were deemed to be discriminatory.
However, it is important to recognise that if there are
The approach we have taken to the SMT
elements of racism, sexism and homophobia within
WhatsApp transcripts and the instant messages
the Party workforce – or even lack of recognition of the
is explained in the introduction to Section C of
importance of such issues – when serious complaints
this report.
are received of discriminatory behaviour in the wider
C6.2 The authors of the messages deny any Party, those complaints may well not be prioritised or
discriminatory intent and in many cases consider indeed understood and treated with the appropriate
the comments to have been taken out of context urgency and sensitivity.
and/or deliberately misrepresented in the Leaked
Report. We will consider briefly in this section The SMT WhatsApp transcripts
the extent to which those messages evidenced
discriminatory attitudes amongst the senior C6.5 Several extracts from, in particular, the SMT
management team, though we do not seek to WhatsApp transcripts have been cited as
address wrongdoing by particular individuals – evidence of discriminatory views held by the
where appropriate, we understand disciplinary senior management team – most significantly:
action has been taken against the individuals
concerned and we do not seek to replicate that • Comments that Diane Abbott “literally makes
exercise here. me sick”, is “truly repulsive” and is a “very
angry woman”;
C6.3 Our primary interest is in the broader question
of the extent to which any problematic • Discussions about the attire of junior female
communications between individuals were staff, in which one is said to be “wearing a
indicative of a broader culture of discrimination see through, flesh coloured, skin tight top and
in Party workplaces. Like the GMB Union, “we no bra”; “You’d think with all that money she
believe that any action against individuals is could afford to buy a jacket and a bra”; and
of secondary importance to the overarching
need for institutional responses to what is an • Descriptions of a Karie Murphy as a “crazy
institutional and cultural problem.” woman” and “bitch face cow”, as well as
comments about her physical appearance.

82 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C6.6 The discussions about Diane Abbott, including in C6.10 In our view the authors should have considered
relation to the exchange to which we refer on page whether the fact that Diane Abbott is a Black
26, have been the focus of significant attention. woman, and has been vilified on that basis
over several decades, (a) might have impacted
C6.7 The authors of the relevant messages deny that on their instinctive responses to her, even if
she was singled out for criticism because she was unconsciously, and (b) meant that they should
a Black woman; they say that she was criticised take particular caution with their language when
when her performance justified it (for example, discussing her.
when she missed the Brexit vote or performed
poorly in an interview about policing costs). C6.11 We agree with Diane Abbott’s own comments that:
Some of the witnesses we spoke to suggested “None of this narrative was ever challenged by the
that they had, in effect, just been treating Diane other participants in the WhatsApp groups which
Abbott like they would white male MPs, and that leads to the conclusion that the remarks in the
they considered all MPs to be fair game for at report were not outliers but represented the general
times vicious criticism. tone of conversation amongst senior Labour Party
staff about me and other black elected members.
C6.8 We take issue with the underlying premise as And it is worth noting that not a single member of
to how MPs should be treated, but we also note the Senior Management Team or the Labour Party
that MPs of colour and female MPs were not Forward Planning group was black.”
always treated during the relevant period in the
same way as their white/ male counterparts – not C6.12 We think that the discussions about junior female
just in terms of the abuse they received, but in staff and Karie Murphy, and the defences put
terms of the level of instinctive respect they were to us by the authors, are again indicative of a
afforded within the Party and within Parliament. broader problem. The authors in some cases
It is incumbent on Party staff to recognise this pointed to the fact that they are feminists, and
failure and to continue to work to ensure that it have done substantial work to promote women
does not persist. within the Party, as (in effect) negating the sexism
of comments about the appearance and attire of
C6.9 The nature of the justifications we were female colleagues, the possibility that they have
presented with point, in our view, to one of the progressed because male colleagues find them
fundamental ways in which racism is able to attractive, and so on. In our view those comments
fester in an organisation like the Party – through were straightforwardly sexist, irrespective of who
the belief that unless you are criticising someone made them, and it is unacceptable for senior staff
because of the colour of their skin, you are not to discuss female colleagues in those terms even
being racist (coupled with a pervasive belief in private.
amongst Party staff that they are “on the right
side” of these issues and do not need to give C6.13 We take a similar view of the comments about
them any particular thought). There are plenty of Karie Murphy – we recognise that many of the
criticisms of Diane Abbott in the SMT WhatsApp authors had extremely difficult relationships with
transcripts which we would consider to be an her, but there are no circumstances in which we
acceptable expression of the authors’ opinions consider that it would be acceptable to criticise
– indeed we would put the majority of them a colleague’s appearance or to call her a “bitch”.
in that category. No one, needless to say, has The criticisms of Karie Murphy were often couched
suggested that Black and female MPs should be in gendered terms, and it seems to us that the fact
immune from criticism. The criticisms of Diane that Karie Murphy is a woman played some part in
Abbott cited above, however, are not simply a intensifying the level of vitriol towards her.
harsh response to perceived poor performance –
they are expressions of visceral disgust, drawing C6.14 We accept that there were relatively few explicitly
(consciously or otherwise) on racist tropes, and sexist comments in the SMT WhatsApp transcripts;
they bear little resemblance to the criticisms of they do not take away from the sterling work some
white male MPs elsewhere in the messages. of the authors have done for women in the Party
(but nor does that work excuse them). We have
heard expressions of sincere regret from some of
the authors and it is clear to us that at least some
lessons have been learned.

83 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C6.15 In our view the fundamental problem is that C6.19 68 of the submissions the Inquiry received were
people who are committed to progressive from current or former Party staff, some of whom
politics find it difficult if not impossible to accept had worked in HQ, some in LOTO, and some in
that they might have acted in a way which was regional offices; 45 of them told us that they had
discriminatory. In fact, if one lives (as we do) in either experienced or witnessed discriminatory
a society which is shot through with racism and behaviour in Party workplaces during their time
sexism, one has to work actively to recognise as employees.
and reject discriminatory language and ideas,
however consciously one rejects regressive C6.20 In the June 2020 staff survey provided to us by
ideologies. There seems to us to be a tendency the GMB Union, 54% of respondents reported
among Party staff to believe that they are insulated encountering discrimination while working for the
from the ills of their society – the same dynamic Party. In relation to a question asking how far they
which was, in our view, behind the failure of agreed with the statement that the Party “protects
the elected leadership to countenance that (as its employees from discrimination” (on a scale of
lifelong antiracists) they could be behaving in a 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest) the average
way which perpetuated antisemitism. response was 4.

C6.21 We set out below some of the comments we

Broader culture received regarding racism, sexism and certain
other types of discrimination in Party workplaces.
C6.16 Our primary concern is with the extent to which
We also note that some submissions denied
messages such as those cited in the Leaked
that discrimination was a significant issue,
Report are indicative of broader cultural problems
saying, for example, that “no-one I worked with
within the Party.
made antisemitic, racist, homophobic or sexist
remarks in my hearing and were undoubtedly
C6.17 As a starting point we should say that we
motivated by the principles and traditions of the
consider it unlikely that there are many large
Party”. We have no reason to doubt the sincerity
organisations in the UK which do not have work
of what they said. However, we also note that
to do when it comes to diversity and inclusion.
those who are not themselves in groups likely
As the UK’s largest progressive political force,
to be discriminated against often find it harder
however, we think it is fair to expect the Party to
to recognise discrimination where it arises,
be leading rather than following in this area. We
especially given the subtle ways in which it
note that work is underway on that front, which
often manifests itself and the blind spot which
we welcome, but we consider that it may be of
progressive individuals sometimes have when it
some value to record here the submissions we
comes to recognising it within their own ranks.
received regarding the extent of the problems.
That is part of the reason why we have quoted
We note that the Labour Muslim Network has
fairly extensively below from the submissions
produced an excellent report on Islamophobia in
we received. We acknowledge that we did not
the Party, which we hope that the Party will also
conduct a comprehensive quantitative study of
consider carefully.
the problem, but the weight of evidence we heard
satisfied us that it was real, and we reiterate our
C6.18 Our analysis is based on the witness evidence
gratitude to all of the individuals who took the
and written submissions we have received,
time to record for the Inquiry’s benefit what have
which constitute a fairly wide-ranging and in
often been extremely difficult experiences.
our view very helpful record of the first-hand
experience of Party employees. We have not,
however, carried out a root and branch review
of the Party’s workplaces; witnesses to the
Inquiry were self-selecting and inevitably spoke
to their perceptions of what went on, which we
have not been able to test forensically. Thus
we do not suggest that the below represents a
comprehensive analysis.

84 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

C6.22 While the submissions we received did not these irregular recruitment practices which
include direct evidence of overtly antisemitic denied them opportunities and promotion
behaviour by Party staff, the evidence we
and many concluded that there was no way
received indicated a pattern of complaints about
antisemitism either being ignored, or exploited
to make progress in the LP and simply left.”
along factional lines, revealing a troubling inertia
on behalf of the Party in response to this issue. “[My manager] took me out of the office for
coffee [when I joined] and said that the reason
Racism she took me out, was to warn me that BAME
women tend to get “thrown under the bus”
C6.23 An employee survey conducted by the Party in and to be careful who I trust in the Party.”
August 2020 (the staff survey), was in our view
unhelpfully framed, in that the options in response “As a practising Muslim, I have faced
to the question “what is your ethnicity?” were: challenges in trying to acquire a faith space
British; English; Mixed Heritage; Other White
in our offices where I could perform prayers
Background; Black, Middle Eastern or North
Africa; Scottish; Irish; Other Asian background;
as part of my faith at particular intervals
Indian; Other / prefer not to say. If the question throughout the day. When I first raised this
was indeed about ethnicity rather than national as an issue with HR in early 2018, I was
identity, it appears that (for example) “British” passed onto the facilities team, who offered
has been used as a synonym for “white British”, me a dark and dirty mailroom for prayers,
which needless to say is problematic, and the
which was unsuitable. Later, I raised this
other groupings are somewhat odd and not
comprehensive. This in itself demonstrates that
again and was told to book meeting rooms
the Party still has some work to do in how it as and when required, however, meeting
approaches these issues. rooms were almost certainly always booked
weeks in advance and I struggled to keep up
C6.24 In total, noting that the categorisations are flawed, with my daily prayers at work.”
82% of staff identified as “British”, “English”, “Other
White Background”, “Scottish” or “Irish” (and C6.26 We received so many comments about racism
we note that that would include individuals from that we felt it was important to include a
Gypsy, Roma or Traveller backgrounds). Only representative sample and we have done so in
3% identified as “Black, Middle Eastern or North the Annex at the end of this section.
Africa”, 2% “Indian”, 2% “Other Asian”, 5% “Mixed
Heritage” and 5% as “other / prefer not to say”.

C6.25 We heard evidence relating to the experiences of

ethnic minority members and staff:

“Diversity in the Party organisation is

We consider it unlikely that there
something which again has been an issue
for the entire time I’ve worked for the Party. are many large organisations in
Initially when I first started of the 11 Regional the UK which do not have work
Directors and General Secretaries in place 9 to do when it comes to diversity
were men and all were white.”
and inclusion. As the UK’s largest
“Recruitment practices were routinely progressive political force,
flouted. Women and ethnic minorities were however, we think it is fair to expect
expected to apply and interview for posts the Party to be leading rather than
yet it was common for white men to arrive
following in this area.
without going through a recruitment process
[…] Black staff and women were aware of

85 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

Sexism the party’s Westminster/HQ core which has
gone unchallenged for too long and been
C6.27 The Party’s August 2020 survey found that 43% allowed to thrive.”
of its staff were female, 52% male, and 4%
other / preferred not to say. This was the other C6.29 Experiences of senior women in Party workplaces:
main category of discrimination about which we
received submissions, extracts from which are “I would be lying to say I’d never experienced
set out below. There was a general sense that misogyny in the Labour Party [but] I’ll be
things had improved over the years in some
honest – I don’t know whether it’s as I’ve
respects, but that young women and women
grown in age, confidence and status in the
from ethnic minorities continue to face significant
barriers to progression and wellbeing within the Party but, as time has gone on, those things
Party. There was also a sense that even senior are, in my experience, a long way now in the
women were judged more harshly and held to past. I’ve learnt however, from conversations
different standards than their male counterparts with other women and the work that I’ve done
but unfortunately that is part of the normalised
with the women’s network that […] people
culture for women in politics.
still experience these things. Of going to a
C6.28 Experiences of junior women in Party workplaces: meeting and being […] identified as the only
woman and asked to take the notes […]
“In the leaked messages I was named People not being able to talk about issues
and ridiculed for my appearance with around, you know, women needing […]
the implication that I only had a positive hospital appointments around, you know,
reputation as a result of the fact that others gynaecological issues and bosses just can’t
found me attractive. Both parts of this deal with it.”
message demonstrate sexist and regressive
attitudes that undermine women at work. […] “Within the party as a staff organisation
Both I and another young woman adviser sexism in my experience is more limited to
were made fun of in this way. It was notable under promotion and micro aggressions or
that we both came from the same factional being spoken over in meetings.”
and ideological background”
“Senior women were excluded even when
“During the general election some staff the subject was their area of expertise.”
members had made comments about my
“I have personally been on the receiving
clothing and a staff member in the press
end of briefings against me for being a bully,
office claimed in a chat that I and another
which breaks my heart. If I’m a man doing
young woman in my team were in a “harem”
this job and I’m doing it fairly but I’m doing
with […] one of our managers, implying that
it sternly, I’m never going to be accused of
we had had sexual relations with him and
being a bully. You know it’s an easy target
suggesting this is how we had got our jobs.”
because you’re, because you’re a woman.”
“The Labour Party is not a safe space for
“During the four years under Jeremy Corbyn’s
women, in fact – I would go as far as saying
leadership, I watched multiple, excellent
that it is a dangerous place and young women
colleagues leave the party, often because
are at risk of being exploited, overlooked,
they were forced out […] I know, myself, four
assaulted […] The Labour Party is infected
women during this period who returned from
with sexism at all levels – from its culture
maternity leave to [find] a member of the
to its treatment of women – led by a sexist
Leaders’ Office team had taken over their
culture of (predominantly) white men right at
responsibilities.”

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C6.30 Failure to deal with complaints: C6.32 We received very few responses which touched
on homophobia or discrimination against people
“The failure to deal with sexist conduct by with disabilities in Party workplaces and we did
male colleagues was a recurrent complaint not receive reports of transphobia. That does not
necessarily tell us anything about their prevalence.
raised by female union members with me as
We suspect that (in some cases) it is at least in
Branch Equalities Officer” part because the Party has a relatively low number
of employees and former employees with those
“Personally, whilst heavily pregnant, I was protected characteristics. Some of the evidence we
advised by my trade union to begin keeping saw supported this suggestion, at least historically:
a diary of instances of bullying that I was
experiencing […] I felt powerless to make a • One former employee who had worked for the
Party for many years, for example, told us that
formal complaint on the basis of the issues
“I met no disabled staff during my entire time
that I was experiencing because I knew that it working for the LP. Yes, some disabilities are
would not be investigated properly and would hidden but there was no discussion or awareness
be a seen as a mark against my name.” of disability issues.” However, in the staff survey
in 2020, 10% of respondents confirmed that they
“Grievance and complaints processes considered themselves to have a disability.
went nowhere if against certain people. My
• Another respondent told us that the Party was
personal experience of these processes
“disproportionately heterosexual probably…
were terrible. I put in a grievance regarding well, the issue is we haven’t got data in terms of
bullying, harassment and sexism against my sexuality.” In the staff survey, however, 78% of
then line manager but as they were a political staff identified as straight, 7% as bisexual, 6% as
appointment my complaint was disregarded, gay or lesbian and 10% other / prefer not to say.
and twisted to try to make me sound like I
• In the staff survey, 97% of staff said that they did
was politically motivated rather than the
not identify as trans, while 3% answered “yes”,
victim of bullying and sexism.” “prefer not to say”, or “prefer not to self-describe”.

