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EN BANC

JOSEPH ROBLE PENAS UDK-16915

Petitione,;
Members:

GESMUNDO, CJ.,
PERLAS-BER.NABE,
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
-versus- HERNANDO,
LAZARO-JAVIER,
INTING,
ZALAMEDA,
LOPEZ, M.,
GAERLAN,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROSARIO,
represented by the CAMPAIGN LOPEZ, J,,
.FINANCE U~'IT DIMAAMPAO, and
Respondent MARQUEZ,JJ

Promulgated:

February 15, 2022

x---------------------------------
~k~
----------------- ~----------x
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

DECISION

The Case

Petitioner Joseph Roble Penas assails the following issuances of the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in E,Q, Case No. 14-422 entitled
Cummissiun on Elections represented by the Campaign Finance Unit v,
Joseph Roble Penas:
~--··

4
Decision 2 UDK-16915

1
1. Resolution No. 18-0665 dated November 5, 2018, finding
probable cause for his indictment for violation of Section 1002 in
relation to Section 262 3 of Batas Pambansa 881 (BP 881), the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC), as amended by Republic Act
(RA) 7166, 4 for election overspending;

2. Resolution5 No. 20-0121-33 dated December 9, 2020, denying

his motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for

Mayor of Di gos City, Davao Del Sur for the 2010 National and Local
Elections (NLE). He ran under the banner of the Nationalist People's
Coalition (NPC). For the 2010 NLE, Digos City had a total of 93,801
registered voters.

On June 7,2010, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8944,6

petitioner filed with respondent COMELEC his Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures (SOCE) 7 where he declared his total election campaign
expenditures in the amount of !'600,000.00.

By Letter8 dated October 1, 2014, respondent's Campaign Finance Unit

informed petitioner that under Section 13 9 of RA 7166, a candidate who

Rollo, pp. 73-83.

2 SECTION 100. limitations upon expenses of candidates. - No candidate shall spend for
his election campaign an aggregate amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where he filed his candidacy: Provided, That the expenses herein
referred to shall include those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate, whether in cash or in
kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and
paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided,further, That where the land, water or aircraft, equipment,
facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the
Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the expenses for the use
thereof, based on toe prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the total expenses incurred
by the candidate. ·
3 SECTION 262. Other election offenses. - Violation of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of the
following sections of this Code shall constitute election offenses: Sections 9, 18, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82,
83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 107, 108, 109, I 10, 111,
112,122,123.127, 128,129,132,134,135,145,148,150,152,172,173,174,178,180,182,184,185,
186,189,190,191,192,194,195, !96, 197,198,202,203,204,205,206,207,208,209,210,211,212,
213, 214, 215,216,217,218,219,220,223,229.230, 231,233, 234. 235. 236,239 and 240.
4
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR SYNCHRONIZED NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AND FOR
ELECTORAL REFORMS, AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS THERFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURFOSES.
5
Rollo, pp. 97-99.
6
Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expei!diture,:,; in Connection with the May
10 2010 National and Local Fiections,
0
7
Rollo, p. 39.
8
Id. at 40.
9
SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political flarties. - The aggregate amount that a
candidate or regislcrcd polilical party may sp~nd for election campaign shall be as foi!ows:
(a) For candidates---Ten pesos (P!0.00) for PrJsider.t and Vic-.3-P1csident; and for other candidates,
Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter c:um:.-::ntly registered in ihe constiruency where he filed his certificate
of candidacy: Provided That, a candidate ,vithol!t any political party and without support from any
political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P:).00) for every such voter~ and
(b) For political parties-~ Five pesos (P5.00) fOr every voter currently registered in the constituency
or constituencies where it has official candidat;:. . .;,_

[
Decision .) UDK-16915

belongs to a political party is only allowed to spend three pesos (1"3.00) for
every registered voter in the constituency where he or she seeks to be elected.
Hence, petitioner was allowed to spend up to 1"'281,403.00 only for his election
campaign. By spending P600,000.00 for his election campaign, as reported in
his SOCE, petitioner clearly exceeded the expenditure limit allowed by law.
Petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the letter to submit his
written explanation why no charges should be filed against him for election
overspending.

