The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-20-4

Editor in Chief Features

LISA ALLEY 11

Maintenance: People Readiness
GEN Paul E. Funk II
Commandant 14 Bringing Great-Power Competition to the Tactical Level: European Rotational
BG KEVIN D. ADMIRAL Deployment Considerations for Company-Grade Armor Leaders
MAJ Brigid Calhoun and CPT Alexander Boroff
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published quarterly by the U.S. Army 20 A Picture is Worth 1,000 Words (or 3,110 Words)
Armor School, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Kark- LTC Jim Armstrong
er Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905.
26 The ETHICAL Warrior
Disclaimers: The information contained in ARMOR represents the Chaplain (MAJ) Jared Vineyard
professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily re-
32 Reconnaissance and Security Operations are Essential to Thwarting Russian Interests
flect the official Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
in the Western Hemisphere
or U.S. Army Armor School position, nor does it change or super-
sede any information presented in other official Army publications. 1LT Anthony M. Analla
37 At the Forward Edge and Beyond: Lethality and the Armored Brigade Combat Team
Manuscripts and their accompanying figures become government
MAJ(P) James Burnett and MAJ Jeff Feser
property and public domain upon receipt in ARMOR editorial of-
fices. (The ideas within the manuscript remain the author’s intel- 41 Armored Brigade Combat Team Cavalry Squadron’s Combat Trains during
lectual property and may be reused by the author, but the work it- Large-Scale Combat Operations: Balancing Maintenance, Recovery, Freedom
self — the particular expression of the ideas — passes to public do- of Maneuver
main upon receipt of the manuscript.) ARMOR staff will make nec- MAJ Gary M. Klein and CPT Ragan T. Rutherford
essary grammar, syntax and style corrections on the text to meet
publication standards and will redesign illustrations and charts for 50 Zone Reconnaissance – Why Don’t We Do It?
clarity and to standards as necessary. ARMOR staff may coordinate MAJ Jeffrey W. Jennings
changes with authors in the interest of ensuring that content re- 54 Reforge the Broken Saber: Evolving the Infantry Brigade Combat Team’s
mains accurate and professionally developmental. As a non-copy- Cavalry Squadron to Win the Recon Fight Part II
righted government publication, no copyright is granted if a work SGT Christopher Broman
is published in ARMOR, and in general, no copyrighted works should
be submitted for consideration to publish. On occasion, however, 64 Recon and Security in the Urban Fight
ARMOR may wish to publish copyrighted material, and in that in- CPT Kyle D. Woods
stance, individual authors’ copyrights will be protected by special
arrangement. Table of Contents continued on next page
As the primary purpose of ARMOR content is the professional de-
velopment of Armor Branch soldiers, ARMOR focuses on materials
for which the Armor School has proponency: armored, direct-fire Departments
ground combat systems not serving primarily as infantry carriers; 1 Contacts
weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series en- 2 Chief of Armor’s Hatch
listed Soldiers; miscellaneous items of equipment which armored 5 Gunner’s Seat
and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all 6 Letters to the Editor
19-series officers and CMF 19-series enlisted Soldiers; and informa- 9 In Memoriam
tion concerning the training, logistics, history and leadership of ar- 110 Book Reviews
mor and armored cavalry units at a brigade/regiment level and be- 111 Battle Analysis
low, to include threat units at those levels. 124 From the Boresight Line
129 Armor Branch Update
Distribution: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 132 Featured Unit: 91st Cavalry Regiment
Official distribution is made as one copy for each armored brigade
headquarters; armored cavalry regiment headquarters; armor bat-
talion headquarters; armored cavalry squadron headquarters; re-
connaissance squadron headquarters; or armored cavalry troop,
armor company and motorized brigade headquarters of the U.S.
Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DoD schools, HQDA and
Army Command staff agencies with responsibility for armored, di-
rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations and training of the
personnel for such organizations may request two copies by send-
ing a request to the editor in chief.
Reprints: ARMOR is published by the authority of the Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, and is in the public domain except where copyright is indi-
cated. ARMOR requests that reprinted material carry credit given to
ARMOR and the author. Direct inquiries to Editor in Chief, ARMOR,
McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort
Benning, GA 31905.

2028901
Fall 2020, Vol. CXXXIV, No. 4
 Armor School Points of Contact
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: Articles can be submitted as email at-
tachments to usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.armor-magazine@mail.
mil. For all submissions, please include a complete mailing
ARMOR Editorial Office
ad­d ress and daytime phone number.
Editor in Chief
SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: We ordinarily do not print articles Lisa Alley (706) 545-9503
that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, Email: [email protected] DSN 835
other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your article
to only one Army professional bulletin at a time. Deputy Editor
Gary A. Jones (706) 545-8701
GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We will accept conventional photo Email: [email protected] DSN 835
prints or electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300
dpi PNG or JPG format. (Please do not send photos embedded Covers, Art Support, Tanks of the World Feature
in PowerPoint and Word.) If you use Power­Point for illustra- Jody Harmon (706) 545-5754
tions, please try to avoid the use of excessive color and shad- Email: [email protected] DSN 835
ing. If you have any questions concerning electronic art or
photo submissions, contact the Editor in Chief.
UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery U.S. Army Armor School
problems or changes of unit address, email usarmy.benning.tra-
[email protected]; phone DSN 835-2698 or com­ Commandant (ATZK-CD)
mercial (706) 545-2698. Requests to be added to the official BG Kevin D. Admiral (706) 545-2029
dis­tribution list should be in the form of a letter or email to Email: [email protected] DSN 835
the Editor in Chief.
Deputy Commandant (ATZK-DC)
EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: U.S. Army Armor School, COL Sean W. Barnes (706) 545-2029
ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg.4), Suite W142, 1 Email: [email protected] DSN 835
Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905.
Armor School Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CM)
REPRINTS: ARMOR is published by authority of the Chief of CSM Tony T. Towns (706) 545-3815
Staff, U.S. Army. Material may be reprinted, provided credit Email: [email protected] DSN 835
is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright
is indicated. Request all organizations not affiliated with the 194 th Armored Brigade (ATZK-BAZ)
Department of the Army contact ARMOR for reproduction/re- COL Dawson A. Plummer (706) 626-5969
printing permission. Inquiries may be directed to Editor in Email: [email protected] DSN 620
Chief, ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite 316 th Cavalry Brigade (ATZK-SBZ)
W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. COL Peter C. Glass (706) 626-8670
ARMOR MAGAZINE ON-LINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine Web­ Email: [email protected] DSN 620
site at www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/. Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)
ARMOR HOTLINE — (706) 626-TANK (8265)/DSN 620: The Ar- George DeSario (706) 545-1352
mor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with Email: [email protected] DSN 835
questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations and Army Capability Manager-Armored (CDID ACM-BCT-MC)
equipment of the armor force. Brigade Combat Team and Reconnaissance 706.626.2444
COL Jason H. Rosenstrauch DSN 835
Email [email protected]
Army Capability Manager-Security Force (ATZB-CIG)
Assistance Brigade 706.545.5054
Tom Harraghy DSN 835
Email [email protected]

Table of Contents continued 102 Mobility, Shock and Firepower for Light Armor-Infantry
Operations: Past, Present and Future
71 The Growing Vacuum of Today’s Live-Fire Ranges
and their Future Requirements CPT S. Scott Diddams
1SG(R) Frank Belonus 108 Section Gunnery and Armored Brigade Combat Team
77 The BMPT-72 and the Problem of Direct-Fire Support in Lethality
Armored Formations CPT Zachary J. Matson
2LT E.R. Chesley 116 COVID-19 and Virtual Wargaming in ROTC: A Deadly
84 Volcano Minefield Planning at the Brigade Combat Team Virus R
esurrects Aged Tactical Training Method
and Below LTC Andrew P. Betson, 2LT Adam Messer, 2LT Tristan
CPT Gregory Shepard and CPT Doni Wong Boomer, 2LT Justin DiCarlo, 2LT Marshall Green
88 Armored Warfare During the Spanish Civil War (1936- 122 A Case for Covered Motorpool Parking
1939): T
he Experience Reconsidered CPT(P) David Blanton
COL(R) Anthony J. Candil
 CHIEF OF ARMOR’S HATCH

BG Kevin D. Admiral
Chief of Armor/Commandant
U.S. Army Armor School

Developing Leaders
“We are facing increased global disor- career-long learning and develop-
der, characterized by decline in the ment. Leaders matriculate the in-
long-standing rules-based internation- stitutional domain at different
al order – creating a security environ- points in their careers to receive
ment more complex and volatile than professional military education. Martin Dempsey said that “our doc-
any we have experienced in recent trine and our organization and even
The operational domain is where lead-
memory. … This increasingly complex the guidance we give … is not going to
ers gain experience. In the operation-
security environment is defined by rap- be perfectly suited. And so these
al domain, training events (situation-
id technological change, challenges young men and women out there on
al-training exercises, round-table dis-
from adversaries in every operating the edge – it’ll be their responsibility
cussions or seminars) provide multiple
domain and the impact on current to take what they are given ... and ap-
repetitions and sets to strengthen
readiness from the longest continuous ply it in a way that will allow us to pro-
mental agility while post-training af-
stretch of armed conflict in our na- tect our national interest and promote
ter-action reviews provide feedback
tion’s history. In this environment, our values.”
for improvement.
there can be no complacency – we
must make difficult choices and prior- Leaders continuously navigate the Armor leaders must think faster and
itize what is most important to field a self-development domain as they en- react with lethal precision; therefore
lethal, resilient and rapidly adapting ter and exit the operational and insti- the method we use to develop leaders
Joint force.” -2018 National Defense tutional domains; the self-develop- must be deliberate and planned like an
Strategy ment domain is
where leaders
People remain the No. 1 priority in the
learn from the ex-
Army, and developing leaders is quint-
periences of oth-
essential to building readiness. To de-
ers through pro-
velop leaders to meet the challenges
fessional reading
listed in the 2018 National Defense
Strategy, we must understand what and reflect on
leader development is and why it is their own experi-
important. ences. This do-
main enables
The Army Leader Development Strat- leaders to inter-
egy defines leader development as “a pret their mis-
continuous, progressive process by takes and inter-
which the synthesis of an individual’s nalize lessons-
training, education and experiences learned during
contribute to individual growth over training.
the course of a career.” Field Manual
(FM) 6-22 defines three domains asso- Figure 1 depicts
ciated with leader development (insti- the Army’s lead-
tutional, operational and self-develop- er-development
ment). strategy.
Figure 1. Army leader-development model from 2013’s
The institutional domain represents Retired G E N Army Leader Development Strategy.

2 Fall 2020
 Table 1. Example platoon-sergeant development program. (Adapted from Figure 2-4, FM 6-22)

3 Fall 2020
 operation. The planning process for Engaged leadership is the final com- strengths and weaknesses, and facili-
developing leaders is no different from ponent in developing leaders. We tates individual development plans to
planning and resourcing an attack, de- must create environments that are achieve growth; counseling is vital to
fense or gunnery. conducive to learning by accepting effective reflection. Reflection enables
prudent risk and not being risk-averse subordinate leaders to understand de-
Unit leader-development programs during training – or be attributional ficiencies and transcend within the
(LDPs) are vital in developing Armor when assisting with personal-growth self-development domain. Counseling
leaders. They must target identified requirements. Subordinate leaders has a direct correlation with lifelong
shortfalls and develop critical thinking must have the opportunity to gain ex- learning and leader development.
and decision-making skills. Plan and perience in an environment that ac-
manage LDPs at the battalion level for Forge the Thunderbolt!
cepts failure but provides feedback
platoon leaders/platoon sergeants, and time for improvement and growth.
and at the brigade level for company The aforementioned fosters mutual
commanders, first sergeants and field trust throughout the formation. Acronym Quick-Scan
grades.
Lastly, superiors must counsel subor- FM – field manual
Table 1 is an example LDP for platoon dinate leaders. Counseling enables LDP – leader-development program
sergeants from FM 6-22. shared understanding of expectations,

4 Fall 2020
 GUNNER’S SEAT

CSM Tony T. Towns

Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor School

Developing Leaders
of Character
Leader development is an ongoing en- Intellect is not just about the knowl-
deavor, delivered in many forms and edge possessed.
by different means. From Army attri- It includes men-
butes and competences across the in- tal agility, sound
stitutional, operational and self-devel- judgment and in-
opment domains, to feedback mecha- terpersonal tact,
nisms such as coaching, counseling to name a few.
and mentorship, leader development Tough, realistic
is foundational to a disciplined, fit and training opportu-
confident outfit that is “Army Ready” nities that are
for the crucibles of ground conflict. both physically
and mentally
While level of competency can be de-
challenging are
termined through tests, measures of
often engines
performance and assessments, the
that showcase
quality of one’s attributes (character,
mental agility
presence, intellect) are more challeng-
and sound judg-
ing to ascertain, therefore more diffi-
ment. As leaders,
cult to devise a deliberate plan for de-
are we recogniz-
velopment. The Army attributes rep-
ing these mo-
resent the values and identity of the
ments as they oc-
leader, how the leader is perceived by
cur and devising
followers and others, and the mental
a plan for im-
and social faculties the leader applies Figure 1. Introductory logic map from Army Doctrine Pub-
provement?
in the act of leading (Army Doctrine lication 6-22.
Publication 6-22). The Army attri-
butes of character and intellect could our No. 1 priority – America’s sons and
Character is not something that is
not be more important in our Army daughters are grounded in the disci-
teachable. Character is often exposed
than present-day, yet there are often plines and values of our profession,
through personal or professional en-
few formalized plans to develop these have a warrior spirit and possess the
counters (good and bad), moments of
essential tenets in our Soldiers and mental agility / resilience to face and
uncertainty or fear, or when facing
leaders. As daily-life endeavors (per- conqueror any obstacles. This focus of
tough decisions that require moral or
sonally and professionally) provide the leader development is undoubtedly
ethical decisions. As leaders, are we
window to assess both character and the most challenging, yet I firmly be-
recognizing these moments when they
intellect, we must catalogue and de- lieve it is the most essential!
occur, intently observing behavior to
assess the developmental need and, vise a developmental plan that ensure Armor Ready! Forge the Thunderbolt!
more importantly, devising a plan for
improvement?

5 Fall 2020
LETTERS
Dear Editor, assignments could be in infantry, ar- Reconnaissance and Surveillance
In the Summer 2020 issue of ARMOR mor or cavalry units, and in any of the Leader’s Course (which falls under the
magazine, CPT Nicholas M. Charnley three brigade combat team (BCT) Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade
wrote an article titled, “Why Cavalry structures. in the Infantry School), CLC and SLC
Officers Should Have Their Own (which fall under the 316th Cavalry Bri-
The Maneuver Center of Excellence
Branch.” The article articulated many gade in the Armor School), this is a re-
and the U.S. Army Armor School (US-
well-researched points and made an sult of different audiences’ require-
AARMS) have multiple functional
argument for the development of an ments for these courses.
courses that are not only available but
independent Cavalry Branch. However,
encouraged and often mandatory for The 3 rd Squadron, 16 th Cavalry Regi-
there are many reasons why Cavalry
Armor officers to attend after attend- ment Squadron, of the 316th Cavalry
officers should not have an indepen-
ing MCCC. Brigade at Fort Benning, GA, trains and
dent branch.
CPT Charnley also highlighted the lack certifies all CLC and SLC instructors.
CPT Charnley highlighted the Army’s FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Securi-
dependence on non-organic assets at of focus in the Infantry Basic Officer
Leader’s Course (IBOLC) and Armor ty Operations, is the foundation for
the brigade and division levels. It is their knowledge and curriculum. Fur-
true that the conventional Army de- Basic Officer Leader’s Course (ABOLC)
on R&S. This is true; however, the in- thermore, instructors from both cours-
pended on a great deal of surveillance es attend all certification teaches for
and observation equipment as well as tent of those courses was never to
build leader proficiency at R&S tasks. prospective instructors, which are led
on Special Operations Forces to collect by the squadron command group.
valuable intelligence during the coun- Following ABOLC, lieutenants attend
the Scout Leader’s Course (SLC). Fol- While there is a slight difference in ex-
terinsurgency-driven global war on perience between students who are
terror. However, the Army acknowl- lowing MCCC, captains attend the Cav-
alry Leader’s Course (CLC). These brand-new lieutenants or young staff
edged and is adjusting the force struc- sergeants (SLC) vs. captains and first
ture to address the importance of re- courses are designed to build profi-
ciency at R&S tasks. The requirements sergeants (CLC) as far as level of un-
connaissance and security (R&S) at derstanding and detail is concerned,
echelon; it knows surveillance alone from U.S. Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM) and the Armor Branch there is no gap in the doctrinal under-
will not suffice during large-scale com- standing among the instructors of
bat operations (LSCO). make it very clear that these courses
are not voluntary and nest with exist- each course. These courses build on
According to Joint Publication 2-0, re- ing professional military education the doctrinal knowledge that officers
connaissance is “a mission undertaken (PME). Furthermore, FORSCOM guid- and noncommissioned officers receive
to obtain, by visual observation or oth- ance dictates that all lieutenant colo- during earlier PME. SLC and CLC pro-
er detection methods, information nels selected for Cavalry squadron duce proficient cavalry leaders ready
about the activities and resources of command must attend CLC if they to operate in armor, infantry or Stryk-
an enemy or adversary, or to secure have not in the past. er BCTs.
data concerning the meteorological,
CPT Charnley implies that there is BCT The U.S. Army does not need and
hydrographic or geographic character-
inequity at CLC; that is an outdated should not create a Cavalry Branch. As
istics of a particular area.” Field Man-
and inaccurate assumption. CPT Swee- stated earlier, cavalry units need to
ual (FM) 3-55, Information Collection,
ney (co-author of this letter) served as understand the tasks, capabilities and
distinctly describes the difference be-
a CLC instructor 2018-2019; during limitations of the formations they sup-
tween “surveillance” and “reconnais-
that time, he instructed Cavalry lead- port to be effective. Their leaders are
sance.” Reconnaissance is active in na-
ers in the ranks of staff sergeant to better suited to execute LSCO after at-
ture, while surveillance is passive and
lieutenant colonel. Every small group tending broader PME for their respec-
continuous. Therefore the active na-
had an equal mix of Soldiers assigned tive branch before attending the spe-
ture of reconnaissance usually in-
to armored brigade combat teams cialized R&S courses. Instead of seek-
cludes human participation, and it of-
(ABCTs), infantry brigade combat ing to separate Armor officers with
ten requires units to maneuver and
teams (IBCTs) and Stryker brigade their branch, the Armor Branch con-
fight for information. Due to this dis-
combat teams (SBCTs), as well as many tinues to emphasize the key function-
tinction, it is illogical to divorce caval-
leaders from security-force assistance al courses for leaders going to cavalry
ry units from maneuver.
brigades. Also, an ABCT requested one organizations. USAARMS continues to
Armor captains attend the Maneuver of five mobile training teams (MTTs) enhance the learning experience for
Captain’s Career Course (MCCC) be- executed in that timeframe. students and uses outreach/MTTs to
cause it provides the foundational expand the knowledge of these cours-
knowledge required for all maneuver CPT Charnley also highlights inconsis- es in the operating force.
captains before they go to their fol- tencies among the courses. While MAJ DEMARIUS THOMAS
low-on assignments. Those there may be some differences among CPT TIMOTHY SWEENEY

6 Fall 2020
Dear Editor, division artillery (for which we would Amos Fox’s article, “On the Employ-
I have mixed feelings about what has usually have priority of fire) or the Co- ment of Cavalry,” ARMOR, Winter
been happening with Armor Branch in bras. And it was good. 2020 edition). Second, the nature of
the last 10 or more years. I’m amused the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan didn’t
that my hunch from more than a de- One of the “lessons learned” from Op- require divisions to fight as they had
cade ago that the Army may once eration Desert Storm was that the 58s previously envisioned. This set up the
again need divisional-cavalry squad- (I’m talking about the “C” model here, “division troops” to be the billpayers
rons seems to have turned out to be without the sophisticated sensors of for the slots now assigned to brigades,
correct. At the same time, I’m disap- the later “D” model) were too slow, and voila, the divisional-cavalry squad-
pointed that so much of the expertise lacked advanced sensors and couldn’t ron mission was erased.
I/we formerly took for granted has keep up with the Apaches of an attack
company. The Army aviation commu- Although each brigade combat team
been lost.
nity, in its collective wisdom, decided (BCT) gained its own cavalry squadron
I’ll start off by saying that MAJ Nathan to pull the 58s and replace them with as its third maneuver battalion, could
Jennings did Armor and Cavalry a Cobras. The old aviation warrant offi- that squadron really function as cav-
great service in his article, “Reconsid- cers groused because the TO&E alry in a brigade with only two maneu-
ering Division-Cavalry Squadrons, Part change made their Vietnam-era tactics ver battalions? If I remember correct-
IV” (ARMOR, Spring-Summer 2019 prohibitively expensive. By that I mean ly, the Army later went back and add-
edition). Since “what’s past is pro- flying an aircraft low and fast above a ed a third maneuver battalion, which
logue,” I should say that I came up tree line to draw fire while a gunship would then in theory free up the cav-
through a light divisional-cavalry flew above to respond was no longer alry squadron to do reconnaissance
squadron: 1st Squadron, 158th Cavalry economically viable since no one real- and security (R&S) tasks for the bri-
Regiment, Maryland Army National ly wanted to consider losing a Cobra. gade, but I’ll leave it to others to fact-
Guard. We were the divcav for 29th In- But I digress. check me on that.
fantry Division (Light). By my reckon- It was generally recognized by the late So how’s that working out? The elimi-
ing, that formation has been extinct in 1990s that the Cobra was a legacy air- nation of the divcav squadron was
Maryland and all across the Army for frame and needed to go. Active Army probably reasonable based on the sit-
12-plus years. To spare you from hav- units would receive the light attack he- uation at the time, but now that the
ing to wipe the dust off an old table of licopter (LHX) while the Guard would Army’s focus has returned to a near-
organization and equipment (TO&E), I get Apaches, with its modern optics peer conventional fight with divisions
can tell you that in the beginning, we and avionics packages. Then two maneuvering in the field like in Desert
had two air troops, an aviation-main- things took place generally in the Storm or the invasion of Iraq, it’s time
tenance troop, a ground troop and a same timeframe. First, the LHX pro- to reach for those spurs and Stetsons
headquarters and headquarters troop. gram was cancelled (largely due to a again. Every time I’ve done a division-
Being a glasses-wearer and an Armor failure by the Army to manage its re- level Warfighter-like exercise, the an-
officer, naturally I was in the ground quirements and what aviators wanted swer to the question of “Who are we
troop (A/1-158 Cavalry). Initially we the aircraft to do, in my opinion). Sec- going to use for the division’s deep
had OH-58Cs and AH-1F Cobras. ond, 9-11 happened, and the Apaches fight?” is to break up a maneuver bri-
(which we had been slated to receive gade to use its battalions as substitute
Although I was in the unit in the from 101st Airborne) were suddenly no divcav squadrons. I seem to recall
1990s, this was essentially a Vietnam- longer available. I was hoping we’d get from reading a manual where it says
era task-organization and would have the OH-58D, but I suppose there ad hoc teams conducting missions for
sounded familiar to anyone who had weren’t enough to go around. Without which they’re not well trained are
been in uniform in the 1970s. Even so, aircraft to form a ground/air team, the high-risk operations.
when we got the ground troop work- light divcav was no longer viable.
ing with one of the air troops, it was a While this approach works in a com-
highly effective task-organization. The Despite equipment shortages, the puter simulation, with “tie guys” who
aircraft would identify the “big things” death knell of the light divcav squad- can reset the battlefield according to
(vehicles, large troop movements), ron was the transformation the Army the needs of the training scenario, you
and we in the ground troop would went through in the 2007/8 time- can color me skeptical about this
identify the “little things” (dismount- frame. Two changes came into play working with real people shooting real
ed infantry or provide detailed recon- that required us to hang up our spurs bullets. A division commander has the
naissance). Doctrinally we would and Stetsons. The first was the Army’s authority to use the brigade’s cavalry
screen or provide reconnaissance focus on brigades as the primary ma- squadron as his own. However, are
along the 20- to 25-kilometer front or neuver echelon (vice the division), BCT cavalry squadrons manned,
flank of our light division, and our which meant that assets formerly as- trained and equipped for the job? Do
training and organization enabled us sociated with divisions (such as intel- the squadron’s doctrine, organization,
to do that. Being light, we didn’t want ligence, surveillance and reconnais- training, materiel, leadership and ed-
to engage an enemy directly but pre- sance) were now pushed to brigades. ucation, personnel and facilities align
ferred to use the General Support (A more thorough explanation of this to support the division commander’s
155(T) howitzer battery from the phenomenon is presented in MAJ mission? I think all of us know the an-

7 Fall 2020
swer, and it’s not a “roger.” vehicles on the ground and armed
unmanned aerial vehicles or attack Acronym Quick-Scan
This is where MAJ Jennings’ article
helicopters in the air.
does us a great service. In revisiting ABCT – armored brigade combat
missions and organizations of divcav • It will need to have adequate team
squadrons gone by, he’s reminded me dismounted capability for detailed ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer
of things I thought I’d forgotten and reconnaissance and to maintain a Leader’s Course
spurred some more thinking about the screen over a sustained period of BCT – brigade combat team
problem. In the past I remember be- time. It should maximize currently CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course
FM – field manual
ing envious of my separate heavy ar- available and future reconnaissance
FORSCOM – (U.S. Army) Forces
mored-cavalry regiment counterparts and sur veillance technology, Command
and their ability to fight for informa- including advanced night-vision gear IBCT – infantry brigade combat
tion, and also their ability to conduct and hand-held drones. team
guard-and-cover missions (the latter • It must be able to communicate IBOLC – Infantry Basic Officer
with augmentation). These are things Leader’s Course
securely across long distances and LHX – light attack helicopter
we couldn’t do in the light cavalry h ave co m m a n d , co nt ro l a n d LSCO – large-scale combat
without a lot of help. communications tools which enable operations
Looking ahead, what should a division- shared situational awareness and MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s
al-cavalry squadron be able to do? The understanding across the squadron Career Course
and up to division and higher. MTT – mobile training team
squadron must be able to conduct R&S PME – professional military
missions along the entire division • It will need to be able to fuse all- education
front, flank or rear. On the defense, it source intelligence, long-range fires, R&S – reconnaissance and security
must be able to screen. I submit that close air support and electronic SBCT – Stryker brigade combat
it should be inherently strong enough warfare into a highly aware, lethal team
TO&E – table of organization and
to guard without augmentation. On and united effort. equipment
the offense, it must be able to conduct USAARMS – U.S. Army Armor
area, route and zone reconnaissance Moreover, we must continue to rein- School
ahead of the division. On a limited ba- force the lessons we have learned at
sis, it should also be able to destroy great expense in places like Afghani-
high-value targets, seize key terrain stan and Iraq. The cav squadron must teams, psychological operations or
and hold it for a short period of time also be able to tap into and under- even civil-affairs Soldiers. Should that
to deny it to an enemy and enable di- stand the “human terrain” through expertise be built in to future cavalry
vision forward movement. culturally aware leaders and 19D10s, squadrons, or will we be forced into
or we will once again pay the price. playing a pick-up game again?
What might a current-day divisional- The local people know things about
cavalry squadron look like? the terrain and the adversary that a If MAJ Jennings or someone else
• It will need to have ground and air map, satellite photo or briefing from would like to know more about “the
components inherent to the task- the S-2 can’t tell you. Based on the sit- way things were,” there may still
organization. This might be a uation, we should enhance scouts enough of us old guys around to ask.
combination of wheeled and tracked with tactical human-intelligence COL ANDREW D. GOLDIN

8 Fall 2020
IN MEMORIAM
In Memoriam: MG Robert J. Sunell
MG(R) Robert J. Sunell, the leader who MG Sunell was a leader in the devel- Knox, KY; deputy director, Armored Re-
was instrumental in developing and opment of conceptual use of artificial connaissance Scout Vehicle Task Force,
fielding the Abrams tank, died Aug. 8, intelligence in warfare. He served on U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-
2020. He was 91. the steering committee of the Center mand, stationed at Fort Knox; deputy
for Strategic and International Studies, project manager, XM1 Tank Systems,
He is preceded in death by his wife,
Washington, DC, for the Defense In- Warren, MI; commander, 11th Armored
Joann, and his son, Robert P. Sunell.
dustrial Base Study and the future of Cavalry Regiment, Germany; com-
MG Sunell entered military service in armor/anti-armor warfare. He was mander, Army Training Support Center
1953 and retired 33 years later in also an adviser to the Army Science (during the development of the Na-
1987. Board on “Close Combat (Heavy) Train- tional Training Center), Fort Eustis, VA;
ing Strategies for the 1990s.” project manager, M1 Tank System, U.S.
Contributions Army Materiel Command, Warren, MI;
MG Sunell was an excellent leader, an MG Sunell was also a consultant for ar- and director, Armored Family of Vehi-
innovative thinker and a visionary. His mor/anti-armor and virtual simulation cles Task Force, Office of the Deputy
peers referred to him as “the father of programs with the Institute for De- Chief for Operations and Plans, Fort
the modern tank.” For example, he fense Analyses, and was appointed as Eustis, VA.
was a forward thinker regarding the a consultant to the Army Science
Notably, when MG Sunell assumed
Army’s training needs, and he institut- Board’s Tank Modernization Study.
command of 11 th Armored Cavalry
ed programs that greatly improved
Regiment (Blackhorse Regiment),
Army capabilities. As deputy program Summation of service based in Fulda Germany, in 1978, his
manager for the XM1 Tank Systems in MG Sunell commanded both infantry responsibilities included implement-
Warren, MI, he conceived and incor- and armor units in peace and war, and ing and testing the new cavalry orga-
porated into the design of the M-1 held multiple positions that signifi- nization as well as integrating new ve-
tank innovative ideas that resulted in cantly impacted the development of hicles into the regiment. He was pro-
the Army’s fielding the premier tank in the current armored force. His assign- moted to brigadier general while in
the world. ments included executive officer, 1 st command of the 11th Cavalry, the only
As a major general and project man- Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Vietnam; general to command the regiment.
ager of the M1 Abrams tank, he con- commander, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry, Colleagues commented that the 11th
ceived the idea of a family of armored 4th Infantry Division, Vietnam; chief, Cav assignment was the one he was
vehicles to replace the armored force Battalion and Brigade Tactical Opera- the proudest of and meant the most
as it became obsolete. tions Division, Armor School, Fort to him.

Figure 1. M1A1 System Enhancement Program V2 Abrams tank. MG Sunell’s work not only influenced the tank the
United States fields as its main battle tank, but other countries use variants of the Abrams. (U.S. Army photo)

9 Fall 2020
In the international arena, MG Sunell to improve international cooperation from the University of Nebraska and a
was an exchange officer with the Brit- through common equipment and master’s of science degree in commu-
ish Army and program-manager advis- methods. MG Sunell was a contract nications from Shippensburg State Col-
er for “Tank 88,” a Korean indigenous professional for several companies in- lege.
tank. He also chaired the U.S.-German volved in training simulation, robotics,
and U.S.-British Tank Standardization artificial intelligence and armaments MG Sunell held a number of awards
and Harmonization Program, and he for future combat vehicles. for valor and service. These awards in-
worked closely with the Israeli and cluded the Silver Star, Legion of Merit
His military schooling included the ba- (two awards), Bronze Star, Air Medal
Swedish research and development
sic infantry-officer course, the ad- with V device, Meritorious Service
community.
vanced course for Armor officers, U.S. Award (two oak-leaf clusters) and Dis-
After retirement, he was a member of Marine Corps Command and General tinguished Service Medal.
the Swedish Science Council. He also Staff College and the U.S. Army War
founded Suonperra Inc., which worked College. His civilian education includ- MG Sunell will be interred in Arlington
closely with U.S. and Allied militaries ed a bachelor’s of degree in education National Cemetery.

LEGENDS OF ARMOR

10 Fall 2020
by GEN Paul E. Funk II reasons. This number does not include minimum of 90 percent operational
Soldiers who are also not mission ca- readiness for most of our fleets, this is
While growing up in armored-cavalry pable (NMC) due to their failing Army not something we can tolerate for our
units, maintenance was always at the Body Composition Program or Army people. We cannot accept a loss of
forefront of my mind. A good mainte- Physical Fitness Test (APFT) standards. combat power of 6 percent or more
nance program generates combat This personnel NMC rate also does not before we even cross the line of de-
power, gives the commander options include Soldiers unable to perform to parture. This is leader business. Lead-
and provides units the tools to win. As their full potential due to temporary ers need to focus on building “people
a young officer, I viewed maintenance injuries and profiles. readiness,” and it starts by changing
as a function of applying people, parts, While we can accept the bare the culture of fitness. We must adopt
petroleum, tools and time (also known
as P3T2) to bring equipment up to
10/20 standards.
Why do we need H2F? on patient care
As I matured in the Army, I learned • 12 percent of Active Component
• 70 percent of people between the
that successful units and maintenance Soldiers (~56,000) are non-
age of 17-24 are unqualified for
programs depend on a culture of deployable, equivalent to loss of
military service (about 31 percent
maintenance – a pervasive attitude 13 brigade combat teams (BCTs);
due to obesity);
and focus on building and maintaining of this number, 66 percent
readiness by setting priorities, exercis- • 17 percent of Active Component
(~37,000 or nine BCTs) are non-
ing leadership and ruthless execution. Soldiers and 25 percent of Reserve
deployable for medical reasons;
It has been a winning formula. It is this / National Guard Soldiers are
obese by Body Mass Index; they • A 1 percent reduction of non-
culture, or way of doing business, we
are statistically more likely to available rates will save more
must now employ to turn on a persis-
ex p e r i e n c e i n j u r y a n d b e than $40 million.
tent challenge regarding our No. 1
pacing item – our Soldiers. We need to medically non-available;
“The capacity and capability of the
apply the culture of maintenance to • Musculoskeletal injuries affect 55 Soldier on today’s battlefield is
our people to build our overall readi- percent of Soldiers annually; threatened by poor health and lack
ness and the health of the force. • Equates to 10 million limited duty of physical readiness.” -GEN Mark
At any given time, 6 percent of our days Milley, 39 th Chief of Staff of the
force is non-deployable. Of these, • Some $577 million spent annually Army.
most are unavailable due to medical

11 Fall 2020
a culture of holistic health and fitness
(H2F).
Changing culture is hard but neces-
sary. Many will argue that we have al-
ways valued fitness, but our pursuit of
physical fitness has been unevenly ap-
plied and has not incorporated all
components of fitness. In our current
and future fights, every part of our
force, every occupational specialty
and every unit must value and adopt
a culture of fitness. We will win on the
battlefield by embracing a culture of
comprehensive fitness.
We are starting this change by replac-
ing the APFT with the Army Combat
Fitness Test (ACFT). For the first time
in our history, we have developed a
Figure 2. A U.S. Army Soldier receives instruction on proper form for the
scientifically validated fitness assess-
ACFT during the ACFT Trainer’s Course at 7th Army Noncommissioned Officers
ment based on the physical demands Academy, Grafenwoehr, Germany, July 14, 2020. The ACFT Trainer’s Course is
of combat. Critically, the ACFT also designed to train leaders to be subject-matter experts on the fitness test. The
drives balanced and appropriate phys- ACFT is scheduled to be implemented in 2022. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Zacha-
ical training that will reduce overuse ry Stahlberg)
injuries and unplanned attrition and,
like combat, the test standards are age H2F System. H2F is the foundation of In the H2F system, dietitians, physical
and gender neutral. We will measure the entire fitness enterprise. H2F pro- therapists, occupational therapists,
all Soldiers against common Soldier vides the commander all the tools re- athletic trainers and strength and con-
and military-occupation specialty quired to maximize the physical and ditioning coaches will provide relevant
tasks, using the physical demands we non-physical components of health and ready subject-matter expertise.
expect Soldiers to face in combat. But and fitness. H2F is the Army’s primary Just as important are resilience, men-
physical fitness is just the beginning. investment in increased Soldier readi- tal readiness and spiritual health to
ness and lethality, optimized physical address the interrelationship between
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine and non-physical performance, re- physical and mental well-being. Com-
Command (TRADOC), through the duced injury rates, improved rehabili- manders and leaders take heed – H2F
Center for Initial Military Training, is tation after injury and increased over-
is not designed to be the “valet ser-
leading the effort to implement the all effectives of the Total Army.
vice” option. Do not expect to hand
them the keys when they show up to
your unit and stand back and watch
them do their thing. H2F provides the
mechanism, but your engaged leader-
ship will make it happen.
Leaders must do three things:
• Understand the system;
• Trust the system; and
• Dedicate the time to make it work.
Creating a shared understanding is the
basis for successful mission command.
It starts with my headquarters and
team. As we move to broader adop-
tion of the program and resourcing
across the force, we will use every
available means to expose leaders to
the concepts and techniques. While
we are pushing, you need to pull; ed-
Figure 1. SSG Sharonica White, assigned to U.S. Army Garrison Japan, com- ucate and arm yourselves with the
pletes a deadlift repetition during the U.S. Army Japan 2020 Army Week’s knowledge, skills and proven science
ACFT Fitness Warrior Competition at Camp Zama, Japan, June 8. (U.S. Army our teams have used to get us this far.
photo by Winifred Brown) Only you can take us to the next level.

12 Fall 2020
When you see the results with your multi-domain operations enabled Fort Irwin, CA; squadron operations of-
own eyes, I have no doubt you will force and modernizing equipment ficer, 1st Squadron, 3rd Armored-Caval-
trust the system. Results will not come across all warfighting functions to ry Regiment (ACR), Fort Carson, CO;
fast or easy. We will see some short- meet the ever present requirement to regimental operations officer, 3rd ACR,
term positive results, but the ultimate fight and win in large scale combat. Fort Carson; division operations offi-
prize is increased readiness and re- Our efforts to improve the most essen- cer, 1 st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood;
duced musculoskeletal injuries over tial component – the individual Soldier chief of staff, III Corps, Fort Hood; dep-
the long term. True success will only – is not a separate endeavor but the uty commanding general, Combined-
come through a long-term commit- true cornerstone of building a more Arms Center for Training, Fort Leaven-
ment to regularity and progression. capable Army. As GEN George Patton worth, KS; deputy commanding gener-
You will see results. observed, “Wars may by fought with al (maneuver), 1 st Infantry Division,
weapons, but they are won by men.” Fort Riley; and assistant deputy chief
Finally, units will embrace what the Today’s men and women in our great of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army, Washing-
commander values and resources. The Army will win our wars of today and ton, DC. Joint assignments include
most precious of these resources is tomorrow. It is up to us to prepare chief, Joint Exercise Section J-37, North
time. Make H2F a priority. Nothing them to win. American Aerospace Defense Com-
demonstrates a commander’s priority mand, U.S. Space Command, Peterson
like dedicated time on the training Victory starts here!
AFB, CO; deputy commanding general
schedule; to optimize use of the H2F (maneuver), Combined Joint Task
system, you will have to commit train- GEN Paul Funk II commands TRADOC,
based at Fort Eustis, VA. As TRADOC Force-1, Afghanistan; commander,
ing time throughout the day. H2F is an Combined Joint Forces Land Compo-
example of the Army’s commitment to commander, GEN Funk is responsible
for 32 Army schools organized under nent Command-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq;
its people. and commander, Combined Joint Task
eight centers of excellence that recruit,
Commanders’ successful H2F adminis- train and educate more than 500,000 Force - Operation Inherent Resolve,
tration makes that commitment real. Soldiers and service members annual- Baghdad. GEN Funk holds a bachelor’s
Our obligation to our Soldiers is to ly. Commissioned as an Armor officer, of arts degree in speech communica-
provide them with an immersive, inte- GEN Funk has commanded at every tions from Montana State University
grative and comprehensive training level, company through corps, includ- and a master’s of science degree in ad-
system to ensure their success on the ing Company A, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Ar- ministration from Central Michigan
ACFT, reduce injuries and build indi- mor Regiment, 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored University. He is a graduate of the Ar-
vidual and unit readiness. Most impor- Division, Kirchgoens, Germany; Head- mor Basic Officer Leader’s and Ad-
tantly, Soldiers watch what the com- quarters and Headquarters Company, vanced Courses, and the Command
mander does and where the com- 4th Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 3rd and General Staff College and he com-
mander chooses to spend his or her Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, Kirch- pleted his Senior Service College as a
time, so my advice is to lead by exam- goens; 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regi- fellow at the Institute of Advanced
ple. We lead the way. ment, 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Technology, University of Texas at Aus-
Fort Hood, TX; 1 st Brigade Combat tin.
Generating combat power or building
Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood;
readiness does not just “happen.” Just
1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS; and
like returning a tank to the fight, pre- Acronym Quick-Scan
III Armored Corps, Fort Hood. GEN
serving the health and physical fitness
Funk’s combat and operational experi-
of a Soldier to withstand the rigor of
ence includes six deployments in sup- ACFT – Army Combat Fitness Test
combat is the product of planning,
port of Operations Desert Shield and ACR – armored-cavalry regiment
hard work and leadership. We will APFT – Army Physical Fitness Test
Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Free-
need generous quantities of all three BCT – brigade combat team
dom, Operation Enduring Freedom
if we truly want to change the culture H2F – holistic health and fitness
and Operation Inherent Resolve. Op-
of fitness. It all starts with leadership. NMC – not mission capable
erational assignments include observ- TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training
This is a priority.
er-controller with the Live-Fire Team and Doctrine Command
Our Army is in the midst of building a (Dragons), National Training Center,

13 Fall 2020
 Bringing Great-Power Competition to the Tactical Level:
European Rotational Deployment Considerations
for Company-Grade Armor Leaders
by MAJ Brigid Calhoun and extensive Defense Department (DoD)- operational environment where these
CPT Alexander Boroff wide review designed to optimize U.S. leaders may rotationally deploy; and
military force posture within the stra- providing leadership and planning
On July 29, 2020, Secretary of Defense
tegic environment of great-power considerations for their rotations.
Mark Esper unveiled his new plan for
competition.
European Command’s force posture, Although the Indo-Pacific region re-
which will result in the reduction of Discussion and analysis of great-pow- mains the focal point of U.S. national
11,900 troops currently stationed in er competition currently dominate na- security, the European theater and
Germany.1 Of those troops, 5,600 will tional-security and defense-strategy Russian threats demand deterrence
be repositioned across Europe, while forums. This article seeks to distill the from forward-staged Army forces.
4,600 will redeploy to the continental concept and its implications down to Company-level Armor leaders will like-
United States and subsequently con- the tactical level of war by explaining ly spend at least the next decade of
duct rotational deployments to Eu- great-power competition to company- their careers preparing to fight and
rope. 2 This decision follows an level leaders; describing the European win ground wars in this contested

Figure 1. Soldiers from various NATO countries train together at the Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels training areas in Ger-
many during Exercise Combined Resolve IV in 2016. The 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort
Stewart GA, participated in Combined Resolve IV as the primary U.S. Army training unit; the unit is the Army’s region-
ally aligned brigade to Europe. Combined Resolve is a series of bi-annual U.S. Army Europe exercises designed to train
participants to function together in a multinational and integrated environment and to train U.S. Army rotational forc-
es in Europe to be more flexible, agile and better able to operate alongside allies and partners in the region. Com-
bined Resolve IV featured more than 4,700 participants from 10 NATO allies, including Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, the United States and three partner nations of Moldova,
Montenegro and Serbia. (U.S. Army photo)

14 Fall 2020
environment. Studying and under- participating in rotational deploy- which should be ABCTs, augmented by
standing the grand strategy of great- ments thus operationalize these stra- airpower and fire support, in the Bal-
power competition will prove instru- tegic objectives. The hallmarks of Eu- tics to prevent their rapid overrun by
mental to their success. ropean rotational deployments – in- Russia.
cluding combat-training-center tours,
What is great-power NATO had arrived at similar conclu-
partnered exercises and maintenance
sions and solidified the Enhanced For-
competition? of professional relationships with
ward Presence (EFP) initiative at the
In the unclassified 2018 National De- NATO partners – nest neatly within the
July 2016 Warsaw Summit. The EFP re-
fense Strategy (NDS), then-Secretary NDS and NSS.
sulted in the assignment of four mul-
of Defense James Mattis stated that tinational battalions, separately led by
“inter-state strategic competition, not Impact on U.S. forces Germany, Great Britain, Canada and
terrorism, is now the primary concern in Europe the United States, each to Poland, Es-
in U.S. national security.” 3 The NDS While much of the national great-pow- tonia, Latvia and Lithuania; it was the
further explained that “[t]he central er competition dialogue has rightfully largest addition to the NATO defense
challenge to U.S. prosperity and secu- focused on China’s aggression within posture in a generation. In 2017, the
rity is the re-emergence of long-term the Indo-Pacific, Russia remains, in Army contributed more forces outside
strategic competition by what the Na- large part, the Army’s most direct of the NATO context by executing its
tional Security Strategy (NSS) classifies competitor. Forward-positioned Army first nine-month heel-to-toe regional-
as revisionist powers.” aviation and Armor forces constitute ly aligned force (RAF) deployments of
It is increasingly clear that China and critical capabilities for countering Rus- ABCTs and CABs to Europe.
Russia want to shape a world consis- sian threats to European territorial in-
Despite the push toward a sustained-
tent with their authoritarian model — tegrity and U.S. national interests. A
readiness model, which ideally main-
gaining veto authority over other na- brief review of U.S. force posture
tains all units at a high level of readi-
tions’ economic, diplomatic and secu- trends in Europe may help company-
ness, operational and tactical realities
rity decisions.”4 The NDS cites Russia’s level Armor leaders understand why intervene and prevent constant readi-
2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 an- their continued presence on the con- ness, especially with the strain the ro-
nexation of the Crimean Peninsula as tinent is so important to our nation’s tations place on the armored force.
catalyzing events in a new era of stra- ability to maintain competitive advan- The rotations of ABCTs to the Europe-
tegic competition in Europe.5 Russia’s tage over Russia and preserve the an theater will likely continue in the
disregard of the rules-based interna- rules-based international order. near term, even as discussions among
tional order, state sovereignty and ter- While the 12 th Combat Aviation Bri- DoD, Congress and NATO allies contin-
ritorial integrity threatens the stability gade (CAB) is permanently assigned to ue regarding the possible drawdown
of Europe. Instability in turn threatens Ansbach, Germany, no permanent ar- of U.S. forces in Germany and the po-
“unfettered access to the global com- mored brigade combat team (ABCT) tential establishment of a permanent
mons (air, sea, space and cyberspace) has existed in Europe since 2014.8 Rus- U.S. base in Poland.
for all,” a key U.S. national interest.6 sia’s invasion of the Crimean Peninsu-
Such actions put the North Atlantic la that same year, however, rapidly re-
Treaty Organization (NATO) on edge, Meaning for company-
versed America’s decision to retro-
as our allies, particularly on the east- grade its armored forces. In an effort
grade leader
ern flanks of Europe, wonder if they Secretary Esper’s emphasis on rota-
to re-establish deterrence following
will be the next target of a Russian at- tional forces is part of the answer to
this invasion, the United States sent
tack. this question, especially if the person
small numbers of tanks to Europe for
posing the question is an Armor offi-
Both the NSS and NDS call for whole- short deployments throughout 2015.9
cer.10 Without attempting to analyze
of-government solutions to build and
The following year brought significant the advantages or disadvantages the
assert U.S. competitive advantages
changes to the U.S. force posture in rotational deployment policy possess-
across all domains using various in-
Europe. A seminal 2016 report by the es, Europe, South Korea and, in a less-
struments of national power. The mil-
RAND Corporation wargamed a hypo- er vein, Kuwait, remain the U.S. Army’s
itary’s diplomatic, information, mili-
thetical Russian invasion of the Baltic anchor points across the globe to both
tary and economic paradigm provides
States and alarmingly found that Rus- assure allies of the U.S. our commit-
a useful framework to demonstrate
sian forces would reach the outskirts ment to their defense and to dissuade
how the instruments of national pow-
of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals enemies from moving into positions of
er unite policy alternatives across gov-
within 36-60 hours. The report further relative advantage. While the location
ernment departments and agencies.
assessed that existing NATO defenses of these rotational deployments may
Specifically within Europe, the U.S.
would be overwhelmed and that NATO change, they will likely comprise the
military solution to Russian aggression
would have to launch a bloody coun- bulk of a company-grade leader’s di-
requires forward presence, flexible re-
teroffensive to eject Russian forces rect experience with great-power
sponse options and strengthening
from the Baltics. RAND ultimately rec- competition. And although these same
NATO by reassuring allies.7
ommended that NATO position a force officers may have been hailed as “stra-
C o m p a ny- l eve l A r m o r l e a d e rs of about seven brigades, three of tegic lieutenants” in the past, they

15 Fall 2020
now occupy more traditional roles at Poland’s Drasko Pomorskie, Miros- forces to discredit them. As such, even
the tactical level as part of conven- lawiec and Bemowo Piskie training ar- company-level training can yield stra-
tional combined-arms teams. 11 They eas are among the most commonly tegic consequences if thoroughly ex-
still must be educated in strategy, his- frequented by RAF units. The brigade’s ploited by the Russians. The battalion
tory and current affairs to make in- geospatial-intelligence cell should dis- staff and company leadership should
formed decisions. tribute tactical maps of central Europe therefore explore how to best allocate
and the Baltics that clearly illustrate the unit’s intelligence collection18 and
Company-level officers or noncommis- avenues of approach suitable for analysis capabilities across the forma-
sioned officers (NCOs) may find them- wheeled and tracked vehicles. tion and manage the unit’s digital
selves as the ranking U.S. military rep- footprint.19 Rotational units may con-
resentatives at a particular partnered Furthermore, units should study bat- duct exercises on NATO’s eastern
training event or garrison. However, tles fought on the same terrain to ac- flanks not far from Russian training
they will generally not occupy posi- cumulate historical context and les- sites;20 such proximity inherently puts
tions analogous to the platoon-level sons learned. World War II’s Eastern friendly units at risk of Russian intelli-
combat outposts characteristic of Front offensives, coupled with Cold gence collection and information op-
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq War planning to secure West Germa- erations.
and Afghanistan. Certainly, interac- ny’s Fulda Gap, inform today’s strate-
tions with allies that are frequently a gic environment and concerns with
The unit intelligence section owns the
part of rotational deployments play a the Baltics’ Suwalki Gap. 12 Also, the
lion’s share of creating shared under-
significant role in diplomatic relations Soviet Army’s Vistula-Oder offensive
standing of Russian military capabili-
between the militaries of said coun- in January 1945 serves as a particular-
ties and vulnerabilities, but the unit
tries. Rotational deployments to Eu- ly useful case study to help Armor
should also liaise with the broader na-
rope will require company-level armor leaders visualize a combined-arms at-
tional intelligence community (IC),
leaders to build rapport with foreign tack across Belarus, Poland and
particularly the Defense Intelligence
allies and partners, and may often find Ukraine into Germany. The Army Uni-
Agency and National Ground Intelli-
that the relationships become increas- versity Press even offers free virtual
gence Center, to obtain classified in-
ingly habitual over the course of a staff rides of the Battles of the Marne
telligence reports and briefings on the
nine-month training deployment. Nev- (1914) and Stalingrad (1942-1943) to
current enemy situation, Russian or-
ertheless, the great-power competitor facilitate historical analysis of Europe-
der of battle, hybrid warfare and
at the tactical level must be trained an warfare.13
multi-domain operations. These agen-
and ready to execute a great-power
Tabletop exercises to study these bat- cies may even be willing to host site
war, hopefully only as a deterrent to
tles can be incorporated into existing visits for unit leaders or, at a mini-
the reality of one.
company and battalion leadership pro- mum, participate in classified video-
fessional development (LPD) programs teleconferences to brief unit leaders
Learning terrain, enemy to build readiness. Because terrain on their future AO. Unit leaders could
Preparation for likely RAF deploy- then maintain relationships with the
does not change much over time, ju-
ments should begin with every Soldier agencies’ European threat analysts
nior leaders’ investment in terrain
understanding the tactical, operation- throughout the RAF deployment and
analysis is almost guaranteed to yield
al and strategic environment into provide bottom-up refinement of their
future dividends.
which the unit will deploy. Leaders intelligence assessments. Such collab-
should leverage their unit intelligence However, future Russian military op- oration will only benefit the Army and
section to provide background brief- erations in Europe will likely look IC over time.
ings in addition to the doctrinal intel- much different than those executed in
ligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield the past. Therefore historical study The unit’s field-grade leadership
outputs. The intelligence section’s ear- must be accompanied by thorough ex- should also contact Army foreign-area
ly provision of friendly and enemy amination of emerging Russian mili- officers (FAOs) at the European em-
equipment recognition guides will as- tary technology, hybrid warfare and bassies in countries where the unit
sist every Soldier in distinguishing multi-domain operations. Russia’s will deploy. FAOs can bridge military
friend from foe. Understanding the ca- campaigns in Syria, 14 Libya 15 and and political considerations, providing
pabilities and limitations of friendly Ukraine’s Donbas16 region provide in- strategic insight beyond the usual pur-
force equipment will ease future plan- sight into how the Russian military view of an ABCT. FAOs can coordinate
ning for partnered training events in fights17 in the modern age, task-orga- briefings with the embassies’ Offices
theater. nizing electronic warfare at the lowest of Defense Cooperation (ODCs) and
echelons and incorporating private- defense attaché offices (DAOs) to
Also, leaders and the intelligence sec-
military security companies as force complement those received from the
tion should together analyze the ter-
multipliers. IC. FAOs may also provide recom-
rain of their future area of operations
(AO), and should prepare maps and Within Europe, the Russian military mended readings that unit leaders can
graphics for anticipated training areas. has also leveraged well-coordinated incorporate into LPD programs.
Germany’s Hohenfels training area, information and intelligence collection
Romania’s Novo Selo training area and operations against U.S. and NATO Continued on Page 18

16 Fall 2020
Figure 2. Map of NATO member Poland and the Baltic States, Suwalki Gap marked in red. Poland is bordered by the
Baltic Sea, NATO member Lithuania and Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast to the north; Belarus and Ukraine to the east; Slo-
vakia and NATO member the Czech Republic to the south; and NATO member Germany to the west. Latvia, not shown
on this map, borders Lithuania to the north, and Estonia lies north of Latvia. The Suwalki Gap is an area of strategic
concern. (Based on map from CIA World Factbook) (NATO membership list at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_
states_of_NATO)

17 Fall 2020
Basic deployment and senior NCOs rotate through units after-action reports from previous ro-
frequently, their lower-ranking NCOs tations can also shorten the learning
readiness for and lower-enlisted Soldiers do not. It curve and prevent mistakes that oth-
European mission is the tactical leaders’ burden to shoul- erwise would be repeated.
Although “readiness” has been the Ar- der this understanding and steward
my’s watchword nearly a decade, it in- The context and considerations out-
these Soldiers’ time in the garrison en-
cludes theater-specific considerations lined in this article are the first step in
vironment as able, with the knowl-
for rotational deployments to Europe. understanding why junior leaders find
edge that near-constant rotational de-
Company leaders in Europe-aligned themselves in the situation they do.
ployments and training cycles likely lay
units, therefore, can begin pursuing An introductory understanding of how
ahead. Communication of the long-
the qualifications and licensing neces- junior leaders’ missions nest within
range training calendar to Soldiers and
sary to mobilize for deployment. The America’s national defense and secu-
their families can help manage expec-
standard qualifications for unit mobil- rity strategies empowers them to bet-
tations and prepare the force for in-
ity officer, hazardous materiel, vehicle ter adapt to and succeed in today’s
creased operations tempo. Any type
drivers’ licenses and government pur- competitive and dynamic global envi-
of predictability that unit leaders can
chase/travel cards should be supple- ronment.
provide is critical.
mented by international drivers’ li- MAJ Brigid Calhoun is a graduate stu-
Given the constraints that an ABCT
censes, training for contracting offi- dent, Georgetown University, Wash-
training cycle levies upon its members
cers and disbursement of funds, and ington, DC (first year of the Army’s Of-
with respect to field time and time
arranging for diplomatic clearances. fice of the Secretary of Defense/Joint
away from family, considerations must
Also, identifying Soldiers in the unit Chiefs of Staff Fellowship Program).
be made to fully understand the im-
who speak European languages can in- Previous assignments include team
pacts of training decisions made. An
form manning for liaison-officer posi- chief, Foreign Intelligence Watch,
unfortunate truth of being assigned to
tions and build the capability to read Headquarters Department of the Army
an ABCT is the necessity of longer-du-
local open-source material in the G-2, Pentagon; commander, Company
ration training events given their cost.
unit’s future AO. D (military-intelligence), 54th Engineer
Thus, company-grade leaders should
maintain a pulse on their formation in Battalion (Airborne), 173rd Infantry Bri-
Lastly, studying successful previous gade Combat Team (IBCT) (Airborne),
RAF rotations21 and partnered training multiple ways. Command climate sur-
veys, family days and activities, and Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy; S-2, 1st
events 22 can ease the workload of Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Air-
training management during the de- simple off-duty interactions among
members of the unit can enable lead- borne), 173rd IBCT (Airborne), Vicenza;
ployment. As institutional knowledge assistant brigade S-2, 173rd IBCT (Air-
of these rotational deployments is still ers to understand these impacts. Suc-
cessful management of time at the borne), Vicenza; and platoon leader,
somewhat limited, leaders within Intelligence, Surveillance and Recon-
ABCTs should look to previous units’ small-unit level leads to more produc-
tive Soldiers. naissance Platoon, Company D (mili-
experiences to inform the preparation tary intelligence), Special Troops Bat-
for their own. talion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st
Conclusion
Examining the position of junior lead- Airborne Division (Air Assault), For-
Leadership calculus ers within armored formations today ward Operating Base Gamberi, Af-
This great-power competition environ- leaves little of which to be envious. ghanistan, and Fort Campbell, KY. MAJ
ment, with its reduction of traditional They face a complex and uncertain op- Calhoun’s military education includes
“combat deployments,” places rota- erational environment, and a high-de- the Military Intelligence Basic Officer
tional training events in higher regard. mand operations tempo through rota- Leader’s Course, Air-Assault School,
Tactical leaders face an incredible tional deployments, and they are of- Maneuver Captain’s Career Course,
leadership challenge when determin- ten left with fewer and fewer resourc- Counterterrorism Analysis Course, Air-
ing how to prepare and deploy Sol- es to successfully complete their mis- borne School, Jumpmaster School and
diers to these events. As defense bud- sion sets. Yet despite these challenges, Combatives Level 1. MAJ Calhoun
gets continue to contract, the Army it is important to realize that they are holds a bachelor’s of science degree in
must retain strategic and operational surmountable, especially with good history from USMA, and she is a can-
flexibility to provide its stabilizing in- leadership at the tactical level. didate for a master’s in policy man-
fluence on global affairs. agement degree from Georgetown
Any preparation a unit conducts ahead
University. Her awards include the
Readiness to deploy comprises a large of its deployment to standardize
Bronze Star Medal and the Meritorious
portion of this flexibility. While it is knowledge of terrain and enemy
Service Medal.
nearly impossible to be 100 percent threats will only optimize available
ready at all times, tactical leaders planning time during the rotation. A CPT Alex Boroff is a J-2/J-3 public-af-
must understand that while they are host of theater- and national-level ex- fairs desk officer, Joint Staff, Pentagon,
not actively deployed, they will likely perts, from intelligence professionals Washington, DC. His previous assign-
be training or assisting their higher to FAOs, ODCs and DAOs, stand ready ments include Joint Chiefs of Staff in-
headquarters to train. They must un- to assist ABCTs in preparing for up- tern at Georgetown University’s Stu-
derstand further that while officers coming deployments. Reviewing dent Detachment, Fort Jackson, SC;

18 Fall 2020
commander, Troop C, 3 rd Squadron, 8
Meghann Myers, “Back to Europe: The 18
CPT Doni Wong, 1LT Theodore Lipsky,
61st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd IBCT, 4th In- Army is Sending More Troops, Tanks and CPT Brigid Calhoun and CW2 Pablo Cruz,
fantry Division, Fort Campbell, KY; bri- Helicopters to deter Russia,” Army Times, “Integration of Signals Intelligence, Elec-
gade planner, 2nd IBCT, 4th Infantry Di- March 29, 2017, https://www.armytimes. tronic Warfare in the Reconnaissance
com/news/your-army/2017/03/19/back- Troop: Seeing Where the Eye Cannot
vision, Fort Campbell; commander,
to-europe-the-army-is-sending-more- See,” ARMOR, Fall 2018.
Troop C, 3 rd Squadron, 16 th Cavalry, troops-tanks-and-helicopters-to-deter-
316th Cavalry Brigade, Maneuver Cen-
19
John Cogbill and Eli Myers, “Decentral-
russia/. izing the Fight: Re-Imagining the Brigade
ter of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA; 9
Ibid. Combat Team’s Headquarters,” Modern
battalion assistant S-4, 3-69 Armor War Institute, Aug. 5, 2020, https://mwi.
Regiment, 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry Divi-
10
U.S. DoD, “DoD Senior Leaders Brief
Reporters on European Force Posture,” usma.edu/decentralizing-the-fight-re-
sion, Fort Stewart, GA; and company imagining-the-brigade-combat-teams-
July 29, 2020.
executive officer, Company D, 3-69 Ar- headquarters/.
mor Regiment, 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry Di-
11
Scott A. Silverstone and An Jacobs,
“Strategic Lieutenants,” Parameters,
20
Carlo Angerer, “Americans Train with
vision, Fort Stewart. His military NATO Not Far from Russian Drills in the
Winter 2019-20, https://publications.ar-
schooling includes Maneuver Captain’s mywarcollege.edu/pubs/3720.pdf. Baltics,” NBC News, Sept. 23, 2017,
Career Course, Armor Basic Officer https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/
12
Angina Grigas, “NATO’s Vulnerable Link
Leader’s Course and Ranger and Path- americans-train-nato-not-far-russian-
in Europe: Poland’s Suwalki Gap,” The At-
finder schools. He holds a bachelor’s drills-baltics-n803336.
lantic Council, Feb. 9, 2016, https://www.
of science degree in mechanical engi- atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/na-
21
LTC Dan Hodermarsky, MAJ Brennan
neering (honors) from the U.S. Military to-s-vulnerable-link-in-europe-poland-s- Speakes and MAJ Oliver Davis, “Regional-
Academy and a master’s of science de- suwalki-gap/. ly Aligned Forces Europe Produce Long-
gree in systems engineering from Term Readiness,” ARMOR, Winter 2020.
13
Army University Press, “Staff Ride Of-
Johns Hopkins University. His awards ferings,” Aug. 5, 2020, https://www.ar-
22
MAJ Craig J. Nelson, CPT John T. Wil-
and honors include the Bronze Star myupress.army.mil/educational-services/ liams and CPT Mackenzie Sims, “Exercise
Medal, Meritorious Service Medal and staff-ride-team-offerings/. Bayonet Shield 2017: United States,
the Combat Action Badge. NATO Allies Train Together to Present
14
Robert E. Hamilton, “Russian and
Credible Deterrent to Aggression,” AR-
American De-Confliction Efforts in Syria:
Notes MOR, Fall 2018.
What’s the Endgame in the Civil War?,” in
1
U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Se- Russia Foreign Policy Papers, Foreign Pol-
nior Leaders Brief Reporters on European icy Research Institute (FPRI), April 2018, Acronym Quick-Scan
Force Posture,” July 29, 2020, https:// https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/up-
www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Tran- loads/2018/04/Hamilton2018.pdf.
ABCT – armored brigade combat
scripts/Transcript/Article/2292996/de- 15
Ranj Alaaldin and Emadeddin Bandi, team
partment-of-defense-senior-leaders- “Libya’s Proxy Sponsors Face a Dilemma,” AO – area of operations
brief-reporters-on-european-force-pos- in Order from Chaos, The Brookings Insti- CAB – combat aviation brigade
ture/. tute, June 15, 2020, https://www.brook- DAO – defense attaché office
2
Ibid. ings.edu/blog/order-from-cha- DoD – Department of Defense
3
U.S. DoD, “Summary of the 2018 Na- os/2020/06/15/libyas-proxy-sponsors- EFP – Enhanced Forward Presence
tional Defense Strategy,” 2018, https:// face-a-dilemma/. FAO – foreign-area officer
FPRI – Foreign Policy Research
dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ 16
Robert E. Hamilton, “Five Years of War
Institute
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy- in the Donbas,” in Black Sea Strategy Pa- IBCT – infantry brigade combat
Summary.pdf. pers, FPRI, October 2019, https://www. team
4
Ibid. fpri.org/article/2019/10/five-years-of- IC – intelligence community
war-in-the-donbas/. LPD – leadership professional
5
Ibid. 17
Dr. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bar- development
6
James Carafano et. al., “Preparing the tles, “The Russian Way of War: Force NATO – North Atlantic Treaty
U.S. National Security Strategy for 2020 Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of Organization
and Beyond,” The Heritage Foundation, Russian Ground Forces,” Foreign Military NCO – noncommissioned officer
May 23, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/ Studies Office, Army University Press, NDS – National Defense Strategy
defense/report/preparing-the-us-nation- Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2016, https:// NSS – National Security Strategy
al-security-strategy-2020-and-beyond. www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/ ODC – Offices of Defense
7
U.S. DoD, “DoD Senior Leaders Brief Re- Hot%20Spots/Documents/Russia/2017- Cooperation
porters on European Force Posture,” July RAF – regionally aligned force
07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bar-
29, 2020. tles.pdf.