Other types of discrimination C6.33 The lack of responses in relation to these types of
discrimination could also be because the Leaked
C6.31 We have not included in this section Report did not focus on them, and they were as
discrimination on the basis of political beliefs, such not seen as being issues which were central
because that is covered in our consideration of to the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference. We strongly
Allegation 1; we note, however, that many of the suggest that the Party’s planned actions with
Inquiry’s respondents felt that they were subject regard to diversity and inclusion training includes
to negative treatment, exclusion or bullying on the training with regard to these kinds of discrimination.
basis of their factional alliance, and that in many
cases they felt that factional hostility triggered,
or intersected with, other forms of discrimination.
One individual, for example, who felt isolated
from both factions, told us that “people on the
right and left of the Party did not trust me, and The ongoing factional battle was
a part of me felt that the microaggressions of seen by both sides as justifying
race & religion played a part in it.” It certainly
seems that the ongoing factional battle was unprofessional, inadequate
seen by both sides as justifying unprofessional recruitment practices, and so on. It
and hostile behaviour, inadequate recruitment
thereby contributed to the creation
practices, and so on. It thereby contributed to
the creation of an atmosphere in which other of an atmosphere in which other
types of discrimination were able to flourish, not types of discrimination were able
least because staff feared that complaints would
be dismissed as factional attacks. to flourish.

87 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section C

Annex

Lack of ethnic minority representation in “whilst I was there, 25 local organisers were hired
Party workplaces: all at the same time to help us fight the election, of
those hired there was not one member of that cohort
“in our [BAME Staff] Network meetings, the contents from a diverse background - all were white men and
of the [leaked] report have resonated - concerns women and quite frankly for an organisation like the
have been regularly raised about the apparent lack Labour party, to hire 25 members of staff with no
of progress for people of colour in the organisation, diversity is disgusting.”
which has an impact at all levels of the Party. The
trainee organising program established by the Party, Barriers to recruitment and promotion:
for example, did not hire a single BAME organiser
in its national cohort in 2019. And the problem is “Diversity, recruitment, and retention of BAME staff
exacerbated at more senior levels in the Party: the is a distinct problem in the Labour Party. Clearly
Directorate has almost no representation of BAME the contents of the report are related to this. They
people, and at the most senior level, the top three indicate a culture which looks on [B]lack, asian and
positions in the Party are all occupied by white minority ethnic staff as “lesser”.”
men. There are almost no senior people of colour in
“As part of the BAME staff network there were
decision making roles with higher levels of authority.
various discussions about those with experience
Imagine if there had been just one person of colour
applying for jobs and being frequently overlooked
in the WhatsApp groups in the report - not a single
for less experienced white staff members […] It also
one of the racist comments contained within them
did not escape me that even with the increase in
would have been permissible.”
BAME staff this was at lower levels in seniority and
“one of the things I identified [in 2018] is just about of course subsequently paygrades.”
every single member of every regional team was
“The way career progression is handled in the party
white. Including London […] So it was hardly diverse
places further barriers for Black staff. In my experience
and it was astonishing that the region where we
it’s been a lot harder to progress compared to my
have 50% of our membership, and was the most
White colleagues. Staff are promoted by managers
diverse region in the UK, didn’t have a more diverse
as part of internal political manoeuvring or due to
[workforce].”
favouritism.”
“I do not have statistics, but the party HQ staff
“In one hiring process I was asked to input on (but
were overwhelmingly and disproportionately white.
was not leading on), I raised that all the candidates
For a progressive party based in one of the most
were white men and I advised that we reopen
diverse cities in the world, it was shocking how
applications. I was ignored and one of the slew of
unrepresentative the party HQ was either our voter
white men was hired. In the process, an argument
base or of London.”
was made that it wouldn’t be possible to diversify the
list as we needed a more qualified candidate. I was
aghast at this racism.”

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Other manifestations of racism in Party Treatment of MPs from ethnic minorities
workplaces: and their staff:

“I write this submission to you feeling degraded, “I have often been uncomfortable with the way people
overlooked and insulted on so many levels. I am a talk about Black politicians, but particularly Diane
prime example of why some many say the Party has Abbott....She undoubtedly receives much more ire and
a problem with race. It is why you can count on one abuse because she is Black, and yet more because she
hand the number of senior Black women in the party, is a Black woman. It has therefore always concerned
and on multiple hands the number of Black people me how Black people far more junior than Diane may
that have left.” be seen or talked about […] this sort of thing makes me
more conscious of my colour in the Labour Party than I
“A lot of the racism in the workplace was insidious, am in everyday life – which is not a good situation for a
people being especially tough or critical of you, party with the values we have.”
feeling as you had to work twice as hard to get half
as far, your contributions to work being erased and “I always felt disrespected as a member of staff and
being left out or overlooked for high profile work/ for a significant amount of time I was the only Black
projects.” political advisor. I was often asked around Parliament if
I was Diane [Abbott]’s daughter or her niece or on work
“Women and ethnic minorities were micro-managed experience.”
while male colleagues could come and go as they
pleased.” “As a muslim, brown woman working for Diane,
the way that others began to interact with me as
“The staff at Labour HQ have a tradition of having an extension of the way they treated Diane, my
socials at a pub called The Colonies in Victoria, confidence took an incredible tumble and I began to
which is a relic to and celebration of the UK’s colonial question myself.”
past. Given the number of drinking establishments
within the square mile of Labour HQ, you would think “Seeing the comments directed towards Diane
Labour employees would recognise how deeply Abbott in the report only really confirmed what many
offensive and alienating to Asian and African staff of us understand exists – that is a culture that see
members this is. These socials were advertised Black people and other people of colour in a negative
widely through the Labour Party’s social club.” light.”

“The Labour Party is not a welcoming place for “It is quite interesting to hear how some of the staff
people of colour.” refer to activists or politicians of colour when they
don’t agree with them. They use far more extreme or
dangerous references to them.”

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Hierarchy of racism: “As a mixed-race member of staff in an organisation
with a less than acceptable level of diversity, it
“There have been many occasions where I’ve been is upsetting when it feels like racism is only taken
distraught in the lack of urgency for other cases such seriously when it is political convenient [sic]. The
as Islamophobia, Racism and Sexual harassment, above narrative in my opinion shows white staff
due to the organisational priority being Antisemitism.” obstructing, whether deliberately or accidentally,
the Party’s attempt to deal with antisemitism. This
“There are various forms of racism that clearly apparent willingness to subjugate the tackling of
take place in the Labour Party but the most hurtful racism to personal and/or factional disagreements
is perpetuated by staff in the party, some who must be tackled if the Party has any serious chance
propagate a hierarchy of racism. Where one form of of rebuilding its relationship with various ethnic
racism is seen as more important than others in the minority communities which have felt mistreated and
way it is dealt with or discussed.” taken for granted by the Party for years.”

“It is incredibly hard to not draw the conclusion that,

just as in British society, Islamophobia is not treated
with the same seriousness within the Labour Party
as other forms of racism.”

“The Party also has created a clear hierarchy of

racism and prioritised the viewpoint of certain
groups over others […] It did not go unnoticed that
the [Community Organising Unit] was treated like an
enemy within and bullied by the rest of the staff as
well as well known MP’s and also just happened to
be the most diverse.”

90 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section D

C
D
SECTION D
91 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section D
Section D:
Disciplinary Processes
In The Party

More recently, and in concert with the EHRC and other

Summary stakeholders, the Party has committed to change
– and change on the scale required to address the
As we conclude in our consideration of Allegation 2 in
structural issues that have been reported to us. Indeed
Section C, historically the Party’s disciplinary system
substantial reform of the Party’s disciplinary system
was not fit for purpose or able to cope with the sharp
relating to discrimination cases was a fundamental
increase in complaints that followed the post-2015
requirement of the EHRC report. To that end a set of
surge in Party membership. As at 2015 there was no
proposals to reconstruct the Party’s processes was
comprehensive system for logging complaints and
presented to, and approved at, the 2021 Conference,
thus no way to ascertain how many complaints were in
having been recommended by the NEC. Those
existence, or active, whether associated disciplinary
measures include the introduction of an independent
proceedings had been launched or the stage they
complaints system overseen by independent lawyers,
had reached. Meanwhile a substantial backlog of
and a new set of principles governing impartiality.
cases awaiting determination developed.

While we welcome these improvements and are

Whilst incremental changes were made under Iain
broadly supportive of the resulting changes to the
McNicol’s tenure as General Secretary (2015-2018) –
system that have now been implemented, we do
most notably the creation of a distinct ‘complaints’ team
have continuing concerns – in particular, in relation
to deal with the management of incoming complaints,
to the use of lengthy administrative suspensions,
thus freeing up the pre-existing investigations team to
and sanctions on individual members deemed to
focus on only those cases deemed serious enough to
have supported newly proscribed organisations. As
warrant further action – the broad structure for dealing
a result of these concerns (which are addressed in
with complaints remained largely the same during
more detail in this section of the report) we consider
this period.
that further reform of the Party’s disciplinary system is
A series of further changes were made under Jennie required. A series of recommendations for that reform
Formby (2018-2019), which increased capacity for is then set out in Section F.
the investigation and reporting of complaints and
gave the Party greater flexibility to hear and dispose
of antisemitism cases. Although these changes were
undoubtedly improvements – allowing the backlog of
outstanding 2015-2016 cases to be cleared by early
2020 – they were made in a reactive and somewhat
piecemeal fashion; no radical overhaul of the Party’s
response to the handling of complaints was attempted.

92 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section D

D1 Scope D2 The disciplinary system
As noted in the introduction to this report, the Inquiry’s Terms
as at 2015
of Reference require us to consider “the structure, culture
D2.1 The Party’s basic disciplinary procedures are set
and practices of the Labour Party organisation…” as we
down in detail in the rules, especially in Chapter 6
“think appropriate having regard to [our] investigation as a
of the Rule Book. Members subject to disciplinary
whole.” They also invite us to “make such recommendations
action have a contractual right to be treated in
as [we consider] appropriate concerning the organisation
accordance with those rules.
and structures of the Labour Party, arising out of [our]
investigation…”
D2.2 The basic life cycle of a complaint remained
broadly the same from 2015 through to 2019,
In our view this gives us the mandate to consider and make
albeit with fine-tuning of the specific elements.
recommendations for reform of the Party’s disciplinary
As at 2015 the process was as follows:
systems. To do so, however, it is necessary to understand
the evolution of those systems during the period covered
• Complaints were received by the complaints
by the Leaked Report. We also considered it logical to
team (formerly the Compliance Unit) either
consider – even though they strictly come after the period of
directly or via regional offices/CLPs. The
our focus – both the reforms to disciplinary procedures that
disputes team ascertained whether the
were required by the EHRC, and the wider package of rule
complaint related to a Party member.
changes approved by the Party at its 2021 Conference.
• If the complaint did relate to a member,
We take this wide approach largely because – as with
but the complaints team did not consider it
other aspects of Party operations – our Inquiry received
serious enough to merit further investigation,
evidence and accusations of the Party’s disciplinary
they would either:
process itself being affected by both serious inefficiency
and by damaging factional antagonism and bias. These
- take no further action;
allegations related to both its administration and its
outcome and to both interference with due process and - issue a reminder of conduct; or
‘fixing’ of that process for factional advantage based on the - refer the matter to be dealt with at a regional
politics of the member accused (or the member initiating level (either informally or through a regional
the complaint). investigation).
• If the allegation was more serious, it was
reported to the NEC. The Director of GLU
Our Inquiry received evidence had the power to impose an administrative
suspension pending determination.
and accusations of the Party’s
disciplinary process itself • The disputes team then investigated the
being affected both by serious case (using powers delegated to the General
Secretary and other officials by the NEC), often
inefficiency and by damaging on the basis of the papers but sometimes by
factional antagonism and bias. conducting interviews.

The explosion in membership post

2016 greatly increased the strain on
the disciplinary system.

93 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section D

 • Next, the disputes team prepared a report D2.5 There was no master index or database of
and recommendation for the Disputes Panel of complaints and as such no straightforward way to:
the NEC. As at 2015 the Disputes Panel were
drawn from the (large) membership of the NEC’s • search the Party’s system for comprehensive
Organisation Sub-Committee which only met in information about complaints or disciplinary
plenary form four times a year. The Disputes proceedings relating to an individual;
Panel could choose to:
• identify what stage a particular complaint had
- take no further action; reached;

- issue a written warning (the most severe

• ascertain how many disciplinary cases were
sanction the NEC had the power to impose);
active at a given time; or
or
- refer the matter to the constitutionally separate • tell how many disciplinary cases had been
NCC, an elected body within the Party with instigated in a given period (in relation to
no other functions but to hear and determine specific categories of misconduct, or overall).
serious disciplinary charges; to hear appeals
against NEC disciplinary decisions; and to D2.6 After 2015 the volume of complaints increased
impose sanctions. The NCC normally sat in hugely, to a level that the existing complaints
panels of three members. system was simply not designed to cope with. The
rise in the number of complaints largely reflected
• Where a case went to the NCC, and the charge the increase in members (from 190,000 in May
was found proved, the available sanctions 2015 to over 500,000 in July 2016), coupled with
included a formal warning, a reprimand, a the “validation exercise” undertaken in 2015 on
suspension from membership, a suspension applications for membership to check they were
from holding Party office, the withdrawal of eligible for Party membership. A substantial
endorsement as a candidate, suspension backlog of cases awaiting NEC determination
or expulsion from the Party, or any other developed (with many of the members involved
reasonable and proportionate measure. subject to administrative interim suspensions
while their cases passed through the system). By
D2.3 CLPs also operated disciplinary processes. In
2017 some organisations were submitting “bulk”
practice, in accordance with Chapter 6, Clause
complaints relating to social media activity, which
II.1.F of the Rule Book, CLPs were expected to
increased the backlog still more.
contact the relevant regional office for guidance
as soon as a complaint which appeared to relate D2.7 We were told in evidence that there were further
to a disciplinary matter was received. We are bottlenecks in cases referred by the NEC to
not commenting in any detail on CLP or regional the NCC for various reasons. These were said
procedures. to include difficulty in finding NCC members to
sit on the panels that heard cases and delays
D2.4 At HQ there was apparently no single location for
caused by respondents (especially those with
logging complaints and tracking their progress
legal representation) requesting deferrals. It was
through the system. Witnesses have reported that,
also alleged in other evidence to us that these
prior to 2015, this was not considered necessary
delays were compounded by the perceived need
due to the relatively low volume of complaints.
in particular cases to make sure the balance of
Where complaints resulted in investigations, the
membership of the NCC panel was likely to be
material generated was stored on the Party’s
factionally acceptable to the then dominant
“members centre”.
faction of the NEC. We are not in a position to
make a firm finding as to the truth or otherwise of
this latter allegation. However, one way to avoid
the problem described to us – or any perception
of it – would be to have a system that does not
depend on the current factional balance of the
NEC rather than an evidence-based and fair
assessment of the seriousness of the alleged
breach of Rule or Code of Conduct.