On October 29, 2014, pet1t1oner submitted an Affidavit of

Correction/Exp!anation 10 to the COMELEC Law Department. He explained
that he failed in good faith to specify the breakdown of his expenses in his
SOCE. Because he was overwhelmed with emotions for having won in the
mayoralty elections in his city, he failed to thoroughly review the SOCE which
his secretary prepared. Petitioner clarified that of his reported P600,000.00
total campaign expenditures, r'l 12,924.10 was spent for the printing of sample
ballots and r'245,000.00, for lawyer's fees. These items, he claimed, should
not have been included in the computation of expenses incurred by a candidate
conformably with Section 8 11 ofCOMELEC Resolution No. 8944 for the May
10, 2010 NLE, and Section 3, Rule 4 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 13
for the 2013 NLE. Had these amounts been deducted from the P600,000.00
expenditure he earlier reported, his expenses would have only totaled
P241,574.0l for his election campaign, well within the expenditure limit
prescribed by law.

On November 6, 2014, the COMELEC Campaign Finance Unit filed a

formal complaint 14 against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 100 in
relation to Section 262 of the OEC, as amended by RA 7166, for election
overspending.

Any provision of Jaw to the contrary notwith~tanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any
candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes. duly reported to the
Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.
10
Rollo, pp. 55-57.
11
Rule 4, Section 3 provides:
Section 8. Lawful expenditures. - No candidate or treasurer ofa party shall, directly or indirectly, make
any expenditure except for the following purposes:
XXX
1. For employment of counsel;
XXX
k. For printing sample ballots in such color size and maximum number as may be authorized by the
0

Commission.
The expenditures for items (i), (j), a.nd (k), :"'hall not be taken into account in determining whether the
expenditure limit has been breached by U1e candidate or party in the conduct of campaign activities.
12
Section 3. Lawful expenditures. - Nv canCidn.le ll\ i.rt!asurer of a party shall, directly or indirectly, make
any expenditure except for the follo,.vi:ng ::i~u;:•ose:.;:
XXX
1. For employment of counsel;
XXX
k. For printing .samp!e ballots in ~u.,.:h c-:::ler, ::,;izc- 1.:1d maximum nu111ber as may be authorized by the
Commission.
13
Rules and Regulations Governing Czunp-iign ;:.·;t~wK(;:~ and Discfo::;ure in Connection with the 13 May
2013 National and Local Eiections a~\1 Subse•~uc:ll Election:-. Thereafter.
14
Rollo, pp. 26-32.

«
Decision 4 UDK-16915

On February 9, 2015, petitioner submitted his Counter-Affidavit 15

dated January 26, 2015 where he essentially averred that on September 22,
2009, he was appointed party Chairman ofNPC for Digos City, Davao Del
Sur for the 2010 NLE. As City Chair, he was authorized by the NPC to pay
for any and all expenses ofNPC-Digos City as well as reasonable expenses
redounding to the benefit of all NPC local candidates. For this reason, he spent
P112,924.10 for the printing of sample ballots for NPC candidates both for
the national and local elections. Too, he engaged the legal services of Atty.
Leopoldo Diones (Atty. Diones) to address the collective legal concerns of
NPC local candidates in Digos City. He paid Atty. Diones P245,500.00 as
lawyer's fees, albeit, it was listed as "Miscellaneous Expenses" in his SOCE.

The expenses for the printing of sample ballots and payment for the
legal services of Atty. Diones were NPC political party expenses and not his
own personal expenditure as mayoralty candidate, thus, should have been
excluded from the computation of his expenditures during the 2010 campaign
period. This is in accordance with Section 102(i) and (k) of the OEC 16 which
categorically state that the expenses for engagement of legal services and
printing of sample ballots, respectively, are excluded from the computation of
campaign expenses. The exclusion of these items would bring his total
campaign expenditure to P241,574.0l only, well within the allowed
expenditure limit of P281,403.00 for Digos City.

Rulings of the COMELEC En Banc

By Resolution No. 18-0665 17 dated November 5, 2018, the COMELEC

En Banc found probable cause to hold petitioner for trial and consequently
ordered the filing of an. Information against him for violation of the OEC, viz:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to adopt the recommendation of the Law
Department finding probable cause to hold respondent
JOSEPH R. PENAS for trial and the filing of
information for violation of Section 100 ofB.P. Big. 881,
otherwise known as the Onmibus Election Code (OEC),
as amended by R.A. No. 7166, in relation to Section 262
of the same Code.

15
Id. at 41-53.
16
Section 102. Lawful expenditures. -To carry out the provisions of the preceding sections, no candidate
or treasurer of a politica! party shall, directly or indirectly, make any expenditure except for the following
purpose:
xxxx
(i) For employment of counseL t.he cost of which shall not be taken into account in detem1ining the
amount of expenses which a candidate or political party may have incurred under Sections 100 and 10 I
hereof;
xxxx
(k) For printing of sample ba11ots in such color. size and maximum number as may be authorized by the
Commission and the cost of such printing shall not be taken into account in determining the amount of
expenses which a candidate or political party may have incurred under Sections 100 and IOI hereof-;
xxxx
" Rollo, pp. 73-83.

