New Directions in the Study of

China 云 Foreign Policy

Edited by Alastair Iain ]ohnston

and Robert S. Ross

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

STANFORD , CALIFORNIA 2006

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。 2006 by the Board of Trustees of the

Leland Stanford Junior University.
All rights reserved.
No part of this book may be reproduced
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Printed in the United States of America on

acid-free , archival-quality paper

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

New directions in the study of China's foreign policy / edited by Alastair Iain
Johnston and Robert S. Ross
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8047-5362-8 (cloth: alk. paper)-IsBN 0-8047-5363-6 (pb k.:
alk. paper)
1. China-Foreign relations-1976- 1. Johnston , Alastair 1. II. Ross ,
Robert S.
DS779.27.N49 2006
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Original Printing 2006

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To Allen S. Whiting
Scholar~ Practitioner~ Mentor
Contents

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ROBERT S. ROSS AND ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON

Part 1. S卢 curity Studies

2. Comparative Deterrence: Thê Tâiwan Strait and
the Korean Peninsula 一 I3

ROBERT S. ROSS

Iv 3. Windows and 币Tar : Trend Analysis and Beijing's

Use of Force 50
THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN

/ 4. China's Decision for War with India in I962 86

JOHN w. GARVER

5. Across the Yalu: China's Interests and the Korean

Peninsula in a Changing World I3 I

AVERY GOLDSTEIN

6. The Limits of Economic Interdependence:

Sino-]apanese Relations I62
MICHAEL YAHUDA

7. Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts

to the China Threat Theory I 86
YONG DENG
VIII CONTENTS

Part II. China and Globalization

8. More Than Just Saying No: China's Evolving
Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention
Since Tiananmen 21 7

ALLEN CARLSON

9. China in Geneva: Lessons from China's Early Years

in the World Trade Organization 24 之

岛1ARGARET 岛1. PEARSON

10. Chinese Foreign Policy Faces

Globalization Challenges 27 6
SAMUEL S. KIM

Part III. Domestic Politics

1 1. Identity and Conf1 ict in Sino-American Relations 309
PETER HAYS GRIES

12. The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion

Toward the United States , 1998-2004 34 0
ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON

13. Conclusions and Future Directions 379

THO 岛1AS J. CHRISTENSEN , ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON ,
AND ROBERT S. ROSS

Select Bibliography 4 21
Index 4 63
List of Figures and Tables

Figures
12.1 Sources on "rising Chinese nationalism" in U.S.
newspapers , October 2000-]uly 2001 343
12.2 U.S. temperature in comparison across time
and across countries 353
12.3 Distribution of levels of amity to the United States ,
199 8 and 200 4 354
12.4 Average respondent perception of Chinese ,
Americans , and ]apanese on combined peaceful
(1) to warlike (7) and moral (1) to immoral (7) scales 3 58
12.5 Identity difference scores for Americans and
]apanese , 2000- 200 4 359
工 2.6 The perceived main threat to Chinese national
security, 2001-2003 362
12.7 Temperature category as portion of respondents 366

Tables
7.1 Chinese interpretations of the China threat theory 193
10.1 Globalization in China's "State of the
World Message" in the General Assembly's
Grand Debate，工 994- 2002 282
10.2 China's GDP growth rate in comparative
perspectlve , 1990-2001 28 5
10.3 Multinational citizens' perceptions of
threat and influence in Asia (l ate 2000) 29 1
10.4 Voting in the Security Council, 1971-2004 294
12.1 Dependent and socioeconomic/demographic
control variables , and the BAS survey years for
which there are data 35 2
X FIGURES AND TABLES

12.2 Summary of results concerning levels of amity

toward the United States 356
12.3 Summary of 且ndings about "identity difference" 3 61
12.4 Summary of fìndings about the "main threat

to China's national security" 365

Contributors

Allen Carlson is assistant professor in Cornell University's Government

Department. He is the author of Unifying China~ Integrating with the
World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty During the Reform Era (Stanford
University Press , 2005). He also recently co-edited (with J. J. Suh and
Peter Katzenstein) Rethinking Security in East Asia: Power~ Identity and
Effìciencies (Stanford University Press ，之 004). In addition , he has pub-
lished articles in the Journal of Contemporaη China and Paci卢c Affairs.

Thomas J. "S~!.isten~~en lis professor of politics and international affairs at

Princeton University. He received his B.A. in history from Haverford Col-
lege , M.A. in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania ,
and Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. Before arriving
at Princeton in 2003 , he taught at Cornell University and the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology.

Yong Deng is associate professor in political science at the U.S. Naval

Academy at Annapolis , Maryland. His scholarly works on Chinese foreign
policy include two edited volumes~ In the Eyes of the Dragon: China
Views the World (co-editor , I999) and China Rising: Power and Motiva-
tion in Chinese Foreign Policy (co-editor, 2005). He has also published in
academic journals , including Political Science Quarterly , China Quarterly ,
and Pacifìc A仇 irs ， as well as in several edited volumes.

John Garver is professor with the Sam Nunn School of International

Affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology. His research specializes on
Chinese foreign relations , and he has written many books and articles in
that area; His most recent research has dealt with China-India and China-
Iran relations. He has set up and directed student programs in both China
and greater East Asia for Georgia Tech.

Avery Goldsteìn is professor of political science and associate director of

the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Insti-
tute inPhiladelphia. He is the author of Rising to the Challenge: China 云
Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford University Press ,
XII CONTRIBUTORS

2005) , Deterrence and Security in the 2Ist Century: China , Britain,

France, and the Enduring Legacy ofthe Nuclear Revolution (Stanford
University Press , 2000) , and From Bandwagon to Balance-of二Power Poli-
tics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China , I949-I978 (Stanford
University Press , I99I).

Peter Hays Gries is assistant professor of political science at the University

of Colorado , Boulder, and director of the Sino-American Security Dia-
logue. He is author of Chin的 New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Di-
plomacy (University of California Press , 2004) and co-editor of State and
Society in 2Ist Century China: Crisis, Contention , and Legitimation
(RoutledgeCurzon , 2004) , as well as author of over a dozen journal
articles and book chapters.

Alastair lain Johnston is the Laine Professor of China in World Affairs in

the Government Department at Harvard University. Johnston is the au-
thor of Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in. Chinese
History (Princeton University Press , I99 5) , and co-editor of Engaging
China: The Management of an Emerging Power (Routledge , I999). He
has written on socialization theory, strategic culture , China's participation
in international institutions , Chinese nuclear doctrine and arms control ,
and Party-Army relations in China , among other topics.

Samuel S. Kim (M. I. A. and Ph.D. , Columbia) is adjunct professor of polit-

ical science and senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian
Institute , Columbia University. He is the author or editor of twenty-one
books , including , most recently, The International Relations of Northeast
Asia (ed. , Rowman BζLittle且eld， 2004) and The Two Koreas in the
Global Community (forthcoming).

Margaret M. Pearson is professor of government and politics at the Uni-

versity of Maryland , College Park. She received her Ph.D. in political sci-
ence from Yale University. Her publications include the books Joint 论n-
tures in the People 云 Republic of China (Princeton University Press , I99I)
and Cháω 云 New Business Elite: The Political Results of Economic Re-
form (University of California Press , I997) , as well as articles in World
Politics , China Journal , Modern China , China Business. Review , and other
journals.

Robert S. Ross is professor of political science at Boston College , associate ,

John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research , Harvard University,
and senior advisor , Security Studies Program , Massachusetts Institute of
 CONTRIBUTORS Xln

Technology. His current research focuses on Chinese security policy and

U.S.-China relations , in particular Chinese use of force and deterrence in
East Asia. His recent publications include Normalization of U. S.-China
Relations: An International History (Asia Center, Har飞rard University,
2001) , of which he was co-editor.

Michael Yahuda is professor emeritus of international relations at the

London School of Economics and visiting scholar at the Sigur Center
for Asian Studies , Elliott School of International Affairs , George Wash-
ington University. He enjoys an international reputation as a specialist
on the international relations of East Asia. He has published more than
150 journal articles and book chapters and is the author of six books , the
latest being The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (1996; rev ed. ,
RoutledgeCurzon ，二 004).
Editors' Preface

This volume is dedicated to Allen Whiting. The contributors are jun-

ior and senior scholars who share a commitment to building the field of
China's foreign policy and who share an approach to the subject that blends
theory and evidence in a way that originated with Whiting. Beginning with
his early writings , Whiting combined empirical research with a theoretically
rich and policy-relevant analysis of China's international behavior. 1n short , -V
the contributors join us in a tribute to Whiting as the founding father of
Chinese foreign policy studies.
Whiting's work teaches us that China specialists need to understand not
only Chinese history and politics but also international politics and the en-
during sources , both domestic and international, of the international be-
havior of the Chinese state. His 1960 classic China Crosses the Yalu: The
Decision to Enter the Korean War established the norm of using empirical
民search to support analytic conclusions regarding the sources of Chinese
foreign policy, of Chinese deterrence signaling , and of misperceptions in the
U.S.-China conflict. His second book on China's use of force , The Chinese
Calculus of Deterrence: lndia and China , developed a comparative analysis
for understanding Chinese deterrence behavior. His work on the domestic
sources of Chinese policy-making is equally insightfu l. 1n China Eyes Japan ,
he combined theoretically informed analysis with documentary research
and interviews in China and ]apan to explain the historically derived cog-
nitive sources of Sino-]apanese conflict. His work on Chinese nationalism
similarly reflects his appreciation of domestic political and societal factors
in foreign policy.
That scholars can and should serve the public interest is demonstrated by
Whiting's career as a policy analyst and government adviso r. His work with
the Council on Foreign Relations and the Rand Corporation showed that
scholars can inform the public and contribute to policy-making. Whiting
served in government during the mid 1960s, when the United States was
struggling with the seemingly interminable conflict in Vietnam and casting
about to understand the political convulsions in China. After he left gov-
ernment, Whiting continued to serve American foreign policy. 1n 1969 , he
played a pivotal role in calling the attention of the White House to the es-
calating military conflict along the Sino-Soviet border and its impli
XVI EDITORS' PREFACE

Whiting: "When you served as a consultant to the Department of State in

the Nixon administration 1, too , benefited from your knowledge of the
Pacific region. 1 particularly remember the time you came to San Clemente
to brief me on the Sino-Soviet border dispute. It was a most impressive
briefing and helped signi且cantly to shape my own thinking about how the
United States should react."
Thus , we honor Allen Whiting for having launched Chinese foreign pol-
lC y as a 且eld of study and having sustained it with a record of scholarship
and public service. that continues to inform new research agendas and to
serve as a model for the civic-minded schola r.
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF
CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY
 1 Introduction
Robert s. Ross and Alastair lain Johnston

This volume reflects an effort to take stock of the 且eld of Chinese

foreign policy and to consider potential avenues of new research. It is a col-
laborative effort by scholars of different generations and many academic
perspectives who share an interest in and commitment to explaining Chi-
nese foreign policy and to using systematically gathered and analyzed evi-
dence. It is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of the field of Chinese
foreign policy, which is simply too large and diverse for one volume to be
able to cover all the topics , draw on all the relevant theories , and include all
the 且rst-rate scholars in the 且eld. Rather , scholars were chosen in an at-
tempt to represent current research in Chinese foreign policy from multiple
theoretical perspectives and methodologies and multiple academic genera-
tions. To some degree , the timing of the volume is also worth noting: it ap-
pears at a point in history when the integration of the People's Republic of
China (PRC) with regional and global economic and political institutions
has never been greater, and when a narrowing range of tropes of unease
about "rising China" are coming to dominate policy and pundit discourses
both in the United States and elsewhere. Not only is there greater demand
today for information about China's foreign policy, but scholars are able , in
principle , to supply greater amounts of sophisticated analysis.
The chapters were first presented at a conference held at the John King
Fairbank Center at Harvard University in December 2002. 1 The volume is
organized into three subfields of Chinese foreign policy. Part 1 examines Chi-
nese. security policy, including Chinese use of force , policy toward conflicts
of interests affecting war and peace , and China's strategy as a rising powe r.
Owing to greater access to Chinese analysts , decision-makers , and docu-
ments , these chapters draw on a wider range of materials about the sources
and effects of Chinese security policy than was available in the earlier days of
the 且eld. 2 Part II considers China as an actor in multilateral institutions and
China's response to emerging global trends , including evolving conceptions
Z INTRODUCTION

of sovereignty and the emergence of globalization. These topics are rela-

tively new for the field ,3 reflecting the fact that since the late -I 98os , China
has advanced more rapidly into international institutional life than any
other major state moving from a similar position of isolation. Part 111 pre-
sents new research on domestic-foreign linkages , considering the impactof
trends in public opinion and of Chinese identity on China's policy toward
major powers. This is a very new subfield , because access to public attitudes
has been severely restricted in authoritarian China , and the impact of pub-
lic opinion on foreign policy has never been considered relevant. With rapid
urbanization , marketization , and the diversification of political, economic ,
and foreign policy preferences , this seems to be changing. 4

The Study of Chinese Security Policy

Robert Ross examines the role of deterrence and use of force in Chi-
nese foreign policy. His Chapter 卒， "Comparative Deterrence: The Taiwan
Strait and the Korean Peninsula ," places these two theaters of deterrence in
the context of the theoreticalliterature on effectivedeterrence and on the
sources of unstable deterrence and unintended war, enabling comparative
analysis of the two theaters and estimates of the likelihood of war in East
Asia. Regarding Korea , Ross assesses North Korean deterrence of U.S. use
of force for either regime change or denuclearization , and U.S.-South Ko-
rean deterrence of North Korean use of force for unification. Regarding the
Taiwan Strait, he considers Chinese deterrence of a Taiwan declaration of
independence , an "act of war," and U.S. deterrence of Chinese initiation of
use of force for unification. Using deterrence theory and concepts of credi-
bility, capability, and expected utility, he considers the effectiveness of mu-
tual deterrence dynamics in each region. He also compares these two deter-
rence theaters regarding incentives for first strikes and the implications for
crisis instability and unintended wa r. Ross argues that although there is ef-
fective mutual deterrence on both the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan
Strait so that the status quo is preferred to use of force by all of the other-
wise revisionist states , the distinct weapons capabilities of the actors in each
theater and the distinct geography of each theater create distinct crisis dy-
namics. He argues that these differences have made the Korean peninsula a
more probable military threat than the Taiwan Strait since the end of the
Cold War, and that the Korean peninsula will remain a more likely source
of war than the Taiwan Strait.
Thomas Christensen's Chapter 3 , "Windows and War: Trend Analysis
ànd Beijing's Use of Force ," examines conditions under which China has
used force since 1949. Working within international politics theories of pre-
emptive and preventive war, Christensen applies the concept of "closing
 INTRODUCTION ,.,
3

windows" to provide a comprehensive explanation for all post-1949 cases

of Chinese use of force. He argues that Chinese leaders have used force
to achieve international political objectives , despite the absence of a clear
"red-line" provocation , when they perceive a closing window for China to
achieve its strategic objectives , to deter an adversary from becoming more
‘ aggressive , or to create favorable long-term strategic trends. Christensen
~~ also argues that dome~巳旦旦4jtions have comstently contributed to Chi-
nese use of force , not because domestic instability can contribute to Chinese
threat perception but because Chinese leaders have seen use of forc
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of force suggests a relatively pessimistic outlook for relying on deterrence
to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait. Based on past PRC behavior, he
warns that although Taiwan might not offer a red-line provocation by de-
claring de jure independence , mere continued Taiwan movement toward de
jure independence could produce su面cient Chinese concern about a closing
window to elicit use of force , even should Chinese leaders expect interven-
tion by superior U.S. forces.
John Gar飞rer's Chapter 4 , "China's Decision for War with India in 196 鸟"
presents an analysis of Chinese use of force against India in 1962. This case
study integrates many of the issues addressed by Ross and Christensen to
explain a major Chinese use of force. Drawing on voluminous new materi-
als , the chapter analyzes the sources of Chinese threat perception, Chinese
deterrence strategy, and China's decision to use force. Following the works
of Allen Whiting and Neville Maxwell , Garver concurs that India's border
policy challenged China's territorial integrity and that the Chinese failure
to deter Indian forward deployment across the McMahon Line reflected
low Indian assessment of China's resolve to use force and the constraints
of Indian domestic politics on Nehru's ability to moderate India's broader
policy. But, in contrast to Whiting and Maxwell , Garver argues that China's
subsequen
4 INTRODUCTION

and compelled India to adopt a more cautious China policy, Mao's misper-
ception of Nehru's intentions also inflicted signifìcant costs on China , in-
cluding long-term hostility with a determined and more modern Indian
army and development of anti-China Soviet-Indian cooperation.
Chapters 5 and 6 analyze Chinese policy toward two key issues affecting
Chinese security-developments on the Korean peninsula and trends in
Sino-]apanese relations. Avery Goldstein's Chapter 5, "Across the Yalu:
China's Interests and the Korean Peninsula in a Changing World," exam-
ines contemporary Chinese policy toward the Korean conflict. He stresses
that during the Cold War, ideology, territorial security, and alignment with
Soviet power against U.S. capabilities dominated Chinese policy. In con-
trast , although in the post-Cold War era , U.S. power remains at the heart
of PRC assessments of trends on the peninsula , in the absence of the option
of alignment with a great power, Beijing has had to accommodate U.S.
power, while seeking gradual development of greater Chinese capabilities
and minimization of domestic political instability. These demands require
Beijing to seek a peaceful international environment, including peace on the
Korean peninsula , even as management of domestic instability and concern
about U.S. capabilities require vigilance against U.S. policy and an endur-
ing commitment to the survival of the North Korean government. This an-
alytical indeterminacy requires development of a framework for forecasting
the future of China's Korean policy. Goldstein develops four "stylized sce-
narios" and assesses each in terms of its implications for China's pursuit of
its multiple interests on the Korean peninsula , especially vis-à-vis the United
States. He then applies two conceptual frameworks to assess the likely
course of Chinese policy among these four futures. First, he builds onWhit-
ing's concepts of Chinese threat perception and deterrence behavior, stress-
ing that linkage between internal instability and heightened PRC threat per-
ception , on the one hand, and the role of force in diplomatic signaling in
Chinese deterrence efforts , on the other, may affect crisis outcomes. Second ,
he considers the impact of China's Korean policy on U.S.-China manage-
ment of the rise of China , stressing that the very indeterminacy in PRC pol-
icy creates space for a negotiated solution ,
 INTRODUCTION 5

Goldstein, he argues that the end of the Cold War in East Asia has transformed
the security preferences of each country. In the absence of the constraints
imposed by the Soviet Union, each country has developed more assertive
and independent security policies. Simultaneously, each country has also
been increasingly intolerant of the changes in the other's policies. Yahuda
explains this development and the resulting tension in relations by observ-
ing each country's inability to appreciate the impact of its changing security
policies , especially the growth in respective military capabilities , on the
other's security, that is , its inability to appreciate the impact of the security
dilemma in internationa l. politics , so that each develops a worst-case per-
spective on the other's intentions. He explains these mutualworst-case
analyses by developments in domestic politics. Following Whiting's analy-
sis of Sino-]apanese relations in the 1980s , he fìnds that anti-]apanese na-
tionalism in Chinese educ旦且更n has fostered widespread Chinese r些~二
ceptions about ]apanese behavior. Moreover, generational change in China
and ]apan has given rise to leaders with limited knowledge of the other's
cultureand society. The result is that security perspectives , informed by
domestically informed misperceptions , have offset the potentially positive
effects of increased economic interdependence.
Part 1 concludes with Deng Yong's Chapter 7 , "Reputation and the
Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat Theory," which dis-
cusses China's management of its rising power status , considered in the con-
text of Beijing's implicit appreciation of the impact of the security dilemma
in international politics. Whereas Yahuda suggests that Chinese leaders are
insensitive to the impact of Chinese policy on ]apanese security, Deng ar-
gues that the Chinese leadership is aware that China's reputation in other
countries can be a major factor in their assessments of Chinese intentions
and in their corresponding response to China's rising capabilities. In partic-
ular, perceptions of a "China threat" can lead other countries to adopt bel-
ligerent policies toward China that might disrupt Beijing's ability to focus
on economic development and to enhance Chinese security in a peaceful in-
ternational environment. Thus , Chinese diplomacy has actively tried to neu-
tralize China threat a
6 INTRODUCTION

tal changes in Chinese foreign policy that have taken place since the Maoist
era , when China primarily depended on a reputation for military r: esolve to
influence the behavior of potential adversaries.

China and Globalization

Part 1 of this volume thus considers the impact of China's interna-

tional strategic environment on Chinese policy. Part 11 is also concerned
with China's response to its international environment, but the focus Ís on
China's response to globalization, including the globalization of norms of
limited sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and economic cooperation.
Allen Carlson's Chapter 8 , "More Than Just Saying No: China's Evolv-
ing Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention Since Tiananmen ," examines
in depth perhaps the most sensitive challenge of globalization - China's
gradual compromise of its long-term commitment to absolute sovereignty
in response to its determined exposure to the deepening and increasingly
global norm of humanitarian intervention. Although Carlson acknowledges
the role of material interests in Chinese behavior, he explains the evolution
in Chinese thinking on sovereignty by focusing on the susceptibility of Chi-
nese foreign policy elites to international norms through "sociallearning."
He argues that Chinese participation in international society has led to in-
ternalization of hitherto unacceptable ideas. His empirical work examines
changes in Chinese attitudes toward sovereignty as they relate to the legiti-
macy of security and humanitarian international intervention in a state's
domestic affairs. Carlson argues that even as interest calculations clearly
drove China's initial moderation of its stand on absolute sovereignty in the
early I990s , China's changing policy also encouraged underlying ideational
change among Chinese foreign policy elites that sustained and even deep-
ened the trend in China toward acceptance of the concept of limited sover-
eignty well into the decade. By the 且rst decade of the twenty-fìrst century,
despite enduring Chinese concern that Western democracies , in particular
the United States , have used the concept of limited sovereignty to suit their
narrow national interests , the global norm of humanitarian multilateral in-
tervention in protection of human rights , expressed in the very language used
by Western foreign policy elites , had become widespread in Chinese foreign
policy circles , and Chinese government attitudes toward multilateral inter-
vention had become increasingly flexible.
Margaret Pearson's Chapter 9 , "China in Geneva: Lessons from China's
Early Years in the World Trade Organi
 INTRODUCTION 7

the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention , Pearson examines China's

stance toward the WTO's formal rules and informal norms in the early and
critical period after December 200 1. But whereas Carlson stresses growing
Chinese socialization into evolving norms of sovereignty, Pearson , while
open to the suggestion that China may become "socialized" into WTO
norms , stresses that calculations of economic interest drive cooperative ,
norm-acceptant Chinese policy. Rather thanactively promoting the revi-
sionist agenda of developing countries , China works with the handful of
states at the center of power in the WTO; it aligns with coa 1itions of devel-
oped states that promote.policies favorable to greater PRC access to inter-
national markets , including the markets of developing countries. Thus , on
agriculture issues , it has aligned with the United States to promote open
markets. On textiles , although it opposes U.S. protectionist efforts , it has
maintained a low pro且le ， even when its preferences favor the interests of de-
veloping countries. Insofar as the WTO norms enable agenda stetting and
negotiations to be dominated by the economic powers and their interest
in maintaining the existing trade order, since 2000 , China has avoided
revisionist behavior and has accommodated itself to well-established WTO
rules and norms. Underscoring Samuel Kim's observation that globalization
and the development of so-called intermestic actors have undermined the
policy-making authority of the central government , Pearson observes that
China's ability to assume leadership in the 嘀咕o will depend on its ability
to forge a consensus position among competing domestic interests prior to
conducting negotiations with its international trading partners.
Samuel Kim's Chapter 10, "Chinese Foreign Policy Faces Globalization
Challenges ," steps back and addressees the big picture-the multiple chal-
lenges China faces as it engages globalization and the wide range of inter-
national institutions that are the agents of globalization. He observes that
after many years of criticizing globalization as a threat to Chinese sover-
eignty and as a plot to foment domestic instability, by the early 1990s, Chi-
nese leaders had acknowledged that both domestic stability and Chinese
international security required China to participate in globalization, that
China could not be a revisionist power. Since th
8 INTRODUCTION

in a state's sovereign affairs , increasingly supporting UN peacekeeping op-

erations since the late 1990S. Kim observes that whereas participation in
globalization has enhanced Chinese national power and its ability to defend
its external sovereignty, the associated weakening of national boundaries has
simultaneously undermined China's internal sovereignty. Domestic groups
with competing international interests , intermestic actors , require Chinese
leaders to engage in domestic negotiations before they can successfully ne-
gotiate at the internationalleve l. Moreover, the central government's dimin-
ishing control over localities and of cross-border information flows poses a
long-term challenge to political stability.

Domestic Politics and Chinese Foreign Po /i cy

The chapters in the second part of this volume argue that Chinese
participation in globalization has necessarily eroded the boundary between
China's domestic politics and its foreign policy. Part III directly addresses
this issue and the domestic sources of China's international behavior. In
particular, it seeks to assess the impact of the erosion ofthe Chinese central
government's authority over society and the corresponding implications of
the influence of mass attitudes on China's foreign policy.
Peter Gries's Chapter 11 , "Identity and Conflict in Sino-American Rela-
tions ," examines the role of "othering" in Chinese nationalism and thus its
impact on China's involvement in international conflict , in particular in
conflict with the United States. Like Carlson in Chapter 8 , Gries acknowl-
edges the important role of material interests in shaping foreign po 1icy and
also argues that a constructivist approach employing social identity theory
can reveal the substance of Chinese nationalism and its contribution to
conflict. Examining the writings of China's more vocal nationalists , Gries
develops a "hard test" to argue that Chinese nationalism is not necessarily
a source of Chinese belligerence. Following the research on social identity
theory, he argues that China's in-group identity does not require a zero-sum
policy framework that promotes hostility toward the out group , so that na-
tionalism is an indeterminate source of compe tÎ tive , conflict-prone attitudes
toward the United States. Gries's case studies are the 1999 U.S.-China ten-
sion over the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the
2001 U.S.-China tension over the crash of a Chinese surveillance plane after
its collision with an American EP-3 intelligence aircraftnear Haìnan Island.
Whereas conflict over the embassy bombing continues to fester in China ,
theEP- 3 incident was fully resolved. The difference , Gries explains ，飞iVas that
whereas U.S. policy in both cases undermined China's positive self-identity,
in the latter case, creative ambig山ty in U.S.-China diplomacy enabled both
 INTRODUCTION 9

sides to "save face ," while enabling China to escape zero-sum dynamics in
its nationalist out-group competition with the United States.
lain Johnston's Chapter 12 , "The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion
Toward the United States, 1998-2004 ," addresses broader themes in pub-
lìc attitudes toward key international actors and the potentiallong-term im-
plications for China's role in international politics and its policy toward the
United States. Taking advantage of a variety ofsocial science methodologies
and seven years of polling of Beijing-area residents , he presents the fìrst
randomly sampled , nongovernmental time-series analysis of Chinese public
opinion on foreign policy issues , with controls for various socioeconomic
and demographic variables. Johnston observes that repeatedshort:-term
mini crises in U.S.-China relations have contributed to a gradual decline of
"warmth" toward the United States among Beijing residents. But Johnston's
fìndings also suggest that wealth , education , and travel abroad may help off-
set these trends to some degree. Thus insofar as China's exposure to glob-
alization contributes to the expansion of an educated middle class and to
greater cross-border information flows resulting from travel and news re-
ports about international politics , the foreign policy preferences of this
group will tend to be relatively less anti-American and nationalistic. More-
over, greater income levels , education , and travel all tend to diminish Chi-
nese tendencies toward "othering," in which a positive Chinese self-identity
is paired with a negative characterization of the United States. Johnston ac-
knowledges the many limitations in the polling data and the limited role
that public opinion continues to have in Chinese policy-making. Yet his
analysis since 1998 of the opinions of Beijing-area residents suggests that re-
duced central government control over society, including that resulting
from globalization and democratization , may not necessarily lead to greater
anti-American nationalism and heightened U.S.-China conflict.

Conclusions

The research in this volume should not be considered as either defìni-

tive or all-encompassing. Rather , it simply reflects an effort to consider the
study of Chinese foreign policy from multiple dimensions , including differ-
ent research agendas and diverse methodologies and research materials. It
is the hope of all the contributors that the volume will be considered a ges-
ture of their appreciation of the work of their predecessors , who 且rst estab-
lished the importance and viability of the 且eld of Chinese foreign policy
studies , and whose work contributed to the richness and sophistication of
current research. They also hope that the volume may make a modest con-
tribution to ihe future development of the fìeld.
10 INTRODUCTION

Notes

工. We are grateful to Elizabeth Economy, Joseph Fewsmith , Steven Goldstein ,

Roderick MacFarquhar, Alan Romberg , and Ezra Vogel for serving as discussants
and for their valuable contributions to the conference and to the quality of the chap-
ters in this book , as well as to David Zweig for sharing his research on China's re同
verse brain drain. We also wish to thank the Fairbank Center for providing the fund-
ing and administrative support for the conference , which was the Fairbank Center's
way of honoring Allen S. Whiting, owing to the fact that he had been unable to de-
liver the prestigious Reischauer Lecture the year before.
2. The earlier literature on Chinese security behavior is too rich to cite here. But
some of the pioneering work-research that tried to mainstream Chinese foreign pol-
icy behavior by applying standard analytical constructs such as deterrence theory, ra-
tional actor models of decision-making , and a realism-influenced focus on China's
pursuit of power within different regional and global configurations of power and in-
terest-include Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Ya/u: The Decision to Enter the
Korean War ( 工 960; Stanford: Stanford University Press , 1968); Peter Van Ness , Rev-
o/ution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Pe走 ing 云 Support for W句rs of National Libera-
tion (Berkeley: University of California Press , 1970); Allen S. Whiting , The Ca/culus
of Chinese Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press ，工 975); J. D. Armstrong , Revo/utionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Po/icy and
the United Front Doctrine (Berkeley: University of California Press , 1977); and
Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Huang , China Under Threat: The Politics of Strat-
egy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press ，工 9 80 ).
3. In contrast to the work on Chinese security, there are very few pioneering
works on which to build this new research. The most obvious of these are Samuel
Kim , China, the United Nations and World Order (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press , 1979); Gerald Chan , Chiria and International Organizations (Hong
Kong: Oxford University Press , 1989); and Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksen-
berg, China 云 Participation in the IMF, the World Ban 走， and GATT (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press , 1990).
4. This research is new in the sense that it tries to analyze the impact of ideol-
ogy, historical memory, and collective identity in society, no
Part One
SECURITY STUDIES
2 Comparative Deterrence
THE TAIWAN STRAIT AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Robert s. Ross

In the 1990s, the United States was involved in two confrontations in

East Asia involving the People's Republic of China. In 1994 , it contended
with North Korea , the PRC's immediate neighbor and ally, over Pyongyang's
nuclear weapons program , and in March 1996, it contended with the PRC
over Beijing's military activities in the Taiwan Strait. The difference between
these two incidents presents a puzzle. Former Secretary of Defense William
Perry characterized the confrontation on the Korean peninsula as a crisis in
which the United States risked war, but he was also clear that the 1996 Tai-
wan Strait confrontation was not a crisis. Why is it that the United States
I

did not experience a crisis in a direct military confrontation with China , a

major power possessing considerable naval and air force capabilities, con-
tending over a vital interest, Taiwan's sovereignty relationship with main-
land China , but did experience crisis decision-making when it directly con-
fronted North Korea , a small state with a weak and backward military, and
only indirectly confronted China , over a prospective N orth Korean nuclear
weapons program?
The solution to this puzzle does not lie in the respective capabilities of
China and North Korea in weapons of mass destruction. In the mid 1990s,
China possessed a small yet credible nuclear capability deployed on inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the continental
United States and on shorter-range missiles capable of targeting U.S. re-
gional allies , including ]apan. In 1994 , North Korea did not possess nuclear
weapons , but it possessed a signifìcant arsenal , possibly including chemical
and biological weapons , and a large land force that could cause great de-
struction in South Korea , as well as to U.S. forces deployed in South Korea.
War with either country could be catastrophic.
The argument of this paper is that in the mid 1990s, effective mutual
deterrence existed both on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.
工4 SECURITY STUDIES

None of the protagonists preferred war to maintaining the status quo , and
all of the protagonists believed that their adversaries possessed su面cient re-
solve to use force to resist a challenge to the status quo. From this perspec-
tive , the risk of war and thus the propensity for crisis escalation should have
been the same in each case. Nonetheless , despite these similar conditions ,
there were different outcomes , reflecting the difference in mutual deterrence
in the two cases. Whereas there was mutual stable deterrence in the Taiwan
Strait, there was mutual unstable deterrence on the Korean peninsula.
Following the conceptual work of Thomas Schelling, this paper argues
that crisis dynamics and the propensity for escalation reflected the unique
character of each deterrence dyad. 2 Whereas the protagonists in the Taiwan
theater possess effective deterrence capabilities , these same capabilities do
not have significant offensive potential , so there exists mutual stable deter-
rence. In contrast, the deterrence capabilities of the adversaries on the Ko-
rean peninsula also possess signi且cant offensive capabilities, creating mu-
tual fear of incurring a debilitating first strike. The resulting intense security
dilemma dynamics create pressures for each side to prepare for war and to
consider the merits of a preemptive strike. Thus , there is mutual yet unsta-
ble deterrence on the Korean peninsula , explaining the propensity for crisis
escalation and the potential for unintended war.
The first part of this paper discusses the sources of effective mutual de-
terrence and unstable mutual deterrence. The second part argues that there
is mutual deterrence in both the Korean and Taiwan theaters. The third part
assesses the sources of stable and unstable deterrence in each theate r. The
且nal part considers the policy implications for the United States of the dis-
tinct deterrence dynamics of each dyad.

Deterrence and the Taiwan and Korean Conflicts

In the Taiwan theater, mutual deterrence involves U.S. deterrence of

Chinese use of force for uni且cation and Chinese deterrence of a formal Tai-
wan declaration of independence. In the Korean theater, mutual deterrence
depends on U.S. deterrence ofNorth Korean use of force for unification of the
Korean peninsula under Pyongyang's rule and North Korean deterrence of
U.S. use of force for unification under Seoul's rule or for denuclearization of
North Korea. In each deterrence relationship , effective deterrence requires
the status-quo state to possess the retaliatory capability to inflict costs that
outweigh the benefits to a country that might use force to change the status
quo and the reputation for resolve to make its retaliatory threats credible.
Effective deterrence thus requires that all of the actors value peace more
than costly forceful revision of the status quo. This is clearly the case. China
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 15

has not used force to unify Taiwan for over 且fty years , and although Taiwan
has moved closer to declaring formal independence , its leaders have thus far
judged the risk to be too great. Similarly, the protagonists on the Korean
peninsula have preferred peace to war since I9 53. The question for the
future is whether changes in capabilities or domestic political conditions
have altered this assessment for any of the actors and thus the deterrence
dynamics in either or. both of the two theaters.
But even should each of the actors be deterrable by the costs of war , they
must also have sufficient respect for their opponent's resolve to make their
retaliatory threats credible. Credibility in part reflects interests. Sometimes,
the deterrer's interests are so high that its credibility is not in doubt. Atother
times , its interests are so low that reputation cannot enhance credibility, re-
gardless of capabilities. In between lurks the extended deterrence problem ,
where uncertainty about the deterrer's interests and resolve can determine
the credibility of threats. 3
The United States faces the extended deterrence problem in its effort to
deter Chinese and North Korean useof force against Taiwan and South
Korea , respectively. In the I950S and I960s , U.S. policymakers feared that
if the U.S. deterrent of a Soviet invasion of western Europe was undermined
by the questionable credibility of its retaliatory threats , the U.S. ability to
deter conventional use of force by a nuclear-armed China was even less cer-
tain , because U.S. interest in the East Asian status quo was not as strong as
its interest in the European status quo. 4 Washington's extended deterrence
problem in East Asia is no different today than it was during the 且rst half
of the Cold War.
China also faces an extended deterrence problem. Its commitment to
defend its North Korean ally is necessarily not as strong as its commitment
to defend its own territory. The questionable credibility of its commitment to
maintain a buffer state on its northern border in part explains its failure to
deter U.S. expansion of the Korean War to northern Korea in the I950s.
Many U.S. leaders believed that China would not go to war if Washington
established its determination to use force to unify Korea under southern
rule. 5 In contemporary East Asia , China's reputation for resolve to defend
its ally affects U.S. willingness to risk war to eliminate the North Korean
reglme.
Per
I6 S E C U R 1 T Y S T U D IE S

the people of Taiwan will resist a mainland attack. Taiwan's democratic

government is legitimate , but it is unclear whether the people of Taiwan
will maintain their resistance to unification in a war, given the high costs of
war to other important Taiwanese interests , China's overwhelming supe-
riority in size and likely war-fighting endurance , and the common culture
and increasing societal ties connecting the people on the two sides of the
Strait.
The capabilities and credibility of the status-quo state interact with the re-
visionist state's interest in challenging the status quo to create the "expected
cost" of the use of force and thus the effectiveness of deterrence. Leaders must
balance the credibility of a threat to retaliate with the likely costs of retali-
ation when addressing the expected cost of use of force. Thus , high costs of
war can offset low credibility of retaliation. This was the source of effective
nuclear deterrence in the mutually assured destruction relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union. 6 In contemporary East Asia , the
high cost of war can compensate for a status-quo power's questionable re-
solve , as in extended deterrence threats or when doubts about resolve can
re f1 ect domestic politics , creating a high expected cost of use of force and
thus effective deterrence.
Deterrence can be effective in both East Asian theaters , but nonetheless
unstable if any of the protagonists fears that a surprise attack would lead to
very high costs or to defeat. Unstable deterrence can re f1 ect the inf1 uence of
geography, weapons technologies , and defense strategies on first-strike ca-
pabilities , creating heightened security dilemma dynamics as the offensive
potential of military capabilities and actions designed to deter or defend cre-
ate fears of attack and thus spiraling preparations for war .7 This is the crit..:
ical distinction between the Korean and Taiwan theaters. There is effective
mutual deterrence in both theaters , but heightened security dilemma dy-
namics undermine the contribution of deterrence to peace on the Korean
peninsula , but do not do so in the Taiwan Strait.

Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait

Peace in the Taiwan Strait requires mutual deterrence-both China

and Taiwan must be deterred from challenging the status quo. Deterring
China requires U.S. possession of the capabilities and credibility necessary
to persuade Beijing that the expected cost of U.S. retaliation would be
greater than the benefits of using force for unification. Deterrence of Taiwan
requires sufficient Chin~se capabilities and resolve to persuade Taipei that
the expected costs of a Chinese retaliation would be greater than the benefits
of formally declaring independence for Taiwan.
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAI 飞èJl AN 17

CAPABILITIES AND CREDIBILITY: DETERRING CHINA

Effective U.S. deterrence of Chinese use of force requires that Chinese

leaders understand that the United States possesses the capabilities and re-
solve to make Chinese use of force too costly to other Chinese interests.
They must understand that China lacks su面cient capabilities to incorporate
Taiwan and deter costly U.S. intervention.
Chinese military analysts argue that the most fundamental change in U.S.
conventional capabilities since the end of the Cold War is that the United
States no longer faces adversaries with superior or even equal conventional
power. During the Cold War , when the United States confronted adversaries
with effective conventional forces , it depended on its nuclear forces for
extended deterrence. Today, U.S. extended deterrence relies on the over-
whelming superiority of the United States in high-technology conventional
weaponry, so that Washington can de-link extended deterrence from reliance
on nuclear weapons. PRC military analysts further concluded from the U.S.
victories in the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 war in Kosovo not only that
high-technology weaponry had become the most important factor in war-
fighting , but that the elements of high-technology warfare "to a very high de-
gree determine the outcome of wa r." Thus , superiority in "precision-guided
weapons of greater variety and higher performance" results in "battlefield
contro l.吨 Moreover， the U.S. military's rapid deployment capabilities allow
it to project force "as soon as needed" for any regional contingency, further
reducing U.S. dependency on nuclear missiles for retaliation. 9
U.S. conventional rtlilitary superiority also benefits from superiority in
information warfare. In the era of information warfare , "military combat
‘ transparency' [toumingdu] . . . has already become an effective form of . . .
combat." The superior power can blind the adversary by destroying its
information systems , thus immobilizing its war-fighting capabilities and
establishing information dominance. Indeed , a fundamental element of con-
temporary deterrence is "information deterrence" (xinxi weishe). Some
Chinese military specialists argue that superior information capabilities can
create an "information umbrella" (xinxi san) that not only can substitute
for the nuclear umbrella but is superior to it. Information deterrence is the
咀nest result" of "defeating the enemy without fighting." 1
r8 SECURITY STUDIES

U.S. misgivings about punishing potential challengers. 12 As one military an-

alyst concluded , "the usability. of conventional deterrence forces is far
greater than that of nuclear deterrence forces" and the credibility ofU.S. ex-
tended deterrence commitments to intervene in local conflict is thus higher
than in the past. 13
Second, if deterrence fails , the United States can achieve its objectives
through victory on the battlefìeld. Conventional deterrence failure therefore
has the unintended effect of enhancing the credibility of subsequent U.S. de-
terrence threats. This was the effect of deterrence failure against Iraq and
the subsequent U.S. victory in the Gulf Wa r. Presumably, U.S. deterrence
failure and subsequent military actions fìrst against Serbia and then against
al-Qaeda terrorists and their Afghan host government have had a similar
effect in enhancing the credibility of the U.S. retaliatory threats .1 4
Third , if nations do not submit to U.S. demands , Washington can use con-
ventional forces to carry out "assured destruction ," which in the past would
have depended on nuclear weapons. U.S. 0丘ensive conventional capabilities
enable the United States to abandon the strategies of limited war and grad-
ual escalation it unsuccessfully employed in the Vietnam Wa r. Should deter-
rence fail , U.S. strategy calls for the rapid and decisive introduction of U.S.
forces , facilitating victory in the shortest possible time in the initial stages
of the war. 1S
Chinese leaders acknowledge that U.S. capab i1 ities would be particularly
effective against Chinese forces operating in the Taiwan theate r. A senior
Chinese military 0面cer has lectured his troops that China's likely adversary
in a local war would possess high-technology equipment that could neu-
tralize China's ability to rely on manpower to defeat the enemy. A civilian
analyst has noted that in a war in China's coastal region , it would be
di面cult for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to take advantage of its su-
perior numbers as it did during the Korean War, and that the adversary could
"make full use of its superiority in air and navallong-range , large-scale , high-
accuracy weaponry."16 A military analyst was more direct , explaining that
not only would such superior capabilities seriously restrict China's ability to
seize and maintain sea control around a "large island ," but would also pose
a major threat to coastal politica
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 19

Beijing must assume that the prospect of victory in a conflict with the
United States would be close to nil and that the costs of war and defeat
would be massive , even if China could defeat Taiwan and compel it to con-
cede. Once war began , the United States could target China's large but
backward navy. Even China's advanced Russian destroyers equipped with
highly capable missiles would not contribute to its war-fighting capability,
because they lack sufficient standoff range to challenge U.S. offensive forces.
Indeed , U.S. capabilities would be even more effective in targeting Chinese
surface assets at sef than they have been in targeting enemy assets in deserts ,
as in the 1991 GulfWar, the 2001 war in Afghanistan , and the 2003 war in
Iraq.19 War with the United States would also compel China to switch to a
wartime economy, requiring reallocation of resources away from civilian in-
frastructure development to large-scale acquisition of outdated military
hardware and would cost it access to international markets , capital , and
high technology. The resulting economic dislocations would defer China's
ability to achieve great power status well into the second half of the twenty-
first centu吓 20 Most important , the combination of a military defeat over
Taiwan and a domestic economic crisis would challenge the leadership's top
priority-continued leadership of China by the CCP. Nationalism and eco-
nomic performance , the twin pillars of CCP legitimacy, would collapse ,
bringing Party rule down with them.
Thus , China assumes that if the. United States intervened in a mainland-
Taiwan war, the costs of defeat would be catastrophic. It also assumes that
the United States has the resolve to intervene in a mainland-Taiwan war and
to impose such costs. Chinese civilian and military analysts understand that
U.S. domestic politics has encouraged the growth in U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan since the early 1990S and will constrain the administration's options
during a mainland-Taiwan conflict. They also acknowledge that the March
1996 U.S. deployment of two carriers to the vicinity of Taiwan during PRC
military maneuvers and missile launches was a "strong military signal" of
U.S. readiness to intervene in a war over Taiwan. 21 The carrier deployment
strongly coupled the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan to the credibility
of its commitments to its allies in East Asia. Since then, Chinese leaders have
assumed that a war wi
20 SECURITY STUDIES

Chinese analysts also realize that U.S. forces can wage war while re-
maining out of range of enemy forces and can use precision -guided munitions
to target leadership command-and-control centers to shorten the war and
further reduce casualties , thus enhancing American resolve to use force. Chi-
nese studies of the 1991 GulfWar concluded that high-accuracy, long-range
weaponry was the decisive factor in the U.S. victory. One Chinese military
analyst , summing up the impact of high technology on warfare , argued that
"whoever possesses the newest knowledge and technology can thus grab the
initiative in military combat and also possess the ‘ killer weapon' to vanquish
the enemy."25
Beijing possesses considerable respect for U.S. resolve , but it may believe
that Taiwan lacks resolve to fight a war against the mainland. Chinese lead-
ers may calculate that a rapid barrage of missile and air attacks against Tai-
wan in combination with the deployment of special forces could quickly
devastate Taiwan's resolve to resist, leading to political collapse and rapid
Taiwan capitulation to Beijing's political demands that it acknowledge the
mainland's sovereignty over Taiwan. Such a fait accompli strategy might en-
able Beijing to end the hostilities with a political victory before U.S. inter-
vention, leaving Washington the unattractive option of engaging PRC forces
in order to reverse Taiwan's compromise over a political issueof little con-
sequence to U.S. security interests. 26
But Beijing can have little confidence in the coercive capability of its mis-
siles. Beijing mayhave deployed as many as 700 DF- 巧 missiles across from
Taiwan by 2005.27 But Chinese missiles and aircraft have only limited
coercive capability. The United States dropped approximately 22 ,000 bombs
in its wars in Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan , including over 12,000 precision-
guided bombs in the latter case. Yet in both cases , U.S. missile and air assaults
did not cause enough destruction to cause rapid political surrender. In 2003 ,
the United States used cruise missiles to oust the Saddam Hussein govern-
ment, but it could not weaken his army's ability to wage protracted warfare.
Chinese missiles , despite significant improvement since 1995 , still lack the
accuracy ofU.S. missiles. 28 Thus , a Chinese missile-based fait accompli strat-
egy might wreak havoc in Taiwan , but Beijing cannot have high confidence
that it would cause Taiwa
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 21

with post-Cold War U.S. rapid response capabilities. The United States
possesses signi且cant forward military presence of the U.S. military in East
Asia. In addition to U.S. aircraft deployed in Japan, the United States has
transferred aÌrcraft carriers and attack submarines to the Pacifìc theater, de-
veloped nuclear-powered guided missile submarinesfor East Asia , and sta-
tioned cruise missiles on Guam, as well as fìghter aircraft , bombers , and un-
manned reconnaissance aircraft. It is also gaiùing increased access to naval
facilities in Japan , Singapore , and the Philippines. U.S. rapid response ca-
pabilities have thus greatly improved. 29 Finally, given the di面culty of sur-
prise and U.S. satellite and signal intelligence capabilities , additional U.S.
deployments would also likely be present at the outbreak of wa r. 30
Beijing acknowledges the high cost of a U.S.-China war, respects U.S. re-
solve , and is necessarily uncertain of its coercive capabilities and of Taiwan's
resolve. Accordingly, Chinese military 0面cers and civilian analysts urge
caution and promote reliance on "peaceful uni且cation" though long-term
development of China's economy and modernization of its military. "Smooth
economic development" is China's most fundamental interest and most im-
portant national security strategy. It is also the most effective way to assure
Chinese territorial integrity. As long as China's economy continues to de-
velop , time is on its side. 31 As one Chinese analyst has argued , China has
already waited 100 years to achieve unifìcation and should be prepared to
wait another 50 years. 32 In the meantime , as long as Chinese deterrence of
Taiwan is effective , China can achieve peaceful unifìcation through long-
term economic and militàry modernization. 33

CAPABILITIES AND CREDIBILITY: DETERRING TAIWAN

Peace in the Taiwan Strait also requires deterring a formal Taiwan

declaration of independence. This task falls to China. Beijing must possess
su面cient capability and credibility to impose costly retaliation against a
Taiwan challenge to the status quo. Effective deterrence of a Taiwan decla-
ration of independence by the PRC does not depend on its ability to defeat
Taiwan , but rather on its ability to punish it. PRC punishment capability rests
on the combination of the mainland's missile and aircraft capability and
Taiwan's economic and political vulnerability to mairiland use of force.
China's medium-range missiles are not very accurate and possess minimal
war-fìghting capability. Minimal hardening of Taiwan's defense facilities
would negate their pure military value. 34 Nonetheless , in combination with
penetration of Taiwan air space by the Chinese air force , Chinese missiles
have signi且cant punishment capability. Overnight , Taiwan's economy would
contract, and unemployment would skyrocket as its stock market plum-
meted and cipital fled the island. In the fìrst three months of 1996, when
China massed its troops across the Strait from Taiwan and carried out
22 SECURITY STUDIES

military exerclses nearby, the Taiwanese stock market fell by 巧 percent，

even though the government spent U.S.$ I. 6 billion to reduce. the decline.
Loss of confidence in the Taiwan dollar and panic buying of the U.S. dollar
required the Taiwan government to intervene in capital markets. 35 More-
over , Chinese missiles are inexpensive and in close proximity to Taiwan, so
that over the long term , missile-defense systems will not be able to offset
Taiwan's vulnerability to PRC missiles. 36
In addition to targeting Taiwan with its SRBMs , the mainland could also
declare a blockadearound the island. Although the Chinese navy and air
force would lack the ability to militarily enforce a blockade against U.S.
military intervention , the mere announcement of such a blockade and PRC
threats of economic sanctions against any of its trading partners that con-
tinued to trade with Taiwan would not only dramatically curtail commer-
cial shipping to Taiwan but also cut off most of Taiwan's remaining foreign
trade.
Finally, the mainland could directly retaliate against Taiwan's economic
interests. As Taiwan has increased its economic involvement in the main-
land economy, it has been losing its economic autonomy and ceding lever-
age over its continued prosperity to the mainland. In 200I , the combined
Chinese-Hong Kong market surpassed the U.S. market as Taiwan's most
important export market. In 2002 and in 2003 , Taiwan's exports to the
mainland increased by more than 25 percent , while Taiwan's exports to the
United States declined. And in 2003 , more than 35 percent of Taiwan's ex-
ports went to the China-Hong Kong market, while Chinese exports to Tai-
wan amounted to only 6.4 percent of total Chinese exports. 37 Moreover , in
2002 , the mainland became the leading production center of overseas Tai-
wan investors. Nearly 55 percent of Taiwan overseas investment is located
on the mainland and Taiwan's largest corporations , including its high-
technology manufacturers , have invested in the mainland. These investment
trends create an additional source of PRC leverage over Taiwan's economy.38
Cross-Strait economic trends are creating societal ties that the mainland
can use for political purposes. More than one million Taiwanese now have
residence~ on the mainland , where they have established separate Taiwan
communities , complete with elementary schools. More than 500 ,000 Tai-
wanese live in the Shanghai are
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 工3

Chinese military and economic retaliation against a Taiwan declaration

of independence and the ensuing international and domestic crisis would
inevitably cause political instability on Taiwan. In a mainland-Taiwan war ,
not only would Taiwan's economy suffer, but the survival of Taiwan's dem-
ocratic political system would be in jeopardy. Thus , the cost to Taiwan of
mainland retaliation. against a declaration of independence would be the
loss of its economic prosperity and of its demoèracy.
The mainland's threat to retaliate against a declaration of independence
is credible. As noted above , the result of China 、 fìfty-year commitment to
Ulll且cation is that the politicallegitimacy and survival of the Chinese lead-
ership is attached to its commitment to resist Taiwan independence. As one
Chinese analyst argues , "no Chinese politician, strategist, or anyone else
will dare to abandon the objective of making Taiwan return and the
unifìcation of the motherland."41 Failure to respond to a declaration of in-
dependence would also challenge China's international reputation to defend
other vital interests , affecting border security and independence movements
around its periphery. But the mainland also has developed a reputation for
resolve regarding the Taiwan issue. Despite the risk of U.S. intervention and
of a U.S.-China crisis , in March 1996, the PLA launched DF-15 missiles
into coastal waters within the vicinity of Kaohsiung , Taiwan's major port
city, to underscore its will to oppose Taiwan independence and thus reverse
the trend in U.S. policy toward Taiwan and Lee Teng-hui's independence
policy. Senior Taiwan political and military 0面cials concur that a declara-
tion of independence would lead to war with the mainland 卢
The deterrent effect òf mainland capabilities and credibility is reflected
in Taiwan's domestic politics. Since 1997, in public opinion surveys com-
missioned by the Taiwan government, support for an immediate declaration
of Taiwan independence has declined since the high of 7.4 percent in mid
1998. The consistent low level of support for immediate independence
reflects widespread understanding on Taiwan that mainland retaliation
would be both costly and likely. Indeed , Taiwan voters have routinely sig-
naled their opposition to pro-independence politicians. Since Taiwan's 且rst
competitive election in 1989 , on all but one occasion , the pro-independence
party h
24 SECURITY STUDIES

tion with his mainland policy.43 Since then, visits to the mainland and the
strong statements in opposition to Taiwan independence by opposition
party leaders have been widely supported by the electorate.

Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula

As with the Taiwan Strait, peace on the Korean peninsula requires mu-
tual deterrence. Deterring North Korea depends on U.S. possession of the ca-
pabilities and credibility necessary to persuade Pyongyang that the expected
cost of U.S. intervention in a north-south war would be greater than the
bene fì. ts of using force for uni fì. cation. Deterrence of the United States and
South Korea from using force to eliminate the Pyongyang government or its
nuclear weapons capability requires that the expected cost of North Korean
retaliation be high enough to persuade them to accept the status quo.

CAPABILITIES AND CREDIBILITY: DETERRING NORTH KOREA

North Korean commentary does not use the language of deterrence

to discuss contemporary military trends. Nor does North Korea publish de-
tailed analyses of contemporary military affairs or of the likely course of a
war on the Korean peninsula. Nonetheless , North Korea's assessment of the
U.S. military makes it clear that North Koreans share Chinese respect for
U.S. ability to intervene in post-Cold War regional conflicts.
North Korean commentators concur with Chinese analysts that the
United States faces no opponent in the Third World that can limit its use of
force , its "tyranny and military hegemony." This is a "very dangèrous de-
velopment," Song Mu-kyong asserts , because it enables theUnited States to
use force "as it sees fì. t" and to carry out "armed intervention at any time."44
Pyongyang further understands that the source of U.S. post-Cold War su-
premacy is its development of high-technology weaponry. North Korean
analysts observe that modern warfare is "three-dimensional" and that it re-
lies on long-range weaponry, such as missiles , to carryout offensive opera-
tions. These analysts point to such advances as stealth air and naval tech-
nologies , including radar-elusive vessels equipped with long-range missiles ,
and laser weaponry as reflecting Washington's quest for domination. 45
Moreover, North Korea understands that the forward military presence
of the United States enables it to "carry out armed intervention at any
time ," and that since theend of the Cold War, the United States has been
expanding its deployment in East Asia. In the aftermath of the U.S. war
against the Taliban , North Korean commentaries observed that the United
States is trying to consolidate its supremacy in East Asia to better prepare
to cope with a Korean "contingency."46
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAI \V AN 25

Pyongyang also acknowledges the security consequences ofNorth Korea's

extreme technological backwardness. An editorial in the Korean Workers'
Party newspaper put it bluntly. "Now is the age of science and technology.
We cannot even take a step forward." Thus , whether N orth Korea can
"possess up-to-date science and technology . . . in a short period of time is
a serious question decisive to the future of the nation. "47 Key to North
Korea's interest in science and technology is its preoccupation with informa-
tion technologies. "Everything depends on the ideological point of view. In
the new century, we cannot do anything at all without the knowledge of in-
formation technology. Nor can we remain loyal to the party and leader. "48
Another author observed , "We are living in a century where the national
strength of each country is guaranteed by science and technology, which is
developing at an unimaginably rapid rate."49 Thus , "how to develop mili-
tary science and technology is a crucial issue to national defense." Because
a "bloody competition is taking place in the science and technology sector
world wide . . . , it is impossible to have one's own strong military capabil-
ity without improved science and technology." 50 Given the gravity of N orth
Korea's strategic circumstances , it is "旦旦旦旦坠pt upon the North Korean
revolutionary party and people to build up their own military force more
firmly than ever before." Thus , they should focus on developing science and
technology to help arm the military with "sophisticated weapons and de-
fend the sovereignty of their country." 51
The leadership's recognition of North Korean technological inferiority
has led to fundamental changes in Pyongyang's approach to ideology, eco-
nomic development , and foreign trade. Whereas in the past, North Korea's
economic isolation reflected its ideological commitment to self-reliance ,
today it also reflects the U.S. blockade of science and technology. North
Koreans must "smash" this blockade , Kim Chong-son asserts , or they will
not be able to "free themselves from backwardness even after 100 years."52
Similarly, whereas the doctrine of self-reliance once implied economic
芝~!archy， Pyongyang now sees self-reliance as an objective requiring devel-
opmeIÌfòf high-technology capabilities through imports from advanced
economies. In the contempora t; y era , where there is no science and tech-
nology, "there is no sel
26 SECURITY STUDIES

use of the market and creation of specia1 economic zones for foreign
investment. 55
NorthKorea can ho1d 1ittle hope of withstanding an encounter with U.S.
forces. Even shou1d Pyongyang's ground forces be ab1e to occupy much
of South Korea , U.S. air and nava1 power wou1d be ab1e to inflict devastat-
ing assau1ts on the primitive and undernourished North Korean army, so
thatNorth Korea's ability to ho1d South Korean territory is doubtfu l. More-
over , its air force , missiles , and artillery cou1d I?-Dt provide assistance to its
ground forces , because U.S. air and nava1 p1atforms cou1d target North
Korean assets while remaining out of range of its air defense systems. The
North Korean military might be ab1e to impose significant costs on South
Korea , but the United States wou1d retain the mi1itary capabi1ities to inflict
rapid defeat on the North Korean military and high costs on its economic
system.
Moreover, paralleling the Chinese situation , North Korean military de-
feat wou1d not on1y frustrate Pyongyang's effort to unify the peninsu1a un-
der communism but wou1d 1ead to the fall of the North's Korean Workers'
Party and to Korean unification under southern ru1e. In North Korea's case ,
the end of Party ru1e wou1d result not on1y from 10ss of 1egitimacy and the
economic dis1ocations following military defeat , but a1so from 1ikely U.S.
and South Korean determination to achieve an unnegotiated end to the war
based on unconditiona1 surrender.
North Korea a1so respects the credibility of U.S. reta1iatory threats. First,
Pyongyang must contend with Washington、 fifty-year security commitment
to the defense of South Korea. This commitment is reflected in U.S. partic-
ipation in the Korean War, the subsequent and ongoing U.S. military pres-
ence in South Korea , and the United States-Repub1ic of Korea Mutua1
Defense Treaty. Because none of these signa1s of commitment exist in the
U.S.-Taiwan relationship , North Korea's assessment ofU.S. reso1ve to defend
South Korea is like1y much greater than China's assessment of U.S. reso1ve
to defend Taiwan.
Second, the U.S. reputation for reso1ve is bo1stered by North Korea's
eva1uation of U.S. willingness to use force in the post-Co1d War era. Ac-
cording to N orth Korean commentary, American use of force to overthrow
the Ta1iban government was simp1y the 1atest post-Cold War example of
the U.S. effort to rid the world of countries that resist its wi1 1. Moreover,
each
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 27

of punishment."58 Changes in U.S. defense doctrine indicating readiness to

use nuclear weapons against states developing weapons of mass destruction
suggest even greater U.S. resolve. Pyongyang argued that Asia was the most
contentious region in the world , and that the Korean peninsula was the
"dangerous ignition point for nuclear war in Asia."North Korea was the
"且rst target of the U.S. nuclear attack plan ," according to Kim Chong-son. 59
Thus , both North Korea and China believe the United States has the
commitment and capabilities necessary to make credible its retaliatory
threats. But whereas in the Taiwan theater, Beijing understands that the
United States can rely on its long-range missiles and advanced aircraft to
limit its casualties , North Korea's ability to use its ground forces to inflict
significant casualties on the United States may undermine the credibility of
the American commitment to defend South Korea. This difference between
the two theaters is not trivia l. Nonetheless , another difference between the
two regions is also significant. Whereas in the Taiwan theater, U.S. deter-
rent forces remain outside the theater, thus suggesting the possibility of
mainland-Taiwan war that does not involve the United States , in the Korea
theater, U.S. troops are at the front line , so that U.S. credibility to defend
South Korea is enhanced by the presumed U.S. resolve to retaliate against
an attack on its own forces. U.S. forces play the role of a "trip wire." In ad-
dition , the large U.S. civilian presence in Seoul and elsewhere in South
Korea means that Pyongyang cannot avoid inflicting significant collateral
damage on U.S. citizens.
Complementing the U.S. retaliatory capabilities and resolve is South
Korea's own development of a retaliatory capability. Since the 1990s, Seoul
has acquired over 100 U.S.-made advanced 300-kilometer-range ground-
to-ground guided missiles and 29 launchers. Since then, it has begun the
acquisition of U.S. joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) , which the United
States used in Afghanistan in 2001 and has used in Iraq since 2003.60 The
deployment of these missiles will give South Korea an independent and sur-
Vl飞rable retaliatory capability that can reach over a North Korean invasion
force to target Pyongyang's command and control facilities and its defense
facilities.
Thus , in the early twenty-first century, American andalso South Korean
credibility to use
28 SECURITY STUDIES

the unification of Korea by the U.S. military. As with China's attitude

toward Taiwan , North Korea has waited over 缸ty years to "liberate" South
Korea and is prepared to wait another fifty years.

CAPABILITIES AND CREDIBILITY: DETERRING

SOUTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES

Deterring war on the Korean peninsula also requires that the United
States and South Korea be deterred from using force against North Korea.
The effectiveness of North Korea's deterrence posture , based upon its as-
sured destruction retaliatory capability, is evident from U.S. assessments of
Pyongyang's capabilities and resolve , from its assessment of the risk of war,
and from its caution in crisis situations.
North Korean capabilities make the cost of war prohibitively high for
both South Korea and the United States , and no strategy, including a mas-
sive surprise attack , can create sufficient con且dence that this cost can be re-
duced to an acceptable leve l. Pyongyang's only plausible strategy to defend
against an invasion is to go on the offensive , and just as South Korea has de-
ployed the bulk of its forces between the demilitarized zone and Seoul
(which is some 30 miles from the DMZ) , North Korea has deployed most
of its forces-over 700 ,000 soldiers and two thousand tanks-south of its
capital (which is 85 miles from the border). It lacks both the infrastructure
to enable dispersed forces to coordinate a rapid response against a focused
attack and the ability to turn back an attack from deep within its territory.
As General James R. Clapper , former deputy director of the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency, observed , North Koreans "think that the best defense
is a good offense."61
Complementing Pyongyang's conventional defense strategy is its conven-
tional and WMD-based deterrent capability. Its forward deployment of its
conventional forces deters invasion by threatening to make a ground attack
on North Korea very costly. Between Pyongyang and the demilitarized zone ,
North Korea has deployed approximately 8,000 artillery systems , including
500 long-range systems , armed with one million tons of ammunition. The
U.S. Department of Defense estimates that this artillery could sustain a bar-
rage on South Korea. of up to 500 ,000 rounds an hour for several hours.
Augmenting North Korea's conventional deterrent is its deployment of
chemical munitions in its artillery systems. Beginning ip. the late 1980s, as
North Korea experienced increasing military inferiority vis-à-vis South
Korea , it developed chemical weapons. By the late 1990s, Pyongyang had
stockpiled up to 5,000 metric tons of chemical agents. Approximately
10 percent of its forward-deployed artillery shells are deployed with chem
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 29

Deployed at the front lines , North Korea's WMD capability is a destruc-

tive trip wire that poses a credible "use it or lose it" retaliatory threat of
widespread civilian and military casualties in South Korea , even should
North Korea be unable to avoid rapid political collapse after a U.S. retalia-
tory attack. Thus , in 1994 Washington could not discount Pyongyang's
threat to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire" if United States carried out a pre-
ventive strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities. The U.S. Department
of Defense estimated that in the first ninety days of an ensuing war, there
would be over 50 ,000 U.S. casualties and nearly 500,000 South Korean
casualties. 63
North Korea's nuclear program and its ballistic missile program possess
a similar deterrent threat. Pyongyang began its nuclear weapons program in
the late 1980s, just as the collapse of Soviet power undermined the balance
of power on the peninsula and Moscow was normalizing relations with
Seou1. 64 By 1994 , North Korea had extracted su面cient enriched uranium to
produce two nuclear bombs. In 2005 , U.S. officials reported that it had ex-
tracted sufficient plutonium to make six nuclear bombs. 65 In June 2003 , as
U.S.-North Korean tension escalated , Pyongyang declared that it was ac-
ti飞rely developing a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. aggression. In August ,
it said that it planned to declare itself a nuclear power , and that it was
prepared to carry out a nuclear test. 66 Although North Korea has yet to
conduct a nuclear test , and there is uncertainty regarding North Korean
possession of a delivery vehicle , the United States cannot assume that war
on the Korean peninsula will not escalate to North Korean use of nuclear
weapons.
North Korea's deterrent capahility is enhanced by the credibility of its
retaliatory threat. Pyongyang's past willingness to use terrorism , special op-
erations , and low-level force against the South Korean leadership reflects its
willingness to q?eate crises and risk war evenin the absence of threats to re-
gime surviva l. Its style of crisis diplomacy, including its frequent readiness
to heighten tension and threaten war, further contributes to its reputation
for recklessness. 67 Indeed , mirroring North Korea's perception of the re-
solve in U.S. defense policy to carry out a preemptive strike , the United
States and South Korea perceive in North Korean behavior the resolve nec-
essary to use force for unifica
30 SECURITY STUDIES

Stable and Unstable Deterrence

Effective deterrence exists both in the Taiwan Strait and on the

Korean peninsula , but whereas it is stable in the former case , in the latter,
it is unstable. The difference lies in the distinct geographic deployments of
the protagonists and the implications for security dilemma dynamics.
Instability in deterrence is characterized by a propensity for unintended
crisis escalation and for unintended wa r. This occurs when a status-quo
state is vulnerable to a debilitating 且rst strike , so that it experiences pres-
sure to prepare for war rather than risk being caught unprepared. Stable de-
terrence , on the other hand , reflects con且dence on the part of both states
that the outcome of a war would not be determined ~y a surprise attack. In
these circumstances , each of them can observe its counterpar t's actions with
greater patience , rather than prepare for possible imminent attack. Thus ,
crises are slower to develop and unintended war less likely. Mutual deter-
rence can be effective yet unstable. Two states may be deterred from using
force by their opponen t's retaliatory threat , but if each state's deterrent pos-
ture includes first-strike capabilities , each may nonetheless respond to the
other's efforts at deterrence with preparations for war, thus contributing to
a crisis spiral.
In the U.S.-China dyad in the Taiwan Strait, there is relatively minimal
security dilemma pressure for unintended cnsls escalation. The United
States has little apprehension that a surprise PRC attack on U.S. naval forces
would determine the outcome of the war, for China lacks the capability to
launch an attack that would deny the United States time to protect su面cient
forces to maintain a powerful retaliatory capability. Although China has in-
creasingly been relying on Russian submarines to enable it to threaten U.S.
surface ships and to develop an access-denial capability, this capability does
not allow a decisive first-strike capability. The security of the U.S. surface
fleet reflects China's intrinsic inability as a land power to contend with the
naval forces of an advanced maritime power. It also reflects its backward
economy and technology. Given U.S. information warfare dominance and
China's limited targeting ability, U.S. surface vessels will be relatively secure
from Chinese capabilities for many years. Thus , Chinese capabilities that
deter Taiwan independence do not have a first-strike capability aga
 ÐETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAI 顶lAN 3 工

spending and the considerable head start the United States possesses in both
quantity and quality in the U.S.-China naval balance ensure long-term U.S.
maritime superiority and , thus , continued stable deterrence in the Taiwan
Strai t.
The security of U.S. deployments in East Asia against a surprise Chinese
attack enables the United States to respond to Chinese mobilization of de-
terrent capabilities thatalso allow for a coercive fait accompli strike against
Taiwan without contributing to cnSlS escalation. U.S. aircraft based on
Okinawa can come to Taiwan's defense without extensive defensive prepa-
rations suggesting offensive planning. The United States can also deploy
its power-projection naval forces to the region to "observe" Chinese actions
without placing these forces on high alert , thus contributing to conf1 ict
contro l.
Just as U.S. naval forces are secure from a surprise Chinese attack , China
is secure from a surprise U.S. attack. Although the United States possesses
capabilities that can inf1 ict considerable costs on China , Chinese leaders do
not fear that a surprise attack w i1l deterinine either the outcome of war or
the fate of the regime. China's mere size offers it security from air attack.
The United States signi且cantly depleted its stockpile of cruise missiles in its
war in Kosovo , but the impact on Serbian w i1l or war-fighting capability
was minima l. 71 China's ability to absorb such an attack is far greate r. More-
over , China's DF-15 missile launchers are mobile , so that they can be pro-
tected from attack , preserving China's ability to retaliate against a Taiwan
declaration of independence. 72 Defeating China requires engaging it on the
mainland..But as the U.S. experience in both the Korean and Vietnam wars
revealed , the United States possesses minimal ability to project war-winning
power onto the East Asian mainland.
The security of U.S. and Chinese capabilities explains each side's com-
posure during the 1996 March confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. China
launched DF-15s in the vicinity of Taiwan, and the United States responded
by deploying two aircraft carriers within 200 miles of the Chinese coast.
Nevertheless , Secretary of Defense Perry con且dently observed that a Chi-
nese attack on Taiwan would be " a dumb thing." China , he said , did "not
have the capability" to invade Taiwan. Although Perry believed that China
had the ability to "harass" Taiwan , he observ
32 SECURITY STUDIES

China was equally composed. Although the United States deployed two
aircraft carriers to the vicinity of Taiwan and possessed considerable
forward-presence air power on Okinawa , China did not perceive the U.S.
response to its political use of force as posing an imminent threat of a deci-
sive first strike. Hence , it did not heighten the readiness of Chinese forces in
response to U.S. deployments. To the extent that Beijing may have short-
ened its military show of force , it responded to the political costs of its con-
frontation with the United States , not the risk of war .75
Mutual deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is effective and stable. But on the
Korean peninsula , there is unstable mutual deterrence. The likelihood of
crisis escalation and unintended war is greater, reflecting each side's vulner-
ability to a surprise attack and the likelihood that a surprise attack could
determine the outcome of the wa r.
In contrast to the character of the Chinese deterrent forces in the Taiwan
Strait, North Korean and U.S. capabilities that deter use of force and defend
against an invasion also possess offensive ，且rst-strike capabilities. Both
countries have deployed land-based forces and weapons systems to serve as
a trip-wire deterrent, yet trip wires do not only contribute to deterrence.
Trip-wire deployments close to a border also create a first-strike capability
that contributes to an adversary's fear of attack. The resulting security di-
lemma dynamics are thus a critical factor in threat perception on both sides
of the demilitarized zone.
North Korea's forward-deployed ground forces and tanks pose the threat
of a blitz warfare strategy. According to retired General John Tilelli , the for-
mer commander of U.S. forces in South Korea , the "tyranny of proximity"
of Pyongyang's massive forward deployment of artillery systems and chem-
ical weapons enables North Korea to carry out destructive shelling of both
U.S. and South Korean forces and the civilian population in Seoul. 76 Should
North Korea launch a surprise massive first strike , there would be extraor-
dinarily high casualties among both the military and civilian populations.
Moreover, the ensuing associated panic and widespread destruction in South
Korea could also make an effective retaliatory attack di面cult. U.S. and South
Korean infantry and land-based aircraft might be immobilized , limiting the
initial U.S. reprisal to shelling from naval
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 33

In these strategic circumstances , there is intense pre削re for crisis esca-

lation on both sides of the border. General Leon J. LaPorte , commander of
U.S. forces in South Korea , explained that due to the "proximity and lethal-
ity" of North Korean capabilities , U.S. forces "must be ‘ ready to be able to
fight tonight. 门'78 In these insecure circumstances , North Korean military
moves designed to signal deterrent credibility w i1l be readily seen by the
United States as potentially dangerous preparations for a first strike , thus
eliciting corresponding military mobilization and spiraling crisis dynamics.
During the June 1994 crisis , as the United States prepared to mobilize its
forces for a possible strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities , the Clin-
ton administration feared that its own military preparations might elicit a
North Korean preemptive strike , even though the United States had not yet
decided to use force. Such fears were warranted-North Korea had begun
to mobilize its forces just as the United States was evaluating its deployment
options. Former President Jimmy Carter's diplomatic intervention during
his visit to Pyongyang on 16 June 1994 did not forestall an imminent U.S.
attack , but it did defuse a developing crisis that might well have quickly
escalated into unintended war .79 Thus , in 1994 , the mere preparation for
deployment of U.S. forces had elicited heightened tension and a dangerous
U.S.-North Korean crisis in a way that China's actual military deployments
and missile and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 had not.
The 2003 Korean crisis reflected similar elements of crisis instability.
Whereas the Clinton administration had considered positioning forces near
North Korea to prepare to attack North Korean facilities , in 2003 , the Bush
administration actually deployed U.S. forces near North Korea to try to co-
erce Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program. In February, it
positioned equipment for launching precision-guided missiles near North
Korea and placed B-1 and B-52 bombers on alert for deployment to Guam.
In March , it deployed these bombers to Guam , immediately following Pres-
ident Bush's warning that he was prepared to use force to end North Ko-
rea's nuclear program. In addition, U.S. and South Korean forces carried
out large-scale war games , using F-1 17 Stealth 且ghters for the first time in
seven years. Following the exercises , these fìghte
34 SECURITY STUDIES

ment its capabilities on the Korean peninsula by immediately deploying an

advanced Stryker Brigade Combat Team to South Korea , facilitating rapid
and flexible application of U.S. medium and heavy weaponry. Washington
also announced that it would deploy advanced Apache military helicopters
and PAC-3 missiles in Korea. 81
The United States accompanied its increased military deployments with
signals that it was prepared to initiate use of force against North Korea. In
September 2002 , the Bush administration released its report on U.S. na-
tional security, which explicitly stated that preemption was an effective re-
sponse to threats of nuclear proliferation. 82 Fo11owing U.S. use of force
against Iraq in March 2003 , North Korea seemed the likely next target of
U.S. preemptive use of force. In February, President Bush repeatedly warned
North Korea that 飞11 military options were open" to deal with its nuclear
program. In March , he warned that if U.S. efforts "don't work diplomati-
cally, they' l1 have to work militarily." Other U.S. 0面cials warned that N orth
Korea should learn a lesson from U.S. use of force against Iraq.83 In May,
U.S. Defense Department officials explained that the United States was de-
ploying its forces in Northeast Asia to be able to carry out an attack on the
North Korean leadership similar to the attack that it had just launched
against the Iraqi leadership.84
In this context , both U.S. and North Korean forces prepared to be at-
tacked. U.S. forces were at the "highest stage of readiness." According to a
U.S. defense official , there was no way for them "to be any more prepared."
Echoing General LaPorte's remark in 2002 , General George Coggins , the
operations 0面cer for U.S. forces in South Korea , reported that U.S. soldiers
were "ready to fight tonight if we have tO."85 North Korea was similarly
prepared for wa r. As the United States made the final preparations for war
against Iraq , North Korean president Kim Jong 11 飞平rent into seclusion for
fifty days near the Chinese border, apparently fearing that he might be the
target of a U.S. attack. U.S. forces prepared to interdict North Korean
vessels suspected of carrying components of weapons of mass destruction ,
and Pyongyang warned that its forces were at "full combat readiness."
Pyongyang declared that it was "closely watching" U.S. preparations "with
a high degree of vigilance. "86
U.S. concern for the North Korean "tyranny of proximity'
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 35

the first such test in three years. In February, too , its military aircraft entered
South Korean airspace for the first time in twentyyears. In March , North
Korean military aircraft intercepted a U.S. reconnaissance plane. The North
Korean aircraft came within fifty feet of the U.S. plane and tailed it for over
twenty minutes. Then , in July, South Korean and North Korean forces
exchanged machine-gun fire over the demilitarized zone. 87
The instability of the Korean peninsula is underscored by prior cases in
which fear of 且rst strikes elicited preparation for wa r. According to the
North Korean defector Hwang Jang Yap , during three prior U.S.-North
Korean incidents , the north was on the brink of war. It was in crisis mode
during the 1968 Pueblo incident, involving North Korean capture of a U.S.
intelligence collection ship , the 1969 EC-12 incident , and the 1976 Pan-
munjom incident, involving the murder of two U.S. military 0面cers. In each
case , Pyongyang placed its troops on high alert and transferred civilian pop-
ulations in preparation for a wa r. 88 Similarly, according to General Clapper ,
the annual U.S.-South Korea Team Spirit military exercise causes height-
ened threat perception in Pyongyang , because the North Korean leadership
cannot be sure that the exercises are not a prelude to a devastating first
strike. 89 The high-technology conventional superiority of the United States
and its preemptive strategy have increased the threat to Pyongyang of attack
and thus further intensified the dilemma of security instability.90 The United
States and South Korea are similarly predisposed to prepare for attack dur-
ing military incidents with North Korea. In addition to fearing a North Ko-
rean surprise attack during the 1994 crisis , during the 1976 Panmunjom in-
cident , Washington heightened the alert status of U.S. military forces and
deployed military aircraft to South Korea from Idaho. 91
The potential for crisis escalation is intrinsic to the strategic structure of
the opposing forces on the Korean peninsula. The contrast with the Taiwan
theater is clear. Despite annual and increasingly larger and more sophisti-
cated PRC military exercises in the Taiwan Strait since 1996, there has not
been corresponding tension in U.S.-China relations. Since the 1950s, there
has not been any tension in the Taiwan Strait similar to the repeated crises
on the Korean peninsula.
The deterrence relation
36 SECURITY STUDIES

Nonetheless , there is a critical distinction between Europe before World

War I and the contemporary Korean peninsula. Crisis escalation in 1914
reflected Austrian and German fear of a Russian offensive. Germàn support
for Austria required Berlin to mobilize for war in response to Russian
mobilization for war against Austria. Alliance dynamics combined with
security dilemma dynamics to contribute to unintended war. On the Korean
peninsula , although China and North Korea are allies , they do not share
the same security dilemma concerns regarding U.5. capabilities. Whereas
U.S. deterrent and defensive deployments threaten North Korea with 且rst­
strike capabilities , thus requiring Pyongyang to mobilize rapidly during pe-
riods of heightened tension, U.5. deployments do not pose a similar threat
to China.
The moderate security d i1 emma in U.5.-China relations on the Korean
peninsula has two important and positive implications for crisis escalation
and unintended war. First, Chinese leaders can observe U.5. preparations
for war against North Korea without carrying out a corresponding mobi-
lization of China's own ground forces. Given China's overwhelming nu-
merical superiority in ground forces , even should the United States escalate
the war to China's borders , or even into Chinese territory, Beijing can be
confìdent that it can repel the attack and defeat U.5. forces on the Korean
peninsula. 93 5uch confìdence explains Chinese patience before it mobilized
its forces and then engaged U.5. troops following U.5. entry into the Korean
War in 1950.94 Similarly, in 1994 , despite the crisis in U.S.-North Korean
relations , although China warned the United States not to attack North Ko-
rean nuclear sites , there is no evidence that China prepared its forces for
war. And during the 1976 Panmunjon incident , the Nixon administration
was not concerned about possible Chìnese or Soviet intervention should the
United States retaliate militarily against the killing of the two U.5. 。面cers. 95
Thus , a crisis on the Korean peninsula can be contained within U.S.-North
Korean relations , reducing the potential for a great power war. In this re-
spect , the implications of U.S. mobilization for deterrence on the Korean
peninsula for China is similar to the impact of Chinese mobilization for de-
terrence in the Taiwan 5trait for the United States. In these two scenarios ,
the third-party great power can obs
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAI\VAN 37

Conclusions

There is effective mutual deterrence in both the Taiwan and Korean

theaters. No country values revising the status quo higher than the expected
cost of use of force. Nonetheless , because of very different deployment pat-
terns and geographies , the security dilemma dynamics in the two theaters
are very different. In the Taiwan Strait, the United States can rely on offshore
platforms that minimize U.S. vulnerability to a first strike from Chinese
forces. In contrast , although North Korea cannot rival China as a military
power , its conventional capabilities and its chemical weapons capability
present a far greater offensive threat to the United States than Chinese ca-
pabilities. This is because defense of South Korea has required U.S. ground
force deployments close to the North Korean border. Whereas the United
States is relatively secure in its confrontation in the Taiwan Strait with
China , the world's second most powerful country, without the protection of
water , the United States is vulnerable to a first strike from North Korea , one
of the world's poorest and most backward countries. 96
These distinct dynamics create very different prospects for conflict man-
agement. In the Taiwan Strait, there may well be future confrontations sim-
ilar to those in 1996, because China may once again use its military in re-
sponse to developments in Taiwan's mainland policy or in U.S.-Taiwan
relations , and the United States may respond with its own political use of
force. But, as in the past , there is minimal likelihood that such confronta-
tions will escalate into a true great power crisis. Stable mutual deterrence
reduces pressures for both unwanted escalation and unintended wa r.
In addition , the peripheral role of U.S.-Taiwan relations in U.S. deter-
rence of Chinese use of force allows the United States to manage relations
with Taiwan with relatively minimal attention to the implications for sta-
bility. Thus both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations could
criticize Taiwan's moves toward independence without undermining U.S.
deterrence of Chinese use of force. In this respect , the U.S. relationship
with Taiwan in cross-Strait deterrence is similar to China's relationship
with North Korea in deterrence on the Korean peninsula , with similar pol-
icy consequences. Chinese con且dence in U.S. respect for China's threat
to retaliate against U.S. troops in Korea has enabled China to manage
potentia
38 SECURITY STUDIES

worried that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or improved U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic

relations might encourage Taiwan independence by suggesting that the
United States would defend Taiwan against mainland retaliation. But the
combination of mainland missiles and Taiwan's economic vulnerability
has increasingly undermined the value to Taiwan of the U.S.-Taiwan defense
relationship. For all its power, the United States can defend Taiwan against
neither missiles nor economic sanctions. Thus , many Chinese foreign policy
analysts now argue that effective Chinese~terrence of Taiwan indepen-
dence through credible and assured destruction threats means that "time is
on China's side ," and Chinese leaders can more easily tolerate provocative
U.S. policies with regard to Taiwan. 97
In contrast to the constructive trends in the Taiwan theater, the Korean
peninsula is likely to remain far more dangerous than the Taiwan Strait, de-
spite efforts at conflict management. If the Taiwan issue is the world's most
likely source of a great power war, the Korean peninsula is and will remain
the world's most likely source of major wa r. 98
In contrast to the Taiwan Strait, developing policy to promote greater
stability on the Korean peninsula is inherently difficult. The tendency of
states to focus on capabilities rather than on intentions and the massive
deployments on both sides of the demilitarized zone mean that the United
States and South Korea and North Korea will all experience intense pres-
sure to make policy based on worst-case assumptions. As Deputy Direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency John McLaughlin observed , it might
be "foolish" for North Korea to use force , but it also "would be foolish
to make that assumption. . . . We can ill-afford to ignore capabilities."99
North Korean leaders would agree-U.S. capabilities require preparation
for wa r.
In this context , it is likely that confidence-building measures that focus
on intentions , such as nonaggression agreements and normalization of re-
lations , will be rejected by both the United States and North Korea; the risks
of being seduced by false promises are extraordinarily high. Rather than
focus on intentions , management of the security dilemma on the Korean
peninsula must focus on the capability-induced instability there. Fear of sur-
prise attack and corresponding pressure for crisis escalation can be reduced
by measures such as advance noti
 DETERRENC 豆 AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 39

Notes

I. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security

Strategy for America (Washington , D.C: Brookings Institution Press , I999) , chs. 3
and 4.
2. Thomas C Schelling , The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University
Press , I963) , ch. 9; Thomas C Schelling , Arms and In斤uence (New Haven , Conn.:
Yale University Press ，工 966) ， ch. 6.
3. Richard K. Betts , Nu c/ear Blackmail and Nu c/ ear Balance (Washington , D.C:
Brookings Institution Press ，工 987); Patrick M. Morgan , "Saving Face for the Sake
of Deterrence ," in Psychology and Deterrence , ed. Robert Jervis , Richard Ned Le-
bow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press , I9 8 5) ,
I25 -3 5; Schelling , Arms and Influence , chs. 2 and 3, and Strategy of Conflict, ch. 8.
There is debate in the theoretical 1iterature regarding the role of reputation in deter-
rence. See Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke , Deterrence in American For-
eign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press , I974) ,
559-60; William W. Kaufmann , "The Requirements of Deterrence ," in Military
Policy and National Security , ed. id. (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press ,
I95 6 ) ，巧 -29; Glenn H. Snyder and PaUl Diesing , Conflict Among Nations: Bar-
gaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton ,
N. J.: Princeton University Press ，工 977) ， I85-88; Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and
International Politics (It haca , N. Y.: Cornell University Press ，工 99 6 ).
4. For a discussion of the Cold War deterrence problem in East Asia , see , e.g. ,
Schelling , Arms and Influence , 49-50 , 63-66, 82-83; Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence
and Defense: Toward a Theory ofNational Security (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press , I96I) , ch. 4; Henry A. Kissinger , The Necessity for Choice: Prospects
of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers , I960) , ch. 2.
5. See Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the
Korean W句 r (I960: Stanford: Stanford University Press , I968).
6. On expected cost and similar concepts , see Snyder, Deterrence and Defense ,
29; and George and Smoke , Deterrence in American Foreign Policy , 60 , 5 巧 -26.
See also Robert Jervis , "Deterrence and Perception," in Strategy and Nu c/ear De-
terrence , ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press ，工 9 8 4) ，
58-59; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita , The War Trap (New Haven , Conn.: Yale Uni-
versity Pre
40 SECURITY STUDIES

9. Yao Yunzhu, Zhanhou Meiguo weishe lilun yu zhengce [Postwar U. S. deter-

rence theory and policy] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe，工 998) ， 162, 1.68 -69 ,
工 73-74; Zhai Xiaomin , Lengzhanhou de Meiguo junshi zhanlue [American mili-
tary strategy after the Cold War] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe，工 999) ， 73 ,
8 工， 93.
工 o. On information and deterrence , see Strategic Research Department, Acad-
emy of 岛1ilitary Science , Zhanlue xue (2001 edition) , 237-38; Chen Bojiang ,
"Xinxi shidai Meiguo junshi liliang jianshe yu yunyong de jishuhua" [Buildup and
use of U. S. military strength in the information age] , Zhongguo Junshi Kexue , no. 2
(1999): 146; Chen Bojiang, "Cong ‘ he wupin san' dao 'xinxi san'" [From "nuclear
weapons umbrella" to "information umbrella 寸 ， Guangming Ribao ,' 23 January
200 工， www.gmw.com.cn/0_gmho01/o1ho010123/GB/01 八工 86 74 八 O 八 GMC1-218
.htm (accessed 17 October 2005); Zhao Xijun , "'Bu zhan er quren zhi bing' yu
xiandai weishe zhanlue" ["Victory without war" and modern deterrence strategy] ,
Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 5 (2001): 60; Yuan Zhengling , "Shilun changgui weishe"
[On conventional deterrence] , Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 4 (2001): 9 工; and Zhao
Zhongqiang and Peng Chencang, Xinxi zhan yu fan xinxi zhan: zema da [Informa-
tion war and anti-information war: how to 且ght] (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian
Chubanshe , 2001) , 375. See also Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future W句r­
fare (Washington , D. C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies , National Defense
University, 1997) , pt. 4.
1 I. Military Teaching Department, General Staff Department, Chinese People's
Liberation Army, Junshi gao jishu zhishi jiaocai [Teaching materials on knowledge
about military high technology] , 2d ed. (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe ，工 99 6 ) ，
148-49. "If our networks can outperform the other guy's networks , we can win the
battle without ever 且ring a shot," Vice Admiral Timothy La Fl eur, commander of
the U. S. naval surface forces in the Pacific, is quoted as saying (Sharon Weinberger,
"Future Littoral Ships Could Wage Information Warfare ，。面cial Says ," Aerospace
Daily , 17 July 2002).
工 2. Yao , Zhanhou Meiguo weishe lilun yu zhengce , 177-78.
13. Ibid. , 172 ，工 77-7 8 .
14. Ibid.; Zhai, Lengzhanhou de Meiguo junshi zhanlue , 82-83; and Wang
Qiming and Chen Feng , eds. , Daying gao jishu jubu zhanzheng: junguan bidu
shouce [Winning high-technology local war: required readi
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA A~D TAIWAN 41

15. Yao , Zhanhou 儿1eiguo weishe lilun yu zhengce ， 工 78 - 80; Chen , Xiandai
lubu zhanzheng lilun yanjiu , 155; Teaching Departmentof the Chinese Communist
Party Central Party School , Wuge dangdai jianggao xuanbian [A compilation of fìve
contemporary lectures] (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe ,
2000) , 243
16~ Zhang Wannian , Dangdai shijie junshi yu Zhongguo guofang [Contempo-
rary world military a直airs and China's national defense] (Beijing: Junshi Kexue
Chubanshe ，工 999) ， 183-84; Chu Shulong , "Zhongguo de guojia liyi , guojia liliang ,
he guojia zhanlue" [China's national interest , national strength , and national strat-
egy ], Zhanlue yu Guanli , no. 4 (1999): 工 5.
17. Liu Yijian , Zhi haiquan yu haijun zhanlue [Command of the sea and strate-
gic employment of naval forces] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe , 2000) , 146.
See also Zhang Wannian , Dangdai shijie junshi yu Zhongguo guofang [Contem-
porary world military affairs and China's national defense] (Beijing: Zhonggong
Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe , 2000) ，工 00. Chinese comparison of the Gulf War
and the war in Kosovo underscores that deserts do not provide the cover necessary
to defeat information dominance. The implication for China's surface fleet is clear.
See Zhao and Peng , Xinxi zhan yu fan xinxi zhan , 4 二 -44.
18. "Kongjun zhihui xueyuan zhuanjia tan-21 shiji de fangkong geming" [Air
Force Command College experts discuss-the twenty-fìrst-century revolution in air
defense] , Jiefang Junbao , 16 May 2001 , 9; Yu Kaitang and Cao Shuxin , eds. ,
Tezhong 走 ongxi mubiao yu dui走 ang lilun yanjiu [Theoretical research on special
air-attack targets and counterattack] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe , 2000);
Wang Houqing and Maj. Gen. Zhang Xingye , chief eds. , Zhanyi xue [Military cam-
paign studies] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe , 2000) , ch. 12; 币Tang and Chen ,
eds. , Daying gao jishu jubu zhanzheng. Zhu Chenghu's observation is in the New
Yor走 Times， 15 July 2005 , 8. See also Kenneth W. Allen , "China and the Use of
Force: The Role of the PLA Air Force ," forthcoming.
工 9. On the impact of U. S. intervention on the outcome of a war , see David A.
Schlapak , David T Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of
the China- Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica , Calif.:
Rand Corporation , 2000) , 38-45. On the PRC's navy, see Bernard D. Cole , The
Great Wall at Sea: China 云 Navy Enters
4二 SECURITY STUDIES

Beijing Qingnian Bao , 30 August 2001 , www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi Ir 9213 5I 4/

3646ho010830/547897.html (accessed 均 September 2005).
22. Shi Yinhong , "Kunnan yu xuanze: dui Taiwan wenti de sikao" [Di面culty
and choice: thoughts on the Taiwan issue] , Zhanlue yu Guanli , no. 5 (1999): 4;
Shi Yinhong , "Meiguo dui Hua zhengce he Taiwan 飞-venti de weilai" [U. S. policy to-
ward China and the future of the Taiwan issue ], Zhanlue yu Guanli , no. 6 (2000);
Zhang, "Meiguo junshi zhanlue zhuanxiang yatai zhendui shei?"; and author inter-
views with Chinese government foreign policy analysts , civilians , and military
o面cers ， 2000.
23. Wang Yizhou, "孔1ianxiang 21 shiji de Zhongguo waijiao ," 2 1. Se.e also the
comments by Yan Xuetong and Jia Qingguo , in An and Li , Shizi lu走 ou shang de
shijie , 388-89.
24- Author interview with a Chinese military 0面cer， 2001.
25. Guo Dafang , "Kexue jishu shi gao jishu jubu zhanzheng shouyao de
zhisheng yinsu" [Science and technology are the first factor in subduing the enemy
in high-technology local war] , Zhongguo Junshi Kexue , no. 6 (2000): 146; Chen
Youyuan , "Junshi jishu geming yu zhanyi lilun de fazhan" [The revolution in mili-
tary technology and the development of campaign theory ], and Zhan Xuexi , "Xian-
dai zhanyi tedian" [Analysis of the characteristics of contemporary campaigns] , in
Campaign Teaching and Research 0面ce ， Research Department, National Defense
University, Gao jishu tiaojian xia zhanyi lilun yanjiu [Research on theory of local
war under high-technology conditions] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe ,
工 997) ，江， 54-56; 市Tang and Chen , Daying gao jishu jubu zhanzheng , 50勾引Tang
Baocun , "Shixi xinxi zhan" [On information warfare ], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue ,
no. 4 (1997):103; Yao , Zhanhou Meiguo weishe lilun yu zhengce , 169; Zhao and
Peng , Xinxi zhan yu fan xinxi zhan , 44-47; and Liu Aimin , "Xinxihua zhanzheng
tezheng tantao" [lnquiry into the characteristics of the information transformation
of war] , Zhongguo Junshi Kexue , no. 3 (2000): 72.
二 6. On fait accompli strategies , see T. V. Paul , Asymmetric Conflicts: W如 r Initi-
ation by W告aker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ，工 994); and Paul
K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of Local War (New Haven ,
Conn.: Yale University Press ，工 9 88 ).
27. Central News Agency, 1 March 2005 , in FBIS , CPP20050301000214.
之 8. And these numbers pale compared to the number of bombs d
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAI 飞lV AN 43

Defense , 2001) , www.defenselink.mi l!pubs/qd f2 00 1. pdf (accessed 27 September

200 5); James Dao , "Army to Move Some Weapons Out of Europe ," New York
Times , 31 August 2001 ，工 6; Richard Halloran , "America Realigns Military Forces ,"
Straits Times , 11 June 2005. On U. S. force requirements , seé Schlapak , Orletsky,
and Wilson , Dire Strait? 38-39. For Chinese attention to these trends , see Cai Wei ,
"Mei haijun zhunbei jinnian xiaji jiang sansou luoshanji ji he jianting bushu dao
guandao" [This summer the U. S. Navy will deploy three Los Angeles class nuclear
submarines to Guam ], Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times ], 9 May 2002 , 17; Yang Lei ,
"U. S. Strategy Is Pointed Straight at Asia ," Renmin Ribao (Guangzhou South China
News Supplement) , 3 April 200 工， in FBIS , 3 April 2000; Wu Qingli , "At Whom Is
the U. S. Asia-Pacifìc Strategic Spearhead Pointed ," Ren仰1刀m
切
ηm
unt
in FBI巴S ， 31 March 2002; Richard Halloran , "Checking the Threat That Could Be
China ," Japan Times , 12 June 2005.
30. See , e.g. , Renminwang， 工 9 August 200 工， in FBIS , 21 August 2001; and Cen-
tral News Agency, I I August 2001 , in FBIS , August 巧， 2001.
3 1. Zhang , Dangdai shijie junshi yu Zhongguo guofang (2000) , 76-77;
Chu , "Zhongguo de guojia liyi , guojia liliang he guojia zhanlue ，"工 6-17; Shi ,
"Guanyu Taiwan wenti de jixiang bixu zhengshi de da zhanlue wenti ," 3 1; Wang ,
"Mianxiang 21 shiji de Zhongguo waijiao ," 21; and interviews with Chinese mili-
tary 0面cers and civilian analysts , 2001 and 2002.
32. Ye Zicheng , "Zhan yu he , jiaogei Taiwan dangju xuan" [War and peace , give
the choice to the Taiwan authorities ], Huanqiu Shibao , 22 October 1999.
33. Shi , '‘ Kunnan yu xuanze: dui Taiwan wenti de sikao ," 4; Zhang , Dangdai
shijie junshi yu Zhongguo guofang (1999) , 203 - 4 , and Dangdai shijie junshi yu
Zhongguo guofang (2000) , 75; discussion by Jia Qingguo , in An and Li , Shizi lu走 ou
shang de shijie , 393 -94. This is also the conclusion of Yan Xuetong , "Dui Zhong-
guo anquan huanjing de fenxi yu sikao" [Analysis and thoughts on China's strate-
gic environment], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] , no. 2
(2000): 10.
34. On Taiwan's defense policy, see Michael D. Swaine , Taiwan's National Se-
curity, Defense Policy, and W告apons Procurement Processes (Santa Monica , Calif.:
Rand Corporation，工 999).
35. Edward Gargan , "Long-Term Forecast for Taiwan Remains Upbeat ," New
Yor走 Times ， 22 March 1996, 35; Sheila Tefft, "Taiwan Moves to Re
44 SECURITY STUDIES

FBIS , CPP20020928000044; and 7 August 2002 , FBIS , CPP20020807000167.

The investment statistics are in Central News Agency, 7 Augus.t 2002 , FBIS ,
CPP20020807000167 , and 21 October 2002 , FBIS , CPP20021022000004; Zhong-
guo Xinwenshe , 3 January 2004 , FBIS , CPP20040103000056.
38. The investment statistics are in Central News Agency, 7 August 2002 , FBIS ,
CPP20020807000167 , and 2 工 October 2002 , FB1S , CPP20021022000004. For a
discussion of historical cases in which trade dependency created leverage affecting
security policy, see Albert O. Hirshman , National Power and the Structure of For-
eign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press , 1980).
39. Zhongguo Xìnwenshe , 3 January 2004 , FB1S , CPP20040103000056; inter-
view with 0面cial from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council , January 2004.
40. Mark Landler, "Money Might Not Be Able to Buy Political Ties , Either,"
New Yor走 Times ， 9 December 2001 , 4; "Taiwan and China 1nk Landmark Oil
Exploration Pact," Reuters , 16 May 2002; "Mainland to Hire Hi-Tech, Financial
Experts from Taiwan," Agence France-Presse , 24 May 2002.
4 1. Wang , "Mianxiang 21 shiji de Zhongguo waijiao ," 20.
42. 1nterviews with Taiwan military and civilian 0面cials ， 2002 , 2004.
43. 1nterviews in Taiwan with DPP and KMT 0面cials ， January 2005; Taipei
Times , December 4 , 2005 , at http://www.taipeitimes.com/Newslfront/archives/
2005 /r 2104 /2 003282889 (accessed December 5, 2005).
44. Song Mu-kyong, "Domination and Unilateralism 1s the Road to 1solation
and Destruction ," Nodong Sinmun , 3 March 2002 , in FB1S ，工 4 March 2002.
45. Kim Chong-son, "One's Own Military Power Must Be Strong ," Nodong
Sinmun , 26 October 2002 , in FB1S , 28 October 2002; "U. S. 1mperialist Warmon-
gers Who Are Heated Up in Arms Buildup ," Pyongyang Central Broadcasting Sys-
tem , 27 April 2002 , in FB1S , 27 April 2002.
46. Cho T' aek-pom, "Military Maneuvers Aimed at Domination of Asia ,"
Nodong Sinmun , 13 September 2001 , in FB1S , KPP20010924000058; Song , "Dom-
ination and Unilateralism."
47. Editorial , "Let Us Effect a New Leap in the Construction of a Powerful State
While Seizing Science and Technology," Nodong Sinmun , 23 January 2002 , FB1S ,
KPP20020123000024.
48. Editorial , "Following the Lead of Our Great Party, Let Us Go Construct
Even More Splendidly Our Fatherland's 1nformation 1ndustry," Kwahak-ui Segye ,
5 October 2001 , in FBIS , KPP2002011000096.
49. M. A. Kim Ch'ol-ryong , "On Wor
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 45

53. Kirn Un-chu , "Major Tasks over Self-Reliance ," Nodong Sin111的1 ，二 8 Febru-
ary 丰 00 卒， in FBIS , KPP20020316000042. See also editorial , "Let Us Thoroughly
Implement the Slogan of Self-Reliance in Accordance with the Demand of the New
Century," Nodong Sinmun , 9 May 200卒， in FBIS , KPP20020 5I 5000124.
54. Kim Ch'ol-ryong , "On World Trends."
5 5. For a discussion of recent North Korean reforms , see , e.g. , Norimitsu
Onishi , "2 Koreas Forge Economic Ties To Ease Tensions on Their Own ," New
Yor走 Times， 8 February 2005 , 1; Howard W. French , "North Korea Experiments ,
with China as Its Model ," ibid. , 28 March 2005 , 6.
56. Song , "Domination and Unilateralism."
57. Commentary, "Reckless Act Aimed at Preemptive Attacks ," Nodong
Sinmun , 24 June 2002 , in FBIS , KPP20020624000060.
58. Commentary, "The U. S. Imperialist Must Not Run Recklessly Amuck ,"
Nodong Sinmun , 9 December 2001 , in FBIS , KPP200II209000033.
59. Kim Chong-son , '‘ Korean Peninsula Is Most Dangerous Starting Ground
for Nuclear War by U. S. Imperialists ," Nodong Sinmun , 21 March 2002 , in FBIS ,
KPP20020329000060.
60. Chosun Il bo , 24 April 2005 , at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/htmll
news /200504/200504 二 40006.html (accessed 29 September 2005). The North
Korean reaction is in Korean Central News Agency, 7 January 2002 , in FBIS ,
KPP20020107000025. The JDAMs are reported in Yonhap , 26 May 2002 , http://
english. yna.co.kr /Engnews /20050526/610000000020050526 工 8 5I 22E8.html (ac-
cessed 2 December 2005).
6 1. For a discussion of North Korean vulnerability to a 且rst strike and the cor-
responding role of its forward deployment strategy, see David Kang , "North Korea's
Military and Security Policy," in North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold
War Era , ed. Samuel Kim (New York: Oxford University Press , 1998) , 171-75;
Leon V. Segal , Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Prince-
ton , N.J.: Princeton University Press ，工 998) ， 20-2 I. Also see U. S. Department of
Defense , 2000 Report to Congress on the Military Situation on the Korean Penin-
sula (Washington , D. C.: U. S. Department of Defense , 2000) , for a discussion of the
defensive elements in North Korean deployments.
62. On North Korea's WMD program, see Chung Min Lee , "Coping with the
North Korean Missile Threat: Implications for Northeast Asia and Korea ," in
Emerging Threats , Force Structures, and the Role of Air Power in Korea , ed. Natalie
Crawford
46 SECURITY STUDIES

ard B. Meyers , commander, Pacific Air Forces , Subcommittee on Military Readi-

ness , House Armed Services Committee , 6 March 1998 , www.house.gov/has c/
testimony/工 o 5thcongress/ 3-6-9 8myers.htm (accessed 工 7 Octo ber 2ÒO 5); .Korea
Times， 工 5 May 1998 , in FBIS , dreas05 工 61998000007; Korea Times , 15 August
1997 , in FBIS , dreaso 8 工 5 工 997001662.
64. For a discussion of the origins and motivations in North Korea's nuclear
weapons program , see Alexander Platkovskiy, "Nuclear Blackmail and North Ko-
rea's Search for a Place in the Sun ," in The North Korean Nuclear Program: Secu-
rity, Strategy and New Perspectives from Moscow , ed. James Clay Moltz and Alex-
ander Y. Mansourov (New York: Routledge , 2000) , 93-100.
65. See the statement by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld , U. S. Depart-
ment of Defense briefing ，工 7 October 2002. See also David E. Sanger , "U. S. Not
Certain if Pyongyang Has the Bomb ," New York Times ， 工 7 October 2002; David S.
Cloud and David E. Sanger, "U. S. Aide Sees Arms Advance by North Korea ," ibid. ,
二 8 April 2005 , 1. For a discussionof U. S. intelligence on North Korean nuclear
capabilities , see Jonathan Pollack, "The United States , North Korea , and the End
of the Agreed Framework ," Naval War College Review 缸， 3 (Summer 2003):
II-49.
66. Korea Central News Agency, 18 June 2003 , in FBIS , KPP2003061800007 与
David E. Sanger, "North Korea Says It Seeks to Develop Nuclear Arms ," New York
Times , 10 June 2003 , 10; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel for
Atom Bombs ," ibid. ，工 5 July 200 3; Joseph Kahn and David E. Sanger, "North Ko-
rea Says It May Test an A-Bomb ," ibid. , 29 August 2003 , 9; Korean Central Broad-
casting Station , 20 August 2003 , in FBIS , KPP20030820000050.
67. On North Korea's crisis diplomacy, see Scott Snyder , Negotiating on the
Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Washington , D. C.: United States Insti-
tute of Peace , 1999).
68. David C. Kang , "The Dog that Didn't Bark: Why Noith Korea Hasn't At-
tacked in Fifty Years and 明That International Relations Theorists Can Learnη(un­
published paper) discusses the fact that North Korea's reputation for risk-taking
serves deterrence but does not reflect its intentions to use force. For a discussion of
various North Korean high-risk activities , see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A
Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books , 1997).
69. For a discussion of the impact of the Chinese intervention in the Korean War
on U. S. policy in the Vietnam War, see yi
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 47

Los Angeles Times , 30 April I999 ，之9; "Postwar Review Found Fewer Serb Weap-
ons Hit in Kosovo ," Washington Post , 9 May 2000，工 7.
7 二. On the 1ikelihood of survival of PRC mobile short-range missile launchers , see
Alan Vick , Richard Moore , Bruce Pirnie , and John Stillion , Aerospace Operations
Against Elusive Ground làrgets (Santa Monica , Calif.: Rand Corporation , 200I).
73. Secretary of Defense William Perry's comments at the National Press Club ,
Washington , D. C., 28 February I996. For a discussion of U. S. and Chinese motives
during the I996 confrontatÌon , see Robert S. Ross , "The I995 -96 Taiwan Strait
Confrontation: Coercion , Credibility, and Use of Force ," International Security 25 ,
2 (Fall 2000): 87-I23.
74. Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense , 95.
75. Note that China canceled two of its planned missile tests. It did not target
the closure zone of the east side of Taiwan. These tests would have been the most
provocative , for fìring missiles into this zone would have required it to send the mis-
siles directly over Taiwan. Interview with Robert Suettinger , director of Asian af-
fairs , National Security Counci l. Also see Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six President~
and China (New York: Public A丘alrs ，工 999) ， 3 I , which notes that China readied
"more than a dozen missiles" for 且nng.
7 6 . 飞1ernon Loeb and Peter Slevin , "Overcoming North Korea's ‘ Tyranny of
Proximity,' "研句shington Post , 20 January 2003 ，工 6.
77. For U. S. mi 1itary discussion of a possible North Korean strategy for war, see
the paper presented to the Army War College workshop on Competitive Strategies ,
I2-I4 June 2000 , by Stephen Bradner, special advisor to the commander-in-chief
of the UN Command in Korea , www.npec-web.org/essay/Bradner. htm (accessed
29 September 2005). For a discussion of North Korea's ability to surprise U. S. and
South Korean forces , see Michael McDevitt , "Engagement with North Korea: Im-
plications for the United States ," in North Korea 云 Engagement- Perspectives, Out-
100 走， and Implications , ed. U. S. National Intelligence Council (Washington, D. C.:
National Intelligence Council , 200I).
78. See General LaPorte's response to advance questions posed by the Sen-
ate Armed Forces Committee in preparation for his confìrmation hearing on
26 Apri12002 , at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military!library/c ongressho02_hr/
laporte 426.pdf (accessed December 5, 2005).
79. Carter and Perry, Prevent
48 SECURITY STUDIES

KPP2003053 工 000020. For a discussion of the Stryker Brigade , see Alan Vick , David
Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie , and Seth Jones , The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Re-
thin走 ing Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options (Santa Mon-
ica , Calif.: Rand Corporation , 2002).
82. See the report at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall. html (accessed 2 Decem-
ber 2005).
83. Davìd E. Sanger, "U. S. Sees Quick Start ofNorth Korea Nuclear Site ," New
Yor走 Times， 1 March 2003 , 1; David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "U. S. Sending
Two Dozen Bombers in Easy Range of North Koreans ," ibid. , 5 March 2003 , 1;
Michael Wines , "Warning to North Korea on Nuclear Arms ," ibid. , 12 April
200 3, 5.
84. Thom Shanker, "Aftereffects: Korea Strategy," New York Times， 工 2 May
200 3, 17.
85. Howard French , "Heightened Tension Touch South Korea Troops ," New
York Times ，" 巧 February 2003 , 16; Struck , "War Games on Korean Peninsula
Upset North."
86. Shanker, "Aftereffects: Korea Strategy"; Korea Central News Agency,
20 June 2003 , in FBIS , KPP20030620000034; Pyongyang Broadcast Station , 6 July
2003 , in FBIS , KPP20030706000015.
87. Struck , "Observers See Rising Risk of U. S.-N. Korean Conflict"; Eric
Schmitt, "North Korean MIG's Intercept U. S. Jet onSpying Mission ," New York
Times , 4 March 2003 , 1; Bradley Graham and Glenn Kessler , "N. Korea Tails U. S.
Spy Plane ," Washington Post , 4 March 2003 , 1; "North and South Koreans Ex-
change Gun且re，" New York Times ， 工 7 July 2003 , 6.
88. See the report of his testimony at http://nis.go.kr/english/democratic
.hwang 1. html (accessed 29 September 2005). See also Oberdorfer, Two Koreas , 79.
89. Segal, Disarming Strangers , 2 1.
90. See North Korea's discussion of U. S. preemptive strategy in Commentary,
"Reckless Act Aimed at Preemptive Attacks ," Nodong Sinmun ， 二 4 June 2002 , in
FBIS , KPP20020624000060 ，之 4 June 2002.
9 1. Oberdorfer , Two Koreas , 78.
归. See , e.g. , Jack Snyder, The ldeology of the 0厅ensive: Military Decision
Ma走 ing and the Disasters of 1914 (It haca , N. Y.: Cornell University Press , 1984);
Steven M. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones , and Stephen Van Evera , eds. , Military Strat-
egy and the Origins of the First World War , rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press , 1991).
93. Interviews with senior Chinese military analysts , June 2003.
94. Whiting , China Crosses the Yalu; Thomas J. Christensen , Useful Adver-
saries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization , and Sino-American Confl
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 49

Forces Committee , U. S. Senate , 7 March 2000. Also see the testimony of R. James
耶Toolsey， director of central intelligence , before the Committee on National Security,
U. S. House of Representatives , 12 February 1998.
99. See John McLaughlin , speech at Texas A&M University, 17 April 2000 ,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/ddcLspeech_0417 丰oo r. html (copy
in author's possession).
100. For an analysis of U. S. policy options that favor cautious engagement , see
Victor D. Cha , "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Penin-
sula ," International Security 匀， 1 (Summer 2002): 40-78.
3 Windows and 切T
TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE

Thomas J. Christensen

If the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is any guide ,

there is reason to be concerned about the possibility of conflict across the
Taiwan Strait sometime in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.
War is hardly inevitable , however, and at the time of this writing , conflict
appears rather remote in the near term. If policies in Beijing , Taipei , and
Washington are managed well , the two sides of the Strait can handle their
differences peacefully and avoid conflict. Good management will not nec-
essarily be easy, however , and will require both vigilance and an under-
standing of what factors are most likely to lead to cross-Strait conflict. Ex-
cessive optimism can be as dangerous as excessive pessimism , because the
former can lead us to ignore problems that might spark a conflict and
thereby fail to remedy them in time. An understanding of the factors that
have led to the use of force in PRC history could help us avoid that pitfall
in the future.
Some analysts believe that cross-Strait relations and the u.s. deterrent
role in those relations are quite stable now and should remain so long into
the future. The optimistic logic flows as follows. The United States can
rather easily deter conflict by maintaining military superiority over the PRC.
For its part , Taiwan can avoid provoking a mainland use of force against the
island and its offshore interests by simply avoiding a declaration of perma-
nent legal independence from the Chinese nation. Given the costs of conflict
with the mainland to the island, such a declaration seems unlikely. Without
a bright-line provocation such as a declaration of independence , the PRC
would not dare to use force against Taiwan. In addition to the economic
and political costs of belligerence to the mainland , the PLA lacks the ability
to invade and subdue the island quickly, if at al l. More important , once the
United States became involved in the conflict , the PLA would be facing a
massively superior military. In other words , since it would be di面cult， if not
impossible , for the PRC to finish the job and resolve the Taiwan problem
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 51

once and for all at acceptable costs , Beijing will not use force except under
the most dire circumstances. 1
The logic of these arguments is very tight and is rooted in a rich tradition
of deterrence theory. But the study of PRC strategic history offered below
suggests that deterrence and stability in cross-Strait relations might not be
quite as simple to maintain as the optimistic scenario allows. In episodes
that have been largely lauded as strategic successes in PRC historical writ-
ings , CCP leaders have used force-sometimes 哩ainstilur.e且也鱼空 or their 扑 2n
allies-because they feared that , if they did not , the PRC's strategic situa- 机 t复飞z
tion would only worsen f~r~her. They often have done so in anticipation of
a future bright-line provocatíon rather than waiting for the provocation to
occur. Moreover, on several occasions , they have used force to affect and 吟瓮飞机。
shape long-term political and security trends in the region and at home , not t; 样'
to resolve security problems permanently. In the contemporary Taiwan set-
ting , this history suggests that the PRC might use force even if the 卫旦~d
States has military superiority, even if Taiwan has not主妇纠豆坐dared
legal independence , and even if the PLA lack~_ability to resolve the Tai-
.--……-、、-

wan question permanently through the use of force against the island and
its interests. If this is true , what we need to know is whether the CCP views
long二!~rm tren~~ as dangerous or benefìcial to PRC security and whètIle;
the use òTfo丘七币ìght be seen as the best way, however dangerous , to slow,
halt , or reverse long-term trends that appear to CCP elites to be running
against the PRC's security interests.
In this chapter 1 briefly review the PRC's strategic history from 1949 to
1979 for the purpose of 皿ç9~~ing ，certain rel~Y，ant 'p atterns in Beijing's de-
0~.~ons a bout th~ .~~~ Qf force.. The lessons about these patterns should pro-
,

vide cautionary warnings about the potential for future conflict across the
Taiwan Strait and , by association , across the Pacifìc. The aspects of PRC
strategy and strategic thinking to be studied are:
The use of trend analysis by CCP elites and the belief that , if force is not
used in the near term , a dangerous window of vulnerability might be
jlrr
J
川MLM

opening or a window of opportunity to accomplish some goal might

be closing permanently.
The use of force against superior foes or their allies in the belief that
enemy superiority and aggressiveness will only gro
52 SECURITY STUDIES

In some of the cases 1 discuss below, only one or two of the phenomena
listed above were present. For example , in the Korean War and in the
Vietnam War, CCP leaders applied windows logic for their decision to enter
the conflicts , but they clearly sought full victory in both wars at the onset of
their intervention. In those cases , warfare was seen as a solution to a secu-
.~卫r哩!gn， not just as a political tool to make the 'pr石bïëiñffi币
fractable. In other cases , such as the 1954 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 1969
border conflict with the USSR, all of the factors above are found , including
the use of force primarily as a method of shaping longer-term international
security trends.
From my case studies , 1 conclude that the PRC has used force most fre-
quently when it perceived an opening window of vulnerability or a closing
window of opportunity. A key element of Beijing's "windows logic" has
been its estimation not only of changes in adversaries' aggressiveness or
military might in comparison to China's own , but also political trends in
China's own alliances and in the alliances formed among China's actual or
potential enemies. Chinese elites have paid careful attention to trends in the
domestically generated power capabilities of China and its adversaries and
to the political and military trends 飞曰 thinNi=. aJlianct:;~旦ld anti-PRC
alli;矶~s in the 1':塔ion. Another consistent concern has been the poterifiaJ
过omestic politi.c:a1 costs of acquiescence and the potential domestic politi-
calτ4画也 ιbelligerence to the CCP regime , given certain trends in
international politics and certain chal1 enges facing the CCP leadership
at home.
Chinese elites only sometimes believed that they clearly had the upper
hand in the military arena before choosing to use force. In some cases ,
they merely surmised that trends were working against them and that how-
ever dangerous and disadvantageous armed conflict might be in the short
term , forgoing force would be even more dangerous. Leaders decided that
the use of force could serve political purposes and reverse or halt perceived
trends that were not in China's favor , even if, in the short term, military
victory as traditiona l1y conceived was not possible given the military and
political circumstances Beijing faced. In other cases , CCP elites hoped to
eliminate an enemy in a particular theater permanently through the use of
force.
This is not to say that the PRC is particularly prone to use force or
that
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE
53

may be critically important today in assessing the stability of relations

across the Taiwan Strait.