19 Fall 2020
A Picture is Worth
1,000 Words (or 3,110 Words)
by LTC James Armstrong As they develop their operational ap- that such tools are unique to each
proach as part of their role in the op- commander or organization. While I
People process pictures holistically
erations process, their ability to rep- created a useful vision statement
and process words sequentially, piec-
resent their understanding and visual- while at the Pre-Command Course
ing them together. This is why pictures
ization in a picture allows them to (Figure 1), the visual tool developed
can express multiple, complex ideas
more effectively create and share their while in command captured challeng-
quickly and inspire countless discus-
vision across the organization, and it es and the context that led to deeper
sions. While the benefit of a written
enables deeper conversations than re- discussions with all levels of leaders in
vision and approach to command forc-
lying on a vision statement by itself.1 the unit.
es a commander to provide clarity and
This picture gives commanders the
logically connect ideas, commanders
ability to, literally, distribute a vision Reality not ideal
can use a picture of the same vision as
from which the organization can as- All commanders spend time creating
a powerful tool to understand, visual-
sess if it is on/off glidepath, describe their vision, establishing goals for the
ize, describe, counsel and assess.
distractors or changes with impacts, organization to achieve and thinking
Using an example visual tool, I will and identify where commander and about the culture the commander
demonstrate the rich benefits in how subordinate actions contribute to the wants to create. A commander’s ideal
a commander can better create shared organization. accomplishments and culture never
understanding for the organization’s meet reality. Commanders must un-
The visual tool example was devel-
mission, leader development, risk, re- derstand why the ideal will not meet
oped at a battalion level at which
sources and assessment methods with reality, the impacts of necessary ad-
Army doctrine emphasizes the impor-
a picture rather than relying solely on justments and what those impacts
tance of requiring leaders to be “… ad-
a statement. Army writings which de- mean for their organization and its
ept at establishing a vision, communi-
scribe the usefulness of systems think- leaders.
cating it and deciding on goals and
ing and visual modeling as part of de-
mission outcomes.”2 The ability for the Acknowledging that ideal will not
sign have value as part of a command-
commander and subordinate to point match reality is not enough. The com-
er’s vision for and assessment of their
to this picture and discuss the com- mander must have a plan to continu-
organization, but are not commonly
mander’s understanding, visualization, ally assess and make necessary adjust-
used as part of command preparation.
operational approach and how the ments. This discrepancy between ide-
subordinate, higher headquarters and al and reality with required changes
Why a visual tool? resources impact the desired end state
A visual tool for commanders to un- leaves commanders with a delicate
is extremely influential.3 balance to manage. Too much pres-
derstand, visualize and assess/reas-
sess enables them to more clearly de- This article uses a visual tool devel- sure from top-down may achieve re-
scribe and direct their organizations. oped during command and recognizes sults but breaks people, families and
equipment while sacrificing leader de-
velopment. Too little pressure puts
mission accomplishment at risk and
creates an organization that does not
perform to its potential.
Figure 2 is the author’s visual tool
used to illustrate these various inter-
actions. Figure 3 is the author’s visual
tool overlaid on the doctrinal depic-
tion of the commander’s visualiza-
tion.4
Subsequent paragraphs will elaborate
on the relationship among the ideal,
reality and influencing factors as a
means for having key discussions re-
garding: 1) resources; 2) nesting; 3)
Figure 1. Example of the author’s vision statement. leader development; 4) multi-echelon

20 Fall 2020
 achieve his/her visualization or goals.
Time is often understood as the most
important resource. Once spent, it
cannot be regained. Commanders’ de-
cisions about what they do with their
time personally and how their organi-
zation uses time is critical. Command-
er-to-commander dialogue needs to
focus on candid and specific discus-
sions about items left undone which
all represent risk.
As a result of the importance of how
time is used and the resulting risk, a
commander provides intent, priorities
and resources (time, people and ma-
teriel). The reality commanders often
face is that, depending on echelon,
they can provide materiel at varying
Figure 2. Author’s visual tool illustrating interactions among major factors. levels of speed but can rarely provide
(Graphic by the author) more people and time. The only sure
way of allowing the people and time
necessary is to go beyond a list of pri-
orities and create resources internally
by removing tasks from subordinate
headquarters while accounting for the
associated risk.
The friction of limited resources and
mounting tasks is often exacerbated
by friction of external forces pulling on
the organization in various magni-
tudes and directions other than the
commander’s ideal. This friction is a
result of conflicting direction com-
manders take action to mitigate risk;
in some cases, commanders can sim-
ply identify the effects of the friction
to ease the organizational frustration.

Nesting
The concept of nesting is widely ac-
cepted, which results in each head-
quarters pulling an organization in the
same direction. Each commander who
publishes and explains intent and pri-
orities should accomplish nesting. 5
However, in application, higher head-
quarters often adjusts its focus, caus-
Figure 3. Figure 2 factors overlaid at the bottom with graphic material from
ing a change in priorities. This change
Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 5-0. (Graphic by the author)
could be the result of the leader iden-
training; 5) risk, and 6) assessment. the people and the training events the tifying problems from his/her periodic
The variety and depth of these key dis- assessments or the rise of completely
organization conducts. This ever-
cussions illustrates the richness of us- new problems.
changing organization reinforces the
ing a visual tool. importance of continuing to reassess Practical examples of problems and
the organization’s talent and location corresponding solutions that may dis-
Resources: people, on the glidepath toward achieving rupt nested priorities include an in-
time, materiel goals. crease of discipline incidents with re-
Each organization comes with its own sulting mitigation measures; a sub-
strengths and weaknesses. Strengths Every commander also has a time ho- standard maintenance inspection
and weaknesses change as often as rizon in which he/she is attempting to which causes renewed emphasis on

21 Fall 2020
 a short amount of time often looks like
a commander dragging the organiza-
tion to his/her ideal and forsaking
leader development, job satisfaction
and families along the way. Leaders fo-
cused on short-term change often
start with this approach but fail to ad-
just to a sustainable strategy.

The other end of the spectrum results

in an organization that never reaches
its full potential, individually or orga-
nizationally, and it jeopardizes mission
accomplishment. The ultimate leader-
ship laboratory provides purpose, di-
rection and motivation along the path
to achieve nested goals, which enables
the organization to progress with ap-
propriate resources with retraining
Figure 4. External forces and their impact, necessitating commander’s adjust- opportunities.7
ments. (Graphic by the author)
However, resources are always limit-
maintenance processes and parts in- Leader development ed. As an organization experiences re-
ventory; force-protection changes as Given time as our most important re- source constraints, leaders start to
a result of a change in threats; or a source, it follows that its impacts on work on gaining efficiencies. A small-
degradation in funding. the organization are the most signifi- arms qualification density is a simple
cant and wide-ranging. Commanders example of a common task where we
While a disruption in nesting among
must understand the full impact of centralize to gain efficiency. If there is
headquarters has its own root causes
time constraints. For example, getting not time or resources (range availabil-
and solutions, a visual tool can help
the most tasks done in the least ity) for each company to conduct its
commanders recognize and address
amount of time may be the most effi- own training event, the unit tasks one
the impacts of the disruption and al-
cient but not the most effective ap- company to run the range as others
lows the organization to make neces-
proach. Therefore commanders should rotate through qualification. As a re-
sary adjustments. The visual tool illus-
make constant assessments to balance sult of this gain in efficiency, the train-
trates this nesting mismatch in multi-
leader-development opportunities, ing, experience and leader-develop-
ple arrow types to show forces exter-
achieving results and the effects of the ment opportunity for each company
nal to the organization pulling in vari-
pace on Soldier health (physical, men- to plan and execute a training event is
ous directions (see Figure 4).
tal and spiritual). narrowed to one company. Further-
Pulling in various directions frustrates more, if time is severely constrained
Soldiers and leaders alike. The impacts Too much focus on achieving results in and the unit has but one opportunity
include task saturation and competi-
tion for resources. As a result, com-
manders must understand these ex-
ternal forces and adjust their own pull
on the organization. Failure to adjust
creates frustration as Soldiers and
leaders feel pulled in different direc-
tions. Failure to adjust also dilutes fo-
cus and does not recognize the practi-
cal delay in reaching previously de-
fined goals.
Adjustments without commander’s di-
alogue about the impacts of adjust-
ments can cause the same frustra-
tions. It is critical for commanders to
recognize these external forces, be
able to assess their magnitude and di-
rection, and adjust to the associated
risks all within a relevant amount of
time. Figure 5. External forces pull in different directions. (Graphic by the author)

22 Fall 2020
to get the range done correctly, lead- purposeful nesting of training objec- and accepting risk without reasonable
ers assess the risk of failure too great tives, identify primary training audi- understanding of the possible out-
to allow and attempt to prevent fail- ences and preserve time for subordi- comes is the definition of gambling.10
ure through detailed oversight. nates to train on supporting tasks pri-
or to moving to collective events.9 Risk of action and inaction. Army doc-
If leaders are not confident in the dis- trine is sound in balancing the risk of
cipline or training of their subordi- action and inaction. ADP 6-0, Mission
nates, they quickly lose trust, and de- Risk Command, begins discussion of disci-
tailed oversight becomes microman- Each adjustment as a result of chang- plined initiative with a quote from
agement. This is how leader develop- ing goals, resource constraints and the Field Services Regulation dated 1941:
ment becomes the first element to simple business of choosing what to “Every individual from the highest
suffer in a condensed schedule. To execute well all creates risk. Com- commander to the lowest private
gain efficiencies, we centralize events. manders have far too few real risk dis- must always remember that inaction
We lose the ability for commanders at cussions for three reasons: and neglect of opportunities will war-
each level to develop their own plans • We are not honest with ourselves rant more severe censure than an er-
on how to prepare their units for their about who makes risk decisions; ror of judgment in the action taken.”11
higher-headquarters’ collective event • We too often worry about the risk of However, in practice, our view of risk
using the Eight-Step Training Model. taking action instead of inaction; or is skewed as a result of codifying the
Leaders who understand that leader
• We e x p e c t t o o m u c h f r o m risk of taking action rather than de-
development was sacrificed as a result
subordinate headquarters to provide scribing the risk of not acting. The con-
of efficiency and who can create rep-
feedback on failure. versation is often “If we take X action,
etitions to replace those lost opportu-
then Y risk may result.” We too fre-
nities are more likely to strengthen the Who makes risk decisions? Without quently turn the conversation on its
foundational discipline and training el- concerted leader effort and the cour- head and ask “If we do not take X ac-
ements necessary to trust and em- age to have dialogue about achievable tion, then what Z risk may result.” Of-
power subordinates. objectives, the gathering risk as mis- ten, Z risk is greater to the formation
Units can also help themselves by sions get communicated from higher than Y risk.
guarding against gaining efficiencies headquarters to subordinate head-
quarters is assumed by our least Let us examine two examples where
through poorly-thought-out multi-ech-
equipped personnel to make risk deci- flipping the conversation reveals a
elon training. Executing multiple
sions. If brigade tells battalion to do greater risk. As a tactical example, if
events simultaneously is not the same
10 missions with only the resources we put the scout platoon on a screen
as multi-echelon training.8 Command-
(time, people, materiel) to conduct line, they may get decisively engaged
ers should be wary of making the
five, and battalion turns and gives and take casualties. Conversely, if we
training audience at one echelon the
those same missions and resources to do not put the scout platoon on a
trainers and certification authority of screen line, the enemy destroys the
simultaneous events. companies – and so on – we eventu-
ally end at a young sergeant, special- main body; scout casualties, while not
For example, if a battalion operations ist or private who now has 10 missions desired, are less risk than failing the
center is providing mission command and resources to only do five. Often mission as a result of the main body
for a platoon live-fire, and the opera- this young Soldier has the least expe- being destroyed.
tions officer is required to execute du- rience, education and training to make An operations-security (OPSEC) exam-
ties as the range officer in charge risk decisions. This young Soldier has ple would be if we use an unclassified
(think in the tower), the executive of- nowhere to pass the missions, so he application to communicate informa-
ficer may be required to help run or she makes the best decision possi- tion, an adversary could piece togeth-
checkpoints to shut down areas of the ble about which five missions are not er relevant OPSEC details. Conversely,
training area to support conduct of going to get accomplished.
if we do not communicate information
the range (think admin of training-ar- in a relevant timeframe, the organiza-
ea support). The battalion commander After leaders discover the failure of
half the originally assigned missions, tion does not move forward and the
may be on the lane certifying pla- adversary “steals the march.”12
toons. Then it is not realistic to expect we then start asking each echelon why
the primary trainers to give the battal- we chose to execute these five vs. the Reversing this common trend requires
ion staff the appropriate level of other five. Commanders and leaders a deliberate effort to have the “con-
coaching and training necessary to im- at echelon confront risk decisions verse” discussion and to get back to
prove. where the experience, education and the intent of our doctrine.
training match the results of the deci-
If we are to gain efficiencies or seize sion, or they accept the default to that Higher headquarters should set con-
opportunities to train multiple eche- young Soldier making the decision ditions for success, not failure. Head-
lons, we can consider augmentation which, in some circumstances may be quarters exist to enable success of
from outside the training audiences or required but should not be left at that subordinate units and to combine
scale back expectations of training ob- Soldier when unnecessary. The differ- their efforts in a way that allows the
jectives. Leaders should provide a ence between accepting prudent risk whole to be greater than the sum of

23 Fall 2020
its parts. We have become too reliant assess and reassess. Leaders use many potential but should account for (iden-
on bottom-up feedback and have cre- tools for assessing their organizations, tify and adjust to) the external forces
ated intellectual laziness on the part including inspections, battle-rhythm while mitigating the resulting risk. This
of higher headquarters. Rather than data points, spending time with Sol- leaves the leader with a likely problem
do analysis on troops-to-task, our diers at the point of execution, formal statement: The leader must accom-
headquarters are knowingly giving an assessments such as command-cli- plish the mission given resource con-
unfeasible volume of missions to sub- mate surveys and planned engage- straints, while leaving room for leader
ordinate units and then asking for ments with different cohorts of Sol- development and without breaking
their feedback on what they cannot diers. families or the Soldier’s desire to serve
accomplish. along the way.16
The point is that leaders should think
While bottom-up refinement is criti- critically about their assessment tools Showing this problem in a picture to
cal, and many commanders would ap- and how those tools allow them to see share the commander’s visualization
preciate their higher headquarters giv- their blind spots. Everyone has blind is extremely valuable and allows the
ing them a chance to shape mission spots, and the self-awareness to be commander to have discussions with
sets as a result of their feedback, we open to assessments that help illumi- peers and subordinates about how
cannot use this as a crutch for poor nate those blind spots is what sepa- they impact the organization, what
work. Especially at battalion- to com- rates leaders who can make meaning- changes have occurred and make ac-
pany-level echelons, where we have ful adjustments from those who are curate assessments. Whatever picture
the most significant gap in training, ex- satisfied with receiving reports that all the commander deems most helpful
perience and education between the is well. These assessment tools are allows leaders to share in the under-
echelons. We can do more work to what allow leaders to truly understand standing and visualization; informs
provide feasible mission sets rather the magnitude and direction of forces how subordinates and other organiza-
than provide a road to failure and ex- acting on the unit. tions fit into assessment loops; and
pect junior leaders to tell us where provides a start point for discussion
they are going to fail.13 The leader can then adjust his/her about where along the path the orga-
“rheostat” on expectations, engage in nization lies.
This idea does not replace the bottom- real risk discussions, create resources
up assessment we need from our Sol- or adjust priorities and intent. The two While the picture does not replace the
diers who accomplish the mission, but most likely points of failure in assess- clarity and logical trail of the written
we are out of balance on this equation ment occur because leaders do not word, it supports quickly communicat-
and scratch our heads wondering why create a broad enough tool set for as- ing a shared understanding across all
subordinates are hesitant to tell us sessment and are too willing to accept ranks. If this visual tool and its discus-
about failure and the associated risk good news.14 As Colin Powell wrote in sion points created dialogue between
we knowingly handed them. My American Journey, “The day Sol- the reader and a fellow professional,
diers stop bringing you their problems whether that dialogue was in agree-
Assessment is the day you have stopped leading ment or in disagreement with the use-
Not one concept presented in this ar- fulness or accuracy of the tool, then
them.”15
ticle is helpful beyond initial counsel- the reader has experienced the bene-
ing or as a start point for leading an Leaders naturally want their organiza- fit a visual tool provides for a com-
organization without the ability to tions to perform to their highest mander and the organization.
LTC Jim Armstrong commands 2nd Bat-
talion, 70 th Armor Regiment, 2 nd Ar-
mored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT),
1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS. His
previous assignments include concept
lead for the Joint Staff Innovation
Group, Washington, DC; squadron op-
erations observer/coach/trainer for
Grizzly Team, Joint Multinational
Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germa-
ny; brigade operations officer (S-3), 3rd
ABCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood,
TX; battalion operations officer (S-3),
1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry
Division, Fort Hood; brigade plans of-
ficer, 3rd ABCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort
Hood; and Joint Operations Center
battle major, Regional Command-East,
Bagram, Afghanistan. During his ca-
Figure 6. A visual tool for a unit’s self-assessment. (Graphic by the author) reer, LTC Armstrong has also served as

24 Fall 2020
platoon leader, executive officer and 5
A “nested” concept illustrates how the Chaos, Penguin Random House, Sept. 3,
company commander. His military actions of subordinate units fit together 2019.
schools include Air-Assault Course, to support a mission of the higher head- 16
Colin Powell and Joseph Persico, My
Master Fitness Trainer Course, Armor quarters. American Journey, New York: The Ran-
Basic Officer Leader Course, Armor 7
While the author understands the mili- dom House Ballatine Publishing Group,
Captain’s Career Course; intermediate- tary’s penchant to allow subordinates to 1995.
level education, common-core and learn from failure much like industry’s 16
A problem statement should not start
“fail, fast, forward,” we must maintain out with “how,” which is the beginning of
qualification courses, Command and
that our profession requires winning. We a question. The statement is declarative
General Staff College (CGSC); and Joint should be careful about learning and re-
Firepower Control Course. LTC Arm- and describes the dilemma and tradeoffs
training vice propagating the idea of ac- as a result of the problem.
strong holds a bachelor’s of arts de- cepting failure.
gree in systems engineering from the 8
FM 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex
U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, World, Oct. 5, 2016.
and a master’s of military arts and sci- 9
Ibid. Acronym Quick-Scan
ence degree in military history from
CGSC.
10
ADP 6-0.
11
Ibid. ABCT – armored brigade combat
Notes 12
ATP 5-19, Risk Management, April 14, team
1
ADP 6-0, Mission Command, July 2018. 2014. ADP – Army doctrinal publication
ATP – Army technical publication
2
Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Leader Devel- 13
Battalion commanders with 17-20 CGSC – Command and General
opment, June 2015. years of experience, in comparison to Staff College
3
Army Technical Publication (ATP) 5-01, company commanders, most likely at five FM – field manual
Army Design Methodology. to eight years of experience. OPSEC – operations security
4
ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, July
14
Jim Mattis and Bing West, Call Sign
2019.

25 Fall 2020
 The ETHICAL Warrior
by Chaplain (MAJ) Jared L. Vineyard concept to understand. Armies with- Army profession and create the cul-
out discipline are mobs; killing without ture of trust essential to Army profes-
Is one immoral act or one immoral Sol-
legal and moral grounds is murder.”3 sionals in the conduct of missions,
dier able to change the perception of
performance of duty and all aspects of
an entire unit or organization? The Based on our own definition, if one is
life.”4
seemingly obvious answer is yes. not ethical, one cannot be a profes-
sional. This is an idea that all Army While this is the standard for all Army
Ethics is a hot topic these days – when leaders need to think long and hard professionals to know and follow, this
to use force, how to use force, whom about. Just like the idea of being an ethic is a bit vague. It might be hard to
to use force on and systematic fairness Army professional is 24 hours a day, teach and train in practical situations.
are all a part of the national discus- seven days a week, the idea of being So how does an Army leader do the
sion. These are not only valid topics of ethical is the same. Ethics are not just right thing based on doctrine, both
discussion but are topics that a func- for downtown Kabul but are also for personally and professionally? How is
tional society needs to be able to an- downtown Columbus, GA, or wherev- this leader to train his or her forma-
swer. er a Soldier finds himself or herself. tion in what is right?
And while these and related discus- To answer this question practically,
sions continue nationally, they are not What does it mean? ADP 6-22 contains two specific sec-
new concepts to the military profes- What does it mean to be ethical? The tions that assist leaders and Soldiers
sional. Ethics are embedded in the Army is in the business of training Sol- in living the Army ethic while teaching
foundation of the Army profession. diers, which implies that there is a explicit principles for doctrinally based
When one looks at the definition of standard to be trained to. Thus, when ethical living. The first help is a matrix
the Army profession, it is immediately discussing ethicality, what is the stan- that provides the moral and legal
clear that ethicality is essential. dard for Army professionals? While a foundations for the Army ethic.
perusal through doctrine will show the
While not necessarily intuitive to an need to be ethical, a challenge comes This matrix provides 19 legal and mor-
outside observer, part of being an when one actually tries to define what al documents or concepts the Army
Army professional by definition is an that means. In Army Doctrinal Publica- looks at to make decisions. These spe-
expertise focused on “the ethical de- tion (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership and cific ideals allow an Army leader to
sign, generation, support and applica- the Profession, ethics (or a variant of make the right and therefore ethical
tion of landpower.”2 What this means it) is discussed 94 times in its 132 pag- decision in any situation.
is that to be a part of the Army profes- es. In almost every case, no explana-
sion, one must not simply be techni- For instance, if a Soldier is unsure how
tion or definition is given. And if a
cally and tactically proficient – that is, to act toward another Soldier in a
leader is challenged to define a con-
solely able to design, generate, sup- tense moment, the concept of the
cept personally, that leader will be
port and apply landpower. One must challenged to teach or train it to Sol- Golden Rule or “treating someone like
also be able to do it ethically. diers generally. you would want to be treated,” in con-
junction with the Army Value of re-
Army leaders have long agreed with Therefore a standard is needed. The spect, would both apply. These two
this. A more recent example came Army has such a standard, known as ideals, the Golden Rule and Army Val-
from GEN Stanley McChrystal, who the Army ethic: “The Army ethic is the ues, are both specific and specified
wrote that “maintaining our force’s set of enduring moral principles, val- moral principles that Soldiers should
moral compass was not a difficult ues, beliefs and laws that guide the aspire to follow.

Figure 1. The Army profession of arms.1

26 Fall 2020
 virtuous person, or a person of the
mean, would be a person of courage.
Courage is a specific example given by
the Army in the paragraph on ethical
decision-making. Thus, asking the
question, “would a virtuous person do
it?” Thinking through a response
based on the mean helps a Soldier
know what to do in certain situations.
This is not the only question the Army
Table 1. Foundations of the Army ethic. (From Table 1-1, ADP 6-22) suggests asking. The next might be
“Would I want all military profession-
When it comes to this matrix, the im- After reading through that material,
als to do it?” This is based on rules by
plied task is that all Army leaders have one might ask where did this come
Immanuel Kant. Kant taught that
a working understanding and knowl- from and how does this practically ap-
“there is only one categorical impera-
edge of each document or concept to ply? To answer the first question about
tive and it is this: Act only on that
live them out. This idea is reinforced where these three perspectives come
maxim by which you can at the same
in ADP 6-22, which says that Army from, one has to look toward the
time will that it should become a uni-
“professionals perform their duty ev- Western philosophy of Aristotle for
versal law.”8 It is enough to generalize
ery day in a manner that the American virtues, to Immanuel Kant for rules
that Kant believed that if a maxim, or
people judge to be ethical according and to John Stuart Mill for conse-
rule, could be universalized, then it
to the beliefs and values enshrined in quences. The Army is open about the
might be ethical for all. Therefore, a
the nation’s founding documents.” sources of its values when it says that
Soldier might ask would he or she
These pertinent documents, as well as “the Army ethic has its origins in the
want all Soldiers, noncommissioned
others, are found in this matrix. philosophical heritage, theological and
officers or officers to do what they
cultural traditions, and the historical
But this is not the only place in doc- were about to do? Or could they make
legacy that frame our nation.”6 While
trine that helps an Army leader to a universal law for everyone in the
these three philosophers clearly view
practically answer how to live out same position or situation to follow?
the world from differing perspectives,
what is ethical. The other piece of
Soldiers could ask themselves a basic The third and final question that the
practical help comes from a section
question from each. Army suggests a Soldier ask might be
entitled “Ethical reasoning.” This para-
graph states: “Ethical choices may not The question based on virtues that a “What are the consequences of this
always be obvious decisions between Soldier might ask is “Would a virtuous decision?” The consequences focus on
right and wrong. Leaders use multiple person do it?” Aristotle taught: “There the unit, the mission or the Soldier’s
perspectives to think about ethical are three kinds of disposition, then surroundings. This idea comes from
concerns, applying them to determine two of them vices, involving excess the philosophy of utilitarianism by
the most ethical choice. and deficiency respectively, and one a John Stuart Mill. Mill wrote that “ac-
virtue, namely the mean, and all are in tions are right in proportion as they
“One perspective comes from a view a sense opposed to all. … That moral tend to promote happiness, wrong as
that desirable virtues such as courage, virtue is a mean, then, and in what they tend to produce the reverse of
justice and benevolence define ethical sense it is so, and that it is a mean be- happiness. By happiness is intended
outcomes. A second perspective tween two vices, the one involving ex- pleasure and the absence of pain.”9
comes from a set of agreed-upon val- cess, the other deficiency.”7
ues or rules, such as the Army Values Once again, not diving into Mill’s phi-
or constitutional rights. A third per- Without getting too in-depth in his losophy too deeply, this happiness is a
spective bases the consequences of philosophy, it is enough to understand not about a person’s individual happi-
the decision on whatever produces that Aristotle believed that virtue re- ness but about aggregate or collective
the greatest good for the greatest sides within the mean of a person’s happiness. Thus for an Army leader, it
number [of people] as most favorable. character, not within his or her ex- would be appropriate to think about
tremes. An example can be seen in the unit, the mission and the sur-
“Leaders able to consider all perspec- how someone deals with dangerous rounding area of operations when
tives applicable to a particular situa- situations. A person on one extreme – thinking through consequences. If the
tion are more likely to be ethically as- one who doesn’t have any fear – might consequences of a decision are posi-
tute. When time is available, consult- be considered reckless or rash, while tive, it may be a right decision. It is im-
ing peers and seniors is often helpful. on the other end of the spectrum, a portant to note that all three of the
Chaplains can provide confidential ad- person who never wants to deal with questions need to be asked for each
vice to leaders about difficult personal danger might be considered a coward, decision a Soldier makes.
and professional ethical issues to en- according to Aristotle.
courage moral decisions in accord with At this point, defining what is ethical
personal conscience and the Army Val- For an Army leader, neither position is according to Army doctrine is basical-
ues.”5 particularly suited or desired. Thus, a ly complete. The Army has an ethical

27 Fall 2020
standard: the Army ethic. It is rooted (Emphasis on Just-War Theory and Many may call this the moral compass
in the philosophical, theological, cul- the Law of Land Warfare.) of a leader. This compass informs a
tural and historical legacy and tradi- • L – Is this decision legal? (Emphasis leader’s conscience, which is formed
tion of our nation, which has legal and on U.S. and military law, including and developed over time by a number
moral implications today. specific rules of engagement.)10 of sources. For instance, “influences
such as background, beliefs, education
The problem is that these principles Let’s look at each letter briefly to en- and experiences affect all Soldiers and
from the previously discussed matrix, sure that there is a proper under- [Department of the Army] civilians.”16
as well as the three perspectives, can standing of each concept. How does a leader know if something
be difficult to remember, let alone is immoral? A decision or act might be
train the force on. Therefore, one of The first category is “equitable.” To be
ethical, all military personnel should judged immoral if it goes against the
my tasks when taking a year to study dictates of their conscience.
ethics in preparation for my current ask themselves the question, “Is this
teaching assignment was to create decision equitable?” Equitable means Doctrine also tells leaders what to do
something easier to remember but “having or exhibiting equity; dealing when given an order that is immoral.
rooted in the preceding doctrine. It fairly and equally with all con- “Army forces reject and report illegal,
was to design an ethical decision-mak- cerned.” 11 It has fairness at its es- unethical or immoral orders or ac-
ing framework that could act as a stan- sence. Standards in the Army should tions. … Soldiers are bound to obey
dard for both Soldiers and leaders to be tough; the bar for leaders should the legal and moral orders of their su-
know and implement. From my own be high, but standards must also be periors, but they must disobey an un-
experience, it is always easier to re- fair. This gets at the principle dis- lawful or immoral order.”17 Therefore
member a concept that can be made cussed earlier, the Golden Rule. This is a Soldier must ask himself or herself,
into an acronym. So the goal was to codified very clearly in the Army Value “Is what I’m about to do morally true
take all the principles found in the two of Respect, which says that Army pro- according to the dictates of my con-
previously discussed sources of infor- fessionals “treat people as they should science?” If this is disregarded, moral
mation and place them in an easily re- be treated.”12 injury is likely to occur.
membered format. Aristotle’s virtue or justice might also
The next category is “helpful.” To be
fall under this category. Justice deals
The acronym that eventually came out ethical, all military personnel should
ultimately with the issue of fairness.
of this experiment was the exact word ask themselves the question, “Is this
Thus, if a Soldier is going to be ethical,
I wanted Soldiers to remember: ETHI- decision helpful?” This is meant in two
he or she should ask, “Is this decision
CAL. Each letter of the word stands for senses, both previously discussed in
equitable or fair?”
a doctrinal concept. Each concept in rules and consequences. One way this
turn is asked as a question in deciding The next category is “true.” To be eth- question could be asked is, “Is this
whether a decision or action might be ical, all military personnel should ask helpful to my profession?” Or, worded
ethical. This acronym thereby be- themselves the question, “Is this deci- differently, “Would I want all military
comes an “ethical checklist” for a Sol- sion true?” This question needs to an- professionals to make this decision?”
dier. swered in two senses based on doc- Next, based on consequences, “Is this
trine. The first sense is objective truth decision helpful to my unit, to the mis-
The acronym is (with the doctrinal or facts. Mission command states that sion or my surroundings?”
principles in parentheses): “ideally, true understanding should be
• E – Is this decision equitable? the basis for decisions.”13 Samuel Hun- It is interesting to note that doctrine
(Emphasis on the Golden Rule, Army tington in The Soldier and the State states that part of our moral motiva-
Value of Respect and the virtue of writes that “the ‘military opinion’ tion for service are basic rights. These
justice.) must never be colored by wishful can be found both in the Declaration
thinking. … The military man will be of Independence as well as in the Uni-
• T – Is this decision true? (Emphasis
dealing with military fact, hard figures versal Declaration of Human Rights.
on facts and the Soldier’s moral
and grim realities of time, space and An example of asking the “helpful”
compass/virtues.)
resources.”14 While Army profession- question using these documents might
• H – Is this decision helpful? (Emphasis als understand that complete under- be, “Is this decision helpful to those
on basic human rights, consequences standing in every situation is never around me?” According to our Decla-
and rules.) possible, ethical decisions must be ration of Independence, some truths
• I – Is this decision institutionally rooted in reality. are “self-evident” such as “all men are
appropriate? (Emphasis on Army created equal” and have “certain un-
But it is not only facts the Army leader
Values, Soldier’s Creed/Warrior alienable rights – among which are
needs to consider when thinking
Ethos and Soldier’s oath.) life, liberty and the pursuit of happi-
through decisions; it is moral truth
• C – Is this decision culturally ness.”18 Therefore a Soldier on patrol
that needs to be consulted a well. This
appropriate? (Emphasis on treaties, cannot simply impede someone’s ba-
truth is guided by each leader’s con-
standards of conduct, policies and sic rights just because he or she feels
science. Doctrine tells us that “a lead-
directives.) like it; that would be unethical.
er’s character consists of their true na-
• A – Is this decision application just? ture guided by their conscience.” 15 The next category is “institutionally

28 Fall 2020
 Army Values Soldier’s Creed Army Civilian
The Army Values are: I am an American Soldier. Corps Creed
• Loyalty – Bear true I am a warrior and a member of I am an Army civilian, a member
faith and allegiance to a team. of the Army team.
the Constitution of the I am dedicated to our Army, Sol-
I serve the people of the United
United States, the diers and civilians.
States and live the Army Values.
Army, your unit and
other Soldiers. I will always place the mission I will always support the mission.
• Duty – Fulfill your obli- first. I provide leadership, stability
gations. and continuity during war and
• Respect – Treat people I will never accept defeat.
peace.
as they should be treat- I will never quit.
ed. I support and defend the Consti-
• Selfless service – Put I will never leave a fallen com- tution of the United States and
the welfare of the na- rade. consider it an honor to serve our
tion, the Army and your I am disciplined, physically and nation and our Army.
subordinates before mentally tough, trained and pro- I live the Army values of loyalty,
your own. ficient in my warrior tasks and duty, respect, selfless service,
• Honor – Live up to the drills. honor, integrity and personal
Army Values. courage.
• Integrity – Do what is I always maintain my arms, my
right, legally and moral- equipment and myself. I am an Army civilian.
ly. I am an expert and a profession- Figure 4. Army Civilian Corps
• Personal courage – al. I stand ready to deploy, en- Creed.21
Face fear, danger or ad- gage and destroy the enemies of
versity. the United States of America in
close combat. require cultural and geopolitical
Figure 2. Army Values.19
I am a guardian of freedom and awareness to properly prepare subor-
the American way of life. dinates for the places they will work,
appropriate.” To be ethical, all military the people with whom they will oper-
personnel should ask themselves the I am an American Soldier. ate, and the adversaries or enemies
question, “Is this decision institution- Figure 3. Soldier’s Creed. they will face. The Army requires lead-
ally appropriate?” What this question ers who are geopolitically aware and
is pointing to is that there are many can explain how their unit mission fits
Army-specific institutional norms and values and norms that guide the con- into the broader scheme of opera-
values that should be followed. The duct of all personnel within the Army tions. These are important factors
classic example of this is Army Values. institution. Other institutions such as when Army leaders attempt to extend
the Navy or Air Force have different, influence beyond the chain of com-
These values are what we as the Army although similar, values. Army person- mand.”22
have said are important to us as an in- nel must live these agreed-upon val-
stitution. In fact, the Army has gone so ues and principles if they are going to When it comes to understanding dif-
far to say that “the Army Values em- be ethical. ferent cultures, leaders need to have
body the practical application of the an understanding of treaties and stan-
Army Ethic.” 20 What this means in a The next category is “culturally appro- dards of conduct, as well as different
sense is that if one wants to see the priate.” To be ethical, all military per- policies and directives such as status-
Army ethic is practice, one only needs sonnel should ask themselves the of-forces agreements. When Soldiers
to look as far as the Army Values. question, “Is this decision culturally and leaders understand the context of
appropriate?” As everyone familiar where they serve, they will be much
Another institutionally appropriate
with the U.S. Army knows, “the sun more likely not to offend our foreign
concept is the Soldier’s Creed, with its
never sets on the U.S. Army.” There- partners and to be able to extend re-
associated Warrior Ethos, and Army
fore Army leaders understand: “Army spect with dignity to those with whom
Civilian Corps Creed.
organizations operate around the we serve. Dignity and respect are most
These creeds personify what it is to be world in a wide variety of environ- definitely a two-way process and help
an Army professional. And while these ments with different unified-action leaders from different cultures build
institutionally appropriate values partners representing many different rapport and trust, which is the bed-
might be good for all people to know cultures. Leaders should acquire cul- rock of the Army profession. Being cul-
and live out, they are at the same time tural and geopolitical knowledge turally aware and appropriate helps
very institutional. This means that about the areas in which they expect ensure Army leaders make ethical de-
they are institutionally-agreed-upon to accomplish the mission. … Leaders cisions.

29 Fall 2020
 is a doctrinally based standard to help
leaders and Soldiers make the right
decisions – to be ETHICAL warriors.
We as an Army must be ethical, not
just to be perceived as right but be-
cause our profession demands that we
are right.
Chaplain (MAJ) Jared Vineyard is the
ethics instructor and writer at the Ma-
neuver Center of Excellence, Fort Ben-
ning, GA. He has served as a chaplain
for the past 11 years, including battal-
ion chaplain in 25th Infantry Division,
Schofield Barracks, HI; 704th Military
Intelligence Brigade, Buckley Air Force
Base, CO; and 101st Airborne Division
(Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY. Before
his chaplaincy assignments, MAJ Vine-
yard served as a field-artillery officer.
He has been deployed as both a field-
Table 2. Application of basic LoAC principles.23 artillery officer (Iraq, 2003-2004) and
as a chaplain (Afghanistan, 2010-
2011). He holds a bachelor’s of science
The next category is “just applica- laws, the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
degree in political science from the
tion.” To be ethical, all military person- tice, executive orders, etc. For a deci-
U.S. Military Academy and has earned
nel should ask themselves the ques- sion to be ethical, it should be legal.
two graduate degrees: a master’s of
tion, “Is this decision’s application
Ethics is an area that every Solder and divinity from Southwestern Baptist
just?” The focus of this concept is
leader must think through, whether Theological Seminary and a master’s
combat, specifically looking through
training during peacetime or fighting of sacred theology in ethics from Yale
the lens of the Just-War Theory and its
during war. The Army’s job is to win. Divinity School. His military schooling
related Law of Land Warfare. All Sol-
This can be seen in its mission state- includes the Field-Artillery Basic Offi-
diers and leaders must understand
ment: “The Army mission – our pur- cer Leadership Course, the Chaplain’s
that there is a proper way to apply
pose – remains constant: to deploy, Basic Officer Leadership Course and
landpower to fight and win our na-
fight and win our nation’s wars by pro- the Chaplain Captain’s Career Course.
tion’s wars. Discussions on the proper
viding ready, prompt and sustained His awards include the Bronze Star
use, allocation and timing of force
land dominance by Army forces across Medal and the Purple Heart.
have been a part of Western armies as
long as there have been armies. A the full spectrum of conflict as part of
the joint force.”24 Notes
brief summary of key principles from 1
ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the
the Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC) are Profession, Washington, DC: Headquar-
in Table 2. Victory done right ters Department of the Army, 2019.
But in winning, there is a tension. This 2
Ibid.
For Soldiers to be ethical, they must tension is summed up by Michael Wal- 3
GEN Stanley McChrystal, My Share of
honor the Law of Land Warfare and zer with the dilemma of winning and the Task, New York: Penguin Group,
ensure that their application of land- fighting well. 25 While the Army is 2013.
power is just. tasked to win, we must win the right 4
Ibid.
way, the ethical way. Walzer goes on
The final category is “legal.” To be 5
ADP 6-22.
to say, “War is the hardest place; if
ethical, all military personnel should comprehensive and consistent moral
6
Ibid.
ask themselves the question, “Is this judgments are possible there, they are 7
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics,
decision legal?” While this might seem possible everywhere.” 26 What is he trans. David Ross, Oxford, United King-
obvious, all Soldiers and leaders need saying? War is hard, and if you can be dom: Oxford University Press, 2009.
to ensure the legality of the decisions moral in war, you can be moral any- 8
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the
they make. Some might add that this where. Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Arnulf
should be the first question leaders Zweig, ed. Thomas Hill and Arnulf Zweig,
ask when making a decision; while But I think all Soldiers and leaders Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Universi-
that may be true, it is surely not the need to be challenged with the other ty Press, 2002.
only question that should be asked. side of that comment: If you can’t be 9
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed.
The military works under the legal moral anywhere when it is “easy,” you Roger Crisp, Oxford, United Kingdom: Ox-
framework where the U.S. Constitu- won’t be moral in war. Being moral im- ford University Press, 2004.
tion is the foundation followed by plies a standard; the acronym ETHICAL 10
Jared Vineyard, “Operationalizing the

30 Fall 2020
Army Ethic: An Army Decision-Making Constitution of the United States with in-
Model,” graduate paper, Yale Divinity dex, and Declaration of Independence, Acronym Quick-Scan
School, 2019. Malta: National Center for Constitutional
11
“Equitable” entry in Merriam-Webster Studies, 2015. ADP – Army doctrinal publication
Dictionary, accessed June 16, 2020, 19
Ibid. LoAC – Law of Armed Conflict
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic- 20
Ibid.
tionary/equitable. 21
Ibid.
12
ADP 6-22. 22
Ibid.
13
ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command 23
Field Manual 6-27, Commander’s
and Control of Army Forces, Washington,
Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare,
DC: Headquarters Department of the
Washington, DC: Headquarters Depart-
Army, 2019.
ment of the Army, 2019.
14
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and 24
ADP 1, The Army, Washington, DC:
the State: The Theory and Politics of Civ-
Headquarters Department of the Army,
il-Military Relations, Cambridge: The
2019.
Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1985.
25
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars:
15
ADP 6-22. A Moral Argument with Historical Illus-
trations, 4th edition, New York: Basic
16
Ibid. Books, 2006.
17
Ibid. 26
Ibid.
18
“Declaration of Independence,” in The

31 Fall 2020
 Reconnaissance and Security Operations
Are Essential to Thwarting Russian
Interests in Western Hemisphere
by 1LT Anthony M. Analla prepare for potential hostilities in the support for the Latin American coun-
region. try that could manifest itself into an
Leaders of the Russian Federation
armed conflict in the Western Hemi-
maintain a strategic foothold in the Maduro and his United Socialist Party sphere.
Western Hemisphere by preserving of Venezuela (PSUV) present a desper-
the presidency of Nicholas Maduro in ate need for political, economic and Russian mindset
Venezuela. Cooperation between Rus- military aid that complements the Since the late 1990s the Russian Fed-
sia and Venezuela offers the Russian Russian desire for influence in the re- eration has executed a series of mili-
government an ability to bolster its in- gion. Venezuelan Socialists justifiably tary actions that reveal the character
tertwined military, economic and po- fear the threat of a coup because the of the military forces the Kremlin has
litical interests. To that end, the Rus- PSUV temporarily lost power during a developed to actualize its political ob-
sian military continues a campaign of coup d’état in 2002. 1 Russia deters jectives and the mindset of its con-
material support to the Venezuelan threats to the PSUV through arms temporary leaders. In June 1999, Rus-
military to deter foreign and domestic sales, 2 private military contractors, 3 sian forces successfully gained lever-
threats. military advisers/trainers 4 and the age in negotiations over the disposi-
United States’ fear of confronting the tion of a newly created United Nations
The United States recognizes interim Kremlin in open conflict if a move is peacekeeping force by seizing the air-
President Juan Guaido and considers made against the PSUV. Further, Rus- port in Pristina, Kosovo, prior to the
the Venezuelan National Assembly, sian veto power in the United Nations arrival of North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
which he currently leads, to be the Security Council provides political cov- zation (NATO) forces. 6 This was the
only legitimate federal institution, ac- er for Maduro. Finally, the Kremlin bol- first of many actions that demonstrat-
cording to the Venezuelan Constitu- sters Venezuela through direct finan- ed rising boldness among Russian
tion. This pits Russian and U.S. inter- cial aid and lines of credit.5 In return, leaders and a belief that Western pow-
ests in Venezuela at odds because Rus- the Russians gain a foundation to build ers will not risk the use of military
sia supports Nicolás Maduro, presi- influence and undermine the interests force against Russians.
dent of Venezuela since 2013, with his of the United States in the Western
presidency under dispute since 2019. Hemisphere. Russian actors launched a cyberattack
In this context, it is crucial to effective- in April 2007 against the government
ly train the U.S. Army and our allies in With bolstering Venezuela the known of Estonia in retaliation for the remov-
reconnaissance and security tactics objective of the Russian government, al of a World War II monument honor-
that incorporate the lessons of post- the U.S. Army must think critically and ing Soviet veterans. 7 False news re-
Soviet acts of Russian aggression to train effectively to counter Russian ports that the Estonian government

32 Fall 2020
planned to destroy rather than just soldiers, 18 military contractors 19 and main battle tanks and small arms
move the statue exacerbated the un- the dubious use of humanitarian aid.20 while supporting with its own attack
rest among ethnically Russian popula- Despite these efforts to deny the ex- aircraft. 28 Sustaining this effort re-
tions in Estonia.8 This unprecedented tent of Russian involvement, unsubtle quired the Russians to use reserve
wave of cyberattacks led to major dis- funerals for fallen Russian soldiers units and military contractors, which
ruptions of government services, confirm the reality of the situation.21 suggests a weakness in Russian capa-
email, on-line banking, automated- In conjunction with Russian actions in bilities with respect to personnel.29
teller-machine access, e-commerce Georgia, these actions confirm a
and more. Cumulatively, the cyberat- strong preference in the Kremlin for Russian contractors became the sub-
tacks and ethnic tensions led to riots the use of military and paramilitary ject of much debate when they at-
and crippled the country for more forces that afford the Kremlin deni- tacked a combined U.S.-Kurdish force
than two weeks.9 ability on the international stage. near Deir Ezzor, Syria, in February
2018. Some suggest leaders in the
Notably, the Russian government nev- Kremlin used contractors to prosecute
er acknowledged its role in the cyber-
Lessons-learned the attack to maintain deniability for
Members of the U.S. Army’s Asymmet-
attack and the specific perpetrators the government. Others suggest the
ric Warfare Group, among others,
remain unknown, though they are al- contractors acted in a cavalier fashion
have published studies based on the
most certainly government-supported, without explicit consent from the
ongoing conflict in Ukraine that iden-
Russia-based actors. 10 Russia and Kremlin.30 Both of these possibilities
tified critical lessons for the U.S. mili-
many other nations learned that cy- require that the United States prepare
tary. Their findings indicate that the
berattacks now present an effective for such actions by Russian contractors
Russian military favors the use of snip-
and low-risk means of disrupting an in the future. Through Russian assis-
ers and boobytraps as a means of fix-
enemy’s ability to maintain order, tance the Assad regime has regained
ing larger forces and causing signifi-
which reduces its capacity for armed much of its territory, and Russia now
cant psychological strain on their en-
conflict. has a blueprint for strengthening oth-
emies. 22 Russia has integrated un-
er regimes in the future.31
One year later, Russia intervened in manned aerial systems (UAS) with
then-Georgian-controlled South Osse- electronic-warfare (EW) capabilities Russian military forces currently train
tia and Abkhazia in support of ethni- to project jamming and spoofing ef- and equip Venezuelan military forces
cally Russian populations. 11 Prior to fects on its enemies’ locations. These to inoculate the Maduro regime
the Russian occupation, the Russians systems also fuel the targeting of indi- against internal and external threats.
recruited, organized and equipped rect weapons, often toward elements Economic turmoil poses the greatest
separatists to prepare the battlefield.12 with a large electronic signature.23 threat to the Maduro regime, so the
They also conducted large-scale train- Russians have responded with billions
ing exercises that served as rehearsals Fire-support elements, as opposed to in direct aid and credit.32 Since 2000,
for the occupation and a plausible cov- maneuver elements, take finishing ac- Russia has made arms sales of more
er for massing forces near the Russia- tions in Russian offensive operations; than $7.5 billion to Venezuela, includ-
Georgia border.13 In this conflict, the this is a continuation of Soviet-style ing fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, ar-
Russians fought in all domains to fighting. 24 Despite many advances mored personnel carriers and small
achieve limited strategic goals that in- since the end of the Cold War, re- arms.33 Venezuela also relies on em-
cluded greater influence over the source constraints cause several vul- bedded Russian troops to train its
South Caucus Energy Corridor and dis- nerabilities in the Russian fighting force and serve as a deterrent to po-
couraging a partnership with NATO.14 force. Specifically, their lack of re- tential aggressors.34 Russian strategic
Post-conflict analysis reveals that the sources causes a deficit of highly bombers have also visited Venezuela,
Russian military struggled to operate trained professionals, especially in the and the two countries have conducted
effectively in joint and combined-arms sustainment occupational special- combined military exercises, to the
operations.15 Georgian tactical success ties.25 As a result, their force struggles dismay of Western officials. 35 These
sparked a new determination to up- to match top-tier maneuver and fires means and methods of support indi-
grade Russia’s military equipment and with top-tier sustainment, reducing cate that any potential conflict in Ven-
move away from Soviet-era tactics.16 the likelihood of success in expedition- ezuela will have a similar character to
ary operations. those in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria.
Russian President Vladimir Putin took
his largest and boldest military actions Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad re-
to date by annexing Crimea and quested military assistance from the Aggressive intelligence
launching an offensive in the Donbass Kremlin in 2015 as he struggled to collection
region of Ukraine in 2014. Russia has fight a growing multitude of militant Lessons of Russian intervention in the
gained an advantage throughout the groups.26 Officially, the Russian Feder- recent past indicate that reducing the
conflict through the effective use of ation Council approved only the use of effectiveness of Russian strengths and
deception to delay responses by the air assets for combat operations in exploiting Russian weaknesses re-
Ukrainians and the West.17 Concrete Syria, though the Russians maintain a quires aggressive intelligence collec-
steps taken to conceal Russian involve- ground force in the country.27 Russia tion. Training reconnaissance organi-
ment include the use of unmarked has equipped the Syrian army with zations includes at least three

33 Fall 2020
audiences – the primary collectors networks that support the battlefield effectively, the staff must analyze the
(Soldiers and junior noncommissioned effects of snipers and boobytraps. enemy and predict the task and pur-
officers), platoon and troop-level lead- Analysis from the staff fuels an ongo- pose of their UAVs. As a result, the
ership and the staff. Effective training ing effort to plan future reconnais- staff enables commanders to establish
for all audiences requires the use of sance patrols among other operations. engagement criteria. Primary collec-
technology for specific threats and Ultimately, the feedback loop signifi- tors and troop-level leaders must train
scenarios that force us to think like our cantly increases the difficulty our ad- in identifying UAVs and employing
adversaries. Ultimately, developing versaries have in achieving battlefield counter-UAS systems. Again, success
muscle memory in the tasks that cause effects from either a sniper or a boo- requires a feedback loop with each
the right information to flow quickly bytrap.39 component of a reconnaissance orga-
to the appropriate decision-makers is nization working effectively.
the goal. This goal includes two impor- Leveraging technology
tant indicators of success: risk deci- U.S. and allied forces must leverage Effective employment of counter-UAS
sions made at the appropriate level the latest technology in conjunction systems offers an important example
and mid-operation changes to the en- with battle drills to reduce and defeat of friendly forces exploiting the weak-
emy’s course of action. the threat of boobytraps and snipers. nesses of countries like Russia and
Currently, U.S. forces infrequently Venezuela. If the United States even
This conceptual framework and our went to the extreme of using a Stinger
train with gunshot-detection devices
synopsis of selected Russian actions missile (about $38,000) 41 to destroy
and jammers that increase our surviv-
leads to five focus areas for training: the common Russian Orlan-10 drone
ability. Technology, like the processes
• Improvised explosive devices (IED)/ of information flow, requires extensive (about $87,000),42 U.S. forces gain a
boobytraps; training that leads to muscle memory significant advantage. As the Asym-
• Snipers; to yield a material benefit. For exam- metric Warfare Group stated in its
ple, the placement of gunshot-detec- analysis, Russia struggles to compete
• UAS; with the United States in the sustain-
tion devices within a convoy or on a
• Sustainment; and ment warfighting function. 43 This
piece of tactical infrastructure re-
• Information operations. quires critical analysis from leaders at weakness results from the United
the platoon and troop level. Improper States maintaining about 30 times
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United placement may yield no benefit to Russia’s wealth, which translates into
States invested significant resources to friendly forces. 40 Technology infre- greater resources for defense activi-
defeat the threat posed by IEDs and quently defeats threats on its own; ties.44 Venezuela depends heavily on
snipers, two strengths we expect to rather, it enables maneuver forces to Russian support due to its own eco-
find in Russian supported forces. In defeat an enemy threat. Therefore, nomic turmoil. It is likely, therefore,
contrast to Iraq and Afghanistan, Rus- training battle drills such as react-to- that U.S. and allied forces can signifi-
sian supported forces likely use mili- contact must accompany training with cantly impact the means and ambition
tary grade manufactured explosives – gunshot detection and jammers. an actor such as Venezuela has to fight
boobytraps – rather than IEDs. 36 We by attacking its scarce resources.
must also anticipate that the skill of a Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threats
Russian trained sniper will surpass the contrast threats from snipers and boo- In an armed conflict in the Western
skill of the snipers from Iraq and Af- bytraps in that the means and meth- Hemisphere, the lack of logistical sup-
ghanistan.37 Passivity significantly in- ods available to counter them lack port may constrain adversaries of the
creases the risk to the force in an en- thorough, real-world testing. Most United States to the point that it yields
vironment with snipers and IEDs/boo- commonly, UAVs serve as intelligence, a strategic benefit. To exploit weak-
by traps, while proactive reconnais- surveillance and reconnaissance as- nesses in sustainment, primary collec-
sance efforts reduce both the psycho- sets that frequently support the tar- tors and troop-level leaders must
logical and material impacts of the geting process for indirect-fire assets. learn to identify the equipment Russia
threats.38 As noted, Russia specifically began us- and its allies use for sustainment.
ing drones to project EW impacts to Members of the staff must learn to an-
Proactive reconnaissance efforts for their enemies in Ukraine; however, it alyze the types of forces that specific
these threats begin with primary col- is unlikely Russia would support a equipment sustains and assist the
lectors and troop-level leaders learn- country like Venezuela with such a commander in valuating it properly.
ing to think like the enemy while ana- scarce resource. This may change as Ultimately, developing and dissemi-
lyzing the terrain. From this analysis, Russia produces and fields more EW- nating engagement criteria that sup-
they identify positions of advantage capable drones or if the Syrian civil ports U.S. or allied strategic goals be-
from which to counter the threat and war stabilizes. comes paramount in this type of con-
minimize the risk to their force. Cur- flict. Reconnaissance organizations as
rently, our force rarely teaches aver- Equipping scouts with counter-UAS de- a whole must only introduce a single
age scouts to think like a sniper. How- vices and weapons enables friendly limiting factor, such as food, water or
ever, we would be wise to encourage forces to severely limit a key compo- ammunition, into an adversary’s oper-
this training. Members of the staff nent of any potential adversary’s fight- ations to give the following maneuver
must use the analysis to identify the ing style. To leverage these resources force a significant advantage.

