Soldier pulls watch during traffic checkpoint

coordinated with members of Afghan National

Army outside of Combat Outpost Yosef Khel,
Paktika Province (U.S. Army/Ken Scar)

st
Shaping a 21 -Century
Defense Strategy
Reconciling Military Roles
By William G. Braun III and Charles D. Allen

nce again the U.S. military is an appropriate national security strat- future requirements for a complex

O transitioning from a period of

sustained conflict to a resource-
constrained and uncertain future.
egy. Even before that strategy is fully
formulated, the military submitted a
budget that comports with fiscal aus-
international security environment.
This article expands the national se-
curity debate by advocating adapting the
Accordingly, the Nation is again debat- terity while sustaining current readiness joint force to the emerging strategy and
ing its global role and how to develop and investing in capabilities to meet security environment through enhanc-
ing its shaping capabilities. The principal
stimulus driving the need for change is
the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance,
William G. Braun III is Professor of Strategy, Policy, and Landpower in the Strategic Studies Institute
at the U.S. Army War College. Charles D. Allen is Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies in the
which sustains the security strategy shift
Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War College. from deterrence and containment to

52  JPME Today / Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014
cooperation through engagement. The President Bill Clinton described how the emphasize the use of economic and dip-
emerging consensus suggests the future vision could be achieved through a strat- lomatic means backed by the limited use
national security strategy will direct a egy of “engagement and enlargement,” of the military as a coercive instrument
regionally tailored force for limited en- thus giving it structure. This particular of national power. In this era of fiscal
gagement.1 As with any fundamental shift strategy relied primarily on economic and austerity, emerging consensus emphasizes
in national policy objectives, strategy, or diplomatic efforts, backed by military a regionally tailored military strategy of
operational concepts, the initial guidance force, and was designed to expand the limited engagement.
is seldom the last word.2 The military global reach of democracy and economic The current Defense Strategic
must be sized and resourced to adapt to prosperity.6 President George W. Bush’s Guidance (January 2012) directs the
the realities of strategy and policy adjust- National Security Strategy reiterated military to adapt to the future strategic
ments as they occur. It is critical that many of the tenets of the earlier post– environment even as it remains a “global
military capabilities are resourced for the Cold War security strategies. Faced with presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific
national strategy and that they posture the new reality of terrorist attacks and and the Middle East” and at the same
the joint force to create and seize oppor- the emergent demands of two simultane- time is “prepared to confront and defeat
tunities. The objective is a military that ous wars, Bush emphasized the role of aggression anywhere in the world,” all
protects and advances U.S. interests in military power and highlighted the U.S. with a much smaller size and reduced
times of peace while providing robust and prerogative for preemptive action to resources.9 In underwriting this strategy,
flexible options to confront aggression counter rogue states or terrorist organiza- the Secretary of Defense is expected to
worldwide. tions that might strike without warning.7 develop a joint force that is “smaller and
While President Barack Obama’s 2010 leaner” but “will remain agile, flexible,
A Shift from Containment National Security Strategy acknowledged ready, innovative, and technologically
to Engagement the role of the military, it reverted to advanced.”10 This is a tall order that
To establish context for the emerg- much of the language related to coopera- requires prioritization and trade-off of
ing military narratives, it is necessary tion and burden-sharing reflective of the risk. The security establishment requires a
to trace the trajectory of the national 1990s.8 model for dynamic force adaptation and
security debate since the end of World The national security strategy is in a framework to develop the narrative that
War II. The Cold War grand strategy, transition again. The strategic environ- guides prioritization.
often attributed to “the father of con- ment presents a weak global economy, a The organizational concept of dy-
tainment” George Kennan, carried struggling U.S. economy, and shrinking namic equilibrium may provide such a
the Nation through the last half of the defense resources. While the current model. It draws on an ecological system
20th century.3 In his famous “X article” national security strategy is not fully metaphor to examine an organizational
published in 1947, Kennan advocated developed or articulated, it appears to response to a changing environment.
replacing cooperation with the Soviet conform to a general trajectory evident The “open system” ecological metaphor
Union with a strategy of long-term since the Cold War, from containment is rooted in chaos, complexity, and sys-
containment of their expansionist phi- and deterrence to cooperation and tems theories. Several elements of the
losophies. While the strategy matured engagement, with more limited ambi- metaphor can be applied to the military’s
during the Cold War, the military’s role tions than those initially expressed in adaptation to the evolving threat, secu-
remained stable.4 With a few notable the 1990s. This emerging narrative is rity, and operational environments.
exceptions, the Armed Forces provided designed to address a security environ- The dynamic equilibrium metaphor
credible and robust conventional ment that includes a nonhostile but captures the interactive and multidi-
combat capability to defend national rising rival in Asia (China), international mensional nature of systems and the
interests, exercised legitimate coercive nuclear proliferation (Iran, Pakistan, and continuous adaptive change imposed
power to maintain international order North Korea), revolutions against exist- by each member of an ecosystem on
through containment, and demon- ing world order (the Arab Spring in the the other. This interactive adaptation is
strated a mutually assured destruction African Maghreb and Egypt), continued a dynamic where the norm is constant
capability that discouraged nuclear unrest in the Middle East (the Levant), change in response to multiple simulta-
confrontation. and growing concern over instability and neous stimuli from other members and
With the demise of the Soviet Union violence (Mexico and other Central/ elements of the system. There are two
and the end of the Cold War, a search South American nations) in the Western broad mechanisms of change within the
for a new grand strategy narrative began. Hemisphere. theory—iterative evolution and rapid
President George H.W. Bush presented The national security strategy narra- adaptation.11 The first is more common
a vision of a “new world order” to tive is expected to focus on engagement in nature. The second can produce rapid
Congress in 1990 that emphasized and cooperative relationships to advance (transformational or revolutionary)
“cooperation,” where “nations of the U.S. interests and establish a stable in- change, but just as often results in the
world can prosper and live in harmony.”5 ternational order. It should appropriately death of many members of the system

JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Braun and Allen  53

 national strategy and policy objectives.
The long-term horizon is based on
estimates of future threats, operational
environment opportunities, and the
range of potential strategy and policy
decisions that may be pursued by future
administrations. The long-term horizon
requires senior leaders to establish aspi-
rational goals and a vision of the range
of military capabilities to achieve them.
The Services’ primary concern is with
the near-term horizon, which requires
the distribution of resources to maintain
readiness while initiating the evolution-
ary change and development initiatives
that move the force in the direction of
the long-term vision.
Military Strategy Equilibrium.
Absolute war and peace are archetypal
states that are never fully realized.
Competition spans a continuum from
the civil order of peace through major
combat manifested by war. Unattended
turmoil and misunderstandings among
nonhostile rivals can lead to escalation
of hostility and increased incidence of
extreme violence. Similarly, managing
disorder within the context of combat
Solider and Afghan police officer search terrain in Kunar Province prior to firefight (U.S. Army/Gary
operations is necessary to nurture the civil
A. Witte)
order associated with peace.
and the emergence of a new ecosystem. implementation concepts can facilitate the The U.S. security establishment has
Death occurs when an organism stops identification of alternative approaches to acknowledged the vital role of the mili-
adapting and no longer actively influences achieving national objectives. Instead of tary in shaping the security environment.
or is influenced by the system.12 The physically “pivoting” to the Asia-Pacific In 1997, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
remaining sections address several dimen- and Middle East, one could envision a of Staff General John Shalikashvili stated,
sions of the military’s environment that strategy that employs military power in “The military has an important role
must be considered as our leaders adapt various regions to rebalance our global in engagement—helping to shape the
the joint force for the future. efforts to indirectly influence the regions international environment in appropriate
prioritized by U.S. national leadership.15 ways to bring about a more peaceful and
Equilibrium in the In addition one may develop innovative stable world.” In the next sentence he
Military Narrative ways to exploit military relationships and provided a caveat: “The purpose of our
Threat versus Opportunity. National partnerships while employing other in- Armed Forces, however, is to deter and
security literature tends toward threat- struments of national power. defeat threats of organized violence to
based analysis. Security studies and Time Horizons Equilibrium. The our country and its interests.”16 When
military planning are likely to focus on military narrative should include link- faced with austere budgets, reduced force
approaches that prevent unfavorable ages to current policy, strategy, and structure, and uncertain futures, senior
order and unacceptable levels of disor- resources while engaging proactively civilian and military leaders typically
der,13 while identifying and planning for in actions that adapt the organization revert to a rhetoric dominated by the
black swan contingencies.14 Conversely, to future threats, opportunities, and force sizing and prioritization mantra to
contemporary organizational and busi- political perspectives. This results in two “fight and win the Nation’s wars,” with
ness literatures promote strategies that time horizons for strategic decisions that all other uses of the military being “lesser-
focus on opportunity identification and affect force development. The near-term included” capabilities.
exploitation. horizon is driven by prioritized distribu- The military’s force-sizing con-
Applying this opportunity perspec- tion of available resources, which has struct since the Cold War has been a
tive to security strategy and military to be justified in the context of current two-theaters strategy. While arguably

