Exclusionary Rule

[G.R. No. 247348. November 16, 2021.]

CHRISTIAN CADAJAS y
CABIAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respond
ent.

DECISION

J.Y. LOPEZ, J  :
p

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule

45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision R.A. No. 9775
The Antecedents
Petitioner, who was then 24 years old, met the victim, AAA, 5 who was
only 14 years old, in the canteen where he works. Their relationship
started when the younger sibling of AAA told petitioner that AAA had a crush
on him. Petitioner tried to evade AAA, but the latter started to stalk him. Later,
AAA sent petitioner a request in his Facebook Messenger, which he
accepted. The petitioner and AAA would then exchange messages on
Facebook Messenger and after some time, petitioner courted AAA for two
weeks, until they became sweethearts on April 2, 2016. 6
Sometime in June 2016, BBB, the mother of AAA, learned of their
relationship. 7 She discovered the relationship because AAA would borrow her
cellphone to access the latter's Facebook account. 8 Her mother was thus
able to read their messages whenever AAA would forget to log out her
account. BBB disapproved of their relationship because AAA was still too
young. 9 However, petitioner and AAA ignored her admonishment.
Sometime in October 2016, BBB was disheartened when she read that
petitioner was sexually luring her daughter to meet with him in a motel. She
confronted petitioner and told him to stay away because AAA was still a
minor. 10
At around 5:30 in the morning of November 18, 2016, BBB was
shocked when she read the conversation between petitioner and AAA. She
found that petitioner was coaxing her daughter to send him
photos of the latter's breast and vagina. AAA relented and sent
petitioner the photos he was asking. When AAA learned that her mother read
their conversation, she rushed to a computer shop to delete her messages.
BBB, however, was able to force her to open petitioner's Facebook
messenger account to get a copy of their conversation. 11  CAIHTE

On the part of the petitioner, he admitted sending

AAA the messages "oo ready ako sa ganyan" and "sige hubad." He, however,
denied having sent AAA, photos of his private part. On November 17, 2016,
AAA asked petitioner to delete their messages from his account. He even told
her "bakit kasi hindi ka pa nagtitino, hayan tuloy nakita ng mama mo."
On the same day, petitioner broke up with AAA because her mother did not
like him. 12
Petitioner later learned from his co-workers that two (2) criminal cases
were filed against him. 13 He was charged for violation of Section 10
(a) of R.A. No. 7610 and for child pornography as defined and penalized
under Section 4 (c) (2) of R.A. No. 10175 in relation to Sections 4 (a), 3 (b)
and (c) (5) of R.A. No. 9775. The two (2) informations that were filed against
petitioner on December 27, 2016, read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 215-V-17
The undersigned Associate Prosecutor Attorney II
accuses CHRISTIAN CADAJAS of "Violation of Section 10(a) of R.A.
No. 7610" committed as follows:
That on or about November 16, 2016 in Valenzuela City and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, acting with lewd design, and abuse of minority, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously coerced [AAA] (DOB:
February 10, 2002) (POB: Valenzuela City), 14 years old, a
minor, to send pictures of her breasts and vagina through Facebook
Messenger, which circumstances debased, degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human
being, thereby endangering her youth, normal growth and
development.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 14
Criminal Case No. 216-V-17
The undersigned Associate Prosecution Attorney II
accuses CHRISTIAN CADAJAS of Child Pornography under
Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 (Cybercrime
Prevention of 2012, in Relation to Sections 4(a) and 3(b) and (c)
(5) of R.A. No. 9775," committed as follows:
That on or about November 16, 2016 in Valenzuela City and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the accused, the above-
named accused, acting with lewd design, did, then and there, willfully,
 unlawfully and feloniously coerced, induced [AAA], (DOB: February
10, 2002) (POB: Valenzuela City), 14 years old, to send him
pictures of her vagina and breasts, through Facebook Messenger
using a mobile phone.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 15
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during
arraignment. 16
After trial, the RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge
for violation of Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, but found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4 (c) (2) of R.A. No.
10175 in relation to Sections 4 (a), 3 (b) and (c) (5) of R.A. No. 9775. As such,
petitioner was sentenced to reclusion temporal and to pay a
fine of P1,000,000.00. 17
According to the RTC, petitioner was aware that AAA was still a
minor when he obstinately prodded the latter to send him photos of her private
parts. This is an explicit sexual activity, a lascivious conduct, which the minor
victim, AAA, could not have done were it not for the persistent
inducement of the petitioner. 18 Moreover, petitioner's violation of R.A. No.
9775 is a malum prohibitum. 19 As such, his claim that he was in a relationship
with AAA finds no relevance.  DETACa

On the other hand, the RTC dismissed the charge against petitioner

for violation of Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 holding that AAA is a city lass
who was no longer innocent of the ways of the world. She herself attested that
she was not affected by what happened. As such, the RTC ruled
that the protective mantle of R.A. No. 7610 is wanting. 20 Thus, the RTC
disposed the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 215-V-17, finding accused CHRISTIAN
CADAJAS y CABIAS NOT GUILTY and is hereby
acquitted. The prosecution failed to prove beyond cavil of doubt
all the elements of the offense as charged.
In Criminal Case No. 216-V-17, finding accused CHRISTIAN
CADAJAS y CABIAS GUILTY of violation of Sections 4(a) and 3(b)
and (c)(5) of RA 9775 and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal and to pay a
FINE of One Million Pesos.
SO ORDERED. 21
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment. The CA held
that the minority of AAA was both established and was even admitted
by the petitioner. 22 Furthermore, petitioner's conversation with AAA showed
that he induced her to send him photos of her private parts. 23 These facts
clearly evince that petitioner committed child pornography as defined and
penalized under Section 4 (c) (2) of R.A. No. 10175, in relation to Sections 4
(a), 3 (b) and (c) (5) of R.A. No. 9775. The CA did not give
credence to the sweetheart defense that was raised by petitioner
as the violation committed by petitioner was a malum prohibitum. 24 As
regards the penalty, the CA modified the same and sentenced
petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 14 years, eight months and
one day, as minimum, to 18 years and three months, as maximum. The fine
imposed was retained as it was within the range prescribed by
law. 25 Thus, the CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Decision dated August
7, 2017 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch
270 in Criminal Case No. 216-V-17 finding Christian Cadajas y Cabias
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 4(a) and 3(b)
and (c)(5) of Republic Act
9775 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 14 years, 8 months and 1
day, as minimum, to 18 years and 3 months, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 26
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its
Resolution 27 dated May 9, 2019.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant Petition 28 before this Court.
Issues
I.
Whether the CA gravely erred in not finding that the evidence
presented by the prosecution are inadmissible for violating
petitioner's right to privacy.
II.
Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting
petitioner of violation of Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No.
10175 in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No.
9775 despite the fact that the alleged act complained of does not
constitute an offense penalized under the said statute. aDSIHc