~
Decision 5 UDK-16915

Let the Law Department implement this

Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

The COMELEC En Banc essentially ruled that petitioner's plea to

admit the correction of entries in his SOCE was a mere afterthought to avoid
criminal liability. At any rate, the correction and supporting receipts were self-
serving and should be scrutinized in a full-blown trial. 18

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 13, 2018

which was denied under Resolution No. 20-00121-33 dated December 9,
2020.

The Present Petition

Petitioner now charges the COMELEC with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict
him for overspending for his campaign during the 2010 NLE, notwithstanding
that: ( 1) he submitted an Affidavit of Correction/Explanation to rectify the
errors in his SOCE; (2) the SOCE was considered though the same had not
been duly executed; and (3) the COMELEC incurred inordinate delay in
resolving the complaint.

On number (2), he asserts that the notarized SOCE he filed on June 7,

2010 had not been duly executed. For although the aforesaid SOCE stated that
it was "supported by receipts, vouchers and other documents reflecting full,
true, accurate and complete election contributions received and expenditures
incurred L,x", 19 in truth, the SOCE was not supported by such documents.
Hence, although the SOCE was notarized, the same does not bind him since
he himself admits that the document was defective. 20

As for nwnber (3), he charges respondent with inordinate delay in

conducting the preliminary investigation in his case, thus, violating his right
to a speedy disposition of his case. He invokes Section 8, Rule 34 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure ordaining that preliminary investigation must
be tenninated within twenty (20) days from receipt of the counter-affidavit
and other evidence of the respondents, and resolution thereof shall be made
within five (5) days thereafter. As it was, the COMELEC failed to observe the
prescribed period because it took the COMELEC approximately three (3)
years and nine (9) months from submission of his counter-affidavit to issue
the resolution finding probable cause to charge him with election
overspending, and approximately two (2) more years to resolve his verified
motion for reconsideration. In total, it took the COMELEC more than ten ( l 0)
years from the filing of his SOCE to indict him for alleged violation of the
OEC. 21
18
Id. at 79.
19
Id. at 13.
20 Id. at 18.
21
Id.

(
Decision 6 UDK-16915

In its Comment, respondent COMELEC, represented by the Office of

the Solicitor General through Assistant Solicitor General Henry S. Angeles,
and Associate Solicitors Michael Pio V. Cua and Gerard Samuel Alphonsus
B. Contreras, counters that the petition must fail on both procedural and
substantive grounds.

On procedural ground, petitioner alleged that on February 4, 2021, he

received Minute Resolution No. 20-00121-33, denying his motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner then counted thirty (30) days from February 4,
2021 before filing the present petition before the Court on March 8, 2021,
citing Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner, however, failed to
deduct the seven (7)-day period between his receipt of Minute Resolution No.
18-0665 on December 6, 2021 until the filing of his motion for reconsideration
on December 13, 2021 as required under Section 3, Rule 64.

Applying the provision, petitioner only had twenty-three (23) days left,
not a full thirty (30)-day period, from February 4, 2021 or until February 27,
2021 to file a petition for certiorari. But since February 27, 2021 was a
Saturday, petitioner's recourse could have only been filed on March 1, 2021
at the latest. Clearly, the present petition was filed seven (7) days late on
March 8, 2021, hence, should be dismissed outright.

Too, dismissal of the present petition is warranted because petitioner is

not without any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course oflaw. For the issuance of Resolution No. 20-0121-33 signaled the end
of preliminary investigation before the COMELEC and the start of the
criminal proceedings before the trial court. What petitioner should have done
was submit himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, appear during
arraignment and enter his plea, and proceed to the trial of the ensuing criminal
case22 instead of filing a petition for certiorari before the Court.

Going now to the issue of inordinate delay, its detennination is not a

numbers game23 and the entire context of the case should be considered, more
so in this case where the government agency involved is tasked to administer
the elections of the country.

The complaint here was filed in 2014. lt was only resolved in 2018 or
four (4) years later. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in 2018 which
eventually got resolved in 2021. Meantime, the Comelec was busy with the
intervening elections in 2016 and 2019, hence, it was unable to immediately
act on the complaint and petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

At any rate, petitioner failed to make a timely assertion of his right to a

speedy disposition of his case. As held in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, 24
petitioner should have done overt acts to manifest his assertion of the right,
such as the filing of a motion for early resolution. Failing in this, petitioner
22
Comment. p. 10.
23
Comment, p. 18.
24
See 837 Phil. 815 (2018)

~
Decision 7 UDK-16915

was deemed to have acquiesced to the delay, if any, and had already waived
his right to the speedy disposition of the case.