Theoretical Writings on Power Shifts , Windows of

Opportunity and Vulnerability, and the Causes of War

Before turning to the cases , it is important to recognize that the con-

cepts 1 am using in this article , windows of opportunity and windows of vul-
nerability, are part of a hotly contested literature in the international rela-
tions theory literature: theories of.YL~-tntive or preemptive wars. The
theories are simple: proponent:s石fíhem ar豆豆百hat语言rsare-s百面ffimes ， or
even often , caused by leaders who fear that if they do not act militarily in
the short term , their long-term security objectives will be even mQre threat-
ened by an increasingly powerful or aggressive enemy or alliar…二f erie-
mies. Before the most recent war in Ir aq , critics argued that such wars "al-
most never happen ," to quote one , andthat even in cases where windows
logic Ís purported to have affected outcomes , the importance of those vari-
ables is at best unclear. 2
Although 1 reject this critic's conclusion, there are indeed some real prob-
lems in the existing literature on windows logic and preventive war. There
has been too much focus in this literature on the great powers and on
whether or not one country was overtaking another in overall national
power prior to a war. 3 For our purposes , this approach suffers from two
major limitations. First, by focusing on power competitions between actual
or near-peer competitors , the literature often misses the question of whether
or not leaders in weaker states might believe that war in the short term is
preferable to war in the longer term, despite the risks of taking on enemies
that they view as militarily stronger than their own state in the near term.
A second problem with the literature , recognized by its critics , is that wars
are almost never purely caused by naked power considerations. 1 agree with
this proposition , but in many political relationships , there are ample rea-
sons for rivalry, distrust , and conflict outside of trends in the relative capa-
bilities ofthe potential foes. But given existing or p :r edictable occasions for
tensions , shifts in that balance can lead one side or the. other to act now,
rather than later, and can preclude patient diplomacy if one actor perceives
an opening window of vulnerability or a closing window of opportunity ei-
ther in the short term or the longer term. 4 In certain relationships , such as
America's relationship with China on the Taiwan issue , political provoca-
tions occur fairly regularly. The question is , which provocations , under
what conditions , wil
 54 SECURITY STUDIES

Korea , I950 应乞也决 \〉主

均.~~\v~飞 The classic case of Chinese "window亡b营lC was Mao Zedong's de-
快." cision to enter the Korean War in October 1950. Much has been written
It~~: 7'<'~ about the decision , and controversy still revolves around the issue among
p61itical scientists and diplomatic historians. 5 But it appears clear from the
documentary record from China and the former Soviet Union that Mao
eventually decided to enter the Korean War reluctantly and largely because
of the perceived long-term threat that would be posed by the permanent sta-
tioning of U.S. forcesinNorth Korea. This portrayal of Mao as being driven
by PRC security concerns is accurate despite evidence to the contrary such
as Mao's support for Kim Il Sung's initial invasion of the south , Mao's
/""'1 preparation for war even before General Douglas MacArthur's Inchon
JfA/;lap44吨， and Mao's very aggressive strategy once he entered thê waZ-'. 吃 J
广 In Mao's eyes , the Americans appeared increasingly strong and aggres-
sive after they entered the Korean War in late June , inserted the Seventh
Fleetjnto the Taiwan Strait at that time , and then crossed the 38th parallel
with U.S. troops in October. Mao and other Chinese elites viewed fighting
the Americans as highly risky, but Mao and his field general Peng Dehuai
argued successfully to their colleagues that doing so was preferable to wait- ,

ing to fight the Americans later , following a bui1 dup of American forces in
Kõrea五百才τãìwári. Mao 豆亘在Veng believed that , if the PRC were to allow
American troops to remain in both Taiwan and North Korea , the United
States might bu i1 d up its forces and attack China at some later time o{its
choosing. It is important then to recognize the critical role played by Presi-
dent I-Grry Truman's decision on 27)1d!!~ 1950 to use the U.S. Navy to
block the Taiwan Strait, apparently(réversingtj:lepresident's assertion in his
speech of 5 January 1950 that Washìn事。ndid not intend to intervene in the
Chinese Civil Wa r. From Mao's sometimes almost paranoid perspective ,
this did more than just demonstrate increased American hostility to his
regime , it showed that the United States was building a circle. of allia l)_,* s
around C坦na， from French Indochina to Taiwan to Kore马 .6 More币er， by
linking Up with Taiwan , the United States. was lending encouragement to
Mao's domestic enemies at a time when American forces in Korea could tie
down large numbers of PLA forces at the border, rendering them incapable
of suppressing domestic fo~s. 7 T
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEI]ING'S USE OF FORCE 55

Peng were careful to avoid 且ghting on the enemy's timetable precisely

because they viewed the world in terms of windows of opportunity and
vulnerability.
In early October , just after MacArthur showed his hand by demanding
the surrender of N orth Korean forces north of the 3 8th parallel (1 Octo ber)
and just days before he actually ordered UN forces to cross into North
Korea (7 October) , Mao and Peng apparently needed to convince some very
worried high-level comrades that taking the 且ght to the Americans was a
good idea , despite the risks. They ultimately succeeded in doing so , appar-
ently because of the spect.er of American troops coming north and because
of Mao's and Peng's arguments about long-term windows of vulnerability if
the PRC remained passive while being encircled by the United 5tates and a
revitalized ]apan. In his briefìng to his division commanders just before en-
tering Korea , Peng pointed out that the United 5tates and its allies were
overextended in October 1950 and , while the Americans were mobilizing ,
it would take the United 5tates until ] une 1951 to draft and train 500 ,000
additional troops. He said that this had been the reasoning used by those in
the Politburo who decided that fìghting a war sooner rather than later was
the right decision , despite China's own lack of full readiness. 9 As Peng ex-
plained to his leading 0面cers: "Our preparations [for war] are insu面cient，
[but] the enemy's preparations are also [currently] insuffìcient , especially the
American imperialists' preparations are insu面cient." 10 Mao and Peng's
argument to the Politburo for action was that a combination of geography
and Chinese military backwardness made ground warfare the most desir-
able option to employagainst the Americans. Waiting to fìght would also
allow the Americans to bring more force to bear against more economically
developed targets. 50 , part of the winning argument for war in Beijing was
that fìghting a war in the short term would be less painful than 且ghting a
larger war later , a clear example of windows logic .1 1 Mao was hardly
con且dent of success , nor did he believe that China clearly had the upper
hand in the near term. Rather, Mao and Peng believed the local political and
military balance of power might easily worsen over time if the PRC did not
take action soon. For our purposes , it is important to note that Mao inten-
tionally took on a superior foe out of fear that his enemy's superiority would
only grow, an
56 SECURITY STUDIES

China's perceived weakness and Beijing's fear that things would be even
worse if the PRC did not act decisively made China's war strategy very
aggresslve.
The fundamental importance of this wi l1 dows logic in Beijing's strategy
in late 1950 has been clouded bý<thr哩功cts: Mao's advance approval of
Kim Il Sung's initial invasion of South Korea in June 1950 and support for
Vietnamese communists before the outbreak of the war; Mao's preparation
for war before MacArthur's Inchon landing; and the discrepancies between
Russian and Chinese archival materials from October 1950.
Mao's support for communist expansion in Vietnam and Korea before
the Korean War broke out might call into question the portrayal of Mao as
a defensive actor concerned with closing windows of vulnerability. The
simple answer to this question is that Mao was both aggressive and defen-
sive , ideological and highly concerned about his new nation's defense. De-
spite his ideologicalleanings and his desire to spread revolution when the
opportunity presented itself, he was not eager to fìght the Americans in
Korea. In fact , his indecision apparently delayed the crossing of the Yalu
because he was wracked with doubts about the dangers of a war for his
weak military and his new regime. Mao reportedly paced the floor for sixty
hours (10-12 October) before sending the 岳nal order for troops to prepare
to cross the Yalu. 12
Mao had indeed given a verbal nod to Kim Il Sung's initial push south in
spring 1950. There are t:y_o potential reasons why. First , Stalin had cleverly
cornered Mao with responsibility for the decisìon by approving the very
confìdent Kim's plan on the condition that Mao also approve it. This would
mean that Mao's refusal would make Beijing responsible for pouringcold
water on Kim's plan. According to one authoritative Chinese account , Mao
was very wary about Kim's plan , because he was not as confìdent as Kim
and Stalin that the invasion would score a quick victory that would preclude
an effective American response of some kind. But Stalin's maneuvers put
Mao in a bad position , and Mao agreed to approve Kim's gambit even
though he felt Kim was overconfident and that conflict in Korea threatened
the achievement of China's core goal of regaining. Taiwan. 13 Another inter-
pretation of events , based in part on Soviet archival material , is that , to a
large degree , Mao shared Kim's view that the United States likely lacked the
strength and resolve to resp
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 57

There is probably some truth in both versions of Mao's calculations.

Nobody was quite as aggressive and confident as Kim Il Sung , who took
months in late I949 and early I9 50 to persuade Sta 1in to support his plan and
only succeeded in late J anuary, after Truman's speech on noninterference in the
Chinese Civil War on 5 January I9 50 and Secretary ofState Dean Acheson's
speech to the Press Club on I2 January I9 50 suggesting that the United States
would not defend Korea. 15 So , to say Mao had more reservations than Kim is
not saying much. Still, the United States had abandoned the Chinese mainland
in I949 , had apparentlywritten offTaiwan and South Korea inJanuary I9 50 ,
and had very limited firepower in the region , as demonstrated by MacArthur's
struggles both before and after Inchon. As the Chinese scholar Shi Yinhong
argued recently, a combination of the communist allies' overconfidence , in
the face of an apparent lack of U.S. resolve , and PRC obligationsto the com-
munist alliance led to Mao's disastrous failure to restrain Kim Il Sung. 16 So ,
especially given the diplomatic pickle that Stalin and Kim had placed him
in , it might have seemed relatively wise to offer verbal support for Kim's
plan to attack South Korea. One thing seems fairly certain from the avail-
able evidence. Mao did not expect the United States both to enter Korea
with a large number of troops quickly and to intervene in the Taiwan Strait.
And it was this surprising combination of events , not either in isolation, that
created Mao's perceived window of vulnerability in October I950.17
The fact that Mao prepared to enter the war before Inchon also suggests
to 叫~e t~at the UN.，cr~~si吧Ç>f the 38th parallel was not critical to China's
decision , and that China was not behaving reactively out of windows logic.
In fact , one of the critics of preemptive war theory focuses on this point to
show that this "classic case" of preemptive war was likely nothing more than
clear-cut PRC ideological expansionism. 18 This argument disregards the con-
tentious meetings within China leading up to the final decision and various
documents f:r om July and August in both the Soviet and Chinese archival
collections available in the West. Those documents show the crossing of the
38th parallel and the need to defend North Korea , not a desire to "liberate"
South Korea per se , as the key triggers for expansion of the war by Beijing.
Most important, the argument resting on PLA planning befo
58 SECURITY STUDIES

have required massive Chinese assets , which in turn would have required
massive Soviet support for a plan that , on both political and military
grounds , would have been much more risky than engaging American forces
that were overextended , closer to China (providing for shorter Chinese 10-
gistics lines) , and in terrain that was more favorable to the Chinese .1 9
As for the reliability of Chinese sources on these questions and their con-
sistency with Soviet archival sources , it should be noted that the document
collections from the Soviet and Chinese archives are largely compatible and
the discrepancies can largely be explained by Mao and Peng's need to con-
vince the Politburo in early October that their call for an aggressive strategy
was justifÌ ed. A telegram from Mao to Stalin in the Chinese archives , dated
2 October I9 50 , which was apparently never sent, because it does not bear
the stamp that telegrams routinely received after being sent, portrays a deci-
sive Mao preparing for wa r. However , a telegram to Stalin from the Soviet
embassy on the same date , found in the Soviet archives , portrays Beijing as
extremely reluctant, with Mao citing resistance to war in his own Polit-
buro. 20 Some combination of Mao's personal standing in the Party, the per-
suasiveness of Mao's and Peng's geostrategic arguments with reference to an
American encirclement campaign involving Korea and Taiwan , and the
threat posed by the U.S. crossing of the 38th parallel on 7 October helped
Mao and Peng win the day. On 8 October, Mao initially decided to enter the
war with the backing of the Politburo and alerted both Stalin and Kim Il Sung
to that fact. He then planned a strategy in Korea on which both Soviet and
Chinese archival documents concur. Between IO and I3 October , he also had
last-minute second thoughts before he reached the 且nal decision to enter and
recon fÌrmed his commitment to enter on I3 October in the telegram to Zhou
Enlai cited above. Again , there is no apparent contradiction between the two
document sets either on that issue or about Mao's war plans outlined in the
telegram of I4 October to Zhou Enlai in MoSCOW. 21
Mao saw both windows of opportunity in Körea in early I9 50 and win-
dows of vulnerability later in the yea r. He was an offensive and defensive
actor calculating trends in his own alliance and in the alliance of his main
adversary, the United States. His combination of Ç>ffensive and defensive mo-
tives made him partic

Taiwan , I954-I955

In late summer I9 54 , Mao also believed international forces were

shifting against the PRC and would perhaps permanently prevent Beijing
from attaining its goal of reuni fÌ cation with Taiwan and elimination of his
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 59

Civil War enemy, Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT). In this case , Mao
used limited force to send a message to the United States and to Chiang
about the costs of forming a formal alliance. This case fits all of the criteria
discussed above. Mao's analysis of long-termtrends led him to attempt to
alter those trends through the use of force. He used force not directly, after
a bright-line provocation , but rather in anticipation of provocative actions
to follow. He did not try to resolve the problèm once and for all through
military means , but rather to create a security situation that would be some-
what better than the one he predicted would result if the PRC were to re-
mam passlve.
According to well-connected PRC scholars , Mao was concerned about
two trends that he believed augured a more stubborn "Taiwan problem" if
the PRC did not take action. Th~ first was a diplomatic trend in the region,
partially supported by Beijing's own-diplomacy in Korea and Vietnam: the
settlement of Asian civil wars by internationally recognized demilitarized
zones and political separation lines that created the appearance of two
geographically distinct legitimate governments in Korea and Vietnam. Such
an outcome , if it were going to become a precedent , clearly ran counter
to Mao's desire to unify his country under CCP leadership and to gain
diplomatic recognition of Beijing as the sole legitimate government of all
of China.
The second trend was the expansion of American alliances in the region
to include actors antagonistic to communism around China's periphery.
The United States had failed to set up anything akin to NATO in East Asia.
The Eisenhower administration , in its efforts to create the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO) , appeared poised to change that. The prob-
lem for Mao on this score was twofold: first , a stronger and tighter alliance
among anti-communists in 豆豆4 古as clearly aimed at containing communist
China and preventing China from reaching its regional goals , especially re-
garding Taiwan; second , and more important , Beijing was gravely con-
cerned that the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan would be included in
the alliance system, thus strengthening and encouraging Chiang militarily
and politically. Moreover , this linkage between the United States and Tai-
wan would occur at a time when China was recovering from the Korean
War and Chiang still had strong irredentist claims on the mainland , which
60 SECURITY STUDIES

because the United States would be providing assistance to anti-communist

forces on Taiwan that wanted to use military means and subversion to over-
throw Mao's regime. 23
Although it actually back且red and, if anything , only hastened the U.S.-
ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, the PLA's artillery assault on the offshore
islands , which began in September 1954 , was designed to send a signal to
both Taipei and the United States. The intended political message of the at-
tack was that China would not stand idly by as Washington and Taipei tied
the military knot and, more abstractly, to remind the United States that re-
maining involved in the Chinese Civil War by supporting Chiang Kai-shek
would be both costly and risky.
In January, the PLA attacked and seized the offshore island of Yijiang-
shan off of Zhejiang, and in February, the PLA took the Dazhens , also off
of Zhejiang , after they were evacuated by ROC troops. According to He Di ,
the Yijiangshan and Dazhens attacks were really more of military than of
political significance , because they provided good practice for a weak PLA
amphibious capability. Although the islands were very far from Taiwan and
weakly defended , they had provided a base for irritating harassment and
blockade activities by the ROC. But Mao had apparently recognized that
full-scale invasion of the most important ROC offshore garrisons on the
islands of Quemoy and Matsu was impractical , given their strong forti-
且cations and the PLA's weak amphibious forces. The motivation for the ar-
tillery attacks on those islands , which sparked the crisis with the United
States , was apparently largely politica l. 24 It is hardly clear, however, that
Mao would have wanted to seize all of the offshore islands , even if he had
believed the PLA to be more able to do so. As part of Fujian province , the
offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu provide a notional political bridge
between Taiwan and the mainland. Cutting that bridge , especia l1y with no
hope of taking Taiwan itself soon thereafter , would serve the perceived
American goal of permanently wresting Taiwan away from the mainland.
According to Colonel Xu Yan of the National Defense University, in ad-
dition to the international political objectives discussed above , there was
also a domestic dimension to the operations in 1954 - 55. As a revolution-
ary, Mao emphasized the psychology of struggle as necessary for his popu-
lace to meet the domestic goals set by th
 TREND ANALYSJS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 6I

In his sometimes surprisingly frank 1992 open-source book , Jinmenzhi

zhan (The battle over Quemoy) , Xu Yan sums up the factors discussed
above when he writes:

Beginning in July 19 54 , the Central Committee , [and] Mao Zedong at the same time ,
placed "liberation ofTaiwan" and the coastal islands question in prominent positions ,
demanding that the PLA increase its struggle in the coastal regions. This decision made
at this time was the result of comprehensive consideration of multiple factors [such as]
the international situation , the struggle across the Taiwan Strait , and domestic politi-
cal mobilization and economic construction , etc. The main reason for the prominence
of the Taiwan issue was the re~ult of the 19 54 Geneva conference . . . [Mao's l 且rstcon­
sideration was the international strategic situation's influence on the question of re-
unification of the motherland. At that time , the separation of Korea into north and
south had been fixed and completed, [and] the result of the cease-fire in Indochina was
also a dividing line [separating] north and south Vietnam. The United States was also
mustering together Britain , France , Australia , the Philippines , New Zealand , Thai-
land , and Pakistan in preparation for signing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization ,
whose purpose was to co n.tain China. Atthe same time , it [the United States] was plot-
ting the solidi且cation [gudinghua] of the separation of the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait. The need to stress the "liberation ofTaiwan" was an expression of the CCP's res-
olute position on unification of the motherland and the smashing of plots to divide
China. In addition to this . . . under conditions of armistice in Korea and the Geneva
conference's decision for a cease-fire , [Mao] was unwilling to allow the peaceful
influences to slacken the national people's 且ghting spirit [quanguo renmin douzhi].
And that is not even to mention that at that time , the U. S. military was still illegally oc-
cupying the Chinese territoryofTaiwan , constituting a major threat to the new China ,
and the Taiwan KMT alsohad continuously harassed the mainland. 26

Xu goes on to say that Mao's decision in summer 1954 did not represent
a decision for large-scale military attack across the Taiwan Strait (da guimo
de duhai zuozhan) but rather Mao's efforts to affect real or perceived nega-
tive trends in international politics and domestic politics by use of coercive
diplomacy.

The I958 Taiwan Strait Crisis

The assaults on Quemoy and Matsu in August-October 1958 were

similar to those in 1954 - 55 in some ways and not in others. China used
force in a demonstrative way against the offshore islands of Quemoy (J in-
men) and Matsu (Mazu) for what appeared to be political purposes. As be-
fore , Mao apparently did not seem overly dedicated to the mission of seiz-
ing the islands or even to driving all ROC forces off of them, despite the
sometimes ferocious intensity of the shelling. 27 Because it was typhoon sea-
son, it was a particularly poor time to plan an amphibious attack on either
Quemoy or Matsu. The artillery forces alone suffered mightily from wind
62 SECURITY STUDIES

and rain in August 1958 户 Mao's commander in the fìeld , Ye Fei , reported
that Mao had never given him orders to prepare for seizing the islands , so
he had not taken certain actions consistent with such a plan , such as. soft-
ening up the defenses on the islands with large-scale bombing. 29 Moreover ,
at one point late in the crisis , when the artillery blockade appeared to be
having a real effect on the islands and the United States was urging with-
drawal of ROC forces there , Beijing encouraged the forces to stay and even
offered to bring supplies to them if they needed them. 30
But if Mao's goals in late summer and early fall 1958 were limited and
largely political , what political situation was he addressing? It is possible
that Mao was employing a straightforward windows logic following the in-
troduction of new weapons systems to Taiwan, such as the nuclear-capable
Matador missile , deployed to Taiwan in the second half of 1957. In fact ,
some leading scholars have asserted that Mao did perceive an increasing
threat to the mainland from growing U.S.-Taiwan cooperation since sum-
mer 1957. 31 Running somewhat counter to this argument is evidence that
Mao did not see the United States or Taiwan as particularly threatening in
summer 1958.32
My interpretation is that Mao was indeed responding to a shift in the in-
ternational distribution of power , but that he was most concerned with a
shift within his own alliance and the long-range implications for China if
it were not reversed. 33 After Sputnik, Beijing elites became concerned that
the increasingly powerful Soviet Union was becoming less dependent on
China and less supportive of its revolutionary allies now that it appeared to
have a home-based deterrent against its main enemy.34 In Mao's eyes , Mos-
cow also appeared to be more assertive toward China in hopes of gaining a
higher degree of control over its weaker ally. Mao viewed as evidence of this
trend Nikita Khrushchev's foot-dragging on certain weapons transfers and
especially his request for joint naval fleets and Soviet submarine radio
stations on Chinese soil, which Mao regarded as an "assault" (j ingong) on
China's sovereignty.35 Although this was a response to a changing balance
of power , it was not of the same kind, however, as that noted above in the
case of Korea or in some of the cases discussed below.
These concerns about Soviet power and bullying contributed to Mao's
desire for a stronger, more self-su ffÌ cien
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 63

Mao wanted to achieve political goals , including mobilizing his popula-

tion for the Great Leap , and , most probably, to demonstrate foreign policy
independence from the USSR , which was not informed in advance of the at-
tack. It also could not hurt to remind the Americans , the KMT, and the
world that the Civil War was not over and that the division of China was
not considered acceptable in Beijing. Most Chinese histories of this event
published in the reform era include a l1 of these rnotives in their analysis , sug-
gesting that the desire to preclude further solidifÌ cation of the U.S.-ROC al-
liance was at least one of the motives behind the shelling of Quemoy and
Matsu in early fall I9 5 8. 37
There are certain aspects of the case that match the analysis offered above
quite well. Unlike in the case of the Korean War , in the shelling in I95 8 ,
Mao clearly did ilO t want war with the United States and did not see his mil-
itary campaign as a permanent solution to the Taiwan issue. Force was used
to send a political message. As in the I9 54 - 55 case , Mao seemed concerned
to avoid escalation with the Americans , and Lin Biao even entertained the
idea of warning the Americans in advance to ensure that no U.S. advisors
on the islands were inadvertently hit (the notion was rejected by Mao).38
Mao also strictly restricted air activity over the islands so as to avoid en-
gaging American aircraft. 39 Despite these precautions , when one notes the
hair-raising U.S. contingency plans in the crisis , including tactical nuclear
strikes on PRC targets , one realizes that Mao ran real risks. The political
use of limited force always raises the prospect of escalation , even if such es-
calation is not intended. 40 This is an important lesson for the analysis of
contemporary cross-Strait relations.

India , I962

It is di面cult to 且nd many references to windows logic in the relatively

large secondary literature in China about this case. The main reason is that
aggressive lndian actions are portrayed fairly universally as driving events.
But there is at least one sense in which windows logic applies: Chinese an-
alysts ascribe to lndian leaders a window of opportunity logic in explaining
why Nehru provoked the conflict. ln internally circulated Chinese analysis
of the case , Nehru is in fact portrayed as being driven by false hopes related
to a perceived window of opportunity that did not exist. Chinese authors
argue that Nehru misread the meaning of global trends in the Cold War and
China's growing isolation from both the USSR and the United States.
Nehru's lndia is portrayed as becoming more aggressive on border issues be-
tween I959 and I962 because of Soviet military aid to lndia and because of
lndian leaders' false belief that lndia's status as a neutral power in the Cold
64 SECURITY STUDIES

War would deter a Chinese military response to Indian incursions. An in-

ternally circulated book argues that , in addition to trying to .divert popular
resistance to New Delhi outward, Nehru was guilty of false application of
windows-of-opportunity thinking: "India's government incorrectly judged
the situation: it believed the serious difficulties in the Chinese economy were
insurmountable; China's Tibet and Xinjiang regions were unstable; the
United States was supporting the Taiwan KMT's preparations for raids on
the southeast coast , tying down [qianzhi] the PLA's main forces [zhuyao li-
liang]; China's western border defense vacuum was an opportunity to seize
[you ji 走 echeng]; the United States and Soviet Union and such countries
supported India and opposed China , so China was isolated without help. "41
Another internally circulated text states that Nehru believed that "China
would not dare risk the danger of American and Soviet intervention and
launch a counterattack against India. "42 The military historian Xu Yan
reports that in fall 196二， Mao judged the major reasons for India's ob-
streperous behavior to be a desire to divert domestic troubles by creating a
conflict, an attempt to obtain foreign aid from the West, a desire to attack
China's prestige in the Third World , and the general belief ih Indian strate-
gic circles that China would not dare counterattack, given its domestic
problems and international isolation. Mao believed the last of these factors
was the most important driver of Nehru's policy.43
Whether or not Chinese elites themselves saw closing windows of vul-
nerability is much less clea r. As John Garver points out, Mao and others
were concerned about Indian designs on Tibet , where India wanted to cre-
ate a buffer state (huan chong guo) between it and its Asian rival to the
east. 44 Those Indian designs became all the more important toChina as
Sino-Soviet relations worsened. Strategically important roads ran between
western Tibet and Xinjiang province , thus potentially linking the many PLA
forces in Tibet with those facing Soviet troops in the northwest. There is
one problem with a straightforward window of vulnerábility argument in
the Sino-Indian war case. In the Chinese literature , PLA and CCP leaders
are often portrayed as relatively confident and calm in the face of Indian
salami tactics , waiting for the enemy to launch a larger-scale assault so
that the PLA could imp
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 65

was likely to enter the conflict on India's side either , particularly since the
brief war broke out during the Cuban missile crisis. China's economy was
indeed in shambles after the Great Leap. And Taiwan recently had appealed
unsuccessfully to the United States for assistance in invading the mainland ,
given the CCP's domestic and international weakness. If Nehru misread
the relationship between Taipei and Washington as different than it was , so
must have Mao , as late as June 196卒， when he assembled large numbers of
troops along China's southeast coast in order to defend against a possible
k岛1T assault. 47
In his 1975 classic The. Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: lndia and lndo-
china , Allen Whiting traces a series of domestic and international concerns
among the Chinese leaders , beginning in early 1962 , and shows some ex-
plicit links between these concerns and the problem of India in the months
leading up to the crisis. We lack the kind of smoking-gun documentary ev-
idence and memoirs regarding the fight with India that we have in other
cases. Such documentation would be helpful in more directly establishing
Mao's desire to reverse dangerous international and domestic trends by us-
ing force. But Whiting's research on China's 0面cial statements about its se-
curity concerns in the 且rst few months of 1962 is thorough and paints a pic-
ture of a China with security perceptions that fit the approach offered
above. Foreign forces are viewed as preparing to exploit China's economic
weaknesses and vulnerabilities and to promote separatism in Taiwan and
Tibet. Japan in particular is seen as conspiring with the United States to
cause the downfall of the KMT and to promote Taiwan's independence , and
the United States is viewed as upgrading its security relationship with
Taiwan in preparation for wa r. 48 In May, all of these domestic and inter-
national factors were linked to the problems in India by Foreign Minister
Chen Yi. 49
Unfortunately, we do not have such evidence from October 196卒， but it
seems hard to believe that Beijing was so concerned about trends in the in-
ternational situation in spring and had such a dramatic turnaround in its
consciousness within six months. This having been said , Mao was almost
certainly more confident about the Taiwan issue in the near term after the
United States restrained Chiang in Summer 1962 , but the issue was hardly
solved on a permanent basis. However, according to Taylor Fravel ,
66 SECURITY STUDIES

only to New Delhi , but to Taipei , Washington , and Moscow as well. This
is , however, di面cult to prove or disprove without more documentary evi-
dence. Moreover, by almost all accounts , 1ndia was so aggressive and
overextended in its deployments that one could hardly have expected China
to do anything but counterattack. 51 50 it is hard to sustain the argument
that sending a signal to third parties was the main purpose of the Chinese
operations. China's use of force was nonetheless clearly more defensive and
political than it was rooted in a desire to expand Chinese territory, because
China quickly and. unilaterally ceded much of the territory that the PLA
gained in its utter rout of 1ndian forces on the latter's side of the 5ino-1ndian
border's line of control.

Vietnam , I964-I969

China's use of force from 1964 to 1969 had complex causes , ranging
from China's assessment of international security trends to its desire to com-
pete with the 50viet Union for the hearts and minds of international com-
munists , especially in the Third World. The combination of national secu-
rity concerns and ideology made Mao much moreaggressive in supporting
revolution in Vietnam and much less eager for a peaceful 'settlement of the
war there , for example , than we would have expected had he only been
interested in national security traditionally conceived. 52 That having been
said , although it was not the only important factor or perhaps even the
most important factor , Mao's assessment of international security trends
did apparently affect his decisions to increase the number of troops the PRC
sent to Vietnam and the amount of material aid transferred to the Viet-
namese communists both before and after the Gulf of Tonkin 1ncident
and Pleiku. As in Korea , Mao's intervention in Vietnam was based on the
goal of driving the Americans out of the country, so t: he goals were not pri-
marily political , as they were in the Taiwan crises in the 1950S and in the
1962 case.
1t is very di面cult to imagine that the Vietnamese communists could have
carried out their revolutionary plans in the south without Chinese assis-
tance , particularly prior to the U.5. escalation in 1964 - 65 and the 50viet
assistance to Vietnam that followed it. 1n fact , as a CCP Party history ar-
gues , basically all of the Vietnamese communist matériel was supplied by
China in the first half of the 1960s, aside from weapons captured from the
enemy.53 Perhaps of equal importance , China offered its own territory as a
strategic "rear area" if the United 5tates were to invade the north. 54 Even
before the Gulf of Tonkin 1ncident, Mao announced to the North Vietnam-
ese chief of staff his intention to send "volunteers" into Vietnam. 55 On
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEI Jl NG'S USE OF FORCE 67

10 July 1964 , just one month before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution , Zhou
Enlai bolstered Vietnamese communist spirits by making a clear commit-
ment to assist North Vietnam in the event of a U.S. invasion of China's ally.
He said: "If the United States is resolved to expand this war , by invading the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam , or directly sending in forces , bringing the
flames of war to China's side , we cannot just stand idly by [zuo shi bu guan].
That is to say, if they. want to fìght a Korean:..style war, we shall prepare
for it. "56
Mao's support for the Vietnamese communists was üê:些dhèth on ideo-
logical goals Mao set in competition with the USSR and on national secu-
rity concerns not shared by the more distant Soviet Union. Arguably, before
the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident , the former were more important
than the latte r. Mao did discuss the American threat and the need to pre-
pare for it earlier in the year , but he did not expect a direct American inva-
sion of N orth Vietnam , let alone China , anytime soon. 57 He said that the
United States was spread too thin militarily and would have to rely on in-
termediate allies , such as Japan and West Germany, to take the fìght to
communist countries other than the Soviet Union. He believed the U.S.
strategy was to be the "last to join an international wa r." As for China , he
believed that the U.S. strategy was based more on "peaceful evolution" than
military conquest. 58 Despite such a moderate threat assessment , in J une , Mao
himself offered "unconditional support" to a Vietnamese military General
Staff entourage. 59
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August 1964 and the U.S. reaction to it
would change Beijing's perception of the Vietnam War and the trends in
U.S. security policy. On 6 August , one day after U.S. Navy aviators bombed
North Vietnam , the CCP Central Committee resolved that "America's in-
fringement [qinfan] against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is an in-
fringement against China." It pledged to make "assistance to Vietnam our
top priority. We must handle all Vietnam's requests with the utmost seri-
ousness , conscientiousness , and activism." The statement goes on to say
that China must facilitate the delivery of supplies to communists in South
Vietnam as wel l. 60
In order to boost Vietnamese morale , China made early signifìcant prom-
ises of support. In April 1965 , Liu Shaoqi promised Le Duan that the
Chinese would "do our best to support" the Vietnamese comm
68 SECURITY STUDIES

Among the Chinese forces , arguably the most important were 150,000 air
defense troops. Beijing claims that it supplied U.S.$20 b i1lio Il worth of as-
sistance from 1950 to 1978 , 90 percent of it in outright grants , outfìtted
2 m il1ion Vietnamese troops , laid hundreds of kilometers of strategically
important railroad lines , and provided 300 million yards of cloth, 5 m il1ion
tons of food , and 3 ,000 kilometers of oil pipeline. China suffered thousands
of casualties , both dead and wounded , in Vietnam. 62
As in Korea , and unlike in the 1950S Taiwan Strait crises ，岛1ao sought
military victory for the communist forces in Vietnam. He was not just mak-
ing a political statement, because he did not initially want to sett1 e for a
cease-fire line. Instead , Beijing continued to assist in Hanoi's efforts to "lib-
erate" the south. In May 1965 , Mao supported Ho Chih Minh's plan to use
Chinese road engineers in the north to free up Vietnamese personnel for ac-
tion in the south. Mao also supported building roads through Laos , and, in
preparation for escalation of the war , he even told Ho that "because we
shall fìght large-scale batt1es in the future , it would be good if we also build
roads to Thailand."63 In August 1966, Zhou Enlai even decided to send 100
specially trained personnel into South Vietnam to serve in "command staffs ,
logistics , chemistry, engineering , [and] political t r<iining."64 In late 1967 ,
just weeks before the Tet offensive , Mao promised again that China would
be a "reliable rear area" for Hanoi should it fìnd itself in greater trouble af-
ter taking the fight to the south. 65 All of these measures were designed to en-
courage the Vietnamese communists to eschew peace deals with the United
States and South Vietnam , as was preferred at the time by the ideologically
less fervent and geographically more distant Soviet Union.
China's actions in Vietnam are not usually considered among thecases
of Chinese use of force. Arguably, China's material and political support for
the Vietnamese communists was more important than its personnel in the
wa r. But if the statistics cited above are indeed correct , China's intervention
in the Vietnam War was massive at times and signifìcan t1y raised the costs
and dangers of American involvement in the wa r. Although ideology and
Sino-Soviet competition played a heavy role in China's Vietnam War strat-
egy, especially in Mao's many efforts from 1965 to 1969 to scutt1 e peace
talks between Hano
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 69

north (the USSR) in the years 1965 -69. In fact , as early as March 1965 , Mao
told foreign audiences that he was so concerned about Soviet-American
collusion in Vietnam peace negotiations that he was preparing for the pos-
sibility of a joint U.S.-Soviet assault on China. 66 So , Mao's concerns about
the USSR increased in 1968-69 , but they were not new.

The Road to Zhenbaodao in I9 69

Sino-Soviet differences over the proper course of war and diplomacy

in Vietnam in 1965-68 tùrned into direct Sino-Soviet tensions in this pe-
riod , which reached a boiling point in 1968. With the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia , which Moscow sought to justify by proclaiming the so-
called Brezhnev Doctrine , Sino-Soviet rivalry within the communist camp
turned into Sino-Soviet confrontation. 67 The Brezhnev Doctrine had clear
implications for China: if the Kremlin reserved the right to use force to over-
throw regimes that strayed from orthodox Marxism-Leninism as defined
in Moscow, then Cultural Revolution China surely was at risk of attack.
There were more than just ideological reasons to worry. Since 1965 , the
USSR had been gradually building up its forces , not only along the Sino-
Soviet border in Xinjiang and Manchuria , but also in Mongolia , a country
with which Moscow signed a defense pact in 1965. By 1967 , several Soviet
divisions were in Mongolia alone. 68 At the same time , when assessing the
broader international environment , it appears that Mao became increas-
ingly convinced that the Americans were not going to escalate in Vietnam
in the near term , and that the threat on China's southern flank was there-
fore diminishing. 69
Most of the recent scholarship on China's role in the Sino-Soviet border
clashes seems to support the earlier wisdom of Allen Whiting and Thomas
Robinson. Fighting seemed to have started on Zhenbaodao (Damansky)
Island , in the Ussuri River , in March 1969 after a Chinese ambush of Soviet
forces in disputed territory.70 In terms of the analysis offered above , politics
were in command in this case , and trend analysis led to the use of force
against a superior foe. The PRC was using force to try to alter long-term
trends that were running against Beijing's security interests. Force was used
to teach the USSR a lesson and demonstrate China's resolve. It was not used to
resolve the Sino-Soviet tensions at the border once and for all , or to prevent
an imminent Soviet invasion , which nobody, least of all Mao , expected at
the time of the attack. Rather, Mao's concerns were more about the longer-
term future. Mao seems to have expected and feared that an increasingly
powerful Soviet military presence in East Asia might be the precursor of an
eventual Sovièt attack on China. Given the crushing of the Prague Spring,
70 SECURITY STUDIES

political trends seemed to con fÌ rm this view of the world. 旬， ln a manner

consistent with his actions in I954 and , to a lesser degree , I9 t! 2 , Mao used
force against the Soviets. 71 Yang Kuisong argues that, as in the earlier cases ,
Mao worked hard to prevent escalation , because he was not seeking a wider
wa r. "Beijing's leaders , Mao in particular, had no further military aims than
to teach the Soviets a bitter lesson , so that Moscow would stop further mil-
itary provocations on the Sino-Soviet border ," Yang contends .72
The use of force almost certainly had a domestic component as well , as
it did in Korea and the Taiwan Strait crises in the I9 50S , especially the I95 8
crisis. Yang emphasizes this factor-the need to restore Party and national
unity at home following three years of Cultural Revolution-alongside his
argument regarding the "pedagogical war" incentives. In a provocative ar-
ticle about the case , Lyle Goldstein dismisses the strategic argument alto-
gether, pointing to the lack of an objective Soviet threat to China in the the-
ater before the Zhenbaodao incident. Instead , Goldstein focuses exclusively
on the domestic mobilization aspects of the conflict. 73 Goldstein believes
that Mao was simply attempting at this time to rein in the excesses of the
Cultural Revolution and to unify the CCP at the April I969 Ninth Party
Congress. The I969 border clash , then , was a diversionary conflict , not a
preventive one , because Mao could not have seen the Soviet forces in the
theater before the conflict as particularly threatening. In his Ph.D. disserta-
tion , Taylor Fravel takes issue with Goldstein's account , arguing that evi-
dence from China strongly suggests that Chinese elites saw the Soviet forces
as increasingly threatening , even if an objective military assessment might
dismiss the notion that Soviet forces might be used in an offensive against
China anytime soon. Fravel stakes out his position in a way that is reminis-
cent of Whiting's work on Chinese perceptions , asserting that "even though
China maintained numerical superiority [locally in I9 69 ], China's leaders
viewed the dramatic increase in Soviet deployments as representing a sharp
and adverse decline in their ability to secure the border and project power
over disputed areas. How China's leaders perceived the balance is as im-
portant as the actual balance."74
There may be a way to resolve this debate wit1)out dismissing either the
internat
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 71

tlζof using external conflict to bring about internal Party unity, Mao might
very well have calculated that a carefully circumscribed conflict with the
USSR would create the sense of emergency in high-level Party circles that he
deemed necessary to unify the CCP during 'and after the critically important
Ninth Party Congress , which was necessary if China were to counter grow-
ing Soviet pressure and , perhaps , to prepare for eventual rapprochement
with the United States. Consistent with this thesis , Yang Kuisong reports
tha t , as in 1958 , Mao urged millions of Chinese to rally in protest , this time
against the Soviet revisionists rather than the American imperialists. There
may be a way to synthesize the two apparently quite different aspects of
Yang's thesis. One of the things that made China appear weak in Soviet eyes ,
and actually made China weak in fact , was its internal turmoi l. Mao might
have seen a need to "internally balance ," to use political science termi-
nology, by unifying and mobilizing his society to counter the long-term
threat from the USSR. Attacking the Soviet forces on Zhenbao Island sent
a tough signal before Moscow was fully ready and willing to retaliate mas-
sively against China in East Asia. Mao then used the heightened tensions for
longer-term mobilizational purposes , as he had done in sparking a crisis with
the United States in 1958.
Yang Kuisong's account , however, provides a potentially sobering future
lesson for Chinese leaders who would emulate Mao by "teaching a lesson"
to a superpower spread thin in multiple regions and distracted elsewhere.
Yang argues that Mao was shocked by the intensity of the Soviet response
both in terms of a near-term war scare and the fast-paced military buildup
on the Chinese borderthat followed. Mao had not expected such a con-
certed response so soon , especially when it occurred far from European
Russia , where the main Soviet forces and logistics bases were. In the end ,
these tensions did not escalate and did have one good result for China: they
sped rapprochement with the United States , allowing China to break out of
its isolation. But in an unusually frank and brave thesis , Yang rejects the no-
tion that Mao knew that this would be the outcome , and insists that he
badly miscalculated the Soviet response in dangerous ways.75 Yang's ac-
count seems both balanced and plausible.

The Xisha Islands (Paracel习， I974

This case does not deserve a great deal of attention , perhaps , but the
PRC's use of force to seize the Xisha Islands from the Republic of Vietnam is
a fine example of windows logic. In this case , the term "window of opportu-
nity" might apply better than "window of vulnerability," but they are really
two sides of ihe same coin. In 1974 , it was fairly clear that the American
72 SECURITY STUDIES

position in Vietnam was weak and getting weaker. Also , the Sino-American
rapprochement meant that the United States would not actively intervene if
PLA forces attacked Vietnamese forces around the Paracels. Moreover ,
China wanted to settle the dispute before North Vietnam successfully "lib-
erated" the south. Chinese relations with the Vietnamese communists had
worsened in the early 1970S as Hanoi turned increasingly to the USSR for
assistance , and as Sino-Soviet relations remained chilly at best. In any event ,
China was more likely to win the Xisha dispute against the weak , noncom-
munist Republic of Vietnam than against a strong communist Vietnam
backed by the Soviet bloc. Although the aim of the use of force here was to
seize territory militarily, rather than to send a message , doing so fits the pat-
tern described earlier: a window was open and was quickly closing. If force
were not used to seize the islands at this point , it would be much more
di面cult to do so in the future. 76

Vietnam , I9 79

Perhaps the most di面cult case of China's use of force to study is the
1979 "pedagogical war" against Vietnam. On two trips to China in 2001
and 200 卒， 1 attempted to find interesting new materials on this topic , but
was told in interviews that such materials are very hard to acquire and that
even CCP historians do not have access to most of the details of the
decision-making process. One CCP international security analyst confided
to me that this might be because the military effort was largely a failure , and
the CCP not only avoids airing its dirty laundry before outsiders , on secu-
rity politics , it does not freely air that laundry within the Party eithe r. 77
From viewing the international setting at the time and how it must have
appeared to the Chinese elite , the post-Mao CCP elites' decision to use force
且ts the window of vulnerability logic offered here. Relations with the USSR
remained extremely tense in 1978 , and the competition with Moscow was
intensifying on several scores. Soviet relations with Vietnam had improved
markedly since Hanoi successfully unified Vietnam under its rule. As Har-
lan Jencks argues: "The [recently signed] SovietιVietnamese treaty threat-
ened a considerable increase of Soviet military aid to the SRV [Socialist Re-
public of Vietnam ], but the Soviet military presence in Vietnam was still
fairly small in mid-February 1979. Chinese leaders probably saw time
working against them in this respect , and therefore wanted to strike sooner
rather than late r. "78 The Chinese were also seeking a counter to Vietnam-
ese power in Southeast Asia by supporting the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.
And , in December 1978 , Vietnam launched a massive invasion of Cambo-
dia withthe purpose of overthrowing Pol Pot's regime. So the Chinese
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEI]ING'S USE OF FORCE 73

attack was almost certainly designed to slow or even reverse Vietnam's

invasion of Cambodia.
King Chen offers the most detailed account of the December 1978 Plenum
Party meetings at which a conditional decision to use force against Vietnam
was made. Vietnam would be subject to attack if Hanoi did not back down
on Cambodia and in border conf1 icts with China. Although his story is com-
pelling , we cannot be certain of Chen's sources. Chen argues that Deng Xiao-
ping was extremely concerned about the situation in Cambodia and about
the 50viet-Vietnamese encirclement campaign more generally. Chen reports
that Deng also argued to the CCP elite that the costs of invasion would be lim-
ited , and that any failures that might occur could be beneficial in convincing
intransigent domestic forces of the necessity for the reform and moderniza-
tion programs that were being launched at the same plenum .79
In terms of windows of opportunity, the recent diplomatic normalization
with the United 5tates might have given Deng confidence that he could take
such actions without spoiling the warming trends with Washington and
without sparking a war with the U55R.. It is fairly clear that during his trip
to Washington and Tokyo in January 1979 , Deng sought at least tacit ap-
proval of his attack in Vietnam in both capitals , and he certainly behaved as
if he had received it. 80 Moreover , Taiwan was on the defensive diplomati-
cally, and could not gain U.5. backing for an attack even it had been con-
sidering one. 50 , there was little or no danger that action in Vietnam would
leave dangerous vulnerabilities to ROC attack along China's southeast
coast. 81
Harlan Jencks argues that , on the military side , February was a logical
time for an invasion of Vietnam. The rainy season in April would compli-
cate an invasion of Vietnam and the spring thaw in the north would make
a 50viet counterattack against China's northern border less feasible than it
would be in winte r. 50 by attacking in very late winter , China was jumping
through a weather window that maximized its own chances of success ,
while minimizing the time that the U55R would have to mobilize an attack
against China. 82
One last window of opportunity or vulnerability might have been at
work. Deng was about to launch a massive reform program under the ban-
ner of the Four Modèrnizations. Deng knew that military modernization
was only the fourth of the four modernizations , and that he planned to cu
74 SECURITY STUDIES

West to "break up the timetable of Soviet strategy." The Chinese need for
long-term peace during the nascent reform era , rather than making China
less belligerent in the short term , made it more so. Nayan Chanda argues
that this was the case because "China could buy time by preempting the
enemy plan at an early stage."84
There had been other major irritants in Sino-Vietnamese relations before
the invasion. These included a cutoff of Chinese aid , border disputes , and
Hanoi's inhumane treatment and expulsion of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.
But these incidents appear epiphenomenal: the underlying causes. of these
disputes and the military conflict itself seem to have been geopolitics and
Chinese fear of encirclement. In fact , according to Nayan Chanda , the poor
treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam was viewed in Beijing not so much
as a violation of those citizens' human rights but as a sign that Vietnam was
taking instructions from Moscow about how to prepare for an encirclement
campaign against China. 85 As Robert Ross argues persuasively, Soviet ac-
tions in South and Southeast Asia and the development of the Soviet Pacific
Fl eet in the 1970S were the strategic backdrop for China's view that Mos-
cow and Hanoi were colluding to encircle China and limit China's influence
in its own backyard. 86
As in the Korean War case , China chose to take action on land rather
than at sea. But unlike in the case of the Korean War, and more like many
other cases discussed above , there is no evidence that China had expansive
goals of defeating enemy forces throughout the country or of changing the
territorial status quo. This is true despite the very large scale of the Chinese
invasion. 87 Instead, force seems to have been intended more to alter politi-
cal trends and send political messages. The invasion probably had two aims:
on the political side , to send a coercive message to Hanoi that its pro-Soviet
and anti-Chinese behavior was unacceptable. and would be costly, thus
reversing the negative political trends in the tegion; and on the military
side , to draw su面cient Vietnamese military strength away from Cambodia
and to give Pol Pot a chance to regroup and better counter the Vietnamese
invasion. Neither result was achieved. Soviet-Vietnamese relations would
only tighten in the remaining years before Gorbachev transformed Soviet
foreign policy. The new Soviet Pacific Fleet moved into the U.S.-built naval
base at Cam Ranh Bay,
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 75

正 ounterfactual reasoning to deem the effort a success by comparing it to a

hypothetical projected future in which China had not used force in Viet-
nam. Would the security situation in Southeast Asia and along the northern
border with the Soviet Union and Mongolia. have been even worse from
China's perspective had Beijing not responded vigorously to the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia and the budding Soviet-Vietnamese alliance? Robert
Ross argues that the campaign , however militarily clumsy, might indeed have
served the PRC's security interests for this reason. 88
For our purposes , the important lessons of this case are that , like Mao ,
the post-Mao Chinese leadership took significant risks to launch a war for
largely political, rather than territorial , objectives. Although one might
code the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as a "br口i电ght 四t仁-li
the attack on Vietnam was about broader objectives than simply reversing
Vietnamese gains there. Those objectives were based primarily on an as-
sessment of negative and positive trends in the alliances and alignments of
China's friends and enemies , and on Beijing's desire to alter those trends be-
fore the PRC's long-term interests were harmed. As in other cases , the need
for a long-term peaceful environment encouraged shorter-term belliger-
ence. 1n particular, the domestic political challenges involved in the reform
process probably only made the use of force more rather than less likely. Fi-
nally, although Vietnam was not itself militarily superior, and CCP elites
probably perceived it as even weaker than it was , Vietnam was aligned with
the much more powerful Soviet Union , so China was running real risks by
attacking. 1n 1979 , the reputation of the United States for resolve and as-
sertiveness in internatiònal affairs was hardly at its peak , thus rendering
Beijing's belligerence against a new Soviet ally all the more risky.

Conclusions: Taiμ!an and Trend Analysis

in the Contemporary Era

A brief overview of the 1995 -96 Taiwan crisis shows how the PRC
used force coercively in response to views of long-term trends in Taiwan
politics and in U.S.-China relations. 89 China was concerned about President
Lee Teng-hui's diplomatic assertiveness , the potential implications of Wash-
ington's granting Lee a visa to visit the United States , the politically charged
nature of L町 's public speeches and statements while in the United States ,
and the prospect of a long-term trend in Taiwanese domestic public opinion
in the direction of legal independence for Taiwan. One can easily see that
President Lee's visit to the United States fell far short of a declaration of
independence, yet it sparked a militarized cnsls , including PLA missile
launches and surface exercises. Chinese interlocutors in 2002 stated that a
76 SECURITY STUDIES

similar visit by Taiwan's current president, Chen Shui-bian , to Washington

would require a show of force that exceeded in scope that of 主 995-9 6 . 90
1 have written about the potential impact on Chinese trend analysis from
I993 to the present in several articles. This is not the place tò present those
且ndings ， but rather to establish some links to the themes discussed above. 91
Since I996 , Chinese security analysts have been concerned about various
trends in U.S. security policy, in cross-Strait relations , and in domestic pol-
itics in Taiwan. PRC analysts ascribe great influence to the United States in
cross-Strait relations , so one of the key factors that determine whether their
trend analysis is pessimistic or optimistic is their attitude toward U.S. secu-
rity policy. They ask: what is the nature of the U.S.-Taiwan political and de-
fense relationship , and what is the relative likelihood that Washington is
moving toward unconditional support for Taiwan's security, even in cases
where Taiwan were to take provocative diplomatic steps to spark a crisis or
conflict? Along these lines , CCP security elites worry about the Bush ad-
ministration's efforts to sell weapons to Taiwan , even though they appreci-
ated the tough tone that the Bush administration adopted when President
Chen Shui-bian made statements suggesting Taiwan's national sover-
eignty.92 Beijing also pays careful attention to trends in the U.S.-]apan al-
liance and other U.S. defense relationships in the region , especially those
with implications for war in and around Taiwan.
1n general , since II September 200I , Chinese analysts have recognized
that the United States is intent on avoiding provoking a fight with China.
Washington would like Beijing's cooperation in the global war on terror and
on related proliferation issues , such as the North Korean nuclear cnSlS.
Even without positive incentives for cooperation , Beijing realizes that the
United States has other fish to fry, in Afghanistan , 1raq, and elsewhere.
PRC analysis ofTaiwan domestic politics is centrally important to Beijing's
trend analysis. The electoral fortunes of traditionally pro-independence
parties on Taiwan have been a major focus of attention in Beijing , especially
as Taiwan prepares to revise its constitution over the next few years. The
election and reelection of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive
Party President Chen Shui七lan m
 T R E N D A N A LY S 1S A N D B E 1J1N G 's USE 0 F F0 RCE 77

and strongly favors Taiwan in terms of the trade balance. This creates po-
liticalleverage for the PRC. More important still , Taiwanese citizens have
invested as much as $100 billion in the mainland , and hundreds of thou-
sands of Taiwanese citizens now have residences in the Shanghai area alone.
China's increasing economic and diplomatic importance to other actors in
the region and the United States has also bolstered Beijing's con且dence that
few, if any, important countries would be eager or even willing to line Up
against Beijing on the Taiwan issue.
1n military affairs , China's quickly growing , but stilllimited , coercive ca-
pacity against Taiwan counsels patience, at least until the PLA has absorbed
and trained with some of the imported and locally produced weapons sys-
tems procured for Taiwan scenarios. Especially since 1999 , Beijing has
expended greater resources and greater attention on developing coercive
options against Taiwan. This effort takes time , however , and it appears that
the PRC is capitalizing on the budgetary malaise in Taiwan to improve its
relative coercive capacity against the island , while Taiwan struggles to
respond. However , concerns remain in Beijing about certain long-term
military trends , including increased coordination between the U.S. military
and its Taiwanese counterpart , strengthening of the U.S.-]apan alliance ,
and the prospect of the introduction into the region of future upper-tier ,
theater-navy-wide ballistic missile defenses once these systems are fully
developed.
If, at a time when China had developed more robust military options
against Taiwan than it currently has , PRC elites were to become very con-
cerned about these trend lines (as they were in early 2000) and frustrated
that factors like Taiwan's economic dependence on the mainland and PLA
coercive capacity were not producing Taipei's accommodation, then Chi-
nese use of force for largely political purposes seems quite possible , even if
Taiwan had not yet declared legal independence and even if Beijing elites did
not believe that they could resolve the Taiwan issue on their own terms by
using force.
Fortunately, there are usually many "ifs" in any pessimistic scenario about
how cross-Strait relations could lead to conflict. The situation is far from
hopeless , as long as the United States can mix credible threats of interven-
tion and arms transfers to Taiwan with credible political ass
78 SECURITY STUDIES

Instead , they should ask themselves how to reduce China's ability to hurt
American forces , coerce America's friends and allies , and damage Taiwan's
economy. At the same time , they should be asking what diplomaticsteps ,
military improvements , alliance policies , and diplomacy toward Taiwan
and the mainland best meet the paradoxical demands of deterring mainland
adventurism while reassuring Beijing that the United States is not backing
China into a corner on the Taiwan issue by encouraging the forces of Taiwan
independence over time.
This balance in U.S. policy might prove tricky to find , especially as PLA
coercive capacity grows during this decade. Deterring coercion is harder
than deterring invasion and requires a much higher level of superiority for
U.S. , ]apanese, and Taiwan forces in combination. We should expect a
security competition between China's coercive capabilities and the increas-
ingly coordinated defensive capabilities of Taiwan , the United States , and,
perhaps , ]apan. Taiwan might even try to break out of this race by going of-
fensive and creating a deterrent of missiles and weapons of mass destruction
of its own. This would not happen overnight, however , and judging from
the history of PRC use of force , we should not expect the PLA to wait until
those capabilities are up and running to strike Taiwan and try to force a
political dea l.
The optimists are correct that peace is still more likely than war , and the
problems that exist in cross-Strait relations can be resolved. But for Wash-
ington to play a constructive role in this process and increase the likelihood
of peace , U.S. security analysts need to understand the ways in which PRC
security analysts consider present and future trends in military affairs , eco-
nomics , and politics when devising security strategies.

Notes

1. For the most thorough and theoretically informed presentation of the case for
optimism and the 1ikely future effectiveness of the traditional U. S. deterrent posture
in cross-Strait relations , see Robert S. Ross , "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deter-
rence , Escalation Dominance, and U. S. -China Relations ," 1nternational Security 27 ,
2 (Fa112002): 48-85.
2. The most comprehensive review of the literature on preventive war is Jack S.
LeηT， "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War ," World Politics 40
(October 1987): 82-107. The best analysis of both preemptive wars and preventive
wars , and the best defense of the theories about them , is Stephen Van Evera , Causes
of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press,
1999) , chs. 3 and 4.. The assertion that preemptive wars "almost never happen"
comes from Daniel Reiter, "Exploding the Powderkeg Myth: Preemptive Wars Al-
most Never Happen ," International Security 20 (Fall 1995): 5-34.
 T R E N D A N A LY S 1 S A N D B E 1J 1N G 's USE 0 F F0 RCE 79

3. For classic examples of power transition theory, see A. F. K. Organski and

Ja∞k Kugler , The W如r Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press ，工 980); and
Robert Gilpin , W句r and Change in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press , I98I).
4. The clearest statement of this argument is Van Evera , Caωes of War , ch. 3.
5. The pioneering and still classic account of Mao's calculations in the second
half of I950 is Allen Whiting , China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the
Korean War (I960; Stanford: Stanford University Press , I968); also see Thomas J.
Christensen , Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization , and Sino-
American Conflict (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press , I996) , ch. 5. For ar-
guments that Mao was more aggressive and ideologically driven than either Whit-
ing or 1 argue , see Chen Jia的 excellent book China 云 Road to the Korean War: The
Making of Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press ,
I994). Other prominent works include Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue
Litai , Uncertain Partners: Stali刀， Mao , and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford
University Press , I993) , esp. chs. 3 -4; Shuguang Zhang , Deterrence and Strategic
Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations , I949-58 (Ithaca , N. Y.: Cornell Uni-
versity Press ，工 992); and Shuguang Zhang , Mao 云 Military Romanticism (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press ，工 995).
6. For relevant evidence and argumentation , see "Talk at the Eighth Meeting of
the Central People's State Conference ," 28 June I9 50 , in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong
wengao [The manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the founding of the nation] (Beijing:
Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe , I987-) , I: 423; Hong Xuezhi , Kang Mei yuan
Chao zhanzheng huiyi [Recollections of the war to resist U. S. aggression and to aid
Korea] (Beijing: Liberation Army Literature and Art Publishing ，工 99 0 ) ，工 Chai
Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian , Banmendian tanpan [Panmunjon negotiations] (Bei-
jing: Liberation Army Press , I989) , 8 工 -82; Chen Jian , China 云 Road to the Korean
W妇们工 32; Peng Dehu缸， "Talk to the Meeting to Mobilize Cadres of Division Com-
mander and Above of the People's Volunteer Army，"工 4 October I950 , in Peng De-
huai junshi wenxuan [Selected military writings of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Zhong-
yang 币Tenxian Chubanshe , I988) , 322; and Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai , "China's
Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Re
80 SECURITY STUDIES

terrence and Strategic Culture , ch. 4; and Michael Hunt, "Beijing and the Korea Cri-
sis ," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1992): 453-78; Peng Dehuai also reports
sleepless nights in early October regarding the prospect of entering the war , see
Peng, Memoirs , 473.
工 3. Shen Zhihua , Mao Zedong, Si Dalin yu Chao zhan: Zhong Su zui gao jimi
dang'an [Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War: the top secret Sino-Soviet
archives] (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books , 1998) , 218-20; and Chen ]ian, China 云
Road, II2.
14. Kathryn Weathersby, "New Findings on the Korean War," Cold War In-
ternational History Project Bulletin , no. 6-7 (Winter 1995-96). This obsession
with ]apanese intervention on Mao's part is also noted by the most recent open-
source Chinese scholarship on the war by Song Liansheng, which reports more
frankly about the events of spring 1950 than any previous work 1 have read , open
or internally circulated. Song reports that, from late 1949 through 1950 , China's
main concern about foreign intervention in Korea was with ]apanese forces fight-
ing at the behest of the United States. Mao's initial commitment to assist Kim if his
invasion plan went badly was premised on the notion that 20-30 ,000 ]apanese
troops might enter the fray. Song Liansheng, Kang Mei yuan Chao zai hui shou
[Looking back again on the Korean War] (Kunming: Yunnan People's Press , 2002) ,
4 2 -43.
工 5. Kathryn Weathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean
W句r， I945-5o , Working Paper No. 8 (Washington , D. C.: Cold War International
History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars , 1993).
工 6. "PRC Scholar Shi Yinhong on Gains , Losses , Winners , Losers in Korean
War" (in Chinese) , Beijing Qianlong Wang online text，二 8 ]uly 2003 , in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (hereafter cited as FBIS) , CPP20030730000190.
17. For an excellent review of the reasons for Mao's underestimation of Ameri-
can power, resolve , or both , see Chen , China 云 Road， 126-28 , which positsthat
Mao was not so much stunned by the hypothetical prospect of eventual war between
China and the United States as he was by the speed and intensity of the American
response m 1950.
18. Reiter , "Exploding the Powderkeg Myth."
19. Russian documents reveal that in Sino-Soviet discussions of the conditions
for escalation and of Stalin's desire for China to enter the war as early as ]uly, de-
fending against a breach of the 38th parallel by American force
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 81

the Principles and Deployments of the People's Volunteer Army as It Enters Korea
for Combat," in ]ianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao , 1: 560-6 工， translated in Use-
fμ 1 Adversaries , app. B.
22. Xu Yan , ]inmen zhi zhan [The battle over Quemoy] (Beijing: Zhongguo
Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe , 199 抖， 159.
23. . He Di , "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy Toward the
O丘shore Islands (Quemoy, Matsu) ," in The Great Powers in East Asia, I9丹 -60 ，
ed. Warren 1. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) ,
222-45; and Thomas Stolper, China , Taiwan , and the 0萨 hore Islands (Armonk ,
N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe , 1985) ，工 9-27; Gerald Segal , Defending China (Oxford: Oxford
University Press , 1984) , ch. 7 .
24. See He , "Evolution ," 226.
2 5. Xu Yan , ]inmen zhi zhan ， 工 59. Xu's argument directly contradicts a leading
work on the offshore islands problem in the West. Given Mao's domestic agenda ,
"external cnSlS then would only be a distraction ," Stolper, China , Taiwan , 18 ,
矶rntes.

26. Xu Yan , ]inmen zhi zha刀，工 73-74.

之 7. I argue these points in greater detail inChristensen , Useful Adversaries , ch. 6.
28. Ye Fei , Ye Fei huiyilu [The memoirs of Ye Fei] (Beijing: Liberation Army
Press , 1988) , 651; and Xu Yan , ]inmen zhi zhan , 216.
29. Ye Fei , Ye Fei huiyilu , 656-63.
30. Jonathan Pollack , "Perception and Action in Chinese Foreign Policy, Vo l. 1:
The Quemoy Decision" (Ph.D. diss. , University of Michigan , 1976) ，二 37.
31. Zhang , Deterrence and Strategic Culture , ch. 8; and Gong Li , "Tension
Across the Taiwan Strait," in Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy,
I954 -73 , ed. Robert S. Ross andJiang Changbin (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Asia Center, 2001) , 156-57.
32. Christensen , Useful Adversaries , 225-27.
33. Ibid. , ch. 6.
34. See , e.g. , the account of Mao's Russian-language interpreter on how Sputnik
hurt Sino-Soviet relations by making Khrushchev less accommodating to Beijing. Li
Yueran , Waijiao wutaishang de xin Zhongguo lingxiu [The leaders of new China on
the diplomatic stage] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press , 1989) , 177-78.
3 5. See Mao's reflections on the requests in 1959 in "An Outline Concerning the
International Situation ," 12 September 1959 , in]ianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao ,
8: 599-603.
36. Christensen , Useful Adversaries , ch. 6.
37. See , e.g. , Xu Yan , ]inmen zhi zhan , and Gong Li , in Re-examining the Cold
W如 r， ed. Ross and Jiang.
3 8 . 怡，坠 Fei huiyilu , 650
82 SECURITY STUDIES

Islands Crisis of 1958 ," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2 , 4 (Winter

1993): 343- 6 7.
4 1. Zhong Yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhan shi [The battle history of the self-
defense counterattack on the Sino-Indian border] (Beijing: Academy of Military
Sciences , 1994) , 2. These findings are consistent with the coverage of the Chinese
literature by John 币已 Garver， Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twen-
tieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press , 2001) , 58 - 6 工.
42. Chen Pingsheng , chief ed. , Yindu junshi sixiang yanjiu [Research on Indian
military thinking] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences , 199 抖， 47- 4 8 (internally
circulated).
43. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie ziwei fanji zuozhan de lishi zhenxiang [The real
history of the self-defense counterattack warfare at the Chinese-Indian border ], in
Junshi miwenlu [Secret military records] (Beijing: Beijing Shifan Daxue Press ，工 993) ，
3 6 -7 1 , at 48.
44. Garver, Protracted Contest , 58-6 1.
45. Zhong Yin bianjing ziwei fanji zuozhan shi, 181 ，巧 3.
46. Xu Yan , "Zhongyin bianjie ," 48.
4 7. Stolper, '‘ China , Taiwan , and the Offshore Islands ，"工 3 2. The crisis deesca-
lated when the United States sent reassurances to Beijing that it did not support a
k岛1T attack on the mainland , but the CCP must still have been wary of American
promises , particularly from Kennedy, whom Beijing portrayed as more aggressive
than Eisenhowe r. Allen S. Whiting , The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Ar-
bor: University of Michigan Press ，工 975) ， 34-35.
48. Whiting, Chinese Calculus , 34- 65; also sc: e Segal , Defending Chin向工 49.
49. Whiting, Chinese Calculus , 63.
50. Taylor Fravel , "The Long March to Peace: China and the Settlement of
Territorial Disputes" (Ph.D. diss. , Stanford University, 2003) , ch. 6. Consistent with
Fravel's account, Xu Yan states that the Central Military Commission ordered the
restoration of military patrols near the McMahon Line in early June 1962. Xu Yan ,
"Zhong Yin bianjie ," 44-45.
5 1. For critical accounts of Indian strategy, see Neville Maxwell , India ￥ China
War (London: Jonathan Cape ，工 970); and Brigadier J. P. Dalvi , Himalayan Blunder:
The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of I962 (Bombay: Thacker , 1969).
52. 1 cover these topics in greater depth in Thomas J. Christensen , "Worse Than a
Monolith: Disorganization and Rivalry in East Asian Communist Alliances and U. S.
Containment Challenges , 1949-69 ," Asi
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 83

57. Qiang Zhai , China and the Vietnam Wars , I9so-I97S (Chapel Hill , N. C.:
University of North Carolina Press , 2000) , 140-4 1.
58. Li Danhui , "Sino-Soviet Relations ," 3 - 5.
59. For Mao's June 1964 statement, see Qu Aiguo , '‘ Zhongguo zhiyuan budui
yuan Yue kang Mei junshi xingdong gaishu" [A narrative of the military activities of
the Chinese volunteer units in the Assist Vietnam Oppose America War] , in Junshi
Shi Lin [Military History Circles] , no. 6 (1989): 40.
60. Zhou Enlai nianpu , vo l. 2 , 6 August 1964 , 663.
6 1. Liu Shaoqi and Le Duan , Beijing , 8 April 1965 , in 77 Conversations Between
Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in lndochina, I964-I977 , Working Paper
No. 22 , ed. Odd Arne Westad et a l. (Washington , D. C.: Cold War lnternatìonal His-
tory Project , Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars , 1998) (hereafter cited as 77 Con-
versations) , 83. Also see Zhou Enlai , N guyen Van Hieu, and N guyen Van Binh, Great
Hall of the People , Beijing , 16 May 1965 , ibid. , 83-84.
62. See Guo Ming , ed. , Zhong Yue guanxi sishinia刀， 68-7 勾引Tang Xian'gen ,
Zhongguo mimi da fabing: yuan Yue 走ang Mei shilu [Chir旧 's secret large dispatch
of troops: the real record of the war to assist Vietnam and resist America] (Ji'nan:
Ji'nan Publishers ，工 99 抖， esp. the back cover; and Yang Gongsu , Zhonghua ren-
min gongheguo waijiao lilun yu shixian [The theory and practice of PRC diplo-
macy ], a limited edition Beijing University textbook，工 996 version , 341 (internally
circulated).
63. Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh , Changsha (Hunan) ，工 6 May 1965 , in 77
Conversations , 84 - 8 5
64. Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, Hoang Tang , Beijing ，巧 August 1966, in
77 Conversations , 9 6 -97.
65. "Zhujia Yuenan nanfang minzu jiefang lianxian chengli qi zhounian de dian同
bao" [Telegram celebrating the seventh anniversary of the establishment of the Na-
tional Liberation Front of South Vietnam ], 19 December 1967 , inJianguo yilai Mao
Zedong wengao , 12: 458-59.
66. See , e.g. , Zhang Baijia , "Mao Zedong yu Zhong Su tongmeng he Zhong Su
fenlie" [Mao Zedong and the Sino-Soviet alliance and the Sino-Soviet split] (MS pre-
sented to the Chinese Communist Party Central Party History Research 0面ce's ln-
ternational Scholars Research Forum , Beijing, October 1997) , 7.
67. Thomas Robinson , "China Confronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplo-
macy Along China's lnner Frontier," in Cambridge History of China , vo l. 15 , ed.
Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (Cambri
84 SECURITY STUDIES

where Whiting had previously worked , see William Burr, "Sino-American Relations ,
工 969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps Toward Rapprochement/' Cold W如T
History I , 3 (Apri1200I): 73-II2. Recent works that emphasize the importance of
international pressures , a combination of international and domestic factors , or just
domestic factors all assert that Mao intentionally set a trap for the Soviet forces. For
an account emphasizing international pressures on Mao and his preemptive re-
sponse , see Gong Li , "Chinese Decision Making ," in Re-examining the Cold War:
U.S.-China Diplomacy, I954-73 , ed. Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cam-
bridge , Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 200I) , 327-3 工; for a mixed account
emphasizing the preemptive warning calculus and the need to mobilize the Party and
nation after three years of the Cultural Revolution , see Yang Kuisong , "The Sino-
Soviet Border Clash of I969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapproche-
ment," Cold War History I ，工 (August 2000): 江- 52; for the pure domestic argu-
ment , see Lyle J. Goldstein , "Research Report: Return to Zhenbao Island: Who
Started Shooting and Why Does It Matter," China Quarterly , no. I68 (December
S200I): 985-97.
7 工. Gong Li , "China's Decision Making ," 327-3 工. Citing William Whitson's
classic , The Chinese High Command (New York: Praeger, I973) , Thomas Robin-
son offers this possible explanation for Chinese behavior, which he considers a likely
component but not exclusive factor in China's strategy. He writes of this hypothe-
sis: "whenever the Chinese Communists perceived a superior force about to attack ,
the proper strategy (l earned through bitter experience during the Shanghai-Kiangsi-
Yenan days) was to preempt the situation at a place and time of one's own choosing ,
thus throwing the enemy off balance and perhaps even preventing his coming ahead
at all" (Robinson , "China Confronts the Soviet Union ," 263).
72. Yang , "Sino-Soviet Border Clash ," 30.
7 3. Goldstein , "Research Report."
74. Fravel , '‘ China's Long l\Ilarch to Peace ," 45.
7 5. Yang , "Sino-Soviet Border Clash ," "esp. 35 - 3 7.
76. For a detailed review of this case , see Segal , Defending China. Segal's ac-
count fully 且ts a windows logic , with China worrying on the one hand that new-
found oil deposits in the South China Sea would bring international actors into the
dispute over the Paracels and that the Republic of Vietnam's impending
 TREND ANALYSIS AND BEIJING'S USE OF FORCE 85

and defense budgets would be cut so sharply in the next few years that they would
not return to 1978 levels until the mid 1990s, after years of double-digit increases
beginning in the early 1990s.
84. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War (San Diego: Har-
court Brace , 1986) , 259. The quotation is from D r. Michael Pillsbury.
85. Ibid. ，立 56.
86. Robert Ross , The Indochina Tangle: China 云 Vietnam Policy, I975-79
(New York: Columbia University Press ，工 988) ， chs. 7-8.
87. For the most comprehensive coverage of the military aspects of the war to
date , see Edward O'Dowd , "The Last Maoist War" (Ph.D. diss. , Princeton Univer-
sity, 2004).
88. Ross , Indochina Tangle.
89. For excellent coverage of this case , see Allen S. Whiting , "China's Use of
Force ，工 950-96 ， and Taiwan ," International Security 26 , 2 (Fall 2001): 103-3 工;
Ross , "Navigating the Taiwan Strait"; and Andrew Scobell, China 云 Use of Force:
Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press , 2004).
90. As one high-ranking military 0面cer stated in a discussion in 2002 , the PLA
response would not necessarily include an attack on the island of Taiwan itself but
would exceed in intensity the exercises of 1995 -96. He therefore predicted a major
crisis with the United States if such a visit were to occur.
9 I. For a few of those articles , see "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs 75 ,
5 (September-October 199 6): 37- 口; "China , the U. S.-Japan Alliance , and the Se-
curity Dilemma in East Asia ," International Security 巧， 4 (Spring I999): 49- 80;
"Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China's Rise and the Challenges for U. S.
Secùrity Policy," International Security 25 , 4 (Spring 200I): 5-40; "China ," in
Strategic Asia, 2002-2003: Asian Aftershoc走s ， ed. Aaron L. Friedberg and Richard
Ellings (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research , 2002) , 5 工 -94; and "The Con-
temporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," Washington Quarterly
25 , 4: 7- 2 I.
92. Author interviews in Beijing and Shanghai , January 2003; Thomas J. Chris-
tensen and Michael Glosny, "Sources of Stability in U. S.-China Security Relations ,"
in Strategic Asia, 2003-2004 , ed. Richard Ellings and Michael Wills (Seattle:
National Bureau of Asian Research , 2003). For further discussion of these issues , see
my contributions to nos. 6 , 7 , and 8 of the China Leadership Monitor , online at
www.chinaleadershipmonito r. org (accessed September 巧， 200 5).
4 Chin的 Decision for 阳r with 1ωd
in I962
John W. Garver

Why Did China's Leaders Decide for War

Against lndia?

Why did the People's Republic of China (PRC) go to war with lndia in
19 6ρ What were the reasons for that war from the standpoint of China's
leaders? What were the considerations that led the PRC's leaders to opt for
large-scale use of armed force then? And how accurate were the views held
by China's leaders? These are the questions this chapter addresses.
The 1962 war with lndia was long the PRC's forgotten wa r. Little was
published in China regarding the process through which China decided
for war-unlike in the case of the Korean War, the lndochina wars , the
conflicts over the offshore islands in the 1950s, and even the 1974 Paracel
lsland campaign. Foreign analysts such as Ne飞rille Maxwell and Allen Whit-
ing , writing in the early 1970s , were thus compelled to rely on inferences
drawn from Chinese public statements. 1 This situation began to change
during the 1990s, when a half dozen Chinese publications on the 1962 war
appeared. On the lndian side , the publication in 2002 of lndia's long-
classifìed 0面cial history of the 工 962 war offered additional new and au-
thoritative materia l. 2 While these sources are far from complete , they do of-
fer su面cient new materials to warrant a revisiting of China's road to the
1962 war.
This study will postulate two major, interrelated sets of reasons why
China's leaders decided for war with lndia in 1962.3 Ordered in the chrono-
logical fashion in which they preoccupied China's leaders , these two sets of
factors were:
1. A perceived Iieed to punish and end perceived lndian efforts to un-
dermine Chinese control of Tibet , which were seen as aimed at restoring
the pre-1949 status quo ante there.
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN I962 87

2. A perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression

against Chinese territory along the border.
This study is also concerned with the accuracy of Chinese perceptions in
these two areas. It will attempt to ascertain whether China's decision for
war was based , to some" degree , on misperceptions rather than on accu-
rate assessment of the situation. I 旦哩哇~at in terms of deterrence along the
þorder, Chi_n~se perceptions were substantially accurate. Chinese percep-
tions regarding Indian policy toward Tibet, however , were substantially
maccurate.
The historiography of any war is politically sensitive , because ittouches
on the question of which nation bears responsibility and thus the implicit
moral onus for initiating wa r. The 1962 war is especially sensitive in this re-
ga时， and its historiography figures prominently in the contemporary polit-
ical psychology of Sino-Indian relations-on both sides of that relationship.
While a scholar should ideally be oblivious to the requirements of any such
pressures , this ideal is hard to realize in practice. Fortunately for a scholar
who feels deep empathy with both sides in the 1962 war, this study argues
that the two sides share responsibility for that wa r. India's policies along
the border , and especially the Forward Policy adopted in November 19 缸，
were seen by China's leaders as constituting incremental Indian seizure of
Chinese-controlled territory, and there is little basis for deeming that view
inaccurate. Chinese perceptions of Indian policies toward Tibet were fun-
damentally erroneous , however , and those Chinese misperceptions con- I 飞也 A
t由uted Sl的antially to the 1962 wa r. Hence both sides bear the onus for 性骂不句
the 1962 war, China for misconstruing India's Tibetan policies , and India 布'"钱足'
for pursuing a confrontational policy on the borde r.
Regarding the border , this study tests the Whiting-Maxwell hypothesis
regarding China's road to the 1962 war by drawing on recently available
Chinese accounts of the decision-making process in the People's Republic
of China. Broadly speaking，哩出坠豆豆nd_ Maxwell reached the same con-
clus~on: China 主 resort to war in 1962 was largely a function of perceived
l!l dian aggression. As noted earlier, Maxwell and Whiting were forced to
rely largely on inferences drawn from 0面cial Chinese statements at the time
of the 1962 wa r. Newly available Chinese materials allow us to go "inside"
the Chinese de
 88 SECURITY STUDIES

States] ," Whiting said regarding Chinese perceptions of U.S. policy, but he
went on to note: "Preconceptions can ac~~_ filt~~ior seJect些缸elevant ev-
idence of intention~副司豆豆司局再hdiJ4ias in assessing tt叫豆豆豆豆豆二t
面r-eatto-be 二口fic单豆tèa了'4Targue t五at-fIll豆k牛二 indeea--ine-c豆豆功而瓦1ao's
au面证ltatÎve luogmeñfs about Indian motives.
Two concepts from psychology are useful for understanding the Chinese
perceptual filters 由t linked Tibet and the 1962 war: fundamenta1 attribj!-
t恒旦旦旦旦nd projection~Attribution involves an i~idual's inferen
一一…

about why another per画 n acts as he or she does. It is a process beginning

…
with the perception of another person in a particular social context , pro-
ceeding through a causal judgment about the reasons for the other person's
behavior, and ending with behavioral consequences for the person making
the judgment. A fundamental attribution error occurs when one person in-
correctly attributes particular actions to the internal motives , character, or
disposition of another individual , rather than to the characteristics of the
situation in which that individual finds him- or herself. Commission of a
fundamental attribution error entails systematic underestimation of situa-
tional determinants of the other's behavior, determinants deriving , above
all , from the political and social roles of an individ u: al and compulsions on
the individual arising in particular situations due to those roles. Instead of
recognizing that other individuals act as they do because of their particular
roles and the requirements of particular situations , observers , may attribute
their behavior to personal motives or interior disposition. Social psycholo-
gists have found this to be very common. There is a pervasive tendency to
attribute the behavior of others to interior motivations , while attributing
O肘 's own behavior to situational factors. 5 Below targue 出at M哩主吧7
四壁d a fundamental attribution ertor by concludiIlg that Nehru wa~些k二
ing to seize Tibet from China.
/~. Projection involves transference by one individual onto another of re-
sponsibility for events deriving, in fact , from actions of the first individual.
It is very difficult for people to deal with the dissonance arising from the fact
that their actions were inept or created pain for themselves and others.
Rather than accept the blow to self-esteem and the psychological discom-
fort that comes from that acceptance of responsibi
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR 飞)í1 AR WITH INDIA IN 1962 89

A premise of the argument developed below is that what leaders think

matters. Some realists fìnd it satisfactory to look only at interests and poli-
cies , black-boxing or ignoring the specifìc psychological processes through
which leaders arrive at their determinations about interests and policies. It
is notnecessary or possible to engage this fundamental issue here. But it
should be stipulated 出at theafgument below rests on the premise that par-
ticular policies derive from speci且c setsof heliefs and calculations 1inked to
those beli~fs ， and that differe r: t sorts of beliefs and calculations might well
lead to different policies.

Tibet and the I962 War: The Chinese

View of the Root Cause

A starting point for understanding the Chinese belief system about

the 1962 war is recognition that , from the Chinese point of view, the road
to the 1962 war begins in Tibet. Although Chinese deliberations in 1962
leading up to the war were closely tied to developments on the border , Chi-
nese studies of the 1962 war published during the 1990S link lndian border
policies to Tibet and insist that lndian border policies derived from an
lndian effort to weaken or overthrow Chinese rule over Tibet. Chinese stud-
ies of the 1962 war insist that an lndian desire to "seize Tibet," to turn Tibet \喊
into an lndian "colony" or "protectorate ," or to return Tibet to its pre-1949
status , was the root cause of lndia's forward policy and the 1962 wa r. These
contemporary assertions mirror the views of China's leaders circa 1962. ln
other words , Chinese beliefs about the nature of lndian objectives regard-
ing Tibet deeply colored Chinese deliberations regarding lndia's moves along
the borde r.
There is unanimous agreement among Chines~_~chQhlrS that the root
cause of the1962 war was an lndian attempt to undermine Chinese rule and
seize Tibet. The offìcial PLA history of the 1962 war argues that lndia
sought to turn Tibet into a "buffer zone" (huanchongguo). Creation of such
a buffer zone had been an objective of British imperial strategy, and Nehru
was p~rceived as a "complete successor" to Britain in this regard. Nehru's
objective was seen as the creation of a "great lndian empire" in South Asia
by" 且l1ing the vacuum" left by the British exit from that region. According
to the PLA history, Nehru regarded control of Tibet as essential for "mas-
tery over South Asia" and "the most economical method for guaranteeing
lndia's security. 时 A study by Xu Yan , professor at the PLA's National De-
fense University and one of China's foremost military historians , fo l1 ows the
same line of argument: Nehru aspired and worked consistently throughout
the 19 50S to turn Tibet into a "buffer zone." According to Xu , Nehru had
90 SECURITY STUDIES

imbibed British imperialist ideology and believed that India should domi-
nate neighboring countries. He quotes Nehru and other early Congress
Party leaders about their aspirations that India should lead and organize the
Indian Ocean region. Regarding Tibet , Nehru aspired to turn that region
into a "buffer zone" between China and India. This was Nehru's consistent
objective throughout the I950s. The "decisive factor" in the deterioration
of Sino-Indian relations , according to Xu Yan , was Nehru's policy of "pro-
tecting" the Tibetan "splittists" after the Lhasa rebellion of March I959 .7
An article by 明Tang Hongwei of the Chinese Academy of Social Science ,
and one of China's senior India hands , presents a similar view. Priorto I 94 7 ,
Britain's objective , Wang argues , was to bring Tibet within its "sphere of in-
fluence." Britain sought "Tibetan independence" and continually attempted
to instigate Tibet to "leave China" (tuoli Zhongguo). Nehru was deeply in-
fluenced by this British thinking , Wang argued , through education in Britain
and by assimilation of the mentality of the British ruling class. In I9 59 , the
Indian government "supported the Tibetan rebels ," permitted them to carry
out "anti-China activities" on Indian territory, and even gave some Tibetan
rebels military training. Simultaneous with this , India advanced claims on
Chinese territory. 8 Implicitly but clearly, the purposeof India doing this was
to achieve Tibetan "independence" by instigating Tibet to "leave China."
One of the most extensive and nuanced Chinese accounts of events lead-
ing up to the I962 war is by Zhao Weiwen , a longtime South Asian analyst
of the Ministry of State Security. Zhao's account of the road to war also be-
gins with Tibet and attribution of aggressive motives to Indian policy
moves. From I947 to I9 5 2, Zhao writes , "India ardently hoped to continue
England's legacy in Tibet."9 The "essence" of English policy had been to
"tamper with China's sovereignty in Tibet to change it to 'suzerainty' thereby
throwing off the jurisdiction of China's central government over Tibet un-
der the name of Tibetan ‘ autonomy. 门'10 By I95 2 , however, the PLA's vic-
tories in Korea , in Xikang province (l ater to become the western part of
Sichuan province), the conclusion of the I7-point agreement of May I9 口，
the PLA's occupation of Tibet , and Beijing's forceful rejection of Indian ef-
forts to check the PLA's
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN 196 二 91

of sovereignty over Tibet. Zhao is more sensitive than other Chinese ana-
lysts to the domestic political pressures weighing on N ehru in I9 59. Yet
even she suggests that Nehru's "dark mentality" led him to give free rein t。
"anti-China forces" in an attemptto cause Tibet to "throw off the jurisdic-
tion of China 's central government."
The attribution to lndia by contemporary Chinese scholars of a desire to
seize Tibet mirrors-as we shall see below-the thinking of Chinese lead-
ers who decided to launch the I962 wa r. This is probably due to the fact
that published scholarship in China is still expected to explain and justify,
not to criticize , the decisions of the Chinese Communist Party, at least on
such sensitive matters as war and peace.

lndian Policy Toward Tibet

Assessment of the accuracy of Chinese views regarding lndian policy

toward Tibet depends on ascertaining. what actually transpired in lndo-
Tibetan-Chinese relations in the years prior to the I962 wa r. A brief review
is thus requisite.
lndian policy toward the PRC takeover 哑aLC_O皿plex. On the one hand ,
New Delhi opposed Beijing's military occupation of Tibet. ln I949 and
I950 , lndia covertly supplied small amounts of arms to the Tibetan gov-
ernment. 12 During the same period , and while the PLA was preparing to
move into Tibet , the lndian government sought via diplomatic protests to
the new PRC government to prevent or limit PLA occupation of Tibet. Bei-
jing rejected these lndian protests with stern warnings. New Delhi also ini-
tially sought to uphold lndian rights in Tibet inherited from Britain and em-
bodied in treaties with the old Republic of China. These rights included
trading missions , representative 0面ces ， telecommunications facilities , and
small military contingents to guard these facilities in several Tibetan towns.
Beijing viewed these rights as products of imperialist aggression against
China an èl. unilaterally abrogated the treaties upon which they were based.
By I9 5 2 or so , Nehru had accepted China's views of these old treaties and
of lndia's derivative special rights in Tibet. Many in lndia , including a num-
ber 'of very prominent individuals , though not initiallyNehru, were con-
cerned about the fate of Tibe t's Buddhist-based and lndian-influenced civi-
lization under rule by the Chinese Communist Party. Nehru became
increasingly sensitive to these "sentimental ," "cultural" (terms Nehru used)
interests in Tibet as the years passed. 13
On the other hand , lndia actually helped China consolidate its control
over Tibet. ln October I950 , lndia refused to sponsor a Tibetan appeal to
the United Nations. When El Salvador sponsored such an appeal , lndia
92 SECURITY STUDIES

played a key role in squashing it. Many governments , including those of the
United States , Britain, and many Middle Eastern countries , were willing to
follow India's lead on this issue , and India's opposition to the Tibetan ap-
peal to the United Nations was , in fact , a major reason for its nonconsider-
ation. 14 New Delhi also turned down U.S. proposals in 1950 for Indo-U.S.
cooperation in support of Tibetan resistance to China. 15 India also played a
key role in persuading the young Dalai Lama not to flee abroad and try to
rally international support for Tibet , but to return to Tibet and reach an ac-
commodation with China's communist governmept-an accommodation
that occurred with the 17-point agreement of May 195 1. Then in 1954 , In-
dia formally recognized China's ownership of Tibet as part of an effort to
reach a broader understanding with China. Again , most countries recog-
nized India's leadership on this matter. After the 1954 agreement between
China and India regarding Tib时， the Indian government encouraged the
Dalai Lama and his local Tibetan government to assert its autonomy under
the 17-point agreement. Perhaps most important of all, until mid 1959 , In-
dia allowed trade with Tibet to continue unimpeded. Prior to the mid
19 50S , when new PLA-built roads into Tibet were opened, India's supply of
foodstuffs , fuels , and basic goods was essential to restraining inflation in
Tibet created by demand for these commodities due to the introduction of
large numbers of Chinese soldiers and construction workers into a region
with a subsistence economy.
In mid 1957 , the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began covert as-
sistance to rebels in the Kham region of southeastern Tibet. Assistance ren-
dered through this CIA program was actually quite limited , totaling only
250 tons of munitions , equipment , and supplies between 1957 and 196 1. 16
But CIA operations came to the attention of Chinese intelligence and thus
became a concern of China's government. Tibetan refugees who found asy-
lum in northern Indian cities (especially Darjeeling, Kalimpong , and Gang-
tok) in the 1950S also in various ways supported resistance movements in-
side Tibet. Covert operatives from various countries , including the United
States , Nationalist China , and the PRC , were also active in those cities. By
late 1958 , Beijing began demanding that India expel key leaders of the
Tibetan resistance based in India and suppress a
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR 'W ITH INDIA IN 19 62 93

with Tibe t's struggle. Beijing condemned a large number of Indian moves
that it said encouraged the rebellion , including the Indian consul general in
Lhasa's meeting with demonstrating Tibetans in the early days of the Lhasa
uprising; granting asylum to the Dalai Lama; having 0面cial contact with
the Dalai Lama; treating the Dalai Lama as an honored guest; permitting
the Dalai Lama to meet with the media and foreign representatives; not
quashing the Dalai Lama's appeal to the United Nations; granting asylum
to ten thousand or so Tibetan refugees who followed the Dalai Lama to
India; concentrating those refugees in camps near the Tibetan frontier; not
suppressing "anti-China activities" conducted in those refugee camps; per-
mitting or encouraging negative commentary by Indian newspapers about
China's actions in Tibet; Nehru raising the "Tibet issue" in India's parlia-
ment and making critical comments about China's policies in Tibet; Nehru
permitting the Indian parliament to discuss Tibet; allowing "anti-China ac-
tivities" by protesters in Indian cities; not punishing Indian protestors for
defacing a portrait of Mao Zedong; instigating an "anti-China campaign"
in the Indian press; restricting trade between India and Tibet; and allowing
the Dalai Lama to speak of "a Tibetan government in exile." All these acts ,
in China's view, constituted "interference in the internal affairs of China."17
Beijing saw these Indian actions as ways in which New Delhi was attempt-
ing to "seize Tibet."

CCP Leader矿 Perceptions of lndian

•• Expansionism" in I 959

As noted earlier, the uniform belief of PRC historians of the I990S

that India wanted to seize Tibet mirrors the beliefs of China's leaders in
I959. In the aftermath of the uprising that began in Lhasa on IO March
I959 , the CCP decided to dissolve the Tibetan local government, assert its
own direct administration , and begin implementing social revolutionary
policies in Tibet. On 25 孔1arch， "central cadres" met in Shanghai to discuss
the situation in Tibet. Mao gave his views of the situation. India was doing
bad things in Tibet, Mao Zedong told the assembled cadres , but China
would not condemn India openly at the moment. Rather, India would be
given enough rope to hang itselfψo xing bu yi-literally, "to do evil deeds
frequently brings ruin to the evil doer"). China would settle accounts with
India later, Mao said. 18
Three weeks later, as thousands of Tibetans fled into India , where out-
raged Indian and international sympathy welcomed them , Mao intensifÌ ed
the struggle against India. On I9 April , Mao ordered the Xinhua News
Agency to issùe a commentary criticizing unnamed "Indian expansionists."
94 SECURITY STUDIES

Mao persona l1y revised the draft commentary.19 Four days later Mao ordered
a further escalation. Renmin Ribao (People 云 Daily) should now openly crit-
icize Nehru by name , Mao directed. When Mao was presented with the
draft, he rejected it. The draft missed the point , Mao said. The target should
not be "imperialism" but "lndian expansionists" who "want ardently to
grab Tibet" (wangtu ba Xizang nale guoChU).20 Days later, on 25 April ,
Mao convened a Politburo Standing Committee meeting and immediately
asked about the status of the revised editorial criticizing Nehru. He then di-
rected that the criticism should "be sharp , don't fear to irritate him [Nehru],
don't fear to cause him trouble." Nehru had miscalculated the situation ,
Mao said , believing that China could not suppress the rebe l1 ion in Tibet and
would have to beg for lndia's help. Here Mao implied that Nehru was pur-
suing a strategy of fomenting rebe l1ion in Tibet in hopes that Beijing would
solicit lndian help in dealing with that rebe l1 ion. The objective was to main-
tain Sino-Indian friendship , Mao said, but this could only be achieved via
unity through struggle. Nehru's incorrect ideas had to be struggled against. 21
lmplicit in Mao's comments was the notion that Nehru's instigation was
responsible for the rebe l1 ion in Tibet.
The polemic ordered and revised by Mao appeared on 6 May I9 59 un-
der the title "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy. "22 The main
charge leveled against lndia was conduct of an "anti-China slander cam-
paign" being waged by Nehru and the lndian media over events in Tibet.
Nehru's main offense against China was what he was saying about Tibet ,
and the encouragement those words gave to rebels in Tibet. ln his com-
ments , Nehru denied "that a handful of upper-strata [Tibetan] reactionar-
ies are responsible for the rebellion in Tibet , describes the just action of the
Chinese people in putting down the re be l1 ion as a ‘ tragedy' and expresses
sympathy for the rebellion. Thus , he commits a most deplorable error ,"
according to the article. The "vociferous self-styled sympathizers of the
Tibetan people" in fact "sympathize with those who for generations op-
pressed , exploited , and butchered the Tibetan people" -with the "big serf-
owners" who tortured and oppressed the Tibetan people under the "cru-
elest and most savage serfdom in the world." Nehru was spreading such
"slanders" against China in Tibet vi
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR 飞W' ITH INDIA IN 19 62 95

Nehru's sympathy for the Tibetan serf-owning class stemmed from the
"dual character" of the Indian "big bourgeoisie ," which by its class nature
"has a certain urge for outward expansion." Thus Nehru and the Indian
"big bourgeoisie" strove "to prevent China from exercising full sovereignty
over its territory in Tibet." They wanted Tibet to have "a kind of semi-
independent status ," to be a "SOft of buffer zone between China and India."
It is signi:ficant that Nehru's most egregious offense was his words. It was
these words that were reflective of his "philosophy," of his inner nature , of
his class character , of his role as a representative of the Indian "big bour-
geoisie" and its ambitions for expansion in Tibet. Mao's close involvement
in the drafting of this document makes clear that it fully represented Mao's
own Vlews.
The same day that Renmin Ribao published this commentary, Zhou En-
lai outlined Chinese views for an assembly of socialist country representa-
tives in Beijing. In doing so , Zhou underlined the links between Nehru's
words , his "class nature ," and his counterrevolutionary objectives in Tibet.
Nehru and people from the Indian upper class , Zhou explained , "oppose
reform in Tibet , even to the extent of saying that reform is impossible."
Their motive in doing this was to cause "Tibet to remain for a long time in
a backward state , becoming a ‘ buffer state' between China and India."
"This is their guiding mentality, and also the center of the Sino-Indian
conf/ ict ," Zhou said (emphasis added). "A section of the Indian upper class
had inherited England's old policy of saying Tibet is an ‘ independent coun-
try,' saying that China only has ‘ suzerainty,' or saying Tibet is a ‘ protec-
torate. 门， All these formulations were violations of China's sovereignty,
Zhou said. Nehru and company claimed sympathy for the Tibetans , but
"Actually, they sympathize with the serf-owners. Their objective is to cause
Tibet not to advance , not to reform , to become a ‘ buffer country,' to remain
under India's influence , and become their protectorate." This was "Nehru
and companyγ"basic class reaction." 23
The question of responsibility for the crisis in Tibet :figured prominently in
the co r:t tentious talks between Mao Zedong and Soviet leader Nikita Khru-
shchev in Beijing on 2 October 1959. After a complete disagreement over
Taiwan, Khrushchev turned to India and Tibet, saying: "If you let me , I will
tell you what a gu
96 SECURITY STUDIES

not our fault ," the Soviet leader responded, "but the fault of the United
States of America , if 1 understand you correctly. Please , look here , we had
an army in Hungary, we supported that fool [Hungarian Premier Máty幻]
Rákosi-and this is our mistake , not the mistake of the United States."
Mao rejected this: "The Hindus acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them. "24
The proposition that an 1ndian desire to seize Tibet underlay 1ndian ac-
tions continued to be central to Chinese thinking in the weeks prior to the
1962 wa r. On 16 October 1962, two days befo-\e the Politburo approved
the PLA's plan for a large-scale "self-defensive counterattack" against 1n-
dia , General Lei Ying旬， head of the PLA's "war-fighting department" (zuo
zhan bt功， reported to Mao on why 1ndia had six days previously launched
a major operation to cut off Chinese troops atop Thagla Ridge. Lei had been
appointed to head an ad hoc small group established to probe the motives
and purposes behind 1ndian actions. Tibet headed Lei's list of five major 1n-
dian motives. "Nehru has consistently wanted to turn China's ethnically Ti-
betan districts into 1ndia's colony or protectorate ," Lei reported to Mao. Lei
adduced various 1ndian actions of 1950, 1956, and 1959 to substantiate
this proposition. 1n March 1959 , Lei reported to Mao , Nehru "incited the
Dalai Lama group to undertake rebellious activity of openly splitting the
motherland." Nehru "always wanted to use the strength of a minority of Ti-
betan reactionaries to drive China out of the Tibetan areas of Tib时， [west-
ern] Sichuan , and Qinghai." When Nehru saw this "plot" of using Tibetan
reactionaries to split China had failed , he "sent 1ndian forces to aggress
against China's borders." "Yes," Mao said as he nodded in agreement with
Lei's conclusions about Tib时， "Nehru has repeatedly acted in this way."25
Typically, Mao Zedong stated the matter most directly and forcefully.
Speaking to a visiting delegation from Nepal in 1964 ，咆~O told his foreign
~tOJ~ that the major problem between 1ndia and China -wa-sil证tne
McMahon Line but the Tibet question. "ln the opinion of the 1ndiangov-
ernment," Mao said , "Tibet is theirs."26

u--l f li
ft

/KJ
川vhhHh'

The Erroneous Nature of Chinese Perceptions

of lndian Policy Toward Tibet

The fact that China's leaders saw 1ndian efforts as attempts to "grab
Tibet ," to turn Tibet into "a buffer zone ," to return Tibet to its pre-1949
status , to "overthrow China's sovereignty," or to cause -Tibet to "throw off
the jurisdiction of China's central government" does not necessarily Iilean
that those perceptions were accurate. 1n fact , this core Chinese belief was
wrong. This belief, which Chinese analysts explain underpinned China's
decision for war in 1962 , was , in fact , inaccurate. ~""as a deeply- pernicious
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN I9 62 97

Chinese misperception that contributed powerfully to the decision for war

in 1962.
The Indian government indisputably was attempting to influence events
inside Tib时， as well as relations between the Tibetan local government and
Beijing. What is in question is not Indian actions , but the motives and pur-
poses that lay behind those actions.
Nehru's policies derived not from a desire to seize Tibet or overthrow
Chinese sovereignty there , but from a desire to uphold Tibet's autonomy
under Chinese sovereignty as part of a grand accommodation between
China and India-an accommodation that would , Nehru believed, make
possible a global partnership between India and China. Nehru envi凶 S盯ioned a
旦坦E
胆 LQ~堕
f
Chinese respect for Tibetan autonomy combined with Indian respect for
Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. This accommodation would, Nehru be-
lieved , provide a basis for a broad program of cooperation between China
and India on behaH of the peoples of the developing countries and against
the insanity of a nuclear-armed bipolar Cold Wa r. Nehru believed that by
demonstrating India's acceptance of China's ownership and military control
of Tibet while simultaneously befriending China on such issues as the war
in Korea , the PRC's admission to the United Nations , the peace treaty with
]apan and transfer of Taiwan to the PRC , Indochina , and decolonization
and the Afro-Asian movement , China could be won to cooperation with In-
dia. The two leading Asian powers would then create a new axis in world
politics. ~巴些国主βf-Tibet， _Nehru ~<?ped that China would repay Jnc!!<:!'~_
friendshi p: ß:nd consolidate the Sino-Indian partnership by grantinRTihet a-
signifìqlULd_egree of autonomy.27
产 A series of moves by Nehru in 1959 contradicts the proposition that he
sought to undermine China's rule over Tibet. Nehru stated repeatedly and
publicly that Tibet was part of China and that events there were a Chinese
internal affair. When he granted asylum to the Dalai Lama in March 1959 ,
he believed , on the basis of earlier comments by Zhou Enlai regarding such
a possibility in 1950, that Beijing would not regard it as an unfriendly act.
After the Dalai Lama's flight to India , Nehru initially thought the Tibetan
leader could work out a deal with Beijing restoring a degree of autonomy
and permitting his return to Lhasa - as had been the case in 1951. After the
Dalai Lama's 1959 flight to India , Nehru urged the Tibetan leader to avoid
speaking of i
98 SECURITY STUDIES

U.S. State Department stated in February 1960 that the United States be-
lieved the principle of self-determination should apply to the Tibetan
people , India did not welcome this move. These moves do not suggest a pol-
icy of seeking to overthrow China's control over Tibet. As Tsering Shakya
concluded , Nehru's handling of Tibet during 1959-60 (and indeed all the
way to the 1962 war, according to Shakya) , amounted to an e:ffort to pla-
cate Beijing at the expense of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence. 28
Nehru believed that India had certain "cultural" and "sentimental" in-
terests in Tibet by virtue of several thousand years of intimate interaction
between the two countries and the fact that Tibe t's unique culture had been
deeply influenced by India. These interests were very limited , Nehru be-
lieved , and could best be achieved by respect for China's sovereignty over
Tibet. Nehru had explained India's interests , and their limited nature , to
Zhou Enlai in 1956, and believed that Zhou had been quite reasonable and
even generous in his recognition of them. That agreement accommodating
Chinese and Indian interests regarding Tibet was to be the foundation for
Sino-Indian partnership in Asia and the world. Then came Beijing's dis-
carding of Tibetan autonomy in 1959.
Nehru believed that he and Zhou Enlai had reached a meeting of the
minds , an "agreement," in 1956 whereby India agreed to recognize China's
sovereignty over Tibet in exchange for China's granting of a significant de-
gree of autonomy to Tibet. This "agreement," according to Nehru , accom-
modated India's "sentimental," "cultural" in(erests in Tibet , and China's
security and sovereignty concerns in that region , and thus provided a foun-
dation for Sino-Indian partnership. India's encouragement of Tibetans' ef-
forts to uphold their autonomy in the 1950S were , Nehru believed , in ac-
cord with China's promises to uphûld Tibe t's autonomy. During the mid
1950s , Zhou Enlai had been remarkably understanding of India's cultural
interests in Tibet , or so it seemed to Nehru. India's various moves to
strengthen Tibetan autonomy in the mid 19 50S (tutoring the Dalai Lama on
the 17-point agreement and the ways he could use it to uphold Tibet's au-
tonomy, etc.) had been in accord with the Sino-Indian agreement. Follow-
ing the uprising in Lhasa in March 1959 , howev~r， China's destruction of
Tibetan autonomy "broke" this agreement. 29 In 1959 , Beijing
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN I9 62 99

Nehru was dismayed in 1959 by Beijing's breaking of what he believed

was the agreement between him and Zhou Enlai regarding Tibetan auton-
omy. He was dismayed too that Beijing apparently did not value India's
friendship highly enough to respect its side of the bargain with India.
Nehru's strategy was not to oust China from Tibet but to press China to
compromise with the modest and limited Indian "cultural and sentimental"
interests in that regiün , a compromise that would permit broad Sino-Indian
cooperation on the world scene. Neþ!~'s ~þj~<.:ti.':'鸟 in other words , was not
to "seize Tibet" or deny Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. }!was toper~旦de
Beiji吨 to r~~p~~!)!ldia's ~imited interests in that region within the frame-
W证E证lildian suppor口or Cl1ina's sovereignty over Tibet.
生些更9!1SLIndi扭曲 i_ective (other than upholding India's 气ultural" in-
terest) in Tibet~n be reasonably inf~rre4: minimizing the threatposed to
India by Chinese military forces in Tibet posìtioned on India's northern bor-
ders. While Nehru and other Indian leaders were not explicit about this ,
slÌch a concern almost certainly helped inspire their desire to maintain Ti-
betan autonomy. An autonomous Tibet would be one with fewer Chinese
soldiers and Chinese military bases. Again , this does not equate to a desire
to "seize Tibet" or cause Tibet to "leave China." Rather, persuading Beijing
not to militarize Tibet required reassuring Beijing that India respected and
would help uphold China's sovereignty over Tibet , and that there was , con-
sequently, no reason for China to militarize that region. As Nehru told
Sadar Vallabhai Patel in late 1949 , when Patel pointed out to Nehru the ad-
verse consequences for India of China's impending military occupation of
Tibet, since there was not very much that India (or any country for that mat-
ter) could do to prevent China from asserting sovereignty over Tibet, it was
best for India to recognize Chinese sovereignty and work to secure India's
interests within that framework. 30 Rather than challenging Chinese sover-
eignty over Tibet, it is more accurate to say that Nehru sought to persuade
Beijing to Irespect Indian interests regarding Tibet by assuring Beijing of In-
dia's acceptance of China's sovereignty over Tibet and convincing Beijing of
the benefits that would accrue to China if it compromised with India over
Tibet , thereby winning Indian friendship. Nehru's hope was that Beijing
would repay In
100 SECURITY STUDIES

to parliament on 4 May: failure to grant the Dalai Lama asylum would have
won the support of only a "few thousand" lndians , while 叮lundreds of mil-
lions" welcomed the granting of asylum. It was simply "impossible" not to
grant asylum , Nehru explained. 31 Tibetan refugees streaming into lndia af-
ter March I9 59 offered firsthand accounts of Chinese vicious repression
that were further sensationalized by lndia's media. There was widespread
revulsion in lndia at China's bloody and brutal repression in Tibet. As
Jaiprakash Narayan , one of lndia's foremost Gandhians , put it in miq I959:
"Tibet may be a theocratic state rather than a secular state and backward
economlεally and socially, but no nation has the right to impose progress ,
whatever that may mean , upon another nation."32
Ascertaining the exact relation of Nehru to Tibetan resistance , both
armed and nonviolent , and to U.S. covert operations is crucial for deter-
mining the accuracy of Chinese perceptions. Regarding nonviolent Tibetan
resistance , the evidence is fairly clear: Nehru , and lndia , did give low-key
support to such resistance. Nehru's statements to parliament in I959 , plus
his comments to lntelligence Bureau chief B. N. Mullik in the mid I950s ,
indicate that Nehru saw strong but nonviolent and unarmed Tibetan resist-
ance to unlimited Chinese rule in Tibet as one way to help maintain a sub-
stantial and genuine degree of Tibetan autonomy-while recognizing and
accepting Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. 33
Regarding Nehru's attitude toward armed Tibetan resistance to Chinese
rule , and his knowledge of covert CIA operations in support of that armed
resistance , the evidence is , unfortunately, unequivoca l. The closest study of
lndia's decision-making process during this period , by Steven Ho丘man，
concluded: "It is unclear how much lndia's government knew in I9 5 8 or
I959 about the major CIA program" to support the Tibetan armed resist-
ance. 34 Nor does the official lndian history of the I962 war, published in
late 2002 , shed any 1ight on this question. Mullik maintained in his mem-
oir that Nehru told him that armed Tibetan resistance would be suicidal
and counterproductive and insisted that peaceful , nonviolent resistance was
the best way. Tsering Shakya also concluded that Nehru and other lndian
leaders were not aware until after the I962 war of the extent of U.S. activ-
ities in support of Tibetan armed resistance. They had as
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN 196 2. I01

Morrison , in a study based on interviews of U.S. participants in those covert

operations , concluded that Nehru and Mullik , at least , knew the general
parameters of and tacitly condoned U.S. covert operations in Tibet. 37
This author's guess is that that Nehru , Mullik , and perhaps a few other
people in the Indian government understood at least the broad contours of
U.S. covert operations into Tibet but chose to turn a blind eye to them.
Given the scope of U.S. activities among the Tibetan refugee community at
that juncture , and given India's good domestic intelligence services , any-
thing else seems improbable. But even if we stipulate that Nehru knew of
and turned a blind eye to :O .S. covert operations in Tibet, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the Indian objective was to seize Tibet or overturn Chi-
nese sovereignty there. A far more economical explanation , and one in line
with Nehru's conciliatory handling of the Tibet issue outlined above , and
also congruent with the evidence of Nehru's hope of striking a grand bar-
gain with China , is that Nehru's objective was to create a set of pressures
that would induce Beijing to accommodate India's interests in Tibet. In
other words ，!'J~hru's turnillK <l bliIl~eye to Q.S. covert activities was prob-
aþ1Y~ way of persuading Beijing of the wisdom of securing Indian cooper-
ation in upholding Chinese sovereignty.
It is clear that Nehru sought to persuade and pressure Beijing to grant
Tibet a degree of genuine autonomy. It is also probably true that Nehru
sought to limit the level of Chinese military presence in Tibet for the sake of
India's own security. It is an insupportable leap from these elements of In-
dian policy to the conclusion that India sought to overthrow or undermine
Chinese 口lle--ÜY~~IH)J~t~_Ihe-p-rüI20.sitÚ;tn tha t beca-use-India recognized and
acted on interests within Tibet, it was ipso facto attempting to undermine
Chinese soyereignty is untenable , although this proposition certainly con-
stitutes one element of the Chinese belief system.
Narrower elements of the Chinese belief system were also clearly inaccu-
rate. The proposition that Nehru sympathized with Tibe t's "serf-owning
class" and wanted to maintain Tibet's traditional sociopolitical system un-
changed is palpably wrong. Nehru deemed himself a socialist, a secularist ,
and , in religious terms , an agnostic. He had little sympathy for the reac-
tionary, religion-based political system of T
工 02 SECURITY STUDIES

China's leaders erred in attributing to Nehru a desire to seize Tibet from

China , transforming it into an Indian protectorate or colony. Once "ex-
pansionist" motives were attributed to Nehru and judged to arise out of
his "basic class character," "British in f1 uences ," or "dark psychology," it
followed that China would have to struggle against and punish Nehru and
his ilk. A determination that Nehru sought a balanced compromise of Chi-
nese and Indian interests regarding Tibet within the framework of Indian
support for Chinese sovereignty, and for the sake of Sino-Indian global co-
operation, would have led to a very different Chinese course of action.
This fundamental attribution error must be laid at Mao's door. It was he
who fìrst determined , at the central meeting on 巧 April 1959 , that "Indian
expansionists" wanted to "seize Tibet." Mao completely dominated China's
foreign policy decision-making process by 1959. Once Mao made that
determination, China's other leaders were compelled to chime in. Indeed ,
even today, China's scholars are still compelled to a面rm Mao's erroneous
judgment.
The consequence of Mao's fundamental attribution error regarding
Nehru was compounded by projection onto India of responsibility for
Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule. Confronted with strbng Tibetan resist-
ance to Chinese policies in Tibet , Mao and his comrades responded by
blaming that resistance on Indian "expansionist" machinations. This too
was faulty thinking.
It is certainly true that demonstrations of Indian sympathy such as con-
veyed by Nehru's comments in March-April 1959 did , to some degree , en-
courage Tibetan resistance to the dictates of Beijing. Far more fundamental ,
however, were such factors as those analyzed by Tsering Shakya in his mon~
umental study of Tibe t's history: the inttoduction of large numbers of PLA
soldiers and road construction crews into Tibet and the increased demand
for foodstuffs and inf1 ation that followed; the socialist reforms-especially
collectivization of agriculture 一 introduced in ethnically Tibetan regions
of western Sichuan and the f1 00d of refugees into Lhasa those reforms pro-
duced; the civilizational clash between CCP atheism and Tib时 's deep reli-
giosity; and perhaps most important of all , the pervasive sense of unease
Tibetans felt as they watched more and more Han Chinese pour into the
Tibetans' ancestralland , where Han had previously been scarce.
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN 1962 I03

comrades to recognize that their own policies had produced a popular

rebellion against them.
Chinese misperceptions of Indian motives in 1959 were linked to the
border con f1ict of 1961- 臼 (discussed in the next section) in two ways.
Fìrst , Mao's beliefs about Nehru's desire to "seize Tibet" structured the
Chinese interpretation of Indian border policies-especially the forward
policy. A more accurate understanding òf Nehru's increasingly desperate
effort to maintain his cooperative , friendly policies toward China might
have prod!lced a more conciliatory Chinese response to the forward policy.
If the forward policy had. not been seen -as Mao saw it-as part of an
effort to "seize Tibet," but as arising from a desire on the part of Nehru to
demOllstrate toughness and resolve in the face of mounting domestic criti-
cism , the Chines_e rebuff of November 1962 might not have been deemed
necessary.
The second link between Mao's misperceptions of 1959 and the border
conflict of 1961-62 was that Beijing's strident polemics and diplomatic
protests in 1959-60 helped propel Nehru towarda more forceful border
polic乒 Beijing's strident denunciations of Nehru's policies in spring 1959
contrasted sharply with Nehru's equivocation during the same period. This
discrepancy fueled the mounting chorus of criticism of Nehru's "weakness"
and "naïveté" that drove him toward the forward policy. If Beijing had re-
sponded to Tibetan events in 1959 not by polemicizing against Nehru , but
by lauding and courting him, by finding a few face-saving sops for him re-
garding Tibetan "autonomy" that Nehru could use in fending off his do-
mestic critics , Nehru mightßo!h~vefeltcompelled toprove his toughness
on the. horder issue. Instead of adopting the forward policy, he might have
stood by a still-not-discredited friendship policy.

China 云 Response to lndia 云 Forward Policy

If CJ1jIl~se perceptions r咿rding Indi矿s Tibet actions and policies

were deeply flawed , the same cannot be said about Chinese views of India's
forw.:ar.d牛 policy. Succinctly stated , the orthodox scholarly view in this re-
ga时， established by Maxwell and Whiting , is that , in deciding for war,
China's leaders were responding to an Indian policy of establishing Indian
military outposts in territory claimed by both India and China but already
under effective Chinese military occupation, the purpose being to expel
Chinese forces from territory claimed by India. Evidence from recently pub-
lished Chineseand Indian histories substantiates this traditional view.
Because war is a continuation of policies , it is important to understand the
evolution of Chinese policies toward the Indo-Tibetan border. The crucial
background was Nehru's rejection of a Chinese proposal-subtly and
工 04 SECURITY STUDIES

unofficially but nonetheless effectively raised by. Zhou Enlai during his
April 196οvisit to India-that China drop its claims in the eastern sector
in exchange for India dropping its claimsinthe Western secto r. Such-a-swap
would have given each si~e}~gé:lLright to terri些自芝lreadý in its possession
and most important to each nation's security. Nehru rejected tlìê.swàp pro-
posal and insisted that China abandon its claim in the east and withdraw
from Aksai Chin in the west. The grounds for Nehru's position was a belief
that there already existed a legally based boundary between India and Tibet
going back to the 1914 Simla conference. The question , for Nehru , was
whether China woUld respect that legal and already existing boundary. Chi-
nese leaders , on theother hand , saw the Simlaagreemenlas-without legal
or moral basis. It had been rejected by China's central government in 1914
and had been implemented by British force majeure during China's century
of national humiliation. China wasnonetheless willing to accept the McMa-
hon Line as the basis of a settlement, as was intimated by Zhou to~ Nehru
during discussions in 1956 and 1957. By doing this , however , China be-
lieved it was making a substantial conceSSiOJ1-.that reasbnably required an
Indian quid pro quo in Aksai Chin. In the words of the 0面cial Indian his-
tory, Nehru "did not agree to barter away the Aksai Chin area , under ille-
gal occupation of China , in return for China giving up its unreasonable
claim to Indian territory south of the McMahon Line."39 From the Chinese
point of view, the offer of an east-west swap was eminently fair and took
into consideration the interests of both countries. Its rejection by Nehru
was , China's leaders felt , entirely unreasonable.
Three rounds of border talks were held in 1960 following two visits by
Zho ll to India. Those talks soon deadlocked. Zhou's repeated visits to In-
dia were seen by Beijing as further tokens of Chinese sincerity. Then in Feb-
ruary 19 缸， India published in full its final report on the talks , along with
an English translation of the Chinese report to India. New Delhi hoped that
publication of this voluminous documentary record would cause China to
"adopt a reasonable attitude. 叫o Beijing saw it as a further Indian effort to
force China to accept an unreasonable and unfair settlement. When Indian
representatives found no change in China's position , New :p elhi became un-
interested in further talk
 CHINA'S DECISrON FOR WAR WrTH INDIA JN 1962 I05

po 1icies?) and anormative question (i.e. , were Beijing's offers of a border

settlement fair and、 reasonable?). Normative propositions are intrinsically
subjective. It should perhaps be noted , however , that had Nehru accepted
Zhou's 1960 offer of an east-west swap , he (Nehru) could very probably
have carried lndian public opinion with him-and avoided war. Thus
Nehru's rejection of Zhou's package-deal solution and his insistence on Chi-
nese abandonment of Aksai ChinJ::nust b_es~~I!~~_S Sfllcial steps on the road
to the 196_2 .~<lr.
Nehru's insistence on Chinese abandonment of Aksai Chin established a
link in Chinese minds between the border iss.':le and China'sability to con-
trol Tibs:ιThe road bui1t via thaCdêsolate but low snow-fall plateau was
then very importañt toPL A.lü-gistÌè: capabilities in Tibet. 42 Chinese aban-
domlmt of dIMroad wouldbve 吨nificantly diminished PLA capabilities
in Tib~t;-further increasing pressure on Beijing to compromise with lndia
regarding Tibet. Whether this was , in fact , Nehru's intention we do not and
probably never wi lI know. There is , however, no evidence indicating that
this was , in fact , lndia's objective. Steven Hoffman traced Nehru's concern
with Aksai Chin to a vision of lndia's historic boundaries adversely com-
promised by British colonial bureaucrats 卢 The recently declassi且ed official
lndian history of the 1962 war also attributes the lndian fixation on Aksai
Chin to "Jlational sentiments" roused by "loss of national territory. "44 Very
probably, the powerful but inaccurate Chinese belief about lndia's desire to
"seize Tibet" led to an incorrect Chinese conclusion that Nehru's insistence
on AksaiC l1 in was part of a grand plan to achieve that purpose.

The Militarization of the Border Conflict

The militaIY forces of both sides began pushing into remote and pre-
viously mostly unoccupied mountainous frontier regions in 1958 and 1959.
Beijing's greater public assertiveness in challenging the McMahon Line in
1958 , combined with growing lndian awareness of China's road building in
Aksai Chin , led lndia t() begin pushing lndian forces into forward regions.
As for China , following the Lhasa upnsmg in March 1959 , the PLA
launched an "all-out war" against the Tibetan rebels. The first objective of
the operation was to seal the border between the Lokka region of Tibet
southeast of Lhasa and lndia's North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA) and
Bhutan. By August , the PLA had sealed the border. 45 That brought Chinese
forces into forward areas.
Th巳 first incident of bloodshed on the Sino-lndian border occurred at
Longju on the Lokka-NEFA frontier on 25 AugustI9..59. That clash appar-
ently occurred , or at least escalated , at the initiative of the Chinese side , but
106 SECURITY STUDIES

without the authorization of China's central authorities. Khrushchev dis-

cussed this incident with Mao and Zhou during his early October 1959 visit
to Beijing. He was dismayed with the spiraling tension in Sino-Indian rela-
tions and wanted an explanation of the 25 August incident. Both Zhou En-
lai and Mao assured him that the Chinese handling of that incident had
been at the initiative of the local commander and without central authori-
zation , and that China desired peaceful resolution of the border problem卢
ln September, just before Khrushchev's visit , Chinese leaders had 函et in
Hangzhou , Zhejiang province , Jo consider how to avoid further bloodshed
on the border with lndia. Mao , Zhou , PRC President Liu Shaoqi , Beijing
mayor and Politburo member Peng Zhen , Mao's secretary Hu Qiaomu , and
General Lei Yingfu participated. The meeting began with a report by Lei on
the border situation. Lei recounted repeated calls from frontline command-
ers for "rebuff" (huanji) of lndia's "blatant aggression" against China. Mao
became somewhat exasperated at this and observed that conflict wasin-
evitable as long_as soldiers of the two sides were "nose to nose." He there-
fore proposed a mutual withdrawal of 20 kilometers. If lndia was unwilling to
do this , Mao suggested , China should unilaterally withdraw. "Meeting par-
ticipants unanimously supported Chairman Mao's suggestion ," according to
Lei Yingfu. 47 Thus , Chinese forces were ordered to withdraw 20 kilometers
from what China felt was the line of actual control and to cease patrolling
in that forward zone. Further Chinese measures to decrease tension on the
border were adopted in January 1960 (prohibiting target practice , food
gathering , exercising , etc. , within the forward zone). Tension declined for
twenty-three months.
It began to_ spiral up again in November 1961 when lndia started imple-
menting its forward policy. According tothe 0面cial lndian history, before
1961 a "wide corridor of empty area" separated Chinese forward outposts
from lndian outposts. But Chinese forces were steadily pushing forward
their posts "occupying more and more of the empty area." ln an effort to
prevent further Chinese advances by demonstrating "that the remaining
area was not empty," lndian forces were ordered to "push forward." The
assumption underlying this critical decision was that the Chinese were not
likely to use force against lndian 0
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN 196 乙 10 7

further acceleration of the forward policy. According to the official lndian

hìstory. "A large number of lndian posts were established quickly."50
Shortly after lndian forces began implementing the forward policy, Mao
Zedong convened a Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting in Bei-
jing to consider China's response. 51 Mao had earlier asked the Tibet and the
Xinjiang military regions for proposals , and those were apparently on the
table when the central meeting convened. Mao compared lndia's forward
policy to a strategic advance in a game of Chinese chess in which one side
pushes pawns across the centerline of the board , a line known as the Han-
Chu boundary, in referençe to the frontier between those twoancÏ ênt Chi-
nese states: "Their [lndia's] continually pushing forward is like crossing the
Han-Chu boundary. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns ,
on our side of the rive r. If they don't then cross over, that's great. If they do
cross~'\we'll eat them up [a chess metaphor meaning take the opponent's
pieces]. Ofcourse , we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small
matters upsets great phns. We must pay attention to the situation."52
lnfine with Mao's comments , the CMC ordered China's border forces
to resume patrols within the zone 20 kilometers north of the McMahon
Line-patrol~ suspended since October I959. Accelerated construction of
roads tQ 均工ward areas was alsoordered. As the crisis built, Mao Zedong
took per号onal chà.igeρf the "struggle with lndia." Mao stressed to PLA
Chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing that the firing of the Chinese "first shot" must
be personally approved by himself, Mao Zedong. 53
On 26 February I962 , Beijing delivered a lengthy and conciliatory-
sounding note to lndia. The note called for negotiations to reach a peaceful
settlement of the boundary problem. lndia's reply came on I3 March. It re-
iterated lndia's standard position that Chinese withdrawal from Aksai Chin
was an essential precondition for negotiations. 54
A while later Mao met again with Lin Biao , then vice chair of the CMC
and minister of defense , Zhou Enlai , and Luo Ruiqing. Again the topic was
the situation being created by implementation of lndia's forward policy.
Zhou Enlai hrst 四ported on lndia's rejection of China's many diplomatic
propo臼1s for negotiations. Lin Biao then reported that lndian forces con-
tinued to. s~t up outposts next to Chinese outposts , continued to dispatch
patro
 108 SECURITY STUDIES

interlocking , zigz a. g Jashion. But Chinese forces were also to seek to. avoid
bloOdshed. They were absolutely not to fire without orders from above. In
this fashion a situation of ".armed coexistence" would develop. M.ao's com-
ment on this situation was: "Nehru wants to move forward and we won't
let him. Origina11y, vve tried to guard against this , but now it seems we can-
- not prevent it. If he wants to advance , we might as we11 adopt armed coex-
istence. You wave a gun , and 1' 11 wave a gun. We'll stand face to 岛一旦 and
can each practice our courage."55
Following this meeting , further orders went out to the Tibet and Xinjiang
military regions accelerating construction of new PLA outposts and roads.
A11 levels of the PLA and frontier forces were ordered to report develop-
ments immediately, and it was reiterated that lower levels absolutely could
not decide matterson their own. At a11 costs , troops and units were to avoid
actions that would cause a further worsening of the border situation. Chi-
nese forces were also ordered to conduct propaganda work toward Indian
soldiers , calling out to them on enC0unters to urge them to stop their ag-
gression against China , extolling the traditional friendship between China
and lndia , and recounting the efforts of theChinese government to achieve
a peaceful resolution of the border issue. 56
Chinese border forces also abandoned their initial policy of withdrawing
when encountering new Indian posts. Chinese forces began standing their
ground. According to the offìcial Indian history, "When some Indian posts ,
for example in the Galwan va11ey [in Aksai Chin] were established outflank-
ing the Chinese posts , the Chinese attitude changed and became more
threatening." Rather than withdraw as previously, Chinese forces coun-
tered the In dian move by building positions surrounding the new Indian
post and cutting off its supply routes to rear areas. 57
As Whiting and Maxwe11 maintained , Chinese leaders believed they were
defending territory that they believed was legitimately Chinese and had al-
.ready been under de facto Chinese occupation for some time when Indian
forces arrived on the scene. To fail to contestlndia's forward policy would
be to acquiesce to continual Indiau.."nibbling" of Chinese territory, n~sult­
ing，且na11y， in unilateral lndian establishment of a new de factü líne of con-
trol between lndian and Chinese territory.
China's abandonment of the initi
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN 1962 109

policy stillmore aggreBsive. Rather than merely seeking to preempt Chinese

occupation of vacant land , "It was now decided to push back 出ε ，Chinese
posts they already occupied. "59
In April 196 之， India accelerated implementation of the forward policy in
the eastern sector , apparently because Nehru believed that the situation
there fa飞Tored India more. 60 More Indian posts_~t::reÞ lJilt on<=ommahding
heights near existing PLA outposts , and aerialand ground reconnaissance
was increaßed. This produced a "strongest protest" from Chiria's foreign
mini.?try. "Should the Indian government refuse to withdraw its aggressive
posts and continue to carry out provocation against the Chinese posts ," the
note said , "the Chinese fronti~Is will be forced to defend themselves."61 In-
dia pushed forward with implementation of the forward po 1icy in spite of
China's protests. On 5 May 1962, the 且rst officially protested exchange of
gunfire occurred. Another Chinese protest followed on 19 May: unless In-
dia "desists immediately" from intrusions into the Longju region , it said ,
"the Chinese Government will not stand idly by."62 By the end of June , the
Indian Foreign 0面ce reported that Indian forces had brought under Indian
control over 2,000 square miles of territory since the beginning of the
forward policy.63 Moreover, in July 1962 , lndian Army Headquarters "gave
discretion 'to all post commanders to fire on the Chinese if their [Indian]
posts were ever threatened."64
Egregious Indian miscalculation regarding China's willingness to resort
to milita!y force underlay the increasingly assertive Indian policies that un-
foldecL between- 1'、~ovember 1961 and October 1962. There was a virtual
consensus among Indian leaders that China would not respond with mili-
tary force to Indian advances , and that if it did , any military response would
be eX~IemeJy limited. A Chinese resort to large-scale military force was
deemed impossible. This conclusion was established by Nehru and Defense
Minister Krishna Menon , not challenged by Indian military leaders , and , in
the judgment of the 0面cial Indian history, became unchallengeable political
orthodoxy.65 In spite of a clear Indian recognition of China's military supe-
riority in the!~2-J].!Le! r~gions， Indian leaders reached the conclusion that
China's'supêriority was irreleY<l nt. If lndia demonstrated firm intent , China
would back down. ln the words of the Indian chief of General Staff reg
工 10 SECURITY STUDIES

the People's Republic in October I949. It would no longer be bullied by for-

eign powers. The PLA had fought the United States in Korea and performed
creditabl民 at least in the judgment of China's leaders. Yet here was lndia
acting as though the PLA wO !lld turn tail and run rather than fight to de-
fend Chinese territory and honor. 牛 pparently, lndiah 注äd 一巾 I
lesson 由 t ha
挝t the Am 口len旦
9 翌ns had learned in Korea 一一一 to respect the power of
t巾he 町
n e仰w China. Tl时也剑 implication 仙di矿s apparent disdain for Chi-
nese power was that à very strong jolt would probably be necessary tocause
lndian leaders to acquire a sober appreciation of Chinese power~ The grad-
ual hardening of china's response to India's forward policy--iceasing with-
drawal when confronted by lndian advances and adoption 创 a policy of
"armed coexistence ," acceleration of China's own advance , buirdìng posi-
tions surrounding , threatening , and cutting off lndian outposts , steady
improvement of PLA logistic and other capabilities in the frontier region , in-
creasingly strong and direct verbal warnings , and by September I96 卒， out-
right but small-scale PLA assaults on key lndiaooutposts-did not cause ln- 鼻
dia to abandon its illusion of Chinese w叫cness.飞The finalChìilese decision 主
to in f1 ict a big , painful defeat on lndian forces dhived substantially from a
sense thaωnly_~u~h~blQcvv would qmse lndia to begin taking GhiIl~se power---
seriously.