III.
Whether the CA gravely erred in the interpretation of the unlawful and
punishable acts under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No.
10175 in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775.
 IV.
Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting
petitioner of violation of Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No.
10175 in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No.
9775 despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
Upon a careful
review of the records of this case, the Court finds the petition to be without
merit.
On petitioner's right to privacy
One of the arguments raised by petitioner before
this Court concerns the admissibility of the evidence presented
by the prosecution, which was taken from his Facebook messenger account.
He claims that the photos presented in evidence
during the trial of the case were taken from his Facebook messenger account.
According to him, this amounted to a violation of his right to privacy, and
therefore, any evidence obtained in violation thereof amounts to a
fruit of the poisonous tree.
We disagree.
The right to privacy is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary
sensibilities." It is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted
publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference
by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."
Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone." 29 In his Separate
Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
expounded on the concept of privacy, as it has developed
throughout the digital age, thus:
Chief Justice Puno sparked judicial
interest in the right to privacy. In his speech that I cited in my separate
opinion in Versoza v. People, 30 he discussed the three
strands of privacy in American Jurisprudence, namely, locational or
situational privacy, informational privacy, and decisional privacy.
Locational privacy, also known as
situational privacy, pertains to privacy that is felt in a
physical space. It may be violated through an
act of trespass or through an unlawful search.
Meanwhile,
 informational privacy refers to one's right to control
"the processing — i.e., acquisition, disclosure and use
— of personal information."
Decisional privacy, regarded as the most
controversial among the three,
refers to one's right "to make certain
kinds of fundamental choices with respect to their
personal and reproductive autonomy." 31
This speech has been influential in several of our
jurisprudence. 32 To this day, we are still refining our
concept of privacy, particularly the right to informational privacy. 33
As early as Morfe v. Mutuc, 34 we have
recognized the increasing
importance of the protection of the right to privacy in the digital age.
Such right is of particular importance given the nature of the internet
and our inescapable dependence on it despite the possible disruption
that it can bring. In my separate opinion in Disini v.
Secretary of Justice, 35 I explained:
The internet or cyberspace is a complex
phenomenon. It has pervasive effects and are, by now,
ubiquitous in many communities. Its possibilities for
reordering human relationships are limited only
by the state of its constantly evolving technologies
and the designs of various user interfaces. The internet
contains exciting potentials as well as pernicious
dangers.  ETHIDa

The essential framework for

governance of the parts of cyberspace that have
reasonable connections with our territory and our people
should find definite references in our Constitution.
However, effective
governance of cyberspace requires cooperation and
harmonization with other approaches in other
jurisdictions. Certainly, its scope and continuous
evolution require that we calibrate our constitutional
doctrines carefully: in concrete steps and with full and
deeper understanding of incidents that involve various
parts of this phenomenon. The internet is neither just one
relationship nor is it a single technology. It is an
interrelationship of many technologies and cultures.
xxx xxx xxx
While the Internet has engendered innovation and
growth, it has also engendered new types of disruption. A
 noted expert employs an "evolutionary metaphor" as he
asserts:
[Generative technologies] encourage
mutations, branchings away from the status
quo — some that are curious dead ends, others
that spread like wildfire. They invite disruption —
along with the good things and bad things that can
come with such disruption.
Addressing the implications of disruption, he adds:
Disruption benefits some while others lose,
and the power of the generative Internet,
available to anyone with a modicum of knowledge
and a broadband connection,
can be turned to network-destroying ends . . .
[T]he Internet's very generativity — combined with
that of the PCs attached — sows the seeds lot a
"digital Pearl Harbor."
The Internet is an infrastructure that allows for a
"network of networks." It is also a means for several
purposes. As with all other "means enhancing
capabilities of human interaction," it
can be used to facilitate benefits as well as nefarious
ends. The Internet can be a means for criminal activity.
Parallel to the unprecedented
escalation of the use of the Internet and its various
technologies is also an escalation in what has been
termed as cybercrimes. 36
Privacy scholars explain
that the right to informational privacy, to a certain
extent, requires "limitation on inspection, observation, and knowledge
by others." 37 Thus, it has the following aspects: (1) to keep inalienable
information to themselves; (2) to prevent first disclosure; and
(3) to prevent further dissemination in case the information has already
been disclosed. More recently, the European Union has paved the way
for the fourth aspect — the right to be forgotten,
or the right to prevent the storage of data.
As regards the first
component of the right to informational privacy, a person
has the right not to be exposed on the internet in matters involving
one's private life, such as acts having no relation to public interest or
concern. Closely related to the first component is the right to prevent
first disclosure, allowing individuals to regulate the extent, time, and
manner of disclosure, if at all, of their information. In case the data
 have been illegally disclosed, a person does not lose protection since
they have the right to prevent their further dissemination. In some
cases, one has the right to prevent the storage of their data, which
gives one the right to be forgotten. Privacy scholars describe
this right as "forced omission,"
or the process of making the information difficult to find
on the internet. 38
Under the 1987 Constitution, the right to privacy is expressly
recognized under Article III, Sec. 3 thereof, which reads:
SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence sh
all be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court,
or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.  cSEDTC

While the above provision
highlights the importance of the right to privacy and its consequent effect
on the rules on admissibility of evidence, one must not lose sight of the fact
that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect private individuals against
government intrusions. Hence, its provisions are not applicable between and
amongst private individuals. As explained in People v. Marti: 39
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must
always be subject to protection. But protection against whom?
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights
answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general
reflections. The protection of fundamental
liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy.
Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual
and the state. Its concern is not the relation between
individuals, between a private individual and other
individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare
some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship
Speech of Commissioner Bernas,
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674;
July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied) 40
While the case of Zulueta v. Court of Appeals 41 (Zulueta) may
appear to carve out an exception to the abovementioned rule by
recognizing the rule on inadmissibility of evidence between
spouses when one obtains evidence in violation of his/her
spouse's right to privacy, such a pronouncement is a mere obiter dictum that
cannot be considered as a binding precedent. This is because the petition
brought to the Court in Zulueta simply asked for the return of the documents
seized by the wife and thus, pertained to the ownership of the documents
therein. Moreover, documents were declared inadmissible
because of the injunction order issued by the trial court and not on
account of Art. III, Sec. 3 of the Constitution. At any
rate, violation of the right to privacy between individuals is properly governed
by the provisions of the Civil Code, the Data Privacy Act (DPA), 42 and other
pertinent laws, while its admissibility shall be governed by the rules on
relevance, materiality, authentication of documents, and the exclusionary
rules under the Rules on Evidence.
In this case, the photographs and conversations in the Facebook
Messenger account that were obtained and used as evidence against
petitioner, which he considers as fruit of the poisonous tree, were not obtained
through the efforts of the police officers or any agent of the State. Rather,
these were obtained by a private individual.
Indeed, the rule governing the admissibility of an evidence under
Article III of the Constitution must affect only those pieces of evidence
obtained by the State through its agents. It is these individuals who can flex
government muscles and use government resources for a possible abuse.
However, where private individuals are involved, for which their relationship is
governed by the New Civil Code, the admissibility of an evidence
cannot be determined by the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Here, the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were
properly authenticated when AAA identified them in open court. As further
pointed out by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
during the deliberations of this case, the DPA allows the processing of data
and sensitive personal information where it
relates to the determination of criminal liability of a data subject, 43 such as
a violation of R.A. No. 10175 in relation to R.A. No. 9775 and when necessary
for the protection of lawful rights and
interests of persons in court proceedings, 44 as in this case where the commun
ications and photos sought to be excluded were
submitted in evidence to establish AAA's legal claims before the prosecutor's
office and the courts.
Be that as it may, the act of AAA cannot be said to have violated
petitioner's right to privacy. The test in ascertaining whether there is
a violation of the right to privacy has been explained in the case of Spouses
Hing v. Choachuy, Sr. 45 as follows:  SDAaTC
 In ascertaining whether there is
a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has
been violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that
"the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a
two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices
may, therefore, limit or extend an individual's "reasonable
expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person's
expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis
since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. 46
Here, petitioner's expectation of privacy emanates from the fact that his
Facebook Messenger account is password protected, such that no one can
access the same except himself. Petitioner never asserted that his Facebook
Messenger account was hacked or the photos were taken from his account
through unauthorized means. Rather, the photos were obtained from his
account because AAA, to whom he gave his password, had access to it.
Considering that he voluntarily gave his password to AAA, he, in effect, has
authorized AAA to access the same. He did not even take steps to exclude
AAA from gaining access to his account. Having been given
authority to access his Facebook Messenger account, petitioner's reasonable
expectation of privacy, in so far as AAA is concerned, had been limited. Thus,
there is no violation of privacy to speak of.
While the messages and photos were taken from the Facebook
Messenger of petitioner because AAA was forced by BBB to do so, such does
not deviate from the fact that petitioner allowed another person to access his
account. When he gave his Facebook Messenger password to AAA, he made
its contents available to AAA, and the latter would then
have the latitude to show to other persons what she could access, whether
she be forced to do so or not. The availability of accessing these photos
limited the scope of his right to privacy, especially that these became
essential in pursuing AAA's claims to protect her rights.
In any case, it bears pointing out that petitioner failed to raise his
objection to the admissibility of the photos during the proceedings in the RTC.
Basic is the rule that in order to exclude
evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made
at the proper time, and the grounds therefore be specified.
Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is formally
offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after
all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified,
specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this
time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence
may be made. When a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence
at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered
as waived. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and
would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper
time. 47
As a complimentary principle, it is well-settled that no question
will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings
below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-
judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they
cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised
for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel. 48
By failing to timely raise his objection to the admissibility of the photos,
petitioner is deemed to have already waived the same. Thus, the photos
taken from his Facebook Messenger account are admissible in evidence.
On petitioner's liability
Petitioner was charged for violating Section 4 (c) (2) of R.A. No.
10175 49 in relation to Sections 4 (a) and 3 (b) and (c) (5) of R.A. No.
9775, 50 which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act: x x x
(c) Content-related Offenses: x x x
(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or
prohibited acts defined and punishable
by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a
computer system: Provided,
That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one
degree higher than that provided for in Republic
Act No. 9775. acEHCD