34 Fall 2020
Greatest risk will use IEDs/boobytraps, snipers, Conflict with the United States in the Ca-
UAVs (possibly with EW capabilities) ribbean,” Foreign Policy, Oct. 9, 2019,
Among likely threats from a Russian
and Russian contractors on the battle- https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/09/
ally like Venezuela in the Western russias-putin-venezuela-evade-oil-sanc-
Hemisphere is the ability of the Rus- field. Outside of the battlefield, the
tions-preparing-conflict-united-states/.
sian government to manipulate infor- Russian government will most likely
use its political capabilities to create
5
Darya Korsunskaya, “UPDATE 3 - Putin,
mation. It presents the greatest risk to Maduro Discussed Venezuela’s Debt to
the mission. Russia claimed that hu- confusion while conducting an infor-
Russia Last Week,” Reuters, Oct. 1, 2019,
manitarian needs necessitated their mation campaign and cyberattacks on
https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-
inter vention in Georgia 45 and behalf of the Venezuelans. venezuela-debt-kremlin/update-3-putin-
Ukraine,46 while claims of fighting ter- To counter these threats and exploit maduro-discussed-venezuelas-debt-to-
rorism drove its intervention in Chech- the weaknesses of a Russian-support- russia-last-week-idUSL5N26M4LA.
nya47 and Syria.48 Russia currently em- ed Venezuela, the United States must 6
Patrick Wintour and Ian Traynor, “Rus-
ploys hundreds of military contractors properly equip reconnaissance forces sian and British Troops in Tense Pristina
in Venezuela, whose activities remain and train them to aggressively collect Stand-Off,” The Guardian, June 12, 1999,
largely unknown. 49 Cuba – another information. Scouts, staff and com- https://www.theguardian.com/
Russian ally – maintains an estimated world/1999/jun/13/balkans5.
manders must rehearse specific collec-
force of 20,000 personnel in Venezu- tion and analysis tasks that enable us
7
Damien McGuinness, “How a Cyber At-
ela.50 Also, the PSUV has driven Vene- to destroy IED/boobytraps and sniper tack Transformed Estonia,” BBC News,
zuela into a humanitarian crisis.51 Cer- April 27, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/
networks. Similarly, we must rehearse
tainly, Russia could use humanitarian news/39655415.
collection and analysis to engage en-
concerns or threats posed by pro- emy UAVs and sustainment assets ac-
8
Ibid.
Western, anti-Maduro militias as a jus- cording to our strategic goals. Finally,
9
Kertu Ruus, “Cyber War I: Estonia At-
tification for more direct military in- we must train with the mindset of tacked from Russia,” European Affairs 9,
tervention. proving our innocence to an onlooking No. 1-2 (2008), https://www.europeanin-
stitute.org/index.php/component/con-
Reconnaissance organizations make world to deny the Russians any advan-
tent/article?id=67:cyber-war-i-estonia-at-
first contact with both the enemy and tage in an information campaign. tacked-from-russia.
the civilian population. Scouts, there- Ibid.
1LT Anthony Analla is the squadron 10

fore, must train to identify which Rus-

S-4, 3 rd Squadron, 61 stCavalry Regi- 11
Official Website of the Russian presi-
sian-supported actors are on the bat-
ment, 2 nd Stryker Brigade Combat dent, Aug. 26, 2008, http://en.kremlin.
tlefield and where civilians require hu- ru/events/president/transcripts/1222.
Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Car-
manitarian assistance. In an informa-
son, CO. His previous assignments in- 12
Ariel Cohen and Robert E Hamilton,
tion campaign, U.S. forces and our al- clude executive officer, Headquarters The Russian Military and the Georgian
lies must consider ourselves guilty un- Troop, 3-61 Cav, Fort Carson; and ex- War: Lessons and Implications, Carlisle,
til proven innocent. By distinguishing ecutive officer of the scout troop and PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute,
between actors on the battlefield and scout-platoon leader, 3-61 Cav, Fort 2011, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/full-
identifying areas requiring humanitar- Carson. His military schools include the text/u2/a545578.pdf.
ian assistance, the United States takes Armor Basic Officer Leader Course,
13
Ibid.
important first steps toward denying Army Reconnaissance Course and Air- 14
Ibid.
Russia the ability to use information to Assault School, U.S. Military Academy, 15
Ibid.
its advantage. Distinction between ac- West Point, NY. 1LT Analla has a bach-
tors on the battlefield in conjunction
16
Peter Apps, “Russia Raises Military
elor’s of science degree in law and le- Clout with Reforms after Georgian War,”
with thorough training on escalation- gal studies from the U.S. Military Reuters, Feb. 27, 2014, https://www.re-
of-force procedures and the rules of Academy. uters.com/article/us-russia-military-
engagement leads to justifiable ac- clout/russia-raises-military-clout-with-re-
tions. Non-lethal capability, means of Notes forms-after-georgian-war-idUS-
restraint (e.g. flexcuffs) and other 1
“The Current Situation in Venezuela,” BREA1Q1YR20140227.
forms of technology increase the op- Organization of American States, May 28, 17
Uri Friedman, “Russia’s Slow-Motion
tions available to commanders to sup- 2002, http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/eng- Invasion of Ukraine,” The Atlantic, Aug.
port U.S. goals in an information cam- lish/docs_en/docs_items/cpdoc3616_02. 29, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/
paign. When encountering a Russian- htm. international/archive/2014/08/russias-
backed actor, tactical success becomes 2
Joshua Chang, “Arms Sales, Mercenaries stealthy-slow-motion-invasion-of-
meaningless without the ability to and Strategic Bombers: Moscow’s Mili- ukraine/379312/.
control information. tary Footprint in Venezuela,” George- 18
Ibid.
town Security Studies Review, Nov. 24, 19
Ellen Ioanes, “These Are the Countries
Summary 2019, https://georgetownsecuritystudies- Where Russia’s Shadowy Wagner Group
In summary, Russia has strong incen- review.org/2019/11/26/arms-sales-mer- Mercenaries Operate,” Business Insider,
tives to train and equip the Venezue- cenaries-and-strategic-bombers-mos- Nov. 19, 2019, https://www.businessin-
lan military and defend Maduro’s re- cows-military-footprint-in-venezuela/. sider.com/russia-wagner-group-merce-
gime. Recent history suggests that a
3
Ibid. naries-where-operate-2018-4.
Russian-supported Venezuelan force 4
Ryan C. Berg, “Russia Is Gearing Up for a 20
Pavel Polityuk, “Ukraine Says May Block

35 Fall 2020
Russian Aid Convoy,” Reuters, Aug. 12, ganized-and-rearmed-military- 44
Jeff Desjardins, “All of the World’s
2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ pub-69853. Wealth in One Visualization,” Visual Cap-
us-ukraine-crisis-russia-aid/ukraine-says- 30
Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-Hour italist, Jan. 17, 2020, https://www.visual-
may-block-russian-aid-convoy-idUSK- Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and capitalist.com/all-of-the-worlds-wealth-
BN0GC08Q20140812. U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria,” The in-one-visualization/.
21
Karoun Demirjian, “Putin Denies Rus- New York Times, May 24, 2018, https:// 45
“Meeting with Creators of the Film Au-
sian Troops Are in Ukraine, Decrees Cer- www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/ gust 2008 and Veterans of the Military
tain Deaths Secret,” Washington Post, middleeast/american-commandos-rus- Operation in South Ossetia,” Feb. 23,
May 28, 2015, https://www.washington- sian-mercenaries-syria.html. 2012, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/presi-
post.com/world/putin-denies-russian- 31
Lavrov. dent/news/14582.
troops-are-in-ukraine-decrees-certain- 46
“Vladimir Putin Answered Journalists’
32
“Russia to Boost Venezuela Ties Amid
deaths-secret/2015/05/28/9bb15092- Questions on the Situation in Ukraine,”
US Pressure,” BBC News, Feb. 8, 2020,
0543-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story. March 4, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-
html. events/president/news/20366.
america-51423110.
22
Christopher Scott et al., Russian New- 47
Official site of the Russian president,
33
Chang.
Generation Warfare Handbook, Asym- interview for National Public Radio, Nov.
metric Warfare Group, December 2016,
34
Berg.
16, 2001, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
https://info.publicintelligence.net/AWG- 35
Christopher Woody, “The US and Rus- president/transcripts/21402. This is a
RussianNewWarfareHandbook.pdf. sia, and Their Fighter Jets, Are Looming NPR interview of Russian President Vladi-
23
Yuri Lapaiev, “Russian Electronic War- over Venezuela’s Latest Dispute,” Busi- mir Putin.
fare in Donbas: Training or Preparation ness Insider, Oct. 23, 2019, https://www. 48
“Meeting with President of Syria
for a Wider Attack?” Eurasia Daily Moni- businessinsider.com/russia-us-geopoliti- Bashar Assad,” president of Russia, Oct.
tor 17, No. 34, March 17, 2020, https:// cal-tensions-loom-over-venezuela-colom- 20, 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
jamestown.org/program/russian-elec- bia-conflict-2019-10. president/news/50533.
tronic-warfare-in-donbas-training-or- 36
Scott et al. 49
Richard Sisk, “Hundreds of Russian
preparation-for-a-wider-attack/. 37
Ibid. Mercenaries Now in Venezuela, U.S. Ad-
24
Keith Crane, Olga Oliker and Brian miral Says,” Military.com, Oct. 4, 2019,
Nichiporuk, “How Capable Are Russia’s
38
“IED and Sniper Defeat: The Battle Staff
Operations Process in a [Counterinsur- https://www.military.com/daily-
Armed Forces?” RAND Corporation, Oct. news/2019/10/04/hundreds-russian-
29, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ gency] Environment,” 2007, https://info.
publicintelligence.net/USArmy-Battle- mercenaries-now-venezuela-us-admiral-
research_reports/RR2573.html. says.html.
Staff.pdf.
25
Scott et al. 50
Adam Taylor, “How Many Cuban Troops
39
Ibid. Author’s note: This is my personal
26
Kinda Makieh, “Syria’s Assad Wrote to Are There in Venezuela? The U.S. Says
synthesis of the information that the
Putin over Military Support: Statement,” over 20,000. Cuba Says Zero,” Washing-
Combined Arms Center presents. They
Reuters, Sept. 30, 2015, https://www.re- ton Post, May 2, 2019, https://www.
describe the feedback loop with a focus
uters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria- washingtonpost.com/world/2019/05/02/
on staff operations. My focus is on the
putin/syrias-assad-wrote-to-putin-over- how-many-cuban-troops-are-there-vene-
process as a feedback loop, with each
military-support-statement-idUSKC- zuela-us-says-over-cuba-says-zero/.
segment of the reconnaissance organiza-
N0RU17Y20150930. 51
Lucia Kassai, “End of Venezuela’s Oil
tion playing an equally vital role.
27
Tom Balmforth and Maria Kiselyova, Fortune Looms over Maduro’s Regime,”
40
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Bloomberg Quint, June 20, 2020, https://
“Russian Forces Just Occupied a Former
Sniper Defeat Handbook, 2008. This re- www.bloombergquint.com/business/
US Air Base in Syria,” Business Insider,
source is restricted to Defense Depart- end-of-venezuela-s-oil-fortune-looms-
Nov. 15, 2019, https://www.businessin-
ment Common Access Card holders. See over-maduro-s-regime.
sider.com/russia-lands-forces-at-former-
Chapter 5 for details on the placement of
us-air-base-in-northern-syria-2019-11.
detection devices.
28
Anton Lavrov, “The Efficiency of the
Syrian Armed Forces: An Analysis of Rus-
41
Franz-Stefan Gady, “India to Buy 245
sian Assistance,” Carnegie Middle East US Stinger Air-to-Air Missiles,” The Diplo- Acronym Quick-Scan
Center, March 26, 2020, https://carnegie- mat, April 1, 2016, https://thediplomat.
mec.org/2020/03/26/efficiency-of-syri- com/2016/04/india-to-buy-245-us-sting- EW – electronic warfare
an-armed-forces-analysis-of-russian-as- er-air-to-air-missiles/. IED – improvised explosive device
sistance-pub-81150. 42
U.S. Army TRADOC, “OE Data Integra- NATO – North Atlantic Treaty
tion Network,” accessed June 18, 2020, Organization
29
Keir Giles, “Assessing Russia’s Reorga- PSUV – United Socialist Party of
nized and Rearmed Military,” Carnegie https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/
Venezuela
Endowment for International Peace, May Orlan-10_Russian_Unmanned_Aerial_Ve-
UAS – unmanned aerial system
3, 2017, https://carnegieendowment. hicle. UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle
org/2017/05/03/assessing-russia-s-reor- 43
Scott et al.

36 Fall 2020
 At the Forward Edge and Beyond:
Lethality and the Armored Brigade Combat Team
by MAJ(P) James Burnett and these lessons were the most valuable mechanized formations are the arm of
MAJ Jeffrey A. Feser tool a battalion commander could dis- decision to the most capable land
tribute across the force. force in the world. However, while the
Operational requirements for the past
United States focused on COIN-centric
20 years have degraded the armored These documented experiences, aug-
operations for the past 20 years, our
brigade combat team’s (ABCT) lethal- mented with decades of experience
adversaries have capitalized on our
ity. The state of armored lethality at from senior noncommissioned officers
preoccupation. They adapted, mod-
the small-unit level is serious, and it is (NCOs), especially master gunners
ernized and professionalized, testing
continuously decreasing through the (MGs), enabled our junior leaders to
their weapons, tactics and doctrine in
loss of institutional knowledge. develop the tactics and leaderships
limited conflicts with devastating ef-
skills that made America’s armored
Decline of lessons- fects.
formations the most formidable and
learned lethal in the world.
Before 2001, when the National Train- Regaining operational
However, the shift to the counterin- knowledge
ing Center (NTC) was the keystone
surgency (COIN) environment ren-
event in every brigade training cycle, The return of great-power competition
dered these lessons-learned about
battalion and brigade commanders represents a different operational en-
how to approach decisive-action en-
brought with them a sacred institu- vironment than previously faced. The
gagements at NTC obsolete. With the
tional knowledge gained through ex- incorporation and integration of ene-
return to great-power competition, to-
perience. Hard lessons-learned creat- my elements associated with the rise
day’s Armor force faces the loss of in-
ed leaders who bore the knowledge of of Grey Zone operations requires small
stitutional knowledge across the force
past battles, engagements and experi- U.S. military elements to disperse over
when it comes to decisive-action en-
ences through fighting a lethal and great distances to rapidly converge,
gagements.
thinking enemy. As the bridge be- engage and destroy the enemy in com-
tween operational art and tactics, The U.S. Army ’s armored and bined-arms operations. The U.S.

37 Fall 2020
military must move rapidly from one by HQDA, U.S. Army Forces Command managing and fielding MGs within the
point of conflict to another, reposi- (FORSCOM), HRC and TRADOC, to cor- force.
tioning and attacking the next objec- rect systemic issues from the crew
To decrease delinquencies and build
tive to provide continuous overmatch through Army-command level. These
effective MGs, III Armored Corps is
of violence at decisive points. LoEs center on MG use and proficien-
working with Army divisions to create
cy, M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehi-
Unfortunately, recent reports from the standardized sabot academies; in-
cle (IFV) leader competency and im-
combat-training centers (CTCs) cite a crease access to the Abrams Training
proved operational training.
30-percent decrease in target hits dur- Assessment Course and the Bradley
ing the past two decades with first-run Encompassing these LoEs, III Armored Training Assessment Course; and cre-
crew-qualification rates routinely be- Corps recently submitted the Com- ate a Department of the Army selec-
low 60 percent. Discrete adjustments mander’s Guide to ABCT Gunnery tion process to discover potential can-
to Army manning, training and struc- Handbook to the Center for Army Les- didates. III Corps is also working with
ture have resulted in a multitude of sons Learned for its publication. This FORSCOM and HQDA to designate
unanticipated second-order effects publication connects commanders coded MG skill-identifier positions in
within the armored force. For exam- with the knowledge that MGs and se- Armor platoons while adding require-
ple, a myriad of global requirements nior NCOs have developed during ments for Armor, Bradley and Stryker
dampened platform lethality despite years of executing gunneries. It also MGs at division and corps headquar-
technological advances throughout provides tips and lessons for how to ters levels.
the mechanized force. prepare for successful gunneries as Upon completion of these initiatives,
The question we now need to ask our- well as enhanced training standards each tank company will have three
selves is how can we regain operation- intended to stress crews to their max- more MGs, with an increase of 18
al knowledge through institutionalized imize training value. Its focus is how to within each ABCT. Upon identification
training, doctrine and manning to in- use gunnery as the means to an end and graduation from the course, com-
crease ABCT lethality and dominate in to increase crew lethality in combat. manders are ensuring MG stabilization
large-scale combat operations (LSCO). through proper personnel coding to
Increasing lethality maintain unit stability following the
To address this question and the cur- To increase lethality, it is necessary for completion of key development posi-
rent state of the armored and mecha- all units to fill all authorized MG posi- tions – a historical delinquency depriv-
nized force, III Armored Corps initiated tions to train our mechanized forces. ing units of trained personnel.
the Lethality Report on the State of MG use and proficiency addresses the
the Armored Brigade Combat Team mechanized force’s lack of MGs and Units are able to maintain technical
(ABCT). It collected observations, in- the correlating general decline in le- and tactically proficient NCOs up to 18
sights, data and lessons in collabora- thality and safety. MGs are the life- more months to increase institutional
tion with Headquarters Department of blood to developing unit and crew le- knowledge and stability within the
the Army (HQDA), Human Resources thality. They are the subject-matter force. Therefore active solicitation of
Command (HRC), U.S. Army Materiel experts, institutionally trained in di- MGs, along with committed manage-
Command, U.S. Army Training and rect-fire weapon systems, planning, ment and support from HRC for re-
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), First gunnery, training programs and com- maining shortages within each branch,
Army and the Maneuver Center of Ex- bat-vehicle weapons maintenance. is facilitating increased experience and
cellence. They enable us to defeat the enemy by lethality within ABCTs.
Report authors III Corps deputy com- optimally employing our most lethal Looking at our maneuver brethren in
manding general and III Corps com- weapon systems and increasing train- the XVIII Airborne Corps, we can see
mand sergeant major presented the ing focus on effective direct fires; they they have embraced the idea of insti-
findings at the Army Warfighting Con- are a force multiplier. tutional training as the keystone to re-
ference in September 2019. The re- alizing operational lethality. Ranger
Engaging the enemy effectively at the
port articulated a snapshot of the School, Airborne School and Air-As-
tactical horizon while dominating the
overall state of III Corps’ formations, sault School are all key components of
operational foreground takes direct-
seeking to address the probability of their leader development. M2 Bradley
fire precision that can only be taught
winning a peer-on-peer LSCO by estab- IFV leader competency must address
by our MGs. However, MGs are
lishing a baseline for discussions on the lack of leader proficiency within
manned at below 50 percent across
the requirements of the armored and the M2 Bradley force.
the force, and they often have less
mechanized community. The report
live-fire experience than a senior lieu- The M2 Bradley is the preeminent
also identified and highlighted the de-
tenant of the 1980s. This lack of expe- fighting platform deliberately devel-
clining lethality in the armored force
rience and an inadequate quantity of oped by the Army to be part of the le-
despite continued weapon-system and
MGs can be attributed to poor identi- thality coefficient and a key compo-
fire-control improvements.
fication, development and perfor- nent of combined-arms teams on the
In response, III Corps identified three mance of the candidate at the MG battlefield. As such, the vehicle com-
lines of effort (LoEs) encompassing 38 course. III Corps is actively working to mander must be able to both effec-
recommendations and operationalized change this trend; it is building, tively destroy the enemy with direct

38 Fall 2020
fire and transport infantry into close of sufficient technically competent short- and medium-range targets that
combat. They are responsible to not NCOs who are skilled on the M2 has do not represent the standard and did
only “shoot, move, communicate,” but stagnated current training proficiency not operate under the conditions units
also to integrate direct and indirect within armored and mechanized forc- expect to operate in during combat.
fires; maneuver infantry while sup- es. Correlations stemming from ineffi-
In response, III Armored Corps is initi-
porting vehicle maneuvers; and com- cient training and standards are fur-
ating multiple efforts to correct these
municate a clear and concise view of ther impacted by current operational
issues and limit the difference. To im-
the engagement area through the in- tempo, inefficient “Leader’s Time
prove operational training and main-
corporation of the Bradley Fighting Ve- Training,” lack of Advanced Gunnery
tain proficiency, it published new pol-
hicle. Training System (AGTS) / Bradley Ad-
icies to change the mindset of gunnery
vanced Training System (BATS), and/or
A single ABCT holds 233 Bradley crew- from a training event to a means to-
poor preparatory training prior to cer-
man positions or about 3,700 infantry- ward lethality. It now requires unit-
tifications. As such, negligence of
trained M2 crewmen across the Army level training emphasizing gunnery
technical proficiency and the tactical
enterprise. Of the approximately 1,800 tasks and AGTS/BATS systems leverag-
capability among platform command-
officers and NCOs on assignment in- ing to increase lethality. III Armored
ers remains limited, which prevents
structions to mechanized forces in Corps also forward-positioned digital
the ability to train and develop lethal
2020, less than 1,100 have prior ABCT training systems to support continu-
Soldiers.
experience. With that in mind, leader ous training during operational de-
competency must be addressed across These critical issues affect our combat ployments.
the force as nearly 700 leaders lack capabilities and Soldier safety. CTC in-
M2 experience upon arriving at an juries demonstrate that inexperience Recommended changes to Training
ABCT. Without proficient crews, troop is the lead contributing factor for in- Circular (TC) 3-20.31, Training and
and company commanders, units can- jury and loss of life on both the M2 Qualification, Crew, also limits al-
not effectively, nor safely, bring to Bradley and the Stryker. A long-term lowed variances within gunnery; these
bear the full lethality of the M2 plat- solution for this problem will have to limits restrict deviation approval lev-
form. include exponential increases in the els and quantities. All planned devia-
Bradley Commander’s and Gunner’s tions from standards prescribed in the
In response, III Armored Corps is TC require approval by the first gener-
Course capacity and the creation of a
changing the instructional method for al officer in the chain of command at
Bradley Crewmen Course to incorpo-
leaders unfamiliar with mechanized the G-60 brief.
rate junior leaders. The investment in
platforms. It is supporting re-institu-
institutional introduction and recur- Similarly, division G-3s must now ap-
tionalization training and an associat-
ring training will reduce injuries, in- prove all primary and alternate gun-
ed B9 additional skill identifier for In-
crease proficiency and ensure units nery scenarios and shot sheets for
fantry Branch M2 trained crewmen. It
are ready and lethal in case of LSCO. crew qualification tables. These ac-
is also enlarging and re-allocating pri-
oritization of NCOs for the Bradley A lack of MGs and their limited expe- tions will change the mindset of gun-
Leader’s Course through the unit mod- rience amplifies poor training. As a re- nery, returning its focus to crew lethal-
ified table of organization and equip- sult, training and live-fire standards ity instead of gunnery completion.
ment, while requiring attendance of across heavy formations vary signifi-
institutional schooling prior to arrival cantly from the requirements estab- Conclusion: increase
at ABCTs to create the competency lished in the Gunnery Training Circu- lethality
and lethality. lar. These deviations result in a wide The U.S. Army must be able to execute
Starting in 2021, HRC will annually in- lethality variance across the force as simultaneous offensive, defensive and
crease total Bradley Leader’s Course units differed on the types of engage- stability operations to prevail in large-
slots for NCOs, increasing training op- ments and distances they chose. scale ground combat while distribut-
portunities because of operational ed, but Armor lethality at small-unit
The future battlefield demands a cul-
needs. Mechanized-infantry Soldiers level remains in a serious state. The
ture where units raise proficiency by
must understand how to maneuver problem is complicated, but the cor-
achieving the standard against in-
their platform at the tactical level; it is rections required are feasible when
creasingly difficult conditions; howev-
the key to robbing the enemy of the they are recognized as an intercon-
er, the Lethality Report discovered
initiative. By combining maneuver and nected system. Returning to a great-
that only one of the four brigade com-
surprise, leaders at the lowest levels power training focus requires ABCT
bat teams’ (BCT) Abrams gunneries
create opportunities to deny the ene- emphasis on MG use and proficiency,
that were analyzed fired 72.7 percent
my the initiative. M2 leader competency and improved
(eight engagements) of their main-gun
operational training to increase lethal-
targetry at a long-range distance.
Strenuous training ity and ensure the mechanized force is
Three other BCTs averaged below 27.3
prepared to win the next first battle.
needed percent (three engagements). The pre-
Finally, to increase lethality, forces ponderance of BCTs surveyed failed to MAJ(P) James Burnett is the deputy
must reintegrate strenuous and com- challenge the capabilities of the vehi- fire-support coordinator, Joint Fire-
prehensive training scenarios. The lack cle or the crews; they engaged power Course, III Corps, Fort Hood, TX.

39 Fall 2020
His previous assignments include bri- a 450-trooper task force (in Kuwait),
gade S-3 division artillery; battalion co-assigned as commander, Headquar- Acronym Quick-Scan
S-3, 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery ters and Headquarters Company, 1 st
Regiment; fire-support officer, 1st Bri- Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, Fort ABCT – armored brigade combat
team
gade; fire-support officer, 1st Air Cav- Hood; commander, Company D (tank AGTS – Advanced Gunnery Training
alry Brigade – all with 1st Cavalry Divi- company), 1-12 Cav, Fort Hood; Multi- System
sion, Fort Hood. Other assignments in- national Battle Group – East planner, BATS – Bradley Advanced Training
cluded action officer, Pakistan Afghan- 504th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, System
istan Coordination Cell, J-5, Joint Staff, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo; and recon- BCT – brigade combat team
Pentagon, Washington, DC. MAJ Bur- naissance-platoon leader, 6th Squad- COIN – counterinsurgency
nett’s military schools include interme- ron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX
CTC – combat-training center
FORSCOM – (U.S. Army) Forces
diate-level education, Joint Fires (Operation Iraqi Freedom – Kirkuk). He Command
Course, Field Artillery Captain’s Career deployed to Afghanistan as the execu- HRC – Human Resources
Course and Field Artillery Basic Officer tive officer for Troop A, 1st Squadron, Command
Leader’s Course. He has a bachelor’s 13th Cav, Fort Bliss. MAJ Feser’s mili- HQDA – Headquarters Department
of arts degree in English literature tary schools include the School of Ad- of the Army
from St. Lawrence University; a bach- vanced Military Studies, Command
IFV – Infantry Fighting Vehicle
elor’s of arts degree in history from St. LoE – line of effort
and General Staff College, Engineer LSCO – large-scale combat
Lawrence University; and a master’s of Captain’s Career Course and Armor Ba- operations
arts degree in diplomacy from Norwich sic Officer Leader Course. He has a MG – master gunner
University. MAJ Burnett’s awards in- bachelor’s of arts degree in interna- NCO – noncommissioned officer
clude the Bronze Star Medal; the De- tional affairs and economics from NTC – National Training Center
fense Meritorious Service Medal, 1st George Washington University, a mas-
TC – training circular
oak-leaf cluster; and the Meritorious ter’s of arts degree in military art and
TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training
and Doctrine Command
Service Medal, 2nd oak-leaf cluster. science from the School of Advance
MAJ Jeff Feser is the G-35 planner, Le- Military Studies and a master’s degree
thality Cell Operational Planning in business administration from the Medal, 1 st oak-leaf cluster; Order of
Team, III Corps Headquarters, Fort University of Mary Hardin-Baylor. His Saint George medallion; and Order of
Hood, TX. His previous assignments in- awards include the Bronze Star Medal, Saint Maurice medallion.
clude battalion operations officer for 1st oak-leaf cluster; Meritorious Service

40 Fall 2020
 Armored Brigade Combat Team Cavalry Squadron’s
Combat Trains during Large-Scale Combat Operations:
Balancing Maintenance, Recovery,
Freedom of Maneuver
by MAJ Gary M. Klein and for the eastern end of the Colorado Blackhawks, became keenly aware of
CPT Ragan T. Rutherford Wash (MCP3). For at least a brief pe- the aforementioned gap in their com-
riod of time, the squadron was going bat trains’ disposition during National
The squadron was planning to contin-
to have three MCPs. Training Center (NTC) Rotation 20-01,
ue its reconnaissance east across the
and they sought to improve their po-
Ujen Bowl toward Razish, but its com- How did the squadron end up with so
sition. Unfortunately the fast tempo of
bat trains were about 20 kilometers many MCPs? How should the squadron
operations prohibited them from clos-
back from the current forward-line-of- arrange its leaders to lead these addi-
ing this gap entirely. However, they
own-troops (FLOT) in the vicinity of tional maintenance and recovery
Reyalem. The squadron leadership learned valuable lessons about their
nodes? How can the squadron leader-
knew this was less than ideal to sup- combat trains they share in this article
ship create a maintenance common
port even current operations, so the to help leaders navigate the inevitable
operational picture (COP) to enable it
headquarters and headquarters troop friction units will encounter while sus-
to track and regenerate combat pow-
(HHT) commander had started to move taining themselves during large-scale
er in multiple MCPs?
the combat trains to the western end combat operations.
of the Washboard the day before. Un- Cavalry-squadron doctrine provides a An armored brigade combat team
fortunately the HHT commander did template for how to organize and ar- (ABCT) cavalry-squadron’s combat
not have enough M88 recovery vehi- range the squadron’s sustainment and trains contain a number of critical re-
cles in the combat trains to move the maintenance systems.1 Unfortunately sources and capabilities, but this arti-
squadron’s non-mission capable battlefield friction makes it challeng- cle will focus on three:
(NMC) M1 Abrams and M2/M3 Brad- ing for leaders to arrange and operate
• Command and control;
ley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) in the the combat trains as neatly as doctrine
• Recovery; and
maintenance collection point (MCP) in describes it. The three MCPs in the in-
• Maintenance.
one movement. troductory real-world vignette is one
example. Squadron leadership must Ideally, these three activities operate
Compounding this challenge, the
continually reorganize its sustainment simultaneously without interference,
squadron’s new mission was about to
and maintenance assets to improve but reality is rarely so clean. Leaders
send it another 10 kilometers east.
the system, striving to bridge the in- must consider a number of questions
This left the squadron in the precari-
evitable gap between doctrine (an ide- related to these three capabilities:
ous position of improving its current
al solution) and the current battlefield • When should leaders recover NMC
position – moving its combat trains
situation. equipment to another location, and
from Reyalem (MCP1) to the western
end of the Washboard (MCP2) – while The authors, both leaders within 1 st when should they fix it in place?
simultaneously planning another MCP Squadron, 1 st Cavalry Regiment • What conditions may cause this

Figure 1. Doctrinal squadron/battalion trains. The left side of the illustration, from Army Technical Publication (ATP)
3-20.96, does not show the MCP in the squadron’s combat trains, but it does describe it in its text. (Left-side illustra-
tion adapted from Figure 7-4, ATP 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron; right-side illustration is adapted from Figure 7-3a, ATP
3-90.5, Combined-Arms Battalion)

41 Fall 2020
Figure 2. Echeloned squadron trains and maintenance and recovery assets. This figure and Table 1 describe the Black-
hawk Squadron’s standard distribution of maintenance personnel and recovery vehicles. They also describe what re-
covery sections or assets are responsible for evacuation among the different maintenance nodes (i.e. troop trains,
combat trains, MCP and field trains). (Graphic by the authors)

Table 1.

standard to change? The aforementioned questions allude shared understanding of how to lead,
• H o w d o c u r re n t a n d f u t u re to the fact that leaders must under- organize and arrange the combat
reconnaissance and security (R&S) stand the current mission and opera- trains; how to balance the potentially
operations impact these activities? tional variables to develop and imple- competing demands of maintenance,
• Whose responsibility is it to make ment successful sustainment concepts recovery and freedom of maneuver;
these decisions, and who must of support. Furthermore, units must and how to establish a maintenance
c o m m a n d - a n d - c o n t ro l t h e s e develop and practice standard operat- COP that helps leaders sustain contin-
activities once leaders make a ing procedures (SOPs) that enable ued R&S operations.
decision? them to succeed in a range of situa-
tions. This article will explain some of Cavalry-squadron
These are a few of the questions Cav-
the challenges the Blackhawk Squad- combat trains
alry leaders must consider to employ
their combat trains effectively, enable ron faced during NTC Rotation 20-01 The squadron’s combat trains tradi-
the squadron’s R&S operations and and present some options for how tionally contain the squadron’s com-
achieve their purpose of answering units might address these challenges bat-trains command post (CTCP), the
the commanders’ priority intelligence in the future. HHT command post (CP), the squadron
requirements.2 Squadron leadership must have a aid station (SAS), an emergency

42 Fall 2020
resupply of Class III and V, and the HHT commander has supervisory re- Blackhawk Squadron’s trains is the
MCP (Figure 1, left side).3 Although it sponsibility over the combat trains. baseline disposition of the squadron’s
is not specifically referenced in Caval- However, the Blackhawk Squadron maintenance and recovery assets (Fig-
ry doctrine, the combat trains – spe- gave the HHT commander operational ure 2). In line with doctrine, the Black-
cifically the MCP – usually contain a control over all elements in the com- hawk Squadron SOP prioritizes for-
portion of the forward-support com- bat trains to leverage his leadership ward maintenance and recovery sup-
pany (FSC)’s maintenance platoon to experience and authority – a decision port by placing the four FMT M88s and
return battle-damaged and NMC that enabled the squadron’s sustain- contact trucks in the troop trains,
equipment to the fight as soon as pos- ment operations at NTC.7 along with a portion of each team’s
sible.4 The Blackhawk Squadron’s com- tank and BFV mechanics (91A and
bat trains include most of the FSC’s In addition to the added weight of a 91Ms). 8 The rest of each FMT’s 91A
maintenance control section (MCS) troop commander, Blackhawk’s deci- and 91Ms are located in the combat
and service and recovery (S&R) sec- sion to place the HHT commander in trains, along with the FMTs’ forward
tion, the squadron’s shop stock, ele- command of the combat trains creates repair system (FRS) and bench-stock
ments of the cavalry and tank troops’ redundant leadership there. This en- containers.9 The FRS and bench-stock
field-maintenance teams (FMTs), and ables the S-4, HHT commander or HHT containers are located in the combat
a team from the field-maintenance executive officer to leave the CTCP and trains to not hinder the mobility of the
section (FMS) to support wheeled and trains for the squadron main CP or the troops’ trains. This arrangement plac-
light track maintenance (Figure 2 and field trains to conduct planning and es all the squadron’s 91A and 91Ms in
Table 1).5 support activities. either the troop or combat trains.
Finally, if the combat trains have to
With this SOP, the Blackhawk Squad- Cavalry-squadron doctrine is not
split – like in the case of creating mul-
ron combat trains include four key unique in organizing its FMTs forward
tiple MCPs, which will be covered in
leaders: the squadron S-4, the HHT in the troop and combat trains. Com-
the next section of this article – these
commander and platoon-level leader- bined-arms=battalion doctrine orga-
leaders can separate to lead the addi-
ship from the SAS and maintenance nizes its FMTs into the company and
tional node(s).
platoon.6 Doctrinally the squadron S-4 combat trains as well (Figure 1, right
controls the squadron’s trains, and the Another notable aspect of the side).10 The forward placement of all

Table 2. Options for MCPs unable to displace in one movement.

43 Fall 2020
the brigade’s 91A and 91Ms means the the threshold at which the combat situation permits to return inoperable
only tank and BFV mechanics further trains can still “displace in one move- and damaged equipment to the battle
back than the squadron or battalion ment.”14 Once the combat trains ex- as quickly as possible.”16
combat trains are the M88 recovery- ceeds two NMC combat platforms, the
To retain the squadron’s ability to con-
vehicle operators in the brigade-sup- squadron is forced to look for other
duct maintenance and recovery oper-
port battalion (BSB) FMC. In effect, the options to retain its freedom of ma-
ations forward, the squadron can re-
brigade does not have any field-main- neuver.
quest reinforcing support from the bri-
tenance capability for its combat plat-
Once the combat trains are no longer gade’s BSB. Unfortunately, the FMC
forms (M1 Abrams and M2/M3 BFVs)
able to displace in one movement us- has limited reinforcing capacity for re-
in its field trains or brigade-support
ing its organic S&R M88s, the squad- covery support, and there may not be
area (BSA) unless leaders deliberately
ron has three options to retain its free- enough M88s available in the BSB’s
adjust their task-organization or place-
dom of maneuver (Table 2). First, lead- FMC – depending on the brigade’s op-
ment of 91As and 91Ms.11
ers can provide reinforcing support by erational readiness (OR).17 Some com-
consolidating the troops’ FMT M88s in manders may commit the FMC’s M88s
Balancing maintenance, the squadron combat trains or by re- early to reinforce battalions or the
recovery, freedom of questing reinforcing M88s from the squadron if they have one or more
maneuver BSB’s FMC S&R section. Second, the NMC M88s.
Leaders must balance their desire to commander can evacuate NMC plat-
forms with its S&R M88s to the squad- Also, the BSB may need to retain these
conduct maintenance forward with
ron field trains, typically located in the M88s to move NMC vehicles in the
the realization that the squadron’s
BSA, or request assistance from the BSA. Reinforcing recovery support is
combat and troop trains can lose their
BSB’s FMC S&R section to accomplish the preferred option to retain the
freedom of maneuver – a fundamen-
the same task. combat trains’ freedom of maneuver
tal of reconnaissance – if they are
in most cases, but this option may be-
overwhelmed with NMC vehicles.12 At
Finally, the commander can create ad- come difficult depending on the bri-
the troop-level, doctrine states that
ditional MCPs and bound NMC equip- gade’s OR rate.
“[i]f the field-maintenance team can-
not repair the equipment quickly on- ment from one MCP to subsequent
Another option is to recover NMC
site, evacuate the component to the MCPs on the battlefield. Each of these
combat platforms back to the squad-
squadron’s [MCP].” 13 Unfortunately courses of action has advantages and
ron’s field trains in the BSA. R&S doc-
the authors learned firsthand that the disadvantages (Table 2), and some re-
trine implores planners to specify
need to evacuate NMC equipment to quire assets that may or may not be
when this is necessary – without citing
the combat trains to retain troop free- available depending on the current
specific examples – but maintenance
dom of maneuver can have the sec- mission variables.
doctrine reminds us that this option
ond-order effect of limiting the squad- The first option to displace the MCP requires moving more maintenance
ron combat trains’ freedom of maneu- and combat trains with more than two assets and personnel to the field trains
ver. NMC combat platforms is to gain rein- to enable maintenance operations
forcing support by consolidating the there.18
Cavalry troops have little choice but to
evacuate NMC vehicles that require squadron’s M88s or by requesting According to current modified tables
lengthy amounts of time to fix, so the M88 support from the BSB. 15 If the of organization and equipment, the
squadron must develop options to re- squadron orders its FMTs to provide brigade only has four tank and BFV
tain its combat trains’ freedom of ma- reinforcing support to the FSC’s S&R mechanics in the BSA, but these main-
neuver. Ideally, the troops’ FMTs in the section, this solves the immediate tainers are dedicated to the FMC’s
combat trains are able to repair NMC problem of the combat trains’ mobil- M88s for recovery operations, not
combat platforms recovered there rel- ity, but it hinders the troops’ ability to maintenance operations. This disposi-
atively quickly. Alternatively, the com- conduct its own recovery operations tion differs from historical mainte-
bat trains can hold NMC vehicles until and may limit the troop trains’ of free- nance concepts of support that includ-
additional part(s) arrive from the bri- dom of maneuver. ed maintenance pass-back support.19
gade’s supply-support activity, still al- This does not mean that the squadron
This may be a good solution if M88
lowing the FMTs to repair the vehicles cannot conduct maintenance activities
support is only needed for a short pe-
in the combat trains. on its combat platforms in the field
riod of time or if the troops can go
trains, but commanders must either
In either case, the HHT commander without their M88s for a specified pe-
send maintainers back to the field
must prepare to displace the combat riod of time (for example, during more
trains with their NMC vehicles or task-
trains, including any NMC vehicles. stationary security operations) be-
organize 91A or 91Ms to the FSC’s
Given the fact that there are two M88s cause the commander can solve the
FMS.20
in the combat trains, this starts to be- problem without requesting assis-
come problematic if there are more tance from another headquarters. In some cases, a combat platform may
than two NMC combat platforms However, it runs counter to the doctri- be damaged to such an extent that it
there. Given the combat trains’ dispo- nal concept of keeping maintenance requires evacuation for sustainment
sition, two NMC combat platforms is assets “as far forward as the tactical maintenance. If this is true, the lack of

44 Fall 2020
tank and BFV mechanics in the BSA is MCP closer to the FLOT, while the HHT necessitates more than one move-
not an issue. Doctrinally, the BSB’s commander, with recovery support, ment to displace. If attacked, leaders
FMC “serves as the central entry and assumed the task of recovering the may have to temporarily abandon
exit point for all equipment requiring NMC vehicles from the existing MCP some immobile equipment during sur-
evacuation for sustainment mainte- to the new MCP in multiple move- vivability moves. Also, multiple MCPs
nance.”21 ments (Figure 3). will decisively engage the squadron’s
recovery assets until all NMC vehicles
The decision to evacuate NMC combat Rather than being constrained by its are consolidated in the new MCP. Fi-
platforms back to the squadron field rear-most, immobile pieces of equip- nally, each additional MCP is another
trains retains the troops’ and combat ment, multiple MCPs enabled the location that must be secured and sus-
trains’ freedom of maneuver, and it squadron to continue sustainment op- tained, requiring additional mainte-
enables the brigade to maintain its erations and maintain its “mobility so nance personnel to conduct security
standard recovery stance. However, it that it may support the [R&S] mission operation and additional time for lo-
may come at the cost of forward- at extended ranges” by creating an- gistics-resupply operations.
maintenance activities. In the best- other MCP closer to the FLOT.22 This
case scenario, if commanders can af- places the S-4 and the CTCP closer to While more MCPs enable the squad-
ford to reallocate maintainers to the the troop trains so that he or she can ron to continue operations, they hin-
field trains, this option may slow the maintain communication and sustain- der the squadron’s ability to rapidly
return of combat platforms to the ment reporting with the troops. displace and regenerate combat pow-
troops. In the worst-case scenario, the er. As the squadron’s lines of commu-
field trains collect excess NMC vehi- Also, this allows the portion of the nication (LoCs) get longer, M88s and
cles, which jeopardizes the field trains troops’ FMTs in the combat trains and like vehicles for recovery move further
and BSA’s freedom of maneuver. their maintenance capabilities (lift, from the older MCP(s) and make it
shop and bench stock, etc.) to remain more difficult to recover vehicles from
Either way, the decision to recover ve- closer to the troop trains, supporting there.
hicles back to the squadron’s field their maintenance requirements. By
trains in the BSA must be a deliberate creating another MCP, the squadron Also, leaders prioritize recovering ve-
one that includes ensuring M1 Abrams can continue its logistics planning and hicles that have parts on hand, leaving
and M2/M3 BFV mechanics and tools position its alternate CP (i.e. the CTCP) those with long-lead-time parts at
are available to fix these platforms. closer to the main CP, and enable the MCPs further back. At that point, the
squadron’s freedom of maneuver squadron inherits another logistical
The third option is for the squadron to
through close access to emergency problem: resupplying multiple MCP(s).
temporarily create more than one
ammunition and fuel while simultane- The HHT commander and first ser-
MCP. As briefly touched upon in the
ously recovering vehicles from the geant must assume the responsibility
opening vignette, the authors found
previous MCP(s). for resupplying the MCP(s), and this
themselves in this situation during
creates more demands on their al-
NTC 20-01, and although it was less
ready busy timelines. Until the squad-
than ideal, they were able to negoti- Multiple MCPs ron transitions to more stationary op-
ate the challenges by leveraging the Having multiple MCPs has its advan-
erations, regenerating its lost combat
HHT commander’s leadership. If the tages, but it creates more challenges
power becomes more and more diffi-
combat trains were unable to move all and support requirements as well.
cult as its LoCs get longer.
the NMC vehicles in the MCP, the S-4 Having multiple MCPs enables the
could move the CTCP and the bulk of combat trains’ freedom of maneuver Despite these disadvantages, the
the combat trains, and establish a new by restoring its mobility, but it often squadron may be required to create

Figure 3. Proposed composition of combat trains with two MCPs.

45 Fall 2020
Table 3. Maintenance running estimates tracker with example data.

multiple MCPs if reinforcing support is ATP 3-20.5 suggests a standard where- friendly force information require-
not available and the brigade or by “repairs requiring up to two hours ments (FFIR) and continuously update
squadron does not wish to execute are conducted at company trains; two- the squadron’s running estimates us-
pass-back maintenance to the field to six-hour repairs at the combined- ing these FFIR, or risk unnecessary
trains or BSA. arms battalion MCP; and any repairs maintenance delays or the squander-
Regardless of the option selected to requiring greater than six hours go to ing of future combat power. Three
retain the trains’ freedom of maneu- the field trains.” 25 Leaders must re- keys to enable the establishment of
ver, leaders must establish mainte- member that the option to recover ve- the squadron’s maintenance COP are
nance time limits and evacuation hicles to the field trains must consider FFIR and reporting and tracking sys-
timelines, and specify conditions for whether the brigade, BSB and squad- tems. Leaders across the squadron
recovery operations to determine ron commanders’ plans – specifically, must report timely and accurate main-
when evacuation to the different the disposition of the brigade’s tank tenance information to update the
trains is advantageous. 23 At a mini- and BFV mechanics – support execut- squadron’s COP.
mum, leaders should establish these ing maintenance in the field trains and
BSA. The first step to establish maintenance
conditions within their operations or-
running estimates is determining what
ders, but ideally, they establish and
train these conditions as part of their
Maintenance running information must be reported to en-
estimates able the commander to make mainte-
tactical SOPs.
To enable the squadron and troop nance and recovery decisions. The 1-1
Comparing current doctrine, ATP Cav’s experience during NTC 20-01
commanders to make maintenance
3-20.97, Cavalry Troop, mentions the highlighted the need-to-know of four
and recovery decisions, the squadron
idea of time guidelines to enable re- critical FFIR:
must include maintenance running es-
pair or recovery decisions. ATP 4-33,
timates as part of its COP. Mainte- • Location and fault(s) of all NMC
Maintenance Operations, discusses
nance running estimates enable com- equipment;
some of the things that commanders
manders to determine where to con- • Part availability for NMC equipment;
should consider when developing
duct maintenance, when to recover
maintenance time limits. ATP 3-20.5, • The location and capabilities of each
vehicles to a different maintenance
Combined-Arms Battalion, references maintenance node; and
node (i.e. troop trains, combat trains,
specific examples of evacuation time- • Current recovery capabilities at each
MCP and field trains), when to adjust
lines, and ATP 3-20.96, Cavalry Squad- node.
the standard maintenance time limits,
ron, mentions that leaders must de-
and how to retain the trains’ freedom
termine triggers in coordination with The list of NMC equipment at the
of maneuver.
supporting elements across the bri- MCP(s) was particularly important for
gade for when evacuating equipment To enable these decisions, the staff commanders to continue to account
to the trains is advantageous.24 must develop maintenance-related for equipment and plan for the

46 Fall 2020
47 Fall 2020
Figure 4. 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, combat-power tracker. (Graphic by CPT Max Banerjee)
displacement of the squadron’s com- demanding enough in garrison, but Advanced Military Studies Program,
bat trains. Collectively these mainte- they face increased challenges during Command and General Staff Officer
nance running estimates (Table 3), tactical operations. Inevitable drops in Course, MCCC, Armor Basic Officer
combined with the squadron combat the squadron’s OR rate often create Leader’s Course, Ranger School, Air-
power tracker (Figure 4), enabled competing maintenance and recovery borne School and Air-Assault School.
commanders to decide where to con- demands that can challenge the He has a bachelor’s of science degree
duct maintenance, when to recover MCP(s) and trains’ freedom of maneu- in biochemistry from the University of
NMC vehicles to a different mainte- ver. The squadron has three options to Michigan, a master’s of science degree
nance node and how to prepare for fu- overcome these challenges: request in medicinal chemistry from the Uni-
ture operations. reinforcing M88 support; initiate pass- versity of Illinois-Chicago and a mas-
back maintenance; or create more ter’s of arts degree in military opera-
Maintenance running estimate track- MCPs. These three options for retain- tions from the School of Advanced Mil-
ers must be updated from a combina- ing the combat trains’ freedom of ma- itary Studies.
tion of routine situation reports, bat- neuver have advantages and disadvan-
tle-update briefs (BUBs) and periodic tages, and leaders must understand CPT Ragan Rutherford is an instructor,
maintenance updates from the squad- the entire maintenance system from Cavalry Leader’s Course, 3rd Squadron,
ron’s trains. Troops’ routine situation the troop to the brigade level to en- 16th Cavalry Regiment, 316th Cavalry
reports should include information on able optimal maintenance and recov- Brigade, Fort Benning. His previous as-
NMC vehicles – whether they were ery decisions. signments include commander, Troop
combat losses or maintenance faults A and HHT, 1-1 Cavalry, 2nd ABCT, 1st
– and the locations of troop and com- To sustain continued combat opera- Armored Division, Fort Bliss; plans of-
bat trains. BUBs provide another ven- tions, squadron leaders must have a ficer, 2nd ABCT, 1 st Armored Division,
ue for confirming and refining running shared understanding of how to bal- Fort Bliss; executive officer, Troop N,
estimates, including planned move- ance the potentially competing de- 4th Squadron, 2nd Cav, Rose Barracks,
ments of the squadron trains during mands of maintenance and recovery, Germany; and platoon leader, Troop O,
the next 24-48 hours and maintenance and the trains’ freedom of maneuver. 4-2 Cav, Rose Barracks. CPT Ruther-
updates from the troops. All commanders must contribute to ford’s military schools include the Cav-
these efforts by reporting accurate alry Leader’s Course, MCCC, Ranger
Finally, periodic maintenance updates FFIR that update maintenance running School, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s
from the squadron’s combat and field estimates and establish a COP to en- Course, Army Reconnaissance Course,
trains provide critical updates on NMC able decision-making. Airborne School and Pathfinder School.
vehicle locations and maintenance sta- He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in
tus. Updates from the combat trains Finally, the HHT commander must
have an intimate knowledge of the bri- history from Texas A&M University.
are especially important, as mainte-
nance activities there are taking place gade’s maintenance and recovery sys- Notes
under the supervision of the HHT com- tem to lead the combat trains and en- 1
ATP 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron, Wash-
mander and away from the line-troop able combat power regeneration. Re-
ington, DC: Government Printing Office,
commanders. While the squadron ex- generating and maintaining combat 2016.
ecutive officer, maintenance officer power are not easy tasks during con- 2
Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnais-
and field-maintenance technician are tinuous operations, but leaders must
sance and Security Operations, Washing-
responsible for leading the field-main- learn and apply lessons like those ton, DC: Government Printing Office,
tenance effort itself, the HHT com- mentioned here to ensure successful 2015.
mander must plan, recommend and R&S during large-scale combat. 3
ATP 3-20.96.
supervise the combat trains in the
MAJ Gary Klein is the squadron execu- 4
ATP 4-33, Maintenance Operations,
context of its sustainment, mobility Washington, DC: Government Printing
tive officer, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry
and tactical emplacement within the Office, 2019.
Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX. His previous
squadron’s larger operations.
assignments include squadron opera- 5
The MCS attaches one 92A to support
This includes potentially splitting the tions officer, 1-1 Cav, Fort Bliss; plans logistics automations in the field trains.
combat trains if conditions require officer, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; The S&R section attaches one M984 to
that. This is a significant increase in small-group leader, Maneuver Cap- support recovery operations from the
tain’s Career Course (MCCC), Com- field trains. The FMS is primarily located
the HHT commander’s maintenance
in the field trains, but it attaches 91Bs
responsibilities as compared to garri- mand and Tactics Directorate, Maneu-
and 91Hs to the combat trains to enable
son – where HHT does not even have ver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, wheeled vehicle and light track mainte-
a field-maintenance team of its own – GA; troop senior observer/coach/ nance there as necessary.
and the squadron executive officer trainer, Task Force 4, Operations 6
It is advantageous to echelon the
and HHT commander must synchro- Group, Joint Readiness Training Cen- squadron’s S-1 and S-4 leadership across
nize plans and priorities daily to en- ter, Fort Polk, LA; commander, Troop the battlefield as well. We recommend
sure unity of effort. B, 1st Squadron, 33rd Cavalry Regiment, splitting the S-1 section between the
“War Rakkasans,” Fort Campbell, KY; combat and field trains, and the S-4 sec-
Conclusion and commander, HHT, 1-33 Cav. MAJ tion between the squadron main CP and
Maintenance o p e ra t i o n s are Klein’s military schools include the combat trains.

48 Fall 2020
7
Placing the HHT commander in charge maintenance support method like it was
of the combat trains is not unusual. See prior to Army modularization. See ATP Acronym Quick-Scan
Paul M. Guzman, Anthony R. Davila and 4-33 for modern mentions of reinforcing
Marc A. DeLuca, “The Combat-Trains maintenance support; FM 6-0, Com- ABCT – armored brigade combat
Command Post in the Stryker Brigade mander and Staff Organization and Op- team
Combat Team’s Cavalry Squadron,” AR- erations, Washington, DC: Government ATP – Army technical publication
MOR, January-March 2016; and Kyle S. Printing Office, 2014, for modern support BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle
Marcum and Andrew J. Prunty, “Fighting relationships doctrine; and FM 4-30.3, BSA – brigade-support area
the Combat-Trains Command Post in a Maintenance Operations and Proce- BSB – brigade-support battalion
Decisive-Action Training Environment,” dures, Washington, DC: Government BUB – battle-update brief
ARMOR, January-March 2016. Printing Office, 2004, for a description of COP – common operational picture
8
ATP 4-33. the historical “backup / reinforcing sup- CP – command post
port method.” CTCP – combat-trains command
9
NTC Ops Group, “Combined-Arms Bat- post
talion Maintenance,” The Company Lead-
16
ATP 4-33. FFIR – friendly force information
er; accessed May 9, 2020, http://compa- 17
Ibid. requirements
nyleader.themilitaryleader. 18
ATP 3-20.96; ATP 4-33. FLOT – forward-line-of-own-troops
com/2020/05/09/combined-arms-battal- FM – field manual
19
FM 4-30.3, Maintenance Operations
ion-maintenance/. FMC – forward-maintenance
and Procedures. company
10
ATP 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion, 20
Garrick L. Cramer and Jeffrey P. Kelley, FMS – field-maintenance section
Washington, DC: Government Printing
“Passback Maintenance in a Decisive-Ac- FMT – field-maintenance team
Office, 2016.
tion Operation,” www.army.mil, May 29, FRS – forward repair system
11
ATP 4-33. 2018, https://www.army.mil/arti- FMS – field maintenance section
12
FM 3-98. cle/204474/pass_back_maintenance_ FSC – forward-support company
in_a_decisive_action_operation; ac- HHT – headquarters and
13
ATP 3-20.97, Cavalry Troop, Washing- headquarters troop
ton, DC: Government Printing Office, cessed May 3, 2020.
LoC – lines of communication
2016. 21
ATP 4-33. MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s
14
ATP 3-20.96. 22
FM 3-98. Career Course
MCP – maintenance collection point
15
Reinforcing support is mentioned in 23
ATP 3-20.96.
MCS – maintenance-control section
modern maintenance doctrine, and it is 24
ATP 3-20.97 and ATP 4-33. NMC – non-mission capable
specifically referenced in modern sup- 25
ATP 3-90.5. NTC – National Training Center
port relationship doctrine, but it is no OR – operational readiness
longer deliberately described as a R&S – reconnaissance and security
SAS – squadron aid station
SOP – standard operating
procedure
S&R – service and recovery

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of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA, is interested in leaders who are called to a
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personally and professionally should apply at the Fort Benning Website,
https://www.benning.army.mil/MCoE/NCOA/Instructor-Application.html.