94 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section D

 D2.12 In 2017 various amendments were made to
Changes made under the Party’s rules, including an amendment to
Iain McNicol 2015-2018 Chapter 2, Clause 1.8 (which proscribes conduct
“prejudicial” or “grossly detrimental” to the Party).
D2.8 The structure for dealing with complaints The rule was amended to require the NEC and
remained broadly the same during this period, NCC to take into account the Party’s Codes of
in which Iain McNicol was General Secretary, Conduct in considering allegations under this rule,
but there were various attempts to fine tune it and to provide that any incident which objectively
(in some cases based on recommendations demonstrated hostility or prejudice based on a
made in the Chakrabarti Report, though many of protected characteristic had to be regarded as
the recommendations made by the Chakrabarti “conduct prejudicial to the Party”. Late in 2017
Report were never implemented). a Code of Conduct relating to antisemitism and
other forms of racism was adopted which stated,
D2.9 In early 2017, the complaints and disputes team amongst other things, that any behaviour or use
were separated. The new complaints team was to of language which “undermines Labour’s ability
focus on the management of inbound complaints to campaign against any form of racism” was
(primarily received, from late 2017, via the new unacceptable conduct.
email account [email protected]), with
the disputes (or investigations) team focused on
investigating all of the cases deemed serious
Changes made under
enough to require further attention. In practice, Jennie Formby 2018-2019
though, we have heard that the demarcation
between the two teams was often blurred. D2.13 Jennie Formby became General Secretary
in March 2018 and put in place a number of
D2.10 In 2017, the Party commissioned the design and changes intended to improve the functioning of
construction of a project management system to the disciplinary system, albeit her efforts were
allow better recording and tracking of complaints hampered (at least initially) by the departure of
(the complaints centre). Whilst that system was a large number of staff from GLU following her
being constructed, we are told that a Microsoft appointment.
Access database was used to track all matters
which had been passed to the disputes team by D2.14 Jennie Formby appointed a general counsel,
the complaints team (a slight improvement on the Gordon Nardell QC, in June 2018 (as per the
Excel spreadsheet). One member of complaints recommendation of the Chakrabarti Report).
staff told us that the system was launched in July Various other changes were made to the structure
2017, and the contents of the Microsoft Access of the disputes team, including the designation of
database were imported into it. Another witness the post of Director of GLU as one which required
told us that it was not fully operational until April legal qualifications.
2018. The new system was designed to provide a
central source of information in relation to any given D2.15 In 2018-2019 a new team of governance officers
member, although it still did not allow broader was recruited to assist with the complaints
searches (by, say, category of misconduct). function (with each officer responsible for
complaints arising from particular nations/
D2.11 In late 2017 (in the wake of #MeToo) all sexual regions, referring them as appropriate to the
misconduct complaints reported to the NEC were disputes team). This created additional capacity
heard not by the plenary NEC Disputes Panel, for the investigation and reporting of cases and
but by smaller panels of five members (with the preparation of NCC bundles.
a quorum of three) sitting with an independent
legal advisor.

95 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section D

D2.16 In line with a recommendation made by the
newly-established Antisemitism Working Group,
Changes to be implemented
the power to dispose of antisemitism cases to the Party’s disciplinary
was removed from the plenary NEC Disputes
Panel and given to smaller panels of three to
system following approval at
five members, akin to those used in sexual 2021 Party conference
misconduct cases. The panels were assisted
by an external legal advisor. Again, the intention D2.20 Proposals to overhaul the Party’s disciplinary
was to speed up the handling of cases (given that processes with the introduction of an independent
the Disputes Panel only met four times a year), complaints system were approved by 73.64% of
to encourage a more robust discussion of the delegates at the 2021 Conference, having been
evidence than the plenary format allowed, and recommended for approval by the NEC. Reform
to depoliticise the outcomes. A decision-making of the Party’s disciplinary system in relation
matrix and guidance in relation to antisemitism to discrimination cases was a requirement of
was drawn up in mid-2019 for use by the NEC the EHRC report on antisemitism cases and
“small panels”. We understand that this system proposed measures were agreed with the EHRC.
allowed the backlog of 2015-2016 cases to be
cleared by early 2020. D2.21 The proposals establish a new Independent Review
Board (IRB) – comprised of independent lawyers
D2.17 In May 2019 new guidelines were introduced – to review all disciplinary decisions of the NEC
to encourage the swifter and fairer resolution of concerning allegations of discrimination. Each
cases by the NCC; in September 2019 the NCC decision will be reviewed by a member of the IRB to
was expanded from 11 members to 25 so that it ensure they comply with legislation, Party rules and
was able to convene panels with greater ease. new principles of independence and impartiality
(as set out at paragraph D2.25). The IRB will have
D2.18 In September 2019, rule changes were the power to set aside decisions and remit them to
implemented to give greater powers to the a fresh NEC Disputes Panel to be determined.
NEC, including its small panels, which became
able to impose any of the sanctions available D2.22 All discrimination cases currently determined by
to the NCC, up to and including expulsion, in the NCC, will now go before a newly-established
cases involving hostility or prejudice based on Independent Complaints Board (ICB) for
a protected characteristic. Members subject to determination. The ICB will comprise a pool of 12
such sanctions by the NEC have a right of appeal members – four lawyers; four human resources or
to the NCC. regulatory professionals; and four lay members –
each with a term of two years. A panel of three
D2.19 Cases involving racism, discrimination and/or members (one from each designation) will be
harassment based on a protected characteristic convened to hear cases.
were removed from the disciplinary powers of CLPs,
and instead had to be dealt with through GLU.16 D2.23 The ICB members will be appointed by a standing
recruitment committee, which will be appointed
by the General Secretary. Lay members will be
appointed following an open application process.
Applicants must hold five years’ membership
and a clean disciplinary record.

D2.24 All appeals against decisions concerning

discrimination will be subject to preliminary
review by a legally qualified member of the ICB. If
that member considers that there are grounds for
appeal, a panel of three members (one member
from each category) will be convened to hear
the case. Appeal decisions will be reached by
majority vote and will be final.

16
This was communicated to CLPs and Branch Secretaries by an email from the General Secretary, dated 30 July 2019.

96 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section D

D2.25 The new set of principles governing impartiality
are as follows:
Reflections and Conclusions
D2.27 During the course of our Investigation issues
• Avoid conflicts of interest: to take decisions
relating to the regulation and disciplining of the
in the best interests of the Labour Party, not
Party membership, whether it be at individual,
in one’s own personal or political interests
local, council, staff or Parliamentary Party level
and, where required to exercise a subjective
have proved to be highly contentious. That
judgement, to take whatever action seems
continues to be the case.
most likely to advance the interests of the Party.
D2.28 Submissions have been made suggestive
• Equality: to take decisions untainted by
of manipulation of process along factional
unlawful discrimination.
lines, marginalisation of those with protected
characteristics, opacity of procedures and a
• Transparency: to act openly and transparently.
perceived hierarchy of engagement with different
protected characteristics.
• Freedom from corruption: to ensure that
disciplinary proceedings are free from corruption.
D2.29 In relation to the latter, certain elements representing
interest groups within the Party have complained
• Good faith: to act in good faith and without
that allegations relating to sexual impropriety
arbitrariness or capriciousness.
following the “#MeToo” movement commencing in
• Impartiality: to act impartially and to avoid giving 2017 and the allegations of antisemitism have been
rise to any reasonable perception of bias. more expeditiously investigated and sanctions
applied by the Party than allegations of race
• Rationality: to make decisions rationally, on discrimination, Islamophobia, homophobia and
rational grounds. LGBT+ phobia. That such complaints have been
made must be of concern to the Party, particularly
• Evidence: to make decisions based on as it promotes itself as being in the vanguard on
evidence, to take into account all relevant diversity and inclusion.
matters and to exclude irrelevant matters.
D2.30 We have had real difficulties in accessing detailed
• Fairness: to inform members subject to records, email exchanges and processes “in real
disciplinary action of the case against them, and time” as we have been told records do not exist
to give them an opportunity to state their defence, or were not kept in an accessible form and we
before imposing a disciplinary sanction. have been reliant upon the recollection of those
involved as to processes.
• Tolerance: to respect political opinions
with which one disagrees and to safeguard D2.31 It has become clear to us that not only was the
freedom of speech, so long as that speech record system totally inadequate but the system
does not comprise or promote discriminatory and process for disciplinary cases of all sorts
views or hate speech or gratuitous abuse. were not fit for purpose with regard to structure,
resources or management well before 2015,
• Democracy: to promote democratic engagement and lacked transparency and basic procedural
in the Labour Party and wider society where protections.
possible.
D2.32 But it is also clear that the explosion in
D2.26 These are important but very generalised membership post 2015 greatly increased the
principles against which both the detailed strain on the disciplinary system. This was
process and the practice for disciplinary cases aggravated by the political challenges the
will need to be judged. Party faced with three general elections in four
years, two leadership elections and the need to
be constantly campaigning – plus the intense
factional tensions we have outlined earlier.

97 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section D

D2.33 During the time period that we have been asked • The continued use of administrative suspension
to consider reforms were made but in a reactive for prolonged periods and without effective
and rather piecemeal fashion. Following on means of appeal; and
from those reforms and the EHRC investigation,
further changes and improvements have been • The consequences for individual members
made and there are further proposals emanating of the arrangements to deal with Proscribed
from the Action Plan that the Party has devised Organisations and Proscribed and Prohibited
with the EHRC. Acts.

D2.34 Enquiries of the Party reveal that in 2016 there

were over 5,000 unresolved complaints in the
Administrative Suspension
disciplinary process, of which almost 3 in 10
D2.41 There has been widespread criticism of the
were allegations of antisemitism.
use of administrative suspension by Party
officers, and sometimes by Disputes Panels.
D2.35 Successive Leaders, General Secretaries and
We recognise that when serious accusations
NECs have declared that outstanding cases will
are made about a Party member’s conduct
be dealt with rapidly. However until very recently
administrative suspensions may be appropriate
progress on reducing that number has been
to allow investigations to proceed. However
slow. Effectively efforts to reduce the backlog
we have heard of substantial numbers of
only really started to have an effect from the end
cases where administrative suspension has
of 2019.
been indeterminate in length with sometimes
individuals (and also CLPs and Branches)
D2.36 In May 2021, the backlog of cases (made up of
being administratively suspended for months
everything received and not yet resolved before
and years. And in the case of some individuals
May 2021) totalled 7,090. By October 2021,
indeterminate administrative suspension has
5,411 had been assessed, with 2,893 closed.
stopped them being considered for election
as officers or selection as candidates; in some
D2.37 Recent enquiries of the Party reveal that the vast
cases that has in effect been career ending.
majority of complaints have now been resolved.
We received claims that allegations were made
As at March 2022, there were 554 active cases,
against individual members prior to selection
which included 55 awaiting allocation.
of candidates for local government elections
or for positions within the CLP deliberately to
D2.38 The Labour Party is a membership organisation. It
provoke administrative suspensions to stop such
is entitled to demand high standards of propriety
candidates going forward.
from its membership and to act in relation to
conduct that is fundamentally incompatible with
D2.42 While administrative suspension is never justified
membership, such as discriminatory conduct.
when used purely for factional advantage, we
accept that it will be appropriate in some cases.
D2.39 Our investigations reveal that not only were
However, we consider that the Party should
successive systems unfit for purpose and
exercise particular caution before imposing an
susceptible to factional interference, and
administrative suspension that would adversely
manipulation, but that the importance of a
affect the prospects of the person so suspended
transparent, consistent and fair disciplinary
in any impending s/election process. We would
process was not regarded as fundamental to
also suggest that any administrative suspension
the effective management of the Party and its
should be the subject of a review by two case
membership, as it should have been.
examiners, one of whom should be a lay member,
D2.40 We also have concerns about two aspects to be held, other than in exceptional cases or in
of the current and incoming operation of the times of particular pressure, within 6 weeks of the
system which have appeared already and could date on which the suspension was first imposed.
increasingly give rise to accusations of factional This process should involve consideration of (a) the
bias and manipulation unless operated more merits of the suspension and (b) whether it should
clearly in line with the principles of natural justice. continue pending disposal of the substantive
These are: complaint.

98 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section D

 • to confirm four organisations that constitute
Consequences of “political organisations” for the purposes of
Proscription of organisations Chapter 2, Clause 1.4.B of the Labour Party
Rule Book; and
D2.43 We also have concerns about the implications for
individual members of the Rules, approved at the • that identifies examples of “support” for any
Party’s 2021 Conference, in relation to Proscribed of those organisations for the purposes of
Acts and Prohibited Acts respectively. We do not Chapter 2, Clause 1.4.B of the Labour Party
dispute the right of a political party to determine Rule Book,
that membership of certain organisations is
incompatible with membership of that Party. There We think it would be preferable, however, to
will be differing views about the desirability of a set out examples and criteria which are to be
Proscribed List; in any event, we consider that the of general application.
process for proscribing organisations should be
fair and transparent. Equally, the processes for D2.45 Accordingly, we make both core and detailed
the automatic termination of (i) membership, or (ii) recommendations, which are set out in Section
eligibility for membership, as a result of committing F below. They apply primarily to cases involving
a Proscribed Act cannot be allowed to operate protected characteristics which will all be dealt
in a manifestly unfair way. For example, it cannot with under the new complaints system. However
be right that a forged nomination document that we also have concerns about the process for
apparently, but erroneously, shows an individual’s complaints about other issues including breach
intention to stand against the Party in an election of any Party Rule and of bullying and harassment
should be relied upon to justify termination of Party at CLPs and other Party bodies. We received a
membership. We accept that such challenges worryingly high level of such allegations from
could be brought on appeal – the Party having members contained in submissions following our
voted at its 2021 Conference to introduce a new and Call for Evidence.
welcome right of appeal in that regard. However,
we think it would be desirable to allow individuals in D2.46 We would expect our core recommendations
appropriate cases – for example of fraud of the sort to be implemented in any event. The
referred to above, or of mistaken identity - to make detailed recommendations provide a more
representations at an earlier stage with a view to comprehensive framework for a fair, transparent
avoiding termination of their membership in the first and effective disciplinary process. We accept,
place. however, that when considering implementation
of these latter proposals the Party will need to
D2.44 As regards Prohibited Acts, the NEC has the take account of the Party’s finite financial and
power ‘in its absolute discretion’ to designate staffing resources, and that it may need to modify
an organisation to be inimical with the aims and some of our suggestions accordingly to enable
values of the Party17. The NEC is also then given them to be carried into practice.
the power to terminate the membership of any
Party member or provisional member – or block
the acceptance of a prospective member – who
supports any such organisation (with ‘support’
also being defined by the NEC in its ‘absolute
discretion’ – in effect leading to ‘auto exclusion’ (in
the same way as support of an alternative political
Party would)). Again, we consider that the criteria
and process for so designating organisations – The detailed recommendations
and the boundaries of the definition of ‘support’ in
this context – should be fair and transparent. We provide a more comprehensive
note that the current iteration of the Labour Party framework for a fair, transparent
Complaints Policy18 records a decision made by
the NEC on 20 July 2021:
and effective disciplinary process.

17
Chapter 2, Clause 1.5 of the Rule Book
18
Complaints Policy Version 1.1, 22 July 2021

99 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section D

E
SECTION E
Section E:
The Culture, Structure and Practices
of The Labour Party Organisation

Whilst staff within the Party have at times been able

Summary of findings and to work together effectively, the overall effectiveness
recommendations of the Party has been affected by these issues and
a “monoculture” at HQ leading to “groupthink”, as
Working for the Party, with the aims and values to which detailed in the previous section of this report. Staff
it lays claim, should be a collective endeavour; there have not historically been representative of the
will always be disagreements about policy or strategy membership, much less the country, and this has
but we would have expected them to be dealt with in a meant the Party has missed out on talent. We heard
comradely – or at least respectful – manner and in an persuasive evidence from staff from ethnic minorities
environment which permitted healthy debate. Instead that they had experienced additional barriers at work.
– in the period we are considering – we have been
shocked to find the existence of a toxic atmosphere, The Party has commissioned external consultants
which appears to have been fuelled by an entrenched Q5 to carry out further analysis on the Party’s culture;
factionalism, but also by some worrying discriminatory this fine grained analysis will be critical to informing
attitudes including racism and sexism exhibited the action required for cultural change and growth.
amongst some senior staff. We need to make it clear that the Q5 consultancy is
relatively recent and that we are not in a position to
As has already been noted, these have been judge its effectiveness.
exacerbated by long running poor recruitment
practices, and structural issues within the Party’s Simply adopting a “zero tolerance” approach will not
operations. Although not within our Terms of Reference resolve these issues. Although disciplinary action
we have also received some evidence that other Party and expulsions may be appropriate in extreme cases,
spaces, including CLP meetings and meetings of the in many instances a meaningful educational and
PLP, have similar issues. awareness building programme will be more effective.
Training on antisemitism has been introduced but
We have noticed a tendency on all sides of the Party we consider the format to be sub-optimal. Ideally,
to dismiss any challenge to the behaviour of a person education and training on issues concerning
from the same faction as a bad faith, factionally- discrimination and other cultural issues should consist
motivated attack. This encourages a culture in which of facilitated reflection, rather than taking a lecture
people are emboldened to act in ways that they would format. It should also be underpinned by fundamental
consider unacceptable from people coming from a ethical principles and focussed on building skills such
different Party tradition. Very few of the people we as deep listening and full engagement with different
spoke to reflected on the part they, or their particular perspectives. There should be more support for
tradition, may have played in contributing to a locally developed education programmes.
discriminatory and factional culture.