xxx xxx xxx

Section 4. Unlawful or Prohibited Acts. — It shall be unlawful for any
person:
(a) To hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a
child to perform in the creation or production of any
form of child pornography
 Section 3. Definition of Terms. — x x x
(b) "Child pornography" refers to any representation, whether
visual, audio, or written combination thereof, by electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means, of child
engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities.
(c) "Explicit Sexual Activity" includes actual or simulated — x x x
(5) lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts,
pubic area and/or anus. 51
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing, one can be convicted for committing child
pornography upon proof of the following: (1) victim is a child; (2) victim was
induced or coerced to perform in the creation or production of any
form of child pornography; and (3) child pornography was performed through
visual, audio or written combination thereof by electronic, mechanical, digital,
optical, magnetic or any other means. This Court finds that the prosecution
was able to prove these facts by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 9775 defines a child to be as follows:
(a) "Child" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or over,
but is unable to fully take care of himself/herself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.
For the purpose of this Act, a child shall also refer to:
(1) a person regardless of age who is presented,
depicted or portrayed as a child as defined herein;
and  EcTCAD

(2) computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted

images or graphics of a person who is represented or
who is made to appear to be a child as defined herein.
The members of the Technical Working Group for the Pre-Bicameral
Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 6440
and Senate Bill No. 2317 (Anti-Child Pornography
Act of 2009) explained the intent in defining "child" under the statute as
follows:
MS. GIRONELLA. Sir, in addition to that, I would just
like to quote what Senator Defensor-Santiago said on the floor
because she fully agreed with the expanded definition as
seen in the House version, numbers (1) and (2). She said that she fully
agrees to the extended definition of the term "child" so that adult
website that display explicit images of legal-aged models in pigtails
with the balloon or lollipop while surrounded by stuff animals
 could be prosecuted under the measure. While the law
seeks to protect children, the extended definition
punishes the depravity of the viewer. So, what we are after here talaga
is the perpetrator. We don't care what age the child or the person is.
What we're trying to penalize, what we're trying to prohibit
is the pedophile from gravitating towards that kind of material.
Yes, Mr. Del Prado.
MR. DEL PRADO. We support that view. That's why it is specific
here a person regardless of age. It is the representation that is deemed
reprehensible and I think the public policy expression here is
really to prohibit promoting the child as a sexual object and, therefore,
it covers both the adult and children being subject of sexually explicit
activity. 52
Here, it was uncontroverted that AAA was only 14 years old
at the time of the incident. This was established from the copy of her
Certificate of Live Birth 53 that was presented in evidence. Moreover, petitioner
was aware of this fact. It was undisputed that BBB confronted petitioner and
told him to stay away because her daughter was still a minor.
It is likewise clear from the records of this case that petitioner induced
AAA to send him photos of her private parts through Facebook Messenger.
This is evident from their conversation, which the CA quoted as follows:
AAA (K):
Hahaha gusto ko siya pagtripan e di mo kasi ako
pinagtritripan (sic) e.
Cadajas (C):
Gsto (sic) muh (sic) pagtrepan (sic) kita ngayon
K: Oo
Ready ako sa ganyan
C: Sge (sic) hubad
K: Nakahubad na hahaha
C: Tangalin (sic) uh (sic) panti (sic) muh (sic) haha
K: Baliw hubad na lahat
C: Picturan uh (sic) pasa muh (sic) xkin (sic) bi
K: Lah gagi bi wag
Ayoko
C: Uh ayaw muh (sic) pala sa mga treep (sic) KO (sic) ei (sic)
xxx xxx xxx
 C: Tayo lang naman makakakita ie (sic)
K: Hahahaha baka pagkalat mo  HSAcaE