The Final Five Months

While lndia's forward policy was gathering steam in mid I9 6 二， Bei-

jing received indications that a war between China and lndia would not
draw in other powers. First, Beijing secured indications from Washington
that the United States would not support a Nationalist Chinese attack on
mainland China. ln late May I962 , Premier Zhou Enlai recalled Ambas-
sador Wang Bingnan from vacation and ordered him to return to his post
in Warsaw to ascertain U.S. intentions regarding the Nationalist Chinese in-
vasion then being ostentatiously prepared on Taiwan. (Ambassadorial talks
in Warsaw were then the main venue for U.S.-PRC interactions.) The crisis
in Laos was still raging , and Zhou was concerned that Laos might serve as
a corridor for a possible Nationalist attack. Were Washington to support a
N ationalist invasion, a conf1 ict between lndia and China might become
linked to that invasion , possibly touching off a larger con f1 agration across
China's entire southern border. Thus Wang was "extremely relieved" when
he heard from his U.S. counterpart in Warsaw on 23 June that the United
States did not desire war with China and would not, "under present cir-
cumstances" support a Nationalist Chinese invasion of the mainland. Wang
later learned that this information played a "very big role" in China's
decision-making process. 67
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN 工 962 111

Next , the war raging in Laos between Laotian communists supported by

Hanoi and Beijing and anti-communists supported by the United States was
put on hold by a de facto partition of that country. On 23 July, exactly a
month after the Warsaw ambassadorial meeting , the major powers signed
an agreement at Geneva "neutralizing" Laos. The end of intense fighting in
Laos , plus a U.S. pledge hot to introduce its military force into Laos (part
of the "neutralization" agreement) reduced the prospect that U.S or U.S.-
supported Nationalist Chinese forces might attack China via Laos. This
development increased the prospect that a war between China and India
would remain limited.
During the Geneva conference on Laos , Beijing also made another effort
to halt the Indian advance via diplomatic means. Zhou Enlai directed
China's representative , Foreign Minister General Chen Yi , to seek out In-
dia's representative , Defense Minister Krishna Menon , and urge him to find
ways of preventing the border situation from further deteriorating. This
would be advantageous not only to Sino-Indian relations but to the peace
of the whole world , Zhou told Chen to tell Menon. Chen Yi was one of the
PLA's most combat-experienced PLA generals , having had years of expe-
rience fighting Japanese and Nationalist forces with considerable success.
One can imagine the meeting in Geneva between this hard-headed general
and the idealistic Krishna Menon , who believed in the persuasiveness of
moral opinion. On 23 July, the two men met. Chen asked Menon what
ideas the "honorable Indian government" had about solving the Sino-
Indian border problem. Menon replied that , in India's view, there was no
border problem between China and India. The location of the boundary
was very clearly displayed on Indian maps. Implicit in this was the notion
that the way to a solution lay in Chinese withdrawal from all territory
claim~d by India. Moreover, this message was conveyed in an arrogant tone
of voice , according to the Chinese account. Chen Yi then said that Indian
forces were steadily advancing into Chinese territory, and could it be that
the Indian representative did not know this? Menon replied that the move-
ments of Indian troops were taking place on Indian territory. He did not
wish to argue , Chen said , but the border problem was a "big one ," and the
two sides should sit down and calmly discuss it. Chen proposed that he and
Menon issue a joint communiqué a
112 SECURITY STUDIES

Zhou reportedly replied. "Premier," Chen replied , "Nehru's forward policy

is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and
await death." "We need to discuss the matter with the Chairman ," Zhou
concluded. 69
AroundJuly I962 , Mao issued a "twenty-character directive" in response
to lndia's "forward policy." The CMC later embodied Mao's directive in a
decision that provided the "general direction" until several weeks before the
October wa r. According to Mao's directive , the PLA should "absolutely not
give ground , strive resolutely to avoid bloodshed, interlock [with lndian
forces] in a zigzag pattern , and undertake a long period of armed coexis-
tence."70 To implement this new "general direction," Luo Ruiqing issued or-
ders to the Xinjiang military region specifying twenty-two measures that
PLA frontline troops were to follow. If lndian forces advanced on PLA posi-
tions , PLA forces would give warning and urge the lndian forces to withdraw.
If the lndian forces did not heed these warnings , the warnings could be re-
peated two , three , or even more times. Only if lndian forces advanced to
within fifty meters of PLA positions and Chinese forces "could not survive
without self-defense ," would PLA forces "prepare for self-defense." If the en-
emy then withdrew, PLA forces would not seek to block that withdrawal.
It is not clear whether Luo's twenty-two measures authorized Chinese
soldiers to fire on lndian forces closing in a threatening fashion within fifty
meters of Chinese forces. Reading between the lines , Xu Yan's account im-
plies that it did. But that is only implicit. It may be that PLA forces were or-
dered to prepare to fire but not authorized actually to open fire unless first
fired upon by lndian forces. ln any case , firefights intensified. On 9 July, fol-
lowing deployments the previous day by an lndian platoon cutting off a
PLA position in the Galwan valley.of the western sector , a Renmin Ribao
editorial delivered another warning: "The lndian Government should rein
in at the brink of the precipice. "71 According to Xu Yan, some lndian forces
interpreted PLA restraint under the July CMC guidelines as weakness. The
result , according to Xu , was repeated provocations against PLA outposts.
ln one such "provocation" on 2I July, lndian forces opened fire first on
Chinese forces manning a "newly constructed" outpost. Chinese forces
returned 且re. After a twenty-minute 且re且ght， th

forces from lndia'sentire NEFA .73

These Chinese warnings did not cause Nehru to halt the forward policy
or agree to unconditional talks on the border dispute. Beijing noted a speech
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA JN 196 主 II3

by Nehru to the Lok Sabha (House of the People) , the popular body of the
lndian parliament, on I3 August in which he reiterated that the precondi-
tion for negotiations was China 、s complete withdrawal from all Indian ter-
ritory it had "unilaterally occupied ," that is , Aksai Chin. An Indian note of
22 August formally presented the same demands. From Beijing's perspec-
tive , this "closed the door to negotiations."74
Chinese leaders spent considerable time in mid I962 analyzing Nehru's
objectives in attacking China. Three main reasons were identified. First ,
Nehru wished to direct outward internal contradictions within India. Sec-
ond , he hoped to win inte.r national , and especially U.S. , support. Third , he
hoped to "attack China's prestige in the Third World." Pursuit of these ob-
jectives by attacking China was based on the belief, Mao concluded , that
China would not hit back?5 Notably absent from this Chinese understand-
ing of Nehru's motives was the proposition that Nehru believed that
through the forward policy, lndia was recovering legitimately Indian terri-
tory arbitrarily and illegally occupied by China. ~旦旦1:hip.ese leaders sim-
ply failed tounderstand-Nehru's motivesand attributed far-fetched motives
to him deriving from his evil class nature.
In August, Lei Yingfu received CMC orders to inspect and report on the
situation in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. Lei's report con-
cluded that PLA forces "without firing could no longer prevent Indian
forces from advancing furthe r. "76 When considering Lei's report, the CMC
also noted among Indian public opinion and political personages a rising
chorus for the "expulsion of Chinese aggressors from Indian terr让ory."
The situation in the rugged terrain in the Tawang tract east of the Tibet-
Bhutan-NEFA tri-border juncture was growing increasingly tense. There
the massive Thagla Ridge dominated the local terrain at the forward line of
actual contro l. Indian forces had established an Indian outpost at Dhola at
the southern base of Thagla in June I962 as part of the forward policy and
as part of a plan to push Chinese forces from atop Thagla Ridge. 77 Chinese
forces responded by entrenching themselves atop that ridge in August , ac-
cording to the official Indian history.78
By early September, Beijing was warning New Delhi that if India "played
with 且re，" it would be "consumed by 且re."79 On 8 September, a force of
800 Chinese soldiers d
I 工4 SECURITY STUDIES

Thagla Ridge ," in the words of the official Indian history. The Indian
government "in its fond belief did not expect serious retaliation from the
Chinese and it assumed that whatever mild reaction came from the Chinese ,
the Indian Army would be capable of neutralizing it." Thus "the Govern-
ment of India ordered the Army to rid the Thagla Ridge of the Chinese as
early as it was [prepared to do it and the Army] accepted the task一 both
having based their decision on the unmilitary assumption that the enemy
would not react strongly and that mere starting of military activity by India
would make the Chinese vacate the Thagla Ridge."80 On 18 September, an
Indian government spokesman announced the government's intention of
driving Chinese forces from the Dhola area at the base of Thagla. 81 Indian
Army efforts to achieve that objective led to clashes at Dhola on 20 and
24 September.
The increasingly tense armed confrontation at Thagla Ridge forced Mao
and other Chinese leaders to reconsider the earlier policy of armed coexis-
tence in late September. The policy had not halted the Indian advance. Mao
and other Chinese leaders now began considering administering a large-
scale and "painful" military rebuff to Indian forces. Nehru had mistaken
China's policy of restraint for weakness , they believed. A number of factors
had apparently contributed to an Indian judgment that China would not
counterattack, Mao and his comrades concluded. Chinese security concerns
were centered on the Paci且c coast and regarded the United States and
Chiang Kai-shek , while China also faced internal economic di面culties ， and
Chinese-Soviet relations had soured. China had relatively few troops in Ti-
bet , having withdrawn most of its forces after the successful repression of
the Tibetan rebellion circa 1960. On these grounds , China's leaders sur-
mised , Nehru had concluded that China would not counterattack in re-
sponse to India's forward policy, but would merely issue protests. 82 In these
circumstances , a sharp , major blow was necessary to disabuse Nehru and
force him to stop his aggression against China.
Nehru's insistence on pushing the forward policy rendered ineffective
China's previous policy of very limited use of force. Confronted with con-
tinual Indian attacks , the previous policy of def~nding Chinese positions
with "little blows" no longer worked. Even if Chinese "little blows" in one
place forced Indian forces there
 CHINA 、 S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN 1962 115

1-1oreover, we can guarantee that for a long time to come [the aggres-
sors] will not dare to come again to conduct aggression against China's
borders." 83
In early October (probably on the 6th) , China's leaders met to review the
escal Cl ting conflict with India. Deputy CMC Chair. Lin Biao led with a
briefing on the situation.Reports from both the Tibet and the Xinjiang mil-
itary regions indicated continual lndian advahce and 且rings on Chinese
outposts in both the eastern and western sectors. Ten Chinese personnel had
been killed or wounded , Lin reported. Yet Chinese forces had strictly fol-
lowed the principle of not firing the first shot, and "have throughout not
fired." Even more serious , India was concentrating military forces in both
sectors and had deployed artillery to positions threatening Chinese outposts
and camps. The situation was rapidly worsening , according to Lin. Reports
by PLA intelligence units indicated that Indian forces might undertake an
attack on Thagla Ridge on 10 October. 84 After hearing Lin's report, Mao
commented: "It seems like armed coexistence won't work.lt's just as we ex-
pected. Nehru really wants to use force. This isn't strange. He has always
wanted to seize Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge. He thinks he can get every-
thing he desires." 85 Then Mao declared himself for war:
We fought a war with old Chiang [Kai-shek]. We fought a war with]apan , and with
America. With none of these did we fea r. And in each case we won. Now the Indi-
ans want to fight a war with us. Naturally, we don't have fea r. We cannot give
ground , once we give ground it would be tantamount to letting them seize a big
piece of land equivalent to Fu: jian province. . . . Since Nehru sticks his head out and
insists on us fighting him , for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough.
Courtesy emphasizes reciprocity.

Zhou signaled his concurrence: "We don't wish for a war with lndia. We
have always striven in this direction [of avoiding 飞，var]. We wanted India to
be like Nepal , Burma , or Mongolia , and solve border problems with us in
a friendly fashion. But Nehru has closed all roads. This leaves us only with
wa r. As I see it , to fight a bit would have advantages. It would cause some
people to understand things more clearly."86 Mao concurred: "Right! If
someone does not attack me , I won't attack him. If someone attacks me , I
shall certainly attack him."
Apparently following this consensus among Mao , Zhou , and Lin , a
larger meeting of military leaders was convened in the western outskirts üf
Beijing. Participants included Mao , Zhou Enlai , Chen Yi , Lin Biao ，孔1arshals
Ye Jianying and Liu Bocheng, Chief of Staff General Luo Ruiqing , Vice
Chief of Staff General Yang Chengwu , head of the PLA General Political
Department General Shao Hua , head of the General Logistic Department
General Qiu Huizuo , the commander of the Tibet military region , Lieutenant
II6 SECURITY STUDIES

General Zhang Guohua , and the commander of the Xinjiang military re-
gion , Major General He Jiachan. 87 Mao opened by indicating that war had
already been decided upon, and that the purpose of the meeting was to con-
sider pröblems associated with it. Mao explained: "Our border conflict
with lndia has gone on for many years. We do not want war and originally
sought to solve it through peaceful negotiations. But Nehru is not willing to
talk and has deployed considerable forces , insistently demanding a fìght
with us. Now it seems not to fìght is not possible. If we fìght , what should
be our method? 明That should the war look like? Please everyone contribute
your thoughts on these policy issues." 88
Mao then asked Chen Yi to brief the group on the "diplomatic struggle."
Chen traced the problem to I9 54 , when lndia had published an 0面cial map
showing the McMahon Line as a de且nitive national boundary. At present,
Chen said, lndia "occupies or claims" I ,25o ,oOO square kilometers of Chi-
nese territory. Forty-seven Chinese personnel had been killed or wounded
in attacks by lndian forces on the borde r. China had devoted considerable
diplomatic effort to achieving a negotiated settlement, Chen said , but
"Nehru is not willing to sit down and talk, and moreover has adopted a
provocative forward policy. . . . It seems we can only meet him [Nehru] on
the battlefìeld." 89
Mao then placed the projected war in a broad historical context. "A war
between China and lndia is truly a most unfortunate event ," Mao said. He
had recently been reading books on lndian history and was struck by the
friendly, bene且cial interactions between China and lndia frorn the seventh
to ninth centuries. After some discussion of those interactions , Mao turned
to the history of China-India wars , of which there had been "one and a
half." The 且rst war, Mao said , had been in A.D. 648 , when a Tang dynasty
emperor had dispatched troops to assist the legal claimant to a throne to a
subcontinental kingdom-after the other claimant had killed thirty mem-
bers of a Tang diplomatic mission. A Tang-strengthened force defeated the
usurper , who was captured and sent to the Tang capital Chang'an , where he
lived out his life. The "half war" came in I398 , said Mao , when Timurlane
captured Delhi. This was a great victory, but was followed by the slaughter
of over IOO ,OOO prisoners and looting of all precious metals and gems
across the land. This was a "half war" because Timurlane an
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN 1962 II7

of the 1ndian Army commander , General B. M. Kau l. Ye had met Kaul dur-
ing a I957 visit to 1ndia. Even though Kaul had apparently served in the
Burma :rheater during World War II , Ye said , the 1ndian commander had no
actual combat experience. He also seemed to be a very rìgid , if impressive-
looking , soldier. Still, he was one of 1ndia's most outstanding commanders.
"Fine ," Mao interjected , "he'll have another opportunity to shine." Mao
concluded the meeting by warning that China would find itself internation-
ally isolated during the coming war , but that this would not be the decisive
facto r. The United States and the Soviet Union would , of course , oppose
China's action. Sotoo wou)d many other "uninformed countries."Chiang
Kai-shek might "adopt measures." But China needn't fear this isolation ,
Mao said. As long as the frontline troops fought well , "We shall be in an
advantageous position. . . . It 's better to die standing , than to die kneeling."
If China fought successfully and in an awe-inspiring way, this "will guar-
antee at least thirty years of peace" with 1ndia. 91
On 6 October, New Delhi rejected a Chinese proposal of 3 Octoher to start
peaceful negotiations to settle the border issue. Xu Yan terms this a "final ef-
fort to secure peace" and asserts that its rejection by 1ndia , together with
N ehru's declared intent to continue the forward policy, led Mao and the CM C
to begin "final consideration" of a large-scale counterattack against 1ndia. 92
On 6 October, Mao and the CMC decided in principle for a large-scale
attack to severely punish 1ndia. 93 The same day, PLA Chief of Staff Luo
Ruiqing received a directive from the CCP center and Chairman Mao au-
thorizing a "fierce and painful" attack on 1ndian forces. "If 1ndian forces
attack us , you should hit back fiercely . . . [you should] not only repel them ,
but hit them 且ercely and make them hurt."94 The 6 October directive also
laid out the broad directions of the projected offensive. The main assault
was to be in the eastern sector, but Chinese forces in the western sector
would "coordinate" with the eastern assault.
The CMC sta旺 was then directed to draw up detailed operational plans
for a campaign to expel 1ndian troops from the area north of the traditional ,
customary boundary (that is , China's claim line at the southern foothills of
the Himalayas) in the eastern sector. 1t was in the process of this staff work
that the idea of terminating the war by a unilateral Chin
II8 SECURITY STUDIES

example , lndian "armed personnel" provoked an incident on the border

with Nepal. When the Nepali government expressed anger over the inci-
dent, the Chinese government issued a statement of "firm support" for
Nepal's "protection of national sovereignty." Beijing noted that some lndi-
ans went so far as to suggest that lndia act to prevent Nepal from becom-
ing a "Chinese satellite." Toward Pakistan , too , Beijing detected a more ag-
gressive lndian policy. ln early October, an armed conflict erupted on the
East Pakistan-Indian border, which continued with artillery and automatic
weapons fire for twelve days. 96 It seemed to Mao and his comrades that ln-
dian hegemonism was increasingly running amo k. ln spite of sympathy for
Nepal and Pakistan , however , punishing lndian "hegemonism" toward its
small neighbors was probably not a major motive for the 1962 wa r. Rather,
this was an example of the common tendency of people facing a difficult de-
cision to seek out and "pile up" reasons substantiating their preferred so-
lution. Doing this mitigates somewhat, at least cognitively, the recognized
negative costs of the favored solution.
ln deciding for war with lndia , Mao recognized many difficulties and
dangers. Nehru enjoyed great international status , and lndia was a leader of
the nonaligned movement and a prestigious advocate of nonviolence. Both
the United States and the Soviet Union were cöurting lndia and Nehru.
lndia saw itself as the leader of the "third force" in the world. lndia's mili-
tary inferiority to China would play into lndian efforts to depict China as
the aggresso r. (lndian military forces were about one-sixth of China's , ac-
cording to China's calculations.) Even among "some Afro-Asian countries ,"
there would be some "misunderstanding." These costs were more than
offset , however , by the long-term gains of inflicting a severe if limited defeat
on lndia.
On 8 October, the CMC ordered several additional divisions in the
Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions to move into Tibet. All these forces
were veteran , high-quality units. Most had previously participated in anti-
rebel operations in Tibet and were therefore acclimated to combat opera-
tions at high altitudes. The PLA judged lndian forces inferior to the Chinese
in combat and war-fighting capability. But uncertainty about lndian mili-
tary strength led the CMC to concentrate larger forces than might otherwise
have been necessary.
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN 1962 II9

were worst in the west. Roads to that region "were not convenient" for the
PLA. lndia's geographic situation in the west was also di面cult ， making it
hard for lndia to concentrate large forces there. The Chinese objective of
in f1 icting a big , painful defeat on lndia that would cause it to sober up
meantthat a "big battle" was required. 98 A powerful Chinese offensive that
met only thin lndian forces would not fulfìll that political objective. The
east , where lndia could more readily rush in large reinforcements , better
served Chinese objectives in this regard. It was also in the eastern sector that
Nehru insisted that the McMahon Line was an "established fact." Focusing
the Chinese offensive there would hit at Nehru's "hegemonist attitude" and
compel lndia to accept the fact that negotiation with China was the only
way to achieve a complete settlement of the territorial issue. 99
A "strategy small group" set up in the CMC staff paid considerable at-
tention to problems of conduct of the war. Marshal Liu Bocheng headed
that group. On IO October , Liu laid out four "opinions" regarding the up-
coming war. Liu was one of China's leading military strategists and one of
China's foremost exponents of mobile warfare. 100 The crux of success in the
coming war, Liu argued , was "concentration of local superiority to achieve
a swift war and swift decision." It was absolutely vital to concentrate supe-
rior matériel , weapons , and forces in one locality to wage a quick battle and
achieve a quick decision. The PLA must also absolutely fìght wel l. Victory
in the war was a matter directly connected to the prestige of the Chinese
army and nation , Liu warned. 101 It was thus essential to deploy crack
troops. The upcoming fìght would not be against border police , but against
lndia's best regular forces , which had participated in World War II. The
PLA could not be arrogant in this situation. Nor could it rely on such
"mechanistic" tactics as in且ltration， isolation , and encirclement. Such mea-
sures would not produce victory. The correct approach was to "kill , wound ,
and capture the enemy" by "gnawing the f1 esh off their bones ," that is by
attacking fìercely.l02
On 9 October , the anticipated lndian offensive to evict Chinese forces
from atop Thagla Ridge began. The Chinese positions were deemed too
powerful for direct assault, so lndian forces moved to outf1 ank them by seiz-
ing a previously unoccupied peak to the west of and outf1 anki
I20 SECURITY STUDIES

from the ridge. On I2 October, Nehru told the press that lndian forces were
still under orders to "free our country" from Chinese occup.ation-a com-
mentembroidered on considerably by lndian newspaperso 105 lndian forces
continued "aggressive patrolling" and "harassing fire."106
ln Xu Yan's view, this lndian attack signaled the beginning of relatively
large-scale fighting in the eastern sector. 107 The fact that the lndian side had
shot first created a advantageous political situation for China. Chinese lead-
ers also noted that Nehru had made public comments on I2 October (just
prior to a trip to Ceylon) about ordering lndian forces to clear Chinese
forces from all "lndian territory." This too made clear Nehru's "stubborn
and war-mongering attitude ," according to XU. 108
Shortly after the start of the lndian move to outflank Thagla , Zhou En-
lai appointed Lei Yingfu and Luo Ruiqing to research and report on the rea-
son for lndia's "expanded offensive" against China. On r6 October, Lei re-
ported to Mao. Lei laid out five key reasons for lndia's new offensive
posture. The 且rst was a desire to turn Tibet into "a colony or a protec-
torate" of lndia-the core Chinese belief discussed earlier. Other reasons
adduced were a desire to gain increased U.S. and Soviet military assistance
by becoming a part of their anti-China campaign; a desire to "achieve he-
gemony in Asia" by using anti-China activities to increase lndia's status
with poor and small countries of the Third World; and a desire to divert
class and national contradictions within lndia. The final and probably most
important reason adduced by Lei's group was a belief that China was
"blu面ng." Lei returned repeatedly to the notion that Nehru believed that
China "was weak and could be taken advantage of" and "barks but does
not bite." Because of U.S.-Soviet-Indian "encirclement" of China , com-
pounded by China's "economic di面culties ，" Nehru believed "that no mat-
ter how they attack us , we shall not hit back." Mao agreed with Lei's analy-
sis: "It seems like it is indeed that sort of a situation. ln this case , we cannot
but fight a wa r. Well , since Nehru says we only ‘ bark but don't bite ,' we ab-
solutely must fight. We have no other choice. We might as well go along
with him [in fighting a war]."109
On I6 October , the same day Lei Yingfu reported to Mao , the CMC for-
mally decided to "annihilate" (j ianmie) lndian forces that had aggressed
against Chinese territory
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN 1962 121

attìtude on the Sino-Indian border con f1 ict was impossible , the Soviet leader
said. If China were attacked , it would be an act ofbetrayal to declare neu-
trality.ll I Chinese leaders attributed this Soviet support , and the stark re-
versal of earlier Soviet policy of neutrality in the Sino-Indian dispute it en-
tailed , to a Soviet desire for Chinese support in the event of war with the
United States over Cuba. 112 The Cuban missile crisis would not erupt until
22 October , when President Kennedy announced the U.S. discovery of So-
viet missiles in Cuba and the U.S. naval blockade of the island. It seems ,
however, that Moscow had earlier given Beijing some glimpse of the plan to
deploy missiles to Cuba. According to Moscow's timetable , the new de-
ployment of missiles to Cuba was not to be made public , and the anticipated
crisis to erupt , until mid November, after the U.S. midterm elections .1 13
Thus Chinese leaders may have anticipated a Soviet-U.S. confrontation in
late November , coinciding with the second , expanded stage of the projected
punitive war against India , unleashed , in fact , on 18 November.
Approaching winter also forced China's decision. The best time for mil-
itary operations in the Himalayas was. July-September. By October, the
weather was already becoming cold , and heavy snowfalls were possible.
The Tibet military district reported that once such snowfalls began , the PLA
would encounter "great diffìculties" in moving supplies and reinforcements
across the high passes to frontline Chinese forces. 114 扎1ajor PLA action
would have to come soon or be deferred to mid 1963. On the other hand ,
PLA intelligence made it apparent that the military balance in the front
regions currently weighed heavily in China's favo r. In terms of number of
troops , heavy weapons , and communications , the PLA held a distinct ad-
vantage. Indian forces were short even of winter clothing and food. llS Were
China to postpone the attack by six months , however , the Indian forces
might become better prepared.
On 17 October , the CMC cabled the appropriate orders to the Tibet mil-
itary district. PLA forces were ordered to "exterminate the Indian aggressor
forces."116 On 18 October, the CMC met yet again to give formal approval
to the decision for a "self-defensive counterattack war" (yi chang ziwei fanji
zuozhan).117 Participants in the meeting included Mao , Zhou , Liu Shaoqi,
Deng Xiaoping , Luo Ruiqing , and Marshals Li
工二1.. 2 SECURITY STUDIES

Qiao Guanhua , and General Lei Yingfu. 119 The meeting opened with a
statement by Zhou that from many different aspects , it was apparent that
China could not but launch a "self-defensive counterattack" against lndia
as quickly as possible. Mao seconded Zhou 、 "opinion，" but warned of
the need not to underestimate lndia's military forces. General Zhang Guo-
hua , designated to command the upcoming attack , reassured Mao in this
regard. Finally, the PLA's war plan was approved. The attack was set for
20 Octobe r. 120
The PLA offensive launched on that day in the Tawang region continued
for only four days , culminating in the seizure of strategically located
Tawang on 23 October. ln the western sector, the offensive continued until
27 October. Chinese forces then halted , and a 由 t hre倪e
Allen Whiting was probably correct in his surmise that 由 t hi白s hiatus was in-
tended to provide an opportunity for lndian leaders to rethink their ap-
proach and abandon their forward policy. The weeklong PLA offensive that
began on 20 October, followed by a pause , was in line with the gradual es-
calation of Chinese moves under way since early I962. The 20 October of-
fensive was a step considerably more forceful than the encirclement and
then attack on the Dhola outpost in September, but a measure considerably
more limited than the massive assault that came in November. Yet there is
nothing in the new Chinese sources that directly substantiates the hypothe-
sis that the three-week lull was intended by the Chinese as opportunity for
an lndian drawback. Currently available Chinese sources do not indicate
another decision for war after the 6 and I6 October decisions. It seems that
those decisions were for a multistage wa r. lndian forces would 且rst be given
a sharp and bloody warning , after which Chinese forces would halt and re-
organize for their next offensive. If lndia did not change its frontier policy
after this warning , and if there were no indications of U.S. intervention , the
next stage , a massive assault on the southern fringe of the Himalayas , would
follow.
Roderick MacFarquhar raises the important point that Nehru could and
shöuld have used the early November lull to reorient lndian policy.1 21 By
then it was abundantly clear that the key assumption underlying the for-
ward policy-that China would not go to war over the border-was
wrong. The realities of the military balance , that is , the PLA's clear superi-
ority
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR WAR 明T1TH INDIA IN 1962 123

In fact , Indian offensive operations to oust the Chinese from both the
Tawang and Walong areas of the NEFA resumed 011 14 Novembe r. l22 Chi-
nese forces responded by launching a massive , preplanned offensive on 18
November, and Indian defenses in the east rapidly crumbled. PLA forces
would not halt until Chinese soldiers looked out from the Himalayan
foothills to the broad valley of the Brahmaputra Rive r.

Internal Mobilization and International Confrontation

It is now pretty well established that Mao's domestic mobilization

concerns occasionally helped inspire his preference for confrontational in-
ternational policies. Thomas Christensen has demonstrated this in the cases
of Mao's 1950 decision for war with the United States in Korea and his
1958 decision to bombard the offshore islands .1 23 A similar dynamic may
have been operating in 1959 and again in 1962. In early 1959 , when he de-
cided to launch a polemical struggle against Nehru , Mao was struggling to
push the agricultural collectivization movement to a new high. In fall 1962 ,
as Mao was guiding his comrades toward war with India , he was also striv-
ing to revive "class struggle" in agricultural policy as part of a broader ef-
fort to reverse the post-Great Leap retreat from collectivized agriculture. 124
On the other hand , there is a danger of overdetermining an event , and the
border conflict , viewed on the Chinese side through the prism of Tibet, cer-
tainly seems adequate to explain the 1962 wa r. In any case , both the highly
selective Chinese sources on the 1962 war available thus far and constraints
of space associated with a single book chapter do not allow testing of the
internal mobilization hypothesis here.

Conclusions

There was an underlying reason why China's leaders decided for war
in 1962: a belief that India's leaders did not appreciate the factthat the
People's Republic of China was a "new China ," that had "stood up~' and ,
unlike pre-1949 "old China ," could no longer be "bullied" and 叮lUmili­
ated" by foreign powe皿 Indian leaders 拴limhRat China would not
strike back , but would back down before Indian provocations , or so China's
leaders concluded. Indian leaders did not respect the new China but arro-
gantly believed they could impose their will on it , just as Britain, India's
imperial mentor, had done repeatedly in the nineteenth century. Indian
leaders were unaware of the power and determination of the new China.
This image -of India was linked , 1 believe , to a fundamental asymmetry of
Chinese and Indian worldviews regarding the role of military power in
I24 SECURITY STUDIES

world affairs , an asymmetry symbolized perhaps by the meeting of Chen Yi

and Krishna Menon at the 1962 Geneva conference. China's leaders saw
military power as playing a central role in politics , both domestic and in-
ternationa l. When and how to use military power were a matter of prag-
matic calculation for them. (This is exempli且ed by the prominent role of
combat veterans such as Liu Bocheng, Lin Biao , Chen Yi , and even Mao ,
Deng , and Zhou , in China's decision-making.) Nehru and Menon , on the
other hand , believed that war among major powers was an obsolete phe-
nomenon. World moral opinion would constrain potential aggressor states.
And certainly among the African and Asian states that had shared the com-
mon experience of national oppression, resort to war was unthinkable.
Thinking along these lines led India to disregard the realities of power in the
Himalayas and to conclude that China would not resort to war against In-
dia. China's hardheaded leaders took India's disregard for China's power as
disdain. They took the Indian belief that China would not fight as a belief
that China was weak and would back down before assertive policies.
Was China's resort to war in 1962 prudent? Did it achieve its policy
objectives at an acceptable cost? The 0面cial PLA history of the 1962 war
stresses that "quickly achieving peaceful , stable borders in the west" (ba
xibu bianjiang diqu xunsu wending xialai) was the objective of the 1962
wa r. This goal was to be achieved by inflicting a painful defeat on India ,
thus demonstrating the futility and danger of aggressing against borders de-
fended by the PLA and forcing India to abandon the forward policy. Sharp
military defeat would also "compel India to again [sic] sit down at the ne-
gotiating table and solve the Sino-Indian border problem." This too would
"achieve peaceful stability along the western borders."125
The harsh defeat inflicted on India in 1962 did , in fact , cause Indian
leaders to look much more soberly and respectfully at Chinese powe r. India
did in fact swiftly abandon the earlier policy of using military force to chal田
lenge Chinese control of disputed territory. After 1962 , Indian leaders were ,
in fact , much more cautious in dealing with China and more respectful of
China's powe r. The reality of Chinese power also ultimately led New Delhi
to resume border negotiations with China still in possession of Aksai
Chin-although it would take twenty-seven years for this
 CHINA 、 S DECISION FOR WAR WITH INDIA IN I962 125

to Chinese diplomatic friendship offensives and more determined to keep

China out of places like Nepal and Bangladesh. Fear of the Chinese rooted
in 19 6 年 was a major factor impelling lndia to keep open its nuclear weap-
ons options and then , in 1998 , openly to acquire nuclear weapons. There
also exists in lndian military culture a desire for payback against China to
erase the humiliation OfI962. The trauma of 1962 impelled New Delhi into
close strategic alignment with the Soviet Union iri the 1960s and 1970s , a
development "encircling" China with Soviet power. Even in the 2000S ,
when lndia began developing a military partnership with the United States ,
the defeat of 1962 was a remote but distinct factor in lndia's deliberations.
lndia also began serious military modernization after the 1962 defeat , and
this would eventually change the equation of military power between the
two countries. One component of the new military capabilities developed
by lndia was a highly trained , professionally led , and militarily very potent
Tibetan armed force of roughly 10 ,000 men , the Special Frontier Force .1 26
Given the decisive impact of the 1962 war on increasing lndian hostility to
China , it is quite plausible that had China not opted for war with lndia , or
had perhaps opted for a far less powerful and traumatic assault, China and
"China's Tibet" would today face far less of a threat from lndia.

Notes

I. Ne飞rille Maxwell , India 云 China War (New York: Random House ，工 97 2 );

Allen S. Whiting , The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press ，工 975).
2. P. B. Sinha , A. A. Athale , with S. N. Prasad , chief eds. , History of the Conflict
with China , I962 (New Delhi: History Division , Ministry of Defence , Government
of India ，工 99 抖， published online by the Times of India , December 2002 , www
.bharat-rakshank.com (accessed 2I December 2002).
3. There was a third set of factors underlying China's road to the 1962 war-a
perception of U. S.-Indian-Soviet collaboration against and encirclement of China.
Considerations of space require limitation to consideration of the first two factors ,
which were , 1 believe , rather more important than the third.
4. Whiting , Chinese Calculus of Deterrence , 36, 34.
5. See Encyclopedia of Sociology , ed. Edgar Borgatta and Rhonda J. v. Mont-
gomery (New York: Macmillan , 2000) , 1: 工 94;4: 275 工.
6. Zhong Yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi [History of the Sino-India border
self-defensive war] (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe，工 994) ， 37-40. This 0面cial
PLA history of the 1962 war labors at considerable length to demonstrate that
India's aggressive intentions and actions precipitated the 工 962 confrontation and
provides copious details of PLA military operations. Yet it gives very short shrift to
the actual process through which China's leaders decided to resort to war. Only 4
out of 567 pages deal with China's decision-making process. Still, these few pages
126 SECURITY STUDIES

provide important information when pieced together with other equally fragmen-
taryaccounts.
7. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bia叼iie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang [True history of the Sino-
lndian border war] (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books ，工 993) ， 28 ，之9-30 ， 50， 53. This is
the most important Chinese work thus far on the 工 962 wa r. It is signi且cant that Xu's
work was published in Hong Kong rather than in the PRC. The work deals at con-
siderable length with China's actual decision-making process. Xu apparently had
access to primary documents , although he does not reference those sources.
8. Wang Hongwei , "Zhong Yin bianjie wenti de lishi beijing yu 1962 nian
Zhong Yin bianjie zhanzheng" [Historical background of the Sino-Indian border
problem and the 1962 Sino-Indian border war] ，而 Tai Ziliao [Asia-Pacifìc materi-
als ], no. 1 (18 March 1989): 1-13.
9. Zhao Weiwen , Yin Zhong guanxi fengyun lu (I949-I999) [Record of the vi-
cissitudes of India-China relations (工 949-1999)] (Beijing: Shi Shi Chubanshe ,
2000) , 103. Zhao is one of China's authoritative lndia hands. From 1950 until the
mid 1990s , she worked for the analytical branch of China's Ministry of State Secu-
rity, the China Institute for Contemporary International Studies and its organiza-
tional predecessors.
工 o. Zhao Weiwen , Yin Zhong guanxi fengyun lu , 110.
1 1. Ibid. , 129.
12. Tsering Shakya , The Dragon in the Land ofSnows: A History of Modern
Tibet Since I947 (London: Pimlico , 1999) ，巧， 26.
13. Regarding India's Tibet policies , see ibid. and Claude Arpi , The Fate of
Tibet: When Big Insects Eat Small Insects (New Delhi: Har-Anand , 1999).
14. Arpi , Fate ofTibet, 338-43.
工 5. Shakya , Dragon 的 Land of Snot叫 21- 2 3.
16. John K. Knaus , Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle
for SUl川vival (New York: Public Affairs ，工 999) ， 155. See also Kenneth Conboy and
James Morrison , The CIA's Secret W如r in Tibet (Lawrence: University of Kansas
Press , 2002).
17. Zhao Weiwen , Yin Zhong guanxi fengyun lu , 124-29. These Indian trans回
gressions are also enumerated in Yang Gongsu , Xin Zhongguo duiwai zhengce
[New China's foreign policies] (MS) , 68 -69. Yang was foreign affairs assistant
to the PLA in Tibet in the 19 50S. He was later China's ambassador to Nepa l. Yang
charges the Indian consul general in Lhasa with encouraging Tibetan demonstra-
tors to draft a statement of demands that eventually became a Tibetan declara-
tion of independence , and with promising to convey such a s
 CHINA'S DECISION FOR 顶!AR WITH INDIA IN 196 二 12 7

year polemical war , 1956 -1966: a memoir of Sino-Soviet relations] (Beijing:

Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe , 1999) , 1: 195. Wu Lengxi was the head of the
Xinhua News Agency as well as general editor of Renmin Ribao at the time. He was
also the Politburo's record keeper for relations with the Sovlet Union. His two-
volume memoir is an extremely rich source for scholars. See my review in China
Quarterly , no. 173 (March 2003): 197-2 1}.
19. Wu Lengxi , Shi nian lunzhan， 工 97.
20. Ibid. ，工 9 8 .
2 1. Ibid. ，工 9 8 -99.
22. Editorial department of Renmin Ribao , "The Revolution in Tibet and
Nehru's Philosophy," 6 May 1'959 , in Peking Review , 12 May 1959 , 6 -15.
23. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic documents of Zhou
Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe , 1990) , 268-76.
24. "Memorandum of Conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong,
Beijing , 2 October 1959 ," Cold War International History Project Bulletin
[明Toodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars , Washington , D. c.], no. 12 - 1 3
(Fall-Winter 2001) , 266.
25. Lei Ying旬， as told to Chen Xianyi , Zai zuigao zongshuaibu dang sanmo-
Lei Yingfu jiangjun huiyilu [Serving on the staff of the high command: memoir of
General Lei Yingfu] (Nanchang: Baihuazhou Wenyi Chubanshe ，工 997) ， 20 7.
26. "Mao Zedong sixiang wansui" [Long live Mao Zedong thought ], in Miscel-
lany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1949-1968) , 2. Joint Publications Research Service
(JPRS) , no. 61269 (20 February 1974) , 573.
27. Apri , Fate of Tibet , 320-47 , 392-98; Shakya , Dragon in Land of Snows ,
5 2 - 18 4.
28. Shakya , Dragon in Land of Snows , 215 , 219 ，巧 2 ， 233.
29. Nehru returned repeatedly during his parliamentary testimony in 1959 to
this theme of a two-part agreement. See Nehru's statements to parliament, 30 March
1959 , 27 April 1959 , and press conference on 5 April 工 959 ， all in Institute of
National Affairs , Delhi , Dalai Lama and India , 80 , 103 , 105 , 120-2 1.
30. Correspondence between Nehru and Patel over Tibet is in R. K. Jain , China
and South Asian Relations, I947-I98o (Brighton, Eng.: Harvester Press ，工 9 81 ) ，
工 :4 工 -47.

3 1. Institute ofNational Affairs , Delhi , Dalai Lama and India , 127.

32. B. N. Mullik , My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal (Bombay: Allied
Publishers，工 971) ， 22 1.
33. Ibid; , 70 , 180 ，工 82.
34. Steven A. Hoffman , India and the China Crisis (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press , 1990) , 38.
35. Shakya , Dragon in Land of Snows , 2 巧，二 82.
36. Knaus , Orphans ， 工 59.
37. Conboya
128 SECURITY STUDIES

42. See John Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth
Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press ，之 001) ， 79- 86 .
43. Hoffman , India and the China Crisis , 23-30.
44. Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Conflict with China , I9 6z , 4 工 2.
45. Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun liushinian dashiji (I9z7-I987) [Record of
sixty years of major events of the PLA，工 9 2 7一工 987] (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chuban-
she，工 9 88 ) ， 579- 80 .
46. "Memorandum of Conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong"
(cited n. 之4 above) , 266，二 68.
47. Lei Yingfu , Zai zuigao zongshuaibu dang sanmo , 202.
48. Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Conflict with China , I96z , xx.
49. Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence , 46.
50. Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Conflict with China , I96z , xx
5 工. Chinese accounts of the 1962 war are almost entirely devoid of specific dates
for speci且c decision-making events. With several exceptions , reference to meetings
is by very general terms like "later" or "in mid 1962." 1 have therefore tried to or-
der reported meetings by the context of other events discussed by the book at the
time of the reported meeting, or by matters discussed in the meeting themselves.
52. Zhong Yin da zhan jishi [Record of events in the big China-India war ], ed.
Shi Bo (Beijing: Da Di Chubanshe , 1993) , 182.
53. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang , 110.
54. Whiting , Chinese Calculus of Deterrence , 51.
55. Zhong Yin da zhan jishi , ed. Shi Bo ，工 83- 8 4.
56. Ibid. , 184.
57. Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Conflict with China , I96z , xx.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid. , 415-16.
61. Whiting , Chinese Calculus of Deterrence , 55.
62. Ibid. , 58.
63. D. K. Palit , War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis , I96z (New
Delhi: Lancer, 1991) , 177 一 7 8 .
64. Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Con斤ict with China , I96z , xx.
65. Ibid. , xx , 415-17. Also 428-29n9.
66. Ibid. , 430n13.
67. Wang Bingnan , Zhong Mei huitan jiunian huigu [Recollections of nine years
of Sino-American talks] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe ，工 9 8 5) ， 85-9 0 .
68. Zhong Yin da zhan jishi , ed. Shi Bo ，工 85- 86 .
69. Ibid. , 187-88.
70. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang; 87.
71. Whiting , Chinese Calculus of Deterrence , 78.
72. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang , 88.
73. Whiting , Chinese Calculus of Deterrence , 82.
74. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang , 9 工. This corresponds to
Whiting's judgment in Chinese Calculus of Deterrence ,
 CH 1N A' S 0 EC 1 S 10 N F 0 R WAR W 1T H 1N D 1A 1N 1962 129

76. Ibid. , 91-92.

77. Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Con f/ ict with China, I9 62 , 4 工 5.A map of
this region is available in Palit, W句 r in High Hima/aya， 巧 9.
7 8 . Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Con f/ ict with China , I962 , 94.
79. Whiting , Chinese Calcu/us of Deterrence , 95-96.
80.. Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Con f/ ict with China, I962 , 415 , 417.
8 1. Ibid. , 95.
82. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang , 103-4.
83. Ibid. , 110.
84. Zhong Yin da zhan jishi , ed. Shi Bo ，工 88.
85. Ibid. , 189.
86. Ibid.
87. Sun Shao and Chen Zhibin , Ximalaya shan de xue: Zhong Yin zhanzheng
shilu [Snows of the Himalaya mountains: the true record of the China-India war]
(Taiyuan: Bei Yue Wenyi Chubanshe , 199 工)， 95. As far as 1 can ascertain , this was
China's 五rst book-length study of the 1962 war. Although it is not a scholarly
book一 it lacks reference notes and is written in an often-breezy style-it was
authored by two longtime PLA soldiers and to date provides the fullest , most direct
account of Mao Zedong's thinking about the road to war with India. The book was
banned shortly after its appearance. CASS's Wang Hongwei gives an account of a
CMC meeting in "mid October" with some quotations using the exact same lan-
guage as Sun Shao and Chen Zhibin , but omitting not only quotation marks and
precise dates but also the more offhand comments by Mao quoted in the Sun-Chen
book. Omitted too in Wang's account are the negative comments by Ye Jianying
about Kau l. Wang Hongwei, Ximalaya shan qingjie: Zhong Yin guanxi yanjiu [The
Himalayas sentiment: a study of Sino-Indian relations] (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue
Chubanshe , 1998) , 228-30. It may well have been Sun and Chen's too full and
direct quotations of Mao , plus reportage of Ye Jianying's negative evaluation of
Kaul's abilities , that were deemed inappropriate for open publication and led to the
volume's ban.
88. Sun Shao and Chen Zhibin , Ximalaya shan , 96.
89. Ibid. , 97.
9 0 . Ibid. , 97-98.
9 1. Ibid. , 99-100.
92. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang , 104.
93. Ibid.
94. Zhong Yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zω zhanshi， 工 79.
95. Zhong Yin da zhan jishi , ed. Shi Bo , 189.
96. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang， 工 06.
97. Ibid. ，工 09.
98. Ibid. , 11 1.
99. Ibid.
100. Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard , eds. , Biographical Diction-
ary of Republican China (New York: Columbia University Press , 1967) , 1: 404-5.
10 1. Xu Yarr, Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhanlishi zhenxiang , II1-12.
102. Zhong Yin bia
工30 SECURITY STUDIES

103. Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Conflict with China , I962 , 98-100.
工 04.Xu Yan, Zhong Yin bωnjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang , II2.
105. Roderick MacFarquhar , The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: The
Coming of the CataclYSl饵， I96I-I966 (Oxford: Oxford University Press; New York:
Columbia University Press , 1997) , 3, 308 , attributes major significance to Nehru's
comments to the press. Nehru's comments certainly con且rmed established Chinese
suspicions about Nehru , but 1 suspect that the aggressive Indian actions over the
previous week weighed more heavily in Chinese evaluations.
工 06. Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Conflict with China, I962 , 102.
107. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang , II2.
工 08. Ibid.
109. Lei Ying旬 ， Zai zuigao zongshuaibu dang sanmo , 209.
口 o. Zhong Yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi， 工 79.
111. Liu Xiao , Chu shi Sulian ba nian [Eight years as ambassador to the Soviet
Union] (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Zi1iao Chubanshe , 1986) , 12 1.
112. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang , II4.
113. MacFarquhar, Origins of the Cultural Revolution , 3, 314-18.
114. Xu Yan , Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang , 104.
115. Ibid. ，工 07.
II6. Ibid. , II4.
工工 7. Ibid.; Zhong Yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi， 工 79.
118. Zhong Yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi， 工 80.
工 19. Biographic information is from Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark , Bio-
graphic Dictionary of Chinese Communism , I92I-I96S , 2 vols. (Cambridge ,
Mass.: Har飞rard University Press ，工 97 工).
120. Lei Ying旬 ， Zai zuigao zongshuaibu dang sanmo , 209-10.
12 1. MacFarquhar, Origins of the Cultural Revolution , 3, 309.
122. Sinha et a l., eds. , History of the Conflict with China , I962 , 17 工一 74 ，
二 4 2 -47.

123. Thomas Christensen , Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobi-

Sino-American Conflict, I947-I958 (Princeton , N. J.: Princeton Uni-
lizatio吃 and
versity，工 99 6 ).
124. MacFarquhar, Origins of the Cultural Revolution , 3, 261-318.
125. Zhong Yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi , 178.
陪?旦司唱喃喃精萄哩遭

126. Conboy and Morrison offer a good account of the evolution of this force in
Secret War.
-?ifSaa--
5 Across 加 Ya/u
CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA
IN A CHANGING WORLD

Avery Goldstein

Half a century after military conflict in Korea decisively inaugurated

the Cold War, and forty years since Allen Whiting's seminal work about
China's intervention in Korea introduced an analytical approach for inter-
preting Beijing's security policy, much has changed. 1 The Cold War has
ended , and the regime in the People's Republic of China (PRC) today is dra-
matically different from the one that charted the country's foreign policy un-
der Mao Zedong. Yet despite these signi且cant changes , in at least two key
respects , there is continuity: the Cold War persists on the Korean peninsula
in the form of a divided nation led by two regimes , each armed against the
threat they believe the other poses; and , the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
retains the reins of power in Beijing. Given this mixture of change and conti-
nuity, can Whiting's analysis of China's decision to cross the Yalu in the fall
of 1950, and his subsequent generalizations about Beijing's practice of sig-
naling and coercive diplomacy in the Maoist era still illuminate the Korea
policies of a quite different Chinese leadership , operating in dramatically
different international circumstances?2 The answer suggested below is that ,
with substantial modification to account for historical change , Whiting's
work indeed remains helpful , insofar as it identifies strategic beliefs that
continue to shape thinking among the CCP's top leaders , focuses on the way
such beliefs shape perceptions of events in Korea , and suggests the sorts of
signals about China's interests in Korea that one might anticipate. 3
The chapter is divided into four sections. The 且rst section briefly identifies
important differences between the early Cold War era and the contemporary
period. The second section more closely examines several key considerations
shaping China's Korea policy after the Cold Wa r. The third section suggests
four highly stylized scenarios depicting different futures for the Koreanpen-
insula and their implications for China's foreign policy, especially its most
important bilateral relationship with the United States. The fourth section
I3 2 SECURITY STUDIES

returns to several broad insights from Whiting's work about China's strate-
gic practice and suggests how, with substantial modification ,. they may help-
fully illuminate China's choices and perhaps the consequences of choice as
events in Korea unfold. The chapter concludes by briefly looking at the Ko-
rea question in the contèxt of concerns about China's rise and its implications
for international politics in the twenty-first century.

E专sterday and Today

THE MID TWENTIETH CENTURY

In 1950, three broad considerations molded China's perception of

the Korea problem-~ational interest , ideology, and international struc-
ture. China's Korea policy at the time is most convincingly explained by the
concerns of the Chinese Communist Party about its ability to consolidate
its hold on newly acquired national power and to turn its attention to
the daunting tasks of domestic development. Mao might have believed
that his approval of the Stalin-Kim plan to initiate war in Korea carried little
risk of escalation to a wider conflict and potentially great benefits for China
if a communist buffer state dominated the peninsula. 4 But once the United
States decided to lead UN military forces in responding to the N orth Ko-
rean attack on South Korea , and especially once the determined counterat-
tack began to succeed in reversing the tide of the war , any optimism in Bei-
jing was replaced by grave concerns about the potentially serious threat to
the PRC's own political and territorial integrity. A straightforward realpoli-
tik assessment rooted in national interests , therefore , readily explairts Bei-
jing's decision to intervene in Korea after attempts to dissuade the United
States from continuing its military advance toward the Chinese border went
unheeded. 5
That said , ideological considerations were also an important component
of China's calculus in 1950, especially since Marxist ideology as interpreted
by Mao Zedong played a key part in defining national interests and identi-
fying security threats to them. Mao's decision to. "lean to one side" and ally
with the Soviet Union , his support for Kim's attack on South Korea after
Stalin gave him a green light , and his subsequent willingness to dispatch
Chinese forces to engage the forces of "capitalist-imperialism" reflected not
just the universal concerns any state has about a hostile power's military s阻'
tioned on its doorstep. It also reflected the particular concerns of a com-
munist state whose leader had a deeply rooted ideological conviction about
the inevitability of conflict between the socialist and imperialist camps.
The bipolar structure of the Cold War international system reinforced
the realpolitik and ideological considerations driving China's Korea policy
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENJNSULA 133

in 1950. At a time when the militarily superior American superpower's hos-

tility was deepening (and included ambitious talk of rolling backcommu-
llist gains since World War 11) , a thoroughly outgunned China's fate might
well rest on the kind of support it could only get from the world's other su-
perpower, the Soviet Union. Bipolarity, then , created a strong incentive for
China to cultivate Soviet support , which was enshrined in the alliance
formed in February 1950. But even though theUSSR had signed a formal
treaty, the international condition of anarchy meant that its pledge was nec-
essarily problematic. And bipolarity, though providing a powerful incentive
for China to seek Soviet backing, also exacerbated this uncertainty, which
inevitably accompanies such international commitments. Moscow could af-
ford to renege on the promise it was undertaking if its self-interest so dic-
tated , since the Sino-Soviet a l1 iance was a pledge between unequal partners.
Both parties recognized that the alliance was vastly more important to
China's security than it was to that of the Soviet Union. 6 Therefore , to min-
imize the risk that their patron might well fail to live up to its treaty obli-
gation , China's leaders sought to increase the political and military costs the
USSR would pay for abandoning its partner. Mao's public deference to
Stalin's leadership and his plea for the socialist bloc to stand up to rapacious
U.S. imperialism in the postwar world both served this purpose? In this
light , China's willingness to shoulder the risks and burdens of fìghting in
Korea were part of Beijing's effort to demonstrate loyalty to Moscow and
vividly underscore the threat the United States posed to all socialist states.
By bolstering solidarity in the Soviet-led socialist camp , China's leaders
hoped to increase the dependability of the security umbrella the Sino-Soviet
alliance provided.

THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As China considers its policy toward Korea in the twenty岳rst century,

the situation is obviously quite different along each of the three dimensions
just discussed. First, the sense that the most fundamental national interest ,
state survival , faced a serious military threat , in part emanating from the
northeast , no longer prevails. Beijing remains concerned about the possible
problems an unfavorable disposition of forces in Northeast Asia might pres-
ent , but the notion of a foreign power attacking the Chinese mainland to
realize the goal of regime change (arguably a dubious proposition in the
1950S) is not even a remote possibility today. Although China may still be
decades from achieving the status of a peer competitor to the world's sur-
viving superpower, its military modernization has already yielded conven-
tional and especially nuclear forces that confront even the most powerful
adversary's military or civilian population with the risk of unacceptable
工 34 SECURITY STUDIES

punishment if it challenges China's vital interests. 8 Because of the dangers

inherent in any such confrontation , the most plausible threats to survival
that leaders in Beijing face at the start of the twenty-且rst century are no
longer external military pressures. Instead , internal problems resulting from
the dislocations of rapid economic development and the shortcomings of an
archaic political system pose the sorts of dangers most likely to worry
China's leaders today, even as they consider how to deal with the evolving
situation on the Korean peninsula.
Second, Marxist ideology is no longer a major influence on China's for-
eign policy. This change , of course , was evident well before the end of the
Cold Wa r. While the actual significance of ideology as a determinant of
choice in the 1950S and 1960s is debatable , by the 1970s, Beijing's fear of
Soviet domination made China's top priority when discerning friends and
enemies a nearly pure realpolitik calculus covered with an ideologically
correct , but flimsy, fig leaf under Mao Zedong and especially under Deng
Xiaoping. 9 In the post-Cold War era , the notion of rivalry between social-
ist and capitalist camps has simply lost all relevance. As a consequence ,
ideology no longer provides a reason for Beijing to hope that Korea will be
unified under the leadership of a socialist ally. Moreover, Beijing's interest
in peace and stability on the Korean peninsula takes precedence over re-
unification , now described as a goal to be achieved "eventually, peacefully,
gradually, and without outside interference."10 When , to Pyongyang's cha-
grin, Beijing and Seoul normalized relations in 199 鸟 and especially as eco-
nomic ties between South Korea and China boomed afterward , it became
clear that the PRC's leaders no longer see an ideological affìnity with the
North's Korean Workers' Party that implies a signi且cant obligation~ 11 In-
stead , China's foreign policy toward the peninsula has been tailored to meet
China's national interests (a peaceful environment conducive to economic
development in which neighboring states do not become pawns of any for-
eign power hostile to the PRC) rather than to meet the obligations of the 1961
treaty with Pyongyang , signed when ideology underpinned a relationship
of fraternal communist parties allegedly as close as "lips and teeth."12 Thus ,
although China still has interests in Korea and 仁oncerns about the fate of
the Nort
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA 135

natural resources. Beijing's ability to ensure these larger interests , which ex-
tend beyond simply protecting the physical security of the country's borders ,
however, is still tightly constrainedby the reality of vastly superior American
capabilities deployed in Asia and elsewhere. Despite very real improvements
that have resulted from its recent push for military modernization , China's
forces remain at a substantial relative disadvantage. 13
With neither arms nor allies to provide the clout to counter a preponder-
ant United States if it poses a challenge , China's approach to ensuring its in-
terests has been to accommodate the stark realities of American power, while
pursuing capabilities that 'Yill eventually loosen this constraint on Beijing's
options.Especially since the late 1990s , when China's leaders accepted that
unipolarity would not soon give way to multipolarity, Beijing has sought to
(1) husband its resources , while patiently attempting to lay the economic and
technological foundations necessary for it to emerge as a fìrst-class military
power in the mid twenty岳rst century; 但) selectively focus its current military
planning on the most pressing threats to its vital interests; and (3) forestall
new threats that would require the country to shoulder a heavier military
burden and divert investment to producing immediate results at the expense
of comprehensive , long-term modernization. 14
With these considerations in mind , since the mini-crisis of 1995-96,
China's strategists have given top priority to the possible need to use force
in the Taiwan Strait-a scenario in which China anticipates facing Ameri-
can intervention. 15 Beijing, therefore , has a strong interest in ensuring that
tensions on the Korean peninsula do not require it to incur the additional
costs of preparing to simultaneously fìght on a second front where the
United States might be engaged. Beijing would be loath to consider simply
redeploying forces from the Taiwan Strait to the northeast. Taiwan is a
more vital interest for the CCP, having become a litmus test of its national-
ist credentials , which are crucial to the regime's political surviva l. Beijing
would be unlikely to compromise its military readiness in this theater as
a response to developments in Korea , especially since China's interest in
Korea is much less clearly defìned and , in any event , that country, unlike
Taiwan is not a visible test of the r
13 6 SECURITY STUDIES

the chief security concern , foreign policy is tailored to maximize the pros-
pects for the success of China's ongoing program of economi~ development.
This has the twin political payoffs for the CCP of maintaining support
among those Chinese who see the regime serving their material interests
and , by providing the foundation for growing international economicand
military clout and strategic self-reliance, building support among those Chi-
nese who take pride in the prospect of their country rising to the position of
a true great power. Given theseconcerns , Beijing has a strong interest , one
it repeatedly invQkes , in maintaining a peaceful international environment
conducive to its modernization. China's po 1icy favoring efforts to foster
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula serves its interest in minimizing
the risk of political tensions and military conflicts that would complicate
international trade and investment. 17 And , third , if military conflict in
Korea seemed more likely, or if the North Korean state were replaced with
a heavily armed U.S. ally on China's border, prudence would require Beijing
to divert resources to fortifying the northeastern frontier , compounding the
economic burden and military challenges it already faces in managing the
situation in the Taiwan Strait.

China 云 Foreign Policy and Korea

In the post-Marxist era , the legitimacy of China's communist regime

rests on two p i1l ars. One is its ability to de 1iver on the promise of growing
prosperity for the Chinese people. The other is the regime's ability to stand
up to hostile or meddling foreign powers that might challenge the CCP's
credentials as guardians of China's international interests. These twin
pillars link China's domestic and foreign policy agendas in ways that pose
something of a dilemma for the country's leaders. On the one hand , they
have to figure out how to champion policies in Asia that meet the national-
ist aspirations the regime has mirtured. On the other hand , they must do
this in a way that does not provoke tensions with the United States and other
advanced industrial powers whose negative reaction could jeopardize China's
integration with the international economy, a process that since the late 198 os
has become essential for the regime's ability to continue building prosperity
at home. 18
These potentially conflicting imperatives require a delicate and di面cult
balancing act for Beijing in Korea and elsewhere. China's participation in
the armed conflict that froze the current division of the Korean periinsul a
clearly established Beijing's commitment to the survival of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) , a commitment sealed by a steep in-
vestment of Chinese blood and treasure. China's involvement in the Korean
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA 137

War subsequently assumed great symbolic significance for the CCP. Since
the early I9 50S , it has often been invoked as evidence of the competence and
determination of communist Chinese leadership. To buttress the national-
ist credentials of the CCP among those Chinese who do not embrace the
party's Marxist ideological trappings , China's leaders have highlighted the
stark contrast bet:ween the result of its Korean intervention and the repeated
humiliations Chinese regimes had suffered at the hands of foreigners over
the preceding century. The demonstrated ability of the Chinese "People's
Volunteers" to stand up to the might of the world's greatest power and 且ght
the Americans to a draw h~s remained a point of pride for Beijing.
The historicallegacy of the PRC's involvement on the Korean peninsula
in the I950S means that decisively abandoning the decades-long commit-
ment to North Korea would be a costly and di面cult choice for Beijing. Even
if it did not entail risking the sorts of devastating domestic political
ramifications that would accompany abandonment of the CCP's pledge to
recover Taiwan , it would generate controversy within the leadership.19 Nev-
ertheless , the end of the Cold War has changed the meaning of China's com-
mitment to the DPRK. No longer rooted in the rivalry between two camps
defined by ideological preferences , Beijing's interest in the fate of the DPRK
today is mainly rooted in Beijing's post-Cold War concerns. The desirabil-
ity of maintaining (or the acceptability of changing) the status quo on the
Korean peninsula is linked to Beijing's concerns about domestic political sta-
bility and also about the implications of having the military of the world's
sole superpower poised near the PRC's borders.
China's support for any settlement in Korea will be strongly influenced
by its underlying nervousness about preponderant American power and the
constraints it poses. The situation on the Korean peninsula is now tied to
three Chinese concerns about the post-Cold War strategic policy of the
United States-the continuing large-scale forward deployment of American
military forces in East Asia , to which Washington made a 且rm public com-
mitment in the mid I990s; the recasting of bilateral alliances in Asia to cope
with post-Soviet challenges to peace and security (in Beijing's view, implic-
itly aimed at worries about an anticipated China threat); and the deploy-
ment of missile def
13 8 SECURITY STUDIES

the theater where Sino-American disagreements were already potentially

explosive-the Taiwan Strait.
Yet opposing U.S. policy in Asia has not been the guiding principle for
China's leaders since the end of the Cold Wa r. Beijing's main emphasis has
instead been on the need to ensure an international environment conducive
to China's daunting modernization e丘ort， on which the regime's legitimacy
largely rests. This consideration places a premium on containing tensions
with, rather than countering threats from , the United States and its Asian
allies , who are key economic partners for China. In this respect, Korea is
not just a troubled , divided country that provides a rationale for discon-
certing U.S. military polices in the region and a challenge for China's lead-
ers; the peninsula also offers distinctive opportunities from which they can
benefit.
Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has established a remarkably solid
political and a mutually beneficial economic relationship with South Korea. 21
It therefore has little reason to support a North Korean agenda that would
entail killing the southern golden goose. China's economic incentives to
ensure peace on the peninsula have instead encouraged Beijing to craft a
Korea policy that on balance facilitates cooperatioIi with the United States.
As noted below, Washington and Beijing surely have different perspectives
on what would be the optimal future for Korea. Yet both have a strong
short-term interest in managing tensions there in ways that reduce the like-
lihood of a devastating armed conflict , incentives that became manifest in
convening the four-party talks during the 1990S to promote dialogue and
reduce tensions on the peninsula. 22 Indeed , this shared interest in maintain-
ing peace and promoting prosperity in the region has made the Korea issue
one of the most important reasons both Beijing and Washington have
worked hard to contain tensions in theirbilateral relations since the mid
1990s. American leaders have routinely cited the need to cooperate on
Korea when explaining the importance of sustaining a sound working rela-
tionship with China. Despite their ostensibly divergent approaches to U.S. ;:i
policy in Asia , the Clinton and Bush administrations have both subscribed
to this view. President Clinton cited China's usefulness for managing the po-
tential dangers in Korea as a benefit that would result from his administra-
tion's
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA I39

ostensibly geared toward a Korean contingency might threaten China's re-

gional interests; and an incentive to benefit economically from good rela-
tions with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States. These mixed
interests preclude easy forecasts about China's policy toward the Korean
peninsula. One way to begin sorting out the complexity is to think about
these interests in the context of four broad, and intentionally simpli且叫，
scenarios for Korea's future.

Four Korean Futures

SCENARIO 1: STATUS QUO PLUS

Under this scenario , the DPRK remains weak and largely isolated but
poses no imminent threat to its neighbors. In such circumstances , the risk
of intense crisis or war remains at a modest leve l. The American military
maintains its major presence in South Korea , geared toward the contin-
gency of action (either defensive or preemptive) against a dangerously un-
predictable North Korea. This U.S. military posture , the development and
deployment of missile defenses , and the nurturing of the security alliance
with ]apan are all credibly justified in terms of the need to hedge against
a deterioration of the situation on the peninsula. 24 This military posture
also facilitates a thinly veiled U.S. strategy of crypto-containment, aimed at
a potential China threat, but does so in a context that neither requires
theUnited States to commit to this purpose nor China to react to this
possibility.25

SCENARIO 2: STATUS QUO 岛lI NUS

Under this scenario , the DPRK remains weak and isolated but ap-
pears a more imminent threat, demonstrating an enhanced capacity to deliver
weapons of mass destruction by means of ballistic missiles and adopting
more bellicose rhetoric and behavior. The protracted ratcheting up of ten-
sions with the United States after October 2002 (when Pyongyang con-
fessed to a secret program to enrich uranium that violated the spirit, if not
the technicalletter, of the I994 Agreed Framework) seemed to be creating
just this sort of situation. Halting multilateral talks among North Korea ,
the United States, China, South Korea, ]apan, and Russia failed to alleviate
concerns about Pyongyang's apparent determination to field a nuclear
deterrent. 26
The underlying dynamic driving this more dangerous scenario would
most likely be the one that Victor Cha has outlined , in which a desperate re-
gime in Pyongyang overestimates the probability that aggressive behavior
14 0 SECURITY STUDIES

will improve its survival prospects. 27 Under such circumstances , the risks of
crisis and conflict grow and China would find it more difficult tomaintain
its current straddling posture. If the crisis became acute , and especially if it
resulted in the actual use of military force initiated by the United States ,
Beijing would most likely conclude that it had to lend some sort of support
to North Korea. 28 This expectation reflects the competitive aspect of the
broader Sino-American relationship. Although Beijing might care little about
North Korea per se , it would see such an emerging Korean crisis or conflict
as a zero-sum contest in which China's self-interests , both reputational and
intrinsic , were at stake. If the United States were allowed to prevail in a
showdown with the DPRK while Beijing stood aside , America's interna-
tional stature would grow at China's expense; the experience would visibly
demonstrate China's inability to parry U.S. post-Cold War international
dominance even in Beijing's own front yard. The Korean peninsula , after all ,
is not the Balkans or the Persian Gulf, where geographic distance allows
China the option of remaining relatively detached. Inaction during an in-
tense Korean crisis would not only undercut China's international stature
but also besmirch the domestic political credentials of the CCP as the leader
of a proudly resurgent China 户 In addition , a U.S.~imposed solution could
result in a changed military situation that represented meaningful gains for
the United States at China's expense; such an outcome would etfectively
reactivate Korea as an important security concern , a front whose military
importance had declined since the 1950S relative to China's other major
post-Cold War concerns (especially Taiwan , but probably even disputed
claims in the South China Sea).
Beijing , therefore , would have strong incentives to forestall a resolution
of any Korean crisis or conflict that had the potential to cause such damage
to China's interests. Choosing how to respond , however, would be excruci-
atingly difficult. Strong support for North Korea in a confrontation with the
United States would not only harm China's economic ties with the United
States , Japan, and South Korea in the short term, but would also almost cer-
tainly result in a more explicit American strategy in Asia de且ned by con-
tainme
for 阮
B叫
Beij
刷1Jm咯gινμ
， 1I让
m 叫叫
lclu
叫
1址din
吨gt
叩出he 叩
w
 CHJNA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA 141

mìght strangle the economically desperate DPRK and increase the already
huge number of Korean refugees in China's northeast. On the other hand ,
Beijing quietly pressured Pyongyang to agree to compromise in talks with
Washington designed to discover a diplomatic resolutiori.

SCENARIO 3: SERIOUS REFOR 岛4

Under this scenario , the DPRK emulates China's reform strategy,

whose logic requires extensive engagement with the international economy.
As in China , the leaders in North Korea would be expected to combine eco-
nomic reform with tight control of political challenges at home , but to the
extent that Pyongyang sees economic development as the key to regime sur-
vival , its military posture would become more relaxed. Bellicose rhetoric
and weapons development programs that frighten potential investors and
trade partners would be forsaken. 31 The result of such a reform process
would be a situation on the Korean peninsula that best suited China's
interests. Beijing could position itself as role model for the North , continue
as economic partner with the South, and work to undermine the U.S.
justification for its Cold War-style military presence in northeast Asia. The
CCP would be able to enjoy the fr山ts of its open economic policy and at the
same time serve its nationalist agenda , insofar as the regime's stature would
benefit from the perception that it was playing a leading role in solving a
long-standing international problem. 32
In short, such reforms in North Korea would advance China's reputa-
tional as well as its intrinsic interests. Under this scenario , it is the United
States , rather than China , that would confront tough choices-most
broadly between a reduced military role in the region and a more explicit
redefinition of its purpose as a hedge against a potential China threat. Mis-
sile defenses (in the theater or deployed in North America , but with an East
Asian orientation) , having lost their North Korean rationale , would be seen
as insurance against a possible U.S.-China confrontation (most likely to
emerge from a dispute about Taiwan). The United States would be hard
pressed to avoid creating the impression that its alliance with and heavy
troop presence in the ROK , and perhaps even Japan , though cast in terms
of "regional peace and stability," were not aimed at contingencies involving
China , rather than contingencies involving what would appear to be an in-
creasingly cooperative , reformed regime in N orth Korea. 33

SCENARIO 4: TRANSFORMATION

Under this scenario , the DPRK disappears and the peninsula is

unified under Seoul's leadership. Although such an outcome would most
likely resùlt from unpredictable and unforeseen events , one can imagine at
14 2 SECURITY STUDIES

least two ways they might unfold that would not entail the implausible sce-
nario of an ROK military conquest. 34 One would be a peaceful settlement
negotiated by leaders in Pyongyang who anticipated an imminentloss of
control and collapse , possibly as a consequence of a failed attempt at open-
ing and reform of the sort described above. Another would be a- much more
disruptive collapse in which some element of the North Korean security ap-
paratus cuts a deal with South Korea and imposes it on the rest of the elite. 35
However it might come to pass , such a transformation resulting in a unifìed
Korea would profoundly affect Chinese and American interests in the region,
but in ways that would depend on the nature of the new regime.
As long as the U.S.-ROK security alliance holds , the end of the DPRK as
a separate state would immediately put an American ally on China's bor-
de r. 36 At a minimum, this proximity would increase Beijing's uncertainty
about the military challenges with which it would have to prepare to cope ,
even if it is unlikely that the United States would take the provocative step
of aggressively repositioning any forces that remain on the peninsula much
closer to the Yalu River separating China and Korea. 37 America's freedom
of maneuver in northeast Asia would be increased, while China's would
be decreased. During any Sino-American confrontation in the Taiwan Strait
or the South China Sea , U.S. military plannerswould no longer have to
keep one eye on a possible second front activated by the regime in Pyong-
yang. If it wanted to preserve American uncertainty about a second front ,
China would have to incur the burden of allocating signi且cant military re-
sources to its far northeast. And even if it responded in this way, such forces
could only represent a threat to punish the Americans and their allies in Ko-
reà (much as China can threaten Japan); they would not reconstitute the
current risk , however small , that conflict in Korea could result in unifìcation
under a regime hostile to U.S. interests. China , in short , would have lost the
bene且ts of the complication that North Korea presents for American mili-
tary planning in East Asia.
The end of the DPRK as a separate state would also heighten China's in-
security, because it would echo the events of I989-9I , when most commu- ~
nist regimes collapsed and the future of the survlvmg handful seemed 号
doubtfu l. As in the early I99os , China would react with alarm. The mos t
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA I43

celebration 01 the end of the North Korean communist dictatorship , un-

doubtedly including a reprise of President Clinton's theme of being "on the
right side of history," would almost certainly add an ideological challenge
to the potential military-strategic challenge China would perceive.
Washington , of course , would also have to recast its security policies in
northeast Asia in the aftermath of the collapse of the DPRK. It is conceiv-
able that hard choiá~s could be sidestepped simply by citing the need for
continuity as a hedge against unspecified threats to stability and peace in the
region. 39 This , however, seems unlikely to su面ce. Ambiguity may suit diplo-
matic communiqués , but force procurement , contingency planning , and
military exercises require thinking about the dangers that the United States
and its allies would be preparing to confront. Invoking the global war on
terrorism to justify an American presence in the region , though less vague ,
would also do little to explain a continuing major military foothold in
northeast Asia , especially large numbers of U.S. troops in Korea. Instead , a
fundamental question , once North Korea was off the table , would most
likely be the extent to which basic continuity in the American military pos-
ture in Asia could be justi且ed without making explicit what has thus far
been mostly implicit-contingency planning for conflict with China. 40 In
short , while Korean unification under Seoul's leadership would be a wel-
come development for many reasons , it would present substantial chal-
lenges for U.S. interests in Asia. By providing a sound rationale for Ameri-
can regional security policy, North Korea has in many ways been a "useful
adversary" for Washington. 41
Indeed , it is even conceivable that uni且cation could prove to be l~ss trouble-
some for China than the United States , because Beijing's ties with Seoul have
improved so significantly since 1992. A scenario under which China might
very well tolerate the peaceful unification of Korea under Seoul's leadership
is simply no longer as far-fetched as it once might have been. Beijing might ,
after all , deflect the potentially dangerous ideological implications of the
DPRK's demise by describing it as a result of Pyongyang's failure to "seek
truth from facts" during the arduous process of building socialism that the
CCP has mastered. And Beijing might also be able to deflect the potential mil-
itary challe
工 44 SECURITY STUDIES

Whiting 云 Hypotheses Revisited

The preceding sections have examined China's interests in Korea and

how they might shape Beijing's policies under four different scenarios for
the future of the peninsula. Against this background , 1 next revisit and , with
modi且cation， apply several of Whiting's insights into China's foreign policy
behavior, especially its practice of deterrence 卢 In some respects , the prin-
ciples Whiting identifìed in a quite different context have clear implications
for interpreting China's current Korea policy. In other respects ,. the rele-
vance of these principles is more speculative , but nevertheless potentially
helpful for anticipating future developments.

INTERNAL-EXTERNAL SECURITY LINKAGE

The need to deter threats increases as the domestic situation worsens.

In contrast to the early Cold War period , contemporary Chinese concerns
about Korea that link domestic and international security are more likely to
be political than military. Domestic political insecurities provide incentives
for the CCP leaders to worry about the implications of developments on
the peninsula that could exacerbate challenges to regime stability within
thè PRC. This is relevant in three areas: (1) links between the reactivation of
a serious security challenge along China's northeastern frontier and the po-
litical dangers it implies for the regime if it must divert substantial national
resources from civilian to military spending , thereby slowing the pace of
China's economic development , which , as noted above , has been crucial to
political stability since 1989; (2) links between the survival of the DPRK and
demands for an accelerated pace of political reform in China that the CCP
has routinely rejected (a concern that could be prominent under the "trans-
formation" scenario); and (3) links between the problem of illegal Korean
immigration and the dangers of social unrest within China that have accom-
panied painful economic reforms to which the CCP is committed (a concern
that could be prominent under the "status quo plus" scenario).
Fallout from a DPRK collapse. As happened following the events of
1989-91 , and especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the de-
mise of the DRPK could well intensify debate about the long-term viability of
Leninist systems , raising potentially troublesome questions for China's lead-
ers , comparable to those they faced in the early 1990S.43 Put differently, the
da吨ersofins的ility that China's leaders believe they confront reflect not 。由 J
the domestically generated problems of economic modernization but als o .~
pressures for changè linked to the outside world. The latter include direct for-
eign criticism of China's authoritarian political practices , as well as the indi~
rect effects from expanded access to information about the experiences of
 CHINA 弓 S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PEN1NSULA 145

other countries (including other failed communist states) that enables China's
citizens to form their own opinions (positive and negative) about the appro-
priateness of political arrangements in their country.44 A DPRK collapse
would probably increase the pressures for political change in China. To the ex-
tent that China's leaders feel insecure about their grip on power , then , they
have an interest in forestalling the rapid collapse of the regime in Pyongyang. 45
Beijing not surprisingly has tried to encourage a modus vivendi between North
and South Korea that prolongs the life of the DPRK , while urging Pyongyang
to create more favorable conditions for regime survival by embracing its own
version of the 勺narket-Len~nist" model of reform that the CCP has pioneered
(China's preferred outcome described in the "serious reform" scenario).
Recast in terms of Whiting's internal-external hypothesis , the weaker and
more besieged the CCP feels , the more likely it is that it will insist on ar-
rangements in Korea that preserve a signi且cant role for the regime in Pyong-
yang. Conversely, the stronger and more secure China's CCP leaders are , the
wider the range of political arrangements for the future of the peninsula
they may be willing to conside r.
Fallout 斤om Korean re向gees. Beijing's sensitivity to the links
between internal and external security are also manifest in the problem of
economic refugees and political asylum seekers arriving in China from Ko-
rea. The in f1 ux of refugees from the economic hardships that have plagued
the DPRK since the early 1990S exacerbates China's own problems with a
large 吁loating population" and chronic underemployment that has accom-
panied the downsizing of ine面cient state-owned industry. China's northeast
(the country's industrial heartland in the old centrally planned economy) is
not only the destination for illegal Korean immigrants , it is also plagued by
some of the most serious socioeconomic problems resulting from the painful
reform of the state-owned industrial sector. Moreover, these problems are
likely to become more acute as Chinese industry is subjected to growing pres-
sure from foreign competitors under the terms of accession to the World
Trade Organization. Korean immigration , therefore , threatens to worsen the
di面culties confronting an already troubled region of the PRC.
Recast in terms of Whiting's internal-external hypothesis , the m
14 6 SECURITY STUDIES

problem of North Koreans who seek political asylum in the diplomatic

compounds of China's cities as a route for escaping to the ROK卢 Each such
case puts Beijing in a tight spot. The CCP leaders face competing consider-
ations: an interest in adhering to their principled position of absolute re-
spect for state sovereignty and noninterference in the domestic affairs of the
others (i.e. , respecting the jurisdiction of the DPRK over its citizens under
the terms of the extradition treaty with China) , respect for the sovereignty
of the states whose diplomatic compounds have been breached , and a clear
international humanitarian consensus that militates against returning the
asylum seekers to the harsh punishment they may suffer in the DPRK.
Moreover, the visibility these asylum cases achieve , to a limited extent in
domestic media but to a greater extent in foreign media to which many po-
litically engaged Chinese have access , necessarily draws attention to the
grave risks these people have taken in order to escape the repressive policies
of a failing communist state. That subtext aggravates the unresolved tension
between international opinion that increasingly pushes for a universal con-
ception of human rights and the perspective of a CCP regime that puts a
higher priority on order than freedom and justi且es its approach by assert-
ing a "hard" view of state sovereignty in which each country determines its
own citizens' rights according to distinctive national conditions. 47
Recast in terms of Whiting's internal-external hypothesis , with respect to
both economic refugees and political asylum seekers , then , the more secure
China's centralleadership and the lower its anxiety about domestic insta-
bility, the less likely it is that it will see these externally generated problems
as a serious threat, and the more likely it is to adopt a flexible posture in ad-
dressing them. In the early 2000S , a relatively secure CCP has on balance
demonstrated considerable flexibility and pragmatism in its handling of
even the more di面cult problem of Koreans seeking political asylum. Rely-
ing on quiet diplomacy and face-saving solutions (such as sending Korean
political refugees to a third country rather than permitting them to go di-
rectly to the ROK) , Beijing has thus far been able to accommodate interna-
tional pressure for humanitarian treatment , while avoiding the most blatant
忖UTW
接

affront to Pyongyang and min

W运
A 组惆川骂
:-ud萄邂噩

ACTIONS , NOT JUST WORDS

Deterrence requires a belligerent posture that is made credible by .~

actions and not just rhetoric. If China's leaders perceive a growing risk that 1
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA 147

of what developments portend for future milìtary dispositions in the region

or because of the political implications discussed above-Whiting's hypoth-
esis suggests that they might conclude that it is necessary to take dramatic
action to signal concern and prevent a further deterioration of the situation.
This hypothesis , most relevant to the "status quo minus" and "transforma-
tion" scenarios described in the previous section , highlights an important
possibility for an unìntended and potentially dangerous outcome. It indi-
cates that China's leaders , even if their goal is only to bolster the status quo
in Korea , may under certain conditions decide to adopt a belligerent posture.
If so , would others , especially the United States, correctly discern China's
purposes?
The international relations literature about the "security dilemma" and
the "spiral model of conflict" explains why attempts to deter can sometimes
instead intensify conflict卢 Even if Beijing's rhetoric and possible actions
(e.g. , reviving closer military ties with the DPRK , undertaking a military
buildup in China's northeast) were actually intended to maintain the status
quo in Korea , Americans might wonder if they were evidence of a long-
range Chinese strategy aimed at forcing the United States out of a natural
"sphere of Chinese influence." Contemporary concerns among many in the
U.S. government about a rising China's international aspirations , and among
many in the CCP regime about an American interest in precluding the emer-
gence of any great powers to rival U.S. hegemony (the complementary wor-
ries that "power-transition theorists" identify in such dyads throughout his-
tory) , prime both sides for an acute form of the security dilemma generating
spirals of conflict. Under such circumstances , belligerent signals from China ,
even if only intended as deterrents , are likely to be viewed with alarm in the
United States. It is possible that American concerns might be mitigated if
China's signals were sent during a period when bilateral relations were rel-
atively good. But unavoidable uncertainty about China's intentions and ,
more important , the recognition that its intentions could change in the fu-
tu时， especially as China's capabilities increase , would provide the United
States with incentives to hedge its bets in ways likely to amplify mutual sus-
picion. Under the sort of circumstances that would prom
工48 SECURITY STUDIES

analysts would be wise to carefully parse the words and actions that Beijing
employs. It would be especially important to focus not simply on their bel-
ligerent form but also to consider the substance of the message they were
designed to convey about matters such as the future disposition of military
forces on the peninsula , foreign ties to the rival Korean states , or the nature
of a post-unifìcation regime. Whiting's analysis of the West's experience in
interpreting signals in 1950 serves as a cautionary tale. Beijing's belligerence
was at least partly misconstrued , both before the "People's Volunteers" in-
tervened (when warnings were readily discounted as the fìery rhetoric to be
expected from an ideologically motivated revolutionary regime) and after
(when China's actions were simplistically interpreted by many in the West
as part of a communist strategy of aggression rather than at least partly a
Chinese strategy of preventive defense).50

TIMING IS ESSENTIAL

To deter successfully, warn early enough to be e丘ective ， ideally early

enough to prevent the threat from arising , rather than attempting to elimi-
nate the threat after it has emerged. "Bureaucratic and political pressures"
make it more di面cult to persuade others to abandon objectionable positions
to which they have become publicly committed (because this may mean
a substantive concession and also a loss of face) than it is to influence their
deliberations beforehand.
Whiting's position here echoes the arguments Thomas Schelling set forth
in proposing a useful distinction between deterrence (a strategy employing
threats to preserve the status quo) and "compellence" (a strategy employ-
ing threats to alter the status quo or restore the status quo ante). ScheUing,
like Whiting , provides convincing reasons why the latter is often so much
more di面cult to practice. 51 According to this logic , CCP leaders have in-
centives to adopt a proactive stance on Korea's future , especially if the sta-
tus quo appears unstable , and to lay down markers about their "bottom
line." Such clarifìcation needs to be undertaken early enough to discourage
others from promoting political or military arrangements in Korea that 运
Beiji吨 deems unacceptable (a prominent concern under the second and 运
third scenarios above) by indicating the risk that they will trigger a hostile 尊
Chinese response. The more China's leaders become worried about the po- 1'.'
litical fate of the DPRK , themore likely it is that they will assert the limits 盖
of their tolerance with respect to both the process (e.g.", no outside interfer- 司圃
ence) and outcome (e.g. , limits on the size and location of U.S. forces sta- 斗
tioned on the peninsula) of reunifìcation.
China's statements about the Korean peninsula since the early 199 0S r
have consisten由 emphasized the importance of "independent and peacefu1
叫 fìcation" (川 ep川U叫
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA I49

establish military bases in a foreign country.52 These statements should

probably be understood as signals intended to discourage the ROK and the
United States from entertaining the belief that Beijing would tolerate the
unification of Korea under American auspices, especially if it means a ma-
jor U.S. military presence that could be moved farther north. This concern
has deep roots. In the post-Cold War era , Beijing's dissatisfaction with the
implications of enduring unipolarity makes it more likely to worry that the
United States will attempt to exploit its present dominant international po-
sition to lock in , if not expand , its military presence on the peninsula. 53
While this is partly a man~festation of Beijing's broader concerns about the
constraining consequences of continued U.S. preponderance in the Western
Pacific , it also reflects specific concerns about the future purposes of the
U.S.-ROK alliance in the event the North Korean threat no longer provides
a basis for its continuation. As noted above , under such circumstances , an
enduring U.S.-ROK alliance would most plausibly appear to be a hedge
against China , part of a containment strategy linking Korea with other Amer-
ican bilateral security agreements in East Asia in a chain of encirclement. In
fact , such concerns are already apparent in some Chinese analyses that see the
U.S. invocation of "the North Korea threat ," like references to "the China
threat ," as a flimsy pretext devised to justify a continuing strong U.S. military
presence in East Asia. 54
Understanding China's interests may reduce the chances that the signals
it sends about them will be misunderstood , but the risk cannot be elimi-
nated. Problems may arise not only from the di面culty in receiving and
interpreting the message , but also from the challenges China faces in for-
mulating the way to signal its concerns. As Whiting's work details , in late
summer 1950, even relatively explicit attempts to warn Washington that
Beijing saw a serious threat to China's vital interests that it was determined
to protect were ineffective. In the quite different circumstances of the early
twenty-且rst century, China is much less likely to rely on such blunt threats
to try to influence events on the peninsula. China's leaders may recognize
the advantages of adopting a proactive approach sending deterrent signals
to discourage unacceptable outcomes in Korea rather than waiting to re-
spo
工 50 SECURITY STUDIES

If relying on signals to convey deterrent threats is problematic for Beijing,

failing to signal China's concerns about events in Korea wo -q. ld also carry
risks , though different ones. Reticence might benefit China by enhancing its
reputation as a responsible regional actor with which others can safely
trade , and which they need not cooperate to contain. If the status quo en-
dures , or a new status quo emerges that does not pose problems for Beijing,
then the benefits of Chinese restraint might be substantia l. If China's lead-
ers believe there is a significant risk that events in Korea could be moving in
unacceptable directions , however, then silence may have the costly effect of
encouraging others to assume Beijing's indifference and to overestimate its
willingness to tolerate changes it in fact would not accept, changes that
would actually prompt China to respond in ways that would then be both
surprising and alarming. 55

Con c/usions

Miscalculation and misinterpretation are far from trivial concerns in

international politics. In 1950, miscalculating the credibility (for the United
States) or clarity (for Beijing) of deterrent signals about Korea resulted in a
costly war and resulted in a protracted period of intense Sino-American
hostility. The danger in the twenty-first century is that miscalculation over
Korea could contribute to igniting a new Cold War based on the perception
of sharply clashing interests between a dominant United States and a rising
China. Although both share a short-term interest in peace and stability in
Korea , their preferences about the peninsula in the longer term diffe r. The
U.S. vision is one that seeks a resolution of tensions in Korea consistent with
preserving regional security arrangements that Washington designed and
has cemented in place over the past half century. China's vision is one that
seeks a resolution consistent with Beijing playing an increasingly influential
role in molding a post-Cold War security architecture that is less U.S.-
centric. 56
As such , differences about the future of the Korean peninsula look like
one of anumber of Sino-American issues that maÿ reflect what international
relations scholars generally describe as the problems associated with rising
great powers. 57 Much of this literature examining the relations between an
emerging challenger and a dominant power has suggested that the process
is likely to trigger major wars. War allegedly results either when a nervoUS
hegemon , attempting to prevent its displacement , attacks the amhitious
challenger or when the challenger, determined to improve its position , at-
tacks a dominant state that refuses to redraw the international order so that
it better reflects the changing distribution of power. On both empirical and
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA I5I

theoretical grounds , however, this worrisome power-transition argument Ìs

problematic and the implications for China's posture toward the Korean
peninsula are unclear.
Although catastrophic war has sometimes been the outcome of the dy-
namics the power transition literature identi且es ， not all such great power
shifts throughout histoty fit the disaster scenario. Neither the Anglo-
American experience" in the first half of the twentieth century nor the Soviet-
American experience in the second half 且ts the mold. Thus , history alone
does not conclusively demonstrate a law-like pattern indicating that the
United States and China a~e inevitably on a collision course , with disagree-
ments about problems like Korea intensifying the rivalry. Moreover, in ad-
dition to doubts raised by the mixed empirical evidence , there are doubts
about the logic at the core of power-transition theory-that peace prevails
during periods of hegemonic stability, and wars occur as a dissatisfied , ris-
ing challenger catches up with and seeks to supplant the dominant state.
Robert Powell's careful formalization of the bargaining dynamics informally
portrayed in most descriptions of power transition demonstrates that the
outcome of the process is logically indeterminate. 58
Whether the challenger or the hegemon chooses to resort to war as an al-
ternative to a peaceful adjustment of the international order (either prior to
or at the moment of an actual transition) depends on the willingness and
ability of the dominant state to make concessions that the rising state will
find satisfactory in light of the changing distribution of powe r. The abstract
bargaining relationship is clear and can be modeled with precision. But ap-
plying the model to particular cases is di面cult because it requires knowl-
edge about each state's preferences and estimates of relative power, inter-
ests , and resolve , as well as the efficiency with which each updates such
information as their relationship unfolds over time. Sometimes fears about
the consequences of allowing a potential rival to grow more powerful
prompt a state to opt for war while it retains an advantage (as may have
been the case with Germany in 1914 , when it worried about being over-
taken by Russia). Or dissatisfaction with the concessions the dominant state
is prepared to make can lead a rising power to strike 且rst， hoping it can im-
prove its bargaining position (perhaps ]apan in 194
15 2 SECURITY STUDIES

Beijing about its interests and intentions with respect to Korea's future are
part of the information that the United States will use to "screen". China as
a rising power and to assess its willingness to accommodate Beijìng's de-
mands for greater influence. The good news about the prospects for ac-
commodation between China and the United States on the future of Korea
is that neither side is already committed to a position that significantly nar-
rows the range of acceptable compromises (asmay be the case with dis-
agreements about Taiwan). Thus , the process of bargaining about the future
of Korea as China's power rises need not contribute to growing Sino-
American tensions. Interaction in addressing problems engaging both coun-
tries' interests may even provide opportunities for each to demonstrate the
extent of its flexibility and to assess the other's ability and willingness to
compromise. The bad news is that flexibility also means uncertainty and
perhaps dangerous inattentiveness if positions evolve while each party is
focused on more pressing matters-for the United States , the war on ter-
rorism; for China , managing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. A process of tacit
bargaining during which each side relies on signals that may be overlooked
or misinterpreted could then result in a drift toward incompatible positions
from which it may later be tough to climb down. If so , Korea would become
a problem that contributes to intensifying tensions resulting from China's
rise , rather than an issue on which the United States and China demonstrate
the possibility of peaceful adjustment. In this respect , the Korean nuclear
crisis in the early twenty-first century may turn out to be a blessing in dis-
guise if it encourages Beijing and Washington to pay closer attention to each
other's interests in Northeast Asia and to think carefully about the risks that
each is prepared to run in support of them. Events on the peninsula and the
reactions they evoke from China and the United States seem certain to play
an important role in defining the security architecture of East Asia for the
twenty-first century.

Notes

1. 1 thank Chen Cheng , Tang Wei , and Wang Yanbo for their research assistance
in the writing of this chapter.
2. Allen S. Whiting , China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean
War (1960; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); id., The Chinese Calculus
of Deterrence: lndia and lndochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press , 1
1975); id. , The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: lndia and lndochina , Michigan
Papers in Chinese Studies , No. 4 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies publica-
tions , 1981 , 2001). .
3. On similarities and differences across the cases from the Maoist era that
informed Whiting's generalizations , see Whiting , Chinese Calculus of Deterrence ,
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA I53

196-99. Drawing lessons from the past is a di面cult and imprecise business , for pol-
icymakers as well as for scholars. See Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: The Use
and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University
Press , I 97 3); Robert Jervis , Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton , N. J.: Princeton University Press ，工 976) ， esp. ch. 6; Yuen Foong Khong ,
Analogies at War: Korea , Munich , Dïen BienPh风 and the Vietnam Decisions of I 965
(Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press , I992). This chapter, however, does not
use "lessons of the past" or "analogical explanations" as a framework for interpret-
ing China's contemporary Korea policy; it focuses instead on China's interests and
the situational constraints (both international and domestic) its leaders confront. Al-
though events in Korea might.trigger the invocation of historicallessons that would
subsequently shape Beijing's response , the experience that would be deemed relevant
is uncertain. Beijing could , for example , react to an intense crisis on the Korean pen-
insula that included the prospect of Americanmilitary involvement by drawing on
"lessons of I950." Alternatively, it might view a new Korean crisis as another in-
stance of a distinctive pattern of U. S. interventionism in the post-Cold War unipo-
lar world that Chinese analysts have emphasized since the mid 工 990s. In short, it
may be the lessons of the recent past , rather than the distant history of the early Cold
War, that would dominate the minds of the makers of foreign policy in Beijing.
4. A now vast literature reconsidering who among Pyongyang , Moscow, and
(Beijing favored what and when has emerged as more documents have been de-
classified. The new evidence does not resolve all controversies about responsibility
but does reveal differences between Mao and the other top CCP leaders about the
risks China should be willing to run in support of a North Korean attack and then
in its response to the UN counterattack. See Shen Zhihua , "The Discrepancy Be-
tween the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao's 2 October I9 50 Message to Stalin
on Chinese Entry in the Korean 币Tar : A Chinese Scholar's Repl犯" trans. Chen Jian,
Cold W句r International History Project Bulletin , no. 8-9 (Winter I996-97): 巧 7-
43; Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao , Kim , and China's Decision to Enter
the Korean War, September I6-0ctober I
154 SECURITY STUDIES

of 1950, as well as the failure of the United States either to grasp their significance
or, if it was recognized , to believe in the credibility of the actions Beijing was threat-
ening to take , see Whiting, China Crosses the ì句 lu ， esp. ch. 6.
6. The PRC's main contribution to Soviet security reflected geography. As a
friendly state on the Soviet Union's Asian borders , China reduced the length of the
front along which the United States could pose a direct threat to the USSR from
the east. This Chinese contribution to Soviet security was diminished , however , by
(1) East Asia's secondary importance for Moscow compared with Europe , (2) the
need for the USSR to assist China's program of military modernization , and (3) the
anticipation that the real American threat to Soviet security was not likely to be a
conventional ground assault but air and missile power.
7. On the ways junior partners in alliances seek to forestall the dangers of aban-
donment , see Avery Goldstein , "Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security
in the Postwar World ," International Organization 49 , 1 (Winter 1995): 39-7与 id. ，
Deterrence and Security in the 21St Century: China, Britain, France and the Endur-
ing Legacy of the Nu c/ear Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press , 2000) ,
24-26, 69-77. On China's doubts about Soviet commitment , see Sergei N. Gon-
charov, John W. Lewis , and Xue Litai , Uncertain Partners: Stalin , Mao , and the Korean
W句r (Stanford: Stanford University Press ，工 993) ， 118; see also Zhang, Deterrence and
Strategic Culture , 31.
8. See Goldstein , Deterrence and Security in the 21St Century , 37-41 ， 90 一工 03.
9. China's tortured attempts to offer a Marxist ideological explanation for Soviet
"hegemonism" depended on identifying its roots in the revisionist character of the
regime , something that Beijing could no longer comfortably emphasize after 1976
as it rapidly abandoned its own revolutionary Maoist policies.
10. See comments from Jiang Zemin and Li Peng in "Kim Jong-Il Visits China,
Meets Jiang ," Xinhua , 1 June 2000; "Jiu Zhong-Han guanxi , Zhongguo dui
Chaoxian bandao zhengce wenti , Li Peng jieshou Hanguo jizhe caifang" [On China-
ROK relations , Li Peng takes questions from visiting ROK reporters about China's
policy toward the Korean peninsula and other matters] , Renmin Ribao , 26 Febru-
ary 1995; "PRC Delegation Offers Suggestions on Korean Peace Accord ," Xinhua ,
22 January 1999; Su Guiyou and Liu yí
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA I55

October 2000); Weixing Hu , "Beijing's Defense Strategy and the Korean Peninsula ,"
Journal ofNortheast Asian Studies 14 (1995): 50-67; Banning Garrett and Bonnie
S. Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu: Chinese Assessments of North Korea ," Asian
Survey 35 (June 1995): 口 8-45.
13. Experts continue to disagree about the resùlts of China's military modern-
izatioIi. Most, however , agree that the effort is now focused on Taiwan contingen-
cies , and that despite signi丘cant purchases of advanced military equipment from
Russia , the gap between Chinese and American military capabilities remains large.
See Avery Goldstein , "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival ," Interna-
tional Security 22 , 3 (Winter 1997-98): 36-73; Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing
Problems Without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U. S. Security Pol-
icy," International Security 25 , 4 (Spring 200r): 5-40; Council on Foreign Rela-
tions , Chinese 儿们 litary Power , Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by
the Council on Foreígn Relations Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic
Studies (Washington , D. C.: Council on Foreign Relations , 2003) , www.cfr. org/pdfl
China_T F. pdf (accessed 1 October 2005); U. S. Department of Defense , Annual Re-
port on the Military Power of the People 云 Republic of China (Washington , D. C.:
U. S. Department of Defense ，二 004) ， www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC
.pdf (accessed September 27 , 2005).
14. See Avery Goldstein , Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and
International Security (Stanford: Stanford University.Press , 2005).
15. See Robert S. Ross , "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation ," Interna-
tional Security 25 , 2 (Fall 2000): 87-123; Christensen , "Posing Problems Without
Catching Up"; Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen , "China: Getting the
Questions Right ," Nationallnterest , 22 December 2000 , 17-29.
16. Korea is arguably not even China's second priority. That is more likely to be
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. For an assessment that lists Taiwan , the
South China Sea , and the Diaoyu Islands disputes with Japan as the top three pri-
orities , see Craig S. Smith , "China Reshaping Military to Toughen Its Muscle in the
Region ," New Yor走 Times， 工 6 October 2002.
17. See Wang Linchang , '‘ Tang Jiaxuan waizhang baihui Hanguo zongtong Jin
Dazhong" [Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan calls on ROK President Kim Dae Jung ],
Renmi
工 56 SECURITY STUDIES

D. C.: Institute for International Economics , 1994); id. , Integrating China into the
Global Economy ( 币Tashington， D. C.: Brooking Institution Press , 2002).
19. The comments from PLA Chief of the General Sta丘， Fu Quanyou , in Octo-
ber 2002 , reflect the strong opinions still held by some of China's elite: "The tradi-
tional China-DPRK friendship personally forged and fostered by Chairman Mao
Zedong , Premier Zhou Enlai , Comrade Deng Xiaoping , and President Kim Il Sung
is a precious legacy bequeathed by the leaders of the older generation of the two
countries. Over the past many years , despite changes in the international situation ,
China-DPRK friendship cemented with blood has remained unchanged , and has
withstood the testof history" (Dong Lixi, "Fu Quanyou Meets with. the DPRK
People's Army Goodwill Mission ," Xinhua , 11 October 2002).
20. On the North Korea threat as a proxy for China , see 咽地 Xinbo ， '‘U. S. Se-
curity Policy in Asia: Implications for China-U. S. Relations ," Contemþorary
Southeast Asia 22 (2000): 479-97; Yi Jun , Hua Shan , and Xu Shuju叫 "Behind the
U.S.-South Korea ‘ RSOI 2001' Exercise ," Jiefangjun Bao , 30 April 2001 , 12, FBIS-
CHI-2001 一 0430 ， WNC Document No. oGCNRWY01F5CM5; Zhang Xin and
Han Xudong , "Reasons Behind Constant Clashes in Northeast Asia as Viewed from
ROK-DPRK Sea Battle ," Liaowang 28 (2002): 60-6 工， FBIS-CHI-2002 一 07 工 8 ，
啊。JC Document No. OGZNJ2TooJ3S5Q.
2 I. By the end of the 1990s, China and the ROK had established a "Sino-Korean
cooperative partnership oriented toward the twenty.岳rst century." See "Zhu Rongji ,
zongli tong Hanguo zongtong Jin Dazhong juxing huitan" [Premier Zhu Rongji
and ROK President Kim Dae Jung hold talks] , Xinhua , 18 October 2000; Liu
Zhengxue and 明Tang Linchang , "Zhu Rongji tong Jin Dazhong huitan , shuangfang
jiu shuangbian guanxi he diqu wenti jiaohuanle yijian" [Zhu Rongji and Kim Dae
J ung hold talks , the two sides exchange opinions on bilateral relations and regional
issues] , Renmin Ribao , 19 October 2000; Hu , "Beijing's Defense Strategy and the
Korean Peninsula"; Kay Moeller, "China and Korea: The Godfather Part Three ,"
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 1 5" (199 6): 35 - 48.
22. See Tao , "China's Position气 Ding Shichuan , and Li Qiang , '‘ Chaoxian ban-
dao heping jizhi ji qi qianjing" [A peace mechanism for the Korean peninsula and
its prospects] , Xiandai Guoji Guan刀， no. 4 (1999): 42-44; Zhang Guocheng,
"Qua
t.
，叫祖
i啕a
泊
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA I57

poses of such U. S. military deployments across Asia , See Gao Tian , "U. S. Nucleai
Submarines on Guam Target China ," Renminwang , I9 March 2002; Wu , "U. S. Se-
curity Policy in Asia"; Yi , Hua , and Xu, "Behind the u. S.-South Korea ‘ RSOI2001'
Exercise"; Zhu Feng , "RiChao shounao huitan: Xiaoquan chengle zuida 'ying jia'?"
[The ]apan-DPRK summit: will Koizumi be the biggest ‘winner' 汀 ， Zhongguo Ribao ,
巧 September 2002.
二 6. Despite diplomatic efforts , between 2002 and 2005 North Korea assertively
moved toward deploying nuclear weapons. Pyongyang evicted international inspec-
tors , resumed reprocessing plutonium , withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproltfera-
tion Treaty, harassed a U. S. spyplane in international airspace , tested short-range
missiles (some that might be ~apable of carrying nuclear warheads) , made vague
claims about already having a nuclear deterrent , and then bluntly claimed to possess
a working nuclear weapon.
27. Victor D. Cha , '‘ Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean
Peninsula ," International Security 27 , 1 (2002): 40-78.
28. See Garrett and Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu ," 534. Most Chinese an-
alysts , 0面cers ， and 0面cials whom the author interviewed during March 2003 in
Beijing indicated that China would oppose U. S. military action against the North
but that its support for Pyongyang would be mainly diplomati c. Chinese assistance
to the DPRK , if it were forthcoming , would almost certainly not include the PRC's
direct military participation.
29. The contrast between China's role on the Iraq and Korea problems in 2003
clea r1y reflected such geopolitical considerations. Beijing played a minimal role dur-
ing the debate preceding the U. S.-led military operation against Iraq but was at the
same time working hard to encourage the North Koreans and the Americans to 且nd
a face-saving way to deescalate tensions and search for a diplomatic solution to the
confrontation over the DPRK's nuclear program. China's efforts facilitated a
resumption of dialogue brokered by Beijing in April 2003.
30. A string of perceived American humiliations of China since the ea r1y 1990S
have elicited a sometimes strident nationalist reaction in the media and on the streets.
These events included the alleged U. S. role in denying China the 2000 Olympics , the
American interdiction and boarding of a Chinese ship (the Yinhe) mistakenly
thought to be carrying illicit cargo , the U. S. reve
15 8 SECURITY STUDIES

32. Thus , China's Korea policy seeks to foster this outcome by prodding the
DPRK to reform , pressing the DPRK's adversaries to continue dialogue with
Pyongyang , and encouraging the ROK , Japan, the Europeans , and the Americans
to engage , rather than isolate , the DPRK and integrate it into the international
system. See also Robert J. Saiget, "North Korean Premier in Beijing amid Renewed
Nuclear Threats ," Agence France-Presse , 22 March 2005 , FBIS , NewsEdge Docu-
ment No. 二00503221477.1_2389008b6e6f5d5e; "North Korea This Week , No.
338 (Marchμ) ，" Yonhap , 31 March 2005 , FBIS , NewsEdge Document No.
二005 0 33 11 477. 工 _42d30d5h 53 fc 3 6d .
33. In March 2005 , ROK President Roh fueled the simmering debate about the
future of the U. S.-ROK al1 iance when he suggested that Korea might move beyond
its historical role as the cockpit of great power conflict and close Cold War align-
ment with the United States and might instead become an active "balancer" facili-
tating the resolution of disputes among potential adversaries such as China , Japan ,
and the United States. See "Roh Stresses S. Korea's Balancing Role in Regional Se-
curity," Yonhap , 22 March 2005; An So'ng-kyu , "ROK NSC 0面cial Expounds on
‘ Balancer Role' in Northeast Asia Interview with Yi Cho'ng-so 毡， deputy chief of the
National Security Council ," JoongAng Il bo , 15 April 2005.
34. This assumes that the ROK would not attack the DPRK unless blatantly
provoked , and that the North recognizes the suicidal consequences of attacking the
South.
35. Such a scenario might reflect the expectations of those in the United States
who prefer a policy that will trigger "regime change" rather than negotiated nuclear
disarmament in the DPRK.
36. The Korean presidential election of 2003 , in which the winning candidate
was most closely identified with continuing Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy toward
the DPRK , coincided with an upsurge in protests against the U. S. military presence
in Seoul and raised questions about the future of the alliance. By late March 2003 ,
however, Pyongyang's nuclear brinkmanship apparently motivated the newly
elected South Korean president, Roh Moo Hyun , to reiterate his governmen t's de-
termination to maintain a close security alliance with the United States , including a
substantial American troop deployment on Korean soi l. See Howard W. French,
"Bush and New Korean Leader to Take Up Thorny Issues ," New Yor走 Times ，
Z 工 December 2002; Howa
 CHINAJS INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA 159

the DPRK simply underscores the need to overcome the contradictions between the
rapid pace of economic reform and the snail's pace of political reform.
39. As an official U. S. report on its strategy for East Asia stated: "The United
States welcomes the public statements of ROK President Kim Dae-Jung a面rming the
value of the bilateral alliance and the U. S. military presence even after reuni且cation
of the Korean Peninsula. The U. S. strongly agrees that our alliance and military pres-
ence will continue to s\l pport stability both on the Korean Peninsula and through-
out the region after North Korea is no longer a threat. . . . Beyond the Peninsula , in-
stability and uncertainty are likely to persist in the Asia-Pacifìc region , with heavy
concentrations of military force , including nuclear arsenals , unresolved territorial
disputes and historical tensio.ns , and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and their means of delivery serving as sources of instability." From The United
States Security Strategy for the East Asω-Pacifìc Region (Washington , D. C.: 0面ce
of International Security Affairs , 1998) , 62-63.
40. For discussion that hints at this contingency but carefully avoids naming
China as a prospective adversary, see U. S. Department of Defense , "Quadrennial
Defense Review Report" (Washington , D. C.: U. S. Department of Defense , 2001) ,
www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qd f2 00 r. pdf (accessed 27 September 2005).
41. On the reasons why such adversaries niay be useful , see Thomas J. Christensen ,
Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization , and Sino-American
Conflict, I947-I958 (Princeton , N. J.: Princeton University Press ，工 99 6 ).
42. For the full set of principles of deterrence that Whiting distilled from China's
experiences with confrontations in Korea , India , and Indochina , see his Chinese
Calculus of Deterrence , 202-3.
43. John W. Garver , "The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet
Communism," China Quarterly , no. 133 (1993): 工 -26.
44. Growing access to Internet-based information is compounding this concern
and Beijing's response has been an imperfectly effective attempt to restrict access.
See Shanthi Kalathil , "Dot Com for Dictators ," Foreign Policy , no. 135 (March-
Apri12003): 43-49. Despite the controls , it is unclear that the regime believes it can
any longer prevent China's citizens from learning about major events outside China ,
even when they
160 SECURITY STUDIES

the specific conditions of each country must also be taken into consideration in
observing this principle" (People's Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ,
"The Signing of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights by the
Chinese Government" (17 November 2000) , www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng /z iliao/36021
3604 1t1804 1. htm (accessed 1 October 2005).
48. See e.g. , Elisabeth Rosenthal , "7 North Koreans Al1 0wed to Leave China ,"
New York Times , 29 June 2001 , and "North Korean Asylum Seekers Leave China ,"
ibid. , 24 June 2002.
49. On deterrence and spirals , see Jervis , Perception and Misperception in Inter-
national Politics. For a discussion that explores reasons why actors often fail to con-
sider alternative explanations for the signals an adversary sends , or for his observed
behavior, see Robert Jervis , "Hypotheses on Misperception ," World Politics 20
(19 68 ): 454-79.
50. See Whiting , China Crosses the Yalu , esp. chs. 8 and 9.
51. On the differences between deterrence and compe l1 ence , see Thomas C.
Schelling , Arms and In f/ uence (New Haven , Conn.: Yale University Press ，工 9 66 );
Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 2ISt Century.
口. See Chen Hegao , Li Siyang, and Gao Haorong , "Li Peng weiyuanzhang hui-
jian Jin Dazhong zongtong" [NPC Standing Committee Chairman Li Peng meets
with President Kim Dae Jung] , Xinhua ，巧 May， 200 1. Opposition to U. S. forces
in Korea was reiterated by China's ambassador to the ROK , Li Bin, in remarks on
the tenth anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between China and the
ROK (Kim Ji-ho , "China's Envoy to ROK: US Troops in Korea Must Not Pose
Threat to Neighbors ," Korea Herald , 21 August 2002).
53. Repeated displays of U. S. military superiority in the post-Cold War era have
led Chinese analysts to argue that the transition period from unipolarity to multi-
polarity will be protracted. See Lu Youzhi , "Chongxin shenshi Zhongguo de anquan
huanjing" [A fresh examination of China's security environment] , Shijie Jingji
yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] , no. 工 (2000): 56-61; Ye Zicheng ,
"Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlüe shizai bixing" [The imperative for China
to implement a great power diplomatic strategy] , ibid.: 6-7; Chu Shulong and
Wang Zaibang, "Guanyu guoji xingshi he wo duiwai zhanlüe ruogan zhongda wenti
de sikao" [Reflections on some important questions about the international situa-
tion and our exter
 CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA I6I

55. China's policy during the standoff over North Korea's nuclear weapons pro-
gram after 2002 may have reflected an attempt to steer a middle course , simulta-
neously sending deterrent signals that China's interests could not be ignored , while
also offering to play a responsible role in working toward a diplomatic resolution.
56. Yan Xuetong , "Dui Zhongguo anquan huanjing de fenxi yu sikao" [Analy-
sis of and reflections on China's security environment ], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
[World Economics and .Politics ], no. 2 (2000): IO; Fang Hua , "Yatai anquan jiagou
de xianzhuang , qushi ji Zhongguo de zuoyong" [The current Asia-Pacific security
framework , trends , and China's role ], ibid.: I I , 14; Chu Shulong , "Lengzhanhou
Zhongguo anquan zhanlüe sixiang de fazhan" [The development of China's think-
ing about security strategy a{ter the Cold 明1ar]， ibid. , no. 9 (工 999): I I - I3; Xiao ,
"Dui guoji xingshizhong jige redian wenti de kanfa ," 3; Sa Benwang , "Woguo an-
quan de bianhua ji xin de pubian anquanguan de zhuyao tezheng" [The change in
our country's security and the main features of the new concept of universal secu-
rity] , Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan , no. I (2000): 5 I; 明1ang Yiwei , "Dui Tai jun-
shi douzheng dui shijie zhanlüe geju de yingxiang chutan" [A preliminary explo-
ration of the effects on the international strategic situation of military action against
Taiwan ]," ibid. , no. 6 (工 999): 二 8.
57. See A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler , The War Ledger (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press , I980); Robert Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics (New
York: Cambridge University Press ，工 981); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fa l! of the
Great Powers (New York: Random House , I987). On the application of such argu-
ments to the rise of China , see Goldstein , "Great Expectations ," 62-63; id. , Rising
to the Challenge.
58. Robert Powell , In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in lnterna-
tional Politics (Princeton , N. J.: Princeton University Press ，工 999).
6 The Limits of Econ01仰 1nterdepen.dence
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Michael Yahuda

The principal question that this chapter addresses is why the grow-
ing economic interdependence between the People's Republic of China and
]apan in the post-Cold War period has failed to prevent a marked deterio-
ration in relations between the two states , especially in the early years of the
twenty岳rst century.l Such a development does not accord with generallib-
eral international theory, which claims that deepening economic relations
and economic interdependence should lead to recognition of shared inter-
ests as bolstered by separate business and other constituencies in each coun-
try with a stake in improving relations. 2
Yet the increased openness of Chinese and ]apanese societies and the
growth of contacts between the two sets of peoples , as evident from the num-
bers of student exchanges and visits by tourists , have not led to an improve-
ment of the image that each side has of the other. 3 On the contrary, the rela-
tively positive views of each other in earlier years have been replaced by
negative ones. No wonder that many in the foreign policy elites in both
countries sense that the gap between them is widening. 4
1 argue that the key to understanding the deterioration in Sino-]apanese
relations is the structural change ín the international politics of East Asia
occasioned by the end of the Cold Wa r. This change has been slow in un-
folding , but its impact is extensive , and it has Ïl ot yet run its course. The
change resulting from the end of the Cold War has been far less dramatic or
readily visible in Asia than in Europe , which is perhaps why it has not re-
ceived much attention in the Asian context. No "ßerlin Wall" came down ,
the communist parties of China , North Korea , and 'Vietnam did not falll
from power, and no recon且guration of alliances took place. Nevertheless
the impact of the loosening of the shackles imposed by the Cold War in Asia
has been profound. It has led to a repositioning of the regional great pow-
ers and has allowed for an intensification of economíc development in mo st
 SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 16 3

of the East Asian countries , especially China. This in turn has helped change
the international and regional economies and possibly the regional and in-
ternational balance of power. In one sense , the American predominance of
power has been enhanced , but in another , the American capacity to deter-
mine outcomes has been weakened. 5
The collapse of the Soviet Union also pointed up the bankruptcy of the
Soviet (or communist/socialist) economic model and paved the way for
intensi且cation of the Chinese embrace of globalization. As elsewhere , glob-
alization had the paradoxical effect of encouraging the development of re-
gional economic grouping~， while at the same time bringing about a yearn-
ing to redefine more local or national identities. Coupled with the changes
in the international political system , the countries of East Asia have been
engaged in new attempts to redefine their domestic , regional , and interna-
tional identities. Thus a new national assertiveness is evident in South Korea ,
as well as in China and ]apan. Each of the three may be seen to be reacting to
these changes in accordance with its own particular domestic and external
Cl rcumstances.
The problem in the case of China and ]apan is that their respective
nationalist resurgences are developing with the other cast as the putative
adversary. Furthermore , China and ]apan do not have experience of con-
ducting relations with each on the basis of equality. Before the advent of Eu-
ropeans in East Asia , China was accepted as superior, even though ]apan
was fully independent. Following the modernization of ]apan after the Meji
Restoration of 1868 , the tables were turned and ]apan became the superior
power, as attested by its defeat of China in 1895. N otwithstanding its de-
feat in 1945 , ]apan soon began to see itself as superior once again when its
economy rose from the ashes of defeat to become in due course second in
the world only to the United States. It was not until recent years that the rise
of China changed that perception , meaning that for the first time in their re-
spective histories , the two major powers have to conduct relations when
neither is prepared to defer to the other. Moreover, the two sides have little
if any experience in discussing the management of their strategic relations
in depth. Neither appears to take into account the national security inter-
ests of the. other, and there are no means in place for their leaders to meet
on a r
工 64 SECURITY STUDIES

threaten regional stability in an area of its abiding security and commercial

mterests.
This chapter first outlines the depth and far-reaching character of the
economic interdependence of the two countries , before going on to explore
further how their relationship has been affected by the end of the Cold War.
It then considers the specific issues on which the divide between the two has
deepened and concludes with a discussion of the strategic agenda that must
be addressed if the two are to narrow their differences and reduce the risk
of a new confrontation between them that could threaten the stability of the
region as a whole.