101 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section E

 Cultural growth, including the skill of deep listening, We have heard evidence of excellent practice
acceptance of differing traditions within the Party at all levels of the Party. We have suggested an
as legitimate, and compassion, need to be led “appreciative analysis” is undertaken for CLPs to
and demonstrated by the leadership of the Party. identify what is being done well and how that good
Senior leaders should also consistently demonstrate practice can be scaled up.
respectful behaviour and encourage a willingness to
show “vulnerability” (such as changing one’s mind, Issues with the roles of, and cooperation between, LOTO
accommodating a different perspective or sincerely and HQ were brought to something of a head in the
apologising). Behavioural change will be required at Corbyn years. The behaviour of certain staff within HQ
all levels of the Party, together with the prioritisation of appeared to us to have been equally inappropriate for
different political skills. their permanent “civil service” type role and it was also
inappropriate for LOTO to try to incorporate aspects of
There will need to be a full consultation leading to HQ’s role into its own operation. There appears to have
revised Codes of Conduct – we suggest one for staff, been no concerted effort for staff at LOTO and HQ to
another for members generally and, although outside get to know, and trust, each other. Better differentiation
of our Terms of Reference, given the evidence we between LOTO and HQ; avoidance of the duplication
have seen, another for officers and elected members. of their roles; better informal cooperation and ensuring
The detail of the Codes will need to be determined that HQ and regional staff regard their role as being to
following a more granular and wider analysis than serve the best interests of the Party as a whole (in part
we were able to undertake, but we have made some akin to that of the civil service) – rather than to pursuing
recommendations as to what should be included as a the narrower objectives of strands within the Party – are
minimum. required to prevent a future recurrence of these issues.

E1 Scope E2 Our approach

E1.1 The third of the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference asks E2.1 We hosted a roundtable discussion on culture with
us to investigate and report on: organisational and academic participants drawn
both from inside and outside the Party, to enable
“The structure, culture and practices of the the Panel to stand back from the evidence received
Labour Party organisation including the and to have a more reflective discussion of the sort
that we encourage the Party and CLPs to have.
relationship between senior party staff and
The Panel found the roundtable meeting extremely
the elected leadership of the Labour Party, useful and consider it a model of how to address
as the Panel think appropriate having regard difficult questions and ensure differing views and
to their investigation as a whole.” perspectives are heard in a respectful space. It is
difficult to actively listen but that is what should be
E1.2 These issues have been canvassed in Section C a main aim of outcomes for the future.
above, particularly in considering the evidence
on: factionalism and its effects in C1 to C4; poor E2.2 To the extent our Terms of Reference require us to
recruitment and management practices in C5; investigate racism, sexism and other discriminatory
and discrimination on the basis of protected behaviour, we are directed to focus principally on
characteristics in C6. In this section, however, the position within Party workplaces. Accordingly,
we want to provide an overview of our broader we have not analysed in any depth how prevalent
thoughts and conclusions on this topic and this factionalism, discriminatory attitudes and
section is, therefore, rather more discursive other cultural issues of concern are within the
than the earlier sections. Recommendations are membership of the Party (nor, indeed, how these
contained in Section F. issues both inside and outside of Party workplaces
affect the membership). In practice, however,
we accept that it is impossible to divorce Party

102 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section E

 workplaces entirely from other important spaces E3.2 By no means have all employees contributed to
in the Party, in particular local CLPs. Although we this culture – indeed, despite the prevailing culture,
have not heard much evidence directly from, or in some witnesses have testified to good working
relation to CLPs, or the membership as a whole, relationships between individuals working for
we have, to some extent, addressed the issues LOTO and HQ. Submissions have been divided
relating to them in our analysis below and in our as to how widespread the toxic culture is, how
recommendations. long it has been present and who is responsible
for it. It is plain that there are wider issues:
E2.3 We summarise below the cultural and structural
issues we have identified (many of which are “It also became clear during the course
addressed in more granular detail in Section C), of our investigations [for the report] that
and then discuss how these issues can perhaps be
factionalism had played an important and
addressed. Specific recommendations on culture,
Party structure, social media, and education and potentially destructive role in the Party’s
training are contained in Section F. mishandling of antisemitism complaints. For
example, GLU prioritised “hunting trots”, i.e.
E3 Culture suspending members who supported Jeremy
Corbyn, in 2015 and 2016 over dealing with
E3.1 As is evident from what we say above, the Leaked complaints of antisemitism, Islamophobia or
Report portrays a toxic culture in Party workplaces. other types of complaints. This also fuelled
This has also been a common theme among many
the destructive denialist narrative amongst
of the submissions made to us. There appear to
be several main streams feeding this toxic culture:
Party members that all suspensions and
(a) factionalism, including at the highest levels of disciplinary action is just another factional
HQ and LOTO; (b) racist, sexist and otherwise ‘purge’ or ‘witch-hunt’ against the left.”
discriminatory behaviour and culture; (c) bullying
and threatening behaviour, particularly but not “When I went on the road with Jeremy
exclusively on the part of staff at LOTO, and (d) Corbyn to Norwich, a staff member from
a culture of denialism across all factions in which
the Eastern region was talking about […],
many of the people involved in such behaviour
the local MP, in a negative and demeaning
failed to accept that they may have acted in a
way that is bullying, threatening, discriminatory way and this staff member and another staff
or which perpetuates discriminatory behaviour, member from HQ were using ableist and
simply because they are committed to progressive offensive language about the local members
politics. We have also noted a tendency amongst all being “crazy” and “insane” supporters of
staff to feel that they were operating in a conflict
Corbyn and Momentum.”
zone in which otherwise unacceptable conduct
could be justified, without reflecting on their own
“I am one of the relatively few Jewish
part in contributing to and/or escalating that
conflict. These issues, combined with lack of members of staff. I have on occasion directly
diversity in Party workplaces (and structural issues experienced anti-Semitism from those who
concerning the Party’s operations), have in too would regard themselves as being on the
many instances created a working environment left as well as being aware of the many
totally at odds with the values the Party stands for. many examples where Labour members
have exhibited either anti-Semitism or an
attitude so dismissive of the concerns of
A working environment totally Jewish people that they cannot reasonably
at odds with the values the be regarded as anti-racists.”
Party stands for.

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 “Senior management […] appeared to do and less likely to believe that local members
nothing to detoxify staff relations in the reflect and understand people living in the area
and all their diversity19.
organisation or improve the working culture
in the Party. On the contrary, it appears E3.5 We were concerned by evidence we received
that the most senior levels of management about the effect of cumulative and consistent
actively engaged in this sort of abuse.” treatment experienced by Jewish members
at certain CLPs that has led to them feeling
E3.3 In addition to creating a toxic working atmosphere, intimidated. For example, the tabling of motions,
there are further ramifications of this culture. As at every meeting of certain CLPs, in which
one submission from someone who worked in the actions of the Israeli government were
HQ for a couple of years during the period we are questioned/condemned, and Jewish members
considering explained: “the political, social and present were then placed under pressure to
workplace culture of Labour HQ was suffering demonstrate openly their support for this position.
badly from the long term effects of drawing staff It is of course acceptable for Party discussions
almost exclusively from one tradition of the Party to include criticism of the Government of Israel –
to the exclusion of those from other traditions, or any other state – when it is perceived to have
or, as in my case, none.” They described this acted in an oppressive or discriminatory way;
as a “mono culture”, which encouraged classic what is not acceptable is to infer that Jewish
‘groupthink’ such as confirmation bias and wilful members and Labour supporters of Israel back
blindness. They told us that that the WhatsApp such actions, or to focus repeatedly on that issue
messages quoted in the Leaked Report in order to discomfort Jewish members. These
“accurately reflect the prevailing workplace and actions constitute antisemitism. The Fabian
management culture at Southside” for much Society Survey found that Jewish members
of their time there (although this was disputed reported the most negative experiences of local
by one witness) and that the Leaked Report parties amongst all under-represented groups20.
“merely reveals the symptoms and reach of the
mono culture”. We consider that the notion of a E3.6 This is the context in which the dispute over the
‘mono culture’, disrupted by the arrival of a new response to antisemitism has to be understood.
leadership from another, previously marginalised This toxic culture has been allowed to fester
tradition of the party, is helpful in understanding and has been aggravated in some instances by
the cultural problems identified in our inquiry. poor management practices, detailed also in the
Kerslake Review.
E3.4 It is impossible to read the Leaked Report other
than through the lens of the divisive and mutually E3.7 As further explored in C5, another symptom of this
antagonistic factionalism identified that had toxic culture, as well as structural issues discussed
become increasingly toxic during the period further below, is what the submission quoted in
2014 to 2019. In addition to the evidence we paragraph E3.3 described as “the shockingly low
received directly, we agree with the conclusions representation of BME communities in Labour
of the Kerslake Review in that “a culture of HQ and the nepotistic networks among staff that
factionalism and bad behaviour has become heavily influence selection for appointment and
embedded in the organisation” (p5). A recent promotion”. This culture was “reinforced by a
survey of 2,890 Party members conducted by rigidly hierarchical culture of power, supported
the Fabian Society (the Fabian Society Survey) by exclusionary outside workplace staff social
found a reported decline in positive experiences networks”. The submission warns us that any
of local parties since 2015, which respondents recommendations from our Inquiry that ignore the
linked to more intense factionalism. This was “hostile exclusionary mono culture in Labour HQ
particularly marked amongst members of under- will leave the roots of the problem untouched”.
represented groups who were more likely to find We agree.
other members unfriendly and unwelcoming; less
likely to enjoy attending meetings; less likely to
believe people are treated fairly in the local Party;

19
Ben Cooper and Andrew Harrop, The Fabian Society, More To Do: Unequal Experiences of Labour Party Membership; November 2021, p2-4
20
Ibid p6-7

104 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section E

E4 Promoting cultural Cultural growth as a positive message
growth E4.2 Having spoken so far about cultural ‘change’ it was
put to us at the roundtable that it might be better
It is encouraging that the Party leadership has to talk about cultural ‘growth’ as a more positive
taken some first steps and has enlisted the Q5 message that is less likely to create a dynamic of
consultancy to help with the process of cultural resistance. As one submission put it, change is more
growth. The Party will need to carry out a more likely to be embedded if the focus is on nurturing a
fine grained diagnosis of what is needed than our more healthy environment that will gradually take the
Inquiry was able to undertake. Future success place of more toxic aspects of Party culture.
will depend on the quality of that diagnosis.

We start with three general statements that are

crucial to the kind of cultural change we believe
Change is more likely to be
is needed. embedded if the focus is on
nurturing a more healthy
• First, culture really matters.
environment that will gradually
• Second, it might be better to talk about cultural take the place of more toxic
‘growth’ as a more positive message that is
less likely to create a dynamic of resistance. aspects in the Party culture.

• Third, cultural growth is difficult, particularly in

a political organisation where there are various
E4.3 That is not to say that there should not be clear
centres of power.
expectations about behaviour and consequences
for poor behaviour. However, the emphasis needs to
Culture really matters be on a continuous and ongoing process of creating
a truly positive working environment for staff that
E4.1 First, culture really matters. To quote from an actively nurtures and promotes the values that the
influential text on organisational change: “a Party stands for and that creates a similar environment
strong shared culture is the glue that keeps in the wider Party. A number of contributors to
empowered organisations from falling apart”21. the roundtable noted that disciplinary action and
We have therefore sought to establish what is “zero tolerance” of discriminatory incidents will be
the shared culture that can provide this glue. insufficient and ultimately counterproductive:
We asked participants in the roundtable “What
would success look like?” One participant
“zero tolerance confuses the problem
summed it up in the following terms: “from
the grass roots to the very top and officials … of anti semitism which, if you like, is a
[everyone] would consider themselves part cultural phenomenon with the problem of
of a common endeavour [which goes beyond anti semites, which is individuals who, if
winning elections] with common purposes and you like, are so obsessed with the idea of
common values. And that differences that are malign Jews that this frame helps to frame
inevitable between individuals and groups
their political outlook. And you can certainly
would be listened to with an open mind and with
respect”. They noted that this was a statement expel the latter from the Party but the former,
of the obvious that should not need to be made. like other forms of racism and like other
The very fact that it does appear to the Panel to forms of stereotyping and so forth, is always
need saying, and saying strongly, underlines going to be a work in progress and needs
how far the Party has diverged from a sense of to be addressed through education, through
common purpose and values.
encouraging people to be self-critical [and
through personal reflection and growth as
happened with Naz Shah]… in other words,
discipline is not enough”

Frederic Laloux, Reinventing Organizations: A guide to creating organizations inspired by the next stage of human consciousness, Brussels, Belgium:
21

Nelson Parker, 2014, p33.

105 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section E

 “absolutely at the extremes you might have to E4.5 We believe this will also help to:
discipline them, but what you try to do is work
• overcome the resistance many involved
with them and get them to see it and try and in
in progressive politics feel when asked
fact not address it as an individual problem… to interrogate their own behaviour for
because the problem is not about the individuals, discriminatory motive or effect; and
it is about a way of looking at the world, a cultural
reflex if you like... Because the point was never • promote a culture where staff no longer
about those individuals, many of whom, from perceive themselves (and others) to be
members of factions (where their own faction is
what I gather, were basically espousing Nazi-type
legitimate and other factions are illegitimate),
anti semitism – I mean, that is another question: but rather see everyone as representatives of
how did these people, even in an expansion, ever valid traditions and views within the Party.
get to be in the Labour Party and feel that was
their home? But that’s not what most of us have E4.6 A submission from a local member summed it up
well: what is needed ‘is a renewal of a culture of
been talking about… [It has been much more]
decency so that the bureaucracy and the NEC
about Jewish people feeling they were being members behave properly and fulfil their duties of
eye-balled at meetings by the same resolution, trust’. The same submission suggested that the
slightly changed, coming up on the vexed issue Party should work to put itself in a position to be
of Palestine, meeting after meeting after meeting. able to claim ‘great place to work’ accreditation.
That’s a shorthand to describing a whole culture
of when complaints are made, somehow being Cultural growth is difficult
treated as a suspect community… It’s that
E4.7 Cultural growth is difficult, particularly in a political
culture that people have been talking about and, organisation where there are various centres
of course, if you only focus on being intolerant to of power. It will take time and commitment at
the intolerant through disciplinaries, you’ll miss it every level of the Party. The leadership – both in
completely.” Westminster and HQ – have to be fully engaged,
and this engagement has to be sustained. This was
E4.4 The response to the Naz Shah incident was seen the overwhelming message from our roundtable
in our roundtable as a positive example of how and also from the Labour Together Report.
incidents can be dealt with in practice. Naz Shah
retweeted an antisemitic cartoon. She ended up E4.8 We consider that this needs to be an urgent priority
making a statement, with input from (amongst for the Party. Not only is it a moral imperative
others) the JLM, and had a meeting with the Board for any employer, let alone a progressive Party,
of Deputies. She expressed a sincere apology but our findings in Section C make it clear how
and sought to make amends for her actions. cultural issues have led to, amongst other issues
We recognise that similar resources cannot be in Party workplaces: “groupthink”; a breakdown
invested in every problem, but the Party should, in communication between LOTO and HQ; delays
as a participant at the roundtable put it, “think in addressing major issues (such as antisemitism
about the elements that went into that [response] complaints); unnecessary staff turnover; a culture
and think about how they could be reproduced of leaks and associated lack of trust across the
at scale when different incidents arise because it workplaces; and duplication of effort. None of
offers a way forward which is not soft on racism, this is conducive to a functional organisation.
antisemitism or misogyny [etc] but starts off from
an assumption where possible – and it won’t always E4.9 For that reason, we suggest that responsibility for
be possible – the people involved are on the same cultural growth is assumed at the highest levels.
side and there might be a way forward”. Whilst prime responsibility for sustaining a positive
approach to cultural growth should rest with the
General Secretary and senior staff at HQ backed
Cultural growth will take time by the appropriate NEC Committee(s), there is
and commitment at every level also a role for the political leadership. All parts of
the leadership must embrace and embody the
of the Party. changes they want to see in the Party.