54  JPME Today / Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014
underresourced, the construct was based Considerations of the role landpower American Landpower:
on an aspiration to fight and win two plays in this operational concept appeared Prevent—Shape—Win
nearly simultaneous major regional con- late in the concept’s development.20 But The Army Chief of Staff (CSA) has Title
tingencies.17 In his February 2014 press even as a latecomer, landpower’s role was 10 responsibilities to field the Army and
conference, Secretary Hagel conveyed soon recognized in clearing coastal areas sustain America’s joint force. General
that the construct was now passé and of surface-to-ship missiles, providing for Ray Odierno, in the 2012 Army Posture
stated as well that “we are no longer siz- land-based air defense, and performing Statement, presented the Army’s
ing the military to conduct long and large myriad sustainment functions associated primary roles as prevent, shape, and
stability operation.” 18 He went on to say with establishing theater operations and win, with readiness, force structure, and
that the Army will be sized to decisively sustaining the joint force. As this joint modernization as the principal rheostats
defeat aggression in one major combat operational concept is further developed, to adjust resource prioritization to adapt
theater while defending the homeland it is likely that the vital role for landpower the Army to the strategic and fiscal
and supporting a joint force engagement will be better understood. environment. Current military force
in another theater. If the United States adopts a realist sizing is based on a “fight and win” phi-
When not engaged in war, the mili- foreign policy, the approach of balancing losophy. The fight and win imperative
tary structure and its inherent capabilities rising powers with regional partners and encompasses decisive joint combat capa-
are available to America’s political leaders preserving the ability to counter rivals bilities for the rapid defeat of enemies
for other missions. In practice the mili- once hostilities commence is a sound and a decisive end to hostilities.
tary does a great deal more than simply strategy. The Air-Sea Battle operational The “win to prevent” paradigm of-
preparing for and executing regional con- concept facilitates countering a hostile fers two paths to achieving a political
tingencies and major combat operations. enemy with strategic stand-off and anti- objective prior to the onset of combat.
Especially with regard to landpower, access/area-denial capabilities. A force-in-being’s “win” capabilities
a force capable of fighting two major However, senior national security discourage opportunistic rivals from
regional contingencies can accomplish a leaders should reconsider the utility of engaging in hostilities and prevent hostil-
number of “lesser-included” tasks during resourcing an operational concept that ity expansion to other regions after the
periods of relative peace. The deterrent limits the range of military options to start of conflict. America must maintain
quality of a ready force is intended to direct confrontation, especially when a legitimate military deterrent power
provide the Nation with sufficient coer- countering nonhostile rivals. Such an ap- by fielding a force-in-being capable of
cive power to discourage the escalation proach seems unwise, especially in cases decisively defeating any enemy while
of national rivalries into major combat where the rival’s economic markets may demonstrating the political will to use it.
operations. Should that deterrence fail, be closely linked to the U.S. economy. The Air-Sea Battle concept combined
the military’s mission has historically been This limited approach would leave our with operational concepts for landpower
to decisively defeat the enemy. leaders with few military options to (combined arms maneuver, wide area
Realist/Balancer versus Idealist/ counter a rival that confronts the Nation security, counterinsurgency, and coun-
Engagement Foreign Policy. Air-Sea directly with economic and diplomatic terterrorism doctrines) provide the
Battle has occupied a great portion of power, and employs military power basis for decisive combat operations to
the public debate regarding the mili- through distant or amorphous proxies. accomplish the military’s “win” mission.
tary’s strategic narrative since the release One can easily envision the coercive Air-Sea Battle facilitates coercive access
of the Defense Strategic Guidance. Air- power levers a rival could bring to bear to contested areas, thereby enabling
Sea Battle’s key characteristics include short of hostilities, making military em- landpower forces to deploy, stabilize, and
military involvement starting at the ployment options and posturing to deter exploit successes in the accomplishment
commencement of hostilities, withstand- hostilities moot. of strategic objectives. However, short
ing an initial attack, executing a blinding The prioritization of resources to of resorting to coercive methods and
and suppression campaign against enemy prepare the military for the future must direct hostilities, an emphasis on “win”
long-range intelligence, reconnais- accommodate both the future security capabilities offers few military options
sance, and surveillance (ISR) and strike environment and the political reality that using cooperation and engagement to
systems, and seizing the initiative in the U.S. policy and international action do address rivals who choose to challenge
sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains. not align perfectly with either realist or U.S. interests.
From this posture, the execution of the idealist perspectives of political science The military’s ability to shape the
concept would create time for “options theory. Actual policy and international security environment addresses such
to resolve a prolonged conventional political choice reflect a hybrid approach. nonhostile or indirect competition. In
conflict on favorable terms” through The range of military capabilities must addition, shaping provides for the es-
blockades, sustained logistics, and the accommodate options for dealing with tablishment of conditions that support
expansion of military and industrial the future environment that are based in a return to civil order once employment
production.19 both realist and idealist perspectives. of “win” capabilities manages extant

JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Braun and Allen  55

hostilities. The shaping function is •• Shaping operations permit the mili- defeating threats than developing military
directed toward influencing the focal na- tary to contribute to the engagement capabilities to manage the security en-
tion’s people and leadership. Influencing and enlargement objectives associ- vironment. Americans understandably
segments of a society and their leader- ated with promoting liberty under prefer short-duration, decisive conflicts,
ship short of conflict is achieved largely the rule of law, human rights, and and they frequently consider wars to be
through trust relationships and coopera- the subordination of the military to acts of political choice. However, in The
tive engagements. For the military these legitimate civil authority throughout Utility of Force, Rupert Smith presents
operations are normally landpower-cen- the peace-war continuum. a convincing argument that protracted
tric. Thus, in addition to traditional fight conflicts “among the people” repre-
Unlike combat operations, shaping does
and win capabilities, the Army needs to sent the reality of modern warfare.25
not require the threat of hostilities to ex-
develop an ethos that embraces shaping Managing the security environment
ecute. The military can conduct Building
as part of its warrior culture. through shaping offers an attractive
Partner Capacity, Security Cooperation,
“Shape to win” and “shape to alternative to either proposition—de-
Stability, and Security Force Assistance
prevent” paradigms have their own cisive large-scale conflict or protracted
missions in the absence of a threat; or it
mechanisms to achieve desired objectives. war “among the people.” First, shaping
can combine these shaping operations
The “shape to win” model is analogous operations provide a feasible and prudent
with counterinsurgency and counterter-
to flexible deterrent options and has been alternative in which U.S. military capa-
ror combat missions to synergistic effect
associated with campaign planning for bilities advance cooperative behaviors
in nonpermissive security environments
decades. The “shape to prevent” model to maintain a stable security environ-
short of major combat operations.
manifests itself in several ways, with the ment short of coercive hostility. Second,
In 2005, Department of Defense
common theme of enriching coopera- involvement in wars and deteriorating
(DOD) Directive 3000.05 established
tion and partnerships that contribute to security environments is not always sub-
security operations as a core military
favorable order. Shaping contributes to ject to U.S. preference or choice. History
mission. It directed that stability (shap-
achieving national security objectives in is replete with examples of Washington
ing) operations “shall be given priority
environments that span conditions from being compelled to military action to
comparable to combat operations.”21 On
civil order to war and back to civil order. restore order or confront aggression.
a national scale, this effort was reinforced
The shaping role contributes to win- Forward presence shaping operations can
when President George W. Bush signed
ning and preventing war in a number of provide early warning and offer nonco-
National Security Presidential Directive
ways: ercive access, thereby opening a range of
44 directing the Department of State
military options to prevent war or restore
•• Forward presence shaping opera- to be lead agent, using the Office of
civil order short of major combat opera-
tions provide early warning by means the Coordinator of Reconstruction and
tions. Unfortunately, shaping operations
of regional cultural engagement, Stabilization to coordinate and harmo-
associated with forward presence, part-
and opportunities to gather human nize all strategies and plans associated
nering to build relationships,26 security
intelligence and geographic access with reconstruction and stabilization
cooperation, and stability operations27
through established relationships. activities for states transitioning from
continue to be misunderstood, under-
•• The shaping role develops a cooper- conflict and civil strife.22
valued, and underresourced in austere
ation-based capacity and desire for More recently the 2012 Defense
economic environments.
regional partners to confront military Budget Guidance, which followed the
The development of shaping opera-
challenges in a manner that could Defense Strategic Guidance, called for
tions requires the deliberate resourcing
not be achieved independently. “a fresh approach to the traditional ‘two
of specific force design, readiness, and
•• Conducting shaping operations with war’ force-sizing construct that had
modernization initiatives. Embracing
supportive partners can block rival shaped defense planning since the end of
shaping does not imply undervaluing
power ambitions short of hostilities; the cold war.”23 Yet, of the military’s 10
the imperative to “fight and win the
it is a realist/balancing argument. primary missions outlined in the guid-
Nation’s wars.” Shaping and winning
•• Shaping operations conducted with ance, only 4 are designated as criteria for
operations are appropriately designed to
potentially opportunistic partners force sizing. Three of the four involve
provide complementary capabilities. One
offer positive cooperative engage- building the capacity to win wars. The
generally accepted lesson has emerged
ment incentives short of confronta- shaping missions that provide stabilizing
from the last several decades of conflict:
tion to modify their behavior. presence and support counterinsurgency
the resultant civil order—not the defeat
•• Shaping facilitates U.S. force operations are accompanied by specified
of a specific threat—defines victory in
redeployment following hostilities caveats limiting their resourcing.24
modern warfare. By necessity, if there are
with some assurance of leaving the Both 2012 defense guidance
insufficient resources to prepare for both
foundations of sustainable civil order documents convey that the U.S. secu-
missions simultaneously, a portion of the
behind. rity establishment is more focused on
force may temporarily focus on the “win”