Dede lang
C: Ako din bi PSA (sic) mna (sic)
HahAt (sic) bi
K: Magpasa ka din hahaha
Lah (sic) bat lahat
xxx xxx xxx
C: Hahaha hnde (sic) aman (sic) bi
Lahat bi gusto ko
Uo nga nkKaumay (sic) bi nslibugan (sic) ako
K: Gagi ayoko nga yung pepe
xxx xxx xxx
C: Buka muh (sic) nga kunti (sic) bi kunti (sic) lang tutok muh (sic)
Hah (sic)
K: Ayoko na.
Haha Christian haha OK nay an
C: She (sic) nah (sic) gsto (sic) KO (sic) mkita (sic) bi 54
xxx xxx xxx
It is evident from the above-quoted conversation that petitioner induced
AAA to engage in the lascivious exhibition of her breasts and vagina through
Facebook Messenger. Notably, it was petitioner who was the one giving
specific orders to AAA. He even asked AAA to send to him nude photos of her
and for the latter to further spread her legs near the camera, so that petitioner
can see her vagina. In her testimony, AAA further explained that it was
because of the continuous prodding of petitioner, that forced her to send her
nude photos to the latter, thus:
Q: What about those pictures? Can you tell us about those pictures that
you are referring to?
A: Because he instructed me to send a picture to him of my breast and
vagina, so I send him pictures, Sir.
Q: Okay, you send pictures of your breast and you [sic] vagina. What did
you use in order to send him those pictures?
A: Cell phone, Sir.
Q: How did the accused convince you to do that?
 A: He said magsend daw po ako ng picture.
Q: Was there a promise?
A: None, Sir.
Q: Just the accused merely telling you or commanding you to produce or
take pictures of your private parts?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Why did you allow yourself to do that?
A: Napilitan lang po akong magsend ng ganun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Paanong napilitan kung hindi ka pinuwersa or hindi ka tinakot? Paano
mo nasabing napilitan lang? Alam mong mali iyon at hindi naman
pinapayagan na ganun, bakit mo sinend parin kung hindi ka
naman niya pinilit o tinakot? Ano talaga ang nagtulak sayong
magsend ng ganun? Ano ba ang pumasok sa isip mo, pumasok
sa katawan mo nung ginawa mo iyon? Just be candid.
A: Hindi ko po alam.
Q: Hindi mo alam kasi?
A: Naaano lang po ako sa sinabi niya, sa message po niya sakin na puro
please magsend kana sige na puro ganun po.
Q: Sa pagkukumbinsi niya? Panay ang please?
A: Hindi po niya ako tinigilan nun e.
Q: Hindi siya tumitigil?
A: Hindi po. 55  HESIcT

Further, while the conversation in the Facebook Messenger

appears to show that AAA was already undressed while she was conversing
with petitioner, it should be pointed out that they were merely exchanging
messages on a mobile application. It is probable that AAA was merely
bluffing to maintain petitioner's interest. In her testimony, AAA explained that
she was not even serious when she sent some of her messages, thus:
Q: In fact, there is in this statement that you even type these words kuya
nalilibugan ako hahaha is it true that? Did you type this?
A: Yes Sir, I typed that but that is not true, it is just a trip lang sa kanya.
Q: In that trip, in line with it is a four (4) smiley crying while laughing,
smiley with tears meaning you are laughing?
Court:
You are just joking ganun ba?
 Witness:
Yes, your Honor. 56
Likewise, when AAA said "Nakahubad na," the same
cannot be said to be voluntary on her part as it was preceded by
an order from petitioner to take her clothes off. Thus, it was clear
from the wordings of the messages that petitioner induced AAA to send him
photos of her private parts. Without petitioner's inducement, she would not
have been compelled to actually undress and send petitioner, photos of her
private parts.
Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention, his act of inducing
AAA to send photos of her breasts and vagina constitutes child pornography
and explicit sexual activity under Sections 4 (a), 3 (b) and (c) (5) of R.A. No.
9775. While there was no showing that petitioner intended to sell AAA's
photos to other people, this did not exonerate him from liability under the said
provision. During the Pre-Bicameral Conference Committee meeting that
led to the enactment of R.A. No. 9775 the members of the Technical Working
Group made a distinction between the act of merely possessing child
pornography materials from the act of making a profit out of it, to wit:
MR. DESCALLAR.
Madam Chair, I think x x x kasi doon sa House version
amy (sic) distinction between producer, distributor x x x
(MS. THELMA M. RETUBA TOOK OVER)
MR. DESCALLAR.
(Continuing) x x x distributor and user, client. So, pag ni-level
natin siya on the same level, the producer, distributor can say "I'm
just a client. I just possess with no intention to sell." So, I think, we
should differentiate mere possession and with the other x x x
with the intention to distribute or benefit, profit from pornography.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY MANALIGOD.
Madam Chair, may I just explain because this was a specific
amendment of Senator Santiago. In the deliberations on the floor
she stated that on Section 4(d), Senator Santiago noted
that the possession of child pornography was not qualified
by the adverb "knowingly." She explained that knowledge of child
pornography does not attach to possession but only to access.
Therefore, she believed that mere possession of child
pornography is punishable and not subject to the defense
that the possessor was not aware of the materials in his or her
possession.
MR. DESCALLAR.
 Papaano 'yun? Saan?
MR. GIRONELLA.
Earlier Madam Chair, I think there was a
proposal to include the word "knowingly" before the word
"possess." So, it would be "to knowingly possess" or "knowingly
access." Chair Madrigal supports the position of Senator
Defensor-Santiago that knowing possession of a pornographic
material cannot be made a defense by the perpetrator. So, for
us, the fact that he or she possesses a child pornography material
is subject to the penalties of this law.
And on the second point, on the point raised by Mr. Descallar, I
think we also should separate a provision from the possessor's
point of view as opposed to that producer's point of view. So, we
cannot include reproduce.  caITAC

MR. DESCALLAR.
With or without the intent to publish.
MS. GIRONELLA.
For the possessor.
MR. DESCALLAR.
Yes. Oo. Kasi in the House version, letter (f) . . .
MR. MARALIT.
Ihiwalay na lang natin.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Letter (f).
MR. DESCALAR.
x x x In the house version, "to knowingly possess, download,
purchase, blah blah x x x "so, it's mere possession, separate x x x
distinct from producing, distributing, selling or profiting from child
pornography.
MS. GIRONELLA.
So, Sir, I think, what we can do . . .
MR. MARALIT.
Yeah, mere possession.
MS. GIRONELLA.
x x x it would be x x x so, let's adopt x x x the proposal is to adopt
section (d) of the Senate version with the following amendments:
"To possess or knowingly access, download, purchase x x x or
 purchase with reasonable knowledge, any form of child
pornography with or without the intent to publish, sell, distribute
and broadcast";
MR. DESCALLAR.
I think we delete "or without." So, it
will be "with the intent to publish" and you provide another
provision for possession as, like for example in letter
(f) of the House version which is mere possession. Letter
(d) of the house is for possession, downloading, or distribution."
So, separate x x x ano siya, separate siya, 'yang intent to publish
or to distribute.
MS. GIRONELLA.
Sir, can you please word the provision you're proposing.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Okay. May we recognize Atty. Del Prado first.
MR. DEL PRADO.
Na-discuss din po naming ito doon sa x x x first, we support x x x
including the word "knowingly" before "possess." Iyong
discussions po ditto, halimbawa po may nagpadala sa inyo ng e-
mail with an attachment of child pornography na kung hindi natsi-
check ng e-mail, it's been there for several months, hindi pa rin po
'yun dapat "knowing possession." So, pero kapag binuksan mo
'yan na x x x na-access mon a, alam mo na and then you keep it,
so 'yun po 'yung sinasabi na "knowing possession."
And then doon naman po sa point of "with intent to sell,
distribute," ang concern po ng law enforcement agents you are x
x x we are adding another x x x the burden again of proving this
intent kasi 'yung sinasabi nila we can x x x some jurisdictions,
some countries do provide for the x x x parang sa drugs po iyong
how many kilobytes. Pero sinasabi rin po naming, mahirap din
pong mag term kasi po pagka ano 'yung personal and ano 'yung
with intent to distribute. So, we really x x x it's either you possess
and we punish that or you distribute and we punish that. Kasi
kung hindi naman natin ma-prove 'yung kanyang distribution, then
mayroon pa tayong fallback doon sa possession. So, ganoon na
lang x x x 'yun po ang irerekomenda natin para hindi po additional
burden 'yung to establish the intent. ICHDca

COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.