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E4.10 A good start would be for the political leadership • Factionalism within the Party is so extreme that
to share with staff their vision of what the Party whole sections of the Party view other factions
should be, and encourage debate within the as entirely illegitimate, that is people who should
Party around this vision. This would help to create not be in the Party at all. In recent years this has
momentum around building a shared sense of manifested itself in large elements on the Right
common endeavour. Rebuilding trust will be an of the Party regarding Corbyn supporters as
important part of the process. This would require entirely illegitimate (and this is arguably a mirror
a structured programme of engagement between image of an earlier time in the Party’s history when
the leader and staff groups. large sections of the Left of the Party regarded
the supporters of Tony Blair as illegitimate). This
E4.11 We would also suggest that on the political phenomenon has, to some degree, spread more
side, a senior Shadow Cabinet member is given widely in recent times so that those who identify
particular responsibility to liaise with HQ on cultural with one of a number of ideological strands within
change, given the demands on the leader’s time, the Party take the view that other parts of the Party
but that this also has to be underpinned by the have been “captured” by competing factions and
leader’s personal commitment to the process. are therefore less legitimate. A precursor to any
dialogue is going to be a recognition that all these
E4.12 The changes we propose will also require a strands of thought are legitimate, and roles within
well-staffed, professional human resources the Party (whether staff, members or officials)
function with higher status within the Party in are not merely factional. A first step might be an
order to support improved people management open and facilitated discussion between elected
across HQ, LOTO and regional offices. Our representatives of HQ, LOTO and the regional
recommendations involve a significant overhaul offices respectively. Ultimately in our view there
to various policies, practices, and training must be a recognition that, in the words of one
approaches, which will require significant input roundtable participant: “we [i.e. those in the Party]
from the HR team and we are doubtful that the are an alliance of people who come from different
current team has the capacity to carry this out. backgrounds, ways of thinking and seeing and
Further specialist members of staff may need to that is who we are... The only other way … is for
be recruited into this vital function, at least in the one side to win, everybody else to leave and go
short term. We do though recognise that financial to a different party which may be what happens
pressures on the Party may make such action in the end if we don’t solve this.”
difficult at present but it would be an investment
that would pay off and save substantial financial • As the same roundtable participant observed
– and political – costs in the longer term. “culture eats strategy” – that is the culture
of the Party (or any organisation) in itself will
be the biggest barrier to cultural growth and
E5 Barriers to cultural any strategy to address that. For that reason,
growth any interventions need to have a strong
experiential element, and will require: “a
E5.1 We had some very useful contributions in the positive disruption [that is doing] something
roundtable, addressing some of the barriers to differently to the way the culture normally does
cultural growth – both general and Party specific. things for long enough for people to see other
We note them here as action taken in response ways of being and holding that space open to
to our recommendations will need to grapple with be able to do something else that is different
these issues: and hold it open long enough for the new thing
to…outgrow - the old thing. That is why I said
leadership is important because the leaders
The urgent need for a kinder are going to have to hold that space for long
enough for the new thing to get some roots
politics has been recognised
down and begin to be different but it is going
by those on all points of the to have to be a conscious understanding of
political spectrum. the culture, the history, how it got to here and
why things are like that .”

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 • There is a tendency on the Left in general, • There is a tendency in the Party to want to
and in the Party (irrespective of tradition) debate narrow political points when perhaps
to a specific type of self-righteousness. A other forms of political activity might be more
roundtable participant put it like this: “If you conducive to cultural growth. We were told the
believe you represent the forces of good and following anecdote: “I went to my local Labour
if you believe your struggle is by definition Party meeting shortly after the last election
morally superior to anyone else’s…”, you may and…there was a kind of discussion about
allow yourself to behave in ways that might ‘what went wrong’, and younger members
otherwise shame you. both by age and by Party membership were
saying they really want to see this as a space
• Much Party analysis has historically been where we do things where we show our values
rooted in class consciousness. There has also by acting in the community and give people
been an erroneous tendency on the part of an understanding of what we mean rather
some to conflate class and race, with the result than having constant debates about ideas:
that they stereotype Afro-Caribbean people as and it completely fell on deaf ears…within
being working class, and Jewish people as moments the meeting turned into discussions
being middle class, and find it easier to accept about different parts of the Labour Party and
discrimination exists towards the former than relationships with the Lib Dems and all the rest
the latter. At the roundtable meeting, it was of it, and it felt quite telling to me…” Another
said that: “different sorts of racisms manifest participant noted that ideas about what
in different sorts of ways, they have different constitutes an “active member” and the kinds
narratives, they have different tropes, they have of behaviour that are validated and valued is
different slurs. And obviously different minority also important in understanding the Party’s
groups have different experiences. They sit culture.
differently - economically, socially and the rest
of it - but what unites it all is that racism is wrong
for the same reasons. In that sense it’s an
E6 Codes of Conduct
ethical problem.” We agree and for that reason
E6.1 There was broad agreement among those
have recommended that the ethical case be
we consulted on cultural matters that a Code
placed front and centre in a programme of
of Conduct for staff, members and officers
education and training.
(including members of the NEC and local CLP
officers) would be necessary but not sufficient
• The vast majority of members profess to
– it is useful to set down a clear shared vision
believe in equality, compassion, the alleviation
(beyond election winning) and acceptable
of suffering, and speaking respectfully
bounds of behaviour, but it is likely to be the
to others. However, participants at our
result of, rather than the precursor to, frank and
roundtable meeting noted that we live in a
open discussions on culture. (This chimes also
culture where once you enter the political arena
with the Kerslake Review’s recommendations
behaviour does not necessarily align with these
and the recent statement from Labour to Win.)
values. We live in a political environment that
normalises disrespect (for instance behaviour
E6.2 We therefore recommend as a matter of urgency
in the House of Commons which might be
that a Code of Conduct is introduced for staff
shocking in a different context) or discourages
(whether HQ, regional or LOTO staff) and
any display of vulnerability (whether that be by
incorporated into employment contracts. ACAS
apologising sincerely, changing one’s mind
states that a clear policy statement that ‘sets out
or accommodating a different perspective).
expected behaviour for all employees’ is good
Encouragement in the future to show
practice. In our view, such a Code for staff
vulnerability, or lack of certainty, and to behave
should also cover:
respectfully, will need to come consistently from
the top. The urgent need for a kinder politics
• the Party’s commitment to supporting and
has been recognised by those on all points of
treating everyone fairly;
the political spectrum, fleetingly following the
murder of Jo Cox, and more recently following • the kind of behaviour expected of employees,
the tragic killing of Sir David Amess. including staff relations with Party members;

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 • discrimination and the law and what is not • be prefaced by a statement from the leader
acceptable; and General Secretary that accentuates the
positive of the culture the Party wants to see;
• social media policy, both for personal
and Party social media accounts (again, • include information about potential sanctions
including group messaging services such as for breaches of the Code;
WhatsApp);
• include guidance on the standards expected
• the expectation for HQ and regional staff to of members on social media (including group
regard their role as akin to the civil service in messaging services such as WhatsApp);
serving the interests of the Party as a whole;
• include details on the process for resolving any
• where to find the procedures for resolving any issues raised by or about the member, including
problems experienced by the staff; and how such issues should be raised; and

• the Party’s disciplinary process. • be presented concisely (ideally no more than

one or two sides of A4), in a clear, accessible
E6.3 A Code of Conduct already exists for members. and attractive form, and be circulated to
However, it is to be found in one of a number all members as well as forming part of an
of annexes to the Rule Book. Given what has induction pack for new members.
happened, it is now time for a review of that code.
E6.5 The recommendations we are making in relation to
E6.4 We therefore recommend, following wide ordinary Party members are also relevant to officers
consultation (which would itself contribute to and elected members (including MPs, Assembly
the process of cultural growth), a revised Code Members, Councillors and NEC members) and
of Conduct for members should be circulated. consideration should be given to introducing a
We consider it particularly important that Young code for officers and elected members dealing in
Labour and Labour Students are consulted on this particular with their leadership responsibilities and
proposed revised Code of Conduct as it will be the expectations of behaviour, particularly towards
vital that young members are part of the cultural staff and other elected members and officers.
growth of the Party. (Other groups which may
have more direct experience of discrimination
within the Party, such as women’s branches, Black
E7 Cultural growth in CLPs
and ethnic minority branches, LGBT branches
E7.1 Whilst CLP conduct is beyond the scope of our Terms
and disabled members’ branches should also be
of Reference, we also recommend that work be
consulted specifically.) In our view such a revised
undertaken to help CLPs operate other than through
Code of Conduct for members should:
aggressive debate (for instance by consensus
conferences, genuine dialogue and “deep listening”
• incorporate the agreed joint statement of the
– see paragraph E8.2 below for explanation of this
Jo Cox Foundation and the Committee on
term). This was an issue that arose at our roundtable.
Standards in Public Life, entitled Intimidation
Although there are examples of good practice at
In Public Life: joint statement on conduct of
CLP level and CLPs experimenting with creative and
political party members (the Joint Statement),
innovative ways of working, submissions made also
as well as elements of Labour to Win’s
did highlight issues at various CLPs.
statement on culture change (the Labour
to Win statement) – it should emphasise
E7.2 We recommend as a first step that ‘an
the importance of listening and, in line with
appreciative inquiry’ be carried out, with the
the Party’s values, the need for a politics
aim of building a rich and appreciative picture
of openness, kindness, compassion and
that emphasises the positive of what is already
generosity. A need to try to understand the
happening rather than dwelling on the negative.
world from the other person’s perspective was
The question would then be how to scale up such
emphasised by roundtable participants;
practices. It could ask questions such as:

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 • how do the parts of the Party that are engaging in E8.2 One participant in our roundtable made the point
kind, inclusive and respectful politics succeed? that “political education or education inside the
Labour Party seldom leads to cognitive growth
• what is happening in those branch meetings and it seems to be part of the problem, this failure
where people are made to feel welcome and of cognitive growth, the capacity to think about
included? something that challenges your own assumptions,
the capacity to hear from an experience that is
• what skills and qualities have been shown by different from your own, the capacity to identify
those who have led such developments? the assumptions you are making and start
revealing the tensions between them”. At the heart
• what conditions have facilitated constructive of this lies the capacity to listen, really listen, as
discussion around antisemitism and other opposed to just waiting until the other person has
forms of racism and discriminatory behaviour finished talking. Another participant talked of the
and attitudes? need to train people “in real, deep listening which
involves parking everything you think you know
• how have members experienced such and all your ideas”. We believe the Party should
meetings? explore the scope for a programme of education
in deep listening with an organisation skilled in
E7.3 We also endorse Labour Together’s this important but under-valued dimension of
recommendation in its post-Election report to political debate.
open up local parties to encourage greater
accessibility and transparency between Party E8.3 More broadly, as noted above, the point was
and local community. It suggests that some made at the roundtable that the whole approach
meetings could be opened to the public and to debate typically taken by CLPs (but also within
advertised as forums to discuss local issues. the Party as a whole) encourages polarised
thinking. Instead, the Party should encourage
E7.4 Clearly this would be a major change and “different ways of meeting, workshop settings
presents some difficulties. We recommend that etc. so that it is possible to design out aggression
any such move would need to be seen as part of from conversation and so teaching the skills” that
the more fundamental cultural growth required, enable people to engage with the complexity of
and further work to consider how this would work ideas and with different viewpoints to their own,
in practice is needed. even if that is uncomfortable.

E8 Education and training E8.4 These skills (deep listening, reflection and skills
to fully engage with those with different ideas
E8.1 A number of submissions underlined the and viewpoints) can all be learned. We consider
importance of education with reference both to these are key skills and providing training in
antisemitism and other discriminatory attitudes them calls for a total rethink of the Party’s political
and behaviour and to cultural growth. What the education programme and resources.
submissions had in common, and which was
reinforced at our roundtable, was an emphasis E8.5 The Party should also explore the potential for
on reflective education and exploration rather compassion training (starting with senior staff),
than didactic training. This has implications not which we were told by Compassion in Politics
just for the Action Plan agreed with the EHRC but “has proved a successful way of effecting growth
for the whole system of political education in the at a deep personal level and of embedding the
Party and for staff development. kind of positive cultural growth being sought”.
Indeed, we were told that research by the King’s
Fund into the operations of the NHS shows that
compassionate leadership is the most important
factor in creating effective teams22.

22
Paragraph 14 of Compassion in Politics submission sent to the Panel on 22/12/20

110 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section E

E8.6 We note that Labour to Win has called on the Party E9.3 We were provided in our roundtable with an
to offer training for key branch and CLP officers example of a CLP23 which has a successful
to equip them with the skills and knowledge to education and training programme around
manage meetings and make them more inclusive antisemitism. The programme was developed
and welcoming. From the submissions we and run by Party members as part of the local
received that touched on CLPs we agree with this Party’s wider anti-racism work (which has
suggestion. included meetings on Islamophobia and the
Windrush scandal).
E8.7 Local CLPs should also be encouraged to develop
their own educational resources with support from E9.4 The roundtable sessions consisted of facilitated
the centre. discussions with a small amount of preparatory
reading and an introduction that covered (1) the
E8.8 Ultimately the Party should then draw up a wider history of antisemitic ideas being entertained and
programme of education at every level, reflecting propagated in circles of the Left, (2) the history of
the Joint Statement and the revised Code of Zionism and anti-Zionism as relates to the socialist
Conduct, to be circulated to all members and movement and antisemitism and (3) contemporary
issued to new members, recommended above. examples of behaviour, language and tropes that
have been criticised as antisemitic, including from
high-profile figures in the Labour movement.
E9 Training for members,
staff, officers and CLPs E9.5 The roundtable sessions were attended by
members from “across the political spectrum.24”
on antisemitism and other The sessions were conducted with the help of
discriminatory behaviour an invited adviser from a neighbouring CLP
with knowledge of the issues but without any
E9.1 The Party is already committed to a programme of association with the factions that unfortunately
education and training on antisemitism as part of its have become caught up in the debate around
Action Plan agreed with the EHRC. This is welcome. antisemitism in the Party.

E9.2 However, whilst we were glad the Party has E9.6 We were told that these sessions were notable
now established a programme of training on as there was “a respectful dialogue…where
antisemitism, we were not convinced the format everyone was listened to, even when there
and content of those early sessions really were disagreements…Participants commented
addressed the problem they were designed to on how much they had gained from these
address, which is multifaceted, and in relation to discussions and Jewish members, including
which there is a number of legitimate approaches myself, said they felt heard and supported, even
that exist within the Party and the Jewish when politely challenged”.
communities respectively. The sessions were
largely didactic, top down and one dimensional E9.7 In our view this provides a model for the
- with little participation beyond the people Party’s education and training programmes: it
presenting. This does not provide a space in required engagement and deep listening by
which difficult issues, such as attitudes towards all participants; it sought to disentangle issues
Israel, can be safely explored, in a nuanced concerning discrimination within the Party from
way, and does not encourage deep reflection, ongoing factional battles and set a new and more
the importance of which was emphasised by helpful tone; it was developed locally; and most
the participants at our roundtable meeting. As importantly aimed to help participants to grapple
explained above, we do not consider that such with the complexities of the issues themselves
training is in accordance with best practice, or (rather than merely being the recipient of a
with the recommendations received from our particular policy).
roundtable meeting. Improvements are needed.