On substantive grounds, the OSG asserts that the finding of probable

cause against petitioner was well-supported by evidence, specifically, by his
own SOCE. Besides, under Section 7, Rule 3425 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, a complaint initiated motu proprio by the COMELEC, as in this
case, is presumed to be based on sufficient probable cause.

In any event, petitioner cannot deny the due execution of his SOCE. As
a notarized document, petitioner avowed therein, under penalty of law, the
truth of the contents of the instrument or document.

Further, the COMELEC did not err when it did not give weight to
petitioner's Affidavit of Correction/Explanation, the same being self-serving
and having been filed merely as an afterthought when petitioner had already
been notified of the legal consequences of the declaration in his SOCE. In any
case, the legal effect, if at all, of petitioner's affidavit should be threshed out
during the proceedings in the criminal case in court, not during the preliminary
investigation.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

On the late filing of the petition

As correctly argued by the OSG, petitioner erred in reckoning the thirty

(30)-day period within which to file the present petition from his receipt of
the denial of his motion for reconsideration. In Pates v. COMELEC, 26 the
Court already decreed that the fresh-period rule which resets the reglementary
period for seeking judicial relief is inapplicable to petitions for certiorari
under Rule 64. On the contrary, the intervening period used for the filing of
any motion for reconsideration is deductible from the thirty (30) days granted
under Section 3 thereof.

Petitioner received copy of the COMELEC En Bane's Resolution No.

18-0665 finding probable cause for his indictment on December 6, 2018. It
took him at least seven (7) days therefrom to file his motion for
reconsideration dated December 13, 2018. Deducting this seven (7)-day
period from the thirty (30) days granted under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner had twenty-three (23) days left to file the present petition
for certiorari from February 4, 2021 when he received the Minute Resolution
No. 20-0121-33, denying his motion for reconsideration. In other words, he
had until February 27, 2021 to file the present petition. But petitioner filed his

25
Sec. 7. Presumption of Existence of Probable Cause. - A complaint initiated motu propio by the
Commission is presumed to be based on sufficient probable cause and the investigating officer must
forthwith issue the subpoena mentioned in the immediately preceding section.
26
See 609 Phil. 260, 265-266 (2009).

/(
' '
Decision 8 UDK-16915

petition only on March 8, 2021, clearly beyond the period prescribed by Rule
64.

Even then, we cannot lose sight of the fact that procedural rules were
precisely conceived to aid the attainment of justice such that if a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of
substantial justice, the fonner must yield to the latter. 27 In exceptional cases,
the Court allows a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to
promote its objective to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. 28

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to

tardy appeals, the Court has not been oblivious to, or unmindfol of, the
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. ln those
situations where technicalities were dispensed with, this Court's decisions
were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by
law. The Court hastens to add though that in those rare cases where procedural
rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent
the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have
always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of
procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. 29 Here, the Court
finds a compelling reason to relax the strict application of procedural rules --
the COMELEC's assailed actions were tainted with grave abuse of discretion
which is correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, as will be
further discussed below. To rule otherwise would unnecessarily expose
petitioner to the expense and rigors of a public trial when records indubitably
show that his plea for relief is based on meritorious grounds. The Court, thus,
deems the relaxation of procedural rules warranted in this case as the ultimate
purpose of substantial justice so requires.

Certiorari as the plain, speedy, adequate remedy

The COMELEC contends that petitioner erroneously resorted to this

Court via a petition for certiorari when he is not without a p.lain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of Jaw. The COIY1ELEC posits that
petitioner should have just allowed the trial of the criminal case against him
to proceed where he may participate and adduce evidence of his innocence.

To emphasize, however, recourse to Rule 65 does not require absence

of a judicial remedy to a party. Jt is the inadequacy - not the absence - of all
other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that
usually detennines the propriety of certiorari. 30 Adequate remedy simply
means that "xxx a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the

27
Basco v. CA, 392 Phil. 251, 266 (2000).
28
Latogan v. People. G.K Nu. 233298, .ianiiary 22. 2020.
29
Heirs of.luan A1. Dinglasan v. AJ,'11fa Cor1:;oration, (i.R. No. 204378, August 05, 2019.
30
A.L. Ang Network, Tnc. v. 1\ttondejar, ~125 Phii. 28~. 295-296 (20 I4 ).