I think the reason why separate the two (2) to distinguish
possession with the intent to sell and mere possession for
personal use, mas grave ang penalty, 'no. Mas mabigat ang
 penalty for x x x pag may intent pa to sell. Pero kung hindi natin
ma-prove 'yang intent to sell, pasok pa rin siya sa possession.
Now, we can just x x x alisin na lang natin 'yung "personal use,"
no, pero we retain the "intent to sell, 'no. Kasi if you prove
"intent to sell," mas mabigat ang penalty.
MR. MARALIT.
Tama.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
If you fail to prove "intent to sell," mas lighter kasi hindi mo naman
dini-distribute, eh.
MR. DEL PRADO.
I agree po doon sa graduation ng penalties. Ang sinasabi lang po
natin if we include that phrase "with intent to sell" kailangan po
nating i-prove 'yun. Whereas, kung nag-sell talaga siya, it's an
objective culpable act that we can punish.
MS. GIRONELLA.
Madam Chair, point of clarification. What are we talking about?
Are we talking about section "b" of the Senate version, section
(b) of the House version, section (f) of the House version? Parang
naghalu-halo na, eh, kasi earlier we're talking about possession,
'di ba, tapos we went to production and then distribution.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Oo.
MS. GIRONELLA.
So, baka better nga talaga paghiwalayin natin 'yung
"act of possession" which is punishable and then
"act of production, distribution with the intent to sell" as a separate
ano rin, 'di ba?
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
But we already provide "to sell, offer, advertise" and "to produce,
direct," 'di ba? We already provide for the unlawful acts, eh. It's
different, eh. You produce, direct or to sell, it's different. Here, you
possess, meaning, you are not the original owner.
MS. GIRONELLA.
So, 'yung section (b) ng House version we're no longer
considering it kasi I think that's the only provision with the phrase
"with the intent of selling or distributing."
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
 That's why we are saying na x x x because you do not have
provision on "knowingly possess" for personal use. Here in our
version, we have. So, diniferentiate naming 'yung "with
intent to sell" and "without intent to sell." So, 'yun siguro doon tayo
nagkaiba.
In the Senate version, "possession, 'no, whatever x x x with or
without intent to publish it" magkasama na lang
together. In the House version, magkaiba because the intention
is to penalize, to provide for stiffer penalties for those who
possess with the intent to distribute it as against those who
possess without intent x x x and to reproduce this but for his
personal use.
MS. GIRONELLA.
In the Senate version po kasi, Madam Chair, for clarification, we
intend to punish mere possession. So, we don't need to prove
that the person who knowingly possess pornographic material x x
x a child pornographic material. And then secondly, I think we did
away with the intention to sell because that would be a very hard
fact to prove that the person had intent to sell it, unless
nagkaroon ng outright act of selling it. TCAScE

COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.

No, not really. Because if you, by circumstantial evidence, if you
reproduce so many copies and you reproduce or send or
distribute to so many e-mails, 'no, e-mail addresses, the intent is
there already. It's already the act of distributing.
MR. MARALIT.
What our colleague here is saying that in case there are many
copies x x x
(MS. AGNES LUCIA V. TIBAY TOOK OVER)
MR. MARALIT (Continuing)
x x x are many copies made, then it could give rise to a
presumption, maybe a prima facie presumption that he has
intent to sell, distribute. Yeah, we will have to put the presumption
there because iyon nga, iyong intent medyo mahirap i-prove,
although it could be x x x although the possession of so many
could give rise to a prima
facie presumption of intent to sell. In which case, if not
controverted, then the intent to sell will be conclusively presumed,
parang ganoon, siguro if you were to put that there.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
 Kasi para sa akin, pagka may intent ka to distribute, to sell it,
economic na ang reason mo, tapos at the expense of other
people, mas dapat mas malaki ang penalty niya.
MR. MARALIT.
I agree.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Bahala na kasi, anyway naman kung hindi naman ma-prove iyong
intent, punishable pa rin, hindi ba? Punishable pa rin siya.
MR. MARALIT.
Yes, yes, mere possession. So the suggestion is
siguro to differentiate the two. I think a clear
differentiation of the two as well as iyong sa access, huwag natin
isama ito, in my view, kasi mag-iiba ang x x x
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Kasi parang unfair doon sa mere possession, wala siyang
intent to sell. Kasi unfair iyong penalty kung pareho. If we lump it
together in one provision, it will be unfair.
MR. MARALIT.
I agree.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Because the other one has earned a lot or tiyak na mayroon
siyang network para pagbigyan at kikita siya.
MR. MARALIT.
Yeah like Hayden Kho
MR. DESCALLAR.
I suggest that we adopt the House version na letter (d) and letter
(f) with amendments, deleting the term "for personal use" in letter
(f) so parang we distinguish distribution and with the intent to sell
and for mere possession, deleting "for personal use," so mere
possession is punishable.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
And in the case of letter (d) of the House version,
knowledge of possession is not a requirement, basta ma-prove
mo iyong intent to possess, download, with the intent. So there
are two elements here — to possess or download or purchase or
reproduce and then with intent. Kasi pagka wala siyang x x x so
knowledge is immaterial ditto. Hindi kailangan ng knowledge kasi
kapag mapu-prove mo iyong intent. Ngayon kung hindi mo ma-
 prove iyong intent, pasok naman siya sa "to knowingly
possess." cTDaEH