23
Sheffield Heeley
24
https://labourlist.org/2020/08/how-our-local-party-developed-an-educational-programme-on-antisemitism/

111 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section E

E9.8 We recognise the key role of JLM as a E9.12 The Pears Institute recommend a three
longstanding affiliate of the Party and welcome part approach to education and training in
the impetus they have provided in setting antisemitism:
up antisemitism education; but, as we say in
paragraph E9.2, we have our criticisms of the • “an evidence-based and academically
form that education has taken. However, we do credible education programme to build
recognise that there are other voices amongst stronger awareness of the politics, history and
Jewish communities and Jewish members of the culture of antisemitism as one form of racism”;
Party. Hence we are disappointed that there has
been a refusal to engage at all with Jewish Voice • “an antisemitism awareness training
for Labour’s proposals for antisemitism education programme delivered by skilled trainers,
and that CLPs are, we are told, not even allowed focusing on avoiding antisemitic behaviour”;
to enlist their help. and

E9.9 We agree with the Pears Institute for the Study of • the development of online resources in
Antisemitism and contributors to our roundtable support.
that education is key, promoting personal
change (as the example of Naz Shah showed E9.13 We believe that a parallel approach is needed
is possible), rather than relying on a ‘zero- with regard to Islamophobia and that, as above,
tolerance’ disciplinary approach with expulsions. both forms of prejudice and discrimination need
We would emphasise just two aspects of such a to be integrated into a broader ethical anti-racism
programme. education programme alongside education on
other protected characteristics.
E9.10 First, participants in our roundtable were
agreed that antisemitism education should not E9.14 New members should be actively encouraged to
be divorced from that on all forms of racism avail themselves of any inclusion and diversity
and that such training should be based on training and educational resources provided by
an ethical stance that any form of racism is the Party.
simply wrong morally. Antisemitism does need
specific treatment but should also be integrated E10 Training for officers and
within a broader programme of anti-racism
education. We endorse this view. While the elected members
Action Plan agreed with the EHRC covers all
protected characteristics, there is a real danger, E10.1 ACAS underlines the importance of training in
if less emphasis is placed on these, that it setting behavioural standards and expectations
could be seen as establishing a new ‘hierarchy and makes clear that diversity training has to be
of racism’ (that some would argue replaces a an ongoing process in order to create a positive
previous hierarchy that did not take antisemitism working environment.
sufficiently seriously).
E10.2 One submission called for the training of NEC
E9.11 Second, as already argued, there should be a members including to act in accordance with the
strong emphasis on education and reflection in Nolan principles (of selflessness, integrity, objectivity,
any training programme, again a point made in a accountability, openness, honesty and leadership).
number of submissions and at the roundtable. In our view, the introduction of a clear expectation
that NEC members will act in accordance with these
principles and training on them should be a useful
early step in making meaningful the Party’s welcome
adoption of the Joint Statement on Conduct of
Political Party Members. It should not, though, be
confined to NEC members, but should be provided
to all officers and elected members.

112 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section E

 improving cohesion it can cause confusion and in
E11 Structure and practices the era to 2019 exacerbated the conflict.
E11.1 Also as is clear from our conclusions in Section
E11.5 In the highly charged atmosphere between the two
C above, many of these cultural issues were
sides following the Corbyn leadership victory this
exacerbated by structural and practical issues,
blurring of roles was exacerbated by deep political
particularly:
differences. Part of Jeremy Corbyn’s platform was
to change the nature of the Party organisation; it was
• the lack of clarity about HQ and LOTO roles
part of the Corbyn ‘Project’ to shift the Party more
respectively;
into a social and community based Movement. The
• poor recruitment practices; and proposed change from traditional structures can
be exaggerated but the overall direction meant
• poor individual relationships between HQ and there was bound to be a clash.
LOTO staff.
E11.6 There is also typically an element of personality
E11.2 The role of HQ and the role of LOTO are very clash and ideological difference. We were,
different and the staffing, needs and profiles of however, surprised at the degree of overlap,
each is also very different: duplication and entanglement of those roles –
and the conflict that had generated. That was
• LOTO is there to give support to the role of the made more bitter and inevitable because on the
leader in setting and supporting his political and one hand - as the WhatsApp messages show,
parliamentary agenda and taking campaign and we noted earlier - there was deep hostility
themes to the electorate and media. LOTO staff to the Corbyn leadership and ‘Project’ amongst
are appointed by the leader (or in practice by the senior Southside staff and, on the other hand,
chief of staff) and are expected to be supporters there were staff within LOTO who regarded the
of the leader’s political outlook. They are on short fulltime staff of the Party as agents of the Right.
term contracts and, although many are on Party It is clear that for senior HQ staff the politics of
contracts, and some are paid for by the Party’s the Corbyn leadership were unacceptable and
Short Money for Opposition Parties’ parliamentary rendered the Party unelectable. And for the
activity (Short Money), they are responsible to the LOTO staff HQ was a nest of Right Blairites and
leader and senior management in LOTO; and repressive apparatchiks.

• HQ staff are more akin to a permanent E11.7 Nevertheless, as discussed above, in the first
civil service and oversee the operations year clashes were containable and working
of all aspects of the Party organisation: relationships seemed to operate reasonably well
campaigning, membership and policy making until mid-2016. That was the time when there was
processes and rules and discipline. Staff are a failed coup within the PLP and a challenge
mostly on permanent contracts and many are leading to a second leadership election. Staff
long serving, sometimes lifetime, employees. at HQ were regarded as attempting first to try
They are employed by the National Executive to keep Jeremy Corbyn off the ballot paper and
and responsible to them. then to favour the challenger. After this there was
also a change in personnel running LOTO. There
E11.3 The roles (and the culture) historically have followed attempts by LOTO to make changes
therefore been clearly differentiated. of responsibility of senior HQ staff; and some
movement of LOTO staff into Southside, including
E11.4 In recent years the distinction has become into very sensitive positions within GLU. Whilst
blurred. Some of it reflects the ambiguity over some of those jobs appear to have gone through
roles that had been institutionalised (during Ed an application process others did not do so and
Miliband’s leadership) in 2013 when in effect there often individuals received no proper training on
was a partial merger between HQ and LOTO at their role within Southside (again even if in very
top level and two senior LOTO staff were made sensitive positions such as those within GLU).
Executive Directors at Southside. We understand
this has now recently been revived. Rather than

113 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section E

E11.8 Whilst some resentment from HQ staff in response E11.13 As explored in C5 above, recruitment and
to these changes is understandable, the revelations promotion tended to be opaque with roles often
in the Leaked Report of attitudes of senior HQ staff only advertised internally or only on very specific
towards the Corbyn leadership clearly go further websites, and “nepotistic networks” often played
than is appropriate for a permanent “civil service” a role. We heard evidence of similar issues
role. There are certain situations where arguably within LOTO. This lack of transparency is likely to
it is legitimate for the Party’s “civil servants” to have long been a problem, but the extent of the
thwart the parliamentary leadership’s intentions – factional battle between LOTO and HQ following
for example if their proposed actions are unlawful Jeremy Corbyn’s election threw these issues into
or breach the Party’s own Rules or threaten the sharp relief. We consider that the informality and
party’s financial viability. But whatever their lack of transparency of Party recruitment and
personal views a Party “civil service” is supposed promotion processes left those processes open
to support at any given time the general political to manipulation for factional reasons.
direction of the leadership as well as to maintain
the Party machine. E11.14 These issues were not satisfactorily addressed
by either HQ or LOTO and contributed to a
E11.9 It also has to be recognised that – whilst the certain level of chaos, outright mistrust (including
key Party objective when in opposition is to a culture of leaks) and ultimately a duplication of
win a majority government at Westminster - the roles between LOTO and HQ. This led to staff in
Party Organisation is to serve the whole Party, HQ feeling as though they were being covertly
and its electoral responsibilities extend beyond replaced within LOTO, and staff at both HQ and
Westminster – to Wales and Scotland, London LOTO feeling frustrated and unable to access
and regional mayors in England and local the support they needed to fulfil their roles.
government at all levels across Great Britain. It is Ultimately a toxic mutual hostility arose.
therefore important that HQ is recognised to have
functions that cannot be performed by LOTO.

E11.10 It also requires both LOTO and HQ to recognise A toxic mutual hostility arose.
that the Party has to be a broad church and
that there are different ideological and policy
positions legitimately contained within it.
E11.15 It is worth recording that we were assured that
E11.11 These concerns apply not just to the particular changes in HQ and in recruitment practices have
history of the Corbyn leadership era but to achieving since been made to make the process more
a healthy relationship of any LOTO with HQ. professional. We have yet to see evidence that
the effects of factionalism have been eliminated
E11.12 These issues were also exacerbated because, from Party recruitment, management and
as explored above, when Jeremy Corbyn promotion processes.
became leader many of the new hires for LOTO
were not therefore within the existing “network” of  
HQ staff. That in itself may have been a positive
thing but led to two issues (1) many of the LOTO
staff did not have experience of working in the
mainstream of the Party and were not therefore
equipped to seamlessly take over day to day
mechanics, and (2) staff at LOTO and HQ did not
know each other.

114 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section E

F
 F
SECTION F
115 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F
Section F:
Recommendations

We set out below our core recommendations for the reform of the Party’s disciplinary system and processes.
Further details relating to these recommendations, and their practical implementation, are contained in the
detailed recommendations that follow. We would expect the Party to implement the core recommendations
as soon as practicable. We accept, however, that the detailed recommendations are ‘gold-standard’ and
will have to be measured ultimately in terms of their economic viability.

Core Recommendations
Reform of the Party’s disciplinary processes

1. The Party should operate with a standalone Regulatory and Disciplinary Directorate (Directorate) which
should be professional and impartial and separate from other aspects of the Party’s organisation.

2. The Head of the Directorate should have substantive experience of regulation and be capable of
designing, overseeing and implementing a fair and transparent system.

3. Complaints should be appropriately logged, and electronic records updated at each stage of the complaint.

4. The initial assessment of any complaint received should include a determination whether interim action is
needed. The Party should exercise particular caution before imposing an administrative suspension that
would adversely affect the prospects of the person so suspended in any impending s/election process.
Any decision about interim action should be made with full written reasons given and communicated both
to the complainant and the respondent.

5. Allegations should be screened initially by a panel of two case examiners, one of whom should be a lay
member25. The Party may wish to draw for these purposes from the pool of qualified and experienced
lawyers that it is currently recruiting for its IRB and ICB. However it is important that the pool from which
such lay members are chosen should be broad and diverse – in both the demographic and ideological
sense – so as not to be subject to accusations of factional discrimination. The lay member need not be a
lawyer, but should have knowledge and experience of regulation and regulatory systems.

6. Cases should be referred to a full hearing before an NEC Complaints and Disciplinary Panel only where
both case examiners conclude that (i) there is a realistic prospect of a full hearing finding the allegation(s)
proved and (ii) the appropriate sanction falls outside of their sanctioning powers.

7. Guidance to case examiners should be formulated and made available on the Party website and should
cover time-limits, indicative sanctions and conduct of hearings.

25
Lay member means a person who is neither employed by the Party, nor a member of any of its executive bodies.

116 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

8. Complaints should be processed as far as reasonably practicable in accordance with the time limits we propose
in the detailed recommendations; and only in exceptional cases should it take more than nine months to dispose
finally of any such complaint.

9 The number of complaints received and concluded, and details of the progress of all such matters, should be
fully auditable.

117 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

Detailed recommendations on reform of the
Party’s disciplinary processes
1 Structural and staffing

1.1 Recruitment for the head of the Directorate should be open and transparent.

1.2 All positions within the Directorate should be openly advertised and an NEC Panel should oversee all interviews
and appointments. The Panel should consist of NEC members and senior staff.

1.3 The head, and staff, of the Directorate should have no wider responsibilities and should report only to the General
Secretary and the appropriate committee of the NEC (for example, a “rules and disputes committee” (RDC)).

1.4 The recent practice of NEC members being able to attend and vote on all subcommittees should cease and the
RDC should have a small fixed membership of NEC members designated at the beginning of each new NEC
term of office i.e. two years.

1.5 The RDC should have two standing Complaints and Discipline Panels of fixed membership of three members.
These panels should consider cases against Party members following investigation by Directorate staff, who
should recommend action – or no action – for Panel endorsement. In particularly complex cases the Panel
membership could be extended to five, and should be so extended in any complex case in which the respondent
is at risk of expulsion from the Party.

1.6 There should be no other NEC process beyond the Complaints and Discipline Panel hearing. Appeals should go
either to the NCC or in discrimination cases to the new IRB.

1.7 Support may be sought from regional or national staff on a temporary secondment but no other HQ staff, NEC
members, politicians, or political staff (including LOTO staff) should have any decision making role or be able to
intervene in the process of investigating and adjudicating on a complaint.

1.8 No member of Party staff (outside of the Directorate), LOTO staff or other parliamentary staff should be involved
in the process (other than as a complainant, witness or respondent).

1.9 The head of the Directorate should be supported by a qualified deputy or deputies with a background in
regulation and, therefore, capable of devising protocols reflecting best practice as defined by other regulators
and the courts. In exceptional cases (for example, when the complaint concerned is particularly serious, high
profile or otherwise sensitive) the head of the Directorate, or a deputy, may present a matter to a Complaints and
Discipline Panel.

1.10 The Directorate should otherwise consist of caseworkers, case managers, and case examiners.

1.11 Caseworkers should be responsible for the investigation of complaints and the presentation of cases referred
to a full hearing of a Complaints and Discipline Panel. However, a caseworker who has investigated a matter
should not then present the case to a Complaints and Discipline Panel if it is referred to them for full hearing.

1.12 Caseworkers should be responsible for a pre-determined case load which should be capable of audit at all
stages of the complaint.

1.13 Case managers should be responsible for the management of the Directorate’s caseload and work allocation,
and should also present serious, high-profile or otherwise sensitive cases to a Complaints and Discipline Panel.

1.14 The role of case examiners is set out in paragraphs 2.8 et seq. Any person appointed as a case examiner in a
given matter should not sit as a member of the Complaints and Discipline Panel in the same case.

118 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

1.15 A member of the Party’s IT staff should also be appointed as the Directorate’s dedicated IT and data protection
manager to be responsible for the collation of auditable records of complaint progression and outcome.

1.16 There should be an ability to learn from errors with internal circulation of learning points and best practice on a
monthly basis.

119 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

2 Process

Guidance

2.1 The Party should draft and publish indicative sanctions guidance with a view to ensuring consistency of
outcomes when considering complaints. This guidance should deal with common disciplinary matters including
proportionality, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances (repetitive breaches of conduct rules and past
disciplinary history might be regarded as aggravating circumstances, and a long and distinguished service for
the Party a mitigating circumstance). This Guidance should be available to the membership.

Receipt of complaint

2.2 When a complaint is made it should be electronically logged, briefly summarised and categorised.

Interim action/administrative action

2.3 Interim action, including administrative suspension, should be the subject of a review by two case examiners,
one of whom should be a lay member, to be held, other than in exceptional cases or in times of particular
pressure, within 6 weeks of the date on which the suspension was first imposed. This process should involve
consideration of the merits of the suspension, and whether it should continue pending disposal of the substantive
complaint.

Investigation

2.4 Once the complaint has been logged and summarised, the respondent should be written to with a summary of
the complaint (we suggest within 7-14 days) and asked to respond (we suggest within 28 days thereafter) with
any relevant evidence they are prepared to disclose.

2.5 This letter should come from a caseworker (identifiable by case reference) who should, where possible, remain
the caseworker until the complaint is resolved.

2.6 The respondent should also be provided with a copy of the Rules governing an investigation and other relevant
materials concerning the Party’s disciplinary processes, all of which should be available to the membership.
They should include examples of the sort of conduct that might bring the Party into disrepute – for example,
criminal convictions, police investigations or charges, allegations of improper conduct in respect of protected
characteristics.