/(
Decision 9 UDK-16915

injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal
concerned. " 31

Indeed, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may even prosper despite

the availability of other remedies in certain exceptional circumstances, such
as: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate;
(b) when the interests of substantial justice so require; or (c) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 32

In petitioner's case, a full-blown trial is not a speedy and adequate

remedy. Going thro:ugh a public trial would not afford petitioner an
expeditious relief from the detrimental effect of a wrongful charge of an
election offense, especially one that is filed despite inordinate delay.

Petitioner had already been deprived of the prompt disposition of the

complaint against him by the protracted preliminary investigation. It would
be more unjust to further subject him to public trial when there is evidence
early on that otherwise contradicts the initial findings of the COMELEC.
Withal, the original action of certiorari will afford petitioner immediate relief
from the deleterious effects of the COMELEC's whimsical and arbitrary
exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, the Court will not shun from its duty of
affording petitioner a prompt and effective legal remedy.

Respondent COMELEC Acted in Grave

Abuse of Discretion

The COMELEC, through its authorized legal officers, has the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigations of all election offenses and to
prosecute them. 33 This power emanates from Article IX, Section 2, Paragraph
6 of the 1987 Constitution which empowers the COMELEC to "investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and
malpractices." 34 This grant of authority is reiterated in Section 265 of the OEC
as amended by RA. No. 9369, viz.:

SECTION 265. Prosecution. - The Commission

shall, through its duly authorized legal officers,
have the power, concurrent with the other
prosecuting arm, of lhe government, to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election •)i-fenses
pu.'lishablc under this Code, and to prosecute the
same.

As with ordinary criminal cases, the COl\1ELEC is tasked with finding

probable cause 'Nnenever it conducts preliminary investigation of election-
related offenses. It is settled thongh that the finding of probable cause in the

31 Conti V C 11 1,6.,:_ pi,;1 o.:;;6 9~.:: /J 999)

3L S,ecI'hf11;~f,;i:: /3~./;~;t-~;!f Uif.
:-ls,;;;~~-~lic~-i ;.,_ Gaile, Pt}jj_ 670,679 (2009).
33
See Pe,fo v. ltJar!i:ztJ,.'10, 451 Phi!. 356 365 {2003).
0
34
Garcia v. COAfELEC 624 PhiL 72'!:, 733 (20 i 0).

I(
 Decision 10 UDK-16915

prosecution of election offenses rests in the sound discretion of the

COMELEC. 35 Generally. the Court wil! not interfere with such finding of the
COMELEC absent a c!e_ar showing of grave abuse of discretion. 36

A court or tribunal can only be considered as having acted with grave

abuse of discretion when its act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." From the foregoing
definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari can only strike
an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the
petitioner could nianifestly show that such act was patent and gross. 37

Here, the Court finds that the COIVIELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it recommended
the filing of an Information against petitioner despite the inordinate and
oppressive delay which attended the conduct of preliminary investigation.

The COlefELEC is guilty of inordinate delay

A1iicle HI, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution enshrines the guarantee

to speedy disposition of cases, thus:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

As elucidated in Magante v. Sandiganbayan, 38 the provision expanded

the speedy trial guarantee afforded to the accused in a criminal proceeding
under the 1935 Constitution:

xx x Though both concepts are subsumed under the

more basic tenet of procedural due process, the
right to speedy disposition of cases. to contrast with
the right to speedy trial, sweeps more broadly as it
is not confined wilh criminal cases; it extends even
to_ other adversarial proceedings before any
judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative
tribunals. t.Jo branch of goven1n1.ent js, therefore,
exempt fro,11 dnl y ohserving the constitutional
~afCguard and the i"igDt confirrns irrnnunity fron1
arbitrary dduy. xx x

.;s Id.
6
~ Albaiia er: al. v. Belo, eu,(.617 Phil. 3 10, 352 (2009) citing JJaytan v. COMELEC, 444 PhiL 812, 820
1

(2003) .
37
Yu v. .Judge Reyr~,};-(a1:oin, 667 Phil. ,n,t 182 (}') J 1).
1

38
836 Phil. I 108, l i 18 (20!8).
Decision 11 UDK-16915

Hence, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all
officials who are tasked with the administration of justice, including herein
respondent COMELEC.

In Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, 39 the Court laid down certain guidelines

in resolving issues concerning inordinate delay, viz.:

First, the right to speedy disposition of

cases is different from the right to speedy trial.
While the rationale for both rights is the same, the
right to speedy trial may only be invoked in
criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The
right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may
be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused
may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the
right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the

filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a
preliminary investigation. This Comi
acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman
should set reasonable periods for preliminary
investigation, with due regard to the complexities
and nuances of each case. Delays beyorid this
period will be taken against the prosecution. The
period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to
the filing of the formal complaint shall not be
included in the determination of whether there has
been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which

party carries the burden of proof. If the right is
invoked within the given time periods contained in
current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars,
and the time periods that will be promulgated by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the
burden of proving that the right was justifiably
invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time
period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has
the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it

must prove first, whether the case is motivated by
malice or clearly only politically motivated and is
attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that
the defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the

prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that il
followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of
the case; second, that the complexity of the issues
and the volume of evidence made the delay

39
Supra note 24.

!1J
Decision 12 UDK-16915

inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered

by the accused as a result of the delay.

Fourth, determination of the length of delay

is never mechanical. Courts must consider the
entire context of the case, from the amount of
evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or
complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an

allegation that the prosecution of the case was
solely motivated by malice, such as when the case
is politically motivated or when there is continued
prosecution despite utter lack of evidence.
Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior
of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If
malicious prosecution is properly alleged and
substantially proven, the case would automatically
be dismissed without need of further analysis of the
delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of

the accused to the right to speedy disposition of
cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven
that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the
constitutional right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate

delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid
out and discussed by the relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of

cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely
raised. The respondent or the accused must file the
appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory
or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed
to have waived their right to speedy disposition of
cases.

Applying these guidelines, there is clear inordinate delay in how the

COMELEC handled the preliminary investigation and subsequent resolution
of petitioner's case.

First. The right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked to

question the inordinate delay in the course of preliminary investigations by
the COMELEC. While fact-finding proceedings ai.,d investigations such as
these do not form part of the criminal prosecution proper, the respondent may
already be prejudiced by such proceedings. 40

To be sure, a respondent, such as petitioner, though not yet imprisoned

is nevertheless disadva11tagcd by the uncertainties of his potential criminal
case. He is forced to live under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often,
hostility. His fina..ncial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed,
40
See People v. Sandfganbayan and Holganza, G.R. No. 232737. October 02, 2019.

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Decision 13 UDK-16915

and he is subjected to public obloquy. 41 Not to mention, his reputation 1s

already tarnished despite the presumption of innocence in his favor.

Second. The COMELEC failed to observe its own prescribed period

for resolving cases when it finally recommended the filing of an Information
against petitioner on December 9, 2020 or more than six (6) years from when
the formal complaint was filed on November 12, 2014.

The COMELEC is Constitutionally committed to act promptly on cases

filed before it. In fact, this is one of the reasons why Article IX-C, Section 3
of the 1987 Constitution authorized the COMELEC to promulgate its own
rules of procedure:

SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit

en bane or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided
that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en bane. (Emphasis
added)

Article IX-A, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution reiterates this authority

of the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it, thus:

SECTION 6. Each Commission en bane may

promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices. Such
rules however shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive tights.

Pursuant to its rule-making power, the COMELEC promulgated its

Rules of Procedure, Section 8, Rule 34 of which ordains that a preliminary
investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days and a resolution
must thereafter be issued within five (5) days, thus:

xxxx

Sec. 8. Duty of Investigating Officer. - The

preliminary investigation must be te1111inated
within twenty (20) days after receipt of the counter-
affidavits and other evidence of the respondents,
and resolution thereof shall be made within five (5)
days thereafter.

xxxx

41
Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, 808 Phil. 739, 754(2017), citing Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 399,
917 (2004).

1
Decision 14 UDK-16915

As stated, the complaint against petitioner was filed on November 12,

2014. Subsequently, petitioner filed his counter-affidavit on February 9,
2015. By Resolution No. 18-0665 dated November 5, 2018, or about four
(4) years from when the complaint was filed, the COMELEC ordered the
filing of an Infonnation against petitioner. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration and this time, it took the COMELEC another two (2)
years to issue Resolution No. 220-00121-33 dated December 9, 2020 to
deny the motion. Indubitably, the COMELEC went beyond the prescribed
period for the conduct of a preliminary investigation.

Third. In view of the COMELEC's failure to observe its own

prescribed period for resolving petitioner's case, the burden ofjustifying the
delay is shifted to it. Consequently, it must prove first, that it followed the
prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the
prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the
volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice
was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay. The COMELEC,
however, failed to establish these circumstances.