MR. MARALIT.
Iyong suggestion ng colleague naming is, sabi niya, no
proof of intent is necessary if we will provide here that there would
rise a presumption of intent to sell, distribute, in case there are a
number of copies, puwede natin i-craft na lang siguro maya-
maya. Ngayon na, we will x x x
MR. DESCALLAR.
I move to adopt the House version, letter (d) and letter (f) with
some amendments removing or deleting the term "for personal
use" in letter (f).
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Of course, with modifications siguro.
MR. MARALIT.
 Yeah, we will craft the provisions. Can we suspend the session. 57
It can be gleaned from the lengthy
discussion of the members of the Technical Working Group
that the authors of this statute intended to penalize even the mere
possession, for personal use or enjoyment, of child pornography. The law, as
enacted, considers possession with intent to sell, distribute, or
publish 58 to be distinct and separate from mere possession. 59 If proven, a
stiffer penalty would be imposed on those who were found to have
intended to distribute or profit from child pornography. Thus, the foregoing
shows the intention of the legislature to include as much violation for acts
committed that would further
spread the proliferation of pornography in the country, including possession
thereof. Necessarily, as those who merely possess child pornographic
materials are also punished by law, then R.A. No. 9775 could
not be said to have limited its application only to those who are
engaged in the business of child pornography.
It also bears emphasis that petitioner obtained the child pornographic
materials by inducing AAA to send him photos of the latter's private parts. He
did not come into possession of these photos because it was sent by another
person. Rather, he came into possession of AAA's photos
because of inducing AAA to exhibit her private parts to him.
As the inducement to send photos of AAA's private parts was committed
with the use of a mobile phone through Facebook Messenger, petitioner's act
also falls within the purview of Section 4 (c) (2) of R.A. No. 10175, which
penalizes child pornography through the use of a computer system. A mobile
phone is considered as a computer system under Section 3 (g) 60 of R.A. No.
10175.
On another matter, petitioner's heavy reliance on the sweetheart theory
is misplaced. Invoking this defense would depend
on the circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence explained that the said
theory applies in felonies that were committed against or
without the consent of the victim. This theory operates on the premise
that the violation committed was consensual. Hence, the party invoking this
theory bears the burden of proving that said party and the victim were lovers
and that the latter consented to the commission of the act. 61
In the recent case of Bangayan v. People, 62 the sweetheart theory was
given serious consideration because the accused and the alleged victim were
able to show that the alleged rape incident that happened between them was
consensual, and a product of love. As noted
by the court in that case, the accused and the alleged victim had two children
and had lived together even after the filing of the rape charges.
As compared with the instant case, there was
insufficiency of evidence to prove the application of the sweetheart theory.
Lovers, when they are passionate with their feelings, engage in physical
contact, as manifestations of their love towards one another. As they express
their feelings towards one another, they express themselves and not just lust
over the photos of private parts of their partners. While there
may be instances of expressions of love in a virtual space, the same would
usually be predicated by endearing words and not just advances of lust,
as in this case.
Here, AAA was led to believe that she was in a relationship with
petitioner. It was undisputed that it was AAA who relentlessly
pursued the petitioner. Still, it can be gleaned from the facts that petitioner,
who must be basking in her attention, took advantage of her innocence and
vulnerability. The fact that AAA had three previous boyfriends should not
even be taken against her for it is the rule under Section 54 (a)
(1), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court that "the character of the offended
party may be proved if it tends to establish in any degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged." It has been held in rape case, that this
argument may be raised only to show that there was consent in a rape case.
This does not apply when the woman's consent is immaterial such
as in statutory rape or rape with violence or intimidation. 63 It must be added
that consent would also be immaterial if the victim was persuaded, coerced or
induced to do a particular act, as in this case. In his Separate Concurring
Opinion, Justice Leonen made reference to his Dissenting
Opinion in Bangayan v. People, 64 ultimately concluding that the sweetheart
defense should not be allowed in cases involving child pornography, thus: cSaATC

xxx xxx xxx

[S]exual intercourse is a complex act which is not
only physical or sensual. Beyond that, it comes
with the complexity of intimacy, relationship, and
reproductive consequences.
Sexual intimacy may be primarily done for
procreation or solely for pleasure. How sexuality and
intimacy is expressed, what constitutes sex, and with
whom to be intimate with is a person's choice.
Therefore, consent to sex does not only
cover the physical act. Sex does not only
involve the body, but it necessarily involves the mind as
well. It embraces the moral and psychological
dispositions of the persons engaged in the act, along
with the socio-cultural expectation and baggage that
comes with the act. For instance, there are observed
differences in sexual expectations and behaviors among
different genders, and more so, among
individuals. The wide range of sexual desire and behavior
are not only shaped by biology, but by culture and
prevailing norms as well. Full and genuine
consent to sex, therefore, is "preceded by a
number of conditions which must exist in order for
act of consent to be performed."
Part and parcel of a valid consent
is the ability to have the intellectual resources and
capacity to make a choice that reflects [their] judgments
and values. For someone to give sexual consent, [they]
must have reached a certain level of maturity.
This observation becomes more
apparent in determining the validity of sexual consent
given by adults compared to children. Sexual consent is
not a switch, but a spectrum. As a child grows into
adolescence, and
later to adulthood, the measure of sexual consent shifts
from capacity to voluntariness. Under the law, sexual
consent from a child is immaterial, because [they are]
deemed incapable of giving an intelligent consent.
However, this presumption is relaxed as the child
matures. In our jurisdiction, the gradual scale
begins when the child reaches the age of 12 years old.
 From this age, the law may admit voluntariness
on the part of the child.
Nevertheless, voluntariness or informed sexual
consent of a child must be determined cautiously. Cases
involving younger victims must be resolved through more
stringent criteria. Several factors, such
as the age of the child, [their] psychological state,
intellectual capability, relationship with the accused, their
age difference, and other signs of coercion or
manipulation must be taken into
account in order to protect the child.
xxx xxx xxx
It is for the same reason that we cannot allow the sweetheart
defense in child pornography. The sweetheart defense is a common,
distasteful, and much abused in acts of lasciviousness and rape,
aiming to establish that fact that the sexual act was consensual.
Under the pretense of a romantic relationship, it is not unimaginable
that a child will be easily induced or coerced to engage in explicit
sexual acts. Engaging in such a relationship does not
remove the special protection of a child. This is especially
true in the digital age and space, where a child's interaction with others
easily evades supervision. Had AAA not been careless in logging out
from her mother's device, the latter would not have found out about
their relationship. 65
It should be pointed out that AAA was only 14 years old
at the time of the incident while petitioner was 24 years old. Such huge age
disparity placed petitioner in a stronger position over AAA, which enabled
him to wield his will on the latter. 66 Judicial notice must
also be taken of the fact that minors, especially those who are
between the ages of 12 and 18 years, are curious about their sexuality. They
are that stage in their lives when they are dealing with their raging hormones.
Nonetheless, this should not be taken to mean that they are now
capable of giving rational consent to engage in any sexual activity. In a
society where birth control and sex education are taboo subjects, these
sexually curious teenagers are left to their own devices.
Unfortunately, the only source of information available to them are those
from the internet or from their friends, who are also not knowledgeable
on the subject. For this reason, minors have been
acknowledged to be vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults, such
as in this case. 67 
cHDAIS

Unless and until these minors are given proper guidance and/or taught
about sex and its consequences, and until it be shown that their actions arise
from their feelings of love towards their partner, they
cannot be considered to be truly capable of giving an educated and rational
consent to engage in any form of sexual activity.
Thus, to minimize the risk of harm to minors from the detrimental
consequences of their attempts at adult sexual behavior, the State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to intervene and protect them from sexual
predators like petitioner in this case. 68 This must be so if We
are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State
policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-
being of the youth. 69 This is also in harmony with the declared
policy of the State in R.A. No. 9775, which provides:
x x x The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building
and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, emotional, psychological and social well-being. Towards
this end, the State shall:
(a) Guarantee the fundamental rights of every child from
all forms of neglect, cruelty and other conditions
prejudicial to his/her development;
(b) Protect every child from all forms of exploitation and
abuse including, but not limited to:
(1) the use of a child in pornographic
performances and materials; and
(2) the inducement or coercion of a
child to engage or be involved in pornography
through whatever means; x x x 70
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a
Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic that in all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, it is the best interests of the child that shall be the primary
consideration.
Article 1 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as,
"The Child and Youth Welfare Code" is likewise clear and unequivocal that
every effort should be exerted by the State to promote the welfare of children
and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.
This Court, however, concurs with petitioner's argument, and as pointed
out by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in his Dissenting
Opinion, 71 that a violation of Section 4 (c) (2) of R.A. No.
10175, in relation to Sections 4 (a), 3 (b) and (c) (5) of R.A. No. 9775 falls
under the class of offenses known as mala in se, where criminal intent
must be proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The difference
between the concept of mala in se and malum prohibitum were succinctly
explained as follows:
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts
wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which would
not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called
acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with
reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is
done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent
governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is,
has the law been violated? When an act is
illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. When the doing of an
act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare,
and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are
found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala
prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality,
however, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as
plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended.
Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes
defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation.  ISHCcT