Economic Interdependence

China's leaders have long claimed that the Sino-]apanese economies

are highly complementary. ]apan, with its resource-poor advanced high-
tech economy, it is argued , should find a natural partner in China , with its
resource-rich , more backward , but developing economy. Indeed , it would
seem that Chinese expectations have at last begun to bear fruit , because
]apan emerged in the I990S as China's greatesttrading partner , and China
in the 2000S as the biggest for ]apan, surpassing the United States. The
value of their mutual trade , according to Chinese figures , grew from around
$I2 billion in I990 to $83 bi1l ion in 2000 and $工 68 billion in 2004 (the
]apanese figure is $江 4 billion , because it also includes Hong Kong) , when
it accounted for more than 22 percent of China's and 20 percent of ]apan's
total trade. Paralleling this has been a corresponding growth in ]apanese in-
vestment in China. After being cautious in the I980s , ]apanese companies
rapidly increased their investment in China in the I990s. Again according
to Chinese figures , ]apanese investment , which in I 99 I totaled $ 579 million ,
reached $3.2 billion in I998. By the end of the year 2000 , there were 20 ,34 0
]apanese direct investment projects in China , with a total agreed investment
of $38.6 billion and actual investment of $28.2 billion. ]apanese figures put
the accumulated investment at the end of 2003 at a total of nearly $40 billion.
la--TSFG

By the late I990s , China ranked second only to the United States as a target
for ]apanese investment. 7
This is significant, because foreign direct investment (FDI) is often taken
革咱gaa

as a criterion for assessing economic interdependence (or mutual depen-

dence). Indeed , in this case , the point has been reached where some ]apanes e
fear that ]apanese industry is being "hollowed out" because of the tiansfer
of so much manufacturing clpacity to China. Closer economic relations , of
course , can also give rise to new forms of dispute , as well as being a sign of
greater cooperation. Sino-]apanese economic relations have indeed given
 SINO- .T APANESE RELATIONS 工 65

rise to new sources of friction. But economic disputes are more amenable
to settlement than most others. Thus despite their so-called tariff war both
sides managed to settle their differences over Chinese exports of a particu-
lar kind of mushroom , despite thevigorous opposition of Japan's agricul-
turallobby. 8
The deepening economic relationship has been matched by increasing in-
teractions between the two peoples. In 2004 , more than 3.3 millionJapanese
tourists visited China and more than 577 ,000 Chinese visited Japan. Such
visits have grown dramatically in the past few years. For example , both
figures marked increases of.over 35 percent over the previous yea r. 9 Educa-
tional exchanges have also risen signi且cantly. In 2003 , some 巧， 000 Japanese
studied in China and more than 70 ,000 Chinese students were registered at
Japanese institutions of tertiary education. The latter accounted for 64.7 per-
cent of foreign students inJapan. Beyond that, there are more than 220 sister-
city relationships between the two countries and an expanding number of
NGOs working on a variety of topics and issues .i n bilateral relations. 10
The Chinese cliché that "economics are hot and politics are cold" in their
relations with Japan contains much truth. The economic and social inter-
actions between the two sides have been increasing rapidly, especially since
2000. But these have led neither to noticeable improvements in political re-
lations between the two sets of leaders nor to better perceptions of each
other by Chinese and Japanese. There is little to suggest that particular con-
stituencies have developed in either country that press for protecting the
Sino-Japanese relationship. Those in both countries who have spoken in fa-
vor of pursuing a new course so as not to alienate their powerful neighbor
have been effectively silenced on that score by the strength of apparently na-
tionalistic sentiments. Thus Katutaro Kitashiro , head of the Japan Associa-
tion of Corporate Executives , publicly called on Prime Minister J unichir"o
Koizumi to refrain from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine , a Shinto shrine in
Tokyo that commemorates Japan's war dead , which is controversial because
a number of prominent war criminals are among those enshrined there , as
did Yotaro Kobayashi , chairman of Fuji Xerox Co. But they found them-
selves without support from fellow businessmen when they were assailed
in the press and even sub
r66 SECURITY STUDIES

Ministry, ]apanese 0面cial Development Assistance (ODA) to China came

to over 5.4 trillion yen, or "more than half of all bilateral assistance" given
by OECD countries. 13 However, the Chinese side tended to regard the ODA
as something to which it was entitled as a form of war reparations , and
in any case , it was aid from which ]apanese business benefited by being
awarded contracts for many of the projects. For their part, the ]apanese
complained that the Chinese government withheld the true extent of this aid
from its people. It was only following the fence-mending visit of Premier
Zhu Rongji in 2000 that the Chinese began to make the 且gures indicating
the true magnitude of the aid from ]apan publicly available.
Since I995 , ]apanese ODA has reflected another dimension of the inter-
dependence of the two countries that underscores elements of concern
rather than cordiality. ]apanese ODA is no longer aimed at promoting eco-
nomic development as ~uch， but has been retargeted to address environ-
mental problems and poverty alleviation. The former stem from ]apanese
worries about acid rain and dust blown in from China , and the latter
reflects ]apanese anxieties about potential social instability in China that
could also be damaging to ]apan.
To be sure , the economic interdependence between China and ]apan is
crucially important to the relationship as a whòle , and the two countries'
leaders are particularly conscious of its beneficial significance. It also en-
sures that both sides can point to underlying positive value in the relation-
ship. Arguably, the economic interdependence acts as a constraint against
allowing relations to deteriorate unduly. But so far there is little evidence of
these considerations spilling over into other aspects of their relations. Thus ,
although there are arrangements for military exchanges and security con-
sultations , there is no sign that these have led to serious discussions about
the management of security in the region. More indicative of the nature of
the relationship is the complaint by a leading 0面cial of the ]apan Center for
International Exchange that there is a "huge lacuna" in the shape of the ab-
sence of a system of cooperation involving China and ]apan, in particular,
and , to a lesser extent, China and the United States. 14

The Post-Cold War Context

The military threat posed by the Soviet Union to China and ]apan
ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in I99 I. The U.S.-]apan alliance
was also cast in a new and ambiguous light, especially as ]apanese and
American security interests were no longer as closely congruent as before.
Indeed , it was possible to argue that as far as China was concerned , ]apan
faced the dilemma of either being "entrapped" or "abandoned" by the
United States, on whom its security depended. 15
 SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS r67

Evidence of the fear of being entrapped into a hostile policy of isolating

China appeared soon after the Tiananmen massacre. ]apan was the 且rst of
the Western allies both to resume loans and to send an incumbent head
of government to visit China after the Tiananmen massacre. The fear of
"abandonment" was evident in reactions to the "]apan bypassing" prac-
ticed by President Bill Clinton in the course of his visit to China in I998.16
As seen from China , the U.S.-]apan Security Alliance was acceptable if it did
indeed keep the cork in the bottle of ]apan's military potential , but it was
quite a different matter if the alliance were to serve the purpose of co-opting
]apan into becoming an ac~ive partner in American regional security objec-
tives. 17 This was precisely what some in China suspected as a result of the
I996 agreement on new guidelines for U.S.-]apan defense cooperation and
of ]apan's commitment to participate in research into so-called theater mis-
sile defense (TMD).18 If successf时， TMD would be able to nullify the Chi-
nese missile threat to Taiwan and thereby deny Beijing what it sees as the
only credible means of preventing Taiwan from pursuing the path of inde-
pendence~ The fact that the ]apanese have been vague about the geograph-
ical applicability of the new guidelines of their military cooperation with the
United States has only stoked Chinese fears that ]apan still seeks to exercise
influence over the fate of Taiwan , which it ruled for fìfty years until I945 .19
These Chinese fears were apparently confìrmed by the agreement between
]apan and the United States of February 2005 , which specifìcally identifìed
the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem as among the twelve listed
strategic objectives of the two allies. 20
More broadly, froma strategic perspective , the end of the Cold War
brought to light fundamental problems in the place that ]apan and China
each envisioned the other occupying in the region and in the wider world.
Most ]apanese saw their alliance with the United States as central to their
strategic security into the inde且nite future. Accordingly, they implicitly or
explicitly accepted a version of Pax Americana. That ranged in ]apanese
thinking from a vision of America as the provider of hegemonic stability to
a vision of a more liberal order centered on free trade and the promotion of
democracy. Moreover , the security alliance with the United States was seen
as central both to r
工 68 SECURITY STUDIES

have made their preference for a multipolar world order, in which their re-
lations with other important countries are conducted through partnerships
of different kinds , abundantly clear. These partnerships are to be buttressed
by dialogues about security and consultations about economic exchanges
conducted in different multilateral fora. While they accept the basics of a
liberal order, provided that it is confìned to the promotion of free trade in
the interests of "peace and development ," China's leaders reject intrusive
promotion of democracy. The bottom line is the preservation of Communist
Party rule.
The end of the Cold War also had a major impact on the domestic poli-
tics of the two great neighbors , which in turn accentuated the divisions be-
tween them. First , the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the concomi-
tant collapse of the communist economic system as a viable alternative to
capitalism provoked profound changes in the way both the Chinese and
]apanese political elites positioned themselves at home. Once Deng Xiao-
ping had prevailed over his more orthodox or leftist colleagues after the
Tiananmen disaster, the opening to the international economy and the em-
phasis on market-led rapid economic growth quickly undermined what sup-
port remained for the command economy.21 The leadership sought to
strengthen its legitimacy by reaching out for thè support of the people by
launching a two-year campaign of "patriotic education," beginning in 1993.
In contrast to the campaigns of previous years , this one was notable for the
exclusion of socialist themes. Instead , it painted the Communist Party as
the savior of the nation in the war against ]apan, after which it was able to
consolidate Chinese unity.22
In ]apan , the end of the Cold War led to the effective demise of the op-
position Socialist Party and with itof the institutionalized opposition to the
alliance with the United States and the main base of support for the com-
mitment to the policies of peace and opposition to reforming the peace
Article 9 of the ]apanese constitution. By default , the center of gravity in
]apanese politics shifted to the right. 23 If the revival of nationalistic senti-
ments in China identi且ed ]apan as the unreconstructed "other," the new na-
tional assertiveness in ]apan was no longer willing to accept the diplomatic
deference to China associated with the "friendship diplomacy" of the 1970S
and 1980s.
Secon
 SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS r69

This was deemed essential to the encouragement of a more peaceable re-

gional and international environment in which to concentrate on the main
task of domestic economic development. Despite the bursting of its specu-
lative economic bubble and the onset of what was to be a ten-year-long pe-
riod of economic stagnation , ]apan nevertheless found that the constraints
of its alliance with the United States had loosened to the extent that it had
to fashion new foreign policies. For example , it nòw had to deal with Moscow
independently of the United States , and it played an independent role in
helping to fashion a peaceful settlement in Cambodia. Indeed , for the fÌ rst
time, ]apan actively participated in a UN peacekeeping operation by send-
ing a small contingent to Cambodia. 24 However, as a country that was not
used to fashioning independent foreign and strategic policies , ]apan soon
came under pressure for not contributing militarily to the fÌ rst Gulf War
in 1991 and for its q uietist response to the fÌ rst nuclear crisis with N orth
Korea in 1993 -94. 25 Nevertheless , it was at this point that ]apan began to
assert a claim to a permanent seat on the UN Security Counci1. 26
Whilemany ]apanese may have beenpersuaded that they should play a
more assertive international and regional role within the framework of the
alliance with the United States , many in Beijing demurred. They have been
greatly concerned by what they see as the emergence of ]apan as a more ac-
tive partner of the United States in the pursuit of American military strategy
in the region. At the same time , the Chinese have expressed their displeas-
ure at every ]apanese attempt to chart an independent role for their coun-
try. Thus even the participation of ]apanese Self-Defense Forces in non-
combat roles in UN peacekeeping operations has drawn criticism from
China. 27 However, it is not clear what role for ]apan would be acceptable
to China's leaders , other than remaining politically and strategically quies-
cent until such time as presumably it would be overshadowed by China. At
the same time , it is unclear what role ]apan's leaders expect a rising China
to play in the region and beyond.
It is clear that the division between the two political systems and the
ways in which they de fÌ ne their national identities continue to bedevil Sino-
]apanese relations. There is little or no sympathy and understanding on
either side for the expectations and aspirations of the ot
工 70 SECURITY STUDIES

]apanese in offìcial as well as private circles." He went to observe that the

"emotional content of this latter image offset the favorable images and , un-
der . . . [certain] circumstances became dominant in certain sectors , partic-
ularly among Chinese university students."29 Whiting also contrasted the
better informed and nuanced accounts of American society and politics that
were current in the Chinese media to the rather stereotyped writing that ap-
peared on ]apan. 30 That still applies today, as do his points about the sig-
nifìcance of the difference between the two political systems , particularly
how Chinese behavior exacerbates the problems between the tWQ countries
by overstressing the possibility of ]apan's return to militarism and the need
for perpetual Chinese vigilance. Above all , the high moral tone in which
Chinese leaders admonish their ]apanese counterparts to recall the past as
a guide to the future continues "to stand in contrast to the ]apanese pro-
clivity to live in the present with little interest in the past , particularly if it
reflects unfavorably on the nation."31
Newly assertive ]apan has little sympathy for the Chinese demand for
um且cation with Taiwan so as to complete the process of redressing past
humiliations and enable China once again to become the great power it
feels itself entitled to be by virtue of its history and circumstances. Similarly,
the Chinese have little appreciation for the desire of the ]apanese to modify
their foreign-imposed constitution , however innocuous the proposed change
may be. The Chinese offìcially blasted a draft for reforming the constitution
by ]apan's Liberal Democratic Party that basically did little more than
rea面rm the status quo of retaining an armed force for national defense ,
affìrming the right to collective self-defense , as well as to the use of force
when engaging in UN peacekeeping operations , while at the same time
maintaining the renunciation of war , the three non-nuclear principles (no
production , possession , or introduction of nuclear weapons into ]apan).
This was hardly a manifesto for radical nationalism , and it still had to face
the hurdles of gaining a two-thirds majority in parliament, plus a majority
in a nationwide referendum. It was not something that could be determined
by a small conclave meeting in secret. Yet on 16 February 2004 , the Chinese
Xinhua News Agency denounced the draft as "a signal that warr
 SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 工7 1

helped ]apan become an "economic power" and that "as a responsible

member of the East Asia community, it is in its own best interest as well as
that of the region that ]apan continue its pacifist policies." In other words ,
while China continues along the path of acquiring a modern military force ,
as. befits the great world power it is destined to be , ]apan should occupy a
lesser position.
Against this background , it is hardly surprising that the remaining legacy
of the Cold War in East Asia has not brought ]apan and China clos er to-
gether in finding means to address their differences. That legacy includes the
unresolved problems of Ko~ea and Taiwan and the continued rule of China ,
North Korea , and Vietnam by communist parties. Even though all of these
issues were transformed in the new era , none of them may be said to have
led to a closer understanding between China and ]apan. China was closely
involved in the formal negotiations affecting north-south relations in Korea
through the "two + two" arrangements (i.e. , the two Koreas , China , and
the United States) , and it did not respond positively to ]apanese (or even
Russian) attempts to Jom in the process. China meanwhile was active
behind the scenes both in supporting North Korea and facilitating the
American negotiations that led to the I994 framework agreement. Pri-
飞rately， Chinese diplomats made no secret of their expectation that a unified
Korea would come under China's influence at the expense of ]apan. 32 Nev-
ertheless , China and ]apan share certain basic interests in common in how
best to address the immediate problems raised by North Korea's nuclear
ambitions. Neither favorspolicies aimed at forcing a regime change , and
stillless do they like the idea of a possible military strike at suspected sites
of production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) in North Korea. Yet there is no sign of a coordinated approach , and
the two sides were embarrassed by an incident in which Chinese security
personnel burst into a ]apanese consulate in China's northeast in pursuit of
North Korean refugees. Although the matter was swiftly settled , it brought
to the fore differences in the importance that the two sides attach to hu-
manitarian values. The democratic transformation of Taiwan increased ]ap-
anese sympathy for the island , and the Chinese attempt at intimidation by
missile testing in I996 had the effect of intensifying popular ]apanese co
17 2 SECURITY STUDIES

The multilateral fora established within the region since the end of the
Cold War, such as APEC (Asia':'Pacific Economic Cooperation) and the ARF
(ASEANRegional Forum) , whose formation was very much assisted by Japan,
may have played some role in encouraging cooperation within the region ,
but they have done little to promote closer interactions between ]apan and
China. They have not served as vehicles for "rehabilitating" ]apan in Chí-
nese eyes , nor can the ]apanese be entirely satisfied with them as vehicles for
consolidating China as a good regional citizen. Indeed , when the financial
storm broke in Asia in 1997 , many in China blamed ]apan for having ear-
lier revalued its currency. Bilateral relations were hardly improved by China
receiving much praise , especially from the Americans , for refraining from
revaluing its currency, while ]apan received opprobrium , despite being the
largest international donor to the rescue packages and despite having its
proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund thwarted by the United
States. The lack of coordination between China and ]apan became manifest
when China turned down the invitation publicly offered by ]apan for it to
join the Group of Seven (or Eight) , then due to meet in ]apan. A prominent
member of a key think tank in Beijing told me that an important reason for
the Chinese refusal was that the invitation came from ]apan. 33 A degree of
rivalry is also evident between the two major powers in their approach to
the regional grouping of the ASEAN + Three (APT -the ten Southeast
Asian states , China , ]apan, and South Korea) that was formed in Decem-
ber 1997 , which serves to limit such progress that has been made toward
closer economic integration. A currency swap arrangement has been agreed
to , but it has yet to be tested. However , ]apan has resisted Chinese sugges-
tions that that the "Three" form a free trade agreement (FTA) , preferring
instead to form a bilateral one with South Korea. 34 Likewise , ]apan has
blocked the Chinese suggestion to form an East Asian community based on
the APT alone and has successfully urged that Australia and New Zealand
and perhaps others be invited toO. 35

Bilateral Differences: The Agenda Extended

In addition to the three long-standing problems in Sino-]apanese

relations-the treatment of the historical legacy of ]apanese invasion of
China; the Taiwan question; and the disputed sovereign claims to the
Diaoyu Dao /Sengaku Islands-more points of friction have been added.
These include disputes over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and related
drilling rights; ]apanese complaints about illegal Chinese surveys of watèrs
adjacent to ]apan (notably by a nuclear submarine); Chinese complaints
about ]apanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yakusuni Shrine; and
 SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 173

the eruption of violent anti-]apanese demonstrations in China , especially

targeted at ]apan's quest to become a permanent meinber of the UN Security
Counci l. No item on this long list of differences has approached a solution
and , arguably, their intensity has increased in the post-Cold War period.
Nevertheless , it has been argued on both sides that relations at the gov-
ernmentallevel have improved and that whenever problems have threatened
to disrupt relations , they have been dealt with fairly rapidly.36 However, as
noted , newissues of substance emerged in the 1990S associated with each
side's strategic worries about the other. Identifìcation of China as a poten-
tial external threat, fìrst made public in a ]apanese Defense White Paper in
1997 , was rea fiÌ rmed in ]apan's National Guidelines of 2005. Chinese se-
curity concerns about ]apan have been raised by the reinvigoration of the
U.S.-]apan Security Treaty, particularly due to ]apan's ambig山ty about its
application to Taiwan and ]apan's participation in America's TMD pro-
gram , which was followed in February 2005 by an explicit mention of the
Taiwan issue in a major security statement by the American and ]apanese
foreign and defense ministers. The Chinese government also claims to see
the threat of incipient militarism in ]apanese proposals to redefìne ]apan's
peace constltutlO n.
It will be seen that uncertainties in each country about the strategic
signi且cance of the perceived growing military clout of the other are the
common thread to the problems of the 1990s. This is what gives an edge to
Chinese criticisms of activities and statements by right-wing ]apanese politi-
cians , ministerial approvalof ]apanese school textbooks that skate over the
excesses of ]apanese aggression , and disparaging remarks by ministers and
visits by them to the Yasukuni Shrine. In the Chinese view, these illustrate
]apan's failure to come to terms with its past history of aggression and war
crimes and demonstrate that it is not legitimate for ]apan to acquire force
projection capabilities. That is regarded as all the more pressing in view of
]apan's new commitments in relations with the United States. At the same
time , ]apanese complaints indicate concern about China's growing ability
to project force in the adjacent seas and its readiness to engage in coercive
diplomacy, especially with regard to Taiwan. Additionally, there is concern
that di面culties in ma
I74 SECURITY STUDIES

there was a saying in China that those who had studied inJapan (during the
1890S-1920S) returned as revolutionaries , while those who.returned from
studyin the United States were reformers. Even those who had not visited
Japan , like Mao and Deng , nevertheless had a high respect for the capa-
bilities and achievements of the Japanese , notwithstanding the war of
aggression. But the subsequent generations of leaders in China , headed 且rst
by Jiang Zemin and later by Hu Jintao , had no such experience. On the
Japanese side , the postwar leaders who had intimate knowledge of China or
were personally affected by a sense of war guilt , such as those who normal-
ized relations with Beijing in 197 鸟 have long since passed on. The current
Japanese leadership lacks intimate experience of World War II , which ended
some sixty years ago , and is more likely to be affected by the experience of
Japan's postwar privations. As a result , the lack of institutionalized patterns
of exchange is no longer compensated for by the kind of personal links
that matter so much in East Asian political cultures , especially in China and
Japan.
Some of these problems became evident in the course of Jiang Zemin's
visit to Japan in 1998. Coming hot on the heels of President Clinton's visit
to China , which was seen at the time as ele飞rating China's importance to the
United States as a potential strategic partner, and shortly after the Japanese
prime minister had issued a fulsome apology to South Korea's President
Kim Dae Jung , Jiang expected to find a more contrite Japan as a result of
the improvement of China's relative position. But not only did the Japanese
prime minister fail to issue the expected apology, he also refused to follow
Clinton in subscribing to the latter's "three n.o's policy": no support for
"one China , one Taiwan"; no support for Taiwanese independence; and no
support for Taiwanese representation in international organizations where
sovereignty is a condition of membership.38 Jiang reacted by publicly hec-
toring the Japanese , including the emperor, on their failure to atone prop-
erly for their past misdeeds. This backfired to such an extent that the fol-
lowing year, Premier Zhu Rongji visited Tokyo and struck a much more
conciliatory note. Thereafter , China's leaders were more circumspect in rais-
ing the question of historical guilt during their visits to Japan and seemed to
use the issue less as a lever to extract concessions from J
 SINO-]APANESE RELATIONS 175

up the historical issue too far , lest it spark a nationalist reaction in ]apan.
But this did not mean that the issue would not be used for domestic purposes
at home.
The generational divide is more evident among the young. In China , the
overwhelming evidence is that younger people havea negative image of
]apan, which may largely be derived from the one-sided accounts of the
o面cially inspired media. 39 In polls published iri. Zhongguo Qingnian Bao
(China Youth Daily) in December 1996 and the ]apanese newspaper Asahi
Shimbun in ]une 1997, respectively, roughly 41 percent of the Chinese re-
spondents either had "bad'~ impressions of or "disliked" ]apan, while from
10 to 17 percent had a "good" impression or "liked" ]apan; 44 percent inthe
one poll and 35 percent in the other had neither good nor bad feelings about
the country.40 As far as ]apan is concerned , public opinion swung decisively
away from a very positive attitude toward China in the 1980s to a more neg-
ative one in the 1990s. For most of the 1980s, more than 70 percent of re-
spondents to official polls had "friendly feelings" toward China , with around
20 percent claiming "unfriendly feelings." By 1996, the ratio for the fìrst time
showed that more had unfriendly feelings toward China by a margin of
51: 45 percent. 41 Arguably, the latter polls may have reflected responses to
the 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait, when China launched missiles off the
coast of Taiwan. However, polls conducted some 且ve years later , in 2002 , on
the eve of the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions reflected similarly negative views of each other, despite the more upbeat
celebratory messages of the two countries' respective leaders: 41 percent of
]apanese respondents saìd relations were going well , as opposed to 46 per-
cent who thought not; 50 percent of Chinese respondents said relations were
not good , while only 22 percent were of the opinion that they were fìne 卢
Perhaps more significant is the impression of leading scholars on foreign
relations in each country that, generally speaking , there was a lack of inter-
est by the young especially in the culture and contemporary developments
of the other country. By comparison , the younger generation in each coun-
try was much more interested in developments in the United States. Al-
though they conceded that the products of each country were being bought
more extensively in the other, they nevertheless held th
17 6 SECURITY STUDIES

tual development is concerned is that about 82 percent of the Chinese stu-

dents in America in 1995 (32 ， 5 口.) were graduate students. Only about
35 percent of all foreign students in Japan were graduate students , and the
Chinese proportion would have been even less. Moreover, there were 9 ,228
Chinese students carrying out research in the United States , as compared
with only 317 in Japan. 44 There can be little doubt as to the intellectual
dominance of the United States in this regard. This not only il1 ustrates an
important dimension of American "soft power" but also suggests that, de-
spite the animosity felt toward the United States on nationalistic grounds in
China , or indeed in Japan, there is a fundamental reserve in both countries
of understanding of and curiosity about America that is lacking in either
country with regard to the other.
The passing of the Cold 币Tar has also given rise to a new national as-
sertiveness in both China and Japan as each seeks to establish a more active
and independent national identity now that the bipolar constraints have
been removed. Japanese self-con且dence may have become muted after the
bursting of Japan's bubble economy in the early 1990S and its apparent in-
capacity to break out of the sterile impasse that gripped both its economy
and its politics. Nevertheless , Japan has initiated a number of important
diplomatic and political moves that are indicative of a more internationally
active country. These have been accompanied by debates about foreign and
defense policy that not only call for more political activism but raise the
prospect of a more fundamental change in Japan's international identity.
China's leaders did not challenge Japan's key role in the launching of re-
gional multilateral consultative organizations , notably the APEC and the
ARF. The PRC was pleased to joinboth, even though it recognized that one
of the objectives of the organizers was to involve China , in the hope that it
would come to accept the restraining norms implicit in regional cooperation.
Doubtless , China's leaders saw positive benefits for them in earning good-
will by joining these essentially consultative organizations , which could not
commit China to do things that it did not wish to do. However , nearly all
of Japan's other initiatives have elicited varying degrees of hostility or skep-
ticism from China. The Chinese , for example , were not happy with the send-
ing of Japanese mineswee
 SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS I77

vetoed , the ]apanese proposal to establish a combined force against piracy

in the South China Sea.
As we have seen , the new national assertiveness has separately led each
side to take a harsher view of the othe r. In the case of China , the officially in-
spired ~ducation in patriotism has emphasized an interpretation of modern
history that treats China as a victim , with the concluding and unresolved
chapter focusing on ]apanese aggression. As a consequence , indignation
about ]apan and its alleged failure to express an adequate apology is central
to the newfound nationalist ideology of the young , which in turn constrains
the Chinese leadership. Hav:ing stoked the 且res of youthful nationalism as a
unifying element at a time when communist ideology has lost meaning
and support , China's leaders are now fearful of allowing it full expression.
Conscious of instances in modern Chinese history when student demonstra-
tions against alleged humiliations by foreigners ended up being turned
against the incumbent government for being too pusillanimous , China's lead-
ers in the I990S have deliberately prevented students from demonstrating
against ]apan. But as several prominent Chinese scholars and advisors on
foreign affairs pointed out to me in ]uly 2000 , the leadership in Beijing has
been "too weak" to give a proper lead on the issue. They argue that insufι
cient recognition is given to ]apan's accomplishments in developing its econ-
omy and its technology to extremely high levels. A few also deplored the way
in which the strength of ]apanese feelings about adherence to peace and pur-
suit of a role as a civilian power was ignored in the 0面cial media. At least one
professed admiration for ]apan as a democracy. A debate was begun at one
point in China as to whether the time has come to adopt a more conciliatory
approach to ]apan. It was argued that the balance of power is shifting in
China's favor , partly because of the continued growth of the Chinese econ-
omy and partly because of China's newfound partnership with the United
States in the "war on terro r." Additionally, it was suggested that continued
enmity with ]apan limits China's capacity to utilize to the full the new ac-
tivism it has developed in the region's multilateral fora. Moreover, better re-
lations with ]apan would contribute significantly to the regional stability
China's leaders deem necessary to continuing the economic growth that they
regard as fundamenta
17 8 SECURITY STUDIES

which the Chinese seize on remarks by unrepresentative right-wingers. 46 But

more recently, some intellectuals representing mainstream co p. servatives and
more central opinion have written a controversial new textbook that seeks to
fìnd pride in modern Japanese history and see virtue in the Meiji Restoration
of I868 and in the wars against China in I89 5 and against Russia in I9 0 5 .47
Such views , of course , still further widen the gap separating Japan from
China and other neighboring countries , notably South Korea.
Sino-Japanese relations hit a new low in April 2005 , when young Chi-
nese demonstrators in several Chinese cities went on the rampage against
Japanese government and private properties. These were instigated in part
by outrage at a new round of textbooks approved by the Japanese Ministry
of Education that were said to whitewash Japan's war record and , more im-
portant , by an attempt to put an end to Japan's bid for a permanent seat on
the UN Security Council. Western observers noted that the Chinese author-
ities approved of the demonstrations and the security forces stood aside as
the youths attacked the property卢 Premier Wen Jiabao , who was in lndia
at the time , made the Chinese 0面cial position perfectly clear when he noted
that Japan was not qualifìed to be a permanent member of the Security
Council until it had come to terms with its past aggression. 49 The Japanese
side did not get the apology or the compensation it sought , but the local au-
thorities where Japanese property had been damaged quietly carried out re-
pairs. The Chinese security organizations then took stringent steps to stop
further anti-Japanese demonstrations. 50 If the intention of China's leaders
was to demonstrate the strength of popular feelings as a means of strength-
ening their opposition to Japan's UN bid, they may have succeeded. But the
episode damaged the calm, rational diplomatic image that China had been
seeking to demonstrate to its neighbors and others. Either the authorities
had deliberately stirred up the mob , or they were afraid of what the popu-
lar reaction might be if they tried to control it. Neither account put China
in a good light. For their part, most Japanese were shocked by the depth of
animosity on display, and Japan's leading China specialists thought that
only divisions within the leadership could account for the episode. 51

Some Strategic Conundrums

Currently, the fact that none of the protagonists anticipates military

conflict between China and Japan is only possible because of the role played
by the United States. The Am erican security alliance with Japan assures the
Chinese that the cork remains in the bottle of Japanese "militarism." How-
ever, as realists , China's leaders may believe , like Kenneth Waltz , that it 15
only a question of time before Japan is driven by the logic of international
 SINO-]APANESE RELATIONS I79

anarchy to become a military power commensurate with its economic power.

But China's more immediate security concern regarding ]apan is no飞 that it
w i11 emerge any time soon as an independent military power in its own right ,
but rather that it will play a more active security role within the region in sup-
port of the United States.
That raises several problems for Chinese strategists. They object to what
they see as "American hegemonism ," which they perceive as seeking to sub-
vert communist rule at home and contain China's rise abroad. From this
perspective , ]apan has become the partner of the United States in establish-
ing a ring of containment. But any attempt to weaken the alliance risks ac-
celerating the rise of ]apan as an independent military power that could
project force throughout maritime East Asia long before China could do so.
Meanwhile , in attempting to demonstrate su面cient military strength to
exercise coercive diplomacy to intimidate those who favor Taiwan's inde-
pendence , the Chinese have unwittingly provoked a security dilemma with
]apan. Chinese missile exercises against Taiwan in I995 and I996 were
instrumental in changing the image of China in ]apan, and China's fulmi-
nations against any form of missile defense as undermining their deterrent
drove home to many ]apanese that , because of the American bases in ]apan,
they were a target for China's missiles. That was intensified by the shock of
North Korea's testing of a Taepodong missile in I998 that splashed into the
sea after passing over the central island of ]apan. As a result , there is greater
support in ]apan for participating in American research toward the devel-
opment of a TMD system.
Whether or not the continued presence of American military bases in
]apan is sustainable , China's leaders have to think through how a regional
order can be made stable. Essentially, three options present themselves. The
first is to 且nd a way of establishing a cooperative security framework that
accepts the U.S.-]apan alliance as an enduring structure. The second involves
coming to terms with the prospect of ]apan as a "normal" country that will
develop into a military power free of the constraints of the American alliance.
The third would result in a rising China that exercises dominance in the
region with the acquiescence of a quiescent ]apan and a tolerant America.
Each one would involve considerable adjustments and mature leadership by
th
工 80 SECURITY STUDIES

campaigns of patriotic education. It would call for a leadership that could

succeed in promoting the goals and values of cooperative security, as against
the realism that has dominated Chinese foreign policy. It would also call for
a patriotism that ceased to portray the country as a victim of modern his-
tory with an unlimited sense of entitlement from the outside world. It is ,
however , an option that has gained strength from the new alignment with
the United States as partners in the war on terror, which in the wake of the
Iraq War has been extended to North Korea. This has provided an oppor-
tunity for China to take the lead in working with ]apan (alongside South
Korea) to persuade the Bush administration to adopt a diplomatic as op-
posed to a military appro~ch to the North Korean problem. In other words ,
this option does not condemn China to passivity.
The second option requires even greater adjustment. The removal of
American forces from ]apan would automatically bring about the multipolar
order that China's leaders claim to want. But it would also usher in a balance
of power system in the region in which]apan would become a fu l1-fledged in-
dependent military power. That would require a transformation of Chinese
views of ]apan that at present seems almost inconceivable. However, the
logic of realism requires the Chinese to think along these lines.
Lastly, the option of Pax Sinica as an alternative to the Pax Americana
assumes that China can overcome its massive domestic problems and carry
out political reform of su面cient depth as to make it acceptable and even
attractive to its neighbors. China's leaders would have to be able to offer
incentives and rewards to others rather than continue to make demands on
their own behalf. They would have to project their rise in terms of univer-
sal ideals and principles.
Even to lay out these alternatives is to show that for the immediate and
probably the foreseeable future , China has no alternative but to settle for
some version of the fìrst option. Indeed , the Chinese have 0面cially adopted
，〈已哺JdJFL

cooperative security as their new security concept. 52 It possible to charac-

terize Chinese debates about foreign policy as between those who look for-
和

ward to a China that will continue to reform economically, and ultimately

politically at home , and integrate more closely with the international econ-
omy abroad and those of a more conservative outlook who fear the dilution
of Communist
 SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 工 8r

choices. On the one hand , there are those who argue that ]apan should be-
come more of a "normal" country that lends greater support to American
military campaigns based on the right of collective self-defense. On the
other hand , there are those who want ]apan to ~merge as a global "civilian"
power and a model and contributor to less-developed countries that pro-
motes human rights , participates in UN peacekeeping operations , and con-
tributes to improving the environment. If the former see the alliance with
the United States in security terms , the latter understand it in terms of so-
cial relations , friendship , and commitment to common values. The "civil-
ianists" also place the alli.ance in a balance with a range of multilateral
institutions , such as the United Nations , the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration , and so on. The crucial difference between the two is their attitude
toward China. The "civilianists" favor the cultivation of friendly relations
and the promotion of greater social and intellectuallinks between the two
countries. The "normalists" are more wary of the rise of China and assert
the need to contain it. 53

Con c/usions

Notwithstanding the close and signi且cant economic interdependence

between China and ]apan, there is no corresponding spillover into social ,
intellectual, or security engagement. The result is that the two societies have
not come closer together. The recurring disputes about school history text-
books , such as those that eme r: ged in the spring of 2001 and again in April
2005 , are not caused by ignorance of each other's processes of decision-
making on the issue. They stem from a failure of empathy on both sides. To
be sure , there is a particular onus on the ]apanese to stop hiding behind le-
galistic ramparts and confront aspects of their terrible past more openly and
offer redress to the many survivors whose wartime suffering at the hands of
the ]apanese has barely been acknowledged. At the same time , the Chinese
should stop using the issue in the pursuit of short-term political gains. The
tremendous expansion of economic exchanges has not led to the emergence
of constituencies that have publicly taken a stance in favor of promoting
closer ties and against manifestations that evoke hostility toward the other
country. As we have seen, the contrary seems to be happening: recent trends
seem to be driving the two countries farther apart. Fortunately, the two sets
of executives appreciate the dangers inherent in a souring of relations and
take steps to mend relations whenever they seem in danger of rupture. But
in itself that is not enough to build a sound structure for the development
of stable relations in the longer term.
The thinness of the Sino-]apanese relationship places an enormous
premium upon the United States as the ultimate guarantor of security in
182 SECURITY STUDIES

Northeast Asia. Perhaps it is a premium that is greater than either side would
like. Given the uncertainties of U.S. policy and policy-making , especially
between one administration and the next, neither Beijing nor Tokyo can be
confìdent that the United States will be able to strike a reasoned and con-
sistent balance in its cultivation of relations between these two giants of
East Asia.
The growing assertion of nationalist sentiments in both countries con-
tinually threatens to distort each side's cultivation of relations with the
United States. Even if the spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry can
assure all concerned that his country endorses good relations between ]a-
pan and the United States , as we have seen, many of his more nationalistically
minded fellow citizens (including members of the foreign policy elite) see
things differently.54 Meanwhile , there is an increase in ]apanese restiveness
about the presence of American troops in their country. In the absence of a
clear explanation by the American executive about the moral and strategic
principles served by the alliance with ]apan and the stationing of troops
there , it is entirely possible that the support of the American public for con-
tinuing to place them there may erode in the not too distant future.
Traditional concerns about interstate security and about the balance of
power may have been overshadowed by the new security agenda of the
post-Cold War era. Much emphasis is now given to war against terror,
the economic problems of globalization , the problems of intrastate conflict ,
the collapse of some states and cross-border issues of smuggling of people
and drugs by transnational criminal gangs , issues of health , the environ-
ment , and so on. But the traditional security issues have not gone away. The
failure of the deepening economic interdependence between the two great-
est powers of East Asia to bring about closer relations inother dimensions
of their relations has had effects that neither could regard as desirable. To
cite but one example , the absence of proper strategic understandings
between ]apan and China constrains them to depend on the security frame-
work provided by the United States. That necessarily reduces their capacity
to develop the independence to which each side claims to aspire.

Notes

1. This chapter is based ona paper that was originally prepared for a conference
in the summer of 200 1. It has been brought up to date and has benefìted from hav-
ing its original series of interviews conducted in Beijing and Tokyo in 2000 aug-
mented by follow-up interviews four years late r.
2. For an analysis of theories of interdependence, see Robert O. Keohane and
]oseph Nye , Power and Interdependence: World Po /i tics in 1协lsition (Boston:
Little , Brown , 1997).
 SINO JAPANESE RELATIONS
<
18 号

3. For an analysis of this key concept with specific reference to Sino-Japanese

relatìons , see Allen S. Whìting , China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: Unìversìty of California
Press , 1989).
4. First suggested by ìnterviews conducted in Beijing and Tokyo in the summers
of 丰 000 and then affìrmed in 2004.
5. For an excellent overview that attempts to explain developments by using
International Relations theory, see Michael Mastanduno , "Incomplete Hegemony
and Security Order in the Asia-Pacifìc ," in America .Unril项 led: The Future of the
Balance of Power , ed. G. ]ohn Ikenberry (Ithaca , N. Y.: Cornell University Press ,
2002) , 181-210. See also Michael Yahuda , The International Politics of the Asia-
pacifìc (New Yo r. k: RoutledgeCurzon ，二 004) ， ch. 8, "the new structure ofinterna-
tional relations ," 20 9 - 4 工-
6. See , e.g. , Challenges for China-Japan Cooperation , ed. Kokubun Ryosei
(Tokyo: ]apan Center for International Exchange , 1998) , and Ming Zhang and
Ronald N. Montaperto , A Triad of Another Kind: The United States , China , and
Japan (Basingstoke , Eng.: Macmillan , 1999).
7. The Chinese fìgures are drawn from the web site of the Chinese Ministry of
Foreìgn Affairs (www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng).An offìcìal Chinese source was preferred ,
as presumably it would have no interest ìn exaggeratìng the contribution of ]apan to
China's economìc development. For the Japanese , see David Pillìng , "China Sur-
passes US as Japan's Top Trading Partner," Financial Times , 26 ]anuary 2005.
8. For an account of Sino-]apanese economic rìvalry, see Reinhard Drifte , Japan's
Security Relations with China Since I989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?
(New York: RoutledgeCurzon , 2003) , 148-5 工.
9. ]apan's National Tourìst Organization , www.tourism.jp/englìsh/statìstics.
工 o. Brad Glosserman , "Troublìng Signs for ]apan-China Relations ," Pac Net 37
(2 September 2004): 1-2.
1 1. David Ibison , "Head of Japan Business Group Sides with ]apan," Financial
Times， 巧 November 2004; "Koizumi Should Also Fight Terror at Home ," editorial ,
Asahi Shimbun , 14 January 2005.
12. Peter Hays Grìes , "Chìna's ‘ New Thinkìng' on Japan ," China Quarterly ,
no. 184 (December 2005): 831-50.
13. ]apanese Mìnistry of Foreìgn Affairs , www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda /r egion/
e_asìa /c hina-2.html (accessed 2 October 2005).
14. 币Tada Jun , "Applyìng Track Two to China-]apan-U. S. Relations ," in Chal-
lenges for China-Japan Cooperation , ed. Kökubun , 170.
15. Fodurtherdi
I84 SECURITY STUDIES

Cooperation in East Asia? ed. Peter Drysdale and Dong Dong Zhang (Canberra:
Australia-Japan Research Centre , 2000) ， 95 一口 4.
I9. The of且cial web site of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs still lists
Taiwan as one of the speci:fic issues troubling relations with Japan.
20. U. S. Department of State , "Joint Statement of the U. S.-Japan Security Con-
sultative Committee ，"工 9 February 2005 , www.state.govlr/pa/prs/psho05/42490
.htm (accessed 2 October 2005).
2 I. For an account, see Joseph Fewsmith , China Since Tiananmen (New York:
Cambridge University Press , 2000).
22. Suisheng Zhao , A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern
Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press , 2004) , 209-47. See also
Peter Hays Gries , China 云 New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berke-
ley: University of California Press , 2004).
23. Michael J. Green, ]apan 云 Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an
Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave , 200I) , 35 -75.
24. Ibid. ，工 7 2 -79.
之 5. Ibid. , 203 and I2 I.
26. Reinhard Drifte , ]apan 云 Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat:
A Matter of Pride or ]ustice (New York: St. Martin's Press , 2000).
27. See the account in ibid. , I66-70.
28. Whiting, China Eyes ]apan.
29. Ibid. , I9 5.
30. Ibid. , I89-90.
3 I. Ibid. ，工 87.
32. Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat in December I996 in Seoul.
33. Interview with a scholar in the Institute for Asia-Paci且c Studies , Chinese
Academy of Social Science (CASS) , July I996.
34. Interview with leading 0面cial in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs , July
200 4.
35. John Ryall , "East Asia Summit Expansion Bid May Feel Friction ," South
China Morning Post , 6 April 2005 , and To走yo Shimbun , "Agreement to Expand
Participants in East Asia Summit: Japan Aims at Containing China ," 7 May 2005.
36. Senior Chinese scholars and 0面cials whom 1 met in Beijing in July 2000
repeatedly made this point and cited the 工 998 visit to Japan by Jiang Zemin as a case
in point. They claimed that despite the adverse comments in the media , both
governments were satis:fied and important agreeme l1ts were sign~d. Furthermore ,
the exchange of prime ministerial visits in I999 and 2000 ensured that the public
perception corresponded to that of the two governments. The same point was re-
peated , albeit with some quali且cations ， by my interlocutors in Tokyo.
37. A point made by Japanese interviewees in both 2000 and 2004.
38. See "Clinton Publicly
 SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 工 85

Zhang (Canberra: Australia-]apan Research Centre , 2000) , 19-22. If anything , the

depth of feeling in the 1990S seemed to exceed that outlined in the careful account
in Whiting, China Eyes Japan , 66 -79.
40. Osaki Yuji , "China and ]apan in Paci且c Asia ," in Challenges for China-
Japan Cooperation , ed. Kokubun , citing Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth
Daily) , "6 December 1996, and Asahi Shimbun , 9 ]une 1997.
4 1. Osaki Yuji , in Challenges for China-Japan Cooperation , ed. Kokubun , 91-
92. The author points outthat China nevertheless fared reasonably well in compar-
ison to other countries and regions , such as the ASEAN and EU countries and South
Korea.
42. The polls were condu e.ted jointly by Asahi Shimbun and the Chinese Acad-
emy of Social Science in late August- mid September 2002. See the Asahi Shimbun
web site , www.asahi.com/english/international! K200209 2800228 .html (accessed
28 September 2002).
43. Author's interviews in ]uly and August 2000.
44. Wada ]un in Challenges for China-Japan Cooperation , ed. Kokubun , 178.
45. For the more liberal view, see Wu Xinbo , "U. S. Security Policy in Asia:
Implications for China-U. S. Relations ," Contemporary Southeast Asia 22 (2000):
479-97 , and for a more conservative view, see Chong Zi, "]apan Seeks Bigger Mil-
itary Role ," Beijing Review 46 , 7 (13 February 2003): II-12.
46. These were evident in the 1970s. See Wolf Mendl , Issues in Japan's China
Policy (London: Macmillan , for Royal Institute of International Affairs ，工 97 8 ) ，
99- 102 .
47. Tennichi Takahiko , "Debates on ]apan's Foreign Policy," in Challenges for
China-Japan Cooperation , ed. Kokubun , 84.
48. ]oseph Kahn , "Chinese Nationalism: Protests Carry a Risk ," New Yor走
Times， 工 5 April 200 5.
49. "Chinese Premier Hits Back at]apan ," BBC News , 12 Apri12005.
50. Mure Dickie , "Beijing Bid to Contain anti-]apanese Protests ," Financial
Times ， 工 5 April 200 5.
5 1. Bennett Richardson , "Anti ]apanese Protests May Signal Power Struggle ,"
Asia Times , 3 May 2005.
52. Xiong Guangkai, "The New Security Concept Initiated by China ," Interna-
tional Security Studies , no. 3 (2000): 1 - 5. For an evaluation , see my "Chinese
Dilemmas in Thinking About a Regional Security Architecture," Pacific Review 16,
2 (2003): 工 89- 206 .
53. Tennichi Takahiko in Challenges for China-Japan Cooperation , ed.
Kokubun , 77.
54. See Sun Yixi's brie且ng of 12 and 14 ]une 2001 , Beijing Review , no. 26
(June 18 , 2001): 工 o.
7 Reputation and the Security Dile仰na
CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY

Yong Deng

1ntroduction

The so-called "China threat theory" is essentially foreign attributions

to China of a harmful , destabilizing , and even pernicious international rep-
utation. Never before has the People's Republic of China (PRC) had to re-
spond to such persistent denigrations of its international character. Since
the mid 1990S , rebuttals of the idea that there is a China threat have per-
meated 0面cial rhetoric and the writings of academics and government-
a面liated analysts in China. Concern about the China threat theory has
motivated Beijing's foreign behavior, including its strategic choice , reactions
to India's nuclear proliferation, and approach to international institutions ,
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).l It has become a scholarly
consensus that contemporary Chinese foreign policy has countered its neg-
ative reputation through a commitment to building a cooperative , respon-
sible image in the international society.2
Allen Whiting's work suggests that replacing China's image as a "sick man
of Asia" with that of a nation standing up to Western powers fìgured promi-
nently in Mao's foreign policy decision-making. He has shown that Maoist
China's calculus of deterrence was characterized by its willingness to pay dis-
proportionate costs on the battlefìeld to achieve its political aims. Such a
demonstrated resolve helped avert the escalation of the Indochina conflict
to a full-scale war between China and the United States. 3 Similarly, in the fìeld
of international relations , how to establish a reputation for resolve and power
is the central concern of state actors in realism and deterrence theory. From
these perspectives , it is not immediately clear how refuting the China threat
theory contributes to contemporary China's security.
Contemporary Chinese concern about the China threat theory is both im-
portant and puzzling. Yet , while there is plenty of literature that examines the
 CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY r87

origins of and debates about the security challenges posed by rising Chinese
power,4 no comparable effort has been made to explore Chinese reactions.
This chapter seeks to fill that gap in the literature. To decipher Chinese sensi-
tivi町， I draw on the concept of security dilemma , but make two propositions
dissimilar to the standard realist expositions. First , states rely on each other's
reputed character to infer intentions and to determine treatment accordingly.
The intensity of the security dilemma confronted by the individual state , there-
fore , varies depending on its social , political reputation and international sta-
tus. Second, given the clear security stakes involved , the defamed state will be
motivated and may succeed .to legitimize its power by enhancing its interna-
tional recognition and acceptance. Hence , there is no reason to believe thatthe
security dilemma is ineluctable. In making these points , my concern is the in-
ternational politics after the Cold Wa r. In the world of American unipolarity
and great power peace , a state's threat reputation leads to social derogation
and out-group status , which in turn fuels its threat image. Intensifying threat
perception maximizes the security dilemma. Security-conscious Chinese po-
litical elites quickly became aware of the security costs of foreign attribution
of a dangerous quality to China's international character.
They issued the first 0面cial rebuttal in 1995 , but trace the origins of the
China threat theory to 1992 and earlie r. Chinese interpretations lump to-
gether variegated negative views , propounded by nonstate actors as well as
state actors in the West. For Beijing, even though India was once a princi-
pal concern , the three leading progenitors of China threat theory have con-
sistently been the United States , Japan, and Taiwan. Similarly, other versions
of the China threat help to project a destabilizing and aggressive image that
risks justifying discrimination and motivating hostile balancing against
China. These views reflect heightened uncertainties and anxieties about
China's security environment and international status.
The security dilemma confronting Beijing will gain momentum if its threat
image worsens and material capabilities grow simultaneously. To reverse that
dynamic , China has countered the China threat theory by equating it with the
mentality of Cold War-style power politics , on the 0
I88 SECURITY STUDIES

security self-assessment beneath the Chinese views. The fourth section out-
lines China's rhetorical and policy responses. Then the chapter evaluates
the strength of the reputation-security dilemma argument by comparing it
with other alternative explanations. It further offers an assessment of the
successes and challenges in Beijing's reputation diplomacy. The chapter con-
cludes with brief thoughts on the role of reputation and deterrence in Chinese
foreign policy and international relations.

Threat Reputation and the Security Dilemma

Mainstream realism and deterrence theory argue that establishing a

reputation for. power and resolve to carry out security commitments is
paramount in a state's security policy. Typical of this view is Hans Mor-
genthau's approach to "prestige." For him, a state's "policy of prestige" is
about its "reputation for power," whose purpose "is to impress other na-
tions with the power one's own nation actually possesses , or with the power
it believes , or wants the other nations to believe , it possesses." The cardinal
sin for policymakers is to "be satis fÌ ed with a reputation for power which is
inferior to the actual power possessed ," inasmuch as such a "negative pol-
icy of prestige" invites foreign predation. 5
Similarly, deterrence theory equates reputation with the credibility of
a state's resolve to protect its national security interests. 6 For Thomas
Schelling, a state's "reputation for action" "consisting of other countries' be-
liefs (their leaders' beliefs , that is) about how the country can be expected to
behave. . . is one of the few things worth fÌ ghting ove r. "7 Underscoring the
security benefÌ ts of a tough reputation , neither Morgenthau nor Schelling
has much to say about why China would be so terribly upset by the China
threat theory. In fact , Schelling contends that "impetuosity, irrationality,
and automaticity [sic] " boost deterrence. 8 In this vein , the negative costs of
a tough image do not concern those scholars , preoccupied as they are with
issues of power struggle and deterrence credibility.
Insofar as it can be used to illuminate the negative security consequences
of states' threat perceptions , the notion of security dilemma may offer a ba-
sis for understanding Chinese reactions to the China threat theory. Accord-
ing to its proponents , the security dilemma is pervasive in the context of in-
ternational anarchy in which states , uncertain of each other's intentions , are
engaged in the worst-case security planning. They tend to view power and
security as zero-sum and in relative terms. Hence a state's supposedly
security-enhancing capabilities and behavior become threatening to other .
states , triggering responses in kind. Such a vicious action-reaction spiral
leads to competitive armament and 且erce power struggle. 9
 CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY r89

Security dilemma theorists attribute the perpetual source of state insecu-

rity to the anarchic nature of international relations. Under anarchy, there
is not much states can do to escape the security dilemma. For Kenneth
Waltz , "states have to live with their security dilemma , which is produced
not by their wills but by their situations. A dilemma cannot be solved; it can
more or less readily be dealt with." And a robust mutual nuclear deterrence
is the most states (i.e: , great powers for Waltz) can do. 10 Indeed , the Soviet
initiative of peaceful coexistence started in the mid I9 50S was essentially an
attempt to use nuclear deterrence as the "answer" to the USSR's security di-
lemma vis-à-vis the West. l l
Based on a similar be 1ief about the structural sources of the security di-
lemma , Robert Jervis laments: "The central theme of international relations
is not evil but tragedy." 12 For him , the acuteness of a security dilemma is
due to "the inability to recognize that one's own actions could be seen as
menacing and the concomitant belief that the other's hosti1i ty can only be
explained by its aggressiveness."13 In other words , the security dilemma
persists because anarchy blocks states' "learning" about the mechanics of
the security dilemma. And even if states are aware of the danger of escalat-
ing mutual hostility, the structural imperative of anarchy is such that, in the
words of John Mearsheimer, "little can be done to ameliorate the security
dilemma as long as states operate in anarchy." For him, "This situation [of
security dilemma-driven great power struggle ], which no one consciously
designed or intended , is generally tragic."14
Jervis does propose that the security dilemma can be alleviated when sta-
tus quo-oriented states can be con且dent of the defensive nature of each
other's security measures and of their own ability to neutralize any potential
mi1itary threat. Charles Glaser introduces two additional variables , "greed"
and "unit-level knowledge of the state's motives ," arguing that states' moti-
vational structure and mutual confìdence in each other's intentions also de-
termine the acuteness of the security dilemma they face. 15 These analytical
variables have greatly enhanced our theoretical understanding of the key se-
curity dynamic in international relations. But at the practicallevel, defense
and offense are notoriously di面cult to differentiate. In an environment 0
工90 SECURITY STUDIES

reputation and would react accordingly. Mercer's definition closely coin-

cides with the standard definition of image by Allen Whiting ip. Chinese for-
eign policy studies as the "preconceived stereotype . . . derived from a se-
lective interpretation of history, experience , and self-image." Studies of
China's relations with the United States and ]apan clearly demonstrate that
reputation or preconceived image decisively shapes policy-making in all
three ca pitals. 17
Thus a state's reputation determines how other states judge its interna-
tional character and gauge its intentions. 18 A threat reputation will spark
hostile reactions and aggravate the security dilemma. According to Stephen
Walt , "states that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to
balance against them."19 But what are the sources of threat perception?
While they have a material basis , which is emphasized by Walt, threat per-
ception and security dilemmas are ultimately a function of status politics
based on mutual identification and categorization.
For our purposes here , a security dilemma exists when a self-perceived
security-seeking state is confronted with other states that do not share its
definition of security interests and take balancing measures against its power.
The more acute the security dilemma , the greater the conflict of security in-
terests. 20 Under certain circumstances , the costs of an unmitigated security
dilemma are so unambiguously high that a state will have no di面culty grasp-
ing the worsening security dynamics it faces and will attempt to reverse them.
For contemporary China , the prospect of confronting a hostile U.S.-led
coalition is the worst kind of strategic nightmare. It should not take the
security-conscious Chinese political elite long to anticipate and take action
to forestall such an eventuality.
In this age of great power peace , a threat reputation would be particu-
larly damaging to an aspiring great power's social standing , and hence to its
security interests. After the Cold War, militarized conflict among advanced
democratic powers is no longer contemplated or even imagined. A great
power 气ecurity community" exists , which is distinguished by its members'
shared commitment to peace among themselves and to management of
global affairs at large. 21 A reputation as a threat would suggest violent Chi-
nese ambitions vis-à-vis the established great power grouping a
 CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY I91

Without shared identity, there is no democratic peace. 2J Liberal and con-

structivist theorists claim a robust e丘ect of transnational group categoriza-
tion on threat attribution. They posit that the relevance and intensity of real-
politik calculations in interstate relations depend on thé status that states
assign each other in terms of in-group-out-group differentiation. And the
status effect is wholly consistent with the social psychology insights into
group dynamics-atúibution of a negative identity to the "other" a面rms
and magnifies the superior distinctiveness of the in-group identity. Inter-
group prejudice explains the persistence of international conflict at both the
interstate and transnational group levels. 24
Despite the robust effect of social identification on threat image , any at-
tempt to establish the direction of the causal arrow would hardly be con-
clusive. As Dale Copeland observes , group differentiation in international
relations starts with some judgment of the character of a state , including
threat assessment. 25 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett show how the
highly integrated peaceful community of democratic states nurtures a collec-
tive group identity.26 Henry Nau simply bases his state categories of enmity
and ainity toward the United States on the factor of militarized threat-
democratic peace leads to shared democratic identity; security threats posed
by "others" determine their outlier statuses. 27 Given the insurmountable
di面culties in separating the two variables , it seems more fruitful to consider
demarcation of group boundaries and threat imputation as symbiotically
interactive. 28
What is clear is that a state's threat reputation hardens its hostile "other"
status , which in turn could give rise to what Alexander Wendt dubs "no-
holds-barred power politics" directed against it. 29 The China threat theory
has not coalesced into an enemy image in the minds of the public and elites
in the United States , Japan , or elsewhere. But this discourse , if not coun-
tered , could intensify to cause irreparable damage to China's international
status and translate into an insurmountable security dilemma. These con-
siderations explain Beijing's ultrasensitivity and aversion to the China
threat theory.

"The China Threat Chorus": Chinese Interpretations

Three Chinese versions have been advanced as to the precise timing

and genesis of the China threat theory. A Beijing Review article attributes
its origin to an August 1990 article by a professor atJapan's National Defense
Academy.30 Another account comes from Xu Xin , president of the China
Institute for International Strategic Studies and former deputy chief of staff
of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). According to Xu , at a Heritage
工92 SECURITY STUDIES

Foundation symposium on 巧 August 199 鸟 the U.S. assistant secretary of

defense blamed China for sparking an arms race in the Asia -Pacific region.
The notion of a China threat was magnified in the following month by the
former U.S. ambassador to China , James Lilley, in Hong Kong , where he
openly criticized China's military expansion. 31
The official version , commonly accepted by Chinese analysts , dates the
China threat theory from the end of 1992.32 A confluence of factors issaid
to explain its rise. Deng Xiaoping's "Southern Tour" resuscitated China's
market reform , leading to the economic rise of a unified China , which lent
credence to the fear of China's strength in lieu of the commonplace prog-
nosis of an imminent "China collapse" in the aftermath of the cataclysmic
events of 1989. In February that year , China's legislature , the National
People's Congress , passed a law that rea面rmed in particular China's terri-
torial claims to the South China Sea Islands. Meanwhile , the United States
was contemplating the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan , and Japan was on
the verge of passing a bi l1 that would a l1 0w its Self-Defense Forces to par-
ticipate in UN peacekeeping operations. Both the United States and Japan
used China's military threat to achieve their ulterior motives.
The China threat theory has unfolded along both security and economic
lines. On the security front , the theory focuses on China's military buildups ,
irresponsible arms sales , and uncompromising approach to contested terri-
torial claims. A dangerous Chinese expansionism has manifested itself in
power , intentions , and behavior, it is argued , and the aggregate material
power accruing from the phenomenal growth of the Chinese economy is
likely to lead to greater military prowess and aggressive foreign behavio r.
Moreover , China's economic growth alone means that China will out-
compete other countries in areas .where it enjoys comparative advantage ,
particularly in labor-intensive manufacturing industries , and absorb much
foreign direct investment thatwould otherwise go elsewhere. China's growth
will thus be attained at the expense of its economic partners. Its mercantilist
trade policy wiU undermine the internationalliberal economic regimes. And
China's surging demand for natural resources also adds fuel to international
concerns.
Table 7.1 shows that while security and economic threats are consistent
themes , the C
 TABLE 7.1
Chinese interpretations of the China threat theory
Date of Origin
Varíant (approx.) Sources Description

China threat 1992- United States , Cheicnoaniosmreicgarded asTahemrIllsIetaory

t and
theory threat. The rise of these
JTaapiwana,n
news
ofthe omtEhoIrCsetIaaptlletyhrmemOCaEIzyokueTsdhatenhddeupbeeeerpspEmSatreztnn1eg
ts
China threat theory. The three p
have since led the international smear
campaign against China. South Korea
was also a VpIrEoWgSendim tor, but has SInce
seen these views die away there.
japthanre'satChina 1990?- ]apan
hpthaen China
has been a mZIn
threat propaEtkaaeltelsop
theory to rruc
‘oht
amnda
theory down , stoke its own nationalis
divert international attention from its
motivations of remilitarization and
lack of remorse for its wartime past.
India's China 1998-2003 India India cited the China threat to justify
threat its nuclear tests and non-status quo
theory politÍcal and military ambitions.
Cultural 1993-95 Samuel Harmrd pooflitIcal scientISt HuntingtOI1、
sources of HuntingtOI1 , "clash CIVIlizatIons"thesisthsirnega les
China threat United States out Confucianist China as a threat to
the West.
China's food 1995 , 2004-5 Lester Brown, Brown , director of WorldWatch Institute ,
crisis and United States , contended that China couldn't feed its
et al.

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revived in 2004-5.
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superpower JapSaonu,theast
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Asia and overseas Chinese communities
was creating a domineering Chinese
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China doesn't 1999 Gerald SegStaal,te Segal argued that China does not deserve
matter United States 一 great power status and that other great
United pcohwinear'ss need not be accommodative of
Kingdom mterests.
工 94 SECURITY STUDIES

TABLE 7. 工 (continued)
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Japan , South Asian countries blamed their own

Korea , economic woes on China's
Southeast competition. Economic interdepend-
Asia , and ence with China has since lessened
elsewhere their concern. But fear of Chinese
growth at the expense of other econo-
mies has persisted across the wo r1 d.
Rising 2001 John 岛1earsheimer， a University of Chicago
Chinese Mearsheimer, professor , singled out China as the
power, nsmg United States next great power , whose rise is bound
Chinese to trigger a dangerously destabilizing
threat power trans lt1 on.
"China 2001-2 Individuals This represents a new twist to China
collapse in the West threat theory, predicting imminent
theory" collapse of the Chinese economy and
political system.

analysts are particularly concerned about the origins of the China threat
theory from the United States. Reflecting hostilities and bias , they argue ,
various aspects of American China threat theory smear China's image , den-
igrate the Chinese political system , overstate China's strengths , and assign
irresponsible , destabilizing motives to Chinese external behavior.
In the Chinese view, ]apan is another highly enthusiastic peddler of the
most pernicious brand of China threat theory. As discussed earlier, one Chi-
nese account attributes the origin of the theory to ]apan in 1990. Another
Chinese author even suggests that the China threat theory was first floated
in ]apan as early as 1984. ]apan's anti-China theme has varied widely, en-
compassing just about all the concerns about China , including the nuclear,
economic , "greater super China ," and military threats it represents. Chinese
rebuttal directed against ]apan took on added vigor in the mid 1990s. Since
then , ]apan's China threat theory has evolved from being one of the main ir-
ritants in Sino-]apanese relations to becoming the overriding Chinese con-
cern vis-à-vis ]apan.
India was once a leading originator öf the China threat theory. India first
became a main progenitor around the time when. it detonated nuclear
weapons in May 1998. Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee
wrote a letter on 11 May to U.S. President Bill Clinton citing China's nuclear
arsenal and the 1962 Sino-Indian war to justify New Delhi's acquisition of
nuclear weapons. The most prominent actor in India was its defense minis-
ter , George Fernandes , who openly discussed the China threat before and
 CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY I95

after the nuclear tests. 33 Three years later , Fernandes's remarks ignited an-
other round of Chinese rebuttal , which underscoredlndia's use of the China
threat as a "shield" to justify its aggressive arms purchases , expanded missile
programs , and great power ambition. 34 But the Indian bnlnd of China threat
theory proved ephemeral and has withered remarkably since 丰003.
While the United States and Japan have been most responsible for spread-
ing the fear of China , pro-independence advocates in Taiwan have been
equally enthusiastic in magnifying the China threat to advance their causes.
Most dramatically, President Chen Shui-bian attempted to equate Beijing's
military threat with terrori.sm in the aftermath of the events of 11 Septem-
ber 200 1. 35 Other sub-state actors and even individuals in the West have
also been singled out as abetting the China threat theory from various per-
specti飞res. John Mearsheimer's restatement of a hardcore power politics
theory in 2001 reinforces the view about the inevitable military threat a
growing Chinese power poses to the status quo powers. 36
Chinese commentators also take note of the views that link Chinese his-
tory and contemporary nationalism to the China threat. In particular, the
Har飞rard University political scientist Samuel Huntington、 "clash of civi-
lizations" thesis directed attention to the Confucianist culture as underlying
China's military threat. 37 Similarly, legitimate Chinese patriotism and natu-
ral antipathy to Western interference were misrepresented by certain indi-
viduals as irrational , aggressive nationalism that could translate into anti-
Americanism , hegemonic ambitions in Asia , and saber rattling toward
Taiwan. The growing economic ties between China and the overseas Chi-
nese communities were even cited as evidence of the malign emergent
greater Chinese superpower. 38
There is another strand of thinking that attributes the China threat to its
weaknesses at home and abroad. Who Will Feed China? Wa走 e-Up Call for
a Small Planet , a 1995 book by Lester Brown , director of the Worldwatch
Institute , based in Washington , D.C. , contended , for example , that China's
vast population threatened to overstrain the world's food supply. A related
but more enduring theme has been a concern that China's insatiable de-
mand for natural resources , energy, and living space may generate pressures
for an aggressive foreign p
19 6 SECURITY STUDIES

China Under Threat

From a Chinese perspective , the China threat theory is simply con-

cocted by hostile forces seeking to threaten China. As such , Chinese inter-
pretations reflect self-assessments of external threats to China's national se-
curity. As the preceding section shows , Chinese interpretations have lumped
together wide-ranging negative attributions from abroad that exaggerate
China's alleged non-status quo international impulse , destabilizing poten-
tial at home and abroad , and anachronistic worldview. They refleçt an acute
sense of insecurity stemming from myriad sources of threat.
Clearly topping China's security concerns is its relationship with the
United States, which holds the keys to China's core national interests in pre-
飞renting Taiwan's independence , maintaining domestic stability, promoting
economic development , ensuring a manageable international security envi-
ronment, and ultimately achieving its overriding goal of "national rejuve-
nation." The utmost importance the Chinese elites attach to the United
States is dramatically captured by the prominent think tanker, former di-
rector of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Science , Zi
Zhongyun , when she wrote in 1999 that U.S. hegemony "has included two
aspects-'letting those who are with it thrive and prosper,' and ‘ letting
those who are against it come to their doom' [shunzhi zechang nizhi ze-
wang]." 的 Other Chinese commentators may contend that she overstated
the U.S. power and Chinese constraints. But avoiding sustained confronta-
tion with the United States has been the 0面cial policy, supported by main-
stream Chinese analysts 卢 This has proven to be no easy tas k. For the PRC ,
the unipolar U.S. power has become ever more concentrated and unre-
strained since the mid 1990s. Beijing finds both trends unsettling and frus-
trating as it struggles to define its place in the U.S.-led global order卢 Thus ，
as uncertainties and suspicion have persisted in the bilateral relationship ,
Chinese leaders and mainstream analysts have been deeply concerned about
the U.S. threat perception vis-à-vis China.
For the PRC, India is a non -status quo power, insofar as it is deeply dis-
satisfied with its current international status and entertains great power
ambitions. What worried Chinese strategists most was when India openly
played up the China threat to achieve its political and military goals while
seeking to bandwag
 CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY 197

American media. "Although the Chinese side expressed understanding of

lndia's need to carry out nuclear tests for its security needs , it could not
understand why" lndia would use the China threat to achieve its nuclear
ambitions , one leading Chinese lndia watcher wrote 卢 ln addition to fiery
rhetorical rebuttal , Beijing launched corresponding diplomatic counterat-
tacks , including spearheading passage of a UN Security Council resolution
and allying with the. United States to compound denial of lndia's nuclear
status with punitive international isolation卢
But mutual animosities diminished significantly after April 2003 when
lndian Defense Minister F~rnandes， the "number one peddler" of the lndian
China threat theory, paid a high-profile visit to Beijing at the height of the
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) crisis. The improvement of the
bilateral relationship further picked up after Prime Minister Vajpayee's
week-long visit to China two months later. Mutual trust has since increased
as the two Asian giants have quickly elevated their "cooperative partner-
ship" to a forward-looking "strategic partnership" designed to avoid inter-
necine rivalry.47
While lndia's China threat theory turned out to be manageable , the Jap-
anese version has proved deep-rooted and baneful for the Chinese. Japan's
hostility toward China was evident in that while remaining muted on other
powers' nuclear testing , Japan "made the loudest noises" over China's lim-
ited nuclear tests in the first half of the 1990s. Through the end of the 1990s,
Tokyo concocted a China threat, it was argued , as a pretext to increase its
own armaments , dodge its historical past, and readjust its international
strategy, which notably entailed a tightening of its security alliance with the
United States and Japan's decision to Jom the regional theater missile
defense (TMD) system. 48 After the summit between the North and South
Korean leaders in June 2000 , Japan started to fixate its threat perception on
China and the Taiwan Strait. Japan's economic woes , combined with a long-
standing unrepentant attitude with respect to its wartime behavior and ris-
ing nationalist efforts to abandon the pacific restraints placed on its military
and international roles , it is argued , explain its renewed interest in the
China threat theory.49
Japanese complaints about China's military threat to Taiwan were re-
garded as interferenc
19 8 SECURITY STUDIES

changes in the alliance itself, ]apanese domestic politics , regional security dy-
namics , and international politics , and was initially prompted by the nuclear
crisis onthe Korean peninsula in I993-94. Yet for Beijing, the'timing of its
conclusion suggested a linkage with the Taiwan crisis in I99 5 -96 and the al-
liance's anti-China nature. 51 ]apanese refusal to exclude Taiwan from the sit-
uational considerations, Chinese pressures notwithstanding , only fueled
Beijing's suspicions about Tokyo's motives. Thus , when ]apan explicitly
joined the United States in pledging to "encourage the peaceful resolution of
issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue" on I9 February 2005 ,
。面cial Chinese observers considered the seemingly mild statement as mark-
ing a shift of ]apanese policy toward actively using its alliance with the United
States and the Taiwan issue to contain China. 52
For Chinese 0面cial and academic commentators , the notion of a China
threat is merely a pretext for ]apan to remilitarize and to threaten China. "By
disseminating these allegations , ]apan hopes to divert the attention of the in-
ternational community and lull the world into letting down its guard so it
may quietly achieve its long-coveted goal of becoming a major political and
military power." 53 The spread of the China threat theory is seen as being cho-
reographed carefully in tandem with the steps ]apan has taken to abandon its
historical , constitutional, and international constraints on its military powe r.
The China threat absolves ]apan from its responsibi1ity to deal with the war
atrocities it committed between I894 and I94 5. It justifìes reinterpretations
and even possible amendment of Article 9 of the ]apanese constitution to re-
lax restrictions on the role of ]apan's Self-Defense Forces. It provides a ra-
tionale for ]apan to strengthen its high-tech military arsenals and even pos-
sibly develop nuclear weapons. Citing ]apanese sources , one Chinese author
claims that ]apan "can produce nuclear weapons in seven days. And the nu-
clear fuel that ]apan stores is enough to build 7 , 500 nuclear warheads."54
With this technological readiness , all ]apan needs to become nuclear-armed
is a China threat theory to break through domestic opposition and interna-
tional restraints. 55 The remarks of the then chairman of ]apan's Liberal Dem-
ocratic Party, Ic hiro Ozawa, in Apri12002 to the effect that ]apa
 CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY 199

from all over the region , including Southeast Asia and Central Asia产 as
these states may bandwagon with major powers to balance against China.
The marketability of the notion of the China threat underscored the pre-
carious nature of Beijing's relations with these countries and of its overall
secuntyenvlronment.
China's interpretations do not limit China threat theory to the views
associated with the state actors. Rather, they are much more expansive. 1n-
deed , the chorus of anti-China voices ranges from views overstating Chinese
strengths to views underscoring Chinese weaknesses. Express concerns
about the rise of aggressive Chinese nationa 1i sm and the power of greater
China are denounced , and so is Huntington's view that China represents the
challenge of Confucianist civilization. Fears of China's increased economic
competitiveness by neighboring countries are refuted , as are various personal
views highlighting the flaws and frailties of the Chinese system. For Beijing,
these unpalatable views may not directly lead to advocacy of a speci且c policy
inimical to Chinese interests , but they nonetheless tarnish China's image ,
leading to China's political and psychological estrangement from its neigh-
bors and other major powers. The Chinese responses have shown a keen
awareness of the danger that the negative image of China as a threat might
mobilize foreign public opinion in support of the isolation of and discrimi-
nation against China.

Chinese Responses: Rhetoric and Policy

China issued its first 0面cial rebuttal in 1995. Mainstream interpre-

tations , however, trace the rise of the China threat theory to 1992. The lag
reflected the policy elites' uncertainties about both the security implications
and China's proper response. However , it did not take long before the Bei-
jing leadership learned about the weighty costs of a negative image to
China's vital interests. And China's security in the now seemingly enduring
American unipolar world must entail a vigorous response to foreign impu-
tation of a violent predisposition to China. The 1995 -96 Taiwan crisis and
Beijing's disputes with Manila over Mischief Is1and in the South China Sea
in spring 1995 added credibility to the notion of a China threat. Beìjing
immediately responded by sending several high-ranking military and civil-
ian leaders on foreign trips with the exclusive purpose of rebutting the
China threat theory. 。面cial media and academic writings chimed in to
reinforce the government position. The themes of rebuttal vary widely.
As regards the notion of China's economic threat , Chinese responses boil
down to the arguments that China is still a developing country and its
growing competitiveness results from compliance with the market prin-
ciples. 1n other words , blame the game , not the players. 59 On the security
200 SECURITY STUDIES

front , Chinese writers dismiss foreign conjectures about a China threat as a

reflection of Cold War mentality, a trick analogous to "a thief crying ‘ Stop
thief' [zeihan zhuozei] ," played by those countries to hide their own ambi-
tions while obstructing China's rise.
To defeat the China threat theory, leading strategic thinkers proposed the
alternative idea of China's "peaceful rise" (heping jμ eqi) inlate 2003.60 De-
signed to provide a credible vision of a cooperative future in China's foreign
relations , the concept was soon explicitly endorsed by top Chinese leaders
and intensely studied by China's international relations scholars. However,
the debate had died down by the summer of 2004 , because the idea ap-
peared increasingly to Beijing to be wishful thinking and counterproduc-
tive. The ongoing Taiwan crisis and power politics concerns vis-à-vis ]apan
and the United States quickly raised doubts about the wisdom of elevating
the concept of a "peaceful rise" to strategic prominence.
At the substantive level , Chinese responses have focused on debunking
the exaggeration of the PRC's material capabilities , misinterpretations of its
intentions , and misunderstanding of its policy behavior. The arguments go
that despite fast growth of its national power, China still ranks low among
the major powers in comprehensive strength , with an even much lower per
capita income. In terms of military power, in addition to the significant uni-
lateral troop reduction , China falls far behind the United States in military
expenditures and spends less than other powers such as ]apan. 61 Chinese
writers have debunked extrapolations of China's aggressive intentions from
the country's growing power by highlighting its peaceful historical record ,
associated with the benevolent Confucianist culture , as well as its contem-
porary embrace of responsibility and interdependence. For them , the PRC's
military modernization is purely fòr legitimate defensive needs. China's for-
eign policy behavior shows evidence of peaceful intentions , responsibility,
and restraint , even on issues including Taiwan , the South China Sea , nuclear
tests , and arms sales. 62
Chinese commentators have devoted equal attention to views originating
from nonstate actors and individuals in the West that do not lend them-
selves to direct policy prescriptions but are damaging to China's overall rep-
utation in the international s
 C H I NA R EACT S T 0 T H E C H I N A T H R E AT T H E 0 RY 201

from the conservative political camp even attributed these malign views to
racism traceable to the imperialist "Yellow Peril" theory.64
Apart from rhetorical rebuttal , China has undertaken corresponding
policy responses. Admittedly, the behavioral impact of the China threat the-
ory is much harder to pin down. Butanalytical reasoning and empirical ev-
idence clearly establish höw China's fear of foreign attribution of a threat
reputation has shaped its foreign orientations. As was discussed earlier, a
threat reputation attached to China , if not countered , could lead to a U.S.-
led containment coalition against it , imperiling its core security interests.
For the security-conscious. Chinese policy elites , it should quickly become
clear that to effectively refute the China threat theory, behavioral adjust-
ments must also be made.
The impact of China threat theory on Chinese foreign policy was evident
in China's policy toward the WTO. According to the Chinese views , concern
about a China threat was a major reason for the tortuous process of China's
accession negotiations , particularly with the United States. 65 China's chief
negotiator on China's 明TTO membership , Long Yongtu , repeatedly stated
both before and after China's accession that whether the rise of China was
viewed as an opportunity or a threat would determine China's international
environment. In fact , it was Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji who first popular-
ized the "China opportunity" idea during his visit to the United States in
spring 1999. 66 Similarly, other official accounts also consider dispelling no-
tions of a China threat as a major benefit of China's WTO membership.67 A
rationale for seeking China's opening and compliance with the rule-based
trade organization was that it would replace China threat theory with China
opportunity theory and heslp give the country a more responsible image. 68
Similar concern to demonstrate positive contributions of China's rise to
international security and prosperity has also driven China's broad strate-
gic choices. Indeed , since the mid 1990s, the Chinese government has made
vigorous efforts to deepen China's international interdependence , cultivate
multilevel , omnidirectional partnerships , and embrace various forms of mul-
tilateralism. 69 It has been well documented that image concerns have con-
tributed to China's progress in compliance with the internatio
202 SECURITY STUDIES

Escaping the Security Dilemma: Alternative

Explanations and Assessment

Why does China care so much about the China threat theory? One
may speculate that China's ultrasensitivity about its less than honorableim-
age may have to do with its self-conception as the paragon of virtues and
benevolence in the historically Sinocentric East Asian order .l2 Indeed , Chi-
nese commentators often point to Confucian China's benign history and
culture to refute notions of a China threat. But beyond the assertions , there
is simply no evidence in either Chinese writings or Western scholarship to
establish the historical , cultural impact on contemporary China's prefer-
ences or abhorrence with regard to its international image.
Another explanation for the Chinese reactions may be foun吃 in the sup-
posed domestic audience effect. Both Maoist and contemporary Chinese
leaderships have manipulated ideas of foreign threats for popular mobiliza-
tion in the interests of their domestic agendas and to shore up the regime's
legitimacy.73 In a similar vein , blaming China's security predicament on hos-
tile foreigners helps divert popular attention away from serious problems in
the painful domestic transition. According to this line of reasoning , to the
extent that the China threat theory reflects myriad external hostilities , a per-
sistent refutation of the theory perpetuates a sense of national insecurity,
which the Beijing regime fìnds useful to focus the national purpose on main-
taining social stability and economic growth. There is some evidence that
such a calculation may fìgure in Beijing's reactions. For example , in his re-
buttal , Li Ruihuan , then chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consul-
tative Conference , drew on the bitter experience of a weak China's victim-
ization by imperialist powers and quoted an old Chinese saying , "On
hearing the calls of crickets , can you not plant crops?" to urge his domestic
audience to "work wholeheartedly with undivided devotion" to build a
strong China. In a similar vein , Lu Yuan of the Chinese Academy of Mili-
tary Science compared the China threat theory to a "whetstone" that can
"temper our national will" for great power status .l4 Indeed , there is no dis-
tinction in China threat theory over whether the barrage of "character as-
sassinations" was directed against the communist Party-state or the Chinese
nation. In Chinese responses , all these hostile foreign voices are lumped
together under the rubric of "China threat theor
 C H 1N A R E A C T S T 0 T H E C H 1N A T H R E AT T H E 0 R Y 203

keep China down and positive a面rmation by the Party-state leading China
to become strong , wealthy, and respected abroad. This means a highly
controlled , carefully calibrated set of reactions to the unfriendly image-
projections on China. In this sense , the government has good reasons to keep
domestic attention on the stream of China threat theories from Japan , the
United States , and Taiwan. However, strident nationalist rhetoric designed
for domestic consumption is a far cry from Chiria's foreign policy practices.
The domestic legitimacy of the CCP party-state significantly overlaps with in-
ternationallegitimacy, insofar as China's economic modernization and great
power recognition necessitate an overall stipportive world. Unlike. Maoist
China where nationalism was mobilized to support aggressive foreign poli-
cies , contemporary China has to rein in anti-Western emotions and assuage
the fear of China threat in its conduct of international relations. Thus , the
regime-legitimating hypothesis has some validity, but it ultimately offers an
incomplete explanation. One may also propose that the PRC plays up the
China threat theory to paint itself as the innocent victim in international re-
lations. This might have worked with Japan , whose war guilt has defined its
China policy. But to the extent that the theory is about an aggressive Chinese
image , its utility in putting other countries morally and politically on the
defensive is questionable , especially as the PRC has grown so strong.
Thus a full explanation must also consider China's concern about inter-
nationallegitimacy and its fear of a dire security environment to which a
threat reputation may lead. Specifically in this age of great power peace , a
violent , revisionist reputation would lead to out-group status for China.
Such a status escalates the spiral of mutual hostilities and hence the security
dilemma. In dealing with out-group nations , in-group nations interpret
power in terms of zero-sum logic , and they are likely to be ultrasensitive to
power redistribution in favor of a member of the out-group. In contrast,
among themselves , they view power as positive-sum , and hence are much
less sensitive to power shifts within the group.
From the social categorization literature , we know that the out-group is
always the target of negative stereotyping. 75 It follows that China's out-
group status would likely lead to continued , selec
二 04 SECURITY STUDIES

be an unfair and simplistic portrayal of China. They complain that the West-
ern negative image neither appreciates their nation's struggle to balance
the di面cult tasks of reform, stability, and growth nor recognizes China's
progress on both domestic and international fronts. 77 But if a major source
of China's image is its less than favorable social position in the international
order, it is hard to imagine how without significant status advancement
China can qualitatively succeed in projecting a responsible , cooperative im-
age in the West.
In the U.S.-led unipolar world , to be outside the great power peace group
is to be disadvantaged in overall security interests. The status factor may
also explain the validity of the asymmetry in states' mutual attribution of
reputation. Just as social stratification is unequally structured in domestic
society, so too are intergroup relations arranged in international hierarchy.
As Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim have argued, legitimate power
rests on a corresponding hierarchy of recon且gured identities to make non-
coerced compliance possible. 78 Due to the gap in both power and legiti-
macy, the dominant group enjoys greater credibility than the subordinate
group in mutual imputation of negative images. Hence China threat theory
is quite persistent , while China's counter theories about threats from the
United States , Japan , and India have not sold wel l.
Specifically, Chinese commentary has identified three ways in which the
China threat theory may adversely affect China's security: "One , creating
political opinion to apply pressures upon China and to meddle in China's
domestic affairs. . . . Two , distorting China's image and driving a wedge be-
tween China and its neighboring countries to limit China's development.
Three , playing the trick of a thief crying ‘ Stop thief!' to divert public atten-
tion and to direct the spearhead at China to maintain their own hegemonic
position."79 What is particularly worrying to Beijing is the danger of the
threat attribution delegitimizing China as an international acto r. Such
denigration would only intensify the fear of rising Chinese power, thereby
emboldening the Taiwanese independence movement and sparking arma-
ment and alliance-making with the United States directed against China by
its neighbors.
The war on global terrorism after the terrorist attacks on 11 September
2001 has helped deflate the Ch
 C H 1N A R E A C T S T 0 T H E C H 1 N A T H R E AT T H E 0 R Y 205

details hotly discussed at the last meeting" were quickly smoothed over.
Long quoted the American representatives as saying: "At this critical mo-
ment , a rally of civilized countries is more needed." 80
Chinese commentators took particular notice of the fact that President
George W. Bush attended the uno面cial summit meeting at the Asia-Pacifìc
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Shanghai in October 200 1. More
important , while in Shanghai , he referred to President Jiang Zemin as "the
leader of a great nation." Chinese analysts invariably saw in the war on
terrorism an opportunity to direct U.S. threat attention away from China and
toward unconventional transnational threats. 81 While encouraged by signs
that the United States is rethinking its strategic priorities , Chinese analysts
are nonetheless skeptical and uncertain as to whether Washington has under-
taken a complete reassessment of security threats to embrace China as a
strategic partner rather than a potential riva l. They continue to consider
the U.S. threat perception vis-à-vis China as the root cause of the problems in
Sino-American relations. They saw China threat theory reemerge , after only
a brief respite , to encompass China's military power, unfair economic prac-
tices , policy toward Taiwan , and the EU attempt to lift the arms embargo on
China. 82
Concerted Chinese rhetorical and diplomatic response has , however,
achieved important successes in allaying foreign hostilities. China threat
theory has diminished overall in places , including notably Europe , South-
east Asia , India , South Korea , and Russia. But China has encountered fail-
ures in Japan , Taiwan , and the United States. Alexander Wendt contends
that effective strategies of reassurance for a country surrounded by suspi-
cion and fear must entail a wholesale embrace of genuine multilatera1ism,
adoption of democracy (because democracies are seen as inherently more
trustworth y than other po 1ities) , and "self-binding" or even "self-sacrifìcing"
policy choices. 83 This is a tall order in international relations. With its spec-
tacular growth in material power, the challenge is particularly great for
China in its anti-China threat campaign.
Studies in social psychology suggest yet another alternative mechanism
for building trust through cooperative pursuit of a commonly desired and
only jointly attainable superordinate goal. 84 Such cooperation r
206 SECURITY STUDIES

Conclusions: Reassessing Threat

in Chinese Foreign Policy

Studies of Maoist China's foreign policy have focused on Chinese

fear of physical threats in the forms of foreign military attacks and in-
fringement on territorial integrity.86 Since the early I990s , an eminently
"unconventional" threat to China's security has been the persistent foreign
attribution of a dangerously revisionist reputation. Beijing's reactions since
the mid I990S have been marked by an acute sensitivity to international
uncertainties about China's intentions and awareness of the danger of an
escalating security dilemma fueled by fear of rising Chinese power. In com-
parison to the past history of the People's Republic , China has shown greater
attentiveness in reassuring others and greater responsiveness to others' re-
assurance in international relations.
The PRC's image-building efforts have overall abated the China threat the-
ory. But the failures and major setbacks in its relations with the United States ,
Taiwan , and ]apan suggest that a tortuous and uncertain path lies ahead in
China's struggle to balance power and legitimacy in its foreign policy.
The conventional wisdom established in realist theory and deterrence lit-
erature in international relations is that the state's credible resolve to defend
its core interests is essential for national security. Viewed in this light,
China's ultrasensitivity and wholesale rejection of the China threat theory
is puzzling. To the extent that the China threat theory has a direct bearing
on China's "general reputation ,"87 it is not clear how Beijing's reactions
contribute to the credibility of its policy of deterrence vis-à-vis Taiwanese
independence and beyond. What they demonstrate is the role of deterrence
and a set of determinants in the use of force in contemporary Chinese for-
eign policy that do not conform to the patterns set in Maoist China or main-
stream realist propositions. The power of China threat theory suggests that
the issues of international legitimacy and social reputation deserve careful
scholarly inquiry in studies of Chinese foreign policy, great power politics ,
and international relations.

Notes

1 am most grateful to lain Johnston , Bob Ross , and Allen Whiting for incisive
written comments on earlier drafts of the paper. Tom Christensen , John Garver , Pe-
ter Gries , Margaret Pearson , Lucian Pye , and other participants at the Harvard con-
ference where the paper was first presented , as well as the anonymous reviewers ,
also offered helpful comments. For financial support for this research , 1 thank the
N aval Academy Research Counci l.
 CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY 207

1. Avery Goldstein , "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising

Power's Emerging Choice ," China Quarterly , no. 工 68 (December 2001): 835- 6 4;
John W. Garver , "The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity Following lndia's Nuclear
Tests ," ibid.: 865 - 89; Susan Shirk , "One-Sided Rivalry: China's Perceptions and
policies Toward India ," in The India-China RelatiOnship: ，万hat the United States
Needs to Know , ed. Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (New York: Columbia
University Press ，二 004) ， 75- 100 .
2. Alastair lainJohnston , "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy,"
in China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium , ed.
Samuel S. Kim (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press ，工 998); Johnston and Paul Evans ,
"China's Engagement in Int~rnational Security Institutions ," in Engaging China:
Management of an Emerging Power , ed. Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross
(London: Routledge , 1999 九 二 35-7 与 Michael D. Swaine and Alastair lain John-
ston , "China and Arms Control Institutions ," in China Joins the World: Progress
and Prospects , ed. Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg (New York: Council
on Foreign Relations Press，工 999) ， ch. 3; Rosemary Foot, "Chinese Power and the
Idea of a Responsible Power," China Journal , no. 45 (January 2001): 工 -19; Hong-
ying Wang , "Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization ,"
AsianSurvey 41 , 3 (May-June 2000): 475-9 1.
3. See Allen S. Whiting , China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the
Korean War (1960; Stanford: Stanford University Press , 1968); id. , The Chinese
Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press , 1975); and id. , "China's Use of Force , 1950-1996, and Taiwan ," Interna-
tional Security 26 , 2 (Fall 2001): 工 03-3 1.
4. See , e.g. , Denny Roy, "The ‘ China Threat' lssue: Major Arguments ," Asian
Survey 36 (August 1996): 758-71; Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Inter-
preting China's Arrival ," International Security 22 , 3 (Winter 1997-9 8): 36-73.
5. Hans Morgenthau , Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power , 4th ed.
(New York: Knopf, 1967) , ch. 6; quotations from pp. 76 , 70 , 80. Robert Gilpin
makes similar points in his War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press , 198 工)， 3 工 -33.
6. See Paul Huth, "Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical
Assessment," Security Studies 7 , 1 (Autumn 1997): 7
208 SECURITY STUDIES

"The Security Dilemma Revisited ," ibid. 50 , 1 (工 997): 171- 20 1. For applications of
the security dilemma to East Asia , see Thomas J. Christensen , "China , the U. S.-
Japan Alliance , and the Security Dilemma in East Asia ," International Security 巧，
4 (Spring 工 999): 49- 80 , andJennifer M. Lind and Thomas J. Christensen , "Corre-
spondence: Spirals, Security, and Stability in East Asia ," ibid. 24 , 4 (Spring 2000):
190 - 200.
10. Kenneth Waltz , Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill ,
工 979) ，工 87.
1 1. Graham D. Vernon , "Controlled Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of Peaceful

Coexistence ," in Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace , ed. id. (Washington, D. C.:
National Defense University Press ，工 981) ， ch. 7; Adam B. Ulam , Expansion and
Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, I9I7-I967 (New York: Praeger,
1968) , 509-610.
12. Jervis , Perception and Misperception , 66.
13. lbid. , 75.
14. John Mearsheimer , The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton ,
2001) , 3 6 , 3.
15. Glaser, "Security Dilemma Revisited."
工 6. Merce'r, Reputation in International Relations , 6.
17. Allen S. Whiting , China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press ,
1989) , quotation from p. 18; David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Per-
ceives America , 197 之一 1990 (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press , 工 99 1 );
Jianwei 明Tang ， Limited Adversaries: Post-Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press , 2000).
18. Peter J. Katzenstein , "lntroduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Se-
curity," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,
ed. id. (New York: Columbia University Press ，工 99 6 ) ，工 4- 1 7.
19. Stephen Walt , The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca , N. Y.: Cornell University
Press , 1986) , quotation from p. 巧; emphasis added.
20. For a succinct argument that security "incompatibility" is driven by the se-
curity dilemma , see Jervis , Perception and Misperception , 75-76.
2 1. Robert Jervis , "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace ," Ameri-

can Political Science Review 96， 工 (March 2002): 1-14; Emanuel Adler and Michael
Barnett , eds. , Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998); and Richard Rosecrance , ed. , The New Great Power Coalition (Lanham ,
Md.: Rowman&ζLi ttlefield , 2001).
22. Mercer , Reputation in International Relations.
二 3. See , e.g. , JackSnyder , "Anarchy and Cul
 CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY 209

and the Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press ，工 999);
and Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein , "Why 1s There No NATO in Asia?
Collective 1dentity, Regionalism , and the Origins of Multilateralism ," International
Organization 56 , 3 (Summer 2002): 575-607. For state-level analyses , see]onathan
Mercer , "Anarchy and 1dentity," International Organization 49 , 2 (Spring 1995):
229 - 52 , and Alastair 1ain ]ohnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand
Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton , N.].: Princeton University Press , 1995).
Mercer seeks to explain why the state as an in-group pursues relative gains , while
]ohnston draws on these social psychology insights to illuminate the role of symbolic
strategic culture in 孔1ing China.
二 5. Copeland , '‘ Do Reputations Matter?" 5 5 - 6 工.
26. Adler and Barnett, Security Communities , 47-48 and passim.
二 7. Henry R. Nau , At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign
Policy (Ithaca , N. Y.: Cornell University Press , 2002).
28. See Robert Latham , The Liberal Moment: Modernity, Security, and the
Making of Postwar International Order (New York: Columbia University Press ,
1997) , ch. 3 and passim.
29. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press , 1999) , 2 但. See also Latham , Liberal Moment; Cronin ,
Community Under Anarchy.
30. Wang Zhongren , "‘ China Threat' Theory Groundless ," Beijing Review ,
no. 40 (14-20 ]uly 1997): 7-8 , in Foreign Broadcast 1nformation Service (hereafter
cited as FBIS) , FTS199707 工 6000009.
3 1. Fang Zhi , "Who Threatens Who After All ," Liaowang, n.d. , in FBIS ,
21 March 工 996， FTS1996032100oo061.
32. Guan Cha ]ia [Observer] , "China's Development 1s Beneficial to World
Peace and Progress-Refuting the ‘ China Threat' Theory," Renmin Ribao , overseas
edition , 22 December 1995 , 1 , 3 , in FB1S , FTS199 5I 22000064.
33. Yan Xuetong , "Why Has 1ndia Created a ‘ China Threat Theory,'" Guang-
ming Ribao online，工 9 May 199 8, 3, in FBIS , FTS19980520000644; China Radio
1nternational in Mandarin to N ortheast Asia , South Pacific , Hong Kong , Macao ,
and Southeast Asia , 0900 GMT, 2 工 May 1998 , in FB1S , FTS19980521001220.
34. Wang Hui , "1ndia's ‘ China Threat' Unfair," China Daily online ，工 4 March
2001 , in FBIS , CPP200103 14000063; Zhao Zhangyun , "1rresponsible Argument,"
Renmin Ribao online, 7 ]une 2001 , 3 , in FBIS , CPP20010607000038; Wang ]ia-
q
210 SECURITY STUDIES

37. Liang Lihua, "A Political Myth of Multiple Incarnations: The China Threat
Theory," Dangdai Sichao , no. 2 (20 April 1998): 57-63 , in FBIS , FTS199806020
0117 1. See also 明Tang Jisi , ed. , W告nming yu guoji zhengzhi [Civi1izations and inter-
national politics] (Shanghai: People's Press , 1995)'
38. "James Lilley's Sorrow," Renmin Ribao , 1 February 1997 , FBIS ,
FTS19970201000694; Yang Xuejun and Li Hanmei, "Key Factors Affecting Com-
ing Japanese Diplomatic Strategies and Actions ," Zhanlue Yu Guanli , no. 1 (Febru-
ary 1998): 王 7-23 ， in FBIS , FTS19980502000166.
39. Gu Ping , "What Is the Motive for Be1ittling China?" Renmin Ribao , 16 Sep-
tember 1999 , 6, in FBIS , FTS 19991023001000.
40. Liu Xiaobiao , "From ‘ Threat Theory' to 'Collapse Theory,' " Renmin Ribao
online , 11 June 2002 , 3, in FBIS , CPP200206rrooo045.
4 1. Zi Zhongyun , "For the Maximum Interests of the Nation , for the Long-term
Welfare of the People ," Taipingyang Xuebao , no. 21 (December 14 , 1999): 工 0- 1 5 ，
in FBIS , CPP20000725000044 , 6.
42. John Garver, "Sino-American Relations in 2001: The Di面cult Accommoda-
tion of Two Great Powers ," International Journal 57 (Spring 2002): 309 , calls this
Chinese view "the law of avoidance."
4 3. Yong Deng , "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives of the U. S.
Global Strategy," Political Science Quarterly rr6 , 3 (Fa1l 2001): 343-65.
44. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Wash-
ington , D. C.: National Defense University Press , 2000) , ch. 3. On India , see John
Garver , The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War
Era (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002).
45. Quoted in Garver, "Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity," 869.
46. Ibid.; Shirk, "One-Sided Rivalry"; Yan Xuetong , "Why Has India Created a
‘ China Threat' Theory," Beijing China Radio International in Mandarin to North-
east Asia , South Pacific , Hong Kong , Macao , and Southeast Asia , 21 May 1998 , in
FBIS , FTS19980521001220. For the broad context of Chinese reactions , see Ming
Zhang , China 云 Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear
Tests (Washington , D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , 1999).
47. "Chinese Premier , Indian PM Hold Talks ," Renmin Ribao on1ine, http://
english. peop le. com. cn /200306/巧 /eng20030623_rr8736.shtml (accessed 23 June
2003); Fang Zhou, "China, India Forming Strategic Ties ," China Daily , 18 Feb
 CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY 211

49. Gu Ping , "New Pretext for ]oining the TMD System ," Renmin Ribao online ,
4 August 2000 , 6 , in FBIS , CPP 20000804000053γ‘ ]apanese 'Dream of Military
Power ,'" Liaowang , no. 37 (II September 2000): 28-29 , in FBIS ,
CPP200009 工 9000054; Tang Tianri , "]apan Seeks New Pretext to Expanding Mili-
tary Forces ," Liaowang, 16 ] uly 200 工， in FBIS , CPP20010727000031; Sheng Xin ,
"What Intentions Does ]apan Have in Raising Again the ‘ China Threat' Theory?"
Jiefangjun Bao online ,.in Chinese , ]uly 2001 , 5, in FBIS , CPP200107 巧 000057.
50. For the complete version of the guidelines , see Michael J. Green and Patrick
Cronin , eds. , The U. S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Coun-
ci1 on Foreign Relations Press , 1999) , app. 3, 333-45. For a comprehensive review
of Chinese concerns over the new U.S.-]apanese alliance , see Banning Garrett and
Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions About Revitalization of the U. S.-]apan Al-
liance ," Asian Survey 37 , 4 (April 1997): 383-402. For an in-depth assessment of
the alliance's security implications , see Christensen , "China , the U. S.-]apan Alliance ,
and the Security Dilemma in East Asia."
5 I. Ni Feng , "Enhanced US-]apanese Security Alliance." ]apanese accounts
seem to support Chinese suspicion. See , e.g. , Koji Murata , "]apan's Military Coop-
eration and Alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region ," and Akio Watanabe , "The PRC-
]apanRelationship: Heading for a Collision?" in The Security Environment in the
Asia-Pacifìc , ed. Hung-Mao Tien and Tun-]en Cheng (Armonk , N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe ,
2000) , chs. 4 , 5. For an excellent account of the emerging dynamics in Sino-
]apanese relations since the mid 1990s , see Michael J. Green , Japan 云 Reluctant
Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Pal-
grave , 2001) , ch. 3. The objective , according to one key architect of the renewed
U. S.-]apan alliance , was to strengthen the U. S. engagement policy toward China. See
]oseph Nye ]r., The Paradox of American Power (New York: Oxford University
Press , 2002) , 22.
52. The full text of the "]oint Statement of the U. S.-]apan Security Consultative
Committee" can be found at www.state.gov/r /pa/prs/psho05/42490.htm (accessed
3 October 2005). For Chinese reactions , see Xiu Chunping, "MeiRi zaixiang 'Taidu'
fachu cuowu xinhao" [U. S. , ]apan send wrong signal to "Taiwan independence" yet
again ], Renmin Ribao , overseas ed. , 3 March 2005; Weng Xiang
212 SECURITY STUDIES

Central Asian Countries and China's Western Security Environment ," Zhanlue yu
Guanli , no. 4 (August 1999): 32-38 , in FBIS , FTS19991027000867.
59. Dong Fureng , "On ‘ Theory of China Threat ,'" Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao
online , 2 February 2002 , in FBIS , CPP20020202000017.
60. Song Niansheng , "Heping jueqi, Zhongguo fazhan zhilu" [Peaceful rise:
China's road to development], Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times ], 23 April 2004 , 3,
www.people.com.cn/GB/paper68 1r 1864 1r 06945 工 .html (accessed 3 October 2005).
61. Tian Xin, '‘ China Threat Theory Collapses of Itself, as Military Spending of
Both US and Japan Has Far Exceeded That of China ," Hong Kong W如n Wei Po ,
6 March 2002 , A6 , in FBIS , CPP20020306000090.
62. Guan Cha Jia , "China's Development Is Benefìcial to World Peace and
Progress"; Fang Zhi , "明Tho Threatens Whom After All?"; Wang Zhongren , "‘ China
Threat' Theory Groundless"; commentary, Jiefangjun Bao , 21 January 2002 , 5, in
FBIS , CPP200201221000008.
63. Wang Zhongren , "‘ China Threa t' Theory Groundless"; Gu Ping , "明That Is
the Motive for Belittling China?" 2.
64. Peng Huaidong , "From the ‘ Yellow Peril' to the ‘ China Threat," Zhenli de
Zhuiqiu , 11 April 1997 , in FBIS, FTS19970602001429.
65. Yue Yang , "China's Opportunity Theory," Zhongguo Jingji Shibao online ,
12 April 1999 , in FBIS , FTS19990422000265.
66. "The Rise of China-A Threat or an Opportuni町，" People 's Daily online ,
at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn12002 工 21221eng2002 工 222_ 108 9 巧 .shtml (ac-
cessed 3 October 200 5).
67. See Gong Wen , "Let History Record the 15 Years-Memorandum on the
Negotiations for China's 耶TTO Entry," Renmin Ribao online , II November 2001 ,
2, in FBIS , CPP200IIII2000058; He Chong, "Major Signifìcance of China Be-
coming a WTO Member," in Hong Kong Zhongguo Tongxun She , II November
2001 , in FBIS , CPP200II1IIOoo086.
68. Guan Yuanzhi , '‘ China Is Not Stopping Its Efforts to Rejoin the GATT and
Face Up to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 ," Zhongguo Gaige Bao , 2 March
1998 , 3, in FBIS , FTS 工 9980416000855; Long Yongtu , "Join the World Trade
Organization , Fuse into the International Community Mainstream," Guoji Maoyi
Wenti , September 1999 , 1-10 , 30 , in FBIS , FTS199909 二9 000 5 8 工 ; "Long Yongtu:
Avoiding Disadvantages While Pursuing Advantages of Globalization," Ji'nan
Dazhong Ribao online ，工 o October 2001 , in FBIS , CPP200II010000223; Sun
Xiaosheng and Yu Jingzhong , "Long Yongtu Says Cþina's Accession to th
 CHINA REACTS TO THE CHINA THREAT THEORY 2I3

7I. Thomas Moore and Dixia Yang , "Empowered and Restrained: Chinese For-
eign Policy in the Age of Economic 1nterdependence," in Making of Chinese Foreign
and Security Policy , ed. Lampton , ch. 7; Hongying Wang, "National 1rnage Build-
ing and Chinese Foreign Policy," in China Rising, ed. Deng ai1 d Wang , 73-I02.
72. Swaine and Johnston , "China and Arms Control 1nstitutions," I34; Samuel
Kim and Lowell Dittmer , "Whither China's Quest for National 1dentity," in China 云
Quest for National Identity , ed. id. (Ithaca , N. Y.: Cornell University Press ，工 993) ，二 8 I.
73. Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic
Mobilization , and Sino-American Conflict, I 94 7- I 9 5 8 (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton
University Press ，工 996); Alastair 1ain Johnston , "Realism(s) and Chinese Security
Policy," in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies at陀r the Cold War , ed.
Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press ,
I999) , ch. 8.
74. Yang Guojun and Wang Dajun , "Li Ruihuan Comments on ‘ China Threat
Theory,''' Xinhua Domestic Service , in Chinese , I3 December I999 ，之， in FB1S ,
FTSI999I2I300I045; Luo Yuan, "Zhongguo xuyao lilian liuzhong daguo xin-
tai" [China needs to cultivate six types of great power mentality], 2I October 2005 ,
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/worldhoo 5-I 0/江/contenC3662080.htm (accessed
2 N ovember 2005).
75. For evidence from social psychology and applications of group bias to in-
ternational relations , see Eugene Burnstein , Mark Abboushi , and Shinobu Ki-
tayama , "How the Mind Preserves the 1mage of the Enemy," in Behavioη Culture，
and Conflict in World Politics , ed. William Zimmerman and Harold K. Jacobson
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press , 1993) ，工 97-229; Mercer, Reputation in
International Relations , esp. ch. 2.
76. Yang Guojun and Wang Dajun , "Li Ruihuan Comments on ‘ China Threat
Theory.' "
77. Jia Qingguo , "Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese Perceptions of the Engage-
ment Policy Debate in the U.S. ," Journal of Contemporary China , no. 27 (200 工):
32I-30; Wu Xinbo , "To Be an Enlightened Superpower," Washington Quarterly
抖， 3 (Summer 200I): 63-7 工.
78. Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim , "Hierarchy Under Anarchy: 1nfor-
mal Empire and the East German State ," International Organization 49 , 4 (Auturnn
I99 5): 689-72 I.
79. Guan Cha Jia , "China's Development 1s Beneficial to World Peace and
Progress ," 5. See als
21 4 SECURITY STUDIES

"What Will China Do About US Preemptive Action?" Beijing Shijie Zhishi , no. 16
(16 August 2002): 二 4-25 ， in FBIS , CPP20020906000167.
82. See , e.g. , Yuan Peng , "‘工 1 September's Incident and Sino-U.S. Relations ,' "
Xiandai Guoji Guan刀 20 N ovember 2001 , 19 一巧 63 ， in FBIS ,
CPP20011204000 工 80; Liu Aicheng , "明Then Will the Cold War Mentality Find
Its Resting Place?" Renmin Ribao online, 8 June 2004 , 3, in FBIS ,
CPP20040608000036; Huang Qing , "Anyone Who Poses Threat Shall Bear Re-
sponsibility," People 云 Daily online , 2 March 2005 , http://english.people.com.cn /
200 503/0 2leng200 50302_17 5 287 .html (accessed 巧 March 2005).
83. Wendt, Social Theory in International Politics , 360-63.
84. William Kalkhoff and Christopher Barnum , "The Effects of Status-
Organizing and Social Identity Processes on Patterns of Social Influence ," Social
Psychology Quarterly 句， 2 (2000): 10 1. See also Roger Brown , Social Psychology ,
2d ed. (New York: Free Press ，工 986) ， ch. 工 7; Burnstein et a l., "How the Mind Pre-
serves the Image of the Enemy."
8 5. See Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore , "China Views Globalization:
Towards a New Great Power Politics?" W如shington Quarterly 27 , 3 (Summer
2004): II7- 26.
86. See , e.g. , Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moon Hwang , China Under Threat:
The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press , 1980).
87. On general reputation , see Jonathan Mercer, "Reputation and Rational De-
terrence Theory," Security Studies 7 , 1 (Autumn 1997): 100-113 , and id. , Reputa-
tion in International Relations , 36 - 42.
Part Two
CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION
jjazal--44』4
司 Z百噩噩
8 More Than Just Saying No
CHINA'S EVOLVING APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY
AND INTERVENTION SINCE TIANAN 岛1EN

Allen Carlson

In the spring of 1999 , vocal Chinese opposition to the American-led

NATO operation in Kosovo exposed a. set of apparently widening differ-
ences between the People's Republic of China and other members of the in-
ternational system (especially the United States) over the role of sovereignty
in international politics , and the place of international intervention within
the contemporary international system .1 According to many Western ob-
servers , Beijing's stubbornness on these issues was indicative of its failure to
become _a more integrated and responsible member of international society. 2
China , .~y utilizing the rhetoric of nonintervention and protecting sover-
eignty, appeared to simpl}古e saying "飞 no"tωo humanitariar川nt臼ervention an
multilateral peaceke 臼ee叩
pu吨 .)N忖灿
创net由
O hel
时eless ， this conclusion has not been sup-
ported by a comprehensivé empirical investigation into the main character-
istics of the Chinese approach to sovereignty and intervention during the
1990S.3 This chapter is intended to rectify that oversight. In so doing , it
challenges much of the conventional wisdom about the ~!!!!1!!!sigence of
Beijing's approach to sovereignty and sheds new light on the increasingly
complex relationship that has emerged during this period between China
and the rest of the international system.
Since 1989 , China's position on intervention seems to have been defined
bya set of rigid , unyielding principles that strictly limit when Beijing will sup-
port the international community's right to intervene: for intervention to be
legitimate, it must have UN authorization, take place at the invitation of the
target state , and respect sovereignty; force is only to be used when all other
options have proven ineffective. 4 The prominence of such principles in
o面cial Chinese rhetoric has led many observers to reach the premature con-
clusion that Beijing opposes all forms of intervention and is wedded toan an-
tiquariari approach to sovereignty. In fact , since the early 1990s , the Chinese
2I8 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

have consistently fÌ nessed the meaning of these principles in order to create a

rhetorical space for China's acquiescence in various "明Testern" -sponsored
UN operations. Moreover, during this period, Beijing did little to oppose
multilatera1 peacekeeping, and its po1icies have evo1ved from staking out a
position of reluctant participation to one of expanded invo1vement in peace-
keeping and humanitarian intervention. Thus , although Beijing opposed the
idea of intervention in principle , Chinese 1eaders also committed to a series
of mu1tilatera1 endeavors that gradually modi fÌ ed China's approach to peace-
keeping and , by extension , sovereignty's role in international politics.
This development, however , was slow in coming. At the start of the 19 90S ,
change in Beijing's stance was retarded by a combination of the clear-cut
utility that an invocation of the princip1e of noninterference had for a gov-
ernment facing pronounced challenges to the 1egitimacy of its ru1e , and the
shadow that the past 10ss of sovereignty during the "century of humiliation"
cast upon contemporary Chinese thinking about the norm. 5 lndeed , from
Beijing's perspective , the only bene fÌ t to be gained from acquiescing to the
wave of international interventions that took place in the early 1990S lay in
the extent to which such moves might facilitate a breakout from post-
Tiananmen dip10matic isolation , but this consideration proved to be sub-
stantial enough to push the Chinese to use their seat in the UN Security
Council to cooperate with U.S.-led multilateral initiatives.
While Chinese misgivings about an erosion of sovereignty's role in inter-
national politics remained quite pronounced over the course of the decade ,
during this period two new forces also subtly reframed Chinese delibera-
tions on intervention and sovereignty. First, new international norms in-
volving intervention (and concurrently the necessity to sometimes trans-
gress conventional sovereign boundaries for humanitarian reasons) gained
an increasingly broad and deep acceptance among China's foreign policy
elites. 6 This process , which Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink have aptly
labe1ed "norms diffusion ," that has also been identi fÌ ed as "social1earning"
led to the emergence within China of more open, flexible interpretations of
sovereignty's role in international po1itics. 7 It also , at 1east indirectly, opened
new terrain in B
 CH1NA'S APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 219

pertaining to the task of describing and explaining sovereignty's changing

role within the contemporary international system~ Section two then exam-
ines the way in which the Chinese position on the sovereignty-intervention
dynamic changed from the start of the GulfWar through the late 1990s.
The t}úrd section details the Chinese stance on Kosovo and East Timor, and
the evolution of the Chinese approach to sovereignty through the fall of
2001. The fourth section briefly explores China's position on the U.S.-led
气iVar on terrorism" and in Iraq , and the modest expansion of China's in-
volvement in UN peacekeeping operations during this period. The conclu-
sion discusses theimplications of the claims made here for our understand-
ing of the broader trajectory of China's rise.

Sovereignty and Intervention: Concepts~

Causes~ and the China Case

Before describing and explaining the manner in which China's ap-

proach to sovereignty and intervention has changed , it is necessary fìrst to
reflect briefly on the general relationship between sovereignty and interven-
tion in international politics , and where the words and actions produced by
individual states fìt within that dynami c. It is also of value to consider the
competing arguments put forward in the fìeld of international studies to ex-
plain why individual states take particular positions on this nexus. Such
considerations then also highlight the importance of more closely examin-
ing China's stance on these issues.
To begin with , sovereignty is one of the foundational organizing principles
of contemporary international politics. In a general sense , it is comprised of
"the recognition of a state's right to exercise fìnal authority over its own af-
fairs ," and , as such , it creates a division between the internal affairs of each
state and the concerns of the broader international system. 8 In contrast , in-
tervention involves the projection of force by an outside actor, or actors , into
the affairs of a sovereign state. Historically, violation of sovereign rights
through intervention has been common. Indeed, it is quite obvious that
stronger states have long interfered in the affairs of their weaker peers. 9
Yet the rate at which intervention has occurred is not a constant. Over
the past decade , multilateral intervention, especially operations authorized
by the United Nations , has become an increasingly common phenomenon
in international politics. For example , two-thirds of the fìfty-six peacekeep-
ing operations established since 1948 have come into being since 1991
(with thirteen under way in January 2004). In addition , despite annual fluc-
tuations , the total number of peacekeeping personnel rose in a dramatic
fashion , peaking in 1993 at over 80,000 military and civilian personnel
二!.20 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

deployed. Furthermore , the peacekeeping budget mushroomed , reaching

U.S.$3 billìon in I99 5 .10
At the same time , not all interventions are the same. During the I99os ,
UN-authorized interventions moved beyond the limited con且nes of conven-
tional peacekeeping operations to include peace-building and con f1 ict-
prevention activities. Alongside this development , the claim emerged that
multilateral intervention has "as its purpose (or at least as one of its prin-
cipal purposes) the relieving of grave human suffering."ll Indeed , while
humanitarian concerns have not always been the most prominent rationale
for intervening since the early I99os , they have seldom been absent from the
rhetoric of those supporting any particular intervention, and they have
always been part of the call for international action.
The determination of when this type of intervention is merited , and how
it should proceed , has evolved out of a complex interaction between a wide
array of actors within the international system. The United Nations itself,
international nongovernmental organizations (such as Amnesty Interna-
tional) , and the international media are all involved. However , the stance
taken by the representatives of states (those intervening , intervened in , and
less directly involved) has played the primary role in specifying the balance
between sovereignty and intervention during this period.
The actions taken by each of the five permanent members of the UN's Se-
curity Council (the United States , Great Britain, France , Russia , and China)
are of particular signifìcance , because each of these states has veto power
over any proposed UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operation. Beyond votes in
the Security Council , each of the relevant parties can also provide a degree of
material support for an operation once it has begun. In addition to such pol-
icy measures , the efforts of the leaders of each of the fìve permanent mem-
ber states to justify (or, for that matter challenge) any given action are of
particular importance. In the process of talking about intervention , politi-
cians specify their understanding of sovereignty's role in the international
system. At the same time , what foreign policy elites (rather than top lead-
ers) in these states say to each other about both issues plays an important
role in specifying the point of intersection bet~een sovereignty and inter-
vention , and under what condition
 CHINA 、 S APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 221

primarily the product of subtle shifts in the manner in which leaders attempt
to realize fairly static interests. Thus , when heads of state are confronted with
clearly de岳ned material incentives for compromising sovereignty's role in
international politics , they will act accordingly. For example , Stephen Kras-
ner has argued that politicians use sovereignty when it suits their larger in-
terests and disregard it when such interests change due to new incentives (an
opportunity to benefit from participation in an international convention or
contract) or lack of choice (as the subject of international coercion or im-
position).13 On the other hand , other scholars have argued that change is
largely a result of the increasing salience of new boundar)吨ransgressmg nor-
mative structures and transnational identity constructs that haverede且ned
the way in which elites think about the balance between sovereignty and
intervention. This ideational argument hinges on the claim that sover-
elgn町 's foundational role in international politics was created and sus-
tained through processes of social interaction between the actors (states)
within the system (even as the structure of the system shaped both their
interests and identities).14
Within the context of this general discussion , China's stance on sover-
eignty and intervention poses a particularly interesting case for students of
international politics and Chinese foreign policy. On the 且rst level , China's
position as a permanent member of the Security Council makes it a key actor
in determining the fate of any proposed UN peacekeeping mission. In addi-
tion , through the 1980s , the Chinese had staked out a particularly narrow in-
terpretation of the international community's right to intervene , a stance
predicated upon an interpretation of sovereignty as a virtually sacred right of
states. Determining how much Beijing's position changed during the subse-
quent decade , and the causes underlying the shift (or lack thereof) in the
Chinese approach , is then of central importance to understanding how and
why the sovereignty-intervention dynamic evolved during this time. On the
second level , gauging the extent of change in the Chinese position will pro-
vide a crucial yardstick for measuring how far China has been integrated into
the international system since the late 1980s, and the degree to which China
has been "socialized" into the interna

The Chinese Stance from I990 to I998: From

Limited Approval to Tentative lnvolvement
in Multilateral 1ntervention

Between 1989 and 1999 , the Chinese government reluctantly began

to accept the development of the new interventionist trend in international
politics. The first move in this direction came during the prelude to the Gulf
222 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

War in I990. At that time , Beijing supported the initial UN Security Coun-
cil resolution (UN SC 660) condemning Iraq and demanding an Ir aqi with-
drawal from Kuwait. 15
In the aftermath of this first post-Cold War military conflict, Samuel
Kim astutely observed that China's initial acquiescence to UN-authorized
action against Iraq should be viewed in relation to China's economic and
political isolation following the suppression of student-led demonstrations
in the spring of I989.16 The argument here was that while the international
coalition against China had begun to fray before the onset of the Gulf cri-
sis , China remained in a weak and vulnerable position within the interna-
tional system in the summer of I990. China's leaders then understood that
supporting the fight against Iraq would have a broad setof political and
economic benefits for China.
Evidence of such calculations can be seen in the Chinese leadership's rel-
atively transparent wavering on the initial scope of Chinese backing for the
wa r. 17 Indeed , while Beijing insisted that its support for UN SC 660 was
based on underlying principles , and the United States argued that there was
no linkage between the Chinese vote and Sino-U.S. relations , soon after the
resolution was passed by the Security Council (with Chinese approval) , the
Bush administration took a series of measures to end U.S.-imposed sanc-
tions on Beijing. In other words , China was , at least indirectly, rewarded for
its support for a conflict that in principle it could very well have opposed.
Beijing's vote in the Security Council marked an important turning point
in the Chinese stance on UN-authorized multilateral operations. However,
subsequent Chinese behavior also quickly revealed the depth of Chinese
misgivings about intervention. For example , after approving UN SC 660 ,
China abstained on UN SC 678 , the key resolution authorizing the use of
all means necessary to force Iraq out of Kuwait. In explaining China's deci-
sion, China's foreign minister, Qian Qichen , urged that the United Nations
use "great caution and avoid taking hasty actions on such a major question
as authorizing some member states to take military actions against another
member state." But he added that since the resolution drew on UN SC 660 ,
"China will not cast a negative vote. "18 Beijing .also abstained on a pair of
resolutions (UN SC 687 , 688) that created the mechanism for monitoring
Iraqi we
 CHINA'S APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 223

specifìcally, Chinese foreign policy elites were worried that such trends
might erode Beijing's own somewhat tenuous claims to regions and peoples
that were pushing against the sovereign boundaries of the PRC. Thus , Wang
Kehua , a Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) researcher insisted in
an article that attacked Lee Teng-hui's apparent support for Taiwanese
independence (which Wang argued drew on post-Cold War human rights
and self-determination rhetoric) , "The nation and sovereignty are insepara-
ble , and state sovereignty is inseparable."19 Or , as one international legal
expert whose editorials were prominently featured in the Chinese media
following Tiananmen frankly commented during a personal interview con-
ducted in 1997 , "You ask why we placed such emphasis on sovereignty
after Tiananmen? Because it was our aim to prevent U.S. interference in
Chinese affairs." 20
These misgivings were not just self-interested, they also drew on the his-
torical memory of past transgressions against China's sovereign rights and
an unrelenting commitment to protect contemporary Chinese sovereignty.
One prominent example of the way in which Chinese leaders viewed such
issues through precisely this type of historical lens can be found in Deng
Xiaoping's spring 1990 commentary on the ongoing Western-imposed sanc-
tions China was facing. Deng noted , "1 am a Chinese , and 1 am familiar with
the history of aggression against China. When 1 heard that the seven West-
ern countries , at their summit meeting , had decided to impose sanctions on
China , my immediate association was to 1900, when the allied forces of the
eight powers invaded China. "21 More speci且cally， as noted during a 1998
interview with an international relations scholar whose work is seen as be-
ing quite influential in foreign-policy-making circles Chi旦旦's historicallos~
gf sovereignty "leads to a certain type of values 出at lead [the] Chinese to be
more concerned with protecting sovereignty in calculating the relationship
between national interest and sovereignty." 22
During the following years , Beijing's half-hearted endorsement of the
Gulf War, and the causes underlying it , came to define China's stance on in-
tervention. However, the Chinese position was not static. lndeed , starting
in the early 1990s, Beijing also committed a very limited , but expanding ,
number of personnel to supporting roles in select operation
乙二4 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

with the monitoring of a cease-fire between warring factions , and alsocon-

tributed a small force to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) between
I993and I997. 24
These deployments provided material support for the rhetorical position ,
and the voting record in the Security Council , that the Chinese were stak-
ing out. However, they took place within the context of the expression of
increasingly high levels of skepticism in Beijing about the direction in which
UN peacekeeping was headed. Thus , while China initially supported the
I992 resolution establishing the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in
the former Yugoslavia , it actively opposed the expansion of UNPROFOR's
mandate during the ensuing period , especially the I992 resolution that
authorized the use of "all necessary means" for the provision of humani-
tarian aid in Bosnia. Yet, rather than utilizing its veto power in the Security
Council , China simply abstained on the dozens of resolutions on the dete-
riorating situation in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia proposed during the
following years.
In the same vein , the Chinese 且rst supported the Security Council's
I99I-92 initiatives in Somalia. However, once the UN operation became
bogged down in Mogadishu the following year, Beijing became increasingly
critical of the mission's intrusive nature , and China abstained on each of the
subsequent resolutions designed to provide multilateral forces in Somalia
with a broader mandate. In addition , Beijing was critical of the limited UN
actions proposed to deal with the I993-94 humanitarian crisisin Rwanda.
Thus , China abstained on the main resolution (UN SC 929) on Rwanda
that was passed in I994 , emphasizing that the UN move had not garnered
any indication of '‘ co-operation and consent" from the parties involved in
the conf1 ict there. 25 Beijing also voiced opposition to the UN-authorized ,
U.S.-ledoperation in Haiti the same yea r. Indeed , in explaining his coun-
try's abstention on UN SC 940 , the Chinese ambassador warned that the
actions in Haiti might create a dangerous new precedent in international
politics , one that violated basic UN principles and the norms of interna-
tionallaw. 26
In sum, through the mid I990s , the official Chinese position on multi-
lateral interven tÌ on was one of cautious acceptance and incremental change.
China continued to oppose the expansion of the "Westγright to intervene
in most internal crises , but its opposit
 CHINA 乡 S APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 225

LThis d叫opmer川as 川art ft阶d by the often overlooked fact 巾t at

this time a handful of influential Chinese foreign policy elites were begin-
ning to articulate more flexible , open approaches to sovereignty and inter-
vention than had previou句 been seen in China. )ro be sure , much Chinese
analysis was simply designed to defend a starklý unyielding interpretation
of sovereignty and attack the "West," and especially America , for interfer-
ing in other countries' internal affairs. 27 However , even as these charges
were highlighted in China's 0面cial media , other analysts were cautiously
challenging the accuracy of such rhetorical broadsides against intervention.
This development was a product of the new normative trends in the "West"
that favored intervention , because much of the discussion of these issues
within China was driven by attempts to respond to daims being made by
Western scholars and politicians about sovereign change. Moreover, while
the ties between such analysis and speci f1. c policy decisions are di面cult to
trace , it is also dear that a number of those who advocated the development
of more flexible approaches to sovereignty have gained important access to
decision-makers and top leaders since the late 1990S.28 1n addition , as 1
show later in this chapter, such flexibility has , over time and to a limited
extent , worked its way into China's 0面cial discourse on sovereignty and
mtervent lO n.
Such views were 且rst expressed in China's legal journals. An early ex-
ample of this new thinking can be found in Xu Guojin's 1992 contribution
to Zhongguo Faxue (Chinese Legal Studies) arguing that all states have in-
direct (j ianjie) human rights obligations (against genocide , racism , and slav-
ery) , and in cases where a state violates such obligations , the international
community has the right to act , and this cannot be construed as interfering
in the target state's internal affairs. 29 1n addition , Li 孔1ing， a legal scholar at
Peking University, argued in the same journal that while the UN Charter
made it dear that the principle of noninterference was consistent with the
protection of human rights , in regard to certain human rights problems , it
was still "acceptable to get rid of" such a norm (走 eyi paichu bu ganshe
yuanze).30 The following year Li Buyun, a senior scholar at CASS's Human
Rights Research 1nstitute, observed that aspects of the contemporary inter-
national human rights system extended
226 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

Economics and Politics. "In some situations , placing limitations on the prac-
tice of sovereignty is related to the unjust and unreasonable international
order , [and] very likely the result ofWestern countries attempting to develop
anarrow, selfish interest, but on the other hand , the conditions [sisu] on
sovereignty reflect the rea1ity of the deepening of the trend toward global
interdependence and international society, reflecting a pressing need to solve
serious global issues ," Wang contended. 32
As important as Wang's guarded acknowledgement of change was , it was
soon surpassed by a round of even more open , flexible analysis , which even
more directly accepted the perceived rise of new humanitarian norms in the
"West." For example , in 1996, Wang Shuliang, a researcher at the Shang-
hai Academy of Social Science , argued that "the practice of sovereignty is
limited [xianzhi] by the protection of human rights." 33 Thus , Wang noted
that if astate failed in respect to human rights principles , it could expect to
be condemned by "international society," and in this case it would be "hard
to use the claim of noninterference" to fend off such criticism. 34 In 1998 ,
Zeng Lingliang took this argument much further in the pages of Zhongguo
Faxue by maintaining that after the end of the Cold War, internationallaw
had increasingly permeated into and decreased the domain of state author-
ity. Thus , it was increasingly clear that in internationallaw, global interests
(renlei de zhengti liyi) took precedence over the interests of individual sov-
ereign states. In addition , international humanitarian law had "restricted
[xianzhi] state sovereignty." 35
While such direct admissions about the scope of sovereign change may
strike many observers as being outside the mainstream of Chinese thinking
about sovereignty and intervention , an extensive set of interviews I con-
ducted in Beijing and Shanghai in .1997 and 1998 revealed that Zeng's more
flexible understanding of sovereignty had been broadly accepted within the
Chinese foreign po 1icy community. Indeed , of the 109 individuals inter-
viewed , well over half (58) accepted that at least a 1imited change had taken
place in sovereignty in the post-Cold War period. 36
During this period , official Chinese human rights po 1icies exhibited an
unprecedented level of flexibility. China's lead~rs pledged to sign the two
main human rights treaties and directly en
 CHINA'S APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 227

the Chinese position on these issues (at least in regard to supporting inter-
vention) remained largely untested.