For one. Instead of proving compliance with its own prescribed

procedure, the COMELEC merely attempted to justify the delay by citing
the two (2) general elections which it had to administer during the pendency
of the investigation, i.e. the 2016 and 2019 NLE.

But this hardly justifies the delay it took the COMELEC to conclude
the preliminary investigation. On the contrary, a prolonged investigation
should have been avoided at all cost precisely because of the looming
elections at that time.

Consider. An adverse finding during preliminary investigation would

give rise to a criminal charge for an election offense. If found guilty thereof,
petitioner would have been disqualified from running for public office42 let
alone sit as mayor of Digos City. Surely, the fact that petitioner was an
incumbent elected official who was set to run for re-election if not higher
office during the 2016 and 2019 NLEs should have prompted the CO MEL EC
to conclude its investigation with utmost dispatch. Otherwise, those who
intended to vote for petitioner could have ended up wasting their vote for a
disqualified candidate.

For another. Petitioner's case did not at all involve complex or intricate
issues which require voluminous records or evidence. The lone issue needed
to be resolved was whether petitioner went beyond the prescribed campaign

42
Section 264 of the OEC, provides:
SECTION 264. Penalties. - Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be
punished with imprisonment of not less than 1Jne year but not more than six years and shall not be subject
to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public
office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. lfhe is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation
which shall be enforced after the prison terJTl has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be
sentenced to pay a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos. which shall be imposed upon such party after
criminal action has been instituted in which their con-esponding officials have been found guilty.

I(
 Decision 15 UDK-16915

expenditure limit. To determine if there had incfeed been an excess, a simple

mathematical equation is all tliat is required: multiply the number of registered
voters in Digos City by three pesos (P3.00). The product must then be parried
with the amounfactually spent by petitioner. If the amount spent was greater
than the product, then there is probable cause to charge petitioner with election
overspending, subject to any valid defense which petitioner may raise in his
counter-affidavit.

Indeed, why the preliminary investigation_·fasted for an unreasonable

period of time is clearly unfathomable considering the simplicity of the issue,
that there is only one respondent charged in the complaint, and the evidence
involved here was not at all voluminous. As the Court pronounced in Alarilla
v. Sandiganbayan, 43 · absent any extraordinary complication which the
prosecution must adequately prove, such as the degree of difficulty of the
questions involved in the case, or any event external thereto that effectively
stymied the prosecution's normal work activity, any delay in the resolution of
the preliminary investigation is not justified. 44

Yet another. The six (6)-year period it took to resolve the complaint
grossly prejudiced petitioner. Prejudice is assessed in light of Ll-ie interests of
the accused which the speedy disposition right is designed to protect, such as:
(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii), to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will
be impaired. 45 ·

The Court notes that the first criterion does not apply in this case
because petitioner was never anestcd or incarcerated. The second and third
criteria, however, apply to petitioner.

The unjustified delay caused petitioner mental anguish, fright, serious

anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury, 46 which naturally attend every criminal
prosecution. The pendency of the investigation unduly affected his reputation,
an invaluable asset for a..11 elected official like him. The ascription of an offense
to him eroded the confidence reposed on him by the people ofDigos City, all
the more so because he was a "first time" mayor from whom much was
expected by his constituents and adversaiies. Too, th<": prolonged investigation
impaired his defense in the event of a full-bio,vn trial, for witnesses may no
longer be available to testify for him, or documentary evidence such as
receipts may have gotten lost along the way.

Clearly, the COM.ELEC fa;Jed t<J discharge its burden to justify the
-
length of time it took for it t(• conclude the preliminary. investigation in this
case. There was no showing that the COJVIELEC fr,l!owed its prescribed
~

procedure to the letter in order to ohvi,,te any delHy in the proceedings. Nor

4
:• G.R. Nos. 236177-2!0, Febr11ary 3, 2071.
44 id.
4
s Ombudrman v.Jurad0,, 583 Phil. iJ2. l48 (2(h)8i.
46
Rollo,, p. l 6.

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Decision 16 UDK-16915

was it established that the issues were too complex and the evidence required
voluminous, making delay inevitable. Indubitably, therefore, inordinate delay
attended the COMELEC's conduct of the preliminary investigation of
petitioner's case.

Finally. Petitioner cannot be deemed to have waived his right to a

speedy disposition of his case and against inordinate delay.