The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala

prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or
vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is
immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it
is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its
commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala
prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on
all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. 72
In the ratification speech on Anti-Child Pornography
Act of 2009, the principal author explained the need
for the promulgation of this law, to wit:
This Bill is much awaited by all the sectors
involved in the protection and promotion of the rights of children not
only in the Philippines but also in the international community, and, I
believe, by the children themselves whose voices
resonate in the silence of their hearts and in the equanimity of their
spirits. Knowing how this bill could be of great
consequence to the building of their self-worth
and the realization of their hope for a bright future, this representation
takes pride in sponsoring this noble
piece of legislation in support of their call to stop the menace of child
pornography. Evidently, child pornography is such a disgusting crime
 which operates with surprising efficiency, swiftness and dispatch as it
rides along with technologically advanced communication highways
such as the internet.
What appalls us more is the fact that such meaningless violence
against the honor and dignity of our children knows no boundaries:
political or geographical. Child pornography transcends national and
international boundaries even without actual physical
movement of children from one place of victimization to another. Verily,
while it could be done in the secrecy of her room and abode, its evil
resounds in every corner of society. 73
Even during the pre-bicameral conference committee
hearing, the Technical Working Group had a lengthy discussion
on the title of the statute to emphasize the depravity of the acts being
penalized, to wit:
So, let's start with the title of the bill. So, we just
put in the remarks column that the Senate version was adopted
as the working draft. So, that's the first x x x that's the first remarks,
first remark. So, okay, let us go to the title of the bill. So,
which of the provision x x x which of the title would you think will aptly
or will cover, will cover the purpose, the intent of the bill? So, I suggest
that we adopt the House version because there's still no crime defining
child pornography and if we are not just prohibiting. When you say
crime, it's really punishable. Unlike when you just prohibit, a prohibition
may only take x x x the penalty may not be penalty at all but just a
warning or form of fines. But when it says crime, it attaches criminal
liability. It attaches punishment, fines and even other liabilities.
MS. GIRONELLA.
Conferring with Atty. Maralit, 'no, most of our special laws
penalizing or defining a crime is usually called penalizing or
punishing the specific act. You only use the term
"defining" when it refers to specific rights that you're granting an
individual. For example, Presidential Decree No. 133, which is x x
x I'm sorry, Presidential Decree 704 which is a decree punishing
illegal fishing. So, that's the usual term that they used. That's why
we adopted the word "prohibiting child pornography and imposing
penalties, thereof."
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Although kasi sa legislative . . . this is a legislative enactment
unlike those mentioned by our counterpart that those provisions x
x x those are executive issuances, promulgation.
MR. MARALIT.
 Yes, but we have also examples of statutes titled this way. "An
Act Prohibiting the Demand of Deposits or Advanced Payments
for the Confinement or for Treatment of Patients in Hospitals and
Medical Clinics in Certain Cases." That is BP Bilang 702 which is
a statute. Usually, the word "defining" is used in defining rights
like this statute, Republic Act No. 7438, "An Act Defining Certain
Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or under Custodial
Investigation." So in our view, it's either prohibiting or punishing,
or penalizing, to make a strong message to the violators, would-
be violators of this law that Congress is serious with these
violations of law. 
CAacTH

That is our positions.

COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Okay. Although we also, we already passed several legislations
defining crimes, new crimes, 'yung mga bago pa na hindi pa
talaga legislated, walang specific law na x x x (interrupted)
MR. MARALIT.
Let's just have a compromise. Why don't we say, "prohibiting and
defining?" that would be fine with us, if it's okay with you, "defining
and prohibiting and imposing penalties thereof."
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
We use imposing or prescribing? We prescribe the penalties
for the crime.
MR. MARALIT.
"Prescribe." "Prescribe" is better.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
So, for record purposes, the title of the reconciled bill shall be, "An
Act Defining and Prohibiting the Crime" x x x "Defining and
Prohibiting Child Pornography, Prescribing Penalties Therefor and
for Other Purposes."
MR. MARALIT.
Can we make "penalizing" rather than "prohibiting"?
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Okay, yeah. That's x x x I was about to suggest because
penalizing is more ano x x x
MR. MARALIT.
Yes, more forceful.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
 x x x more forceful than in prohibiting.
MR. MARALIT.
Yeah. Thank you
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
Okay, So, that the title of the reconciled bill shall be "An Act
Defusing and Penalizing Child Pornography x x x
MR. MARALIT. The crime, the crime.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA.
x x x the Crime of Child Pornography, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor and for Other Purposes." I repeat, "An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Child Pornography, Prescribing Penalties
therefor and for Other Purposes."
MR. MARALIT.
Okay. 74
From the foregoing, it is decisively clear that the crime of child
pornography as defined and penalized under R.A. No.
9775 should be classified as a crime mala in se. As parens patriae, this
act of grooming minors for sexual abuse should not be tolerated. We should
not be complicit in reinforcing this belief upon the minors that sex with children
is acceptable and thereby fuel a pedophile's fantasies prior to committing
sexual abuse, which clearly happened in the instant case.
Contrary to the appreciation of evidence of the other
members of this Court, the circumstances of this case showed the intent of pe
titioner to abuse AAA and engage in acts of child pornography by
inducing the latter to exhibit her private parts to him. Petitioner, being the one
with mental maturity, should have known that it was not just legally, but
inherently wrong for AAA, a minor, to show her private parts, particularly,
through a mobile device. If indeed, petitioner loved AAA, he should have
protected her dignity, being a minor. However, as the exchanges of petitioner
and AAA would show, it was through petitioner's prodding that led to AAA's
act of exhibiting her private parts. Thus, this Court concurs
with the findings of the courts a quo that the prosecution was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner induced or coerced the minor
victim to perform in the creation of child pornography and that the same was
done through a computer system.  IAETDc

All told, the courts a quo did not err in finding petitioner guilty beyond

reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4 (c) (2) of R.A. No.
10175, in relation to Sections 4 (a), 3 (b) and (c) (5) of R.A. No. 9775.
 As regards the proper penalty to be imposed, Sections 4 and
8 75 of R.A. No. 10175 both explicitly provide that the proper
penalty to be imposed for child pornography committed through a computer
system should be one degree higher than that provided for in R.A. No. 9775.
Under Section 15 (b) 76 of R.A. No. 9775, the penalty to be imposed
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
P1,000,000.00 but not more than P2,000,000.00. The rationale for
this rule was succinctly explained in the case of Disini Jr.
v. The Secretary of Justice, 77 to wit:
It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009[31] (ACPA) to cover identical
activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government
from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPA's
definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably, no
one has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one
degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one
can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative
prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher
penalty. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular
piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is
incalculable. 78
One degree higher than the penalty of reclusion
temporal is the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the CA should be modified to reclusion
perpetua as it is in accordance with the provisions and intent of R.A. No.
10175.
Finally, the Court finds no compelling reason to modify the fine imposed
by the courts a quo as it is within the allowable range imposed by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Consequently, The Decision
dated September 17, 2018 and Resolution dated May 9, 2019 both rendered
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40298 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Christian Cadajas y Cabias is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of child pornography under Section 4 (c)
(2) of R.A. No. 10175, in relation to Sections 4 (a) and 3 (b) and (c) (5) of R.A.
No. 9775. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all its accessory
penalties and to pay a fine in the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
 The CA held that the minority of AAA was both established and
was even admitted by the petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner's conversation
with AAA showed that he induced her to send him photos of her private parts.
These facts clearly evince that petitioner committed child pornography as
defined and penalized under Section 4 (c) (2) of R.A. No. 10175, in relation to
Sections 4 (a), 3 (b) and (c) (5) of R.A. No. 9775. The CA did not give credence
to the sweetheart defense that was raised by petitioner as the violation
committed by petitioner was a malum prohibitum. As regards the penalty, the
CA modified the same and sentenced petitioner to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for 14 years, eight months and one day, as minimum, to 18 years
and three months, as maximum. The fine imposed was retained as it was within
the range prescribed by law.