2.7 Where there is an absence of evidence or if the investigating caseworker/case manager concludes that the
conduct alleged does not breach Party rules in relation to conduct, or the case is vexatious, the case can
be concluded as long as cogent reasons are given in writing for so doing, and communicated to both the
complainant and the respondent.

120 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

Substantive consideration by case examiners

2.8 A panel of two case examiners, including one lay member, should consider whether:

• there is a realistic prospect that a Complaints and Discipline Panel will find the allegation proved (the First
Test); and

• the appropriate sanction falls outside of their sanctioning power (the Second Test).

2.9 The case examiners’ sanctioning powers should be to:

• order no further action;

• issue a warning as to future conduct; or

• impose a requirement to undergo training/education;

2.10 Only if both case examiners consider that the First Test and the Second Test are satisfied should the matter be
referred to a full hearing.

2.11 A warning as to future conduct should only be issued if the case examiners conclude there is evidence suggesting
that a formal response is needed but the respondent should be told if this is being contemplated and be allowed
to provide comments or request an oral hearing be held.

Review of case examiner decisions

Case examiner disagreement

2.12 Where there is disagreement between case examiners the head of the Directorate should review the decision
and determine whether or not action needs to be taken and should give written reasons for their decision to both
the respondent and the complainant.

Flawed decisions/new information

2.13 The head of the Directorate should have a right of review if any party to a case alleges that the decision of the
case examiners is materially flawed either wholly or in part; there is new information which may have led wholly,
or in part, to a different decision; and the head of the Directorate considers that the review is necessary to protect
the reputation of the Party, or to prevent injustice to the parties.

2.14 If a decision is to be reviewed then all parties should be notified and asked to make representations. If new
information is received it shall be disclosed to all parties and any further inquiries it prompts shall be undertaken
by a caseworker reporting to different case examiners.

2.15 If a review of the sort referred to in paragraph 2.13 is upheld, and the head of Directorate disagrees with the
case examiners, the head of Directorate should have the same sanctioning powers as the case examiners (see
paragraph 2.9 above).

2.16 Whilst a case is proceeding, only the fact of a case having been started (or an administrative suspension pending
investigation having been imposed) should be informed to LOTO, other senior politicians, or the public.

121 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

The Complaints and Discipline Panel

2.17 Once matters have been referred to a full hearing of a Complaints and Discipline Panel, appropriate steps
should be taken to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest or records of potentially prejudicial comments –
such as to disqualify any member of that Panel from hearing the case. The final preparations may mean refining
statements and charges which should be date and time specific, where possible.

2.18 In some cases, there could be a need for case management dealing with issues of disclosure, length of hearing and
order of witnesses, by way of example. A case manager, independent of the case, should hear submissions from
both sides and then set time specific directions. These can be conducted by telephone conference in most cases.
Consideration should be given in particularly complex cases to the appointment of a legally qualified case manager.

2.19 At least 28 days before the hearing, the head of Directorate, or their deputy, should send a Notice of Hearing
detailing the allegations, any facts upon which the allegations are based and a bundle of evidence.

2.20 No less than 14 days thereafter, the respondent should be required to file a witness statement in relation to any
disputed allegations or facts as well as a schedule of admitted facts and allegations and the basis of any admission.

2.21 At least seven days before the hearing, if so advised, the person assigned to present the case (who may be a
caseworker, case manager or (although rarely) the head of the Directorate or a deputy, should serve a skeleton
argument in response upon the hearing panel and the respondent.

2.22 The hearing should be chaired by an individual with substantive experience of regulation, and regulatory systems,
and consideration should be given to appointing a person who is independent of the NEC.

2.23 Consideration should be given to appointing a legally qualified chair of a Complaints and Discipline Panel in any
complex case where the respondent is at risk of suspension or expulsion from the Party, or where the respondent
relies on a legally complex defence.

2.24 The caseworker or case manager responsible for presenting the matter should set out the background to the
complaint and provide details of the investigation, followed by any factual or expert witnesses.

2.25 The respondent should then present their case, give evidence and call witnesses.

2.26 At the conclusion of the respondent’s case, the Panel should retire to consider their decision on the facts and
produce a short reasoned decision supporting their factual determinations. The decision should be recorded in
writing and made available to the complainant and the respondent.

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3 Right of appeal

3.1 We note the new arrangements, approved by the Party at its Conference in 2021, which make provision for
various reforms, including the establishment of an IRB in cases involving accusations of discrimination. The
Party will need to be vigilant that those new procedures, when combined with the further reforms we recommend
in this report, deliver a system which, as far as is practicable, enshrines the core principles of Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, including in particular:

• an entitlement to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an impartial panel;

• a presumption of innocence until proved otherwise according to law;

• minimum rights for any party facing a complaint, including the right:

- to be informed promptly, in a language which the person understands, and in detail, of the nature and
cause of the complaint made against that person;
- to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of any response to the complaint;
- to mount a defence to the complaint in person or through legal assistance freely chosen; and
- to examine or to have examined witnesses whose evidence supports the complaint or complainant and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on behalf of the person facing complaint under the
same conditions as witnesses against that person.
4 Systems

Transparency

4.1 Subject to paragraph 4.2, the fact of a complaint being in the disciplinary process and the stage it has reached in
that process, and any forward dates for hearings/appeals should – except in abnormally delicate circumstances
– be available to Party members and the media.

4.2 Any health issues should be dealt with in private unless any party or witness wishes to place a health issue or
issues into the public domain.

Communications

4.3 All complainants and respondents should provide the Directorate with a postal address and, if available, an email
address which would be used for all correspondence regarding the complaint, including formal service of documents.

4.4 It should be the responsibility of a complainant or a respondent, as appropriate, to inform the Directorate of any
change in this postal or email address.

4.5 The Directorate should use recorded service for all postal correspondence.

Time Limits

4.6 Time limits (including those we recommend above specifically in relation to hearings before a Complaints and
Disciplinary Panel) should be set for each stage of the investigation. We would suggest:

• respondent to reply to the complaint within 28 days;

• the period between initial complaint and the decision by the case examiners (whether or not to refer to a
hearing) should not normally exceed three months; and

• the period between the initial complaint and final resolution should not normally exceed nine months.

123 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

Sanctions

4.7 If any allegation is found proved which is likely to warrant a sanction the Panel should hear submissions from
the member of Directorate staff responsible for presenting the case, and from the respondent, as to appropriate
sanction. Matters of previous character, Party service and mitigation including references can properly be
considered at this stage.

4.8 The Panel should then retire and consider the appropriate sanction, weighing the culpability of the proven conduct,
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, proportionality and the Party’s indicative sanctions guidance.

Aggregation, monitoring and reporting

4.9 The Directorate should produce and make publicly available key data sets about the complaints process, to be
agreed, but to include, for example:

• the total number of complaints made in the relevant period (e.g. the current calendar/financial year);

• the number of complaints made in that relevant period in each of a number of categories to be agreed
including the different forms of racism and discrimination);

• the proportion of (i) all complaints and (ii) complaints in the categories identified in accordance with the
recommendation in the bullet point above, which (i) have been resolved and (ii) remain outstanding at the
date of reporting; and

• the average time taken for complaints to reach key stages in the process, including resolution.

124 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

We set out below our core recommendations for the reform of Party culture and staff. Further details relating to these
recommendations, and their practical implementation, are contained in the detailed recommendations that follow.

Core Recommendations
Reform of party culture

1 Behaviour change is required at all levels of the Party. Senior leadership should consistently demonstrate
respectful behaviour.

2 There should be a Party-wide consultation to identify shared values and the seeds of a healthy culture.
This should be led by both the political leadership of the Party and senior members of HQ.

3 A revised Code of Conduct should be drawn up, to reflect the outcome of this consultation, and be circulated to
all members.

4 The Code of Conduct should be adapted for staff and incorporated into employment contracts.

5 Consideration should be given to introducing a separate code for officers and elected members dealing in
particular with their leadership responsibilities and the expectations of behaviour, particularly towards staff and
other elected members and officers.

6 A programme of reflective education and training to support cultural growth should be developed and
implemented at all levels of the Party.

7 A senior Shadow Cabinet member should be designated to liaise with HQ about cultural change and oversee the
progress made.

Detailed recommendations on reform of Party culture

1 The Party-wide consultation to identify shared values that we recommend should include:

1.1 an open and facilitated discussion between HQ, LOTO, the regional offices, officers and elected members; and

1.2 a separate “appreciative inquiry” for CLPs to identify and celebrate positive cultures and working practices, and
explore how they can be implemented across the Party. In particular, this should identify and share examples of
where the CLPs have operated other than through aggressive debate, for example, through the use of consensus
conferences, genuine dialogue and “deep listening.”

2 The revised Code of Conduct for members that we recommend should:

2.1 incorporate the agreed Joint Statement on Conduct of Political Party Members formulated by the Jo Cox
Foundation and the Committee on Standards in Public Life as well as elements of Labour to Win’s statement.
It should emphasise the importance of listening, openness, kindness, compassion and generosity;

2.2 be prefaced by a statement from the Leader, Deputy Leader and General Secretary that accentuates the positives
of the culture the Party wants to see;

2.3 include information about potential sanctions for breaches of the Code;

125 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

2.4 include guidance on the standards expected of members on social media (see separate recommendations on
social media for further details);

2.5 include details on the process for resolving any issues raised by or about the member, including how such issues
should be raised; and

2.6 be presented concisely (ideally on no more than one or two sides of A4) and in a clear, accessible and attractive
form, for circulation to all members and inclusion as part of an induction pack for new members.

3 ACAS states that a clear policy statement that ‘sets out expected behaviour for all employees’ is good
practice. We agree, and consider therefore that the adapted Code of Conduct for staff that we recommend
should also cover:

3.1 the Party’s commitment to supporting and treating everyone fairly;

3.2 the kind of behaviour expected of employees;

3.3 discrimination and the law and what is not acceptable;

3.4 social media policy, both for personal and Party social media accounts (including group messaging services
such as WhatsApp);

3.5 the expectation for HQ and regional staff to regard their role as akin to the civil service and as an electoral
machine;

3.6 detail of where to find the procedures for resolving any problems experienced by the staff; and

3.7 the Party’s disciplinary process.

4 In our view the education and training programme that we recommend should include:

4.1 training for members to develop deep listening and reflection skills to engage fully with those with different ideas
and viewpoints;

4.2 antisemitism training that is incorporated into a wider programme on anti-racism, Islamophobia and education on
protected characteristics, involving a facilitated discussion prompting real reflection and engagement with the
issues, and with an emphasis on the ethical imperative for anti-racism;

4.3 compassion training, starting with senior staff at HQ and LOTO;

4.4 exploration of training of officers and all elected members to act in accordance with the Nolan principles
(selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership);

4.5 training for key branch and CLP officers to give them skills to encourage different meeting formats and to manage
meetings to make them more inclusive and welcoming (and minimising aggressive debate); and

4.6 encouragement to local CLPs to develop their own educational resources with support and oversight from HQ
and regional offices.

126 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

We set out below our core recommendations for the Party’s social media policy. Further details relating to these
recommendations, and their practical implementation, are contained in the detailed recommendations that follow.

Core Recommendations
Social Media Policy

1 We recognise that social media platforms provide valuable opportunities to participate in interactive discussions and
share information. However, the prominence of the SMT WhatsApp messages in the allegations made in the Leaked
Report illustrates how the use of social media platforms poses wide-ranging risks to the Party, its staff and its members.26

2 In order to minimise the risks referred to above, we recommend the Party develops and implements as soon as
possible a revised policy on the use of all social media platforms by Party staff.

3 It should:

• set out the standards of behaviour expected from Party staff when engaging in social media; and

• apply to all staff and all forms of social media, irrespective of how, where or when the platforms are accessed.

4 Social media use for Party business should be confined to the Party’s IT equipment and communications resources.

5 Clear guidelines and restrictions should be established to ensure social media use is consistent with – for
example – the Party’s values and other policies.

6 The consequences of non-compliance with the revised staff social media policy – particularly as regards
disciplinary action – should be set out clearly.

Detailed recommendations on social media

1 Scope of revised social media policy

1.1 We set out below our recommendations for inclusion in the revised social media policy for staff. The Party should
also conduct a review of its social media policy for Party members, albeit the policy for members will necessarily
be less stringent than that for staff.

1.2 Staff and unions should be consulted on the proposals for the revised staff social media policy referred to in our
first core recommendation.

1.3 That policy should:

• apply to all Party staff (including permanent, temporary and contract workers employed or engaged by the
Party, whether on a voluntary or paid basis) and any third party organisations engaged on Party business.
(For the avoidance of doubt, the reference to ‘staff’ includes those employed by the Party in HQ and the
regions, and in LOTO, as well as those employed by the Shadow Cabinet and paid for under Short Money);

• provide a framework for using any and all forms of social media (whether currently in existence or developed
in the future), including but not limited to Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, WhatsApp, all other
social networking sites, and all other sites with the facility to post user-generated content, including blogs;

26
By ‘social media’, we are referring to interactive digital technologies that allow for the creation, sharing and exchange of any forms of user-generated
expression through virtual networks. Whilst we recognise that WhatsApp is regarded by some as a private messaging service, there are compelling arguments
that it functions as a social media platform in the case of WhatsApp groups. For our purposes, it makes sense to treat WhatsApp groups as falling within the
remit of ‘social media’ and accordingly our policy recommendations apply to WhatsApp groups in the same way as any other social media platform.

127 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

 • be designed to apply to content:

• on both publicly-accessible platforms and closed or private social media forums; and

• which takes the form of messages sent in groups, as distinct from private messages exchanged between
only two individuals;

• be applicable to social media use for purposes associated with the Party as well as personal use that may
affect the Party in any way, and to use both inside and outside of working hours;

• apply to the personal social media accounts of staff as well as any staff accounts linked to the Party;

• be applicable irrespective of whether the social media platforms are accessed using Party IT facilities
and equipment or otherwise (including personal equipment belonging to staff) – although see also the
recommendation regarding devices below;

• apply to content generated by staff members themselves and content generated by others but re-shared or
‘re-tweeted’ by staff members in a manner which could be interpreted as the relevant staff member endorsing
the content; and

• once published, be circulated to all staff, promoted internally and made easily accessible.

1.4 If algorithms are to be adopted to carry out pre-membership social media searches, they need to be professionally
advised upon following wide consultation in relation to the search terms.

1.5 Party business should be conducted on devices issued by the Party.

1.6 Use of social media (in particular, WhatsApp groups) to discuss work matters on personal devices outside of
Party systems should be prohibited27.

1.7 The Party should review its other policies to ensure consistency with the revised staff social media policy, which
should itself be reviewed at regular intervals to reflect the continuously evolving nature of social media.

1.8 The Party may wish to review its policy for those individuals authorised to use social media on behalf of the Party
itself. If a member of staff is representing the Party online, appropriate rules should be set for what information
they may disclose and the range of opinions they may express.

2 Compliance with related policies

2.1 The staff social media policy should reflect the overarching principle that social media should never be used in a
way which breaches any of the Party’s other policies, including any policies on bullying and/or discrimination. If a
social media post would constitute a breach of another policy in another forum, it should be considered a breach
of that policy in an online forum. For example, staff should be prohibited from using social media to breach any
obligations they may have relating to confidentiality or data protection, to defame or disparage anyone or breach
any other laws or ethical standards.

3 Restrictions on use

3.1 While we recognise that social media platforms are widely used in Westminster for a variety of purposes, staff
should be required to consider carefully on a case-by-case basis whether social media platforms are appropriate
communication tools for the particular purpose at hand and, if so, which particular platform is most appropriate.

27
Whilst policing this prohibition may not be practicable, should any activity of this kind come to light it should be treated as a breach of policy.