Javier v. Sandiganbayan 47 (Javier) is apropos:

Here, the Court holds that Javier and

Turnamao's acts, or their inaction, did not amount
to acquiescence. While it is true that the records are
bereft of any indication that Javier and/or
Tumamao "followed-up" on the resolution of their
case, the same could not be construed to mean that
they acquiesced to the delay of five years.

For one, the case of Coscolluela v.

Sandiganbayan (Coscolluela) provides that
respondents in preliminary investigation
proceedings do not have any duty to follow up
on the prosecution of their case. The Court
categorically stated:

Being the respondents in the preliminary

investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners'
duty to follow np on the prosecution of their case.
Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's
responsibility to expedite the same within the
bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its
mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged
before it.

The Court in Cagang did not explicitly

. ,abandon Coscolluela - considering that it
explicitly abandoned People v. Sandiganbayan in
the said case - and even cited it in one of its
discussions. Thus, the pronouncements
in Coscolluela remain good law, and may still be
considered in determining whether the right to
speedy disposition of cases was properly invoked.

Moreover, the Court is not unreasonable in

its requirements. The Ombudsman's own Rules of
Procedure provides that motions to dismiss,
except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, are
prohibited. Thus, respondents like Javier and
Tumamao have no legitimate avenues to assert
their fundamental right to speedy disposition of
cases at the preliminary investigation level. It
would be unreasonable to hold against them - and
treat it as acquiescence - the fact that they never

47
G.R. No. 237997, June I 0, 2020.

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Decision 17 UDK-16915

followed-up or asserted their right in a motion duly

filed.
Lastly, the Court holds that Javier and
Tumamao timely asserted their rights because they
filed the Motion to Quash at the earliest
opportunity. Before they were even arraigned,
they already sought permission from the
Sandiganbayan to file the Motion to Quash to
finally be able to assert their right to speedy
disposition of cases. To the mind of the Court, this
shows that Javier and Tumamao did not sleep on
their rights, and were ready to assert the same given
the opportunity. Certainly, this could not be
construed as acquiescence to the delay. (Emphases
added)

As in Javier, 48 the Court cannot fault petitioner herein for only

invoking his right to a speedy disposition of his case in the present petition.
As held, a respondent in a criminal prosecution or investigation is not duty
bound to follow up on his or her case; it is the governing agency that is tasked
to promptly resolve it. As held in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, 49 "[i]t is the
duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the
Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the
delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due
to causes directly attributable to him."

Further, the Court observes that similar to the Rules of Procedure before
the Ombudsman, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure likewise prohibits the
filing of motions to dismiss. Section l(a), Rule 13 pertinently reads:

Section 1. Vvhat Pleadings are not Allowed. - The

following pleadings are not allowed:

a) motion to dismiss;

xxxx

In other words, there is also no legitimate avenue to invoke ones right

to a speedy disposition of his case before the COMELEC. Petitioner's failure
to do so should not therefore be taken against him.

At any rate, petitioner timely asserted his right to a speedy disposition

of his case since he filed this petition immediately after the COMELEC
directed the filing of an information against him. As held in Javier, it is
sufficient that the right is asserted before entering a plea during arraignment.

All told, given the inordinate delay of about six (6) years in the conduct
of the preliminary investigation and COMELEC's utter failure to provide
sufficient justification therefor, the rulings of the COMELEC should be
reversed and the criminal action filed against petitioner, if any, abated and
48 Id
49 366 Phil. 602, 609 (1999).

t
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Decision 18 UDK.-16915

dismissed. 50 On this score, we deem it unnecessary to further discuss the other

issues raised herein.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 18-

0665 dated November 5, 2018 and Resolution No. 20-00121-33 dated
December 9, 2020 are NULLIFIED for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The formal
complaint against petitioner, Joseph Roble Pefias for alleged violation of
Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the OEC, as amended by RA 7 I 66,
for election overspending is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

AMYift:.L.;;_,AvrnR
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

50
Id. note 42.
~-· '

Decision 19 UDK-16915

t'4
S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice

/
f,

. INTING RODI~fV,,,ZALAMEDA
Asfbtiate Justice

S~MU~~
Associate Justice

RICARl . ROSARIO JHOSE~OPEZ

ciate Justice Associate Justice

' /
&_I/JJ~.,,1~'
JAf"fr!K-1:i--!llli'L/'i.A,W:IT J\)SE l\UDAS .P. NIARQUEZ
Associate Justice ~ Associate Justice

f
 '
/
•
>

Decision 20 UDK-16915

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

~~L,.-.....1~·
AJ4:~mER G. GESMUNDO
;?-
t/.{/ ChiefJustice