56  JPME Today / Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014
Soldiers rally in urban operations complex at Nevada Test and Training Range (U.S. Air Force/ Michael R. Holzworth)

or “shape” role during a particular opera- operations, primarily Building Partner while requiring the Army to develop and
tion or deployment. But that does not Capacity, Security Cooperation, and design tailored capabilities to execute
absolve operational units of the require- Stability (especially when they involve these missions. Once U.S. political lead-
ment to conduct either decisive combat development or law enforcement) fall ership recognizes the value of military
or shaping operations with a limited outside DOD’s roles, missions, and shaping operations as a legitimate foreign
amount of predeployment or rotational authorities. For this reason, national policy execution tool during peacetime,
training. leaders are reluctant to commit resources the Army will have to embrace the
America’s security establishment to build DOD capabilities to engage in shaping mission within its professional
should acknowledge the vital role of land- these operations, and security-minded jurisdiction.
power as the force capable of shaping a interagency partners are not willing to A military argument for resisting the
population-centric security environment, allow the department to assume responsi- prioritization of resources for shaping
whether through the coercive power bility for their execution. capabilities is a belief that any reduction
of combat operations or the influence Shaping operations are necessary to in the “fight and win” capability will
generated by shaping operations. “Shape prevent conflict, mitigate its impact, and endanger the military’s contract with the
to prevent” and “shape to win” models provide the opportunity to transition to American people—to win the Nation’s
define the respective conditions necessary some form of a sustainable civil order. wars. Adherents to this view proffer the
to achieve political and military victory in In the last decade of war, no Federal opinion that should the military fail at
modern warfare. agency has marshaled the resources or shaping, there are other Federal depart-
The arguments against resourcing changed its capability sufficiently to ex- ments and agencies capable of providing
shaping capabilities and capacities align ecute these missions as well as the Army. assistance. There is not, however, an-
generally with the following themes. Some adjustments in roles, missions, and other agency that can fight and win the
First, it is not the function of DOD or authorities are therefore necessary to en- Nation’s wars.
the Army to execute these operations. able other agencies to set objectives and This argument has merit. DOD and
The activities associated with shaping provide oversight when developing plans, the Services cannot abandon their duty

JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014 Braun and Allen  57

Marines select targets in tactical movement training at Camp Rodriguez, South Korea (DOD/James Norman)

to win wars: The notion of winning in The continuity of the U.S. post–Cold given the current fiscal environment. The
modern warfare (and arguably through- War security strategy of cooperative argument to limit resource expenditures,
out history) involves a great deal more engagement, implemented through however, is compelling in light of U.S.
than simply defeating the enemy’s army economic and diplomatic instruments of fiscal circumstances. Faced with a volatile
or planting the U.S. flag in the enemy’s power reinforced by military power, is operating environment, austere resources,
capital. It involves encouraging legitimate appealing. The past two decades suggest and an ambiguous group of adversaries,
government and developing indigenous that even altruistic aspirations to spread the Nation must strive for dynamic equi-
force capabilities that permit U.S. dis- democracy, human rights, and economic librium as it adapts the joint force to win
engagement with some assurance of prosperity through diplomacy and eco- conflicts, manage security environments,
sustainable security and order. nomic initiatives alone are often foiled by and shape civil order within constrained
adversaries with different agendas. U.S. resources. The new security culture must
Conclusion military leadership must embrace civilian embrace the military’s “shape” and “win”
In summer 2013, DOD’s Cost Assess- leaders’ expressed desire to reduce the roles. Shaping operations are primarily
ment and Program Evaluation organiza- size and economic burden of the force, landpower centric because they are con-
tion released the results of the Strategic while at the same time preparing it for the ducted in the human domain among the
Choices and Management Review full range of potential confrontations. people. The Army must and will carry the
(SCMR) study directed by Secretary The argument that the military must burden of successfully executing shaping
of Defense Chuck Hagel. The SCMR retain the ability to “fight and win the operations in support of America’s for-
provided resource prioritization guid- Nation’s wars” when shaping operations eign policy security goals.
ance to the Quadrennial Defense Review are resourced as lesser included capabili- Current defense guidance charges
effort within three broad funding bands. ties is incongruous with current national the military with defeating future threats
It did not alter the regionally prioritized, security strategy aspirations. And it is not and protecting national interests world-
limited engagement strategy proposed in realistic to expect the whole-of-govern- wide. To do that in an austere resource
the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.28 ment engagement capability to increase environment, the force must improve