I999- 200I : From Kosovo to EastTimor and Beyond

In the early stages of the Kosovo conflict, Beijing maintained the same
position of reluctant acquiescence that it had advanced in response to previ-
ous international crises in the 1990s. Thus , in March 1998 , when the earli-
est of the major Security Council resolutions (UN SC 1160) on Kosovo was
proposed , the Chinese delegation voiced its opposition to the motion but
opted to abstain on the final vote rather than use its veto power. The Chinese
explanation for this stance was firm but not particularly combative. For ex-
ample , the offìcial statement on the resolution simply noted that the Kosovo
matter was "an internal affair" and urged the United N ations to proceed with
"caution."38
During the following months , Chinese restraint began to unravel as the
United States and its European allies became more deeply involved in Kosovo.
The first indications of this shift were largely framed in terms of Chinese
criticism of the leading role that the six-power Contact Group (France , Ger-
many, Italy, Russia , Great Britain, and the United States) and the Organi-
zation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were playing in
managing the conflict. Moreover , such warnings quickly became more pro-
nounced through a series of increasingly direct Chinese statements in the
Security Council and other UN forums. 39 Once the air war began in 1999 ,
Chinese opposition became even more blunt. Such objections then turned
to indignant outrage in May following the unintentional (although within
China almost universally viewed as deliberate) NATO bombing of the Chi-
nese embassy in Belgrade. This shift was vividly highlighted by the large-
scale popular protests against the bombing that engulfed the U.S. embassy
and consulates in China.
For many in the "West," the embassy demonstrations created an endur-
ing image of a Chinese nation at odds with the rest of the international com-
munity on the issues of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. How-
ever, only months after anti-U.S. , anti-NATO protests paralyzed relations
between China and the NATO states (especially the United States) , Beijing
played a quiet supportive role in facilitating humanitarian intervention in
East Timo r. Indeed , China voted in favor of both UN resolutions (1264 ,
1272) that authorized international intervention in the East Timor conflict
and issued a number of offìcial statements in support of these votes. 40 In
addition , Beijing substantiated its support by deploying a small number of
civilian police .to the UNTAET mission in September 1999.
228 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

The positive Chinese assessment of the international handling of the East

Timor crisis underscores the relative continuity in the Chinese position on
intervention , despite the fact that Beijing had voiced such strong opposition
to the Kosovo operation just months earlier. At the same time , this po 1icy
marked the on'g oing evolution of Chinese positioning on intervention , in
that the international response to the situation in East Timor did not entirely
conform to the principled stance that Beijing had previously promoted. For
example , the Indonesian "request" for international assistance was less than
enthusiastic and was widely seen as the product of fairly intense pressure
from the very same Western powers of which China had been so critical dur-
ing the height of the Kosovo campaign. In addition , while the intervention
in East Timor was much more of a UN operation than was Kosovo , it was
also obvious that Australia played a central , if not unilateral , role in man-
aging the international response.
As Beijing was enacting such policies , in the aftermath of Kosovo and East
Timor, Western scholars began redoubling their efforts to come to terms with
the normative , theoretical , and policy implications of humanitarian inter-
vention and engaged in a series of debates over the implications of both ac-
tions for sovereignty's role in international politics. Within China during the
immediate post-Kosovo period , however , there was little indication of such
subtle deliberations and differences of opinion. For example , the NATO
operations in Kosovo were universally derided as a form of interference
(ganshe).41 In addition , the Chinese discussion of the Balkan conflict was
dominated , even before the embassy bombing , by a singular surge of fiercely
critical analysis that sharply questioned the legitimacy of the Western con-
cept of humanitarian intervention and staunchly defended the principle of
state sovereignty. The tone and tenor of Chinese analysis became even more
strident after the bombing. Thus , Fan Guoxiang , director of the China
Society for Human Rights Studies and former Chinese ambassador and per-
manent representative to the United Nations in Geneva , cautioned , "In re-
cent years , some politicians andscholars in big Western nations have put
forward ‘ human rights over sovereignty,' [thus] deliberately misinterpreting ,
confusing and emptying out the basic concepts of human r
 CHINA'S APPROACH TQ SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 2 二L9

occasionally has a right , indeed an obligation , to intervene in the affairs of

some of its member states.
Into this slight opening in the Chinese discourse , more expansive inter-
pretations of both sovereignty and interventionwere introduced during the
following years , claims that invariably drew upon the more extensive argu-
ments about change that had been put forward by scholars and politicians
in the "West." For example , during an internal workshop on sovereignty
held in Hangzhou in the summer of 2001 , debate centered on the extent to
which sovereignty was changing , rather than whether or not any change
was taking place at al 1. 43 l :n addition , a more malleable stance on sover-
eignty found its way into the major Chinese foreign policy journals in 2000
and the first half of 200 1. Cheng Shuaihua , a scholar a面liated with Fudan
University, argued that if a state "violates its international obligations ," it
is illegitimate for it to fall back on the claim of defending sovereignty to
avoid censure 卢 In addition , Shi Yinhong , who is now at People's Univer-
sity and has gained the reputation of being one of China's top experts in in-
ternational relations theory, added that international norms on human
rights had come to "restrain and intervene" (xianzhi yu ganyu) the practice
of sovereignty. Moreover , he argued that despite "some problems ," this
development constituted "an improvement in the level of morality within
international politics. "45 Even more directly, Li Zhenguang , a graduate
student at Peking University, contended: "The principle of sovereignty can-
not be used to violate human rights ," nor should it be used as an obstacle
to refuse (j ujue) international society's censure of massive human rights
abuses. 46
Chinese policy on multilateral operations during this period did not en-
dorse such an expansive interpretation of the right to intervene but did
reflect a general (albeit still guarded) acceptance in 0面cial circles of the gen-
erallegitimacy of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War world
order. Thus , in the fall of 2000 at the UN Security Council Summit Meet-
ing , Chinese President Jiang Zemin said: "It is true that peacekeeping oper-
ations have contributed to international peace and security. But they are
not a panacea. "47 Beijing also pledged to increase its support for the UN's
Standby Arrangements System (SAS) and agreed to incrementally increase
the level of its fin
之3 0 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

the commitments other UN member states were making to peacekeeping

operations , a1so incrementally norma1ized Beijing's ro1e in .suchactivities ,
increasing1y making the contribution of personnel more of a routine action ,
rather than an exceptiona1 po1icy move. As a Chinese Defense White Paper
in 2000 made clear, China was now an active participant in UN peace-
keeping , even as Beijing continued to argue for p1acing relatively strict limits
on when and where intervention cou1d be considered legitimate 卢

Intervention and Sovereignty after 9 1I I

In the immediate aftermath of the September I I attacks on the United

States , the focus of internationa1 peacekeeping and multilatera1 intervention
shifted in a dramatic fashion. At this juncture , the United States p1aced a
much higher emphasis on countering terrorism as the basis for intervening
in other states' affairs. More recently, as seen in the lead-up to the war in
Iraq , Washington began to underscore the need for the internationa1 com-
munity to take preemptive measures to defend against the pro1iferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A1though humanitarian concerns
have not been extinguished by these developments , such trends have had a
broad impact on the fragi1e norm of humanitarian intervention that has de-
veloped over the course of the past decade. In short , the war on terrorism
now constitutes the main framework for the enactment of po1icies on and
discourses about the sovereignty-intervention dynamic.
As was the case during the I990s , China has once again emerged as a pe-
riphera1 but signi且cant p1ayer in this unfo1ding story. In the initia1 post-9/工 I
period , China gave rhetorica1 support to the U.S.-1ed war against terrorism.
In addition , Beijing voted in favor of the two main Security Counci1 reso1u-
tions (UN SC I368 , UN SC I373) to include the United Nations in such a
conflict. In doing so , despite murmurs about the dangers of American mi1i-
tary encirclement of China , Beijing imp1icitly endorsed Washington's p1an
to use military means to topp1e the Ta1iban government of Afghanistan in
reprisa1 for its support of Osama bin Laden. Beijing a1so is purported to
have played a ro1e in he1ping convince Pakistan , which had 10ng maintained
a close relationship with China , to support the U.S. wa r. A1though the
Chinese did not then grant the U.S. military the right to use Chinese air-
space during the Afghan cO .t;lflict , China did share intelligence information
on terrorism with Washington (via a series of bi1atera1 meetings). In addi-
tion , following the coHapse of the Taliban , the Chinese p1edged $ I 50 niillion
(over a five-year period) for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 50
As Beijing was taking these steps in the international arena , within
China the response to the U.S.-1ed war against terrorism , more specifically
 CHINA'S APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 乙 3 1

Washington's military campaign in Afghanistan , was somewhat divided. On

the one hand , initial postings on popular Internet chat rooms , such as the
qiangguo luntan (strong power forum) sponsored by People 云 Daily， por-
trayed the United States as the world's biggest terrorist ihreat and warned
that Washington would use the 且ght against terrorism as a pretext for ex-
panding American hegemony. On the other hand , despite such misgivings ,
most elites in Beijing "argued that it was beneficial for China to work with
the United States in supporting the war on terrorism and to accept the war
in Afghanistan as an inevitable aspect of this new confrontation.
Interviews conducted in China during the winter of 200I-2 showed
broad-based support in foreign policy circles for the conciliatory moves Bei-
jing had made during the previous year (amid residual concerns about pro-
tecting sovereignty, and new worries about what post-9 1r I international
politics would look like). Moreover, virtually all those interviewed concurred
that change was taking place in sovereignty's role in international politics.
For example , a scholar at Peking University saw an emerging dilemma in the
relationship between sovereignty and intervention that eluded simple cate-
gorization. 51 An academic at People's University added , "sovereignty is
changing in the world community and this influence is felt [in China] through
international and transnational institutions."52 At the Chinese Institute of
International Studies , a senior researcher also emphasized that China had
been influenced by these developments and argued: "Specific sovereign
rights in practice can be ceded to international organizations [rangbu gei
guoji zuzhi]."53
An even more comprehensive understanding of how Chinese views of
these issues were changing can be gained from a pair of conferences on sov-
ereignty and intervention held in January 2002 , attended by both Chinese
and American scholars and co-sponsored by the N ational Committee on
United States-China Relations , the China Reform Forum , and the Shang-
hai Institute of International Studies. 54 During these meetings , the Chinese
participants placed a heavy emphasis on the continuing influence of the his-
torical memory of the "century of humiliation" on China's contemporary
stance on sovereignty and intervention. But no Chinese participant objected
to the necessity of international involve
23 2 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

of sovereignty and willingness to accept different levels of intervention to

promote global regimes which benefìt everybody."55
Some analysts even acknowledged that the mechanism for intervention
became more diverse during the 1990s. They also hinted that while UN
leadership in any operation is highly preferable , it is not always an essential
attribute of a legitimate and acceptable case of intervention. Many of those
who acknowledged such a development also took note of the increasing flex-
ibility of the policies of China and other developing countries in an attempt
to accommodate and contribute to emerging trends within the international
system. This position was again given its clearest voice in Chu Shulong's con-
tribution to the Beijing conference. He noted that , in a general sense , China's
position is "in the period of transition because [of] the change in the world
and China itself." He added that China's "returning to [the] international
community weakens the traditional concept of national sovereignty and for-
eign intervention" and concluded that acceptance of such developments "is
the global trend that nobody can resist."56
Additional uno面cial analysis from the post-9 /r 1 period revealed that this
more flexible line had 且nally gained widespread acceptance. For example ,
even a scholar like Fan Guoxiang , who had previously argued strongly
against intervention , now began to gingerly parse the differences between
"Western human rights diplomacy" (xifang renquan waijia 0 ) and "Western
human rights theory" (xifang renquan lilun) , and. while 且nding fault in the
former , conceded the validity of a few points that had been made in the lat-
ter fìeld. 57 At the same time , other analysts publicly advocated even looser
interpretations of the sovereignty-human rights dynamic. Zhou Yongkun
argued , for example , that sovereignty itself is a "special human right" (teshu
de renquan) , and that it is therefore imperative to realize that to indiscrimi-
nately abuse (lanyong) the principle of sovereignty to undermine , harm , or
block the protection of other human rights is unjustifìed. 58
All of these arguments are quite transparent variations on normative
declarations by "Western" advocates of humanitarian intervention since
the early 1990s. In short , Chinese claims grew out of "argumentative dis-
course" between elites in China and those in the West who had supported
both the idea and pr
 CHINA.S APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 233

intervention , an increasingly vocal minority argued that by taking a more

flexible stance on humanitarian intervention , China could bolster its inter-
national image as a responsible power. For example , in 2002 , the National
Defense University professor Tang Yongshang was quite frank in this re-
ga. rd , arguing that making a more positive contribut ï'on to international
peacekeeping was both a "responsibility that China should shoulder as a
major power [daguoJ" and in line with China'sbasic national interests. 60
Official discussions of peacekeeping during this period reflected this an-
alytical shift. A spring 2002 statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
proclaimed: "As a respo~sible member of the international community,
China stands ready to develop coordination and cooperation with other
countries in the field of non-traditional security issues."61 Later in the year ,
a top Chinese representative to the United Nations , Zhang Yishan, stated:
"China is willing to make its own contribution , together with other Mem-
ber States , to strengthening the capacity of the United Nations for the pre-
vention of armed conflicts."ω
Beijing once more followed up on thisrhetoric with concrete policy mea-
sures. It promised to establish a new training center for civilian police and
made additional commitments to the UN's SAS mechanism. 63 Moreover, at
the start of 2003 , China committed a comparatively large force of engineers
(175) to the ongoing UN operation in the Congo. 64 In addition, the Chinese
also sent an even larger mission to Liberia. Indeed , the Liberia deployment
was the largest Chinese commitment to a UN peacekeeping operation since
sending observers to Cambodia in the early 1990S.65 Perhaps of even greater
significance was an action that China did not take; mainly, Beijing refrained
from making a vocal stand against the U.S.-led war on Iraq. To be sure , un-
ease about the implications of the impending conflict were pronounced in
China , but in the end , the Chinese did not utilize their veto power in the
Security Council to prevent the United Nations from partially authorizing
this conflict (opposition largely came from Russia and France). Also , while
Beijing took note of the failures of the initial attack on Iraq , the Chinese me-
dia reported on such di面culties in a relatively subdued manner. Moreover,
even as the conflict has dragged on，。面cial Chinese rhetoric has been fairly
silent about the short

Conclusions

In sum , since the early 1990s, a series of multilateral international in-

terventions have occurred , most of which were undertaken with UN Security
Council authorization and justified by reference to new humanitarian norms.
In the process öf attempting to legitimize such operations , the supporters of
234 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

intervention tended to reinforce , perhaps even create , the very norms to

which they were referring. As a result of their efforts , new expectations about
the international community's right tointervene grew, and the efiÌ cacy of uti-
lizing sovereignty-based rhetoric to denigrate such operations and argue
against international action declined.
When China's leaders did not actively move to oppose this development
(for a limited set of largely self-interested reasons) , they created space for the
extension of such norms into the Chinese elite foreign policy community via
limited discussions of the conditions under which intervention was justi且ed.
This is "not to say that such normative torces dictated support for any given
intervention in China , or for that matter among core supporters of such
moves in the "West." Indeed , over the course of the 199os, more immediate
and pressing national interests repeatedly trumped them. However , over
time , it is also apparent that new trends in the international arena eroded
the normative obstacles that conventional sovereignty claims posed to in-
tervention (in the name of preventing humanitarian crises and protecting
human rights) and helped overcome Chinese reluctance to support multi-
lateral peacekeeping.
The limited changes in Chinese positioning on sovereignty and interven-
tion during this period are particularly interesting when considered with
reference to three broader issues. First, the Chinese position on sovereignty
and intervention has often been misunderstood. To be sure , Beijing has
made its opposition to certain multilateral operations quite clear , and it has
consistently proclaimed the sanctity of sovereignty and the centrality of the
principle of nonintervention in contemporary international politics. How-
ever, China's stance entails much more than simply opposing intervention.
Indeed , this chapter has shown that more often than not , Beijing has reluc-
tantly acquiesced to international involvement in a humanitarian crisis , and
in recent years , China has even begun to play a more active role in con-
tributing to such operations. While the Chinese remain leery of interven-
tion , they now also accept it as part of the post-Cold War world orde r. In
this sense , China is no longer so much of an outlier when compared with
other states in the international system. Indeed , the story of China's reluc-
tant compromises told in th
 CHINA'S APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 235

even as China has accepted change , the perpetuation of collective memories

about past violations of Chinese sovereignty, coupled with ongoing con-
∞rns about the fragility of Beijing's rule over Chin~ ， has made Chinese ac-
quiescence especially tenuous and contingent. In short , to the extent that we
think of shifts in Chinese positioning with reference to socialization argu-
ments , the "new learning" that is taking place has occurred within the con-
text of earlier "lessons" that have made Chinese elites particularly sensitive
about ceding any aspect of Chinese sovereignty.
Third , the explanation of Chinese behavior put forward here combines
elements of the rationalist 9- nd ideationalist arguments that have been pro-
posed in the general international studies literature about why states take
particular positions on sovereignty and intervention. On the one hand ,
Chinese behavior has been informed by cost-bene且t calculations , as would
be expected by proponents of the rationalist argument , but Beijing's per-
ception of Chinese interests was framed by both old ideas (involving the
sanctity of sovereignty) and new norms (regarding the legitimacy of hu-
manitarian intervention). On the other hand , ideas explain less of the story
than typical ideationalist approaches to sovereignty have contended. Inter-
national norms have mattered , but their influence was only felt through the
prism of older , more deeply entrenched , and largely domestic normative
constructs (the living historical memory of past transgressions of Chinese
sovereignty) and was offset by more utilitarian considerations. As such , the
chapter points to the merits of developing more eclectic explanations of
Chinese foreign policy behavio r. 68

Notes

1. This chapter began as a monograph written for the National Committee on

United States-China Relations. See Allen Carlson , Protecting Sovereignty, Accept-
ing Intervention: The Dilemma of Chinese Foreign Relations in the I990S (New
York: National Committee on United States-China Relations , 2002) , www.ncuscr
.org/Publications/FulLTexCBooklet% 20_FinaLFormat.pdf (accessed 5 October
2005) , and it draws extensively on Allen Carlson, "Helping to Keep the Peace
(Albeit Reluctantly): The Recent Chinese Approach to Sovereignty and lnterven-
tion ," Pacifìc Affairs 77 ，工 (Summer 2004): 9-28. 1 would like to thank Jan Berris ,
lain Johnston , two anonymous reviewers of the Pacifìc A仰的 article， and the par-
ticipants in New Directions in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Conference in
Honor of Allen S. Whiting , Harvard University, 7-9 November 2002 , for their help-
ful comments on earlier drafts of this work.
之. See Mortimer Zuckerman , '‘ What Does China Want?" US News and World
Report, 7 June 1999 , 2; Jasper Becker , "The Heart of Chinese Sovereignty," South
China Morning Post , 12 June 1999 ，工 7; James Srodes , "Anti-Americans of the World
23 6 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

Unite ," Spectator , 10 July 1999 , 16-17; and "Going to Ground ," New Republic ,
19 April 1999 , 7.
3. For partial exceptions to this gap in the literature on the Chinese position on
intervention , see M. Taylor Fravel , "China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Op-
erations ," Asian Survey 36 (November 1996): II02-22; Jin-Dong Yuan , "Multi-
lateral Intervention and State Sovereignty: Chinese Views on UN Peacekeeping Op-
erations ," Political Science 49 (工 998): 275-95; and Bates Gill and James Reilly,
ωSovereignty， Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing ," Survival 42
(Autumn 2000): 41-59. These articles focus primarily on Chinese behavior in the
Security Council during the 1990S and as such are valuable resources; they do not ,
however, examine more recent events or the broader discussions about sovereignty
and intervention that have emerged within China since the early post-Tiananmen
period.
4. The articles by Fravel , Yuan , and Gill and Reilly cited in the preceding note
emphasize various aspects of these principles.
5. The term "norm" is used in this chapter in a way that is consistent with the
definition of such a concept as "a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with
a given identity" in Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink , "International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change ," International Organization 4 (工 99 8 ): 89 工.
6. 1 use the term "foreign policy elite" here to refer to the group of scholars a面li­
ated with a short list of prominent government-sponsored research institutes , think
tanks , and universities in China that are involved with analyzing China's foreign re-
lations and broader issues of international politics. Such organizations include, but
are not limited to , the CASS Institute of World Economics and Politics (Shijie Jingji
yu Zhengzhi Yanjiusuo) and American Studies Institute (Meiguo Yanjiusuo) , the
Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Studies (Guoji Wenti Yanjiusuo) , the
State Council's Institute of Contemporary International Relaúons (Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi Yanjiusuo) , the Shanghai Institute of International Relations (Shanghai
Guoji Wenti Yanjiusuo) , Peking Universi町's Institute of International Relations , Fu-
dan University's Institute of American Studies , and the Foreign Affairs College. For
two recent surveys of the role and influence of these institutions. see Bonnie Glaser
and Phillip Saunders , "Chinese Civilian Fore
 CHINA 、 APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 二 37

9. For a broad argument about the endemic nature of various "violations" of

sovereignty from the 1600s through the present, see Stephen Krasner了， Sovereignty:
Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press , 1999).
10. For these and other statistics on UN peacekeeping operations , see WWW.un
.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm (accessed 5 October 2005).
1 1. Stephen Garrett, Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of Hum仰'
itarian Intervention (明Testport ， Conn.: Praeger, 1999) , 3.
12. For a comprehensive bibliography of this literature , see International Com-
mission on. Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect:
Research , Bibliography, Bac走ground: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the
International Commission 0η Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: Interna-
tional Development Research Centre , 200 工)， 227-43.
13. Krasner , Sovereignty.
14. For radical strands of this claim , see R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: Inter-
national Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ,
1990) and Richard Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the
Anarchy Problematique ," Millennium 17 (Summer 1988): 江 7-62. For a less radi-
cal ideas-based argument, see Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim , "Hierarchy
UnderAnarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State ," in State Sovereignty
as Social Construct , ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press , 1996) , 240-78.
15. Throughout this chapter, the source used in compiling China's voting record
in the Security Council was the online United Nations Dag Hammarskj 心 ld Library,
http://unbisnet.un.org (accessed 5 October 2005).
16. Sa Il1 uel Kim , "China's International Organization Behavior," in Chinese
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice , ed. Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh
(Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1994) , 422-24.
工 7. See "China Shows Grave Concern over Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait ," Xinhua ,
4 August 1990, in LexisNexis database. The fact that Iraq had invaded Kuwait gave
Beijing rhetorical space for supporting UN involvement in the Gulf conflict, because
such multilateral action could be construed as a defensive action taken in response
to military aggression by one UN member state against anothe r.
18. "UN Adopts Resolution on Use of Force Against Iraq ," Xinhua ，二 8 Novem-
ber 1
23 8 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

二 3. However , when the Security Council moved to place more pressure on the
Cambodians through the enactment of economic sanctions , Beijing showed its op-
position through abstaining on the resolution (792) proposed by other Security
Council members.
二4. See "China's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations ," http://english
.pladaily.com.cn /special /e-peaceltxt /工工 .htm (accessed 5 October 2005). According
to the People 云 Liberation Daily , the Chinese armed forces' offìcial newspaper, the
UNTAC deployment constituted the "first Chinese peacekeeping force." See "China's
First Peacekeeping Force ," http://english.pladaily.com.cn/special /e-peace It xt /05
.htm (accessed 5 October 2005).
巧. "Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the Issue of Rwanda ," Xinhua ，巧 June
1994 , in LexisNexis database.
二 6. See Fravel , "China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations ," I I 10 一
工 5 ， for a detailed discussion of these resolutions. In an interesting contrast , and one
that reflects the shift in China's approach to intervention and sovereignty discussed in
this chapter, in 2004 Beijing sent observers to the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti.
27. The most vocal spokesman of such a position was Liu Wenzong , a senior in-
ternationallegal scholar and professor at the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing. The
frequency with which Liu's editorials appeared in 0面cial publications in the early
1990S suggests that his views represented the orthodox position onsovereignty, in-
tervention , and human rights at that juncture. However, many of the international
legal scholars in Beijing 1 spoke with in the late 1990S expressed the view that Liu's
opinions were particularly conservative and actually well outside the mainstream of
both policy and academic circles in China.
28. A CASS researcher who was among the first to talk about challenges to
sovereignty's traditional role in international politics is widely seen among Chinese
foreign policy elites as having gone from being a marginal 且gure within Beijing's for-
eign policy establishment in the mid 1990S to a well-connected individual within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of the decade. Another scholar who also staked
out a flexible stance on sovereignty, whom 1 interviewed on a number of occasions
in the mid I990s , made an even more dramatic move , from teaching English to un-
dergraduates to briefing China's top leadership on international issues
 CHINA'S APPROACH TO SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION 239

33. Wang Shuliang , "Guojia zhuquan yu renquan" [State sovereignty and hu-
man rights ], Shehui Kexueyuan Xueshu Ji走an (Shanghai) I (工 996): 68.
34. Ibid. , 69.
35. Zeng Lingliang , "Lun lengzhan hou shidai de guojia zhtiquan" [A discussion
ofstate sovereignty in the post-Cold War era ], Zhongguo Faxue I (工 99 8 ). For a
more extensive discussion of these articles , see Carlson , Unifying China , Integrating
with the World , ch. 5.
36. All those interviewed were members of the elite foreign policy comrnunity
identified earlier in this article. Thirty-four interviewees rejected the possibility of
change and staunchly defended a static interpretation of sovereignty. Seventeen in-
terviewees did not comment on this issue.
37. "Qian Qichen Urges Further Promotion of International Human Rights,"
Xinhua , 20 October I998 , in LexisNexis database.
38. "China: Kosovo Issue Strictly an Internal Affair of Yugoslavia ," Xinhua ,
IO March I998 , in LexisNexis database.
39. See "China Opposes Interference in Yugoslavia's Affairs ," Xinhua ，二4 0c to­
ber I998 , in LexisNexis database.
40. See the statement of Shen Guofang (China's deputy permanent representa-
tive tothe United Nations) featured quite prominently in an article entitled "China
on Establishing UNTAET in East Timor," Xinhua ，巧 October I999 , in LexisNexis
database.
4 工. This term , ganshe , in contrast with the more neutral ganyu , is so laden with
negative connotations that it virtually precludes consideration of any relative merits
of the action being described. To ganshe is to get involved in something that is not
one's business , whereas to ganyu in something may, under certain circumstances , be
considered appropriate. The widespread use of the former term to characterize the
Kosovo campaign was indicative of the fact that there was no room in published
Chinese analysis of the conflict for the expression of a less critical stance. Indeed , as
one informant noted , during the Kosovo campaign , and especially after the embassy
bombing , the only way to express a dissenting view on the operation was simply to
be silent (confidential source , 8 January 2002).
42. Fan Guoxiang , '‘ Renquan , zhuquan , baquan" [Human rights , sovereignty,
hegemony ], in Xin tiaozhan: guoji guanxi zhong de "rendaozhuyi ganyu" [A new
challenge: humanitarian intervention in international relations ], ed. Yang Chengxu
(Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe , 200I) , I.
24 0 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

45. Shi Yinhong , "Lun 20 shiji guoji guifan tixi" [A discussion of the system of
international norms in the twentieth century], Guoji Luntan 6 (2000): 8.
46. Li Zhenguang, "Renquan yu zhuquan guanxi de lishi kaocha yu sikao" [An
investigation and reflection on the historical relationship between sovereignty and
human rights] , Taipingyang Xuebao 1 (2001): 63. For a more detailed discussion of
these sources , see Carlson , Unifying China, Integrating with the World , ch. 5.
47. "Peacekeeping Must Observe U. N. Charter: Jiang ," Xinhua , 7 September
2000 , in LexisNexis database.
48. Pang Zhongying , '‘ China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping ," Inter-
national Peace走 eeping 1 (2005): 87-104; and Tang Yongshang , "Zhongguo he
Lianheguo weihe xingdong" [China and UN peacekeeping operations ], Shijie ]ingji
yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics ], no. 9 (2002).
49. People's Republic of China , State Council , 2000 Defense White Paper, "Par-
ticipation in UN Peace-Keeping Operations ," www.china.org.cn/e-whitehooo/
20-6.htm#c (accessed 21 October 2005).
50. See Banning Garrett and Jonathan Adams , U.S.-China Cooperation on the
Problem of Failing States and 1切 nsnational Threats , Special Report 126 (Washing-
ton , D. C.: United States Institute of Peace , September 2004) , and David M. Lamp-
ton and Richard Daniel Ewing, U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September I Ith
World (Washington D. C.: Nixon Center, 2002).
5 1. Personal interview, Peking University, 20 December 200 1.
52. Personal interview, 26 December 200 1.
53. Personal interview, Chinese Institute of International Studies , 21 Decem-
ber 2001.
54. For a more detailed report on these meetings , and a list of participants , see
Carlson , Protecting Sovereignty, Accepting Intervention.
55. Chu Shulong , "China , Asia and Issues of Sovereignty and Intervention"
(paper presented at International Intervention and State Sovereignty Conference,
Beijing ，工 4-15 January 2002).
56. Ibid.
57. Fan Guoxiang , "Zen yang kan de xifang renquan sixiang" [How to regard
Western human rights ideology] , Zhongguo Dang Zheng Ganbu Luntan (二 003): 4.
58. Zhou Yongkun , "Quanqiuxing shidai de renquan" [Human rights in an era
of globalism] , ]iangsu Shehui Kexue 3 (2002): 工 63-64. See Carlson , Unifying 主
China , Integrating with the World , for a more extensive discussion. 量
59. Risse and Sikkink , "Socialization of International Human Rights Norms." 章
60. Tö
 C H 1 N A 's A P P R 0 ACH T 0 S0 V E R E 1 G N T Y A N D 1N T E R V E N T 10 N 241

65. "Chinese Peacekeeping Troops Leave for Liberia ," http://enghsh.chinamil

.com.cn/site 2lspecial-reportsho04-09/I}/c ontenC I} 08 5 .htm (accessed 21 Octo-
ber 2005). This being the case , Beijing did not support all the humanitarian opera-
tions that have been proposed in the Security Council since the fall of 200 1. For
example , China has repeatedly expressed reservations about UN involvement in the
Sudan. conflict , where Beijing has cultivated a growing industry in that war-torn
country's oil reserves.
66. See Peter Van Ness , "China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and 0面cial
National ldentity," in China's Quest for National Identity , ed. Lowell Dittmer and
Samuel Kim (Ithaca , N. Y.: Cornell University Press , 1993) ，工 94- 21 5.
67. See Alastair lain ]ohnston , "Learning Versus Ada ptation: Explaining
Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990S ," China Journal ,
no. 35 (January 199 6 ): 幻 -6 1.
68. For more on this argument see J. J. Suh , Peter Katzenstein , and Allen Carl-
son , eds. , Rethin走 ing Security in East Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press ,
2004). To a certain extent, such a call resonates quite well with the integrative analy-
sis of the 且rst generation of post-1949 China watchers , as exemplified by the work
of Allen S. Whiting.
9 China in Genev
LESSONS FROM CHINA'S EARLY YEARS
IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Margaret M. Pearson

The accession of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the World

Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 has provided scholars of
international relations behavior with a new crucible for exammmg the
behavior of a major new entrant into a multilateral institution. Is China
proving to be a "system maintainer," a "system reformer ," or a "revision-
ist power"? The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that China is far
from revisionist. Rather, for the most part , China has been a system main-
tainer, the exception being its behavior on issues seen to impinge on its sov-
ereignty and dignity. This is largely consistent with the conclusion of previ-
ous studies of Chinese behavior in international organizations that the PRC
is , by and large , a status quo power. 1
Notwithstanding this general conclusion, though , China exhibits a com-
plex pastiche of behaviors across a range of substantive , coalitional , and
governance issues. The complexity of China's behavior stems from a variety
of sources , including: (a) China is in the early stages of determining its
interests in this body; (b) Beijing is in no great hurry to take on a central
leadership role in the WTO , despite willingness to posture on some issues; (c)
the domestic political mechanisms for determining interests and converting
them into positions within the WTO are relatively weak; and (d) Chinese di-
plomacy has to account for a much more diverse set of economic interests ,
political interests , and domestic expectations than is often recognized.
This chapter's empirical focus is the first two ye~rs of China's WTO
membership , from December 2001 to December 2003 , with some reference
to events in subsequent years. Although to some degree the 且rst two years
were a time of learning , they also laid the groundwork for China's posi-
tioning on subsequent issues , particularly drawing a line as to where it
would be flexible and where it would not , and defining its relationship with
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTO 工 43

other WTO members. These first years also offer glimpses into how Beijing
views its trade interests and the strategies that would be undertaken to pur-
sue those interests.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The 且rst section presents background
information useful for comprehending the machinations of the WTO , as
well as an analysis of China's trade interests and trade politics. The second
section considers the ."exceptional" issues 一 those that focus on matters of
Chinese sovereignty-on which China is most sensitive and in many ways
least cooperative with the WTO: treatment of Taiwan in the organization
and the Transitional Review Mechanism. The third section analyzes China's
coalition-building behavior at the WTO , focusing on its relations with de-
veloping countries. The fourth section examines China's ambivalent pos-
ture with regard to its own leadership potential in the WTO. Together, the
third and fourth sections raise the question of PRC attitudes toward the
elitist structure of the 嘀咕o and its perception of its place in that structure ,
as well as in the world. The fifth section turns to China's behavior with re-
spect to two substantive areas central to the country's economic interests-
agriculture and textiles. The 且nal section discusses what the evidence
presented suggests about China's goals in the 明TTO ， about the degree of
"cooperative" behavior China exhibits in Geneva , and about its propensity
to proactive leadership behavior in the organization. 2

Bac走ground Issues

Key to any analysis of China's behavior in the WTO is an under-

standing of the WTO as an organization , and of China's place in it. It is also
important to understand the nature of China's trade interests , and that , as
in other countries , trade politics in China is primarily domestic. This sec-
tion expands upon these background issues.

THE NATURE OF THE WTO AS AN ORGANIZATION

Multilateral talks to liberalize trade consist of a series of highly de-

tailed , multilayered negotiating games , carried out across many substantive
issues. The internal dynamics of the WTO , and the ongoing Doha Round ,
initiated in December 2001 , are no different. In Geneva , trade negotiations
are played out in a series of constantly shifting alliances; while there are
some rather long-standing coalitions (such as the "Quad" and the Cairns
Group) ,3 most are more fractious groups whose members do not proceed in
lockstep. For example , U.S. steel politics often pits the United States against
Íts European and ]apanese "allies ," European agricultural subsidies often
pit the European Union against the United States, Canada , and so on. The
244 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

negotiations that occur within the WTO are serious , and the stakes are
high; nevertheless , because coalitions shift from issue to issue , there is often
a certain "wink-and-nod" quality about disputes as well; it is well under-
stood that narrow domestic purposes will insert themselves into the negoti-
ations , and that they will usually dominate.
Moreover, although the WTO promotes a rules-driven global trade re-
gime , and although it has a formal structure. of councils and committees
for negotiation , consultation , dispute resolution , and other formal decision-
making , it is in fact a "member-driven" organization, in which decision-
making remains poorly institutionalized. 4 Eventually, all members who
have a signi且cant interest in an issue will have a chance to be involved in
consensus-building meetings. But it is those who are most interested in
an issue that initially structure the debate and frame an agreement. Agenda-
setting for council meetings is , not surprisingly, driven by the most power-
ful members. Just as significantly, negotiations frequently occur in the con-
text of informal meetings , often in the infamous "green room" gatherings
of invited participants. Other meetings take place informally, by invitation
only, away from Geneva. U.S. trade negotiators routinely use what they
term "friendlies" to try to build coalitions. 5 OnIy when a consensus is
formed will a formal decision be taken in the appropriate council or com-
mittee. The consensus decision rule , which has the potential to threaten
stalemate , is softened significantly by the practice of involving all interested
parties at some point in the deliberations. Those who have no significant in-
terest are expected simply to "go along" with the decisions reached by in国
terested parties , and to avoid being spoilers. These informal qualities-
which to some degree create a game of intrigue-reflect, in part , the fact
that the organization is new andunderfunded , and that the WTO secre-
tariat's staff is quite small. This informal nature also has the complicity of
the largest members , including China , despite some controversy over gov-
ernance , discussed below. 6
It is useful to note two further characteristics of the WTO process-
characteristics that distinguish the WTO from the Asia -Pacific Economic Co-
operation forum (APEC) , and that pose challenges to China. First , negotia-
tions operate on a "request and offer" principl
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE 飞~TO 245

CHINA'S DELEGATION TO THE

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

China has observed the WTO closely since it was formed in 1995 ,
and maintained negotiating teams there as it worked on its accession
agreement. Once it gained membership in 2001 , China established a formal
diplomatic mission. China's interlocutors at thè WTO are uniformly com-
plimentary about the quality of personnel in China's delegations. The diplo-
mats , including Ambassador Sun Zhenyu , are respected for their intellect ,
hard work , and-despite. their inexperience-for their professionalism.
Chinese members of the mission and involved trade 0面cials are the fìrst to
acknowledge , however , that they do not yet have the staff, expertise , budget ,
or comfort level with the organization to operate effecti飞rely as a major
player on a wide variety of issues. The Chinese mission grew from ten diplo-
mats in 2002 to fìfteen in 2004. It is not as big as the U.S. , ]apanese, or EU
delegations and has fewer members who are WTO "experts ," so it has had
to rely heavily on personnel dispatched from Beijing. 8 Chinese trade 0面cials
have contrasted the PRC delegation's capabilities with that of India;
whereas India has a professional staff of only eight or nine , its members are
seenas "highlyqualifìed" and "muchmoreactive. 问 Echoing these views , for-
eign observers regard the Chinese participants as "neophytes" in their ability
to maneuver within the WTO , and as "overwhelmed." Despite having spent
many years in Geneva negotiating China's accession agreement, the delega-
tion's focus during those years was not on what they would do once China
became a membe r. As we shall see , inability to operate at full capacity hin-
ders the PRC delegation from playing the "insider's" game characteristic of
much WTO activity. They are characterized , moreover, as having "no coat-
tails ," for they cannot yet with any regularity bring others along; even if
their voice is important , it stiU amounts to only one vote.
The makeup of the PRC delegation reflects certain ministerial interests ,
and particularly the effort of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and its successor,
the Ministry of Commerce , to control the mission. Most of the diplomats are
from the Ministry of Commerce. One slot each has been reserved , apparently,
for the ministries responsible for agriculture , finance , customs , and foreign
affairs , with the latter diplomat handling issues related to Taiwan. As was the
case at important times in China's accession negotiation
24 6 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

is empowered to do little more than gather information and send it to Beijing

for comment, which tends to hinder quick turnaround. This is in part a func-
tion of the lack of manpower in Geneva. Nevertheless , the relative lack of au-
tonomy is the norm for PRC missions in international organizations , and
there is no indication that the WTO will be any different.
Many ofthe dif且culties faced by the PRC delegation ii1 Geneva are a reflec-
tion of the domestic political atmosphere at home. Indeed , much ab Ol.it any
country's trade policy can be explained by domestic politics. 11 Partly a func-
tion of leadership transition surrounding the 5ixteenth Party Congress in
November 2002 , domestic politics dominated the political agenda during
the first year of China's membership in the WTO. The comparatively great
control of the Geneva mission by Beijing, combined with the relatively low
priority WTO issues have in Beijing, conspires to keep China's Geneva del-
egation relatively quiet.
Finally, the domestic political backlash to WTO accession and the polit-
ical need for leaders to respond to the idea that China had been "sold out"
by the stringent concessions to which its negotiators agreed are significant
for China's behavior in WTO. After accession , it became de rigueur in
China to indicate that the country would not just incur obligations from
WTO membership but also would "gain rights and benefits."12 As will be
seen , the need to respond to domestic criticism about China's weakness in
its WTO negotiations , the need to stand up to the United 5tates in particu-
lar, and the need to use the "rights" afforded China by membership are key
to many of the public positions China has taken at the WTO.

CHINA'S TRADE INTERESTS

50 , what are China's trade interests? The determination of substan-

tive interests is complicated , and questions of complementarity with other
economies depend on the specific sectors and even products concerned. Al-
though a detailed discussion of China's trade interests is beyond the scope
of this chapter , it can be said that China has extraordinarily diverse eco-
nomic interests. It is useful to simplify this question into two dimensions.
The first is the question of how open the Chinëse economy is to trade and
investment. Although economists debate precisely how open China's econ-
omy is , it is generally recognized to be more open than the economies of
most developing countries and many newly industrialized countries. On
many dimensions , China's economy as a whole is more open than the econ-
omies of Japan , Korea , Mexico , Brazil , and India. 13 Far more than most de-
veloping countries , since the mid 1990s, China has been a "sink" for foreig n
investment. Even though China maintains protectionist barriers in impor-
tant sectors , expansionof trade is a central part of its economic strategy. Put
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS 1 1\1 THE 飞!{!TO 主 47

正lifferently， as t.he _\Vorl~'s _third largest exporting country in 2005 (after

Germany and the United States , having rec~ntly displaced ]apan and Can-
ada) , China has a strong interest in opening the ec~nomies of other coun-
tries to Chinese products. 14 China has export interests in Asia (such aS agri-
cultural specialty goods) , the United States (notably in textiles) , and the
European Union. Chinese trade 0面cials also recognize that the tariffs China
agreed to upon joining WTO are signi且cantly below thòse of many coun-
tries , especially in Asia , to which it might export. Fi na l1y, particularly in
agriculture , there is a recognition that China needs to diversify its trade net-
works so that it is not reliant upon the United States. 15
China's trade interests are also broad. This diversity distinguishes China
from other developing countries , even large ones. China does not have one
dominant , overriding interest , such as Argentina does with agriculture or
Bangladesh does with textiles. Even 1ndia's trade interests are quite asym-
metrica l. China also has broader trade interests than Australia and the newly
industrialized economies of East and Southeast Asia. 1n the range of inter-
ests , in fact , China is increasingly like the United States and the European
Union. Most relevant to China's behavior in the 顶TTO is the fact that , in
addition to its of{ensive interests in opening markets for its exports , China
has defensive interests in protecting its own markets.

The Sensitive Exceptions: Taiwan 云 Status

in the World Trade Organization and
the Transition Review Mechanism

TAIWAN

Chinese behavior in international organizations is predictable as it

pertains to issues regarding sovereignty. Many scholars and'observers , in-
cluding scholars and observers from Taiwan and the PRC , have hoped that
the 明TTO w i1l provide a constructive framework for cooperation between
Taiwan and the mainland. Our ultimate interest in this chapter, though, is
the degree to which the institutional context of the WTO shapes China's be-
havior toward Taiwan. 1ndeed, PRC-Taiwan interaction presents the tough-
est test for the idea that PRC membership in international institutions
shapes the government's behavio r. 1n the first years of China's and Taiwan's
respective memberships , China adjusted some of its behavior in line with
WTO norms , but at the same time , it has launched an effort to downgrade
Taiwan's status and have the organization deny any sovereignty implica-
tions of Taiwan's membership. While some of these hostile actions are
attributable to the extreme level of tension between Beijing and the Chen
24 8 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

Shui-bian administration in Taipei, the underlying dynamic bears the hall-

marks of what has been seen at other times and in other international
orgamzatlO ns.
On the accommodative side of the ledger, behind-the-scenes contact
has been taking place , with an apparent effort on the part of the top mem-
bers of the Taiwanese and PRC delegations to build personal relationships.
Given the fact that 嘀咕。 -Geneva is a relatively small community, mem-
bers of the two delegations see each other frequently. This mirrors what
has occurred in the APEC process , with interactions occurring primarily at
social events held in tandem with sector-specific meetings. 16 Until a blowup
at the APEC Leaders' Meeting in Shanghai in October 2001 over the ac-
ceptability of a representative sent by Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian,
the two sides reportedly worked at the meetings in a nonobstructionist
manner.
In addition to informal interactions , there have been a few high-profile ,
formal meetings between the two delegations. Interactions on both sub-
stantive negotiations and on symbolic issues concerning nomenclature and
status are illustrative of positive and negative trends. One substantive issue
concerned contacts between Taiwanese and PRC delegates over Taiwanese
steel exports following Beijing's imposition of quotas and tariff barriers on
imported Taiwanese steel in March 2002. The PRC invited the Taiwanese
steel industry association to Beijing for informal consultations. It also es-
tablished a new Cross-Strait Trade and Economic Promotion Association
(Liang An Jingmao Guanxi Chujing Xiehui) to help coordinate such con-
tacts , and suggested that Taiwan do the same. Furthermore , Beijing informed
Taipei of its desire for association-level consultation in Chinese for use of
cross-Strait channels rather than formal procedures in Geneva. Beijing
hinted that after the problem had been addressed at the level of industry as-
sociations , it might be brought to formal discussions at Geneva. Taipei re-
fused to deal at the association level , seeing Beijing's overtures as a strategy
to avoid the sovereignty implications of Taiwan's WTO membership and be-
lieving the offer of possible future WTO interaction to be disingenuousY
Taiwan instead requested formal consultations ip. Geneva. The PRC initially
refused , reiterating that "Beijing will not hold trade and economic consul-
tations with T:
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTO 249

the earlier statements precluding direct discussions at Geneva 一-members of

the two delegations conducted a direct three-hour bilateral consultation on
steel , albeit in a Geneva hotel rather than at 嘀咕o headquarters. 20 For those
hoping that the norms of 明TTO interaction would rapidly change China's
behavior toward Taiwan , the direct meeting appeared significant. But if the
meeting did break new ground , its effect was temporary; the PRC dele e: a-
tion canceled several subsequently scheduled consultations , prompting
complaints from the Taiwan delegation to the WTO secretariat. 21
Members of the two delegations held face-to-face formal contacts on still
another substantive issue-:-the Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM) , the
forum for monitoring Chinese compliance to its WTO accession agreement
(discussed below). In September 2Q02 , the PRC delegation answered com-
plaints from Taiwan concerning Chinese tariffs on beer and photographic
equipment, as well as import licensing and tariff administration. Consistent
with China's cantankerous attitude toward the TRM process as a whol e, it
indicated it would pursue some of these issues only outside of the WTO
setting. 22
The dance between the PRC and Taiwan over substantive interactions
was replicated with regard to issues of nomenclature and the status of the
Taiwanese mission. 23 Specifically, the PRC has tried to insist that reference
to Taiwan's membership in the WTO and its organizations not imply sover-
eignty. With regard to Taiwan's pursuit of membership in the WTO's pluri-
lateral Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) , for example , China
(not yet a member) asked other GPA members to include a footnote in
Taiwan's membership documents to the effect that use of the term "central
government of the Republic of China" has no sovereignty implications. 24
This dynamic recurred on a grander scale in early 2003. On the heels of dis-
putes over Taiwan's status in the World Health Organization at the time of
the SARS outbreak , Taiwan made public that the WTO Director-General
Supachai Panitchpakdi had a'pproached the head of the Taiwanese delega-
tion in February 2003 with several requests. The essence of the requests
was to downgrade Taiwan's WTO status from "permanent mission ," which
in diplomatic parlance most often implies an independent country, to "0面ce
of permanent representative ," and for Taiwan to "affìrm that the actions
regarding WTO repr
25 0 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

T B: E TRANSITIONAL REVIEW MECHANISM (TRM)

All WTO members are subject to a periodic Trade Policy Review

(TPR) of their trading practices. China in addition agreed in its accession
protocol to be reviewed during each of the first eight years of membership ,
with a final review in the tenth yea r. 27 Whereas TPRs typically take place
solely within the. WTO secretariat's 0面 ce ， each of the WTO's functional
èouncils is involved in China's transitional review. This "WTO-plus" com-
mitment was justified by the fact that China was to be admitted before it
was in full compliance with the terms of membership.
The TRM is widely unpopular in China. It invokes images of foreigners ,
especially the United States (which has driven the TRM process) , snooping
into China's affairs , even though China's leaders have repeatedly vowed to
comply with the accession terms. The TRM is a focus point for PRC con-
cerns about national humiliation and sovereignty, and it is all the more ag-
gra飞rating to many Chinese citizens because their leaders agreed to it. It also
is evocative of the annual Most Favored Nation (MFN) debate over China
trade in the United States. However, China has more influence over the di-
rection of the TRM debate than it ever did over the 岛1FN debate.
The first TPR was to be completed within one year of China's accession
(by 11 December 2002). The basic dynamic in the first year was character-
ized by U.S. government efforts (with substantial EU and ]apanese support)
to initiate discussion of compliance problems in the various substantive
subcommittees several months prior to the formal review in Decembe r.
The PRC's official response was threefold: compliance issues should not be
brought up significantly before the formal date of the one-year review;
China would respond to issues raised , but only to the letter of the law, and
as such would only provide oral answers; and any other discussions about
compliance should take place in informal or bilateral settings. The delega-
tion further communicated informally to U.S. officials that to the extent that
its responses required information forthcoming from ministries at home , it
was having trouble getting that information. Whether or not officials of
China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC)
had theinformation is debatable , but they were clearly under pressure from
ministries in Beijing not to provide what data they had. 28 China also tried
to mobilize support for its position from other WTO me
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTO 25 1

a senior member of the PRC delegation (not Sun Zhenyu) reportedly "made
a pounding-the-table type of speech ," directed at the United States , that
linked the TRM process to "neo-imperialism"-an echo of speeches deliv-
ered in the Maoist era. In late September, the dispute continued as members
of the .Quad (the United States , the European Union , Canada , and Japan ,
joined for questioning by Australia and Taiwan) complained that China had
not provided any written answers to questions they had posed in the con-
text of the Market Access Committee on compliance. China , while assert-
ing that "some countries" were being "troublemakers," offered to discuss
the issues with the Quad informally, but withdrew the offer after the United
States and Japan said that this was not acceptable and reiterated the de-
mand for written answers. China then stated that the committee's compli-
ance review was over , a view that the committee's Lesothan chair concurred
with by his comments that he could not force China to engage in discussion ,
and that he would forward a factual summary to the superior General
Council for its year-end review on 11 December. 29 The Chinese delegation
also appeared to bristle at the sense that the Quad countries were ganging
up on lt.
A MOFTEC official deeply involved in the TRM process claimed that the
process had left "a lot of bad feelings" among his colleagues , especially
against the United States and Japan , and led to a desire to shun U.S. embassy
officials in Beijing. 30 This 0面cial also was concerned about the attention di-
verted from other substantive negotiations and indicated that China would
continue to try to contain the TRM process , particularly by compressing the
timeframe. Happily for the PRC delegation , its obfuscating tactics were
successful in relieving pressure from the TRM in subsequent years. A PRC
diplomat , viewing the backing off of the United States as a victory, con-
cluded that the United States recognized that the wording of the TRM re-
quirement as written into China's accession protocol was relatively weak. 31

The Politics of Coalition Building: China 云

"Bridge" to the Developing World

The PRC government used the occasion of its firstmajor speech as a

WTO member to dèclare it would serve as a "bridge" between the devel-
oped and developing worlds. This designation is usually dismissed as rhet-
oric , and in significant ways this dismissal is accurate. Yet China's verbal
commitment to support developing countries' concerns and its actual be-
havior in building coalitions highlight important questions about China's
goals in the 明TTO and its self-de且nition vis-à-vis the developed and devel-
oping worlds.
25 2 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

Consistent with the moniker "Doha Development Round ," the Doha
Ministerial Declaration that launched the round in 2001 makes a strong
statement about the need to meet certain developing country demands. 32
The core substantive elements of the developing country agenda are: main-
tenance of distinct categories and preferential treatment for developing
countries , especially the least developed ("special and differential treat-
ment"); guaranteed export markets for products from less developed coun-
tries; special consideration of the impact of the intellectual property agree-
ment on prices , particularly of pharmaceuticals (primarily HIV/AIDS drugs);
and aid for Trade Related Technical Assistance needs , such as capacity build-
ing and WTO implementation. There is also , secondarily, a governance
reform agenda to ensure that developing countries have a fuller voice in the
WTO and are more involved in agenda -setting.
In the WTO , "developing country" is a self-designated term. South Korea
in many instances terms itself "developing," for example. In its accession ne-
gotiations , China's negotiators tried , unsuccessfully, to be recognized as a
developing country as a means of garnering longer compliance phase-in
schedules and other special treatment. Even so , consistent with its concrete
trade interests , China does not put itself in the developing country camp.
How are we thus to understand the consistent rhetorical support , in China's
fìrst years of membership , for developing country interests , and the strong
language about serving as a bridge? These efforts are said by those close to
the process to have been a deliberate tactic to lay a foundation for future
negotiating leverage. 33 Ultimately, China has not been a forceful advocate
of the development agenda. Rather, its "development" positions have been
closely linked to its own economic interests. This is evident , for example , in
a typical speech by China's ambassador to the WTO , Sun Zhenyu. Sun
listed the "developing country goals for the Doha Round" as reduced agri-
culture tariffs and subsidies (China already has reduced tariffs , wishes to ex-
port to higher tariff areas , and says it cannot afford subsidies) ,34 curbs on
excessive use of anti-dumping charges (China is the most frequent target of
such claims) , the opening of services to developing countries' labor ,
progress on liberalization of rules for temporary entry of
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTO
之 53

China appeared "developrnent-rninded" in some early initiatives on 只ov­

ernance issues within the WTO. Governance issues are intriguing b比 e氏
C卢se、
…
剖s 巾
a d iβ
肌阳叫
sκCωωu
山S岱 S叫
governing elite. Yet on two occasions , both occurring iri its first month of
mernbership , the PRC was outspoken on procedural reforrn proposals that
would rein in the authority of the secretariat and cornrnittee chairs , seen as
dominated by deve16ped countries , and would influence agenda-settin e:
:v
The first 0ω川1. was when th~ PR.C joined ith ~ l~rge group of develop-
ing countries to dernand that the chairrnanship of the Trade Negotiatio~s
Comrnittee (TNC) for the poha Round be rotated arnong rnember ambas-
sadors rather than be the perrnanent prerogative of the director general
(DG) of the WTO.36 China also joined with a group of developing countries
advocating restrictions on the discretion of the chairs of the six TNC sub-
comrnittees to decide which alternative positions are included for consider-
ation in draft proposals. The airn was to prevent cornprornise texts that do
not reflect the positions of developing countries and to bring a rnore open
deliberation process to the choice of language. 37 Although it is argued be-
low that China has generally been a follower of others' initiatives , the PRC
was apparently quite influential in this latter decision. 38 As actions on gov-
ernance have subsided into the background in favor of substantive negotia-
tions , however , China's early cornrnitrnent to rejiggering the governance
structure has not been further tested. Rather, governance issues appear mar-
ginal to China's overall agenda in the 明TTO. China's support for these two
rule changes appears to have been to gain easy and costless tactical wins
rather than being a serious garnbit to alter the power structure.
Deeper consideration of China's long-term prospects for leadership of
the developing world requires a sense of the developing countries' views of
China. In speci岳c situations , such as with the governance issues noted pre-
viously, developing countries have found China's support useful. But many
developing countries have been at least as concerned with the threats China
poses to their substantive interests and feel their interests rnore often corn-
pete with than cornplement China's. Foreign 0面cials involved in China's
WTO negotiations frequently observe that developing countries , at the
same time as making plaintive public cornments that China's terms 0
之 54 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

skepticism that China wiU find enduring complementary interests that can
form the basis of substantial alliances with developing countries .4 1 Rather,
it is likely that China will carefully choose where it can take low-stakes
stands on issues it attributes to developing countries , but that its commit-
ment will be less deep than commonly expected. Chinese trade officialsalso
recognize the fractious nature of the developing country group; as one
Chinese trade 0面cial commented , it is a group that, because of its divergent
interests , "cannot be led."42 As will be seen below, and has been shown con-
sistently in China's behavior in international organizations , China has been
relatively aloof from established coalitions within the WTO 卢 When it has
joined coalitions , it does not play an active role but , rather, uses its mem-
bership primarily to improve its image. The idea that it is a "bridge" is a way
to maintain maximum flexibility for maneuver between the developed and
developing agendas.
This effort to cover both sides of the developed-developing country
agenda played out repeatedly throughout China's early WTO tenure. China
at times appeared to tilt toward the developed countries , with the direction
of influence across China's "bridge" toward the south from the industrial-
ized world. This was evident , for example , in U:S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick's attribution of credit to the Chinese (before China was for-
mally admitted) for using the Shanghai APEC meetings in 2001 to launch
the Doha Round itself, including its successful efforts to convince reluctant
Southeast Asian nations-particularly Malaysia 一 of the value of the round.
Chinese trade 0面cials ， too , have expressed pride in China's help to the
United States on this matter. 44 It also is evident in speci且c negotiations on
agriculturalliberalization, as discussed below.
At other times , China has appeared to side with the developing world.
This face of China is consistent with the country's recent outreach toward
Southeast Asia. China is engaged in a strategy to upgrade the quality of its
diplomatic attention to Southeast Asia through unusually proactive diplo-
macy and substantial sensitivity to poorer neighbors' concerns about
Chinese economic competition. 45 The pro-development face reached new
heights in September 2003 in the context of Ch.ina's first WTO ministerial
conference , held in Cancun , Mexico. But what i
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE 飞;V Tü 工 55

U.S.-EU draft did not go far enough to commit to cuts in agricultural sub-
sídies by wealthy exporters , while at the same time as1
业kin2: ιfor tar口i丘时u
旺c肘- 4

t肌

m口len
川lt" for) developing countries. Recall that China's concrete interests are
split between a desire to increase its own agricultural eXDorts and a desire
to reduce subsidies , which it cannot a丘ord， by its competitors.
The initiative for the coalition clearly lay with Brazil and India , notwith-
standing the fact that China's name appeared routinely in reports about the
coalition. China's willingness to allow itself to be called a "leader" on this
issue appeared to be an imyortant stand and was leveraged by the G20 to
lend credibility to its cause. Yet , ultimately, China's role in this coalition was
to lend support, not to lead it or act seriously to advance its agenda. Indeed ,
it appeared quite aloof. For example , China's delegation to Cancun , led by
Minister of Commerce Lu Fuyuan , did not seek headlines for itself con-
cerning the G20 moves. When the talks fell apart , Chinese diplomats moved
into crisis management mode , attempting to reduce the vituperative tenor
of rhetoric from the true leaders , Brazil and India , toward the United States
and European Union. Lu's comments to the media conference where the
G20 made its major statements were much more conciliatory than those
of other participants , saying China "hoped the Ministers would consider
the G20 text even as they are considering the Chairman's draft" (emphasis
added). In contrast , the Argentinean minister said the paper "must" be ac-
corded the same basis as the chair's text , while the Brazilian foreign minis-
ter stated that it was essential that the group's paper be taken as a basis for
negotiations. 47 As discussions among ministers were becoming particularly
tendentious , moreover , Lu intervened to point out , to no avail , that stale-
mate was in nobody's interest. 48
At home , China's media barely reported the activities of China in the G20.
The reports that did appear were descriptive and factua l. The domestic press
carried no signif1. cant analysis of the coalition and China's concrete role in
Cancun. There was no effort to use the failure of the meetings to undermine
the legitimacy of WTO processes or to promote the idea that China is a
developing country working against the interests of the United States and
European Union. Indeed , a PRC Ministry of Commerce WTO analyst ap-
pea
25 6 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

China Inside the Power Center?

What does the discussion of China's concrete economic interests , and

the expected limits on coalitional activity vis-à-vis the Third World , suggest
about China's posture toward the WTO's power center-the United States
and the European Union? Chinese support for mild revisions on governance
has the potential to shift power slightly toward developing countries. But
despite the mild revisionism implicit in these moves , China does not seriously
reject the status quo power structure of the WTO. Rather, its post-accession
behavior suggests that it wishes to join the power center without wresting
control of it. ln turn , representatives of the countries that dominate the WTO
assume that China will necessarily play a major role on many issues and be-
lieve that the idea that China might be excluded is ludicrous. For example , no
non-Chinese interviewee indicated that China should be excluded from
"green room" discussions , although some added the qualification that China's
purposes in such settings should be serious and the PRC should be tractable.
Consistent with China's participation in the UN Security Council , then,
there is no substantial evidence that the Chinese reject the dominant rules
and operative norms of the 嘀咕O. They do not yet feel comfortable in it,
but, according to Chinese 0面cials who have spent time in Geneva , they are
busy learning about it. They take note of when Chinese participants are not
included in informal meetings and have been pleased to be invited when
they are , including to a small number of Quad meetings. More generally,
Chinese trade officials agree that there is a need for the WTO's ubiquitous
informal meetings that allow the most interested parties to work out dis-
agreements before bringing issues to a more formal setting. One Chinese
trade 0面cial spoke in positive terms of the U.S. and EU discussions (which
excluded China) about differences in their approaches to agricultural talks ,
for example , and contended more generally that China "would not support
any major overhaul of the decision-making structure" in Geneva. 50
The question of style of behavior also came up frequently in discussions
with Chinese trad~ 0面cials. They often attempted to distance themselves
from lndia , expressing annoyance at lndia's grandstanding and "uncooper-
ative" behavior in Geneva. Style also translates into deeper behavioral char-
acteristics. U.S. and EU trade 0面cials observe that
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTO 主 57

mestic publicity for its move. (U.S. delegates may try to defuse Chinese op-
position by presenting them with a pre-arranged coalition , or by asking
third countries seen by China as more neutral to voice views in favor of the
U.S. position.)
With regard to China's potential for leadership , Chinese diplomats have
on most issues adopted a learning posture. Thus far , Chinese attempts at
leadership are primaiily exhibited as a desire tohost major meetings , much
as they will do for the Olympics in 2008. They received strong praise for
successfully staging the APEC Shanghai year, culminating in the 2001 Lead-
ers' Meeting in Shanghai. .Though the Chinese APEC planners reportedly
were not proactive on the substantive side , they were organizationally
extremely adept. 52 With APEC Shanghai successfully completed and , un-
doubtedly, with the 2008 Olympics in mind , they have continued their of-
fers to host. For example , China quietly offered to host the midterm review
of the Doha Round in the fall of 2003. There was , however , little enthusi-
asm for China's offer, and Mexico stepped in and was given the job. Perhaps
as a compromise , Hong Kong was chosen to host the next Doha Ministerial
meeting at the end of 2005.
If China is not a deal broker, is it likely to be a deal breaker? Once again ,
the answer must depend on its concrete interests at the time. As noted pre-
viously, any major participant can block any major move that is not in its
interest. China's behavior in the 且rst years since its accession suggests that
the PRC "goes along to get along" unless strong economic or sovereign in-
terests are threatened.

The Substance of Doha: Liberalization

Two major conclusions about China's trade interests have emerged

from the previous discussion. First, China cannot afford deep support for
developing countries' agendas , because its interests are fundamentally dif-
ferent from theirs. Second, China's interests do not permit it to be a major
obstructionist power in terms of further liberalization in key areas on the
Doha agenda. This is not to suggest that China will be a major liberalizing
force; it cannot be expected to pursue liberalization for liberalization's sake.
Overall , however, it is mistaken to presume that China will consistently be
on the opposite side of any group of countries; rather , it will often find part-
ners from among the developed nations and will often favor further liberal-
ization of trade barriers. This section discusses the unfolding Chinese posi-
tion on two sectors that are central to China's export agenda and that are
thus poised to form the core of its 0丘énsive position in the Doha Round: ag-
riculture and textiles.
二 58 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

Before discussing these two concrete issues , it is useful to recall the exis-
tence of the "request and offer" system and the Single Undertaking man-
date. For China , as for all countries , the "request and offer" format and the
"Single Undertaking" built into the Doha Round mean that narrow, tit-for-
tat negotiations wiU not be productive. Although PRC 0面cials have fre-
quently claimed that the depth of China's accession commitments means it
has nothing left to offer, foreign observers counter that "no one is maxed
out." 53 While both these positions are tactical , the foreign position is un-
dergirded by the request and offer modality. Each member is forced to
take a broad view of its interests and formulate a comprehensive strat-
egy involving many issue areas. And in fact the Chinese delegation has
put forth some requests in major areas , notably agriculture and services ,
but has offered little. 54 This is not surprising , given China's domestic po-
litical need to be seen as "reaping the benefits" of WTO membership , and
given the fact that the Doha Round has not yet reached the end-game of
negotiation. 55

AGRICULTURE

The ongoing negotiations on the WTO Agreement on Agriculture

(AoA) are extremely complex and contentious. They are , moreover , so con-
tentious and so central to the Doha agenda that-under the Single Under-
taking rule-their failure would threaten the success of the entire round. 56
Broadly speaking , negotiations are occurring between three somewhat
loosely defined groupings. The United States and the Cairns Group of seven-
teen agricultural exporting countries (see n. 3) have , since the Uruguay
Round negotiations (1986-94) , tended to favor fundamentalliberalization
of agriculture markets. 57 (Note that the Cairns Group is made up of both
developed and developing countries.) The European Union , supported by a
so-called G10 ("Group of 10 勺 that includes Japan , Korea , Norway, and
Switzerland, has opposed drastic reductions in domestic supports and seeks
to protect the "multifunctionality" of agriculture (e.g. , environmental con-
cerns).58 The third major grouping , developing countries , has sought to open
developed country markets to its members' commodity exports , to end price-
suppressing domestic supports by developed countries , and to protect food
security and enhance rural development through "special and differential
treatment" that allows slower trade liberalization in developing countries.
The G20 , formed prior to the Cancun Ministerial , is j-o ined in this grouping
by the G3 3 -led by Indonesia and the Philippines and containing .mostly
African countries. Since the Cancun failure , the main negotiations have
occurred within agrouping known as the Five Interested Parties (FIPs)-the
United States , the European Union , Brazil , India (these two from the G20) ,
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE 飞JVTO 二号 9

and Australia (Cairns). China is not included. The G20 continues to meet and
is presumably informed on the FIPs progress by Brazil and India.
China from the beginning was unlikely to play a major role in the suc-
cess or failure of the agricultural negotiations , both because the negotiating
space is dominated by the other coalitions and because of resol~rce con-
straints and the absence of an authoritative mandate from Beijing. However ,
China's position in the unfolding of these talks suggests how it is de且ning its
trade interests and offers further insight into its coalitional behavior. China
did put forth a proposal in 2002 but , as expected , it did not contain any of-
fers of substantive concessions on China's part. 59 It was framed as a call on
behalf of developing countries , and one of its major goals was the reduction
of European and U.S. domestic subsidies and other trade-distorting sup-
ports. Yet , in substance , China left quite a bit of room for cooperation with
other agricultural exporting countries , particularly the Cairns Group and
the United States , and for a coalition against the European Union , Japan ,
and South Korea. Indeed , China quietly indicated at least some support for
the U.S. initiatives. 60
Moreover, over the course of several months of early Doha Round agri-
cultural talks , China increasingly moved away from its rhetorical position of
support for developing country interests to a more explicit congruence with
the United States and the Cairns Group. During the summer of 2002 , China's
former chief negotiator Long Yongtu (by then a vice minister) appeared on
the scene in Geneva to attend a TNC discussion of agriculture issues. Long
made what U.S. officials considered a very helpful intervention; while por-
traying China as a leader of the developing world , he made statements about
the value of further liberalization of agricultural export markets. On the issue
of export subsidies , which China committed to reduce to zero in its own ac-
cession agreement , it took on the mantle of liberalizer, particularly ag~inst
the European Union and Japan. This , of course , can be seen as helping devel-
oping countries-and China. But China did not feel it necessary to frame its
argument as in opposition to the United States. Moreover , a key 孔10FTEC
official involved in framing China's position on agriculture indicated that the
basic argument was between a Cairns Group-U.S. coalition 一-which he as-
serte
二 60 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

Agricultural import tariff liberalization (mar走et access). These ne-

gotiations revolve around lowering tariffs and tariff quotas on agricultural
goods. China agreed at the time of its WTO accession to reduce average tar-
iffs on agricultural imports to 15 percent by January 2004 , far lower than
those of nearly all developing countries , including others in Asia. (Korea's
and Japan's are about 50-60 percent.)64 China already exports many fr山ts
and vegetables and has a trade surplus in vegetables , mostly exported to
Asian countries (Chinese agricultural production in specialty items is on too
small a scale to be competitive with that of Europe or the United States). It
has large export-oriented 且sh and shrimp-processing industries. PRC agri-
cultural 0面cials understand that China stands to gain export markets if
other countries' barriers come down , and that exports could have a positive
employment effect in the countryside. A U.S. proposal in July 2002 called
for further lowering of the average tariff level to 15 percent (from 62 per-
cent). The Chinese seem to have quietly accepted this proposa l. The PRC ,
United States , and Cairns Group proposals are generally consistent in call-
ing for a phased-in lowering of tariffs , with longer periods for the develop-
ing countries (six years in the PRC proposal) than in the developed (three
years). Disagreement among them has arisen over China's own poor record
of implementing tariff-rate quota commitments in its accession. ln contrast ,
the EU proposal , broadly by the GIO , including Japan , Korea , Norway, and
Switzerland , calls for a 36 percent cut in existing tariffs. 65
Domestic supports. These negotiations focus on how to reduce do-
mestic production subsidies , which are judged to distort trade. ln meetings
in the fall of 2002 , the United States , China , lndia , and the Cairns Group-
all agricultural exporters-called for the eventual elimination of trade-
distorting domestic subsidies ("amber box" spending) ,66 while the Euro-
pean Union , Japan , South Korea , Switzerland, and Taiwan have argued that
elimination of these subsidies-which account for about 40 percent of all
domestic subsidies-is too ambitious. The European Union called for a
55 percent reduction in domestic production-linked subsidies. 67
Export subsidies. China committed to reduce export subsidies to
zero upon WTO entry, a liberalization substantially beyond the current U.S.
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTO 26 工

There are therefore several key issues on which China has signi且cant
ωmplementary interests with liberalizing exporting countries. lnpart be-
cause China sees agricultural exports as a future export stre吨th， 71 and be-
cause its WTO accession agreement commits it to terms niore strin e: ent than
those that apply to other developing countries , as we l1 as , in some-cases , to
the United States and Europe , it clearly has identified an interest in global
liberalization of agriculture. Arguing against the durability of such a coali-
tion is the fact that the United States can be expected to attempt to keep
some form of export supports off the table , both by manipulating the "box"
categories and by trying to avoid the inclusion of export credits (which it
relies upon heavily).72

TEXTILES

As with agriculture , the Chinese position on liberalization of textiles

trade says much about China's trade behavio r. Unlike agriculture , though ,
textiles are likely to be a major source of conflict with the United States.
There are several key dimensions of this issue. First , China is the world's
dominant export power in textiles and appare l. As early as 1996, even while
restricted by quotas (and including Hong Kong re-exports) , China ac-
counted for 12.5 percent of the world's exports and was the world's largest
textiles and apparel producer .73 ln the United States , in contrast , the textile
industry supplies a few niche markets , but has not been able to withstand
competition from lower-cost producers such as China , lndia , Pakistan,
Mexico , and Bangladesh, despite substantial political clout. The WTO
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) provides that restrictions on the
growth of China's market share be lifted through the phasing out of all quan-
titative restrictions on textiles and clothing 一 quota arrangements ensconced
primarily in the Multi且ber Arrangement (MFA)-by the end of 2004.
Second , China is subject to two conflicting international agreements ,
both signed by the United States as well. One is the ATC. The other is the
1999 Sino-U.S. bilateral agreement , which provides the U.S. government
with two tools-the textiles safeguards mechanism (until 2008) and the
product speci且c safeguards mechanism (for twelve years after accession)-
to protect the U.S. textile and apparel market against Chinese imports
deemed excessive or harmfu l. 74
Third, although China would like to gain political leverage at the 币TTO
by claiming that it is upholding international rules , it is unlikely to be able
to form a strong coalition with other developing countries on this issue , be-
cause most developing countries worry about Chinese competition to their
own textile exports. There is disagreement about what the exact impact of
China's ability to expand its exports will be for other textile-producing
之 62 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

developing countries , such as 1ndia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. But the big-
ger issue is the perception of those countries that the reduction of quotas for
China harms their texti1e exports. Although MFA quotas originally had
the effect of curbing imports to developed countries , these quotas also gave
many developing countries a share of the large U.S. and EU markets they
would not have gotten had market share been determined by competitive
market forces. 1n other words , the MFA protected not only U.S. producers
but other low-cost developing country textile exporters as wel l. U.S. trade
officials involved in China's accession negotiations contend that developing
countries , except for 1ndia, never strenuously objected to the u.s. inclusion
of safeguards in its bi1 ateral agreement. Even 1ndia's objections were con-
sidered merely rhetorical , because it has also indicated privately a desire to
see U.S. safeguards in place. 75 Other developed countries that are theoreti-
cally opposed to quotas , because they hinder the credibility of a rules-based
system , such as Australia and the European Union , have not become active
on this issue. 76
Finally, the textile issue is of such importance-both symbolic and sub-
stantive-that Chinese trade 0面cials have sometimes suggested that China
will attempt to link it to other issues in order to get what it wants in textiles
and appare l. If the United States "is difficult on this issue after 2005 , it will
unravel everything ," one PRC 0面cial said. 77 China's other option is to cre-
atively play the role of an upholder of liberalizing agreements-against the
United States.
Tensions over rising Chinese textile exports came to the fore in the spring of
2005 , when exports to the United States and the European Union surged
quickly following the MFA's expiration. As was widely anticipated , the United
States launched safeguard actionsagainst China in 孔1ay 2005.78 China re-
acted with sharp language but did not immediately attempt to retaliate either
bilaterally or in the WTO. The European Union threatened to follow suitwith
its own quotas in June , but the two reached a deal providing for China's vol-
untary restraints on exports to European countries. 79 1n the early stages of
the dispute over surging Chinese textile and apparel exports , then , China has
attempted to avoid throwing oil onto the fire , apparently wishing instead to
preserve steady markets.

Con c/usions

What insights does analysis of China's 且rst years in the WTO provide
about likely Chinese behavior in this and other multilateral institutions in
the future , and about its trade interests? 1n this 且nal section , 1 focus on the
broader implications of China's role , framed around three issues central to
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTQ 26 3

the question of China's emergence on the world stage: (1) Chinese political
and economic interests in the organization; (2) China's propensity for lead-
ership and coa 1ition-building , including in relation to the developing world;
and (3) China's 气ooperative" -as opposed to "revisionist" 一 behavior.
What are China's priorities in the WTO? Beijing's greatest chal-
lenge in effectively maneuvering within the 嘀咕o process in Geneva is to set
clear priorities and to give its diplomats in Geneva the resources and au-
thority to be able to act quickly and effectively. This challenge is dictated in
large part by the complexity of trade negotiations and vastness of the trade
agenda , the Single Undertaking , and the reality of shifting coalitions. The
multiplicity of China's goals is in turn dictated by the diversity of its eco-
nomíc interests , combined with its security and sovereignty goals and its im-
age concerns. Thus , not even accounting for the domestic side of 明rro
compliance, China is trying to pursue multiple goals related to:
• Sovereignty (Taiwan, TRM)
• A trade strategy (build and diversify export markets)
• Substantive sector-by-sector economic interests
• International relations with the developing world and, especially,
Southeast Asia
• Global image-a desire to be a player at the table with signi且cant
leverage , but not a troublemaker (except on sovereignty-related is-
sues) , unlike India
China's public strategy has been to pursue all of these goals without giving
up any of them. But it has spent most of its time on the issues related to sov-
ereignty and (Taiwan relations aside) on guarding its international image
(through Third World bridge rhetoric and by following the lead of other
countries). Moreover, China is no different from other countries in which
domestic politics is the primary driver of trade policy. Hence , attention to
the agriculturaL negotiations is driven by the domestic political attention
now focused on problems in the rural sector and links to social stability, plus
the common popular feeling that China was "d u ped" on its agricultural com-
mitments. Attention to Taiwan's status , much as in other international or-
ganizatioris where Taiwan has a presence , is attributable to the regime's con-
tinuing sensitivity to denying any potential implications of Taiwanese
soverelgnty.
But though domestic politics and economic interests set China's priorities ,
they
二 64 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

undertaking , which requires effective leadership at home. Thus far , neither

the domestic interest aggregation process nor the empowerment of the nego:'"
tiators has occurred, contributing to the gap between the high natural stat-
ure predicted for China and its low level of leadership in practice.
China云 leadership and coalitional behavior. Might China in the fu-
ture take on a proactive leadership role on particular issues , much as the
United States or Cairns Group (or even Australia) has done in agriculture?
Here , the answer is no , not yet , and not for some time-except iil defense of
its own singular sovereignty concerns. Interviewees with long experience in
the WTO routinely say it would be unusual for China to try to assert lead-
ership at this point-it is simply too early. There is a more fundamental
problem with China's leadership potential at this early stage , howeve r. Po-
litically, China has designated itself only as active on behalf of the develop-
ing world , and even its "Third World bridge" rhetoric is devoid of implica-
tions of true leadership. At the same time , China's core economic interests
increasingly lie as much, if not more , with the developed world (or with
specific developed countries on speci且c issues , especially as concerns exports).
It cannot lead what it is not and does not wish to be.
In the longer term, China's effectiveness as a great power will be mea-
sured in terms of its vision for future WTO rounds and its ability to build
coalitions and bring others along. Moreover, in the WTO context , to be
proactive also means aggressively engaging in the game of shifting coali-
tions on an issue-speci且c basis , and actively pursuing coalitions. To do this ,
trade policy leaders once again need to have a strong sense of a country's
offensive interests , to work actively to build consensus between interested
parties at home and in Geneva , and to move an agenda ahead in the WTO.
China has shown itself willing to work on general statements with other
countries , especially developing countries , or to suggest quiet support (such
as to the Cairns Group and U.S. agricultural initiatives). But for the most
part , it seems to either go it alone , or to react to already formed coalitions
(such as on the steel complaint against the United States). Deep and endur-
ing coalitions are not part of the WTO , but the ability to use coalitions nim-
bly to serve domestic interests is important. China does not yet play this
 CHINAS EARLY YEARS IN THE 飞.v TO 26 5

At the level of participation in the institution in Geneva , the answer to

the question ofwhether China is a cooperative power in the WTOis by and
large yes. We can look at this question through two lenses. First , how can we
characterize China's support for pursuing the Doha Round trade agenda-
which is mainly designed to liberalize trade and investment f1 0ws but also
contains a number of commitments to developing countries? Beijing could
in theory coalesce with and even lead a more extreme New International
Economic Order (NIEO) southern agenda against the more status quo
agenda. But China is not "revisionist" in this dimension. The developing
country agenda at Doha is .itself hardly revisionist of the whole trading sys-
tem , although it challenges aspects of it at the edges. Moreover, China has
spent much more energy launching and advancing the Doha Round than it
has criticizing it. Since the beginning of the Doha Round negotiations , in
fact , China has consistently called for talks to move forward on the basis of
the existing agenda , notably when the process was on the brink of disaster
at Cancun.
Second , and more significantly, does China uphold the formal and infor-
mal norms and rules of the organization: consulting formally and informally
with other members , avoiding throwing up obstacles to consensus reached
by others (unless it is a core interest) , understanding that it is a game of shift-
ing coalitions , and so forth? Put another way, does China adhere to the "rules
about rules" of the organization? A country that clearly violates rules about
how an organization is to be governed cannot be considered cooperative. 82
Again , the answer when posed this way is basically positive. At the level of
day-to-day negotiations, cooperation cannot be defined by an absence of
con f1 ict with other nations , since conf1 ict over trade interests is assumed and
built into the process. Indeed , patterns of disputes in the WTO suggest that
conf1 ict between trading nations is more a function of trade volume than
fundamental opposition; the huge volume of U.S. trade with Canada and
Europe means that the United States routinely conf1 icts with these allies.
Furthermore , because coalitions shift from issue to issue , China cannot
therefore be considered uncooperative , because it warmed somewhat to the
United States on agricultural negotiations and at that same time joined the
steel safeguard complaint against the United State
266 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

itself) to India , which has been seen as the WTO's resident troublemaker ,
often criticized for taking ideological positions rather than interest-based
ones. Chinese trade officials recognize that India often marginalizes itself
and wish to avoid doing so.
Where China has routinely come closest to breaching the "rules about
rules" is on the issues of Taiwan and the TRM; these are perhaps the most
interesting cases to watch-precisely because they pose the greatest chal-
lenges for the idea that institutions shape members' interests and behavior.
Both the PRC and Taiwan entered the WTO as full participants in the or-
ganization , yet subordinating Taiwan's membership in global forums has
been important to China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing's ef-
forts to downgrade Taiwan's status to that of Hong Kong , using the WTO's
director general as an agent , contrary to the understanding of members who
admitted both parties , indicates an attempt to change some basic terms of
the organization. The promise that China will continue to resist the TRM
process in future years further suggests that China will continue to rub up
against the edges of the rules of the organization on issues connected with
sovereignty. Still, even here China more or less abides by the letter, if not the
spirit , of the TRM.
Where China has not fully embraced the rules , is there evidence that
China is nonetheless being socialized into the WTO's dominant mode of op-
eration? Precisely because China is rather 吁ar out" on the issue of Taiwan ,
it will be a fruitful place to watch in the future for socialization on the part
of China into the norms of the organization. 84 Recall some of China's conc i1-
iatory gestures toward the Taiwanese delegation , namely, the willingness-
after initial resistance-to hold 0面cial meetings with Taiwan over steel and
the greater propensity to use English in its interactions. Although at this
point , these accommodative signs appear to be more tactical than a result of
any genuine persuasion , and while these issues are likely to be a signifìcant
source of friction in the future , this could change. Such behavior is an irritant
to other members and may produce social opprobrium , perhaps providing
a feedback loop for a socialization process that image-conscious China w i11
且nd di面cult to resist. Indeed , seeking to use the WTO's director general as
an agent , while itself remaining silent , suggests that Beiji
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTO 之 67

its stake in the WTO's legitimacy is high. This makes sense , given all China
conceded to in order to be admitted , the political costs paid at home , and
the domestic understanding of these costs. And it makes sense in light of the
concrete interests China brings to the organization-especia l1y opening the
export markets of developing countries.

Notes

I. See Alastair 1ain Johnston , "1s China a Status Quo Power?" International Se-
curity 27 , 4 (2003): 5-56; Margaret M. Pearson , "China's 1ntegration into the 1n-
ternational Trade and 1nvestment Regime ," in China Joins the World: Progress and
Prospects , ed. Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg (New York: Council on
foreign Relations Press , I999) , I6I-205; and Samuel S. Kim , "China and the United
Nations ," ibid. , 42- 89.
2. This chapter is primarily empirical and its conclusions are inductive. The data
used are drawn primarily from interviews with PRC 0面cials knowledgeable about
China's role in Geneva and with foreign observers (mostly trade 0面cials) of China's
WTO behavio r. The chapter also draws on trade weeklies as the major docu-
mentary basis for these findings. The question of China's behavior in the WTO
examined in this chapter is conceptually separate from the question of how China
is complying with its WTO accession agreement, which is not considered systemat-
ically here.
3. The Quad consists of the United States , the European Union , Canada , and
Japan. The Cairns Group , a formal organization , comprises seventeen agricultural
exporting countries , both developed and developing , committed to a market-based
trading system for agriculture. Its members are Argentina , Australia , Bolivia , Brazil ,
Canada , Chile , Colombia , Costa Rica , Guatemala , 1ndonesia, Malaysia , New
Zealand , Paraguay, the Philippines , South Africa , Thailand , and Uruguay.
4. On the institutional culture of the 明TTO ， see John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos ,
Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2000); Anne O.
Krueger , ed. , The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press , I998); and Gary P. Sampson , ed. , The Role of the World 1切 de Orga-
nization in Global Governance (Tokyo: UN University Press , 200I).
5. "friendlies" are also at times used by the United States to achieve another
strategy (also common in the APE C), which is to find another country to take the
lead on an issue so that it does not immediately alienate those who might quickly
oppose what they perceive to be a U. S. initiative.
6. Some observers 且nd this informality to be highly functional and warn against
"creeping legalism" in the 明TTO. See Razeen Sally, Whither the WTO? A Progress
Report on the Doha Round , Trade Policy Analysis , No. 23 (Washington , D. C.: Cato
1nstitute ，二 003) ， 7.
7. 1bid. ，工
268 CHINA AND GLOBA Ll ZATION

岛10FTEC official , Beijing , November 2002. See also Gong Wen , "Changes Take
Place over the Past Half Year Since China's 嘀咕o Entry," Peopl~ 云 Daily on1ine ,
12 July 2002 , http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/other/archive.html (archive date
20020711 [rr July] (accessed 27 October 2005).
9. Interview with MOFTEC 0面 cial ， November 2002 , and with member of the
Chinese delegation in Geneva , New York , 6 February 2004.
工 o. On bureaucratic interference in China's WTO accession negotiations , see
Margaret M. Pearson , "The Case of GATT/WTO ," in The Making of Chinese For-
eign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform , ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford:
Stanford University Press , 2001).
1 1. Obedience to domestic po1itical calculations of economic interest are the ex-
pected norm within the WTO and other international organizations. See Judith
Goldstein , "International Institutions and Domestic Po1itics: GATT, WTO , and the
Libera 1ization of International Trade ," in The WTO as an International Organiza-
tion , ed. Krueger, 133 - 52; and 1.孔1. Destler, American Trade Politics: System Un-
der Stress , 3d ed. (Washington , D. C.: Institute for International Economics ，工 995).
On China's domestic trade po1itics , see Margaret M. Pearson , "The Institutional,
Political , and Global Foundations of China's Trade Liberalization ," in Japan and
China in the World Political Economy , ed. Saadia Pekkanen and Kellee S. Tsai (New
York: Routledge Press , 2005).
12. See Minister of Foreign Trade Shi Guangsheng's comments in Gong ,
"Changes. . . Since China's WTO Entry."
1 3. Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the World Economy (Washington ,
D. C.: Brookings Institution Press , 2002).
14. Zhang Jin , "Nation Jumps to be World Third Largest Trader," China
Daily , 11 January 2005 , www.chinadail)明 om.cn /english /do c/之 005-01 1r r/content
_40 7979.htm (accessed 7 October 200 5).
r 5. Interview, Austra 1ian embassy economic 0面cer， Beijing, November 2002.
The desire to diversify away from the United States in grain is particularly acute in
some quarters , and is a key reason for China's recent pursuit of regional trade agree-
ments , particularly with Southeast Asia.
工 6. On the informal contacts among top leaders of the delegations , personal com-
munication from business association official , Washington D. C., May 2003. These
informal meetings are said to outnumber the formal meetings , and to take place in
Chinese.
工 7. The
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE 飞WTO 二 69

二o. See Mure Dickie , "China and Taiwan 0面cials Discuss Trade ," Financial
Tirnes ， 工 6December 2002 , and "China Accepts Talks with Taiwan overSteel Tar-
iffs ," Kyodo News Service , 4 December 2002.
21. Communication from trade association 0面cial， Washington , D. C., 20 May

2 00 3.
22. "China's Refusal to Answer Quad Queries Shuts Down Compliance Review
Session ," BNA International Trade Reporter , 26 Sept凹nber 2002 (online trade jour-
nal, available by subscription only).
23. A senior U. S. 。面cial who worked extensively on the Shanghai meetings
reported that the two sides worked very well together , and that the Taiwan offìcials
who were allowed to come to the mainland, many for the fìrst time , were visibly
"giddy" and "thrilled." Ultimately, though , the Chinese delegation refused to call
Taiwanese ministers "minister" in either written or oral contexts , deeply annoying
members of the Taiwan delegation. Interview with U. S. APEC 0面cial ， Washington ,
D. C., August 2002.
24. Interview, Offìce of the U. S. Trade Representative , August 2002.
巧. On 12 February 2003 , Supachai is reported to have made fìve requests of
Taiwan. In addition to the two listed above , it was asked that Taiwan change dip-
lomatic titles on name cards and letterheads; that the WTO secretariat use only
"sovereignty-neutral terminology when referring to Taiwan ," avoiding the terms
"country" and "state"; and that Supachai reserve the right to change any terminol-
ogy in documents that was not sovereignty-neutral. Charles Snyder, "Supporters in
US More Pessimistic ," Taipei Times , 31 May 2003. See also Observer , "Vexed Di-
rectory," Financial Times , 28 May 2003.
之 6. The PRC mission had itself once previously tried to use downgraded nomen-
clature for the Taiwan representative. In the steel talks of December 2002 , noted
above , the Chinese originally used the title "Taiwan Economic and Trade 0面ce"
(TECRO) to refer to Taiwan , implying that Taiwan's delegation held a similar status
to those of Hong Kong and Macao. At the meetings themselves , however, China
switched to the ò面cial terminology of the WTO , the "Separate Customs Territory
of Taiwan , Penghu , Kinmen and Matsu" (Dickie , "China and Taiwan 0面cials
Discuss Trade"). It appears that Supachai's later requests were a continuation of
Beijing's previous efforts , but under an institutional cove r.
27. The TR岛1 is set forth in Paragraph 18 of China's accession protoco l. After
the TR孔1 expires , Chin
27 0 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

government 0面cials at the time felt China was genuinely responding. Sources for
this paragraph are: "China Rejects U. S. Push for More Review of Market Access
Commitments ," Inside US-China Trade , 27 September 2002; "China's Refusal to
Answer Quad Queries Shuts Down Compliance Review Session"; Daniel Pruzin ,
"China Chafes at Dumping Panel Agenda for Excessive Focus on Accession Issues ,"
BNA International Trade Reporter , 26 Apri12002; "China Refuses to Discuss WTO
Trade Review in Farm, SPS Committees ," Inside US-China Trade , 3 July 2002 , 5;
"China Agrees to Allow Trade Remedy Review; Balks on Procedures ," ibid. ,
工 5 May 2002 ，工， 4; Daniel Pruzin , "China Review Woes Continue in WTO as Agri-
culture Meeting Questions TRQS ," BNA International Trade Reporter; 3 October
2002; and interview, USTR 0面cial， Washington , D. C., August 2002.
30. Interview with MOFTEC 0面cial， November 2002 , Beijing. A U. S. embassy
official con且rmed this "cold shoulder treatment" in an interview in Beijing in
November 2002.
3 1. Interview, PRC diplomat to the WTO , New York , 6 February 2004.
32. See preamble to the "Ministerial Declaration" (WT/MIN(OI)/DEC/W/工，
叫 November 200 工， paras. 2 and 3 , at www.wto.org/englishlthewto_e/minisce/
minOI_e/mindecLe.htm (accessed 27 October 2005). On the developing country
agenda , see Sally, Whither the WTO?I8-22 , and Rubens Ricupero , "Rebuilding
Confidence in the Multilateral Trading System: Closing the ‘ Legitimacy Gap ,''' in
Role of the World Trade Organization , ed. Sampson , 37-58.
33. Interviews with a senior MOFTEC 0面cial deeply involved in WTO acces-
sion , Washington , D. C., May 2002; and a Chinese scholar, Beijing , September 2002.
34. This is also the position of the United States. Nobody would argue that the
U. S. support here puts it in the development camp.
35. These comments were made by then Foreign Trade Minister Shi Guang-
sheng , and are quoted in Inside US-China Trade , I May 2002 , 3-4. See also the
comments of Vice Minister Long Yongtu quoted in "Speed Urged for Global Trade
Talks ," China Daily online , 20 July 2002 , www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc12002-
07120/contenCI28755.htm (accessed I November 2005). China also calls for tech-
nical assistance to developing countries at IMF board meetings.
36. This effort in January 2002 was pushed by a broad coalition , including most
African countries and many in Central America and the Caribbean , plus Pakistan,
and opposed by the Quad
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTO 工7 1

39. This view was repeated in interviews with various former and current U. S.
trade 0面cials ， Washington , D.C , and Beijing, August-September 2002. Argentina
was said to have been quite vocal in its view of China as a competito r.
4 0 . Greg Rushford , "Washington's Dirty War on Chinese Clothing ," Far East-
ern Economic Review 168 , 1 (二 005): 31-36.
4 1. One assessment of China's trade interests from the developing country per-
spective argues that the 'prospective picture for competitive exports from China is
mixed, and shows that it must be discussed on a sector- and countf)吨pecific basis.
S. M. Shafaeddin , The Impact of China 云 Accession to WTO on the Exports of De-
veloping Countries , UNCTAD Discussion Paper No. 160 (Geneva: United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development , 2002) , www.unctad.org/en/docs/dp_160
.en.pdf (accessed 7 October 2005)' See also Lardy, Integrating China into the World
Economy, 126- 2 7.
42. Interview with Chinese trade 0面cial， Washington , D.C , August 2002.
43. In the APEC , for example , China is seen as avoiding coa1itions and does not
engage in or form alternatives to the Buick Group (including the United States , Aus-
tralia , New Zealand , Hong Kong , Singapore , Canada , and Chile).
44. Interviews with U. S. and PRC trade 0面cials ， Washington , D.C , and Beijing ,
August and September 2002. China's efforts on the Doha Round in Shanghai can be
seen in the context of Beijing's willingness to channel the most signi且cant portion of
the agenda to security issues raised after the events of I I September 200 1.
45. China is acutely aware of this sensitivity and often acts to downplay actions
that might further deepen the notion that its economic growth will come at the ex-
pense of its Southeast Asian neighbors.
46. The working draft used as the basis for negotiations had been submitted by
the General Council chairma Ìl, Uruguay's Ambassador Carlos Perez del Castillo.
This draft was seen by the G20 as too similar to the draft the United States and Eu-
ropean Union had agreed to several weeks earlier in meetings in Montreal and as ig-
noring concerns raised in a paper submitted in response by the G20 in August.
47. See Martin Khor , "Developing Countries Prepare for Agricultural Battle at
Cancun Ministerial ," TWN Report , 9 September 2003.
48. Peter Wonacott and Neil King , "China Moves Quietly to Push Trade Goals:
Beijing , Balancing Needs to Its Farmers , Factories , Treads Softly at WTO Talks ,"
Wall 5tr
27 2 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

53. "China's WTO Entry Could Hurt Developing Country Interests ," Inside US-
China Trade , 7 November 2001 , 5. One argument made by both U. S. and EU trade
o面cials is that , because most of China's commitments will be phased in as of 2005 ,
and because the Doha Round is not expected to conclude before that , it will be in a
position to offer more.
54. Overall , China's trade barriers sti1l remain higher than those of the United
States , European Union, Canada , etc. , and in areas of keen interest to these coun-
tries. So despite the fact that barriers have come down fast and are lower than many
other developing countries (two points China emphasizes) , they still exist (the point
the developed ecoriomies emphasize).
55. It is noteworthy that China's proposals , while request-heavy, are neverthe-
less said to be detailed and fairly well thought through , in contrast to India's strat-
egy. Interview with EU delegation representative , Beijing , October 2002.
56. During the second half of 2002 , the United States , the European Union , and
even China offered proposals on agriculturalliberalization. The differences between
these proposals were substantial, and the fìrst major deadline by which the inter-
ested parties were to have agreed on negotiating modalities , 31 March 2003 , passed
without agreement. Elizabeth Becker, "Negotiators Fail to Agree on Agricultural
Subsidies ," New York Times , 1 April 2003 , C r.
57. U. S. agricultural production has , of course , relied heavily on domestic
supports for agriculture , a fact that seriously undermines trust in the United States
as an agricultural liberalizer. Nevertheless , compared to the EU-based coalition ,
and particularly in the Doha Round , U. S. trade policy has increasingly favored
restricting the special exemption that agricultural trade has had in the GAT T. An
account that categorizes the main players in two camps-a development perspective
and a trade-liberalizer perspective-is David Orden , Rashid S. Kaukab , and Euge-
nio Diaz-Bonilla , Liberalizing Agricultural Trade and DeveloPing Countries.
Carnegie Endowment TED Policy Brief No. 6 (Washington , D. C.: Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace , 2003) , summary at www.carnegieendowment
.org/publications/index.cfm? 但= view&id = 1 202&prog= zgp&proj = zted (accessed
September 27 ，之 005).
58. The G10 also includes Taiwan.
59. China's proposal was written by the Ministry of Agriculture , but it appears
to be d
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTO 主 73

to ensure rural employment) and would provide exemptions for crops deemed nec~
essary ior secure "food security"in these countries."RFTO Members Split on ‘ De-
velopment Box' and S & D ," Bridges 研句走 ly Trade News Digest, 12 Februarv 丰002.
63. On the Doha positio叫 see Daniel Pruzin , "Harbison Calls on WTO Me II1-
bers to ‘ Change Gears' in Ag.ricultural.Tal~s ，." BNA International Trade Reporter ,
3 October 2002. The agricultural goals of the Doha Round are expressed' in the
Ministerial Declaration .of 200 1. 1n addition to these main pillars , the developing
countries are to receive "special and differential treatment" to take aCCOunt of food
security issues and the needs of rural development. "Non-trade concerns ," such as
animal welfare and consumer protection , also are to be considered , largely at the be-
hest of the European Union. Sa l1y, Whither the WTO? 15.
64. Lardy, Integrating China into the World Economy , 75-76. The TRQ com-
mitments lower import quotas to below this for designated agricultural products.
Global food and agricultural tariffs average about 62 percent. U. S. average agricul-
tural tariffs are about 12 percent.
65. Sa11y, Whither the WTO? 15.
66. Domestic agricultural supports are classified into three "boxes": amber box
(trade-distorting , and subject to reduction commitments) , green box (non-trade
distorting , exempt from reduction commitments) , and blue box (production-
limiting supports , also exempted from 明TTO reduction commitments) subsidies. See
www.wto.org/englishltratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm (accessed 21 October 2005).
There is much contention over the exemption of "blue box" and "green box" sup-
ports , used heavily by the United States , the latter because their sheer volume is said
by some , including the Cairns Group , to be distorting. See Pruzin , "Harbison Calls
on WTO Members."
67. The U. S. position unveiled in the summer of 2002 called for simplification of
trade-distorting domestic subsidies (phased in over a five-year period) to 5 percent
of a country's total value of agricultural production (i.e. , equalizing this for a11 coun-
tries) and then moving to eventual elimination; see www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/
proposa l. htm (accessed 3 November 2005). At present, according to the U. S. De-
partment of Agriculture , Europe is at 25 percent, Japan at 40 percent, and United
States at 10 percent (Ann Veneman , press conference , 29 July 2002). China agreed
in its WTO accession , a
274 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

70. Inside US-China Trade , 21 June 2002. This was in fact quite similar to an
earlier Cairns Group proposa l.
7 1. Daniel H. Rosen , Scott Rozelle , and Jikun Huang , Roots of Competitive-
ness: China's Evolving Agricultural Interests (Washington, D. C.: Institute for Inter-
national Economics , 2004)'
72. Under the U. S. proposal , the United States would maintain certain "green
boxed" domestic supports (such as direct payments to farmers to not grow crops or
income insurance). On export credit negotiations , see "Agriculture ," Doha Round
Briefmg Series 1, 2 (Geneva: International Center for Trade and Sustainable Devel-
opment，二 003) ， at www.ictsd.org/pubs/dohabriefings/doha2-agric.pdf (accessed
31 October 2005).
73. Lardy, Integrating China into the World Economy， 工 23.
74. Ibid. , 123-25.
75. Interviews with former U. S. trade 0面cials involved in China's WTO acces-
sion agreements , July 2002. On developing countries textile exporters' support for
U. S. safeguards against China , see Rushford , "Washington's Dirty War on Chinese
Clothing."
76. Interview with non- U. S. trade official , Beijing, October 2002.
77. Interview, Chinese trade 0面cial ， Washington , D. C., August 2002.
78. U. S. protectionism was also evident in the imposition in 2003 of quotas
on certain types of Chinese imports. See Rushford ,. "Washington's Dirty War on
Chinese Clothing."
79. Lucy Hornby, "EU, China Clinch Deal to Avert Textiles Showdown ,"
Reuters , 10 June 2005 , www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?storyID=8759653&
type = businessNews (accessed 10 J une 2005).
80. Some of the agency problems between Beijing and its trade negotiators that
were evident in China's WTO accession negotiations continue to be relevant. In
those negotiations , the inability of China's trade 0面cials to gain consensus (both at
home and with foreign interlocutors) Iheant that the Chinese timing was often "off."
By the time Chinese negotiators were ready to address and resolve an issue , the ne-
gotiators on the other side had already moved on to something else. Interviews with
U. S. and EU trade negotiators , Washington , D. C. and Beijing , August and Septem-
ber 2002.
81. A relevant question is whose definition of the norms of the 嘀咕o are to be
used: those of intellectuals (primarily liberal trade economists and their counterparts
in IGOs .and NGOs) , on the one hand , or those of member states , as evidenced in
their actual behavior, on the other? Despite the exi
 CHINA'S EARLY YEARS IN THE WTO 丰 75

83. Elizabeth Becker , "明T.T.O. Rules Against U. S. On Steel Tariff," New York
Times ， 二 7 March 2003 , C r.
84. China's 明TTO membership could conceivably change its behavior toward
interactions with Taiwan in international organizations by changing the material
incentives facing China , by altering the distribution of power among the relevant
constellation of actors at home (in the PRC) , or by socializing China to more coop
erative behavio r. See Alastair lain ]ohnston, "Treating lnternational Institutions as
Social Environments ," Intèrnational Studies Quarterly 45 (200r): 4 87-5 r 5. There is
not at this point any evidence that the fìrst two processes are relevant. Thus , social-
ization into acceptable norms of behavior and the processes by which socialization
occurs seem to be the places to look for explanations of change in China's behavior
toward Taiwan in the 明TTO context.
10 Chinese Foreign Policy Faces
Globalization Challenges
Samuel S. Kim

Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a ques-
tion of the first importance for the revolution. The basic
reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China
achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends
in order to attack real enemies.
-Mao Zedong , I926

Opening to the outside world is a long-term basic state pol-

icy. Confronted with the globalization trend in economic,
scientific , and technological development, we should take
an even more active stance in the world by improving the
pattern of opening up in all directions , at alllevels and in a
wide range , developing an open economy, enhancing our in-
ternational competitiveness , optimizing our ecohomic struc-
ture and improving the quality of our national economy.
- Jiang Zemin , I997

Globalization has an immense potential to improve people's

lives , but it can disrupt-and destroy-them as well. Those
who do not accept its pervasive , all-encompassing ways are
often left behind. It is our task to prevent this; to ensure that
globalization leads to progress , prosperity and security for
al l. 1 intend that the United Nations shalllead this effort.
-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan , I998

1ntroduction

At the turn of the new millennium , globalization seemed to have

morphed into all things in the eyes of theorists and practitioners of interna-
tional politics-a fait 主CCO.n:!2U， a myth , a rallying cry, a journalistic buzz-
word , and a theoretical puzzle. Like a tidal wave sweeping across the world ,
the acceleration and intensifìcation of globalization ii1 the last decade of the
twentieth century has 年~w~.d new opportunities and new dangers to na-
tional security, well-being , and identities in both developed and developing
countries. At least until 9 /r 1 , no subject or phenomenon had elicited as
much interest , controversy, and even protest as had globalization among
people in the street , ivory-tower academics , political activists , and elites 、 a11
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 277

advancing conflicting claims about the forces and processes of contemporary

globalization. In addition , globalization suddenly has found its way clear to
becoming the hottest topic of a "global community" structured and sym-
bolized by the United Nations and its a面liated specialized agencies. 1
Where does the People's Republic of China stand inthe controversial dis-
course and politics of globalization? This chapter proceeds from the prem-
ise that by dint of what it is and what it does , the PRC is inescapably part
of both the world-order problem and the world-order solution. Indeed , as
the world's most populous country, enjoying the world's fastest economic
growth in the past two decades , rising China holds one of the master keys
to the future of globalization in the post-Cold War world. The globaliza-
tion trope thus offers a useful but relatively underutilized analytical lens
with which to track and explain the new thinking and directions in China's
foreign policy, especially its global policy. As China is increasingly inte-
grated into the global community, how it wields whatever power it holds-
and how the outside world and particularly the East Asian states adapt to
the emergence of a global China-provides a new empirical basis for ex-
ploring the relationship between globalization and sovereignty, especially
the impacts and consequences of globalization for the shaping of Chinese
thinking and practices on state sovereignty.
This chapter is organized in four sections to provide an overview of how
China is coping with the forces of globalization in the post-Cold War era.
The 且rst section briefly appraises the debate over globalization in order to
develop an alternative conceptual framework to facilitate a more synthetic
assessment of the thinking and practice of globalization in post-Cold War
Sino-global interactions. The second section scans the Chinese globaliza-
tion discourse , especially how the promises and perils of globalization are
actually cönceived of and addressed by key pundits and decision-makers.
The third section explores the complex and evolving interplay between
globalization dynamics and China's post-Mao global policy, particularly
with respect to the questions of unilateralism versus multilateralism , state
sovereignty versus global interdependence , and national security versus co-
operative-human-security. The fìnal section sketches out several cha

China in the Global Discourse

Globalization is a socially constructed and politically contested con-

cept. Despite the burgeoning literature , there is as yet no dominant theory
of globalization that commands much theoretical excitement , let alone
paradigmatic status. 2 While globalization is mentioned as one of the four
27 8 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

leading post-Cold War international relations (IR) theories in the Chinese

scholarly discourse ,3 the scholarly discourse in the United States is dominated
by the continuing turf war of contending realist, liberal , and constructivist
theories. 4
The globalization debate has remained sterile , dominated by two ex-
treme views. At one extreme , hyperglobalists advance a Panglossian claim
that globalization heralds the emergence of a truly open and integrated
global economy, the rise of a new post-Westphalian global order , and the
functional demise of the state system. 5 At the other extreme , neorealist
skeptics argue that there is nothing new in today's world economy, and that
all the frenzy about globalization amounts to nothing more than "glob-
aloney." Relying on a wholly economistic conception of globalization , neo-
realist skeptics argue that the historical evidence at best con fÌ rms only the
existence of heightened' levels of interaction between predominantly na-
tional economies. The postwar growth of international economic transac-
tions is seen as representing internationalization or regionalization rather
than the emergence of a truly global economy, and the current levels of in-
ternational trade are seen as comparable to-or even lower than-those
during the classical gold-standard period (c. I870-I9I4). Moreover, skep-
tics assert that the state is as robust as it ever was , with an impressive array
of political options. 6, "The claim that globalization is undermining sover-
eignty," according to a neorealist skeptic , "is exaggerat~d and historica l1y
myopic."7
Much of the globalization debate in the worlds of academia and pun-
dit町， dominated by the hyperglobalization and globaloney schools , has
been marred by tenuous conceptualizations , ideological presuppositions
and polemics , and inattention to the fu l1 range of available empirical evi-
dence. Both schools are misconceived , proceeding from the dubious prem-
ise of globalization as an ideal end-a fully globalized economy-rather
than as an ongoing process with ups and downs. Globalization is better seen
as a continuum. The either/or conceptions of globalization that underlie the
current debates , suggesting either that a paradigmatic change has already
occurred , heralding a new post-Westphalian global order, or that there is
nothing new in contemporary internationallife , stand on shaky ground his-
t
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 279

and impact of human relations and transactions have radically increased re-
gionally and globally, eroding the boundaries between hitherto separate
economic , political, and !i ociocultural entities throughout the world.
An appraisal of the interplay between globalization and Chinese foreign
policy requires a broad conceptual framework that shies away from hyper-
globalist assumptions about the functional demise of the state , while also
avoiding the neorealist and neomercantilist critjque that does not adequately
take into account new patterns and dynamics{The concept of globalization
suggested here follows the "transformationalist thesis，叼 which refers to an
interactive and interpenetr~ting process that relates multiple levels and facets
of modern life-economics , politics , society, culture , security, and ecωolog白町y.、、}
伊lobaliz
p 丘Z囚atωn is defined as a bound 出a吁叫ar叫n 吨go 创r bou山
und出a吁P 严en
旧e蚓町
tra剖tin
and boundary-weakening process that int优ens 臼SI凶且e臼s the levels of interconnect-
edness and int优er叩pene町创tr
e 住ra
剖t口
甜10
∞ n within and among states and societies-a
worldwide revolution with far-reaching but differing consequences for
people's security, well-being , and identities. As a consequence , the separation
between the local and the global , between "domestic" and "foreign" affairs ,
has become increasingly blurred.Perhaps the most 旦l!~!lt feature of global-
ization is this intensification of domestic and externallinkages. This trans-
formational perspective seems best suited to capture the new thinking , new
directions , and new behavioral tendencies in Chinese foreign policy.

China 云 Evolving Views

Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening in 1978 , while not explicitly

understood or recognized at the time as a response to the emerging chal-
lenges of globalization , may in practice be considered exactly that. 9 There
was a drastic reformulation (and relegitimation) of China's future in terms
of such hitherto proscribed concepts as the open door, international inter-
dependence , division of labor, and specialization. íèhina's backwardness
and stunted modernization were attributed , not to we三tern imperialism , but
to China's own isolationism , going back to the Ming dynasty. for Deng,
Chinese nationalism and globalization were defined in virtuou-sand mutu-
ally complementary terms: the so-called "grabbing with two hands" ap-
proach. With one hand , China would grasp reform and opening (economic
globalization) as necessary to grow strong and prosperous , while at the
same time suppressing all kinds of ideological and cultural pollutants from
abroad (cultural globalization) with the other hand. lO
From a diachronic perspective , it is worth noting that only four years be-
fore the advent of Deng's reforms , Chinese UN Ambassador Huang Hua ,
using a vivid Chinese metaphor, declared to the global audience at the Sixth
Special Session of the General Assembly that "interdependence" in the con-
280 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

temporary world economy was a fig leaf obscuring the asymmetrical inter-
dependence "between a horseman and his mount." l1 Ind~ed， for the de-
pendencia and world-system theorists , Mao's China was the exception-an
anti-center model , as it were-that supported their thesis about the global
political economy of center-periphery capitalism. Johan Galtung argued in
I976 , for example , that the center countries were "not only on the decline
in terms of power , but also as models-which , of course , is one aspèct of
their total power decline" and then argued that "if any country is a model ,
it would rather be China."12
The heated and short-lived debate on "global citizenship" (qiuji) that the
World Economic Herald (Shanghai) initiated in I988 is representative of the
Chinese debate on globalization. The meaning of "global citizenship" that
came out of this debate seems clear enough. Acknowledging that the new
wave of scienti且c and technological revolution was creating complex global
networks of mutual inf1 uence and infiltration , it was said that China could
choose either not to emancipate its political-economy thinking-thereby
falling behind in the technological race , forfeiting its "global citizenship" in
the process-or to more fully integrate itself into the world market and
make more creative use of the global economy 一-whereby the country could
leap into the front ranks of world power. 13
In the wake of the Tiananmen carnage , the concept of "global citizen-
ship" or the notion of "global village consciousness" was denounced as one
source of the ideas behind the uprising of 4 June. 14 Even President George
H. W. Bush's call for a "new world order" was attacked in China as the
invisible integrationist hand of the conspiratorial "peaceful evolution"
strategy of seeking to establish a "‘ free' federation or a federation of ‘ dem-
ocratic countries' on the basis of a common principle and common outlook
and values." The Chinese view at the time was that such a scheme involved
a hidden American agenda of bringing the entire world under hegemonic
u.S. rule. 15
By the mid I99os , the word "globalization" had found its way clear into
Chinese discourse. Li Shenzhi , former vice president of the Chinese Acad-
emy of Social Science (CASS) , advances the ~ost liberal "think globally,
act locally': proposition. According to Li , transnational , supranational , and
global forces are at work , multiplying global prob
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 281

Other scholarly works published since 1995 explore how globalization

dynamìcs are impacting and reshaping the traditional notion of a state-
centric international orde r. The mainstream scholarly discourse converges
on the notion of globalization as simultaneously empowering and con-
straining. Contrary to the hyperglobalization and globaloney schools of
thought , globalization dynamics have not so much replaced the Westphalian
state-centric international order as they have trànsformed the context and
conditions under which states compete for power and plenty.17
Also in the Chinese discourse on globalization , there has been a subtle and
signi且cant shift in mainstream thinking about world order. Previously, the
notion that a strong China was an irreducible prerequisite to international
order was central to Deng's reform and opening to the world: "The stronger
China grows , the better the chances are for preserving world peace ," Deng
asserted. 18 The concept of the responsibility of the great powers , though still
underexplored in Western IR theory, has in recent years suddenly come to the
fore in the Chinese debate on globalization. 19 The rise of China as a respon-
sible great nation in the international community-the notion that China's
sense of responsibility to the world is commensurate with its status as a great
nation-is said to be a major change in Chinese foreign policy.
Gone apparently is the rooted Sinocentric view of the world justifìed by
the tyrannies of the past and the abiding quest for national identity via civ-
ilizational autonomy and political self-suffìciency. In the long stretch of
China's encounter with the outside world , foreign (barbarian) technical ,
commercial , religious , educational , and military advisors have come and
gone without making much of a dent in Chinese world-order thinking. 20
China today belongs to the world , and we are now told that the world does
not belong to China alone. "China cannot afford to pay the price that the
destruction of the existing international system will entail. Nor can it afford
the huge cost of setting up a separate system." China should then shy away
from an ultranationalist policy or the expansionist policy of hegemony.
Should China pursue a revisionist policy, three anti-China consequences
would follow: (1) China would face containment by the United States and
its Western allies; (2) the security environment in the surrou
 TABLE 10.1
Globalization in China 云 "State of the World Message" 的 the General
Assembly 云 Grand Debate, 1994-2002
Date
Doc Symbol Number of
Speaker References Key Remarks

09/28/94 岛1ultipolarity = 1 "Globalization" is not mentioned , but the speech

A/49/PV.8 WTO = 2 does say, in urging developed countries to take
Qian Qichen measures to share their wealth with other coun-
tries and to strengthen economic cooperation ,
that "the world economy is an interdependent
whole."
09/27/95 N/A The closest mention is the phrase "The worldwide
A/50/P V. 8 tendency towards economic integration ,
Qian Qichen regionalization and the formation of economic
groupings has accelerated."
10/24/95 N/A Jiang speaks of the "internationalization of
A/50/P V. 39 economic life" and mentions the need for
Jiang Zemin international cooperation on global issues like
the environment and population contro l.
09/25/96 Multipolarity = 3 The first mention of economic globalization
A/511P V. 8 Globalization = 3 occurs in this speech; it is cited a~ a "tide" and
Qian Qichen as a rare opportunity for all countries to enhance
cooperation. China also speaks of the need to
address noneconomic global issues through
international cooperation.
09 /2 4/97 Multipolarity = 1 Here China approves that the "economic links
A/52/PV. 9 Globalization = 1 and mutual penetration among countries and
Qian Qichen regions are on the constant increase" but warns
of the risks of the "highly globalized" inter-
national financial market. A paragraph is also
叫

devoted to "transboundary issues."

JmUMo
u "啊

=∞

M ·rEM2
盯丘=

V-1
09/23/98 The trends of multipolarity and economic
A/53/PV. 11 globalization are cited as indications of a
Tang Jiaxuan readjustment of international relations. The
1997 crisis occurred "in the overall context of
globalization," but China pledges to "keep
abreast of the trend of globalization" and
expresses its wish to join the WTO. The
"accelerated democratization" of intern-
ational relations (IR) is first mentioned in
this speech.
09/22/99 Multipolarity = 1 Wealthy countries are asked to share in the
A/54/P V. 8 Globalization = 1 responsibility of contributing to the growth
Tang Jiaxuan WTO = 1 of developing countries because "the world
economy is an interrelated and indivisible
whole." China requests that the UN hold
a conference to discuss the globalization
ofthe world economy and other global
issues such as poverty, the environment,
population, etc.
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 283

TAB LE 10.1 (continued)

Date
Doc Symbol Number of
Speaker References Key Remarks

09/06/00 Multipolarity = 2 "The trends towards multi-polarization and

A/55/P V. 3 Globalization = 3 economic globalization are gaining momentum"
Jiang Zemin opens this speech. China points out that the
fr山ts of economic globalization and modern
technology are not shared by all , as well as
mentioning the need to address the environment,
drugs , and refugees internationally.
11111101 Globalization = 5 For the first time , China describes the question
A/56/PV.4 6 WTO = 2 of security as becoming globalized and points
Tang Jiaxuan to the positive and negative aspects of globaliza-
tion; it is "neither a panacea for development
nor a monster causing disaster," the speech
reads. The need to "democratize" IR comes up
agam.
09/13/02 Globalization = 2 China speaks of the need to "strengthen guidance
A/57/P V. 5 and management of the globalization process."
Tang Jiaxuan Following on the security issue , the speech
reads , "countries have come to realize that they
have common security interests and feel a
greater sense of interdependence."

common belief that entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a
threat to China's political , cultural , and economic sovereignty.22 In the wake
of China's accession to the WTO in November 2001 , however, the anti-
globalization groups shifted from outright opposition to a discussion of
how best to meet the new challengers , new rules and norms , and new gov-
erning procedures imposed by China's WTO commitments. 23
And as compared to the hyperglobalist ideal , most Chinese observers and
policymakers conceive of globalization in state-centric and state-empowering
terms. The official understanding , as made evident in the annual "state of the
world messages" given to the UN General Assembly over the past decade , is
that economic globalization is not only state-centric but also largely one-
dimensiona l. As Table 10.1 shows , the first mention of "economic globaliza-
tion" occurs in Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's state of the world message de-
livered on 25 September 1996, a year earlier than PresidentJiang Zemin's po-
litical report to the Fifteenth Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress
invoked the phrase "economic globalization" to the domestic audience for
the first time. Content analysis of China's annual state of the world messages
also reveals that the term "globalization" is often used in connection with
"multipolarization," cited as a reason for the changing trend of international
relations , and çiescribed as a double-edged sword to call attention to the need
for the "standardization and management of globalization."
28 4 CHINA AND GLOBA Ll ZATION

The real surprise in Table 10.1 has to do with the 2001 "state of the world
message" that for the fÌ rst time describes "security" as becoming increasingly
globalized , indicating an extra-economic concept of globalization. Simulta-
neously, the concept of multipolarization that had remained as a recurring
theme and claim in Chinese foreign policy pronouncements since the early
1980s seems to have suffered a disconnect from the concept of globalization.
In a similar vein , the annual frequency of the term "multipolarization" (duo-
jihua) in the People 云 Daily in 1990-2000 appears to be on the steady decline
relative to the term "globalization" (quanqiuhua).24 The strategic implica-
tions of such a shift in China's global policy pronouncements are not self-
evident , but the two terms at the very least assume very different means and
ends of seeking what the Chinese call "comprehensive national strength"
(zonghe guoli).