49 Fall 2020
Zone Reconnaissance –
Why Don’t We Do It?
by MAJ Jeffrey W. Jennings later than 10 p.m. to avoid desynchro- Just as you finished that thought, your
nizing the brigade.” gunner began to read to you a flash,
April 1, 2020: You’re a cavalry-troop
immediate, priority, routine message
commander deployed to the National At 6 p.m., your troop executed LD and from squadron that ordered you to in-
Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. began its zone-reconnaissance mis- crease your rate of march. The com-
Two enemy boyevaya razvedyvatelna- sion, departing Columbia Wash and bined-arms battalion you were sup-
ya dozornaya mashina (BRDMs), or moving (in column) generally north- porting needed you to hurry up so
Russian-made scout vehicles, have just west toward Main Supply Route (MSR) they could LD on time. You radioed 1st
destroyed your entire troop. Ia Drang. A little while later, as the sun Platoon and told them to pick up the
You received a fragmentary order set behind the Sawtooth, your night- pace.
(FRAGO) at 10 a.m. to execute zone re- vision goggles washed out, and you
ducked down in your hatch to check Then, as your vehicle (tucked safely
connaissance west to provide freedom
your Joint Capabilities Release (JCR). between your 1st and 2nd platoons, still
of maneuver for the brigade, expand
You saw your troop’s icons traveling traveling in column) passed the Pizza
the security area and establish a
west in close-column on MSR Ia Drang. Hut on MSR Ia Drang, Red One burst
screen in the vicinity of Brown Pass
You thought you should deploy – after onto the troop net.
(Phase Line (PL) Panther). At noon,
you issued your own FRAGO to your all, the terrain to your south looked
trafficable for your troop’s vehicle “Contact! Tanks! (but they weren’t
platoon leaders, walked through a tanks …) North! 1,000 meters! Out!”
quick map rehearsal, and then you platform.
closed your eyes to sleep for the first Five minutes ago, your troop’s last sur-
Where exactly was your troop bound-
time in two days. viving vehicle was destroyed. You re-
ary to the south, again?
ported with your dying breath to
You woke from your nap at 4 p.m. to On your JCR, you could see there was squadron, and you now sit in your ve-
participate in a commander’s update not much dispersion between 1st and hicle staring at your map – studying a
brief, in which squadron ordered you 2nd platoons. The phrase “ducks in a place called The Race Track. You
to your line of departure (LD) at 6 p.m. row” flashed across your mind. scratch your head. What just hap-
and to make your reconnaissance pace pened?
rapid: “You need to move fast and es- Where exactly was your probable line
tablish your screen at PL Panther no of contact, again? Common scenario
Scenarios like this are commonplace
among cavalry troops at NTC. All too
often, the enemy engages and de-
stroys the cavalry troop as it travels
down an MSR in a convoy or, slightly
better, traveling while “deployed” in a
very tight wedge or line with very lit-
tle dispersion between vehicles. How-
ever, this painful learning experience
can be avoided before your unit de-
parts home station. This is a fight you
can win before LD. Here’s how.
Understand the scout mission profile
and the missions you will execute. Was
the unit described in the opening nar-
rative really executing zone reconnais-
sance?
Zone reconnaissance is the most com-
mon mission assigned to cavalry
Figure 1. A “Donovian BRDM” engages friendly-force vehicles with its Hot-3 troops at NTC, yet it is almost never
anti-tank guided-missile weapon system at NTC. (U.S. Army photo by PVT Aus- executed to standard. The troop com-
tin Anyzeski) mander, in conjunction with the

50 Fall 2020
squadron commander, determines the decisively engaged) and are often de- Commanders must clearly understand
priority of tasks that best answer pri- stroyed in the process. This occur- (and coordinate with adjacent units)
ority information requirements (PIRs) rence constitutes zone-reconnaissance boundaries identifying the troop’s and
and then focuses the troop’s collection failure, is more similar to a movement- platoon’s area of operations to ensure
efforts against these requirements. In to-contact and does not achieve the effective reconnaissance. Command-
other words, they establish reconnais- squadron’s requirement to collect and ers must also ensure that subordinate
sance objectives. According to Army provide information to the customer leaders (at the team, section and pla-
Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-20.97, unit. toon level) understand the indicators
tasks associated with zone reconnais- that will allow them to answer PIRs in
sance include: To successfully conduct zone recon- a timely fashion. Commanders must
naissance, troop commanders must fully understand and incorporate high-
• Find and report all enemy forces
develop a concept of operation (and a er headquarters’ reconnaissance ob-
within the zone;
detailed scheme of maneuver) that jectives and R&S guidance, and must
• Determine the trafficability of all clearly incorporates and delineates re- engage in commander-to-commander
terrain in the zone; connaissance and security (R&S) guid- dialogue to confirm that understand-
• Inspect and classify all bridges in the ance (focus, tempo, engagement cri- ing. Commanders must leverage the
zone; teria, disengagement criteria and dis- squadron S-2’s intelligence prepara-
• Locate and report all mines, obstacles placement criteria) as described in tion of the battlefield (IPB) to assist
and barriers in the zone; and Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance with mission analysis. These are the
• Locate bypasses around built-up and Security Operations, Page 4-8, elements that constitute effective
areas, obstacles, etc. Paragraph 4-38. Commanders must zone reconnaissance (ATP 3-20.97).
consider the supported commander’s
These tasks are completed to answer PIR and the last time information is of Leaders must understand their forma-
PIR in named areas of interest (NAIs) value, and then shape maneuver ac- tion’s doctrinal missions. Build check-
and target areas of interest, or to iden- cordingly. Commanders must integrate lists into your standing operating pro-
tify and mitigate an enemy system on reconnaissance methods such as dis- cedure (SOP) to ensure you accom-
your high-payoff target list. mounted, mounted, aerial and recon- plish the tasks necessary for each mis-
naissance by fire in conjunction with sion. Plan your scheme of maneuver
Did the unit described earlier accom- deployment methods and movement accordingly.
plish any of those things? Did they techniques that support the desired
even attempt to? Perhaps the unit in tempo of operations. To execute effective zone
the opening narrative was uninten-
tionally executing something more
akin to a movement-to-contact. A
movement-to-contact is a mission ex-
ecuted by armor and infantry forma-
tions to develop the situation and to
establish or regain enemy contact
when the tactical situation is not clear.
It’s also used when the enemy has
broken contact. A movement-to-con-
tact, by design, may result in a meet-
ing engagement or a transition into a
deliberate attack. It usually does not
adhere to the principle of making con-
tact with the smallest element. The
goal, once in contact, is to maneuver
quickly to overcome enemy forces be-
fore they can react.
A movement-to-contact is not a doc-
trinal reconnaissance task; it does not
adhere to the fundamentals of recon-
naissance.
Often cavalry troops at NTC simply
maneuver in a specific direction (to-
ward a limit of advance) focused al-
most entirely on making enemy con-
tact. Once contact is made, cavalry
troops usually attempt to maneuver
against the threat (becoming Figure 2. Cavalry-troop zone reconnaissance. (From Figure 3-1, ATP 3-20.97)

51 Fall 2020
 formation(s) and commanders must conduct IPB (and
to employ the leverage the squadron S-2 to assist) to
correct move- determine the probable line of contact
m e n t to determine the probable line of de-
technique(s). ployment.
These failures not
If enemy contact is unlikely, traveling
only reduce the
may be appropriate. When enemy
troop’s ability to
contact becomes likely, scout troops/
execute its zone-
platoons must transition to bounding
reconnaissance
overwatch. When squadron wants a
mission but also
quicker pace/speed, the cavalry troop
provide the ene-
must adjust its movement technique
my with easy di-
rather than its formation. In any case,
rect-fire engage-
one truth remains constant: regardless
ment opportuni-
of the likelihood of enemy contact, a
Figure 3. A scout platoon traveling in column with 20 me- ties.
scout formation traveling in a column
ters of dispersion between vehicles cannot effectively ex-
To effectively per- cannot properly execute zone recon-
ecute zone reconnaissance and is vulnerable to enemy di-
rect- or indirect-fire engagement. form zone recon- naissance.
naissance, cavalry Tactics, techniques and procedures
reconnaissance, you must first under- troops must operate at their maximum (TTP): At NTC during reception, stag-
stand what it requires. achievable dispersement. They must ing, onward-movement and integra-
also transition between movement tion week, platoons and troops can ex-
techniques and formations as appro- ecute drivers’ training/terrain familiar-
Execute proper priate, based on probable lines of en-
maneuver, dispersion ization, incorporating movement tech-
emy contact (by weapon system / ca- niques and formations. This sort of
Was the unit in the opening narrative pability) and the commander’s recon- training should also be executed as a
using the correct formations, move- naissance guidance (tempo and focus). part of all training at home station.
ment techniques and operating dis-
tances (dispersion) for effective zone Properly dispersed, a Stryker brigade
combat team’s scout platoon, for ex- Prepare, rehearse,
reconnaissance?
ample, can achieve a “frontage” of up build playbook now
No. The troop in the opening narrative to four kilometers. This is calculated It’s Training Day 5 in your NTC rota-
was traveling in close columns while (and adjusted) based on enemy-fires tion; you’ve been awake for close to 40
tasked to execute zone reconnaissance capability, friendly-fires coverage, mu- hours. You’ve just received a FRAGO to
(a common occurrence at NTC). In do- tual direct-fire support between vehi- execute a zone reconnaissance. Would
ing so, the troop simultaneously failed cles, unit boundaries, terrain and oth- you rather …
to operate at proper dispersion dis- er mission considerations. References • Put on your thinking cap, pull out a
tances, to use the appropriate for developing operating distances sketchpad and develop your plan
specific to partic- from scratch; or
ular missions is at
• Refer to the “playbook” (SOP) your
Appendix B of
team developed together, discussed,
ATP 3-20.97, Cav-
implemented and trained at home
alry Troop.
station?
In the opening
Have you ever watched a National
narrative, the
Football League game in which the
troop command-
coach and quarterback huddled on the
er wondered
sideline to design every play from
“where is my
scratch immediately before they exe-
probable line of
cuted it? Unlikely. Develop your “play-
contact?” Know-
book” now when you are rested, have
ing where the en-
time, can plan collaboratively and can
emy will likely be-
practice (rehearse) your plays (SOPs).
gin to engage
Figuratively, know that in a given situ-
you, and with
ation you are going to execute “56
what weapon sys-
Trap Right” or “88 Y-Option Wheel.”
tem, is essential
Figure 4. A scout platoon bounding by section with 1,000 to transitioning TTP: Using maps and micromachines
feet between vehicles can effectively reconnoiter a zone between move- on a conference room table, your
and is less vulnerable to enemy direct- or indirect-fire en- ment techniques. team can collaboratively design what
gagement. Therefore, zone reconnaissance (and other

52 Fall 2020
missions) looks like in garrison. You what you think your (insert mission that do none of these things simply
can establish which platoon/section is here) will look like, you may find your- learn the hard way. Start now. Come
responsible for which tasks, and you self in the same position as the troop prepared. The BRDMs in the vicinity of
can make those enduring assignments. commander in our introductory narra- The Race Track are waiting for you.
You can rehearse (have the executive tive.
MAJ Jeff Jennings is a cavalry-troop
officer play the enemy) those “plays”
trainer with Cobra Team, Operations
to work out points of friction early. Conclusion Group, NTC, Fort Irwin, CA. His previ-
Then, once you’re executing in the If you are a cavalry-troop commander ous assignments include commander,
field, you simply adjust your “play” or platoon leader, you can rest assured Headquarters and Headquarters Com-
(SOP) for terrain and enemy, adapt that most of your missions at NTC will pany, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regi-
and execute. It is much quicker than brief a lot like this: “Comanche Troop ment, 1 st Stryker Brigade Combat
designing your play on the spot when executes zone reconnaissance of Area Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Base
time counts and you’re in contact. of Operations Carolina, clears Objec- Lewis-McChord (JBLM), WA; com-
tive Falcon and establishes a screen at
Endeavor to reach a point of shared mander, Comanche Company, 1-23 In-
PL Panther no later than [time/date
competency so well developed that fantry (Stryker), JBLM; Stryker infantry
group] to provide freedom of maneu-
when you tell your team, “We’re exe- battalion assistant operations officer,
ver and early warning to the brigade.
cuting zone reconnaissance to estab- 1-23 Infantry, JBLM; and aide-de-camp
…” Units (leaders) that execute zone
lish a screen at PL Panther” at NTC, ev- to the 1st Cavalry Division deputy com-
reconnaissance (and other missions)
eryone knows exactly what that means manding general of sustainment, Fort
to standard come prepared.
and the part he/she will play in it. Bat- Hood, TX, and Kandahar, Afghanistan.
tle drills are only well rehearsed and • They develop, rehearse and execute MAJ Jennings’ military schools include
effective once the whole team under- SOPs at home station (they come Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course,
stands and incorporates the associat- with a playbook). Maneuver Captain’s Career Course,
ed pre-combat checks and pre-combat • They know, understand and use Stryker Leader’s Course and Cavalry
inspections associated with each R&S proper dispersion, movement Leader’s Course. He has a bachelor’s
mission in your unit’s profile. That’s techniques and formations. degree in business administration
why these items must be codified into • They know, understand and abide by from Georgia Southern University.
SOP checklists. Well-rehearsed and their commander’s reconnaissance
fluidly executed battle drills enable guidance.
your unit to achieve the quick pace Acronym Quick-Scan
and effectiveness higher headquarters • They follow the zone-reconnaissance
demands. task list and understand the priority ATP – Army techniques publication
of tasks. BRDM – boyevaya
Before departing home station, strive • They reconnoiter. razvedyvatelnaya dozornaya
to achieve a level of core mission-es- mashina (Russian scout vehicle)
sential task-list proficiency so high • They develop and refine NAIs to CP – checkpoint (Figure 2)
that everyone in your formation could answer PIRs. FRAGO – fragmentary order
do zone reconnaissance in his/her • They use smoke and suppressive IPB – intelligence preparation of the
battlefield
sleep. This will require you to be cre- fires to facilitate maneuver (both
JBLM – Joint Base Lewis-McChord
ative with your training opportunities mortars and field artillery). JCR – Joint Capabilities Release
– you don’t need to be in the field to • They fly their Raven. LD – line of departure
practice zone reconnaissance. You can • They use their enablers and
LoA – limit of advance (Figure 2)
do it on a map (of NTC, preferably) attachments.
MSR – main supply route
with miniature vehicles. You can do it NAI – named area of interest
during physical training. You can do it • They report accurately and with NTC – National Training Center
during brownbag lunches with your timeliness, based on observation of PIR – priority information
NAIs to answer brigade PIRs. requirement
team. Wargame and rehearse now. PL – phase line
• They expand the general themes of R&S – reconnaissance and security
Refer to Chapter 5 (specifically Page this article beyond zone RP – release point (Figure 2)
5-22) of ATP 3-20.97 for a zone-recon- reconnaissance and practice the S – screen (Figure 2)
naissance vignette (which includes a same TTPs when executing security SOP – standard operating
full operations order and graphics) missions as well. procedures
that you can use for planning and re- SP – start point (Figure 2)
hearsing. If you prepare now, you’ll In short, units that are successful at TTP – tactics, techniques and
simply be executing well-rehearsed NTC do all these things routinely. They procedures
battle drills at NTC. Simply put, if you adhere to R&S fundamentals. Units
wait until Training Day 4 to sketch

53 Fall 2020
Reforge the Broken Saber:
Evolving the Infantry Brigade Combat Team’s
Cavalry Squadron to Win the Recon Fight
by SGT Christopher Broman station, the air-vehicle-transport hum- to a reconnaissance platoon that nei-
vee and a launcher trailer, all of which ther has the time to stop and set up
Part 2 of 2
are sling-loaded under a Chinook and the system or wait for the UAS to re-
In Part I we discussed squadron and can be placed in the headquarters and turn so it can move.
troop organizational solutions. In this headquarters troop (HHT).5
part we’ll look at suggested technolo- Another issue is that with only two
gy, as well as more Soldier and vehicle While a simpler solution might be to complete systems per troop, the com-
solutions that support the organiza- simply create operational control of mander is forced to split his UAS be-
tional solutions proposed in Part I. the brigade Shadow to the squadron, tween named areas of interest (NAIs)
at any point the brigade commander and his maneuver elements. Instead,
Squadron, platoon can retask that asset, once again leav- the platoons themselves should also
ing the squadron without its own UAS. have a UAS to assist in their missions,
and squad UAS thus freeing up the Raven to focus
“Aerial reconnaissance conducted by At troop level, the platform used is the solely on troop-level taskings.
[unmanned aerial systems (UAS)] ... RQ-11 Raven. With its 60- to 90-min-
provides a flexible, low-risk means for ute flight time, “disposable” design (by While there are many different types
gaining basic information in the least not storing data onboard) and relative of UAS available, the best for platoon
amount of time,” according to Army ease of use, it’s a good system to be operations is the quadcopter. Re-
Technical Publication (ATP) 3-20.98, used from a stationary position like a search has shown that quadcopters
Reconnaissance Platoon.1 The rise of tactical-operations center (TOC).6 Un- are the “most versatile and mechani-
UAS in both military and civilian appli- fortunately this does not translate well cally easy to construct autonomous
cations has effectively demonstrated
the accuracy of this.
Currently the only organic UAS avail-
able to the squadron are the Raven
systems at troop level. For aerial infor-
mation collection (IC), a UAS needs to
be at every level from squad to squad-
ron. These systems should be man-
portable at the lowest level, scale up
in size and capabilities at the next
higher element, and have vertical
take-off and landing (VTOL) capabili-
ties.2
At squadron level, a RQ-7B Shadow
should be the assigned UAS asset.
With its nine hours’ endurance from
take-off to landing and a variety of in-
telligence, surveillance and reconnais-
sance (ISR) capabilities, it is the ideal
system to help support the squadron.3
In the infantry brigade combat team
(IBCT) and armored BCT, the one Tac- Figure 1. SGT Christopher Curley, an infantryman with small-UAS-operator
tical Unmanned Air Vehicle (TUAV) duties assigned to 1-4 Infantry Regiment, Joint Multinational Readiness Cen-
ter, Hohenfels, Germany, recovers a quadcopter through a second-story win-
platoon is at the brigade level, but the
dow during Combined Resolve X. Combined Resolve X included about 3,700
Stryker BCT squadron has one organi- participants from 13 nations at 7th Army Training Command’s Grafenwoehr
cally in its surveillance troop.4 Instead and Hohenfels training areas. Combined Resolve X also tested the U.S. Ar-
of placing a full platoon, the Shadow my’s regionally allocated combat brigades to Europe in a combat-training
also has an early-entry configuration center rotation that had a Joint, multinational environment. (U.S. Army photo
of 15 Soldiers, one ground-control by 1LT Matt Blubaugh, 145th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

54 Fall 2020
aerial vehicle.”7 This simplicity of con- also the difficulty in effectively coun- Positioning System (GPS) components
struction has led to them being read- tering their use. In the Russian New of U.S. drones.16 The EW vehicles can
ily available in the commercial market Generation Warfare Handbook, there be used to create an interference
and has seen their use by threat forc- is an example of Ukrainian units ob- “bubble” to help prevent observation
es. During the Battle of Mosul, the Is- serving eight Russian UAS overflights by threat systems. For larger systems
lamic State in Iraq and Syria flew more per day, causing inhibited movement that fly well above the range of small-
than 300 missions in one month, one- and instilling a fear of being spotted.13 arms fire, this would be a potentially
third of these being armed strike with In 2014, near the Ukrainian village of effective counter.
off-the-shelf $650 quadcopters.8 Zelenopillya, Russian unmanned sys-
At the scout-platoon level, simply
tems identified a halted Ukrainian col-
Quadcopters are extremely easy to shooting at the drone is not the most
umn and inflicted heavy casualties
use, cheaper to replace and have an effective way of removing the threat.
through indirect fire.14
increased level of maneuverability Instead, new anti-drone rounds or sys-
over systems like the Raven. They are Currently the guidance given is that if tems need to be implemented. One
so agile that the Drone Racing League small UAS (such as Ravens or quadcop- example is the IXI Dronekiller current-
flies them over the seats and through ters) are observed over a unit’s posi- ly being tested by the Army and Ma-
the concourses of the Miami Dolphins tion, it is presumed that position is al- rines. Weighing 7.5 pounds, possess-
stadium at speeds approaching 80 ready compromised and the unit must ing a range of one kilometer and a to-
mph.9 Quadcopters are also VTOL sys- attempt to engage and destroy the tal training time of a couple of min-
tems, so to launch one, operators just UAS with any organic means possi- utes, this weapon can scramble the
have to hold their hands outside their ble.15 The choice units currently face GPS signal of smaller drones, forcing
vehicles – unlike the Raven, which re- is to either stay still and hope they them to either land or go back to their
quires low wind conditions and being weren’t seen or to open fire, trying to controller.
thrown, which can sometimes lead to shoot down a small drone with no
A newer version the size of a M203
a nearly 40-percent failed launch guarantee of success while giving
grenade launcher, with the ability to
rate.10 This means a scout platoon with away the unit’s position. With larger
be mounted under the weapon, is also
a quadcopter can easily launch or re- systems, the size of the Shadow or
being developed.17 Another possible
cover this system on the move, be able Predator, the squadron currently has
answer is a 40mm-grenade round that
to use it even in dense urban or forest no organic means of countering these
launches a small net to entangle
environments, or even land the quad- threats.
drones. Developed by a team of re-
copter to use the platform as a remote
By adding electronic warfare (EW) to searchers at the Armament Research,
camera – all things the Raven could
the squadron organization, the possi- Development and Engineering Center
not attempt.
bility of jamming enemy UAS becomes at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, testing
The use of quadcopters at the platoon available. This technique has been showed the round outperforms other
level is already being done throughout proven in Syria by the Russians, who net-centric tactics like dragging a net
the military. The Navy and Marine have been able to jam the Global from another drone.18
Corps Small Tactical Unmanned Air-
craft Systems Office (PMA-263) or-
dered 800 quadcopters to include
them organically in infantry squads.11
At the Hohenfels Training Area, quad-
copters with 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry
Regiment, led to more fire missions
than any other collection source.12
The Army should follow the Marines’
procurement example and assign two
systems to each scout platoon, one
per section. With these systems, pla-
toon leaders are given a flexibility
and redundancy of sensors previous-
ly unavailable. UAS integration into
the reconnaissance plan should be-
come the rule, not the exception it
currently is, leading to an increased
effectiveness in regard to IC.

Improving counter-UAS
The increasing use of UAS on battle- Figure 2. SGT Nicolas Kotchenreuther, a Stinger team leader, rehearses firing
fields across the world has demon- Stinger missiles with SPC Cody Perez. Both Soldiers are assigned to 4th Squad-
strated not just their effectiveness but ron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment. (U.S. Army photo)

55 Fall 2020
With Mk-19 and M320 systems readily
available in the scout platoons, this
could be a more readily available and
cheaper option available for units to
use to down enemy UAS.
For larger systems such as the Russian
Dozor-100 or Forpost systems, which
can reach altitudes of 4,200 to 6,300
meters,19 scout platoons should have
one to two Soldiers trained on how to
use the FIM-92 Stinger. This would not
only help defeat larger UAS systems
but also give line units a desperately
needed counter-close-air-support
(CAS) ability. Already the Army Chief
of Staff has made a priority an initia-
tive to get Europe equipped with
short-range air defense (SHORAD)
Stinger teams to provide air defense
to maneuver units.20 The Stinger sys-
tem could replace one of the four Jav-
elin systems in the scout platoon. Figure 3. Soldiers assigned to 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored
Division, perform mission-command functions during the Army’s Network In-
tegration Evaluation 16.1 at Fort Bliss, TX. (U.S. Army photo)
Improved C2 vehicles
The current TOC system of two inter- two Light Medium Tactical Vehicle- S-4 vehicle would serve as the combat-
connected Deployable Rapid-Assem- linked Sesolinc containers and one trains CP, and the other three vehicles
bly Shelters (DRASH) is ineffective and 20x32-foot tent.24 This improved plan can either be dispersed or put in a
inefficient. To establish the squadron aligns with the Army’s Command Post laager based on the tactical situation.
command post (CP), two shelters must 2025 vision, which emphasizes inte- With the addition of the four gun
be put up in an area large enough to grated, scalable CP models over legacy trucks to HHT, the machineguns
accommodate both, followed by gen- systems that require hundreds of feet mounted on the expendable vans and
erators hooked up, wires run, tables of cable, stacks of transit cases and the two gun trucks currently assigned,
and computers set up, OE-254s erect- multiple tents.25 the squadron command team and staff
ed and the satellite dish emplaced. All are now able to self-secure during
this takes time and makes it hard for Instead of the DRASH system, the movement.
the TOC to break down and “jump” squadron CP should use multiple
quickly, especially if dealing with an M1087 expandable vans. The M1087 The troop command also requires an
indirect-fire situation. This set-up also includes blackout lights, is maneuver- improved command-and-control (C2)
creates a massive visual and electron- able, is able to tow generators, can vehicle. For most troop TOCs, the ve-
ics signature for enemy forces to de- mount a turret ring and machinegun hicle used is a humvee truck with a
tect and destroy.21 Currently the oper- for defense, and is able to have a shelter secured in the back. A QEAM
ational force is seeking to standardize Quick-Erecting Antenna Mast (QEAM) is mounted on the side, plus other an-
CPs that are austere, mobile, expedi- installed. The 1-12 th Infantry Regi- tennas are mounted for use while
tionary and able to match mobility ment, 2 nd BCT, 4 th Infantry Division, moving. While this vehicle works, the
with the subordinate maneuver forc- tested this by installing a purpose- problem is that the full functions can
es.22 built table that housed all computer only be used when the vehicle is
workstations, voice communications, stopped. While on the move, the
The Army has already been testing associated supporting equipment with troop command is responsible for all
these concepts. For the last six years, their cables and analog trackers.26 This battle tracking, reporting and poten-
2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, has setup reduced the time from when the tially updating products – all while log-
been the Army Experimental Task CP stopped to when it was operation- ging everything into the daily staff log
Force for the Brigade Modernization al, and likewise for teardown. with no other support.
Command and the Army’s Capabilities
and Integration Center.23 Through test- The squadron should take the preced- Another issue is that if someone has
ing, the brigade CP plan went from 11 ing example of the M1087 and issue to be in the back with the radios, and
Air-Beam tents off one large tent with one each to the S-2, S-3 and S-4, and if another Soldier is up front with the
three 40-foot wings – requiring a set- hold a fourth for other staff functions. Joint Battle Command Platform (JBC-
up and teardown time of between 10 Each truck would come with its own P), it is difficult for the two to commu-
and 20 hours – to four M1087 Expand- generator and turret ring with a crew- nicate with each other. If the squadron
able Vans, two M1079 2.5-ton vans, served weapon. With this set-up, the requires an improved C2 vehicle to

56 Fall 2020
 the entire squadron leadership the
ability to view feeds from all of its
available UAS assets in real-time. This
would reduce the delay of having to
rely on others to describe what they
are seeing to lower levels, but instead
improve our overall situational aware-
ness and ability to quickly react to de-
veloping situations.

Intel analyst at
troop level
Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
highlighted an increased need of
troop-level intelligence support. As
stated in ATP 3-21.21, “The Army has
identified that maneuver companies
require an intelligence capability to
support bottom-up intelligence refine-
ment during long-term or extended
Figure 4. Combined-arms battalion (CAB) mobile tactical CPs are M1068 operations.”30 This demand was filled
tracked vehicles with integrated mission-command and radio capabilities, al- with the use of company intelligence-
lowing commanders to “command from the hatch.” (U.S. Army photo) support teams (CoISTs), but when
most of the parent units returned
support the reconnaissance effort, this the ability of drone feeds to be viewed home from deployment, the CoIST
is doubly so for the troop command. at the platoon level while on the teams disappeared. This was because
move. This laptop-like system has an CoISTs were mainly composed of non-
Instead of creating a vehicle from the adaptor kit so it can operate from al- intel Soldiers, so when the deploy-
ground up, a current version of the most every Army vehicle.28 It was al- ment ended, they went back to their
humvee family of vehicles could be ready tested in 2015 when a Stryker original duties.
modified to accomplish this goal. Ex- brigade used the OSVRT from the bri-
amples include the front-line ambu- gade to the company level during a Though the CoIST disappeared, the
lance or the M1113 Expanded Capac- National Training Center rotation.29 need did not. This needs to be
ity Vehicle. This new troop-command changed with the permanent addition
vehicle needs to allow someone to If adapted to view quadcopter un- of an E-5 intelligence analyst at the
safely operate all the radios, update manned aerial feeds, this would give troop level.
trackers and support the troop com-
mand while on the move. The new ve-
hicle needs to have a QEAM mounted;
multiple Single-Channel Ground and
Airborne Radio System radios; a Har-
ris radio system; One-System Video
Remote Terminal (OSVRT) and JBC-P.
The vehicle also needs to be able to
tow a trailer with an Advanced Medi-
um Mobile Power Systems generator
installed inside. This would create a
platform able to function in high-tem-
po operations without losing effective-
ness.

If no other change happens, then at

the very least the OSVRT needs to be
installed in the vehicles of the TOC,
platoon leaders, troop commanders,
S-3, S-2 and squadron commander. As
of now, per modified table of organi-
zation and equipment (MTOE), most Figure 5. SPC Kevin Muirhead, a Soldier with the CoIST of 4th Battalion, 9th In-
of the squadron has no organic meth- fantry Regiment, Combined Task Force 4-2, in-processes a member of the lo-
od to view the full-motion video of ISR cal community during a medical civic-action program in Afghanistan in 2013.
platforms.27 This system would allow (U.S. Army photo)

57 Fall 2020
This position would be responsible for access natively built into it, meaning it lethal threat. Per a report commis-
many of the same responsibilities the could potentially work from any vehi- sioned by the Army Research Labora-
traditional CoIST team had. These in- cle in the troop. Personnel would also tory, “Increased Soldier load not only
clude collecting and analyzing patrol need access to an OSVRT system, but slows movement and increases fatigue
briefs, generating intel products for if these are added to the TOC and but also has experimentally demon-
the commander, conducting intelli- command vehicles, this would be eas- strated to decrease situational aware-
gence preparation of the battlefield ily accomplished. The only additional ness and shooting response times.”33
for troop operations, recommending equipment would be a laptop to help An example of the impact this in-
priority information requirements and create products and a radio on the op- creased weight has is that from 2004
providing both situational awareness erations-and-intelligence net to com- to 2007, one-third of medical evacua-
and situational understanding.31 municate directly with the S-2 cell or tions from the battlefield were due to
HUMINT. spinal, connective tissue or musculo-
An additional duty would include be- skeletal injuries – twice as many inju-
ing in charge of the troop’s UAS assets. Soldier, truck ries as were sustained from combat.34
The intel analyst would ensure all op- improvements Body armor is still very important for
erators are meeting certification re- helping saving lives, but how it is used
Currently cavalry Soldiers are
quirements, conduct training, ensure needs to be improved.
equipped and expected to use the
equipment is serviceable and report
same equipment as any infantryman
this to the squadron S-2 cell.
or truck driver. If the IBCT squadron is The newest system, the Modular Scal-
Since the squadron would traditional- to be a specialized organization, com- able Vest (MSV), aims to create a
ly be out in front of the brigade, there pleting a specialized task, it needs to method for Soldiers to scale the level
is a good chance subordinate units be equipped as such. This means im- of protection based on the threat
would capture enemy prisoners of proving body ar-
war. The intel analyst would be re- mor; issuing sup-
sponsible for collecting these prison- pressors, wrist-
ers, complete and maintain their pack- worn GPS and
ets, and track their current location hearing protec-
and status. They would also be the tion with com-
first point of contact with any human- munication ca-
intelligence (HUMINT) assets working pabilities; and
with the troop, enabling intelligence increasing the
to be processed and analyzed more number of squad
quickly than if they had to wait until designated
returning to squadron. The troop com- marksmen
mander could also attach the intel an- (SDM) rifles in
alyst to a forward unit to exploit any the platoon.
time-sensitive information and assist Trucks in line
with material collection.32 platoons would
also have a
This new position would be used as a swing-arm
developmental post for the S-2 sec- mount installed
tion. New intel analysts would start at in the gunner’s
squadron, learning and improving position with an-
their skills. Once they became promot- other automatic
able, they would pick up their ser- weapon mount-
geant in the troop intel slot. The troop ed on it.
commander then gains a trained intel
Soldier with the knowledge of how to While body ar-
best prepare information for the mor is extremely
squadron, and the new noncommis- important and
sioned officer (NCO) gets experience has saved count-
operating in a high-tempo field envi- less lives during
ronment. When the analyst returns to the Global War
the S-2, he/she will have working on Terrorism, it
knowledge of IC and processing at all i s e s s e nt i a l l y
levels of the squadron. parasitic weight
that does not Figure 6. SPC Hannah Carver-Frey, a chemical, biological,
This new position would not require contribute to the radiological, nuclear specialist with 10th Chemical Hazard-
much in terms of equipment to be- Soldier’s effec- ous Response Company, participates in the final round of
come operational. The JBC-P already tiveness until it field testing for the MSV during a week-long series of eval-
has Tactical Ground Reporting System has to stop a uated tasks at Fort Carson, CO. (U.S. Army photo)

58 Fall 2020
expected. The problem is that instead Another improvement that needs to communication gear to help improve
of allowing the troop commanders to be implemented is in the area of hear- overall C2. Initially fielded in 2014,
delegate what to wear, most senior ing protection. The Defense Depart- more than 20,000 units have been is-
leaders will blanket-order that all piec- ment’s Hearing Center of Excellence sued since then.41
es must be worn for Soldier safety. wrote in an email that one in five Sol-
This “one size fits all” approach ig- diers suffers from hearing loss, based In addition, scouts should also be
nores the different mission require- on data from 2013.38 This is backed by equipped with suppressors for their ri-
ments among the organization’s sub- a Department of Veteran Affairs report fles. Lowering the noise from friendly
ordinate units. While an infantry pla- that pinpointed tinnitus and hearing weapons fire would not only help im-
toon conducting an assault on a de- loss as the most common service-re- prove verbal communication during a
fended position might require the ad- lated disabilities among veterans, re- firefight but also reduce the ability for
ditional six pieces of protective gear sulting in almost $1.1 billion paid out enemy forces to quickly locate the
for the Improved Outer Tactical Vest for hearing-related injuries in 2009.39 scout’s location. The Marines have al-
(IOTV) or the new Blast Pelvic Protec- While Soldiers are typically issued ear- ready tested this by equipping an en-
tor for the MSV, a scout section sneak- plugs, few wear them while conduct- tire infantry battalion with suppres-
ing into a listening post/observation ing operations. This is because they sors.42
post overwatching an NAI does not. block out all noise, reducing the abil- Other equipment that needs to be is-
ity to hear commands and listen for sued includes wrist-worn GPS receiv-
Also, this one-rule mentality goes
both enemy and friendly troop move- ers for team leaders to assist with dis-
against the Army Research Laborato-
ment. mounted tasks. The prevalence of
ry’s recommendation, which stated
that the service “should clearly dele- these systems in combat-arms units,
gate authority to company-level com- Cavalry-squadron Soldiers instead particularly the Garmin Foretrex se-
manders to modify the level of pro- need to be issued systems that com- ries, has clearly demonstrated their ef-
tection as needed, based on the spe- bine both hearing protection and the fectiveness. While more susceptible to
cific threat and mission.”35 This in- ability to be integrated into existing ra- EW measures than the Defense Ad-
cludes the possibility of leaving the dio equipment. One example is the vanced GPS Receiver (DAGR), due to
body armor behind entirely if the Tactical Communication and Protec- the DAGR having a communications-
mission requires it, such as a multi- tive System (TCAPS), a high-tech hear- security fill, they are far easier to car-
day dismounted-reconnaissance pa- ing-protection system that can deaden ry, are just as easy to use, require few-
trol. loud noises while also improving am- er batteries and have the same func-
bient sounds necessary for situational tionality. It was for some of these
As with any new piece of equipment, awareness.40 This headset is also de- same reasons that in 2015 the Army
fielding generally takes time; it’s no signed to connect to a Soldier ’s reached out to industry leaders for
different with the MSV. As units start
replacing their old protective system,
those not slated to receive them for a
while (such as National Guard squad-
rons) should instead be temporarily is-
sued the Soldier Plate Carrier System.
First fielded in 2009, it weighs about
nine pounds less than the IOTV.36 Com-
bined with the new Ballistic Combat
Shirt, Soldiers with this system would
have the same level of protection and
maneuverability as troops with the
new system.
In the same vein, Soldiers should be
allowed to wear battle belts if they
own them. These are already being is-
sued as part of the new Load Distrib-
uting System developed by the Natick
Soldier Research, Development and
Engineering Center. Consisting of a
load-bearing spine system and battle
belt, and weighing only 1.5 pounds,
the goal is to distribute weight to the
waist to reduce injuries.37 Until issued
this system, Soldiers should be al-
lowed to wear their own to get this Figure 7. A Soldier wears TCAPS to protect his hearing in the field but also to
same benefit. help improve overall C2. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Betty Boomer)

59 Fall 2020
wrist-worn GPS receivers for use in the mentioned in Part I sending the EW and Evaluation Task Force found that
Middle East.43 section to the Low-Level Voice Inter- CAS seldom achieved the outcome
cept Course. Units should also send sought by the ground commander,
The 2015 Small Arms Capabilities-
scouts to learn how to use the FIM-92 with less than one-third destroying or
Based Assessment stated that “squads
Stinger for SHORAD capabilities and disrupting enemy forces.45
must have an organic precision-fire ca-
increase the number of SDM Course
pability to engage select personnel
graduates across the squadron. Also, To help counter this, the IBCT squad-
targets from zero to 600 meters.”44 To
the intel analyst at the troop level ron needs to increase the number of
fill this need, some units equipped
needs to attend a course teaching tac- Soldiers it sends to the Joint Firepow-
their SDMs with the M14-based En-
tical-site exploitation. As the brigade’s er Course (JFC) and the Joint Fires Ob-
hanced Battle Rifle. Unfortunately,
lead element, the squadron needs to server Course (JFOC). In most squad-
there are many cavalry squadrons,
have subject-matter experts spread rons, the only graduate of either of
particularly National Guard forma-
throughout the maneuver units to these courses is typically the fire-sup-
tions, which do not have these weap-
help exploit any possible intelligence port officer.46 To help change this, the
on systems assigned. While units may
gained from captured/abandoned en- JFC should be opened to Skill Level 3
still be sending Soldiers to school for
emy locations or personnel. and 4 19D Soldiers. 47 The eventual
the training, when those Soldiers re- goal would be to have at least one se-
turn, there isn’t a weapon platform for A key piece of training that needs to nior NCO or officer in each troop who
them to use the skills they learned. be included and expanded is integra- is a graduate of this course.
With the new 3x9x36 organization, the tion of CAS and indirect fires. As the
cavalry is moving toward at least three brigade’s forward edge, the chance of There should also be at least two to
SDM rifles in every scout platoon. By the squadron being the first element three JFOC graduates in the troop,
establishing this per MTOE, the troop to gain contact with the enemy during with ideally one per platoon. As the
commander will now have improved decisive action is extremely high. Yet platoon is the most likely element to
precision-fire capability, and SDMs there is little in terms of CAS and indi- encounter the front edge of an enemy
would gain an improved weapon sys- rect-fire training in the NCO and offi- assault, it is the element that requires
tem. cer developmental pipelines. This lack the ability to effectively coordinate ar-
Operations worldwide have shown of training has resulted in a lack of CAS tillery, mortar and CAS to destroy or
that gunners need to be able to effec- integration and ineffective use when delay the enemy. Some people point
tively engage targets in “vertical dan- used. Based on 22 observed battles, to the attachment of forward observ-
ger areas” such as the mountains of the Joint Close Air Support Joint Test ers (FOs) from the artillery as filling
Afghanistan. The increased probability
of units fighting in dense, urban mega-
cities – which will, of course, include
high-rise buildings – highlights the
need to have this capability. In Afghan-
istan, many trucks were equipped with
a second weapon system attached to
a mount in the gunner’s hatch to ad-
dress this problem. Whether using a
purpose-designed swing-arm mount
or a standard stovepipe welded to the
inside of the turret, these “eagle
mounts” gave gunners the ability to
engage near-vertical targets with au-
tomatic-weapons fire.
These need to become standard
equipment on platoon vehicles. Not
only would it provide increased en-
gagement capabilities, but in effect it
would provide a back-up M240 or
squad automatic weapon in case the
primary M2, Mk19 or tube-launched,
optically tracked, wire-guided missile Figure 8. Michael Goodman from II Corps Consulting Inc. provides training to
a student in JFOC’s Class 03-13, located at Expeditionary Warfare Training
became disabled.
Group-Atlantic, Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, VA. The
course trains select Joint personnel in engaging targets with AC-130, naval
Schools surface fires and indirect surface fires, and on procedures for providing time-
These changes for the IBCT cavalry ly and accurate targeting information to a qualified Joint Terminal Attack
squadron means there needs to be Controller for Type 2 and 3 CAS, terminal attack controls and conducting ter-
changes in training as well. I minal guidance operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Brandon E. Holmes)

60 Fall 2020
this role, but FOs are not an organic $10 million each.50 This does not even This is part of the reason why IBCT for-
part of the squadron. As an attach- include Strykers, vehicles and training mations did not have heavy vehicles to
ment, when they leave the squadron, costs, to say the least. Yet some of begin with. Per Field Manual (FM)
that skillset leaves with them. Either these cost issues can be resolved us- 3-96, “The IBCTs’ lack of heavy combat
the squadron needs to send its Sol- ing resources that will become avail- vehicles reduces its logistics require-
diers to these courses, or the fire-sup- able as force modernization progress- ments ... not having heavy combat ve-
port team/combat-observation lasing es. hicles gives commanders greater flex-
team detachment needs to be organi- ibility when adapting various transpor-
One avenue to cutting costs will be
cally part of the unit per MTOE, since tation modes to move or maneuver
making the most out of the Marine
that knowledge needs to stay within the IBCT.”51
Corps’ reorganization. All the crew-
the organization.
served weapons and SDM rifles from While these concerns are all valid, and
A broader change across the cavalry as the discontinued armor and infantry the belief behind the doctrine is un-
a whole is making the Scout Leader’s battalions could be used in the new derstandable, the fact is that the cur-
Course (formerly called Army Recon- squadron organization. Even individu- rent IBCT squadron requires heavier
naissance Course) and Cavalry Lead- al gear, such as night-vision and rifles, vehicles that can enable it to effective-
er’s Course mandatory training. For could be used to help ease the costs ly fight for information and time. Us-
the Scout Leader’s Course, officers associated with implementing the ing the Stryker BCTs’ expertise will
would attend after completing their 3x9x36 platoon model. help decrease the impact of these new
Basic Officer Leader’s Course branch logistic requirements.
training, and sergeants would attend Another possible way to cut costs
after completing an abbreviated Ad- would be through the fielding of the The manpower required to field this
vanced Leader’s Course (ALC). This Mobile Protective Fires System. As new organization will also be an issue.
new ALC would be only two to three these replace Mobile Gun System With the addition of all the new ele-
weeks long, with focus on the admin- (MGS) vehicles in their normal units, ments to the squadron and troop, the
istrative side of being a squad/section they can be sent to newly reorganized Army will be forced to reassign or re-
leader. IBCT squadrons. This would help re- organize units to fill these needs. Add-
duce the cost of purchasing new vehi- ing onto the effect of increasing the
For the Cavalry Leader’s Course, offi- cles. IBCT squadron to the 3x9x36 struc-
cers would have to attend after they ture, we’d see an increased demand
have completed the Maneuver Cap- The logistics required for this new hy- for Soldiers for the formation. This
tain’s Career Course but would be en- brid organization will be much higher comes at a time when the Armor
couraged to take it earlier. NCOs would than with a standard IBCT squadron. Branch is the only operational-division
take it after completing their Senior By adding another family of vehicles, branch to shrink since 2013.52
Leader’s Course. The reconnaissance particularly a larger armored vehicle,
and security, intelligence-gathering the number of parts and supplies While the active-duty component
and dissemination, planning and as- needed will grow. The increased main- could more easily fill these slots, the
set-integration techniques taught at tenance requirement in regard to new formations will potentially strain
these schools are essential to the cav- trained and equipped Stryker mechan- National Guard units. Unlike the ac-
alry’s skillset and need to be integrat- ics will also complicate the supply is- tive-duty side, which recruits from
ed into every level of the squadron. sue. across the entire country, the National

Barriers
These changes are important but are
not without issues. Even with full sup-
port, there will be barriers to effec-
tively transitioning the IBCT cavalry
squadron to this hybrid organization.
While there are many issues, the main
ones will be cost, logistics and man-
power. Even after the change has been
made, the new squadron will face the
potential issue of improper use.
With the addition of all these new ve-
hicles, equipment and training, the
primary problem will be that of cost.
TCAPS costs $2,000 per headset,48 and
Figure 9. A U.S. Marine with Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regi-
it cost the Marine Corps $700,000 to ment, uses a suppressor while providing security on a company attack range,
equip an infantry battalion with sup- Twentynine Palms, CA. The U.S. Marine Corps has equipped one of its infan-
pressors.49 To add another TUAV pla- try battalions with suppressors at a cost of $700,000. (U.S. Marine Corps pho-
toon to each brigade would cost about to)

61 Fall 2020
Guard primarily recruits from just the threats, does not have an effective C2 Regiment is spearheading the future dur-
state in which the unit is located. This vehicle for squadrons and troops, and ing Combined Resolve”; Defense Visual
problem would potentially require is overall deficient in firepower. The Information Distribution Service; May 10,
units in states to be disbanded and Army needs to decisively change the 2018; https://www.dvidshub.net/
news/276453/1-4-regiment-spearhead-
their Soldiers to change their military- IBCT squadron’s manning, training and
ing-future-during-combined-resolve.
occupation specialty to fill these new equipping to be effective in the future
positions. Increased bonuses and oth- fight for information.
11
Broman.
er enlistment incentives can help close 12
Blubaugh.
While many of these proposed chang-
this gap but would add to the overall 13
CPT Kevin Zhang, Kevin and CPT Mi-
es have been mentioned before, most
cost of the transition. chael Grdina; “Protection across the Do-
have either not been implemented or mains: Electronic Warfare in the Ar-
Even after all these obstacles are are being phased in incrementally. mored-Cavalry Squadron”; ARMOR, Win-
crossed, there lies the very real possi- These cannot be done piecemeal and ter 2019.
bility that the new squadron will run expect to be enough. If we are the 14
CSM Vincent Simonetti and SGM Aaron
into an even bigger problem: improp- “combat arm of decision,” we need to Forry; “HQ on the Move: Battalion Devel-
er use. With the massive increase in demonstrate that by deciding to over- ops a More Nimble Command Post”; As-
firepower, the brigade commander haul the IBCT squadron to one that sociation of the United States Army; June
might view his cavalry squadron as a can accomplish its mission. 18, 2018; https://www.ausa.org/articles/
CAB and fight them as such. While hq-move-battalion-develops-more-nim-
SGT Christopher Broman is a squad ble-command-post.
MGS carries sabot and high-explosive leader in Troop B, 1st Squadron, 113th
anti-tank rounds, and is able to pro- 15
ATP 3-01.81; Counter-Unmanned Air-
Cavalry, Camp Dodge, IA. Previous as- craft System Techniques; April 2017.
vide limited anti-armor capabilities,
signments include operations NCO in
the vehicle is not a tank and should 16
Yaron Steinbuch; “Russia reportedly
HHT, 1-113 Cav, Camp Dodge; and
not be employed in the same manner jamming U.S. Drones in Syria”; New York
team leader, HHT, 1-113 Cav. His mili- Post, April 10, 2018; https://nypost.
as a tank.53
tary schooling includes the Basic Lead- com/2018/04/10/russia-reportedly-jam-
Also, if the brigade commander gets er’s Course. He has a bachelor’s of arts ming-us-drones-in-syria/.
the squadron decisively engaged, at degree in history from Iowa State Uni- 17
Kyle Rempfer; “This gun shoots drones
that point reconnaissance ceases and versity. out of the sky”; Defense News; April 10,
the potential for achieving and capital- 2018; https://www.defensenews.com/
izing on IC is lost.54 It’s the squadron Notes digital-show-dailies/navy-
commander’s responsibility to teach 1
ATP 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon; league/2018/04/10/this-gun-shoots-
and inform the brigade commander of April 2013. drones-out-of-the-sky/.
this unit’s capabilities and that its fo- 2
CPT Kyle A. Trottier; “The Cavalry 18
Troy Carter; “U.S. Army invents 40mm
cus is to help win the reconnaissance Squadron 2025”; ARMOR, January-March grenade that nets bad drones”; TechLink
fight, not lead an assault on the ene- 2015. Center; Feb. 5, 2019; https://techlinkcen-
my’s main body. 3
“RQ-7B Shadow Tactical Unmanned Air- ter.org/news/us-army-invents-40mm-gre-
craft System (TUAS)”; Army Sustainment nade-that-nets-bad-drones/.
Conclusion Command; Nov. 4, 2014; https://asc. 19
Asymmetric Warfare Group; Russian
In March 2020 the Marine Corps an- army.mil/web/portfolio-item/aviation_ New Generation Warfare Handbook,
shadow-tuas/. Version 1; December 2016.
nounced it would drastically reorga-
nize its entire force structure. Changes
4
MAJ Scott Mason; “Unmanned Aerial 20
SSG David Overson; “Army intensifying
include the removal of all its tank bat- Vehicle Use in Army Brigade Combat Stinger air missile training as part of new
Teams: Increasing Effectiveness across strategic initiatives”; Army News Service;
talions, bridging units, law-enforce-
the Spectrum of Conflict”; master’s the- Jan. 12, 2018; https://www.army.mil/arti-
ment battalions and multiple infantry, sis, Naval Postgraduate School; 2006.
artillery and amphibious vehicle units. cle/198986/army_intensifying_stinger_
5
“RQ-7B Shadow Tactical Unmanned Air- air_missile_training_as_part_of_new_
Overall this move is expected to cut
craft System (TUAS)”; Army Sustainment strategic_initiatives.
more than 12,000 Marines over 10 Command.
years and reduce costs by removing
21
Asymmetric Warfare Group.
6
FM 3-20.98. MG Robert White, COL Charles Lombar-
legacy systems, all to face the Corps’ 22

new projected threat. 55 This change

7
SGT Christopher Broman; “Implement- do and MAJ Ken Selby; “A Smaller Foot-
was based on a realistic look at both ing Quadcopter Unmanned Aerial Sys- print: Multi-domain Battle Means Com-
tems into Reconnaissance Platoons”; AR- mand Posts Must Evolve”; Association of
the Corps’ current capabilities and
MOR, Fall 2019. the United States Army; May 15, 2017;
what it needed to change to meet its https://www.ausa.org/articles/multido-
goal. This same process needs to be
8
Mark Pomerieau; “How $650 drones are
creating problems in Iraq and Syria”; main-battle-command-posts-must-
done with the IBCT cavalry squadron. evolve.
C4ISRNET; Jan. 5, 2018; https://www.
The current IBCT squadron is a paper c4isrnet.com/unmanned/ 23
Ibid.
tiger, unable to fight for information uas/2018/01/05/how-650-drones-are- 24
Ibid.
against near-peer threats. It is unable creating-problems-in-iraq-and-syria/. 25
Claire Heininger; “Army designing next-
to win in the EW space, lacks the 9
Broman. gen command posts”; U.S. Army News
equipment to effectively counter UAS 10
1LT Matthew Blubaugh; “1-4 [Infantry] Service; May 12, 2016; https://www.

62 Fall 2020
army.mil/article/167807/Army_design- Purpose; May 11, 2017; https://taskand-
ing_next_gen_command_posts/. purpose.com/gear-tech/suppressors-ma- Acronym Quick-Scan
26
Simonetti and Forry. rine-unit-weapons.
ALC – Advanced Leader’s Course
27
LTC Brian Flood, MAJ James Hayes and 43
John Keller; “Army reaching out to in- ATP – Army techniques publication
MAJ Forrest Cook; “IBCT’s Reconnais- dustry for handheld and wrist-worn GPS BCT – brigade combat team
sance Squadron in Full-Spectrum Opera- receivers for use in the Middle East”; Mil- C2 – command and control
tions”; ARMOR, March-April 2011. itary & Aerospace Electronics; May 13, CAB – combined-arms battalion
28
Broman. 2015; https://www.militaryaerospace. CAS – close air support
com/rf-analog/article/16714371/army- CoIST – company intelligence-
29
Ibid.
reaching-out-to-industry-for-handheld- support team
30
ATP 3-21.21, SBCT Infantry Battalion; and-wristworn-gps-receivers-for-use-in- CP – command post
March 2016. the-middle-east. DAGR – Defense Advanced G[lobal
31
Center for Army Lessons-Learned; Positioning System] Receiver
44
Rose Thayer; “New Army rifle offers DRASH – Deployable Rapid-
Company Intelligence-Support Team more versatility in combat”; Stars and Assembly Shelter
(CoIST) Handbook; Jan 2010. Stripes; Feb. 17, 2019; https://www. EW – electronic warfare
32
Flood, Hayes and Cook. stripes.com/news/new-army-rifle-offers- FM – field manual
33
Matthew Cox; “The Army’s Body Armor more-versatility-in-combat-1.569090. FO – forward observer
May Be Too Heavy for Soldiers in Com- 45
General Accounting Office; Lingering
GPS – Global Positioning System
bat”; Task and Purpose; Sept. 26, 2018; Training and Equipment Issues Hamper
HHT – headquarters and
https://www.military.com/daily- headquarters troop
Air Support of Ground Forces; Washing- HUMINT – human intelligence
news/2018/09/25/army-body-armor- ton, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office;
may-be-too-heavy-combat-report-finds. IBCT – infantry brigade combat
2003. team
html.
46
SFC Morgan Wallace; “Improper Close- IC – information collection
34
Ibid. IOTV – Improved Outer Tactical Vest
Air-Support Integration During Planning
35
Ibid. at Battalion Level’; ARMOR, Winter 2020.
ISR – intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance
36
Ibid. 47
Ibid. JBC-P – Joint Battle Command
37
Austin Leach; “Load Distribution Sys- Platform
48
Hodgkins.
tem”; TechLink; https://techlinkcenter. JFC – Joint Firepower Course
org/technologies/load-distribution-sys- 49
Jared Keller. JFOC – Joint Fires Observer
tem-redistributes-heavy-loads-without- 50
Mason. Course
hindering-mobility/feb6de0b-96cc- MGS – Mobile Gun System
4597-8bbd-2f8c8e31155c.
51
FM 3-96, Brigade Combat Team; Octo- MSV – Modular Scalable Vest
ber 2015. MTOE – modified table of
38
Joe Palca; “Army’s Smart Earplug
organization and equipment
Damps Explosive Noise”; National Public 52
CPT Kyle D. Woods and CPT William C.
NAI – named area of interest
Radio; June 3, 2016; https://www.npr. Forrest; “Generating Incentive and Moti-
NCO – noncommissioned officer
org/sections/health- vation in the Cavalry and Armor Commu- OSVRT – One-System Video
shots/2016/06/03/480173016/armys- nity”; ARMOR, Winter 2020. Remote Terminal
smart-earplug-damps-explosive-noise- 53
ATP 3-21.91, Stryker Brigade Combat QEAM – Quick-Erecting Antenna
but-can-enhance-whispers. Team Weapons Troop; May 2017. Mast
39
Kelly Hodgkins; “The U.S. Army’s new SDM – squad designated marksman
54
ATP 3-20.96.
earbuds gives soldiers tunable hearing”; SHORAD – short-range air defense
Digital Trends; June 8, 2016; https:// 55
Shaun Snow; “The Corps is axing all of TCAPS – Tactical Communication
www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/army- its tank battalions and cutting grunt and Protective System
noise-canceling-headset/. units”; Marine Corps Times; March 23, TOC – tactical-operations center
40
Ibid. 2020; https://www.marinecorpstimes. TUAV – Tactical Unmanned Air
com/news/your-marine- Vehicle
41
Ibid. corps/2020/03/23/the-corps-is-axing-all- UAS – unmanned aerial system
42
Jared Keller; “This Marine Unit is to De- of-its-tank-battalions-and-cutting-grunt- VTOL – vertical take-off and landing
ploy with Suppressors”; Task and units/.

63 Fall 2020
 Recon and Security in the
Urban Fight
by CPT Kyle D. Woods counterparts in World War II, the Ko- experience civil unrest stemming from
rean War, the Vietnam War and many multiple internal and external sources.
The 2 Brigade, 3 Infantry Division’s
nd rd
times during the most recent war in
dramatic capture of Baghdad in April As nations like the DRC and Nigeria
Iraq. 2 In each conflict America’s ar-
2003 from Iraqi Republican Guard continue to urbanize, the Army’s mis-
mored Soldiers have encountered
forces is legendary among today’s ar- sion to stand ready for rapid deploy-
fighting in larger and larger cities. This
mored force. The Spartan Brigade’s ment anywhere on the globe must ac-
trend is likely to continue.
Thunder Run ranks alongside Eagle count for these megacities. For the Ar-
Troop, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cav- The world continues to urbanize, es- my’s reconnaissance and security
alry Regiment’s overwhelming victory pecially in economically less-devel- (R&S) experts, doctrine must be writ-
at the Battle of 73 Easting in 1991 as oped nations that are at a higher risk ten to account for our role in these po-
proof of American armored suprema- for armed conflict. By 2030 nearly 9 tential situations. While Field Manual
cy in combat. percent of the global population will (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Secu-
reside in 41 megacities – defined as rity, provides for roles and responsi-
The 2-3 Infantry Division’s actions in cities with a population of more than bilities of the cavalry squadron in sta-
April 2003 are distinguishable by the 10 million citizens. 3 For example, by bility operations, little to no attention
terrain where the battle was fought. 2025 Lagos, Nigeria, and Kinshasa, is paid specifically to urban opera-
The Spartan Brigade fought through Democratic Republic of the Congo tions, particularly during decisive ac-
dense urban terrain in its rapid and (DRC), will each be home to more than tion.6
forceful seizure of Baghdad’s govern- 15 million citizens.4 That makes these
ment district. With this in mind, the armored force
cities roughly as populous as Los An-
as a whole should develop a genera-
geles today.5
Since World War II, American military tion of junior leaders better prepared
doctrine has, in writing, discouraged The development level of Nigeria and for eventual conflict in megacities
armored forces from participating in the DRC has left these cities lacking in through: (1) development of a doctri-
the urban fight.1 However, military ne- comparative infrastructure and servic- nal template for how to fight the R&S
cessity has often pressed mechanized es. Nigeria continues to struggle with fight in megacities; (2) foundational in-
forces into the urban fight. American internal conflict caused by the funda- struction on the history of armor and
tankers and mechanized infantry have mentalist Islamic terror group Boko reconnaissance in the urban fight; (3)
come to the rescue of their light Haram, and the DRC continues to and integration of urban training into

Figure 1. Map showing global distribution of top 400 “urban areas” with at least one million inhabitants in 2006.

64 Fall 2020
Table 1. FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, specifies that units should be prepared to conduct recon-
naissance in urban environments for only one form of reconnaissance: reconnaissance-in-force.

the Objective-T training system. spent fighting in urban areas through- which forms of R&S each echelon can
out the U.S. Central Command area of execute within an urban environment.
Foundation: change operations (AO), our R&S manuals lack
doctrine plans for execution of urban R&S by Doctrinal framework
Many operations orders from cavalry cavalry squadrons. Establishment of a doctrinal frame-
and armored units at echelon publish work through clear identification of
the following bypass criteria: “Bypass While it is true that we must always tactical tasks for urban R&S is the first
criteria: Bypass built-up areas and ur- apply the mission factors of mission, step in preparing cavalry squadrons
ban terrain.” This typically is sound ad- enemy, terrain, troops available, time for combat in an urban environment.
vice given the standard missions at the and civil considerations to mission Cavalry units in World War II planned
National Training Center (NTC) and planning – which theoretically allows and trained to execute reconnaissance
home-station preparation for NTC. doctrine to be applied to any set of operations almost exclusively. In prac-
However, necessity in the operating terrain or circumstances – the unique tice, these missions ended up account-
environment (OE) has left command- nature of urban warfare requires spe- ing for less than 10 percent of their ac-
ers with no reasonable alternative to cific attention. Two reasonable and tual combat operations.7
committing their R&S organizations simple steps are available for the cre-
To prevent this lack of preparedness
into urban environments. Almost al- ation of urban R&S doctrine: (1) ex-
for future urban operations, R&S doc-
ways these formations have deployed plicitly indicating which tactical tasks
trine should establish a select group of
into combat scenarios with little to no can be executed by R&S organizations
tactical tasks that R&S organizations
urban R&S doctrine. Even after years in urban terrain; and (2) identifying
can train to accomplish in urban envi-
ronments. Currently the only explicit
mention of urban terrain among re-
connaissance tasks is the task under
the form of recon known as reconnais-
sance-in-force to “enter AOs in com-
plex terrain not previously occupied by
friendly forces, such as urban environ-
ments.”8
Experience at NTC indicates that cav-
alry squadrons are often tasked to iso-
late urban areas in support of their
brigade’s freedom of movement and
maneuver. Ideally a squadron would
be tasked in an urban environment to
isolate, secure, retain and destroy.
Cavalry squadrons are always fighting
to maintain a healthy number of
trained dismounts. Each of these tac-
Figure 2. Soldiers from 3rd U.S. Cavalry Group in 1944. U.S. cavalry groups of- tical tasks would lean heavily on the
ten were forced to seize and retain key terrain or move into urban environ- dismounted capabilities of each type
ments to answer priority information requirements in a timely manner. (U.S. of cavalry squadron, but it is possible
Army photo) for squadrons to become proficient at

65 Fall 2020
these tasks. These tasks would not be thorough review of the capabilities of instill the lessons-learned from our ex-
the primary tasks trained by the cav- each BCT cavalry squadron based on perienced veterans into our junior
alry squadron, but they would be its current modified table of organiza- leaders. I was fortunate enough to
trained at least to a proficient level by tion and equipment would provide the have a Thunder Run veteran as a men-
Subjective-T standards to enable the hard data necessary to determine the tor when I was a young platoon lead-
squadron or brigade commander to doctrinal width and depth for security er; my platoon sergeant had served as
employ the squadron in an urban set- operations these squadrons could rea- a young specialist gunner in the scout
ting if necessary. Training these tacti- sonably provide in various urban set- platoon of 1 st Battalion, 64 th Armor
cal tasks at home station or in the tings. Regiment, during 2nd Brigade’s historic
combat-training centers would pro- mission.
vide units with an experiential founda- Instead of tens of kilometers across
tion should they be called upon to per- desert terrain, squadrons would be
While senior NCOs and officers in our
form these tasks in an urban setting at counting city blocks. Each BCT cavalry
branch probably feel that our force
war. squadron should have its own plan for
has spent enough time in urban ter-
how to fight for information and con-
Alternatively to training a set number rain, every year we commission thou-
duct security operations for its brigade
of tactical tasks, R&S doctrine could sands of officers and pin stripes on
in an urban setting. A strong doctrinal
identify which echelons can execute thousands of NCOs who do not have
foundation on how to execute urban
the various R&S operations in support direct-action combat experience. The
R&S operations would greatly comple-
of their brigades in the urban fight. last platoon leaders to serve in Amer-
ment a program of instruction in offi-
ica’s armored-cavalry regiments in
The second step in providing a doctri- cer and noncommissioned officer
combat are now field-grade officers.
nal framework for the execution of (NCO) developmental schools focused
The sergeants of 2003 are either re-
R&S operations in urban environments on the history of R&S operations in ur-
tired or are first sergeants or com-
is organizing the forms of R&S by ech- ban environments.
mand sergeants major. As a force, we
elon. Security doctrine already clearly are rapidly losing that hard-fought
lays out which echelon of units may Instruction: learn from combat-veteran experience and risk
conduct screen, guard and cover mis- mistakes losing their lessons-learned if we fail
sions. Once urban R&S doctrine is firmly es- to properly codify and institutionalize
tablished, the armor community must their lessons.
For reconnaissance operations, the
planning factors for area, route and
zone reconnaissance would be raised
above their current echelon. Rather
than depending on a section to com-
plete a route reconnaissance, that lev-
el would increase (most likely) to a
platoon or troop, depending on the
brigade combat team (BCT) cavalry
squadron type and the threat level.
Similarly, area reconnaissance would
likely become a troop mission, with
zone reconnaissance becoming a
squadron operation due to the re-
quirements to reconnoiter lateral
routes and all areas within the zone.
Also, the nature of urban OEs requires
more personnel to account for subter-
ranean areas and multistory struc-
tures. Commander’s reconnaissance
guidance established in FM 3-98 en-
ables commanders to use a few words
to provide the necessary guidance to
enable efficient reconnaissance oper-
ations in all spheres, including urban
environments.
Establishing guidelines for leaders to
plan different R&S operations at their Figure 3. The 3rd Infantry Division’s mechanized Thunder Run through Bagh-
echelon should be coupled with effec- dad in 2003 demonstrated the potential for mechanized units to conduct op-
tive use of commander’s reconnais- erations in urban terrain during large-scale combat operations. (Adapted
sance or security guidance. A from FM 3-98)

66 Fall 2020
Figure 4. U.S. Army M1 Abrams tanks maneuver in the streets as they conduct a combat patrol in Tall Afar, Iraq, Feb. 3,
2005. The tanks and their crews are attached to 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. The Army has an opportunity today to
chronicle and capture the firsthand accounts from a cadre of leaders who understand urban operations and proofed
their knowledge in combat. (U.S. Army photo by SSG Aaron Allmon)

There are multiple options available at a foundational block of instruction on aforementioned operations. This has
minimal cost for the Armor Branch to R&S operations in the urban OE, TRA- built a generational wealth of R&S ex-
take lessons-learned and disseminate DOC should package various urban perts who can lend their voice to de-
them to our up-and-coming R&S lead- R&S videos and lessons, then publish veloping and publishing the best pos-
ers during their time in the generating them for use by leaders across the sible urban R&S doctrine our force has
force. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine force. ever had.
Command (TRADOC) possesses the The first step to teaching the lessons-
unique capability of reaching each of- learned by the current and previous
ficer and NCO during their Army ca-
Resources required
generations of R&S professionals to The only resources required to portray
reers. However, little to no time is cur- our junior leaders is instruction in
rently devoted to the formal instruc- the tactical scenario and decisions the
ABOLC and NCOES. To build on the les- leaders faced in the moment would be
tion of urban R&S operations for our sons-learned by R&S experts in urban
junior leaders during their time in the interviewees, a camera and a ter-
operations in the past two decades, it rain board or similar table where they
TRADOC. The Cavalry Leader’s Course is critical that a leadership-develop-
(CLC) incorporates urban elements in could review their actions. Thorough
ment program is incorporated into the research would likely find correspond-
at least the first graded tactical-deci- basic officer course and multiple lev-
sion exercise (TDE), and the Maneuver ing news or home-video footage of
els of cavalry-scout NCO developmen- many of the engagements to bring
Captain’s Career Course (MCCC) incor- tal schools. The Army today has an op-
porates an urban operations order for these battles to life and show our new
portunity to chronicle and capture the officers and NCOs a fraction of the re-
a Stryker-based infantry company. firsthand accounts of thousands of its ality of R&S operations in the urban
As we have done with other training own professionals who served through fight. Ideally these programs would be
objectives, such as Army Values train- urban combat operations on a large targeted for their specific echelon of
ing, we should interview our armor scale. The battles of Fallujah, Sadr City, developmental school. For example,
leaders on their past combat experi- Mosul, Baghdad and more have left ABOLC would incorporate interviews
ence in urban terrain and create an ar- our force with a cadre of leaders who with scout- and tank-platoon leaders
chive to be used during instructional understand urban operations and from urban fights, while the Senior
blocks in the Armor Basic Officer Lead- proofed their knowledge in combat. Leader’s Course would incorporate
ership Course (ABOLC) and the various Unlike Operation Desert Storm, our ar- section sergeants from the military-oc-
NCO Education System (NCOES) mored force was heavily involved in cupation specialty 19D and 19K com-
schools. Following the development of urban fighting during the munities.