128 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

4 Guidelines for responsible use

4.1 A balance should be struck to ensure staff do not feel ‘gagged’, and feel protected against online bullying, and
that the Party feels confident its reputation will be upheld. Our primary concerns relate not to the use of social
media as a mode of communication per se, but to the content of such communications.

4.2 The staff social media policy should provide clear guidelines for responsible use of social media, including the following:

• Social media use should be consistent with the Party’s values of treating all people with dignity, courtesy and respect.

• Social media use should champion diversity and inclusion, such that everyone feels welcome to take part in
discussion about the Party, country and world.

• Staff should have regard to the need to act carefully and responsibly to protect the Party’s image and
reputation. Staff should avoid social media communications which might be construed in a way that could
damage the Party’s reputation, even indirectly. Clear guidelines should be set for employees on what they
can and cannot say about the Party.

• Use of language or content which has the potential to exclude or alienate others should be avoided.

• Any criticism should be based on policy and political actions and not constitute personal attacks on individuals.

• Those with privilege – due to their experience, position within the Party or status in society – should have
particular regard to how their use of social media may be experienced or felt by others.

• Members of staff should consider themselves personally responsible for what they communicate via social
media. Before posting content, staff should bear in mind that postings might be available to be read by
anyone and for an indefinite period of time.

• Members of staff in any doubt about the appropriateness of any post should refrain from making it.

4.3 The staff social media policy should also clearly state what behaviour is prohibited, including:28

• Creating or transmitting material that might be defamatory or incur liability for the Party.

• Posting messages, status updates or links to material or content that is inappropriate. Content that should be regarded
as inappropriate includes: pornography, racial or religious slurs, derogatory gender-specific comments, information
encouraging criminal activity or terrorism, or materials relating to cults, gambling or illegal drugs. It should extend to any
text, images or other media that could reasonably offend someone on the basis of race/ethnicity, age, gender, gender-
identity, religious or political belief, nationality, disability, sexual orientation or any other characteristic protected by law.

• Social media for any illegal or criminal activities.

• Sending offensive or harassing material to others via social media.

• Sending or posting messages or material that could damage the Party’s image or reputation.

• Discussing colleagues without their approval.

• Posting, uploading, forwarding or linking spam, junk email, chain emails and messages.

• Making comments which the Party deems abusive, offensive, obscene, vulgar or violent.

• Abusing, threatening, stalking, harassing or in any way attacking other users on the platforms.

28
Such prohibitions should not, however, prevent the sharing of material between staff for the purposes of pursuing disciplinary action against other staff or members.
Where information is shared for these purposes, or is otherwise deemed necessary, the covering post should clearly dissociate the sender and the Party from the content.

129 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

 • Posting any content that is offensive or derogatory toward others with regard to race/ethnicity, age, gender, gender-
identity, religious or political belief, nationality, disability, sexual orientation, or any other characteristic protected by law.

• Using any language or content that is disruptive, misleading, deceptive, unlawful or fraudulent.

• Trolling.

• Cyber-bullying.

• Knowingly uploading or attaching files that contain viruses, corrupted files, or any other similar software or
programs that may damage the operation or compromise the security of computers and networks.

• Violations of intellectual property rights.

5 Compliance with the policy

Monitoring

5.1 The Party may wish to reserve the right to monitor staff activities on its IT resources and communications systems
(in accordance, of course, with data protection laws).

Personnel

5.2 The staff social media policy should include clear guidance on how to raise any queries regarding the policy and/
or report misuse of social media.

Investigations

5.3 It should also deal with how any such allegations will be investigated by the Party, including a requirement for
any member of staff suspected of committing a breach of the policy to cooperate with the Party’s investigation,
which may involve providing relevant passwords and login details.

Disciplinary action

5.4 Likewise, the policy should set out the consequences of non-compliance; for example, that a breach may result
in disciplinary action in accordance with the Party’s disciplinary procedures. For this purpose, the Party should
apply the same standards of conduct in online matters as it would in offline matters.

5.5 We recommend provision is made for the Party to require members of staff to remove or amend postings which
are deemed to constitute a breach of the policy and, on a related note, that failure to comply with such a request
may in itself result in disciplinary action.

5.6 Whether one instance of misuse of social media platforms constitutes a breach of the social media policy giving rise
to disciplinary action – or whether a pattern of conduct is required – should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

5.7 The Party should consider whether disciplinary action should be time-limited so that, for example, staff are not
unduly prejudiced by historical use of social media platforms.

Recruitment

5.8 If the Party uses social media platforms for recruitment purposes, this should also be reflected in the staff social
media policy (and any recruitment policies). For example, if the Party accesses social media platforms to perform
due diligence on candidates in the course of recruitment (acting in accordance with its data protection and equal
opportunities obligations) it should say so explicitly when sending application forms or interview invitations. We
recommend such practices should be time-limited to, say, three years, so that, for example, applicants are not
unduly prejudiced by historical use of social media platforms.

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We set out below our core recommendations for the recruitment and management of staff. Further details relating
to these recommendations, and their practical implementation, are contained in the detailed recommendations
that follow.

Core Recommendations
Recruitment and Management of Staff

The core recommendations that follow (and the associated, more detailed recommendations below) are intended to
apply to HQ and regional office and junior LOTO staff, but not to senior LOTO staff working directly with the leader of
the Party. In certain respects they reflect or draw on recommendations already made in the Kerslake Review. While the
Forde Inquiry Panel has great respect for the work done by Lord Kerslake and his colleagues in that regard, there is some
difference of analysis and emphasis in this report, as compared with their findings. However, where common ground
exists, there was nothing to be gained in attempting to reinvent the wheel.

1. The Party must radically reform its approach to people management – the recruitment of its staff and their
development, both professionally and personally – if it is to transform itself into the modern, highly skilled and
diverse organisation capable of fulfilling its democratic duty to the voters of this country.

Recruitment

2. There should be a formal, open and transparent application and appointments process, both for external
recruitment and internal promotions.

3. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, all vacancies should be advertised publicly and nationally, as well
as internally, and promoted across a range of channels, platforms and sources.

4. The practice of LOTO duplicating organisational roles that already exist within HQ should not be repeated.

Staff Development

5. The Party should create formal development/promotion frameworks for staff within each directorate setting out
the skills and experience required at each level and for each post.

6. All staff should have a single, named line manager; and there should be a limit on the number of direct reports to
each line manager.

7. There should be regular one to one supervision meetings between line managers and their direct reports, and a
formal annual development review for all staff. Performance and conduct should be measured against objective
criteria and a clear set of rules for employees, to avoid political interference.

8. There should be a formal staff wellbeing plan, which informs meetings between line managers and those who
report to them.

Diversity and Inclusion

9. The Party’s workforce (including at senior management levels) does not reflect the wider electorate. Targets
should be set in relation to recruitment, induction, and the development, and management of staff.

131 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

Detailed recommendations on recruitment
and management of staff
1 Recruitment

1.1 The processes of external recruitment and internal promotions should be governed by a single, clear policy or
suite of policies, the use of which should be mandatory.

1.2 The relevant policy/policies should be subject to review, and revision, as necessary, at appropriate and agreed
intervals.

1.3 The focus on advertising jobs externally and promoting those opportunities across a range of suitable channels,
platforms and sources, should be on finding individuals:

• with appropriate experience in the relevant field (such experience being valued at least as much as, and
perhaps even more so than, a commitment to the Party or to politics in general); and

• from a diverse range of backgrounds.

1.4 Consideration should be given to whether shortlisting exercises should be “blind” as to candidates’ names and
any other demographic details, where appropriate (in particular for entry level positions).

1.5 In selecting who to recruit, the Party should use clear, objective and competency-based person specifications.

1.6 Recruitment panels should always be appropriately representative of different minority groups and gender
balanced.

1.7 Those responsible for recruitment should undertake relevant training, including unconscious bias training.

2 Induction

2.1 New staff should be required to undertake a comprehensive induction programme, covering the Party’s history
(including its recent history, and its struggles with the issues we have investigated), and the structure and
operation of the organisation as a whole, as well as the individual directorate within which they work.

3 Staff Development

3.1 The Party should create formal development/promotion frameworks for staff within each directorate setting out
the skills and experience required at each level.

3.2 Structured learning and development opportunities should be provided in line with those requirements.

3.3 Salary bands should be published alongside those frameworks.

3.4 Line managers should undertake common management development training.

3.5 This training should cover all relevant aspects of employment law, with input as appropriate from the human
resources and legal teams.

3.6 Line managers, and staff members, should continue to seek expert input from the human resources team, as
required, in relation to any employment issues that may arise from time to time.

3.7 The human resources team should seek at all times to provide independent and objective advice to colleagues
within the Party.

132 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

3.8 The results of the regular one to one supervision meetings between line managers and their direct reports, which
we recommend should be summarised and recorded in writing.

3.9 The formal annual development review for all staff should address the things that have gone well in the reporting year,
and areas requiring development; priorities and objectives for the next reporting year; and health and well-being.

3.10 The review of staff well-being should be informed by a formal staff wellbeing plan which includes provisions covering:

• workplace mental health and stress;

• working from home;

• pregnancy, childbirth and parenthood;

• support for disabled employees;

• safeguarding; and

• the “long hours culture”.

3.11 While it is to be hoped that any problems which may arise between a line manager and their direct report
from time to time could be resolved satisfactorily on an informal basis, provision should be made within the
performance review system for formal appeals/dispute resolution mechanisms.

4 Staff retention

4.1 Data on staff (particularly ethnic minority and disabled staff) departures over an agreed period should be collated
and analysed so that staff retention issues can be identified and addressed.

4.2 Exit interviews should be conducted with all departing members of staff, and the results recorded and analysed,
with a view to taking any necessary action.

4.3 Any redundancy process undertaken by the Party should be fair, and draw on the expertise of those in the human
resources team and, if appropriate, legal advice.

4.4 Staff turnover should be monitored.

5 Diversity and Inclusion

5.1 Appropriate steps should be taken regularly to collect relevant data (including on all protected characteristics)
to facilitate monitoring of progress towards the achievement of these targets.

5.2 Information about gender and ethnicity pay gaps should be collated and published.

5.3 The Party should develop a policy to tackle exclusion/discrimination/harassment, which includes clear provision
about to whom such issues should be reported.

5.4 The Party should establish the diversity training outlined in the recommendations on Party culture and staff
behaviour.

5.5 The Party should consider introducing the practice of ‘reverse mentoring’ to allow staff from diverse backgrounds
to share with senior managers what it is like to work for the organisation.

5.6 A regular staff survey, building on/repeating the Pulse survey, should be undertaken to track employee experience.

133 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

We set out below our core recommendations for the future of the relationship between LOTO and HQ and regional
staff. Further details relating to these recommendations are contained in the detailed recommendations that
follow.

Core Recommendations
Future relations between LOTO and HQ/regional staff

1 There should be a clearer formal demarcation and disentanglement of the roles played by LOTO and the Party’s HQ staff.

2 There should be a clear expectation of political neutrality with regard to HQ roles.

3 The practice of ‘parachuting’ LOTO staff into HQ roles without following the recommended recruitment practices
should cease.

4 The practice of designating senior LOTO staff as directors of the Party, within the senior management structure,
should cease.

5 Informal cooperation between LOTO and HQ should be enhanced and encouraged.

6 Senior leadership should take steps to improve their visibility and engagement with staff at all levels within the Party.

Detailed recommendations on future relations between LOTO and HQ/regional staff

1. The clearer demarcation of roles that we recommend should be written into the Rule Book and/or recorded as
a decision of Conference which sets out clearly the differing roles that LOTO and HQ should play (therefore
avoiding the duplication of roles and posts between LOTO and HQ, respectively, about which we have heard
evidence).

2. Clarification should be given to staff in HQ, LOTO and the regional offices about the standards expected of them,
whether by incorporation in a Code of Conduct, training or otherwise. For HQ and regional staff this should
include articulation of the expectation that they should remain neutral, objective and act in the best interests of
the Party, under the direction of LOTO. This should include a respectful and inclusive approach to HQ staff by
LOTO, particularly as many HQ staff will have very significant and valuable experience of working for the Party.
For all staff, the expectations of working relationships between HQ/regional offices and LOTO should be clarified.

3. The enhancement of information cooperation should be encouraged through the introduction of the following
measures:

• the contribution of both LOTO and HQ in staff inductions (whether the role is for LOTO, HQ or a regional office);

• the regular exchange of information; and

• the provision of spaces for physical learning and cross-pollination.

134 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

4. We also make some observations on practical points to improve relationships between LOTO and HQ:

• we recommend that any new leadership team sits down and discusses informally with key HQ personnel their
vision for the future, working relationships and so on;

• deep listening exercises, conducted at intervals, could play a particularly valuable role in ensuring productive
working relationships between LOTO and HQ;

• opportunities for social contact between LOTO and HQ should be improved; and

• the Party should consider “reverse mentoring” through which staff from diverse backgrounds share with senior
managers what it is like to work for the organisation. This could be a useful early step in promoting cultural
growth more generally.

5. The steps to be taken by senior leadership should include the following:

• a clear commitment from LOTO to spend more time in HQ, advertising that they are available to speak to all
staff; and

• regular sessions in which the General Secretary and team engage with staff.

135 | THE FORDE REPORT | Section F

APPENDIX
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

TERM DEFINITION

Chakrabati Report The Shami Chakrabati Report, June 2016

CLP Constituency Labour Party

CO Community Organiser

Directorate Regulatory and Disciplinary Directorate

EHRC The Equality and Human Rights Commission

A WhatsApp group established for discussion of the Party’s response

EHRC WhatsApp group
to the EHRC

Fabian Society Survey A recent survey of 2,890 Party members conducted by the Fabian Society

There is a realistic prospect that a Complaints and Discipline Panel will find
First Test
the allegation proved
A spreadsheet showing incurred printing costs for ‘key seats’ on the
GEL001 spreadsheet
spending code GEL001 totalling £82,230

GLU The Party’s Governance and Legal Unit (formerly the Compliance Unit)

HQ The Party’s headquarters (located at Southside)

ICB Independent Complaints Board

ICO Information Commissioner’s Office

IRB Independent Review Board

A digital forensics investigation, and an HR investigation, each

Internal investigations
commissioned by the Party.
Extracts from the Party’s internal messaging system quoted in the
Instant messages
Leaked Report

JLM The Jewish Labour Movement

The agreed joint statement of the Jo Cox Foundation and the Committee
Joint Statement
on Standards in Public Life, entitled Intimidation In Public Life
The report of Lord Kerslake, entitled Independent Organisational Review of the
Kerslake Review
Labour Party: Becoming a Well Run and Winning Organisation, October 2020

Labour Together Report Labour Together’s 2019 Election Review

The report entitled “the Work of the Labour Party’s Governance and
Leaked Report Legal Unit in Relation to Antisemitism, 2014-2019”, various versions
of which were leaked and published in April 2020

LOTO The Leader of the Opposition’s office

MP Member of Parliament

136 | THE FORDE REPORT | Appendix

TERM DEFINITION

NCC The Party’s National Constitutional Committee

NEC The Party’s National Executive Committee

Defamation proceedings arising from LOTO’s response to the

Panorama litigation
BBC Panorama’s programme “Is Labour Anti-Semitic?”

Party The Labour Party

PLP Parliamentary Labour Party (that is, the Party’s MPs)

relevant period 2015 - 2019

RFIs Requests for Further Information

The report by Baroness Jan Royall entitled Allegations of Anti-Semitism

Royall Report
Oxford University Labour Club, May 2016
The search tool used by the Party for responding to subject access
SAR tool
requests

Second Test The appropriate sanction falls outside of their sanctioning power

WhatsApp groups containing members of the Party’s senior management

SMT WhatsApp groups
team – the “SMT” group and the “LP Forward Planning” group
Transcripts of the SMT WhatsApp groups between September 2016
SMT WhatsApp transcripts
and October 2017

Southside Location of the Party’s HQ

SPADs Special advisers

staff survey An employee survey conducted by the Party in August 2020

137 | THE FORDE REPORT | Appendix