China 云 Evolving Strategy

In the post-Cold War world , which is becoming simultaneously in-

creasingly interdependent and fragmented , it is one thing for a state to an-
nounce a positive view of globalization and quite another for a state to en-
gage substantively with globalization. Even though Chinese leaders and
scholars may publicly claim in general terms that there is no necessary or in-
evitable conflict between globalization and sovereignty-bound concepts
(e.g. , traditional security, multipolarity, independence) , there is growing
recognition, albeit more often outside of China , that globalization by any
de fÌ nition requires a strategic choice about the basic structure and. goals
of the economy and the society, a choice that will determine the nature and
direction of their developmental trajectory. It is important , therefore , to
break down the areas in which China is more or less fully engaging with
globalization.

ECONOMIC GLOBA Ll ZATION

China clearly is a big winner in the (economic) globalization game.

Beijing's generally positive view of and response to globalization are fueled
by impressive economic accomplishments , which in turn reinforce the belief
that the country is well positioned to take further advantage of globaliza-
tion in the future. As early as 1991 , the World Bank had singled out post-
Mao China as having garnered an all-time global record in doubling per
capita output in the shortest period (1977-87).25 China's GDP growth rate
during the 且rst decade of the globalization era (1990-2001) is even more
impressive. China easily won the global race in economic growth rate and
rankíng , with the nearest peer competitor being the tiny city-state of Singa-
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 285

TABLE 10.2
China 云 GDP growth rate iη comþaratzve þersþectzve)
I99 0 - 20 0I

Average Annual Growth Percentage ,

Country 199 0 -2001

China 10.0%
Singapore 7.8%
India 5.9%
South Korea 5.7%
Hong Kong 3.9%
United States 3.5%
France 1. 8%
Germany 1. 5%
]apan 1. 3%
North Korea -2. 0%
Russia -3.7%
World Average 2.7%

Sources: Adapted from World Bank , World Development Report ,

2003 (New York: Oxford University Press ，丰003) ， table 仇丰 38-39; North
Korea's GDP is based on the Bank of Korea (Seou l).

pore-one of the fastest runners in the globalization race , as shown in

Table 10.2 above.
China's trade exploded , from about $20 billion in the late 1970S to
$1.巧 trillion in 2004 , as trade as a percentage of GDP-a widely used
measure of a country's integration into the global economy-more than
doubled once every decade , from 5.2 percent in 1970 to 12.9 percent in
1980 to 26.8 percent in 1990 and then 44 percent in 2000 , compared to
11 percent for North Korea ，工 8 percent for ]apan, 19 percent for India , and
21 percent for the United States in 2000. In 2004 , the rate of China's for-
eign trade dependence witnessed a steep rise , reaching an all-time high of 70
percent , an increase of 58 points since the end of the Mao era. 26 The coun-
try is the world's third-largest trading state after the United States and Ger-
many and is 3.5 times as integrated into the world economy as the United
States or ]apan. China is also the world's largest recipient of foreign direct
investment ($60.6 billion in 2004)27 and the world's second-largest holder
of foreign exchange reserves ($609.9 billion in 2004). All of this has con-
tributed to China having a $7.2 trillion gross national income on a purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) basis (as of 2004).
Foreign direct investment has gone into bolstering China's position as the
world's primary assembly line. China now produces more steel than ]apan
and the United States combined , and it is also a leader in almost every cat-
egory of manufactured goods , from shoes to semiconductors. 28 In the early
286 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

twenty-fìrst century, without much fanfare , China began bridging the digi-
tal divide to become a signifìcant player in the information-technology (IT)
industry. In 2000 , China surpassed Taiwan as the world's third-largest
producer of computer hardware. 29 In 200I , China surpassed the United
States to become the world's largest mobile phone user and market and also
became the world's third-largest maker of IT products , after the United
States and ]apan.
The downside of China's political economy in the post-Mao era is rapid
growth in income inequality. As measured by the Gini coeffìcient, this in-
come inequality had risen to 0.458 by 2000 , up from 0.4 马 in I996.
China's ranking in the UN Development Programme's human development
index dropped from 82d (out of I 60) in 工 990 to 96th (out of I73) in 2000 ,
although the human development index itself registered an improvement
from 0.6I4 to 0.726. Rapid growth helped lift some 200 million Chinese
out of poverty between I978 and I995 , but the poor (under the World
Bank's international poverty line of $I a day) still made up I8.8 percent of
China's population (i.e. , 239 million people) as of the end of 200I , down
from 22 percent in I995 月 The PRC remains a poor global power in per
capita terms: in 2004 , national income per capita was only $I ,290 (or
$ 5, 5 30 on a PPP basis).31
Despite being enmeshed in the Asian-Paci且c economic matrix and bur-
dened by enormous debt , China emerged relatively unscathed from the
I997-98 Asian fìnancial crisis. China's relative immunity was due to the
nonconvertibility of its currency, substantial foreign exchange reserves to
defend against speculative attacks on the yuan , and a large inflow of FDI ,
onlya small percentage of which is portfolio investment, which is more vul-
nerable than capital investment to quick withdrawal in a panic.
Beijing's response to the Asian 且nancial crisis shows a variety of consid-
erations are at work in shaping China's policy and behavior, including
China's integration into the global community as a responsible great power,
which seems to be the primary factor. China's policy elites seldom fail to
cite Beijing's refusal to devalue the renminbi (RMB) as positive proof of its
status as a responsible great power. Beijing's d~cision not to devalue the
RMB is explained again in "grabbing with two hands" terms: "On the one
hand , the non-devaluation of the renminbi demonstrated to the world com-
munity China's formidab
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 287

goods cheaper on the world market , it would also have raised the price of im-
ports. According to most estimates , about 50 percent of China's total exports
depend on the processing of imported raw materials. China's integration into
the world economy has complicated the calculation of relative and absolute
gains , making it non-zerO-SUffi. lndeed , the Asian 且nancial crisis is said to have
strengthened China's resolve to maintain the momentum of its reform and
opening to meet the challenges of glo balization and to more fully integrate into
the global economy.33 Beijing must increasingly define its interests in the con-
text of its position as a 'te sponsible economic power and according to how its
behavior could sire instabihty contrary to its own national interests. )
By any reckoning , the WTO has become a lightning rod (or anti-
globalization protests. As protests against the WTO became frequent , China
completed its protracted struggle to gain WTO entry. Despite significant op-
position at home and major sovereignty-diluting preconditions imposed by
the United States , China's leadership arrived at the conclusion that economic
globalization was indeed irresistible and that China could either join the
trend or be left behind. As eXplained by Jiang Zemin , "Joining the WTO is a
strategic policy decision by the Chinese government under the situation of
economic globalization; it is identical with China's objective of reform , open-
ing up , and establishing a socialist market economic structure."34
After fourteen years of often di面cult negotiations , in late 2001 , China
finally became a member of the WTO under terms that hewed to the long-
standing Western demands not only for reducing tariff and nontariff barri-
ers but also for opening up long-closed sectors such as telecommunications ,
banking , and insurance; ln a few important areas , China assumed obliga-
tions that exceednormal WTO standards-the so-called WTO-plus com-
mitments. 35 There is no denying that Beijing's determination to gain WTO
entry at almost any price represents a big gamble in the checkered history
of China's engagement with the global community. Why then did Beijing
take some unprecedented sovereignty-diluting steps to gain WTO entry?
While there is no simple or single answer , China's WTO entry nonethe-
less underscores the extent to which the forces of globalization have blurred
the traditional divide between the internation
 288 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

lndeed , Jiang and Zhu seem to have assigned an almost impossible multi-
tasking social and economic mission to foreign trade , especially exports:
alleviating the growing unemployment problem , increasing tax revenues
and the state's foreign exchange reserves , fueling steady economic growth ,
accelerating technology transfer, and above all enhancing the competitive-
ness and productivity of domestic enterprises. China's participation in the
WTO is also seen not only as providing one of the most important channels
to participation in economic globalization but also as allowing Beijing more
space toξ羊且! its inf1 uence on the management of economic globalization.
Status drive , not as a hegemonic or revisionist power but as a responsible
great power, is preprogrammed in the form of mutual legitimation 一-the
WTO needs China; China needs the WTO. The not-so-subtle subtext of
China's status drive is clear enough: "The rise in a country's economic sta-
tus will bring about a corresponding rise in its political status."37
As revealed in Jia吨 Zemi的 major speeches since 1997 , the forces that
most define China's national identity now are those associated with global-
ization. 38 This shows the extent to which China has shifted from ideologi-
cal or nationalistic legitimation to performance-based legitimation. Such
performance-based legitimation can be generated. over the long term only
through increased trade , foreign investment , and the more disciplined and
rule-bound domestic economy that WTO membership is expected to bring
about. (And yet the question of how to bring nationalistic legitimation ip~s)'rlS:
with performance-based legitimation is left unmentioned and unresolved ,
气 opening the door , if only in principle , to other claimants to legitimacy.

SECURITY GLOBALIZATION

What does it mean for the Chinese state and people to be or feel "se-
cure" in an era of globalization? With the clarity, simplicity, and apparent
stability of the Cold War gone , the agency and the scope of "threat" as well
as the sources and effects of security globalization have become more com-
plex and diverse than ever. The most common characterization of the rela-
tionship between globalization and security is the "outside-in" premise-
that is , that globalization impinges upon the state from the outside and
transforms the security environment within which it operates. However, se-
curity is also affected by internal transformations of the state. 39 The new se-
curity environment is increasingly being shaped and defined by the "inter-
mestic" interconnection and interpenetration between the international and
domestic spheres. This has been the case in no small part because global-
ization affects not only external sovereignty choices but also internal sover-
eignty in terms of relations between the public and private sectors. 40 Secu-
rity effects of globalization inevitably translate into certain beha飞rioral
tendencies in a state's foreign policy.
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 289

Although the term "security globalization" (anquan quanqiuhua) is se1-

dom used in the Chinese globalization discourse , the question of security is
inevitably smuggled into both scholarly writings and policy pronounce-
ments. Some conservative analysts argue that globalization is the functional
eq山v，dent of a Hobbesian war-of-all-against-all: "economic wars , com-
modity wars , technology wars , and wars over talented people-between de-
veloped and developing countries and among developing countries. 叫1
Other Chinese military analysts see globalization as the functional equiva-
lent of "unlimited wa r." They argue that for a relatively weak country like
China to stand up to a powerful country like the United States , it is strate-
gically imperative to resort to compensatory devices such as terrorism , drug
traffìcking , environmental degradation , and computer virus propagation. 42
At the other end of the conceptual and normative spectrum , more liberal
Chinese scholars have been breaking new ground in de fÌ ning globalization
as more than just an economic phenomenon. In the post-Cold War global-
ization era , security is seen and de fÌ ned more broadly and multidimension-
ally than ever before. Security "refers not only to ‘ safety' in the military and
diplomatic senses , but also to economic and technological security, includ-
ing fÌ nancial , trade and investment security, the avoidance of big rises and
falls , the ability to have stronger competitive methods and a grasp of infor-
mation factors. 叫3，1 The new security concept has also given rise to the no-
tion of cooperative or collective security. Cooperative security is said to
have no common enemy, contrary to Maoist fundamentalism; it only has
the need to deal with a potential threat through political dialogue and mul-
tilateral arrangements. Cooperative security seeks to increase transparency,
deepen mutual understanding , and build institutional ties among the mem-
ber states to deal with transnational security problems such as drugs , crime ,
terrorism , and ecological damage , so as to minimize the factors that may
prompt one country to go to war against anothe r. 44
The policy prescription that flows from this liberal and increasingly
mainstream discourse on the relationship between globalization and secu-
rity is that China should pay more attention to the economic , social , and
political aspects of security.lHence global human ri
29 0 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

eral cooperative security. Although the People's Liberation Army has been
involved in nine wars and armed conflicts-fought for ideo.l ogical reasons
and for the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity-
most of these actions were taken in the 1950S and 1960s, and no war in-
volving China took place in the 1990s. This reflects the peaceful settlement
of territorial disputes with Russia , Mongolia , the Central Asian republics ,
Burma , Pakistan , and Vietnam, as well as the demise of the ideological basis
for war户
To focus on "war" is perhaps to miss the larger picture of Chinese
conflict behavior and crisis management. Yet Johnston's empirical analysis
of China's militarized interstate dispute behavior from 1949 to 1992 con-
cludes that "China will be more likely to resort to force-and relatively
high levels of force-when disputes involve territory and occur in periods
where the perceived gap between desired and ascribed status is growing or
largër."48 Thus the growth seen in Chinese power is not likely per se to
translate into a more aggressive use of that power. In fact , China may be less
involved in conflicts , as long as its territorial integrity and international sta-
tus are afforded proper respect. The combined interactive effects of several
factors in Chinese foreign relations augur well for the peace and stability of
the East Asia region and beyond: (1) the fact that economic globalization
sharply increases the costs of the use of force; 但) the successful settlement
of territorial disputes with most of China's neighbors , with the correspon-
ding sense of enhanced state sovereignty; (3) the demise of ideological
con且ict; and (4) the substantial accomplishment of China's status drive to
be recognized as a great powe r.
There is little evidence that China is seeking regional hegemony in East
Asia; most Asian nations do not see China as dangerous or threatening. A
major multinational citizens' opinion survey, jointly sponsored by Tong-a
Il bo (Seoul) and Asahi Shinbun (Tokyo) , conducted in October and N。因
vember 2000 and involving national samples of 2,000 in South Korea , 3,000
inJapan , 1,024 in the United States , and 1,000 in China , suggests that China
is not generally viewed as a threat. As Table 10.3 shows , the China-threat
theory (Zhongguo weixie lun) is almost exclusively an American elite per-
ception , especially strong among right-wing Republicans. The survey found
that 38.
 F 0 R E 1G N P 0 LI CY A ND G L 0 B A L 1Z A T 10 N CH A L L E NG E S 291

TABLE 10.3
Multinational citizens' perceptions of threat a11d in斤uence in Asia
(late 2000)
ROK Japan U. S. China
1. U. S. 12 .4 13.2 62.8
QJkBey
you feell wmleheotksto11Imilitarily
most nZcEeAolcMuoanuntnrlyt1y do
threatened? 2. Russia 4.0 9.5 20.9 1. 2
Please select one country 3. China 7.7 9.4 38.1
4. Japan 20.7 2.5 12 .4
5.ROK 1. 1 0.1 0.4
6. North Korea 53.7 44.2 6.0 0.2
7. Do not 0.3 8.0 10.0 13.7
know/No
response
IQdnouflyeusoetunIOutE1halm2mk飞刑
Aws111ch
1. U. S. 8.1 13.7 54.9 9.6
COunetrtythe
11 become lE most 2. Russia 2.1 1. 1 4.7 1.4
ia in ten years? 3. China 52.6 47. 2 18.9 73. 2
Please select one country, 4. Japan 23.3 8.4 3.8 7.7
whether it is an Asian country 5.ROK 10.7 4.3 0.9 1. 1
or not. 6. North Korea 1. 0 2.3 2.1 0.1
7.lndia 0.1 0.9 1. 8 0.4
8. Vietnam 0.3 1. 3
9.0thers 1. 2 0.6 2.0 1. 9
10. None 0.1 7.3
11. Do not 0.8 13.9 9.6 4.6
know/No
response
Source: "Multinational Citizens' Poll on Current States Surrounding Korean Peninsula ," Tong-a Ilbo
(Seoul) , 4 December 2000.
Note: South Korea: N = 2,000 , survey conducted 巧 October-18 November 2000.
]apan: N = 3 ， 000，巧 -20 November 2000. United States: N =工， 024 ，月 18 November 2000
China: N = 1,000, 1-10 November 2000.

power in ten years , while only 23.3 percent chose Japan , was to be expected.
What is particularly surprising and revealing , however, is that 47.2 percent
of Japanese respondents selected China , as against only 8.4 percent for their
own country as the most influential Asian power in ten years. Almost 且ve
times as many Americans (18.9 percent) selected China , compared to only
3.8 percent for Japan , as the most influential Asian power in ten years , show-
ing the extent to which the familiar "Japan as Number One" chorus of the
1980s has vanished from American collective memory.
The post-Mao era witnessed the acceleration and intensi且cation of Sino-
UN linkages and interactions , as China's membership and participation in
all the remaining UN-related regimes increased steadily, as did Chinese ac-
cession to UN-sponsored multilateral treaties. This growing and widening
engagement with the UN-centered global community has produced some
nontrivial feedback and spillover effects , facilitating certain adjustments
and shifts in Chinese multilateral diplomacy and also in the policymaking
and policy-reviewing processes and institutions within China 户
China's growing multilateralism is made evident in the sensitive domain
29 2 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

of arms control and disarmament. As Michael Swaine and Alastair Johnston

point out, the Chinese perspective has shifted signi且cantly over.the post-Mao
years , especially in the I990s , from a view of arms control as largely irrele-
vant to China's national security concerns to a broader conception of secu-
rity that recognizes the benefìts to be derived from more active cooperative
participation. Whereas Beijing had signed about IO to 20 percent of all arms
control agreements it was eligible to sign in I970 , by I996 , this fìgure had
jumped to 85 to 90 percent. Much of this cooperative behavior had to do
with China's determined drive to be seen as a responsible great powe r. 50
Despite its absence from conventional security studies , the protection of
the environment is a quintessential challenge of the epoch of globalization.
It is central to "human security" and "cooperative security," just as it is in-
tegral to China's global policy. lndeed , China is rapidly becoming one of the
most important if not yet completely unproblematic players in global envi-
ronmental politics. Beijing plays an active role as a concerned but respon-
sible environmental giant in the preparation and implementation of inter-
national environmental conventions. China has already rati且ed all relevant
environmental conventions , including the Kyoto Protocol , the Montreal
Protocol , the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change , the UN Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, and the UN Convention to Combat De-
sertifìcation. The ratifìcation and implementation process itself seems to
have worked its way clear to placing environmental issues on the national
agenda. 51 However , the discrepancies between promise and performance
are perhaps greater in this issue area than in any other area of China's global
policy.52
Although the question of human rights is conspicuously absent in the
Chinese globalization discourse , ii deserves brief analysis , given that the
concepts of human rights and "human security" are organically interlinked
and that China's human rights diplomacy highlights one crucial and con-
tentious dimension of Sino-global interaction as well as the relationship be-
tween sovereignty and globalization.
China's human rights diplomacy in the post-Cold War and post-
Tiananmen era has proved to be most confusipg , turbulent, and signifì-
cant, marked by a series of unprecedented events. 53 Although the human
r
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 293

The year 1998 , as the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights , conceptually and normatively marked the most significant
turning point in Beijing's acceptance of the universality of human rights ,
with all the accompanying legal accountability and obligations. The Inter-
national Bill of Rights and the international human rights regime engendered
various "second-image teversed" consequences already evident in the emer-
gence of a human rights epistemic community, the publication of a flurry of
white papers , the enactment of a series of criminal justice laws , and the in-
crementallessening of the scope of political repression. Participation in the
human rights regime linked China'sinternationallegal behavior and its leg-
islative politics at home. The two keystone human rights covenants that Bei-
jing signed in 1997 and 1998 provide a legitimating platform for China's
emerging labor union and democratic movements to prod their government
to carry out its new legal obligations. 55 China's willingness to sign the two
principal covenants of the International Bill of Rights , rather than walk away
from the human rights regime , is an acknowledgment that human rights are
a valid subject of international dialogue , as well as a sign of Beijing's will-
ingness to respond to international concerns. In the Chinese case , there is
also the normative/behavioral requirement of great power status: a great
power abroad is and becomes what a great power does at home. Despite such
status-driven forward moves , China's human rights practices have not pro-
gressed far enough for domestic norm diffusion and internalization.
China's participation in the UN Security Council (UNSC) , the co é: kpit of
global security politics , provides an empirical basis for assessing the extent
to which the security effects of globalization are translated into certain be-
havioral tendencies of China's global policy. Despite its "principled opposi-
tion" to a wide range of sovereignty-related issues in the Security Council ,
China has generally expressed its opposition in the form of "nonparticipa-
tion in the vote" in the early post-entry years and abstention in the 1990s.
As shown in Table 工 0.4 ， in more than three decades , from late 1971 to the
end of 2004 , China cast only 4 vetoes out of a total of 138 (2.9 percent) , as
against 14 by the Soviet Union I Russia (10.1 percent) , 14 by France (10.1
percent) ，二 7 by t
 TABLE 10.4
Voting in the Security Council, I97I-2oo4
Nonaligned Total Vetoes Cast
Total Permanent Nonaligned Vetoes by Permanent
Year Passed Unanimous Members Unanimous Cast Five

1971 6 2 2 6 4 SU = 2 , UK = 1
1972 17 3 3 17 8 Cn = 2 , UK = 4 ,
U. S. = 1, SU = 1
1973 20 7 7 19 4 U. S. = 3 , UK = 1
1974 22 11 11 17 4 F =1 , SU = 1,
UK = 1, U. S. = 1
1975 18 10 10 13 8 U. S. = 6 , F = 1,
UK = 1
1976 18 9 9 12 9 U. S. = 6 , F = 2 ,
UK = 1
1977 20 13 13 17 9 F = 3 , UK = 3 ,
U. S.
= 3
2121 2117-11

AU7-zuτ3
1725
7J

叮/句 3nδAU
4inxu

1978
穹30OAU

1979 SU =2
马 dcJ

1980 SU = 2 , U. S. = 1
41 4·i 4EA
1981 U. S. = 5 , F = 4 ,
UK= 4
211121
7IHtA-1-i q41i11tI
1286o 21121
ny

11nU

9J
00

1982 U. S. = 8 , UK = 1
「/A

严J

句3qJQ/7

U. S. = 2 , SU = 1
、 7-1i3

1983
『//OAU
『

1984 U. S. = 2 , SU = 1
11

1985 U. S. = 7 , UK = 2
4Ei
句
3

U. S. = 8 ,
』

1986
UK = 3 , F = 1
122 414EA41 414141 qJOUAU
122
AU

AU
句

A
吁「 /Q/
30U

1987 UK = 2 , U.S. = 2
呵/00

叮/00

1988 U. S. = 6 , UK = 1
内υ

1989 U. S. = 5 , F = 2 ,
UK=2
3479J7655
96455000
72437674 23686655
7-qJζU

fonucJ

7-OVou--111iov
。/f07'9J
、3A 『 fOOEO 「//OCJCJ

1990 U. S. = 2
1991
1992
叮/nunυounu
只U

1993 Ru = 1
正ur6

寸/瓦

1994 Ru = 1
U. S. = 1
V

1995
『/叮 3
，J
、 qv

1996
句3

1997 U. S. = 2 , Cn = 1
(S1199 万 18)
/ιUP、J
ny 『/

1998 73 69 73 O
1999 65 58 62 1 Cn = 1
(S/1999/201)
2000 50 44 49 48 O
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 295

TABLE IO.4ω ntinued)

Nonaligned Total Vetoes Cast

Total Permanent Nonaligned Vetoes by Permanent
Year Passed Unanimous Members Unanimous Cast Five

2001 52 50 50 52 2 U. S. = 2
2002 68 63 66 64 2 U. S. = 2
2003 67 62 64 63 2 U. S. = 2
2004 59 52 51 53 3 U. S. = 2; Ru = 1
1971- 1 ,279 1 ,028 1 ,060 1 ,197 138 China (Cn) = 4
2004 (2.9%); USSR
(SU)/Russia
(Ru) = 14
(10.1 %); France
(F) = 14
(10.1 %); United
Kingdom
(UK) = 27
(19.6%); United
States (U. S.) = 79
(57.2%)

Sources: Adapted from UN docs. s/pv.1599 (巧 November 197 工 )-S/PV.5 工 07 (丰 2 December 2004).

membe r. 57 The third and fourth vetoes were cast in 1997 and 1999 on sui
generis Taiwan-connected cases: a draft resolution (S /r 997/r 8) authorizing
a small UN peacekeeping mission for Guatemala , because of that country's
pro-Taiwan activities-but here again Beijing reversed itself eleven days later
by allowing the Council to approve the UN Human Rights 飞Terification Mis-
sion in Guatemala (MINUGUA)-and another draft resolution (S/工 999/
201) to extend the mandate of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UN-
PREDEP) in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia for a period of six
months , as a punitive strike at Macedonia for establishing diplomatic rela-
tions with Taiwan in the previous month (January 1999). None of the four
Chinese vetoes had any paralyzing consequences for the UNSC's decision-
making process.
Given its long-standing assault on the veto as an expression of hegemonic
behavior, China tried hard not to allow itself to be cornered into having no
choice but to cast its solo veto. In the post-Cold War era , however, "absten-
tion" has become in most cases a kind of normative veto and an expression of
"principledopposition"withoutstandinginthewayofthemajoritywi1l inthe
UNSC. From August 1990 to December 1999 , for example , China registered
no fewer than 41 abstentions as an expression of its principled opposition on
such issues as the use of force , humanitarian intervention, and the establish-
ment of international criminal tribunals. 58 Thus China is sometimes forced
to a面rm a resolution (as in the case of resolution 827 on the international
war crimes tribunal in Bosnia) that violates its most cherished principle of
29 6 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

the nonviolability of state sovereignty, with' nothing more than the habit-
driven ritualistic pronouncement of a "principled position."59
The most obvious explanation for such behavior on the part of China is
the country's desire to retain maximum leverage as part of its indeterminate
strategy of becoming all things to all nations on the many issues intruding
upon the Security Council agenda. As with nuclear weapons , the real power
of the veto lies not so much in its actual use as in the threat of its use or non-
use. To abstain is to apply the Chinese code of conduct of being firm in prin-
ciple but flexible in application, or to 且nd a face-saving exit with a voice in
those cases that pit China's realpolitik interests against idealpolitik norma-
tive concerns for China's international reputation. Barry O'Neill has ar-
gued , with some exaggeration , that China is the most powerful permanent
member of the UNSC , because it wields its veto power from an extreme po-
litical position, standing alone. 60 Use of China's veto power in the UNSC re-
mains the quickest way to project its identity as a great power. With the re-
cent and unexpected revival of Taiwan's UN bid , the veto power has also
been publicly touted as the powerful sword and impregnable shield that de-
fend the integrity of the People's Republic as the only legitimate Chinese
government in the world organization.
China's position on UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) has evolved
over the years in a dialectical situation-specific way, as China has balanced
its realpolitik interests with concerns for its international reputation as the
champion of Third World causes. During the pre-entry period as a whole
(1949-71) , both ideology (in the form of the Maoist theory of just war) and
experience (the trauma of the UN intervention in the Korean War) condi-
tioned China's negative attitude toward UN peacekeeping activities.. Once
on the Security Council , China's position shifted and metamorphosed
through three discernible stages: (1) principled opposition/nonparticipa-
tion (1971-80); (2) support/nonparticipation (1981-89); and (3) support/
incremental and situation-specific participation (工 990-present). In Decem-
ber 1981 , China voted for the first time for the extension of a UN peace-
keeping force (UNFICYP, in Cyprus). In November 1989 , in another shift ,
the Chinese government decided to dispatch five. Chinese military observers
to serve in the U
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 297

responsíbility. China should consider how to select between safeguarding

national interests and safeguarding the world , or think of a way to integrate
them organically. . . . As a world power , China has a responsibility toward
world peace. "62 Pang is apparently not alone in this thinking. There is a
sense among some Chinese IR scholars that abstentions imply that China
has no special message or soft power to project , or that China refuses to
bear the responsibility and requirement as one of the Permanent Five (P 5)
in global security politics. Another scholar joins Pang in an indirect attack
on Chinese abstentions by playing up the notion that China's great power
status as one of the P 5 requires nothing less than the corresponding respon-
sibility and requirement of more proactive participation in UNPKOs. Work-
ing positively in UNPKOs is then not only China's responsibility as a great
power but also a requirement and effective means for China to join the
global security mechanism. 63
Recent Chinese writings and Chinese multilateral diplomacy show a
greater willingness to evaluate UNPKOs according to their contributions to
the "conditions of peace and stability." With the lesson of Kosovo (where
China got badly burned) fresh in Chinese minds , Beijing opted for a more
flexible conflict management approach in East Timor , where China for the
first time contributed its civilian police in a UNpeacekeeping and peace-
making role. One indicator of Beijing's incremental multilateralism with re-
spect to UNPKOs has been the establishment and expansion of training pro-
grams for peacekeepers in China through the Offìce of Peacekeeping in
China , located under the General Staff Headquarters of the People's Liber-
ation Army (PLA).64 Another indicator of Beijing's greater commitment to
UNPKOs is that in I997 China decided in principle to take part in the UN's
standby arrangements for UNPKOs and in 2002 actually joined the Class-
A standby arrangements system.
China actively participated in two major UNPKOs-Cambodia and East
Timor- because of a number of situation-specific factors: geographical
proximity, initial involvement with the authorization process in the Security
Council , and host-nation consent (one of the two conditions for the fìrst
generation of UNPKOs). Where similar conditions are present, and the Tai-
wan factor absent, Beijing's slow yet steady support for UNPKOs is likely
to continue unabated i
29 8 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

the PLA , Beijing was demonstrating its desire and willingness to boost its
international role and reputation as a responsible great power, at a time
when the United States was pressuring the United Nations-without suc-
cess-to demonstrate its "relevance" by legitimizing America's preventive
war against Iraq.

Conclusions

Taken together, Chinese foreign policy in the post-Cold 明'ar global-

ization era leads to one obvious and somewhat paradoxical conclusion:
China's growing integration into the global community, aided and abetted
by the forces of globalization , is having paradoxical effects that at once
confìrm and constrain Chinese sovereignty. On the one hand , the confluence
of domestic and external forces has made it necessary for China's post-Mao
leadership to accelerate its reform and opening to the outside world in or-
der to modernize its economy, to enhance its irìternational reputation , and
to increase its comprehensive national strength. As a result, China's exter-
nal sovereignty is more secure in the global community today than ever be-
fore. On the other hand , post-Mao China has allowed the camel's nose of
globa 1ization toenter the tent of China's internal sovereigntj二 constraining
the Chinese state with all kinds of global norms and rules , and releasing
enormous entrepreneurial energies of sovereignty-free "intermestic" actors
that have transformed the process of economic development with their own
pace , logic , and direction.
While sovereignty remains central to Chinese foreign po 1icy rhetoric , its
underlying premises have been progressively softened and chipped away by
the functional and normative requirements of China's integration into the
global economy. Unless directly challenged , Beijing has been remarkably
willing to compromise or shr1ve sovereignty七ound issues in the pursuit of
national economic interests. ~With the growing globalization of the Chinese
po 1itical economy, the devol前ion of power at home , and the fragmentation
of authority and decision-making structures at the apex , the center has
made a: series of decentra 1izing decisions "enabling" the central planners to
maintain the appearance that they are still controlling the economic reforms
and opening to the outside world.\
The sound and fury of a sovereignty-based international order has been
receding in Chinese foreign policy pronouncements in recent years , high-
lighting a new glob a: l reality that almost everywhere today sovereignty is
either in voluntary or forced retreat or in a highly perforated condition.
Even powerful states command only shared or compromised sovereignty in
a system of multiple power centers and overlapping spheres of authority.
Accordïng to former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Stat
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 299

world's lone superpower , faced with the globalization challenge of doing

more and more with less and less , has had to leverage scarce resources by
forming coalitions with nonstate actors-multinational corporations
(MNCs) , nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) , and such global inter-
governmental organizations as the United Nations , the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)-since such coalitions help the United
States "to work not only multilaterally, but multi-multilaterally, through
several organizations and institutions at the same time. "65
That said , however , China faces at least three major challenges in the
coming years , each of whkh will be a decision on how best to cope with the
multiple dangers and opportunities of globalization , more specifically, on
how to deal with the twin pressures of globalization from above and with-
out and localizationlfragmentation from below and within. First , a silent
revolution of global information and transparency is under way in China ,
even in the remote hinterlands. The Chinese state has lost its hegemonic
power to control the flow of information. This revolution reflects and af-
fects the globalization of increasingly intertwined political, economic , so-
cial , and normative structures and values , even as it fosters the rapid mobi-
lization of people's needs , demands , frustration , and intolerance-indeed,
the second "revolution of people power." Although its full impact is di面­
cult to assess , especially if the Chinese economy continues to grow at 8 per-
cent or a' higher rate , this silent revolution nonetheless undergirds the critical
social forces for change in emerging Chinese civil society. This type of frag-
mentation from within could emerge from the growing economic gaps be-
tween the regions and also through the eruption of ethnonational identity
conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang or a war between Beijing and Taipei.
Second, the fact that China has come to interact with the global com-
munity in more ways , with more depth and complexity, and on more fronts
than ever before has several unsettling consequences for the Chinese
decision-making process. As China's integration continues apace , different
"intermestic" actors , with different interests , will seek to "participate" in
the making and implementation (or nonimplementation) of foreign policy
goals , with their own agendas and rules. The conduct of Chinese foreig
300 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

behind often nationalistic posturing , especially in the early post-Tiananmen

years , was not any military threat from without but the leadership's resolve
to project China's national identity as an up-and-coming great power-and
more recently as a responsible great power-in the Asia-Paci~c region , so
as to make up for domestic legitimation and security deficits.[ Indeed , the
main threat to China's security comes from within , not from without:)
Hence the antinomies between globalization from above and without and
fragmentation (deglobalization) from below and within can be seen as en-
tering full force into China's multiple and competing role conceptions , with
slgm且cant implications for matching the means and ends of foreign policy
as well as for establishing a healthy and stable domestic order. The most
fundamental challenge ahead lies in seeking not grandiose schemes but
more synergistic coalition formation with many types of "intermestic" ac-
tors , including NGOs and transnational corporations (TNCs) to leverage
scarce resources for more effective prevention , regulation , and resolution of
potentially deadly conf1 ict , as well as for the creation of a more peaceful,
prosperous , stable, and just China.
The globalization template is ready-made for advancing the study of
Chinese foreign policy in a number of different but mutually complemen-
tary ways. Although diagnosis and prescription are seldom matched in for-
eign policy, globalization opens a large menu of questions and puzzles for
tracking any new thinking , new directions , and new behavioral tendencies
in China's foreign policy in the post-Cold War globalization era. The ef-
fects of globalization on Chinese foreign policy can be traced and explained
by posing and addressing several key questions. What is the relationship be-
tween globalization and the state , more specifically the impact of globaliza-
tion on state sovereignty, state security, state power, and state identity? Does
Beijing define the relationship between globalization and sovereignty in mu-
tually constitutive or con f1 icting terms , and with what consequences for the
conception and conduct of Chinese foreign policy? How is China's national
identity constructed , deconstructed , and reconstructed and with what be-
havioral consequences? Has the very meaning of "sovereignty," "power"
and "security" changed in the course of Chinese disçourse and respon
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLE l' .JGES 30I

on the complex interplay of the global , regional , and local forces that are
impacting upon and shaping the patterns of China's behavior of conflict or
cooperatlO n.

Notes

1 am grateful to Iain Johnston for valuable comments on an earlier version of this

chapter, and 1 thank Matthew Winters for his superb and dedicated research assis~
tance. The chapter epigraphs are drawn respectively from Selected Works ofMao Tse-
Tung , vo l. I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press , I965) ，可; Jiang Zemin , "Hold High
the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory: Carrying the Cause of Building Social-
ism with Chinese Characteristics to the Twenty-First Century," Xinhua , 2I Septem-
ber I997 , in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter cited as FBIS) , CHI-
97-266; UN Secretary-General Kofì Annan , Annual Report of the Secretary-General
on the Work of the Organization , UN doc. A/53 1r (3 September I998) , pa r. I68.
r. In I998 alone , three major discussions were held under UN auspices on the
opportunities and dangers of globalization for the global community. That year, for
the 且rst time , the UN secretary-general's annual report (a state of the world message)
declared that the world organization would take up the challenge of ensuring that
"globalization leads to progress , prosperity and security for al l." The second half of
I999 witnessed the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank
turning their primary attention for the fìrst time to globalization , presenting in their
annuals-Human Development Report, I999 and World Development Report,
I999 l2 ooo-empirically rich and generally balanced accounts of the new benefìts
and threats globalization poses to human security, broadly defìned. See UNDP, Hu-
man Development Report, I999 (New York: Oxford University Press , I999) , and
World Bank, World Development Report, I99912ooo: Entering the 2ISt Century
(New York: Oxford University Press , 2000).
2. The literature on globalization is too plentiful to list here. Suf且ce it to say that
the most comprehensive and defìnitive scholarly work on globalization remains
David Held et a l., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press , I999) , a product of ten years of collaborative re-
search by four leading British social scientists. For overview readers , see David Held
and Anthony McGrew, eds. , The Global Transformations Reader: An lntroduction
to the Globalization Debate (Cambridge: Polity Press ，之 000) and Patrick O'Meara ,
Howard D. Mehlinger, and Matthew Krain , eds. , Globalization and the Challenges
of a New Century: A Reader (
3 02 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

have fundamentally changed world politics , giving rise to a series of new IR theories
in the West , especially in the United States: Francis Fukuyama's th~ory of "the end
of history"; Huntington's theory of "the clash of civilizations"; the "democratic
peace theory," which he claims is in part directed at China; and "the theory of glob-
alization ," of which there are many schools , but the mainstream school is "new 1i b-
eralism." See Pang Zhongying, "China's International Status and Foreign Strategy
After the Cold War," in FBIS-CHI-2002-0506 (5 May 2002). For a more compre-
hensive treatment of the Chinese understanding and analysis of the globa 1ization de-
bate (although often more outside than inside of China) , see Pang Zhongying , ed. ,
Quanqiuhua, fanquanqiuhua yu Zhongguo: lijie quanqiuhua de 向zaxing yu
duoyangxing [Globalization, anti-globalization, and China: understanding the com-
plexity and diversity of globa1ization] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press , 2002).
4. A few notable exceptions include the prominent IR theorists Joseph Nye , Rob-
ertKeohane , andJames Rosenau. SeeJoseph S. Nye andJohnD. Donahue , eds. , Gov-
ernance in a Globalizing World (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press ,
2000); James N. Rosenau , Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Gover-
nance in a Turbulent World (New York: Cambridge University Press ，工 997) ， Distant
Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University
Press , 2003); and Ian Clark , Globalization and International Relations Theory
(New York: Oxford University Press , 1999). For asuccinctsummaryofthethree dom-
inant IR theories (from a realist perspective) , see Steven M. Walt, "International Rela-
tions: One World , Many Theories ," Foreign Policy , no. 1 工 o (Spring 1998): 29-46.
5. Kenichi Ohmae , The Borderless World (London: Collins , 1990); Kenichi
Ohmae , The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York:
Free Press , 1995); Robert Reich , The 研'or走。f Nations (New York: Vintage Books ,
1992); and Susan Strange , "The Defective State ," Daedalus 124 , 2 (工 995): 55-74 ,
and The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (New
York: Cambridge University Press , 1996).
6. Peter Beinart , "An Illusion for Our Time: The False Promise of Globaliza-
tion ," New Republic , 20 October 1997 , 20-24; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thomp-
son , Globalization in Qu
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 303

Imperialism-Continuities in the Structural Theory of Imperialism ," World Devel-

opment 4 , 3 (March 1976): 16与 emphasis in origina l.
13. See Lu Yi et a l., eds. , Qiuji: yige shijiexing de xuanze [Global citizenship: a
wo r1 dwide choice] (Shanghai: Baijia Chubanshe , 1989) , and Samuel S. Kim , China
in and out of the Changing World Order (PrincetOn , N. J.: Center of International
Studies , Princeton University, 199 工)， 4 8 -49.
工 4. Renmin Ribao ， 卒 6 November 1990 , 5.
15. Kim , China in and out ofthe Changing World Order , 42-49.
16. See Yong Deng , '‘ Conception of National Interests: Realpolitik , Liberal Di-
lemma , and the Possibility of Change ," in 1n the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views
the World , ed. Yong Deng. and Fei-Ling Wang (Lanham , Md.: Rowman {)ζ
Littlefi.eld，工 999) ， 55.
17. See Pang , "China's International Status" and Quanqiuhua, fanquanqiuhua
yu Zhongguo; Wang Yizhou , ed. , Quanqiuhua shidai de guoji anquan [Interna-
tional security in an era of globalization] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press , 1998);
Wang Yizhou , "New Security Concept in Globalization ," Beijing Review , no. 7
(rr- 15 February 1999): 7; 明Tang Yizhou , Dangdai guoji zhengzhi xilun [Analysis
of contemporary international politics] (Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshe ，工 995) ， esp.
19-46; and Hu Angang, Yang Fan , and Zhu Ning, Daguo zhanlue: Zhongguo de
liyi yu shimin [China's grand strategy: missions and interests] (Shenyang: Liaoning
People's Press , 2000).
18. Deng Xiaoping , "A New Approach Towards Stabilizing the Wo r1 d Situation ,
February 22 , 1984 ," in Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China (Beijing: Foreign
Languages Press , 1987) , 97.
19. For a wide-ranging discussion involving Australian , British , and Chinese
scholars on the notion of China as a responsible great power , see Yongjin Zhang and
Greg Austin , eds. , Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy (Canberra:
Asia Paci且c Press , 2001). See also Samuel S. Kim , "China's Path to Great Power Sta-
tus in the Globalization Era ," Asian Perspective 27 , 1 (March 2003): 35-75.
20. This thesis is eloquently argued and developed in Jonathan Spence , To Change
China: W告stern Advisers in China , I620-I960 (New York: Penguin Books ，工 9 80 ).
2 1. Chen Quansheng and Liu Jinghua , "China and the Wo r1 d amid Globaliza-
tion ," in Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong) , FBIS-CHI-1999-0306 , 3 March 1999.
22. Banning Garrett, "China Faces , Debates , the Contradictions
30 4 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

United States declined to $40 billion in 2003 from $72 billion in 2002 and $ 1 67 bil-
lion 2001 , FD 1 into China declined only slightly to $ 5 3 billion in 20.0 3 from $ 55 bil-
lion in 2002. See Laurent Frost, "China Overtakes U. S. as Investment Target," As-
sociated Press , June 28 ，二 004. For the 2004 且gure， see People 云 Daily Online ,
巧 January 2005 , http://english.peopledaily.com.cn.
二 8. Joseph Kahn , "China's Hot , at Least for Now," New York Times , 16 De-
cember 2002.
29. Peggy Pei-chen Chang and Tun-jen Cheng , "The Rise of the Information
Technology in China: A Formidable Challenge to Taiwan's Economy," American
Asian Review 20 , 3 (Fa1l 2002): 125-74.
30. World Bank , China , 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century
(Washington , D. C.: World Bank，工 997) ， 5 0 -5 工; UNDP, Human Development Re-
port, I99I (New York: Oxford University Press , 1991) , 120 , and Human Develop-
ment Report, 2002 (New York: Oxford University Press , 2002) , 150.
3 1. World Bank , World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development
(New York: Oxford University Press , 2005) ，均 L
32. Chen and Liu , "China and the World amid Globalization."
3 3. Pang Zhongying , '‘ Globalization and China: China's Response to the Asian
Economic Crisis ," Asian Perspective 23 , 1 (工 999): 1II-3 工.
34. "Seize Opportunity, Meet Challenge , and Participate in Economic Global-
ization ," Renmin Ribao , 19 December 2001 , in FBIS-:CHI-2001-1220.
35. Nicholas Lardy, lntegrating China into the Global Economy (Washington ,
D. C.: Brookings Institution Press) , 2.
36. Joseph Fewsmith , "The Politics of China's Accession to the 嘀咕0 ，" Current
History 99 , 638 (September 2000): 273. For a comprehensive and authoritative
analysis of how international institutions and commitments can be used by domes-
tic reformers to tie hands in order to force domestic change , see Daniel W. Drezner,
ed. , Locating the Proper Authorities: The lnteraction of Domestic and lnternational
lnstitutions (Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press , 2003).
37. Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily], "The World Trade Organization Needs
China , China Needs the World Trade Organization," in FBIS-CHI-2000-012 1.
38. For this line of reasoning , see Thomas Moore , "China's International Rela-
tions in Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension ," in The lnternational Relations
of Northeast Asia , ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham , Md.: Rowman 8ζLittlefield ， 2004)
and George T. Crane , "Imagining the Economic Nation: Globalisa
 FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGES 305

twenty-且rst century: seeking and balancing three demands] , Zha 1Z lue yu Guanli
[Strategy and Management], no. 6 (I999): 工 8- 2 7.
44. Chen and Liu , '‘ China and the World amid Globalization."
45. Wang , "Mianxiang ershi shiji de Zhongguo waijiao."
46. For an elaboration of the new concept of economic security enjoying a pre-
ferredposition , see the White Paper on China's National Defense , issued 27 July
I998 , in FBlS-CHl-98~208.
47. You Ji , "The PLA , the CCP and the Formulation of Chinese Defense and For-
eign Policy," in Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy , ed. Zhang and
Austin, II9-20. For a list of territorial disputes peacefully resolved in the I990s, see
Defense White Paper, 2000 , in FBlS-CHl-2000-IOI6 , I6 October 2000.
48. Alastair lain Johnston , "China's Militarized lnterstate Dispute Behaviour,
工 949-I992: A First Cut at the Data ," China Quarterly , no. I53 (March I998): 29.
49. Samuel S. Kim , "China and the United Nations ," in China Joins the World:
Progress and Prospects , ed. Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press ，工 999) ， 4 2 - 8 9.
50. Michael D. Swaine and Alastair lain Johnston , "China and Arms Control
lnstitutions ," in China }oins the World: Progress and Prospects , ed. Elizabeth
Economyand Michel Oksenberg (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press ,
工 999) ， I0 1.
5 I. See Stockholm Environment lnstitute and UN Development Programme ,
China Human Development Report, 2002: Ma走 ing Green Development a Choice
(New York: Oxford University Press , 2002).
口. See Elizabeth Economy, "China's Environmental Diplomacy," in Chinese
Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium , ed. Samuel S. Kim (Boulder, Colo.: West-
view Press ，工 998) ， 264-83 , and Lester Ross , "China and Environmental Pro-
tection ," in China Joins the World: Progress and Prospec归， ed. El izabeth Economy
and Michel Oksenberg (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press , I999) ,
29 6 -3 2 5.
53. For detailed discussion of China's human rights diplomacy, see Ann Kent ,
Chin比 the United Nations , and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance (Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press ，工 999); Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond
Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China
(New York: Oxford University Press , 2000); Ming Wan , Human Rights in Chinese
Foreign Relations: Defìning and Defending National Interests (Philadelphia: Uni-
versit
3 06 CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION

77" in January 1977 , drawing its legitimacy from the incorporation of the two hu-
man rights covenants into the domestic laws of communist Czechoslovakia.
56. These 且gures exclude a 1981 Sino-D. S. "veto war" during closed-door de-
liberations on a recommendation on the appointment of a secretary-general; they do
not show up in official records of the Security Council.
57. Kim , China, the United Nations , and World Order , 206-8.
58. Sally Morphet, "China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council , Oc国
tober 197 工 -December 1999 ," Security Dialogue 31 , 2 (June 2000): 工们一臼.
59. Nigel Thalakada , "China's Voting Pattern in the Security Council , 1990-
1995 ," in The Once and Future Security Council , ed. Bruce Russett (New York:
St. Martin's Press , 1997) , 94-95.
60. Barry O'Neill , "Power and Satisfaction in the Security Council," in Once
and Future Security Council, ed. Russett, 59-82.
们. Liu Enzhao , "Lianheguo 飞iVeichi heping xingdong" [UN peacekeeping
forces] , Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [Journal ofI nternational Studies ], no. 2 (1989): 53-6 1.
62. Pang , "China's International Status."
63. Tang Yongsheng, "Zhongguo yu Lianheguo weihe xingdong ," Shijie Jingji
yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] , no. 9 (2002): 39-44. See also Wang
Yizhou , "Mianxiang ershi shiji de Zhongguo waijiao."
64. Bates Gill and James Reilly, "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping:
The View from Beijing ," Survival42 , 2 (2000): 41-59.
65. Strobe Talbott , "Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Perspec-
tive ," Foreign Policy , no. 108 (Fall 1997): 79.
66. Robert Putnam , "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games ," International Organization 42 (Summer 19 88 ): 4 二 7- 60 .
Part Three
DOMESTIC POLITICS
11 Identity and Conflict in Si1伽American
Relations
Peter Hays Gries

What do you see? A cuddly panda or a menacing dragon? Americans

interpreting the People's Republic of China , like subjects staring atinkblots
during a Rorschach test, frequently reveal much more about themselves
than they do about the PRC itself.
Both panda and dragon seers are likely motivated by a complex mixture of
sense and sensibility: cold calculations of their own self-interest are inter-
twined with deep-seated "gut feelings" about China. But post-Enlightenment
Westerners are loathe to admit that we are in f1 uenced by our emotions. As the
Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto noted long ago , while we frequently act
irrationally, we are masters at post facto rationalizations of our behavio r. 1
We rarely admit to ourselves-let alone to others-that we may have been
moved by anything other than enlightened reason.
Rationalizing our China policy preferences , analysts frequently infer
Chinese intentions from Chinese capabilities. Engagement advocates depict
China as a cuddly panda-nothing threatening about a furry vegetarian-
to argue that China is benign. Meanwhile , containment advocates depict
China as a menacing dragon: its scales and fire-breathing speak for them-
selves. This is an aggressive fighting creature.
As Gulf War II has recently revealed , the causal arrows can run the other
direction as well: capabilities can be inferred from presumed intentions. The
Cheney - Rumsfeld argument for war was that since Saddam Hussein was a
"bad guy" with sinister intentions , he must have weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD)-even if the facts belied that inference. "Blue Team" China-
bashers on Capital Hill are frequently driven by a similar logic. In their
1998 book 坠ar of the Rat: How Bill Clinton Compromised U.S. Security
for Chinese Cash , Edward Timperlake and William Triplett II, who view
both the Clinton administration and China as "bad guys ," infer an anti-
American Cliriton-China conspiracy, despite a lack of compelling evidence
to support their inference. 2
3 10 DOMESTIC PO Ll TICS

Can international relations (1R) theory help analysts to move beyond

such inkblot-gazing? Can we interrogate the intentions that. actually drive
the makers of China's foreign policy? When will they, like a cuddly panda ,
choose cooperation? And when will they, like a fierce dragon , choose
confrontation?
Realists like Paul Kennedy have argued that rising powers and hegemons
tend to go to wa r. 3 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the University
of Chicago's John Mearsheimer have drawn on such arguments to suggest
that China is a revisionist power destined to clash with America. 4 Aaron
Friedberg has argued along these lines as well. Some China 1R scholars have
also suggested that under certain conditions the likelihood of China's using
force against the United States is not insubstantia l. Tom Christensen has de-
clared China the "high church of realpolitik" today.5 1ainJohnston has sim-
ilarly argued that the hard realpolitik elements of Chinese strategic culture
would support "hitting hard and hitting 且rst."6
1R theorists in the liberal tradition , by contrast , have been more opti-
mistic. Traditionalliberals like Woodrow Wilson viewed human nature as
fundamentally good; nations , therefore , could coexist without conflict. To-
day, neoliberals maintain that international instittitions and interdepend-
ence restrain state aggression. 1n the U.S.-China case , liberals like Mike
Lampton point to economic interdependence and common security con-
cerns as ensuring bilateral cooperation.
This chapter joins a new controversy in the old 1R debate over coopera-
tion and conflict. Constructivist 1R theorists have focused on the social-
rather than material-side of the debate. 1n a 1992 article , Alexander
Wendt proclaimed in his title that "Anarchy 1s What States Make of 1仁"It
may "lead to competitive power politics ," he explained , but it "also may
not." To Wendt , structural realists were wrong to assume self-help a priori
from the material structure of the world system: "Self-help and power pol-
itics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy. "7 1n asserting
that the relations among nations are not inherently conflictual , Wendt pro-
vided ammunition for liberal critics of realism.
Drawing on social psychology to defend realis rp., in 1995 , Jonathan Mer-
cer took issue with Wend t's critique of self-help. 1n an essay titled "Anarchy
and 1dentity," Mercer argued that ethnocentri
 lDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 311

Identity dynamics , Mercer and Huntington assert , make intergroup conflict

inevitable.
In his 1999 monograph Social Theωory of International Politi乙 Cι.乌耶
W怡end
由t
defends himself against Mercer's critique , arguing that the "in-group bias"
Mercer cites does not predetermine enmity. Wendt provides no empirical
support for this position , howeve r. Furthermore , his book provides few
clues as to when intergroup conflict will occur. 10
50 , when will states clash? This chapter argues that intergroup identity
dynamics do not inexorably lead to conflict. The social psychology litera-
ture Mercer drew on in his effort to refute Wendt does not support his
pessimistic conclusion that interstate conflict is inevitable. 1 thus join Wendt
in questioning the inevitability of anarchy and self-help in international pol-
itics. However, unlike Wendt , 1 highlight contingency: the specific condi-
tions that promote conflict in international affairs , and those that militate
against it. Depending on circumstances , states may lock horns , but they
also may not. Neoliberals and neorealists both have it right some of the
time. The problem is that a narrow focus on material interests alone usually
cannot tell us when states will do battle. By redirecting our gaze to the very
real realm of ideal interests , social psychology provides insights into when
the world of absolute gains will dominate and when the world of relative
gains wil l.
Based on recent findings in social psychology, 1 make concrete predic-
tions about the conditions under which identification with the nation will
lead to international conflict. In brief, we all identify with our nåtions and
imbue our national identities with positive value. When that positivity is
challenged , leading to consequential , relative comparisons with salient ex-
ternal nations , we þromote competition, a stage that necessarily precedes
international conflict. However, the absence of a single one of these condi-
tions will inhibit competition. Furthermore , there are five different ways in
which comparisons may be framed that reduce the likelihood of interna-
tional competition: social mobility ("exit" from a national identity) and
four different forms of social creativity (shifting the dimension under com-
parison , changing the values of the attributes , changing the target of com-
parison , and self-deception). The cards are thus stacked against a competi-
tlv
3 12 DO 岛1ESTIC POLITICS

To illustrate my analysis , I use examples from Sino-American relations ,

and I deliberately use that term rather than speaking of "U.S.-China rela-
tions." My focus is decidedly Sinocentric: on what recent Chinese national-
ist writings about America can tell us about the likelihood of conflict in the
Asia-Pacific region. Therefore , in addition to joining a debate over conflict
in international relations theory, this chapter also seeks to contribute to the
stalemated debate in the China 且eld over the existence of a "China threat."
Specifically, I suggest that lain ]ohnston and Tom Christensen may be right
about the Chinese tendency to resort to force-some of the time. l l Social
psychology can provide insights into when the Chinese will choose cooper-
ation and when they will choose conflict.
By focusing on the recent high tide of Chinese nationalism rather than a
representative sample of Chinese foreign policies over the years , I stack the
cards against my case. If nationalist writings can be used to support my ar-
gument that conflict is a contingent outcome , I shall have made a "crucially
hard case" theoretically.12 I do not, however, seek to make any substantive
claims about the relative weight of nationalism vis-à-vis other Chinese atti-
tudes to foreign affairs. Furthermore , because I bracket cultural differences
and history in an attempt to apply universal social psychological insights to
IR theory, I cannot make strong substantive claims about the future of Sino-
American relations. 13 To repeat: the Chinese examples are used to illustrate
the theory; they do not seek to prove anything.

The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations

For most social psychologists today, groups do not act; individuals

ac t. Although "group psychology" approaches were once popular in Amer-
ica , the days of "groupthink" are over. 14 Social psychology today focuses on
the impact of groups on individuals. Therefore , when ]ames Fearon and
David Laitin dismiss psychological approaches as "group-level" to advocate
their own "individual interactions" approach , they mischaracterize psy-
chology, in the process doing themselves and political science a disservice. 15
Theories of intergroup relations in social psychology parallel the debate
in IR over conflict. The first major approach, realistic (group) competition
theory (RCT) , supports the rationalist position. Based on a 1954 study at a
summer camp in Robbers Cove , Oklahoma , Muzafer Sherif and his col-
leagues found that the introduction of material competition was su面cient to
divide an otherwise homogeneous group of boys into rival groups. Con-
versely, the introduction of a joint task (extracting a "stuck" bus) led the twO
groups to cooperate. 16 Such findings led to the dev毛lopment of RCT, which
maintained that objective relations of material interest determine group
formation and intergroup relations. In other words , patterns of resourζe
 IDENTITY AND CONFUCT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 313

interdependence drive cooperation 0 1' conflict. RCT is the implicit social

psychology of rationalist views of IR.
Further experimental work soon revealed , however , that the direction of
causality implied by RCT was unclear: Yes , material competition could lead
to group formation , but simply categorizing people into separate groups
could also lead to in~group identification and bias. Material competition ,
therefore , was a sufficient but not necessary condition for group forma-
tion. 17 The development of social identity, according to the now dominant
social identity theory (5IT) , was not the epiphenomenal by-product of pat-
terns of resource interdependence , but the result of self-categorization. John
Turner even found that concern about social identity could take precedence
over the individual's pursuit of material self-interest. 18 The 51T challenge to
RCT thus parallels the constructivist challenge to earlier rationalist ap-
proaches in IR , in that both involve a shift in focus from objective conflicts
of interest to identity dynamics.
Group categorization and comparison do not inevitably lead to inter-
group competition and conflict. 19 Recent experimental evidence indicates
that group membership is indeterminate in this respect. As the social psy-
chologist Marilynn Brewer notes , "any relationship between in-group
identification and out-group hostility is progressive and contingent rather
than necessary and inevitable." Two stages intervene between the formation
of in-group identity and intergroup conflict: in-group positivity and inter-
group competition. Conflict is thus the last stage of a four-stage process
constituted by (1) in -group identification; (2) in -group positivity; (3) inter-
group competition; and (4) intergroup conflict.
Although all humans , as social beings , likely engage in the first two pro-
cesses , the latter two stages are indeterminate: They are not inevitable but
require the impetus of additional conditions. 20
The question is what these conditions are and when in-group positivity
leads to intergroup competition. In this chapter, I focus on this transition
between stages 2 and 3, only turning to the equally contingent transition
between stages 3 and 4 in the conclusion. I argue that the issue of social
comparison lies at the juncture of stages 2 and 3. When national positivity
is challenged , we compare our nations with other nations: Intern
3 工4 DO 岛1ESTIC POLITICS

• Social creativity 2: changing the meaning of the value being compared

• Social creativity 3: changing the target of comparison
• Social creativity 4: self-deception
Each of these 且ve conditions , in other words , is su:ffi cient by itself to prevent
competition. No competition thus seems to be the most likely outcome of
internation comparison, a prediction supported by James Fearon and David
Laitin's empirical fìndings on the relative nonoccurrence of ethnic conf1i ct. 21
These social psychological variables , 1 argue , help explain whether we in-
habit a realist world of relative gains or a liberal community of absolute
gams.

In-group Identifìcation and Positivity:

1万hen "Good" is Good Enough

Experimental work in the SIT tradition has convincingly demon-

strated (a) that we identify with groups and (b) that we privilege them. First ,
we associate ourselves with groups that, in effect , become part of our iden-
tities. SIT posits two mutually exclusive aspects of the self: personal identity
and social identity. Henri Tajfel defìned social identity as "that part of an
individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his member-
ship in a social group . . . together with the value and emotional signiι
cance attached to that membership. "22 When social identity is salient ,
the self is extended out and into the group prototype , a process involving
self-stereotyping. The group becomes represented in the individual's self-
concept: its concerns become the individual's concerns. 23
Once we have identifìed with groups , we look to others to better under-
stand our social identities. A century ago , the sociologist Charles Cooley
called this the "looking-glass self" and argued: "Our ideal self is con-
structed chiefly out of ideas about us attributed to other people. "24 George
Mead concurred , noting that "the individual experiences himself . . . only
indirectly . . . by taking the attitudes of other individuals towards him-
self."25 In 1954 , the psychologist Leon Festingèr similarly proposed that
when we are uncertain about our beliefs or social standing , we engage
in "social reality testing" through comparison with reference groups.26
Festinger's social comparison theory holds for both personal and social iden-
tities. When personal identity is salient, we undertake interpersonal compar-
isons; when social identity is pertinent, we engage in intergroup compar-
isons. We gain knowledge aböut our personal and social identities through
comparisons with other individuals and groups.27 As Yu Xinyan writes in
a 1995 patriotic education handbook entitled Waiguoren 走an Zhongguo
 IDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 31 5

(Foreigners' views of China): "If you want to know if your dress is correct ,
you can look in a mirro r. If you want to know if your behavior is appro-
priate , you can listen to what other people say about it. If you want to know
your own nationality, your own nation-state , it is necessary to listen to the
views of foreigners. "28 Constructivists in IR share Yu's insight: Wendt , for
instance , argues that a need for "ontological security" drives states to seek
the recognition of other states. 29 We look to others to understand our per-
sonal and social identities.
Why do we assimilate ourselves into groups? Social psychologists have
explored a number of motives , including uncertainty reduction,30 desires for
inclusion ,31 belonging ,32 and existential distress. 33 However, it is the motive
of self-esteem that has received the greatest attention. 34 At 且rst， SIT re-
searchers thought that desire for self-esteem drives us to join groups. Evi-
dence of the opposite process has been more robust , however: to the extent
that we associate with certain groups , we gain (and lose) "collective self-
esteem" from those groups' accomplishments and failures. 35 One group of
social psychologists , for instance , found that students tended to wear their
school colors more often following a football victory than after a loss , a
finding they explained as a desire to "bask in reflected glory." 36 The same is
true of our national identities. In another experiment , women who were
shown a clip from an altered Rocky IV, in which the American boxer
(Sylvester Stallone) lost to the Russian , were found to have lost national self-
esteem. 37
In addition to identifying with groups , research in the SIT tradition has
demonstrated that we see the groups we associate ourselves with as basi-
cally good , and favor our fellow in-group members over out-group mem-
bers. Indeed , the mere mention of in-group signifiers like "we ," "us ," and
"our" is su面cient to generate positive affect. 38 And experimental studies
have overwhelmingly demonstrated that in-group favoritism is robust even
when the individual has nothing to gain.
Desires to maintain in-group positivity motivate intergroup social com-
parisons. 39 We want others to confirm our positive views of ourselves. 40 The
1990 A Pictorial Histoη of the War of Resistance Against America in Aid
of Korea , which mixes actual photographs with cartoons to tell the "his-
tory" of the Korean War to young Chinese readers
3 工6 DOMESTIC POLITICS

name is Larry. The policy of superior treatment of prisoners quickly dissolved

his antagonistic mentality toward us. He frequently sang: ‘ Hailalalala ,
hailalalala . . . The Chinese and Korean people's strength is great , and has
defeated the American devils!"'41
"Larry" thus confìrms the Chinese authors' claim to in-group positivity.
"明Then we are accepted as we present ourselves ," the sociologist Thomas
Scheff suggests , "we usually feel rewarded by the pleasant emotions of pride
and fellow feeling. "42 1 concur, with a single amendment: it is our percep-
tion of others' acceptance of our claims-rather than their actual views of
us (as the pictorial history's far-fetched cartoon makes clear)-that deter-
mines our emotional response.
Such affect is no "mere" emotional matter , however: It has highly in-
strumental implications. When we believe that our claims to positive in-
group identity are a面rmed ， we not only feel good , we gain con且dence.One
group of social psychologists found , for instance , that in subjects for whom
being a fan of a particular team was an important aspect of their social iden-
tity, assessments of personal e面cacy (l ike their ability to get a date with an
attractive member of the opposite sex, win a game of darts , etc.) were
signifìcantly higher after a team victory than after a team loss. 43 Pride in
past accomplishments translates into confìdence about the future. 44 Basking
in "victory" over America in Korea , for example , is an important psycho-
logical resource when confìdence in China's prospects in confronting the
United States is again required. The pictorial history of the Korean War dis-
cussed above was issued in 1990, when the Beijing elite , facing American-
led international sanctions following the Tiananmen massacre , took ad-
vantage of the fortieth anniversary commemorations of the onset of the
Korean War to bolster Chinese self-confìdence. The role of the war as a psy-
chological resource is often explicit. For instance , war veteran Yang Dezhi
is blunt: "The spiritual riches fjingshen caifu] that the war has left me are
precious. 1 am con斤dent that China will prosper. "45 In 1996, following
the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carriers near Taiwan, Chinese national-
ists again drew on "victory" in Korea to revive what appears to have been
a shaken confìdence about future confrontations with America. The cover
of a 1996 Shenzhen Zhou走an (Shenzhen Panorama Weekly) ,
'EEEw--

IDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 317

complex. 叫6 Kissinger's praise of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai is a favorite

theme in nationalist treatments of the 197 2 establishment of diplomatic re-
lations between China and America. In a 199 8 interview, for example , the
People 云 Daily correspondent Li Yunfei claims that Kissinger gushed: "1 cher-
ish deep feelings for Zhou Enlai . . . [he] was a man ofnoble character who
towered above the rest in intelligence and had profound knowledge and ex-
tensive learning. He was an outstanding politiCian. . . . The profundity of
Zhou Enlai's understanding of the world situation was amazing."
Li a .l so lingers in his article over the minutiae of Kissinger's etiquette in re-
ceiving him: "He hurried o.ver to shake hands with this reporter, saying sin-
cerely: ‘If you were not a reporter from China , 1 would not be able to find time
to do your interview.' Then , he showed me into his Park Avenue 0面ce."47 Li
and his People's Daily editors clearly enjoyed both "basking in the reflected
glory" of Zhou's greatness and Kissinger's obsequious praise of China.
This "Kissinger complex" involves more than just creating pride in
China's past: it is also about creating confidence in the future. Kissinger's re-
cent writings on international relations have been extremely popular among
Chinese nationalists , because they are seen as predicting America's decline
and China's imminent rise. Tang Zhengyu , for example , concludes his sec-
tion of the 1996 sensation Zhongguo 走 eyi shuobu (China can say no) with
the question: "Some say that the nineteenth century was the English cen-
tury, and that the twentieth century is the American century. What about
the twenty-first century?" Tang supports his answer 一 "The twenty-first
century will be Chinaγ---'by appending a translation of a 1996 Kissinger
speech , the gist of which is that America wiU not be able to contain China. 48
Kissinger is featured even more prominently predicting America's demise on
the back cover of Xi Yongjun and Ma Zaihu缸~ 1996 book Chaoyue
Meiguo: Meiguo shenhua de zhongjie (Surpassing America: the end of the
American myth) 户 Kissinger helps these Chinese nationalists relieve any
doubts they might have about China's future glory.
When our desires for positive self-confirmation are not met, however, we
are not pleased. Social psychologists have found that if a member of another
group is perceived to impugn one's own group , one's sense of personal self-
esteem may be threat
3 工8 DOMESTIC POLITICS

且nd it increasingly hard to bear the disregard and affronts of others."52 To

add insult to injury, when the first Nobel Prize was awarded to a Chinese in
2000 , it was given to Gao Xingjian , who is considered a dissident writer-
a traitor 1iving in Paris. Even the nationalist Gu Qingsheng , whose section
of the anti-Am~rican Zhongguo 走 eyi shuobu includes headers like "We
Don't Want MFN, and in the Future , We Won't Give it to You," agrees that
the "Nobel complex" indicates that "we have a psychological problem. .
Although we say that there is nothing special about foreigners , we are very
sensitive [about their views]."53 The Nobel complex , 1 argue , is the f1 ip side
of Chinese nationalists' Kissinger complex: they are the two sides of the
same coin of desire for international a面rmation.
In sum , the need for confirmation of in-group positivity motivates inter-
group comparisons. When in-group positivity is a面rmed ， social competi-
tion is avoided; if it is not , anger and competition may ensue. In the Chinese
case , Kissinger is beloved for providing high-status con且rmation of Chinese
nationalists' claims of superiority; the Nobel Prize Committee , by contrast,
is reviled for withholding such validation.
That "we" must be good does not, however, require that "they" must be
bad. Allen Whiting recognized this distinction in a I995 exploration of Chi-
nese nationalism: "A面rmative nationalism centres exclusively on ‘ us' as a
positive in-group referent with pride in attributes and achievements. As-
sertive nationalism adds ‘ them' as a negative out-group referent that chal-
lenges the in-group's interests and possibly its identity."54 Attitudes toward
self and other are not necessarily zero-sum , but can vary independently. Dis-
criminating in favor of an in-group does not necessitate discriminating
against an out-group. Studies of racism in the United States and Europe , for
instance , have found evidence of a "symbolic"55 or "aversive"56 racism that
involves pro-white , rather than anti-black , attitudes and behavio r. In-group
positivity reserves trust and sympathy for one's own , withholding such pos-
itive sentiments from the out-group. In-group love does not necessarily lead
to out-group hate. 57

1ntergrouþ Comþetition: ，万hen

"Better" is Better than "Good"

旬， when will in-group identification (stage I) and positivity (stage 2)

lead to intergroup competition (stage 3) and conf1 ict (stage 4)? When , in
short, does in-group love lead to out-group hate?
Socia! comparison processes lie at the heart of any answer to this ques-
tion. Comparison is not inherently competitive. First , it is only when com-
parisons are made with salient others , are consequential , and are framed in
,
 IDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 319

zero-sum terms that competition may ensue. Second , the presence of any
one of 且ve forms of social mobility or social creativity is suffìcient by itself
to prevent competItlO n.

Necessary but Not Sufficient Causes

of Intergroup Competition

For competition to follow, comparisons must (a) be made with sa-

lient others , (b) be consequential , and (c) be framed in zero-sum terms. Each
is a necessary but not a su面cient cause of intergroup competition.
First , whom do we compare ourselves to? Comparisons must be made
with salient others to lead to competition. For instance , it is only when a com-
parison is made with external groups that intergroup competition becomes a
possible outcome. Interpersonal and intragroup comparisons will not lead
directly to intergroup competition. The proximity, availability, and similar-
ity of other in-group members makes them ideal objects of comparison. For
example , in most circumstances , individual Chinese will compare their lot
with that of their neighbors-other Chinese-and not with Americans
across the Pacifìc Ocean. This generates a tendency toward interpersonal and
against intergroup comparisons , militating against intergroup competition.
Intragroup comparisons also inhibit competition between groups. For
example , temporal comparisons-Are we better off than we were before?-
militate against international competition. 58 Chinese cultural conservatives
today, for instance , construct themselves as "realists" and "pragmatists"
against the foil of China's recent past: the "radicals" of the late 1980s and
even the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).59 Interethnic comparisons will
not lead to international competition eithe r. When Han chauvinists exoti-
cize Chinese minorities as infantile , feminine , and barbaric to flatter them-
selves as mature , masculine , and civilized , they seek to construct a Han
vision of Chinese national identity.60 They may generate domestic tensions
in the process , but such "otherization" will not directly lead to internation
cOmpe t1 t lO n.
In addition to being external, the salient other must also be a desirable ob-
ject of comparison. National histories , like all "auto-biographies ," usually
tell the story of the nation in relation to other nations. Nationalist historians
turn complex pasts into Manichean histories pitting a good "we" against an
evil "them."61 These histories can help us identify who the desired object of
comparison is. In Chinese histories , it is usually the West in general and the
United States in particular. The 币Test， capitalized as a proper noun to signify
its rei且cation， has become China's alter ego. Following Edward Said's discus-
slO
3 20 DOMESTIC POLITICS

In Chinese eyes , however, Americans are racially and culturally different

from Chinese. They are not , therefore , ideal objects for comparison. Iden-
tity involves both similarity and difference , and "Western devils" are too
different for most Chinese to identify with. It is the more proximate and
similar Japan , instead , that has served as a more ideal object of self-other
dialectics. 63 An assumption of fundamental difference underlying most
Chinese writings about the West forces Chinese writers to be explicit about
the basis of similarity that justifies comparison at al l. The back cover of a
special 1996 issue of Ai Wo Zhonghua (Love Our China) onthe "Sino-
American Contest ," for instance , constructs a framework of Sino-American
equivalence with the line "China and America are both world powers ," but
then highlights difference: China is kind , America is barbaric , China is a su-
perman , America is a bandit , and so on. 64
So , why force comparison with the United States? Because comparisons
with the United States are desirable. When Chinese nationalists choose to
compare China to the otherwise dissimilar United States , they clearly seek
to depict themselves to themselves as a superpower. Upward comparisons ,
psychologists have shown , serve to inspire self-improvement. 65 This helps
explain why many Chinese nationalists obsessively compare China to
America. Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" argument probably
created a sensation among numerous Chinese nationalists less out of oppo-
sition to his view of a Confucian threat to the West than out of a glee that
some Westerners feel threatened by China. Writing in Beijing's in fI uential
magazine Dushu (Reading) , for instance , Li Shenzhi argued that China
"should take Huntington's perspectives seriously, because they represent a
kind of deep [racial] fea r. "66 Huntington's argument is celebrated because it
confirms Chinese nationalists' claims to great power status.
Conversely, those who reject Chinese claims to greatness are despised. For
instance , the late Gerald Segal relegated China to "middling power" status in
a 1999 Foreign A仿irs "article. 67 He promptly drew the ire of the Beijing Re-
view's most prominent nationalist, Li Haibo , who retorted that "Chinese feel
insulted when their strength is underestimated. "68 In sum , it is only compar-
isons with salient others that will generate competition. Specifically, those
othe
 IDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 321

narionalists compete over it. In a 1996 letter printed in Beijing Fazhibao

(Beijing Legal News) , for instance , one man complained about Chinese em-
ployees of foreign companies speaking to him in English. Restaurant menus ,
to add insult to injury, sometimes put English fìrst and list their prices in
U.S. dollars: "It 's a disgrace! "70 Xiao Tong and Du Li's 1997 book Longli,
197 8 - 1 99 6 : Zhuanxingqi Zhongguo baixing xinjilu (Dragon history,
1978-1996: the true feelings of the Chinese people during a time of transi-
tio时， a psycho-autobiography written by members of the ''-fourth genera-
tion" of thirty-something Chinese , reveals a similar angst. In a section en-
titled "Whitey, Please Study Chinese ," the author tells of feeling "su丘ocated
and resentful" on reading in a Chinese-language textbook written for for-
eigners: "I' m determined to study English well. If 1 don't learn it well , 1
won't be able to fìnd a spouse." He comments: "The sentence would clearly
be much more enchanting if you just replaced the word ‘ English' with the
word ‘ Chinese."'71 What he wants is an inversion of hierarchies , with China
in the superior position. 72
Such popular anger has even found public expression. In the spring of
1996, legislation was proposed in the National People's Congress that would
eliminate the "poison" of foreign words from the Chinese language. 73 That
fall , China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs suspended English interpreting at
its press conferences , thereby demanding that all foreign journalists learn
Chinese .74 We compete when the object of comparison is consequential to
our self-concept.
When the object of comparison is inconsequential to our self-concept ,
however, there is no need to compete. As Marilynn Brewer notes , "As long
as the in-group feels superior on dimensions that are important to the group's
identity, members can tolerate or acknowledge out-group superiority on di-
mensions of lesser importance. But when groups hold common values and
adopt a common measure of relative worth , the search for positive distinc-
tiveness becomes competitive."75 Sino-American relations in the 1970S re-
veal a pair of examples of the former dynamic of tolerance. Although Nixon
and Kissinger had been working hard toward establishing diplomatic rela-
tions with China in the early 1970s, Zhou Enlai stole credit for the break-
through with a brilliant gambit: inviting a U.S. ping-pong team to China.
Because f
3 22 DOMESTIC POLITICS

center, Mu) was enormously satisfying to this young American basketball

fan , at the time , few Chinese likely cared much about losing a. game of
basketbal l. 76 In other words , because these two sports competitions were
each only consequential to one side , they did not promote intergroup com-
petition. One side could gain collective self-esteem without threatening
the other.
Third , and finally, how is the comparison framed? Is the social compar-
ison construed in zero-sum or positive-sum terms? Zero-sum comparisons
induce competition. Such is the case whenever an issue is perceived as a
question of status. As a matter of relative ranking , status is a zero-sum
resource. 77 This makes the quest for greater status highly competitive. 78
In China , status issues are often discussed in the language of "face." The
zero-sum nature of face and China's history of victimization at the hands of
the West combine to make many contemporary Chinese view diplomacy as
a fierce competition between leaders who win or lose face for the nations
they embody. Chinese nationalist depictions of Richard Nixon also reveal a
zero-sum view of Sino-American relations.. Ironically, many of the same
Chinese nationalists who adore Kissinger also revel in denigrating Nixon,
to the same end of enhancing their national self-esteem at America's ex-
pense. They delight, for instance , in constructing "victories" over Nixon at
the United Nations in 1971 and at Beijing Airport in 1972. Although Nixon
and Kissinger clearly desired rapprochement with the PRC and greater Chi-
nese involvement in world affairs to balance against the Soviet Union ,79
recent Chinese narratives of the PRC's 1971 entry into the United Nations
ignore such geopolitics to depict the events in Manichean terms: China's
victory was America's loss. An October 1996 People 云 Daily article , for
instance , commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the "restoration"
of the PRC's UN seat with the lines: "The resolution was passed by an over-
whelming majority . . . thunderous applause burst out in the assembly
hall . . . and many could not refrain from dancing. . . . Certain people of
course felt very embarrassed."80 Chen Feng et a l. 's popular 1996 history
ZhongMei jiaoliang daxiezhen (The true story of the Sino-American con-
test) is both more explicit about who these "cerrain people" are and more
creative in describing their "embarrassment." One photograph shows the
UN General A
 IDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 323

in an even more fanciful portrayal of Nixon's reaction to the UN vote ,

which he apparently watched , "still hoping for a miracle ," on television in
the White House library: "The room was perfectly quiet. Nixon burned
with anger, and the blue veins on his forehead protruded suddenly. 'Unbe-
lievable! . . . to perform so poorly at an international forum."'81
Although ZhongMei jiaoliang daxiezhen was produced by the China
Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) , a think tank
under the State Security Bureau (China's equivalent of the FBI) , 1 suspect
that this detailed description of the White House scene was less a product
of Chinese intelligence gathering than of the authors' fertile imaginations.
They project their view of the situation onto Nixon: because face is a zero-
sum game , China's win must be America's loss , and American humiliation
at defeat is represented in Nixon's red-faced fury.
Recent Chinese accounts of the 1972 handshake between Nixon and
Zhou Enlai also depict it as a zero-sum competition over status. In the spe-
cial 1996 issue of Ai Wo Zhonghua (Love Our China) mentioned above , for
example , the PLA writers revel in denigrating Nixon to elevate Zhou and
China. Chapter 1 is triumphantly entitled "Nixon Put His Hand Out First."
Although handshakes are usually understood to signify conciliation, the au-
thors clearly interpret "the handshake" as a Chinese victory. A tone of pride
and vanity permeates their ensuing discussion of Nixon's further humilia-
tion upon discovering no red carpet or masses awaiting at Beijing Airport:
"Nixon had hoped for cheering crowds. This plain and simple welcome
madeNixon think of the American opinion poll that had predicted that he
would be ridiculed and fall into a trap when he visited China." 但 The PLA
authors clearly delight in imagining Nixon、 chagrin.
When framed as an issue of relative status or face , therefore , Sino-
American relations come to approximate the winner-takes-all world of
Hobbesian realism. "A ‘ zero-sum' mentality holds that America's gains (or
losses) are China's losses (or gains) ," Wang Yuesheng noted in the 1997
volume Zhongguo ruhe miandui xifang (How China faces the West).83 Such
zero-sum compansons promote competltlO n.
In sum , when internation comparisons are made with salient foreign
nations , are consequential , and are framed in zero-sum terms , competition
may ensue. The absence of any one of these thre

Causes Sufficient to Prevent Intergroup Competition

The presence of any one of fìve additional psychological processes ,

furthermore , is su面cient by itself to inhibit a competitive outcome. These fall
under two headings: individual mobility and social creativity. Individual
32 4 DOMESTIC POLITICS

mobility refers to the option of "exit" from a threatened or negative

social identity. One can, for example , seek upward social mobility by dis-
identifying with a low-status group in favor of identification with a high-
status group.
Chinese nationalists often seem keenly aware of the temptations of "exit"
from their national identity. In the spring of 1999 , the China News Digest's
U.S. service (CND-US) , a listserv providing news for the mainland Chinese
community in America , printed a letter from Zheng Anderso1), a Chinese-
Canadian, who wrote of being mistreated by an INS agent in Detroit Air-
port. "1 have lived in Canada for 14 years and . . . have treated Canada as
my home ," she writes. But "despite all the hard work 1 have done to con-
tribute to my community and my country [Canada] . . . 1 am still regarded
as Chinese."84 The next issue of CND-US contained four responses to the
story. Two were supportive of Anderson's anger with the INS and its dis-
crimination against Chinese. The other two , however, accused her of aspir-
ing to "individual mobility," or "exit" from her national identity. Li Jie
asks , "Is she ashamed of BEING a Chinese? 1 think that this experience
should teach her a lesson not to think that she is superior to her own people.
She is always a Chinese no matter how many years she has been a Canadian
citizen." 85
Guo Danqun surmises from her name that Anderson is probably married
to a "non-Chinese" and then similarly asserts that she has an attitude of
"supremacy over other Chinese." 86 Chinese like Li and Guo reject the option
of exit from their national identity.
Like such social mobility, social creativity militates against social com-
parison processes leading to intergroup competition. In general , social cre-
ativity involves the reframing of comparisons that threaten one's collective
self-esteem into comparisons that allow for positive distinctiveness. Tajfel
and Turner suggest that social creativity can take three forms: (a) introduc-
ing a more favorable dimension of comparison, (b) changing the values as-
signed to the attributes , and (c) changing the target of comparison. 87 1 would
add a fourth: (d) self-deception.
First , when comparisons are framed along a single zero-sum dimension,
they can lead to head-to-head competition. However, if a new and more
significant dimension of comparison is introduced , the comparison can gen-
erate positive distinctiveness for the in-group , th
 IDENTìTY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 325

can say no) and Zhongguo haishi neng shuobu (China can still say no) ,
juxtapose "Western materialism" with "Eastern harmony" and Westerners'
"impersonal coldness" with Easterners' "warm-heartedness." They then
borrow from Max Weber to argue that although Western materialism is
ascendant , it is an iron cage: it is Easterners who have made "the greater
contribution to humanity."88 Such "othering" of America creates positive
distinctiveness for China , but because it does so on separate dimensions , it
militates against direct competition.
A second type of social creativity involves what Nietzsche called the
"transvaluation of values"; a "negative" attribute is changed into a "posi-
tive" one , or vice versa. The "black is beautiful" movement in the United
States is an example of how social creativity can resolve threats to collective
self-esteem: activists successfully argued that "black" was not ugly or evil ,
but beautiful. A letter published in r切19cheng W切lbao (Canton Evening
News) in 1998 provides a parallel example of this process involving the val-
uation of the very term "Chinese." The writer, a U.S. resident , claims that
Americans use the word "Chinese" as a "racial epithet." As evidence , he
cites an experience he had in Cincinnati when a homeless person taunted
him saying , "Chinese , Chinese." He therefore advocates reverting to the
Sinocentric "Zhongguoren ," literally "person from the Middle Kingdom ,"
rather than using the "pejorative" English "Chinese." To his mind , doing
this would restore Chinese to their proper position of superiority.89 A more
consequential example of this second form of social creativity is the recent
mainland Chinese reevaluation of the Confucian tradition. Lambasted un-
der Mao as "feudal" and "backward ," nationalists now praise Confucian-
ism as the heart of China's glorious civilization. Its meaning transvalued ,
"Confucianism" now bolsters rather than threatens the national self-esteem
of Chinese cultural nationalists.
A third form of social creativity involves changing the comparison target:
switching to a lower-status out-group allows for a more favorable compar-
ison. Downward comparisons , psychologists have shown , enhance self-
esteem, especially under conditions of threat. 90 In a 1996 piece titled
"Chongjian Zhongguo youxi guize" (Rewriting China's rules of the game) ,
for instance , Li Fang 且rst speaks soberly about c
3 26 DOMESTIC PO Ll TICS

Self-deception is the fourth and fìnal form of social creativity. Social

comparison occurs along a single dimension , the standards of "good" and
"bad" are not challenged , and the target of comparison does not change.
Instead , the perception of each party's relative standing is simply distorted.
For all their disagreements , social psychologists share the belief that man is
not the passive object of social influence , but rather actively interprets his
social environment. They thus follow Kant , who argued that we do not see
things as they "are," but actively construct our universe. 92 In their desire to
see China triumph over America , Chinese nationalists often confuse de-
scription and prescription: what is and what ought to be are conflated. Be-
cause of the lengthy history of the WTO talks , trade has become an issue of
status. Chinese nationalists who wish that China's economy is stronger than
America's often simply assert that it is. For instance , the authors of Chaoyue
Meiguo (Surpassing America)argue that the United States is dependent on
the Chinese economy: "If America drops out of the China market . . . the
blow to America would be huge and unprecedented." Americans , they
write , "cannot do without Chinese products twenty-four hours a day."93
This view of American economic dependence on China is remarkably wide-
spread , laments China Economics and Trade University's Chong Ling. 94 In
a broader critique , PLA writer Jin Hui depicts I990S Chinese nationalists
as suffering from an "Ah Q-style blind optimism." Ah Q is the protagonist
of a modern Chinese novel famous for his talent for turning defeats into psy-
chological victories. 95 "For over IOO years ," Jin writes , "generation after
generation of Chinese have been dreaming that since we were once strong , al-
though we are now backward , we shall certainly become strong again." Such
"illusions ," he warns , are "even worse than spiritual opiates."96 However
delusional , such Ah Q-style self-deception has the positive side effect of
diminishing the threat of direct social comparison.
Any one of these psychological processes , in sum , is su面cient by itself to
prevent intergroup comparisons from generating competition.

Sino-American Apology Diplomacy~ I999 and 200I

Two recent examples of Sino-American apology diplomacy illustrate

the utility of social identity theory in explaining Chinese foreign policy.
At midnight on 8 May I999 , an American B-2 bomber dropped 岳阳 pre­
cision guided missiles over Belgrade. All fìve hit their intended target. But it
was not a Serbian arms depot: it was the Chinese embassy. Three exploded
near the embassy's intelligence operations center. Three Chinese were killed
in the blast, and twenty-three others were injured. In Washington , President
Bill Clinton proclaimedthe bombing a "tragic mistake" due to outdated
 JDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 327

maps and extended his "regrets and profound condolences" to the Chinese
people. In Beijing, however, Chinese 0面cials rejected American explanations
as "sophistry" and declared NATO apologies to be "insu面cient" and "insin-
cere." The Chinese media did not publicize Clinton's public apologies until 11
May. Instead , they proclaimed the bombing a "barbaric" and intentional
"criminal act." 97
After lengthy negotiations , Beijing and Washington agreed on compensa-
tion packages for both sides. When money finally changed hands nearly two
years later in January 2001 , however, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman
Zhu Bangzao again demanded that the United States "conduct a comprehen-
sive and thorough investigation into the bombing , severely punish the perpe-
trators and give satisfactory account of the incident to the Chinese People. "98
A few months later, on 1 April 2001 , a Chinese F-8 jet 且ghter and an
American EP-3 surveillance plane collided over the South China Sea. The
EP-3 made it safely to China's Hainan Island; the F-8 tore apart and
crashed , and the Chinese pilot, Wang Wei , was killed. A few days later,
China's Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and President Jiang Zemin de-
manded an American apology. The United States balked: viewing the ag-
gressiveness of the Chinese jet as the cause of the collision , Americans did
not feel responsible. As Senator Joseph Lieberman said on CNN's LarηY
King Live , "When you play chicken , sometimes you get hurt."
The impasse was only broken after eleven days of intensive negotiations.
U.S. Ambassador Joseph Prueher gave a letter to Foreign Minister Tang:
"Please convey to the Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wang Wei
that we are very sorry for their loss. . . . We are very sorry the entering of
China's airspace and the landing did not have verbal clearance." Having ex-
tracted an "apology" from Washington , Beijing released the twenty-four
American servicemen being held on Hainan Island.
What accounts for the willingness of Chinese and American leaders to
choose confrontation over these two issues? And why does the 1999 affair
remain unresolved , while the 2001 incident has largely been diffused?
Rationalist and symbolic approaches to IR provide complementary-
not competing-answers to these questions. Rationalist approaches high-
light the instrumental dimension of China's apologydiplomacy. But sym-
bolic approaches also carry causal weight in ex
3 28 DO 岛1ESTIC POLITICS

1 have discussed the Chinese reaction to the Belgrade bombing at length

elsewhere. 99 Here , suffìce it to say that with the reemergence in the mid
1990sof a victimization narrative of Chinese suffering at the hands ofWest-
ern imperialism, most Chinese understood the Belgrade bombing as yet an-
other in a long history of Western insults. Chinese thus experienced the
bombing as an assault on their collective self-esteem as "Chinese."
Chinese refusals to accept apologies from President Clinton in 1999 thus
had both instrumental and emotional dimensions. Chinese and American
diplomats were jockeying for position in post-Cold War East Asia. A ra-
tionalist analysis of post-Belgrade bombing Chinese diplomacy would
rightly point to an instrumental motivation: restoring China's position in
the East Asian hierarchy of power. Like a father refusing his son's repeated
prostrations of forgiveness , refusing America's repeated apologies was one
of the few ways China's leadership could seek to restore China's status in
the eyes of the Chinese people.
But social identity was also a big part of the problern. All three of the nec-
essary conditions for competition were present. America , as noted above , is
a highly salient peer competitor against which Chinese de且ne their social
identity. Had it been the Serbs who had mistakenly bombed the Chinese em-
bassy, Chinese would not have been as distraught. The death of three Chi-
nese was obviously a consequential issue , and because status is a zero-sum
resource , post-Belgrade bombing diplomacy was primed for competition.
Furthermore , none of the fìve conditions that can prevent competition were
readily available. The bombing was clearly a Sino-American issue , so social
mobility was not an option. And the death of three Chinese was not some-
thing that any amount of social creativity could easily explain away.
Both rationalist and social psychological variables thus help explain why
Chinese diplomats could not resolve the Belgrade bombing incident
through cool diplomacy: the instrumental stakes were too high , and the
assault on Chinese self-esteem was too acute. Chinese nationalists were
moved to take to the streets in protest , and Chinese diplomats had to resort
to a public posture of rejecting American apologies and explanations.
The 2001 plane collision incident was both sirp. ilar and different. From a
rationalist perspective , 2001 , like 1999 , implicated Ch
昏睡 EBFFZ IDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 3 之9

over the meaning of the two μvery sorrys" to declare victory in bilateral di-
plomacy. The reality, of course , is that both sides suffered from the incident.
Ah Q-style self-deception, however, allowed them to diffuse the crisis.
Cross-cultural differences in responsibility. assessment and the meaning
of apologies help explain how both sides could simultaneously claim vic-
tory.100 Chinese tend toward a consequentialist view of responsibility. A
Chinese pilot , Wang Wei , was dead , so an American apology was necessary
to restore the relationship. Americans , in contrast , tend to focus on inten-
tionality in assessing responsibility, hence our legal distinctions , for in-
stance , between first- and ~econd-degree murde r. Was the act premeditated?
Because Americans viewed the incident as a "tragic accident" -not some-
thing Americans had chosen to do or had done with premeditation-no
apology was necessary.
The intensive negotiations over the wording of the letter Ambassador
Prueher gave to Foreign Minister Tang reflected these cultural differences.
Chinese were able to claim that Americans had admitted responsìbility for
the incident , while Americans could claim that the two "I' m sorrys" were
mere gestures of condolence-not an admission of culpability. As Secretary
of State Colin Powell explained after the release of the American crew,
"There is nothing to apologize fo r. To apologize would have suggested that
we have done something wrong or accepted responsibility for having done
something wrong. And we did not do anything wrong."
Hawks on both sides were adept at face-saving self-deception. In Beijing,
many boasted of how President Jiang had planned America's humiliation
from the start and had "taught Bush J r. a lesson." Qinghua University's Yan
Xuetong , for instance , declared that "China stuck to principle" and "did a
better job of dealing with the incident. "101 In this Chinese view, Jiang ,
"diplomatic strategist extraordinaire ," had won a major diplomatic vic-
tory.102 In Washington , meanwhile , Bush was widely praised for having
handled the situation masterfu l1y, winning the day. For instance , the Nelson
Report newsletter offered a parody of the American "we're sorry" letter:
"We're sorry the world is now seeing your leaders as the xenophobic , clue-
less thugs that they rea l1yare. We're sorry you are losing so much face over
this."103 Ironica l1y, it was such Ah Q-style s

Conclusions

Drawing on experimental findings in social psychology, 1 have argued

that our basic human tendency to identify with groups and imbue them with
positive meaníng does not inevitably lead to competition between groups.
33 0 DOMESTIC POLITICS

It is only when comparisons are made with salient others , are consequen-
tial , and are framed in zero-sum terms that competition may.ensue. Each of
these three conditions is a necessary, but not suffìcient , cause of competi-
tion. Furthermore , each of fìve forms of social mobility and social creativ-
ity is su面cient on its own to inhibit against a competitive outcome. Inter-
group competition , in sum, is a highly contingent outcome.
International competition is no different. Although we all , to varying de-
grees , assimilate ourselves into our national groups and favor our fellow na-
tionals over foreigners , we do not invariably pit our nations against other
nations. Anti-foreignism is neither in our blood nor hardwired into our psy-
ches. International competition is not-as Jonathan Mercer suggests-the
inexorable product of our identifìcation with national groups. James Fearon
and David Laitin's quantitative fìndings on the relative nonoccurrence of
ethnic conflict support this argument.
Assuming that competition precedes conflict , this chapter has focused on
the transition from in-group positivity to intergroup competition , the sec-
ond and third stages of the four-stage model of the progression from in-
group identifìcation to intergroup conflict. It has not, therefore , said much
about the equally contingent transition between intergroup competition
and intergroup conflict, stages 3 and 4. Rogers Brubaker and Laitin are
right that this transition is a "phase shift": it is not a change in degree , but
a change in kind demanding separate theoretical attention. 104
1 disagree with Brubaker and Laitin , however, when they assert that psy-
chological theories cannot account for aggression. 105 Just as 1 located com-
parison at the juncture between in-group positivity and intergroup compe-
tition (stages 2 and 3) , 1 suggest that emotion lies at the juncture between
intergroup competition and conflict (stages 3 and 4).106 1 thus join Mercer
and Neta Crawford in calling for emotion to be brought back into the study
of IR.107 The psychologies and sociologies of emotion in particular can
teach us a great deal about when international competition will lead to
war-and when it will not.
Although a persuasive case for the pivotal role of affect in transforming
competition (stage 3) into violent conflict (stage .4) requires separate treat-
ment, a brief discussion of one specifìc emotion-anger-is warranted h
 I D E N T I T Y A N D C 0 N FLI C T 1N S 1N 0 - A M E R 1C A N R E L A T 10 N S 331

Moore highlights the emotional , ]. M. Barbalet stresses the instrumental:

"Vengefulness is an emotion of power relations. It functions to correct imbal-
anced or disjointed power relationships. Vengefulness is concerned with
restoring social actors to their rightful place in relationships." 110 It is such
ethical anger, 1suggest , that impels sustained conflict and violence. 111
Indeed , Chinese nationalists frequently speak of injustice. Xiong Lei , for
instance , writes in the passionate 工 99 6 anti-Am:erican bestseller Yaomohua
Zhongguo de beihou (The plot to demonize China) that "we do not seek to
foment hatred of Americans , only to restore justice."112 The Chinese who
threw bricks at the U.S. erpbassy in Beijing after the bombing of their em-
bassy in Belgrade in May 1999 were also impelled by an ethical anger that
sought to right a wrong. They were genuinely angry-not , as Western pun-
dits generally suggested , playthings in the hands of communist puppet mas-
ters. Chinese protestors sought retributive justice: to restore China's proper
place in international society.l13 Righteous anger can help transform inter-
group competition into violent protest.
In this chapter 1 have attempted to advance the theoretic debate over
conflict in IR by bringing in agency and contingency. N ations do not act:
individuals act. Like all peoples , Chinese are neither innately pacifìst nor
hardwired for conflict. Instead , history and culture shape how individual
Chinese will construe the events of world politics. The social psychology of
intergroup relations can then help explain whether they will choose coop-
eration or conflict in a given situation. Sino-American relations in the
twenty-fìrst century w i1l not , therefore , inevitably be conflictual. Individual
agency plays a vital role. It is the actions of individual Chinese and Ameri-
cans that will determine whether our need to view our nations positively
w i1l lead to Sino-American conflict. By suggesting which conditions pro-
mote intergroup conflict and which diffuse it , social identity theory (SIT)
can help us learn to live together in peace.

Notes

I. Vilfredo Pareto , Trattato di sociologia generale (Florence: G. Barbèra , 191 的，

trans. Andrew Bongiorno et al. under the title The Mind and Society: Trattato di so-
ciologia generale , ed. Arthur Livingston (工 935; New York: AMS Press , 1983) , pt. I.
2. Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett , Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton
Compromised U.S. Security for Chinese Cash (Washington , D. C.: Regnery, 1998).
3. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from I500 to 2000 (New York: Random House , 1987).
4. Condoleezza Rice , "Promoting the National Interest ," Foreign A仇的 79 ，
1 (January-February 2000): 45 一臼; John Mearsheimer, The 丁子agedy of Great
Power Politics (New York: Norton , 2001).
33 之 DOMESTIC POLITICS

5. Thomas Christensen , "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Aρirs 75 , 5 (September-

October 199 6 ): 37n9.
6. ]ohnston makes valuable contributions both in debunking the myth of a
paci且 st Chinese strategic culture (Chinese can and do frequently use force) and by
bringing culture into the analysis. As ]ohnston himself notes , however, his approach
to culture makes the same deterministic predictions about Chinese behavior as a
"simple structural realpolitik model" would. Alastair Iain ]ohnston, Cultural Real-
ism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton , N .J.:
Princeton University Press ，工 995).
7. Alexander 币Tendt， '‘ Anarchy Is 明That States Make of It: The Social Construc-
tion of Power Politics ," International Organization 46, 2 (Spring 199 2 ): 395 , 394.
8. ]onathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," International Organization 49 ,
2 (Spring 工 995): 233.
9. Samuel Huntington , "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign A仇的严， 3 (Sum-
mer 1993):μ-49.
工 o. Although Wendt proposes a "social structural" approach to IR , his view of
the state is often surprisingly asocial: international society, he asserts , has a "low
density," because "states are by nature more solitary than people." This leads Wendt
to concede pessimistica l1y to the materialists that "states are predisposed to define
their objective interests in self-interested terms . . . the international system contains
a bias toward ‘ Realist' thinking." On the other hand , Wendt is remarkably opti-
mistic in asserting that the relationship among his three "international political cul-
tures"-Hobbesian , Lockean , and Kantian-is progressive , or at least "unidirec-
tiona l." Such passages leave the reader wondering whether to be optimistic or
pessimistic about interstate relations. Because his focus is on the macro, systemic
level , Wendt can provide little insight into when speci且c states will spa r. Alexander
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University
Press , 1999) , 276 , 21 , 267 , 241 , 312.
1 I. ]ohnston, Cultural Realism; Christensen , "Chinese Realpolitik."
1 2. Harry Eckstein , '‘ Case Study and Theory in Political Science ," in Strategies
of Inquiry , ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading , Mass.: Addison-
Wesley，工 975) ， 79-137.
工 3. For a brief discussion of the role of culture in the Sino-American dispute over
the April 2001 spy plane collision , see Peter Hays Gries and Peng
 ìDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 333

19. Given that SIT challenges RC T's material self-interest argument about group
formation and intergroup relations , Mercer's use of SITto support realist assump-
tions abo l1 t self-help and relative gains is particularly surprising. 1 disagree with his
assertion that "SIT provides theoretical and empirical supportfor the neorealist as-
sl1 mption that states are a priori self-regarding." Mercer , "Anarchy and Identity,"
251 n 3.
二 o. Marilynn B. Brewer, "lngro l1 p Identifìcation and Intergro l1 p Conflict: When
Does Ingroup Love Become Outgro l1 p Hate?" In Social Identity, Intergroup
Conflict, and Conflict Resolution , ed. R. Ashmore , D. J l1 ssim, and L. Wilder (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press , 2000) , I7-4 工.
2 I. Fearon and Laitin , "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation ," American Politi-

cal Science Review 90 , 4 (December I996): 7I7.

22. Henri Tajfel , Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, I98 叶， 255.
巧. T l1 rner makes this point especially clear in an elaboration of SIT that he calls
self-categorization theory, See John Turner, Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self二
Categorization Theory (Oxford: Blackwell，工 9 8 7).
24. Charles Cool町， Human Nature and the Social Order (1902; New York:
Scribner, 19 22 ), 397.
25. George Mead , Mind, Self, and Society (1934; Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press , 1965) ，工 3 8 .
26. Leon Festinger , "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes ," Human Rela-
tions 7 (工 954): II7-40.
27. Work on "prototypes" in person perception also addresses this iss l1 e of the
role of comparison processes in understanding our social world. See , e.g. Nancy
Cantor and Walter 孔1ischel ， "Prototypes in Person Perception ," Advances in Ex-
perimental Social Psychology 12 (工 979): 3 一口·
28. Yl1 Xinyan , Waiguoren 走an Zhongguo [Foreigners' views of China] (Beijing:
Zhongg l1 o Shaonian Ertong Ch l1 banshe , 1995).
29. Alexander Wendt , "Collective Identity Formation and the .International
State ," American Political Science Review 88 , 2 (Jl1 ne 1994): 384-96. The critical
constructivists Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney go even further in maintaining
that "the deepest motivation for human contact is self-knowledge." See Naeem In-
ayat l1 11ah and David Blaney, "Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in Inter-
national Relations Theory," in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory , ed.
Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner , 19
334 DOMESTIC POLITICS

32. Emile Durkheim , Suicide ( 工 897; New York: Free Press ，工 963); Roy Baumeis-
ter and Mark Leary, "The Need to Belong: Desire for 1nterpersonal Attachments
as a Fundamental Human Motivation ," Psychological Bulletin 117 , 3 (1995):
497-5 29.
33. Emmanuel Castano et al., "1 Belong, Therefore , 1 Exist: 1ngroup 1denti-
fication , 1ngroup Entitativity, and 1ngroup Bias ," Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 28 , 2 (February 2002): 工 35-43.
34. Almost two centuries ago , American President John Adams (1805) wrote
that "a desire to be observed, considered , esteemed , praised , beloved , and admired
by his fellows is one of the earliest as well as the keenest dispositions discovered in
the heart of man." John Adams , Discourses on Davila (Boston: Russell & Cutler,
工 805) ， cited in William Swann , Self二 Traps: The Elusive Quest for Higher Self-
Esteem (New York: W. H. Freeman , 1996 ), 35.
35. Jennifer Crocker and Riia Luhtanen , "Collective Self-Esteem and 1n-group
Bias ," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58 ，工 (January 1990): 60-67.
36. Robert Cialdini et a l., "Basking in Retlected Glory: Three (Football) Field
Studies ," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34 , 3 (September 1976):
3 66 -75.
37. Collective self-esteem was restored , however, if the subjects were subse-
quently allowed to derogate Russians. Nyla Branscombe and Daniel Wann , "Col-
lective Self-Esteem Consequences of Outgroup Derogation When a Valued Social
1dentity 1s on Trial ," European Journal of Social Psychology 24 , 6 (November-
December 1994): 64 1-57.
3 8. Charles Perd ue et a l., '‘ Us and Them: Social Categorization and the Process
of 1ntergroup Bias ," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59 , 3 (Septem-
ber 1990): 475-86.
39. Henri Tajfel and John Turner, "The Social 1dentity Theory of 1ntergroup Be-
havior ," in Psychology of Intergroup Relations , ed. Stephen Worshel and William
Austin (Chicago: Nelson Hall , 1986) , 7-24.
40. Social psychologists have done a better job of demonstrating the existence of
desires for in-group positivity, however, than of explaining them.
4 1. KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng huajuan [A pictorial history of the war of
resistance against America in aid of Korea] , Liang Qianxiang, chief ed. (Beijing:
KangMei YuanChao Jinianguan , 1990) , 366.
4 二. Thomas Sche丘， "Shame and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion System,"
American Sociological Review 53 (19 88 ): 396.
43. Edward Hirt
 1D E N T IT Y AN D C 0 N FLI C T 1 N S1 N 0 - A M E R 1 C A N R E L A T 10 N S 335

47. Li 飞(unfei ， "Zhou Enlai Was the Most Outstanding Politician 一 Interviewing
Former US Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger ," Renmin Ribao , 3 March 1998 , 6, trans.
in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter cited as FBIS) , CHI-98-089 ,
30 March 1998.
48. Song Qiang , Zhang Zangzang et a l., Zhongguo 走 eyi shuobu [China can say
no] (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe , 1996) , 199 , 202-5.
49. Xi Yongjun an d- Ma Zaihu缸 ， Chaoyue Meiguo: Meiguo shenhua de zhongjie
[Surpassing America: the end of the American myth] (Huhehaote: Neimenggu Daxue
Chubanshe , 1996) , 228.
50. Crocker and Luhtanen , "Collective Self-Esteem and Ingroup Bias ," n. 36.
The exact nature of the relationship between personal and collective self-esteem is
not yet clear, however.
51. Zhao Suisheng , "Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for N ational Greatness and N a-
tionalistic Writing in the 1990S ," China Quarterly , no. 152 (December 1997): 73 1.
52. Jin Niu , "Zhongguo ruhe shuobu?" [How should China say no 汗， in Zhong-
guo ruhe shuobu? [How should China say no 汗， special edition of Meiguo daguan
[America the Beautiful] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Science , Institute of
American Studies ，工 99 6 ) ， 5.
53. Song et a l., Zhongguo 走eyi shuobu [China can say no ], 285n48.
54. Allen Whiting , "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng ,"
China Quarterly , no. 142 (June 1995): 295-316.
55. Donald Kinder and David Sears , '‘ Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism
Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life ," Journal of Personality & Social Psychol-
ogy 4 0 , 3 (19 8 工 ): 4 工 4-3 1.
56. Audrey Murrell et a l., "Aversive Racism and Resistance to A面rmatIve
Action: Perceptions of Justice Are Not Necessarily Color Blind ," Basic & Applied
Social Psychology 15 , 1-2 (1994): 71-86.
57. Brewer, "Ingroup Identification and Intergroup Conflict ," n. 15.
58. See the political science literature on relative deprivation , e.g. Ted Gurr, Why
Men Rebel (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press ，工 97 0 ).
59. Xu Ben , "Contesting Memory for Intellectual SelιPositioning: The 1990s'
New Cultural Conservatism in China ," Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 1 工，
1 (Spring 1999): 157-92.
60. Louisa Schein , "Gender and Internal Orientalism in China ," Modern China
巧， 1 (January 1997): 69-98.
6 1. Sudipta Kaviraj , "The Imaginary Institution of India ," in Subaltern Studies
VII , ed. Partha Chatterjee and Gyanendra Pandley (New York: Oxford Universi
33 6 DOMESTIC POLITICS

65. E.g. , Shelley Taylor and Marci Lobel, "Social Comparison Activity Under
Threat: Downward Evaluation and Upward Contacts ," Psychologiçal Review 96 ,
4 (19 89): 5 69-75.
66. Li Shenzhi , "Fear Under Numerical Superiority," Dushu [Reading] (Beijing) ,
no. 6 (J une 1997); 31-38 , trans. in FBIS-CHI-97-296 (巧 October 1997).
67. Gerald Segal , "Does China Matter?" Foreign Affairs 78 , 5 (September-
October 1999): 24-37.
68. Li Haibo , "China and Its Century," Beijing Review 42 , 42 (18 October
1999): 11-16.
69. Cool町， Human Nature and the Social Order , 266n23.
70. "Wo tuoqi nazhong Zhongguoren" [1 detest that kind of Chinese ], Beijing
Fazhibao [Beijing Legal News] , 29 May 1996.
7 1. Xiao Tong and Du Li , Longli, I978-I996: Zhuanxingqi Zhongguo baixing
xinjilu [Dragon history, 1978-96: the true feelings of the Chinese people during a
time of transition] (Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe , 1997) , 287-88.
72. In the context of African decolonization , Franz Fanon argued that the "na-
tive's minimum demand" is that "the last shall be first and the 且rst last." He is
"ready at a moment's notice to exchange the role of the quarry for that of the
hunte r." The Wretched of the Earth (196 工; New York: Grove Press , 1968 ), 37 , 53.
73. "Top Advisors Call for Regulations to Purify Chinese Language ," Xinhua ,
6 March 1996.
74. Not all Chinese , of course , share this view of the English language. The lin-
guist Chen Guanglei , for instance , has urged restraint. There is "no need to either
fear or worship the Western ," Chen counsels; Chinese should "absorb foreign words
while maintaining self-respect and love of our own language." See "Gaige kaifang
zhong hanyu cihui de biandong" [Changes in the Chinese vocabulary under reform
and opening] , Yuyan Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu (Beijing) 2 (1997): 刀，工 6.
75. Marilynn Brewer, "The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup
Hate?" Journal of Social Issues 日， 3 (Fall 1999): 43 5 .
76. Today's Chinese are more likely to care about basketball. China now has its
own professional basketball association , the CNBA , and millions of aspiring
Michael Jordans.
77. The problem is one of inflation. If everyone gets "A's ," for example , an "A"
would lose its value.
78. Manipulating status , furthermore , is very di面cult. "Located" in other
people's minds , status is highly elusive. Attempting to- buy or coerce status , for in国
stance , is usually self-defeating , reducing one's prestige. Rather than being bought
o
 IDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 337

Pr,7ctÎce of Power: U. S. Relations with China Since I949 (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1995).
80. Fu Hao , "A Ruling Given by History-Marking the 25th Anniversary of
China's Restoration of Its Legitimate Seat in United Nations ," Renmin Ribao ,
23 October 1996, 6 , trans. in FB1S-CH1-96-212 ，巧 October 1996.
81. Chen Feng et a l., ZhongMei jiaoliang daxiezhen [The true story of the Sino-
American contest ], vo l. 2 (Beijing: Zhongguo Renshi Chubanshe ，工 99 6 ) ， 3 22 .
82. "Zhongguo qizhi shuobu: ZhongMei jiaoliang" [China shouldn't just say
no: the Sino American contest ], 12n67.
,.-

83. Wang Yuesheng , "Shehui qingxu , wenming jiaowang yu gongtong jiazhi"

[Social sentiment , the exchange of civilizations , and common values] , in Zhongguo
ruhe miandui xifang [How China faces the West], ed. Xiao Pang (Hong Kong: Mir-
ror Books ，工 997) ，工 3 工.
84. Zheng Anderson , "‘ He Was Treating Me Like a Criminal'-A Chinese Ca-
nadian's Experience at Detroit Airport," China News Digest- US , 20 March 1999 ,
www.cnd.org/CND-US/CND-US.99/CND-US.99-03-20.html (accessed 2 Octo-
ber 2005).
85. Li Jie , "She 1s Not Superior to Her Own People ," China News Digest- US ,
3 April i999 , www.cnd.org/CND-US/CND-US.99/CND-US.99-04-03.html (ac-
cessed 2 October 2005).
86. Guo Danqun , '‘ Chinese Holding Foreign Passport Superior to Other Chi-
nese?" China News Digest-US , 3 April 1999 , www.cnd.org/CND-US/CND-
US.99ICND-US.99-04-03.html (accessed 3 November 2005).
87. Tajfel and Turner, "Social 1dentity Theory of 1ntergroup Behavior," 19-
20n40 .
88. Song Qiang et a l., Disidairen de jingshen: xiandai Zhongguoren de jiushi
qingjie [The spirit of the fourth generation: the savior complex of the modern Chi-
nese] (Lanzhou: Gansu Wenhua Chubanshe , 1997) , 246-49.
89. "Wo shi ‘ Zhongguoren ,' bushi ‘ Chinese'" [1 am a "person from China ," not
a "Chinese 勺，而 ngcheng W切lbao [Canton Evening News ], 4 October 1998. My
thanks to Regina Abrami for this reference.
90. E.g. , Thomas Ashby Wills , "Similarity and Self-Esteem in Downward Com-
parison ," in Socia! Comparison: Contemporary Theory and Research , ed. Jerry Suls
and Thomas Ashby Wills (Hillsdale , N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum，工 99 工)， 51-7 8.
9 工. Li Fang, "Chongjian Zhongguo youxi guize" [Rewriting China's rules of the
game ], Zuojia Tiandi [Writer's World] , special issue (工 99 6 ): 巧·
92. 1mmanuel Kant , Critique of Pure Reason (工 7 8 工 ; New York: Cambridge
University Press , 1998). See als
33 8 DOMESTIC POLITICS

95. For a perceptive analysis , see Lu Junhua , Lun Ah Q jingshen shenglifa de

zheli he xinli neihan [On the philosophical and psychological meaning of Ah Q's
psychological victory technique] (Xi'an: Shaanxi Renmin Chubanshe , 1982).
96. Jin Hui , "Geng zhongyao de shi minzu jingshen shijie de chongjian" (More
important is the reconstruction of a national psychological world) , in Zhongguo
ruhe miandui xifang [How China faces the West], ed. Xiao Pang (Hong Kong: Mir-
ror Books ，工 997) ， 182-9 8.
97. Ta Kung Pao editorial 1999 , trans. in FBIS-CHI-1999 一 05 12 .
98. "China Acknowledges U. S. Payment for Belgrade Embassy Bombing,"
Kyodo News Service , 20 January 200 1.
99. See Peter Hays Gries ，叮ears of Rage: Chinese N ationalism and the Belgrade
Embassy Bombing ," China Journal , no. 46 (2001): 巧 -43.
100. For a more detailed discussion , see Peter Hays Gries and Peng Kaiping ,
"Culture Clash? Apologies East and West," Journal of Contemporary China I I ,
30 (2002): 工 73-7 8 .
10 1. Yan Xuetong , "Experts on Jet Collision Incident and Overall Situation in
Sino- U. S. Relations ," Liaowang, 200 1. Cited in FBIS-CHI-2001-042616 , 6-8.
工 02. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Behind the Scenes in Beijing's Corridors of Power,"
,

CNN, I I April 200 1.