67 Fall 2020
Targeting the videos to the actual ech- instructional program in TRADOC, we institutional knowledge gained during
elon of training and positioning the in- can execute the second step: publish- the urban-warfare operations of the
struction at the correct time in the ing that information to the force. The past two decades would not be lost
training glidepath of each school instructional videos developed as among our next generation of cavalry-
would be critical. For officers, the in- classroom instruction or homework men and -women.
struction should occur sometime after for our officer and NCO developmen-
or in the latter portion of tactics train- tal schools could easily be packaged Using the two-pronged strategy of
ing. Placing the urban R&S instruction and published to the force. Mobile- classroom review of lessons-learned
at the right time in the course would training teams from the schoolhouse during urban R&S operations and dis-
maximize the value of the instruction, are expensive and difficult to coordi- semination of the same material to
and it could avoid relying on follow-on nate for units in U.S. Army Forces the force at large, our armored force
courses like the Scout Leader’s Course Command to attend. By electronically can retain the institutional knowledge
(formerly known as the Army Recon- publishing these developmental pro- gained firsthand in combat.
naissance Course) or Reconnaissance grams on an Army system like the
After the establishment of urban R&S
and Surveillance Leader’s Course to Army Training Network or Army
doctrine and teaching our junior lead-
carry the full weight of urban-opera- Knowledge Online, TRADOC could
ers the lessons-learned in the urban
tions training within TRADOC. make these learning tools accessible
operating environment, the most im-
to our junior leaders worldwide with
Realistically, every hour of the method portant step remains. Without practi-
minimal cost.
of instruction for these courses is me- cal application and execution in the
ticulously planned and resourced. By field, we will not be able to success-
Junior officers and NCOs could refer- fully apply our urban R&S doctrine in
setting aside a half day of instruction
ence the same videos they discussed combat.
– or even if just assigning the viewing
and learned in class and use them in
of these videos as homework with an
their own training plans to spread the
hour blocked out for discussion and Execution: get
tactical lessons-learned in combat by
review – it would provide a significant repetitions in field
our R&S professionals across the
improvement to the instruction our ju-
force. Use of these videos as TDEs or The final and most difficult step in
nior leaders now receive.
as part of unit leadership-develop- building an R&S force capable of exe-
Once we have developed a strong ment programs would ensure the cuting operations in the urban

Figure 5. The road to a T rating: “a way” of integrating urban-terrain training into a standard combat-training center
train-up for a cavalry squadron. Applying urban-terrain training at the squadron level as units transition to a dynamic
OE would ensure sections and platoons are fundamentally sound. (Graphic by author)

68 Fall 2020
environment is training in the field. Once codified within Objective-T as a environments, we can build a founda-
While urban operations should not requirement, installations would see tion across the force.
take precedence as the priority for an uptick in demand for their urban
Building on this foundation and lever-
R&S organizations in the field, there training spaces. To prevent units from
aging the human capital available in
are a couple of methods to place ur- having a training requirement they are
the force, the Armor Branch can de-
ban training in the right priority level incapable of achieving, it is critical
velop a series of interview videos and
for squadron commanders and to ex- that units are provided the necessary
TDEs based on real-world combat sce-
ecute it in a resource-starved environ- resources to execute urban training.
narios from urban operations in the
ment. This remains true even if it comes in a
past 20 years to train junior officers in
simulated environment.
The Army’s new training system, called the generating force and publish these
Objective-T, establishes clear criteria Second and equally as important as in- videos for the force at large.
to reach each level of readiness. To tegrating the urban OE into Objective-
reach a “trained” or “T” rating, units T is ensuring the training standards are Finally, and with the most difficulty, by
must be externally evaluated, and executable by subordinate units. The incorporating an urban OE into exist-
they must have conducted their re- Army has invested millions of dollars ing Objective-T evaluation criteria for
spective mission-essential tasks to develop simulation centers at all R&S organizations and by allowing the
(METs) at night and in a chemical, bio- major installations to ensure Soldiers use of simulated training environ-
logical, radioactive and nuclear can receive training from the individ- ments to act as this urban terrain, the
(CBRN)-contested environment. Add- ual level all the way to the division lev- branch can train the techniques, tac-
ing urban terrain to the requirement el in a simulator. Individual marksman- tics and procedures developed by ju-
to reach a T rating would ensure that ship is trained in the Engagement Skills nior leaders to enable R&S operations
units execute this training. Trainer (EST). Crews are trained in the in the urban fight.
Remote Virtual Tactical Trainer and
After the addition of urban training to the CCTT. Battalion, brigade and divi- We owe it to the Soldiers of the future
the requirements to reach a T rating, sion staffs execute command-post ex- to provide a framework for the execu-
the next step would be ensuring that ercises (CPXs) at their unit mission- tion of R&S in the urban environment.
units posted in locations without rea- training centers that ensure staffs can In every major conflict in our Army’s
sonable urban-warfare training sites perform the necessary planning and history, we have employed mounted
(which are high-cost and high-de- CP functions at all levels. troops within urban environments out
mand) are able to execute urban train- of necessity. We must recognize the
ing in the Close-Combat Tactical Train- By creating the requirement in Objec- reality that our next conflict will likely
er (CCTT) or Virtual Battlespace Simu- tive-T for urban training and allowing occur in a country with large urban en-
lator 3 or analogous simulated bat- the use of simulators, commanders vironments or possibly even in a
tlespace. could execute urban R&S training megacity. With this in mind, we can
through CPXs and in the EST and CCTT move forward by identifying the best
First and most important to executing to ensure proficiency for their units. possible employment methods for our
quality urban R&S training in the field Units are already required to conduct R&S personnel in those scenarios to
is integrating urban OE training into a CPX to reach the highest readiness enable the success of the Army within
Objective-T requirements. Objective- rating for their staffs, and the deliber- urban OEs.
T’s evaluation criteria are a significant ate incorporation of an urban R&S op-
change for the evaluation of unit read- eration in their planning would require CPT Kyle Woods commands Troop C, 6th
iness. By imposing criteria such as ex- no more resources or requirements. Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, Fort
ternal evaluation, the requirement to Our existing CCTT simulators have ur- Stewart, GA. Previous assignments in-
train at night and under contested ban terrain that could easily support clude plans officer, 6th Squadron, 8th
CBRN conditions, the Army would be company/troop-level maneuver and Cav, Fort Stewart; executive officer,
moving closer to creating homoge- below, ensuring that all our armor ve- Blackfoot Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cav,
nous training plans for all units that hicle crews can train in the urban OE Schofield Barracks, HI; and platoon
share the same METs. without burning any fuel. leader, Blackfoot Troop, 3rd Squadron,
4th Cav, Schofield Barracks. His military
By adding the urban OE for maneuver
schooling includes MCCC, CLC and
organizations, or specifically R&S or- Moving forward Pathfinder and Air-Assault Schools.
ganizations, Objective-T could ensure In conclusion, the Armor Branch has a CPT Woods holds a bachelor’s of arts
that commanders factor in this type of unique opportunity to capitalize on ex- degree in history and government
OE to their training plans. By restrict- isting combat expertise in urban R&S from Claremont McKenna College. His
ing it to the highest readiness level, operations to develop a first-ever ur- awards and honors include the black
commanders would retain the ability ban R&S doctrine for our mounted medallion, Order of Saint George.
to prioritize urban training last, or not force. Through the establishment of
at all if their guidance is only to reach doctrine by specifying tactical tasks for Notes
a “proficient” level based on compet- cavalry squadrons in the urban OE or 1
Richard Ogorkiewicz, “Armor and Future
ing requirements at the brigade or di- identifying echelons that can perform Urban Warfare,” ARMOR, March 2004,
vision level. forms of R&S operations in urban www.benning.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR.

69 Fall 2020
2
Gordon L. Rottman, World War II U.S.
Cavalry Groups, Oxford, United Kingdom: Acronym Quick-Scan
Osprey Publishing, July 2012.
3
“Bright Lights, Big Cities,” The Econo- ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer FM – field manual
mist, Feb. 4, 2015, www.economist.com/ Leadership Course MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s
node/21642053. AO – area of operations Career Course
BCT – brigade combat team MET – mission-essential task
4
“Growth Areas,” The Economist, Dec. CALFEX – combined-arms live-fire METL – mission-essential task list
13, 2010, www.economist.com/graphic- exercise NCO – noncommissioned officer
detail/2010/12/13/growth-areas. CBRN – chemical, biological, NCOES – Noncommissioned Officer
5
Data Access and Dissemination Systems, radioactive and nuclear Education System
“American FactFinder – Results,” Oct. 5, CCTT – Close-Combat Tactical NTC – National Training Center
2010, factfinder.census.gov/faces/table- Trainer OE – operating environment
services/jsf/pages/productview. CLC –Cavalry Leader’s Course R&S – reconnaissance and security
xhtml?srx=bkmk. CP – command post STX – situational-training exercise
CPX – command-post exercise TDE – tactical decision exercise
6
FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security
DRC – Democratic Republic of the TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training
Operations. July 2015. Congo and Doctrine Command
7
Ogorkiewicz. EST – Engagement Skills Trainer TRP – troop
8
FM 3-98.

Figure 6. U.S. Soldiers of 350th Infantry Regiment liberate the Italian towns of Isola Vicentina and Sandrigo April 29,
1945. (Photo by Laura Kreider, U.S. Army Garrison Italy)

70 Fall 2020
 The Growing Vacuum of Today’s
Live-Fire Ranges and their Future
Requirements
by 1SG(R) Frank Belonus • The targets are infused with realistic just focus on fulfilling today’s needs at
signatures and sensor-triggering today’s standards.
Militaries and law-enforcement agen-
capabilities for further realism.
cies of the world continue to adapt Parallel evolution and collaboration
their training based on lessons- • Targets may be maneuvered against between customer and industry is re-
learned, emerging tactics, techniques Soldiers and may return fire. quired. This means a customer con-
and procedures, and emerging tech- • U n s e e n h i t i n d i cato rs ca u s e veys a clear vision of future platforms,
nology and capabilities. For many, live- immediate, realistic effects on capabilities and training requirements,
fire is the pinnacle of training realism, targets and provide instantaneous coupled with an understanding of
validation and qualification, yet there feedback during training, and from emerging technology, industry direc-
is a growing vacuum in live-fire facili- multiple perspectives for future tion and advancements. This results in
ties’ infrastructure and capabilities review. an educated industry that understands
when it comes to meeting these orga- future-force concepts and capabilities.
All this done on terrain that allows
nizations’ near-future requirements. It allows industry to shape its tactical
freedom of maneuver with very few
employment through experience,
Today’s live-fire ranges have not con- restrictions, allowing 360-degree en-
knowledge-sharing and a shared vi-
ceptually changed much in the last 50 gagements.
sion.
years. The ranges lack true flexibility But the reality is that there is an evo-
and adaptability, and they are limited A shared vision allows an industry to
lutional requirement needed today to pull the latest technology from various
in the overall scope of what can be bridge the “now” and these future
trained on them. sectors and disciplines, be it robotics,
concepts. The current and near-future simulations, sensors, digitization, op-
requirements are what will drive the tics, communications, ballistics, met-
With that in mind, the future of live-
fire ranges may be something com- initial evolutional change as well as als and alloys. This is a natural part of
the true modernization required in change management and evolution for
pletely different than what is seen to-
training and life-fire ranges until tech- any company that strives to remain
day. Imagine projected imagery that
nology evolves to meet the future de- relevant through innovation, but the
reflects different environments:
scribed. customer plays a key role in driving in-
• Targets may be realistic, three-
dimensional holographic images Mindset must change novation in the right direction and in
that accurately reflect the threats of mitigating the industry’s response
The first approach to filling the vacu-
today, moving and acting like an time to fill needs requirements.
um in live-fire ranges to meet future
actual foe. requirements is mindset. It is what al- Research-and-development invest-
• These type of targets are capable of lows us to see beyond the traditional ment is required from both industry
being engaged through simulations to what could be and what will be re- and the customer in future training
such as lasers that are already quired based on emerging technology, and live-fire ranges if the customer
integrated into the latest platforms future-force capability, future threats wants to remain globally dominant.
and weapon systems being used, or and environments. In other words, we Technology provides the advantage,
engaged with actual munitions in must start working today for what will but being capable and effective in us-
live-fire. be needed beyond tomorrow and not ing that technology allows the

71 Fall 2020
customer to be dominant. Training and moving while engaging or being en- tactics from the highest to the lowest
live-fire produces and validates that gaged. Technology and capability are levels. The constant is that training
needed capability, and that will never often diminished in this environment. will inevitably require a complete
change. overhaul to support the new way of
With that said, the ability to engage at
doing things. Live-fire ranges will need
Simulations are invaluable tools that extended ranges is still required in cit-
to adapt to this new norm and to the
greatly enhance training, but they will ies, though the terrain may be severe-
integration of emerging technologies
never replace the need for actual live- ly restrictive. Survivability is still in-
and capabilities.
fire. It still is crucial that Soldiers ma- creased through stand-off and accura-
nipulate their actual equipment – be cy superiority at range, but potential Niche technology focused on equaliz-
it personal equipment and weapon, or threats from a multi-dimensional do- ing the battlefield and exploiting
complex combined-arms fires, or ev- main at close range also threaten sur- weaknesses will continue to be a
erything in between. vivability in this terrain. Issues in com- threat, and it will be unpredictable.
mand and control, maneuverability, Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
Driving future communications and fires control are have proved effective against even the
requirements all further challenged in this environ- most formidable advanced militaries
There are many factors driving future ment. of the world. Drones and weaponized
requirements of live-fire ranges. Those Therefore adaptive, tailored training drones have also proved effective to
factors include urbanization, an indi- and live-fire ranges are needed to en- some extent. Niche technology and
vidual’s flexibility and adaptability, sure a ready force in this world of ur- the countermeasures implemented af-
technology, ability to implement and banization. Unfortunately, most mod- fect operations and tactics, changing
adapt lessons-learned, realism, better ern urban training and live-fire facili- how we do things. Therefore, training
training automation and management, ties lack the density and realism to and live-fire ranges will require rapid
and enhanced training feedback. prepare Soldiers for what they face adaptation to address niche technol-
worldwide today and will face in the ogy and its effects.
Urbanization. According to a United
future. Evolutions in simulations and aug-
Nations report, 55 percent of the
world’s population already lives in ur- Flexibility and adaptability. Militaries mented/virtual reality will soon be in-
ban areas, and this is expected to rise and law-enforcement agencies around tegrated into existing and future plat-
to nearly 70 percent by 2050. Today the world focus on developing agile forms and systems. With the flip of a
the highest urban-populated regions and adaptive individuals who can switch, you’ll be able to enter a virtual
include North America at 82 percent, think on their feet and make decisions world from within your actual tank or
Latin America and the Caribbean at 81 rapidly. These individuals are con- from any other system or platform. La-
percent, and Europe at 74 percent. As stantly evolving forces integrated with ser-engagement systems will also be
the world’s population continues to the latest in technology and capability. integrated, eliminating the time-con-
migrate toward cities, threat forces They must adapt constantly to various suming process of mounting and re-
continue to mitigate advanced military threats, their capabilities and to ever- moving current laser-engagement sys-
capabilities and technology by forcing changing environments. Their ability tems. Training facilities and ranges
the fight into this complex terrain. to adapt is honed in training. This need to also evolve to support this
Therefore it’s crucial to understand means training facilities and ranges evolution in technology, and they
this multi-dimensional terrain, and must be just as adaptive and flexible must be able to bridge the virtual and
how to operate and survive in it is to meet training requirements. live training worlds.
more critical than ever.
Technology. The evolution of technol- Lessons-learned. A military’s ability to
(This is not to say there is no longer a ogy continues to move forward at a rapidly collect, implement and adapt
need for conventional, open-terrain blinding pace. It is allowing us to see to lessons-learned and best practices
capability and training because today’s more, shoot farther and do more with will greatly affect its survivability and
military forces need to be able to tran- less. Unmanned systems on land, sea success. At a lower level, situational
sition through the full spectrum of op- and air are already a reality. The near training with recently learned lessons,
erations in various types of environ- future will have manned and un- and the exercising of new battle drills
ments. Complex terrain such as urban manned systems interconnected and based on capability and lessons
and subterranean environments have working in unison. Advancements in learned, makes an enormous differ-
become the norm for militaries, both conductivity will allow unique com- ence.
in direct and supporting roles.) bined-arms engagements as well. Air
One example of this in recent opera-
and ground forces will become more
Recent urban combat has shown that tions was the use of IEDs for shaping
effective and lethal. Automation and
being engaged from multiple threats operations. The IED would disable or
artificial intelligence will continue to
in windows and on rooftops at close destroy a vehicle in a kill zone and
evolve and make great changes in ca-
range is common. Lessons-learned block a route, which would then trig-
pability and in how things are done.
have also shown that engagements in ger an ambush of those in the kill zone
complex terrain are fluid, with both All these things will continue to and those blocked on the route. Battle
the shooter and threat forces often change strategy, operations and drills were developed to counter this,

72 Fall 2020
but training and live-fire ranges still how to maximize these tools, will range requirements and safety re-
need to support this and other types greatly enhance training feedback and quirements. Then, as each tank crew
of training requirements driven by les- the learning curve. conducts Table VIII, they will face one
sons-learned. of these scenarios the system random-
Live-fire range ly selects. This prevents crews gaming
Realism. Greater realism equates to considerations the range and the same scenario from
better training and better-prepared being used over and over. The versa-
Technology is also affecting those in
militaries and law-enforcement agen- tility also allows greater distribution of
the live-fire-range industry as well.
cies. Realism is the cornerstone to target use, increasing target longevity.
Evolving improvements in materials,
quality training, but it goes far beyond manufacturing, capabilities, interoper- Another benefit of the software is that
that. Realism exercises those things ability and realism continue to im- it allows input to remove certain tar-
we often do not think about like “swi- prove live-fire quality. gets as they malfunction or become
tchology,” which is the ability to ma-
nipulate switches and dials without Mindset. Live-fire ranges are purpose- unusable from impact damage. Then
having to search for them – or even to built. They serve a specific or limited the software adjusts to scenarios that
look at them, in some cases. Realistic set of purposes such as a qualification do not use the specified targets. This
training conditions the mind to know range. They are built with engagement reduces training down-time for main-
what right looks like – for example, ve- criteria such as distance and type of tenance.
hicle identification or even thermal- target in mind. There needs to be a The range-management system should
signature identification. This becomes shift in mindset, though; we need to be integrated with target-activating
significantly important in preventing view them with a different perspec- range sensors, hit indicators, timing/
fratricide, for instance. tive. They will always be needed to scoring software and other monitoring
validate basic marksmanship, but systems such as audio and video. Col-
Realism also becomes quite important
ranges should be more adaptive and lectively this will provide proper feed-
when training to maximize the capa-
inclusive of training needs. Ranges back and validate results. This is all
bility of the technology used. For in-
should support live-fire rehearsals of then integrated into an AAR suite that
stance, an unmanned platform with
today’s battle drills – whether it be of- provides integrated, high-quality feed-
sensors will require cues to integrate
fensive armor attack in a wedge for- back. This feedback will allow input
its capability into training properly. Re- mation, react to IED-initiated ambush, beyond traditional hit/no hit through
alism may include realistic movement incoming ATGM or sniper attack. maximizing technology, identifying
and exposure from the threat. Realism
also tests survivability drills and coun- This will require different target con- reasons for poor performance as well.
termeasures properly, such as the re- figurations, range capability and ma- This facilitates automatic scoring with
action to incoming direct and indirect neuver space. Combat is multi-dimen- minimal interaction required from
fires and effects like the reaction to sional, especially in an urban environ- evaluators/scorers.
anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) ment. Live-fire over flat terrain, always Autonomous targets. Integration of
drones or lasers. Realistic training also at ground level and looking in one di- autonomous, robotic targets are still
means mitigating predictability. The rection with limited left and right lim- in its infancy but has great future po-
threats of the world are unpredictable its does not constitute properly train- tential. These targets provide greater
and capitalize on your predictability. ing and conditioning forces so they are range flexibility, add realism and miti-
prepared for what they may face in gate some infrastructure needs. In
Better training automation and man- the future. turn, they decrease maneuverability
agement. Automated software should
restrictions, which increases their
be integrated with targets, cues and Variable scenario generator, manage-
cost-effectiveness.
operators on live-fire ranges to ran- ment. Range-management software
domly adjust scenarios by crew or can be developed and tailored to a Autonomous targets will inevitably
shooter based on inputted engage- specific range to manage scenario de- replicate any type of target. They will
ment requirements. This will mitigate velopment and range execution. This be easily integrated into existing rang-
false conditioning and predictability. It software knows all the variables in tar- es and interoperate with existing con-
will also streamline the process, allow- gets, ranges, safety requirements and ventional targets. The autonomous
ing increased throughput. scenario requirements. It can produce targets will therefore integrate into
multiple scenarios based on the pa- the range-management system. They
Enhanced training feedback. Audio,
rameters entered, then randomly se- will also be facilitated into more cre-
visual and sensor-aided feedback
lect them for each exercise. ative live-fire training events such as a
greatly enhances learning and under-
suicide car bomb or a vehicle ap-
standing. With that said, capability im- For example, a tank crew conducting
proaching a checkpoint.
provement is still needed when pro- Table VIII qualification exercises has
viding feedback and conducting after- specific types of engagements they Pre-programmed routes can replicate
action reviews (AARs). Evolving tech- are required to exercise. The range- threat and civilian movements. For ex-
nology, data-collection tools and in- management system will develop sev- ample, an input command can cause
teroperability, coupled with trainers eral scenarios to meet these require- different reactions such as all the civil-
and subject-matter experts who know ments based on targets available, ian targets running for cover.

73 Fall 2020
Inputted commands can also direct systems simply provide “hot spots” on Urban, subterranean
targets already engaged and “down” larger targets. However, thermal sig-
to either move out of play and out of natures should closely replicate what
realism
Constant and rapidly increasing urban-
the way, or to move to a designated the target is, providing realistic train-
ization globally will only increase the
point to be reconstituted and put back ing and proper conditioning. Simulat-
need for proficiency in this environ-
into play. They can also be used to ed human targets should also produce
ment. Operations in this environment
work in tandem with traditional tar- proper thermal signatures that allow
produce unique vulnerabilities and un-
gets to reflect realistic actions – such proper night-vision and night-optics
precedented challenges. The complex-
as human targets dismounting from a engagements. Emerging technology
ity is only amplified when adding large
vehicle to attack or provide cover. also needs to address new, creative
numbers of “civilians” and traffic to
and cost-effective ways to not only
Integrated simulations and live-fire the equation. Threats may come from
achieve this but to increase duration
capabilities. Technology is near the rooftops, windows, ground level and
of effectiveness after repeated im-
point where targets will soon accu- even from subterranean areas.
pacts.
rately register hits from both simulat-
ed engagements and actual engage- Multistage targets. Armored vehicles A lack of understanding of this com-
ments without having to transition the in defense are either in turret defilade plex environment, and a lack of prop-
range to support one form or the oth- or hull defilade. Therefore targets rep- er training in this environment, was
er of training. This will likely be accom- licating armor vehicles in defense again highlighted in unnecessary loss-
plished through an evolution in hit should reflect these two positions vi- es during recent combat. Most urban
sensors, all integrated into each target sually and through other cues, such as training areas are woefully inadequate
lifter. This advance – combined with thermal signatures. Maybe the target in depth and complexity, and they lack
lightweight, mobile target packages – could “pop up” in turret defilade for enough live-fire requirements for forc-
will allow greater flexibility in training 30 seconds before normal target expo- es to properly train. Most urban-train-
and training environments. The need sure to better replicate realism. ing areas are built for survivability, but
for mutually supporting range, range- they lack flexibility and realism.
management system and infrastruc- Enhanced target-lifter survivability
with reduced infrastructure require- With this in mind, future urban train-
ture is inevitable as future platforms ing and live-fire complexes will need
will likely have these types of simula- ments. Emerging technology will inev-
itably reduce the signature and weight to be completely redesigned with full
tions capabilities integrated into them. requirements and functions in mind.
of target lifters, allowing reduced in-
Greater target realism. Realistic train- frastructure requirements and porta- This may require using buildings with
ing requires realistic targets. To bility for flexibility. Future lifters may subfloors and false walls that hide
achieve the desired realism, potential- be carrot-shaped and in a sleeve that technology and target lifters, a large
ly cost-effective three-dimensional im- is inserted into the ground to greatly number of targets and autonomous
agery could be used on larger targets. minimize infrastructure requirements targets replicating “civilians.” The civil-
This may also include electronic or ho- and virtually eliminate the need for ian targets could transition into a
lographic imagery when units are in- target bunkers for stationary targets. threat target to fit a given scenario.
tegrating sensors and combat multipli- Remotely controlled, interactive
ers such as unmanned aerial vehicles. Electronics, hydraulics or the combina- threat and civilian targets that can talk
These may be remotely projected with tion of the two will cause the lifters to back would also add realism. Remote-
hit-indicating technology, allowing air rise out of the tube for maintenance controlled, full-sized vehicles would be
and ground use, thus enhancing air/ and service purposes. Lifters are then needed, too.
ground live-fire coordination and ca- easily moved to other tubes for range
reconfiguration. Cost-effective light- Another important aspect of realism
pability. This would also be integrated requires that depth, complexity and
into the range-management system. weight material and increased surviv-
ability of targets will reduce the work- restrictiveness be included to replicate
Greater realism also includes proper multiple types of environments such
signatures during day, night and move- load on lifters; this will affect their
technical requirements as well. as “shoothouses” with adjustable bal-
ment. Enhanced battlefield effects listic walls to match required floor
also need to be improved. plans for live-fire rehearsals. Realism
Re-engineered methods of lifting will
For example, the “return fire” effects, also impact future lifters. Enhanced would also include survivable and/or
when used, could be puffs of smoke to wireless long-range target controlling, expendable clutter such as furniture
help identify targets. Small-arms integrated into the range-manage- or vehicles.
night-fire ranges could have muzzle ment system with built-in hit indica-
flashes. Threat-vehicle targets could tors, will allow a properly networked The critical need for this type of real-
better replicate return fire, and they approach. Power sources will also be istic training environment will only
could be networked into the vehicle- impacted by advancements in re- grow. Therefore it needs investment.
integrated simulations software to chargeable batteries and alternative Research-and-development and relat-
replicate effects in sight systems. power solutions and distribution. ed technology must be leveraged to
find cost-effective, creative solutions
Realistic thermal signatures. Current to meet these needs.

74 Fall 2020
360-degree live-fire ranges. Range infrastructure and con- outstanding, but it should also show
Combat occurs in a 360-degree envi- figuration should consider this type of the impact when using simulation
ronment. The greatest challenges to a training in the design phase. weapons. This expands the use of the
360-degree range are land require- range. This will allow initial marks-
Small-arms ranges. Militaries and law- manship training to be done on the
ments, safety requirements and risk. enforcement agencies globally want to
These challenges can be somewhat range without firing actual bullets,
implement lessons-learned and inte- making it more cost-effective to con-
mitigated by the use of sub-munitions grate emerging technology to improve
and training rounds, but they still duct initial or corrective marksman-
their live-fire marksmanship, training ship training.
would be virtually impossible to and qualification programs. Today’s
achieve on most modern ranges. This basic form of qualification simply eval- Modern simulated weapons are usu-
aspect of training should still be exer- uates one’s ability to engage with a ally actual weapons with simulation-
cised through simulations – at a mini- weapon at variable ranges from a fixed capable modifications to them, but
mum, though. Those who design fu- position, but it lacks the consideration these weapons will likely need to be
ture ranges should consider at least of many other factors that the shooter better ruggedized to withstand the el-
multidirectional ranges and targets. will face. Greater emphasis is being ements. These simulated weapons
Technology and innovation will soon given to the use of cover and conceal- also need to be integrated into the
allow virtual range towers, eliminating ment, magazine changes while engag- range-management software wireless-
their requirement on the actual range. ing, multiple stationary and moving ly to provide feedback capability from
Command, control and safety will all targets, exposure time of the shooter the weapon on things like sight picture
be done from a remote location: a to the threat, weapon transition and and trigger pull. This feedback can be
range command center. Advanced day- night shooting, just to name some ex- done with actual weapons as well. This
and-night observation capability from amples. Consideration should also be feedback, along with cameras on the
multiple directions, range sensors, in- given to the environment in which Sol- shooter, will allow rapid identification
tegrated battle-management systems diers or law-enforcement personnel of fundamental flaws, needed correc-
and vehicle conductivity – both audio will operate so that training can be tions and the AAR of other factors,
and visual (sight optics and turret/ve- adapted to it. such as magazine changes.
hicle mounted cameras) with the
Modern simulations systems have be- Three-story building façades with win-
range command center – will mitigate
gun addressing some of these require- dows between shooting lanes allow
a tower’s need. This range command
ments, but our live-fire ranges and basic qualification of elevated targets
center can be networked to multiple
qualifications programs haven’t adapt- in complex terrain. Emerging construc-
ranges as well.
ed very well. The U.S. Army recently tion techniques, composites and bal-
Portable digital AAR packages linked announced potential changes to its listic protection will facilitate longev-
to the range command center will al- qualification requirements to include ity and easy maintenance of such a
low AARs to be conducted on-site, but some of these factors, but changes will structure. Targets can be presented
the range command center will have be required to existing live-fire ranges from multiple windows and rooftops.
multiple complete, multi-screened to properly implement. For example, A greater number of targets is re-
suites with special integrated software ranges will need to be modified to re- quired, but this allows variable scenar-
to provide a detailed debriefing of any flect multiple environments, unpre- ios and prevents shooters knowing
training conducted. dictable moving and stationary tar- where the targets are at each range.
gets, elevated targets and integration This also reduces range-maintenance
AARs should also include perspectives
of emerging technology to provide re- delays and increases target life.
from the threat’s point of view as well
alism and immediate feedback.
as the friendly point of view. Imagery The integration of robotic, autono-
and sensor feedback from drones and For militaries, enhanced basic-qualifi- mous moving and stationary targets
other combat multipliers would also cation ranges of the near future may can also help increase targets without
be integrated into the range-manage- not look much different than those of increasing infrastructure. Today’s ro-
ment system, triggering feedback dur- today, remaining focused on the fun- botic targets can be programmed to
ing exercises. Feedback could also be damentals of marksmanship and the drive a pre-programmed route or re-
captured for AAR use and historical individual Soldier’s ability to hit tar- main stationary. These are also three-
documentation. This will allow sensor- gets on varying ranges. But more qual- dimensional and can present a realis-
to-shooter tools to be integrated in ification for those in combat arms on tic target regardless of the direction in
live-fire. close-quarter battle ranges, tactical which they move. Routes programmed
ranges and urban live-fire ranges may for moving targets should travel from
Scenario-driven training also be needed. one form of cover to another to pro-
Ranges should be able to adapt to sce- vide realism. These capabilities of ro-
nario-driven live-fire training as well. Small-arms qualification ranges. Real-
botic targets are also integrated into
Realistic targets, threat and no-threat time feedback on shot impact at the
the range-management system.
autonomous and remote-controlled firing point by devices like a “location
vehicles and personnel can also sup- of miss and hit” electronic shot-detec- Qualification ranges should not be
port shoot/no-shoot drills on live-fire t i o n a n d l o cat i o n syste m i s known-distance ranges. Targets should

75 Fall 2020
not be exactly in 50-meter increments monitors/electronic tablets will allow Assembly (Parliament); and chief,
of range. They should vary their dis- playback of videos taken from multiple counterinsurgency-training program
tances, plus or minus 10 meters, to al- angles, and all the other data captured for the multi-national coalition oper-
low an increased number of targets to by the management system would re- ating in Iraq and Afghanistan, based
be used. Qualification ranges are enforce feedback and lessons-learned in Kuwait. 1SG Belonus’ military as-
based on point-of-aim at various rang- on the spot. All this will also be cap- signments included first sergeant,
es, not precision adjustments based tured and on display at the virtual Troop C, 2nd Reconnaissance Surveil-
on known distance. tower, with artificial intelligence help- lance and Target Acquisition Squad-
ing highlight individuals who need fur- ron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Stryker
A couple of the qualification engage-
ther attention and training. Brigade Combat team, 25th Infantry Di-
ments should be fired from around a
vision (Light), Iraq/Fort Lewis, WA;
corner and behind cover such as that
Conclusion first sergeant, Troop P, 3rd Squadron,
found in an urban area. A 45-degree,
The need for realistic live-fire training 16 th Cavalry, 16 th Cavalry Regiment,
four-foot-high, three-foot-long “wall”
and qualification that integrates sur- Fort Knox, KY; chief, Cavalry Platoon
should be placed to one side, slightly
vival and combat skills with marks- Doctrine, Directorate of Training and
behind the normal firing position. This
manship accuracy in a variety of situ- Doctrine Development, Fort Knox;
can be portable or fixed. The wall is at
ations and environments has never scout-platoon sergeant/master gun-
a 45-degree angle to the range to al-
been more important. It is crucial for ner, Headquarters and Headquarters
low continued muzzle orientation
Soldiers to sustain their fighting edge Company, 1 st Battalion, 34 th Armor,
downrange while using cover. Engage-
on today’s battlefields. Emerging tech- Fort Riley, KS; and master gunner,
ments from behind the wall can be
nology, combined with lessons- Troop B, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, Fort
from both prone and kneeling posi-
learned, allows us to adapt our live- Riley. His military schools include Brad-
tions.
fire ranges to ensure more lethal, sur- ley Master Gunner, Pathfinder, Air As-
As discussed, tactical and urban live- vivable Soldiers/law-enforcement per- sault, Bradley Vehicle Commander’s
fire ranges should also include battle- sonnel in any environment. Course, Conduct-of-Fire Trainer (se-
field clutter such as cars and walls. nior-instructor/operator), Advanced
Targets could be presented from be- The future of simulations integrated Noncommissioned Officer Course, Ba-
hind some of these as if the threat is with live-fire is not far off. Rather than sic Noncommissioned Officer Course
using them for cover. Civilian “no- waiting, though, there is plenty we can and Basic Reconnaissance Training. He
shoot” targets should also be integrat- do with today’s technology. There will has an associate’s in arts degree in
ed. These targets can appear in a be a cost to modernizing today’s live- general education from Central Texas
building’s window or as a robotic mov- fire ranges, but with that said, what College. 1SG Belonus’ awards include
ing target dashing from cover to cover. price do you put on Soldiers’/law-en- the Legion of Merit. Bronze Star Med-
Multi-target lifters can also present a forcement officers’ survivability, le- al and Meritorious Service Medal
non-threat target, then the same tar- thality and dominance on the battle- (third oak-leaf cluster).
get can present as a threat target. field of tomorrow?

The range-management system de- 1SG(R) Frank Belonus is president and Acronym Quick-Scan
scribed will be used for all these rang- chief executive officer, Falcon Desert
es as well, integrating many tools for International. His previous civilian po- AAR – after-action review
command-and-control, safety and sitions include senior adviser to the Ku- ATGM – anti-tank guided missile
quality AARs. Tools such as monitors wait military and the Kuwait National IED – improvised explosive device
at the firing point and ruggedized

76 Fall 2020
 The Russian BMPT-72 and the Problem of
Direct-Fire Support in Armored Formations
by 2LT E.R. Chesley tactical gap has developed between chassis, meaning it cannot carry infan-
the tank and the mechanized-infantry try. Unlike a T-72, it does not possess
The tank was originally developed as
squad that renders the latter ineffec- a hard-hitting, high-caliber main gun.
a direct-fire support platform for in-
tive in its fire-support role. The Rus- Instead it is armed with two 30mm au-
fantry, but today the tank is a finely
sians have noted this gap, and they tocannons, four anti-tank guided mis-
tuned machine designed very specifi-
have developed the BMPT-72, a sys- sile (ATGM) tubes and a coaxial
cally to kill other tanks, a task it per-
tem designed to fill the direct-fire-sup- 7.62mm machinegun, all mounted in
forms far better than any other weap-
port role within their armored forma- an unmanned turret with two auto-
ons system. Unfortunately, in becom-
tions. matic grenade launchers mounted in
ing a tank-killer, the tank has lost most
the hull of some models. This array of
of its ability to engage other types of This article provides an overview of firepower allows the BMPT to effi-
targets. the BMPT-72 tank-support vehicle and ciently destroy a range of battlefield
While the tank has been liberally advocates for the creation of an Amer- targets, while its powerful chassis
equipped with weapons and ammuni- ican equivalent. makes it as maneuverable and surviv-
tion for dealing with troops, personnel able as the tanks it supports.¹
carriers, trucks, field fortifications and What is BMPT-72?
The BMPT-72 is an almost completely To better explain the role a TSV might
air targets, all of these weapons and
unique vehicle and, because there is play on the battlefield, I will detail
ammunition represent stopgaps rath-
no real equivalent, it is worth asking how and why the BMPT-72 came to
er than perfect solutions. The tank in
what exactly it’s designed to do. The be.
and of itself lacks adequate direct-fire
capability to deal efficiently with the BMPT-72 is not an infantry fighting ve-
peripheral threats on the modern bat- hicle, armored personnel carrier (APC) Origins of BMPT-72
tlefield. or cavalry reconnaissance vehicle, and In the Russian military, the armored
it is certainly not a main battle tank assault is predicated on the idea of
Traditionally the tank has been sup- (MBT), so what role does it fill? close coordination among armor, artil-
ported in the offense and the defense lery and mechanized infantry. This
by mechanized infantry. Mechanized- The BMPT is the world’s first dedicat- close cooperation proved difficult to
infantry troops and carriers combine ed tank-support vehicle (TSV), a type achieve as infantry carriers are gener-
to form a weapons system uniquely of vehicle designed specifically to pro- ally too slow to keep up with tanks and
suited to support the tank by destroy- vide direct-fire support for tanks. The too vulnerable to survive on a modern
ing non-tank targets. However, a BMPT is built on a modified T-72 MBT battlefield. Thus the Russians saw a
tactical gap developing between the
mechanized-infantry squad and the
tank. In the midst of this revelation,
the Russians experienced acute defi-
ciencies in direct-fire capability during
their invasions of Afghanistan and Gro-
zny.² ³ ⁴
These tactical issues led to the BMPT-
72’s development, designed to coun-
ter the gamut of battlefield threats by
offering the suppressive capability of
a mechanized-infantry squad in a
package that was as protected and
maneuverable as the tanks it would
accompany.

TSV for U.S. Army

A purpose-built TSV would greatly im-
prove American lethality against the
type of mechanized threat that near-
Figure 1. The first model of BMPT-72. Note the unarmored ATGM tubes, hull-
mounted grenade launchers above the tracks and Active Protection System peer adversaries pose. TSVs could pro-
tubes barely visible at the base of the turret. (Photo copyright Vitaly Kuzmin. vide obvious and not-so-obvious ad-
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives vantages to maneuver formations in
4.0 International License.) all sorts of tactical situations:

77 Fall 2020
Figure 2. A Russian army BMPT-72 with a T-80 and T-90. (Photo copyright Vitaly Kuzmin. Licensed under a Creative Com-
mons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.)

• A formation of MBTs and TSVs facing bronetransportyor (BTR – Russian mechanized threat in open country.
a much larger mechanized formation armored personnel carrier), but Alternatively, in the case of an urban
could prioritize targets by vehicle given an airburst round or an anti- environment, a commander might
type, with MBTs focusing on the anti- air-capable fire-control system (FCS), want explosive or semi-armor-piercing
tank fight while TSVs eliminated light the TSV could turn a Hind (Russian ammunition, a Common Remotely Op-
armor and dismounts. This division helicopter) into temporarily airborne erated Weapon Station-mounted ma-
of labor would change the modern art far more quickly and chinegun or automatic grenade
“correlation of fires” in favor of U.S. easily than a man-portable anti-tank launcher, an acoustic gunfire-detec-
forces. This would also mean tanks system air round. TSVs could even tion system and the previously men-
could carry a greater proportion of accept small modular radar arrays tioned obstacle-reduction munitions,
sabot rounds, increasing their and swap ATGMs for surface-to-air along with applique armor to increase
endurance and anti-tank capability. missiles to provide tactical air all-aspect protection without endan-
defense with gun and missile gering dismounts.
• In urban environments, TSVs could
systems. Adoption of an air-defense
provide direct-fire support to MBTs Against a mechanized threat, a com-
anti-tank system (ADATS)-type
and dismounts with the advantage mander might want armor-piercing
weapon would allow one missile to
of being able to fire at higher angles. and high-explosive ammunition,
perform both anti-air and anti-tank
The TSVs also create less collateral ATGMs, advanced day-night optics and
functions.⁶
damage than a tank’s main-gun fire. an explosive reactive armor (ERA)
For obstacles requiring greater • TSVs could also be co-opted to package. By designing modularity into
firepower than 30mm cannons, provide direct-fire support to infantry the platform, the TSV could fulfill mul-
ATGMs could be swapped for formations or guard mobile artillery tiple roles on a variety of battlefields.
unguided direct-fire obstacle pieces operating close to the front.
reduction rockets.⁵ Any role requiring flexible direct-fire The Stryker can be seen as an example
support could be filled by a TSV. of the benefits of modularity. Despite
• TSVs could carry mine rollers and the Stryker’s distinct lack of survivabil-
plows in breaching operations to Modularity ity and cross-country mobility, the
b re a c h a n d p ro o f o bsta c l e s . A key aspect of a TSV should be mod- Army has leveraged this basic platform
Distributing obstacle-reduction ularity. By creating turret and hull sys- into a range of vehicles with unique
equipment to the lighter TSVs would tems that are easily modifiable, even capabilities. As an example, the Army’s
reduce mechanical stress on the in theater, the TSV could be quickly current short-range air defense (SHO-
already heavier MBTs, and they and easily adapted to a variety of RAD) solution – the Stryker-based A1
would be free to overwatch the “roles within a role.” Although the role IM-SHORAD – sees a Stryker chassis
breach operation. of a TSV is to provide direct-fire sup- equipped with an anti-aircraft gun,
• A TSV with an unmanned turret port to tanks, other missions and a missiles, radar and electronic-warfare
would be exceptionally survivable range of different threats on a range systems.⁷ ⁸ ⁹ The Army also apparently
and easily repairable if damaged. of different battlefields would make it intends to equip the vehicle with
Also, an elevated unmanned turret difficult to create a one-size-fits-all emerging laser anti-drone weapon sys-
like the one found on the BMPT-72 platform. tems.¹⁰
would allow the TSV to fight without For example, a TSV moving into an ur- By using a modular platform as a base
exposing its crew to direct fire. ban area would require different sub- on which various weapons and sys-
• A TSV’s cannons could easily destroy systems than one assigned to accom- tems can be attached, the Army has
a boyevaya mashina pekhoty (BMP pany armored formations in an attack created a platform to deal with con-
– Russian fighting vehicle) and a or defense against a sophisticated ventional air threats as well as the

78 Fall 2020
emerging threat of small unmanned and supply of many different plat- platform when the Bradley already ex-
aerial systems. Unfortunately, while a forms proved to be an overwhelming ists. This is a good question because
big step in the right direction, any burden for battalion commanders and the Bradley is a proven platform, and
Stryker-based system remains woeful- the CAB structure was eventually it is similar to a TSV in many ways. Dur-
ly incapable of accompanying armor. abandoned, but there are several im- ing the 1991 invasion of Iraq, the Brad-
A more mobile and better protected, portant differences between U.S. and ley worked closely with the Abrams as
but equally modular, platform could Russian battalions.¹¹ part of the ACT and acted as both a re-
present a solution to a range of tacti- connaissance vehicle and, in many cas-
First, U.S. battalion commanders tend
cal problems that at present are filled es, a makeshift TSV.
to be much more experienced than
by stopgap solutions.
their Russian counterparts and, criti- At the Battle of 73 Easting, a micro-
cally, tend to have a much larger cosm of Operation Desert Storm, Brad-
Organization staff.¹² Second, Russian formations leys used ATGMs to engage targets
One critical, non-materiel question to tend to be less flexible at battalion lev- outside the range of the Abrams main
be asked when considering the adop- els and retain more initiative at eche- gun and used autocannons against
tion of a new platform, especially a lons-above-battalion, making them softer targets such as APCs, infantry
conceptually new platform that is not less capable of integrating combined and field fortifications.¹⁵ There are
simply replacing an existing system, is arms at a tactical level. even accounts of Bradleys destroying
how the new weapon should be inte- multiple tanks at close range, but de-
grated into an existing organization. As to the issue of maintenance and spite their performance, there are lim-
supply, if the TSV was developed on an its to the efficacy of the Bradley that
Let’s consider an armored brigade Abrams chassis, these problems might
combat team. If TSVs are integrated in- can be uncovered by looking closely at
be even less of an issue than they are the 1991 invasion.
dependently from the combined-arms now. Also, despite past Russian fail-
battalions (CABs), perhaps as one or ures, the United States has seen suc- First, Desert Storm, as the name re-
two companies in the brigade engi- cess with tactical combined arms as minds us, occurred in an open desert
neering battalion (like the Stryker exemplified by the armored-cavalry where visibility conditions were limit-
main-gun system in the Stryker BCT), troops (ACTs) organic to armored-cav- ed by severe weather. This meant that
or in a novel “maneuver fire-support alry regiments (ACRs), which I will dis- coalition armor was often able to use
battalion” with one or two companies cuss later.¹³ superior optics and FCS to see through
of mechanized infantry, there would dust and engage enemy targets from
be an benefit in terms of maintenance Another important consideration is beyond the range at which the low-
and organization. If these platforms the fact that the Russians have re- quality export-model T-72s could re-
were grouped together, the brigade turned to the use of CABs in the form spond. The fact that Iraqi armor was
commander would have greater con- of their battalion tactical groups, often unable to lay effective direct
trol over how they were used, and he which are, at present, in wide use.¹⁴ fire, even at close ranges, underscores
or she could mass their effects. If cen- this point.16 This lack of effective fire-
I propose that a sort of best-of-both-
tralized, TSVs could be controlled and worlds solution could be achieved in control capability meant that Bradleys
commanded by officers and Soldiers terms of organization. In the CABs, were less exposed to enemy direct fire
who have the experience and back- TSVs could be integrated as separate and their much weaker armor did not
ground to make the best tactical use TSV companies within the CAB – or present an issue.
of the platform. Also, centralization of even integrated at the company level
these platforms would make resupply That being said, in this situation, it is
along the lines of the ACR’s ACT, with important to consider that there were
and maintenance more straightfor- one or two platoons of TSVs operating
ward. far more casualties among Bradley
with two or three platoons of Abrams. crews than Abrams crews. 17 18 19 The
On the other hand, integration of TSVs Also, at the brigade level, one or two Bradley is vulnerable to direct fire and,
into the CABs by supplementing or re- companies of TSVs could be main- in a European conflict, armored forma-
placing the mechanized-infantry com- tained as a more flexible resource for tions would be exposed to accurate di-
panies would provide greater tactical use by the brigade commander. These rect fire, and the Bradley would be
efficiency. The Russians found that in- brigade-level assets could include TSVs forced to either remain far behind the
tegrating combined arms at the battal- equipped for air defense, infantry fire armor or suffer inordinate losses.
ion level allowed better and more reg- Therefore one of the key principles of
support or security missions, with the
ular combined-arms training. Integra- the TSV concept is that they should be
added benefit that these niche-sup-
tion at the battalion level would lend as survivable as the MBTs they sup-
port vehicles could be operated by
itself to tactical efficiency as more port.
Soldiers with relevant military-occupa-
training opportunities would be avail-
tion specialties (MOSs) such as the 11 The second issue with the Bradley re-
able and tactical leaders would be
or 14 MOS series. lates to its limited mobility. While
more familiar with each other’s sys-
tems and tactics. post-Desert Storm sources stated that
Bradley and Desert Storm the Bradley was able to keep pace
The Russians eventually found that There is the question of why the Army with the Abrams, there were some is-
managing the training, maintenance should pursue an entirely new sues, notably with reverse speed. 20

79 Fall 2020
 the Russians have not discounted their
value in the combined-arms team, and
neither do I.23 In fact, I believe that an
American TSV would free the infantry
to focus on missions for which it they
are more uniquely suited, such as
clearing and patrolling close terrain,
reducing bypassed enemy formations
and assisting in defensive actions from
well-sited and prepared positions. Re-
ducing the exposure of mechanized in-
fantry to anti-tank weapons by remov-
ing them from the bleeding edge of
the battlespace would allow infantry-
vehicle concepts that more closely
conform to the dismounted mission.
The Bradley is relatively well-armed
and -armored because it was con-
ceived for high-intensity Cold War con-
flict against T-72s and BMPs.24 It pays
Figure 3. An M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle operates in desert conditions at the for this substantial combat capability
National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Eric M. Gar-
by having limited space for dismounts
land II)
and less cross-country mobility than a
The Abrams reverse speed is about The TSV could make use of a rede- lighter platform. If mechanized infan-
double that of the Bradley, which re- signed Abrams chassis with the entire try were not forced to closely accom-
sulted in vulnerable Bradleys being left crew moved into the hull to make pany MBTs in combat, their exposure
behind by rapidly reversing Abrams. room for an unmanned turret. Private to direct fire would be decreased and
Also, the Abrams is flat-out faster than industry has already created an infantry vehicles could return to an
the Bradley, and a TSV built on an Abrams with an unmanned turret, and APC concept, typified by lightly armed
Abrams chassis would probably be it has recently displays mockups of a and armored platforms that are highly
about 10-20 tons lighter still than an new version of the same concept.22 mobile and provide protection from
Abrams, meaning that more rapid and The TSV would require a new un- artillery, machinegun and light anti-
shocking attacks would be possible. manned turret, but there are a variety tank weapon fire.
of suitable weapons systems in the As an example, during the Vietnam
The Bradley is a good weapon system U.S. inventory now. These include the
and an important part of any maneu- War the lightly armed and armored
Bushmaster and several new larger- M113 APC was often found to have
ver formation, but it will not prove an caliber autocannons; the tube-
effective substitute for a purpose-built better mobility across difficult terrain
launched, optically tracked, wire-guid- than even dismounted troops due to
TSV. Although creating a new weapons ed missile; Hellfire and Javelin mis-
system from scratch may not be ideal, its light weight and amphibious capa-
siles; and a full selection of machine- bilities.25 Lighter, faster and more ca-
there is no need to develop a com- guns and automatic grenade launch-
pletely new vehicle when the Army al- pacious vehicles would allow the in-
ers. With these options already on fantry to focus on missions at which
ready has many of the parts necessary hand, design work could focus on cre-
to simply “assemble” one. they excel by allowing dismounts to
ating a new housing for pre-existing maneuver to an objective more rapid-
weapons and systems. ly and in greater numbers.
Approach to
acquisitions problem It might also be desirable to rearrange Also, TSVs could provide more effec-
armor around the TSV to enhance all- tive direct-fire support for infantry
While simply shoehorning a pre-exist-
aspect protection at the expense of a than any presently available platform,
ing platform like the Bradley into a
bit of frontal-aspect protection, but making up for the loss of firepower
new tactical role would be cheaper
this type of redesign could be accom- from their old transport vehicles.
than creating an entirely new vehicle,
plished relatively easily by making use
the cost of creating a TSV need not be
prohibitive. The Army would be able
of ERA or applique armor. TSVs in Russian military
To date, the BMPT-72 has not been
to pursue a more “evolutionary” ap- Ultimately, there is no need to rein-
widely incorporated into Russian Army
proach to the acquisitions process, as vent the wheel for a system that rep-
structure. While this might seem to
many of the subsystems necessary to resents more of a conceptual change
discredit the concept, there are sever-
create an effective TSV are already than a technological one.
al reasons for this apparent lack of in-
battle-tested and relatively little
Mechanized infantry terest.
ground-up design work would be re-
quired.21 On the subject of mechanized infantry, While the BMPT-72 has not been

80 Fall 2020
widely integrated, it has been accept- designed for the export market.28 This the West. In 1996 an article was pub-
ed for service, and the Russian Minis- may play a role in its limited adoption, lished in ARMOR that provided a de-
try of Defense (MoD) has begun to as Russian export vehicles are gener- tailed proposal for a vehicle built on
take deliveries of the platform. It ally inferior to their domestic acquisi- an Abrams chassis, designed to pro-
seems that despite ongoing develop- tions. vide air defense and direct-fire sup-
ment, the MoD has only just deemed port with autocannons and missiles.32
the BMPT-72 to be acceptable but Algeria has apparently fielded a sub- However, the collapse of the Soviet
probably not fully so. Despite the lim- stantial number of imported BMPT-72s Union and the beginning of the Global
ited adoption, development is pro- alongside imported T-90s, and Kazakh- War On Terrorism resulted in an al-
ceeding on future models of the stan has enthusiastically incorporated most complete lack of interest in de-
BMPT-72, indicating an ongoing inter- the BMPT-72 into its force structure, veloping platforms for symmetric war-
est in the concept. The next model of even going so far as to commence do- fare.
TSV will reportedly make use of the mestic production under license.29 30
One possibility is that Russia may be With a resurgent Russian military, fo-
Armata chassis and be even more
making shrewd use of an opportunity cus is returning to the armored fight.
heavily armed.26
to field an advanced testbed by selling The U.S. Army has about 20 years of
When looking at Russian arms devel- it to other countries and closely mon- resting on the laurels of Desert Storm
opment, it is important to consider the itoring its performance before pursu- to reckon with. Given the wide range
MoD’s relatively limited financial re- ing final development for themselves; of anti-tank threats on the battlefield,
sources. Despite devoting a propor- however, this is entirely my own spec- the tank’s limited ability to deal with
tionally large amount of money to “de- ulation. these peripheral threats and the
fense,” Russia has historically been un- mechanized infantry’s increasingly
able to field all its newest and most ef- As a final note on the subject, a Chi- limited ability to accompany armored
fective gadgets. nese corporation has developed a TSV formations, it seems clear that a new
similar to the BMPT-72. The QN-506 is solution to the problem of direct-fire
The Armata platform is a perfect ex- built on the Type 59 tank chassis and support in the armored formation is
ample. It seems likely that Russia features an even wider range of weap- warranted.
would like to adopt the T-14 and other ons than the BMPT. However, it is un-
Armata-series vehicles, but it has 2LT E.R. Chesley is in transition, pre-
clear whether the vehicle will be ad-
proven more financially viable to ac- paring for Ranger School. His military
opted for service in the Chinese
quire greater numbers of older, but schools include the Armor Basic Offi-
army.31
still very capable, tanks and armored cer Leader Course. 2LT Chesley has a
vehicles.27 Acquisition of the BMPT-72 bachelor’s of science degree in con-
will likely proceed at a limited rate due
Conclusions
My proposal here is not novel. The struction management from Texas
to financial difficulties rather than lack A&M University.
BMPT-72 demonstrates that Russia,
of interest. the world leader in armor theory, is Notes
Another consideration is the fact that pursuing solutions to the problem of ¹ Dr. Lester W. Grau, “Preserving Shock
the most recent model of the BMPT- direct-fire support in armor forma- Action: A New Approach to Armored Ma-
72 was apparently specifically tions. This is not even a new idea in neuver Warfare,” ARMOR, September-
October 2006.
² Yago Rodríguez Rodríguez, Revista Ejer-
citos on-line, Oct. 13, 2018, https://www.
revistaejercitos.com/2018/10/13/bmpt-
terminator-i/.
³ Grau, “Preserving Shock Action: A New
Approach to Armored Maneuver
Warfare.”
⁴ CPT Charles K. Bartles and Dr. Lester W.
Grau, “A New System Preserves Armor
Dominance of the Future Battlefield:
BMPT ‘Terminator-2’,“ ARMOR, April-
June 2015. This article represents the
main source of my ideas on this subject. I
would highly recommend reading this ar-
ticle in its entirety to better understand
my article, specifically the Russian basis
for developing the BMPT-72.
⁵ Or rockets could make use of high-ex-
Figure 4. The latest model of BMPT-72 destined for the export market. Note plosive squashhead-type warheads,
the redesigned turret and lack of forward-facing grenade launchers. (Photo which have exceptional effects against
copyright Vitaly Kuzmin. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non- obstacles.
Commercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.) ⁶ Dr. Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D.