As early as Morfe v. Mutuc, we have recognized the increasing importance

of the protection of the right to privacy in the digital age. Such right is of
particular importance given the nature of the internet and our inescapable
dependence on it despite the possible disruption that it can bring. In my
separate opinion in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, I explained:

The internet or cyberspace is a complex phenomenon. It has pervasive

effects and are, by now, ubiquitous in many communities. Its possibilities for
reordering human relationships are limited only by the state of its constantly
evolving technologies and the designs of various user interfaces. The internet
contains exciting potentials as well as pernicious dangers.

The essential framework for governance of the parts of cyberspace that

have reasonable connections with our territory and our people should find
definite references in our Constitution. However, effective governance of
cyberspace requires cooperation and harmonization with other approaches in
other jurisdictions. Certainly, its scope and continuous evolution require that we
calibrate our constitutional doctrines carefully: in concrete steps and with full
and deeper understanding of incidents that involve various parts of this
phenomenon. The internet is neither just one relationship nor is it a single
technology. It is an interrelationship of many technologies and cultures.

Privacy scholars explain that the right to informational privacy, to

a certain extent, requires "limitation on inspection, observation, and
knowledge by others." Thus, it has the following aspects: (1) to keep
inalienable information to themselves; (2) to prevent first disclosure; and (3) to
prevent further dissemination in case the information has already been
disclosed. More recently, the European Union has paved the way for the fourth
aspect — the right to be forgotten, or the right to prevent the storage of data.
 As regards the first component of the right to informational privacy, a
person has the right not to be exposed on the internet in matters involving one's
private life, such as acts having no relation to public interest or concern. Closely
related to the first component is the right to prevent first disclosure, allowing
individuals to regulate the extent, time, and manner of disclosure, if at all, of
their information. In case the data have been illegally disclosed, a person does
not lose protection since they have the right to prevent their further
dissemination. In some cases, one has the right to prevent the storage of their
data, which gives one the right to be forgotten. Privacy scholars describe this
right as "forced omission," or the process of making the information difficult to
find on the internet.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the right to privacy is expressly recognized under
Article III, Sec. 3 thereof, which reads:

SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall

be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section

shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

While the above provision highlights the importance of the right to privacy
and its consequent effect on the rules on admissibility of evidence, one must not
lose sight of the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect private
individuals against government intrusions. Hence, its provisions are not
applicable between and amongst private individuals. As explained in People v.
Marti:
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But
protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the
Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in

the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does
is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any
power holder
 In this case, the photographs and conversations in the Facebook
Messenger account that were obtained and used as evidence against petitioner,
which he considers as fruit of the poisonous tree, were not obtained through the
efforts of the police officers or any agent of the State. Rather, these were
obtained by a private individual. Indeed, the rule governing the admissibility of
an evidence under Article III of the Constitution must affect only those pieces of
evidence obtained by the State through its agents. It is these individuals who
can flex government muscles and use government resources for a possible
abuse. However, where private individuals are involved, for which their
relationship is governed by the New Civil Code, the admissibility of an evidence
cannot be determined by the provisions of the Bill of Rights.

Here, the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were properly

authenticated when AAA identified them in open court. As further pointed out by
Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda during the deliberations of this case, the
DPA allows the processing of data and sensitive personal information where it
relates to the determination of criminal liability of a data subject, 43 such as a
violation of R.A. No. 10175 in relation to R.A. No. 9775 and when necessary for
the protection of lawful rights and interests of persons in court proceedings, 44
as in this case where the communications and photos sought to be excluded
were submitted in evidence to establish AAA's legal claims before the
prosecutor's office and the courts.

Be that as it may, the act of AAA cannot be said to have violated

petitioner's right to privacy. The test in ascertaining whether there is a violation
of the right to privacy has been explained in the case of Spouses Hing v.
Choachuy, Sr. as follows:

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy,

courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and
whether the expectation has been violated.
In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person's
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test:
(1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of
privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable."
Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an
individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a
person's expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis
since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. 46
 Here, petitioner's expectation of privacy emanates from the fact that his
Facebook Messenger account is password protected, such that no one can
access the same except himself. Petitioner never asserted that his Facebook
Messenger account was hacked or the photos were taken from his account
through unauthorized means. Rather, the photos were obtained from his
account because AAA, to whom he gave his password, had access to it.
Considering that he voluntarily gave his password to AAA, he, in effect, has
authorized AAA to access the same. He did not even take steps to exclude AAA
from gaining access to his account. Having been given authority to access his
Facebook Messenger account, petitioner's reasonable expectation of privacy, in
so far as AAA is concerned, had been limited. Thus, there is no violation of
privacy to speak of.

While the messages and photos were taken from the Facebook Messenger
of petitioner because AAA was forced by BBB to do so, such does not deviate
from the fact that petitioner allowed another person to access his account. When
he gave his Facebook Messenger password to AAA, he made its contents
available to AAA, and the latter would then have the latitude to show to other
persons what she could access, whether she be forced to do so or not. The
availability of accessing these photos limited the scope of his right to privacy,
especially that these became essential in pursuing AAA's claims to protect her
rights.

In any case, it bears pointing out that petitioner failed to raise his
objection to the admissibility of the photos during the proceedings in the RTC.
Basic is the rule that in order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility
of evidence must be made at the proper time, and the grounds therefore be
specified. Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered.
In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the
party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the
evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that
objection to the documentary evidence may be made. When a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. This is true even if by its
nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had
been challenged at the proper time.

As a complimentary principle, it is well-settled that no question will be

entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.
Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised
for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.
 All told, the courts a quo did not err in finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4 (c) (2) of R.A. No. 10175, in relation
to Sections 4 (a), 3 (b) and (c) (5) of R.A. No. 9775.

As regards the proper penalty to be imposed, Sections 4 and 8 of R.A. No.

10175 both explicitly provide that the proper penalty to be imposed for child
pornography committed through a computer system should be one degree
higher than that provided for in R.A. No. 9775. Under Section 15 (b) 76 of R.A.
No. 9775, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than P1,000,000.00 but not more than
P2,000,000.00. The rationale for this rule was succinctly explained in the case of
Disini Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, to wit:

It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In
theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when
prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system.
Actually, ACPA's definition of child pornography already embraces the use of
"electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably,
no one has questioned this ACPA provision.

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the
crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity
or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for
such higher penalty. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular
piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.