工 03. Nelson Report, April 200 1. 1 thank Rick Baum and Chinapol for this
reference.
104. Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin , "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence ," An-
nual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 426.
10 5. Ibid. , 438.
106. This is not meant to imply that emotion does not play a role in other inter-
group dynamics. Indeed , sociologists of emotion make the broader argument that
emotion is the vitallink between social actor and social structure; see , e.g. , Barbalet,
Emotion , Social Theory, and Social Structure , 27n39. SIT and especially social cat-
egorization theory, however , have shiedaway from motivation in favor of a focus on
the cognitive dimensions of intergroup behavio r.
107. Jonathan Mercer , "Approaching Emotion in International Politics" (paper
presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting , 25 April 1996);
Neta Crawford , "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emo-
tional Relationships ," International Security 24 , 4 (Spring 2000): 口 6-5 6 .
工 08. Phillip Shaver et a l., "Emotion Knowledge: Further Exploration of a Proto-
叮pe Approach ," Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 52 , 6 (工 987): 107 8,
cited in Brenda Major, "From Social Inequali
 IDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 339

Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk ," Economet-
rica 47 (I979): 26 3-9 1.
I I 2. Li Xiguang , Liu K~?g et a l., ~ao_mohua Zhongguo de beihou [The plot to
demonize China] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, I996) , 83.
I I 3. Peter Hays Gries , "Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the

Belgrade Embassy Bombing," China Journal , no. 46 (July 200 工):巧 -43.
12 The Correlates θf Beijing Public Opinion
Toward the United States , I998-2004
Alastair lain Johnston

lntroduction

In the past public opinion has never really been an important issue in
Chinese foreign policy studies for obvious reasons. The People's Republic
of China is not , after all , a country where the people can vote to recall
poorly performing political leaders. Foreign policy is one of the last and
most sensitive "forbidden zones" where unapproved or sharp public dissent
and criticism can still be politically risky.l And the PRC's political system is
still a dictatorship.
Yet in recent years there has been more talk from both U.S. observers and
Chinese analysts about the constraints that public opinion-meaning , at its
simplest , the opinions of some representative sample of the entire politically
aware population-places on Chinese leaders.
Moreover , there is evidence that the Chinese leadership is increasingly
sensitive to and constrained by the opinion of "attentive publics" (primarily
urban political , economic , and military elites) on issues running from Taiwan
to ]apanese reparations to the treatment of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Jo-
seph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen suggest that public intellectuals in partic-
ular have a growing impact on foreign policy through consulting with rele-
飞rant bureaucracies ,2 high-pro且le writing in an increasingly commercialized
press , and efforts to mobilize broader sectors of the public , whose views may
then be reflected in public opinion polling by the state or the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) ,3 even though they do not address mobilization on for-
eign policy issues per se.
It is not unreasonable to believe that just as the cultural , political, and
economic preferences of various sectors of the Chinese public may increas-
ingly influence the domestic policies of the central government , so too their
foreign policy preferences may increasingly constrain the options of China ￥
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 34I

leaders. Just which sectors will matter is unknown , of course , but one sus-
pects that tl叫 r 由 ences of 旧 uubanites
时 and tne bu悖。ning middle 山 s will
predominate. This may be even more likely in the e;ent th~t political reform
leads to limited dmoeratIZation-As it is , WIth Jiang ZeniiI白 decision in
200rto sanction the induction of capitalists and entrepreneurs into the
CCP, it is plausible to expect that a wider range of voices will increasingly
be heard within the Party itsel f. 4
If this general impression in punditry and scholarship is true , then it is
important to learn more about public opinion on international relatìons
and foreìgn policy questiops. 5 This raises two basic questions about which
we know relatively little. Fì rst , what is Chinese public opinion? Second ,
how does it affect the leadership's foreign policy decìsions? Even if we had
good measures of public opinìon , it may be that how Chinese leaders un-
derstand public opinion differs from actual opìnion. For instance , some ar-
gue that U.S. national security elites overestimate the degree of casualty-
aversion and isolationism in the post-Cold War U.S. public. 6 It is possible
that Chinese national security elites wrongly estimate anti-Americanism
among the Chinese public.
This pa per is a 且rst cut at the fìrst question: what is Chinese public opin-
ion about the United States? What is its structure? How does it vary? The
second question is harder to answer without detailed interviewìng inside ,
and data from , the foreign policy process. U.S. studies of the impact of
public opinion on foreign policy reveal very complex relationships. Some
research suggests , for example , that there is a spiral relationship between
opinion polls , media coverage of an issue , elite responses to that coverage ,
and then government policy.7 New research on the impact of U.S. infotain-
ment suggests that instant and graphic media coverage of relatively low-
stakes foreign policy crises mobilizes public opinion , which in turn limits
the political space for decision-makers to back down in crises. This con-
strains decision-makers from getting into such crises in the fìrst place
through risk-acceptant , escalatory policies. 8 Some research suggests that
incumbents , in particular, will anticipate public reactions to foreign policy
successes and failures and thus adjust their policy choices accordingly while
mo面ce. Massive public relations campaigns behin
34 2 DOMESTIC POLITICS

influences decision-makers depends on the decision-maker's a priorinor-

mative belief in the legitimacy and desirability of public opinion as an input
in decisions .1 1
Anecdotally, it seems that in the Chinese case , there are channels through
which public opinion is reflected and refracted. These include inner Party
communications networks , such as the internal reference materials system
(nei can); classifìed polling; an increasingly commercialized punditry (TV
talking heads , sensationalist publications and books , etc.); viewer call-ins;
and interactive Internet talks with 0面cials ， among other sources. Future
work on Chinese public opinion and foreign policy would probably benefìt
from a careful translation of the hypothesized causal mechanisms from U.S.
and western European literature into a marketized Leninist system. Need-
less to say, 1 cannot do this here. 12

Previous Research on Chinese Public

Opinion About the United States

There is a general impression in the U.S. policy and punditry worlds

that whatever Chinese public opinion is , it is iricreasingly anti-American
and nationalist. After the Belgrade embassy bombing in May 1999 and the
collision between a Chinese 岳ghter and a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane in
April 2001 , a number of analyses argued , for instance , that the PRC lead-
ership could not afford to take a soft line on the United States , because pub-
lic opinion might turn against the CCP.13
However, the conclusions about "rising" Chinese nationalism andanti-
Americanism come mostly from anecdotal evidence from foreign media re-
porting , relatively unsystematic reliance on high-profìle , popular publica-
tions in China , or individual intera c;úons between U.S. scholars and offìcials
and Chinese scholars and 0面cials.
The sources that the U.S. media rely upon to make these inferences about
public opmlO n , however, are severely biased (in a sampling sense). An
analysis of U.S. newspaper articles from October 2000 to July 2001 that
mentioned Chinese nationalism shows that in the fìfteen papers that had
such articles , almost 30 percent of the citations were to interviews with
non-randomly selected Chinese students , while another 22 percent were
to young Chinese professionals. Only 12 percent were to U.S. (non-PRC)
China specialists (see Fig. 12.1) .1 4
Books such as Song Qiang et a l. 's 1996 nationalist screed Zhongguo 走 eyt
shuobu (China cansay no) are often held up as evidence of a rising tide of
anti-Americanism. However , another best seller in this time frame was Qian
Ning's 1997 Liuxue Meìguo (Studying in America) , written by the son ot
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNJTED STATES 343

35

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FIGURE 12. 工. Sources on "rising Chinese nationalism" in U. S. newspapers ,

October 2000- July 200 1. Sources: See endnote 14.

the senior foreign policy 且gure Qian Qichen , which both American and
Chinese readers considered a balanced and fair treatment of the United
States , often contrasted positively in it with China. 15
There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of U.S. scholars' impressions
of Chinese scholars' views of Chinese public opinion , nor to doubt that
Chinese scholars may have a better sense of this opinion than American
scholars. But elites can often misjudge popular opinion. Moreover, the to-
tal number of different scholars with whom U.S. specialists on Chinese pol-
itics and foreign policy interact is , of course , exceedingly small and likely to
be unrepresentative of popular attitudes.
In short , all three sources of information need to be treated cautiously,
just as we would urge caution for Chinese colleagues who drew inferences
about U.S. opinion from nonrandom interviews with U.S. college students ,
a small selection of elite scholars , or a couple of best-selling books (such as ,
say, The China Threat by Bill Gertz).
In recent years , a fourth source of information about public opinion and
attitudes towa.rd international relations (IR) and the United States has
become available , namely, quantitative polling data , which have proved to
344 DOMESTIC POLITICS

be of varying representativeness and reliability. The China Youth Daily polls

from the mid 1990S that claimed that the United States was the most disliked
country among Chinese youth are perhaps the best known of these surveys.16
This poll is sometimes invoked as evidence of growing anti-Americanism
and nationalism among Chinese youth , even though it did not meet any
social scientific sampling criteria. 17
There are several studies now of which 1 am aware that use more con-
ventional random sample survey-type methods to extract attitudes toward
the United States. One of these was a randomly sampled survey of 720
Beijing residents' perceptions of military threat from the United States and
Japan , conducted in November 1999 by Chen Jie and the People's Univer-
sity's Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI).18 Chen reports that this
study found that an overwhelming majority of respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that the United States had the intent (75 percent) to threaten China
and believed or strongly believed that it had the capabilities (85 percent) to
do so. The study also linked these perceptions to a number of other politi-
cal attitudes , namely, support for the PRC regime , attitude toward China's
future role in international politics , and degree of attention to political is-
sues. These were all positively correlated with the belief that the United
States constituted a threat. As far as 1 could tell from the report on this study,
no socioeconomic or demographic controls were used , howeve r. The study
only gave respondents a choice between these two external threats to Chinese
security.19
A second study on attitudes toward the United States was run by scholars
at Zhejiang University and Valparaiso University, Indiana. The survey,
conducted after the 1999 embassy bombing , sampled around 750 better-
educated (dazhuan and above) pe O:ple from Hangzhou , Ningbo , and Wen-
zhou and asked questions about attitudes toward the United States and U.5.
China policy. Sixty percent of respondents believed that the main U.S. foreign
policy goal was to preserve America's hegemonic status , although 26 percent
said U.S. foreign policy reflected the interests of domestic political groups.
The overwhelming majority of respondents (62 percent) were optimistic
about U.S.-China relations over the next 且ve ye a, rs. A small portion of the
sample (12 percent) saw the United States as China's main enemy. The plu
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 345

only the raw percentages of responses , without any tests of association ,

difference , or correlation. 20 In additiòn , the reporton the survey is unclear
about sampling procedures. The sample was overwhelmingly made up of
well-educated young male students , and it was thus not especially represen-
tative of society at large. Finally, many of the questions used highly charged
political terms common to Chinese discourse on IR-such as alluding to the
"threat" posed to wodd peace by "U.S. hegemonism" -that could have had
certain cueing effects. The data report only supplies a handful of socioeco-
nomic and demographic controls and does not look at other views about in-
ternational relations to determine whether there are correlates with views
about the United States. Still , the polling procedures and questions appear to
be far more reliable and valid than the previous China Youth Daily polling.
In the past few years , a number of polls have suggested that despite the
ups and downs in the U.S.-China relationship , a substantial portion of the
Chinese public still has relatively positive feelings about the United States
and Sino-American relations. The well-known Horizon Group , for instance ,
has data showing that in 2003 , among urban Chinese , overwhelmingly the
most liked country was , not surprisingly, China (53.6 percent). France was
second (6.3 percent) , and the United States placed third (6.1) , ahead of
Canada (5.1 percent).21 And in a comparison of between 1999 and 2004
polls , Horizon found that the percentage of respondents who had a positive
view of the United States had increased from 60.9 percent to 63 percent over
the intervening 且ve years. The data also showed that the United States was
still the preferred destination for overseas study 一口 .1 percent of respon-
dents chose the United States , while the next most popular destination was
Australia (19.6 percent).22 On the other hand , when choosing which coun-
try was the friendliest toward China , the United States ranked sixth in 1999
(9.8 percent) but had dropped to tenth place (7.2 percent) in 2004. In both
years , the United States was chosen as the country least friendly to China
(70.3 percent and 74.4 percent respectively).
More recently, a multi-city poll conducted by the Chinese Academy of
Social Science's Institute of American Studies has attracted a fair amount of
attention for its relatively positive view of the United States. The full data
34 6 DO 岛1ESTIC POLITICS

The Beijing Area Study Survey

The analysis 1 present below is based on yet another survey project,

the Beijing Area Study (BAS) survey of Beijing citizens , which has been
conducted annually since 1995 by the Research Center on Contemporary
China (RCCC) at Peking University, perhaps the most authoritative and
sophisticated academic social science survey institute in China today.24 My
analysis draws from a unique subset of the 1998 through 2004 BAS data
sets on attitudes toward international relations , including specific questions
about the United States. Sampling was done according to probability pro-
portional to size , a form of strati且ed random sampling , to ensure as repre-
sentative a sample of the Beijing population as possible. The polling involved
lengthy face-to-face interviews with respondents by trained graduate stu-
dents associated with the RCCC. For the most part, the interviews were done
in December or January at the end of each yea r. 25 Some of the questions were
modeled on those used in the 1994 and 1998 Chicago Council of Foreign Re-
lations surveys. Some questions were experimental , designed to test mea-
sures of in-group identification and the degree of "othering" of national
out-groups. Some were designed to tap into attitudes related to China's
growing participation in international institutional life. The questions on
foreign affairs were only a small part of a large list of annual questions on
a range of socioeconomic indicators. Overall , the BAS is modeled on the
University of Michigan's Detroit Area Study.26
The data collection process was also separated by some very important
events , or "shocks ," in U.S.-China relations. The BAS 1998 and 1999 data
collections were separated by the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade in May 1999. The 2000 and 2001 data collections were sepa-
rated by the EP-3 incident. The 2001 and 2002 data were separated by 9 /r 1
and the start of Sino-U.S. anti-terror cooperation. These episodes allow
one to test the volatility in overall worldview and in specific attitudes in
response to major events in Chinese foreign policy. Moreover , they allow
for some insights into the degree to which there is an interactive effect in
Sino-U.S. relations. Some analysts in the United States discount the pos-
sibility that U.S. actions have negative consequences for Chinese under-
standings of the United States , except where there are deliberate PRC gov-
ernment efforts to whip up a
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 347

There are , of course , many problems with public opinion polling , let
alone polling in the PRC: the susceptibility of responses to word choice and
order , to respondent deception, to unrelated exogenous conditions in the
interview situation , and to questions that have low construct validity; the
meaning of "don't knows"; the shoe-horning of people's complex and often
contradictory attitudes into categories of analysis determined by an outside
scholar , among others. But in addition to all its standard advantages (rela-
tive transparency, reproducibility, capturing the attitudes of representative
samples , etc.) , polling is also a way to provide a voice to individuals when
they may have few opportunities to express opinions. 28 These data are an
additional method for tapping into Chinese preferences and attitudes on
foreign policy that can be analyzed alongside qualitative and more impres-
sionistic data. Indeed，且ndings that are similar across sources and methods
should be considered especially robust. Findings that are inconsistent should
compel us to rethink conventional wisdom , whether derived from qualitative
or quantltatlVe sources.
That said , the analysis that follows should not be considered a definitive
study of urban Beijing opinion , let alone urban Chinese opinion. This study
is about the "correlates ," not the causes or the deep structure. The problem
with explaining opinion is twofold. First , I am not developing or testing a
theory of opinions , so I have no particular reason to posit some variables as
critical independent variables. I hazard guesses about direction of influence
between control variables and opinion toward the United States , but these
should be taken as heuristic at best. Second , except for some basic socio-
economic data , I do not have access to other questions on the BAS that one
might use to model causes of these beliefs about the United States (e.g. , one
might expect a liberal ideology or support for domestic political reform to
be part of the explanation for attitudes toward the United States , but I lack
such information). So I only explore the correlates between the standard
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of respondents , rather than
hypothesizing about general socioeconomic and ideational causes of U.S.
attitudes in a multivariate mode l.

BAS Questions Used to Measure

Attitudes Toward the United States

The chapter examines three main sets of questions that pertain to at-
titudes toward the United States as dependent variables. As set out in more
detail below as a first step in explaining these attitudes , the chapter looks at
the relationship between six basic socioeconomic and demographic control
variables.
34 8 DOMESTIC POLITICS

The three measures of attitudes toward the United States are:

Level of amity. "Feelings" about the United States aie measured on
a standard I - I 00 degree feeling thermometer for the years I 998 to 2004.
Feeling thermometers are common in U.S. and European public opinion
polling (for instance , they are used on the Chicago Council of Foreign Rela-
tions quadrennial survey ofU.S. foreign policy attitudes). Respondents were
given a IOO o scale and asked to assign a temperature to a named country cor-
responding to their general degree of amity toward that country. Anything
below 500 signified coolness (meiyou hao gan) toward that state , anything
above 500 signified warmness (you hao gan) , with 500 indicating neutral feel-
ings. A list of states was provided so that, in effect, people were not just be-
ing asked to rate their discrete feelings about states , but were being encour-
aged to think comparatively. In essence , they were being asked where they
would rank a particular state affectively in relation to other states.
Identityand "othering." Howa social group describes its own traits
and those of other groups appears to be a critical indicator of how it will be-
have toward the other. The differences in these characterizations matter, and
they are not necessarily epiphenoma of prior conflicts of material interest.
Based on some very robust empirical findings , social identity theory (SIT) ar-
gues , for example , that the construction of in-group identity generally leads
to the construction of different and often devalued notions of out-group iden-
tity, in order to consolidate the legitimacy of the group's internal order. This
process is commonly if awkwardly referred to as "othering." The degree of
devaluation of the out-group wiU vary depending on the requirements for in-
group identity construction. Less differentiation and thus less devaluation is
hypothesized to be associated with less competitiveness directed at the out-
group.29 The boundaries between in-group and out-group are messier, al-
lowing people to hold marginal (liminal) identities , creating more situations
where individuals may sometimes share an identity with some members of
the erstwhile out-group. Conversely, more differentiation, ceteris paribus ,
can lead to more devaluation and this is associated with more competitive
views of an even more threatening out-group.30 .
The 2000-2004 BAS surveys asked questions about seH a
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TO 飞;V ARD THE UNITED STATES 349

For this study, 1 constructed an othering scale for the 2000 - 2004 data
usmg the peaceful-warlike and moral-immoral scales (1-7). Respondents
were asked to determine where on these scales they would consider "the
Chinese" to be and where they would situate "Americans."33 To capture the
degree of difference that any given respondent believed existed between Chi-
nese and Americans in terms of their inherent traits and characteristics ,34
1 constructed an othering scale , calculated by averaging the multiple scales
into one identity score and then subtracting the Chinese composite score
from the American composite score. The lower this 且gure， the narrower the
perceived identity differençe and the more "like us" the Americans are con-
sidered by Chinese respondents. The higher this figure , the wider the differ-
ence , and the less "like us ," and hence potentially competitive or threaten-
ing , Americans are considered by Chinese respondents.
The main threat to Chinese national security. This question was
only asked in the 2001 , 2002 , and 2003 surveys. Respondents were asked
to chose one of the following options: Taiwan independence , the revival of
Japanesemilitarism , global economic decline , domestic social unrest , U.S.
military power, Russian military power (in 2002 and 2003) , global prob-
lems (e.g. , drugs , terrorism) (in 2002 and 2003) , or none of the above. As
far as 1 am aware , there are no publicly available polling data from China
that provide this range of options for respondents. Most other polls provide
a limited list of countries that could pose security threats (e.g. , Russia , the
United States , Korea , Japan) and asked respondents to chose which was
most threatening. Given that national security problems need not be limited
to countries , this BAS question enables respondents to choose among inter-
nal and external threats.

The Structure of Attitudes Toward the United States:

Socioeconomic and Demographic Correlates

1 use various socioeconomic and demographic control variables in

order to do some descriptive "brush clearing" concerning which factors
at least appear to matter in accounting for variations in attitudes toward
the United States. 1 do not use other ideational or attitudinal questions as
controls , for a couple of reasons. First , it is often hard to determine the
causal direction of attitudes as predictors of other attitudes. For instance ,
one could argue that attitudes toward military spending re fI ect fundamen-
tal conceptions of levels of external threat , from which derive levels of oth-
ering of the United States. One could also argue that othering of the United
States determines the degree to which one believes that there is a threatening
35 0 DOMESTIC POLITICS

external environment and thus one's views on military spending. Second ,

and related, the BAS questions to which 1 have access do not include atti-
tudes toward domestic po 1itics. There may be some attitudes about domes-
tic politics (support for democracy, for instance) that would predict foreign
policy attitudes (lower levels of hostility toward other democracies).
For these reasons (e.g. , omitted variable bias) and because 1 do not have
a theory of attitudes toward the United States that can be tested on these
data , 1 do not try to develop a comprehensive multivariate explanatory
model of respondents' attitudes. Instead , 1 fìrst look at bivariate relation-
ships between views of the United States and these sociodemographic vari-
ables. This helps determine which variables might matter in a multivariate
analysis. Moreover, one can examine whether there is much variation
within these control variables-for example , are respondents who "came
of age" politically after Tiananmen really more anti-American than the pre-
Tiananmen political generation? So it makes sense fìrst to determine which
nonattitudinal variables may account for some of the variation in attitudes
toward the United States.
1 used the following control variables to determine the degree to which
these attitudes about the United States varied:
Income level. One should expect those with higher incomes to dem-
onstrate relatively higher levels of amity and lower levels of othering toward
the United States compared to those from lower income groups. This could
be a reflection of their respective positions vis-à-vis bene且ts from integration
with the outside world. 35 For the purposes of this analysis , 1have used the cri-
teria for determining income groups developed by two Chinese analysts ,
Ming Ruifeng and Yang Yiyong. In their 1997 study, what they termed the
"middle class" in 1995 was the socioeconomic group with annual household
earnings of 30 ,000 RMB (U.S.$3 ,600 at 1996 exchange rates) or more. 36 At
the time of their study, this constituted 9 percent of urban families. 1 divided
the BAS sample into three groups using the income categories suggested by
Ming and Yang. The "middle class" is constituted by respondents whose
monthly household income is 3,000 RMB or more. The "potential middle
class" has household incomes from 800-2 ,999 RMB , and the "poor" re-
spondents have monthly household incomes of less than 800 RMB.37 Until
recently, inflation was very low, and in some years negative , so it is reason-
able to use the same income group thresholds for the2000-2004 period. 38
Foreign travel. One should expect that those who have gone abroad
in some capacity will tend to express lower levels of anti-Americanism than
those who have not been abroad. This might reflect a higher income or ed-
ucation level (in other words , those going abroad are a self-selected group).
Or it might reflect a more critical eye toward self and a more empathetic eye
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 351

toward others as a result of trave l. In the 2001 , 2002 , 2003 , and 2004 BAS ,
the questionnaire asked whether respondents had traveled abroad.
Education levels. One would expect higher levels of education to be
related to lower levels of anti-Americanism , because exposure to more in-
formation about the outside and to more sophisticated modes of analysis
and thought contribute to a more critical or nuanced view of one's own
group. Education levels are tapped by a clustered "level of achieved educa-
tion" variable (do respondents have at least some primary, some secondary,
or some university education?).
Age and political generation. 1 developed a "political generation"
variable that codes for membership in the post-Tiananmen generation. Re-
spondents who were twenty-one years old or younger in 1989 are coded as
members of the post-Tiananmen generation (thus thirty-five or younger in
2004). This is designed to test the general impression that the post-1989
generation has , in particular , been successfully targeted by a state effort to
whip up anti-Americanism and nationalism in an effort to repair the dam-
aged legitimacy of the CCP.39 1 also use age as of the year in which the re-
spondent is interviewed.
Gender. This variable is a standard demographic variable in polling
on foreign relations. In the United States , at least, there is evidence that
women tend to adopt somewhat more "liberal" and "internationalist" atti-
tudes on international conflict issues. 40 But unfortunately the literature on
gender and foreign policy preferences is still too underdeveloped to produce
any testable hypotheses.
Interest in internatio1ω1 news. Respondents were asked whether
they followed international news closely through to not following this news
at al l. The assumption here is that this variable should tap into levels of
awareness of the outside world and possibly levels of amity and othering to-
ward the United States and Americans. A low interest in international news
should correlate with lower levels of amity and higher levels of othering.
Table 12.1 provides a summary of the dependent variables , the socio-
economic and demographic control variables , and years in which these are
available.

The Correlates of Amity Toward the United States

Turning now to the 且rst variable of interest, amity toward the United
States has been relatively volatile comparedto all other states , except for
]apan. 41 In 19"98 , the mean temperature on the 100 0 feeling thermometer
 TABLE 12. 工

Dependent and socioeconomic/demographic control variables,

and the BAS survey years for which there are data
Main
national
secunty
Dependent variable Amity Othering threat

Control variable
Income (class) 1998
1999
2000 2000
2001 2001 2001
2002 2002 2002
2003 2003 2003
2004 2004
Education 1998
1999
2000 2000
2001 2001 2001
2002 2002 2002
2003 2003 2003
2004 2004
Foreign travel 1998
2000
2001 2001 2001
2002 2002 2002
2003 2003 2003
2004 2004
Age /political 1998
generatlO n 1999
2000 2000
2001 2001 2001
2002 2002 2002
2003 2003 2003
2004 2004
Interest in international news 1998
2000
Gender 1998
1999
2000 2000
2001 2001 2001
2002 2002 2002
2003 2003 2003
2004 2004
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 353

100
90
80
70
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∞

60
ω-u

50
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40
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A

30
20
10
O
白白。国』HE。的

何时叮口-
Emm口时

回国内
UUHC

民口MNEEO

口创RHMN
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HUh-m-uAdι

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的

.1998 .1999 .2000 .2001 事醋 2002 2003 2004

FIGURE 12.2 U. S. temperature in comparison across time and across countries

(y axis is mean degrees). Source: Beijing Area Study data.

was highest for the United States , and the U.S. mean was significantly
greater than the mean for all states (see Fig. 12.2). The levels of amity
dropped substantially in 1999 and 2001 , possibly due to the Belgrade em-
bassy bombing and the EP-3 incident. But from 2001 to 2002 , it climbed
again. Then it dropped in 2003 and again in 2004. The trend , therefore , ap-
pears to be a downward one , the slope of which may be steepening. The
United States has gone from a country with one of the highest levels of amity
as late as 1998 to a level that is roughly similar to that of ]apan over the past
few years. Indicative of this shift over the past seven years is the distribution
of amity levels in the 1998 and 2004 data. They are , in essence , mirror im-
ages (see Fig. 12.3).
What then were the relationships between the level of amity expressed to-
ward the United States and the various socioeconomic and demographic
control variables listed above?42
Amity and income level. The BAS data indicate that levels of amity
toward the United States have consistently been higher among the middle
class than among other social groups. While the wealthiest sector of the
population had mean temperatures consistently above the average , only in
2000 and 200.3 was the association between income level and amity statis-
tically significant at the p = 0.051eve l.
354 DOMESTIC POLITICS

Standard deviation = 23.89 Standard deviation = 23.65

200 Mean = 62 Mean = 39
180 N = 71 1.00 180 N = 610.00
160 160
140 140
120 120
Z 100 Z 100
80 80
60 60
40 40
20 20
O O
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Amity (degrees) 1998 Amity (degrees) 2004

1 2.3. Distribution of levels of amity to the United States ，工 998 and

F 1 G U RE
2004. (N = number of respondents). Source: Beijing Area Study data.

Amity and education. Those with more education consistently ex-

press warmer feelings toward the United States. 43 In four of the years , the
ANOVA measure indicated that this overall relationship is statistically
significant. But in 1998 , 2002 , 2003 , and 2004 , the Tukey HSD statistic in-
dicates that the numerical difference between those with some secondary
and some university education was not statistically significant. In 1998 , the
significant difference was between those with some tertiary and some pri-
mary education.
Amity and interest in international news. The data indicate that in
the two years this question was asked , those who followed international af-
fairs closely had higher degrees of amity than those who did not. In 1998 ,
the difference in mean levels of amity was statistically significant at the
p = 0.1 level , with the main significant difference being between those who
were very interested and those who were hardly interested at all (Tukey
HSD P = 0.08). In 2000 , the overall difference was statistically signi且cant
at the p = 0.05 leve l. These findings suggest that those who are better in-
formed about the outside world are less anti-American than those who are
less well informed. 44
Amity and gender. In general , there do not seem to be any clear
trends in gender and amity. In 1999 , 2000 , 2001 , 2003 , and 2004 , women
expressed a lower level of amity than men. But the difference is only
significant at the .05 level in 2001 and at the 0.1 level in 2004. In all other
years gender differences were virtually nonexistent.
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 355

Amity and foreign travel. In the years in which this question was
asked , foreign travel appears to be associated withhigh levels of amity. In
199 8 and 2004 , this relationship was not statistically signi岳cant， but in 2001 ,
2002 , and 2003 , it was significant (p = 0.02 , P = 0.OI7 , and p = 0.00
respectively) .
Amity and poli.tical generation. There does not seem to be any evi-
dence that those who came of political age after Tiananmen are any more
hostile to the United States than older political generations are. In two of
the years , 2000 and 2001 , the post-Tiananmen generation did show statis-
tically significantly lower degrees of amity than the pre-Tiananmen genera-
tion (p = 0.07 and p = 0.09 respectively). But in the other years , the dif-
ferences are not significant. As for age in years , the results also suggest that
the assumption that youth are more hostile to the United States is incorrect.
From 1998 to 2001 , age is negatively related to amity-the younger one is ,
the higher the level of amity-and this relationship is statistically signi且cant.
From 2002 to 2004 , the relationship is not statistically significant , although
the signs on the coe面cients are again negative.
In sum (see Table 12.2) , it would appear that , in general , the wealthier ,
better educated , better traveled , younger , and better informed (or more in-
terested in the external world) one is , the higher one's positive or warm feel-
ings toward the United States are likely to be. Gender does not appear to be
linked to amity toward the United States. And , contrary to the conventional
wisdom , the post-Tiananmen generation , and younger people in general , do
not express markedly more hostile views of the United States than older
generatlO ns.

The Correlates of Identity Difference

Between Chinese and Americans

Do these patterns hold up when it comes to the degree to which Chi-

nese respondents see their identity traits as different from Americans'? First
of all , Chinese respondents clearly perceive a fairly large degree of identity
difference.Figure 12.4 shows the mean perception on the semantic differen-
tial scale for BAS respondents. 1 have included a comparison with percep-
tions of identity difference between Chinese and ]apanese so as to provide
some context for the level of othering directed at Americans. It is clear that
Chinese respondent严 perceive Chinese people to be much more peaceful and
moral by nature than Americans and ]apanese. 45 This suggests considerable
in-group-out-group differentiation by Chinese respondents. However, it is
important to note that the perceived identity difference (scores given to
 TABLE 12.2
Summary of results concerning levels of amity toward the United States
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

VariabJe Effect on ResuJts in Statistically Results in Statistically Results in Statistically Results in Statistically Results in Statistically Results in Statistically Results in Statistically
amlty predicted significant? predicted significant? predicted significant? predicted significant? predicted significant? predicted significant? predicted significant?
direction? direction? direction? direction? direction? direction? direction?
Income Income Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
should be
positively
associated
with amity
Education Education Yes Yes 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
should be
positively
associated
with amity
Interest in Interest in Yes Yes 2 n/a n/a Yes Yes n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
international international
news news should
be
positively
associated
with amity
Gender Women No Women No Women No Women Yes Women No Women No Women Yes 3
express express express express express express express
higher lower lower lower higher lower lower
level of level of levelof levelof levelof levelof level of
affilty affilty affilty affilty affilty amlty amlty
Foreign Travel Yes No n/a n/a n/a n/a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1吨。

travel abroad
should be
positively
associated
with amity
Political Post- No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 Yes No Yes No Yes No
generatlO n Tiananmen
generatlO n
should be
negatively
associated
with amity
Age in Age should No 5 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No No No
years be
positively
associated
with amity

'Between those with some tertiary and those with some primary education.
2 Atthe 0.1 leve l.
3 At the 0.1 leve l.
4At the 0.1 level.
5The younger the respondent , the higher the expressed level of amity.
35 8 DOMESTIC POLITICS

~ 5
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rJl
一--………
一--…，，-一
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…........--一

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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

.. ]apanese - - Americans - Chinese

FIGURE r 2.4. Average respondent perception of Chinese , Americans , and

]apanese on combined peaceful (r) to warlike (7) and moral (工) to immoral
(7) scales. Source: Beijing Area Study data.

Americans and ]apanese minus scores given to Chinese) did not change
much between 2000 and 2004 , except for the last year (Fig. 12.5). In other
words up until 2004 , othering of Americans and ]apanese appears to have
been relatively stable , perhaps reflecting somewhat deeply rooted assump-
tions about the other , regardless of speci且c ups and downs in political rela-
tionships. It is unclear , of course , whether the movement toward conver-
gence in Chinese othering of the United States and ]apan in 2004 represents
a basic shift in the trend. It certainly bears watching; if the shift does repre-
sent a new trend , then it suggests a more fundamental reevaluation of the
degree of perceived compatibility between Chinese and Americans.
Othering and income. The BAS suggests that as we might expect ,
middle-class respondents perceived a lower level of difference between Chi-
nese and Americans. The ANOVA shows that these differences in means
were statistically signifìcant in 2000 ，之 00 卒， 2003 , and 2004 卢
Othering and education. Education is clearly related to perceived
difference between Chinese and Americans with regard to peacefulness and
mora 1ity traits. Those respondents with at least some university educa-
tion perceived a lower degree of difference than thosewith less education.
These differences are statistically signi且cant across the years , except in 2001
and 2004.
Othering and travel abroad. The data show that those who had
traveled abroad consistently perceived much lower degrees of identity
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 359

1:l 2-寸t--
二.工二.二.工
二.工三工.二.二.二工 ιζ 二.二
L
口
Q)
'-<
者 O
......
气3

è -2
'-'
口

当 -3
-4

-6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

… ]apanese - - Americans

FIGURE 12.5. Identity difference scores for Americans andJapanese , 2000-

2004. Source: Beijing Area Study data.

difference between Chinese and Americans. The ANOVA statistic shows

that these differences were signi且cant at the p = O.OI level in all four years
in which the question was asked. 47
Othering and political generation. The BAS data indicatethat in al-
most all years , there is no statistical difference in the degree of othering of
Americans between the pre-Tiananmen and post-Tiananmen generations.
In one year , 2002 , the difference is signifìcant , but it indicates that the post-
Tiananmen generation perceived a lower degree of identity difference than
the pre-Tiananmen generation. These fìndings about political generation
and othering are analytically interesting , because they run counter to the
strong assumption in U.S. policy and punditry discourse that younger Chi-
nese are more anti-American than older Chinese.
Othering and age. There does not appear to be a clear pattern across
the years in the relationship between these two variables. In 2000 , for in-
stance , age was positively associated with identity difference. The younger
the respondent , the lower the degree of othering. This relationship was sta-
tistically signi且cant. This runs contrary to what one might expect , given the
patriotic education campaign aimed at Chinese youth. On the other hand ,
in 2004 , the relationship was the reverse: the younger the respondent , the
higher the degree of othering. In all other years , the relationship was not
statistically signifìcant.
Othering and gender. The BAS data show that the perceived iden-
tity difference between Chinese and Americans differs between males and
3 60 DOMESTIC PO Ll TICS

females , and that the gender difference is statistically signi且cant for aU years
except for 2004. Females perceived greater levels of identity. difference be-
tweenChinese and Americans than males did. 48
In sum, the degree of othering or perceived identity difference between
Chinese and Americans does vary considerably (see Table I2.3). In general
greater wealth, higher levels of education, and travel abroad are all associ-
ated with a lower degree of othering of Americans. This is generally consis-
tent with the findings about levels of amity. As with levels of amity, there is
no evidence of any systematic relationship between youth or membership in
the post-Tiananmen political generation , on the one hand , and higher lev-
els of othering of Americans , on the other.

Perceptions of the American Threat

The third dependent variable is the perceived main threat to Chinese

national security. The first point to make is that there is no uniform opin-
ion on this in the Beijing sample (see Fig. I2.6). In 200I , the largest portion
of the respondents who expressed a choice picked Taiwan independence
(27.5 percent) and domestic social unrest (28 percent). Only a 缸th of the
respondents chose U.S. military power as the main threat (20.8 percent). A
very small percentage (9 percent) chose a revival of ]apanese militarism. In
2002 there was not much change in the portion choosing Taiwan indepen-
dence , although there was a decline in the percentage choosing domestic
social unrest. In both 2002 and 2003 , additional national security threat
choices were listed , including Russian military power and global problems
such as AIDs , crime , environmentalproblems , drugs , and so forth. This lat-
ter option appears to have soaked up a fair amount of choice that might
have gone to another threat, so the 2002-3 years are not entirely com-
parable with 200 I. However, note that even with this additional option,
perceptions of a Taiwan independence threat increased from 2002 to
2003 (from 26.3 percent to 35.8 percent) , while the number of those choos-
ing U.S. military power declined from I6.5 percent to I2 percent (indicat-
ing that respondents did not see these two chòices as mutually substi-
tutable). In short , while amity toward the United States was declining , as of
2003 , U.S. mi 1itary power was not the threat that preoccupied most of the
respondents. 49
Threat and income. In 200I , income and class status were not sta-
tistically related to threat perception. This appears to be a result of the fact
there is little difference across income groups in the identification of Taiwan ,
Japan , and a global economic downturn as threats. The major differences
appear, however, in the choices of domestic unrest and U.S. military power .
 TABLE I2.3
Summary of findings about CCidentity difference"
Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Variable Effect on Results in Statistically Results in Statistically Results in Statistically Results in Statistically Results in Statistically
identity predicted significant? predicted significant? predicted significant? predicted significant? predicted significant?
difference direction? direction? direction? direction? direction?
Income Income is Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
negatively
related to
othering
Education Education is Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 Yes No
negatively
related to
othering
Travel Travel abroad n/a n/a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
abroad is negatively
related to
othering
Gender Women show No Women show No Women show Yes Women show Yes Women show No
higher levels higher levels higher levels higher levels higher levels
of othering of othering of othering of othering of othering
Political Post- No No No No N0 7 Yes No No Yes No
generation Tiananmen
generatlO n
expresses
higher level
of othering
Age Age is negatively N0 8 Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes YKS J
related to othering

6Between those with some tertiary and some secondary education.

7Post-Tiananmen generation expresses significantly lower level of othering.
8The younger the respondents the lower the level of othering.
9 At the O.I leve l.
3 62 DOMESTIC PO Ll TICS

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• 2001 • 2002 2003

F 1G UR E 1 2. 6. The perceived main threat to Chinese national security, 2001-

2003 (% of sample). Source: Beijing Area Study data.

Middle-class respondents were less likely than non-middle-class respondents

to choose U.S. military power (二4.7 percent versus I7.4 percent) and more
likely to choose domestic unrest (30.9 percent versus 24 percent) as a threat.
A multinomiallogit analysis indicates that this particular difference is sta-
tistically significant. In 2002 , the interincome group differences were even
smaller, with virtually no difference between the two income groups with
respect to any of these threats. In 2003 , overall differences appear slight,
with no statistical difference in the choice of the U.S. threat across the two.
Threat and education. In 200I , those who chose the United States
as the main threat were disproportionately likely to be less educated. Alto-
gether, 2I percent of the sample chose the U.S. threat. However, 45.8 per-
cent of those with some primary education chos~ the U.S. threat, whereas
only I6.2 percent of those with some post-secondary education did. The chi
square indicates that the association between education and threat choice
overall is statistically significant at the 0.02 leve l. The multinomial logit
analysis essentially suggests that the main difference is that those without
university education (especially those with only some primary education)
are more likely than those with some university education to choose the U.S.
threat over domestic social unrest or global economic decline. In 2002 ,
there is no overall statistical relationship between education and threat , and
the multinomiallogit analysis shows that there is no statistical relationship
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPTNION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 363

specifically with respect to the likelihood of choosing the United States as

the main threat (though the "sign" is in the right direction , with 23 percent
of those with some primary education only choosing the U.S. threat , and
only I5 percent of those with some tertiary education making that choice).
In 2003 , the association between education and threat reappears (X丰= 2 I. 9;
p = 0.039). Those with some tertiary education , however , were more likely
to choose the U.S. threat than those with only some primary education. In
this regard , education seems to have had the opposite effect than it did in
2002. For all educational levels , the main perceived threat was Taiwan
independence , not U.S. miUtary power.
Threat and travel. In 200 I , there was no statistical relationship
between experience abroad and choice of main threat , although the "signs"
are , again , in the right direction: the proportion of those who had traveled
abroad who picked the United States as the main threat was smaller than that
of those who chose global economic and domestic unrest as major threats.
Those who had traveled abroad also appeared to downplay the ]apan and
Taiwan threats. In 2002 , the association between these two variables was sta-
tistically significant (p = 0.OI4) , although there was no statistical difference
when it came to likelihood of choosing the United States as the main threat.
Again , the "signs" are in the right direction , with I2.6 percent of those with
foreign travel experience choosing this option , while I 7.1 percent of those
with no travel experience choosing the U.S. threat. The main statistical dif-
ference between the two groups had to do with the threat of internal social
unrest , with those who had traveled abroad being more likely to choose this
threat than those who had not. In 2003 , there is no statistical relationship
between travel abroad and perception of main threat. Indeed , when it comes
to the likelihood of choosing U.S. military power as the main threat , the
proportion of those with travel abroad making this choice is precisely iden-
tical with the proportion of those with no travel abroad (12 percent).
Threat and gender. In 2001 , gender is signi且cantly associated with
threat choice (p = 0.04). The multinomiallogit analysis shows that women
are more likely than men to choose the United States as the main threat. In
2002 , again , gender is associated with threat choice (p 二 O.OOI) ， but when
it comes to the likelihood 0
364 DOMESTIC POLITICS

military power as the main threat. In 2002 , the overall association between
the two variables was statistically significant (p 二 0.048) ， bu.t there was no
majordifference in the likelihood of choosing the U.S. threat as the main
challenge to China's national security. In 2003 , the chi square statistic of as-
sociation was not significant, nor was there any statistical difference in the
likelihood of either political generation choosing the United States as the
main threat.
In sum , there was no obvious pattern across the three years of data in the
variables most closely associated with choosing the United States as the
main threat (see Table 12.4). Education is associated in opposite directions:
in 2001 , some university education predicts a lower likelihood of choosing
the U.S. threat, while in 2003 , it predicts a higher likelihood. In 2001 ,
higher income , more education , and being female were all associated with
a lower likelihood of choosing the United States as the main threat. Over the
next two surveys , these relationships essentially disappea r. It is important
to note , given the conventional wisdom about anti-Americanism among the
Chinese youth , that the political generation had no relationship to perceiv-
ing U.S. military power as the main threat to China. The only thing that can
be said is that as of 2003 , perceptions of the U.S. military threat were de-
clining somewhat , while perceptions of the threat from Taiwan indepen-
dence were increasing.

Some Tentative Conclusions

With three major requisite caveats in mind (namely, that Beijing is

not representative of the rest of China; that there are a number of likely rel-
e飞rant omitted variables in the BAS questions; and that it is unclear what
influence popular opinion has on Chinese decision-makers) , the BAS data
suggest a number of conclusions.
First , the trend line in amity toward the United States suggests a decline
between 1998 and 2004.50 Surprisingly, though , in contrast to high-profile
Chinese polls and much punditry and scholarly opinion , amity toward the
United States was quite high even by the late 1990s. The declines in amity
toward the United States , both in terms of mean temperature and in the
portion of people who express "warm" feelings (Fi g. 12.7) appear to be a
cumulative result of reactions to the Belgrade embassy bombing , the EP-3
incident , continuing tension over the Taiwan issue , and a more general con唱
cern about American "hegemony" in the wake of the stepped-up temþo of
U.S. military interventions iri the post-9 /r 1 period. Given the relatively
high starting point in 1998 , the data also suggest that it has been these
short-term , recent events rather than some long-term cumulative effect of
 TABLE 12.4
Summary of findings about the "main threat to China 云 nationalsecurity"

2001 2002 2003

Variable Hypothesized effect Results in Statistically Results in Statistically Results in Statistically
on choice of pdriretdICted significant? pd redicted significant? Predicted significant?
U. S. threat ection? irection? direction?

由tleo
Income Yes Yes Yes No No No
weU
hakltSehly
y resscahtoose

Education those with some Yes Yes Yes No No Yes

ulllverslty
education less
lUik.Se.lythtroecahtoose

Travel abroad Yes No Yes No No No

thotcrshaeovWoeslIetlh
eU
sfsoslrEekt1eh8lrn
yetaot

Gender 引Tomen more Yes women less No 引Tomen 日lO re No

UlIk.Se.lythtroecahtoose Ulik.Se.lythtroecaht oose likely to choose
U. S. threat
Political post-Tiananmen No No Yes No No Yes
generatlO n
glUleknteelyr由
atuoreocanht oose
more
3 66 DOMESTIC POLITICS

60

50
生J

S
rn
40
一 .-0-
'"
'õ 30
.-一.-

一一
.….
.一.一
H口 ωυL川

. ..一...
..一..

一•

----
----
吁'-

AU ..，.…-----圄-
-------------------一
..一-----一
Hω【

10

O
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

. Cool - - Neutral - Warm

FIGURE I2.7. Temperature category as portion of respondents (cool = 0-49

degrees , neutral = 50 degrees; warm = 5 工 -IOO degrees). Source: Beijing Area
Study data.

state propaganda that are largely responsible for the decline. 51 lndeed , there
is wide diversity in opinions of the United States , again suggesting that
whatever uni且ed state effort there is to inculcate a particular view, it is not
especially successful , especially among those who are better educated,
wealthier, better traveled , and so on. Despite this decline in amity, until
2004 , a sizable portion of respondents held warm views of the United
States.
Most interesting here is the composition of this "pro-American" group.
It is generally wealthier, better educated , and more traveled than those who
hold "cool" feelings. 52 The bad news from the U.S. perspective is that it has
shrunk over the past few years , but the good news is that, barring any ma-
jor shocks to Sino-U.S. relations , economic development should increase its
size and political influence over time , to the extent that development creates
constituencies with these characteristics. This constituency or pool of less
hostile views of the United States might wield more influence at the top un-
der some limited domestic political reform and external security scenarios
(e.g. , gradual diversification of inner-Party interests and continued eco-
nomic development , in the absence of major conflict with the United States).
It would appear that the development of a middle class , educated , and trav-
eled urban elite is in U.S. interests-a socioeconomic process that is likely
to be sped up by multilateral and bilateral economic engagement or slowed
down by economic downturn in China and conflict with the United States.
In short , to push these f1 ndings further (perhaps a bit too far!) , the data
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 367

would suggest that the commonly heard argument that democratization in

China willlead to a more nationalistic and anti-American foreign policy
needs to be stated in much more conditional terms. 53 Whether democrati-
zation brings greater nationalism or greater integrationist impulses w i1l de-
pend in part on whose interests are mobilized. Much more research needs
to be done on how different scenarios for political change in China would
mobilize different socioeconomic and ideological constituencies , given what
we are beginning to learn about their foreign policy attitudes.
Second , despite this slight decline in amity, only from 10 to 20 percent of
respondents saw U.S. military power as the main threat to China. This does
not appear to be consistent with the claim made by many U.S. and Chinese
analysts alike that Chinese see the United States as their main threat or as
their number one adversary. When respondents were given the option of a
range of external and internal threats , U.S. military power ranked third
overall in 2001 and fourth in 2002 and 2003.
Third , the degree of othering of Americans as people has been relatively
constantover the years covered here. Basically, those who are wealthier ,
better educated , and have traveled abroad express lower degrees of other-
ing toward Americans. Moreover, this degree of othering has mostly been
signifìcantly lower than that expressed toward ]apanese as people. While
the real-world implications of social identity theory for international rela-
tions are relatively understudied , in principle , stability in perceptions of
identity difference should suggest stability in basic levels of hostility toward
another country and its peöple. This has been the good news. However, the
shift in the BAS 2004 data in identity difference levels toward a greater de-
gree of othering of Americans is something to watch. There is some evidence
that anti-]apanese sentiment is a real constraint on the options that the Chi-
nese leadership has in its foreign policy toward ]apan; in particular, it has
hindered the implementation of "new thinking" (xin siwei) whereby the his-
tory question is downplayed for the sake of a less emotional engagement
strategy.54 All things being equal , if the level of othering of Americans
reaches the level of othering of ]apanese , one might expect similar public
opinion constraints on China's policy toward the United States.
Fourth, forei
3 68 DOMESTIC POLITICS

the Zhejiang University-Valparaiso survey 且nding that those who had been
abroad were much less likely to completely agree that US. hegemonism
threatened world peace than those who had not gone abroad. They were
also much more likely to have positive impressions of the United States than
those who had not gone abroad. They were also more likely to believe that
the U.S. bombing of the Belgrade embassy was an accident. 55 This suggests
that building a constituency with more positive attitudes toward interaction
with the United States requires providing Chinese citizens with more op-
portunities to travel abroad.
Fifth , there appears to be a gender gap problem in Chinese perceptions
of the United States. Compared to men , women generally expressed higher
degrees of othering , and in at least one of the years , they were more likely
than men to identify U.S. military power as the main national security
threat. It is not entirely clear why this is the case. Indeed , it seems inconsis-
tent with the literature that suggests that in many contexts women hold
more "1i beral" foreign policy attitudes. But, as 1 have noted , the question of
gender and foreign policy preferences is an understudied one , so it may be
that the Chinese responses are not unusua l.
Sixth, while the numbers in the total sample were fairly small , there is
not much evidence that students have different views about the United
States than non-students. In other words , the much commented upon anti-
Americanism of Chinese students does not show up in these data. Sampling
that can stratify by student so as to increase the size of the student sample
would be an important next step in any survey. It can be said , however, that
there is no evidence in the BAS surveys that those who came of age after
Tiananmen , and after the implementation of a patriotic education campaign ,
are more hostile to Americans than those who are older.
Finally, 1 want to address the "so what" question-the question of the
substantive impact of these attitudes. Since the attitudes toward the United
States are not being used as independent variables , 1 have not tested for their
effects on other attitudes or on behavior. Obviously, to do so would matter
in the long run , since these differences-even those that are statistically
signif1. cant-will not matter if there is no substantive influence on other at-
titudes or behavior. Does it matter whether, say, the propensity to other the
United States is
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 369

democracy, without better information about the impact of popular opin-

ion on decision-making , this is a hard question to answer at the moment. It
should be noted , however, that over a large voting population , even small
differences in the positions of two or more groups can translate into large
numbers of votes. Depending on the form of the institutions that translate
these votes into political power (parliamentary, presidential , first-past-the-
post , proportional representation , etc.) , these small differences can translate
into large political effects. Obviously, there is no way of knowing at this
point whether the differences in attitudes toward the United States across ,
say, socioeconomic groups or levels of education will have any political ef-
fect. But, to the extent that, as in the United States , the urban educated and
wealthier groups are likely to be more politically active than poorer and less
educated groups , and to the extent that the current Chinese leadership re-
alizes that the urban entrepreneur and white-collar citizen is a social , eco-
nomic , and political force to be incorporated into the system , some of these
differences may come to matter in internal policy debates. To those used to
studying ωuntries with large social , economic , and political cleavages man-
ifested in open political systems , some of the differences reported in this
chapter may appear as a glass half empty. To those who study closed socie-
ties where the intent of the state socialization systems has been to inculcate
uniform attitudes toward major public policies-especially foreign pol-
icy-these emergent differences in the Chinese data could be likened to a
glass half ful l.

Notes

1. When the regime has not clearly articulated a policy or when it has signaled
that it wants to generate ideas for policy, the public debates among scholars and
pundits can be quite sharp. In recent years , these debates have flared over whether
Deng Xiaoping's judgment that this is an epoch of peace and development still ap-
plies and over the pros and cons of WTO membership. Comparatively speaking ,
hard-line punditry in China has more political space than soft-line punditry. None-
theless , there is stilllittle space for direct criticism of the Chinese leadership's han-
dling of foreign relations.
2. The Foreign Ministry, for instance , has regulations on the books that allow
academics to be paid consultants to the ministry.
3. Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen , '‘ The Domestic Context of Chinese For-
eign Policy: Does ‘ Public Opinion' Matter?" in The Ma走 ing of Chinese Foreign and
Security Po/icy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000 , ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford:
Stanford University Press , 200r) , 151-87.
4. Jiang Zemin , "Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of
the Founding ofthe Communist Party of China" (1 July 2001) , www.china.org.cn/
englishlfeatures/357 巧 .htm (accessed 14 November 2005). See Fewsmith and
37 0 DOMESTIC POLITICS

Rosen , "Domestic Context，"工 51-87 ， for an explanation of why the requirements

of China's integration into global politics and economics has created space for at-
tentive pub1ic, expert, and sube1ite opinion.
5. In a sense , this research question extends Allen 耶Thiting's lifelong concern
about the foreign policy images of Chinese decision-makers lower down the politi-
cal hierarchy. Public opinion research in China may be increasingly important for
two related reasons. First, e1ites may themselves become more sensitive to popular
images. Second, popular images may be articulated at decision-making levels through
the diversi且cation of interests within the main political institutions in China , such as
the Party.
6. On elite misperceptions of casualty aversion , see Charles K. Hyde , "Casualty
Aversion: Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military 0 面cers ，" Aero-
space Power Journal , Summer 2000 , 17- 匀， www.airpowe r. maxwel l. af.mi l/
airchronicles/apj/apjoo/sumoo/hyde.pdf (accessed 10 October 2005). On misper-
ceptions of public isolationism, see Steven Kull and 1. M Destler, Misreading the
Public: The Myths of a New Isolationism (Washington , D. C.: Brookings Institution
Press , 1999) , on1ine at http://brookings.nap.edu/books/08157176 5 21html!index
.html (accessed 10 October 2005).
7. Justin Lewis , Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What
They Li走e and Why W告 Seem to Go Along With It (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press , 2001).
8. See Matthew A. Baum, "Soap Opera 币Tars : The Mass Media , Public Opinion,
and the Decision to Use Force Abroad" (Ph.D diss. , University of California , San
Diego , 2000).
9. On these arguments see Ole R. Holsti , "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy:
Challenges to the Almost-Lippman Consensus ," International Studies Quarterly 36
(199 2 ): 439- 66 .
10. On the self-reported impact of pub1ic opinion on the decision-elite's choices ,
see Richard Sobel , The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Viet-
nam: Constraining the Colossus (New York: Oxford University Press , 2001).
1 1. See Douglas Foyle , "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a
Mediating Variable ," International Studies Quarterly 4 工(工 997): 14 1- 69.
12. For one of the few efforts to understand how China's leaders might be
constrained by popular opinion on foreign policy issues , see Fewsmith and Rosen ,
"Domestic Context ，"工 7 2 -75.
13. See CNN, 10 Ma
 BEI ]I NG PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 371

reverse-that the leadership , rather than being constrained by public opinion. either
ignores it or is whipping up nationalism and anti-Americanism. Both groups of analy-
sis , though , tend to agree about the content of this opinion. My thanks to Manjari
Miller for her excellent research assistance on this q .u estion.
工 4. A keyword search of LexisNexis for the phrase "Chinese nationalism" came
up with 缸ty-seven identifìed , quoted sources in fìfteen di旺erent newspapers , the Bal-
timore Sun, Houston Chronicle, Washington Post, Boston Herald, Milwaukee Jour-
nal Sentinel, Boston Globe, USA Today, Chicago Sun- Times , St Petersburg Times ,
Atlanta Constitution, Star Tribune , San Diego Union- 丁子ibune， New York Times ,
Los Angeles Times , and Seattle Times. My thanks to Michael Griesdorf for collect-
ing these articles.
工 5. For an analysis of the impact on its readers' views of Song Qiang et a l. 's
Zhongguo 走 eyi shuobu [China can say no] (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang
Lianhe Chubanshe，工 996) ， see Fewsmith and Rosen , "Domestic Context," 434-
35 n 4ρ.
工 6. See Zhongguo qingnian bao ， 工 4]ulY I 995.
17. For an extensive analysis of the methodology used in this poll , based on in-
terviews in Beijing , see Fewsmith and Rosen; "Domestic Context," 433-34n30. 1n
fact , the survey polled readers' voluntary responses and thus did not represent a ran-
dom sample of Chinese youth. The 1995 survey was designed by Song Qiang et a l.,
the authors of the 1996 volume Zhongguo 走 eyi shuobu [China can say no]. See also ,
more recently, Fang Ning , Wang Xiaodong , and Song Qiang , Quanqiuhua yinying
xia de Zhongguo zhi lu [China's road under the shadow of globalization] (Beijing:
Chinese Academy of Social Science Press , 1999) , 92-93.
工 8. See Chen , ]ie , "Urban Chinese Perceptions of Threats from the United States
and ]apan," Public Opinion Quarterly 65 (200 工):巧 4- 66 .
19. See also Yu Goumìng , '‘ Zhongguo ren yanzhong de Riben he Riben ren ,"
Guoji Xinwen Jie , no. 6 (工 997): 58- 65, which reported that 40 percent of respon-
dents chose the United States as the country most likely to become a threat to China ,
while 21 percent chose ]apan (p. 63).
20. See Yu Sunda et a l., "Zhong Mei guanxi: lai zi minzhong de kanfa" [Sino-
U. S. relations: views from the masses ], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics
and Politics] , nO.6 (2001): 33-38 .
2 1. Zhang Hui, "2003 nian Zhongguo ren yanzhong de shijie zhuanti diaocha
zhi er-Zhongguo ren kan Meiguo: shiy
37 2 DOMESTIC POLITICS

24. The sample sizes were as follows: 1998 , 756; 1999 , 712; 2000 , 757;2001 ,
615; 2002 , 662; 2003 , 551; 2004 , 617. On the sampling procedures; see Hao Hong-
sheng, \'The Sampling Design and Implementation for the 1995 Beijing Area Study"
(Research Center for Contemporary China , Peking University, 7 March 1996).
25. The interviews for the 2004 BAS were done in early 2005.
二 6. See the BAS Data Report (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe ,
forthcoming) .
27. That is , to the extent that respondents take positions independent of gov-
ernment on other foreign policy issues , there is less reason to believe that a rise in
anti-Americanism reflected in these data is the direct effect of anticipating the state's
o面cial position toward the United States.
28. See Lewis , Constructing Public Opinion.
29. See Henri Tajfel and John Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergoup
Conflict," in Intergroup Relations: Essential Readings , ed , Michael A. Hogg and
Dominic Abrams (Philadelphia:Psychology Press , 2001). See also Peter Gries's
chapter in this volume for a discussion of the scope conditions under which this dif-
ferentiation leads to competition and then to conflict.
30. On SIT, see Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergrouþ Relations (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press , 1982); Dominic Abrams and Michael Hogg,
eds. , Social Identity Theory (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990); John C.
Turner, Rediscovering the Social Group (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). On its
application to political science and international relations , see Jonathan Mercer,
"Anarchy and Identity" International Organization 49 , 2 (1995): 229 - 52; William
Connolly, Identity/D i，萨 rence (Ithaca , N.Y.: Cornell University Press , 1991); Paul
Kowert , "The Construction of National Identity," in International Relations in a
Constructed World , ed. Vendulka Kubalkova et a l. (Armonk , N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe,
工 998) ，
101-22.
31. On the logic behind Osgood semantic differential scales , see Charles E.
Osgood , George J. Suci , and Percy H. Tannenbaum , The Measurement of Meaning
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press , 1957). In contrast to Likert scales (e.g. ,
strongly opposed , somewhat opposed , etc.) , semantic differential procedures allow
respondents to make more active judgments/assessments of a wider range of pos-
sible responses: since they are being asked to place self (and/or other) on a logically
inclusive range of possibi
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 373

a people and their state. ln general , respondents did differentiate between state and
people in the U.S. case , consistently considering the U. S. state to be more warlike
rhan American people. Respondents , however, did not make a significant distinction
between the peacefulness of the Chinese peopie and the Chinese state.
34. Unfortunately, 1 have no data on the othering of China in U.S: public
opinio i1. The interactive effects of this process-mediated by rhe news media and
punditry on both sides- is a critical topic that deseryes more research.
35. For a discussion of hypotheses about the foreign policy preferences of high-
income groups , see Alastair lain Johnston , "Chinese Middle Class Attitudes Towards
lnternational Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?" China Quarterly , no. 179 (Septem-
ber 2004): 603 -28.
36. Ming Ruifeng and Yang Yiyong, "Yi ye chun feng: chengli ren de shouru chu
tu xiu se" [An evening of spring breezes: urban population income] , in Gongping
yu xiaoyi: dangdai Zhongguo de shouru fenpei wenti [Equa1i ty and e面ciency: the
issue of distribution of income in contemporary China] , ed. Yang Yiyong (Beijing:
Jinri Zhongguo Chubanshe , 1997) ，工 33. 1 thank Zhang 岛1ing for pointing out this
source. For a more detailed discussion of who or what constitutes a middle class , see
Johnston , "Chinese Middle Class Attitudes."
37. 1 report mostly on the views of the 且rst two social groups. The N of the
"poor" is quite small in the sample , so inferences about their views are more un-
stable and less reliable.
38. China's inflation rate from 1999 through to 2003 ranged from -1. 5% to
1. 2 %. See www.worldwide-tax.com /china /chi_inflation.asp (accessed 14 Novem-
ber 2005).
39. "The generation of young Chinese who began to come of age after 1989 is
notably more xenophobic , anti-democratic , and confrontational than its immediate
predecessors ," according to Arthur Waldron , "The Chinese Sickness ," Commentary ,
July-August 2003.
40. This does not hold for all regions of the world , nor for all issues , of course.
One study of Middle Eastern women found no association between gender and sup-
port for peaceful resolution of conflicts. Rather, liberal attitudes toward women's
rights , whether held by men or women , were a good predictor. See Mark Tessler
et a l., "Further Tests of the Women and Peace Hypothesis: Evidence from Cross-
National Survey Research in the Middle East," International Studies Quarterly
43
374 DOMESTIC POLITICS

dependent variable is categorical data ("main threat") 1 use a chi square test of as-
sociation , supplemented by multinomiallogit regression to determine which control
variable responses matter. To avoid clutter, 1 do not provide the cross tabs or pa-
rameter estimates. The statistical analysis also excludes the "don't know" (DK) re-
sponses. There is much debate over what these responses mean, whether or not a DK
is in fact an legitimate opinion, and how to handle DKs in data analysis. 1 took the
advice of those who run the BAS to exclude the DKs from the analysis. For the most
part, there were relatively few DK responses.
43. This relationship holds if one uses years of education or a more detailed
breakdown of levelof graduation.
44. This result is consistent with the analysis of anti-Americanism in Europe by
Giacomo Chiozza in "Love and Hate: Anti-Americanism and the American Order"
(Ph.D diss. , Department of Political Science , Duke University, 2004) , whose 且nd­
ings , using a feeling thermometer as the measurement instrument, suggest that those
who show higher levels of political knowledge about the outside world have more
pro-American views (p. 13 8).
45. The difference between ]apanese and American scores is statistically signi-
且cant in all years (using a standard paired difference of means t-test).
46. Unless stated differently, when 1 note that the differences in perceived iden-
tity difference are statistically significant, 1 mean that the between-group means as
measured by the ANOVA F statistic are significant at or below the p = 0.1 level.
47. It is unclear, of course , what the causal direction might be here. Are those
who travel abroad more likely a priori to have a lower perception of difference (due
perhaps to wealth or education qualifications that enable travel in the 且rst place) , or
does travel abroad help create a less black-and-white perception of the other? It is
not altogether clear why travel abroad is statistically related to lower levels of anti-
Americanism. That is , why does travel abroad matter for othering? There are at least
a number of hypotheses. One is that those who travel are self-selecting (they are
more cosmopolitan, therefore less likely to "other" Americans than those who
do not wish to go abroad. Therefore travel per se has no particular causal effect on
levels of nationalism. This hypothesis is not entirely convincing. Take the BAS 2003 ,
for example. The pluralit
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 375

some university education , compared to 34 percent for those who have not gone
abroad. Of those who have not been abroad , only 34 percent have some university
education. Finally, a very different hypothesis is that travel abroad is transformative;
it has an impact on how people see the world and others , and it should lead to more
empathy. Unfortunately, the BAS is not a panel study, so one cannot ask people's
views öf national out-groups before travel and after trave l. However, the fact that
there are a wide range of reasons for travel abroad~tourism， short-term training ,
visiting relatives , studying abroad，。面cial visits , and commercial business , among
others-suggests that overall , this group may not be especially selιselecting. This
opens the door to the possibility that travel has socialization effects. Su面ce lt to say
that the relationship is most .likely endogenous in many cases. Unfortunately, the
BAS data do not allow sorting through this relationship , since the respondents
change from year to yea r. A panel study, of course , might help settle the question.
48. It is unclear, however, why gender matters so consistently, and why, gener-
ally, women other Americans more? Gender is not masking for age , since there is no
statistical difference in age of males (43.3 years old) and females (44.4 years old).
Gender is also not masking for years of education. The average number of years of
education for men was 12.34 , and for women it was 12. It is possible that achieved
level of education helps explain the gender difference. Compared to men in the
sample , women are underrepresented when it comes to having some university edu-
cation (37.5 percent versus 45.4 percent for men) and overrepresented in terms of
having some high school education (59.3 percent versus 50.4 percent for men). The
chi square test of association , however, is borderline (p = 0.II3). Nor is gender a
mask for more "liberal" and therefore tolerant foreign policy attitudes among men.
The BAS asks a battery of questions about foreign policy preferences and about do-
mestic spending preferences. Basically, there is no statistical difference between men
and women when it comes to spending on education , the military, unemployment
insurance , UN payments ，且ghting terrorism , support for free trade , or support for
the belief that eco-interdependence will reduce conflict. Gender is also not a cover
for realpolitik preferences. lndeed , wom
37 6 DOMESTIC PO Ll TICS

and capability but still be discounted as a threat (perhaps as a result of confidence

in one's own capabilities). In any event, it would be worth exploring these differ-
ences furthe r. It is possible that there is a consistent unde r1 ying two-partattitude ,
namely, that the United States has the intention and capability to threaten China ,
but that in the long list of internal and external threats China faces , the United States
is not the primary one.
50. In contrast to a widely cited 2000 survey by a Korean newspaper , the Tong-
a Il bo , the BAS data show that from 1998 to 2000 , those who had warm feelings to-
ward the United States (perhaps roughly equivalent to the Tong-a Il bo category
"like") constituted a clear majority of respondents; it was only in 2001 that the ma-
jority had cool feelings (equivalent to the Tong-a Il bo category "dislike"). The num-
ber of those with neutral feelings has remained a constant in the BAS data and has
never reached the 33 percent reported in the Tong-a Il bo survey for those who nei-
ther like or dislike the United States.
51. 1 do not mean to say that state propaganda has had no impact on opinion.
Clea r1 y the highly negative views of ]apan are partly a product of the construction
of historical memory by the state. The propaganda system is still responsible for is-
suing specific instructions about how various topics are to be covered in the media
and the education system. But the fact is that despite what has been perceived to be
a high degree of anti-American propaganda in China over many years , Beijing citi-
zens as late as 1998 (and again in 2000) held quite warm feelings toward the United
States , compared to feelings toward a wide range of other countries. Moreover, 42.3
percent of respondents in the Zhejiang-Valparaiso survey (overwhelmingly male stu-
dents) believed that Chinese media coverage of the United States was not correct or
fai r. See Yu et a l., "Zhong Mei guanxi ," 36. This suggests there is at least some de-
gree of skepticism about 0面cial messages regarding the United States. The extensive
Maryland survey of images of the United States in the PRC media coverage suggests
that in recent years , at least, the messages about the United States have been quite
varied on a wide range of topics. See Deborah A. Cai , principal investigator, "Per-
spectives Toward the United States in Selected Newspapers of the People's Republic
of China" (Institute for Global Chinese Affairs and the Departm
 BEIJING PUBLIC OPINION TO 飞~/ARD THE UNITED STATES 377

Studies Annual Conference , Jvlanila，工 4-I7 September 2000 , by David Dickens ,

www.vuw.ac.nz /c ss/docslreports/IISS.html (accessed 2 October 2005); June
. Dreyer's testimony to the House Armed Services Committee , "Testimony of Dr June
Teufel Dreye r. The U. S. Response to China's Increasing Military Power: Eleven
Assumptions in Search of a Policy" (工 9 July 2000) , www.house.gov/hasc /testimony/
I06thcongress/00-07-I9dreyer. html (accessed II October 2005); Barrett McCor-
mick , "Introduction ," in What If China Doesn't Democratize: Implications for War
and Peace , ed. Edward Frìedman and Barrett L. McCormick (Armonk N. Y.: M. E.
Sharpe , 2000) , II; David Bachman, "China's Democratization and U. S.-China
Relations ," ibid. , I96; Harvey Nelsen , "Caution: Rough Road Ahead ," ibid. ,279;
Ying Ma , "China's America Problem," Policy Review , no. III (February-March
2002) , www.policyreview.org/FEB0 2lma.html (accessed II October 2005). Many
of these sources uncritically accept the Mans且eld-Snyder argument and evidence
about the relationship between democratization and nationalist external aggressive-
ness. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger
of War ," International Security 20 , I (Summer I995): 5-38 , and "Democratic
Transitions , Institutional Strength , and War," ibid. 56 , 2 (Spring 2002): 二97-337.
In fact , there are some problems in their analysis. Among other things , in their first
article. the cross-tab analysis actually shows that it is a change in regime type-
whether toward democracy or autocracy-that correlates with war-proneness , not
democratization per se. In both articles , the primary dependent variable in their data
(war-proneness) is not the dependent variable implied by their theory (aggressively
nationalist and assertive foreign policies). When they use war initiation as a depen-
dent variable in the second article , the statistical findings do not really support their
theoretical claims. Finally, the statistical analysis shows that democratization is
destabilizing only when it is accompanied by weak central political institutions. De-
mocratization per se is unrelated to more conflictual behavior. For critiques of the
first article , see Michael D. 明Tard and Kristian S. Gleditsch , "Democratizing for
Peace ," American Political Science Review 9 鸟 I (March I99 8): 5 工- 6 I , and William
R. Thompson and Richard Tucker, "A Tale of Tw
13 Conclusions and Future Directions
Thomas J. Christensen , Alastair lain ]ohnston, and Robert S. Ross

The chapters in this volume reveal the depth and breadth that is now
possible in the field of Chinese foreign policy. In terms of the substantive is-
sues they cover, the range of methQds and theories that they employ, and
the variety of sources used , they reveal the great strides the field has made
in recent years. Together, these chapters indicate just how much one can and
should consider the systematic study of Chinese foreign policy to be a part
of the larger disciplinary fields of history, foreign policy analysis , and inter-
national relations. We summarize the implications of the research here for
a substantive research agenda , for the incorporation of new methods and
theories , and for the use of new sources with a view to pointing out what
more needs to be done.

Implications for Substantive Issues

in Chinese Foreign Policy

Allen Whiting has taught us a tremendous amount about the foreign

relations of the People's Republic of China. What is even more important for
the future of the field , he has taught us how to approach the study of the
PRC's interactions with other states. Today's China is quite different from
the China of Mao or even of Deng Xiaoping , the topics of three of Whiting's
classic studies. 1 As Avery Goldstein argues in his chapter on Chinese policy
toward Korea ，岛1aoist ideology has vanished from China's foreign policy
calculations , and China has expansive economic and political ties with for-
mer enemies like South Korea. Nevertheless , Whiting's basic lessons about
deterrence and security politics in the PRC endure. The chapters of this vol-
ume and Whiting's own work on more contemporary issues in China's for-
eign relations demonstrate that fact quite convincingly.2
Whiting ha.s long argued that China's government pursues its interna-
tional goals with basic rationality. He believes that this applies not only to
380 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

contemporary leaders in the reform era , like Hu ]intao , but to much more
ideologically fundamentalist actors , like Mao himself. But this basic rule of
rationality does not mean that we can therefore simply apply abstract mod-
els to China without attention to the speci且c historical , domestic , and
ideational context within which Chinese elites pursue those goals. Moreover,
rationality is conditioned by perceptions and misperceptions of China's
international and domestic environment as held by Chinese elites and by for-
eign elites designirtg policies toward China.
In comparison to the Mao era and the early reform era , today we 且nd a
China much more integrated economically with the region and the world
and a China increasingly enmeshed in and active in international institu-
tions. China is also arguably much more pluralistic in its views on the out-
side world , with important, wide-ranging debates within the country and
within the government about how Beijing should address the world. This
means China's future is far from determined. The new and dynamic setting
in which Chinese foreign policy is formed only places a higher premium on
what Whiting has taught us all along: try to see China and the world the
way that influential Chinese see China and the world and you will be not
only a much better scholar but a much more effective advisor to those cre-
ating policies toward Beijing in the United 5tates and elsewhere. Empathy,
not sympathy, is critical.

THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL SECURITY

CALCULATIONS OF THE PRC AND THE
CENTRAL ROLE OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE

Whiting has long emphasized the role of historicallegacies and their

link to CCP domestic legitimacy as a central driving force in China's foreign
relations. In this context , he appreciates the central role that the Taiwan is-
sue plays in linking the domestic and international political challenges
facing the CCP leadership and in influencing PRC relations with actors
other than Taiwan. For example , to our knowledge Whiting was the first
scholar to recognize explicitly the importance of U.5. intervention in the
Taiwan 5trait in ]une 1950 to Mao's decision to cfOSS the Yalu and fight U.S.
troops in Korea in October. 3 He was also among the first in the mid 199 0S
to explore how China's missile exercises in the Taiwan 5trait were helping
to redefine A5EAN and PRC relations in new ways. 4
Consistent with an overall problem-solving theme in his work , Whiting
has always adopted a cautiously optimistic tone about the prospects of
maintaining the peace in the Taiwan area and preventing a U.5.-China war
over Taiwan. One of the central themes in his writings is that no matter how
complex and di面cult an issue appears , understanding the complexity and
di面culty always points one in the direction of a solution. 50 , while Thomas
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 38I

Christensen portrays the Taiwan deterrence problem as quite complicated

and Robert Ross portrays it as tending toward stability (especially in com-
parison to North Korea) , both chapters are consistent with Whiting's work
in one key regard: the problems are , in the end, manageable. No one in this
volume claims that war across the Strait or across the Pacific is inevitable.

THE ROLE OF HISTORY , EMOTIONS , AND NORMS

IN A RATIONAL ANALYTIC FRA 如1EWORK

Along the same lines of cautious optimism , Whiting never considered

problems and challenges iil China's foreign relations as necessarily perma-
nent and beyond repai r. This point comes through in China Eyes Japan ,
where Whiting traces Beijing's negative attitudes about and mistrust of Ja-
pan based on the bitter history of the 193 os and contemporary treatment of
that history in Japan and China. 5 Few problems might appear more in-
tractable and permanent than this one , given the legacy of the Pacific War,
yet Whiting counsels that we need not view this problem from such a fatal-
istic point of view. Not only can emotional elements of policy be contained
within a rational policy framework , but deepening contacts and exchanges
can reduce mutual misperceptions and mistrust. Several chapters in this
book demonstrate not only Whiting's concern for the role of emotion and
historicallegacies in China's foreign relations but also his hope for positive
change in these factors that might make relations with regional actors and
the United States more stable and constructive over time.
Samuel Kim's and Allen Carlson's chapters both touch on a core issue: how
does Beijing view international sovereignty, and how flexible is China's inter-
pretation of it? The general description of China's post-Maoist leadership in
theearlyandmid 1990sas "realist" or "realpolitik" owedmuch to China'sap-
parent obsession with defending a strict Westphalian definition of sovereignty.
This normative view of sovereignty is common in the postcolonial developing
world (although not exclusive to that world , as the U.S. case makes clear) and
leads to suspicion , not only of great power intentions , but also of multilateral
institutions. Kim's chapter tracks in rigorous detail the softening of the
PRC's traditionally hard attitudes about sovereignty toward an acceptance of
"incremental multilateralism" and "conditional multilateralism."
In his chapter, Allen Carlson discusses what might be a truly core issue on
this score: gradual but important changes in China toward international
norms regarding human rights and peacekeeping. Chinese attitudes are
evolving even in this inner core of values related to sovereignty. If these trends
were to progress , it might become easier to imagine more creative proposals
in negotiations across the Taiwan Strait and more creative solutions to territo-
rial disputes iIi the South Ch
382 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

to compromises on these island disputes in some mechanistic fashion , but

rather that a more flexible attitude toward sovereignty and its meaning in
one area can lead to more flexible approaches elsewhere , with potentially
wide-ranging effects on China's foreign relations.
Margaret Pearson's chapter explores China's early and important inter-
actions with the WTO and shows the same combination of progress condi-
tioned by caution and nationalist emotion in response to perceived slights
to PRC national pride. In her very rich stud民 one sees how China's lack of
experience in international forums is a technical hurdle to China's partici-
pation in the 嘀咕0 ， how the Taiwan issue complicates and shilpes China's
approach to the organization, and how "special treatment" of China
through the transitional review mechanism is viewed through the lens of the
"century and a half of humiliation." Still, given where the PRC started in its
relationship to the global economy, the reader will fìnd in Pearson's account
real signs of a momentum in China's engagement with international eco-
nom lC orgamzatlO ns.
All of these works underscore the multiple forms of nationalism that can
affect Chinese foreign policy. China will almost certainly be nationalistic as
its power grows , but there are multiple forms that nationalism can take.
Some are jealous , reactive , and fraughtwith zero-sum thinking (what Whiting
described in 1983 as "assertive nationalism 勺， and some are more confìdent,
characterized by positive-sum thinking , and fully consistent with cooperation
and con且dence-building in the security and economic realms. 6 Whiting is a
pioneer in systematically addressing the role of legacies of history and emo-
tion in the development of Chinese nationalism in the reform era. This is
most prominent in his classic work China Eyes Japan. Whiting focused in
the same spirit on how policies toward history textbooks were in many
ways as potentially volatile an issue in China-]apan relations as issues more
commonly studied by security analysts , such as weapons systems , alliances ,
and territorial disputes.
What form Chinese nationalism will take will depend in large part on
whether or not China's leaders and public view themselves as under pres-
sure from the outside world or as gaining respect. and acceptance in the in-
ternational community. As Peter Gries's chapter shows , the possibility that
alleged examples of disr
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 383

The shoring up of the U.S.-]apan alliance and the U.S. defense commit-
ment to Taiwan in 1995 -96 could well have resulted in similar Chinese sen-
sitivity to the security dilemma. These tough U.S. policies might have led the
PRC to reach out multilaterally to its neighbors in Southeast Asia and Cen-
tral Asia. That is not to say that Chinese acceptance of multilateralism is
purely a response to a perceived threat from the United States , but rather
that the inability of China to deal with the perceived U.S. threat head on and
coercively might have increased the influence of the more creative "positive-
sum" thinkers who already existed within the Chinese system.
Also apropos of potentially positive changes in Chinese attitudes , norms ,
and preferences , lain ]ohnston's chapter tries to track the evolution of
China's attitudes toward the outside world among relatively well-off urban-
ites , many of whom are exposed to that outside world socially and eco-
nomically. It is a mantra in the study of China's foreign relations that en-
gagement of China is more constructive than containment. Scholars and
pundits alike predict that China will feel less threatened by and more
benefited by the international order as a result of engagement and will there-
fore be more pacific and less neurotic than otherwise. But few have explored
in any depth how this process might actually occur. ]ohnston's analysis of
the Beijing Area Survey strongly suggests that relatively economically secure
and cosmopolitan citizens of China are less negatively disposed to the out-
side world , particularly the United States , and more supportive of liberal
foreign policies , such as free trade , than many of their compatriots. This
suggests that engagement and the domestic economic development that it
helps encourage do more than reduce misperceptions; they help socialize at
least some significant segments of China's population into a positive-sum
view of the international arena.

THE DEATH OF MAOIST IDEOLOGY , THE GROWTH

OF INTERDEPENDENCE , AND SOME ENDURING
SECURITY PROBLEMS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Avery Goldstein's chapter on China's security strategy toward the

Korean peninsula is a fine encapsulation of how much has changed in
China's foreign relations in recent years , and yet also of how well Whiting's
analytic lessons endure in the new era. Goldstein discusses how, given the
economic reforms within China and Beijing's early rejection of anything
even vaguely akin to Kim Il Sung's original juche self-reliance strategy in in-
ternational economic policy, China now has almost no ideological stake
in the North Korean regime. If there is any such stake , it is in the hope
that North Korea wiU borrow China's post-Mao marketized development
model and thus survive as a modernizing "pragmatic" state. Moreover,
China has a very deep economic relationship with South Korea and views it
384 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

as a regional partner, not an enemy. Goldstein asserts , however , that China

still wants to maintain North Korea as a bu:ffer and does not want precipi-
tous change on the peninsula , especially violent change , which would in-
crease the number of refugees and bring an American ally, and perhaps U.S.
forces , up to China's Yalu River border. Goldstein argues that China might
still be willing to threaten the use of force against U.S. forces in order to pre-
vent the collapse of North Korea under U.S. pressure. But it would be more
likely to do so if it feels insecure at home and abroad ;as it observes develop-
ments on the peninsula that it views as negative. On the other hand , Gold-
stein also suggests that if Beijing becomes more confident in the region and
in its domestic security, it may become more concerned about the destabiliz-
ing e:ffects of Pyongyang's behavior, and less concerned about the implica-
tions of Seoul or the United States gaining the upper hand over Pyongyang.
One area where China's internal economic reforms and external engage-
ment have not done very much yet to change Chinese foreign policy is Sino-
]apanese relations. All things being equal , economic engagement is certainly
a good thing for bilateral relations , but Michael Yahuda's polling data sug-
gest that anti-]apanese sentiments are still very strong in China. 7 Yahuda
argues that in the absence of a sustained security diaJogue and deeper social
and political interaction , economic interdependence alone may not solve
the problems in this basic relationship.
One wonders about what role growing economic interdependence will
play in the Taiwan Strait as wel l. As Ross and Christensen agree , there is little
doubt that economic interdependence between the mainland and Taiwan is
a factor for caution in cross-Strait relations in both Taipei and Beijing. But in
the absence of cross-Strait political dialogue and in the presence of highly
emotional differences of interpretation over past history and current sover-
eignty, it is unclear whether economic interdependence can create the foun-
dation for a political settlement. In contrast to the Sino-]apanese relation-
ship discussed by Yahuda , one might argue that close blood and cultural ties
across the Taiwan Strait will facilitate the process of political reconciliation.
There is , however , a strong and growing Taiwanese nationalist movement
that has its own emotional and negativ

LOOKING BEYOND EAST ASIA IN THE

STUDY OF CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

Allen Whiting was among the very first to break the exclusive focus on
East Asia in China studies. In Sin走 iang: Pawn or Pivot (1958) and in Chines e
Calculus of Deterrence (1975) , Whiting focused on issues related to China's
western frontier , often neglected by students of China's foreign relations.
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 385

Whiting demonstrated that Beijing's concerns about the PRC's west were
often related to simultaneous concerns about domestic politics at home and
the challenges posed by Taiwan , Southeast Asia , the former Soviet Union、
and so forth. So , even if we were to accept that China's main foreign policy
focus .has been on its south , east , and north , we must recognize that Chinese
elites have not had the luxury of ignoring the western frontie r. John Garver's
carefully researched chapter on the rivalry ofI ndia and China over their com-
mon and disputed border and in South Asia more generally shows how Chi-
nese misperceptions of Indian intentions had dramatically unconstructive
long-term effects on Sino-Indian relations. While Sino-Indian d己tente in the
past decade or so may be based on better information about each other's in-
tentions and capabilities , Garver's work suggests that a future topic for
research ought to be if, how, and why these perceptions persist.

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

As with any good collection of academic essays on an important topic ,

theseessays beg more questions than they answe r. One wonders about the
degree to which China's economic integration in the region and with the
broader world will prevent conflict , particularly conflict over the sensitive
issue of Taiwan. Political science does not have a tremendously strong grip
on how economic integration affects security decisions. Scholarship is basi-
cally divided into three views: that bilateral economic interdependence re-
duces bilateral conflict; that general economic openness is associated with
reduced conflict proneness , although not necessarily reduced bilateral conflict
in any particular dyadic relationship; and that there is no relationship be-
tween economic interdependence and conflict, and that the proper focus is
not interdependence , but relative dependence. The problem only grows if
we move from the question of economic incentives in maintaining the peace
across the Strait to the potential role of economics in fostering a permanent
cross-Strait settlement. Despite the one still partial example of the European
Union , there is little precedent for economic integration leading to political
mtegratlO n.
Most essays in this book point in the direction of further Chinese eco-
nomic growth , further integration with the international cbmmunity, includ-
ing economic and security institutions , and a more cooperative relationship
between China and its neighbors and China and the United States over time.
But there is fairly widespread recognition in the essays that integration to
date is still a relatively new phenomenon , and that China is not yet fully
comfortable in its new institutional and regional roles. This might be chang-
ing quickly under the new leadership of Hu Jintao , who has shown
con且dence arid a proactive approach to diplomacy both in handling the
386 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

North Korean crisis and in diplomacy toward Southeast Asia. But this
progress may not continue smoothly. The chapters do not wrestle in much
detail with the potential consequences of a potential major disappointment
in Chinese domestic politics or foreign policy. This might take the form of
a sharp economic downturn in the region or in China itself, or the failure of
a Chinese multilateral initiative , perhaps in North Korea , or increased ten-
sions in the Taiwan Strait and between the United States and China. Would
such outcomes set back the progress we have seen to date and to what de-
gree? Would regional actors continue to see China as a partner in that
changed setting? Would the politics of emotion and historicallegacies rise
to the fore in Beijing or other capitals under those conditions or would China
and its neighbors become more insular and self-absorbed?
Chapters in this book also do not deal systematically or in detail with the
prospect of signifìcant domestic political change on the mainland over time.
If we consider a scenario in which China were to democratize , for example,
many questions arise regarding whether the outcome would be a "confìdent"
or an "assertive" Chinese nationalism. As Edward Mansfìeld and ]ack
Snyder's work suggests , a stable and developed Chinese democracy might be
quite confìdent and moderate in its interactions with other states , particu-
larly other democracies , but the democratization process is fraught with dan-
ger, specifìcally with the possibility of nationalism-driven conflicts in its
early phases , as long as there are no strong governmental and societal insti-
tutions that can buffer politics from cruder versions of hypernationalism and
emotional politics (Whiting's 飞ssertive nationalism"). 8 Institutional devel-
opment needs to precede or , at a minimum , accompany the opening of the
electoral system for a smooth process of democratization to occur.
One question for scholars is whether China will democratize at all in the
foreseeable future? If so , will it fìrst develop the rule of law, a marketplace of
ideas , and more open media before it does so , thus reducing the likelihood
that hypernationalist attitudes to Taiwan and ]apan might rise to the fore?
How would we as social scientists measure the progress toward such institu-
tionalization, and what public and elite attitudes in China would lead us to
believe that Chinese democratization was likely to start anden

Implications for Theory and Methodology

The chapters in this book demonstrate a very wide range of theoret-

ical and methodological orientations. Not that the book is representative of
all the major schools of theory and methods in international relations (IR)
-E'EBEESe''"$4

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 3 87

,
hp
studies , or even in Chinese foreign policy studies. Indeed , throughout its
history, Chinese foreign policy studies has had a fairly wide range of im-
plicit and explicit positions on theory and methods. In terms of theory, the
fìeld has made use of various stripes of realist thought , including structural ,
classical , and neoclassical arguments;9 interdependence and institutionalist
arguments;10 arguments based on domestic politics and political and fac-
tional bargaining; 11 second image reversed argùments; 12 theories of percep-
tion , image , and belief systems;13 theories of ideology;14 and theories from
the "sociological turn" in IR theory.15
In terms of research methodology, the 且eld has actually been quite eclec-
tic as well. One can fìnd examples of Pekingological analysis of statements
and discourse;16 historical analysis;17 qualitative and quantitative behav-
ioral analysis;18 content analysis;19 interviews;20 surveys and structured in-
terviews;21 and formal modeling. 22
50 it is not that the Chinese foreign policy fìeld taken as a whole has been
atheoretical or methodologically narrow and parochia 1. 23 But it is proba-
bly accurate to say that in much of the research , the major or the default
theoretical and methodological choices are roughly realist and roughly
historica l/descriptive , particularly when focusing on post-Cultural Revo-
lution (I966 - 69) foreign policy. In some cases of research , one fìnds a the-
oretical eclecticism that often stretches the degree of compatibility or com-
mensurability across theories. It is also safe to say that, in general , the
subfìeld has been a consumer but not a producer of theory and methods.
This volume does not , therefore , claim to introduce theories or methods
that have been hitherto absent from the study of Chinese foreign policy. But,
taken as a whole , the chapters here-in the intellectual style started by
Allen Whiting-are more theoretically selιconscious ， more theoretically
consistent , and more likely to take advantage of new materials and new re-
search opportunities compared to past collections of research. As such , col-
lectively, they deepen and sharpen the theoretical and methodological rep-
ertoire available to scholars of Chinese foreign policy. The chapters show,
also , where Chinese foreign policy studies can position themselves along the
cutting edge of IR theory.

REALIST APPROACHES

Recent critiques of realism from within the realist tent have focused
on the neglected importance of perceptions of power and opportunity, and
onthe domestic constraints in mobilizing resources for dealing with secu-
rity threats. Even this realist loyal opposition agrees that a simplistic focus
on rational unitary actor calculations of how to maximize security under .
conditions 0[" uncertainty generated by anarchy are often insu面cient to
explain much of the variation in state behavio r. Together, fìve chapters
388 C 0 N CL U S 1 ON S AND FUTURE DIRE C TI ON S

in this book show the complexity of applying realist arguments to the

China case.
Onthe one hand , both Ross and Goldstein focus on instances where Chi-
nese leaders have correctly understood the constraints on their power and
more or less correctly estimated the options open to them. Stable deterrence
between the United States and China on the Taiwan issue , Ross argues , can
essentially be explained by accurate estimates on both sides of the costs of
using military force. In this context, the likelihood of mistakes in the use of
force or of provocative challenges to the status quo are unlikely. Goldstein
notes that Chinese leaders have more or less clear (and certainly not unique)
national interests in economic development in a peaceful environment and
preserving territorial integrity (the Taiwan issue) , as well as a more or less
clear sense of the power constraints on pursuing this interest (i.e. , limited
military modernization in a unipolar era). This constrains their options to-
ward the Korean peninsula , creating a strong status quo interest there too.
On the other hand , Christensen , Garver, and Yong Deng in one form or
another show that under some circumstances , the decisions of Chinese lead-
ers cannot be modeled by using unitary rational actor, security-maximizing
assumptions. They show that despite the fact that Chinese leaders have been
well schooled in realpolitik views of the world , Chinese foreign policy has
not been an unbroken record of the successful management of security
threats. That is , it is a mistake to treat the Chinese leadership as if it were
always capable of rationally understanding and more or less accurately as-
sessing power distributions , the intentions and capabilities of adversaries ,
and other constraints in the international system , and then acting in ways
that maximize China's own security.
Rather, they note that Chinese leaders have in fact made choices that
helped create some of these security threats. These choices have been biased
by some very basic pathologies of decision-making: poor estimations of
trends in the international balance of power and in domestic politics in
China and in other states (Christensen); lack of recognition of security di-
lemma dynamics; ideology, historical identity, and an inordinately high val-
uation of the symbolic importance of territory (Garver). Attribution errors
have been a key obstacle to correctly reading "structu
EBEEFEEEFRKEFhmiiFfJ

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 3 89

of security dilemmas in external relationships. He shows how strategic di-

lemma theory can illuminate Chinese behavior, where China rationally tries
to alleviate the strategic dilemma through rhetorical strategies designed to
undermine China threat theory. Chinese leaders' recent effort to grasp the
potential for the "peaceful rise" (heping jueqi) of China is further sugges-
tive of Chinese efforts to ameliorate the security dilemma. This suggests , for
one thing , that strategic dilemmas , while pernicious and dangerous sources
of conflict-essentially from a realist understanding of international rela-
tions-do not ineluctably entrap rational actors , and that there are con-
ditions under which the y. may contribute to reducing security dilemma
e丘ects (Gorbachev's policy of perestroika is one example). .lf the motiva-
tion is precisely to head off a strategic dilemma (rather than simply to stra-
tegically reduce an obstacle to China's expansion , for example) , then this
suggests that in a very short time , there has been some "learning" about
how China's own behavior affects the behavior of other countries. This
would represent a basic breakthrough in understanding international poli-
tics , since recognizing strategic dilemmas , as Robert Jervis points out , is ex-
tremely hard for decision-makers to do. Yong Deng's work raises some key
questions-what factors obstruct, disrupt , or moderate security dilemmas ,
and when? Since the security dilemma is central to defensive realist claims
about the sources of conflict under anarchy, understanding how it is ame-
liorated or moderated is crucial to revealing the conditions under which
conflict is created. The Soviet Union's contribution to the peaceful end of
the Cold War under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev involved transna-
tional interaction and persuasion24 of an elite that was particularly moti-
vated to understand its security environment. 25 How does the Chinese case
support or challenge arguments about transnational epistemic communities
and the relative strength of states and societies in the transmission of
transnational ideas?
Together, these chapters suggest that a major step forward in Chinese for-
eign policy studies (and in IR theory in genera l) would be to show whether
there is any systematic variation in the conditions under which Chinese lead-
ers do and do not rationally pursue their material interests un

INTERDEPENDENCE ARGUMENTS

Margaret Pearson shows that China's integration into the global

ecönomy has helped create domestic and policy constituencies with a stake
in preserving international institutions. Such a stake increases the value of
economic exchange with the outside world relative to other interests that
might lead to conflict with other states. The thrust of Pearson's argument is
390 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

certainly not inconsistent with the large literature on the stabilizing effects
of cross-national economic linkages , and she provides invaluable details
about how precisely these linkages do or may influence foreign policy. Much
of the interdependence literature to date relies on large-N statistical models.
The microprocesses by which interdependence might constrain behavior,
however, really only come through in detailed empirical work.
Michael Yahuda's work adds to the list of hypotheses about the require-
ments of economic interdependence , at least in bilateral relationships. His
examination of the Sino-]apanese relationship suggests that in this instance,
the standard interdependence arguments about economic integratìon and
the amelioration of security dilemma effects do not work. To borrow from
]ames Rosenau , we might ask , "Of what is this an instance?" Is it a case
where economic interdependence is not accompanied by political and cul-
tural integration and exchange? Yahuda suggests that economic integration
is only possible in the context of political and cultural exchanges. Economic
interdependence by itself does not su面ce to break down historical memo-
ries that reduce trust. Yahuda's work thus points to historical memory and
identity construction as critical variables when thinking about the political
effects of economic integration. Thus far , there is little in the international
political economy or economic interdependence literature per se that speaks
to this question. Rather, interdependence and economic interaction are as-
sumed to reduce political conflicts by creating constituencies that have a
stake in economic exchange , or by changing domestic balances of power.
Karl Deutsch was one of the first to suggest that the intensity or quality of
exchange-economic and cultural-predicts shared identity and thus the
emergence of security communities. 26 Extending Yahuda's chapter, it would
suggest that Chinese foreign policy students might test this hypothesis fur-
ther by comparing the effects of economic integration in the Sino-]apanese
case with the Sino-ROC, Sino-U.S. , and Sino-ASEAN cases.

PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY

The work in this volume also shows the importance of using concepts
from psychology and sociology-identity, belief systems , and status con-
cerns , among others. These factors do not amount to a deus ex machina.
They are produced through socialization processes within states and be-
tween states. Moreover, there is variation in the strength and importance of
these kinds of variables over time. For instance , the conditions under which
Chinese nationalism shifts in content and intensity, and how natiomilism
works as an independent variable , remain puzzling. The so-called sociolog-
ical turn in IR theory brings a number of new tools and concepts to the analy-
sis of these sorts of questions. For example , as Gries points out, theories of
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 39 1

identity construction and intergroup conflict appear critical to understand-

ing the conditions under which elites try to manipulate and are manipulated
by nationalism.
Allen Carlson shows how ideational constructs-in this case , sover-
eignty-constrain how leaders conceptualize China's interests. He demon-
strates that Chinese constructs of sovereignty have changed , as the literature
on ideational variables would suggest , but also that they are very sticky. Ob-
vious follow-up questions include: What explains the stickiness? Socializa-
tion? Institutionalization? Or coercion? Carlson's work shows how Chinese
resistance to perceived global norms is based on national experience and
socialization in memories of it, something that is a perpetual source of con-
testation in international politics. His work thus contributes to a develop-
ing interest in IR theory to the degree to which there is an endogenous
relationship among four processes: the presence of external norms; state re-
sistance to those norms; the internalization and hybridization of those
norms at the state or regional level; and then the return impact of this
localization on the external norms. 27

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND METHODS

Despite the progress in theorizing about and studying Chinese foreign

policy, a number of lacunae remain. These involve issues where the integra-
tion of Chines e' foreign policy analysis with wider debates in the international
relations field could benefitboth. We list them in no particular orde r.
First, there is a need to integrate the field of comparative foreign policy
studies more fully into the study of Chinese foreign policy. Comparative
foreign policy typically focuses on political leadership and foreign policy
decision-making processes. While it comes naturally for students of Chinese
foreignpolicy to focus on the impact of individual leaders (Mao , Deng ,
Jiang , and now Hu) on foreign policy orientation , we have tended to do it
without the benefit of the literature on personality type , on leadership type ,
on decision-making unit type , and so forth. 28 The information requirements
for testing many of the hypotheses from this literature are quite daunting.
But there has been and will continue to be a growing amount of informa-
tion about decision-making , particularly in the Mao period , as more docu-
ments become available , from both Chinese and Soviet sources.
Second, there is a need for more self-conscious research designs in the
study of Chinese foreign policy. China has certain "natural" advantages for
testing some kinds of hypotheses. One can hold regime type constant (Lenin-
ist dictatorship) throughout the history of the PRC (which makes for useful
longitudinal comparisons with India , for instance). One can hold constant or
vary particular qualities of decision-makers (personality, risk-acceptance ,
392 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

operational codes , decision-making unit) , since so many of the major deci-

sions about strategic and developmental orientation were made bythe same
people or by small numbers of people (Mao , Deng , Jiang). One can hold
constant the effects of geography and geographic contig山ty for much of
PRC history. As a major power whose leaders were particularly sensitive to
relative power trends in an era of bipolarity (in ways that British or French
leaders , say, were not, since they were subordinate allies of the United States
throughout the postwar era) , one can test for the effects of changes in sub-
jective or objective assessments of power distributions on state foreign pol-
icy (e.g. , the subjective assessment that the "East wind prevailed over the
West wind" in the late 1950s, and the objective change in polarity with the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991). Holding ruling party, political struc-
tures , and even some personalities constant, China is a state where devel-
opment strategies shifted from a Stalinist command to a Maoist mobiliza-
tional to a state capitalist / socialist market strategy. China is , therefore , also
a good case to test for the independent effects on foreign policy of economic
integration with the global market economy. In short , there are a number of
puzzles in Chinese foreign policy where factors can be controlled or varied
to test the effects of independent variables of interest to the subfìeld , as well
as to IR scholarship in genera l.
Third , the sub且eld needs to explore a wider range of methods more self-
consciously than in the past. Of course , all methods have their problems ,
and this is not the place to debate them. But a large amount of data about
China's behavior in international relations is now available in standard
quantitative databases户 making it possible to use standard statistical meth-
ods for time series and cross-national comparisons. One relatively new
method-vector autoregression-could be very useful in testing for en-
dogenous or highly interactive relationships with other actors across time
(e.g. , is there an emerging security dilemma between the United States and
China where the interaction of conflictual actions by each side leads to an
increase in frequency andintensity over time?).30 There are also various new
electronic textual sources (journals , documents from the policy process ,
public statements in international institutions , .etc.) that are
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 393

In addition to more traditional social scientific tools , there are new

methodologies appearing that ought to be explored. One is agent-based
modeling (ABM) , where computer simulations of multiple artificial worlds
can help us understand how minor changes in agent characteristics can have
major macro effects on the environment in which agents act. 32 What does
this mean concretely? ABM could be used to model the interactive effects of
multiple actors in the foreign policy decision-making process. Or it could
be used to model the interactive effects of multiple states in the creation of
normallsocial constraints on state behavior. For example , one can test dif-
ferent models of how a sta.te might be influenced by, and in turn influence ,
human rights norms , free trade norms , or arms control norms , among other
things. Given that China is a major power , both its compliance with and re-
sistance to major international regimes and associate norms ought to have
an impact on the content and e面cacy of those regimes and norms , just as
they have an impact on Chinese behavior. ABM modeling helps one to
understand this mutual constitutive process. Carlson raises this question in
his work on sovereignty-the impact of Chinese discourse on global dis-
course. Since this needs to be observed across time , the logical way of mod-
eling this interactivity is via ABM , even if the actual empirical work is done
qualitatively.
Fourth , the field needs to pay more attention to the explicit use of mul-
tiple methods. Often work on Chinese foreign policy will use at most two
different sets of methods , although for different parts of the research puzzle.
Sometimes this is dictated by the nature of the research question. Recon-
structing policy process requires interviews , especially when documentary
evidence is unavailable. As a general rule , however, it is important to com-
pare the findings about a puzzle using multiple methods: interviews , docu-
ment analysis (both open source and internal source) , behavioral data (l arge
N and case studies) , and formal theory. This is especially critical when one
method suggests something counter to the conventional wisdom. For ex-
ample , the survey data about anti-Americanism and nationalism presented
in Johnston's chapter raise questions about the validity and reliability of an-
ecdotal accounts of Chinese scholars' opinions or Western journalists' in-
terviews. Conclusions about the nature 0
394 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

weapons state , and so on. These identity types beg comparisons withother
states. This is beginning to happen. The number of plausible comparisons
will change , obviously, depending on the type and one's research design. But
explicit comparisons with states in the same typology will help with both the
confirmation and revision of theory. Take major power type. If China's be-
havior is similar to that of other major powers , then China cases will be an
important confirmation of theory. If China's behavior as a major power is
unique and challenges conventional theories , say, of major power balancing ,
then this suggests that the international politics literature should revisit the
theory to explain why China is such an outlier and thus to explain the scope
conditions under which the theory does or does not work.
From the perspective of subfield building , there is also a strategic need to
be more comparative. This will make those who are not China specialists
more aware of the Chinese case , and thus more used to including it in their
own research or in edited volumes , which will in turn help reduce the iso-
lation of the Chinese foreign policy field from the rest of the discipline.
Finally, there is the problem of balancing rigor and relevance. How does
one both be true to an increasingly specialized and technical field of politi-
cal science as well as responsible for constructivecontributions to public
and policy debates. This is a problem that Allen Whiting recognized and
on which , in his own work , he struck an ideal balance. But the problem re-
mains and has in some sense become more acute. As scholars become more
plugged into disciplines- both for good intellectual reasons and for regret-
table but real career strategy motives-research becomes less user-friendly,
especially for the policy world. This is not entirely the fault of the academic
side 一 the policy world needs to be less dismissive of theorizing and of rich ,
complex empirical wor k. But the problem does require some thought as to
how to translate research into policy-friendly language.

The Question of Sources

The chapters in this volume demonstrate that the study of Chinese

foreign policy today has benefited from a greáter access to and use of
a wider range of Chinese-language primary and secondary materials
than in the past. It has also benefited from an increasing theoretical self-
consciousness and greater sophistication in political science research meth-
ods. The result , we hope , is a higher degree of confidence in the research
且ndings and a greater ability to address specialized and nuanced aspe Ct s of
Chinese foreign policy behavÍo r.
From 1949 to 1979 , research on Chinese foreign policy primarily de-
pended on analysis of news stories in dispatches from the Xinhua News
··EEEtSHEETS-t

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 395

Agency and articles , commentaries , and editorials in Renmin Ribao (Peo-

ple's Daily) , the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, and the
Peking (Beijing) Review , a publication for foreign consumption. Frequently,
articles in Hong Kong newspapersprovided the only substantive , albeit un-
reliable , window on the Chinese leadership's strategic perspective and any
leadership differences over policy preferences. Given the paucity of Chinese-
language research materials , scholars often relied on U.S. government trans-
lations of the Chinese media distributed by the Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service (FBIS) or British government translations in the BBC's Selected
World Broadcasts series. In this era , it was not di面cult for the U.S. govern-
ment to offer a comprehensive translation service of the Chinese media.
Allen Whiting's use of the Chinese Foreign Ministry publication Shijie Zhishi
(币Torld Knowledge) in China Crosses the Yalu reflected the outer limits of
innovative research on Chinese foreign policy.

CHINA'S PUBLICATION EXPLOSION:

岛1EMOIRS ， DIPLOMATIC HISTORIES ,

AND DOCUMENT COLLECTIONS

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the emergence of Deng
Xiaoping as China's paramount leader in late 1978 , China's publishing in-
dustry gradually broadened. In the mid 1980s , memoirs written by Chinese
foreign policy leaders and increasingly detailed diplomatic histories became
available , and specializedacademic and policy journals emerged. By the
mid 工 990s ， a wealth of materials was available from many different Chinese
institutions , including government ministries , universities , think tanks , and
military research organizations. All of these publications remain a part of
the state-controlled Chinese media and thus cannot cover controversial as-
pects of Chinese political history or adequately reflect the range of foreign
policy views within the Chinese policy-making community. To some extent,
the semi-commercialization of the Chinese media has created some space
for more independent commentary. Nonetheless , there are politicallimits
on the critical analysis of China's own foreign policy. This remains a serious
impediment to research of important subjects in Chinese foreign policy, in-
cluding the domestic politics of policy-making. Still , the result of China's
publication explosion has been a substantial broadening of the Chinese for-
eign policy research agenda.
Chinese document collections , leadership memoirs , and detailed histori-
cal studies now enable scholars to make careful studies of Chinese use of
force. Many of these materials are internally circulated (e.g. , neibu faxing
or junnei faxing) and offer especially informative accounts of Chinesediplo-
matic and military history. As John Garver writes , these newly available
396 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

sources enable scholars to go "inside" China's decision-making process to

some degree. The chapters written by Thomas Christensen and Garver in
this book make extensive use of the internally circulated Jianguo yilai Mao
Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the founding of the re-
public) and Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Diplomatic documents of Zhou
Enlai). These contain telegrams to foreign leaders and Chinese military
o面cers during crises ，。面cial writings , and transcripts of their meetings with
foreigners. Similarly, the collection of Liu Shaoqi's papers , Jianguo yilai Liu
Shaoqi wengao (Liu Shaoqi's manuscripts since the founding of the repub-
lic) , provides insights into the early years of Sino-Soviet relations.
In addition to the collected writings of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping,
the collected writings of other senior 0面cials ， including Zhou Enlai , Wang
Jiaxiang , and Peng Dehu缸， are also usefu l. Although these collections of doc-
uments are not nearly as comprehensive as the U.S. government series For-
eign Relatiα1S of the United States , they nonetheless offer a critical perspec-
tive on elite decision-making.
A related research source is the Chinese dashiji (chronology) and the
nianpu (chronicle). Chronologies of Chinese political and military history,
such as Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao dashiji (Chronology of the
diplomacy of the People's Republic of China) , Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong
dashiji (Chronology of Zhou Enlai's diplomatic activities) , and Renmin
jiefangjun liushinian dashiji, I927-I987 (Chronology of sixty years of the
People's Liberation Army, 1927-1987) can provide key factual information
regarding elite meetings and leadership statements. Chronicles of leaders'
lives , such as the Zhou Enlai nianpu: I949-76 (Zhou Enlai's chronicle:
1949-76) and the Deng Xiaoping nianpu: I975-I997 (Deng Xiaoping's
chronicle , 1975-1997) , can also be important sources of information.
Recent studies of Chinese foreign policy have also made extensive use of
the Chinese memoir literature. Vice Premier Bo Yibo's memoir Ruogan
zho l1 gda juece yu shijian de huigu (Reminiscences of several monumental
decisions and events) , which was one of the :fi rst of the leadership memoirs ,
provides insights into many episodes in Chinese diplomacy. Wu Lengxi's
memoir of his experience as an editor of the Renmin Ribao , Shi nian lunzhan,
I956-I966: Zhong Su guanxi huiyilu
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 习 97

that help us understand the PRC's military chain of command and the trig-
gers for and goals of China's use of force. General Liu Huaqing's 2005
memoir offers insights into more recent Chinese military activities , includ-
ing China's naval engagement with Vietnam in the South China Sea in the
1980s. The Chinese Foreign Minist町 's 0面ce of Diplomatic History has
published various multivolume series of chapter-length memoirs written by
former Chinese diplomats , such as Xin Zhongguo waijiao fengyun (Diplo-
matic storms of new China). These volumes cover not only China's relations
with the great powers and key events and conflicts in post-1949 Chinese
diplomacy, but also Chines~ relations with Southeast Asian , European , Latin
American , and African countries , for example. The weekly magazine Shijie
Zhishi is also a frequent outlet for the memoir literature.
Most Chinese diplomatic archives remain closed to foreign scholars and
to most Chinese scholars. But select Chinese historians at the Central Party
School , the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Central Docu-
ments Research Offìce , the Research Offìce of the Chinese Communist Party,
the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic 0面ce ， the Institute of Contemporary His-
tory, and various PLA research organizations , as well as select university-
based scholars , have "clearance" and thus are able to write highly informa-
tive (yet still politically constrained) diplomatic histories. Scholars such as
Zhang Baijia , Yang Kuisong , Gong Li , Li Jie , Li Danhui , Shen Zhihua , and
Zhao Weiwen have all written Chinese archive-based studies that cover such
subjects as U.S.-China relations from 1949 through normalization of rela-
tions in 1979 , the origins and development of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the
Sino-Indian border conflict , and China's policy on the Vietnam Wa r. His-
torians at China's National Defense University and the Academy of Military
Sciences have similar access to Chinese military archives and have written
valuable histories of the PLA. Xu Yan and Chen Pingsheng have written
archive-based studies of the Sino-Indian wa r. Xu Yan has also written a
study of the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s. Wang Zhongchun and other
PLA historians have written on China's participation in the Vietnam War
and in the Sino-Soviet border conflict. Works by these and other Chinese
scholars frequently appear as articles in specialized Party history
 398 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

changing to some degree. The Foreign Mir).i stry, for instance , has just opened
up its archives to foreigners , but limits the materials to the pr~-1955 period.
Provincial archives remain an underexplored but potentially useful source.
For instance , in the Jiangsu provincial archives , one can fìnd materials re-
lated to briefìngs of provincial officials on major foreign policy issues of the
day through to the mid 1960s, to Sino-Indian relations , and to war prepa-
rations in 1965 in the face of the expanding Vietnam Wa r. These materials
include some Politburo transcripts and instructions on how local levels
should handle foreign affairs. 33
Another extraordinarily rich source of archival materials covering
China's relations with the Soviet bloc , Vietnam , the DPRK , and the U.S.-
China normalization process are the archives of eastern European states.
These tend to be divided into Foreign Ministry and Communist Party ar-
chives. The former include information about China gathered by the coun-
try's diplomats and transcripts of talks with Chinese leaders. The latter in-
clude reports on bilateral and multilateral Party meetings. The ease of access
to these archives varies across countries and archives , but they remain un-
derexplored by China specialists. 34 In 2001 , the Japanese Foreign Ministry
made many of its records of the normalization process with Japan available ,
including transcripts of discussions between Zhou Enlai and Prime Minis-
ter Tanaka Kakuei. 35
Official biographies of Chinese diplomats and military leaders have also
become valuable research resources. There are numerous archive-based bi-
ographies of such leaders as Chairman Mao Zedong , Premier Zhou Enlai ,
President Liu Shaoqi , Foreign Minister Chen Yi , and PLA Marshals Ye
. Jianying , Nie Rongzhen , and Xu Xiangqian. Biographies of Chinese diplo-
mats , including Wang Zhen and Qiao Guanhua , are helpful sources re-
garding U.S.-China relations. These biographies and recent Chinese political
histories must necessarily reflect the 0面cial Chinese Communist Party inter-
pretation of PRC history. Nonetheless , not only do they offer insights into
Chinese diplomacy, but their analyses of the roles of Chinese leaders and
diplomats in Chinese domestic political conflict , such as the factional conflict
involving Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi during the CuJt ural Revolution , provide
an important window into the domestic politics 0
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 399

topics , such as U.S. assessments of Chinese nuclear capabilities; the Sino-U.S.

normalization process; and more recent events , such as the crackdown on
the democracy movement in 1989. But now scholars have access to diplo-
matic documents from other countries as wel l. John Garver's chapter makes
effective use of English-language Indian archive-based scholarship in order
to better understand both Chinese decision-making and the sources of the
1962 Sino-Indian bórder wa r. Both Gar飞rer's .and Christensen's chapters
make extensive use of Soviet archival materials to understand Chinese policy
toward the Soviet Union and the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict.
And Christensen's chapter uses archival documents of Sino-Vietnamese
meetings to analyze Chinese policy toward Indochina. The research with So-
viet and Vietnamese materials relies on the important translation series pub-
lished by the International Cold War History Project based at George Wash-
ington University. By combining research into Chinese-language materials
with translated documents and authoritative histories from other countries ,
scholars now have unprecedented opportunities to develop a broad and nu-
anced understanding of the bilateral dynamics of Chinese foreign policy, in-
cluding the bilateral sources of conflict and cooperation. Another sourceof
declassified Soviet documents that has yet to be fully mined by China foreign
policy specialists is the Har飞Tard Project on Cold War History (HPCW).36

CHINA'S PUBLISHING EXPLOSION:

SPECIALIZED ]OURNALS AND MONOGRAPHS

AND POPULAR LITERATURE

China's publishing explosion and the general opening of Chinese so-

ciety have not only been helpful in the use of historical case studies to un-
derstand Chinese foreign policy. They have also contributed to a greater
understanding of the role of key variables and concepts in contemporary
China's international behavio r. The traditional think tank and academic lit-
erature on foreign policy have become su面ciently rich and complex to enable
research on Chinese attitudes to various IR concepts. Samuel Kim has used
influential journals such as Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management)
and Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Studies) , the journal of the Foreign
Ministry research institute , to research Chinese approaches to globalization
and the growing popu1arity of liberal IR concepts , such as cooperative se-
curity. In order to track the changes in China's understanding of the limits
of sovereignty, Allen Carlson uses such sources as Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(World Economics and Politics) , China's most influential journal on IR the-
ory, and Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of the College of Foreign Af-
fairs). Yong Dong's chapter similarly reveals the wide range of academic
materials now available to researchers. His analysis of China's conceptual
and foreign policy responses to heightened foreign concern about the China
400 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

threat makes effective use of Zhanlue yu Guanli , Taipingyang Xuebao

(Pacific Journa l), and Dangdai Sichao (Contemporary Trends of Thought) ,
as well as of the increasing richness of materials in such 0面cial publications
as Shijie Zhishi and Renmin Ribao. Book-length studies by Chinese special-
ists in IR theory are also important research materials. Studies by such schol-
ars as Wang Yizhou , Qin Yaqing , Yan Xuetong , and Ni Shixiong contribute
to an active Chinese discourse on IR theory.37
The increasing volume and richness of writing by analysts in China's mil-
itary have similarly improved research into contemporary Chinese security
policy. Robert Ross's chapter uses writings by specialists at China's National
Defense University and the Academy of Military Sciences to study China's
understanding of deterrence dynamics and its implications for Chinese be-
havior in crises in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula. Sophis-
ticated writings by PLA scholars such as Chen Zhou , Yao Yunzhu , Wang
Baocun, Wang Pufeng , and other authors from the PLA Academy of Mili-
tary Sciences (AMS) are important research materials on issues of nuclear
and conventional deterrence and war-且ghting， and information warfare.
There are more and more military textbooks and journals available to
scholars as well. Of particular value is Zhanyi xue (Military Campaign
Studies) , a recently published textbook used at the National Defense Uni-
versity.38 This book for internal circulation in the PLA provides new in-
sights into the kinds of operational scenarios for which the branches of the
PLA need to train. The 5 5-volume Junshi 走 exue yuan shuoshi yanjiusheng
xilie jiaocai (Academy of Military Sciences MA graduate student teaching
materials) , which covers strategy, operations , tactics , military theory, Chi-
nese and foreign military history, and military command , among other
things , is also now available , helping us understand how the PLA trains its
military strategists. Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (Chinese Military Science) ,
China's most prestigious open journal of military affairs , is a valuable re-
source for analyzing Chinese approaches to deterrence , the analysis of and
policy response to developments in high-technology warfare , and the PLA's
understanding of the defense strategies of other countries. The journal also
publishes case-study analyses of early PRC uses of force. Increasingly
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 401

of Korean uni且cation. ]ournals such as Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi , Xi正mdai

Guοji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) , the publication of
the international relations think tank of China's Ministry of Public Security,
and Taipingyang Xuebao provide insights not only intoChina's Korea pol-
icy but also into its policies toward a wide range of countries and issues. The
area studies journals pùblished by the research institutes of the Chinese
Academy of Social Science , includingDangdai Yatai (Contemporary Asia-
Pacific) , DongOu ZhongYa Yanjiu (Studies on Eastern Europe and Central
Asia) , and Taiwan Yanjiu (Taiwan Studies) often enable more nuanced as-
sessment of Chinese foreign policy and identi且cation of emerging trends in
Chinese foreign policy perspectives. Guoji Zhanlue Yanjiu (International
Strategic Studies) , the journal of the PLA's China Institute of International
Strategic Studies , can provide a window on the policy perspectives of Chi-
nese military analysts and , in particular , those in military intelligence.
Peter Gries's chapter makes extensive use ofthe popular "nationalist" lit-
erature in contemporary China to establish the a pplicability ofWestern social-
identity concepts to Chinese culture and to develop a multidisciplinary
approach to the social-identity content of Chinese nationalism and the im-
plications for U.S.-China conflict. Gries's examination of the high tide of
anti-American nationalism in the mid 1990S reflects the sentiment of such
widely read works as Zhongguo 走 eyi shuobu (China can say no) , Zhong-
Mei jiaoliang daxiezhen (The true story of the Sino-American contest) , and
Yaomohua Zhongguo de beihou (The plot to demonize China). Popular Chi-
nese writings on ]apanesepolitics and "militarism" are important sources
for research on contemporary China's anti-]apanese nationalism.