81 Fall 2020
 ⁸ Eric Miller, “Stryker Problems Highlight
Testing Shortfalls,” Defense News, Nov. 1,
2004, http://pogoarchive.pub30.convio.
net/pogo-files/alerts/national-security/
ns-siav-20041101.html. In an attempt to
convince the House Armed Services Com-
mittee to block purchase of two Stryker
brigades’ worth of platforms, retired COL
Douglas Macgregor stated that the Stryk-
er lacks the “firepower, protection, mo-
bility and organic logistical support to be
a full-dimensional warfighting organiza-
tion, and its operational utility will con-
tinue to be limited to peace support or
paramilitary police operations.”
⁹ “AUSA 2019: General Dynamics unveils
Stryker A1 IM-SHORAD air-defense ar-
mored vehicle,“ Army recognition, Oct.
22, 2019, https://www.armyrecognition.
Figure 5. The Object 787, an early prototype TSV. (Photo copyright Vitaly Kuz-
com/ausa_2019_news_show_daily_cov-
min. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- Interna-
erage_report_united_states/ausa_2019_
tional License NoDerivatives 4.0.)
general_dynamics_unveils_stryker_a1_
im-shorad_air_defense_armored_vehi-
cle.html.
¹⁰ Department of Defense FY 2020 bud-
get estimates: justification book of mis-
sile procurement, Army, March 2019.
https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/
Documents/BudgetMaterial/2020/
Base%20Budget/Procurement/02%20
Missile%20Procurement%20Army.pdf.
Page 33 discusses the addition of the mo-
bile experimental high-energy laser to
the SHORAD platform, but it also uses
some questionable phrases such as
“long-term capability.”
¹¹ Bartles and Grau, “A New System Pre-
serves Armor Dominance of the Future
Battlefield: BMPT ‘Terminator-2.’“
¹² CPT Charles K. Bartles and Dr. Lester W.
Grau, The Russian Way of War, Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies
Office, 2016. Discusses Russian “opera-
tional art” and how it influences their
command and staff structure.
Figure 6. The Russian Army BMPT-72. Note that the turret has been modified ¹³ Field Manual (FM) 34-35, Armored
with armor surrounding the ATGM tubes and some other changes, but the Cavalry Regiment and Separate Brigade
hull retains the grenade launchers. (Photo copyright Vitaly Kuzmin. Licensed Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Op-
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- International License erations, Chapter 2 (organization) de-
NoDerivatives 4.0.) scribes the ACR’s organization in the
1090s with two tank platoons and two
Bacon, “Forward Area Air-Ground De- 2015 and the future years defense pro- Bradley scout platoons per company.
fense: Do We Need A Dual-Role Hybrid gram.” According to GEN Raymond Odier-
Air-Ground Defense System for the Ar- ¹⁴ CPT Nicolas J. Fiore, “Defeating the
no, “The analysis found that the Stryker, Russian Battalion Tactical Group,” AR-
mored Forces?”, ARMOR, July-August as currently designed, lacks sufficient off-
1996: “[ADATS] is a single-stage, multi- MOR, Spring 2017. Describes the Russian
road mobility to maneuver in the same battle tactical group and provides an
purpose, highly accurate, day/night and operational environment as armored bri-
adverse-weather missile system. It has a overview of their use in Ukraine.
gade combat team (ABCT) combat vehi- ¹⁵ Transcript of taped interview with
true and unique dual-target capability for
cles. Although the Stryker provides im- officers of Troop E, 2/2 ACR, and scout-
engaging low-flying aircraft, advanced at-
tack anti-tank helicopters and armored proved force protection against under- platoon leader from Troop G, 2/2 ACR,
vehicles.” body threats, it lacks protection against March 3, 1991, https://mcoepublic.blob.
direct fire and indirect fire threats.” This core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/ABOLC_
⁷ “Department of Defense authorization was in 2015 and little (nothing) has BA_2018/Research_Modules_B/ 73_East-
for appropriations for Fiscal Year (FY) changed. ing/2-2_ACR-1.pdf. This source provides

82 Fall 2020
a thorough overview of the tactical-level Maneuver Center of Excellence’s Armor Tanks,” Jan. 11, 2020, https://military-
battle at 73 Easting and includes a num- Restoration Shop. As for the private-in- watchmagazine.com/article/finest-ar-
ber of cases where Bradleys were used to dustry mockup, I saw a model of it at the mour-in-africa-algerian-army-receives-
provide direct-fire assistance for Abrams. Maneuver Warfighter Conference in 2019 new-batch-of-t-90sa-battle-tanks: “Serv-
Examples can be found on Pages 8, 15, and confirmed that it was conceived as ing alongside the T-90SA are BMPT-72
19, 22, 23, 27 and 29. an Abrams chassis with a new unmanned Terminator 2 tank-support vehicles, for
¹⁶Ibid. turret. which Algeria was the first foreign client.”
¹⁷ CPT Michael Gollaher, “Two Scouts Un-
23
Grau, “Preserving Shock Action: A New 30
Bartles and Grau, “A New System Pre-
der Fire Helped Injured Buddies During Approach to Armored Maneuver War- serves Armor Dominance of the Future
Night Battle,” ARMOR, May-June 1991. fare”: “It was not an infantry fighting ve- Battlefield: BMPT ‘Terminator-2’“: “In
This article encapsulates the argument. hicle (BMP) and the Russians were not 2012, Kazakhstan, a country with a post-
Bradleys were able to provide effective discounting the value of mechanized in- Soviet Army that somewhat resembles
direct-fire support but were not surviv- fantry in the combined-arms team. They the Russian military in force structure
able in the face of enemy armor. were recognizing that the mechanized in- and tactics, signed an agreement to pur-
18
Tony Wunderlich, “Lucky Scouts Dodge fantry may not be at the critical point at chase nine BMPTs on T-72 chassis, with
‘Big Bullets’ That Ripped Their Bradley,” the critical time.” deliveries starting in 2013. Apparently,
ARMOR, May-June 1991. This article de- 24
Diane L. Urbina, “Lethal beyond all ex- the BMPT was perceived as a great suc-
scribes how an Iraqi armor-piercing, fin- pectations: The Bradley Fighting Vehicle” cess, and in April 2014, Kazakhstan
stabilized, discarding sabot tank round – in Chapter 12 of George F. Hofmann signed another contract with Uralvagon-
was able to blow through a Bradley with- and Donn A. Starry (editors), Camp Colt zavod to produce the BMPT in Kazakh-
out harming the crew. It is important to to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Ar- stan under a licensing agreement.”
remember that Iraqi sabots were made mored Forces, Lexington, KY; The Univer- 31
Kyle Mizokami, “China’s ‘Terminator’
of maraging steel rather than depleted sity Press of Kentucky, the author dis- (TSV) Is Bristling With Weaponry,” Nov. 7,
uranium and lacked the latter’s post-pen- cusses how the Bradley was steadily up- 2018, https://www.popularmechanics.
etration pyrophoric effects, which would gunned and uparmored in response to com/military/weapons/a24793656/chin-
have probably killed the entire crew. This the threat of Soviet armored forces. asterminator-tank-support -vehicle-is-
article also describes how a single 25
Ibid. bristling-with-weaponry/.
12.7mm round disabled a Bradley. 26
Petri Mäkelä, “Check out Russia’s Dead-
32
Sharoni and Bacon, “Forward Area Air-
19
Vince Crawley, “Minute by minute, ly ‘Terminator’ Tank That Was Built for Ground Defense: Do We Need A Dual-
death by death,” Stars and Stripes, Urban Warfare,” The National Interest, Role Hybrid Air-Ground Defense System
March 9, 1991, https://www.stripes.com/ Aug. 13, 2019: “There is also a Termina- for the Armored Forces?”
news/minute-by-minute-death-by- tor-3 version that is based on the T-14 Ar-
death-1.6319. Describes a number of ca- mata platform. The issues with the T-14
sualties among Bradley crewmen that oc- have delayed the introduction of the Ter-
Acronym Quick-Scan
curred during the Battle of 73 Easting. minator-3 into the future.” ACR – armored-cavalry regiment
20
U.S. General Accounting Office report 27
Tomas Malmlöf lecturing at the Center ACT – armored-cavalry troop
to the chairman, subcommittee on regu- for Strategic and International Studies on ADATS – air-defense anti-tank
lation, business opportunities and ener- “The Russian Military of 2035,” May 24, system
gy, Committee on Small Business, House 2017, https://youtu.be/ ATGM – anti-tank guided missile
of Representatives, “Operation Desert iKhOgYA2L30?t=1020. Lecturer starts dis- APC – armored personnel carrier
Storm early-performance assessment of cussing procurement around the 17-min- BCT – brigade combat team
Bradley and Abrams,” January 1992, ute mark. BMP – boyevaya mashina pekhoty
https://www.gao.gov/as- 28
Mikhail Voskresenskiy, “Russian MoD (Russian fighting vehicle)
sets/220/215553.pdf. Pages 18-19 in- Decides to Buy ‘Terminator’ Combat Ve-
CAB – combined-arms battalion
clude a discussion of reverse speed is- hicles – Here’s Why,” Aug. 25, 2017,
ERA – explosive reactive armor
sues. https://sptnkne.ws/fqtC: “The Termina-
FCS – fire-control system
FY – fiscal year
21
Bartles and Grau, “The Russian Way of tor 1 and the Terminator 2. They’re both MBT – main battle tank
War.” Includes an explanation of “evolu- earmarked for export and haven’t been MoD – Ministry of Defense
tionary” acquisitions and elaborates on purchased by the Russian Defense Minis- MOS – military-occupation specialty
its advantages. try.” SHORAD – short-range air defense
22
I have personally seen the unmanned 29
“Finest Armour in Africa: Algerian Army TSV – tank-support vehicle
turret Abrams prototype at the Receives New Batch of T-90SA Battle

83 Fall 2020
 Volcano Minefield Planning at the
Brigade Combat Team and Below
by CPT Gregory Shepard and Though the Volcano minefield system commander’s intent is ensured by un-
CPT Doni Wong transitioned to the focal point of most derstanding the enemy’s composition,
brigade combat team (BCT) defensive capabilities, most likely order of battle
For the past several years, the Nation-
plans at NTC, observer/coach/trainer and most likely course of action (CoA)
al Training Center (NTC) has operated
(O/C/T) observations and discussion – and bringing it all together. Success-
using decisive-action training environ-
during after-action reviews (AAR) have ful IPB reduces the number of likely
ment scenarios after nearly a decade
highlighted the task-force staffs’ unfa- enemy CoAs from infinite to a few like-
of counterinsurgency (COIN) training.
miliarity with the system and its em- ly ones and is a primary driver in the
Before the COIN era, brigade-sized de-
ployment. development of the task force’s plan.
fenses at NTC included large-row
minefields constructed using conven- Unfamiliarity with the system results Likewise, identifying the reconnais-
tional mines such as the M15 or M21 in failure to identify the proper trig- sance assets required to observe
anti-tank land mine. gers required to ensure the mines are named areas of interest (NAIs) to fur-
deployed and still active when the en- ther determine the enemy’s actions by
While many of the U.S. Army’s senior emy arrives, and/or creates unrealistic observing for specific indicators is
leaders at the brigade level and above expectations for what the operators done during this process. The indica-
may recall these training events at NTC can achieve with the Volcano system. tors observed guide commanders and
in the 1990s, many current planners at Moreover, many of the requirements their staffs through the decision-mak-
the battalion level and below have not for Volcano employment are influ- ing process and actions to counter the
participated in them. enced by multiple warfighting func- enemy. From here, the characteristics
tions, including intelligence and com- of the defense and engagement-area
Moreover, changes in U.S. landmine mand and control. development can be used to form a
policy from 2004, 2011, 2014 and
To successfully emplace a minefield, a cohesive plan that addresses the cur-
2020 restrict the munitions available
task-force staff must know the limita- rent situation.
to current planners1 who did not de-
fensively plan in the 1990s. tions of the Volcano system and be Determining how to best use all assets
comfortable with using the R>EACT available to the task force (indirect
The U.S. Army can currently only use (rate, emplacement, arming, com- fires, obstacles, information-collection
mines with a self-destruct mecha- mand approval and travel) formula. assets, survivability positions, etc.)
nism.2 As a result, defensive obstacle should not be done in a vacuum or by
plans rely on the artillery-delivered re- Planning for defense a single warfighting function. Includ-
mote anti-armor minefield, area-deni- Proper and thorough intelligence ing the engineer team who will assist
al artillery munition and Volcano de- preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in constructing or deploying the obsta-
livery system for emplacing large sets the conditions for a successful de- cles in the planning process is critical.
minefield obstacles. fense. Achieving the task-force Understanding the engineers’ capabil-
ities and limitations is vital to creating
a realistic and feasible obstacle plan.
Likewise, engineers must be able to
describe to the task force the obsta-
cle’s possible effects and the limita-
tions on its construction, especially re-
garding time. Building a shared under-
standing and habitual working rela-
tionship with the engineer team and
the maneuver commanders they are
supporting accelerates the plan’s link-
up and dissemination. Also, this will
aid the reduction of poor or overly
vague guidance from maneuver com-
manders regarding what they want the
obstacle to accomplish. The engineer’s
advice can help ensure the ground
commander’s intent is still met while
Figure 1. Volcano system within an ABCT. working within the limits of personnel,

84 Fall 2020
time and equipment. An example of
this is the employment of Volcano
minefield systems

Volcano minefield
employment,
considerations
The Volcano system in the armored
brigade combat team (ABCT) and the
Stryker BCT (SBCT) are similar in de-
sign but vary in capabilities. Specific
obstacle effects are achieved by com-
bining minefield patterns in different
ways. For example, a single-row pat- Figure 2. Volcano system in an SBCT.
tern creates a single minefield obsta-
cle approximately one kilometer long.3 R >EACT formula and affected by terrain, light/visibility
For a more detailed explanation of and weather.
how to arrange minefield patterns to
execution criteria
Volcano minefields are comprised of • A = Arming time of the mines. The
achieve specific effects, see Army scatterable mines (SCATMINES) that arming time is the amount of time it
Technical Publication (ATP) 3-90.8, have a self-destruct time and there- takes for the mines to arm themselves
Combined Arms Countermobility Op- fore must be treated as situational ob- once fired from the Volcano system.
erations, and confer with the support- stacles.5 A situational obstacle is de-
ing engineer unit’s leadership. fined as an obstacle a unit plans and • C = Command-approval time. The
possibly prepares prior to starting an command-approval time is the entire
During the planning process, the task- process from observer to Volcano
operation but does not execute unless
force staff considers the number and operators. It includes the time
specific criteria are met. It’s important
pattern of minefields required to cre- required for the observer to identify
to understand that situational obsta-
ate the intended effect. Though it is and report the enemy’s location and
cles use an event-based criteria or
possible to reload the Volcano system the time for the approval authority
trigger and not a time-based criteria.6
and execute successive minefields, the to receive all specific event-based
time required for emplacement may triggers and make a decision. It also
not always be available. For example, Again, it is imperative for the task
includes time for the approval
the standard planning factor for re- force to conduct a comprehensive IPB
authority to communicate to the
loading a Volcano system is less than during the military decision-making
emplacement authority, and time for
one hour. However, observations and process to identify what routes the en-
the emplacement authority to
multiple AARs as an O/C/T have shown emy is likely to travel. Once the likely
communicate to the crew operating
us that most engineer units do not enemy routes are identified, the task
the Volcano system. The command-
train this task to standard. force staff can use the R>EACT formu-
approval process is much more
la to help aid in planning for the Vol-
complex than perceived by everyone
Problematic lack of cano emplaced minefield.
in the approval process due to the
reload training • R = Expected travel time of enemy difficulties units face with establishing
This lack of training is problematic forces from the NAI associated with effective communications over
when the squad or platoon is attempt- the minefield to the minefield’s distance at NTC. It is important for
ing to reload a Volcano system for the templated location. The task force all those involved in the command-
first time. Moreover, some engineer needs to use its IPB to determine approval process to understand the
units only plan to use the two Volcano enemy rates of march along expected primary, alternate, contingency and
system operators to execute the re- avenues of approach and how those emergency (PACE) plan for how each
load because the rest of the engineer rates may be affected by terrain, element will communicate.
platoon is generally recovering from light/visibility and weather.
36-48 hours of continuous obstacle • T = Travel time of the Volcano system.
construction. • E = Emplacement time of system. The travel time is the time required
The emplacement time is the amount for the Volcano to physically drive
In this case, the expected reload time of time it takes for the Volcano from its hide site to the templated
is a few hours. If the task force is only system to drive through the minefield location and then from the
approved for a four-hour-duration 4 centerline of the minefield and minefield location out of the
minefield, the first minefield may be deploy the SCATMINES. For planning engagement area behind the battle
close to entering the self-destruction purposes, this is assumed to be positions. It is important to ensure
window by the time the same Volcano several minutes but should be the effects of terrain, light/visibility
system begins employing any subse- rehearsed by the emplacing unit as and weather are included in this time
quent minefields. the emplacement time is also as well.

85 Fall 2020
Once task-force planners calculate the the enemy expected avenue of ap- establishing the NAI, task-force plan-
total “EACT” time, they establish an proach such that “R” is greater than ners specify a primary and alternate
NAI at an appropriate distance away the total sum of the “EACT” times (see observer for the NAI, integrate the NAI
from the templated minefield along examples in Figures 3 and 4). After into the information-collection matrix

Figure 3. R>EACT formula example.

Figure 4. R>EACT formula example No. 2.

86 Fall 2020
and create a decision point associated clear understanding of the event- 2-16 Cavalry Regiment, 199th Brigade,
with the NAI. A fully developed deci- based triggers reduces the likelihood Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort
sion point is critical and must contain of a premature or delayed Benning, GA; and platoon leader and
a comprehensive set of criteria found- emplacement of the minefield. company executive officer, 1-22 Infan-
ed on event-based triggers to deter- try Battalion, 1st ABCT, 4th Infantry Di-
mine if and when the minefield will be Recommendations for vision, Fort Carson. CPT Wong’s mili-
executed. way forward tary schools include ABOLC, Airborne
Task-force staffs need to understand School, Ranger School, Maneuver Cap-
The execution criteria for emplacing
that the Volcano minefield delivery tain’s Career Course and Cavalry Lead-
the minefield must be clearly defined
system is limited and is planned using er’s Course. His awards include the
by the task force staff using event-
the doctrinal patterns. Confer with the Bronze Star Medal and Meritorious
based triggers. The observers, the ap-
supporting engineer unit for details Service Medal with one oak-leaf clus-
proval authority and the emplacing
about capabilities. ter.
authority must all have a clear under-
standing of the triggers. For example, Task-force staffs also need to under- Notes
is it a friendly event-based trigger such stand and use the R>EACT formula to 1
Christopher T. Kuhn, Terrain Shaping in
as the cavalry troop, forward in the plan for the execution of a Volcano the Twenty-First Century, U.S. Army War
screen, withdrawing behind the mine- emplaced minefield. Ensure an NAI is College, April 1, 2014.
field? Or is it enemy event-based with included in the information-collection 2
U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Policy
six to eight enemy vehicles driving matrix with a specified primary and al- on Landmines [memorandum], Jan. 31,
through the NAI? Or is it both? What ternate observer. 2020.
if the reconnaissance asset is forced to 3
Project Manager Close-Combat Systems
withdraw due to a reason beyond be- Volcano minefields must use event- (PM CCS), “Volcano Multiple Delivery
ing decisively engaged – is the Volcano based triggers. The execution criteria Mine System,” PdM Area Denial, www.
minefield still emplaced without ob- must be clearly defined using event- pica.army.mil/pmccs/areadenial/lega-
servation? Or, if the reconnaissance based triggers and understood by all cymines/volcano.html.
asset identifies six to eight enemy ve- personnel involved in the command- 4
Ibid.
hicles driving through the NAI but the approval process. Rehearse the com- 5
ATP 3-90.8.
reconnaissance asset can maneuver mand-approval process to ensure var-
ious scenarios concerning event-based
6
Ibid.
and force the enemy to withdraw from
the avenue of approach, is the Volca- triggers are understood and to avoid
no minefield still executed? premature or delayed execution
CPT Gregory Shepard is an O/C/T at Acronym Quick-Scan
All personnel within the command-ap-
proval process must understand the NTC. His previous assignments include
event-based triggers that define the company commander and plans offi- AAR – after-action review
ABCT – armored brigade combat
specified execution criteria of the cer in 70th Brigade Engineer Battalion,
team
minefield as well as the conditions 1st SBCT, Fort Wainwright, AK, and pla- ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer
that may cause them to become inval- toon leader and company executive of- Leader Course
id. ficer in 52nd Engineer Battalion, 555th ATP – Army technical publication
Engineer Brigade, Fort Carson, CO. CPT BCT – brigade combat team
Understanding the event-based trig- Shepard’s military schools include En- CoA – course of action
gers that meet the execution criteria gineer Captain’s Career Course, Sapper COIN – counterinsurgency
is important enough to warrant a sep- Leader Course and Engineer Basic Of-
IPB – intelligence preparation of the
arate rehearsal of the complete ap- battlefield
ficer Leader Course. He holds a mas- Km/hr – kilometer/hour (Figures 3
proval process. This rehearsal benefits ter’s degree and a bachelor’s degree and 4)
the task force in three ways: in civil engineering from the University NAI – named area of interest
• The unit can run through various of California – Davis and is a registered NTC – National Training Center
scenarios to ensure everyone clearly professional engineer in Missouri. O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer
PACE – primary, alternate,
understands the event-based
CPT Doni Wong is a graduate student contingency, emergency
triggers;
at the University of San Diego in the PM CCS – Project Manager Close-
• The rehearsal allows the unit to test Master of Arts in Leadership Studies Combat Systems
its PACE plan to ensure it is applicable; program. His previous assignments in- R>EACT – rate, emplacement,
and clude reconnaissance-troop command-
arming, command approval and
travel
• The rehearsal provides the unit with er in 1-91 Cavalry (Airborne), 173rd In- SBCT – Stryker brigade combat
an understanding of exactly how fantry BCT (Airborne), Grafenwoehr, team
long it will take to approve the Germany; Armor Basic Officer Leader SCATMINES – scatterable mines
minefield’s emplacement. Having a Course (ABOLC) troop commander,

87 Fall 2020
Armored Warfare during the Spanish Civil War
(1936-1939): The Experience Reconsidered
by COL(R) Anthony J. Candil experienced only in Ethiopia against a German magazine Militär-Wochen-
much weaker foe. blatt, but such references are rare,
Historians of armored warfare have of-
and the word blitzkrieg was also
ten misinterpreted the role of armor However, the circumstances of the war scarce in the Wehrmacht’s official mil-
in the Spanish Civil War. Some of them in Spain made it impossible for the na- itary terminology during World War II.
said the war was just a “laboratory”; tions’ ideas to be tested except on a
others concluded there were few, if few limited occasions. Tanks became If the hope of military thinkers was
any, lessons to be drawn from it. The tactical weapons normally employed that the Spanish Civil War would bring
confusion of historians is understand- in support of offensive operations or a return to battlefield maneuver by us-
able because the conflict was not a to bolster defenses. ing tanks, Spain’s experience was
demonstration of brilliant tactics and clearly a disappointment.
great battles, but was rather a series Neither the Nationalists nor the Re-
of attritional battles. publicans in Spain employed blitzkrieg Tanks through
tactics for the simple reason that Ger- attaché eyes
The Spanish Civil War was of interest man doctrine at that moment was
to the U.S. War Department’s Military Not much has been written on the em-
purely theoretical and had not been
Intelligence Division (MID).1 Through ployment of armor during the Spanish
fully worked out, even for the German
Army attachés stationed in major em- Civil War and, in comparison to what
army, much less for the rudimentary
bassies in Europe, MID received tech- happened during World War II, the
Spanish Nationalist forces. Combined-
nical and tactical information concern- proper employment of armor was easy
arms operations involving air-to-
ing weapons that the Germans, Sovi- to overlook. Nevertheless, the Spanish
ground support, though, became im-
ets and Italians used in Spain. Al- Civil War was a kind of foreword for
portant for Nationalist offensives dur-
though the information the attachés what was to come; the lessons ob-
ing the last two years of the war. This
gathered was often random and in- tained in Spain confirmed what we
occurred despite the fact that the op-
complete, they and their sources saw know today as essentials of armored
posing armies were inadequately de-
trends in the development and use of warfare.
veloped to create any other forms of
modern weapons, especially the tank combined-arms operations. Much of In fact, the presence in Spain of key of-
and antitank guns. The attachés’ ef- the time, the defense enjoyed an al- ficers of the armored forces of Germa-
forts provided MID with information most-World War I level of effective- ny, Italy and the Soviet Union – who
that could be analyzed about the na- ness, and though Francisco Franco Ba- during World War II acquitted them-
ture of a possible future European hamonde – the Spanish general who selves very well and even faced each
war; that the U.S. Army could not or led the Nationalist forces in over- other or fought alongside each other
would not make use of the lessons of throwing the Second Spanish Republic on some occasions – adds more inter-
the war in Spain was not due to a lack during the Spanish Civil War – was suc- est to this chapter of Spanish history.
of information! cessful in most of his counteroffen-
sives, they foreshadowed those of As mentioned, in 1936, the U.S. Army
The Spanish Civil War was the first en-
World War II only to a limited degree. shared with the armies of Europe a
counter between tanks in combat, al-
special interest in the war in Spain. It
though limited. However, the employ-
As a matter of fact, the German blitz- was the first time since World War I
ment of tanks on the Spanish battle-
krieg theory was embraced only after that European weapons were used by
field allowed many aspects and possi-
the campaign of France in 1940, lead- Europeans against Europeans. Al-
bilities of armored warfare that later
ing to unforeseen consequences for though most of COL Stephen O.
would make it a key decision tool for
the German army. However, the word Fuqua’s2 reports – as U.S. military at-
modern warfare.
blitzkrieg was expressly mentioned in taché in Madrid throughout the war –
1935 in an article in the professional concerned the non-technical “infantry
Doctrine still developing magazine Deutsche Wehr, stating that war” of individual soldiers, the focus
Each nation that provided armor to
“countries with a rather weak food in- of interest for most of the American
the Spanish Civil War harbored its own
dustry and poor in raw materials military attachés in Europe became
views about how to employ tanks in
should try to finish a war quickly and tanks and antitank/antiaircraft weap-
operations. The Germans were still de-
suddenly by trying to force a decision ons.
veloping their thinking, while the So-
right at the very beginning through
viets had already embraced concepts Even though they were removed from
the ruthless employment of their total
stressing “deep battle” by offensive the fighting, the attachés in Paris and
fighting strength.” (That was certainly
actions – and even codified them in London, and to a lesser extent in Rome
Spain at the time.)
their army regulations of 1936. The and Berlin, provided information that
Italians were committed to their the- A more detailed analysis of the term supplemented the sketchy technical
ory of guerra celere, so far was published in 1938 in the official and tactical data Fuqua sent from

88 Fall 2020
 indicated that Russian tanks were sus-
ceptible to destruction by fire, appar-
ently more than the Italian and Ger-
man tanks.
According to an article by CPT Ed Bau-
er of the Swiss army, forwarded to
MID by U.S. LTC John Magruder from
the U.S. Embassy at Bern, the part
most susceptible to combustion was
“the rubber sheathing covering the
roller bearing which supports the cat-
erpillar drive.”
Another report from Lee early in 1937
had made a similar observation about
how easily the synthetic rubber the
Soviets used on their tanks burned.
The Nationalists soon discovered it
and exploited the flaw.

Italian experience
As mentioned, the tactical employ-
ment of armor during the Spanish Civ-
il War reflected, for the most part, the
contemporary doctrines of the nations
that provided materiel and training as-
sistance to each side. Accordingly, the
Nationalists used a peculiar version of
Figure 1. COL Stephen O. Fuqua (left, in civilian clothes), U.S. Army attaché at German blitzkrieg tactics or, at other
the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, Spain, visits a battlefield near the “Fuentes de times, an Italian method of combined-
Ebro” (“sources of the Ebro” – the Ebro is a river in Spain) in 1937 in Aragon. arms operations integrating infantry
A full regiment of the newest Soviet BT-5 tanks (50) was nearly annihilated and armor. Much has been said of the
by the Nationalist defense by the end of August 1937. Fuqua is talking with role of military intervention in Spain
two unidentified Republican officers. (Author’s collection)
pertaining to the testing and evalua-
tion of new weaponry and tactics, es-
Spain to Washington. by more advanced technology. Yet it pecially in the case of the German
would be wrong to assume from his Condor Legion, which came to play so
The main conclusion reached by the
statement that the tanks used in Spain important a role in the Nationalist
attachés and their sources was that
were old and discarded models, be- forces. What has not generally been
the tanks used in Spain were ineffi-
cause they were not. So, although Lid- appreciated is that this sort of advan-
cient. They lacked the armor and ar-
dell Hart may have been theoretically tage accrued much more to the Soviet
mament necessary to successfully
correct in arguing that these tanks military command than to the Ger-
meet an enemy equipped with heavy
were obsolete, in a practical sense the mans; whereas the Germans were
machineguns and antitank weapons,
tanks used in Spain were the standard skeptical and carefully selective with
and they were continually plagued
weapons of their respective armies at the lessons they chose to draw from
with mechanical malfunctions. U.S.
the time. The information gathered by the Spanish conflict, the Soviet ap-
COL Raymond Lee, military attaché in
the attachés about the Nationalist proach was much more extensive and
London, submitted a report in Spring
tanks appeared to be relatively accu- more credulous.
1937 that contained an excerpt from
rate and consistent. For example, al-
an article by Sir (CPT) Basil H. Liddell
though the attachés never mentioned Italian tankers in Spain faced condi-
Hart, a British soldier, military histori-
the German Panzer I by name, they tions radically different from those of
an and strategist known for his advo-
provided an early description of its ba- the Ethiopian War of 1935-36, where
cacy of mechanized warfare. Within it,
sic characteristics. the poorly equipped Ethiopians were
Liddell Hart stated that the tanks used
overwhelmed by a relatively modern
in Spain were “obsolescent and of
U.S. Army LTC Sumner Waite, military Italian army. The Italians found the ta-
poor quality.”
attaché in Paris, submitted a report at bles turned against them in Spain, and
In a certain sense Liddell Hart was cor- the end of January 1938 that said: this was reflected in the relatively high
rect. With the rapid technical develop- “Whatever types of tanks the Soviets level of their casualties. Even more
ment taking place during the 1930s, sent to Spain, they all seemed to share significant, however, was that the Ital-
much equipment was soon displaced an unfortunate flaw.” Attaché reports ian General Staff failed to draw any

89 Fall 2020
useful lessons in tank warfare from
the Spanish experience. As a matter of
fact, when Italy entered World War II
in 1940, her armored units – including
many L-3 CV 33/35 light tanks – would
face heavier tanks even more formida-
ble than the BT-5 or the T-26B, and the
results on the battlefield would be di-
sastrous.
The first Italian mechanized unit in
World War II in North Africa consisted
of organic assets organized in a hurry
and in a situation already seriously
compromised. However, these Italian
mobile units – although with inferior
means and scant media logistics –
fought the British troops by opposing
powerful and highly mobile tactics
within the limits of what was possible.
Their use, fragmented with little stra-
tegic policy, negatively influenced the
result of the disastrous campaign of
1940, and all Italian mechanized units Figure 2. This is the Italian light tank Fiat L-3 CV 35 made by Fiat-Ansaldo. A
ended up being needlessly sacrificed total of 155 tanks were provided by Fascist Italy to Nationalist Spain. The first
in the final Battle of Beda Fomm Feb. L-3 tanks arrived in Spain in late August 1936, the first modern tanks entering
7, 1941. service in the Spanish Civil War. Outgunned – they were armed with only two
fixed machineguns – they were not a match to Soviet tanks. They did not
The Italian Special Armored Brigade even have a turret; to aim the machineguns, the whole tank had to move.
(also known as Armored Brigade Spe- Some 60 Italian tanks survived the war and even continued in active service
cial Babini, named after its command- until the early 1950s in Spanish cavalry units. (Author’s collection)
er, GEN Valentino Babini, who went to
Spain in 1937) was a mechanized unit victory). Nevertheless, the Fiat L-3 experience made the Italian War De-
of opportunity – quickly established in light tank was considered technically partment acknowledge that a future
November 1940 in North Africa at perfect, stating that “when the crew- major war of high intensity would be
Babini’s request by Marshal Rodolfo men were expert and ready, the tank different from World War I. When an-
Graziani’s High Command in Libya. It became almost perfect, achieving op- alyzing the employment of tanks, the
was created to group the various op- timum results.” booklet brought into light two main is-
erationally separated armored units in sues: cooperation with infantry, espe-
the theater to constitute a sufficiently However, it was clear that the L-3 tan- cially considering the cross-country
powerful and mobile unit that could kette was not up to the task of making speed of tanks, and the problem of re-
thwart the efficient and dangerous a breakout at the front, and a cannon- fueling and resupplying tanks in com-
mechanized units of the British West- armed gun was necessary no matter bat.
ern Desert Force. The Special Brigade what. For that reason, and while wait-
ing for such a better tank, antitank The Italians considered cooperation
was destroyed nevertheless, and most
guns were towed into battle, at least between tanks and infantry an issue
of the Italian troops were taken cap-
one per platoon. The RRS was a mix of because they were never able to
tive, including Babini, who had fought
light tanks and antitank units. Later it achieve simultaneous efforts when
bravely. Babini was captured at the
was equipped with an air-defense-ar- tanks and infantry were on the attack
battlefield of Beda Fomm.
tillery (ADA) unit and 20mm antiair- in Spain. It was a fact that requesting
In Spain, after the city of Santander craft guns. tanks to move in the open at the infan-
was captured in the northwest, the try’s pace was almost suicidal. On the
commander of the Italian Raggruppa- In May 1938, the Italian War Depart- other hand, Italian tanks in Spain were
mento Reparti Specializzati (RSS) (the ment published an information book- often used on their own until they ran
English equivalent is Special Units Task let titled “Notice on the employment out of fuel or outpaced their infantry
Force), then-COL Babini reported3 to of small infantry and artillery units at support – then they were just sitting
the Italian High Command about the the Spanish Civil War.”4 This booklet ducks for the Republican antitank and
good results of the intensive training was relevant for two reasons: first, the heavy weapons. The Italians’ docu-
program undertaken for all Italian paper was about the employment of ment, though, didn’t take into account
crewmen after Guadalajara (a Nation- tanks; and second, it was mainly ad- Babini’s proposal after his return from
alist offensive using Italian troops and dressed to the Italian military com- Spain: to organize combined assault
blitzkrieg tactics that was a Republican mand in northern Africa. The Spanish light task forces made up of light

90 Fall 2020
infantry (bersaglieri) and engineers, Since refueling was an issue, a special cannon-armed with 360-degree turn-
together with tanks. Babini limited his organization was set up to refuel ei- ing turrets should replace all Fiat L-3s
scope to requesting that the infantry ther individual tanks or tank platoons. during a future major war. Tank offi-
speed up its movement. cers also proposed that the Fiat L-3s
As a follow-up, the Italian War Depart-
be used for reconnaissance purposes
By Fall 1938, the Italians had organized ment’s document addressed the ap-
only and that modern trucks, efficient
within the frame of the Italian Volun- propriate armament for the assault
logistics, armored self-propelled artil-
teer Corps, a kind of armored task tank. Superiority of cannon-armed
lery and good command, communica-
force (RRS/Raggruppamento Carri) tanks over the machinegun-only
tions and control assets would be es-
that included: armed tanks became evident in Spain.
sential during a future major war.
• O n e h e a d q u a r te rs c o m p a ny, On the other hand, the usual proce-
including a platoon of L-3 dure then adopted of towing antitank The Italian High Command missed its
flamethrower tanks; guns, with some tanks while in com- opportunity to learn adequate lessons
bat, was considered slow and imprac- from Spain and consequently didn’t
• One tank regiment with three tank
tical when challenging the heavier and improve Italy’s armored forces before
battalions (one manned by Spanish
better-armed Republican tanks. Ac- the next war. Looking at how Italian
soldiers), three tank companies each
cording to the document, the adopted armor did during the first months of
(all with Fiat L-3 tanks);
solution lacked the high mobility World War II, it’s obvious that the
• One mixed mechanized battalion needed for quick intervention. There- Spanish experience had been almost
consisting of one motorized-infantry fore the need for cannon-armed tanks, completely forgotten. Initially, Italian
company on trucks, one company of operating with the light assault tanks armored forces appeared still
machineguns on motorbikes and an armed only with machineguns, was equipped with the Fiat L-3 light tank
armored wheeled car company; now an inescapable demand. The pro- in spite of the fact that it was inade-
• One engineer battalion reinforced posed solution was to organize mixed quate to break out through enemy po-
with a machinegun company; and tank platoons of four tanks, with one sitions. The Fiat-Ansaldo M-11/39 –
• One fire-support battalion, which cannon-armed tank for three ma- the first Italian cannon-armed tank –
included one motorized 65mm chinegun-armed tanks. entered combat in September 1940 in
assault battery, one antitank northern Africa, and the much better
However, there’s no reference or M-13/40 tank entered combat in Oc-
company (with German 337mm Pak statement within the Italians’ booklet
guns), one mixed antitank battery tober 1940 in the Greek campaign.
about the light machinegun-armed However, both tanks were already in-
(with Italian 47mm guns and Russian tank as an “obsolete” vehicle. Light
45mm guns) and one air-defense ferior to what the Allies could deploy
tanks such as the Fiat L-3 were still by then.
company (with 20mm Breda-35 considered useful for scout and recon-
guns). naissance purposes, as infantry-sup- Lacking adequate capabilities, Italian
port platforms and to achieve surprise armor was mostly nonexistent. The
Lack of cooperation on enemy forces, even if they were in- Special Armored Brigade organized in
Nevertheless, full cooperation was al- ferior when facing heavier tanks. No Libya by Babini – achieving at first
ways lacking between tanks and infan- reference at all, though, was made of some limited success – was destroyed
try. In fact, combat in Spain proved armor forces penetrating the depth of at Beda Fomm by the British army, as
that there were rivalries between enemy deployment. The main idea still mentioned. The armored division Cen-
tank-unit commanders and infantry was that of cooperating with the in- tauro participated in the Greco-Italian
commanders – to the point that “be- fantry. Nevertheless, an alarm bell was War and received its first M-13/40
fore the battle everyone was asking ringing in the mind of Italian tank of- tanks in December 1940; it deployed
for the other’s support, especially the ficers. They realized the lack of their the tanks in January 1941, losing many
need for tanks, but on the day after, tanks’ capabilities and the absence of of them to Greek artillery fire.
nobody wanted to admit that the oth- organizational effectiveness for the
er’s cooperation had been essential.”5 employment of tanks in the Italian With the experience they had fighting
However, no matter what, there were High Command’s thinking. They should in Africa, the Italian armored division
many mistakes when employing tanks have considered the experience and was reorganized in 1942 into a six-bat-
– for example, tanks were often used lessons-learned in Spain. talion (three tank and three infantry)
as supply trucks carrying ammunition structure, combined with a field-artil-
Almost all Italian tank-unit command- lery regiment that included two bat-
or to block road crossings in static po-
ers in Spain tried to present the Span- talions of self-propelled guns and one
sitions. Italian tank officers sometimes
ish Civil War’s lessons-learned to their antiaircraft battalion, plus reconnais-
complained about a lack of clear mis-
superiors; it was clear that any future sance and engineer battalions. The re-
sions for tank units.
conflict would require a good under- organization was too late, though.
Refueling while in combat was chal- standing of how to employ tanks and
lenging, mostly due to the Italian Fiat armor on the battlefield. The Italian If the lessons-learned in Spain had
L-3 CV33/35 tank’s technical perfor- army should count on modern ar- been understood and implemented,
mance, which had a limited range for mored cars with high firepower, they results on the operational level after-
operations deep in enemy territory. t h o u g h t , a n d m e d i u m ta n k s ward could have been different for

91 Fall 2020
Italy. Maybe they would not have been Battle of Guadalajara would have been of the Types I and II in its inventory
as successful as the German panzer- very different. On the other hand, than the better-armed Type IV. (The
truppe, but they would not have suf- Babini was clear on how armored Panzer IV was the only tank capable of
fered such humiliating defeats as they troops should be organized: confronting the T-34 and KV-I Soviet
did in Greece and Africa. Sadly for the • Tanks should be fitted to the nature tanks, which were superior to any-
Italians, the lessons were there. of the mission; thing within the Germans’ available
armory.)
Encapsulating Babini on the need for • Tanks should be organized into
tanks and their role in modern war- tactical units; and The Spanish Civil War demonstrated to
fare, everything can be condensed • Tanks should be used in mass the Germans the convenience of en-
into one sentence: “Tanks for all, tanks employment. gaging enemy tanks at maximum
spearheading, tanks for all missions.” range – some German reports men-
Therefore, the need was for more and On the issue of infantry and tanks be- tioned no less than 3,000 meters – a
better tanks than the Fiat L-3. ing separate for reasons of mobility distance considered more than ade-
and speed, Babini’s solution was to quate by today’s standards but out of
On the other hand, the discourse was create heavy-tank task-force units question at the time unless the mighty
no longer about more cooperation be- where infantry and combat engineers 88mm guns were used. However, the
tween tanks and infantry. According to were integrated and subordinated to Spanish Civil War produced other con-
Babini, it was about “tanks and their the tank-force commander. At the clusions for the Germans about tank
supporting infantry, which had the same time, Babini addressed the need operations: “The combination of tanks
mission of protecting the tanks from for close coordination and support of with motorized infantry qualified ar-
assault weapons, antitank weapons tactical aviation. mored units to accomplish many com-
and artillery.” Within the same docu- bat tasks in which both types of units
ment, Babini proposed the future em- The relative success of the Italian mil-
complemented each other. (Failure to
ployment of armor: “All support itary’s small high-mobility units, to-
do so was the main reason to explain
means for the infantry, in the offen- gether with the mirage of the Nation-
Soviet mistakes.) The speed of tanks
sive, should be armored and must in- alists’ final victory, merely recon-
on the march and in combat made
clude heavy tanks for achieving a firmed the Italians’ otherwise gener-
command and timely appraisal of the
breakthrough, medium tanks for close ally inadequate priorities and policies,
situation very difficult. Close coopera-
support and for penetrating in depth, as World War II demonstrated later.
tion with aircraft was therefore neces-
both cannon and machinegun-armed, sary for command, reconnaissance
and assault tanks’ machineguns, German conclusions and combat. (This was clearly under-
armed to go alongside the infantry.”6 Perhaps the only European military stood by the Nationalists and the Ger-
Even while the Spanish Civil War was command that drew the correct les- mans since the very beginning.) Only
still raging, Italian tankers continued sons was the German command, the employment of tanks in depth
implementing some of the lessons and which concluded correctly that the promises success. (A two-mile-wide
experiences learned. By the end of Spanish conflict was a special kind of front was considered the smallest
April 1938, the Italian tank battalion war, from which it would be a mistake front for the employment of an ar-
(Raggruppamento Carri/CTV) made a to draw any major new conclusions or mored division then.) Employment of
special report on the results of recent lessons. However, even the Germans tank-only units was considered only
operations on the Aragon Front and did not altogether draw proper con- suitable in rare cases and adequate
the splitting of the Republican zone in clusions about the need to improve mostly against limited objectives.”
two. Signed by Babini, the report con- their basic antitank weapons and hur-
ry up production of newer, more effi- Thoma added that Franco, as a typical
firmed all that was learned after the general from the old school, wanted
capture of Santander. It opened the cient and better armored tanks, as the
invasion of Poland in 1939 proved. to distribute the available tanks
way for a new debate, especially on among infantry units but, on the other
employment procedures, an idea per- Most of the German armored units
were still equipped with Panzer I and hand, most of the Nationalist victories
haps already grasped by the Germans happened when tanks were employed
as well. Panzer II light tanks during action in
Poland. in a concentrated way, even if in close
coordination with other arms. Never-
High-mobility According to reports sent to Germany theless, it seems that Franco and
units useful by LTC Wilhelm von Thoma, the expe- Thoma were always at odds on this is-
In the chapter dealing with “conclu- rience from the Spanish Civil War ulti- sue, and as the latter recalled: “The
sions and remarks,” Babini’s report7 mately helped speed up production of Spaniards learned quickly but forgot
addresses the “confirmed exceptional gun-armed tanks, especially the Pan- also quickly.”
usefulness of the high-mobility units zer III and IV types. However, the mis-
(unita celeri) when in battle.” Entering leading results of the Nationalist vic- Panzer success unclear
into details, he stated that if the tank tory probably gave the Germans some How important the German panzer
battalion within the Italian tank unit false reassurance, since when Opera- component in the Spanish Civil War
would have had the structure of a true tion Barbarossa started, the bulk of may have been for the final victory is
high-mobility unit, the outcome of the the panzer force still had more tanks hard to say. True, the war did give the

92 Fall 2020
 performed better than Italian and Ger-
man ones. Russian tanks were consid-
ered excellent for defensive action but
were also a good offensive weapon.
The second lesson was that it was dif-
ficult to make conclusive decisions
about tactics based on the Spanish ex-
perience because conditions had been
specific to that conflict alone; in the
first place, too few vehicles had par-
ticipated, and secondly, the terrain in
Spain had been particularly difficult
for the successful use of tanks in com-
parison to the northern European
plains.
The German General Staff concluded
that the belligerents had not used the
tanks “in accordance with their offen-
Figure 3. The panzer Kpfw Ausfuhrung A is on display at the Spanish army’s sive purpose.” Both German and Sovi-
tank museum near Madrid, Spain. This type was one of the first light tanks et tanks had been subordinated to in-
provided by Germany to Nationalist Spain by the end of September 1936. fantry and had been mostly treated as
These tanks were not “real” tanks, in a sense, as they were armed only with heavy-infantry weapons. For all these
machineguns. However, they constituted the bulk of the German panzer arm reasons, the German High Command
at the time. The more powerful and better tanks that would be employed refused to draw any major conclusions
during World War II were yet at an early stage of development. Panzer I tanks about tank tactics or their operational
were supplied to Spain both in Versions A and B that were practically identi- use. Instead they reserved judgment
cal. The total number of Panzer I tanks supplied was 122. The surviving tanks until tanks could be used in a larger
remained in service with the Spanish army until the early 1950s. (Photo by
COL Anthony J. Candil) conflict.8
More details and lessons-learned were
Germans an opportunity to see tank tanks were greatly prized on the Na- recorded in the official report on the
tactics practiced in a live situation. tionalist side. The captured T-26s that Spanish Civil War from the German
However, Franco and the Nationalist the Nationalists managed to return to Army General Staff (Generalstab des
generals – veterans of the North Afri- action ended up constituting the most Heeres) dated March 30, 1939: “Pan-
can counterinsurgency campaigns of potent component of Franco’s ar- zer tanks were never used in action in
the Rif War (in Morocco) – were con- mored force. Then again, the Panzer I a battalion-size unit by the National-
ditioned to the requirements of a civ- was undoubtedly quite effective in an ists. Usually in small packets, the pan-
il war in which it was necessary to infantry-support role for as long as zers were attached directly to and es-
grind down local opposition thorough- there were no Soviet tanks along the corted the infantry as armored heavy-
ly, territory by territory, rather than way. infantry weapons. Based on the judg-
bypass it. Their interest in blitzkrieg- ment of the troops and their achieve-
type mobile warfare was intermittent Despite the important lessons-
learned, the Germans did not plan the ment in the Panzer I Ausf A, ‘Krupp’
at best, leaving the panzers mainly
Wehrmacht’s development around the variant, [the tanks] covered 5,000 to
confined to an infantry-support role.
Spanish experience. They failed to 8,000 kilometers each and the Ausf B
Thoma’s observations determined that draw proper conclusions about the ‘Maybach’ covered 2,000 to 4,000 ki-
by firing steel-core armor-piercing need to improve antitank weapons lometers each. Both tanks were con-
(AP) ammunition, the dual-machine- and protection. Nor can it be said that sidered a success from the viewpoint
gun armament of the Panzer I could clear evidence exists that the superior of mechanical reliability.
disable a T-26 or BT-5, both of which Soviet tank designs spurred them into “Light tanks are useful only when
were scarcely better armored than the rapid improvement of their own bet- armed with flamethrowers, since they
Panzer I at short range. However, this ter tank types. can’t hit anything by firing their ma-
was not very good, as the Soviet tanks
chineguns while moving. However,
all carried the excellent 45mm Russian German lessons from they themselves are vulnerable to ma-
cannon. All the Spanish/Soviet gun-
ners had to do was open fire at the
Spanish Civil War chineguns firing special ammunition.
According to Mary R. Habeck, beyond The nozzle for the small flamethrower
longest range possible to destroy a
unsatisfactory results, German officers can be readily secured in the right-
Panzer I, allowing the latter no oppor-
drew two main conclusions about the hand machinegun mount in the Panzer
tunity to do more than scratch its
use of tanks early in the Spanish Civil I. However, a longer range is desired
paint.
War. The first was an affirmation of because relatively high losses occur to
It was no wonder that captured Soviet the initial lessons: Russian tanks the crews.

93 Fall 2020
“In general, the panzer tanks em- was split between the relatively new the war, the Soviet Union supplied the
ployed in Spain in small numbers and Royal Tank Corps and a few reluctant- Republicans with some 281 T-26 and
without other supporting weapons ly mechanized cavalry units that only 50 BT-5 heavier tanks. The first nota-
have mainly been shown to be inferi- slowly had adjusted to the change ble impact of Soviet participation was
or, very seldom superior to the anti- from horses to armored vehicles. Tank felt on the Central Front in combat
tank defense. They were also only fanatics like Fuller and Liddell Hart around Madrid from mid-October to
available in small numbers. The 45mm with their attitudes hampered the ar- November 1936. Key combat partici-
gun of the Russian tanks shot high-ex- mored units’ development.9 pants were the Soviet crewmen who
plosive shells in an arcing flight path. entered battle Oct. 29 with a mobile
The effectiveness of these shells was Liddell Hart10 made some interesting counterattack against advancing Na-
unsatisfactory. It also shot armor- references about the employment of tionalist troops. However, Republican
piercing shells at a flatter trajectory. armor during the Spanish Civil War: “It commanders were never able to de-
Due to poor steel quality, the pene- was a great mistake to consider the velop effective combined-arms opera-
trating ability of the Russian [AP] Spanish Civil War as proof of ineffi- tions, so successful tank attacks were
shells is significantly lower than the ciency of the mechanized forces. On generally poorly supported and never
corresponding German [AP] shells. the contrary, the mechanized troops sustained for long.
The Russian AP shells can only pene- proved that they should move cross-
trate 40mm armor plate at a range of country by preference and in a wide Mistakes made by the combined Sovi-
100 meters. In addition, up to 75 per- front. … When employed in such a et-Spanish leadership were not cor-
cent of the base fuses fail to deto- way, they contributed a great deal to rectly understood, and the disband-
nate.” the achievement of success. If mecha- ment of existing armored formations
nized troops were used extensively at proved disastrous in 1941. The supe-
In a way, the Spanish Civil War estab- their advantage, they contributed very riority of their equipment gave the So-
lished the axiom of the main battle efficiently to the defense. The most viets some dangerous peace of mind,
tank as we understand it today. As suitable procedure for the defense and by 1941 the T-34 had not been yet
British MG J.F.C. Fuller, senior British was the mobile defense rather than a introduced in sufficient numbers. The
army officer, military historian and strongpoint-based defense.” Soviets also never understood the im-
strategist, stated: “The three types of portance of close cooperation be-
tanks that I have seen in Spain – Ital- Soviet experience tween air support and armor. They
ian, German and Russian – are not the Against the 122 Panzer I tanks Germa- also didn’t grasp the key role of mech-
result of tactical study but are merely ny supplied to the Nationalists during anized infantry working together with
cheap mass production from the
standpoint of a machine.” Fuller
seemed to be advocating for a gun-
armed tank, with full protection and
high reliability as a weapon system.
Fuller was not fair in his appreciation
because by then, in 1936, not even the
British army was in much better shape
than the three main nations involved
in the Spanish Civil War.

British tanks
unsatisfactory
British tanks, except for some heavily
armored variants, were unsatisfactory.
Most were weakly armored, and early
in World War II still carried only ma-
chineguns. Emphasizing mobility, as
Fuller did, the British had not paid
enough attention to the ability of their
tanks to fight other tanks. Even worse, Figure 4. This is a T-26B Soviet light tank furnished by the Soviet Union.
if possible, the standard “cruiser” Those tanks started to arrive into Republican Spain in October 1936 and were
tanks were unreliable, often breaking real tanks with a main gun and machineguns. They were heavier than the
down. ones provided by Germany and Italy to Nationalist Spain and better protect-
ed. The Soviet Union provided 286 T-26B tanks to the Spanish Popular Army,
An improved design was delayed by
and more than 130 ended up in the service of the Nationalist Army by the
lack of attention; British tank design end of the war. They remained in active service until the early 1950s. This
caught up with German design only picture was taken near a memorial for the civil war on what was once the
near the end of World War II. By the battlefield of the Ebro, which took place in 1938. (Photo by COL Anthony J.
mid-1930s, the British armored force Candil)

94 Fall 2020
 Furthermore, the Republicans were
often known to move their tanks with-
out any artillery preparation and with-
out the support of infantry. This made
them vulnerable to enemy antitank
weapons and even to hand grenades
or incendiary devices. Therefore, re-
sults on the battlefield were often dis-
appointing, even when the Republi-
cans held as much as a 3:1 advantage
in the number of tanks.

Red Army learns lessons

Probably no other major European
army devoted as much attention to
the presumed lessons of the Spanish
Civil War as did the Soviet Red Army.
The study of operations in Spain, as
well as the study of German and Ital-
Figure 5. This Soviet BT-5 tank is on display at Russian Museum at Kubinka. ian equipment, was massive, but the
This type of tank was sent by the Soviet Union to Republican Spain by mid- question is whether in fact Red Army
1937. Only 50 BT-5 tanks were supplied, and none survived the war nor saw commanders learned accurate lessons
service in the aftermath. Faster and heavier than the T-26 tank, the BT-5 was or managed to deceive themselves, as
the forerunner of the future T-34, and they fought against German panzers in historian Stanley G. Payne concludes.
the early days of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. (Photo by
COL Anthony J. Candil) Soviet commanders obviously made a
fundamental mistake in taking the
tanks. Despite these shortcomings, technological limitations in communi- Spanish conflict as a valid scenario for
their organization of armored units cation and vehicle effectiveness. The a future European war. The armies in
proved more efficient and has even Soviet 1935 tank corps had two tank Spain for the most part lacked the
lasted until today: three tanks per pla- brigades and one motorized rifle bri- weapons, firepower, leadership and
toon, 10 tanks and three platoons per gade in its force structure, totalling training to provide many lessons ap-
company, 30 tanks and three compa- 348 tanks. However, the Soviet tank plicable to major mid-20 th Century
nies in a regiment, and one indepen- corps was disbanded in favor of a mo- campaigns. Payne noted that this was
dent tank regiment per division. torized division that had 275 tanks and especially true when Spain’s topogra-
more infantry. The most important as- phy was compared with that of East-
As Habeck,11 one of the leading West- pect of this change was that the new ern Europe. Mountains played a major
ern specialists in armored warfare, 1939 motorized division wholly em- role in the Spanish struggle but are al-
writes, “Soviet officers, unlike their phasized the infantry-support role, most absent in European Russia, most
German counterparts, believed that with little focus on exploitation into of Poland and eastern Germany. How-
the conflict presented a valid picture the depth of an enemy force’s disposi- ever, Payne said, it should not be for-
of a future great war. The Soviet com- tion. gotten that German armor managed
mand staff became convinced that the to get through the Ardennes’ hilly ter-
Spanish war was a reliable model of rain on two occasions and through the
modern war and treated each new ex- The Republicans were heavily influ- Balkans in the invasion of Greece in
perience of combat as a valuable les- enced by the Soviet practice of massed 1941.
son for how the Soviet army should armor attacks. It is interesting to note
fight in the future.” Soon after the So- that the Soviets were notably reluc- The most important mistake that So-
viet military intervention in Spain be- tant to let Spanish crews operate their viet commanders made when trying to
gan, GEN Kliment Voroshilov issued or- vehicles. Because they were unfamil- learn from their experience in Spain
ders detailing the specific tactics and iar with the peculiarities of the Span- pertained to armor doctrine and orga-
technology that his men were to study ish terrain, this attitude caused them nization. They also overlooked im-
and test.12 to be overly cautious with their tanks. provements the Red Army was able to
Initially, operations orders reflected a make in many individual technical ar-
The Soviets formed a commission13 to high degree of indecisiveness due to eas, ranging from administration and
review the organization of the Red Ar- Soviet leaders’ caution. The Soviets fi- engineering to specific weapons sys-
my’s tank forces. Soviet experience in nally agreed to mixed crews for politi- tems. Soviet tanks were by far the best
the Spanish Civil War led commanders cal reasons, but this often caused in Spain. With that said, they also re-
who served there to recommend more problems and resulted in consid- vealed notable shortcomings, which
against the use of large mechanized erable squabbling, which sometimes allowed Soviet planners to accelerate
formations, chiefly due to degraded mission accomplishment. the T-34’s development. As a result,

95 Fall 2020
the T-34 became one of the best tanks that the full potential of tanks had not Tank losses
in World War II. The experience of the been displayed in Spain and that the The result of these combined prob-
Spanish war was not uniquely deci- Soviet army should continue to pursue lems was inordinately high losses of
sive, but the intensive studies on the plans to use tanks, but on a mass scale Republican tanks, which led to some
war certainly played a role in the de- with artillery support. On the other interesting conclusions on the Soviet
velopment of better Soviet armaments hand, Marshal Georgy Zhukov’s later side about the future employment of
and even in its technical execution. successful use of mechanized forma- armored units. Thus, from October
tions to defeat the Japanese army at 1936 to February 1937, the Republican
The Soviet army’s lessons from the
Khalkin Gol in 1939 further reinforced forces lost no less than 52 tanks, or
war in Spain were summarized in a
the advocates of armored warfare. between 25 to 30 percent of their de-
1939 study. The study began by noting
that lessons from Spain were impor- ployed tanks destroyed for each day of
Armor-infantry cooperation was not
tant since all modern combat arms battle. By mid-September 1937, the
the only area of concern in Soviet
had participated in the fighting, and Republicans had only 170 tanks ser-
analyses of their experiences in Spain.
the results were likely to be absorbed viceable out of a total of 256 T-26
Command, control and communica-
by all modern European armies. Spe- tanks delivered since mid-October
tions were poor, and radio equipment
cific tactical lessons of the conflict 1936.
– because of technological flaws and
were highlighted, including: lack of experienced operators – never Another view argued that if the Soviet
• Infantry attacks needed to be worked well. More problems pointed Union had sent 256 tanks to Spain, in
supported by tanks; out by Soviet observers included the a half-year of combat, 63 had been
• Coordination needed to be made lack of reconnaissance before tank at- lost, but multiplying these by two, it
among infantry, armor and artillery; tacks. This forced the Republicans to would mean that 126 would be lost in
and attack blind many times, and it dem- a year. Therefore, the normal rate of
onstrated the inadequacy of depend- attrition for tanks in a year would be
• Tanks were vulnerable to antitank
ing on sheer movement to save the around 50 percent of the total force
defenses without such coordination.
tanks. Also, vehicles traveling at 35 employed – no doubt about it, a high
Regarding the use of tanks in the de- mph did not guarantee that they figure.14
fense, the report singled out the role would not be hit by artillery, and the
of tanks as a key element in carrying speed increased the chances of falling Nevertheless, it should be taken into
out local counterattacks based on sev- into antitank traps. Further, visibility account that because tanks arrived in
eral examples of the First Armored Bri- from inside the tanks was too poor, several shipments, and because the
gade in 1937. The study was extreme- and the motion of the vehicles caused fronts where tanks became employed
ly cautious in drawing any lessons inaccurate fire. were widely separated from each oth-
about the use of armor in-depth since er, the Republicans never used more
there were no experiences of the use (However, if the Soviet army some- than 70 to 80 tanks at once except at
of large armor formations in Spain. times drew inaccurate lessons from some special occasions. This practice
The report was skeptical about the the war, it was not alone. For example, was the same for the Nationalists.
possibilities of using independent tank for most French military observers, With these parameters in mind, one
groups to achieve breakthroughs in the Spanish war tended to reconfirm can estimate that the rule for yearly
the face of well-prepared defenses. the importance of the defense and of permanent tank losses could be much
The Soviet General Staff’s view was antitank warfare.) higher, between 300 to 400 percent

Figure 6. Soviet leadership conducts a review of Soviet armored fighting vehicles used to equip the Republican Peo-
ple’s Army during the Spanish Civil War.

96 Fall 2020
– in other words, three to four times conflict in Europe after World War I impression on any of the war’s observ-
the initial strength of the combat where an extensive use of tanks took ers.
force. The conclusion was that tanks place since their appearance on Euro-
Lesson 2: exercise caution in drawing
would suffer massive destruction in a pean battlefields in 1915. It happened
on lessons-learned. Most military an-
major war. certainly at a key moment in arma-
alysts in the mid-1930s had some firm
ments history, when production was
facts about tank-warfare procedures
Key historical moment increasing in many European coun-
in Spain. However, a study at the U.S.
Soviet GEN Dmitry Pavlov thought tries, but especially in Great Britain,
Army Infantry School at Fort Benning,
nevertheless that tanks had fought France, Germany, Italy, the Soviet
GA, by CPT Thomas Stark mentioned
well in short, independent battles Union and even Czechoslovakia. For
that in 1939, “The lack of detailed in-
such as at Jarama, and they performed many, the Spanish Civil War was seen
formation precluded any comprehen-
even better when they had cooperat- as a kind of laboratory to test their
sive analysis.” 16 Spain was certainly
ed properly with infantry, artillery and equipment and doctrine.
not a “proving ground for blitzkrieg.”
air support at Guadalajara. Pavlov con- Many authors insist that the Spanish After failing to take over Madrid in the
cluded that the infantry was helpless Civil War provided few clear tactical winter of 1936, it became obvious that
against tanks, while artillery and air lessons. However, it did provide many. Franco never wanted a quick ending to
forces did not present serious prob- The crucial aspect was whether those the war, but there were some signifi-
lems for an armored attack. Certainly, lessons were considered. Tank em- cant technological lessons.
tanks needed the infantry, but the in- ployment in Spain was certainly
fantry needed the tank just as much. unique, but a bright observer could Lesson 3: armored warfare would be
draw important conclusions about the expensive, and not everyone would
In sum, Nationalist armor and antitank
nature of armored warfare. be able to keep pace. To start with,
tactics were generally more sophisti-
the Spanish Civil War showed that
cated and effective. The Nationalists
Lessons-learned tank vs. tank combat would be the
compensated for the smaller caliber of
Lesson 1: learn the examples of num- main mission for main battle tanks
their tanks’ weapons by falling back at
bers, crew training, tactical under- from then on. But it showed too that
the appropriate time to bring enemy
standing. The Spanish Civil War dem- armored warfare would not be cheap,
tanks within range of antitank guns
onstrated especially that tanks should as better power packs and better ar-
and the 88mm guns of the German
not be split into small factions and maments – combined with better and
Condor Legion, which proved to have
used in small numbers by non-trained improved armor – would escalate at
excellent anti-armor weapons. The Re-
crews, and that senior commanders high speed both purchase prices and
publican People’s Army never became operating costs for a substantial tank
a cohesive skilled army, though some- needed a better tactical understand-
ing of the tank’s capabilities. Using the fleet. It was clear that not all countries
times it fought well enough. would be able to cope, certainly a rea-
Spanish experience to validate any
Overall the Spanish Civil War was a preconception of armored warfare as son why the crippled economy of
low-intensity war punctuated by occa- the French did – and the British also Spain never allowed the development
sional battles of high intensity. There to a point – was a misuse of the les- of a reasonable armor force for the
is no question, however, that Soviet sons. A British military attaché in Spain Spanish army.
assistance postponed the Republicans’ during the war wisely observed that Lesson 4: employ proper tank-infan-
defeat, though at no time was Soviet “the greatest caution must be used in try tactics. According to Spanish GEN
assistance of enough magnitude to concluding general lessons from this Ignacio Despujol Sabater, who retired
give the Republicans a major chance war.”15 from the army in 1931, bad employ-
for victory.
Both warring parties split their tank ment of tanks mainly applied to the
German and Italian assistance was not units and divided them piecemeal Republicans; however, in November
much more decisive than the Soviet among their infantry, but this was es- 1936, during the Battle of Madrid – as
one, but Italian dictator Benito Mus- pecially true of the Nationalists. At the can be seen in the documentary
solini certainly made a major commit- Battle of Teruel, they assigned tank “Spain in Arms” – Nationalist tanks ad-
ment to victory in Spain. The technical platoons and even tank sections to vanced in a line equally spaced by
quality of German assistance was dis- larger units such as brigades or divi- about 60 meters. Infantrymen strung
tinctly higher than the Soviet one. sions. The tank became nothing more out between the tanks rather than
Overall, the German and Italian esca- than a supplementary fire platform. clustered behind each tank for cover.
lation in military aid in November and Similar tactics were evident during the
The course of the Spanish war in 1938 Battle of Teruel. It was obvious that
December 1936 raised the stakes to a
was discouraging for anyone who the Nationalists had much to learn
point where Soviet dictator Josef Sta-
thought that tanks were the decisive about tank-infantry cooperation.
lin was not willing to make a direct bid
weapon of the future. Even though
for victory in the hope of more favor-
more tanks than ever took place in the Evoking the memories of some Span-
able geostrategic conditions in Eu-
conflict, they had not yet made a con- ish Nationalist combatants, they usu-
rope.
vincing impact in any battle, nor had ally smiled when speaking of tanks.
The Spanish Civil War was the first they made an overwhelmingly positive They recounted as a common exploit

97 Fall 2020
 peace (for exam- concerned about accomplishing mis-
ple, the rebellion sions than proving theories.
of Asturias in
The Spanish Civil War certainly was
1934). Public
not a successful testing ground for ar-
opinion and mor-
mored warfare. To be fair, much of the
als imposed a
land where the main campaigns and
form of war appli-
battles were fought was unsuitable for
cable to the mass
massive use of armor. Moreover, con-
of the mobilized
temporary tanks were not developed
population, not
enough, nor were the other arms
just to an elite
trained to cooperate with them to
group of war-
conduct the sort of operations envis-
riors.
aged by the mechanization theorists
In addition, the of the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore, it
Figure 7. Italian troops man a 10-centimeter howitzer at must be no surprise that the Spanish
Guadalajara, Spain, in 1937. (Bundesarchiv) consideration of
making use of ev- commanders did not think of any oth-
how to approach a tank without risk erything they possessed, men and er use for tanks beyond the role of in-
from its blind side. Then they would arms, played a capital role in Spain in fantry support.
throw a bottle of gasoline on the tank, the armies’ composition. Because of The only partial exceptions were Re-
followed by a hand grenade. The tank that, the troops adopted certain meth- publican GEN Vicente Rojo’s plan to
often burst into flames. Moroccan sol- ods of combat, and equally, they seize Zaragoza in 1937 and the Nation-
diers were experts in capturing or de- lacked certain aspects of combat. alist breakthrough on the front of Ara-
stroying Russian tanks with blankets, gon in March 1938. However, these
Therefore to the question of the util-
which they lobbed into the road- were operations limited in time and
ity of armor and tanks, the Spanish
wheels or the tracks’ cogs, which space.
Civil War supplied no answer. As to the
sometimes threw the tracks out and
question of the use of tanks, it an-
stalled the tank. Then they resorted to Nonetheless, there was a difference
swered by the force of circumstances
another blanket soaked with gasoline, between the Republicans and the Na-
that employed them in close liaison
which they tossed over the turret and tionalists. Both based their use of ar-
with other arms. The war sought to
set afire. Adequate infantry coopera- mor on the Spanish pre-war doctrine.
use all the weapons possessed in the
tion would have rendered such actions The Nationalists, however, remained
best way. The main difference was
impossible. Yet it was not the fault of attached to this concept, and their
that on the Nationalist side, these
the tanks; the blame should lie on the German advisers, surely aware of their
were combined for maneuver. Both
commanders who employed the tanks armor’s limitations, seem to have
sides employed recently designed
under such conditions. been satisfied with merely introducing
tanks, but they often discovered that
those tanks were not always ideally minor tactical innovations such as us-
Lesson 5: tanks were also vulnerable ing larger tactical units and employing
to antitank guns. When tanks proved suited for the missions they were
tasked to perform. antitank guns in support. Indeed, the
incapable of the tasks first assigned to evidence shows that the Germans
them, such as clearing the way for the were mainly worried about organiza-
infantry, the immediate use was to
Balanced assessment
tional matters and the Spanish com-
employ them as assault artillery guns. difficult manders’ poor understanding of ele-
Accompanying the infantry and laying A balanced assessment of armored mentary tank tactics. However, above
broadside to provide fire support warfare in the Spanish Civil War is dif- all, there was a single, coherent policy.
made them more vulnerable to anti- ficult to find. Works that focus on
tank guns. Nationalist troops at the World War II or deal with the whole By contrast, the evidence does not
Battle of Brunete made wiser use of history of the tank either avoid this is- show any coherence on the Republi-
their tanks, employing them in close sue altogether or treat it cursorily, just can side. Officers were trained follow-
liaison with the infantry. as a quick introduction to more inter- ing the Spanish regulations in force
esting events. Therefore, this article’s before the conflict. However, the Re-
Mechanized operations did not play review of tank employment in Spain publican command issued instructions
any role in the war because neither should help a better understanding: 1) based on recent battlefield experi-
side had enough mechanized equip- The technological superiority of Soviet ence, which in some points differed
ment. This reason may appear naïve, armor came to matter only at the tac- significantly from pre-war doctrine.
but one makes war with what one has. tical level; 2) neither German nor Rus- How did an officer reconcile the teach-
The Spanish army had neglected tanks sian doctrine received fair tests; and ings of the staff college, where he
and mechanized equipment before the 3) by default, what happened in Spain learned that tanks must not pursue
war. During the war, this continued to degenerated into a series of ad hoc the enemy, with the new instructions
a point that resembled the latest ma- tactical adjustments by commanders from Rojo about advancing deep into
neuvers from the pre-war time of who were understandably more the enemy rear?