58  JPME Today / Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy JFQ 73, 2nd Quarter 2014
operational effectiveness and efficiency Then he invokes the role of diplomats, develop- vember 9, 2011, available at <www.dodbuzz.
ment efforts, intelligence, law enforcement, and com/2011/11/09/services-promises-to-add-
in both combat and shaping capabilities. foreign partner burden sharing. army-to-air-sea-battle/>.
The Army’s recent addition of a seventh 9
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, cover 21
Department of Defense (DOD) Directive
warfighting function, Engagement, is an letter. 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security,
appropriate and needed addition to its 10
Ibid. Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Opera-
doctrine.29 The next iteration of defense
11
As examples, see Connie J.G. Gersick, tions (Washington, DC: Government Printing
“Revolutionary change theories: A multilevel Office [GPO], 2005); and later reinforced by
guidance should prioritize the military’s exploration of the punctuated equilibrium para- DOD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations
role in shaping operations during peace- digm,” Academy of Management Review 16, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009).
time as well as recognize the requirement no. 1 (1991), 10–36; and S.L. Brown and K.M. 22
National Security Presidential Direc-
to conduct combat operations. The fu- Eisenhardt, “The art of continuous change: tive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts
ture operational environment demands a Linking complexity theory and time-paced Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization
evolution in relentlessly shifting organizations,” (Washington, DC: The White House, Decem-
robust military capability to win conflicts
Administrative Science Quarterly 42, no. 1 ber 2005), available at <www.fas.org/irp/off-
among the people, while improving co- (1997), 1–34, available at <http://search. docs/nspd/nspd-44.html>.
operative engagement shaping capabilities proquest.com/docview/203986467?account 23
DOD, Defense Budget Priorities and
to maintain or restore peace. JFQ id=27965>. Choices (Washington, DC: GPO, January
12
Richard Tanner Pascale, Linda Gioja, and 2012), 7, available at <www.defense.gov/
Mark Millemann, Surfing the Edge of Chaos: The news/Defense_Budget_Priorities.pdf>.
Laws of Nature and the New Laws of Business 24
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership. The
Notes (New York: Random House, 2000). four mission sets that joint forces will be sized
13
Nate Freier of the Center for Strategic against are counterterrorism and irregular war-
1
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priori- and International Studies coined the phrase fare, deter and defeat, nuclear deterrent capabil-
ties for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: unfavorable order and unacceptable disorder to ity, and homeland defense/defense support to
Department of Defense, January 2012). describe the security environments most likely civil authority. The limiting language associated
2
For early contrasting views and initial to compel U.S. intervention. with providing a stabilizing presence is “with
push back on the official strategy and military 14
It is impossible to plan for black swan reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need
operational concept, see Douglas A. Ollivant, contingencies in the sense that Nassim Nicholas to be made regarding the location and frequen-
“Go Army, Beat Navy,” Foreign Policy, Septem- Taleb used the term in The Black Swan: The cy of these operations”; and with stability and
ber 28, 2012, available at <www.foreignpolicy. Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed. (New counterinsurgency operations the language is
com/articles/2012/09/28/go_army_beat_ York: Random House, 2010), but there are “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct
navy>; Colin Clark, “Pentagon takes Second a host of “gray swans” in the environment large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” The
look at Strategy: Where are the holes?” AoL that could test the robustness of any national language is reasoned and mild in both cases,
Defense, September 10, 2012, available at security strategy or military operational concept but it is sufficient to marginalize any argument
<http://defense.aol.com/2012/09/10/ and would satisfy the contingency planning made in defense of capabilities supporting these
pentagon-takes-second-look-at-strategy-where- requirement. missions during the budget wars.
are-the-holes/>. 15
Consider the possibilities of influencing 25
Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The
3
James Gibney, “Big thinker,” The Ameri- China through activities in Africa. To stimulate Art of War in the Modern World (New York:
can Scholar 81, no. 1 (2012), 114–117, avail- ideas associated with this potential indirect Knopf, 2007).
able at <http://search.proquest.com/docview regional approach, see David E. Brown, Hidden 26
This is especially so with unsavory part-
/923850522?accountid=4444>. Dragon, Crouching Lion: How China’s advance ners with whom it is necessary to build trust
4
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Contain- in Africa is understated and Africa’s poten- and legitimacy to influence fundamental change
ment: A Critical Appraisal of American Na- tial underappreciated (Carlisle, PA: Strategic over time.
tional Security Policy During the Cold War, 2nd Studies Institute, 2012), available at <www. 27
These may be conducted with “small
ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display. foot-prints” and to some degree with rotational
5
George H.W. Bush, “Toward a New cfm?pubID=1120>. forces. But to be effective they are inherently
World Order,” address to a joint session of 16
National Military Strategy of the United long-duration operations.
Congress and the Nation, 1990, available at States of America: Redefining America’s Mili- 28
Detailed results of the Strategic Choices
<www.sweetliberty.org/issues/war/bushsr>. tary Leadership (Washington, DC: The Joint and Management Review are in “Deputy
6
National Security Strategy of Engagement Staff), cover letter. Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter and Vice
and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The White 17
Daniel Goure, The Measure of a Super- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James
House, February 1995), available at <www. power: A Two Major Regional Contingency Winnefield Jr. Prepared Testimony House
au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf>. Military for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Armed Services Committee,” in House Armed
7
The National Security Strategy of the The Heritage Foundation, January 25, 2013). Services Committee, Washington DC, 2013.
United States of America (Washington, DC: 18
Chuck Hagel, Remarks by Secretary 29
See U.S. Training and Doctrine Com-
The White House, 2002), 14, available at Hagel and Gen. Dempsey on the Fiscal Year mand (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-5, The
<www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ 2015 Budget Preview in the Pentagon Briefing U.S. Army Functional Concept For Engagement
policy/national/nss-020920.pdf>. Room, Alexandria, VA, February 24, 2014, (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, February 24,
8
National Security Strategy (Washington, available at <www.defense.gov>. 2014).
DC: The White House, 2010), cover letter, 19
Jan Van Tol, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-
available at <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/de- Departure Operational Concept (Washington,
fault/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strat- DC: Center for a New American Security,
egy.pdf>. President Obama states, “Our Armed 2010), xiii.
Forces will always be a cornerstone of our 20
Philip Ewing, “Services promise to add
security, but they must be complemented.” Army to ‘Air-Sea Battle,’” DoD Buzz, No-

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