INTERVIEWS AND SOCIAL SURVEYS AS RESEARCH TOOLS

The research in this volume underscores the growing importance of

interviews in complementing text-based research in carrying out focused
and in-depth research on Chinese foreign policy. Indeed , for some issues ,
such as the policy-making process , interviews are the primary materials. Av-
ery Goldstein uses interviews to probe Chinese assessments of the risks of
Korean unification , an issue addressed only superficially in the open media.
Similarly, Michael Yahuda's work on Sino-]apanese relations relies on in-
terviews with foreign policy intellectuals in China and ]apan to understand
the sources and content of enduring conflict in Sino-]apanese relations , in-
cluding the role of nationalism and power considerations. Such interviews
can be useful for gauging the impact of nationalism on China's ]apan pol-
icy. Allen Carlson's chapter on China's evolving approach to sovereignty is
based in part on his systematic interviews with 109 Chinese foreign policy
intellectuals. To supplement his formal interviews , Carlson incorporates the
402 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

oral contributions by Chinese IR specialists at an international conference

on changing attitudes toward sovereignty and intervention iq international
politics.
Despite the importance of interviews , their value can vary dramatically.
Interviews with academic and think tank analysts are easier to set up than
those with 0面cials ， but are often at least a couple of levels removed from
the policy process. Usually, interviews with senior 0面cials are short in
length, and these officials rarely stray from the 0面cialline. Interviews with
the functional and regional specialists within foreign policy institutions are
even harder to arrange than those with senior 0面cials. Usually, the most
useful individual interactions take place when the interlocutor is relatively
young, has been educated abroad , has known the interviewer for some time
and is personally comfortable with her or him , and when the interviewer
makes it clear she or he is already fairly knowledgeable about the topic.
There are a number of useful aids to learn more about interviewing and
ethnographic techniques so as to make interviewing more systematic. 39
Paralleling the case..:study research on Chinese use of force , in which
Russian , Indian , and Vietnamese documents are useful in explaining Chinese
behavior, interviews with 0面cials from other countr'Ï es can complement the
value of interviews with Chinese 0面cials. Interviews with U.S. government
o面cials have long been important to research on China's U.S. policy. The
U.S. State Department's collection of oral histories from some of the key
players in the making of U.S. China policy also provides insights into Chi-
na's own decision-making process. Margaret Pearson's chapter shows that
interviews with foreign 0面cials can also address important questions regard-
ing China's role in international institutions. Pearson's interviews in Beijing
and Geneva with Chinese trade 0面cials and with trade 0面cials from the
United States , Canada , Europe , and Australia enable her to analyze China's
role in the World Trade Organization to consider such issues as the impli-
cations of China's "rise" for its role in the international economic order,
China's relationship with developing countries , and the role of domestic
politics and economic and security interests in its global alignment strate-
gies. Similar research methods are essential for scholarship on Chinese par-
ticipation in reg
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 403

attitudes with socioeconomic measures. Complementing Gries's research ,

]ohnston's research employs multidisciplinary measures , including social-
psychology measures of identity(Osgood semantic differential scales) , to
correlate measures of identity and "othering" with foreign policy attitudes.
]ohnston's chapter suggests that despite the political sensitivity of foreign
policy issues in China , collaboration with Chinese social scientists can fa-
cilitate reliable data collection, enabling effective use of quantitative social
science methodologies to reach conclusions regarding the societal bases of
Chinese foreign policy. Such formal polling techniques and social science
methodologies compleme Q. t interview-based research in gauging the inten-
sity and trends in Chinese nationalism. 40

The Digital Revolution and Research

on Chinese Foreign Policy

All of these studies of contemporary Chinese foreign policy use tradi-

tional research materials , including printed resources-newspapers , jour-
nals , and books-and interviews and opinion polling. In addition to these
sources , the Internet has become an important source of research materia l.
Its most common role is in expanding access to traditional Chinese research
materials. 41 Comprehensive research is far more possible today than ever be-
fore. Many of the chapters in this volume used the Internet to access such
newspapers as Renmin Ribao , Guangming Ribao (Enlightenment Daily) ,
Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) , Beijing Qingnian Bao (Beijing
Youth Daily) , and Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend) , and to access
documents at the Chinese Foreign Minist巧 's web site. More specialized
Chinese publications on international politics are increasingly available
at independent Chinese web sites , such as "The Strategist," at http://www
.l aocanmou.net. In this respect , Chinese-Ianguage search engines , including
http://c n.yahoo.com , have become valuable research tools.
Digital editions of Chinese newspapers and journals with powerful
search engines have also become widely available. Full collections of such
periodicals and journals , including Renmin Ribao , Jiefangjun Bao , Dang de
W切xza刀， and the International Forum column in Huanqiu Shibao (Global
Times) , the weekend IR newspaper published by Renmin Ribao, are now
increasingly available on CD-ROMs in China and at major research li-
braries outside of China , and now online. In addition, the online China Aca-
demic Journals Full-Text Database allows powerful searches of nearly three
million Chinese-Ianguage articles in the social sciences and humanities pub-
lished since 工 994. Most of the academic and policy journals used in this vol-
ume are accessible at this site.
404 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

But the Internet also allows for more innovative research on society and
foreign policy. Gries's work on Chinese nationalism would nQt be nearly as
rich if he had not made use of Chinese postings on a Chinese-Ianguage In-
ternet listserv. In addition , Chinese online bulletin boards , including those
sponsored by newspapers , Internet portals , such as http://www.sohu.com.
and those based at universities , can provide insights into public attitudes to-
ward Chinese foreign policy and attitudes toward other countries. As an
outlet for the more activist and more discontented voices in Chinese soci-
ety, Internet chat rooms can be a useful research window on an important
segment of informed Chinese public opinion.
The digital revolution offers a daunting yet ultimately exciting challenge
to the field of Chinese foreign policy. On the one hand , the ever-expanding
access to research materials suggests that scholars will find it increasingly
di面cult to do comprehensive research on any given subject. More than ever
before , it is possible for a scholar truly never to be able to complete his or
her research and thus begin writing. On the other hand , digital resources
enable increasing access to Chinese materials right from the scholar's desk ,
thus facilitating expanded use of primary research materials outside of
China. Second, even local libraries will have the space and financial re-
sources to acquire digital collections of specialized Chinese-Ianguage mate-
rials. Third , powerful keyword search engines allow effective management
and use of large amounts of primary sources by enabling efficient identifica-
tion of relevant materials. For all of these reasons , traditional research agen-
das can only benefit from the exponential expansion of Chinese-Ianguage
research materials.
Equally important , the combination of powerful search engines with CD-
ROM databases and Internet colledions of Chinese newspapers and au-
thoritative journals (such as the China Academic Journals Database) can
facilitate the use of sophisticated large-N content analysis methodologies
to study Chinese foreign policy. Nearly all of the discipline's traditional
fields of study could benefit from digital research materials. Our under-
standing of Chinese crisis signaling and the sources of threat perception
would benefit from the ability to trace gradual and nuanced changes in Chi-
nese diplomatic language in authoritat
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 405

CO l1 clusio l1 S

The agenda for the Chinese foreign policy 面eld is rich and varied. The
chapters in this volume have by no means exhausted the topics , methods ,
and sources available to scholars. But together they do suggest a number of
issues that could use more attention as the 且eld develops further. Below we
draw together some of the suggestions for further research from this chap-
ter and from the other chapters in the book. These represent an agenda , not
the agenda , for the field. We list them in no particular orde r.
First , we need a better handle on China's uses of force. There are endur-
ing debates among scholars about whether there are obvious patterns in
China's political and military signaling , how defensive or offensive Chinese
military strategy has been , whether China is more or less likely to use force
as a "normal" tool of diplomacy, and how risk-averse or risk-acceptant Chi-
nese leaders are or have been. 42 These topics are obviously not yet exhausted.
But now is the time to start cross-national comparisons. The PRC has a
complex history of use of force-duri n: g the Cold War, it was the second
most militarized dispute-prone major power, after the United States. The
fact that it has far more contiguous states than most other major powers has
also meant that territorial disputes are a particularly important feature of
China's geopolitics. But comparisons with other countries might be usefu l.
For instance , comparison with lndia would allow one to control for levels
of development , to see how variations in colonial and postcolonial histories
and contrasts between democratic and authoritarian governments can ex-
plain the frequency, scope , scale , and risk-averseness of leaders. Compari-
sons with the USSR and Vietnam allow one to hold regime type constant.
Chinese attitudes and behavior toward spheres of influences are another
topic that needs to be further explored. This issue will come to the fore as
China becomes even more proactive in setting up regional institutions in East
Asia and in increasing the economic and political depth of its relations with
surrounding countries. How precisely does the PRC deal with the asymme-
tries-or perceived asymmetries-in economic , military, and political
power vis-à-vis its neighbors? Again , comparisons with the U.S. and Soviet
concepts of limited sovereignty in their respective spheres of influence-
Latin America and eastern Europe-could explain the sources of Chine
406 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

On other bilateral relations (Sino-U.S. , China-Taiwan) , however, there are

debates among China specialists as to whether public opinion matters , and ,
if so , whose opinion: urban entrepreneurs'? regional political and economic
leaders'? urban youth's? party elites'? the military's? How is opinion artic-
ulated in the decision-making process in a system where there is limited
freedom of the press , where there is no electoral recall of leaders , and where
organized interest groups can be politically threatening to the regime? This
is 6bviously a rich set of topics , though if it is anything like the study of the
influence of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy, it will be a frustratingly
complex question.
How precisely has China's interaction with international institutions
evolved over time , or compared across issue area and institution. Margaret
Pearson's work in this book , Ann Ken t's work on China and international
legal institutions such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) , and
]ohnston's and Medeiro's forthcoming works on China in arms control
institutions help fill some of the gaps.43 But we need more of these micro-
focus studies in order to see how institutions affect and are affected by
China's foreign po1icy.
Relatedly, more work needs to be done to understand the Chinese foreign
policy process. There is some pathbreaking work out there ,44 but it covers
only a relatively limited or somewhat dated range of China's foreign policy
behaviors. There is still a dearth of studies on the policy process of bilateral
relations (e.g. , Sino-U.S.; Sino-Indian; Sino-Soviet/Russian; Sino-]apanese) ,
despite the fact that these are the focus of much of the 岳eld's research. Apart
from the field's focus on patterns in Chinese deterrence strategy, there has
been limited work on Chinese crisis behavior. More research on the policy
process may tell us more about the varying effects of other factors , such as
public opinion, bureaucratic interest , and the constraints of technology.
Decision-making strategies and habits are an important related topic. Is
there any systematic variation in the conditions under which Chinese lead-
ers rationally pursue their material interests under different distributions of
power? How do Chinese leaders make trade-offs among conflicting interests?
Should we assume that there is indeed a "grand strategy" that guides these
decisions?
Relatedly, how do Chi
 C 0 N C L U S1 0 N S A N D F U T U R E D 1 R E C TI 0 N S 407

status matters , as opposed to material security, normative preferences , or

domestic politicallongevity? Thinking in these terms will help the Chinese
foreign policy field develop something to say about the relative importance
of material structure and normative structure versus domestic political ma-
terialmotivations and domestic normative motivations. It is this question of
relative importance that Is at the heart of some of the main theory and em-
pirical debates in IR scholarship today.
There is a growing and sophisticated literature on contemporary Chinese
nationalism. But for the most part , these are standard and unquestioned
tropes that still need to be problematized. Perhaps the most common trope is
rising Chinese nationalism. Yet without baselines and benchmarks , it is im-
possible to tell whether something is rising , falling , or remaining constant.
Moreover , little of the work on nationalism has looked across time from
the beginning of the PRC to the present to see what precisely has changed in
terms of the content, intensity, and targets of Chinese nationalism.
Another topic that directly relates to some essential features of Chinese
foreign policy is the question of how economic dependence , interdepend-
ence , and conflict relate. Fi rst , do Chinese policymakers understand the dis-
tinction between dependence and interdependence? Do they even think
about interdependence , or are they focused on relative capabilities and the
issue of "who needs whom more?" To the extent that China's leaders focus
on dependence relations , how does Chinese policy respond to China's de-
pendence on others? Alternatively, how have Chinese leaders manipulated
the dependence on China of other states , such as Vietnam , South Korea , and
Taiwan , to achieve political objectives? That is , how does China use eco-
nomic coercion or incentives? On the other hand , as China's economy con-
tinues to grow, it may well find itself interdependent (mutually dependent)
with other large economies , such as with the United States , Japan , and the
European Union. This issue concerns not only bilateral trade relationships
but also the stability of the international economic order. Research suggests
that there is a great deal of variation between economic interdependence ,
on the one hand , and its apparent political effects , on the other. It has been
a standard argument to point to pre-World War 1 Europe as evidence th
408 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

argue that the level of bilateral interdependence is not a particularly good

predictor of levels of conflict between states , compared to the.overall open-
ness of the economy. The more open the economy, the less conflict-prone
the state iS. 48 In other words , there are a lot of hypotheses that could be
tested to throw some light on the scope conditions under which economic
interdependence does or does not introduce elements of restraint into
China's bilateral and multilateral relationships.
How has the Chinese foreign policy system reacted to major setbacks in
Chinese domesticand foreign policies , such as large-scale socioeconomic
unrest, a major legitimacy crisis , the loss of a major ally, and large-scale
conflict on its borders? China has faced all these in the past-the Great
Leap Forward , the Cultural Revolution , the Sino-Soviet dispute , and the
Korean War-as well as other shocks , such as the Tiananmen massacre.
And it may well face them in the future in the shape of an implosion of
North Korea , military defeat in a Taiwan conflict, or an explosion of class
and ethnic resentments , among other possibilities. We cannot predict the fu-
ture , but we can venture more educated guesses and forecasts by examining
major setbacks in the past , and by examining how other major powers have
responded to such internal and external shocks.
Related to this question , how has Chinese foreign policy responded to ma-
jor domestic change in the mainland? Has there been enough variation in
the political process-from consensus among top leaders , to rule by Maoist
charisma , to a system where the Party chairman is more equal than others ,
to a more institutionalized consensus , where politics is relatively less dan-
gerous-to see how leadership types have a .ffected foreign policy?
The question of Chinese foreign policy under severe resource constraints
-the e.ffects of severe stresses on water, energy, and the environment-is
also understudied. David Zweig and Bi Jianhai have started looking at how
one conceptualizes the foreign policy of a resource hungry state. As they
point out , this is a "new characteristic that drives much of China's current
foreign policy behavio r. "49 As one example , it sets up conflicts with the
United States , IÌot only because of competition over access to resources , but
also because the PRC is willing to deal politically w~th regimes that the United
States believes are potential sources of terrorism or re
 C 0 N C L U S10 N S A N D F U T U R E D 1 R E C TI 0 N S 409

of this hypothesis through the combined use of random sample surveys and
anthropologica l/ethnographic research methods. It is important to know,
both intellectually and from a policy perspective , whether this argument has
any legs at the individualleve l.
Another demographic issue concerns Chinese population growth. Histo-
rians have observed that population growth and corresponding land pres-
sures have contributed to the growth of the Chinese state. In the contempo-
rary era , in which sovereignty limits expansion and borders are more fixed ,
how do population pressures and associated resource problems influence
Chinese foreign policy, especially foreign economic policy and attitudes to-
ward self-su面ciency and dependency? Another related issue is the foreign
policy implications of an aging population. Due to improved standards of
living and population control , China's population is aging rapidly. By 2030 ,
according to the United Nations , the proportion of China's population that
will be over sixty years old could be greater than that in the United States. 51
The costs of providing adequate social support for this population will be
enormous. This could lead to a number of policies with foreign policy im-
plications-for example , a guns versus butter debate , or opening the door
to greater immigration from the region. ]apan's aging population will also
likely require liberalization of its immigration policies. If there is a large-
scale influx of Chinese immigrants who retain close ties to their homeland ,
how will this affect Sino-]apanese relations? These are all speculative ques-
tions , but comparative and historical analyses could be useful for under-
standing the potential stresses and strains on Chinese foreign policy.
Other hypotheses related to demography worth testing have to do with
the middle class and foreign policy. Some democratic peace research posits
that middle classes generally have more cautious foreign policy preferences ,
owing to the benefits of economic interdependence and the costs of sacri-
ficing blood and treasure on foreign policy adventures. Moreover, because
of their preference for social safety nets , the middle classes are more likely
to help encourage guns versus butter debates. This may be even more likely
as China's population both gets richer and older.
How has China responded to emerging international norms? It is hard to
predict precisely wh
410 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

current regime in China. There is some pioneering research onChina's un-

derstandings of sovereignty,53 but much more needs to be done , across a
wider range of normative arenas.
What is the effect of the Chinese diaspora on Chinese foreign policy? We
are not referring here to the role of generations of overseas Chinese , but to
the impact of the post-Maoist brain drain and return. Diasporic studies and
foreign policy is not yet a field. 54 Preliminary work on lridia's diaspora sug-
gests that overseas talent can affect domestic politics through the transfer of
investment , management skills , and political preferences. In the Indian case ,
these preferences tend to be politically and economically conservative (or
classically liberal).55 Except for David Zweig's pioneering research on the
Chinese brain drain and returning students , there is virtually no other liter-
ature on this topic in the Chinese case. 56 Zweig shows that the Chinese lead-
ership has finally realized that this circulation of human capital is essential
for the development of China's comprehensive national power. 57 It is still not
clear, however , what, if any, political and economic preferences the diaspora
will bring directly or indirectly to the foreign policy process. As Yossi Shain
and Ahron Barth suggest, in principle , the effect of the diaspora on foreign
policy will depend on how permeable the policy pröcess is and how much
control the state can exercise over the diaspora. Yet we have no way of con-
ceptualizing, let alone measuring, this notion of permeability in the Chinese
policy process , in part because homeland attitudes toward the diaspora can
be so complex and contradictory.
The effect of regional interests on the center's foreign policy is also un-
derstudied. In an era of globalization , economic decentralization , and the
diffusion of information , regions in extant states are developing distinctive
foreign policy interests. What are the implications for the ability of central
governments to manage interstate relations? IR specialists in eastern Europe
are paying increasing attention to this issue in the Russian Federation. 58
There so far has been only a limited amount of work on regional economic
interests and Chinese foreign policy.59
In the face of perforated sovereignty-a function mainly of economic
integration -there is wide variation in how states have defined citizenship ,
in the mechanisms they use fo
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 4II

Relatedly, what role do racial stereotypes play in the formulation and ex-
ecutÌon of foreign policy? This is a neglected topic in international relations
in genera l. Yet there is no reason to believe that racial stereotypes do not
matter. They have mattered enormously in the domestic histories of major
powers , and there is little reason to believe that these effects stop at the bor-
der. We know that cultural and racial stereotyping has an important effect
on how decision-makers carry out net assessment processes when estimat-
ing the overall military power and competence of other states. 60 There is
interesting , if controversial , evidence that American racial stereotypes mili-
tated against the construction of deep multilateral security cooperation with
Asians during the Cold War. 61 We know that in China , popular and elite
hatred of ]apan and the ]apanese is often baldly framed in racist terms.
In addition to these more micro-process-focused research topics , the field
could use an updated macrohistorical account of the evolution of Chinese
foreign policy since 1949. Not only have Yahuda's masterful volumes been
useful for teaching undergraduates and graduates , but they embody themes
and arguments about what drives the totality of China's foreign policy. De-
spite new research methods , theories , and sources (including new Chinese
materials and declassified materials on foreign policy in the 1950S and
I960s , and transcripts and notes from the China-U.S. and China-]apan nor-
malization processes) , we have seen nothing comparable in the past decade
that rethinks the "big questions" such as the role of Marxist-Leninist ide-
ology, nationalist ideology, perceptions of power realities , the impact of ex-
ternal actors and opportunities , and so on. How does one explain the quite
radical change in China's foreign policies from the Maoist to the post-
Maoist periods , from what Samuel Kim has referred to as a system trans-
former role to a system preserver role? The fact that this shift from Maoist
anti-engagement to Dengist engagement with global capitalist institutions
occurred in the absence of any change in regime type , and was carried out
by many of the people who had been in power before the shift , has very few
historical analogues.
In sum , the study of Chinese foreign policy over the past ten or so years
has made noticeable advances in its understanding of past and current Chi-
nese behavior
412 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

At the same time , the study of Chinese foreign policy has yet to fully re-
alize its potentia l. In all facets of scholarship , students of Chinese foreign
policy still have much to accomplish. As our partiallist suggests , there re-
main many unanswered questions about China's international behavior and
many unexplored theoretical and methodological approaches that could yet
answer many of these questions. There are also many underutilized research
materials that could contribute to knowledge of China's international be-
havior through traditional as well as more contemporary approaches to in-
ternational relations. The China foreign policy community itself is still very
small , especially in light of the sheer number of topics that need to be cov-
ered in greater depth and sophistication and the demand for information
from the policy world. It is clear, too , that as it develops and grows , the fìeld
of Chinese foreign policy studies holds to the path that Allen Whiting fìrst
blazed thirty-fìve years ago , and that its debt to his groundbreaking schol-
arship is undiminished.

Notes

1. Allen S. Whiting , China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean
W句 r (Stanford: Stanford University Press ，工 960); The Chinese Calculus of Deter-
rence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press , 1975); and
China Eyes ]apan (Berkeley: University of California Press , 1989).
2. For two examples , see Allen S. Whiting , '‘ ASEAN Eyes China: The Security
Dimension ," Asian Survey 37 , 4 (April 1997): 299-322 , and "China's Use ofForce ,
1950-96, and Taiwan ," International Security , 26 , 2 (Fall 2001): 103 -3 I.
3. Whiting , China Crosses the Yalu. Subsequent research fìndings confìrmed 明Thit­
ing's early analysis of this problem. See Thomas J. Christensen , Useful Adversaries:
Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization , and Sino-American Conflict, I947-S8
(Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press , 1996) , ch. 5.
4. Whiting , "ASEAN Eyes China."
5. Whiting , China Eyes ]apan. On this issue , see also Allen S. Whiting , "Assertive
Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy," Asian Survey 23 , 8 (August 19 83): 9 工 3-33.
6. Whiting , "Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy."
7. Johnston's own data are not entirely reassuring on this score either , because
negative feelings toward Japan persist despite the high level of bilateral economic in-
terdependence and Japan's relatively restrained security posture in the region.
8. Edward D. Mansfìeld and Jack Snyder, '‘ Democratization and the Danger of
War," International Security 20， 工 (Summer 1995): 5-38.
9. Michael Ng-Quinn , "The Effects of Bipolarity on Chinese Foreign Policy,"
Survey 26 , 2 (Spring 1982): II6 -30; Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization
and Its International Implicatio 邸， I94S-I99o (Seattle: University of Washington
Press , 1992); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross , The Great W句 II and the Empty
Fortress: China's Search forSecurity (New York: Norton , 1997); and Denny Roy吨
China 云 Foreign Relations (Basingstoke , Eng.: Macmillan , I998).
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 413

10. Harold ]acobson and Michel Oksenberg , China 云 Participatiol1 in the IMF,
the World Bank, and GATT: Toward a Global Economic Order (Ann Arbor: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press , 1990); Elizabeth Econorny and Michel Oksenberg , eds. ,
China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Colincil on Foreign Rela-
tions Press , 1999); Margaret M. Pearson , "The Major Multilateral Economic Insti-
tutions Engage China ," in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power ,
ed. Alastair lain ]ohnston and Robert S. Ross (London: Routledge，工 999) ， 207-34.
11. Lucian Pye , The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Carnbridge ，孔1ass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press ，工 992); Kenneth Lieberthal , "Dornestic Politics and Foreign Policy," in
China's Foreign Policy in the I98os , ed. Harry Harding (New Haven , Conn.: Yale
University Press , 19 84) , 43 一 70; and Robert Ross , "Frorn Lin Biao to Deng Xiaop-
ing: Elite Instability and China's US Policy," China Quarterly , no. II8 (June 1989):
26 5-99.
12. David Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global
Lin走ages (It haca , N. Y.: Cornell University Press , 2002)
13. Whiting , China Eyes Japan; ]ianwei Wang , Limited Adversaries: Post- Cold
War Sino-American Mutual Images (New York: Oxford University Press ，之 000);
David Sharnbaugh , Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, I972-I99o
(Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press , 1991).
14. Bruce D. Larkin , China and Africa, I949-I97o: The Forei喀 gl刀1 Pol
Pe
ω ople's Republ占ic of China (Berkeley: University of California Press ，工 97 工).
J; 5. Alastair lain]ohnston , "The Social Effects o fI nternational Institutions on Do-
rnestic (ForeignPolicy) Actors ," in Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of
Domestic and International Institutions , ed. Daniel Drezner (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press , 2002) , and Allen Carlson , "Constructing a New Great Wall: Chinese
Foreign Policy and the Norrn of State Sovereignty" (Ph.D. diss. , Yale University, 2000).
16. Sharnbaugh , Beautiful Imperialist.
工 7. Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis , Interpreting China 云 Grand Strategy:
Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica , Calif.: Rand Corporation ，二 000); Nathan
and Ross , Great Wall.
工 8. Sarnuel S. Kirn , China , The United Nations and World Order (Princeton ,
N. J.: Princeton University Press ，工 979); Peter Van Ness , Revolution and China's For-
eign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Pr
414 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

22. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita , David Newman , and Alvin Rabushka , Red Flag
over Hong Kong (Chatham , N. J.: Chatham House ，工 996); Emerson Niou and Peter
C. Ordeshook, "A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's The Art of W句r，"
Journal of Peace Research 归， 2 (May 1994): 161-74.
23. An excellent example of a theoretically (though not so methodologically)
diverse collection on Chinese foreign policy is Thomas W. Robinson and David
Shambaugh , eds. , Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford
University Press , 1994).
24. Matthew Evangelista , Unarmed Forces: The 1切nsnational Movement to
End the Cold W句r (Ithaca , N. Y.: Cornell University Press , 1999).
25. Janice Gross Stein , "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as an Uncom-
mitted Thinker," International Organization 48 , 2 (Spring 1994): 155 - 84.
26. Ka r1 W. Deutsch et a l., Political Community and the North Atlantic
Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton University Press ，工 957).
27. Amitav Acharya , "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Local-
ization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," International Organization
58 , 2 (April 2004): 二 39-75.
28. Margaret Hermann and Cha r1 es Hermann , "Who Makes Foreign Policy De-
cisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry," International Studies Quarterly 33 , 4 (De-
cember 1989): 36 工 -87; Paul A. Kowert and Margaret G. Hermann , "Who Takes
Risks? Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making ," Journal of Conflict Resolu-
t1 0n 4 工， 5 (October 1997): 611-37; Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack , "Let
Us Now Praise Great Men (and Women): Restoring the First Image ," International
Security 巧， 4 (Spring 2001): 107-47; Joe D. Hagan , "Domestic Political Systems
and War Proneness ," Mershon International Studies Review 38 , 2 (October 1994).
29. For example , the Correlates ofWar Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, the
International Crisis Behavior data set , and the Kansas Events data set, among others.
30. For an example of vector auto-regression and its application to Chinese for-
eign policy, see Kuofeng Su , "Taiwan's Democratization and Its Foreign Policy: The
Impact of Taiwan's Elections on Its China Policy" (Ph.D. diss. , University of Michi-
gan , 2000).
31. For a review of different computer-aided content analysis programs , see
Kimbe r1 y Neuendorf and Paul Skalski , "Quantitative Content Analysis and the
Measurement
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 4I5

John H. Holland, Hidden Order: How Adaptatio l1 Builds Complexity (Reading,

Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1995).
33. Our thanks to Wang Dong for discovering the foreign policy holdings in pro-
vincial archives , and to Manjari Miller, Andy Kennedy, and Lorenz Luthi for pro-
飞riding information on the contents of these archives.
34. Our thanks to Lorenz Luthi for the information about the eastern European
archives.
35. See , e.g. , Naoto Ito , "China's Decision and Strategy Toward the Normaliza-
tion with Japan" (MA thesis , Harvard University, Regional Studies East Asia , 2005).
3 6 . The HPCW, for instance , organized a major conference on "The Cold War
and Its Legacy in Tibet" in April 2002. A considerable amount of Soviet archival
material on China's role in the Korean War has been translated into Chinese and
published in Taiwan. See Zhihua Shen , ed. , Chaoxian zhanzheng: Eguo dang'an-
guan de jiemi wenjian [The Korean War: declassi且ed documents from the Russian
archives ], Historical Material Collection No. 48 (Taipei: Academia Sinica , Institute
of Modern History, 2003).
37. Ni Shixiong , Dangdai xifang guoji guanxi lilun (Shanghai: Fudan Univer-
sity Press , 200I); Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng , Guoji guanxi yanjiu shiyong
fangfa [Practical methods of international studies] (Beijing: People's Publishing
House , 200I); Wang Yizhou , Xifang guoji zhengzhi xue: lishi yu lilun [Western in-
ternational politics studies: history and theory] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chu-
banshe , I998); Wang Yizhou , Dangdai guoji zhengzhi xilun [An analysis of con-
temporary international politics] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe , I99 5).
38. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye , chief eds. , Zhanyi xue [Military cam-
paign studies] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe , 2000).
39. See e.g. , Grant McCracken , The Long Interview (Beverly Hills , Calif.: Sage
Publications ，工 988); Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing:
The Art of Hearing Data (Thousand Oaks , Calif.: Sage Publications , 2004); Jaber
F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein , Handboo走。f Interview Research: Context and
Method (Thousand Oaks , Calif.: Sage Publications , 200I).
40. The Research Center on Contemporary China at Peking University, the Pub-
lic Opinion Research Institute at People's University, the Survey and Statistics Insti-
tute at the China Communications University, and Horizon Group are among the
reputable s
416 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press , 1975); id. , "China's Use of
Force , 1950-96, and Taiwan ," International Security 26 , 3 (Fall 20~1): 工 03-3 1.
43. Ann Kent, China , the United Nations , and Human Rights: The Limits of
Compliance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press ，工 999); Alastair lain
]ohnston, Social States: China in International Security Institutions, I98o-2ooo
(forthcoming); Evan Medeiros , Shaping Chinese Foreign Policy: The Evolution of
Chinese Policies on WMD Nonproliferation and the Role of U.S. Policy, I98o-
2004 (Stanford: Stanford University Press , forthcoming).
44. Lu Ning , The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China (Boul同
der , Colo.: Westview Press , 2000) , and David M. Lampton , ed. , The Making of
Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, I978-2000 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press , 2001).
45. The relativity in definitions of core interests and concepts in international
relations was stated forcefully by the godfather of modern realist theory, Hans
Morgenthau. See his third principle of political realism , Politics Among Nations:
The Struggle for Power and Peace , 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978) , 8-9".
46. Dale Copeland , The Origins of Major Power War (lthaca , N. Y.: Cornell
University Press , 2000).
47. Stephen Brooks , "The Glo balization of Production and the Declining Benefits
of Conquest ," JOUlηal ofConflict Resolution 43 , 5 (October 1999): 646-70.
48. Soo Yeon Kim , '‘ Structure and Change in International Trade and Milita-
rized Conflict: When Is Engagement Constructive?" (unpublished paper, 1999).
49. David Zweig and Bi ]ianhai, "The Foreign Policy of a ‘ Resource Hungry'
State" (unpublished paper，之 005).
50. Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, "A Surplus of Men: A Deficit of
Peace Security and Sex Ratios in Asia's Largest States ," International Security 26 ,
4 (Spring 2002): 5 -3 8.
51. Richard ]ackson and Neil Howe , "The Graying of the Middle Kingdom: The
Demographics and Economics of Retirement Policy in China" (presentation at the
Center for International and Strategic Studies ，二 5 May 2004).
52. Anti-terrorism may undermine some of these norms (e.g. , democratization)
while strengthening others (e.g. , humanitarian intervention to alleviate socioeco-
nomic conditions that breed support for terrorism).
53. See Allen Carlson, "More Than ]ust Saying No: China's Evolving Approach
to Sovereignty and Interven
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 417

58. Jeronim Perovic , Internationalization of Russiall Regions and the Conse-

quences for Russian Foreign and Security Policy. Regionalization of Russian Foreign
and Security Policy Project, Working Paper No. 工 (Zurich: Center for Security Stud-
ies and Conflict Research, 2000).
59. See , e.g. , Gale Christoffersen , "Xinjiang a n: d the Great Islamic Circle: The
Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning ," China
Quarterly , no. 133 (March 1993): 130-5 工; Peter T. Y. Cheung and James T. H.
Tang , "The External Relations of China's Provinces ," in The Ma走 ing of Chinese
Foreign andSecurity Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford:
Stanford University Press , 2001) , 91-120. Jean-Marc Blanchard has also done re-
search on the foreign economic interests of China's northeastern provinces. See his
essay in Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and Interna-
tional Institutions , ed. Daniel 耶T. Drezner (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press ,
2002).
60. Michael Fischerkeller, "David Versus Goliath: The Influence of Cultural
Judgments on Strategic Preference" (Ph.D. diss. , Ohio State University, 1997).
6 1. David Capie , '‘ Power, Identity and Multilateralism: The United States and
Regional Institutionalism in the Asia-Pacifìc" (Ph.D. diss. , York University, 2002).
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lndex

Acheson , Dean, 57 U. S.-Japan relations ，工 81; and win-

Adams , John , 334n34 dows logic , 52; in 嘀咕0 ， 243 ，巧 1-
Adler , Emanuel , 191 64 , 267nn3 , 5, 270n36 , 273n66;and
Afghanistan: Chinese position" on, 230- 嘀嘀1]， 3 6
3 1 ; Soviet invasion of, 74; U. S. invasion al-Qaeda , 18
of, 19-20, 27 , 76, 176; and U. S. credi- Amnesty International, 220
bility, 18-19 , 24 , 26 anarchy, 188-89 , 3 11 , 387 , 389
Africa , 124 , 241n65 , 336n72; peacekeep- Anderson , Zheng , 324
mg operatlO ns m , 224 , 229 ，二 33 ， 29 6 - Annan , Ko且，之 7 6
97; sources on, 397; and WTO , 258 , anti-Americanism , 341-4 丰， 344 ， 35 0 -
267n3 , 270n36 51 , 37 0n1 3, 373 n 39 , 37 6n 5 1, 393;in
Afro-Asian movement , 97 , II8 Europe , 37 4 n 44
agent~based modeling (ABM) , 393 anti-communism , 59- 60 , 133
Agreed Framework (North Korea; 1994) , APEC (Asia-Paci且c Economic Coopera-
139 , 17 1 tion) forum , 172 , 176, 181 , 205 , 244 ,
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA; 嘀咕。)， 248 , 254 , 271n 5!; alliance dynamics
25 8 in , 267n 5, 27 In4 3; Shanghai year in ,
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC; 257 , 27 1n 5 2
WTO) , 261 Argentina , 247 , 255 , 267n3
agriculture: Chinese , 102, 123, 245 , 247 , arms control , 5, 201 , 29 2, 393 , 4 06
268n15; in developing countries , 252 , arms sales , 200 , 205; U.S.-Taiwan , 38 ,
273n63; development box in，之7 丰n62; 6 卒， 76-77 ， 19 2
in Sino-Japanese relations ，工 65; subsi- ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
dies to，二43 ，二 5 二， 254-55 , 259- 60 , Nations) ， 1 口， 17 6 ， 185n41 , 3 80 , 39 0 ,
27 2n 57 , 273nn66 -69 , 274n72; tar- 402
iffs on, 252 , 255 , 260 , 273n64; U. S. , ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) , 172 ，工 7 6
268nI5 ， 272n57 ，二 73nn66-67 ， ASEAN + Three (APT) , 172
二 74 n 7 2 ; WTO negotiations on , 7 , Asian financial crisis (1997-98) , 17λ
243 , 245 , 254-55 , 258-61 , 263-64 , 201 , 282 , 286- 87
272nn57 ,62 , 273nn62-63 ,66-67 Asian Monetary Fund , 172
AhQ， 3 二 6， 3 2 9 asylum: for Dalai Lama , 97 , 100; for
Aksai Chin region , 104-5 , 107 ，工 13 ， 115 ， Korean refugees , 146
118 , 124 attribution error, 88 , 102-3 , 388
alliance dynamics: in APEC ，二 67 n 5 ， Australia , 61 , 17 丰， 228 , 247 , 27 工 n43 ，
271n43; and China threat theory, 345; in WTO ，巧 1 ， 259 , 262 , 264 ,
201; and Chinese expansionism, 281; 267n3
in Cold War , 59-60 ，工 33; with inter- Austria , 36
mestic actors , 299-300; and Korean
War , 54 , 57-58; and North Korea , 36 , Bangladesh, 125 , 247 , 26 工 -6 二， 293
149; post-Cold War，工 37 ， 162, 168- Barbalet , J. M. , 331
69; and PRC invasion of Vietnam , 74- Barnett, Michael , 191
75; and Sino-Indian relations , 124; and Barth, Ahron , 410
Sino-Japanes"e relations , 166-69 , 173; Beijing Area Study (BAS) survey, 346-69 ,
and Taiwan issue , 59-60 , 62 , 78; and 383; amity towards U. S. in , 348-49 ,
4 64 INDEX

3 5I -57 , 3 60 , 3 64 , 366 - 6 7; character- Carlson, Alan , 6, 8, 2I7 , 3 8I , 39 I , 393 ,

istics of respondents in , 347 , 349-52; 399 , 4 0I
conclusions of, 364-69; othering in , Carter, Jimmy, 33
34 6 , 34 8 -49 , 3 5I, 355 , 35 8 - 60 , 3 6I , Central America , 270n36. See also Latin
367; questions in , 347-49; threat per- America
ception in , 3 60 - 6 5, 367 , 375n49 Central Asia , 30 ，工 99 ， 29 0 ， 3 8 3- 8 5
Beijing International Intervention and Central Military Commission (CMC;
State Sovereignty Conference (2002) , PRC) , I07 , II2-I3 , II7 , II9-2I
23 工 Cha , Victor , I39
Belgrade embassy bombing (I999) , 8, Chanda , Nayan , 74
工 57 n 3 0 ， 228 , 239n4 工; and apology di- chemical weapons ，巧， 28 ， 32, 37
plomacy, 326-28; and Chinese public Chen, King , 73
opinion , 227 , 33 I , 34 2 , 344 , 34~ 353 , Cheney, Richard , 309
364 , 3 68 Chen Feng, 322
Bhutan , I05 Cheng Shuaihua , 229
Bi Jianhai , 408 Chen Guanglei , 33 6n 7 4
bin Laden , Osama , 230 Chen Jie , 344
biological weapons ，巧， 28 Chen Pingsheng, 397
Blaney, David , 33 3n2 9 Chen Shui-bian , 23 , 76, I95 , 247-48
blockades , 22 , 25 Chen Yi , 65 , 398; and Sino-Indian war,
Bolivia , 267n3 III-I2 , II5-I6 ，工 2I ，工 24
border conflicts: Sino-Indian , 86-I30; Chen Zhibin , I29n87
Sino-Russian , 30; Sino-Soviet, 52 , 69- Chen Zhou , 400
7 I ; sources on , 397 Chiang Kai-shek , 59-60 , 65 , Iq , II7
borders , 8-9 , I82; with Burma , I 巧， Chile ，二 67 n 3 ， 27 In 43
290; with Central Asia , 30; with India , China , Republic of (pre-I949) , 9 I. See
87 ， 89 ，工 03-5 ， 385; with Mongolia , also Taiwan
句， 75 ， II5; with Nepal , II5 China collapse theory，工 9 2 ，工 94-95 ， I99
Bosnia , 224 , 229 , 295 China Crosses the Yalu (Whiting) , 395
Bo Yibo , 396 China Eyes Japan (Whiting) , 38 工 -82
Brazil , 246, 255 , 259 , 267n3 The China Threat (Gertz) , 343
Brewer, Marilynn , 3 工 3 ， 3 2I China threat theory，工 86-2q ， 382 , 389;
Brezhnev Doctrine , 69 and Chinese foreign policy，工 86-88 ，
Brown, Lester, I9 3, I9 5, 200 20I , 203; Chinese interpretations of,
Brubaker, Rogers , 330 I9 工- 95; and clash of civilizations the-
Burma ，工巧，均 O ory, I93 , I95 ，工 99-200 ， 302n3 ， 3IO­
Bush , George H. W. , 222 , 280 , 322 II , 320; and Cold War mentality, 5,
Bush, George W. , 205 ,.} 29; and North I87 , 200; and Confucian culture ，工 93 ，
Korea , 32-33 , I38 , I80; andTaiwan , I95 ，工 99 ， 202; and containment policy,
37 , 7 6 5, I9 2, I9 8 ，丰 OI; as domestic propa-
ganda , 202-3; and economic develop-
Cairns Groùp (嘀咕o coalition) , 243 , ment， 5 ，巧 2 ， I94 ，工 99-200 ， 202 ， 204;
258-60 , 264 , 267n3 , 273n66 and India , I87 , I93 -97 ，之 05; and Ja-
Cambodia , I69 , I76, 238n23; and PRC pan , I73 , I87 , I9I-94 , I97-98 , 20 3,
invasion of Vietnam , 72-75; UN mis- 20 5- 6 ; and Korea , I3 9 ，工 4I ， 143 , I47 ,
slO n m , 223 , 233 , 297 工 49; and military.capability, 187 , I9 2,
Canada , 247 , 27 In 43 , 272n54 , 345;in I94 ，工 97 ， 205; and natural resources ,
WTO , 243 , 2 5I, 265 , 267n3 , 269n29 I92-93 , I95 , 200; and nuclear weâp-
Cancun conference (WTO; 2003) , 254- ons , I94 , I96 -97; origins of, I9 I -94 ,
55 , 25 8, 26 5 I99; public opinion on , 290-9I; re-
capitalism , I68 , 280 , 34I buttalof, 5, I87 ，工 99-20I; and repu-
Caribbean , 224 ，工 38n26 ， 270n36 tation , 206 , 382; and social identity,
 INDEX 465

18 7 ，二 03 ， 3 12 ; sources on , 399-400; racial stereotypes in , 411; Sino-Soviet

and Southeast Asia , 193-94 , 199 , 205; relations in , 132- 33; u. S.-Soviet rela
and Taiwan , 192-93 , 195-9 6，工 9 8 ， tions in , 15 - 1 6; use of force in , 4 0 5;
203 - 6; as threat to China ，工 9 6 -99; USSR in , 4 , 35
and U. S. , 137 , 18 7 , 192-94 , 196, 199 , Colombia , 267n3
20 元二 05-6 ， 290; and WTO , 186 ，工 94 ， communism, 54 , 56，工 71 ， 177; collapse of,
201 , 204-5 142, 162-63; as economic model , 16 3 ,
China Youth Daily opinion polls , 344 - 4 5 168 , 34 1;. See also anti-communism;
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences ideology
(CASS) , 345 , 401 Conboy, Kenneth , 100
Chinese Civil 币Tar ， 54 , 57 , 59- 60 , 63 , Confucianism, 193 , 195 ，工 99-200 ， 202 ,
84 n 7 1 32 5
Chinese Communist Party (CCP): and Congo , UN operation in (MONU C), 2 丰 9 ，
China threat theory, 202-3; and Cold 233 , 297
War , 132 , 162; and economic develop- Congress Party (lndia) , 90
ment，工 77 ， 34 工; Fifteenth Congress of constructivist theory, 27 8, 31 0 , 3 工 3 ，
(1997) , 28 3; information control 峙， 333 n2 9
归， 398; internal communications of, Contact Group (Kosovo conflict) , 227
34 2 , 395-9 6 ; and Korea policy, 5 丰， containment policy, 179 , 181 , 281; and
工 3 1 -3 立，工 4 0 ， 14 2 -43 , 145; legitimacy China threat theory, 5, 192, 198 ，丰 01;
of, 19-20 , 136, 138 , 168 , 351; Ninth vs. engagement, 309 , 383; Kissinger
Party Congress of (1969) , 70-71; 197 8 on , 317; and Korea , 139-40 ，工 49
Plenum of, 73; and public opinion , 340 , Cooley, Charles , 3 工 4 ， 3 20
342; and reform，工 44 ， 180; and Sino- cooperation , multilateral: economic, 6 ,
Soviet border clashes , 70-71; Sixteenth 21-23 , 140, 193 , 310 , 380 , 3 8 5;and
Party Congress of (2002) , 246; threats globa1ization , 6 , 280 , 289-92; security,
tO ， 19 ，工 35; and Tibet , 95; and Viet- 工 68 ，工 79- 80 ，二 33 ， 289-90 ， 3 8 3;and
nam War，口， 67 sovereignty vs. intervention , 7- 8 ，二 33 ，
Chong Ling , 326 3 8 工 ; strategic, 205. See also particular
Chu Shulong，二 3 1 -3 2 multilateral organizations
CIA (U. S. Central lntelligence Agency) , 3 , Copeland, Dale , 191
92 , 100-101 corporations , multinationalltransnational
citizenship , 410; global , 280 (孔1NCs/TNCs) ， 299-3 00
civil society, Chinese , 299 Costa Rica ，二 67 n 3
Clapper, James R. , 28 , 35 Crawford, Neta , 330
"clash of civilizations" theory (Hunting- credibility: Chinese , 23 , 109 一工 0 ， 15 0 ，
ton) , 193 , 195 ，工 99-200 ， 302n3 ， 310- 工 5 4 l l5; and deterrence ，丰，工 5 -16 , 29 ,
11 , 320 33 , 38 , 206; and status , 204; U. S. , 16,
class: and public opinion , 360 , 369; in Ti- 18- 工 9 ， 24 ， 26-27 , 77. See also reputa-
bet, 94-95 , 10 1. See also middle class tion; resolve
Clinton , Bill , 14 3 ，工 67 ， 309; and Belgrade crime , transnational , 182 , 283 , 28 9 , 349 ,
embassy bombing, 326 -28; and China 3 60 , 3 62
threat theory，工 94 ， 19 6; China visit of, crisis dynamics , 406 ，斗 08; and deter-
174; Korea policy of, 33 , 138; and Tai- rence , 2 , 13 , 29-30 , 37; escalation in ,
wan , 37 叫， 3 0 ， μ-33 ， 35-36 ， 3 8 ; in 嘀嘀哇，
Coggins , George , 34 35-3 6
Cold War: alliance dynamics in , 59-60 , Cross-Strait Trade and Economic Promo-
133; CCP in ，工 3 卒， 162; and China's tion Association (PRC), 248
Korea polic瓦 13 工- 3 3; deterrence in, Cuban Missile Crisis , 65 , 121
15-17; end of, 162-63 , 301n3 , 389; Cultural Revolution , 69-70 , 3 工 9 ， 39 8 ，
lndia in , 63-64 , 97; mentality of, 5, 408
工 87 ， 200; nuclear weapons in , 17 , 35; culture，工 74 ， 279 ， 33 2nn6 ， 10 ，工 3 ， 4 01 ;
4 66 INDEX

and clash of civilizations theory，工 93 ， and Sino-Indian war, 87; and Sputnik,
195 ，工 99- 200 ， 3 02n 3 , 310-11 , 320; 62; stable vs. unstable , 14 ，工 6， 30-36 ,
Confucian，工 93 ， 195 , 199-200, 202 , 388; in Taiwan Strait, 13 二 24 ， 3 0 -3 丰，
325; inIndian-Tibetan relations , 91 , 37-38 , 50-51 , 77 , 381; and threat
9 8 -99 perception ，工 46-48; Whiting on ，工 86 ，
currency revaluation , 172 , 286 379
Cyprus , 296 Deutsch , Kad , 390
Czechoslovakia , 69 , 3 0 5n 5 5 developing countries , 402; agriculture in ,
25 丰， 258-59 ， 272n62 ，二 73n63i capac-
Dalai Lama , 92-93 , 95-98 , 100 ity building in , 252; and China , 234 ,
Dazhen islands , 60 251-55 , 263-66; exports of，二 52 ，
decision-making , 244 , 299; pathologies 260-61 , 267; foreign aid to , 64 , 72 ,
of, 388; public opinion in , 364 , 368- 165-166, 177 , 181; and free trade ,
69; research on, 39 1, 393 , 396, 406 二 46 ， 260 , 272n54; and globalization ,
decolonization , 97 , 33 6n72 28 卒， 289; and international politics ,
demilitarized zone (DMZ; Korean penin- 232; and peacekeeping operations ,
sula) , 28 , 3 2, 35 , 3 8 , 59 296; rural economies of, 258 , 273n63;
democracy，二 05 ， 280 ， 350; and group and Sino-Indian war，句， 97 ， 1 巧， 120;
identity，工 90-91; and peace , 190-91 , and sovereignty, 381; textiles of, 261-
302n3; and Sino-]apanese relations , 62; and Vietnam War , 66; and WTO ,
工 67- 68 ，工 77; in Taiwan，工 6 ， 171 7 ， 243 ，二 51-59 ， 261- 6 7 ，二 72n62. See
democratic movements , 293 , 399. See also particular countries and regions
also Tiananmen protests Diaoyu (Senkak l,l) Islands ，工 55n16 ， 172,
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 193
See North Korea dissidents , Chinese , 318
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP; Tai- Doha Round (WTO) ，丰 43-44 ， 25 2 -53 ，
wan) ，巧 257-62; agriculture in ，二 7 2n 57 ，
democratization, 9 , 409 , 416n5 2; dangers 273n63; China's role in , 254 , 257 , 265 ,
of, 376n53 , 386; and globalization , 二 7 1n 44
282-83; and public opinion , 341 , 367 domestic politics: and deterrence , 15 - 16,
Deng Xiaoping , 321; and China threat 148; and human rights , 225 , 305n55;
theory, 192; and foreign relations , 134 , and international politics ，丰， 8, 144-
156n19 , 174; and globalization, 279 , 146, 279 , 288 , 380-81 , 384; theories
281 , 411; and public opinion , 369n1; of, 3 8 7- 88
reforms of, 279 , 317; research on, domestic politics , Chinese: and borders ,
39 1 -9 丰， 395 -9 6 ; and sovereignty vs. 63 , 117 , 123 , 385; and brain drain ,
intervention , 223; and use of force , 73 , 410; and China threat theory, 202-3;
121 , 124 decentralization in , 8-9 , 298-99 , 410;
Deng Yong , 5-6 , 186 and economic interdependence , 389-
denuclearization ，丰， 14 , 24. See also 90; and foreign policy, 7-9 , 5 丰， 144-
nuclear weapons 4 6 , 4 08 ; instability in , 3 -4 , 7 , 135 ,
deterrence , 3-4 , 13 -49 , 148-5 0 , 4 00 , 144-45 , 202 , 204 , 263 , 299-300 ,
406; and China threat theory, 206; in 349 , 360 , 362-63 , 386; and Korea ,
Cold War , 15-17; vs. compellence , 134 , 137 , 140, 14 2 ，工 46， 384; and Ko-
148; and credibility，二， 15- 16 ， 29 ， 33 ， rean War , 54-55; legitimacy in ，工 9-
3 8 ，丰 06; and domestic politics ，巧， 20 , 136, 138 , 168. , 300 , 351; and male
148; extended , 15 -1 8; and 且rst-strike surplus , 408 -9; mass mobilization in ,
capability、 3 0 -31 ， 37; inKorea , 2, 13- 工 23 ， 202; and public opinion , 340 ,
16, 24-30 , 32-38 , 146-50; in Korean 350 , 368-69; and Quemoy-Matsu
War , 149-50 , 153n5; and military ca- attacks , 62-63; reform in , 144-45 ,
pability, 2, 13 -14 , 16; nuclear , 1 乡， 134 ， 159 n 3 8 ，工 80 ， 298 ， 341 ， 36~38~re­
189; and reputation , 14-'16 , 188; and search on, 407; and Sino-Indian war ,
security dilemma dynamics , 14 , 16, 30; 63 , II7 , 123; and Sino-]apanese rela-
 INDEX 4 67

tlons , 5 ，工 68; and Sino-Sovlet border with , 1, 14 1 , 180, 382; and China's Ko-
clashes , 70-71; and Sino-D. S. rela- rea policy, 136, 138 ，工 41; and dump-
tions , 196 , 257; sources on , 395 , 398 , ing , 248 , 252 , 268n17; instability in ,
402; and Taiwan issue , 60-61 , 137 , 34 9 , 362 - 63 , 386; interdependence in ,
380; and trade policy, 243 ，丰4 6 ， 257 , 162- 8 5 ， 3 8 4 ， 3 8 9-9 0 ， 39 立， 4 0 7-9 ，
263; and Vietnam , 73 , 75; and WTO , 4 1 丰 n7; multilateral cooperation in ,
24 2 ，丰 44-46 ， 258 ， 263-64 ， 267 ， 287 6 , 21-23 , 140, 193 , 310 , 380 , 385;
domestic politics , Indian; 3 ，句， 90 一归， and perçeived threat , 349 , 360 , 362-
98-100 , 103 , 105 , 113 63; and Sino-Japanese relations , 4-
domestic politics , Japan , 170 5, 168 , 180. See also World Trade
domestic politics , Japanese , 5, 198 Organization
domestic politics , Taiwanese ，巧， 20 ， 23 一 education , 9 , 352 , 355 , 3 6 9 , 374n47 ,
24 , 37 , 75-7 6 375n48; and amity, 354 , 356 , 366; and
domestic politics , D. S. ，巧， 19 , 34 1 , 344 anti-Americanism , 350- 口， 354; and
D PRK. See N orth Korea othering, 358 , 360-61 , 367; overseas ,
drug trafficking , 182, 283 , 289 , 360 345; and perceived threat , 362-65;
Du Li , 321 state control of, 37 6n 5 1. See also patri-
otic education campaign~ students
Eastern Europe , 69 , 3 0 5n 55 , 398 , 405 , Eisenhower, Dwight D. , 82n47
4 10 elites , urban , 340 , 343 , 345 , 3 66 , 3 8 3.
East Timor, 219 , 227-28 , 297 See also foreign policy elites
EC- 1 2 incident (工 9 6 9) ， 35 El Salvador, 91
economic development , Chinese: and encirclement, Chinese fear of, 58 , 74 ,
CCP，工 77 ， 34 1; and China threat the- 120 , 125 , 125n3 ，工 49 ， 23 0
ory, 5, 19 2 , 194 , 199- 200 , 202 , 204 , energy, 193 , 195 , 408. See also oil deposits
271n45; and Cold 币Tar ， 132 , 162- 63; environmental issues , 166 ，工缸，巧 8 ，均二，
destabilizing effect of, 144-45 , 171 , 360 , 408 -9; and globalization , 282 ,
173 , 177 , 180 , 299; and GDP growth 28 9
rate , 284 - 8 5; and globalization, 7 , EP-3 aircraft collision (2001; Hainan Is-
277 , 288 , 298; and internatiönal envi- land) , 8 , 157n30 , 327 , 332n13;and
ronment , 169 , 179 , 203; and Korea , apology diplomacy, 328 一巧; public
134 , 138 , 144 , 149; and legitimacy, opinion on , 342 , 34 6 , 353 , 3 6 4
工 36 ， 407; market-led , 168; and Nobel Ethiopia , 229
Prize , 3 工 7; and public opinion , 366; re- ethnicity: and conflict, 299 , 314 , 319 ,
alist approaches to , 388; regional in- 330 , 410; Han Chinese , 102, 319; in
equality in , 299; and self-deception , Southeast Asia , 74 , 34 0
326; and Sino-Japanese relations , 166, ethnocentrism , 310
169 , 17 1 ，工 77; and Sino-D. S. relations , Europe , 15 , 35-36 , 175 , 227 , 344 ,
196; and socialization , 383; and Tai- 374n44 , 397. See also Eastern Europe;
wan issue , 21 , 6 工 NATO
economy: communist vs. capitalist , 168 , European Union (EU) , 185n4 工， 20 5 ，
341; of developing countries , 258 , 二47 ， 38 5, 407; agricultural subsidies
273n63; and globalization , 278; Japa- in , 272n57 , 273nn67 ,69; and free
nese , 17 工， 17 6 -77 ，工 97; North Ko- trade ，二 56， 272n54; and North Korea ,
rean , 25-26 , 141 , 383; Taiwanese , 38 , 157n31 , 158n32; and WTO ，之 43 ， 245 ，
78; Tibetan, 92 二 5 0 -5 工，二 56，二6 二， 265 ， 267n3; and
economy, Chinese; command, 168; and WTO agriculture negotiations , 254-
military capability, 30 , 135; openness 55 , 25 8 - 61
of，二46; and Sino-Indian war，句， 65 ， exclusive economic zones (EEZs) ，工 7 2
114 , 120; threats to , 19 , 145 , 349 , expansionism: Chinese , 57 , 66 , 192, 281;
386; unfair practices in，之05 Indian , 93 -96, 102-3
economy, international: center-periphery exports: agricultural , 255 , 260 ,
capitalism in , 280; China's involvement 273nn68-69; Chinese , 247 , 253 , 262 一
4 68 INDEX

64; of developing countries , 252, 260- GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
61 , 267; and globalization, 7 , 288; in Trade) , 272n57
Sino-Japanese relations ，工 65; subsidies gender, 409
for , 260 , 273nn68-69; and WTO ，巧 L gender, in BAS , 351-52 , 355; and amity,
257 , 259 ，之 63- 6 4 354 , 356; and foreign policy, 368 ,
373 n 4 0 ; and othering, 359-6 工， 3 68 ，
face. See reputation; status 375n48; and threat perception , 363-
Fan Guoxiang, 228 , 232 65 , 3 68
Fanon, Franz , 336n72 generational differences: in Japan , 173-
Fearon, James , 3 口， 3 叫， 33 0 75; and nationalism, 5, 3 5 工; and other-
Fernandes , George , 194-95 , 197 ing, 359-6 工; post-Cold War , 173-75 ,
Festinger, Leon , 314 177; in public opinion, 35 0 -5 2, 355 ,
Fewsmith , Joseph , 28 7 , 340 357 , 363-65; and Tiananmen , 350-
且nancial issues , 245 , 282 , 289. See also 5 工， 355 ， 359 ， 3 6 3 ， 3 68
Asian financial crisis Geneva Conference (1954) , 61
First Five Year Plan (PRC; 工 953-57) ， 60 Geneva Conference (196抖，工 11 ， 124
first-strike capability, 30 -3 2, 34-35 , Germany, 36, 67 , 15 1, 227 , 247 , 285 ,
37-3 8 353
food security，丰 58 ， 273nn62-63 Gertz, Bill, 343
Foot, Rosemary, 336n79 Glaser, Charles ，工 89
foreign aid , 64 , 72 , 165-66, 177, 181 glo balization，工 -2 ， 276-306， 399; Chi-
foreign exchange reserves , 285-86 , 288 nese engagement with ，工 63 ， 28 4-9 8 ;
foreign investment, 19 卒， 246; direct (FDI) , Chinese views on , 277 , 279-84; debate
工 64 ， 285-86 ， 303n27 , 4 0 7; and glob- on , 277-79;definition of, 279; and
alization , 7 , 285-86 , 289; in North Deng Xiaoping , 279 , 28 工， 411; eco-
Korea , 26; in Sino-Japanese relations , nom lC, 6-7 , 277-78 , 283-88 , 298;
164; in Sino-Taiwanese relations , 22 , 77 hyper, 278 , 281 , 283; vs. localization ,
foreign policy elites , 6, 236n6 , 238n28 , 巧 9-3 00 ， 39 工， 410; and multilateral
二 39 nn 3 6 ，43 ， 3 80 , 39 工; and public cooperation, 6, 280 , 290-92; and
opinion, 340 , 369n1 , 370n5; sources multipolarity, 283 - 84; vs. nationalism ,
on, 396 , 401; and sovereignty vs. inter- 279 , 281 , 288 , 300; and security，工 82 ，
vention , 220 , 223 , 225-26, 234 277 , 283-84 , 288-98 , 300; social con-
Forward Policy (India) , 87 , 89 , 103-9 , struction of, 277; and sovereignty, 7-9 ,
112 一工 4 ， 116-18 , 122 , 124 23 1 -3 卒，二 77-78 ， 283-84 , 288 , 292 ,
France， 6 工， 285 ， 293 ， 345 ， 392; and sov- 298 , 300; as threat , 279-80 , 289; and
erelgnty vs. mterventlO n , 220 , 227 ，二 33 UN，二 76-77 ， 283 ， 301n1
Fravel , Taylor, 65 , 7 0 Goldstein , Avery, 4 , 379 , 383-84 , 388 ,
free trade ，工 7 立， 274 n8 工 ， 393; and devel- 4 00 -4 01
oping countries , 246 , 260 , 272n54; Goldstein, Lyle , 70
and EU, 256, 272n54; public opinion Gong Li , 397
on , 375n48 , 376n52 , 383; and Sino- Gorbachev, Mikhail , 74 , 389
Japanese relations , 167-68. See also Government Procurement Agreement
protectlOll1 Sm (GPA; WTO) , 249
Friedberg , Aaron , 310 Great Britain, 6 工，工 5 1 ， 220 ， 2 丰 7 ， 293 ，
Friedheim, Daniel , 204 392; and China threat theory，工 93;and
Fukuyama , Francis , 302n3 India , 102, 104-5 , 1 丰 3; and Tibet, 89-
Fu Quanyou , 15 6nr 9 9 0 ， 9 丰， 95 ， 97 ， 102
Great Leap Forward , 62-63 , 1 巧，
Galtung , Johan , 280 4 08
Garrett , Banning , 281 Gries , Peter Hays , 8-9 , 309 , 382 , 390-
Garver , John W. , 3-4 , 64 , 385 , 388 , 9 1, 4 01 , 4 0 3 -4
395-9 6, 399 Group of Eight , 172
 INDEX 4 69

Group ofTen (GI0; WTO) , 258 ，丰 60 ， Hussein. Saddam., .LT 59 n 44 , 30 9

27 2n 5 8 Hwang Jang Yap , 35
Group of Twenty (G20; WTO) , 254 一口， hyperglobalization , 278 ，丰 81 ， 283
二 5 8 -59 ， 27 1n 4 6
Group of Thirty-three (G33; WTO) , 258 ideational theory, 221 ，丰 35 ， 39 1
Guam , 21 , 33 identity. See national identity; social
Guatemala , 267n 3 , 295 identity
Gulf of Tonkin Incident (1964) , 66-67 ideology, 29 0 , 296 , 388 , 4II; and China
Gulf War (199 工)， 17- 20 ， 4 工 n17 ， 169 , threat theory, 202-3; and Korea po 1icy,
176, 219 , 221- 23 13 2, 134 , 137 , 14 二 -43 ， 379; North
Guo Danqun , 324 Korean , 25 , 383; and Sino-Soviet rela-
Guo Xingjian , 318 tions , 69 , 132 , 134 , 154n9; theories of,
Gu Qingsheng, 318 387; and Tibetan uprising , 102; and
Vietnam War , 66-68
Hainan Island aircraft collision. See EP-3 imperialism, 89 一庐， 202
aircraft collision Inayatullah , Naeem, 33 3 n 月
Haiti， 2 坷， 23 8n26 Inchon landing (Korean War) , 54 , 56
Han Chinese , 102 , 319 income: and anti-Americanism , 350 , 356 ,
He Di, 60 366; inequality of, 166, 286; and oth-
hegemonism: Chinese ，巧。- 91; Indian, ering, 358 , 360-61 , 367; and perceived
89-9 0 , 93-9 6 , II7- 18 ; U. S. , 179 , threat , 360 , 364 - 65; and pub 1ic opin-
23 工， 279- 80 , 344-45 , 3 64 , 3 68 ion , 9 , 35 2 -53 , 355 , 369 , 374n47
He Jiachan , II6 India: China's borders with , 87 , 89 , 103 一
He Long , 121 5, 385; in Cold War, 63-64 , 97; com-
Heritage Foundation , 191-92 parative studies of, 391 , 405; diaspora
historical memory: and foreign policy, from , 410; domestic politics of, 3, 63 ,
186 ， 3 80 - 8 工 ， 386 ， 388 ， 390 ， 405; in 90-91 , 98-100 , 103 , 105 , 113; For-
Sino-]apanese relations , 163 , 168 , ward Policy of, 87 , 89 , 103 -109 , II2-
174-75 ， 367 ， 376n51 ， 38 工 -82;and 114 , 1 工 6-118 ， 122 , 124; and Great
social comparison , 319; and sover- Britain , 102 , 104-5 , 123; growth rate
eignty vs. intervention, 218 , 223 , 231 , of, 285; hegemonism of, 89-90 , 93-
235 ， 322 ， 328 ， 38 丰， 391; and Taiwan 9 6 , II7 一工 8; media in, 93-94 , 100,
issue , 5 工， 3 8 4 120, 130n105; military capability of,
Ho Chih 岛1inh ， 68 99 , II8 , 122 , 125; NEFA in ，工 05 ， 112 ,
Hoffman , Steven , 100, 105 123; and Nepal , 117-18; nuclear weap-
Hong Kong , 164 , 193 , 269n26 , 271n43 , ons of, 125 ，工 86 ， 193-98; and Paki-
285 , 395; and WTO , 257 , 261 , 266 stan ， 117- 18 ，工 24; public opinion in ,
Horizon Group , 345 , 415n40 93 , 113 , 124 , 291; sources m , 399 , 402;
Huang Hua , 279 and Tibet, 3 ， 91-93 ， 98-100 ，工 25; Ti-
Hu Jintao ，工 74 ，巧 8n28 ， 380 , 385-86, betans in, 97 , 100, 125; use of force
39 1 against , 3-4; and USSR , 4 , 66 , II7-
humanitarianism，工穴，二 33-34. See also 18 , 120; and WTO ，二45-4 6 ，巧 0 ， 255 ，
intervention, multilateral: humanitarian 二 59-63 ， 26~270n3~272n55.See
human rights , 6 , 146, 181 ，二 89 ， 393;and also Sino-Indian relations; Sino-Indian
Chinese diplomacy, 23 卒， 292-93; m war
Czechoslovakia , 305n5 5; new norms Indochina , 54 , 86, 97. See also Cambodia;
on , 225-26 , 229 , 233-34 , 381; uni- Laos; Vietnam
versality of, 159n47, 225 ，二93 Indonesia , 228 , 25 8 , 267n3 , 34 0 , 353.
Hungary, 95-96 See also Southeast Asia
Huntington, Samuel，工 93 ， 195 ，工 99- 200 ， industry: information-technology (IT) ,
302n3 , 310-II , 320 286; and Sino-Taiwanese relations , 22吁
Hu Qiaomu，工 06 268n17; state-owned , 145 , 287; steel ,
47 0 INDEX

243 , 24 8 - 249 , 25 6 , 264-266 , Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

269n26 , 285 (UNIKOM) , 223
information , 8 -9; access to ，工 44-45 ， Iraq war (2003-) ， 33-34 ，口， 7 6 ， 2 巧，
410; and globa 1ization, 299; Internet- 298 , 345; Chinese reaction to , 157n28 ,
based，工 59n44; mi 1itary, 17 ，刀， 3 0 ， 159 n 44 ，工 80 ， 233; and deterrence , 18-
4 工 n17 ， 400 19; intentions vs. capabilities in , 309;
information technology (IT) ，巧， 286. See weapons used in , 20 , 27
also Internet isolationism, 279 , 34 工
Injustice: The Socia Bases of Obedience ltaly, 227
and Revolt (Moore) , 330
institutionalist theory, 387 ]apan, 398 , 407; and China threat theory,
intellectual property, 252 , 269n29 工 73 ， 18 7 ，工 9 工 -94 ， 197-98 ， 203 ， 205-
interdependence: economic , 162 - 8 5, 6; Chinese othering of, 355 , 358-59 ,
3 8 4 , 3 89-9 0 , 392 , 407-9 , 412n7;po- 367; Chinese public opinion on, 351 ,
1itical , 279-80; in Sino-]apanese rela- 353 , 37 6n 51; Chinese students in ,
tion~ 162- 8 5, 3 84 , 39~407 ， 4 工 2n7; 工 73 -7 6; civilianists vs. normalists in ,
and sovereignty vs. intervention, 226 18 工; constitution of, 168 , 170 , 173 ,
interdependence theory, 387 , 389-90 198; domestic po 1itics in , 5 ，王 68 ，工 7 0 ，
interests: Chinese national , 13 2 - 33; 工 98; economy of, 1 穴， 176 -77 , 197 ,
cultural， 9 工， 98-99; economic ，丰 4 2 ， 247 , 28 5; foreign policy of，工 69 ， 17 6 -
274n81 ; material , 3 工 2- 巧， 406; offen- 77; generational change in ，工 73-75; in-
sive vs. defensive , 247; regional , 4 工 0; dependence of, 179-80 , 182; and Ko-
security, 166-67 ，工 90 ， 19 2 ，二 63 ，二 81 ， rea , 13 , 139 , 14 2, 149 ，工 5 8n 3 2 ，工 69 ，

f!ir--J14
-jjJtdG4J1it1
288-98; trade ，二 4 6 -47 ， 262- 6 3 172 , 174 , 17 8, 197; and Korean War ,
intergroup relations: anger in , 330-31; 55 - 56 , 80n14; and Mao , 80n14 , 174;
competition in , 3 工 8- 巧，严 8-3 0 ; media in，工 84n36; Meiji Restoration

气6哈d
·zan
conflict in , 3 工 8 ， 330-31; emotion in , in， 16 3 ，工 78; militarism of, 177-78 ,

吐 i叶
338nl06; positivity in , 329-30; pre- 工 93 ， 197-98 ， 349 ， 360 ， 362-63 ， 40 工;
vention of competition in , 3 巧-丰 6; so-

Uvi
military capability of, 167, 170 ，工 73 ，
cial psychology of, 312-14. See also 176-81 , 198; in multilateral regional
social identity organizations ，工 7 2 ， 176-77; National
intermestic actors , 7- 8 ，二 87- 88 ， 299- Guidelines of (2005) , 173; nationalism
301 in， 16 3 ，工 97; nuclear weapons óf， 工 7 0 ，
internal-external security 1inkages , 2 , 8 , 198; public opinion in , 175 , 290-91;
144-46, 279 , 288 , 380-81 , 384 right wing in , 173 ，工 78; and Russia ,
International Bill of Rights , 293 16 9 ，工 78; and Sino-Indian relations , 65 ,
International Convention on Civil and 97; and South Korea , 172 , 174 , 178;
Political Rights , 15 9n4 7 and Taiwan issue , 77-78 ，工 97; technol-
International Monetary Fund (IMF) , 299 ogy of, 177; textbooks in , 178 , 18 工，
International Telecommunications Union 382; as threat to China , 204 , 344; in
(ITU) ， 27 日151 triangular relationship , 163 , 166; and
Internet, 15 9 n 44 , 34 二， 4 0 3-4 UN，工 69-7 0 ， 173 , 17 6 ，工 7 8 ，工 8 工， 19 2 ;
intervention, multilateral , 217-4 工， 4 02 ; U. S. military in，日，工 79-80 ， 182; and
Chinese acceptance of, 221-27 , 231; Vietnam War , 67; war guilt of，工 77 ，
Chinese discussion of, 228-29 , 231- 20 3 , 34 0 ; and WTO , 243 , 245-46 ,
32; Chinese participation in , 227-30 , 250-51 ， 256 ， 258-60 ， 265 ，丰 67 n 3 ，
23 丰 -33; humanitarian , 6 ，工 4 6 ， 二 73n67; in 嘀嘀TII， 151 , 166, 178 , 193 ,
159 n 47 , 21 7 , 220 , 224 , 228-33 , 295 , 197-98. See also Sino-]apanese rel a:-
3 81 , 409; limited ，巧。 ; vs. soverelgnty, tions; U. S.-]apanese relations
7- 8 , 21 7-4 1 ]encks , Harlan , 72-73
Iran , 353 ]ervis , Robert , 189 , 389
Iraq , 221-22 , 237n17. See also Gulf War ]iang Zemin , 154nII , 205 , 229 吨 28 7 ，
(199 1) 341 , 391-92; and EP-3 airplane colli-
 INDEX 47 1

slO n , 3 27 , 3 二9; and globalization, 276 , 153n5; lnchon landing in , 54 , 56; and
282- 83, 288; Japan visit of (1998) , Japan , 80n14; and Mao , 54-58 , 80n14 ,
174 , 184n36 巧丰， 153n4 , 380; and Sino-Indian war ,
Jin Hui , 326 86 , 90 , 97 , 110 , 123; and Sino-North
Jinmen zhi zhan (The battle over Quemoy; Korea relations , 136-37; vs. Sino-
Xu Yan) , 61 Soviet border clashes , 70; and Sino-
juche self-reliance strategy, 383 Taiwanese relations , 56 , 59 , 63 , 3 80 ;
and Sino-U. S. relations , 36, 54-57 ,
Kant, lmmanuel, 326 315-16 , 380; UN in , 55 , 57; U. S. in ,
Kaul , B. M. , II7 , 129n87 26 , 54 , 58 , 110 ，巧与 and USSR , 54 ,
Kennedy, John 丑， 82n47 , 121 56-58; and Vietnam, 66 , 68 , 74; win-
Kennedy, Paul, 310 dows logic in ，口， 54-58
Kent, Ann , 406 Korean Workers' Party, 26 , 134
Khmer Rouge , 72 Kosovo , 41n17 , 217 , 21 9 , 297 , 346;a~
Khrushchev, Nikita , 62 , 95-96 , 106, war in (1999) ，工 7 ， 31; Chinese response
120-21 to , 227-28 , 239n4 工
Kim , Samuel 丘， 7- 8 ， 222 ， 27 6 ， 38 工， 399 ， Krasner , Stephen , 221
4 02 , 4 11 Kuomintang (KMT) , 59 , 6 工 ， 63 ， 65. See
Kim Chong-son, 25 , 27 also Taiwan
Kim Dae Jung , 158n36 ，工 59 n 39 ， 174 Kuwait ， 2 巧， 237 n1 7
Kim Il Sung ，口， 80n14 , 132 , 15 6n 巧， Kyoto Protocol , 292
3 8 3; and Mao , 54 , 56 , 58 Kyrgyzstan , 15 9n44
KimJong Il, 34 , 154 nII , 157 n 3 1
Kissinger , Henry, 83 n70 , 3 工 6-18 ， Ladakh ，工 09
3 21 - 22 Laitin , David , 3 工 2 ， 3 1 4 ， 330
Kitashiro , Katutaro , 165 Lampton , Michael , 310
Knaus , John , 100 Laos , 68 , 110-11
Kobayashi , Yotaro , 165 LaPorte , Leon J., 33 - 34
Koizumi , Junichiro , 1 句，工 7 2 ， 174 Latin America , 9 工， 247 , 27 1n 43 ，二 95 ，
Korean peninsula , 400 - 40 工; China's in- 405; sources on , 397; and WTO ，巧 L
terests on, 131-61 , 349; Chinese pol- 259 , 267n3. See also Brazil; Mexico
icy towards , 4 , 37 , 136-39 , 383; deter- leadership , 246 , 408; research on, 391; in
rence on, 2, 13-16 , 24-29 , 37-38; 明TTO ， 二 4 2 -43 ， 253 ， 255-57 ， 26 3- 6 4
DMZ on , 28 , 3 卒， 35 ， 38 ， 59; future Le Duan , 67
scenarios for , 139-43; and Japan , 169 , Lee Teng-hui , 23 , 75 , 157n30, 223
17 1 ，工 97; military forces on , 147-48; legitimacy: of CCP, 19 -20 ，工 3 6 ， 13 8 ，
negotiations on, 13 8 - 39; nuclear crises 168 , 351; and China threat theory,
on, 33 , 3 6, 14 0 , 161n55 , 169 , 19 8;re- 187 , 201-3 , 206; in Chinese domestic
alist approaches to , 388; security ar- politics, 19-20, 136, 138 ，工 68 ， 300 ,
rangements on，工 50 ，巧与 vs. Taiwan 351; and economic development, 13 6 ,
Strait, 35; tyranny of proximity on, 407; and foreign policy, 408; and glob-
3 2 -34; unification of, 14-15 , 24 , 27- alization，二 88; and historicallegacies ,
29 , 134 , 14 1-45 , 14 8 -49 , 159 n 39 , 380; and humanitarian norms , 233-
工 7 工; unstable deterrence on , 30 , 32- 34; of multilateral interventions , 6,
3 6 ; U. S. troops on , 33-34 , 37 , 14 1, 工 4~ 21 7 , 220, 228-3 0 ，巧 2; ofNorth
143 , 14 8 -49 , 15 8nn 3 6 -37 ，工 59 n 39 ， Korea , 26; of public opinion , 342; and
384. See also North Korea; Sino-North reputation, 15-16, 187 ，二 04; and so-
Korea relations; Sino-South Korea rela- cial identity, 348; in Taiwan issue , 16 ,
tions; South Korea 巧; ofWTO , 2 口， 26 7
Korean War (1950-53) ，巧， 18 ，巧，严， Lei Yingfu , 96 , 106, II3 , 120 , 122 , 396
二96; alliance. dynamics in，抖， 57-58; Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) , 170
and Chinese foreign policy, 15 3n3 , liberalism, 27 8, 314 , 375 n 4 8 , 37 6n 52 ,
408; deterrence signals in, 148-50, 399
47 2 INDEX

Liberia , UN Mission in (UNOMIL) , 224 , dominance doctrine of, 64; and Sino-
233 lndian war , 64 一句，邸，工 02-3 ， I06-7 ,
LiBuyun, 225 II2 一工 3 ， II5- I8 , I20- 2: 2 , I29n87;
Li Danhui, 397 and Sino-Soviet relations , 69-7 工，
Lieberman, Joseph , 327 83n70 , 95-96 , I33-34; and Taiwan
Li Fang, 325 issue , 59-6I; and U. S. , 67 , 80nI7; and
Li Haibao , 320 Vietnam War , 66-69
Li Jie , 3 24 , 397 materia 1ist theory, 33 2nIO
Lilley, James ，工 9 2 Matsu (Mazu) island , 60-63
Li Ming , 225 Maxwell , N eville , 3 , 86 一邸，工 03 ， I08
Lin Biao , 63 ，工 07 ， II5 , I24 Ma Zaizhun, 3 I7
Li Peng, I54nI 工， 28 7 McLaughlin , John , 38
Li Ruihuan , 202-3 McMahon Line , 3 , 96 , 99 , I04; and Sino-
Li Shenzhi, 320 lndian war, I05 , I07 , I 口，工 I6 ， II9
Li Shezhi , 280 扎1ead ， George , 3 I4
Liu Bocheng , II5 , II9 , I24 Mearsheimer, John , I89 , I94-95 , 3 IO
Liu Huaqing, 397 岛1edeiros ， Evan , 406
Liu Huaqiu , 3 I media: lndian , 93 -94 ，工 00 ， I20 ,
Liu Shaoqi , 67 , I0 6 , I2I , 39 6 , 398 I30nI05; international , I46 , 220;
Liu Wenzong , 238n27 on lnternet, 403-4; Japanese , I84n36;
Liu Xiao , 396 and public opinion, 34I; U. S. , 342-43 ,
Liuxue Meiguo (Studying in America; 373 n 34
Qian Ning) , 342 media , Chinese , I46 , I57n30，工 84 n 3 6 ，
Li Yunfei , 3 I7 I99 , 255 , 3 2 7 , 386; as research source ,
Li Zhenguang, 229 394-95; and Sino-Japanese relations ,
Loklζa region (Tibet) ，工 05 I7 0 ，工 75 ， I77; and sovereignty vs. in-
Longli, I978-96 (Dragon history, I978- tervention , 223 , 225; state control of,
96; Xiao Tong and Du Li) , 32I 37 6n 5I
Long Yongtu , 20I , 204 , 272n60 Meiji Restoration (Japan; 王 868) ， I63 , I78
Lu Fuyuan，二 55 Menon , Krishna ，工 09 ， III , I24
Luo Ruiqing , I07 , II2 ，工 I5 ， II7 , I20-2I Mercer, Jonathan , I89-90 , 209n24 ,
Lu Yuan , 202 3 IO - II , 33 0 , 333 nI 9
Mexico , 246 , 257 ，二 6I
Macao , 269n26 middle class , opinions of, 9 , 34I , 350 ,
MacArthur, Douglas , 54-57 353 , 35 8 , 3 62 , 3 66 , 374 n 47 , 4 0 9
Macedonia , 295 mlgra t1 0n , I44 , 2 户， 4 0 9- IO
MacFarquhar, Roderick , I22 mi 1itary capability, Chinese: air-attack ,
Malaysia , 254 , 267n3 I8 , 2I-22; amphibious , 60; and China
Ma Licheng, I 65 threat theory, I87 , I9 丰， I94 , I97 , 20 5;
Manchuria , 54 , 69 modernization of, I3 3 , I3 5, I 54 n6 ,
Mao Zedong, 396; attribution error of, I55nI3 , 388; naval , I9 , 22 , 30-3I , 60;
工 02-3; biographies of, 398; domestic vs. North Korean , 37; and peaceful rise
mobilization policies of, I23; and for- theory, 200; and Sino-Indian war , I09;
eign policy，工 02 ， I24 , I86 , 206, 289 , and Sino-Japanese relations , I73 , I79;
392; and globalization , 276 , 4II; and and Sino-Soviet relations , I 54n6; and
ideology, 388; and lndia , 3-4 , 9 '3 -96; Taiwan issue , 2I-:-22 , 30 , 50 , 77-78 ,
and Japan , I74; and Kim Il Sung , 56; 工 55nI3; in Tibet , 99 , I0 5 , II8; vs. U. S. ,
Kissinger on , 3 I7; and Korean War , I6 , I8 , 55-56; and use offorce , 52
54-5 8, 8on14 , I3 丰， I53n4 , 380; in militarycapability, U. S. , 34-35 , I33 ,
leadership studies , 39I; and North Ko- I60n53 , 344; vs. Chinese , I6 , I8 , 55-
rea , 56 , I3I , I56nI9; and Quemoy- 56; and North Korea , 24-28 , I37-39;
Matsu attacks , 6I-63; rationality of, rapid-response , 2I , 24 , 3 I
380; risk-taking of, 75; second-strike Ming Ruifeng , 350
 INDEX 473

Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic legitimacy, 136, 351; and China threat
Cooperation (MOFTEC; China) , 250- theory, 193 , 199 - 200; and conflict ,
1 工， 259 312; vs. globalization , 281 , 300; and
minorities , Chinese , 299 , 319 Kissinger , 3I6~18; and North Korea ,
Mischief Island (South China Sea) , 199 工 37 ， 140 -4 1 ; in public opinion , 34 2 ,
missile defense , theater (TMD) , 139 ，工 4 1 ， 344 , 35 1, 3 6 7, 37 0n1 3, 374 n 47;and
16 7 , 17 1, 173 , 179 , 197 Sino-U. S. relations , 157n30, 176; and
missiles: Chinese , 13 , 19-20 , 31, 47n75 , social comparison , 319-20; and social
179; in Cuba ，句， 121; and North Ko- mobility, 324; vs. Taiwanese , 384; and
rea , 24 ，工 37 ， 139 ，工 41; North Korean , WTO , 3 82
29 , 33-35 , 179;South Korean , 27; and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
Taiwan issue , 21-23 tion) , 35 , 21 7 , 227 , 3 2 7
Mongolia , 69 , 75 , II5 , II6; 290 natural resources , 134-35 ，工 64 ， 408-9;
Moore , Barrington, 330 - 31 and China threat theory, 192-93 ，工 95 ，
Morgenthau , Hans , 188 ， 4 工 6n45 200
Morrison , ]ames , 100-10 工 Nau , Henry, 191
Most Favored Nation (MFN) debate ，巧。 Nehru , ]awaharlal , 3-4; and British pol-
motivational structure , 189 , 201 , 221 , icy, 89-90; and Forward Policy, 103-
38 5 5; Mao's perception of, 88 , 94-96; and
Mozambique , UN Mission in Sino-Indian war , 63 -66, 107-9 , II2-
(ONUMOZ) , 223 20 , 122-23; and Tibet, 9 1-93 , 97-
Mu l1 ik , B. 此， 100-101 103 , 126n17
Multifìber Arrangement (MFA) , 261-62 neoliberalism, 278 , 302町， 3 10 - 11
multilateral institutions , 1, 5, 7 , 277 , 402 neomercantilist theory, 279
Mutual Defense Treaty (U. S.-South Ko- neorealist theory, 279 , 28 工， 3 10 - 11 ，
rea) , 26 333 n1 9
Mutual Defense Treaty (U. S.-Taiwan) , 60 Nepal , 96 , 1 巧， 117- 18 ，工巧
New International Economic Order
Namibia , 296 (NIEO) , 26 5
Narayan , ]aiprakash, 100 NewZe~and ， 61 ， 17 卒， 267n3 , 27 1n43
National Guidelines (Japan; 2005) ，工 73 Nicaragua , 341
national identity，丰， 410; ethnonational , Nie Rongzhen , 398
299; exit from , 324; vs. globalization, Nietzsche , Friedrich, 3 巧
281 , 288; historical , 388; and Korean Ninth Party Congress (CCP; 工 9 6 9) ，
War, 315-16; and language, 320-21; 7 0 -7 1
and nationalism , 390-91; as respon- Ni Shixiong, 400
sible great power, 2 缸， 286 一邸，均二- Nixon , Richard M. , 36 , 321- 巧， 33 6n 79
93 , 297 , 300 ; and self-esteem, 3 巧， Nobel Prize complex , 317-18
317; in Sino-]apanese relations , 163 , nonaligned movement, 1 1 8
16 5 ， 168-7 工， 173-75 ， 177- 80 ， 182 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) ,
nationalism, 40 工， 404; assertlve , 3 缸， 220 , 299-3 00
386; and China threat theory，工 95 ， noninterference principle , 217 ，丰 Z 卒， 225 一
197 , 202; and democratization , 386; 26, 228 , 234
and foreign policy, 382 , 393 , 407 , 411; norms , international, 283 , 298 , 404; dif-
vs. globalization , 279 , 281; and iden- fusion of, 218 , 221 , 2 巧， 293; humani-
tity, 390-91; and injustice , 331; and tanan，之二 5-22~229 ， 233-234 ， 293 ，
self-deception , 326; and Sino-]apanese 3 8 工 ; and sovereignty, 7 , 219 , 221 , 225 ,
relations , 176 ，工 97; in Sino-]apanese 232 , 234-235 , 381-82 , 39 1, 4 0 9;and
relations , 5 ，王 63 ， 168 ，工 73 ， 177- 1 7 8 , terrorism , 416n52; and UN ，巧 6;and
180, 376n51 WTO ，巧 6-57 ， 26 4- 6 7，二 74 n81
nationalism, Chinese: anti-]apanese , 5, North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA;
16 3 , 168 , 173 , 177-78 , 180, 376n51; India) , 105 , II2 , 123
and apology diplomacy, 328; and CCP North Korea (Democratic People's Repub-
474 INDEX

lic of Korea; DPRK) , 398 , 408; Agreed lic opinion, 8-9 , 34 6, 34 8 -49 , 35 工，
Framework for , 139 ，工 71; and alliance 355 , 358-60 , 374n47; in Sino-U. S. re-
dynamics , 36 ，工 49; Chinese public lations , 3 巧， 373n34; and social com-
opmlO n on , 29 工， 3 53; denuclearization panson， 3 工 9; sources on , 403; and
of，工 4 ， 24; and deterrence ，卒， 13 ，二 4- threat perception ，工 9 工
巧， 36; domestic politics of，始， 134; overseas Chinese ，工 93 ，工 95 ， 4 10
economy of，巧 -26， 14 工，工 57 n 归 ， 28 5 ， Ozawa, Ichiro , 198
383; and end of Cold War，工 6与 and
EU， 157 n 3 工， 158n32; ideology in , 25 , Pakistan, 61 , 290 ，二93 ， 353; and India ,
383; military capability of，巧， 28- 29 ， 工 17-18 ， 124; and WTO , 26 工 -62 ，
32-35 , 37 , 179; nuclear weapons of, 27 0n 3 6
工 3- 1 4 ， 24 ， 29 ， 33-34 ， 37 ， 7 6 ，工 39 ， Pang Zhongying, 296-97 , 301n3
工 52 ，工 57 nn26 ， 28 ，工 59 n 39 ，工 61n55 ， Panmunjom incident (1976) , 35-36
16 9 ， 1 穴， 386; reform in，巧， 37，工4 工， Paracel Islands , 86
157 n 3 工，工 58n32; refugees from , 141 , Paraguay, 267n3
145-4 6 ，工 71 ， 384; reputation of, 28- Pareto , Vilfredo , 309
29 , 46n68; and South Korea ，工 3- I4 ， Patel , Sadar Vallabhai , 99
56 , 158n32; vs. Taiwan , 381; threat patriotic education campaign (PRC)，工 68 ，
from , 34-35 , 3 8 ，工 39-4 1. See also 工 77 ， 180 ， 359 ， 3 68
Korean peninsula; Korean War; Sino- peaceful rise theory, 5, 200 , 389
North Korea relations; U. S.-North Ko- peacekeeping , multilateral , 217 , 38 工; in
rea relations Africa , 224 , 229 , 233 ，二96-97; Chinese
North Vietnam (Socialist Republic of; partlclpatlO n m , 221 ，丰 23- 2 4 ， 226-
SRV) ， 5 6 ，工 71 ， 290; China as rear area 27 , 229-3 0 , 23 2 -34 , 295-97;and
for , 66 , 68; Chinese aid to , 66-69; soverelgnty VS. mterventlO n , 219-21;
Chinese invasion of, 72 -7 5; ethnic UN, 8, 169 -70 ，工 76 ， 181 , 192 , 218-
Chinese in , 74; invasion of Cambodia 21 ，丰 23- 2 4 ， 226 ， 229-3 0 ， 295-97
by, 72-73; Soviet aid to , 66 Pearson , Margaret M. , 6-7 , 242 , 382 ,
Norway, 258 , 260 389-90 , 402 , 406
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty，工 57n26 Peng Dehu缸， 54-55 , 58 , 39 6
nuclear weapons , 27 , 34-35; and Chi- Peng Zhen, 106
na's Korea policy，工 4 0 -4 工; and China People's Liberation Army (PLA) , 102,
threat theory, 194 , 19 6 -97; Chinese , 290 , 400-401; capability of, 18 , 30 ,
15 ，工 33 -34 , 197 ，二 00; VS. conven- 50 , 60; and peacekeeping operations ,
tional forces , 17-18; and deterrence , 297-98; and Sino-Indian war , 105 ,
工 3 ， 18 9; Indian , 12 5 ，工 86 ， 193 -98; 110, 11 卒，工工 9. See also Central Mili-
]apanese , 170, 198; North Korean , 13- tary Commission; military capability,
14 ，二 4 ， 29 ， 33-34 ， 37 ， 7 6 ， 139 ， 15 2 ， Chinese
157 nn26 ，二 8 ， 159n39 , 161n55 , 169 , Perez del Castillo , Carlos ，二 7 1n 4 6
17 王， 3 86 Perry, William，巧， 31
Philippines , 21 , 61 , 199 ，丰 58 ， 267n3
Occidentalism, 3 工 9 ， 3 24 ping-pong diplomacy， μI
Official Development Assistance (ODA) , Politburo (PRC), 55 , 58 , 94 , 96
16 5- 66 Pol Pot, 7 2, 74
oil deposits , 84n76，工 7 立， 24 工 n65 population control , 282 , 409
Okinawa , 31-32 Powell , Colin, 329
Olympics , 157n30, 257 Powell , Robert,. 151
O'Neill , Barry, 296 preemp t1 ve war, 2 , 14 ， 70-7 工， 75 ，巧。;
opportunity, window of, 51 - 52 Bush doctrine of, 32 , 34-35; and Chi-
OSCE (Organization for Security and nese Civil War , 84n71; on Korean pen-
Co-operation in Europe) , 227 insula ， 3 卒， 57; and military capabili町，
othering: in foreign policy, 37 2n 3 丰 ;and 5 工， 53
gender , 359-61 , 368 , 375n48; in pub- propaganda: anti"American , 376nsr;
 INDEX 475

anti-]apanese , 168 , 376n51; and China 1 59n3 8 , 192; and foreign policy，工 80;
threat theory, 202-3; and Chinese pub- and globalization , 279 ，均 8; market-
lic opinion , 366 , 369 , 376n51; and Leninist, 145; in North Korea ，巧， 37 ，
Sino-Indian war , 108 14 工， 157n31 ， 15 8n 3 2; political, 144-
protectlonism , 7 , 24 6 - 47 , 27 2n 54 , 45 , 159n 3 8 , 180 , 341 , 366; in Tibet ,
274 n 7 8 , 373 n 4 o , 375n48.Seeaho 101-2
free trade refugees , 283; North Korean , 141 , 145-
Prueher , ]oseph, 3 二 7 ， 3 2 9 46 , 17 工， 384; Tibetan , 92-93 , 101
public opinion: on China , 290-91; In- Republic of Korea. See South Korea
dian , II3 , 124; international, 199; ]ap- reputation: and deterrence，工 4-15 ， 188;
anese , 175 , 18 工; research on, 405-6; and globalization , 298; and hierarchy,
sources on , 34 二一 43 ， 4 0 4; Taiwanese, 204; of North Korea ，巧， 46n68; revi-
23-24; U. S. ，工 82 ， 373n34 sionist , 206; and security dilemma , 5-
public opinion, Chinese , 340 一 77 ， 3 8 3; 6 , 188-9 1. See also status
anti-American , 341-4 丰， 344 ， 37 0n1 3; reputation , Chinese: and China threat
anti-]apanese , 173 , 175-78 , 384; theory, 206 , 38 丰; and Korea , 140 ,
causes of, 347; and decision-making , 150; and peacekeeping operations ,
364; and foreign policy, 2, 8-9 , 340- 218 , 233 , 298; perceived disrespect for ,
4 2 , 3 6 4 , 367; research on , 342-45; 3 82; as responsible great power , 281 ,
on U. S. vs. ]apan ，工 70; on WTO ，丰 4 6 ， 286-88 , 292-93 , 297 , 300; and se-
25 0 , 26 3 curity dilemma , 186-214; and Sino-
public opinion polls , 340 , 342 , 402-3 , Indian war, IIO; and Taiwan , 23; UN
415n40; China Youth Daily, 344-45; votes ，巧 6; and WTO ，巧 4 ， 26 3, 266
quantitative , 343 - 45; sampling proce- Research Center on Contemporary China
dures in , 344-46; weaknesses of, 347 (RCCC; Peking University) , 346
Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI; resolve: Chinese , 69 ，工 09- 10 ， 186， 206;
People's University) , 344 North Korean , 28; perceptions of, 15-
Pueblo incident (19 68 ), 35 16, 188; and power transitions , 151;
Putnam, Robert , 300 Taiwanese , 20; U.S. , 19-21 , 26-27 ,
38 , 80n17
Qian Ning , 342 revisionism，工 6 ， 206 , 281 , 288 , 310; Chi-
Qian Qichen , 222 , 226 , 282- 83, 343 , 396 nese , 203 ，巧 6， 263-67; and WTO , 7,
Qiao Guanhua , 122, 398 二42 ， 256 ， 26 3- 6 7
Qinghai province , 96 Rice , Condoleezza , 310
Qin Yaqing , 400 rising-power status , Chinese ，工， 13 2 ， 18 7 ，
Qiu Huizuo , 115 21 9 ， 3 工 0 ， 402; and China threat theory,
Quemoy (J inmen) island, 60 - 63 5, 194 , 200-201 , 204 , 206; contain-
ment of，工 79 ， 181; and globalization,
racism , 201 , 3 18 277; and Korea , 147 , 15 0; peaceful, 5,
Rákosi , Mátyás , 96 200 , 389; and responsibility, 28 工， 286-
rationalist theory, 220-21 , 235 , 312-13 , 88 , 292 , 297 , 300; and Sino-]apanese
3 二 7 ， 3 81 relations , 167 , 169 , 179-80; and Sino-
rationality, Whiting on , 379 - 80 U. S. relations , 4 ，可 0-5 2
Reagan administration, 341 Risse , Thomas , 218
realistic competition theory (RCT) , Robinson , Thomas , 69 , 84n71
3 工 2- 1 3 RO C. See Taiwan
realist theory, 27 8, 314 , 333n19 , 3 81 , Roh Moo Hyun ，工 5 8nn 33 ， 3 6
387-89 , 416n45; and China threat the- RO K. See South Korea
ory，工 86 ，二 06; and SIT, 312 , 319 , 323 , Rosen , Stanley, 340
33 2n10 Rosenau , James , 390
reform: and. China threat theory，工 9 2 ， Ross , Robert 丘， 1-2 ，工 3 ， 74-75 ， 379 ,
204; and domestic stability, 144 , 381 , 384 , 388 , 400
180; economic，巧， 37 ， 73 一汀， 144 ， Rumsfeld , Donald, 309
47 6 INDEX

Russia , 402; and China , 30 , I55nI3 , borders , 66, 87 , 90 , 103 -5; and China
20 5 ，均 I ， 349 , 353; economy of, 285; threat theory, 186-87 , I93-97 , 20 5;
and 1raq war , 233; andJapan , I 句， diplomacy in ，工 11 ，工 16， 124 一巧; and
I78; and Korea , I39 , I7I; and Kosovo , divergent worldviews ，工巧 -24; im二
227; and legitimate intervention, 220; provement in , I9 5 ，工 97; and 1ndia's
as perceived threat , 360 , 362; and Forward Policy, 103-5; and Japan , 65 ,
UNSC , 293; in 咄咄'1， 36 , I 5I. See 97; negotiations in , 90 , 1: 04; Nehru's
also Soviet Union policy on, 97-103; perceptions in , 96-
Russo-Japanese War (I905) , I78 I03 , 123-24; and Sino-1ndian war ,
Rwanda , 224 11 工， I24-25; and Soviet-1ndian rela-
tions ，工 25; threat perception in , 93 一
Said , Edward , 3 I9 工 05; and Tibet , 94; and Zhou Enlai ,
sanctions: after Tiananmen , 222- 巧， 97-99
3I6; against Cambodia , 238n23; and Sino-1ndian war (工 9 62 ) ， 86 -I3 0 , 399;
China's Korea policy, I4 0-4 工; against and armed coexistence , 108 , 110 , 115;
dumping，二 52; and Taiwan , 22 , 38 and China threat theory, I94 , 196;
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) costs of, II3-14 , I18 , 120 , 124; and
cnsls , I97 ，二 49 developing countries , 63 , 97 , II3 , 120;
Scheff, Thomas , 316 and 1ndian policy, 87 , 89 ，工 03-9 ， 112-
Schelling, Thomas ，工 4 ，工 48 ， I88 I4 , 116-I8 , 122, 124; and Korean
Schwartz , Thomas , 48n98 War, 86 , 90 , 97 , 110 , 1 巧; and Mao ,
Security Coúncil , UN , 7 , I69 , 173 ，工 7 6 ， 64-65 , 88 ，工 02-3 ，工 06-7 ， 112-13 ,
工 78 ， 2I 8, 220 , 230 , 233; China's role 工 I5-18 ， 120 -, 22 , 129n87; negotía-
in , 22I , 234 , 25 6, 293-9 6 ;and honsln , 111-13 , 11~ 1I9 , 12 卒， 12 4;
Kosovo , 227-28; vetoes and absten- psychology of, 88-89; Thagla Ridge
honsln , 222 , 224 , 22~ 之 93-95 operatíon ín , 96，工 09 ， 1I3-15; wm-
security dilemma dynamics , 37 , I47 ，工 79 ， dows logic in , 63-66
388-90 , 392; and China threat theory, Sino-Japanese relations , 401 , 405 -6; and
186 -214 , 382; and deterrence ，工 4 ， 16， China threat theory, 190, 194 ，丰 00;
30; on Korean peninsula , 3 丰， 3 8 ;and and democratization , 386; and domes-
reputation , 5-6 , I88-9 工; and threat tic politics , Chinese , 5 , I 68; economic
perception, I87 , 189-90; and WWI , 36 vs. political , 4-5 , 162-85 , 384 , 390 ,
Segal , Gerald , 193 ，工 95 ， 3 20 407 , 412n7; historical memory in ,
self-determination , 98 , 222 一巧 16 3 ，工 68 ， I74-75 , 367 , 376n51 , 3 81 -
self-esteem，当 15 ， 3 1 7 ， 3 22 ， 3 巧， 3 28 82; interdependence in , 162-85 , 384 ,
self-reliance (juche) , 383 390 , 407 , 412n7; and Korea ，工 40 ， I80;
September 11 , 2001 attacks , 76 , 195 , military, 166; nationalism in , 5, 163 ,
204-5 , 230-33 , 27In44 , 346 工 65 ，工 68-7 工，工 73-75 ，工 77- 80 ，工 82 ，
Serbia ，工 8 ，3I 37 6n 5 工; and population growth , 409;
Shain , Yossi , 410 post-Cold 币'ar ， I66-7 与 and public
Shakya , Tsering, 98 , 100, I02 opinion，工 65 ， 173 ， 175-7 8 ， 3 6 7;and
Shao Hua , I1 5 regional stability，工 63-64; social , 165 ,
Shen Guofang , 239n40 I69-70 ，工 74 ， 181 , 320; stereotypes m ,
Shen Zhihua , 397 I70 , 41I; and students , 162 , t65 ，工 7 0 ，
Shi Yinhong , 57 , 165 , 229 173-74 , I77-78; Taiwan issue in , 16 7 ,
ShiZhe , 396 170-74 , 179; textbooks in , 178 ，工 81 ，
Sichuan , 96 , 102 382; and U. S. , 163 , I66-68 , 177-
Sikkink , Kathryn , 218 8 勾引1hiting on , I69-70 , 381-82; in
Simla conference (19I4) , 104 WTO , 269n29; and 嘀嘀TII ， 1 句， 166 ，
Singapore , 2 工， 27 Ill43 , 28 4- 8 5 , 353 169-70, 17 2 -75 , I77-78 , 180-81 ,
Sino-1ndian relations , 4 , 63 -66 , 204 , 工 93 ， 197-9 8
353 , 385 , 397-98 , 406; armed coexis- Sino-Japanese War (I895) , 1 句， I7 8
tence in , 108 , 110 , 112 , 114-15; and Sino-North Korea relations ，巧， 3 6 ，
 INDEX 477

154 nI 1 , 383-84; China's committ- agreements in , 26 工 -62; and China's

ment to , 134; 月 6-37 ， 156n19; diplo- rising power status , 4 , 150-52; and
macy m , 1 料，工 46 ， 15 1, 157n28 ;and China threat theory, 196 , 200; in Cold
Korean 顶7ar， 136-37; and Mao , 56 , War，巧与 crises. in , 6 丰 -63 ， 75 -7 6 ,
可 1 ， 156n19; and nuclear weapons , 386; deterrence in , 16-21 , 31 , 50; and
14 .0 -4 1 ，工 61n5 5; post-Cold 耶Tar ， 134 , Gulf War , 222; and Korea , 36 ，可 1 ，
王 38; and refugees , 14 1 , 145-46，工 7 1 ， 工 34 ， 13~ 13 8 -43 , 147 , 149 , 15~
3 84 and Korean 币Tar， 315-16; and national
Sino-South Korea relations , 149 , 1 54n1 1 , identity, 309-39; normalization of, 73;
15 6n 2I , 353 , 379 , 383-84; and China and ping-pong diplomacy, 321; pub-
threat theory, 193 - 94 , 205; economic , lic opinion on , 9 , 227 , 23 工， 33 1 ， 34 卒，
134 , 13 8 -39 ，工 43; and N orth Korea , 344-46 , 353 , 364 , 366 , 368; rap-
14 0 -4 1 ，工 80 prochement in , 71 , 83n70; security di-
Sino-Soviet relations , 83n70 , 15 4n6 , lemma in , 190, 392; and self-deception,
384-85 , 393 , 396-99 , 406 , 408; bor- 326; and Sino-Indian war, 63 , 88; and
der conflicts in , 52 , 69-7 工， 75 ， 290; in Sino-Soviet border clashes , 71; and so-
Cold 币Tar ， 132-33; and ideology, 69 , cial comparison, 319 一日， 3 巧; and so-
13 2 ，工 34 ，工 54n9; and Korea，工 34;and cial identity, 8, 390; and Taiwan, 30-
Sino-Indian war , 63 , II4 ，工 20-21; and 31 , 36-38 , 53; and Vietnam , 7 2 -73 ,
Taiwan, 62-63 , 95; and Tibet, 95-96; 75; and war on terror , 180 , 204-5 ,
and UN, 322; and Vietnam , 72-75; 231; and WTO , 7 , 2 饵， 26 9 n2 9
arid Vietnam War , 66 , 68 social comparison: and competition, 323-
Sino-Taiwanese relations , 297 , 385-86 , 26 , 330; of consequential objects , 320-
388 , 406 , 408; and China threat the- 23 , 328 , 330; creativity in , 323-26 ,
ory, 192-93 ，工 95-9 6 ， 19 8 ， 200 ， 20 3 ， 328-30; and identity, 3 工 4-15; and in-
205-6; deterrence in , 13 , 21-24; and tergroup relations , 313 , 3 18 - 20; re-
domestic po 1itics , 137, 299; economic, framing of, 3 二4-25; self-deception in ,
21-22 , 76-77 , 268n17 , 384; fait ac- 314 , 324 , 326 , 328-29; targets of,
compli strategy in，却， 31; and inde- 3 巧， 328 ， 330; with the West, 3 巧-
pendence issue , 14- 工 5 ， 21- 24 , 38, 50 , 20 , 3 22 , 3 2 5
75 , 77-78 , 195 , 204 , 206 , 360 , 362- social identity, 401; and apology diplo-
64; and internal-external security link- macy, 326 -29; and China threat the-
ages , 380-8 工; and Japan , 77-78 , 197; ory，工 87 ，之 03 ， 3 工二; and competition,
and Korea ，工 35-36 ， 138; and Korean 348-49; definition of, 314; of demo-
War , 56; and mi 1itary capability, 21- cratic states , 190-91; and in- vs. out-
22 , 30 , 50 , 77-78 , 155n13; andpub- groups , 187 , 190-91 , 203-4 , 311 ,
1ic opinion, 340 , 345 , 349 , 364; and 313-18 , 348 , 355; perceptions of, 316;
shared identity, 390; and Sino-Indian and public opinion , 9 , 34 6 , 34 8, 355-
relations , 97; and Sino-Japanese rela- 60 , 403; and racism , 318; and Sino-
tions ，工 67 ， 17 0 -74 ，工 79; and Sino-U. S. U. S. relations , 8, 309-39 , 390; and
relations ，工 96; social ties in , 22 , 77; social comparison theory, 314 - 15;
and sovereignty vs. intervention , 223; and social creativity, 3 11 , 3 工 3-14 ，
and UN , 295 , 336n79; and U. S.-Japan 319; and social mobility, 3 II , 3 巧，
relations , 76-77 ，工 71; a:ld Vietnam , 3 1 9 ， 3 巧 -24 ， 330; theory of (SIT) ,
73; and windows logic , 58 - 6 工; and 310-12 , 314 , 330-31 , 33 2n1o , 348 ,
WTO , 243 ，二45 ， 247-49 ， 26 3 ， 266， 3 6 7 , 39 0 -9 1
269nn23 ,25 , 275n84 , 3 82 Socialist Party (Japan) , 168
Sino-U. S. relations , 3 88 , 393 , 397-98 , socialization , 6 , 218 , 375n47 , 3 8 3, 389-
406 , 4II; and apology diplomacy, 326- 90; of China , 221 , 234-35 , 266-67 ,
29; and basketball exchange , 321-22; 275n84; and sovereignty vs. interven-
and Belgra4e bombing , 8 ，工 57 n 3 0 ， tion, 7 , 22 工， 232， 234-35 ， 391; and
227-28 , 239n41 , 3 26 - 28 , 331 ， 34 二， 嘀咕O ， 266-67 ， 275n84.Seeaho
344 , 346 , 353 , 364 , 368; bilateral norms , international
47 8 INDEX

Somalia , 224 War, 4 , 35 , 18 9 , 3 89; collapse of, 144 ,

Song Liansheng, 80n14 工 63 ， 166, 168 , 389 , 39 2 ; and India , 4 ,
Song Mu-kyong , 24 66，工工 8 ， 125; and Korea Î1 War, 54 ,
Song Qiang, 3 2 4 , 342 56-58; and North Korea , 29; Pacific
South Africa ，二 67 n 3 Fl eet of, 74; and Panmunjom incident
South China Sea: and China threat the- (1976) , 36; and Sino-Indian war , 117 ,
ory，工 92-93 ， 200; Chinese claims in , 工 20; and Sino-]apaneserelations ，工 66 ，
140 , 15 5n1 6 ，工 9 2 ， 199 , 3 8 工 -82; oil 工 68; sources in , 399 , 415n36; and Tai-
deposits in , 84n76; piracy in , 177 wan issue , 62; and UNSC ，二93;and
Southeast Asia , 54 , 27 1n45 , 397; and U. S. , 15-16, 69 ，巧 1; and Vietnam,
China threat theory, 193-94 , 199 , 7 二 -75; and Vietnam War, 67-68. See
205; Chinese relations with ，之 63 ， also Sino-Soviet relations
268n15 , 383 , 385-86; and WTO , 247 , Special Frontier Force (Tibetan unit) , 125
254 , 263 , 268n15 , 270n36.Seeaho spiral model of conflict, I4 7
particular countries Sputnik, 62
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Stalin , ]oseph, 56-58 , 80n19 ，工 3 2 -33
(SEATO) , 59-61 Standby Arrangements System (SAS) ,
South Korea (Republic of Korea; ROK): 229 ， 233 ，二 97
and deterrence ，丰， 26-29; and eco- State Department, U. S. , 98
nomic interdependence , 407; economy status , 190 , 290 , 326 , 336n78 , 390 , 407;
of, 246, 285; and ]apan，工 7 二， 174 ， and apology diplomacy, 328; and emo-
178; in Korean War , 56-57; military tion , 330-31 , 338n111; great-power ,
capability of, 27; nationalism in , 163; 281 , 286-88 , 292-93 , 297 , 300; in-
and North Korea , 13- I4, 56，工 5 8n 3 2 ; ternational hierarchy of, 二 04; and so-
presidential election in (2003) , 15 8n 36; cial comparison , 322- 巧 . See also rep-
public opinion in , 290-91; as regional utation; rising-power status , Chinese
balancer, 15 8nn3 3, 3 6; sunshine policy stereotypes , 190 , 203-4 , 411
of, 15 8n 36; and unification scenario , structuralism , 3 87
I4 1-43; U. S. troops in , 26- 2 7 , 37 , students , 368 , 410; and Sino-]apanese
I3 9; and worst-case analyses , 38; and relations , 162 , 165 , 17 0 , 173-74 ,
WTO , 252 , 258-60. See also Korean 177-7 8
peninsula; Sino-South Korea relations Sudan , 24 工 n65
sovereignty, 29 0 , 381 , 393 , 399 , 4 01 - 2, Sun Shao , 129n87
405 , 410; changing conceptions of，之， Sun Zhenyu , 245 , 252
218-19 , 229 , 391; Chinese discussion Supachai Panitchpakdi, 249 , 269nn25-
of, 228 -29 , 23 1- 3 卒， 234; definition 26, 270n36
of, 219 , 236n8; and globalization, 7-9 , Swaine , Michael , 292
231-32 , 277-78 , 283-84 , 288 , 292 , Switzerland，巧 8-60 ，二 7 2n61
298 , 300; and historical memory, 218 , symbolic theory, 327
223 , 231 , 235 , 322 , 328 , 382 , 391;
and human rights violations , 146, 229 , Taiwan (Republic of China; ROK) , 384 ,
巧 2 ， 234; and international norms , 7 , 407; alliances of, 59-60; constitutional
219 , 221 , 225 , 232 , 234-35 , 381- revision in , 76; democracy in，币，巧，
82 , 391 , 409; vs. intervention , 7-8 , 171; economy of, 21 一巧， 76-77; and
217-41; limited, 6-7 , 226; in post- globalization, 286; independence of, 2-
Cold War era , 226; as special human 3 , 14-15 , 21-24.37-38 , 50 , 75-78 ,
right , 232; of Taiwan ，工 74 ， 247-49 ， 195 , 204 ， 20~223 ， 360 ， 3 6 丰 -64; lll-
269nn25-26 , 384; in Tibet, 97-103; dustry associations in , 268n17; and
and UN , 219- 2I, 293 , 296; and WTO , Korea , 27 , 140-42 , 152; and Korean
24 2 -43 , 247'-5 0 , 257 , 26 3 -64 , 266 , War, 55; public opinion in , 23-24; and
269nn25-26 , 287 SEATO , 59; and Sino-Indian war , 65-
Soviet Union(USSR) , 5, 405; in Cold 66 , IIO-11 , II4 , II7; and Sino-Soviet
 INDEX 479

relations , 95; sources in , 415n36; and and globalization ，丰 88; and Korea , 3 丰，
Tib时， 92 ， 100; and UN，丰 96; unifica- 137 , 146-48; psychologyof, 88-89;
tion with China of , 21-24; U. S. arms and public opinion , 349 , 3 60 - 6 5 , 3 6 7 ,
sales to , 19 , 38 , 6丰， 76-77 ， 192; and 375n49; and security dilemma , 18 7 ,
Vietnam , 73; and WTO , 251 , 260 , 189-90; in Sino-Indian relations , 93-
工 72n58. See also Sino-Taiwanese 105; and Sino-Indian war , 87-88; and
relations social identification , 190-91; U. S. ，工 9 6 ，
Taiwan Strait , 397 , 400; 1950 crisis in 205. .See also China threat theory
(Korean War) , 54 , 57 , 3 80 ; 1954-55 "three no's policy" (Japan's militariza-
crisis in , 52 , 58 - 61; 1958 crisis in tion) , 19 8
(Quemoy占1atsu)~ 60-63; 1995-96 "three no's policy" (Taiwan issue) ，工 74
crisis in , 19 ，丰 1- 2 3 ， 3 工 -3 2 ， 75 -7 6, Tiananmen protests (工 9 8 9) ， 14 丰， 168 ，
135 , 17 工，工 75 ，工 79 ， 198-99 ， 31~ 3 80 ; 29 卒， 300 ， 399 , 408; and China threat
and Chinese use of force , 3 5, 50 - 5 工， theory， 19 二; Chinese isolation after ,
68 , 7 0 , 123; deterrence in , 13 -24 , 30- 218 , 222; generation following , 350-
3 丰， 37-38; islands in , 58-63 , 86 , 123 51 , 355 , 359 , 363 , 368; and global citi-
Tajfel , Henri , 314 , 324 zenship , 280; sanctions after , 222-23 ,
Talbott, Strobe , 298 316; and Sino-]apanese relations , 167
Tanaka Kakuei , 398 Tibet: 1959 uprising in , 3, 90 , 92-93 ,
Ta吨 Jiaxua民 282- 8 3 ， 3 2 7 , 3 均 9 8 - 100 ，工 02-3 ，工 05; as buffer zone ,
Tang Shiping , 400 89 - 90 , 95 - 9 6; Chinese sovereignty in ,
Tang Yongsheng , 233 9 2 -93 , 97- 10 3; CIA in , 3 ， 92 ，工 00-
Tang Zhengyu , 317 101; class structure of, 94-95 , 101;
tariffs ，工 65 ， 247 , 272nn54 , 57; agricul- demonstrators in , 126n17; and domes-
tural , 252 , 255 , 260 , 273n64; and tiè instability, 299; imperialism in , 89-
quotas , 248 , 260 ，丰 62; and U. S. steel 9 工; and India , 3 , 9 工 -93 ， 98-100 ， 12 5;
industry, 256; and WTO , 248-49 , and India's Forward Policy，工 05;and
25 二， 273n64 , 28 7 Mao's attribution error, 88; militariza-
Tawang region , 113 , 122-23 tion of, 99 , 101; PLA occupation of,
technology, 288 , 406; and global citizen- 9 0 一庐 ， 105; refugees from , 92-93 ,
ship , 280; and globalization , 283 , 289; 工 0 工，工 25; resistance in , 92 , 96 ，工 00-
information (IT) ，巧， 286; ]apanese , 102; road construction in，工 02 ，工 08;
工 64 ， 177; and military capabili町，工 7 ， 17-point agreement on (195 叫， 9 0 ， 9 2 ，
30 , 135 , 400; in N orth Korea ，巧 98; and Sino-Indian war , 63 ，句， 86-
terrorism，工 82 ， 289 , 408; and China 87 , 89- 10 3 ，工 05 ， 115 , 118 , 120-21 ,
threat theory, 195 , 204 - 5; Chinese re- 12 3
sponse to , 230 - 31; and international Tilelli, ]ohn, 32
norms , 416n52; and North Korea ，巧， Timperlake , Edward, 309
143 ，工 52; and public opinion , 34 6 , 349; Timurlane , 116
and Sino-Japanese relations ，工 77;and ti-yong (essence and utility) , 280
Sino-U. S. relations , 180, 204-5 , 23 盯 tourism ， 16 卒， 16 5
and sovereignty vs. intervention, 219 , trade: and China's Korea policy，工 34 ，
230-31; and Taiwan Strait crises , 76 149-50; and China threat theory, 192;
textiles , 7 ，二43 ，二 47 ， 25 2 -53 , 25 8 , Chinese , 246-47 , 260 , 285; and Chi-
261-62 nese foreign policy, 136; and domestic
Thagla Ridge , 96 ，工 09 ， 113-1 5 politics , 243 , 246 , 263; and globaliza-
Thailand , 61 , 68 , 267n3 tion , 278 , 285 , 288-89; lìberalization
Third World. See developing countries of, 243 , 265; and North Korea ，巧，
threat perception , 404; and att:ribution 1 57n31; offensive vs. defensive inter-
error, 102-3; Chinese , 3-4 , 70 ，工 3 二， ests in , 247; Sino-Japanese , 164; Sino-
137 , 14 6 -4 8 ，工 73; and deterrence , Taiwanese , 22 , 76 -77; and status ,
工 46-48; and gender, 363-65 , 368; 326; with Tibet, 92-93. See also ex-
4 80 INDEX

ports; free trade; tariffs; World Trade Chinese students in，工 74 ， 176; credibil-
Organization ity of，工 6， 18-19 , 24 , 26- 2 7, 77; de-
Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC; terrence of，主 8-29; domestic politics
嘀咕0) ， 253 in，巧，巧， 341 ， 344; economy of, 285 ,
Trade Policy Review (TPR; 嘀咕0) ， 25 0 304n27; foreign policy of，工 4 ， 137，
Trade Related Technical Assistance , 252 34 工 -4 2 ， 344 , 39 2 ; gender opinion
Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM; differences in, 351; and globalization ,
WTO) ， 243 ，二49-51 ， 26 3 ，二 66 ， 二98-99; and group identity, 191; hege-
269n29 , 382 monism of, 179 ，巧工， 279- 80 ， 344-
travel , foreign: and amity, 366-67; and 45 , 364 , 3 68 ; and Hungary, 96; and
othering, 358-61 , 367-68; and public India , rr8; and Korean War , 54 , 1 工 0 ，
opinion, 9 , 35 0 -5 丰， 355 ， 374 n 47;and 工 32; and Kosovo , 227; and Laos , 111;
threat perception , 363 , 365 , 368 military deployments of, 137; other-
triangular relationship (U. S.-]apan 一 ing of China in , 373n34; as perceived
China) , 163 , 166 threat , 375n49 , 383; public opinion
Triplett, William, II, 309 in , 290-91; resolve of，工 9 ， 75;and
Truman, Harry S, 54 , 57 SEATO , 61; and Sino-Indian war , 66 ,
Turner, ]ohn, 3 1 3, 324 113-14 , 1 工 7 ， 120, 122 , 125; and Sino-
]apanese relations , 163 , 167-68 ，工 77-
ultraleftists , Chinese , 28 工 82; and Sino-Soviet relations ，工 54 n6 ;
UN Development Programme (UNDP) , and sovereignty vs. intervention, 6 ,
3 0 工 n1 1 53 n 3, 220; and terrorism，巧。-}1;
unemployment , 145 , 259-60 , 273n62 , as threat to China ，二 04 ， 344 ， 349;and
288 Tibet， 9 卒， 100 一工 01; trade of, 247;
unintended war, 30 , 32-33 , 36-38 , 147 272n54; and UN , 293 ，二98; uni-
United Nations (UN) , 402; China's admis- polar power of，工 34-35 ，工 49 ， 153 n 3 ，
sion to , 97 , 322-23 , 336n79; China's 160n53 ， 16 3 ，工 68 ，工 87 ， 19 6 , 199 ，二 04;
rokin , 221 , 234 ， 25~26~ 291 , 293- and USSR , 15-16, 69 , 15 工; and WTO ,
296; coalitions with , 299; and global- 243-45 , 25 0 -5 工， 254-5 6 ， 25 8 - 62 ，
ization , 276-77 , 283 , 301n1; and In- 264-65 ， 267nn3 ， 5 ，二 87. See also anti-
dia , 197; and ]apan，工 69-7 0 ， 173 ， Americanism; military capability, U.S.;
17 6，工 78 ， 181 , 192; in Korean 币Tar ， Sino-U. S. relations
55 , 57; and noninterference principle , Universal Declaration of Human Rights ,
225; peace-keeping operations of, 8, 226 , 293
16 9-7 0 ，工 7 6 ， 18 工， 19 2 ， 218-2 工， 223- UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR;
24 , 226 , 295-97; and Sino-Indian re- Yugoslavia) , 224
lations , 97; and Sino-Taiwanese rela- UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
tions , 295 , 336n79; and sovereignty vs. (UNTAC), 223
mterventlO n , 217 , 219-2 工， 21 9- 2 工， UN Truce Supervision Organization
228- 2 9 ， 23 二 -33 ， 293 , 29 6 ; Taiwan in , (UNTSO) , 223
296; and Tibet, 9 工 -93 ， 97-9 8 ;and Urugua~ 267n3 , 271n46
war on terrorism , 230. See also Secu-
, Uruguay Round (1986-94; 耶TTO) ， 25 8
rity Council, UN U. S.-]apanese relations: defense guide-
United States (U. S.) , 398-99 , 402 , 407 , lines in (工 997) ， 197-9 8; and ]apanese
4 rr; iç. ~fghanistan， 18 - 19 ，工 9- 20 ， independence ，工 69 ，工 82; ]apanese role
24 , 26-27 , 76 , 176; agricultural subsi- in ，工 64 ， 175-76; military，工 67 ， 169;
dies in , 272n57 , 273n67 , 274n72; in and North Korea ，工 39 ， 14 1; and Sino-
APEC , 271n43; and Chiria threat the- ]apanese relations , 166-67 ，工 73 ， 178-
ory, 187 , 192-94 , 196 ，工 99 ， 20 3, 81; and Sino-Taiwanese relations , 76-
205 - 6; Chinese perceþtions of, 170; 77 , 17 1; and Sino-U. S. relations , 137 ,
Chinese public opinion on , 175-76, 197 , 383; and Taiwan , 65; and U. S.
345 , 34 8 -49 , 35 1-57 , 3 60 , 37 2n 33; steel tariffs , 256
 INDEX 4 81

U. S.-Japan Security Alliance , 167 , 173 Wang Shulia吨， 226

U. S.-North Korea relations , 140 , 159n39 , 飞X7ang Wei , 327 , 329
180; deterrence in , 13 ，二 4- 2 9 ， 36 明Tang Yizhou , 225-26 , 400
u. S.-South Korea relations , 57 , 14 丰， Wang Yuesheng , 323
15 8n 33; and troop deployments , 33- Wang Zhen , 398
34 , 37 , 14 1 ，工 43 ， 14 8 -49 , 15 8nn 3 6 - Wang Zhongchun, 397
37 , 159 n 39 , 3 8 4 Warsaw talks (U. S.-PRC), 110
u. S.-Sóuth Korea Tea i11 Spirit military weapons of mass destruction (WMD) , 27 ,
exerCl se , 35 7 8 ，巧。; biological，巧， 28; chemical ,
U. S.-Taiwan relations ，二 6; and anti- 13 , 28 , 32 , 37; in Iraq , 309; in Korea ,
communism , 59 - 60; arms sales in , 34 , 159 n 39; North Korean , 28- 29 ,
3 8 ， 6 丰， 76 -77 , 19 2 ; and invasion of 139 , 17 工 • See also nuclear weapons
mainland , 64 - 65; and Korean 明Tar， Weber , Max , 3 巧
口，口， 380; and Sino-Indian war , 63 , Wendt , Alexander , 191 , 204-5 , 31 0 , 315
65 , 110; and Sino-Taiwanese relations , Wen Jiabao , 178
37-3 8 ， 6 之一 63 ， 7 6 -77 ， 3 8 3 Whiting , Allen , 3-5 , 65 , 190, 24 1n68 ,
use of force , 1-2 , 50-85 , 3 88 , 395 , 397 , 318 , 370n5 , 412; and China's Korea
402 , 405; and China threat theory, 206; policy, 13 工 -32 ， 144-50; on China's
and Chinese UN votes , 295; ånd cul- west , 384 - 8 5; on Chinese rationality,
ture , 123 - 24 , 33 2n6; and deterrence , 379-80; on deterrence , 186; and Kis-
13-49; and escalation, 14 , 30 , 3 2 -33 , singer, 83n70; on the other, 372n32;
35-36 , 38 , 63 , 68-69; expected cost and policy, 394; on Sino-Indian war ,
of, 16 , 37 ，二90; and globalization , 290 , 86-88 ，工 03 ， 106 ， 108 , 113 , 122;on
300 ; in Korea , 24 , 26- 2 7 , 29 , 3 2, 34 , Sino-Japanese relations , 169 -70 , 381-
140, 157n28 , 171 , 384; and legitimate 82; on Sino-Soviet border clashes , 69-
intervention , 217; and rising-power sta- 70; sources used by, 395; on Taiwan
tus , 310; in Sino-Indian war , 3 - 4 , 109 , i~sue ， 380-81; and theory, 387
114; social psychology on , 310-12; Wilson , Woodrow, 310
and Taiwan ，工 4-15 ， 21-22 , 59; thera- windows logic , 50-85; and Chinese in-
peutlC vs. curatlve , 51 vasion of Vietnam , 72; in Korean War,
Ussuri River , Sino-Sovietconflict on, 52 , 54-58; literature on , 53; and op-
69-7 1 portunity, 51-52; and Quemoy-Matsu
attacks , 62; in Sino-Indian war , 63 -66;
Vajpayee , Shri Atal Bihari , 194 ，工 9 6 -97 and Sino-Soviet border clashes , 70; in
Vietnam ，工 62 ， 29 1 ， 397-99 ， 402 ， 4 0 5 ， Sino-Taiwanese relations , 58-61; and
407; division of, 59 , 61; South , 71-72. vulnerability, 51-52; and Xisha Islands ,
See also North Vietnam 7 1 -7 2
Vietnam War , 18 , 31 , 52 , 66-69 , 86 , World Bank , 284 ，均 9 ， 3 01n 工
186, 397-9 8 World Health Organization (耶吁-I 0) ， 249
vulnerability, window of, 51-52 World Trade Organization (币TTO) ， 6 ，
145 , 242-75 , 326 , 3 69 n1 , 3 82 , 402;
Waldron, Arthur , 373n39 agriculture negotiations at , 7 , 67 , 243 ,
Walong region (NEFA; India) , 123 245 , 254-255 , 258-261 , 263-264 ,
Walt , Stephen ，工 9 0 27 2nn 57 ， 6 二， 273nn62-63 ,66; behav-
Waltz , Kenneth，工 78 ， 189 ， 310 ior in , 256 , 264-67; and China threat
Wang Baocun , 400 theory, 186, 194 , 201 , 204-5; Chinese
明Tang Bingnan , 110 , 396 acceptance into ，二 45-46 ， 28 7- 88 ;
明Tang Hongwei , 90 , 129n87 Chinese compliance with , 250-51;
Wang Jiaxiang , 396 Chinese delegation to , 245 - 46 , 250-
Wang Kehua , 223 5 工， 263 -64 ，二 74n80; Chinese leader-
WangPufeng主 400 ship in , 242-43 , 253 , 255-57 , 26 3-
Wang Shangrong, 121 64; coalition building in, 251-55; con-
48之 INDEX

sensus in , 265; demonstra呼ons against , Yang Kuisong , 70-7 工， 397

287; developing countries in , 251-55; Yang Shangkun, 121
and globalization , 282-83; governance Yang Yongyi , 350
Of， 244 ，巧立一口，巧 6， 265; informal Yan Xuetong, 3 二9 ， 4 00
organization of, 243-44 , 256, 265; Yao Yunzhu , 400
languages used in, 248 , 266, 268n16; Yasukuni Shrine , 165 , 173
norms and rules of，巧 6-57 ， 264- 67 , Ye Fei, 62 , 396
二 74n81; "request and offer" principle Ye Jianying , II5-17 , 129n87 , 398
in, 244 , 258; Single Undertaking prin- Yellow Peril, 201
ciple in，二 44 ， 25 8, 263; Taiwan issue Yen Ching-chang, 248
in , 247-49; and textiles , 7 , 243 , 247 , Yijiangshan island , 60
25 2 -53 ，二 5 8 ， 261-6 卒， 26 工 -62 Yinhe incident, 157n30
World War 1, 35-36, 151 youth , opinions of, 350-5 工， 355 ， 357 ，
World War II: and power transitions , 359- 61 , 3 6 3-64 , 3 68 , 373 n 39
151; and Sino-]apanese relations , 163 , Yugoslavia , 20 , 224 , 295
166, 169-70 ，工 7 2 -75 ，工 77-7 8 ，工 80- Yu Xinyan , 314 - 15
81 , 193 , 197-98
worst-case analyses , 3, 5, 3 8 ，工 88 Zeng Lingliang, 226
Wu Chunsi , 400 zero-sum dynamics , 8 -9 , 140 , 1 邸， 20 3 ，
Wu Lengxi, 127n18 , 396 382; and SIT, 3 1 3, 3 工 8- 1 9 ， 3 22 - 2 4 ,
Wu Xiuquan , 396 3 28 , 33 0
Zhang Baijia , 397
Xiao Tong , 321 Zhang Guohua , 116, 121-22
Xia Yong , 238n28 Zhang Hanfu, 121
Xikang province (Sichuan) , 90 Zhang Wenmu , 400
Xinjiang, 69 , 299 , 384; and Sino-Indian Zhang Yishan , 233
war，句， 108 ， 1 口， 115 Zhao Weiwen , 90-9 工， 126n9 , 397
Xiong Lei , 3 3 1 Zhejiang University-Valparaiso survey,
Xiong Xianghui , 396 344 , 3 68 , 37 6n 51
Xisha Islands (Paracels) , 71-72 Zhenbaodao (Damansky) Island (Ussuri
Xi Yongjun , 317 River) , 69-7 1
Xu Goujin, 225 Zhou Enlai , 58 , 95 , 156n19 , 173 , 3 1 7 ,
Xu Xiangqian , 398 396 , 39 8; and Nixon , 3 巧; and Sino-
Xu Xin , 191 Indian relations , 97-99; and Sino-
Xu Yan , 60-61 , 64 , 397; on Sino-Indian Indian war , 65 ，工 04-7 ， 110-12 ， 115 ，
war , 112 , 114 , 117 , 119-20; on Tibet, 120, 122 , 124; and social comparison ,
89-9 0 3 日 -22; and Vietnam War , 67-68
Zhu Bangzao , 327
Yahuda , Michael , 4 - 5, 16 丰， 3 84 , 39 0 , Zhu Chenghu, 18
4 01 , 4 11 Zhu De , 121
Yakusuni Shrine , 172, 174 Zhu Rongji , 1.66, 201 , 287-88
Yang Chengwu, 115 Zi Zhongyun , 196
Yang Dezhi , 316 Zoellick, Robert , 254
Yang Gongsu , 126n17, 396 Zweig , David , 408 , 410