98 Fall 2020
This problem was worsened by the na- circumstances where the different impact of even just a single T-26 com-
ture of most of the Republican officer theories of operations elaborated by pany on the defenders of Madrid was
corps. When the regular officer corps the foreign countries supplying them fully understood by both sides.
of foreign armies elsewhere were hard could not be executed. Instead, tanks
put to assimilate the procedures of ar- became tactical weapons normally When considered in their true per-
mored warfare, it is easy to under- employed in support of operations, ei- spective, rather than in hindsight-aid-
stand why the improvised officers of ther offensive or defensive. ed assessments of later German suc-
the Spanish Republican army so often cesses against Poland, France and the
Tanks showed some value in pursuit, Soviet Union, tank actions in the Span-
failed to use and understand armor ef-
as demonstrated by the Italians at ish Civil War, especially the opening
fectively. As it has been said already, it
Malaga, and as a counterattack force, engagements, appear neither as flaw-
was not so different from present
as shown by the Republicans at Ma- less manifestations of later blitzkrieg
times, especially when tanks are still
drid, but this was only true if used be- doctrine nor as unqualified indications
subordinated to the infantry.
fore the enemy had organized the ter- of the Soviets’ intention to use long-
The fighting in Spain ended on the last rain and brought forward antitank range independent operations.
day of March 1939, and five months weapons. However, tanks did partici-
later Europe was at war. There was no pate in urban combat in some villages In the United States, attaché reports
time to ponder the data gathered and and cities, where they were most vul- from Spain reinforced the somehow
the conclusions reached. War followed nerable to antitank measures and im- parochial attitude of most of the U.S.
war too quickly. Yet Spain held clues to provised devices. Nevertheless, one Army’s leadership at the time, and
the war that came in Europe. The lesson was clear: tanks, even during even that of the ground combat-arms
weapons used by the Germans, Ital- limited operations, required mobile in- branches. The then-Chief of the Ar-
ians and Soviets in Spain were not out- fantry support to negate antitank de- my’s General Staff, GEN Malin Craig,
dated relics or surplus to their armies. fenses.17 Whatever promise indepen- stated that a balanced army could nev-
They were largely their armies’ stan- dent tank and mechanized action held, er “dispense with a proper proportion
dard equipment, and they were em- combined-arms operations involving of horse-mounted cavalry and horse-
ployed based on tactical doctrine tank and dismounted infantry were to drawn artillery.” 18 The field artillery
learned in peacetime training in Ger- be expected. also continued to view the tank as an
many, Italy and the Soviet Union. infantry-accompanying weapon, an
German personnel avoided engage- idea that had not changed much since
Light, fast tanks sent to Spain by Ger-
ments with Russian tanks whenever 1918.
many and Italy proved vulnerable to
possible and increasingly limited
antitank guns and to the heavier-ar-
themselves to instructional duties. Most U.S. Army attachés stationed in
mored and -sarmed Soviet tanks. And
Spaniards commanded the tanks in Europe, starting with Fuqua, the atta-
all tanks were in peril when employed
battle as they had before the Ger- ché in Madrid, who was a former Chief
singly or in small groups without the
mans’ arrival, and it would not be un- of Infantry, reported that lightly ar-
protection of artillery or aviation. The
til the war’s closing months, at the of- mored tanks armed only with ma-
attachés and their sources insisted
fensive in Catalonia, that the tanks chineguns were unable to overcome
that tanks had to be employed in mass
would participate in an operational determined enemy fire. These lessons
and in combination with infantry, avi-
decisive offensive. Tank vs. tank en- were misread in the United States, and
ation and artillery to be effective.
gagements, where they did happen, in 1939 the M2 medium tank, al-
The use of tanks in Spain also demon- continued to favor Republican tanks, though underpowered and underar-
strated that the advantages of heavy but it was to no avail because in a few mored, was introduced. Fuqua’s opin-
armor and armament outweighed the weeks the Republic lost the war. De- ion was that tanks did not prove them-
corresponding loss of speed. Effective spite the personnel turnover rate and selves in separate offensive operations
antitank guns, especially when com- the small number of tanks available, in Spain because they were effectively
bined with obstacles, served to slow the tank’s great potential as a close- challenged by antitank guns – there-
or destroy enemy tanks. And as the support weapon for non-mechanized fore his main conclusion was that
tanks of the future became heavier, infantry assaults became apparent, tanks were only useful when in sup-
there was a corresponding indication and the yet unfulfilled promise of in- port of attacking infantry.
in Spain that antitank weapons would dependent operations did not make
Regarding military operations in Spain,
likewise become larger and more pow- this less truthful.
GEN Craig’s view was that tanks were
erful. The Germans’ successful use of
The Soviet experience also indicates not successful due to antitank weap-
the 88mm gun as both a direct-fire
that tanks, although they were real ons, insufficient armor protection, me-
weapon and an antiaircraft gun was an
purpose-built offensive weapons, chanical defects, tactical errors in their
indicator of the direction in which de-
were often a front commander’s most employment and inadequate support
fensive weapons could develop.
effective stop-gap, especially when from artillery and aviation. In the
The stabilized conditions at the front neither artillery nor air support was meantime, MG Adna Chaffee 19 was
when tanks arrived at the war, coupled available (this is precisely what the also paying close attention to events
with the relatively small numbers of Germans tried to do in Normandy in in Spain. A report he received from the
vehicles deployed, created 1944). The positive psychological General Staff stated that tanks used in

99 Fall 2020
Spain were unsuccessful in almost all in 1939 it was Europe’s most modern Spain: American Military Observations
operations. The problems identified war, fought with weapons newly de- on the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939,
were many, such as inadequate crew veloped since 1918 and pitting indus- Williamsport, MD: Potomac Books, 2012.
training and poor discipline, mechani- trialized European nations against During the Spanish Civil War, foreign mili-
tary officers wrote highly elaborate re-
cal deficiencies, insufficient terrain re- each other. It is truly worthy of mili-
ports of their experiences at the front.
connaissance, lack of infantry and ar- tary interest. One was attaché COL Stephen O. Fuqua
tillery support, the questionable use of the U.S. Army, who later became a ma-
of tanks against strong obstacles and Spanish army COL(R) Tony Candil has jor general. His presence was highly un-
villages, inadequate numbers and the lived and worked in Spain, the United usual, for most military observers were
reported superiority of antitank guns. Kingdom, Belgium and Italy. He cur- less-experienced captains, majors and
As far as the new mechanized cavalry rently lives in Texas. COL Candil’s as- lieutenant colonels. Fuqua’s reports con-
was concerned, the Spanish Civil War signments included defense assistant tained important observations about
only provided ample evidence of what attaché at the Spanish Embassy in Lon- Spanish armament and troop move-
not to do. don, United Kingdom; defense assis- ments, and he managed to acquire Na-
tant attaché at the North Atlantic tionalist propaganda and information de-
American mechanized and armored- Treaty Organization headquarters, spite being situated entirely within the
cavalry pioneers at Fort Knox, KY, be- Republican military lines. His reporting
Brussels, Belgium; Spanish Joint De-
lieved that the new weapons of the was considered so valuable that during
fense Staff, Plans and Policy Division, World War II, Fuqua was tapped to be
war – armored cars, self-propelled ar- Madrid, Spain; and director of the Ar- Time magazine’s military commentator.
tillery, tanks and mechanized-infantry mored Vehicles Program (Leopard II
vehicles – required new mission-ori-
3
“Esperienze dalla Offensiva Santander,”
main battle tank) at the Spanish Min- RRS/CTV, Sept. 15, 1937.
ented tactics rather than the tank tac- istry of Defense, Madrid. His military
tics inherited from World War I and schools include Armor Officer’s Ad-
4
“Note sull’impiego delle minori unità di
demonstrated in Spain. The consensus fanteria e artiglieria nella guerra di Spag-
vanced Course of the U.S. Army Armor
among American armor specialists na,” Italian War Department, May 1938,
School, Italian War College, Spanish published Rome.
was that tank tactics used during the Staff and Command School, British De-
Spanish Civil War were unsound and fence Intelligence Course, German
5
According to Babini: “Bisogna final-
that tanks were improperly used. Army Armor School and the Spanish mente avere il coraggio di confessare
questo bisogno generale di carri nel sen-
General Military Academy (equivalent
During the 1930s, the military debate so dinamico della parola. Succede ques-
to the U.S. Military Academy). He has to: alla vigilia della battaglia tutti preten-
revolved around the issue of mechani-
a bachelor’s of science degree in phys- dono i carri ed nessuno ne può fare a
zation. After World War I it was clear
ics from the University of Madrid; a meno; il giorno dopo la battaglia non si
that airplanes and tanks had appeared
master’s of arts degree in administra- riconosce più il grande compagno d’armi.
on the battlefield and were there to
tion from the University of Navarre, Perché non c’è posto per tutti anche nei
stay, but there was not a clear view on
Spain; a master’s of arts degree in in- consuntivi tattici?”
how they would be employed. The in-
ternational relations from St. Antony’s 6
Putting Babini’s words in today’s proce-
terwar era found, therefore, all major
College, Oxford, United Kingdom; and dures, he was then asking for main battle
armies in the world seeking an im-
a doctor of philosophy degree in East- tanks and armored infantry fighting vehi-
proved solution to use the tank as a
ern European Studies/history from the cles.
tool to end the trench-machinegun-ar-
University of Edinburgh, Scotland. COL 7
Babini becomes sometimes a bit confus-
tillery deadlock. Conservative think-
Candil’s awards include the command- ing when talking of “tank units” (unità
ers, including most general staffs,
er of the Victorian Order (United King- carriste) or “high-mobility units” (unità
were not impressed by the new tech-
dom), Medalha Do Pacificador (Brazil) celeri), concepts he mixed often.
nologies. Spanish military minds were
and Honor Cross (Germany). 8
GEN Heinz Guderian, Achtung – Pan-
not particularly isolated on the issue
and, as many others, considered the zer!, Stuttgart, Germany: Union Deutsche
Notes Verlagsgesellschaft, 1937.
new machines, especially tanks, to be 1
The American ambassador and the
roleplayers. They still believed the bat-
9
Corelli Barnett, Collapse of British Pow-
American military attaché to Spain also
tlefield belonged to the infantryman er, Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books,
recognized the war as a testing ground.
and, to a certain extent, to the horse. 1986.
The ambassador, Claude G. Bowers, used
that very phrase after the war: “Spain 10
Sir Basil Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of a
Worthy of then was to be the testing ground. Here Captain, but first presented in Liddell-
would be staged the dress rehearsal for Hart’s book Europe in Arms, New York:
military interest the totalitarian war on liberty and de- Random House, 1937.
In Spain, tanks restored mobility and mocracy in Europe. …” COL Stephen O. 11
Mary R. Habeck, Storm of Steel: The
maneuver to the battlefield. In so do- Fuqua, the U.S. attaché, wrote in Spring Development of Armor Doctrine in Ger-
ing, they proved that war and tactics 1937 that “it is generally accepted that many and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939,
could consist of more than launching the civil war in Spain had not only been a Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.
bloody frontal assaults by massed in- laboratory for testing equipment, partic- Habeck is an associated professor of stra-
fantry. Nevertheless, even if the Span- ularly of German and Russian designs, tegic studies at Johns Hopkins University.
ish Civil War was quickly overshad- but a dress rehearsal for the next war.” Her book is a masterpiece on armored
owed by World War II, for a brief time 2
James W. Cortada, Modern Warfare in warfare and development.

100 Fall 2020

12
Robin Higham and Frederick W. Kagan, the Proving Ground for Blitzkrieg, Ox- 1938, he assumed command of the reor-
The Military History of the Soviet Union, ford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, ganized 7th Cavalry Brigade, the Army’s
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. Copi- 2010. only armored force. Chaffee battled con-
ous and detailed reports were sent to 16
MID reports at the U.S. National Ar- tinuously during the prewar years for
Russia by the Soviet military advisers, ul- chives and Records Administration, also suitable equipment and for the creation
timately composing an entire section in cited by Zaloga. of armored divisions. With the collapse
the Red Army archives. Specialists return- 17
COL Antonio J. Candil, “Soviet Armor in of France in June 1940, Chaffee’s 1927
ing to the Soviet Union after combat in Spain: Aid Mission to Republicans,” AR- predictions of the importance of armored
Spain were interrogated exhaustively on MOR, March-April 1999. forces in modern warfare were con-
the effectiveness of the equipment sup- firmed.
18
George F. Hofmann, Camp Colt to Des-
plied.
ert Storm, the History of U.S. Armored
13
Jonathan House, “Toward Combined- Forces, Lexington, KY: The University
Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century
Tactics, Doctrine and Organization,” Fort
Press of Kentucky, 1999. Acronym Quick-Scan
19
MG Adna R. Chaffee Jr. was nicknamed
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command
the “Father of the Armored Force” for his ADA – air-defense artillery
and General Staff College, 1984.
role in developing the U.S. Army’s tank AP – armor-piercing
14
A report by Soviet GEN Kirill Meretskov forces. He predicted in 1927 that mecha- MID – Military Intelligence Division
to Marshal Boris Shaposnikov, Chief of nized armies would dominate the next RRS – Raggruppamento Reparti
the General Staff, Aug. 5, 1937. Cited in war and assisted in the first program for Specializzati
Habeck. developing a U.S. Army armored force. In
15
Steven Zaloga, Spanish Civil War Tanks,

LEGENDS OF ARMOR

101 Fall 2020

Figure 1. 82nd Airborne paratroopers integrate Armor vehicles to support combined-arms training. Infantry brigade
combat teams (BCTs) soon will have organic light-armor mobile protected firepower (MPF) companies to provide them
with more firepower to counter near-peer threats. (Photo by SSG Jason Hull)

Mobility, Shock and Firepower for

Light Armor-Infantry Operations:
Past, Present and Future
by CPT S. Scott Diddams win a low-tempo “hearts-and-minds” response to this deficiency, 82nd Air-
game to winning a high-tempo, large- borne Division has begun experiment-
“Armor in the future must fly, just as
scale, combined-arms fight against a ing with a mobile protected firepower
all other means of war must fly. Pos-
smarter, modern enemy. (MPF) company to augment its light
sessing good cross-country mobility,
battalions.
and gunned to destroy any earthbound
This transition to better engage a dif-
vehicle, the tank will play the decisive
fering mix of enemies reflects the na- The MPF platform promises to be a
role in the coming battles of the air-
ture of war itself. Tactics, techniques 30-ton tracked vehicle equipped with
heads.” -MG James M. Gavin1
and procedures (TTPs) are constantly a 105mm direct-fire precision-weapon
The U.S. Army has begun a major shift evolving as the enemy encounters our system. Currently, the role has been
in training to focus on countering weapons’ effects, just as we upgrade filled with U.S. Marine Corps’ light ar-
near-peer, well-equipped and well- our weapons and training to counter mored vehicles (LAV-25), equipped
funded adversaries fighting with an as- his advantages. This is especially true with the appropriate laser engage-
sortment of mechanized-infantry and in our infantry brigade combat teams ment system (Multiple Integrated La-
armored platforms far more capable (IBCTs), which have limited resources ser Engagement System [MILES]) to
than the typical insurgency. This to counter bunkers, tanks and other simulate MPF. The Army has chosen
means a transition from attempting to protected adversarial assets. In two prototypes to evaluate within 82nd

102 Fall 2020

Airborne in 2021. The product of this except when they encountered anti- the infantry to keep up, running them-
and other evaluations will determine tank weapons. Infantry units would be selves into anti-tank fire. When the in-
the platform of the proposed MPF expected to destroy anti-tank weap- fantry did keep close, they would of-
units to be activated within the IBCTs ons using “stalking and infiltration tac- ten absorb fire meant for the tanks.5
in 2025. tics.”3
The tanks were being moved around
The concept of augmenting expedi- While there was consistency in doc- so often they were typically unable to
tionary, light-infantry organizations trine for both tank and infantry lead- develop cohesion with their infantry
with armor isn’t new. Examples in- ers, it would take a number of failures counterparts as a combined-arms unit
clude general headquarters (GHQ) before commanders could effectively and to develop effective TTPs. They
tank battalions that were tasked to employ the tanks with the infantry. also had trouble accessing spare parts
support light infantry in World War II The armored units employed in Africa and crew replacements.
and Korea, or 73 rd Armor Regiment, were not GHQ battalions and were
which air-dropped Sheridan tanks into therefore not trained to work with the The chief of the Armored Force, LTG
Panama. These and many more histor- infantry. The mass attacks tank com- Jacob L. Devers, wrote the following to
ical, doctrinal evolutions produced a manders had expected to conduct GEN George Marshall in 1942: “Econ-
plethora of lessons-learned on the were not possible in the rugged ter- omy-of-force and unity of command
subject of light tank-infantry integra- rain of North Africa. 4 Tanks were go together. You get little of either if
tion. However, in 82nd Airborne Divi- forced to be dispersed as infantry sup- you get a lot of attached units at the
sion, which has been without an ar- port in much smaller numbers than last moment. Team play comes only
mored component since 1996, many what was originally planned. with practice.”6
of these lessons have been lost or dis-
carded. It is valuable, therefore, to ex- Infantry commanders did not know Devers’ note to Marshall reflected
amine history as the Infantry Branch what to do with the tanks when they what Americans had been learning
develops plans for the future. received them. Initially, infantry units, while fighting. In Africa, organizations
attempting to locate and fix their en- in which tanks and infantry were at-
This article will examine several rele- emies while leaving their tanks be- tached together for extended periods
vant historical vignettes and then dis- hind, would be pinned down and de- ultimately became highly capable in
cuss lessons-learned and how they ap- stroyed with indirect fire. In other cas- battle.7
ply to the development of future light- es, when tanks were moved to the
armor doctrine, which should be of in- front, they would move too fast for
terest to Armor Branch leaders and
Soldiers.

Operation Torch and

development of tank-
infantry tactics
The Army published doctrine prior to
the invasion of Africa that would be
tested and developed throughout the
duration of Operation Torch. Field
Manual (FM) 7-5, Organization and
Tactics of Infantry – The Rifle Battal-
ion, governed infantry tactics, where
infantry leaders were instructed that,
when their attacks were supported by
tanks, to advance their units as close
behind the tanks using the same ma-
neuvers they would if not supported
by tanks.2 The manual instructed infan-
try leaders to assume that the tank
units would conduct battle the same
as they would without infantry as well.
FM 17-10, Tank Platoon, which gov-
erned tank tactics, allotted GHQ tank
battalions to be attached to higher
echelons and distributed among infan-
try organizations as needed. The FM
still assumed that infantry would fol- Figure 2. Soldiers from 740th Tank Battalion and 82nd Airborne Division push
low behind, as dictated by FM 7-5, through the snow near Herresbach, Belgium, Jan. 28, 1945. (U.S. Army photo)

103 Fall 2020

504th and 740th advance toward the enemy on top of a platoon outside the town of Suwon. Two sepa-
of tanks no doubt increased the con- rate task forces were assembled from
on Siegfried Line centration and tempo of the move- 64 th and 89 th Tank Battalions and 1 st
Company C, 740 th Tank Battalion ment-to-contact. The ability of the and 2nd Battalions of 27th Infantry Reg-
(GHQ), was attached to 504 th Para- tank-infantry team to react to such a iment. The plan consisted of the tank
chute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 82 nd large enemy force so decisively in so battalions launching penetrating at-
Airborne Division, for the advance on little time was a result of mobility, tacks to the flanks and rear of the hill-
the Siegfried Line Jan. 28, 1945. They shock and firepower that would have tops, while infantry attacked up the
were equipped with M4 Sherman been lacking without armor support. hills themselves.
tanks, each with a 76mm cannon, two
30-caliber coaxial and bow machine- The armor teams were not meant to
guns, and a 50-caliber pintle-mounted
Infantry-armor task seize or secure any terrain, only to dis-
machinegun on top of the turret. force in Korea organize and disrupt the enemy to in-
As the war in Korea progressed into flict maximum casualties and then
One tank platoon from Company C 1951, especially in the west where ter- withdraw. In the flanking maneuver,
was attached to each of 504th’s three rain was more forgiving, American and each tank company was teamed with
battalions. Their objective was the United Nations forces were regularly an infantry company, and both com-
town of Herresbach, Belgium, and conducting combat operations in in- manders remained together physically
they would be the right flank of First fantry-armor battalion task forces. for the rest of the operation. Typically
Army. the infantry commander would ride on
Typically an infantry regiment consist-
The 3rd Platoon from Company C of the the back deck of the armor command-
ing of three battalions had a tank bat-
740 th and 3 rd Battalion of the 504th er’s tank. The operation ended with a
talion of four companies in support,
would lead the attack. Snow and fog reported 4,251 enemy killed at the
and each battalion would have one or
covered the advance down a single cost of 100 allied casualties.11
two tank companies attached in addi-
narrow trail. Single tanks led para- tion to other enablers such as engi-
troopers marching in columns of two 3-73 Armor and
neers, artillery and reconnaissance
spaced at platoon interval.8 companies. These infantry-armor task Operation Just Cause
forces were successful in limited-ob- In the early morning of Dec. 20, 1989,
For the first 7,000 yards of the ad- Company C, 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor
vance, the column encountered only jective attacks such as the attack on
Osan-Suwon Jan. 15, 1951. Regiment, air-dropped 10 M551A1
minimal resistance, consisting of ma- Sheridan tanks to the east of the
chinegun and small-arms fire. At that The 27 th Regimental Combat Team Tocuman-Torrijos Airport in Panama as
point the column was notified of a (RCT) was organized into three task part of Operation Just Cause. The light
German counterattack to its north. forces of 27th Infantry Regiment, sup- tanks of this unique division-organic
Four tanks assembled at the front of ported by 89 th Tank Battalion. Task tank battalion were equipped with a
the formation, and infantry climbed Force Baker – consisting of Soldiers 152mm main gun, 7.62mm coax and
on to maneuver toward the suspected from 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regi- the commander’s .50-caliber pintle-
enemy. ment, and Company C, 89th Tank Bat- mounted machinegun.
talion – spearheaded the attack on Su-
The German and American columns Of the 10 vehicles dropped into Pana-
won. Their rapid advance, coupled
stumbled upon each other, and with- ma, eight were made operational and
with the shock effect and firepower of
out hesitation American paratroopers organized in sections belonging to
their armor enablers, caught the de-
and tanks jumped into action, seizing each of the three PIRs, with one sec-
fending enemy off guard, inflicting 200
the initiative. The lead tank opened tion establishing a blocking position at
casualties.
with its full complement of machine- the airport’s entrance.12 Soldiers from
guns as well as its main cannon, while The RCT continued toward and into 1st Battalion, 504th Infantry Regiment
paratroopers on the ground charged Suwon Jan. 16-17 with additional air made direct contact with the Panama-
forward, firing from the hip. The vio- support. With shock and surprise, the nian Defense Force (PDF) when they
lent combined-arms action was over RCT engaged enemy forces on top of were ambushed by a machinegun po-
in 10 minutes, with the 504th reporting and inside buildings, flushing them out sition while clearing an obstacle not
more than 100 Germans killed and onto the street kill zones with air and far from the drop zone. The lead tank
about 180 captured. Not a single ground fire. By the end of the opera- commander immediately opened fire
American casualty was reported.9 The tion, an estimated 1,150 enemy were with his .50-caliber machinegun, and
town of Herresbach was seized within killed at the cost of a single American his wingman, upon acquiring the ene-
an hour. casualty.10 my location, fired a single 152mm
high-explosive (HE) round, causing the
Interspacing tanks among infantry pla- Similar infantry-armor task-force con-
side of the building occupied by the
toons along the canalizing trail to Her- cepts were put to use successfully in
enemy to collapse. Enemy fire ceased,
resbach allowed for optimal security several more operations of this time
and the infantry battalion reduced the
and firepower spread throughout the period. Notable is Operation Punch in
obstacle and continued.
formation. Upon notification of con- February 1951, in which 25th Infantry
tact, the ability of riflemen to ride Division attacked to seize two hilltops Later on the same route, Sheridans

104 Fall 2020

 commander to support the infantry
battalions as they expanded their con-
trol over the airhead.
After encountering minimal resis-
tance, the platoon was attached to 2nd
Battalion, 501st PIR, and assisted in re-
pelling multiple mechanized-infantry
counterattacks over three days until it
was finally destroyed by enemy armor.
The morning after, a two-vehicle sec-
tion that was initially attached to 1st
Battalion, 504th PIR, was rerouted to
2nd Battalion, 501st PIR, to supplement
that battalion’s defense. The receiving
company commander provided clear
and brief guidance to provide a defen-
sive battle position (BP) facing down a
narrow road with platoons of infantry
occupying BPs at the flank. Around
Figure 3. An M551 Sheridan sits outside the Apostolic Nunciature, the Vati- midnight an enemy armored-battalion
can’s embassy, during negotiations for Manuel Noriega’s surrender in Opera- column approached the company en-
tion Just Cause. (U.S. Army Center of Military History photo) gagement area. As planned, infantry
attempted to engage enemy armor
and infantry encountered another ob- infantry counterparts fought. Together first with their dismounted anti-tank
stacle consisting of an apparent vehi- they produced a lethal and highly suc- systems with limited success. The MPF
cle-born improvised-explosive device. cessful team. Tanks were available to section then began engaging enemy
The obstacle was reduced by firing a assist their infantry counterparts in armor with immediate effects.
single 152mm HE round. When the the joint forcible entry almost imme- Initially, the enemy focused on the dis-
smoke cleared, the tanks pushed the diately after hitting the ground and mounted infantry arrayed in the tree
wrecked vehicles aside, and the route provided much-needed mobility, line at their flank. A few boyevaya
was open.13 shock and firepower to keep para- mashina pekhotys (BMPs) identified
troopers moving from the airhead to and fired back at the engaging MPF
Elsewhere, Sheridans were being put
their objectives while minimizing ca- section, but their 30mm cannons had
to work on the offensive against the
sualties. Company C accomplished its no effect on the MPF platform’s fron-
PDF’s Commandancia complex and air-
mission and returned home from Pan- tal armor. The section expended all of
borne and ranger training base. In the
ama with only one crewmember its ammunition in the space of 20 min-
former, Sheridans used their main can-
wounded utes, destroying a company-sized ele-
non to knock down walls and open ar-
eas for dismounted maneuver. They Company A, 4th Battalion, ment of T-80s and BMPs.
fired HE rounds into buildings as pre- Continuing to receive only 30mm fire,
paratory fires prior to the infantry en- 68th Armor, at JRTC
In June 2019 at Joint Readiness Train- the section arranged its vehicles to
tering and clearing. The HE rounds
ing Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA, 82nd form an effective roadblock, and the
killed occupants and drove the enemy
Airborne Division’s MPF Company enemy armored column was com-
into a state of confusion and discord
brought three platoons of Marine pletely halted. It was the first time in
before being swept away by the pre-
Corps LAVs equipped with MILES sim- recent history that a light brigade had
cise urban maneuver of the paratroop-
ulating a 105mm auto-loading cannon been able to effectively stop the ad-
ers.
and 30 tons of armor. The company vance of the armored counterattack at
In the latter, the company commander supported 1st Brigade Combat Team in JRTC.
of the armor-infantry team took his the airborne joint forcible entry, fol- Following the defense, the MPF com-
position at the deck of one of his at- lowed by defensive and finally offen- pany was reconstituted and divided up
tached Sheridans and manned the dis- sive operations against a near-peer into three armor-infantry teams, two
mount telephone to coordinate direct mechanized enemy. of which were tasked with breaching
fires, putting tanks to use preventing
The initial plan was to task each of the enemy defenses around the strong-
fratricide.14
three platoons to a habitual parent in- hold town of Sangari and passing dis-
In contrast to prior infantry-armor op- fantry battalion, with one platoon be- mounted paratroopers onto the objec-
erations, the paratroop commanders ing air-dropped and the other two ar- tive. These teams were augmented
knew the capabilities of their perma- riving by air-land. Immediately upon with M1A2 72-ton main battle tanks in
nent armor enablers, and likewise the air drop, a platoon of MPF vehicles addition to the MPF platforms. On the
Sheridan crewmen knew how their were made available to the brigade approach, the teams took little

105 Fall 2020

 platforms, an MPF and a machinegun-
equipped humvee, or preferably an
MPF and a squad of riflemen.
Dismounts are ideal because it is
critical to cover the deadspace
around the vehicle and prevent
infiltration.
• Avoid deliberately maneuvering the
MPF platform off-road through low
ground or loose sand and soil. A
thorough terrain analysis should be
conducted at a minimum via a map
reconnaissance to determine
severely restricted terrain. You don’t
want your vehicles to get stuck.
• Make use of engineer assets to
provide hull defilade fighting
positions. The MPF platform benefits
from the smallest silhouette possible
while still being able to traverse its
turret.
• Give the MPF clear lines of sight and
maximum standoff. The MPF is
Figure 4. A Sheridan tank supporting the 82nd Airborne rotation at JRTC pa- equipped with precision, high-
trols the forward landing strip in Cortina. (Photo by Raymond Barnard)
velocity, direct-fire, laser-ranged
weapon systems firing both kinetic
contact until a section of both MPF ve- spent their careers in armored and and chemical ordinance. These
hicles and M1A2s were mistaken for mechanized organizations, IBCTs typi- weapons systems can affect every
enemy armor and destroyed by friend- cally lack personnel with mechanized perceivable land target accurately
ly dismounted anti-tank systems. After experience or understanding of armor and easily at least 3,000 meters
absorbing this significant loss, the doctrine. This general lack of under- away.
teams continued to the objective, standing of armored capabilities and
meeting and destroying enemy armor doctrine among leaders in IBCTs is also • Plan to make Class III resupply
and successfully opening the breach dangerous in that it has created a available to the MPF daily and plan
for infantry to follow through. prevalent attitude of rejection toward to make Class V resupply available
the armored force. Light-infantry com- during offensive or defensive action
Lessons for the future manders and staff typically believe against armor or armored targets.
The bottom line is that success of the they can accomplish their mission The MPF in contact with armor will
light armor-infantry team, as with any without armor because they have run out of main-gun ammunition
enabler, is predicated first on the com- been doing so for decades. History has quickly. Ensure that the MPF platoon
bined understanding of each other’s shown, however, that permanent light sergeant and battalion S-4 have
capabilities and limitations by both ar- armor augmentation is an incredible made contact during logistical
mor and infantry leaders, leading to force multiplier, which will allow the planning.
harmonious coordination between IBCT to accomplish much more. • The infantry planner should have
crew members and dismounts. This is constant access to the MPF platoon
best achieved through repeated MPF- Whether light-infantry commanders leader prior to execution. During
infantry maneuver training at battal- want it or not, the MPF company will execution, the combat commander
ion and below level with organic or ha- become a part of IBCTs in the near fu- should prioritize his control of the
bitually attached MPF crews. In a mis- ture. For those commanders who find MPF. The MPF will most likely be the
sion-command environment, the effi- themselves with armor enablers for combat commander’s most casualty-
cacy of armor enablers in training and the first time in their formations and producing weapon system and best
the development of strong TTPs is lim- don’t know how to employ them, I of- enemy-detection system. Employing
ited to a well-informed commander’s fer that there is no right answer, but it at the center of mass of the
creativity and willingness to take pru- experience and history has taught us operation is critical and enabled by
dent risk. Once this habitual training to adhere to these key principles: keeping the MPF leader physically
relationship is achieved and strong with the tactical planner prior to
• The MPF requires local security
TTPs are established among leaders, (and decision maker during) combat
provided in the form of dismounts
success on the battlefield will follow. operations.
or a wingman vehicle. Successful
While this formula for success may combined-arms teams can be Adherence to these principles and the
seem trivial to commanders who have formed between two or more MPF lessons history teaches us, coupled

106 Fall 2020

with the application of common sense, mor,” Infantry Journal, January 1948.
will set your operation up for success. 2
FM 7-5, Organization and Tactics of In-
Acronym Quick-Scan
When the platform arrives, its techni- fantry – The Rifle Battalion, 1940.
BMP – boyevaya mashina pekhoty
cal specifications will no doubt affect 3
FM 17-10, Armored Force Field Manual: (Russian fighting vehicle)
its maneuverability and combat capa- Tactics and Techniques, 1942. BP – battle position
bilities. The key is to train together, 4
John W. Washburn, “Integration of Ar- FM – field manual
take risks and make mistakes, then mored Forces in the U.S. Army Infantry GHQ – general headquarters
train again, and again, and again. Division,” monograph for master’s thesis, HE – high explosive
U.S. Army Command and General Staff IBCT – infantry brigade combat
CPT Scott Diddams is the deputy chief team
College, 2001.
of training, G-3, 82nd Airborne Division, JRTC – Joint Readiness Training
Fort Bragg, NC. Previous assignments
5
Michael D. Doubler, Closing with the Center
include plans officer, 3rd Battalion, 73rd Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Eu- LAV – Light Armored Vehicle (U.S.
rope, 1944-1945, Lawrence, KS: Universi- Marine Corps)
Cavalry, 1st BCT, 82nd Airborne Division,
ty Press of Kansas, 1994. MILES – Multiple Integrated Laser
Fort Bragg; MPF-platoon leader, Com- Engagement System
pany A, 4-68 Armor (Airborne-Provi-
6
Washburn.
MPF – mobile protected firepower
sional), 82nd Airborne; scout-platoon 7
Doubler. PDF – Panamanian Defense Force
leader, 3/73 Cav, 1st BCT, 82nd Airborne; 8
After-action report, 740th Tank Battal- PIR – parachute infantry regiment
and assistant instructor, Critical Think- ion, January through April 1945, Wash- RCT – regimental combat team
ing Program, U.S. Military Academy, ington, DC: U.S. Army, 1945. TTP – tactics, techniques and
procedures
West Point, NY. CPT Diddams’ military 9
History of 504th Parachute Infantry Dec.
schools include Army Reconnaissance 18, 1944, to Jan. 11, 1945, Washington,
Course, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s DC: U.S. Army, 1945.
Course, Basic Airborne Course, Air-As- 10
Employment of Armor in Korea – The
sault School and Basic Military Moun- First Year, Vol. II, Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army
taineering Course. He has a bachelor’s Armor School, 1952.
of science degree in environmental en- 11
Ibid.
gineering from the U.S. Military Acad- 12
K.J. Hammond and F. Sherman, “Sheri-
emy. dans in Panama,” ARMOR, March-April
1990.
(Reprinted by permission from Infan-
try magazine, Spring 2020 edition.)
13
F. Sherman, “Operation Just Cause: The
Armor-Infantry Team in the Close Fight,”
Notes ARMOR, September-October 1996.
1
MG James M. Gavin, “The Future of Ar- 14
Ibid.

107 Fall 2020

 Section Gunnery and Armored
Brigade Combat Team Lethality
by CPT Zachary J. Matson live-fire exercise (LFX) that bears Infantry NCOs in
more importance than any other like
The U.S. Army continues to prepare Armor formations
exercise;
for large-scale combat operations What matters to Infantry Branch non-
(LSCO) through tough, realistic train- • Battalion commanders reluctantly commissioned officers (NCOs) for pro-
ing against a near-peer threat. 1 The separate platoons into sections motion to sergeant first class is rated
bulk of America’s conventional striking which reduces flexibility in planning;
time as a rifle-squad leader, not as a
power – its armored brigade combat and
section leader. 3 Infantry NCOs as-
teams (ABCTs) – may struggle to main- • Company commanders and platoon signed to an ABCT must rotate through
tain qualified and lethal sections due leaders do not have any validation or the rifle squads to accumulate rated
to both high personnel changeover confidence in their sections’ time. Understandably, this priority of
and the deliberate neglect of section operational autonomy before rated time creates a desire in NCOs to
gunnery. While Human Resources separating them for survivability on serve in the rifle-squad-leader role
Command and Department of the a dispersed 21st Century battlefield. that is mandatory for promotion.
Army control the former, brigade com- While brigade and battalion com-
manders have control over the latter. manders might see platoon Table VI as In addition to this discrepancy in rated
Choosing to neglect section gunnery an opportunity to train both platoons time between a section and a squad,
generates three distinct problems: and sections, the truth is this ap- the rifle-squad leader is sure to get
• Section leaders never receive proach does not accomplish the best multiple repetitions in a squad LFX,
feedback and development on a training or preparation for LSCO.2 while a section leader will not be

Figure 1. A Bradley Fighting Vehicle assigned to Company A, 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade
Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, advances to the first berm during a crew gunnery at Fort Stewart, GA, Sept. 25,
2019. (Photo by SPC Jordyn Worshek)

108 Fall 2020

rated as objectively during platoon LFX and use of live rounds, section leaders military schooling includes the Recon-
because this is the platoon’s evalua- do not benefit from this simulated naissance and Surveillance Leader’s
tion with the platoon leader and pla- training, as valuable as it is. Course, Bradley Leader’s Course, Path-
toon sergeant responsible for the re- finder and Ranger Courses, Infantry
sults. More often than not, platoon The Army knows it will fight dispersed, Basic Officer Leader’s Course, and Air
leaders and sergeants maneuver their so it is a commander’s responsibility Assault and Airborne Schools. He holds
sections, with the section leader rele- to train those echelons and leaders a bachelor’s of science degree in Eng-
gated to the role of track commander with live rounds and incorporate that lish from the U.S. Military Academy,
during platoon Table VI. into our peacetime training calendars. West Point, NY.
Section Table VI qualification allows
Comparatively, a squad LFX gives a the battalion commander the flexibil- (Reprinted by permission from Infan-
squad leader the chance to formulate ity to operate as either sections or pla- try magazine, published in Spring 2020
a plan, brief it, execute it and receive toons.6 Sections will be the smallest edition.)
feedback for development, all while unit we see in a mechanized formation
incorporating enablers under stress on the future battlefield, and prepara- Notes
and with live rounds – truly an impor-
1
LTG Michel D. Lundy, “Meeting the Chal-
tion begins now to dominate in close
tant exercise for leader development. lenge of Large-Scale Combat Operations
combat. Today and Tomorrow,” Military Review,
Section leaders do not get the same
Section gunnery, often missing in September-October 2018.
opportunity because they are not of-
fered the ownership of a section LFX. ABCT training calendars, provides an
2
Training Circular 3-20.0, Integrated
important mechanism to make these Weapons Training Strategy (IWTS), June
Section gunnery and formations lethal. By planning, re- 2019.
sourcing and executing section gun-
3
Infantry (Career-Management Field 11)
leader development career-progression plan, Office Chief of
Section gunnery and NCO develop- nery, commanders provide their for-
mations with more seasoned and ca- Infantry, Fort Benning, GA.
ment go hand in hand. Field-grade
pable NCOs who take their evaluation
4
Through various interviews the author
leaders who fail to schedule this event has had with peers who have served in 1st
deny a portion of their formation in- and performance more seriously. Suc-
cessful completion of section Table VI Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and
valuable training. Unfortunately, many 3rd Infantry Division.
ABCTs choose this route.4 provides battalion commanders with
qualified sections that can both oper-
5
Sydney J. Freedburg Jr., “Miserable, Dis-
Leader development is even more vi- ate independently and survive on the obedient and Victorious: GEN Milley’s Fu-
tal as formations on the battlefield of ture U.S. Soldier,” Breaking Defense, 5
future battlefield. Training at this ech-
October 2016, accessed from https://
the future are expected to perform elon makes ABCTs more lethal and ful- breakingdefense.com/2016/10/misera-
while geographically dispersed. GEN fills the promise of leader develop- ble-disobedient-victorious-gen-milleys-
Mark Milley, who served as 39th Chief ment that we as an Army focus on. It future-us-soldier/.
of Staff of the Army (CSA), described requires more time and effort, but the 6
Center for Army Lessons Learned Hand-
the future battlefield as requiring nev- increased lethality and leader compe- book 18-36, Commander’s Guide to Gun-
er-before-seen levels of unit disper- tence ensures mechanized formations nery, September 2018.
sion. “Soldiers … must split into small – at any echelon – can fight and win
units and stay either on the move or tomorrow’s wars.
under cover,” warned the former CSA.5
Mechanized rifle platoons will break CPT Zachary Matson is an infantry of-
Acronym Quick-Scan
up into sections to increase survivabil- ficer serving as regimental assistant
ity on a modern battlefield; however, S-1 of Headquarters, 75th Ranger Reg- ABCT – armored brigade combat
sections never train or operate inde- iment, Fort Benning, GA. Previous as- team
CSA – Chief of Staff of the Army
pendently in current unit training signments include plans officer, 1st Bat- LFX – live-fire exercise
plans. Occasionally, a commander de- talion, 18 th Infantry, Fort Riley, KS; LSCO – large-scale combat
taches a section from its platoon dur- mechanized-platoon leader, 1-18 In- operations
ing combat-training-center rotations, fantry, Fort Riley; and assistant S-3, NCO – noncommissioned officer
but without the deliberate planning 1-18 Infantry, Fort Riley. CPT Matson’s

109 Fall 2020

 BOOK REVIEWS
progressed. The Soviet cavalry main- first 15 chapters cover the origins of
Soviet Cavalry Operations During the tained an essential mobility advantage the Soviet cavalry as an operational
Second World War and the Genesis of over their German opponents in areas force, as well as its equipment and or-
the Operational Manoeuvre Group by lacking a significant road network, re- ganization before World War II. From
John S. Harrel; Yorkshire, UK: Pen & gardless of their mounts. As Harrel there, operations are told chronologi-
Sword Military; 2019; $23 hardcover. elucidates, the cavalry was the only re- cally, often covering multiple opera-
liably mobile Soviet force during the tions across multiple fronts in the span
first years of the war. Despite their of a few pages. Some actions are ex-
The Soviet-German front in World War mobility, horse-mounted cavalry, like tensively covered, while others are rel-
II was characterized by massive opera- the rest of the Red Army, often paid a atively sparse on details. For students
tions and immense violence. It is often heavy price for minimal gains. of the Eastern Front, this is unsurpris-
thought of as a conflict between ar- ing and does not detract from the
mored forces. German panzers dueled The first operational-level raid was work’s overall value. The inclusion of
Soviet T-34s, with the infantry doomed launched in early 1942, as 1st Guards so many maps is valuable. This said,
to suffer in the cold and in the cities. Cavalry Corps penetrated the German the keys on the maps are often lacking
The conception of cavalry units of sig- 4th Army’s lines in an effort to strike at scale and other normal information,
nificant size and impact has largely 4th Panzer Army’s rear near Vyazma. reducing some of the maps’ value.
been omitted from the war’s histori- Their efforts, combined with para-
ography. troopers dropped behind German By the end of World War II, while the
lines, led German GEN Franz Halder, Red Army was largely motorized, cav-
John S. Harrel’s latest work serves as a chief of the German General Staff, to alry units continued to play significant
reminder that the era of horse-mount- cite supply difficulties in the area and roles in the final strategic offensives.
ed warfare had not passed and, in- requirements to shift German forces The cavalry units, with tables of orga-
deed, continued until the war’s con- from the front lines to counter the nization now containing increasingly
clusion. Soviet Cavalry Operations threat to the rear. armored and motorized formations,
During the Second World War and
continued to penetrate Axis lines, con-
The Genesis of the Operational Ma- While deployed to cut vulnerable sup-
ducting reconnaissance and threaten-
noeuvre Group is an expansive analy- ply lines and disrupt rear-area opera-
ing lines of communications. They
sis of the technical, tactical and oper- tions, cavalry forces often faced signif-
kept Axis defenders off-balance and
ational employment of Soviet cavalry icant logistical problems as the Red
helped spearhead the Soviet’s con-
against the Germans and their Axis al- Army was unable to reliably supply
cluding operations in Europe and
lies. For practitioners who want to un- them with ammunition, replacements
against Japan. Along with the rest of
derstand the history and develop- or medical support. The cavalry troops
the Red Army, the Soviet cavalry grew
ment, the book is a goldmine of over- were frequently required to live off
in terms of operational prowess and
looked campaigns and actions. As dur- the land and, due to mounting losses,
skill as the war progressed, and Har-
ing World War II, while new technolo- to consolidate their forces into ever-
rel’s work brings to light the opera-
gies promise to shift combat opera- shrinking formations as the Germans
tional impact that seemingly obsolete
tions, the study of the seemingly ar- pursued them. Nevertheless, as Harrel
tactics and formations had on a mod-
chaic cavalry serves as a reminder that recounts, their impact on German rear
ern battlefield. The book’s dense and
old platforms continue to be effective areas was significant and they tied
detailed presentation makes it valu-
long after becoming outdated. down large numbers of troops.
able to operational planners and those
While initially solely horse-mounted, The book is organized into 25 chapters interested in the Soviet-German war.
the Soviet cavalry, like much of the with an introduction, glossary, notes MAJ TIMOTHY HECK
Red Army, was increasingly motorized and a bibliography, all supplemented U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
a n d m e c h a n i ze d a s t h e wa r with 63 maps and 48 illustrations. The

110 Fall 2020

BATTLE ANALYSIS
Covering Operations in the Loudon Valley,
June 17-23, 1863: A Brief Assessment
by MAJ Christian Garner During the Battle of Gettysburg, much during most of the Battle of Gettysburg
attention continues to be given to BG itself, the contributions of the Confed-
The U.S. cavalry has maintained a his-
John Buford’s defense along the ridge- erate cavalry were nonetheless impor-
tory of executing reconnaissance and
lines west of town during the morning tant, as they allowed the Army of
security (R&S) operations in support of
of July 1, 1863. Immortalized in Mi- Northern Virginia to disengage from a
higher-echelon formations. While this
chael Shaara’s The Killer Angels and numerically superior force and move
historical role remains unchanged, the
the actor Sam Elliot’s role as Buford in undetected into enemy territory. Al-
U.S. Army’s current transition to large-
the movie Gettysburg, the current ver- though failing in its reconnaissance
scale ground combat places increased
sion of Field Manual (FM) 3-98 uses role, Stuart’s cavalry performed admi-
emphasis on the reconnaissance func-
Buford’s defense as a textbook exam- rably in its exemplary execution of its
tion of cavalry to seek out enemy for-
ple of the dual R&S roles cavalry pro- covering operation as GEN Robert E.
mations. Regardless of vehicle compo-
vides.2 Lee moved his army north into Mary-
sition or echelon, cavalry formations
While a worthy example, a lesser- land and Pennsylvania.
are still required to perform collective
missions that include zone, route, area known security operation occurred just
and forceful reconnaissance or screen, a few weeks prior to Buford’s action on Lee moves north
guard and cover assignments.1 Given the western approaches around Following his defeat of the Union Army
these tasks to not only find the enemy McPherson’s Ridge and the Chambers- of the Potomac at the Battle of Chan-
but also protect friendly forces, the se- burg Pike. cellorsville in May 1863, Lee consoli-
curity function of cavalry formations The absence of MG J.E.B. Stuart’s Con- dated and resupplied his forces in
remains and must not be forgotten. federate cavalry until the third day preparation for an invasion north.
from the Battle of Gettysburg is often Starting June 3, 1863, he began to shift
Within the Army, and specifically the a point of contention that is brought his forces from their positions outside
Armor Branch, there is much current up in any analysis of the campaign and Fredericksburg, VA, to the west to be-
debate on the future composition of subsequent battle. Out conducting a gin the planned invasion. To mask his
cavalry units and the capabilities they raid deep into Pennsylvania and Mary- movement north, the operational plan
would bring to the fight. While task-or- land, Stuart’s absence leading up to called for the Army of Northern Virgin-
ganizing existing cavalry squadrons is July 1, 1863, led to a climactic meeting ia to follow the Shenandoah Valley
seen as a current measure to achieve engagement which arguably changed north into enemy territory. By using
successful R&S operations, there is the course of the Civil War. Absent the Shenandoah, Lee intended to
likely value in creating permanent,
standing organizations to reinforce
training, establish habitual relation-
ships and simplify the chain of com-
mand. However, regardless of struc-
ture or echelon, U.S. cavalry functions
best in both its R&S roles when it is giv-
en direct command and control of en-
ablers to assist the organic cavalry ele-
ments. By maximizing the rapid mobil-
ity of mounted formations with the
unique capabilities brought to the bat-
tlefield by enablers, U.S. cavalry units
have historically been able to success-
fully execute the variety of missions as-
signed to them.

While the history of American cavalry

forces provides bountiful examples of
successful reconnaissance operations,
security operations are somewhat less
well known, if not more elusive. Figure 1. The red area marks the Loudon Valley’s location.

111
Fall 2020
Figure 2. Looking east across the Loudoun Valley, as seen from the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains near Bluemont,
VA.

exploit the neighboring Bull Run and brigades of mounted cavalry and six Kilpatrick of Gregg’s Division slamming
Blue Ridge Mountains to form a natu- batteries of artillery, Stuart had the into the Confederate positions astride
ral screen line to help conceal his ar- ability to dedicate a battery to each the two turnpikes leading west to Ash-
my’s movements from detection. Be- brigade. By doing so, he created habit- by’s Gap and northwest to Snickers
tween the two mountain ranges lay an ual relationships between the brigade Gap. Blunting the initial Union assault,
area known as the Loudoun Valley, and regimental commanders with their Munford’s dismounted troopers were
which contained a series of mountain respective battery of artillery and its aided by enablers in the form of CPT
passes that allowed passage in and out leadership. Stuart would put this com- James Breathed’s battery of four three-
of the mountain ranges. This land be- mand relationship to good use in the inch rifled cannon from 1 st Virginia
came contested terrain June 17-23, coming days in the multiple engage- Horse Artillery.
1863, as each side conducted R&S op- ments fought across the Loudon Valley
erations in the fight to find or protect in the middle of June 1863. Checking Kilpatrick’s continued charg-
Confederate forces.3 es, the Confederate cavalrymen and ar-
Although almost numerically the same tillerymen continued to hold the im-
By June 5, 1863, Union MG Joseph size as the Union force, Stuart found portant crossroads throughout the day.
Hooker – commander of the Army of himself at a disadvantage. While the Frustrated by the delay, Gregg commit-
the Potomac – realized that Lee had defense is generally considered the ted a second brigade of Union cavalry
abandoned his position in Fredericks- stronger form of warfare, the Confed- to Aldie in an attempt to force the task-
burg, and he tasked his cavalry force erate cavalry found themselves de- organized Confederates to cede the im-
under the command of BG Alfred Plea- fending the many gaps bisecting the portant terrain. Although eventually
sonton to ascertain the enemy’s intent Loudon Valley and neighboring moun- forced to retire due to growing Union
as Hooker prepared the Union army for tain ranges. Conversely, Pleasonton strength, Munford successfully delayed
movement. To achieve this mission, had the advantage by being able to the initial Union reconnaissance effort
Pleasonton ordered his two divisions mass his cavalry forces at the division and prevented the enemy from gaining
under the commands of Buford and BG level, thus achieving local numerical knowledge of Lee’s movements.5
David Gregg to mass their brigades and superiority at a time and place of his
force the passes in the Loudon Valley choosing. To counter this threat, Stuart After hearing of the action at Aldie and
to determine the Confederate disposi- relied on his enablers, specifically his recognizing Stuart’s covering opera-
tions. Countering Pleasonton’s recon- field-artillery formations, to help his tion, Hooker ordered Pleasonton to
naissance efforts, Stuart placed his six organic cavalry formations conduct “find out what was behind [the Con-
brigades of Confederate cavalry direct- their covering operation for the main federate cavalry],” which resulted in in-
ly west of the gaps that pass through body of the Army of Northern Virginia. creased Union cavalry commitment
the Bull Run Mountains to cover the June 18.6 Though hard-pressed by a nu-
Confederate main body as it moved merically superior force, Stuart consid-
north into Maryland.
Forcing the gaps ered it his “duty to mask the move-
On June 16, Hooker ordered Pleason- ments of Lee’s infantry” by “checking
In addition to the six brigades of cav- ton’s two divisions of Union cavalry to the enemy’s reconnaissance” efforts as
alry under Stuart’s direction, he also the town of Aldie, an important cross- far away from the main force as possi-
commanded a formation of horse artil- roads town, to find Lee’s army. Defend- ble.7
lery, consisting of six batteries, and a ed by part of a dismounted brigade of
task force commanded by BG John Im- Confederate cavalry under the com- Not to be denied, Pleasonton contin-
boden, containing two regiments of mand of COL Thomas Munford, June 17 ued his aggressive reconnaissance ef-
cavalry, a company of partisan rangers found the lead Union cavalry brigade forts June 19 in the vicinity of Middle-
and one battery of artillery.4 With six under the command BG Judson burg, five miles to the west of Aldie.

112
Fall 2020
Again leading with a Union cavalry bri- Vincent – including 20th Maine, later to afterthought to Gettysburg, the sharp
gade, this time under the command of gain fame for its defense of Little series of battles still took a deadly toll
COL J. Irvin Gregg from Gregg’s Divi- Round Top during the Battle of Gettys- on its participants. In total, from June
sion, Pleasonton attempted to achieve burg – to engage Stuart and his cavalry 17-23, the Union forces lost 883 men
local numerical superiority against the around the small settlement of Upper- and Stuart’s cavalry had 510 casualties,
two dismounted partial Confederate ville further west in the Loudon Valley. reflecting the nature and importance
cavalry brigades under the command Using its infantry attachments, the of the R&S operations as both sides
of BG Beverly Robertson and COL John Union force initially pushed back the fought to gain or protect information.12
Chambliss. Still needing to cover the dismounted Confederate cavalrymen To highlight the importance of Stuart’s
main body of Lee’s advance northward, of BG Wade Hampton and the support- covering effort, on June 22 – the day
Stuart ordered Robertson and Cham- ing battery of CPT James Hart’s Wash- after the Battle of Upperville – MG
bliss to conduct a delaying action by ington Horse Artillery. Robert Rodes’ division of LTG Richard
trading space for time. Ewell’s corps crossed into Pennsylva-
Although initially forced to retreat,
nia, the first Confederate force to
With the initial Confederate skirmish Stuart reformed his defensive line to
reach the state.
line driven in, Stuart established a po- the west of Goose Creek in an effort to
sition around Mount Defiance, a neigh- halt the numerically superior force. The organization of the Confederate
boring ridgeline, to the west of Middle- Calling for reinforcements, Stuart or- force to conduct its covering operation
burg. In addition to the troopers of dered the cavalry brigades of BG Wil- in the Loudon Valley serves as a text-
Robertson’s and Chambliss’ com- liam “Grumble” Jones and Chambliss book example of enablers supporting
mands, Stuart supplemented the de- to converge west of Upperville to es- cavalry formations. With six batteries
fenses with two batteries of attached tablish a secondary defensive position of organic artillery already at his dis-
artillery, the Lynchburg Rifles under and protect his flank from Buford’s en- posal, Stuart made the wise decision
CPT Marcellus Moorman and 2nd Vir- veloping brigades. Supporting this sec- to attach a battery to each of his bri-
ginia Horse Artillery commanded by ondary defensive position, the Ashby gades. Tasked with covering a series of
CPT William McGregor. Combined, Horse Artillery under the command of gaps and passes connecting the Loud-
these two batteries provided three Na- CPT Roger Preston Chew unlimbered on and Shenandoah Valleys, the Con-
poleon smoothbore cannons and five and deployed its one three-inch rifle federate cavalry could not mass its
three-inch rifled cannons to support and one howitzer. forces; instead, it had to fight in dispa-
the embattled Confederate troopers. rate brigade-sized elements. The en-
By pouring enfilading fire into the flank
of 8 th Illinois Cavalry, the battery abler support provided by its artillery
With the initial advance of his cousin
helped check the Union cavalry from batteries proved their utility in helping
COL J. Irvin Gregg stopped, Union BG
reaching the Confederate supply wag- the Confederate troopers fight off nu-
David Gregg once again brought his
ons attempting to escape through Ash- merically superior forces.
second brigade up in an attempt to
force the Confederate position. Also, a by’s Gap. Able to re-establish his de- While the technology of the 21st Cen-
brigade from Buford’s division moved fensive lines, Stuart’s troopers contin- tury makes the battlefield of today
south in an effort to flank the defen- ued to fight a delaying action the rest look little like those of the American
sive position. Realizing the tenuous na- of the day, though eventually ceding Civil War, the principles of R&S opera-
ture of the Mount Defiance position, the town to enemy control.11 tions have not changed. Enabler sup-
Stuart withdrew his forces behind the port has and will continue to provide
Kirk’s Branch Creek farther west. Al- Battle analysis cavalry formations unique capabilities
though forced away from Middleburg, Although being forced to cede control in support of these missions.
Stuart’s combined cavalry and artillery of the Bull Run Mountains and the
force once again successfully stopped Loudon Valley to Union cavalry, Stuart Stuart’s controversial departure June
the Union reconnaissance efforts and and his force retrograded to the west 25, 1863, to begin his raid deep into
protected Lee’s main body from detec- and continued covering the passes of Union territory continues to dominate
tion.8 In his official report to Hooker, the Blue Ridge Mountains for the next the narrative of the usage of Confeder-
Pleasonton reported, “We cannot force three days. After several days of in- ate cavalry during the Gettysburg cam-
the gaps of the Blue Ridge in the pres- tense combined-arms actions, Pleason- paign. Though Stuart’s operation from
ence of a superior force.”9 ton confirmed that Lee and the Army June 25 to July 2 can be called into
of Northern Virginia were not in the question, his covering operation begin-
In a final effort to dislodge Stuart’s cov-
Loudon Valley, but the Union cavalry ning June 17 against a numerically su-
ering force, Pleasonton asked Hooker
still could not actually determine the perior force is a textbook example of
for a division of infantry as reinforce-
location of the Confederate main body. the use of cavalry and enablers to pro-
ments to once and for all “cripple [the
The Confederate cavalry and artillery tect the disposition and intent of the
Confederate cavalry] up.”10 Leaving two
under Stuart’s command had succeed- main force.
infantry brigades to secure his lines of
ed in their mission to provide security
communication and baggage, on June Hooker, the Union commander, gave
for the movement of the Army of
21 Pleasonton committed his two divi- the most telling assessment of Stuart’s
Northern Virginia in its invasion north.
sions of cavalry and an infantry brigade operation and the efforts of his troop-
under the command of COL Strong Although often a footnote or ers. Writing President Abraham Lincoln

113
Fall 2020
 to keep him abreast of current opera- Officer College, Military Intelligence
tions, Hooker wrote that the Confeder- Captain’s Career Course, and Military Acronym Quick-Scan
ate horsemen and artillery had “hith- Intelligence Basic Officer Leader
BCT – brigade combat team
erto prevented me from obtaining sat- Course. He holds a bachelor’s of sci- FM – field manual
isfactory information as to the where- ence degree in history from USMA and R&S – reconnaissance and security
abouts of the enemy. They have a master’s of arts degree in history USMA – U.S. Military Academy
masked all of their movements.”13 For from the University of North Texas.
the opposing commander to candidly
admit such frustration, there can be lit- Notes available from http://collections.library.
tle doubt to the effectiveness of the 1
Headquarters Department of the Army, cornell. edu/moa_new/waro.html. Ac-
Confederate covering operations in the FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security cessed April 16, 2020.
Loudon Valley in the summer of 1863. Operations, Washington, DC; Govern- 7
Coddington; MG JEB Stuart to GEN Rob-
ment Printing Office, June 2015.
ert E. Lee, Aug. 20, 1863, OR [online], Ser.
MAJ Christian Garner is the brigade S-2 2
Ibid. 1 27 (2).
for 17th Field Artillery, Joint Base Lewis 3
Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg 8
Laino.
McChord, WA. Previous assignments Campaign: A Study in Command, New
include assistant professor, Depart- York: Simon and Schuster, 1968.
9
BG Alfred Pleasonton to BG Seth Wil-
ment of History, U.S. Military Academy liams, June 20, 1863, OR [online], Ser. 1
4
Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg, New 27 (3).
(USMA), West Point, NY; commander, York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003.
Headquarters and Headquarters Com- 10
Coddington; BG Alfred Pleasonton to
5
Ibid; Philip Laino, Gettysburg Campaign
pany, 513 th Military Intelligence Bri- MG Joseph Hooker, June 20, 1863, OR
Atlas, Gettysburg, PA: Gettysburg Publish-
gade, Fort Gordon, GA; S-2, 2nd Battal- [online], Ser. 1 27 (1).
ing, 2009.
ion, 12th Cavalry, 4th Brigade Combat 11
Sears; Laino.
6
MG Joseph Hooker to MG Henry Halleck,
Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort 12
Sears.
June 18, 1863, in The War of the Rebel-
Hood, TX, and Kirkuk, Iraq; and platoon lion: A Compilation of the Official Re- 13
Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The First
leader, 2-12 Cav, 4th BCT, 1st Cavalry Di- cords of the Union and Confederate Day, Chapel Hill: The University of North
vision, Fort Hood, TX, and Nasiriyah, Armies, Washington, DC: Government Carolina Press, 2001; MG Joseph Hooker
Iraq. MAJ Garner’s military schooling Printing Office, 1880-1901, Ser. I, 27 (1) to President Abraham Lincoln, June 21,
includes Command and General Staff [book on-line]. Cited as OR [on-line]), 1863, OR [online], Ser. 1 27 (1).

TRADOC G-2 newsletter

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s G-2 has begun a monthly newslet-
ter, unclassified and approved for public release. Its inaugural edition highlights
many of G-2’s most recent products. The newsletter “seeks to arm leaders and
Soldiers with resources to understand the operational environment [OE] and suc-
ceed when operating in it.”
“One of the challenges associated with the changing character of warfare comes
not just from the emergence of disruptive technologies and our adversaries’ em-
brace of them, but also from the ways in which they adopt hybrid strategies that
challenge traditional symmetric advantages and conventional ways of war,” writes
LTG Theodore D. Martin, TRADOC deputy commanding general and TRADOC’s
chief of staff – and former commandant of the U.S. Army Armor School. “It is cru-
cial to understand what the OE looks and feels like to warfighters to shape our
application of combat power and how we train our formations to meet these
challenges. [A] deep look at the future allows us to examine our assumptions
about warfare, force structuring and capabilities requirements. This assessment is vitally important to every member
of the Army team, from the brand-new Soldier, to general officers, to career Army civilians. Shared understanding of
the environment is essential to preparing our people, setting the context for readiness, informing our modernization
efforts and guiding us in reforming our processes to meet new challenges.”
Specific country products:
• Iran products: https://community.apan.org/wg/gckn/p/irandproducts
• China products: https://community.apan.org/wg/gckn/p/chinaproducts
• Russia products: https://community.apan.org/wg/gckn/p/russiaproducts
• North Korea products: https://community.apan.org/wg/gckn/p/northkorealibrary
TRADOC G-2’s Operational Environment Center Website: https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/OEC/default.aspx
See also TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92-1, The Changing Character of Warfare: the Urban OE, https://adminpubs.tradoc.
114
army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-92-1.pdf.
Fall 2020
Figure 3. Stuart’s ride (shown with a red dotted line) during the Gettysburg Campaign, June 3-July 3, 1863. (Map by Hal
Jespersen)
115
Fall 2020
 COVID-19 and Virtual Wargaming in the Reserve Officer Training Corps:
Deadly Virus Resurrects Aged Tactical-Training Method
by LTC Andrew P. Betson, 2LT Tristan These models of the past served as a Design, provided a valuable guide. We
Boomer, 2LT Justin DiCarlo, 2LT framework for designing a new meth- used it to return to the initial planning
Marshall Green and 2LT Adam Messer od to not only test our cadets’ ability phase and switched our live training
to plan but also to train them how to to virtual/gaming.
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COV-
handle the fog and friction of the en- The COVID crisis and university con-
ID-19) pandemic stopped the world in
gagement. straints largely dictated what combi-
its tracks early in 2020. As unfamiliar
terminology such as “social distanc- The Gateway Battalion’s senior class nation of live, virtual, constructive and
ing” and “reducing the curve” prolifer- and cadre developed a three-day vir- gaming training enablers we could
ated everyday life, military leaders tual field-training exercise (VFTX) in- achieve. Our best course of action, we
faced familiar (and unceasing) training volving a day of individual-skills re- predicted, would be to combine and
requirements despite the unexpected fresher training and two days of a se- leverage virtual and gaming compo-
challenges that arise from a pandem- ries of curated tactical-decision games nents for maximum effect.4 After toy-
ic. (TDGs) designed to test our third-year ing with maximizing virtual training,5
cadets’ (junior class) ability to conduct we found we could adapt the simplest
At St. Louis’s Army Reserve Officer
platoon-level operations. This effort concepts of kriegsspiel and its sequels
Training Corps (ROTC) Gateway Battal-
demanded much in the planning and to form our virtual TDG to prepare ca-
ion, the story was the same. Universi-
preparation phases. We had to create dets for summer training.
ties across the city closed in March,
an infrastructure to teach and evalu-
and students were sent home, With an established concept for our
ate the cadets. In other words, we had
prompting the need for a new solution virtual game, we faced a few upfront
to design the game. From there, to
to fulfill training requirements. Our challenges. For one, the entire VFTX
provide context and tie a common
ROTC program’s third-year cadets and the game needed to run on a fa-
thread between the weekend’s events,
were expected to be trained (or, at miliar digital platform to minimize
we designed a convincing and in-
least practiced “P+”) in leader and col- confusion. We needed a platform for
depth scenario and enemy situation.
lective tasks for platoon-level tactical players, trainers and observers/coach-
operations and in warrior tasks and Our plan, called Operation Gateway es/trainers (O/C/Ts) to communicate
drills. With unprecedented levels of Archangel, commenced April 16. Until with each other communally and pri-
technology and communication at our its completion on the afternoon of vately, and it had to be relatively user
fingertips, the cadre and the fourth- April 19, we orchestrated the training friendly. Zoom fit the bill. Cadets knew
year cadet leadership of Gateway Bat- of almost 100 cadets from all reaches Zoom, as they had largely used it for
talion looked to the Prussians of the of the United States and adapted to on-line classes, particularly as the
early 1800s and U.S. Army Reserve unforeseen difficulties throughout the Gateway ROTC program taught almost
units of the 1980s for help. The result operation’s execution. For both cadre exclusively on the platform at the out-
succeeded beyond expectations when and fourth-year cadets, only months set of the COVID-19 crisis.
it came to training our cadets. from receiving their commissions, the Gateway Battalion decided on the
Appearing in the early 19 th Century, planning and execution of Gateway platform early enough to test certain
kriegsspiel (translated from German as Archangel was an important lesson in features in the weekly “leadership
“wargame”) served as a tool to test the utility of agile and adaptive lead- labs” leading up to the VFTX. We test-
tactical-decision-making for Prussian ership when faced with unprecedent- ed a multitude of features, including
officers for generations. American of- ed challenges. screen-sharing and breakout rooms,
ficers of the time took note of the both of which we knew would benefit
game’s usefulness after observers re-
Kriegsspiel 4.0 the game’s final product.
When we first received the news in
ported on actions from the Franco-
mid-March 2020 that we could no lon- Finally, we needed a “common opera-
Prussian War in the 1870s.1 Iterations
ger hold our annual FTX training in tional picture” for everyone to “see
of the wargame tool continued in the
person at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, we the battlefield.” We chose Google
U.S. Army for another century, usually
resolved that the junior class and the Slides on Google Drive because cadets
executed in command-post exercises
other classes of cadets deserved a consistently worked with it both inside
in the 1970s and ‘80s using turn-based
top-notch culminating training event and outside of ROTC classes. Google
wargames like the Pegasus free-play
that integrated all the components of Slides provided a means for multiple
manual wargame well known to Cold-
military science. Therefore we adopt- viewers, either through sharing a
Warrior-era Armor officers.2 Such plat-
ed work already done and leveraged screen on Zoom or by watching the
forms were considered elemental for
available systems to create the appro- slide itself on the Google Drive.
battalion training before attending
priate training/learning environment.
more advanced training at the Nation- In addition, multiple cadets could ma-
al Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA.3 Training Circular (TC) 7-101, Exercise nipulate the slides in real time,

116 Fall 2020

allowing “pieces” to be moved on im- staging, onward movement and inte- enemy, dressed in SAPA uniforms,
agery of the battlefield. Simultaneous- gration phase.6 This sparked an appro- both have AK-47s, one has a handheld
ly, the O/C/Ts could reveal opposing priate level of interest at the outset. radio. They chatter and smoke in their
forces (OPFOR) as appropriate. position, so if the platoon does an
For the purposes of developing the ex- SLLS [stop, look, listen and smell] halt
ercise within the context laid out in within 200 meters, they will smell and
Setting exciting stage the video, Fort Leonard Wood’s Range
Once the game was established and hear them.”
Control helped by providing maps and
the platform chosen, we identified an- After establishing our operational area
imagery of all their training areas, in-
other significant challenge. With our and the enemy, we linked the missions
cluding a 1:50,000 map of the installa-
program’s cadets spread across the to a wider narrative related to the
tion modified to reflect the cities,
country, surrounded by distractions “war” and sought ways to make things
roads, etc., of Atropia.
within their homes and linked only by harder. The friendly Blue Forces (BLU-
a sometimes-tenuous WiFi connection The planning phase of Gateway Arch- FOR) virtually conducted an ambush
to a Zoom meeting, how could we pro- angel proved an exercise in teamwork on an enemy patrol, followed by a raid
vide context sufficient to keep our ca- and training in exercise design, involv- on a SAPA weapons cache. Keen ca-
dets engaged? Answering this ques- ing task/countertask development and dets recognized that the SAPA ele-
tion proved to be a great training tool orders production for the program’s ments had among them differently
for the senior cadets/soon-to-be lieu- senior cadets. 7 The result was a se- uniformed “advisers,” which matched
tenants. quence of four engagements that in- the commander’s critical-information
creased in difficulty and complexity requirements in the company’s order.
The seniors were recently exposed in during the course of the VFTX. (See
their curriculum to the truth that war Following completion of the first two
Figure 1.)
does not occur in a vacuum and that missions, Arianan forces invaded Atro-
one should think about war as a tool We developed the enemy’s composi- pia from the west and made a bold
of statecraft. This education point led tion and capabilities using the World- thrust into central Atropia. In re-
us to tackle the challenge in an enter- wide Equipment Guide, which pro- sponse, the BLUFOR maneuvered
taining way by leveraging the pro- vides organizational charts and equi- southward into the northern flank of
gram’s YouTube account to set the page for the irregular (South Ariana the Arianan front. There, platoons
stage. We spent extra effort to devel- People’s Army, or SAPA) and regular conducted a deliberate attack against
op a coherent narrative for the battles (Arianan army) forces in our exercise.8 an Arianan cavalry troop to seize key
and their respective OPFOR. This informed the OPFOR portion of positions along a main supply route.
the “white-cell information” docu- As the Arianan attack began to crum-
In the final days preceding the VFTX,
ment (discussed later) for each en- ble, BLUFOR conducted a movement-
the senior cadets produced a “Road to
gagement. Since there were no human to-contact against disintegrated OP-
War” video that explained why the ca-
beings available for cadets to see in an FOR in an engagement that culminat-
dets found themselves in “Atropia.” It
observation post (OP) or on an objec- ed in a call-for-fire mission on Arianan
explained the political context of the
tive, we developed the information armor – securing victory for the Amer-
war, which could be used by O/C/Ts to
beforehand. ican forces.
explain the proficiency of enemy forc-
es. The senior cadets played the video, For the raid, for instance, the O/C/Ts The believable nature and actions of
which incorporated music and maps, knew that “[t]he OP is located at MB the enemy, combined with a compre-
to the training audience during the 713 784 (draw) to the northeast of the hendible political situation, kept the
VFTX’s first night – our reception, objective overlooking creekbed. Two cadets engaged and thinking critically

Figure 1. The concept for Gateway Archangel’s increasingly difficult regimen. The regimen was linked in logic to the
scenario, implementing irregular and regular forces. (Graphic by LTC Andrew P. Betson)

117 Fall 2020

throughout the VFTX. designed, with increasing difficulty, to emphasized the importance of under-
challenge even the best junior cadet standing our tactical “language” of
Creating virtual as they integrated the components of control measures and tactical-mission-
gameroom military science learned over the task symbols, while the imagery re-
With the stage set and enemy capabil- course of their previous semesters. vealed expertise (or challenges) in ter-
ities, actions and reactions set, the However, each company order was rain analysis.
cadre and senior cadets created each done on a “Gateway Standard” four-
page tactical OPORD template. This Our third component, alluded to in
battle’s four critical components: the
encouraged the junior cadets to un- preceding paragraphs, was the white-
company-level operations order
derstand that any platoon-level plan cell information given to each of the
(OPORD), operation graphics and in-
that cannot be laid out on their four- O/C/T teams. Apart from the provided
telligence, white-cell information and
page laminated template is probably Red picture, it also provided BLUFOR
the battle’s “game board.” The first
too complicated. developments. For instance, in our
two were for the junior-year trainees,
platoon attack, when the junior cadets
while the white-cell document went to
The second component, operational initiated actions on their objective,
the O/C/Ts. The senior cadets hung
graphics and intelligence, were done the O/C/Ts knew to tell them, “One
the game boards in folders named for
in Microsoft PowerPoint and used two Arianan fires a grenade that immedi-
each junior-cadet pair on the battal-
resources provided by Fort Leonard ately kills two members of your sec-
ion’s Google Drive.
Wood’s Range Control. The company’s ond M240B gun team and wounds
The cadre took pains to ensure that operational graphics were overlaid on badly the third Soldier. The weapon
the company OPORD presented the ju- the Atropia map, while the intelli- appears to be undamaged.” Each BLU-
niors with a doctrinally and tactically gence documents used Fort Leonard FOR situation was designed to test the
sound plan to develop their platoon Wood’s contour-line-laden maneuver- junior cadets’ mastery of the compo-
operation in context. Each was a r e a i m a g e r y. T h e g ra p h i c s nents of military science and their de-

Figure 2. Google Slides and Fort Leonard Wood maps serve as a means for an interactive, virtual battlefield. (Graphic
by LTC Andrew P. Betson)

118 Fall 2020

cision-making in the face of friction. platoon leadership received the com- objective were guided by the white-
pany OPORD, graphics and intelligence cell information and tested the train-
The final required element for each (Components I and II). They spent an ees’ knowledge of special-teams activ-
battle was the game board for the hour consuming their tasks, planning ities, knowledge of intelligence re-
TDG. This PowerPoint file included the their own missions and building a ter- quirements and medical-evacuation
same imagery mentioned from the rain board model wherever they were steps.
Fort Leonard Wood Range Control im- in the country. Meanwhile, the O/C/Ts
agery of their maneuver areas with Once the O/C/Ts determined the train-
accessed and studied their white-cell
contour lines (Figure 2). One slide had ing and learning objectives were met,
information and conferred about en-
the entire platoon area of operation, the battle stopped, and they began a
emy locations and scenarios that
while another zoomed in on the objec- deliberate after-action review (AAR)
might challenge the trainees. Upon
tive area. Both had text boxes on the process. The underclass cadets went
being placed in their Zoom breakout
side where the trainee could type in to the TOC while the O/C/Ts and se-
room, the platoon leadership briefed
the movement techniques and forma- nior-cadet observers quickly gathered
their platoon OPORD to both the O/C/
tions of their units at echelon. comments. The AAR allowed cadets to
Ts and squad leaders using their ter-
explain rationale in decision-making,
Finally, it also included icons to iden- rain model kit. When it was time for
thereby letting the O/C/Ts determine
tify squads, machineguns, the platoon the battle to begin, the senior cadet in
whether mistakes represented funda-
leader, platoon sergeant, casualty-col- the room shared to all the participants
mental misunderstandings of the com-
lection points, support-by-fire lines in a chat window the link to the
ponents of military science or misun-
and more that the trainees could click Google Drive folder that contained the
derstandings due to the novel nature
and drag onto the terrain (Figure 2). game board.
of the virtual training environment.
Prior to kicking off the battles, our se- The platoon leader began the game by Finally, the senior-cadet observers
niors created a game board for each placing the relevant icons on the map provided comments on each of the
pair of trainees for each battle. depicting their starting location. They leaders, and the cadre members gen-
then described everything to be done erated “Blue Cards” to help evaluate
Each of these components differed lit-
in the first phase of the battle, includ- the trainees’ attributes and competen-
tle from any other training exercise,
ing their movement techniques, for- cies.
but the virtual nature of ours required
mation, order-of-march and direction.
a deliberate architecture of Zoom
When appropriate, they spoke as if on Before the battle
rooms for each battle. A key cadet
the radio to the O/C/Ts as the higher To best prepare the trainees for the
leader hosted the Zoom meeting for
headquarters and to their squad lead- TDG on Day Two, we devoted Day One
each battle, which served as a kind of
ers to give instructions. to training and testing individual skills.
tactical-operations center (TOC). Once
the trainees and trainers arrived in the While the platoon symbols moved We wanted to provide a refresher as
TOC, the host transferred each into along the board, the O/C/Ts continu- well as a means of testing for land nav-
their assigned breakout room. At any ously analyzed the probability that the igation, tactical combat-casualty care
time that O/C/Ts needed to discuss BLUFOR or OPFOR would identify the (TCCC), call-for-fire and the size, activ-
the result of a battlefield action, or ar- other. We were not literally “rolling ity, location, uniform, time, equipment
bitrate, they could “press pause” on dice,” though a more developed form (SALUTE) report. Each of the “round
the battle and send the trainees back of the game could include such prob- robin” training stations was held in a
to the TOC until they were finished ability inclusion. If the BLUFOR en- different Zoom classroom hosted by a
and called them back. It should be countered the OPFOR, the O/C/Ts re- primary senior-cadet instructor. The
clear that this required multiple re- ferred to the “white cell” information Zoom conference codes and pass-
hearsals, a robust Annex H and cadets for guidance on casualty information words were distributed through Annex
who were savvy with the system. for both sides, or to describe what ex- H. In each case, after an instruction
actly the BLUFOR saw. Any time the phase, we integrated different plat-
Each breakout room had an O/C/T O/C/Ts required further deliberation, forms to test the underclass cadets.
team made up of at least one cadre the training audience was sent to the
member, one senior cadet, the junior- TOC.
Land navigation
year cadets serving as platoon leaders After the PowerPoint-based refresher
and platoon sergeants, and all fresh- The trainers and trainees repeated this on land navigation, the junior cadets
men and sophomore cadets to serve process through the subsequent phas- moved to a breakout room, where
as squad leaders, team leaders and es of the operation, reacting to con- they received instructions to take a
members of squads. The battalion’s tact when made and to other scenari- Blackboard-based exam. It was a
leadership or distinguished visitors os as the O/C/Ts imposed them. Once 60-question exam that included all ba-
could drop into any of breakout rooms the platoon approached the objective sic elements of land navigation (for ex-
to observe an OPORD briefing or the area, everyone shifted to seeing the ample, identifying terrain features,
battle itself. objective-area imagery slide, which al- colors of the map, reading a legend)
lowed more detailed discussion of and progressed into more complicated
The rhythm movement and placement of the pla- questions (for instance, intersection,
One hour before their report time, the toon elements. Actions on the resection, curved road distance).

119 Fall 2020

Due to the COVID-19 quarantine and vehicles, enemies and equipment. Conclusion
the situation preceding the VFTX, few Leadership, like warfare, exists in the
Junior-year trainees received a grid lo-
cadets had hard copy maps with them. realm of uncertainty and is extremely
cation for their OPs and a distance and
Instead, we adapted the Atropia map. susceptible to fog and friction. The
azimuth for the photo. This reinforced
The maps were printer-friendly (main- Gateway Battalion’s VFTX demonstrat-
the importance of map-reading skills
taining their scale), allowing cadets to ed not only the necessity for agile and
by forcing the ability to determine a
print all 17 pages at home and tape adaptive leaders in the U.S. Army, but
point on a map. Each cadet wrote their
them together. it also emphasized the importance of
SALUTE reports and were called on to
submit them using proper radio eti- training regardless of circumstance –
TCCC thereby sometimes we must fight to
The TCCC refresher included a combi- quette.
train. In our adapted training, as bud-
nation of premade videos of caring for ding new second lieutenants, we
casualties and live demonstration. The Call for fire
The call-for-fire task incorporated the learned much about Army leadership.
senior-cadet instructor demonstrated The VFTX, especially the tactical-deci-
evaluation and treatment of casualties most variety of platforms. The refresh-
er course included a video from the sion game, revealed the importance of
on his roommate, another senior-year the components of military science –
cadet from the battalion. Following battalion’s YouTube account shared by
the senior-cadet instructor. The junior leaders must understand terrain anal-
the demonstration, the instructor re- ysis, military symbology, troop-leading
viewed the nine-line medical-evacua- cadets then received instructions and
a map image from U.S. Army Training procedures, staff functions and rela-
tion report. The cadets learned when tive combat power.
this would be used, how to fill one and Doctrine Command’s Operational
out, how to call it in to higher head- Environment Training Support Center’s There was never a question that it
quarters and platoon members’ roles. digital Observed-Fire Trainer (OFT), would have been preferable to train in
which was available to all cadets the mud and woods of Fort Leonard
Each junior-year cadet received an in- through U.S. Army Cadet Command’s Wood. We learned, however, that
dividual evaluation by the senior-ca- Blackboard site. meaningful, effective training can be
det instructor presenting a situation conducted even when standard meth-
using “Army men” toys. The trainee After generating their radio transmis-
ods fail.
walked the senior-cadet trainer sion, junior cadets shared their
through what they would do in a situ- screens with the senior-cadet instruc- Cavalry and Armor leaders should con-
ation that demanded all the compo- tor, which showed the images from sider the TDGs of the past, augmented
nents of TCCC (Figure 3). the OFT. Cadets being evaluated sub- by technological advancements, as a
mitted his/her information for the ini- versatile means to develop tactical
SALUTE reports tial request for fire and watched the skill and improve judgment. They
After a PowerPoint refresher on radio simulator for rounds to impact. They could follow the Gateway Battalion’s
etiquette and the components of SA- then adjusted the fire until they ap- three efforts resulting from this expe-
LUTE, the cadets transitioned into a propriately ended the fire mission. rience. The cadre and cadets in St.
practical exercise. The senior-cadet in- This task would be the last task of the Louis are first, seeking ways to inte-
structor prepared a slide deck full of final battle in the wargame, signifying grate analog TDGs into their labs in fu-
photos of military activity with various victory for the BLUFOR. ture years.

Figure 3. Zoom images of TCCC demonstrations and evaluation “game” with BLUFOR and OPFOR. (Graphic by LTC An-
drew P. Betson)

120 Fall 2020

Second, they will pilot a program us- Battalion, 98th Regiment, 102nd Train-
ing the U.S. Army’s Virtual Battlefield ing Division (this battalion teaches the Acronym Quick-Scan
Simulator 3 (VBS3) to improve our basic and advanced leader courses for
new officers’ awareness of virtual- civil affairs and psychological opera- AAR – after-action review
training platforms at the tactical level. tions) at MG William Weigel U.S. Army BF – Blue Forces (Figure 1)
Reserve Center, Edison, NJ. His military BLUFOR – Blue Forces (friendly
Finally, the Gateway team will use forces)
schooling includes ROTC, Washington
what it learned to retain “Kriegsspiel CGSC – Command and General
University, St. Louis. 2LT DiCarlo has a
4.0” as a contingency to face whatev- Staff College
bachelor’s of arts degree in interna- COVID-19 – Coronavirus Disease
er frictions may lay ahead.
tional relations from Washington Uni- 2019
LTC Andrew Betson is professor of mil- versity. FTX – field-training exercise
itary science at Washington University O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer
2LT Marshall Green is attending the In- OFT – Observed-Fire Trainer
in St. Louis, MO. His previous assign-
fantry Basic Officer Leader’s Course, OP – observation post
ments include aide de camp to the III
Fort Benning, GA. His military schools OPFOR – opposing forces
Corps commanding general, Fort
include ROTC, Washington University, OPORD – operations order
Hood, TX; executive officer and opera- ROTC – Reserve Officer Training
St. Louis. 2LT Green has a bachelor’s of
tions officer, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Corps
arts degree in international relations
Regiment, at Fort Hood and Mosul, SALUTE – size, activity, location,
and a bachelor’s of arts degree in eco-
Iraq; future-operations chief, 1st Cav- uniform, time, equipment
nomics, both from Lindenwood Univer- SAPA – South Ariana People’s Army
alry Division, Fort Hood and Bagram,
sity. TC – training circular
Afghanistan; and commander, Compa- TCCC – tactical combat-casualty
ny A, 4th Battalion, 64th Armor Regi- 2LT Adam Messer is attending the Cy- care
ment, Fort Stewart, GA, and Bagdad, ber Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Fort TDG – tactical-decision game
Iraq. LTC Betson’s military schools in- Gordon. His military schools include TOC – tactical-operations center
clude Basic Army Parachutist Course, ROTC, Washington University, St. Lou- VBS3 – Virtual Battlefield Simulator
Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course, is, and Air-Assault School. 2LT Messer 3
VFTX – virtual field-training exercise
Sapper Leader’s Course, Maneuver has a bachelor’s of science degree in
Captain’s Career Course and Command systems science and engineering from
and General Staff College (CGSC). He Washington University, St. Louis. cadets in the target training audience
has a bachelor’s of science degree in download a version of the Army’s pro-
military history from the U.S. Military Notes gram of record for virtual training, “Virtu-
Academy, West Point, NY; a master’s
1
William Roscoe Livermore, The Ameri- al Battlefield Simulator.” As of this writ-
of arts degree in diplomacy and inter- can Kriegsspiel: A Game for Practicing ing, we are on VBS3. However, the propo-
the Art of War upon a Topographical
national commerce from the Universi- nent could not provide a version of the
Map, Houghton, Mifflin, 1879. Accessed game that did not require a computer
ty of Kentucky; and a master’s of mili- through Google Books, June 2, 2020.
tary art and science degree (as an art- without gaming-quality graphics capabil-
of-war scholar) from CGSC. LTC Bet-
2
U.S. Marine Corps MAJ Dominic Nicolosi ity. Due to this lesson, the Gateway Pro-
Jr., “A framework for an interactive, com- gram seeks to pilot a program of instruc-
son’s awards and honors include the
puter-supported, battalion-level tion that exposes cadets to the system of
Bronze Order of St. George. record as part of the military science cur-
wargame,” master’s thesis, June 1979.
2LT Tristan Boomer is attending the Accessed at https://core.ac.uk/down- riculum to serve as a potential contingen-
Cyber Basic Officer Leader’s Course, load/pdf/36711970.pdf, June 1, 2020. cy to such situations in the future.
Fort Gordon, GA. His military schools 3
MAJ Charles R. Steiner Jr. “Thunder in 6
Gateway Battalion’s “Road to War” vid-
include ROTC, Washington University, the desert,” ARMOR, May-June 1982. eo can be found at https://www.youtube.
St. Louis, MO. 2LT Boomer has a bach- 4
Headquarters Department of the Army, com/watch?v=OcvjHzcIaQM&t=15s.
elor’s of science degree in systems sci- TC 7-101, Exercise Design, November 7
TC 7-101.
ence and engineering from Washing- 2010. 8
Worldwide Equipment Guide, accessed
ton University. 5
The professor of military science ex- at https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG,
plored the possibility of having all the June 3, 2020.
2LT Justin DiCarlo is assistant S-1, 5th

121 Fall 2020

 A Case for Covered Motorpool Parking
by CPT(P) David Blanton
The U.S. Army invested more than $20
billion in new ground-combat systems
(GCS) acquisition in Fiscal Year 2020.1
Notably absent from the investment
was an analysis of preventive mea-
sures to increase the service life of
these systems – for example, overhead
covered parking shelters designed to
protect high-cost GCS from the envi-
ronment. The shelters are similar to
open-air aircraft hangers already used
by other military services.

Issue and background

The Army directs considerable re-
sources toward analyzing maintenance
processes while striving for cost sav-
ings and efficiencies.2 Absent, howev-
er, is assessment of physical structures
to increase efficiency and service life. Figure 1. Soldiers conduct preventive-maintenance checks on newly acquired
In contrast to Army motorpools, some M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks at Fort Bliss, TX, Aug. 22, 2019. (U.S. Army
local government sectors report antic- photo by SSG Kris Bonet)
ipated 50-year cost savings in excess
of $20 million for fleets of only 60 ve- consideration and analysis for cost p o l i c y m a ke r s w o u l d n o t b e
hicles by incorporating overhead park- savings and implementation. conducted. Therefore high-cost
ing shelters.3 Notably, these local gov- Army GCS will remain uncovered in
ernment fleets are far less expensive Stakeholders large outdoor parking pads.
than most Army GCS. A similar initia- Any policy implementation must ac- • C o n d u c t a n i n t e r n a l A r m y
tive by the Army could represent huge count for the following key stakehold- assessment. The Army commissions
preventative maintenance cost savings ers: a study related to system lifecycle
during a GCS lifecycle. • Army – may stand to gain significant and maintenance cost savings
maintenance readiness goals and associated with covered parking
Critics might argue that high-cost
cost savings by conducting this shelters. The study should also
Army GCS are designed for operation
study; account for factors like safety and
in any environment, making overhead
• American taxpayers – if maintenance productivity increases. An internal
shelters an unnecessary investment.
costs can be decreased and lifecycles Army study would likely be cheaper,
Assuredly, the Army has resilient
extended for high-cost Army GCS, it but it would take longer to complete.
equipment capable of operating in all
environments. However, alternatives would be responsible management • Contract an external assessment.
may exist that could make even the of resources; and The Army authorizes an outside
initial investment cost-neutral. For ex- • Soldiers – reduced non-productive agency, or contractor, to conduct a
ample, solar-energy investment and labor hours due to storms or high cost-benefit and feasibility study
solar parking shelters are already com- temperatures and covered shelters using the same criteria as listed in
mon across many military installa- may also increase overall safety and Alternative 2. An external assessment
tions. Instead of covering post-ex- productivity when conducting would likely be the costliest overall,
change and public-parking areas with preventative maintenance and but this method is faster, and the
solar shelters, future solar shelters training. cost would be a fraction of the
could be built in motorpools.4 project’s anticipated positive impact.
In addition to GCS lifecycle cost sav- Policy alternatives
ings, covered parking structures will • Do nothing (status quo). The Army Recommendations
increase operator safety and increase and Department of Defense can and implementation
preventative-maintenance productiv- choose to do nothing and not Of the three alternatives cited, the ex-
ity. Protection from the elements is a commission a study. While there ternal-assessment option would be
prudent investment to enabling Sol- may be marginal cost savings the most effective. Once compiled, the
diers to properly care for equipment. respective to the study itself, an assessment should be forwarded for
T h i s i s s u e w a r ra n t s f u r t h e r intentional analysis that truly informs consideration and resource-sourcing

122 Fall 2020

 Company D, 1-68 Armor, 4thInfantry Di-
vision (Mechanized). CPT Blanton’s
military schools include the Armor Of-
ficer Basic Course, Maneuver Captain’s
Career Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course
and Stryker Leader’s Course. He has
bachelor’s of science and bachelor’s of
arts degrees in international business/
German from Ohio State University.
CPT Blanton also has a master’s de-
gree in public administration (nonprof-
it management) from Indiana Univer-
sity and a master’s degree in policy
management from Georgetown Uni-
versity.

Notes
1
Comptroller, Office of Undersecretary of
Defense, “FY 2020 program acquisition
costs by weapon system,” Washington,
DC, Department of Defense, 2019. Re-
trieved from https://comptroller.defense.
Figure 2. The U.S. Army needs covered storage in its motorpools, similar to gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
that shown over this Royal Australian Air Force jet and its crew at Luke Air fy2020/fy2020_Weapons.pdf.
Force Base, AZ. (U.S. Air Force photo by A1C Leala Marquez) 2
C.R. Harz, “Problems in Army vehicle
maintenance: Results of a questionnaire
solutions. Even if adoption is not rec- American taxpayers. Most important- survey,” RAND, Washington, DC, 1981.
ommended for every GCS in the force, ly, it is also prudent for Soldiers to Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/
recommendations should still be made maximize maintenance efficiency, content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/
for partial adoption based on end- safety and overall readiness. R2487.pdf.
item acquisition cost, geographic loca- 3
R. Thompson, “Alternative fleet storage
CPT(P) David Blanton is currently as-
tion, environmental factors, equip- options: A case for covered stor-
signed to the Joint Staff, Washington,
ment size and the stage of GCS lifecy- age,” Government Fleet, 2012. Retrieved
DC. His previous assignments include
cle. Integrating these variables may di- from https://www.government-fleet.
assignment officer, Armor Branch, com/148322/alternative-fleet-storage-
rect specific and maximized cost ex-
Army Human Resources Command, options-a-case-for-covered-storage.
penditures commensurate with capital
Fort Knox, KY; commander, Company
construction investment. 4
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Solar
D, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment photovoltaic CXS,” 2020. Retrieved from
To maximize future cost savings, it is (Light), 25th Infantry Division, Schofield https://www.usace.army.mil/Missions/
critical that the Army act now to fur- Barracks, Hawaii; commander, Troop Sustainability/Expertise-in-Sustainability/
ther investigate a service-life cost-ben- E, 2nd Squadron, 14thCavalry Regiment Solar-Photovoltaic/.
efit study analyzing future construc- (Stryker), 25th Infantry Division, Scho-
tion of overhead covered parking shel- field Barracks; commander, Company
ters. This initiative can save the Army B, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, Acronym Quick-Scan
critical money for reinvestment in oth- 4thInfantry Division (Mechanized), Fort
er programs. The study is fiscally re- Carson, CO; and platoon leader, GCS – ground-combat systems
sponsible and in the best interests of

Table 1. Policy option comparison: Army parking shelter cost-benefit study.

123 Fall 2020

FROM THE BORESIGHT LINE
Correlating Proficiency and Lethality
in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
by SFC Zack D. Eckert only to qualify once and then serve as conducted from 2017 to 2019.1 While
the supporting asset for tactical oper- not an empirical study, the informa-
Soldiers who have spent time in a
ations. Since this crewmember is slat- tion provides enough anecdotal evi-
Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT)
ed against dismounted positions, it is dence to support the thrust of this ar-
after previously serving in an armored
vital for career progression for him/ ticle. All variables listed here are per-
brigade combat team (ABCT) will often
her to be rotated from the gunner po- tinent factors in a crewmember’s abil-
find themselves in a strange environ-
sition to gain critical leadership time ity to effectively engage targets from
ment when the topic of gunnery and
on the ground as a team or squad the firing platform.
live-fire comes up. For instance, the
leader.
drastic distinction between the defini- The inclusive list is an essential part of
tions of “crew” is a prime example. This turnover often has a significant determining the maximum engage-
impact on the SBCT. Specifically speak- ment limit of each platform and each
Tank crewmembers are often situated ing, platform proficiency remains at echelon when aggregate data is ap-
on a given tank for extended periods the lowest level of requirements in- plied.
of time. The tank commander, once a side the infantry battalions due to the
young sergeant, now commands the lack of visibility, quality assurance and Probability of hit
tank using the same driver and loader, emphasis on platform lethality. This Probability of hit (Ph) is a key factor in
both of whom have also been promot- discussion intends to help remedy this crew gunnery. Ph is factored by the
ed in rank and position. The lieuten- problem by informing SBCT leaders number of rounds fired against a tar-
ant, leading the tank platoon, is the about recommended methods to de- get in relation to the number of
person most likely to transition out of velop quality gunners for their forma- rounds striking the given target.2 For
the platoon. tions. this assessment, two factors take pre-
cedence: range-to-target and firing-
Conversely, the SBCT often relies on Variables vehicle posture.
one Soldier to serve as both the vehi- The following analysis comes from the
cle commander and the gunner. The information gleaned by scouring eval- As the range to a target increases, the
proficiency of the crew is sufficient uation packages for live-fire events muzzle velocity drops and dispersion

Figure 1. A Stryker Mobile Gun System engages an armored target. (U.S. Army photo by SFC Ben Johnson)

124 Fall 2020

increases, thereby reducing the likeli- fundamental task for gunners and im- and given practical experience in a
hood for a round to fly true. Determin- portant in effective crew communica- simulator. Gunners should be aware of
ing the appropriate range-to-target is tion during a firing engagement. how to determine which irregularities
an essential factor for target acquisi- in their field of view may act as indica-
tion, especially for non-stabilized Probability of detection tors of a target attempting deception
weapon systems. Also, firing on the With the advancement of sensor tech- and camouflage.
move decreases a weapon’s accuracy. nology, the likelihood of detecting ac-
tive targets has become increasingly Finally, the detection system should be
Given these factors, the most effective more lucrative. Target detection re- maintained regularly to ensure it
shot would be a short-range static en- mains a significant factor in the en- meets the expected technical specifi-
gagement from a defensive position. gagement process, as it reduces the cations by performing drift null, bore-
Also, effective target acquisition and exposure of the firing vehicle prior to sight or alignment. However, since
ammunition selection positively influ- issuing a fire command and engaging. each of these systems will still be sub-
ence a gunner’s effectiveness. To in- Common detection systems include ject to shock, gravity and static build-
crease effective target acquisition, the Forward-Looking Infrared, PAS-13 up over time, firers should be pre-
gunners should follow three basic thermal sight and the Long-Range Ad- pared to conduct a sensor reset as fre-
rules: vanced Scout Surveillance System. quently as the tactical situation per-
These systems are designed to detect mits.
• End gunner lay in elevation. Once
the left and right limits have been thermal signatures with a common
established, releasing the handles performance measure rating out to no Reliability of
either manually or electronically will less than 2,500 meters. targeting system
cause the bore to settle at the last Fire-control systems (FCSs) vary by
That being said, utilization rates and platform, but all follow an inherent se-
second. To reduce this possibility, a
practice indicate that sensors are not ries of principles in which to compute
gunner ends with an upward
being implemented into training pro- ballistic solutions and increase the
adjustment to ensure the reticle and
grams to increase the outcome of de- probability of a first-round hit. Some
bore stay on the intended mark.
tection. Commanders should ensure sensor systems determine whether or
• Aim center visible mass. To that gunners understand appropriate
guarantee a target is hit based on not the gun trunnion is perfectly level
scanning techniques using the associ- with the horizon (cant), thereby re-
exposure, avoid guesswork. What is ated detection sensor and that they
presented and visible is the target to moving one source of gunner error.
can rapidly distinguish battlefield de- The vehicle’s ability to compute move-
aim for. bris from targets in addition to recog- ment through the use of an inertial
• Remember sight picture and trigger nizing the presence of camouflage, navigation unit will update ballistic so-
squeeze. A weapon is only as concealment and decoys (CCD). Envi- lutions to add or remove drift.
effective as the operator, so setting ronmental hazards such as rain, snow,
this final condition ensures that dust and smoke further complicate Vehicles with a height-management
when the weapon cycles through target detection. Gunners must be ex- system can make adjustments to pro-
and functions, all potential loss of posed to these elements during train- vide a greater field of view or reduce
accuracy has been mitigated. ing to increase their comfort in chal- exposure. With the implementation of
lenging target-detection environ- an integrated LRF, the vehicle then
Finally, improper ammunition selec- ments, with the goal being to maxi- uses the computer inside the FCS to
tion can dramatically affect the ballis- mize their proficiency. factor the following: vehicle status,
tic firing solution for an intended tar-
range to target and weapon/ammuni-
get, causing the round to hit wildly off- Common training methods for this in-
tion inputs. It computes these factors
target. For example, on a dual-feed clude acquisition drills and counter-
to make corrections to the reticle and
weapon such as the M242 25mm CCD. Acquisition drills ensure that for
bore, applying adjustments as neces-
Bushmaster, the last round on the face each engagement and for each posi-
sary to conduct the engagement.
of the bolt is projected to follow the tion, the gunner has determined his
current ballistic solution and cannot ability to “see” targets, traversing While the platform and weapons may
be discarded easily. This creates a re- from the left range limit and transi- vary, these three factors remain the
quirement during Bradley gunnery to tioning from wide field of view (WFOV) same. Training conducted to enhance
allow the firing of a “dump round” to narrow field of view. If equipped targeting effectiveness relies on the
when transitioning from anti-phos- with a laser range finder (LRF), the use of training aids, devices, simula-
phorus to high-explosive (HE) muni- gunner should be able to lase a target tors and simulations (TADSS) to gain a
tions. For the tank, incorrectly index- and obtain an accurate return. Once technical appreciation for the related
ing the round results in sabots going complete, the gunner returns to systems. Crewmembers familiar with
extremely high of the target, whereas WFOV, rapidly traversing the sector to the targeting process are more likely
an HE anti-tank fired with sabot in- the right range limit and repeating the to avoid incorrect inputs.
dexed results in the round falling well procedure.
Also, while systems are designed to
short of the target.
Counter-CCD is an element that can be communicate with each other, not all
In either case, “switchology” is a taught in a classroom environment circumstances will grant the ability to

125 Fall 2020

use a fully functional FCS. In those was using a brand-new gun mount. For the baseline experiment, a target
events, crewmembers must be trained placed at 500 meters from the gun tar-
Two key elements play into the de-
and proficient in degraded operations. get line will produce the desired re-
pendability of the mount and weapon
For example, a targeting system with sult. For stabilized firing platforms, the
system: circular error probable (CEP)
an ineffective LRF can still be used expected dispersion is two degrees
and dispersion radius. When deter-
with the manual input of an accurate left or right of the mean point of im-
mining CEP, a control should be estab-
range to target, but only if the crew- pact, or center of the target, based on
lished with assigned equipment to de-
member has been trained to deter- single-shot or automatic modes of
termine the level of accuracy, regard-
mine range accurately. fire.
less of the gunner. CEP is a measure of
the weapon system’s precision, so de- For unstabilized platforms, the intend-
Reliability of weapon termining these results does require ed dispersion angle is five degrees. Us-
Not all weapon systems are created the use of controlled execution. As a ing the same control principles as be-
equal. Also, not all platforms are crewmember assigned to a specific fore, each platform uses its organic
equally functional. Therefore it is im- platform and associated equipment, equipment to validate the information
portant for commanders to conduct an each gunner implements the same and records it for consolidation. Since
analysis of the equipment provided to conditions and records the results. the dispersion area accounts for mul-
determine whether the gunner or the tiple variables – human error, gun or
equipment is the problem. Fifty percent of the rounds falling cannon tube wear, propellant temper-
within the expected tolerance for the ature and type of munition fired – the
For example, two brand-new M2A1 weapon system for a given range (in
.50-caliber machineguns are assigned emphasis lies on replicating the exact
this scenario, 500 meters) create the conditions for all tests.
to a section with unstabilized MK-93 mean point of impact. 3 For 100
mounts. Both mounts have a traverse rounds, the remaining 50 rounds be- Finally, the reliability of a platform
and elevation mechanism assigned, come the average impact point. with an FCS requires the implementa-
and both gunners have engaged the tion of a muzzle reference system up-
same target from identical platforms. Determining the effectiveness of the date that accounts for excessive firing
Gunner 1 has placed 75 percent of his weapon system – the weapon paired and gun tube droop. While a smaller-
rounds within a 12-inch circle at 500 with the mount and platform – relies caliber weapon may not be subject to
meters. Gunner 2 has only placed 30 on the individual platform in compari- gravity, it will require a change of bar-
percent in the same area. son to the rest of the commander’s rel or reticle reset to retain accuracy.
fleet.
What caused such a dramatic drop in
performance? While the fastest an- Secondly, dispersion determines the Probability of a kill
swer is usually that Gunner 2 is simply ability to consistently place rounds in given a hit
not as good as Gunner 1, it was deter- the same place, shot after shot. When To determine a platform’s true lethal-
mined that his mount had been in cir- planning this control, the first step is ity, synthesize the previously men-
culation for 10 years, while Gunner 1 to determine an appropriate target. tioned factors through the application

Table 1.

126 Fall 2020

of a formula that amalgamates all Training development, in manpower, and as the Army contin-
probabilities into a singular result. For ues to develop new platforms to in-
this, determine that the ammunition
management crease the effectiveness of these plat-
selected is appropriate to meet a kill Key elements play a part in the ability forms, crew mentality needs to devel-
standard for a given threat. Then con- to gauge proficiency on this level. op into a culture of “fighting from the
vert the data from percentage to dec- Commander involvement is a must to hatch” to preserve the freedom to ma-
imal, then back to percentage for the ensure the controlled tests are con- neuver against an ever-evolving
result. ducted to a standard that collects ap- threat.
propriate data prior to the execution
The probability a of kill (Pk) equals of gunnery. If issues can be addressed, SFC Zack Eckert is the senior Instructor,
probability of hit (Ph) times probabil- the information collected at qualifica- Stryker Master Gunner Course, as-
ity of detection (Pd) times reliability of tion Table VI will prove an accurate as- signed to Maverick Troop, 3rd Squad-
targeting system (Rsys) times reliabil- sessment of proficiency. ron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, 316th Cav-
ity of weapon (Rw), or Pk = Ph x Pd x
Also, the implementation of quality- alry Brigade, Fort Benning, GA. His
Rsys x Rw. For example, if a missile op-
assurance practices enhance the pro- previous assignments include senior
erates properly 90 percent of the time
gram’s feasibility and maximizes re- instructor, Stryker Scout Commander
(assuming a good shot), the targeting
sources, both TADSS and live-fire am- Course, Fort Benning; brigade master
system operates properly 85 percent
munition. The team used for this gunner, 1 st Brigade (Stryker), 1 st Ar-
of the time and enemy targets are de-
should be qualified to operate as both mored Division, Fort Bliss, TX; squad-
tected at 50 percent, then our Pk esti-
vehicle-crew evaluators and range ron master gunner, 6 th Squadron, 1 st
mation is Pk = 0.9 x 0.5 x 0.85 x 0.90 =
safety officer for events, increasing Cavalry Regiment, 1/1 Armored Divi-
0.344 = 34 percent Pk.
the exposure and ensuring that expec- sion, Fort Bliss; senior instructor, 2-16
tations are met. Cav, 316th Cav Brigade, Fort Benning;
Application and reconnaissance instructor, 2-16
Commanders tend to assume each fir- Moving beyond the Tier 3 crew strat- Cav, 316th Cav Brigade, Fort Benning.
ing platform is equal. While this pre- egy, more evaluators should be inte- SFC Eckert’s military schools include
diction satisfies the engagement crite- grated into the process for data collec- the Stryker Master Gunner Course,
ria for a templated, untrained adver- tion and integration. The battalion-lev- Master Gunner Common Core, Cavalry
sary, the results from execution lean el staff should seek the guidance of Leader’s Course, Scout Leader Course,
toward the inability of the crews to the master gunner to facilitate the Maneuver Senior Leader’s Course and
operate at the expected threshold, preparation of live-fire events as well Advanced Leader Course. He is work-
thereby affecting the results. When an as using their knowledge to inform ing on an associate’s degree in crimi-
analysis of all factors are applied, units crew members of the requirements. nal justice at Troy University. SFC Eck-
can better determine the strengths Crew members assigned to a firing ert’s awards include the Bronze Star
and weaknesses of platform firers at platform should be stabilized to vali- Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal
echelon and cross-organize their as- date their performance on the plat- with second oak-leaf cluster, the Mas-
sets to achieve realistic effects. If the form, providing commanders a base- ter Gunner Identification Badge and
unit performs better under ideal line for increasing proficiency through the Combat Action Badge.
weather and time conditions, give the repetition. Finally, sergeants’ time
crews a more offensive-oriented training conducted at the company
threat package to elevate training. If level should be aligned with weapons Notes
crews cannot qualify the minimum proficiency for the crew members to
1
III Corps lethality report on the state of
standard, they should be allocated reinforce the practical application of the ABCT direct-fire weapon systems (M1
Abrams and M2 Bradley family of vehi-
with a supporting platform (wingman) gunnery skills.
cles), Sept. 20, 2019.
to ensure the objectives have been
met on the battlefield. Conclusion 2
Donald E. Carlucci and Sydney S. David-
When the SBCT brings its guns to the son, Ballistics Theory and Design of Guns
Table 1 gives an example of the infor- and Ammunition, Boca Raton, FL, London
fight, crew members should remain
mation.4 and New York: CRC Press, Taylor and
actively employed to support the op- Francis Group, 2007.
The scenario depicted includes the ex- eration from their platform. If com-
manders can reinforce the need for di-
3
William Hackborn, “The Science of Bal-
ecution of three degraded tasks of the
listics: Mathematics Serving the Dark
10 steps conducted during Table VI. rect-fire support, the result is more le-
Side,” Canadian Society for the History
More information can be collected thal support-by-fire elements from po- and Philosophy of Mathematics, 2006 an-
from the evaluation and consolidation sitions of relative advantage. Crew nual meeting, York University, Toronto,
of the qualification packets: Pk for of- members who have been trained to Canada; https://www.researchgate.net/
fensive or defensive engagements deploy, fight and win from their firing publication/319459791.
only, Pk for day or night engagements platform bring the ability to retain the 4
Technical Report 2013-56, Probability
only and average Pk based on range to initiative against a near-peer threat of Hit and Kill Simulation User/Analyst
target and target posture. and maintain the support needs of the Manual, Army Materiel Systems Analysis
dismounted infantry. What the SBCT Activity, September 2013; https://www.
lacks in firepower, it compensates for dac.ccdc.army.mil/TopMS.html.

127 Fall 2020

 Acronym Quick-Scan
ABCT – armored brigade combat LRF – laser range finder SBCT – Stryker brigade combat
team Pd – probability of detection team
CCD – camouflage, concealment Ph – probability of hit TADSS – training aids, devices,
and decoys Pk – probability a of kill simulators and simulations
CEP – circular error probable Pkh – Probability of a kill given a hit TVI – crew Table VI, qualification
FCS – fire-control system Rsys – reliability of targeting system WFOV – wide field-of-view
HE – high explosive Rw – reliability of weapon

ARMOR magazine is seeking reviewers for books that come

to us on Armor, Cavalry, maneuver and/or leadership. Re-
views are intended to add to the force’s professional knowl-
edge about what resources are available. Reviewers can be
officer or enlisted, civilian or military, U.S. Army or any oth-
er service, American or international. If you’re interested,
email us (usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.armor-magazine@
mail.mil) what your interests are and we’ll try to match the
books we get in with your interests.
Some things you should know:
• Your “pay” is that you may keep the book we send you.
• Reviews should answer the question, “Why should Armor
and Cavalry officers and soldiers read this book?” Mention
the book’s target audience: Armor, Cavalry and/or
maneuver leaders.
• Book reviews should average about 750 words. (Query if
your review will be much longer.) This length means you
give a brief outline of the book, enough to answer the
preceding question.
• Our standard word-processing format is Microsoft Word;
if you don’t have Word, please save your text as a Rich Text
Format file to send to us.
• There’s no deadline, but we would like to be able to publish
the review within the same calendar year as the book was
published.
• Send the review as an email attachment to usarmy.benning.
[email protected].
• The format for the lead-in paragraph is title, author,
publishing house, location of publishing house, year
published, page count, notes on what the pages include
(such as photographs, maps, etc.) and publisher’s price.
We send a copy of the correspondence from the publisher,
and most times the price is included in that correspondence.
• Further tips for writing the review: Mention if it’s the
author’s first book, and if not, how this one compares with
previous works. What are the book’s strengths? Its
weaknesses? Would you recommend it? Why or why not?
Thank you for your support of ARMOR!

128 Fall 2020

 ARMOR BRANCH UPDATE
#GoArmor! The Annual Recruiting
and Assessment of Officer Talent
by Alex Turkatte solution. Accomplishes the task. USMA and ROTC
The U.S. Army Armor School is tasked • Innovative – Creative, inquisitive outreach
annually to support branch-specific and insightful. Easily identifies new For more than 10 years, the Armor
education for cadets of the U.S. Mili- solutions and catalyzes change. School has supported branch briefings
tary Academy (USMA) and Reserve Of- • Communicator – Precise, efficient during annual USMA Branch Week and
ficer Training Corps (ROTC). This task- and compelling in both written and the ROTC summer events, currently
ing includes annual evaluations of spoken word. named ROTC cadet summer training.
nearly 7,000 cadets for their potential In support of these efforts, an M1A2
to branch into Armor. This annual pro- Armor cadre with USMA and ROTC are SEP V2 Abrams, M1127 Stryker Recon-
gram is referred to as #GoArmor! encouraged to recommend cadets naissance Vehicle and a Bradley Fight-
seek to improve their scores in these ing Vehicle (BFV) are transported an-
Branching background six Armor talent priorities. High talent nually to both events. (Note that the
In 2012, the Office of Economics and scores in these six talent traits will Infantry Branch has been required to
Manpower Analysis (OEMA) at West help influence branch board panels, use the BFV for its branch display for
Point, NY, began an officer-talent- who review cadet records to deter- the past two years, instead of just
based accessions program based on mine the cadets’ level of potential to highlighting its light dismounted
the May 2010 Officer Corps Strategy branch into Armor. branch focus.)
Series 1 publication known as The
Green Pages. This new talent-manage-
ment accessions initiative started with
USMA cadets who would commission
in Summer 2013, replacing the previ-
ous order-of-merit-list branching pro-
cess.

Armor talent priorities2

As part of the talent-management ini-
tiative, 20 talent priorities were devel-
oped by OEMA for the evaluation of
cadet potential for each branch. Of the
available talent-category options, the
Chief of Armor selected the following
six talent priorities as key indicators
for which a cadet would be best suited
for Armor:
• Mentally tough – Stress-tolerant
and emotionally mature. Performs
well even under extreme
psychological duress.
• Physically fit – Physically tough,
gritty and tenacious. Performs well
even under extreme physiological
duress.
• Technologically adept – Understands
and comfortably uses the latest
technologies.
• Problem-solver – Able to choose Figure 1. Soldiers from 1-16 Cavalry load a C-17 from the New York Air Na-
b e t we e n b e st p ra c t i c e s a n d tional Guard for airlift to USMA as part of the annual Branch Week event in
unorthodox approaches to reach a August 2020.

129 Fall 2020

 a part of this education and talent as-
sessment process, OEMA is in direct
coordination with OCS leadership for
future developments.
In closing, through the help of leaders
sharing the Armor story, the Army can
continue to educate and assess cadets
for the continued success of our Ar-
mor Branch.
Alex Turkatte is a military human-re-
sources specialist with OCOA at Fort
Benning, GA. His previous assignments
include 420A human-resources techni-
cian (as chief warrant officer 3), U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command
G-1/Adjutant General, Fort Monroe,
VA; Headquarters U.S. Army Europe,
Heidelberg, Germany; secretary gen-
eral staff, Headquarters V Corps/Com-
Figure 2. CPT Gabriella Katz discusses the Armor Branch with cadets at USMA bined Joint Task Force-7, Baghdad,
during the annual Branch Week event in August 2020. Iraq; 1st Special Forces Operational De-
tachment-Delta Human Resources
During 2020 and the coronavirus pan- • Cadre evaluation statements; Troop, Fort Bragg, NC; and S-1, 3-12
demic, virtual branch briefings were Infantry (Mechanized), Baumholder,
• Interview conducted with HireVue
established for ROTC and USMA ca- Germany. His military schooling in-
application and questionnaire form;
dets using Blackboard and Microsoft cludes Defense Civilian Emerging Lead-
• Military, academic and physical er Program, Warrant Officer Candi-
Teams applications. More video brief-
grade-point average; and date School, Adjutant General Warrant
ings and Armor officer testimonials
were developed for posting on social • Army Physical Fitness Test or Army Officer Basic Course, Airborne School
media and the Armor School Website Combat Fitness Test. and Jumpmaster Course.
to help educate cadets on Armor. This These seven items are used to create
effort was highly successful through Notes
an initial Armor preference score of 1
Officer Corps Strategy Series, May 2010,
the assistance of brigade combat the cadet’s potential. A score of 3 is Wardynski, Lyle, Colarusso.
teams submitting their videos for in- “most preferred” for Armor; 2 is “pre- 2
Armor talent priorities 2021, https://
clusion in these Armor Branch prod- ferred”; and 1 is “least preferred.” www.benning.army.mil/Armor/Cadet-
ucts, which are uploaded to the Armor Once this initial score is created, a Branching/.
School Webpage as well as to the De- panel of Armor leaders reviews all in- 3
Memorandum, “[Assistant Secretary of
fense Visual Information Distribution formation and votes to retain or the Army (Manpower and Reserve Af-
Service. change the preference score for each fairs)] [Fiscal Year 2021] Guidance to
cadet. The panel is also charged to en- Branches for Selecting Army Officer Can-
Cadet evaluations sure Armor Branch accessions are in didates in the [Department of the Army]
Conducted simultaneously with sum- line with Army diversity goals in accor- Regular Army Branching Alignment Mod-
mer branch-education efforts, the Of- dance with Army Regulation 600-20 el.”
fice of the Chief of Armor (OCOA) con- and Army guidance.3 Although the ca-
ducts in-depth analysis and evalua- det’s final branch choice is a signifi-
tions of more than 1,000 USMA and cant factor during branching, the Ar- Acronym Quick-Scan
6,000 ROTC cadets. Through individu- mor preference score provides the
al cadet data provided by OEMA, all Army G-1 with critical information to BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle
cadets are scored for their potential to finalize all branch determinations. OCOA – Office of the Chief of Armor
branch Armor using the following in- OCS – Officer Candidate School
formation: #GoArmor! OEMA – Office of Economics and
There are several benefits to the offi- Manpower Analysis
• Cadet talent priority scores (as ROTC – Reserve Officer Training
cer branching process to ensure the
discussed previously); Corps
best talent is selected to join Armor. USMA – United States Military
• Cadet branch choice for Armor; Although the Officer Candidate School Academy
• Cadet personal statements; (OCS) on Fort Benning, GA, is not yet

130 Fall 2020

131 Fall 2020
 ALRY REGI
AV M
C
91 ST

EN
T
The shield includes yellow, the color of the cavalry, denoting the origin
of the organization in that service. The horseshoe also carries out the
same idea. The speeding wheel, enhanced by speed lines, creates the
impression of the lightning speed of the modern armored force. The motto
“Alert” is appropriate and fittingly expresses the sentiments of the unit.
The distinctive unit insignia was originally approved for 91st Reconnais-
sance Squadron Aug. 6, 1942. It was redesignated for 91st Reconnaissance
Battalion May 25, 1950. The insignia was redesignated for 91st Armored
Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion Oct. 22, 1953. The insignia was redes-
ignated for 91st Cavalry Regiment, with the description and symbolism
updated March 1, 2006.
Headquarters, Department of the Army PB 17-20-4
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited PIN 207723-000